Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980

Volume XVI

Southern Africa

Editor Myra F. Burton
General Editor Adam M. Howard

United States Government Publishing Office
Washington
2016
About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

*Sources for the Foreign Relations Series*

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government en-
gaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Carter Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration’s Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Carter Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign
About the Series

Relations series have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

Editorial Methodology

Documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the sources of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related docu-
VI About the Series

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2013 and was completed in 2016, resulted in the decision to withhold 6 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 12 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 31 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Carter administration’s policy toward Southern Africa.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.        Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
General Editor               The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
September 2016
Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Jimmy Carter. The volume does not cover all countries in the region, but focuses on the countries where U.S. interests and concerns were greatest. Although the administration developed policies that were discrete to the region, those policies often impacted other countries on the continent. To better understand the administration’s overall policy toward Africa, this volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, volume XVII, Parts 1 and 2, for documentation on U.S. policy toward the Horn of Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa respectively.


South Africa posed a unique challenge for the Carter administration. Acutely aware of South Africa’s central role in the region, both as a bulwark against communism in Southern Africa and an important partner in the independence negotiations, the administration would not ignore the plight of black South Africans in exchange for their participation in the talks. They viewed the apartheid regime as a major contributor to violence in the region and incongruent with the administration’s commitment to human rights. The growing unrest in South Africa was a topic of national and international concern, leading the Carter administration to criticize the government over their treatment of black South Africans and to reassess U.S. policy. Concern about reports that South Africa had exploded a nuclear device resulted in a robust diplomatic effort which led to talks on nuclear issues in 1978.

South Africa was one of several seemingly intractable problems in Southern Africa. Like their predecessors, the administration viewed the violence and instability in the region as a potential inroad for communist expansion. The presence of Cuban troops in Angola, supporting the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Angolan President Agostinho Neto, complicated efforts by the MPLA and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to end the civil war in the country. Their presence also created concerns that Cuban troops would be introduced into the conflicts in Namibia and Rhodesia.
While policy toward Southern Africa was developed by the National Security Council, the Department of State, and, in some instances, the Central Intelligence Agency, Carter was directly involved as well. In early 1977, Carter instructed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to explore ways to improve relations with Angola. The issue of Cuban troops and the need to decrease their presence dominated the discussions. The administration decided upon a two-pronged approach: direct talks with the Angolans to convince them to tell the Cubans to leave and a covert propaganda operation highlighting the negative impact of Cuban presence on both Cuban and Angolan societies. While some in the administration hoped to rekindle support for Jonas Savimbi and UNITA, congressional legislation passed in 1976 precluded that as an option.

In February 1977, the administration sought to reinvigorate negotiations, started during the Ford administration, for peaceful settlements to the conflicts in both Namibia and Rhodesia. While Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was the driving force behind the earlier effort, Carter, Vice President Walter Mondale, Vance, and others were directly involved in the new effort. Meetings were held regularly with the British, South Africans, and Front Line Presidents, but discussions were expanded to include leaders of the black Nationalist insurgencies to secure their buy-in. These intensive efforts proved successful in Rhodesia, culminating in the signing of the Lancaster House Agreement in December 1979, which ended the civil war. Robert Mugabe was elected Prime Minister in the months following the agreement, and Zimbabwe’s independence from the United Kingdom was officially recognized in April 1980.

Negotiations over Namibian independence were less successful. Dozens of meetings among the Contact Group, the South Africans, leaders of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), and U.N. officials leading up to the 1979 New York Proximity Talks, failed to resolve some of the more contentious issues. South African concerns over Cubans at the border between Angola and Namibia, the decision over who would control Walvis Bay, and a host of other concerns involving administration of the country led to an impasse. Additionally, the South African Government began to chafe over U.S. insistence that the apartheid regime address its racial problems. While incremental progress was made, Carter left office with no resolution to the conflict in Namibia.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Jimmy Carter Library, especially Betty Egwenike, Ceri McCarron, and James Yancey. Thanks are due to Nancy Smith, former Director of the Presidential Materials Staff at the National Archives and Records Ad-
administration, and to the Central Intelligence Agency for arranging access to the Carter Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project. The Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency were accommodating in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. The editor also thanks the staff at the National Security Council for providing access to the NSC Intelligence files, Sandy Meagher for her assistance with Department of Defense materials, and the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland for their assistance with Department of State material.

The editor collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of M. Todd Bennett, Chief of the Asia and Africa Division and Adam M. Howard, then Chief of the Middle East and Africa Division, and currently General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. David Nickles and Adam M. Howard reviewed the volume. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division. Stephanie Eckroth did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Myra F. Burton
Historian
# Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>About the Series</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources</td>
<td>XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations and Terms</td>
<td>XVII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>XXI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note on U.S. Covert Actions</td>
<td>XXVII</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Southern Africa**

- Angola                                      | 1    |
- Namibia                                     | 97   |
- Rhodesia                                    | 362  |
- South Africa                                | 744  |
- Index                                       | 1121 |

XI
Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support, cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. U.S. foreign policy agencies and Departments—the Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library—have complied fully with this law and provided complete access to their relevant records.

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Jimmy Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.


The files at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia, are the single most important source of documentation for those interested in U.S. foreign policy toward Southern Africa during the Carter administration. Foreign policy research in the Carter Library centers around two collections: National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, and National Security Affairs, Staff Material. Comprehensive documentation of bilateral and regional issues is in Brzezinski Material, particularly the Country File, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Cables File, the Subject File, and the Agency File, which contains Department of State Evening Reports. Many of these reports, with Carter’s handwritten annotations, are also in the Plains File, Subject File. Additional important documentation is in National Security Affairs, Staff Material, especially the North/South File, Office File, and the Global Issues File. Also housed at the Carter Library is the National Security Council, Institutional File, which contains records related to the issuance of Presiden-
Sources

The National Archives and Records Administration facility in College Park, Maryland (Archives II), houses a variety of materials produced by the Department of State. The Central Foreign Policy File is a valuable resource for diplomatic cables. Department of State lot files, some of which have been or will be transferred to Archives II, provide documentation on Department policy. Records from the Executive Secretariat, as well as those of specific individuals, such as Cyrus Vance and Anthony Lake, contain important documentation for this volume.

Department of Defense records in RG 330, specifically FRC 330–80–0037, Top Secret General Files 1977, provide information on cooperation with South Africa on ocean surveillance. Documents crucial to understanding the administration’s policy toward Angola are in the National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject and Special Programs File. This collection contains interdepartmental records pertaining to the development and implementation of the covert operation in Angola.

The volume also includes Central Intelligence Agency documents. Two collections were particularly useful: the Executive Registry Files and the Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis. The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and some of these records are already available for public review at the National Archives.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State, Washington D.C.

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Office of the Secretariat Staff

1979 Briefing, Fact Sheets, Visit, and Conference Books for the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and other Senior Officials, Lot 80D110

Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

RG 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia

National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material
- Agency File
- Cables File
- Country File
- Country Chron File
- President’s Correspondence With Foreign Leaders File
- Subject File

National Security Affairs, Staff Material
- Global Issues
- North/South
- Office

National Security Council
- Institutional Files
- Papers of Walter F. Mondale
- Plains File
- Presidential Materials
- President’s Daily Diary

Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia

Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence

Office of the Director of Central Intelligence
- Job 80M00165A, Executive Registry Subject Files (74–78)

Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence
- Job 79T01316A, Intelligence Publication Files (1977–1979)
- Job 80T00071A, Production Copy Files (1976–1979)

National Security Council, Washington D.C.

Carter Administration Intelligence Files

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RC 330, Records of the Department of Defense

Published Sources

Chicago Tribune
XVI Sources

New York Times
**Abbreviations and Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Anglo-American Plan/Proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF/S</td>
<td>Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>Administrator-General (Namibia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amb.</td>
<td>Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amcit</td>
<td>American citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>all parties conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APM</td>
<td>all parties meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>British Petroleum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Commodity Credit Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Contact Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Chief of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>Defense Attaché Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATT</td>
<td>Defense Attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dels</td>
<td>delegates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFA</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIA</td>
<td>Defense Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissem</td>
<td>dissemination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTA</td>
<td>Democratic Turnhalle Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Executive Council (Rhodesia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERDA</td>
<td>Energy Research and Development Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exdis</td>
<td>exclusive distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXIM</td>
<td>Export-Import Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAPLA</td>
<td><em>Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola</em> (People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FED</td>
<td>Federal Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FL</td>
<td>Front Line</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEC</td>
<td><em>Frente Nacional de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda</em> (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNLA</td>
<td><em>Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola</em> (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
XVIII  Abbreviations and Terms

FonMin, Foreign Minister
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FY, fiscal year

GC, Governing Council
GM, General Motors
GMT, Greenwich mean time
GNP, gross national product
GOA, Government of Angola
GOI, Government of Israel
GOF, Government of France
Govt, government

GRPA, Governo da República Popular de Angola (Government of the People’s Republic of Angola)

HEW, health, education, and welfare
HMG, Her Majesty’s Government

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICJ, International Court of Justice
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
ILO, International Labor Organization
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IRS, Internal Revenue Service
ISA, International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

LEU, low-enriched uranium

MPLA, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NMCC, National Military Command Center
NNF, Namibia National Front
Nodis, no distribution
Noforn, no foreign dissemination
NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty
NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSC, National Security Council
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum

OAU, Organization of African Unity
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PAC, Pan-Africanist Congress
PD, Presidential Decision
PF, Patriotic Front (Rhodesia)
PM, Prime Minister
PNG, persona non grata
Abbreviations and Terms  XIX

PRC, Presidential Review Committee
PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum

RC, Resident Commissioner (Rhodesia)
REF, referenced telegram
Reps, representatives
RG, record group
rpt, repeat

S/S, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State
SAG, South African Government
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Sasol, Energy and chemical company, based in Johannesburg, South Africa
SCC, Special Coordination (Coordinating) Committee
SEAP, Southeast Asia and the Pacific
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State (or his delegation) to the Department of State
septel, separate telegram
SR, special representative (Namibia)
SWA, Southwest Africa
SWAPO, Southwest Africa People's Organization
SYG, Secretary General

Tosec, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Secretary of State (or his delegation)

U.K., United Kingdom
U.N., United Nations
U.S., United States
UANC, United African National Council
UCOR, Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa
UNDel, United Nations delegation
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA, Unión Nacional para la Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
UNSC, United Nations Security Council
UNSR, United Nations Special Representative
UNSYG, United Nations Secretary General
UNTAG, United Nations Transition Assistance Group
USAF, United States Air Force
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VOA, Voice of America

WEO, Western Europe and others
WEOG, Western Europe and other group governments
WH, White House

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)
Z/R, Zimbabwe/Rhodesia
XX Abbreviations and Terms

ZANLA, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU, Zimbabwe African Nationalist Union
ZAPU, Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZDF, Zimbabwe Development Fund
ZIPA, Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army
ZNA, Zimbabwe National Army
ZUPO, Zimbabwe United People’s Organization
Persons

Aaron, David L., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ahtisaari, Martti, United Nations Commissioner for Namibia

Bennet, Douglas J., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, from 1977 until May 1979; Administrator, Office of the Administrator, Department of State, from June 1979
Blackwill, Robert, member, National Security Council Staff for West Europe Affairs from September 1979 until January 1981
Blumenthal, W. Michael, Secretary of the Treasury until July 1979
Bomani, Paul, Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States
Bongo, Omar, President of Gabon; Chairman of the Organization of African Unity from July 2, 1977, until July 18, 1978
Borg, C. Arthur, Executive Secretary of the Department of State from July 12, 1976, until April 15, 1977
Botha, Pieter Willem (P.W.), South African Prime Minister from October 9, 1978
Botha, Roelof Frederik (Pik), South African Permanent Representative to the United Nations until 1977; South African Ambassador to the United States from July 1975 until May 1977; South African Minister of Foreign Affairs from April 1977
Bowdler, William G., U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from May 1975 until April 1978; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from April 1978 until December 1979; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from January 1980 until January 1981
Brement, Marshall, member, National Security Council Staff for USSR and East European Affairs from May 1979 until January 1981
Brewster, Kingman, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom from June 1977 until February 1981
Brown, George S., General, USAF; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 1974 until June 1978
Brown, Harold, Secretary of Defense
Brzezinski, Zbignew K., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Buchanan, Thompson R., Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
Byrd, Robert C., Senator (D-West Virginia)

Caetano, Marcello, Portuguese Prime Minister until 1974
Callaghan, James, British Prime Minister from April 5, 1976, until May 4, 1979
Carlucci, Frank Charles III, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from January 1975 until February 1978; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from February 5, 1978, until February 4, 1981
Carter, James Earl (Jimmy), President of the United States
Carver, Baron Richard Michael Power, Field Marshal, British Resident Commissioner-designate for Rhodesia from August 1977 until October 1978
Castro Ruz, Fidel, President of Cuba
Chakulya, Wilson M., Zambian Foreign Minister from 1979 until 1981
Chand, Dewan Prem, Lieutenant General, United Nations Force Commander in Rhodesia until 1977; United Nations Special Representative in Rhodesia

XXI
XXII Persons

Chidzero, Bernard T., Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Chirau, Jeremiah, Chief, President of the Zimbabwe United People’s Organization; Chairman, Executive Council of the Transitional Government

Chona, Mark, adviser to Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda

Christopher, Warren M., Deputy Secretary of State from February 26, 1977

Clift, A. Denis, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

Conyers, John J., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Michigan); member of the Congressional Black Caucus

Crosland, Charles Anthony, British Foreign Secretary from April 8, 1976, until February 19, 1977

Cutter, W. Bowman, Executive Associate Director for Budget, Office of Management and Budget

Davidow, Jeffrey S., Southern Rhodesia Desk Officer, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1979.


De Laboulaye, François, Political Director, Foreign Ministry of France until 1977; French Ambassador to the United States from 1977

Diggs, Charles C., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Michigan) until June 3, 1980; member of the Congressional Black Caucus

Di-Lutete, Umba, Zairean Foreign Minister from 1977 until 1979

Dodson, Christine, Deputy Staff Secretary, National Security Council, from January 1977 until May 1977; Staff Secretary from May 1977 until January 1981

Dos Santos, José Eduardo, President of Angola from September 1979

Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Duff, Sir Arthur Antony, Deputy Governor of Southern Rhodesia from December 1979 until April 1980

Duncan, Charles W., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1977 until 1979; Secretary of Energy from 1979 until 1981

Eanes, António Ramalho, President of Portugal

Easum, Donald B., U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria from May 22, 1975, until October 15, 1979

Ecksteen, J. Adriaan (Riaan), Acting South African Permanent Representative to the United Nations until September 1979; thereafter Permanent Representative to the United Nations

Edmondson, William B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until April 1978; U.S. Ambassador to South Africa from June 1978 until July 1981

Escher, Alfred M., Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations regarding Namibia

Evron, Ephraim, Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry from 1977 until 1978; Israeli Ambassador to the United States from January 11, 1979

Fauntroy, Walter E., delegate, U.S. House of Representatives (D-District of Columbia); member of the Congressional Black Caucus

Ferreira, Armenio, Lisbon Representative of the Portuguese Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola

Figueiredo, Eliosio, Angolan Representative to the United Nations

Fourie, Bernadus Gerhardus (Brand), South African Secretary of Foreign Affairs

Funk, Gerald, member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan African Affairs from December 1978 until January 1981

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, Federal Republic of Germany Minister of Foreign Affairs

Giscard D’Estaing, Valéry, President of France
Graham, John A., British Deputy Under Secretary from 1977 until 1979; British leader of US–UK consultative group on Rhodesia

Guiringaud, Louis de, French Minister of Foreign Affairs until November 29, 1978

Habib, Philip C., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from July 1, 1976, until April 1, 1978

Harmon, John M., Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice

Hawkins, Harold, Air Vice Marshal, Rhodesian diplomatic representative in South Africa

Hayakawa, Samuel I., Senator (R-California)

Helms, Jesse A., Jr., Senator (R-North Carolina)

Herzog, Chaim, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations from 1975 until 1978

Houghouet-Boigny, Felix, President of Cote d’Ivoire

Jackson, Richard L., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Jamieson, Donald, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs from 1976 until 1979

Jay, Peter, British Ambassador to the United States

Jorge, Paulo Teixeira, Angolan Foreign Minister

Junior, Lewis D., Director, Office of Central African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

Kaunda, Kenneth, President of Zambia

Keogh, Dennis W., Deputy Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, Department of State, from 1976 until 1978

Khama, Sir Seretse, President of Botswana

Kirk, Roger, Deputy Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from 1975 until 1978

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1969, until November 3, 1975; Secretary of State from September 21, 1973, until January 20, 1977

Knoche, E. Henry (Emil), Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until August 1, 1977

Koornhof, Pieter G.J. (Piet), South African Minister of Cooperation and Development from 1978 until 1984

Laingen, Lowell B., U.S. Ambassador to Malta from January 1977 until January 1979; Chargé d’Affaires ad interim U.S. Embassy in Tehran until April 7, 1980, when the U.S. severed diplomatic relations

Lake, Anthony W., Director of Policy Planning, Department of State

Low, Stephen, U.S. Ambassador to Zambia from August 1976 until July 1979; thereafter U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria

Machel, Samora, President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique

Malan, Mangus A., General, Chief of the South African Defense Force

Matanzima, Kaiser D., founder, Transkei National Independence Party; Transkei Prime Minister from 1976; President of the Republic of Transkei from 1979

McGovern, George, Senator (D-South Dakota)


Mitchell, Parren J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Maryland); member of the Congressional Black Caucus

Mkapa, Benjamin, Tanzanian Foreign Minister

Mobutu, Séseko (Joseph-Désiré Mobutu), Lieutenant General, President of the Republic of the Congo (Zaire) and Minister of Defense
Mogwe, Archibald, Botswana Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mondale, Walter F., Vice President of the United States
Monteiro, José Oscar, Mozambican Minister of State
MoyNIihan, Daniel P., Senator (D-New York)
Mugabe, Robert, leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union; Prime Minister of Zimbabwe from April 18, 1980
Muskie, Edmund S. (ED), Senator (D-Maine) from January 3, 1959, until May 7, 1980; Secretary of State from May 8, 1980, until January 20, 1981
Muzorewa, Abel, Bishop, leader of the United African National Council, Rhodesia
Muale, Siteke G., Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1976 until 1978
Neto, Agostinho, President of the People’s Republic of Angola from November 11, 1975, until September 10, 1979
Newson, David D., U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia until October 1977; U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines from November 1977 until March 1978; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 1978
Niles, Thomas, Deputy Director, Dependent Areas Affairs, Office of UN Political Affairs, Department of State
Nkom, Joshua, leader of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union
Norland, Donald R., U.S. Ambassador to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland from December 1976 until October 1979
Nujoma, Samuel D., President of the Southwest Africa Peoples’ Organization
Nyerere, Julius K., President of Tanzania
Obasanjo, Olusegun, General, Nigerian Head of State from 1976
Odom, William E., Lieutenant General, USA; Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
Owen, David A., British Foreign Secretary from February 21, 1977, until May 4, 1979
Owen, Henry D., member, National Security Council Staff for International Economics
Palliser, Sir Michael, British Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Petterson, Donald K., Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, from 1977 until 1978; Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, until October 1978; thereafter, U.S. Ambassador to Somalia
Pickering, Thomas R., U.S. Ambassador to Jordan until July 1978; Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs from October 10, 1978
Press, Frank, Special Adviser to the President for Science and Technology; Director, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, from June 1, 1977
Ramphal, Sir Shridath Surendranath (Sonny), Commonwealth Secretary-General from 1975
Ramsbotham, Sir Peter, British Ambassador to the United States from 1974 until 1977
Rangel, Charles B. (Charlie), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York); member of the Congressional Black Caucus
Reinhardt, John E., Director of the U.S. Information Agency from March 1977 until March 1978; thereafter Director of the International Communications Agency
Rentschler, James, member, National Security Council Staff for West Europe Affairs from September 1978 until January 1981
Ribicoff, Abraham A., Senator (D-Connecticut)
Richard, Ivor, British Permanent Representative to the United Nations from June 2, 1974, until December 21, 1979
Richardson, Henry, member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan African Affairs from February 1977 until November 1978
Roberto, Holden A., leader of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
Roux, A.J. (Ampie), President of South Africa’s Atomic Energy Board; Chairman of the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa

Saunders, Harold H. (Hal), Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from December 1, 1975, until April 10, 1978; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Savimbi, Jonas, President of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
Schaufele, William E., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from December 19, 1975, until July 17, 1977
Sebastian, Peter, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State
Seelye, Talcott W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until 1978
Seitz, Raymond G.H., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State
Senghor, Leopold, President of Senegal
Sithole, Ndabaningi, Reverend, founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union
Soames, Baron Arthur Christopher John, Governor of Southern Rhodesia from December 1979 until April 1980
Solarz, Stephen J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York); Chairman, House Sub-Committee on African Affairs
Sole, Donald B., South African Ambassador to the United States from May 11, 1977, until June 4, 1982
Spain, James W., U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania from January 8, 1976, until August 21, 1979
Smith, David C., Rhodesian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Smith, Gerard C., U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency from July 14, 1977, until November 10, 1980; Ambassador at Large and U.S. Special Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters from July 22, 1977, until November 10, 1980
Smith, Ian, Rhodesian Prime Minister from April 13, 1964, until June 1, 1979
Smith, William Y., Lieutenant General, USAF; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Solomon, Anthony M., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs from March 1977 until March 1980; New York Federal Reserve Bank President from April 1980
Spain, James W., U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania from January 8, 1976, until August 21, 1979
Spiliotes, Nicholas, member, National Security Council Staff for Sub-Saharan African Affairs from August 1979 until January 1981
Steele, Henry, British legal adviser on Rhodesia
Stirn, Olivier, French State Secretary of Foreign Affairs from April 1978 until May 1981
Sullivan, Leon H., pastor of Zion Baptist Church, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, from 1950; member of the Board of Directors of General Motors from 1971

Tarnoff, Peter, Executive Secretary, Department of State, from April 4, 1977, until February 8, 1981
Thatcher, Margaret H., British Prime Minister from May 4, 1979
Tolbert, William, President of Liberia from July 23, 1971, until April 12, 1980
XXVI Persons

Tsongas, Paul E., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) from 1974 until 1978; thereafter Senator (D-Massachusetts)

Turner, Stansfield, Admiral, USN; Director of Central Intelligence from March 9, 1977, until January 20, 1981

Twaddell, William H., Special Assistant, Office of the Secretary, Department of State

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State from January 20, 1977, until April 28, 1980

Van den Bergh, Hendrik Johannes, General, Director, Bureau for State Security; Security Advisor to the Rhodesian Prime Minister

Vasev, Vladillen, Soviet Minister Counselor

Vorster, Balthazar Johannes (B.J.), South African Prime Minister from September 13, 1966, until October 2, 1978; South African President from October 10, 1978, until June 4, 1979

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations

Walker, Lannon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Wisner, Frank G. II, Deputy Executive Secretary, Department of State, from 1977 until June 1979; U.S. Ambassador to Zambia from August 1979

Young, Andrew, U.S. Representative to the United Nations from January 1977 until September 1979
Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration’s concern over Soviet “psychological warfare” prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4–A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4–A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouched funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.1

The CIA’s early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4–A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct “covert” rather than merely “psychological” operations, defining them as all activities “which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

1 NSC 4–A, December 17, 1947, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, Document 257.
covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare. The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific proj-
ects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

**NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee**

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA’s latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency’s responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.5

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the “NSC 5412/2 Special Group” or simply “Special Group,” emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.6 The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the

---


Note on U.S. Covert Actions

group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.7

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy’s request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of $25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.8

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.9

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson

8 Ibid., p. 82.
assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.\textsuperscript{10}

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of “Special Group 5412” to “303 Committee” but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.\textsuperscript{11}

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.\textsuperscript{12}

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,\textsuperscript{13} which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40


\textsuperscript{11}For text of NSAM No. 303, see ibid., Document 204.

\textsuperscript{12}Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56–57.

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

reaffirmed the DCI’s responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and “politically sensitive” covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA’s individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d’etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.14

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a “finding” and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.15

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in po-

---

14 Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.
15 Public Law 93–559.
political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.\(^{16}\)

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch’s organizational structure for covert action.

President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC’s Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.\(^{17}\) Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely: the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC’s replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford’s EO 11905 on “United States Foreign Intelligence activities.”\(^{18}\) In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC’s replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.


Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy’s (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for “world-wide” or “general” (or “generic”) covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the USG. A new type of document—known as “Perspectives”—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential finding or Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so that the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing “world-wide” finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.
Another new document used during the Carter administration was the “Memorandum of Notification” (MON). MONs were initially used to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlined\(^\text{19}\) in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings “in a timely fashion,” but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment’s provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the committees “fully and currently informed” did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was “essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States,” the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the “Gang of Eight.” If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence committees “in a timely fashion” and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{19}\) Executive Order 12036, “United States Foreign Intelligence Activities,” January 24, 1978, \textit{Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents}, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194–214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the E.O. to the “SCC” were effectively references to what was known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC-I.

Southern Africa

Angola

1. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, April 15, 1977

SUBJECT
Improving Relations with Other Nations

On April 5 you asked me to explore ways of improving relations with Angola, Mozambique, Somalia and Iraq. I gave you a preliminary report on April 6 of our present thinking on bettering relations with these countries and promised to follow up with more complete proposals. This memorandum offers some further thinking on steps we are considering or undertaking in pursuit of improved relations with these four nations.

Angola

In my April 6 report to you I reviewed the steps we have taken so far toward improving relations with Angola. I noted that we have delayed further communication on the subject because of the Zaire crisis, in which the Angolans are apparently playing an unhelpful role, and are awaiting the results of Nigerian mediation efforts.

In the meantime, we have responded to a U.N. appeal for food aid for displaced persons in Angola by offering to provide $12.5 million worth of foodstuffs, which is roughly 25 percent of the U.N. goal. We are also providing modest amounts ($1–2 million) of humanitarian assistance through the UNHCR for Angolan refugees in Zaire. Should

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 4/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “cc Cy.”

2 The report is in an April 6 memorandum from Vance to Carter. (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 4/77)

3 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Why not a more direct approach?”
our relations improve, we would expand our humanitarian aid as an initial step, and begin to assess Angola’s needs in the area of technical and development assistance.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Angola.]

2. Memorandum From Henry J. Richardson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 26, 1977

SUBJECT

 ALERT ITEM: Cuban Reinforcements Arriving in Angola

Summary

Several trends in Angola are conjoining, creating a situation not now alarming but which warrants scrutiny. Increases are now being noted in Cuban men and materiel flowing into Angola, but on current information the purpose of this is unclear. Close intelligence monitoring is underway. The intensity of and success of insurgency activity in the south and in Cabinda has also increased, as has friction between the Soviet/Cuban military-civilian adviser-occupation forces and the Angolan civilian population. The Gulf Oil installation on Cabinda may be in some danger of destruction by the FLEC liberation movement which enjoys local acquiescence among the population. Around 200 American and British nationals may be involved, and evacuation may be required. The immediacy of this danger is unclear, however. The Cabinda situation is now public knowledge.²

The government is beseiged with serious problems, but cannot be said to now be in danger of falling, notwithstanding dissent (with possible racial overtones) in MPLA ranks, as long as Castro continues his current strong support of the Neto regime.

This situation may furnish an opportunity for the US, in the context of the present steady but not accelerated process toward normalizing

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 105, 4–5/77. Secret. Sent for information.

² The Chicago Tribune reported on the unrest in Cabinda in a May 17 article entitled “Anti-Reds threaten to blow up Gulf Oil rigs in Angola.” (Chicago Tribune, May 17, 1977, p. 2)
relations with Angola, to arrive at exercising some influence in Luanda while the Cubans and Soviets pay the freight. It would seem to be in Neto’s interest to move toward us somewhat to give himself additional options, to open another channel to Mobutu, and to lay the basis for requesting badly needed US aid and ultimately technical assistance.

The Nigerians, by virtue of the time and effort spent in their Angola-Zaire mediating effort, and the Zambians would seem to have immediate interests in maintaining Neto’s stability, i.e., in urging him to take positive action on the Cabinda and UNITA situations, and in shoring up the Angolan economy.

Introduction

There appears to be some dissent within the upper level MPLA leadership as well as increased insurgency by anti-governmental groups in Angola. Within the past few weeks Cuban flights to Angola have been noticeably full and three Cuban convoys of ships have left for Angola in the month of May alone.

Angolan-Cuban Friction

Angolan dissatisfaction over Cuban and Soviet involvement there has grown in recent months. Although Angolan President Neto probably has good relations with top Cuban and Soviet leadership, their substantial and continued presence in Angola has led to increasing frictions at lower levels of the Angolan Government and society. There are an estimated 10,000 to 14,500 Cuban military and civilian advisors in Angola. Several hundred Soviet advisors and sizeable contingents from other East European states are also there. The Cubans and Soviets are criticized for being arrogant, monopolizing luxuries, being incompetent for the salaries paid them, not fostering economic progress, and not eliminating the insurgent threat in southern Angola and the exclave of Cabinda. Reportedly, Cuban troops have been reluctant to actively pursue insurgents, and this has created additional friction.

While Neto is undoubtedly aware of the problems caused by continued Cuban and Soviet presence, he simply cannot afford to reduce their role given Angola’s current economic difficulties and his increasing dependence on the Cubans to maintain internal security and keep the government functioning. Fidel Castro apparently, however, remains committed to the preservation of the Neto regime, and these reinforcements would seem to confirm that. However, they may also be evidence of Cuba’s sinking into a Viet-type quagmire.

Cuban Reinforcements

The third Cuban convoy on the way to Luanda is currently under very close intelligence surveillance. [4 lines not declassified] [less than 1 line not declassified] coverage of the port of Luanda is being arranged and further reports will be made.
The purpose for these three convoys is uncertain. There is a possibility that this could be part of a large though normal rotation of Cuban troops accompanied by shipments of new equipment.

More probable is that these men and equipment are related to reinforcing Cuban participation on the side of the Neto government against the insurgency by UNITA in the South, against the insurgency by FLEC on Cabinda, against any problems generated by the apparent trickling back across the Angolan-Zaire border of defeated Katangese, or Cuban participation in other internal security duties for the Angolan Government, or all of the above. There is tentative evidence, for example, that of the two-ship first convoy, one ship docked in Cabinda and the other in Luanda.

The ranking probability is that this activity is related to a felt Cuban need for reinforcements in the UNITA and the Cabinda situations. Neither of these have been going particularly well militarily for the Angolans and Cubans recently: UNITA has managed to at least temporarily interdict some food supply routes in the South; and FLEC appears the most disciplined and effective military force on Cabinda, against Cubans, Angolans and Zairians, and evidently controls over half of that territory with the acquiescence of the local population.

The latter raises a problem for the Gulf Oil installation on Cabinda, from which FLEC has demanded payment of royalties otherwise flowing to Luanda, on threat of destroying the installation. Unconfirmed reports are that some Gulf personnel have felt threatened enough to seek safety on offshore oil drilling platforms, which are now also threatened. It is unknown whether FLEC actually possesses the capability to carry out this threat, or the extent to which the installation is effectively being protected by the Angolan/Cubans. Evacuation may be needed here. Further, it seems important that Gulf have maximum flexibility relative to its royalty payments in this situation. Such flexibility has in the past been a key to the survival of that installation when Gulf was caught between the Portuguese and the growing MPLA liberation movement.

It must be emphasized that the information on the Cuban reinforcements and the Cabinda situation discussed above is still tentative, and that the situation remains under very close scrutiny.

An Opportunity for the US

While I believe it would be too much to say that the Neto government is in danger of falling, especially with continued Cuban/Soviet assistance, it is safe to say that he and his regime are beseiged with very serious problems. This is especially the case in Cabinda from which the Gulf installation furnishes a significant part of the country’s revenues, and in the south where the UNITA insurgency represents
not only political and military antagonism toward Luanda, but also tribal differences. The Neto regime has never come to terms with the Ovimbundu peoples who are the mainstay of UNITA support; there are reports of Soviet pressure on Neto for him to open serious negotiations with UNITA to stabilize the situation and prevent further economic drain on the country. This apparently has not yet occurred.

Neto would not seem in a position to eject the Soviets and the Cubans, even if he wanted to. Other possibilities are, down the line after protracted negotiations, for some kind of shared governmental arrangement with UNITA. Neto still has OAU and African recognition which would seem unlikely to be withdrawn, especially since there is probably residual South African support for UNITA.

He probably seeks normalization of relations with the US to, among other reasons, give himself more options in the situation and to lay the basis for future requests for US aid. It would seem profitable for us to continue the process of normalizing relations, though not to accelerate it, and through that process search out small and then larger opportunities for US leverage and influence in Luanda. We would have to tread cautiously, acting positively in a guarded way, while seeing whether the Soviets and the Cubans hang themselves. All of the foregoing indicates that it is increasingly within Neto’s interest to begin to slowly counterbalance ‘occupational influence’, and this may be a situation where we can begin to be heard while the Cubans and the Soviets pay the freight.
3. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner

Washington, June 8, 1977

SUBJECT
Angola

With reference to our forthcoming African review, the NSC needs an assessment of the present scope and longer-term prospects of Savimbi’s guerilla activities in Angola.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

---

2 See Document 5.

4. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance, Director of Central Intelligence Turner, and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt)

Washington, June 27, 1977

SUBJECT
Cubans in Angola

The President recently noted a report on Cubans in Angola. The report stated that the image of Cubans as the new colonialists has spread. According to the report, the Angolans frequently criticize the

---

2 Reference is to a May 24 intelligence memorandum entitled “Angolan Perceptions of Cuban and Soviet Involvements in Angola.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80T00071A, Production Copy Files (1976–1979), Box 8, Angolan Perceptions of Cuban and Soviet Involvements in Angola)
Cubans for being arrogant, for ignoring African sensibilities, and for monopolizing with the Soviets the few remaining luxuries in the country. Furthermore, the Cubans and the Soviets are also being faulted for lack of economic progress and the failure to eliminate insurgency.

In response to this report, the President asked whether we have any propaganda capability. For example, radio broadcasting? Would you please provide a report to me in response to the President’s question.³

Zbigniew Brzezinski⁴

---

³ See Document 5.
⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

---

5. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 27, 1977

Dear Zbig:

The attached memorandum on Savimbi’s guerrilla activities in Angola and long term prospects responds to your request to me of 8 June² for an assessment to support the forthcoming Africa review by the PRC. Briefly, we believe that Savimbi has the men and materiel to survive as a guerrilla against Neto and the Cubans over the next two years, but that he will not be able to expand his present territory very much unless he has substantial outside assistance. Without such assistance, Savimbi’s long term future depends mainly on whether Moscow and Havana are willing to continue to support a frustrating campaign against him.

Please let me know if you have comments or questions on this subject.

Yours,

Stansfield Turner³

---

² See Document 3.
³ Turner signed “Stan” above this typed signature.
Washington, June 22, 1977

SUBJECT
Savimbi’s Guerrilla Activities in Angola

Summary
1. Jonas Savimbi’s effective leadership of UNITA has kept in the field a force of about 7,000 regular and 8,000 irregular fighters; this force now moves freely within and is supported by the inhabitants of an area of southern Angola that is roughly between a third and a half of the country’s territory. In this area, UNITA does not occupy the major towns, which remain in Cuban and MPLA hands, and its administrative organization is probably rudimentary in part because operations in ethnically friendly territory do not really require much elaboration at this stage. Given this base area, and UNITA’s demonstrated ability to survive major offensives against it, it has good longer-term prospects for maintaining forces in being and in effect denying southern Angola to the MPLA/Cuban regime in Luanda. At the same time, an effort by Savimbi to expand much beyond his present limits would encounter some of the same difficulties now faced by the MPLA and its Cuban supporters. Under these circumstances, Savimbi’s movement is not likely to “take over” in Luanda in the foreseeable future. Its long term prospect for achieving, or more likely sharing, national power in Angola will depend on the intensity of Neto’s problems within the MPLA; the duration of the Cuban commitment to Neto; and the MPLA’s eventual willingness to abandon its claim to exclusive jurisdiction.

UNITA’s Assets

2. The major single asset of Savimbi’s movement is Savimbi himself. He has impressed Americans and other foreigners as serious, hard working, realistic, intelligent, and easy to deal with. Within his movement, he insists on discipline and allows virtually no autonomy to his subordinates. This organizational principle and the force of his

---

4 Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
5 An unknown hand added a period after “rudimentary” and struck through “in part because” to read “rudimentary. Operations in.”
6 An unknown hand highlighted this paragraph in the left-hand margin.
Angola 9

personality have kept UNITA free of the factionalism and feuding that have characterized the other Angolan nationalist movements.

3. Among Savimbi’s strengths is his attention to the welfare of his troops in the field. He commands loyalty because he appoints effective subordinates and takes pains to organize supply. UNITA’s central base of operations is a site near Bela Vista, northeast of Huambe, from which Savimbi maintains radio—not always reliable—and courier contact with four regional fronts. So-called “first line” guerrilla forces, which [less than 1 line not declassified] numbers about 7,000, are organized into companies of 100–120 men.

4. These units conduct reconnaissance and patrols, man road blocks, and are the basic elements for offensive operations; larger concentrations probably conduct the “sieges” that UNITA maintains to isolate the MPLA and Cuban forces occupying towns within the UNITA area of control. A specially trained unit operates against the Benguela Railway and other rail lines and bridges. These UNITA units are armed with a variety of light infantry weapons left over from the civil war or captured from the Cuban/FAPLA forces. UNITA reportedly has 8–9 months supply of small arms ammunition. There are relatively few weapons of large calibre, although UNITA does have various sizes of mortars, bazookas, and rockets, for example. Motor transport is scarce, largely for want of fuel, and captured armored vehicles are used for static defense. In the area of their operations, UNITA forces have a logistical advantage over their opponents, as well as the advantage of operating in a familiar geographic and a friendly ethnic environment, and when used in combination with guerrilla tactics these more than balance the technical superiority of Cuban/MPLA forces operating far from base.

5. Other, so-called irregular UNITA forces, claimed to number 8,000, guard stores, participate in political indoctrination, and generally conduct themselves along what UNITA believes to be Maoist lines. Military duties for this group evidently shade off into political and social action; UNITA officials assert that, as they have gained the military initiative in southeastern Angola from the Cubans and FAPLA, greater emphasis is being placed on political action programs.

6. [less than 1 line not declassified] there is a well elaborated structure of UNITA political organization and administration down to the village level, it seems doubtful that much of this exists on a wide scale except as necessary to procure food supplies and for local recruiting. Since the population of UNITA’s area is friendly, the members of the village UNITA “cell” and the more traditional indigenous leadership very likely overlap.

7. The geographic limits of Savimbi’s territory—his “zone of influence”—include most of southern and southeastern Angola, but not the
southern coast nor, apparently, the far southern border with Namibia. The provinces of Cuando-Cubango, Cunene, Mexico, Mocamedes, Huila, Bie, Huambe, Benguela and parts of Cuanza Sul, Malanje, and Luanda would be included. Within this area, UNITA “controls” the countryside along and south of the Benguela railroad in that it has the allegiance of the local population, sharply limits the movement of FAPLA/Cuban forces, and is subject to only sporadic opposition from them. Notable exceptions to UNITA’s control within its own zone are the towns of Cangamba, Serpa Pinto, Huambo and Bie—all still occupied by FAPLA/Cuban garrisons.

8. Savimbi also has foreign friends, whose support is useful but not critical at this time. We believe that UNITA still receives some specialized items such as radios, and perhaps some funding, [less than 1 line not declassified] and it is of course in the South Africans’ interest to keep the Angolan regime focused on its internal insurgency problems so as to limit practical support for SWAPO’s operations against targets in Namibia.7 UNITA has close ties with the British,8 [2 lines not declassified]. Zambian President Kaunda, who has had similar relationships, is an old supporter of Savimbi.9 The “moderate” West Africans, Senghor and Houphouet-Boigny, are also favorably inclined, but Zaire under Mobutu is not trusted by Savimbi, and the French fall in this category too. The UNITA leadership, despite its home grown quality, has considerable experience in exploiting these foreign relationships.10

UNITA’s Liabilities

9. Many of UNITA’s strengths are also sources of weakness. Savimbi’s ability to dominate the organization and enforce discipline means that, despite the existence of a group of talented subordinates who work well together, none has anything like his stature or would be able to take his place as a national Angolan figure if he were to be removed from the scene. There are signs that Savimbi is aware of and attempting to remedy this situation, but is still moving slowly in delegating authority.

10. The ethnic core of UNITA is among the Ovimbundu people of the central highlands of Angola, although the movement has been and is supported by other tribes of the southern and eastern regions and its top leadership includes Cabindans and others from outside its base.

---

7 An unknown hand highlighted the first sentence of this paragraph in the left-hand margin.
8 An unknown hand underlined “British.”
9 An unknown hand underlined “Zambian” in this sentence.
10 An unknown hand underlined “considerable experience in exploiting these foreign relationships” in this sentence.
area. This degree of ethnic homogeneity, along with Savimbi’s talent as a mediator, is the source of much of UNITA’s cohesiveness, but it simultaneously inhibits UNITA’s acceptance as a national movement. If and when UNITA mounts substantial military operations outside the area in which it now moves freely, it will be moving in what is now still an alien ethnic environment. This again is a disability that Savimbi is aware of and one that he is trying to overcome, but if he does so he will probably owe more to the ineptitude and disarray in the MPLA than to his own efforts.

11. From a military standpoint too, UNITA’s logistical problems would multiply as it sought to expand and, unless there had been very thorough political preparation, it probably would have to adopt more conventional tactics. In these conditions, the lack of armor and heavier firepower would become more telling as Savimbi’s forces moved out of their accustomed habitats. Savimbi’s success in hanging on and in keeping the FAPLA/Cuban units to the towns has encouraged him to consider a northern offensive, but unless the MPLA had collapsed internally or the Cubans had already given up, it is unlikely that he could carry such an operation through successfully without substantial foreign support.

UNITA’s Prospects

12. UNITA’s current thinking, [less than 1 line not declassified] indicates some ambivalence and probably divided counsels on the movement’s future strategy. Savimbi’s basic objective is to drive the Cubans and Soviets out of Angola and replace the Neto regime with a “government of national unity” led by UNITA. But how? At one point Savimbi thought of declaring a “liberated republic” in southern Angola, but this idea smacks of ethnic separatism which he wants ultimately to overcome.

13. A safer, less spectacular, but in some ways more difficult course would be to develop UNITA’s political and administrative apparatus in the area it now largely controls, and to use this as a secure base for politico-military operations against the MPLA regime. Such a longer range strategy could make use of the underground assets UNITA may have in Luanda and other coastal and northern cities, whose takeover at some point will be essential to long term success. But this strategy assumes that Neto and the Cubans will continue to stumble and that, [less than 1 line not declassified] after a couple years Neto will collapse for primarily internal reasons. Savimbi’s pressures could, of course, contribute to such a collapse or to a change of leadership in the MPLA; they might in time also force the MPLA to some kind of compromise with Savimbi—although there are now no indications that Neto is considering a deal. But if Neto does not cave in one way or another, and

the Cubans remain committed to defend him, UNITA would remain an essentially regional insurgency which could be contained though not suppressed.

14. The answer to Savimbi's dilemma thus does not lie primarily with his own assets and liabilities but with those of his opponents in Luanda and Havana—and Moscow. As long as Castro continued to receive strong Soviet backing and could see some military progress against the insurgents, he probably would be willing to commit additional civilian resources and combat troops to Angola beyond the 3–4,000 Cubans arriving there now. Savimbi too can survive, but the key to his doing more than that is in the will of the Cubans to continue to provide those technical and military services that allow the Neto regime to survive as the "government" of Angola.

6. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, June 29, 1977

REFERENCE

June 27, 1977, Memorandum Re Cubans in Angola

Through the Voice of America we do have the capability to publicize the image you describe of the Cubans in Africa. To do so we need and are arranging a creditable source of this information and a peg to hang the story on. To this end, we are requesting that the VOA be granted an interview with Richard Moose, the newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, who has just returned from a trip to Africa. During the interview Mr. Moose will have the opportu-

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country File, Box 11, Cuba: 6–7/77. Secret.

2 See Document 4.

3 In a July 6 memorandum to Vance, Turner, and Reinhardt, Brzezinski wrote: “The three memoranda contain a number of interesting possibilities, and I believe it would be useful to discuss them at the next meeting of the Special Activities Working Group of the SCC.” Regarding the Moose interview, he wrote: “In the interim, I think it would be best if we took no action in this area; specifically the interview with Assistant Secretary Moose should be held off until we can coordinate it with other activities.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country File, Box 11, Cuba: 6–7/77) The three memoranda Brzezinski referred to are printed as Documents 6, 7, and 8. The minutes of the SCC meeting are Document 11.
nity to discuss African attitudes towards the Cubans. The interview will be broadcast in our worldwide English Service and will further serve as a basis for comment and analysis in our other language services. I assume the report to which the President refers is also available to Mr. Moose.

Once Mr. Moose has enunciated these points and the information is in the public domain, our Press and Publications Service can also carry his comments on the Wireless File, which goes to all of our embassies and is available for press placement.

I think that it will be most helpful if you call a meeting of all agencies assisting in this project so that we can assess overall progress. Meanwhile, we shall proceed as outlined above.

7. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 30, 1977

SUBJECT

Propaganda Exploitation of Soviet and Cuban Involvement in Angola

REFERENCE

Your memorandum dated 27 June 1977,\(^2\) Subject: Cubans in Angola

1. This memorandum is in reply to your request in the referent memorandum to provide a report on our propaganda capabilities to exploit developments stemming from Cuban and Soviet involvement in Angola in response to the President’s expressed interest in this subject. Along general lines, we believe that the Agency can explore the possibility of influencing the propaganda content of certain foreign radio broadcasts to Angola; conduct related propaganda and political influence operations elsewhere in Africa; and use its international covert action infrastructure for propaganda outside of Africa, particularly in West Europe and Latin America.


\(^2\) See Document 4.
2. In the field of radio broadcasts beamed to Angola, we could attempt to interest the [less than 1 line not declassified] in augmenting [less than 1 line not declassified] radio programs beamed to Angola and other African audiences with information from Agency and [less than 1 line not declassified]. Similar efforts could be attempted with other countries which are concerned over Cuban/Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia. A number of countries come to mind in this regard including [less than 1 line not declassified], Zaire, Zambia, [less than 1 line not declassified].

3. Elsewhere in Africa we could undertake to make the Cuban/Soviet role in Angola known through a variety of means, including:

   a. Providing intelligence briefs and analyses to African heads of state, key government officials and cooperative intelligence services.

   b. Providing similar briefings to unilateral African agents of influence and other influential contacts in governments and political parties.

   c. Providing guidance and tailored propaganda materials to agent assets with access to newspaper and other media outlets.

4. In other regions of the world, we would direct our media agents to increase their coverage of Angolan developments and, particularly in West Europe, we would concentrate our efforts on surfacing Angolan materials in reputable outlets for replay to African audiences.

5. In Latin America, we believe that the Cuban internal audience and leadership represents a secondary target for propaganda stressing the “quagmire” effect of Cuban involvement in Angola. In this regard there is still a considerable euphoria in Cuba over the Cuban success in Angola and the increased Third World prestige which the Cubans perceive they derive from this venture. [I line not declassified] Elsewhere in Latin America we have a modest capability to conduct propaganda operations on this issue.

6. With regard to the foregoing proposals, you should be aware that the Agency, because of the so-called Tunney/Javits amendment, may face legislative restraints on the type of covert action that can be undertaken in regard to Angola. The problem here is that the language of this amendment, the purpose of which was to cut off the use of appropriated funds for our paramilitary operations in Angola, is sufficiently ambiguous as to raise questions on whether or not the Agency can conduct any covert action in regard to Angola. With this problem in mind, we are initiating contact with Senator Javits and others to seek clarification on the intent of the Congress in this regard. We will keep you informed on the outcome of this effort.

7. Finally, since your request involves options for overt as well as covert action, it is suggested that you may wish to refer this matter to the Special Coordination Committee Special Activities Working Group for further discussion and to firm up recommendations for action.

Stansfield Turner
8. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 2, 1977

SUBJECT
Cubans in Angola

You have received by now Admiral Turner’s memorandum noting our capabilities for exploiting the negative aspects of the Cuban and Soviet activities in Angola.² As that memorandum notes, there are a number of means both overt and covert which may be employed.

In pursuing such courses of action, however, we would have to take into account countervailing considerations. To the extent that our effort is targeted at the Angola situation, and assuming that our hand will show, we should consider the possible effect of such a campaign upon (a) our interest in normalizing relations with Angola and, (b) whether our actions would appear to represent an effort to undermine Neto’s position. Beyond the foregoing are the more serious questions of where recent internal political events in Angola are leading and where U.S. interests lie among possible alternative political alignments within Angola.

The most effective anti-Cuban propaganda is the behavior of the Cubans in Angola and the economic difficulties which the country and its population are facing. To the extent that the insurgency spreads (as it appears to be doing), and conditions within Angola worsen, “foreigners”, and principally the Cubans, will be blamed and be held accountable in Africa and elsewhere in the world.

If the purpose of an information campaign would be to generate concerns and suspicions about Cuban activities on a broad scale, we should look to our natural allies. A number of moderate African leaders, for example, are already expressing concerns about Soviet and Cuban activities. Their criticisms have obviously struck a sensitive Soviet nerve. African elites read and are influenced by respected European and African publications such as, The Economist, Le Monde and Jeune Afrique when they address Cuban activities in Angola.

The most difficult challenge would be to reach the Marxist-oriented intellectuals in Africa and elsewhere. Here, Neto and the Cubans have

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P770109–1877. Secret. Drafted by Buchanan and Moose on July 1; cleared by Moose.
² See Document 7.
a natural advantage: To the extent that our propaganda appears to be “made in the U.S.A.”, it will automatically be discounted.

Nevertheless, there are certain careful actions which we can take. The Voice of America can note hard news—particularly reports originating in Africa—of an uncomplimentary nature about Cuban activities in Angola and accompany this with some understated commentary; we can prepare background briefings for the American and European media; we can work with the BBC which enjoys a large African and Third World audience; and, using the Voice of America and our other radios, we can also beam selected information to the Soviet and Cuban population to play on their resentment of costly foreign involvement. Throughout, however, in designing our message, we must be careful to avoid giving the impression that we seek to upset the Angolan regime or further complicate the country’s fortunes.

Perhaps the most important way in which Cuban and Soviet misadventures can be exploited is through our contacts with respected African leaders. As the evidence of Cuban misadventures mounts, we should be prepared to instruct our ambassadors to approach selected leaders and discuss with them the risks which continued Cuban involvement pose for Angola and Africa at large.

Peter Tarnoff

3 Denis Lamb signed for Tarnoff.

9. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, July 6, 1977

SUBJECT

US Propaganda Capability About Cubans in Angola

You asked recently whether we had any propaganda capacity to spread the image of Cuban arrogance and general difficulty they are encountering in Angola.

Admiral Turner has reported that the Intelligence Community does have some capability in this area,² [2 lines not declassified]. State’s response suggested some limited possibilities but noted that US involvement in spreading the message could be counterproductive.

I believe it would be best to coordinate this issue through the mechanism of the Special Activities Working Group of the SCC, and we will put this on the agenda of its next scheduled meeting. We will forward recommendations for your approval shortly thereafter.³

² See Document 7.
³ Carter wrote below this paragraph: “It is disturbing to me that this relatively simple effort creates so much delay, confusion & possible reluctance. Let’s just tell the truth. J.”

10. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 12, 1977

SUBJECT
Cubans in Angola

USIA has begun to move on publicizing the growing disillusionment with Cubans in Angola. John Reinhardt has informed me that VOA has made a careful check of materials available in the public domain indicating awareness of and dissatisfaction with Soviet and Cuban interference in African affairs. Attached is a copy of a recent VOA news analysis dealing with Socialist imperialism in Africa.² This analysis will be used in English, French, Portuguese, and Swahili broadcasts to Africa.

VOA will continue to pursue this matter.³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1/77–12/78. Secret. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “DA please act on this in SCC-working group. ZB.” Dodson wrote below this: “(Copy sent to Henze 7/14)”
³ Carter wrote below this paragraph: “OK—Let’s push actual effort—not just analysis—Also radio broadcasts to Cuba—Keep me informed. J.”
Subject: SCC/SAWG Meeting, 21 July 1977, 10:00 a.m.–12:15 p.m., White House Situation Room

Participants:

USIA
Ambassador John Reinhardt (Item 1 only) John Harmon
William Funk

State
William McAfee Edward R. Jayne
Emerson Brown Arnold Donahue

DOD
Walter B. Slocombe NSC
Frank Porrino David Aaron

CIA
William W. Wells Samuel M. Hoskinson
[name not declassified] Paul B. Honze
Henry Richardson (Item 1 only)

The meeting opened with an extensive discussion of the present situation in Angola and the desirability of publicizing the problems the Cubans are having there, in which the President had recently expressed interest. Mr. Reinhardt explained that his Agency had the capability of doing more but needed more accurate and attributable material. CIA representatives described ways in which more material could be surfaced. Mr. McAfee summed up possible reservations which the State Department saw in respect to this effort. CIA raised the question of consultation with the Senate on possible restrictions on this kind of effort stemming from previous legislation, and Mr. Funk commented on this question at length. The chairman questioned whether an effort such as the one proposed, which involved normal use of CIA’s media infrastructure, required SCC review. In conclusion, it was decided that CIA and State would develop a “Perspective” on this question and consider whether it involves a policy issue requiring SCC review. Justice will consider whether the effort is affected by the Tunney-Javits Amendment and whether the previous Presidential Finding on CIA

media activity is applicable. [1 line not declassified] A progress report will be expected at the next SCC/SAWG meeting.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

12. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for Emerson Brown of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Washington, July 25, 1977

SUBJECT

PERPECTIVES—Cuban/Soviet Presence in Angola

1. Cuban intervention in Angola succeeded in allowing Fidel Castro again to pose as a leader of “international revolution”, enhanced his image as a leader in parts of the Third World, gave him renewed international attention, and served to reinforce his contention that Communist and Third World countries are continuing to gain advantage over the West. The use of the Cubans as surrogates allowed the Soviets to retain a relatively low profile, offsetting possible African fears of neo-colonialism, while they extended their military capability and political influence over a significant part of Africa. The strategic location of Angola on borders of both black-ruled and white-ruled countries gives the Soviets an unusual opportunity to exert influence in this area, particularly in relation to the debate and struggle over the future of Rhodesia and Namibia, and the ultimate problem of South Africa.

2. It is estimated that there are 18,000 or more Cubans in Angola, and there have been recent reports citing a growing Angolan unhappiness with this presence. Angolans have referred to the Cubans as arrogant “new colonialists” who tread on African sensibilities, who together with the Soviets monopolize what few luxuries are available in the country, and who contribute little or nothing to the economic progress or internal security of the country.2

3. With the objective of dispelling the aura surrounding the Cuban/Soviet presence in Angola, and of discouraging its spread elsewhere in Africa, we propose to expose Angolan displeasure with the Cuban


2 See footnote 2, Document 4.
presence, and to discourage the continuation of that presence, through the use of our international covert action infrastructure. In general terms, we intend to influence the propaganda content of certain foreign radio broadcasts to parts of Africa; conduct related propaganda and political influence operations elsewhere in Africa, and use the infrastructure for propaganda outside of Africa, particularly in Western Europe and Latin America.

4. The following themes, to be used in selective tasking of the infrastructure, are submitted for State Department approval.3

   a. Stress that the Cubans and Soviets in Angola are the new breed of colonials who have become arrogant and have continually ignored African sensibilities, and have monopolized those few luxuries that exist in the country.

   b. Cite instances of frictions created between Angolans and Cubans as a result of Cuban attitudes and actions. These include Angolan charges that the Cubans enjoy conspicuously high standards of living while Angolans experience severe shortages of food and other basic necessities, that Cuban technicians were inadequately trained, that “administrators” know little about administration, and that Cubans confine themselves to garrison towns and do little in pursuit of the enemy.

   c. Encourage moderate African leaders to express concern about Cuban and Soviet presence in Angola as a threat to the territorial integrity of African states.

   d. Exploit continuing criticism made by the People’s Republic of China of Cuban/Soviet presence in Angola and domination of the Angolan government.

   e. Question Castro’s requests for foreign aid from other governments, and the wisdom of such aid being granted while he is spending so much on continued deployment of troops and equipment in Angola.

---

3 On August 2 the Department responded: “We agree that the Angola government and its Cuban allies appear to be in an increasingly difficult situation, however, we are reluctant to agree that USG covert propaganda in an effort to publicize this situation would be useful to us for the following reasons: 1. We are attempting to normalize relations with Angola and Cuba and a covert propaganda campaign would work against that policy. 2. Moderate and friendly African governments are very aware of the situation in Angola and are already accusing us of failing to block Soviet-Cuban aggression and urging us to take action. Covert propaganda directed towards these governments would be preaching to the converted. 3. ‘Radical’ and ‘progressive’ governments are becoming increasingly aware of the situation. Savimbi of UNITA is attempting to obtain publicity (witness the Washington Post reporter who just returned from seven months in the bush and who will be publishing a series of articles in August). The situation is becoming increasingly embarrassing for the Angolans and the Cubans and any involvement on our part raises the risk of compromising the bona fides of the information now surfacing.” Leon Dash wrote a series of seven articles published in the Washington Post August 8–13.
f. Call attention to the critical attitude of some Latin American governments toward Cuban foreign adventures, and to beliefs of some Latin American leaders that Cuba cannot expect to assume a position of being a worldwide “revolutionary leader” through continued presence in Angola, and at the same time retain its respectability in Latin America.

g. Emphasize that Angola is far removed from Cuba and well beyond reasonable limits of Cuban security interests. Stress that the presence of Cubans in Angola serves to undermine Cuba’s apparent wish to improve relations with the US and other non-Communist nations.

h. Cite the need for negotiated political settlement for majority rule in Rhodesia and self-determination for Namibia. Settlement of these issues would negate major pretexts that the Cubans and Soviets have used for their presence in Angola.

i. Stress that the Cuban involvement in Angola prolongs a bloody, internecine war, pitting black against black.

13. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 3, 1977

SUBJECT
Meeting with UNITA Secretary of Information

PARTICIPANTS
Angola (UNITA) US
Jeremias Chitunda, William Swing, AF/C Alternate Director
UNITA Secretary of Marianne Spiegel, S/P
Information Thomas Doubleday, AF/C Angolan Desk Officer

In opening the conversation, Mr. Swing stated that the Administration, in line with its policy of openness, attached importance to listening to all points of view, especially as regards countries such as Angola with which we have no relations. Swing also underscored Congressional

prohibitions on assistance to any group or faction in Angola. This said, it was useful to have this occasion to obtain an assessment of the situation in Angola given the constraints on information available to us from Angola.

Mr. Chitunda said that the hostilities in Angola were continuing to increase, especially in the Huambo (formerly Nova Lisboa) region. The Cuban presence, he said, now numbers 24,000, including about 4,000 who arrived shortly after the unsuccessful revolt of May 27, and UNITA expects that the total may reach 50,000. Asked for the basis of this prediction, Chitunda replied that the conditions were similar to that phase of the Vietnam war when the US was being sucked into a deepening involvement and felt compelled to commit ever great numbers of troops.

Chitunda observed that despite UNITA’s string of victories over the past year and a half and the fact that more than half of Angola is under its control, the Angolan conflict will never be settled until a political solution is found. A total military victory, he said, is not feasible and even if it were, it would only increase the suffering in Angola. In the end, a political settlement must be worked out between MPLA and UNITA. The MPLA is a minority, and any government by a minority, white or black, cannot be condoned. At the same time, UNITA realizes it cannot govern Angola without the MPLA, since Luanda and other areas are traditional MPLA strongholds. The MPLA are not UNITA’s principal enemy, Chitunda said; after all, they are Angolans too. He specified that UNITA would deal with MPLA as an organization, not simply with individual MPLA members. He added that a settlement must include FNLA as well, because, even though it may have become ineffective militarily, it still has a popular base of political support.

However, such a political solution is not possible at present, Chitunda continued, because the Cuban presence has internationalized the problem. Withdrawal of Cuban troops is a prerequisite to a settlement. The international community has the responsibility to take steps to bring this about, since the moral and political support of the international community is the critical factor enabling the Cuban presence to continue. More specifically, this support comes from the West, and especially the U.S., which is following an “ambiguous” policy, and, through Ambassador Young, issuing public statements in support of the Cubans. Mrs. Spiegel asked why Chitunda seemed to be more critical of the US than of the Western Europeans, who have recognized the MPLA government, whereas the US has not. Chitunda replied that recognition by the Europeans took place last year, whereas he was referring to current conditions; and that what he had in mind was a country’s overall attitude, which, in the case of the US, was not favora-
ble to UNITA, as shown by Ambassador Young’s remarks. In the case of Portugal, he said, although the Soares and Neto governments are developing closer relations, there is still sympathy for UNITA within the Portuguese government—although not on the part of such as Manuel Alegre—along with a desire to encourage a reconciliation.

Mr. Doubleday, referring to Chitunda’s statement that a Cuban withdrawal was a prerequisite for negotiations, asked whether a Cuban withdrawal and UNITA–MPLA talks might possibly proceed along parallel tracks, rather than all Cuban troops having to be out of Angola before talks could ever begin. Chitunda replied that, once the Cubans had decided to leave and had begun the process of doing so, “even though their bags might not be completely packed,” he could conceive of UNITA agreeing to begin talks. (Comment: Later in the conversation, he appeared to return to the standard UNITA hard line, so that it was not clear exactly how flexible UNITA might be. He was obviously instructed to present the line, and was not prepared for the question.)

Swing asked whether the Cubans were more active or less so now. Chitunda said that the Cuban military stick primarily to the cities. The Cubans are well uniformed, whereas the MPLA are ill-clad and barefoot for the most part. MPLA suffering is considerable and they are increasingly resentful toward the Cubans. Although Cuban troops, by UNITA’s calculations, number 24,000 and the MPLA only 30,000—almost the same strength—the casualty rate is 90 MPLA to 1 Cuban. Increasingly, the Cubans are spreading out into the provincial capitals and are to be found in administrative and social services as well as security and other para-military functions.

Chitunda observed that the MPLA had suffered a severe blow in the loss of over 20 of its senior people in the May 27 uprising, either because they were killed in the fighting or were implicated in the plot. He added that the Cubans would clearly have to take on greater responsibility. Some 400 Algerians, including a sizeable number of pilots, are also in Angola. Asked whether UNITA had captured any Algerians, Chitunda replied in the negative. Asked what other African nationals were serving in support of the MPLA, he responded that there were about 500 Nigerians, 300 Congolese, and some from Guinea (Conakry) and Mozambique.

Asked for his assessment of the Shaban border situation, Chitunda replied that he expected the Katangan gendarmes soon to launch a guerrilla (not conventional, like last spring) attack against Shaba. UNITA has two battalions in the Shaba border area and is preparing to fight the Katangans, who UNITA considers to be the enemy because of the Katangans’ past attacks on UNITA in support of the MPLA. UNITA will hit the Katangans “just as hard” as they do the MPLA. UNITA’s combat against the Katangans has not yet begun, however,
because the UNITA forces in that area are still being organized and equipped. Asked about possible assistance to UNITA by Mobutu, Chitunda replied to the effect that if (in return for UNITA’s attacks against the Katangans, UNITA’s enemy) Mobutu were to provide aid to UNITA, UNITA would certainly not object. Asked about reports of 200,000 refugees from Shaba in Angola, Chitunda expressed doubt that the number was that high, although a large number of refugees is to be expected, because of Mobutu’s negative attitude toward the Shabans.

In reply to a question, Chitunda stated that at the UNITA Congress last March, it was decided not to have any further collaboration with FNLA in the struggle against MPLA, and that this decision still held. He noted the “enormous decline” of support for FNLA in Kinshasa.

Swing raised the question of UNITA’s current relations with FLEC. Chitunda recounted that several months ago there had been some unofficial, exploratory meetings between the two. The question of collaboration with FLEC is “delicate and complex” for UNITA, however, as the problem of territorial integrity is thereby posed. Cabinda’s importance at present lies in its oil reserves. At current pumping rates, however, these will last no longer than 15–20 years. Angola’s long-term economic future depends upon development of foreign trade and investment. There will have to be a meeting of minds on priorities if UNITA/FLEC cooperation is to come about.

Chitunda said that he had been in Angola most recently from February until July 7. This included participation in UNITA’s Congress March 23–28. He had walked some 3800 kilometers around southern Angola and had felt completely secure. MPLA forces simply were not to be encountered. Chitunda said that he had read the Dash articles in The Washington Post and found them generally accurate.2

Mrs. Spiegel queried Chitunda about UNITA’s apparent inability to take the cities, especially in the south. He replied that (a) UNITA had only withdrawn from most of these a year ago; (b) they lacked the necessary military hardware and equipment; and (c) the Cubans are good soldiers and are strongest in the cities. Chitunda went on, however, to point out that UNITA controlled the breadbasket area of Angola. In reply to a question, he said that UNITA forces are still in control of the several small southern towns they have captured in recent months, such as Cuangar and Calai.

UNITA has forbidden the circulation in its territory of the kwanza, the Luanda regime’s monetary unit, permitting the use only of the Portuguese escudo. UNITA is capturing as many kwanzas as it can, as many as 3 million per month, and withdrawing them from circulation.

---

2 See footnote 3, Document 12.
After it has accumulated a large amount, it plans to dump the currency back on the market as part of its strategy of sabotaging the economy of the MPLA-controlled area.

Chitunda said he would be staying in Washington a few more days before leaving for Africa via Europe.

Comment: UNITA had told our Embassy in Kinshasa that Chitunda was coming to Washington to discuss UNITA’s written request, submitted through the Embassy, for US aid, including arms, money, medicine, and radios. However, perhaps because it was made clear at the beginning of the conversation that existing legislation prohibited such aid, he did not raise the matter. His emphasis was on the political factor, on US policy as it relates to the Cuban presence.

14. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, October 17, 1977

SUBJECT

U.S. Policy to Angola

The President has recently seen two intelligence reports on Angola. The first related to West African aid for UNITA.² In response to this report, the President asked what policy are we following with respect to UNITA and Neto. The President stated that we should push openly for Cuban troop withdrawal and recognition of UNITA as a legitimate political force. He further stated that we should call for South Africa to stay out of the Angola situation.

The second report dealt with Angolan relations with the U.S.³ The report stated that President Neto may send a senior official to Nigeria during the President’s visit to make a direct appeal for U.S. diplomatic recognition of his regime. In response to this, the President stated that he does not intend to recognize the Neto government.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1/77–12/78. Secret. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “dispatched 10/18 10:30 a.m. copy to Richardson also sent.”
² Not found.
³ Not found.
Please respond to the President’s query on U.S. policy to Angola as soon as possible.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Brzezinski initialed “ZB” above his typed signature.

15. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, October 23, 1977

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Toward Angola

Your query on U.S. policy with respect to Angola, UNITA and Neto came as we were developing a strategy of working with African mediators to reconcile the factions and to begin the process of Cuban troop withdrawal. I believe the strategy, outlined in the memorandum, will most effectively further the goals you have indicated: to end Angola’s dependence on Cuban troops by encouraging it to come to terms with UNITA as a legitimate political force and by reducing the threat from neighboring states, such as South Africa. It also addresses the question of U.S. recognition. Andy Young agrees.

Background

The war in Angola is developing into a long stalemate. UNITA’s successes in the southern rural areas seriously disrupt the economy not only of Angola but of the entire region—cutting off all the cities from food supplies, enabling the Benguela Railroad to operate only sporadically at best. Yet UNITA is unable to take any southern cities, many of which are traditional MPLA strongholds. This prevents UNITA from consolidating its own position even in its own tribal area.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 105, 10/14–26/77. Secret; Exdis.

2 See Document 14.
UNITA’s military successes have increased Angolan dependence on the Cubans; and racist appeals by MPLA internal opposition have increased Neto’s personal dependence on their protection. The ever-present threat of more meddling and even intervention by neighboring states—South Africa and Zaire—adds to the MPLA’s fears that it cannot afford to have the Cubans leave. Reports indicate that South Africa may be providing UNITA some assistance, for example communications equipment, but not on a large scale. Probably more important in Angolan eyes is South Africa’s large and modern force, and significant military presence on Angola’s border in Namibia. It has easily swept through southern Angola in the past and, in Angola’s view, could do so again.

UNITA is concentrating its efforts not on South African support but on securing resumption of assistance through Zaire, from third countries. UNITA claims to have commitments from Zaire, France and francophone African states that assistance will be provided. There has been no evidence yet that it is being delivered. Should substantial Zairian assistance to UNITA be resumed, it would provide Neto with every incentive to support another major Katangan military effort in Zaire’s Shaba province.

MPLA’s approach to Ivory Coast for mediation of its dispute with UNITA has provided some hope that the conflict in Angola might be resolved and the Cuban military presence rendered less important to the MPLA government. Ivory Coast has quietly begun this effort. While UNITA has initially refused to talk with MPLA until the Cuban troops leave, it has also reiterated its position that the war in Angola cannot be won militarily, and political reconciliation is the only solution.

U.S. Objectives

We believe that a mediation strategy thus best serves our objectives:
—To secure removal of the Cuban troops.
—To encourage reconciliation among the factions and an end to hostilities.
—To avoid a broadening conflict involving neighboring states—such as Zairian intervention in Angola and a Katangan invasion of Zaire.
—To encourage Angolan independence of outside powers, such as Cuba and the Soviet Union.
—To promote economic prosperity in Angola and develop mutually beneficial economic relations.
—To work productively with Angola on southern African issues. For example, it has more influence with SWAPO than any other African state and could be helpful in the Namibia negotiations.
Proposed Strategy

Assistant Secretary Moose has discussed with the Ivory Coast Foreign Minister a possible scenario for reconciliation containing the following elements: Cuban troops would withdraw from UNITA territory in the south, with control of the southern cities to be negotiated. Savimbi would stop fighting. Neto could invite him to serve as Vice President in a government of national reconciliation, although Savimbi might wish to remain in the south for the time being. The Western powers could weigh in with Mobutu to assure Angola against cross-border interference, and they could bring additional pressure on the South Africans to stay out. The U.S. could recognize the new government of reconciliation as the complete withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola progressed, and could institute an assistance program, including projects in southern Angola. Given Congressional constraints, we begin with Titles I and II of the PL–480 program.

This scenario must not be presented as an American blueprint for the future of Angola, which would certainly harden the positions of Neto, Savimbi and the Cubans. But the Ivory Coast has expressed interest in pursuing it and would want at some point to be able to say it has United States support.

A memorandum elaborating this strategy is being sent to the NSC staff.

U.S. Policy Toward UNITA

U.S. recognition of a government of reconciliation which included UNITA would amount to our recognizing UNITA as a legitimate political force. I believe it is important, however, that such recognition take place within the context of the reconciliation strategy, and that we take no position of support for UNITA per se. It would be particularly damaging to our objectives were we to make any public statement of support in any sense for UNITA.

A public call for recognition of UNITA as a political force would have the following effects: It would bring back to the surface Neto’s underlying suspicions—based on past U.S. support for UNITA—and could well make him feel compelled to harden his position on dealing with UNITA. It could make our important dealings with Angola on Namibia that much more difficult. Coming on top of UNITA’s successes on the battlefield this year, it could conceivably encourage Savimbi to fight more and think less about reconciliation. Reactions in Africa would be strong, as many would suspect that the U.S. was again intervening in Angola on the side of UNITA.

Cuba

The United States should oppose all intervention in Angola by outside states—including Zaire, South Africa and others, as well as
Cuba. We should continue to make clear our opposition to the presence of Cuban troops anywhere in Africa. But a more active public campaign focusing on Cuban withdrawal would likely be counter-productive, as Cuba would not want to withdraw, or be seen to be withdrawing, under U.S. pressure.

An important factor in a reduction of Cubans in Angola will be the lessening of Neto’s dependence on them. This is one result anticipated from the reconciliation strategy. Continuation of the war means continued reliance by Neto on the Cubans. Such reliance would also be reinforced by any act on our part to strengthen UNITA.

U.S. Recognition and Congressional Attitudes

One of the ways in which we can support eventual moves toward reconciliation in Angola is to hold out the ultimate prospect of U.S. recognition assistance. Thus, if the Neto regime or an intermediary like Obasanjo asks us about our intentions, we should avoid an absolute refusal. We should, however, point out that domestic political constraints prevent us from moving ahead now, and we can indicate that Cuban troop presence and the continuing civil war are factors which complicate our ability to recognize. We should use any contact we might have with Angola to encourage SWAPO cooperation in the Namibia negotiations.

In addition, Andy Young believes that we should at some point early in the strategy consult with the Soviets to assure them that we are not aiming at a simple reduction of their influence in Angola—and let the Cubans know that, while we will abstain from a public call for their withdrawal, we nonetheless intend to work quietly to this end. I agree.

In sum, we would like to launch the initiative through Houphouet and, in the meantime, to consult closely with key members of Congress to begin to build the support we would need if the strategy works. We should not move toward closer relations with Angola until we see some progress.
SUBJECT

Covert Action Exploitation of Cuban Involvement in Angola

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide you with a preliminary status report on actions being taken by the Central Intelligence Agency to commence a covert action campaign abroad on the issue of Cuban involvement in Angola.

2. Pursuant to our discussion with the President on 8 November 1977, I am forwarding, as an attachment to this memorandum, a background paper for Ambassador Young’s use in preparing a speech on this subject. We have included in this paper a number of themes on issues stemming from the presence of Cuban armed forces in Angola along with supporting factual information derived from our intelligence reporting. This approach will allow Ambassador Young to pitch his speech or other public comments to an African, Latin American or internal Cuban audience, as he desires. If, after Ambassador Young reviews this paper, he requires additional information or other assistance on his speech, we, of course, stand ready to render all possible help.

3. Following the President’s formal authorization of this effort on 8 November 1977, we immediately notified the Hughes/Ryan committees of the Congress that a new covert action finding had been made, and that we are ready to brief the committees at their convenience on

---


2 In a November 8 memorandum for the record, Turner summarized the discussion: “Brzezinski brought up the Angolan covert action propaganda program. I briefed that it was under way, with a major [less than 1 line not declassified] newspaper story our first objective, along with directions to 90 other stations to put out these stories. The view was expressed that they were anxious to see this one through: (a) to see that the Presidential order was carried out; and (b) to see that the mechanism for this type of activity could and would function.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M00165A, Executive Registry Subject Files (’74–’78), Box 23, Memo of Conversation with the Pres 010177–311277)

3 Attached but not printed. In a November 8 memorandum for the record, Turner noted Brzezinski’s request for a point paper for Young and his agreement to “take on the job of the Cuban radios.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M00165A, Executive Registry Subject Files (’74–’78), Box 23, Memo of Conversation with Brzezinski 010177–311277)

4 Presidential Finding not found. For a summary of the initiative, see Document 18.
the nature and scope of these operations. A schedule for these briefings is being arranged commencing early next week.

4. Along general lines it might be helpful if I first provide you with some conceptual comments on our approach to the implementation of the covert action aspects of this proposal. First of all, although there have been a few sketchy reports in the press about some of the problems resulting from the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, this is not now a prominent issue in the international press. For the purpose of credibility and to protect the security of our covert action assets we need a pretext for this effort. However, as you know, the anniversary of Angola’s independence from Portugal is 11 November. Therefore the appearance of press and editorial comments on this issue at this time will not appear unusual. We also need to get the story out in the open so that our controlled assets can use it. For this purpose we are arranging to place a major feature story drawing on our intelligence in a prestigious daily. We will also try to arrange through pick up this story for replay into Africa and other areas. At this point our controlled media assets and influence agents can also draw on this placement for press stories, local editorial comments, and to encourage political or psychological action within their governments or organizations. The text of this story has been prepared and was cabled on the evening of 8 November 1977 along with guidance and implementing instructions. We expect to know shortly when the story will be placed and in what outlet.

5. Along more specific lines, also on the evening of 8 November a preliminary guidance cable was sent. This cable stressed the urgency and importance of this covert action assignment, outlined the intelligence facts relating to this effort, articulated the covert action theme lines, provided general operational and tasking guidance and solicited suggestions for actions beyond routine media placements. For the latter purpose, we are also sending out today a cable to these stations and bases providing a summary of press items that have appeared spontaneously recently that coincide with our covert action theme lines. This will enable our media assets to commence replay of editorial comment now as we await the surfacing of our major feature story.

6. As a result of the preliminary guidance cable, a number of our stations have already forwarded some suggestions, for example:

a. notes that Peking domestic broadcast service is hitting the issue of “the Angolan people oppose the
Soviet mercenaries.” Selective replay of this material where Chinese opinion holds some weight may prove useful.

b. [less than 1 line not declassified] reports that it will be difficult to get a handle on this proposal in [less than 1 line not declassified] because of the strong support that government has given to the Cuban presence in Angola. [less than 1 line not declassified] notes that the government might be susceptible to approaches by influential Africans reporting on the problems that Cuban troops are causing the Angolan people and we are looking into this possibility.

c. [less than 1 line not declassified] has asked for and we are cabling an intelligence brief on this subject for use by a well placed local agent of influence.

d. [less than 1 line not declassified] reports that it will pass the guidance and supporting materials to local press assets.

e. [less than 1 line not declassified] asked for and is being provided with a tailored story for placement in a leading [less than 1 line not declassified] weekly.

f. [1 line not declassified] have indicated they can possibly place appropriate materials in the local press and have asked for background materials which are being provided.

g. [1 line not declassified] all report that they are ready to undertake appropriate local press exploitation as soon as they have a suitable international press item for attribution. The [less than 1 line not declassified] story will serve this purpose.

h. [less than 1 line not declassified] reports that it is moving to task several local media assets on this requirement.

i. [less than 1 line not declassified] reports that it will utilize a number of local media assets and has suggested that an influential local contact be encouraged to invite journalists from key foreign countries to UNITA-held territory in Angola to collect first-hand stories about Cuban actions. We are considering the advisability of the latter suggestion.

7. The foregoing information is intended to provide you with some of our initial thoughts on and early field reactions to this proposal. I will be providing you with regular status reports as this campaign proceeds.

Stansfield Turner
17. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, December 1, 1977

To keep you abreast of VOA coverage of the subject of the Cuban presence in Angola, I attach the transcripts of two full-length programs prepared for broadcast in the past few days. As you will note, the Voice has drawn on a wide range of sources in developing these programs.

“The Soviet-Cuban Presence in Africa” (text attached)\(^2\) is based upon comments from the press in Africa, Latin America and India.

Usage, and planned usage, is as follows:

The program will be broadcast today in Swahili; and by the weekend in Portuguese and in English to Africa; in Spanish and Portuguese to Latin America; in Worldwide English; in Russian; Armenian; Czech-Slovak; Hungarian; Polish; Romanian; Serbo-Croatian; Slovene; Estonian, Portuguese to Europe; Arabic; Chinese; Indonesian and Vietnamese.

Yesterday afternoon’s opinion roundup “Cubans in Africa” (copy attached)\(^3\) drew from U.S. press comment, quoting the Los Angeles Times, the Houston Post, the Miami Herald and the Baltimore Sun.

Usage, and planned usage, is as follows:

The roundup has been broadcast in French, Portuguese and Swahili to Africa; in Worldwide English; Spanish to Latin America; Russian; Ukrainian; Albanian; Bulgarian; Hungarian; Polish; Serbo-Croatian; Estonian; Portuguese to Europe; Greek; Turkish; Arabic; Bengali; Burmese; Chinese; Indonesian and Thai. It will be broadcast in Romanian, Lithuanian, Armenian and Vietnamese at an early date.

As we discussed, the Voice of America will continue to give this subject thorough treatment as source materials become available. We will keep you informed of its coverage.

---

\(^1\) Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Special Programs File, Box 29, USSR-Cuban Intervention in Africa 7 November 1977–5 December 1977. No classification marking.

\(^2\) Dated December 1. Attached but not printed.

\(^3\) Dated November 30. Attached but not printed.
18. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency to Members of the Special Coordination Committee

Washington, February 9, 1978

SUBJECT

Report on the CIA Covert Action Program Dealing with Cuban/Soviet Intervention in Angola

1. Summary: In response to the 1977 Presidential finding on Soviet/Cuban activities in Angola, CIA has made 219 non-attributable media placements in 50 countries and has provided comprehensive information to liaison contacts and agents of influence in 43 countries. Reports of local reactions indicate that CIA’s Angola program is achieving significant results.

2. Presidential Initiative: A Presidential finding signed 8 November 1977 instructed CIA to use its media assets, agents of influence and liaison relationships to conduct non-attributable propaganda and take other actions in order to publicize the facts concerning Soviet and Cuban activities in Angola.

3. Non-Attributable Propaganda: CIA has to date used its media assets to make 219 non-attributable press placements in the following 50 countries:

- Europe: [14 countries not declassified]
- Latin America: [12 countries not declassified]
- Africa: [10 countries not declassified]
- East Asia: [5 countries not declassified]
- Near East: [9 countries not declassified]

1 Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files A–E, Box 25, Angola 11 July 1977–18 April 1978. Secret; Sensitive. Purcell forwarded the report to Henze under cover of a February 13 memorandum in which Purcell wrote: “We think the information in the attached report makes a good case for how the covert action infrastructure can be effectively used in support of United States policy. Since the infrastructure per se is a matter of some contention within the SCC, we believe it would be informative and useful to have this status report circulated to the members.”

2 Presidential Finding not found.
Illustrative of these 219 placements are the following:

(a) a major feature story in a prominent [less than 1 line not declassified] news magazine, dealing with Cuban responsibility for instability in Angola;

(b) a four-page article in a national economic journal published in the [less than 1 line not declassified], stressing Soviet military and economic penetration of Angola through use of Cuba as a surrogate;

(c) a front page editorial in a major [less than 1 line not declassified] daily newspaper, attacking the presence of 30,000 Cubans in Africa (This editorial was repeated in a New China News Agency broadcast from Peking);

(d) an editorial in a prominent [less than 1 line not declassified] daily, condemning Cuban intervention in Angola;

(e) a series of broadcasts over two television stations in a [less than 1 line not declassified], focusing on Cuban intervention in Angola.

4. Liaison Relationships and Agents of Influence: Comprehensive information on Angola has been provided to 99 liaison contacts and agents of influence in the following 43 countries:

- Europe: 9 countries
- Latin America: 9 countries
- Africa: 11 countries
- East Asia: 8 countries
- Near East: 6 countries

These efforts have proved highly effective. For example:

(a) A comprehensive briefing paper was passed through a [less than 1 line not declassified] to President [name not declassified]. [name not declassified] praised the paper and urgently requested additional factual information.

(b) The [less than 1 line not declassified] Minister of the Interior in [less than 1 line not declassified] was briefed and a background paper given to him for use in advising President [name not declassified] on the Angolan situation.

(c) A high level official in the Zambian [less than 1 line not declassified] expressed appreciation for briefings on Angola, indicating the reports were timely and of interest to President Kaunda.

(d) A briefing was passed to a senior [less than 1 line not declassified] who personally briefs the prime minister, the foreign minister and the defense minister.

5. Reactions: There have been numerous reactions to this combined effort. For example, in the Third World:

(a) the head of a major Latin American nation reversed his position and publicly denounced Cuban intervention in Angola following the
circulation of a briefing paper on this subject at the top levels of government;

(b) after a briefing on Angola, both the President and Defense Minister of [place not declassified] were reported as furious, determined to get the Cubans out of Africa;

(c) the President of [place not declassified] was reported visibly upset after a briefing on Angola and sent the report to his Foreign Minister for discussion at a cabinet meeting;

(d) at a Geneva meeting of the ILO governing body, a great deal of informal discussion centered on the Cuban/Soviet role in Angola. Serious consideration was given to introducing a resolution condemning this activity, but the notion was dropped after comment that this was the type of action which had caused the U.S. to withdraw from the ILO.

Among our adversaries:

(e) a Cuban diplomat in an Asian capital visited the offices of all daily newspapers in an effort to offset published articles critical of the Cuban role in Angola;

(f) in two separate speeches before the recent MPLA congress in Luanda, the secretary to the CPSU Central Committee, Andrey Kirilenko, mentioned “the most vile fabrications concerning (Soviet) policy,” which in the context appears an almost certain indication of his irritation over the CIA campaign;

(g) Carlos Rafael Rodriquez, senior policy adviser to Fidel Castro, was reported concerned over the widespread campaign in several countries against Cuba and its role in Africa.

In addition, there is substantial evidence that CIA’s covert media campaign, combined with overt White House and State Department pronouncements on Angola, has stimulated substantial spontaneous foreign media coverage of this topic of a favorable nature.

6. Current Action: CIA continues to stimulate and encourage Field action in support of the 8 November 1977 Presidential finding.3 While world attention has tended to shift from Angola to the Horn of Africa, the Angolan situation retains a special relevance to developments in the Horn, as a parallel example of Soviet-backed Cuban intervention in Africa.

3 In a March 10 status report, the CIA reported: “As of 10 March, a total of 267 items have been placed in media of 51 countries with distribution as follows: Europe, [number not declassified]; Africa, [number not declassified]; Latin America, [number not declassified]; Near East, [number not declassified]; and East Asia, [number not declassified].” The report also noted that the Agency was attempting to reach Cubans via radio in addition to the media placement campaign. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files A–E, Box 25, Angola 11 July 1977–18 April 1978)
19. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, February 17, 1978

SUBJECT
Questions Regarding the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

1. How much communications do we have with Savimbi and his group?
   a. We maintain discreet direct contact with Savimbi to acquire intelligence from him when he travels outside of Angola. We also have discreet contacts for the same purpose with his representatives abroad who are in touch with him. His representatives in Zaire maintain contact with Savimbi by radio and courier. They also occasionally travel to Angola.
   b. [1 line not declassified]
   c. We have trained two of Savimbi’s men to be radio operators and provided them with radio gear. They have accompanied him back to Angola, and we anticipate that they will be in communication [less than 1 line not declassified] in the near future to report intelligence. At the moment they are traveling overland with Savimbi to his base camp in southeastern Angola.
   d. [4 lines not declassified]
   e. Savimbi has recently acquired a DC–4 aircraft which has made one trip from Zaire to southern Angola. We could send messages to Savimbi by this route.

2. How much communications could we establish with Savimbi and his group if we do not have any? If we do have some, how could they be upgraded?
   a. We have recently upgraded the communications by training the UNITA operators and providing them with [2 lines not declassified].
   b. We could upgrade by:
      —Stepping up our contacts with UNITA personnel outside Angola.
      —Training more operators.2
      —Providing additional gear to permit more of Savimbi’s regional bases to communicate securely with Savimbi as he moves from place

---

2 Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
to place. It would also provide him with better communications to his
subordinate commands and [less than 1 line not declassified].

—[3 lines not declassified]

—Provide Savimbi with a small jet transport aircraft to facilitate
his movements and permit him to leave Angola more frequently for
consultations. (In 1975–1976 [less than 1 line not declassified] commercial
interests provided him with such a jet.)

c. Pros of upgrading:
—Improve our intelligence on the situation in Angola.
—Enhance the security of Savimbi’s forces.
—Strengthen the effectiveness of his organization.
—Make more difficult the Cuban and MPLA task of containing
Savimbi’s forces.
—Boost morale of Savimbi.

d. Cons of upgrading:
—Moves our involvement in the direction of doing more than
merely collecting intelligence.
—Risks some exposure of the hand of the United States Govern-
ment.
—Could require funding from CIA [less than 1 line not declassified].

3. How much indirect help are we giving him?

a. To acquire intelligence we are providing him some help in the
form of assistance in communications as listed in paragraph 1 above.

b. Our freedom of action has been limited by the Tunney-Javits
amendment to the appropriations act for FY 1976 which reads:
“205,600,000, none of which, nor any other funds appropriated in this
Act may be used for any activities involving Angola other than intelli-
gence gathering.”

c. This applied specifically to the appropriations for FY 1976 and
has not been included in subsequent Acts. There is an open question
as to whether or not the Tunney-Javits amendment reflects continuing
intervention on the part of the Congress to restrict CIA support for the
insurgency movement in Angola.

4. How much indirect help could we give him?

a. In increasing order of magnitude we could:
—Stop advising friendly governments through diplomatic chan-
nels against aid to Savimbi.4

3 Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
4 Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point and Carter placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin.
—Avoid recognizing the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regime in Luanda as the Government of Angola.\(^5\)
—Encourage third parties to provide further help. For example, we could supplement the aid Morocco is providing by giving them funds to act on our behalf. Other countries such as France, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Zaire could be similarly encouraged.\(^6\)
—Give a signal to the Portuguese that we would like them to support Savimbi. We have reason to believe that they would be responsive to the degree it does not adversely affect their citizens and economic interests under MPLA control. For example, the Government of Portugal might turn a blind eye to the recruitment of mercenaries in Portugal.\(^7\)
—Provide covertly assistance to Savimbi in making his case known on the world scene.\(^8\)
—Use covert action resources to mobilize support for Savimbi among other nations.
—Provide third country nationals to assist in the training of Savimbi’s forces.\(^9\)
—Provide third country nationals to perform technical functions such as:
—Communications and transportation (radio operators, technicians, aircrews, etc.).
—Ordnance and logistics.
—Medical.
—Field intelligence.

b. Pros of more indirect help. Assistance to UNITA would tend to:
—Tie up more Cuban troops and Cuban and Soviet resources in Angola.
—Raise the price of the Cuban intervention in terms of casualties, army morale.
—Hearten other governments who now support Savimbi.
—Reduce the popularity in Cuba for intervention in Africa.
—Hamper the use of Angola as a training and staging area for other guerrilla movements.

---

\(^5\) Carter placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point.
\(^6\) Carter placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point.
\(^7\) Carter wrote in the right-hand margin: “Check with Carlucci.”
\(^8\) Carter underlined “making his case known” and placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point. Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin.
\(^9\) Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
—Maintain Savimbi’s movement to participate in a future national government which could expect to establish peace throughout Angola.
—Reduce capacity of Luanda regime to intervene elsewhere such as by support of Katangan infiltration of Zaire.
—Hasten the day when MPLA government in Luanda becomes realistic about need to compromise to form a national government.

c. Cons of more indirect help. More indirect help tends to:
—Introduce contentious issue of the interpretation of Tunney-Javits amendment.
—Raise level of fighting in Angola. (Savimbi will fight on, but with help he may fight much more intensively over a larger area.)
—Create tensions with those governments which support the MPLA by associating the United States Government more closely with governments which favor UNITA.
—Increase Neto’s present dependence on Soviet and Cuban military power and reduce whatever remaining tendency Neto may still have to adopt non-aligned foreign policy.
—Incite Soviets and Cubans to escalate their own involvement.
—Create additional obstacle to possible improvement in Cuban-United States relations.
—Associate United States more closely with present regime in Zaire and its protection.
—Complicate our relations with the Southwest African Peoples Organization (SWAPO).

In any event, indirect help is unlikely to reach a level which would permit Savimbi to win a clear-cut victory.10

10 Carter placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this point.
20. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, February 21, 1978

With reference to your enclosed note regarding help and/or communication with Savimbi,\(^2\) I have asked the CIA to respond to a number of specific questions. Their response is herewith attached.\(^3\)

I have marked on pages 2–4 certain limited actions we could undertake to enhance our communications with Savimbi and to provide him some limited indirect help. None of them would involve major engagement of U.S. resources or prestige, yet cumulatively they could upgrade his capabilities.

We will be considering this matter in the SCC,\(^4\) but given your personal initiative, I thought I would respond immediately.

---


\(^{2}\) Not found attached.

\(^{3}\) See Document 19.

\(^{4}\) Carter underlined “considering this matter in the SCC,” and wrote “good” in the right-hand margin.
WASHINGTON, MARCH 14, 1978

SUBJECT

Aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

REFERENCE

Memorandum from DCI to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of 17 February 1978, Subject: Jonas Savimbi

1. In response to your request, we attach a paper which discusses:

—The steps which might be taken to help the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)—for which you requested further elaboration.

—Impact of such steps on the Cubans.


2. In brief, these steps would strengthen Savimbi and help keep his forces active in the field, but they are unlikely to tip the scale toward a victory by UNITA. They would help UNITA to tie up more Cuban resources in Angola. The diplomatic moves and the program to provide limited assistance in communications would carry slight risk, but they would have proportionally less impact in tying up Cuban resources than the stimulation of further military aid. More substantial materiel help to UNITA would require consultation within the United States Government which would be difficult to keep secret. Compromise of a program of even indirect American materiel aid would work against UNITA. For example, American help to UNITA would be used to justify the continued presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

3. Our previous covert paramilitary support of UNITA in Angola generated a great deal of controversy. Thus, any new steps which verged on covert paramilitary activities should be considered in the light of the anticipated reaction within Congress.

Stansfield Turner


2 See Document 19.

3 Not found.

4 Turner signed “Stan” above this typed signature.
Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Aid to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

REFERENCE
Memorandum from DCI to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs of 17 February 1978

I. INTRODUCTION
For the past two years and without significant foreign assistance, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi, has prevented the regime of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), led by Agostinho Neto in Luanda, from consolidating its hold over Angola. UNITA has done this despite the presence of about 20,000 Cuban combat troops and massive Soviet and Communist Bloc military and other assistance. The United States could help Savimbi to make his guerrilla activities more effective and to expand his influence in the countryside by:

—Diplomatic steps to influence others to help Savimbi.
—Steps to improve UNITA communications to [less than 1 line not declassified].
—Covert political action to make his case better known abroad.
—Indirect materiel assistance.

These steps would not lead to an early Savimbi victory, but even modest steps could noticeably increase the cost in men and materiel to the Cubans and Soviets.

The obstacles to any American support of UNITA arise mainly within the United States. Exposure of a secret American program to support UNITA would tend to offset many of the advantages of the program. For example, the Cubans could justify their support of the Luanda regime as a defense against an American-backed attack on this regime. Furthermore, most of the steps contemplated would require some form of consultation with Congress. The controversial nature of the previous debates over support to UNITA would tend to make it harder now to preserve secrecy in Washington about any renewal of the support.

5 Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
II. SPECIFIC STEPS

A. Diplomatic
1. The following diplomatic steps would be significant:
   a. Stop advising friendly governments through diplomatic channels against aid to Savimbi.
   b. Avoid recognizing the MPLA regime in Luanda as the Government of Angola.
   c. Stimulate a change in Portuguese policy by discreetly advising President Eanes of American interest in the Portuguese quietly assisting Savimbi.
2. As these steps are outside the intelligence and covert action fields, further comment will not be made.

B. Communications
1. We could improve [less than 1 line not declassified] by improving communications with UNITA at either of two levels:
   a. A limited communications assistance program to provide radio gear and training to permit communications from each of four UNITA provincial bases to [less than 1 line not declassified] to other UNITA bases [1 line not declassified].
   b. An enhanced communications assistance program to provide radio gear and training for UNITA field intelligence collection teams and to link them with the four UNITA provincial bases. This program would provide training of UNITA communicators, technicians and intelligence collectors. It would provide upgrading of communications from UNITA in Kinshasa to UNITA headquarters—now in Mpupu in southern Angola. ([dollar amount not declassified])
2. We believe that such communications support to Savimbi would:
   —Expand [less than 1 line not declassified] on Savimbi’s activities, on Cuban military operations, and on relations among the Soviets, Cubans and Angolans.
   —Enhance the security of Savimbi’s present radio communications and deny intelligence to the Soviets and Cubans.
   —Enhance Savimbi’s ability to report significant developments to the outside world.
   —Enhance Savimbi’s command and control of his forces, improve his intelligence, and thereby improve UNITA’s combat effectiveness.
3. We believe that the impact on the Cubans would:
   —Increase Cuban losses in men and Soviet-provided materiel.
   —Cause Cubans to take steps to reduce casualties, withdraw to populated centers, etc., but have only a marginal impact on the size of Cuban forces in Angola.
—Reduce range and frequency of independent Cuban combat patrols, but stimulate Cubans to concentrate their forces and undertake operations in larger units.

—Force the Angolan military into a more active role in combat operations.

—Cause the Cubans to invest greater resources in training of Angolan army and militia.

C. Covert Action

1. We could provide to UNITA covert support along these lines:
   a. Covertly provide assistance to Savimbi in making his case better known on the world scene. (This would include working with UNITA to improve and expand its public information and representational activities abroad.)
   b. Disseminate information about UNITA’s struggle through our network of operational contacts in the foreign press.
   c. Bring Savimbi’s case to the attention of foreign governments and political leaders through cooperative foreign intelligence services and our agents of influence.

2. Third Party Aid to UNITA

   Since mid-1977 UNITA has been receiving some covert assistance [2 lines not declassified].

   We could stimulate such third party support to Savimbi by committing the United States to assist in a limited way. Specifically, we could take one of the following courses:

   —Provide funds directly to [place not declassified] for its use, as it sees fit, in assisting UNITA. We believe that amounts of [less than 1 line not declassified] dollars would be required to achieve a significant impact.

   —Provide funds directly to [place not declassified]—but tied to the purchase of medical supplies, clothing, food and other humanitarian aid for UNITA. ([dollar amount not declassified])

   —Provide funds to [place not declassified] tied to the purchase of specific war-related materiel of European manufacture for UNITA. ([dollar amount not declassified])

   All three of the above programs are based on our current knowledge of UNITA’s needs. We have not discussed the subject with Savimbi or other UNITA officials. If authorized to do so, we would be able to amend the above programs appropriately. We have selected [place not declassified] as the intermediary. [3 lines not declassified]

3. We believe that the above steps involving covert action and indirect aid through a third party would:
   a. Enhance UNITA’s combat effectiveness.
b. Buoy the morale of UNITA’s adherents in Angola.

c. Lessen the effects of hostile propaganda and political maneuverings against UNITA.

4. We believe the impact on Cuba would:
   a. Make continued military presence more expensive for the Cubans; increase losses in men and materiel.
   b. Make Cuba uncomfortable by unfavorable publicity about Cuba’s intervention in Angola.
   c. Further exacerbate the morale problem among the Cubans in Angola and the tension between the Cubans and Angolans.
   d. Promote Cuban domestic knowledge of and dissatisfaction with Cuba’s involvement in Angola.
   e. Contribute to putting Cuba on the defensive in international fora.
   f. Weaken support for the MPLA in international fora.

III. AUTHORIZATION

   A. In early 1976 Congress put an end to covert paramilitary support by CIA of Jonas Savimbi and UNITA by the Tunney-Javits Amendment to the Appropriations Act for 1976. This reads:

      “[dollar amount not declassified] none of which, nor any other funds appropriated in this Act may be used for any activities involving Angola other than intelligence gathering.”

   B. This applied specifically to the appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976 and has not been included in subsequent Acts. There is an open question as to whether or not the Tunney-Javits Amendment reflects continuing intervention on the part of the Congress to restrict CIA support for the insurgency movement in Angola. Before embarking on a covert action program involving direct or indirect paramilitary support, it would be wise to ascertain the sense of Congress.

   C. The Hughes-Ryan provision (Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) would not apply to those of the above steps which are strictly diplomatic—without a covert action aspect—or which are designed to improve intelligence collection and could be funded out of our current budget. However, even the limited communications assistance program would require consultation with the House and Senate Oversight Committees. Other steps considered above would require us to follow the Hughes-Ryan provisions.

   D. Appendix A⁶ lists each of the proposals mentioned above and what form of clearance it is judged would be required.

---

⁶ Appendix A, entitled “Authorization Required for Specific Steps Regarding UNITA,” is attached but not printed.
IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are other points which should probably be kept in mind in considering the above steps:

—Our diplomatic, political and indirect materiel aid to Savimbi is unlikely to match the help which the Soviets and Cubans are giving the present regime in Luanda. In other words, the above steps can strengthen Savimbi and help keep his forces active in the field, but they are unlikely to tip the scales toward a victory by UNITA.

—The system of briefing widely in Congress tends to make it difficult to carry out any covert action that does not enjoy virtually unanimous backing in Congress.

—The support of the Tunney-Javits Amendment in 1975 and early 1976 came from:

—Congressmen who were opposed to any engagement of American resources in a civil war in Africa.

—Congressmen who did not wish to consider a program that did not offer promise of a quick and clear-cut victory.

—Our previous covert paramilitary support of UNITA in Angola generated a great deal of controversy. Angola may be a poor choice as to the place where we try to engage in some further covert paramilitary action. An abortive attempt to reopen the issue of covert paramilitary support of UNITA—even indirect—could lead to damage to our capability and flexibility to undertake any covert action in the future.
22. Memorandum From Tom Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, April 10, 1978

SUBJECT
Relations With Unita

I was troubled by some of the discussion at the SCC on Unita² and feel that I should respond to it in a purely personal and private way.

1. It misses the point to discuss whether two radio sets will do one thing or another. Obviously they are a symbol. But of what? No matter what we say, I do not see that Savimbi can see them as anything but an earnest of more support later if he does well. They are, after all, meant to encourage him to do things that will (if successful) require more sophisticated forms of support. Are we willing to take this next step—and there will be a next step, either forward, involving us more, or off to the side and backwards, effectively welshing on an implied promise. I think you see them as a token of nothing more than the political support (or blessing) of the United States for Savimbi’s undertaking. Frankly, I don’t think that is worth much any more. The French and Moroccans—and Savimbi himself—will do what they think necessary no matter what we think. What we are willing to do in terms of tangible support will embolden their decisions of course—and that is why they will read your radio sets as a symbol of more to come. They know what our “blessing” is worth and assume that we know it also. We should not risk any misunderstanding that we are prepared to do more than we are able to.

2. Vance’s question was a fair one—What do you want? Again, I am disturbed by an answer that seems to say: “Let’s roll the dice and see what happens.” One possible outcome is that Savimbi will read us the same way that Siad Barre did, stick his neck out too far and get it chopped off. This would be a political and moral disaster. We have already done this once in Angola. Also, it is by no means clear that a half-hearted move to support Savimbi will have the result of getting the Cubans out or tying them down very much. It is equally likely to give them an excuse to stay there. Unless Savimbi is extremely success-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 73, Africa: Box 2 [II]. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
² Minutes of the SCC meeting on UNITA were not found.
ful and if he is, it will be little or no thanks to us it is not going to result in governmental rearrangements in Luanda that would reduce Cuban and Soviet influence. The Cubans will still have enough people to send some to Rhodesia if they want. The net result of a continuing insurgency is probably going to be continued difficulty for us in having useful relations with Angola. All of these things may well happen anyway—but what is the point of our being involved?

3. Now, the question of making the Cubans pay for their involvement in Angola. I am all for hanging them high on the propaganda petard but I gather that what you are aiming at is payment in physical terms. Expenditure of treasure does not bother me (nor, I suspect, does it bother the Cubans much either for the Soviets probably make most of it up). Since I am not a complete pacifist, I can also accept the idea of people being maimed and killed on occasion. But I cannot accept the idea that they get maimed and killed as part of a process that has no objective. Granted, our effect one way or the other may remain minimal—but why be involved on the side of greater slaughter when there is no pressing reason to do so? Is making an essentially secondary political point at the cost of human lives—Cuban and Angolan—morally acceptable?

4. A final note. You seem to think that you have a new wave of support in Congress for an interventionist policy. Perhaps you do (although I have seen nothing of it). Remember, though, that Kissinger’s Angola actions were briefed to the Congress with extreme conscientiousness and met no opposition. Once the going got rough, however, this support melted away leaving him—and our Angolan friends—high and dry.

3 Aaron highlighted this paragraph in the left-hand margin and drew a line to his comment at the end of the memorandum: “This is why I want better intelligence! If we can really tie the Cubans down there & make Rhodesia significantly more difficult for them then we should do it. But we don’t know that because our intelligence is so poor. DA.”
Washington, April 28, 1978

SUBJECT
Meeting of SCC Working Group on Horn, 28 April 1978

I chaired an SCC Horn Working Group which met for nearly two hours this morning. Principal issues discussed and actions agreed upon were as follows:

[Omitted here are issues and actions unrelated to Angola.]

Angola:

Following the meeting, CIA representatives showed me draft proposal for providing Savimbi with funds to enable him to publicize his fight against the Cubans in Angola. It impressed me as being both do-able and very much in line with the President's current desires. I asked them to prepare it for discussion at the next SCC.2

Comment:

With the sense of urgency about events in the Horn declining, the bureaucracy is slipping into go-slow patterns. This is most marked in State but also a problem in the Pentagon where getting anything through the cumbersome bureaucracy of ISA and JCS can take weeks. I plan to hold Horn Working Group meetings every couple of weeks now and recommend we continue to hold SCC meetings on the Horn at least once per month. Agenda for next SCC should include:3

1. Somalia—arms and related issues
2. Ethiopia—aid problems
3. Sudan—economic situation military aid
5. [3 lines not declassified]

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 10, SCC Meeting: #77 Held 5/15/78, 4/78–5/15/78. Secret; Outside System.
2 Brzezinski wrote: "OK" in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph.
3 Brzezinski underlined this sentence and wrote "schedule. ZB" in the right-hand margin.
24. Summary of Conclusions of Special Coordination Committee Meeting


SUBJECT
Horn of Africa

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Richard Moose, Asst Scy for African Affairs

Defense
David E. McGiffert, Asst Scy for ISA

OMB
Randy Jayne, Assoc Dir for Ntl Scy and Intl Affairs

USUN
Ambassador Andrew Young

JCS
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith

CIA
Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director

[name not declassified], Near Eastern Division, DDO

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
David Aaron

NSC
Gary Sick (Notetaker)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

Angola:

The Clark amendment\(^2\) effectively prohibits covert action of any nature with respect to Angola, including the sale of equipment to France for transfer to Angola. Based on Admiral Turner’s consultations on the Hill, all agreed that this would not be the time to try for repeal of the amendment. It was decided to leave the issue alone for now and simply tell the French that we are unable to respond. Defense pointed out that the sale of Redeye, which the French had requested, would have problems of transferability, quite apart from the Clark amendment.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Angola.]

---

\(^{1}\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 10, SCC Meeting: # 77 Held 5/15/78, 4/78–5/15/78. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

\(^{2}\) Reference is to an amendment to the U.S. Arms Export Control Act (1976), sponsored by Dick Clark (D-Iowa), which prohibited aid to groups involved in military or paramilitary operations in Angola.
25. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 14, 1978

SUBJECT
U.S.-Angolan Relations

The President has been informed that Angolan President Neto is anxious for a U.S. official to visit Luanda to discuss U.S.-Angolan relations. The President has determined that we might consider an unofficial visit focusing on these issues:

1. Namibia
2. Neto and Savimbi
3. Withdrawal of Cuban Troops
4. Recognition

The President stated that we should let the Angolans know our position on these issues clearly. In this connection, Ambassador McHenry should inform Angolan UN Representative Figueiredo of the issues we would want to discuss should Ambassador McHenry meet with Angolan officials in Luanda in the context of a Contact Group visit.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

---


2 In telegram 2352 from USUN, June 8, the Mission reported: “The most significant development was statement by Angolan Perm Rep that he had received message from Neto asking if it possible for ‘someone’ from the United States to visit Luanda.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–2654)

3 McHenry held a series of bilateral talks with the Angolans in Luanda June 22–25. The discussions are summarized in telegram 170933 to multiple posts, July 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780278–0415)
26. **Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State**

Kinshasa, August 20, 1978, 2219Z

9028. For AF DAS Walker or AF/C Country Director Junior from Charge. Subject: Message From Angolan President Neto to President Carter. Ref: State 209876.2

1. [less than 1 line not declassified] late August 20 that during lunch on Presidential riverboat same day Neto asked Mobutu to deliver message to President Carter. Neto’s message was that Angola wishes to establish diplomatic relations with United States. Mobutu agreed to Neto’s request and [less than 1 line not declassified] to deliver foregoing to Embassy for transmittal.

2. When queried about Mobutu’s reaction to Neto’s proposal to establish diplomatic relations with US, [less than 1 line not declassified] said that Mobutu had made no comment.

3. When delivering above information to [less than 1 line not declassified] said Neto told Mobutu that although Ambassador Andy Young understood Angola and its problems, by comparison, President Carter and Presidential advisor Brzezinski seemed unsympathetic to Angola.3 In spite of this, Neto reportedly said, he wants to move toward full diplomatic relations.

4. Neto also reportedly asked Mobutu to tell French President Giscard d’Estaing that GOA knows France is assisting UNITA and requests that such assistance be terminated.

5. I have just received message from GOZ Fon Minister Umba saying that Angolan Fon Minister Paulo Jorge will receive me at 0700 GMT August 21 when I intend to deliver contents of reftel on Namibia. Immediately after that meeting, Neto, Jorge, and retinue of about 80

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1/77–12/78. Secret; Sensitive; Niacit Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 In telegram 209876 to Kinshasa, August 18, the Department transmitted points to be made to the Angolans addressing rising violence at the Angola/Namibia border. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780337–0395)

3 In telegram 9067 from Kinshasa, August 21, the Embassy reported on Neto’s annoyance with the administration’s criticism of the Cuban presence in Angola: “Neto reportedly said Angola would not be able to take any steps toward reducing Cuban presence while under pressure from American Government. However, Neto added that he would be willing to receive a special US mission to Luanda to discuss and, as appropriate, ‘negotiate’ question of such a reduction.” Neto indicated that any negotiations “would have to start from promise that with any reduction of Cubans, USG would guarantee Angolan security and territorial integrity.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1/77–12/78)
leave for airport to return to Luanda. Mobutu will leave Kinshasa immediately thereafter for Gbadolite and then will go to Bangui for meetings with Emperor and Giscard.

Davis

27. Memorandum From Tom Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, August 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Angolan Initiative

The Angolan request for a meeting to discuss the Cuban presence, especially with the hooker about US guarantees, presents us with an intriguing problem. First, we have to determine the accuracy of the report. I think Walt Cutler should go back to Mobutu to confirm the details and get any atmospherics that he can. [1 line not declassified]

Second, we then have to decide how to respond. I think the USUN channel (McHenry) is appropriate to acknowledge receipt and convey our yes or no.

Third is the issue of the content of our response. I see no alternative but to accept the Angolan offer and, indeed, see it as a golden opportunity. As I have mentioned before, I think Neto is running very scared on both economic and political grounds and genuinely wants to make his peace. It is of course in our interest to do so if reasonable conditions are met. (One caveat: the guarantees demand could simply be a way of putting the burden for expected failure on us. I don’t think this is the case, but we have to guard against it.) We would be foolish to hold out for evacuation of all Cubans; equally foolish to go ahead with

---


2 An unknown hand drew a line from the phrase “The Angolan request” to the top of the memorandum and wrote a question mark next to it.

normalization in the absence of any movement. I think we should look for a substantial initial draw-down with the promise of reasonably rapid movement towards an acceptable level, and then move to normalize. The issue of Angolan security should be answered in terms of Angola normalizing its relationship with Zaire (to which we will be a contributor) and getting the Namibia agreement sealed. Once these are done, the question of external security is moot. That will leave, however, the question of internal security and Savimbi—which the Angolans surely must have also had in mind. That is not going to be an easy choice of course, but on balance I think I would cut Savimbi off completely (and ask others to do so) if we were reasonably sure that we were getting what we want from Neto. Solution of his Savimbi problem, plus settlements with Zaire and Namibia, substantially remove the reason for keeping Cubans in Angola. This does not exactly solve our Savimbi problem in its moral or political dimensions. McHenry believes that foreign support is the obstacle to Savimbi-Neto negotiations; I fear that withdrawal of foreign support removes Neto’s incentive to negotiate at all. Nonetheless, I see no good reason to keep Savimbi in play unless we think he has reasonable near-term prospects of taking over. As far as I can tell, that is not likely.

Fourth is the question of sending a delegation. We should do so—not too high-powered, but something more than just Don McHenry. I would recommend that David go along with Don; if that is impossible, then somebody else from NSC. Neto perceives a split between USUN/State on the one hand and the White House on the other. A united front will both enhance our credibility and reduce the danger of misunderstandings on the home front.

These are initial thoughts; State will be sending specific recommendations. (I don’t know what they will be but assume that they will not be too different from mine.) I am rather confident of my sense of timing. The Angolan question is a mixture of interrelated factors: the threat from Zaire; the threat from South Africa (Namibia); the threat from Savimbi; catastrophic economic situation; numerous problems with the Soviets and Cubans—all of these press Neto to compromise. Our failure to respond could make him swallow the last two and rely increasingly on the Cubans. A deal involving normalization and withdrawal of

---

4 An unknown hand underlined “substantial initial draw-down with the promise of reasonably rapid movement towards an acceptable level” and wrote “And some solution to Savimbi” in the left-hand margin.

5 An unknown hand underlined “I fear that withdrawal of foreign support removes Neto’s incentive to negotiate at all” and wrote “Indeed” in the left-hand margin.

6 An unknown hand highlighted the last two sentences in the margin and wrote “Overdrawn: problem is how to use the Savimbi lever” in the left-hand margin.
Cubans is his way of getting out from under and is precisely what we want. I see no guarantee that the terms of the trade are going to get markedly better.

7 Dodson wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “Bob Pastor’s read it and concurs. CD.” An unknown hand also wrote: “1) The pressure is on Neto—not us: and his situation gets worse, not better, with time, even if not rapidly & markedly so. 2) We should not cut Savimbi off—rather, our first approach to Neto should include notion of negotiations with Savimbi (whom we should push, too): this is only way we can keep leverage alive and build basis for cutting Savimbi off if it comes to that. 3) Package has to include some reduction of Soviet presence, as well.”

28. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, November 17, 1978

SUBJECT
Moose Mission to Luanda

Attached at Tab A are proposed instructions to the Moose mission to Angola which departs Saturday evening, November 18. These instructions are based on our existing policy as well as the deliberations in the Mini-PRC.

The Moose mission will explore the possibility of a draw-down in Cuban forces in exchange for steps toward normalization. In this connection, we would offer to work with the Angolans on removing external threats to their security. We would not, however, indicate a willingness to discourage others from aiding UNITA. Rather, we would point out and seek to discuss the possibility that the UNITA insurgency could be terminated through the establishment of a government of national reconciliation and the withdrawal of Cuban combat forces.

The Delegation will also seek support for our efforts for a peaceful solution to the problems of Namibia and Rhodesia and will indicate our support for their efforts to improve relations with Zaire.

---


2 Tab A, a November 17 memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, is attached but not printed.
On the question of trade and aid, State would like to indicate that we “favor increased U.S. private sector involvement in Angola” and offer to “provide interested U.S. firms with what information and counsel we can by way of encouragement.” State also requests that the Delegation be permitted to mention the possibility of considering further ExIm credits (e.g., with the Benguela Railway) once Angola’s current arrears are cleared up.

Since the latter will be politically visible, we would like your guidance on whether the Delegation should go this far.

---

3 Carter underlined the phrases “favor increased U.S. private sector involvement in Angola” and “provide interested U.S. firms with what information and counsel we can by way of encouragement.” He also highlighted the last sentence and placed a question mark in the left-hand margin.

4 Brzezinski wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “(In brief, I want to avoid a repetition of the May experience, when all of a sudden we seemed to becourting Angola, without any tangible quid pro quo).” Carter wrote “I agree” next to Brzezinski’s note.

---

29. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, November 18, 1978

SUBJECT

Moose Mission to Luanda

Based on the discussion of the Mini-PRC on the Moose mission to Angola, the President has approved the following instructions:

1. Our principal strategic concern is that Angola not serve as a base for further Soviet and Cuban military intervention in Africa. Removal of the present Cuban combat forces will be necessary for normalization to take place. We are prepared, if the Angolans reciprocate, to take steps toward improved relations should they be prepared to take steps to meet our principal security concerns.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 18, State: 10/78–2/79. Secret; Sensitive.

2 Minutes of the mini-PRC meeting were not found.
2. The objective of the Moose mission should be to ascertain Angolan willingness to move in this direction. To this end, the Delegation can offer to work with the Angolans to remove external threats to their security and, in particular, make clear to them our intention to seek a peaceful solution to the problems in Namibia and Zimbabwe. The Delegation should seek Angolan support for these efforts. We are also prepared to support an improved relationship between Angola and Zaire.

3. On the issue of UNITA, the Moose mission should encourage and explore the possibility of internal reconciliation between the Neto Government and UNITA. The Delegation should emphasize that the United States is giving no support to UNITA. Should the Angolans raise the issue of discouraging others from supporting UNITA, the Delegation should seek to explore the possibility that the UNITA insurgency might be ended by internal reconciliation and withdrawal of Cuban combat forces.

Zbigniew Brzezinski³

³ Aaron signed for Brzezinski.

30. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State¹

Kinshasa, November 24, 1978, 1027Z


1. Summary: US and Angolan delegations met for over two hours afternoon November 21 for discussion of Angolan security concerns. Several key elements in current GRPA thinking on subject crystallized in course of meeting: (a) heavy preoccupation with southern border instability to virtual exclusion of northern border about which GRPA seems relaxed for the moment; (b) concern in this connection with SAG intentions and alleged “actual physical presence” of South Africans in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 11/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
Angola; (c) absence of rhetoric about SWAPO but reaffirmation of unconditional GRPA support for SWAPO and speedy conclusion of internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia; (d) ruling out of any reconciliation with UNITA which was dismissed as narrow-based tribalistic terrorist group devoid of either domestic significance or support and which would disappear once external aid ceased; (e) justification of continued large Cuban military presence on historical grounds as well as alleged shifting emphasis of Cuban presence from combat role to technical assistance and training of Angolan cadres. GRPA sought USG assistance on: (a) ensuring early genuine Namibian independence; and (b) ending outside aid to UNITA.

Second session to continue discussion of security question set for morning of November 22, septel sent. Full memcons being despatched from Kinshasa. End summary.

2. Southern border threat. Number of significant points emerged on Angolan perception of its security situation: (a) Angolan FonMin Jorge emphasized southern border instability with noticeable lack of concern about present border relations with Zaire; (b) GRPA absolutely convinced that SAG would commit further aggression against Angola, sooner or later; (c) in such event, Angola would not conceal fact that it preparing to meet this aggression with “every means at its disposal—national and international—to preserve Angola’s national sovereignty, territorial integrity and revolutionary process which is consistent with aspiration of Angolan people”; (d) in this regard Angola would be involved anew in war not because it desired this route but because SAG would have forced it upon Angolan people; (e) as long as Namibia not independent there would be clashes and military conflict, even conflict on a major scale owing to Angola’s unconditional support for SWAPO as legitimate representative of Namibian people and fact that political and social system Angola had chosen seemed objectionable to South Africa and its allies; and (f) GRPA was convinced that Western intelligence should have known of SAG military buildup on Angola’s borders. Moose enumerated recent steps taken in Pretoria and Washington to highlight urgent USG concern at SAG actions in regard to Namibia/Angola border. US policies were directed at enhancement of security in South-Central Africa which accounted for our persistence on Namibian question which has such important bearing upon Angolan security situation. Criticism of USG/South African contacts ignores fundamental belief that such exchanges are aimed at facilitation of ultimate solution. Moose said USG prepared to approach SAG again on border threats when it was felt this would be useful. (In this connection,
Moose sought and received Jorge’s assent to importance of Angola’s exercising restraint on SWAPO.)

3. US aid with Angolan security. Jorge then turned to possible US role in this grim situation, stating there were “certain measures” US and other Western powers could be taking: (a) insure that Namibia achieved independence on internationally acceptable terms as soon as possible; and (b) to bend every effort to end external assistance to UNITA. He reiterated that in case of attack GRPA would use “all means, national and international, to combat such aggression”.

4. UNITA. While UNITA had caused MPLA some problems, Jorge strongly denied periodic rumor in Western circles that UNITA “occupied” certain Angolan provinces. He depicted UNITA as “creation of Portuguese colonial armed forces created to fight against the MPLA which was only movement that had waged genuine independence struggle”. GRPA views UNITA as “primarily tribal in origin whose support depended on the Umbundu (Ovimbundu) who are terrorists and racists, and allied with those who support apartheid”. In such circumstances Jorge asked rhetorically how certain countries could consider collaboration with this organization, or could even remotely suggest that the GRPA endeavor to achieve reconciliation or a government of national unity with UNITA. As Angola, in contrast to UNITA, upheld principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference and non-use of violence, Jorge failed to understand how certain countries would not accept Angola’s right to choose its own political-social system and its determination to build a socialist society.

5. Clark Amendment. Jorge stated Angolan concern over events of last spring, relating to the Clark Amendment, citing specific members of the NSC Staff as having played a role in those events which raised questions about their attitude toward UNITA. Moose responded firmly to this charge citing the President’s statements with regard to non-interference in Angolan affairs, emphatically denying any support for UNITA or encouragement of others and citing subsequent gestures toward understanding with Angola. After another exchange on this matter Jorge let it drop.

Pursuing Jorge’s remarks on UNITA, Moose stated that we should explore this question further including the fact that the presence of Cuban forces in Angola is one reason why some governments may still be providing assistance to UNITA.

6. Benguela Railway. Reopening of Benguela was a fruit of détente in Central Africa and could contribute importantly to economies of Angola, Zaire and Zambia. On historical note, Jorge remarked that when MPLA had succeeded in expelling South Africa and Zaire, it found 130 bridges destroyed. UNITA confined itself to sabotage, pillaging, bomb planting, and terrorism. Sabotage is difficult to control in vast country like Angola and two more bridges had been destroyed recently.
7. Concluding, Moose stressed the concept that normalization was an objective which could flow from the process of dealing with problems which US viewed as threatening the stability of the area including Namibia, Rhodesia and Angola/Zaire, emphasizing that the introduction or threat of introduction of foreign military forces into such situation made their resolution more difficult and would affect US ability to play a constructive role. It is essential for US and Angola to work together to break the complex “chicken and egg” syndrome involving Angolan security and Cuban military presence.

8. Another meeting set for morning of November 22.

9. S/S please insure appropriate lateral distribution.

31. **Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State**

Kinshasa, November 23, 1978, 1400Z


[1.] Summary: Morning session Nov 22 continued with discussion of Angolan security concerns, with main emphasis on Angolan rationale for Cuban presence and US explanation of questions that Cuban presence raises in consideration of future of US-Angolan relations. USDel concluded with urging of Angolan cooperation in preventing any widening of conflict in Southern Africa in same spirit it has worked with us on Namibia and Zaire, which could enhance prospects for our relations. End summary.

2. Moose opened substantive discussion of Angolan security concerns by distinguishing Carter African policy from that of its predecessors by its emphasis on conflict resolution in Southern Africa directed at independence for peoples in that area. USG ability to pursue this objective constrained domestically by limited public understanding of complexity of issues involved. US recognition that Angolan policy strongly influenced by perception of its security situation is element underlying US efforts to find settlement in Namibia and Rhodesia and

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 11/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
support for Angolan/Zairian reconciliation. Moose asked Angolans to assess relationship between level of Cuban presence in Angolan in three different situations—(a) existing improved border situation in north; (b) a stabilized situation on the southern border; and (c) a Namibian settlement.

3. Zairian reconciliation. Jorge responded that Angola had taken bulk of initiatives in reconciliation with Zaire and was pleased that process was “going forward smoothly”, noting range of agreements in transportation, commercial and other areas. Moose interjected that he would be meeting with Mobutu on Nov 24 and would reaffirm the importance we attach to continued progress in implementation of practical measures of reconciliation. Jorge gracefully declined offer of US intervention with Mobutu on specific unresolved issues believing them to be susceptible to bilateral resolution. Similarly, Jorge declined US offer to see whether we could assist Angola through UNHCR in defraying costs of resettling returning Angolans.

4. Southern border. Jorge said tensions would persist on southern border as long as Namibia is “illegally occupied”. Stabilization of Namibian situation would enable GRPA to concentrate national energies on social and economic development.

5. Cuban presence. Jorge gave no ground on Cuban presence which Angolans consider essential as long as threat of further SAG aggression persists. Cuban presence, based on bilateral agreements, is being increasingly directed away from combat role to one of military training and civil projects in fields such as health, fisheries and education. Overriding GRPA concern is to develop indigenous cadres in all sectors, including military. This said, however, as long as Angola was subjected to South African threats, it would continue to seek “whatever help we need.” Jorge said GRPA could not understand duality of Western attitude on foreign military presence since the West maintained forces in South Korea and FRG, for example, and had accepted uncritically French military bases in Africa, and maintained its own military base in Cuba. Jorge said he understood US concern over Cubans in Angola in context of “longstanding conflict between US and Cuba.” He wondered aloud, however, whether we would have had similar concern if French or Germans had been involved instead of Cubans. He was sure we would not have been concerned. He suggested US and others were departing from principle of even-handed treatment of nations out of a concern to combat the development of a Socialist society and the establishment of a Communist regime in Africa. He regretted ex-colonialist powers’ efforts to maintain status quo on African continent and noted that no Socialist country was to be found among these former colonialists. Angola had been invaded by two regular armies since independence, something unique in post-independent Africa.
6. In response Moose noted that Jorge’s mention of the shifting nature of Cuban presence raised questions regarding the continuing requirement for so large a combat contingent which, in turn, raised the further possibility that such forces might become involved in surrounding areas, for example, Rhodesia. The US would be opposed to such intervention, either by South Africa or Cuba. Jorge agreed that foreign forces should not intervene in such situation and stated that the Angolans had no indication that Cuban forces were involved in Zambia or Namibia; that there was “no flow of Cubans from Angola to Zambia;” and that “the maintainance of Cubans in Angola is in no way related to the situation in Zimbabwe or Namibia.” Many Cubans had returned to their country and once Angola was free from any possible aggression, there would be no need for outside military presence.

7. UNITA. Jorge said he hoped [in?] the context of bilateral cooperation that the US could assist by taking actions to eliminate external assistance to UNITA. The day UNITA ceased to receive external aid it would disappear, for UNITA is insignificant as an internal force which is why it resorts to banditry and terrorist strikes. Jorge noted that Moose had indirectly acknowledged foreign support for Savimbi. Moose responded that knowledge gained by “independent unilateral means” did not imply approval and that we could not control such situations. UNITA problem had both its external and internal aspects and US wondered, granting that it was an internal matter, what Angola proposed to do about the domestic aspects of the problem.

8. Comment: The Angolans are intensely concerned over the situation in the south. Receding prospects of a Namibia settlement may have affected their evaluation of the current possibility of movement in the Cuban troop-US/Angolan normalization complex. Just as we have established a withdrawal-normalization linkage, the Angolans make a link between a Namibian settlement and Cuban withdrawal. There is no doubt that they regard the removal of SAG forces from their southern border as a basic security objective. A settlement in Namibia would remove the threat of SAG forces aimed at Angola’s Socialist govt and at Angolan assistance for a legitimate liberation movement. Our estimates notwithstanding, the Angolans also believe that the removal of SAG control and its forces from Namibia would also reduce if not eliminate UNITA as a threat. They believe they would then be able to concentrate on their internal social and economic development and reduce their dependence on the Soviets and Cubans. I find nothing unreasonable in this from their point of view and believe that their position constitutes an important added incentive for a strong stand with the SAG on the implementation of the Contract Group
proposal. The Angolans regard the withdrawal of an illegal South African presence from their borders as a more legitimate and immediate concern than our concentration on the removal of Cubans from Angola.

9. The Angolans do not seem to expect movement at this meeting on the basic question which divides us. Thus, there seems little prospect that we will see President Neto, although our reception otherwise could not have possibly been more friendly. Within the terms of our instructions there seems little else to be said at this point. The Angolans have evidenced no interest in discussing trade or technical assistance matters. We plan to remain here until noon Thursday but we do not anticipate any further formal meetings after this afternoon’s session which we expect to devote to Namibia. Arrangements are being made for one of our party to visit the Americans in jail.

10. S/S pls insure appropriate lateral distribution.

Cutler

---

32. Telegram From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State

Kinshasa, November 24, 1978, 1215Z


1. Summary: The Angolan Govt asserts that dip recognition of Angola by the US is a necessary next step before normalization can proceed further and for the development of trade or assistance. Jorge asks what the United States would do if Angola were attacked by the SAG? End summary

2. Angola view on Namibia:

FonMin Jorge opened session by giving following exposition of GRPA view of Namibia situation: GOA doubts that Group of Five\(^2\) will exert sufficient pressure on SAG to bring about SAG cooperation with UNSC resolutions on Namibia. Despite Oct visit of five FonMins to Pretoria, SAG is going ahead with unilateral elections.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 11/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 The Five refers to the five Western governments on the UN Security Council: Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
GRPA sees two possible scenarios for Namibia situation: either Group of Five will put firm “even violent,” pressure on SAG to conform to UNSC resolutions, or the armed struggle will intensify. If the Five continue to abstain on, or even veto, Chapter Seven sanctions, the international community will interpret this as a contradiction of the proposals espoused by the Five in UNSC. If SAG goes ahead with elections, this will lead to a situation similar to Rhodesia in 1965. The so-called leaders emerging from the elections will claim they have been chosen by the people, when in fact the people have been forced to elect them. This will lead to inevitable military confrontation, with OAU which recognizes SWAPO, Angola continuing to provide assistance to SWAPO in this situation. (Comment: In fact, GRPA is now restraining SWAPO.)

3. US response on Namibia:

In reply McHenry referred to Front Line, particularly GRPA, support for Group of Five efforts. He reviewed Pretoria meeting and subsequent developments. The Five felt that at Pretoria meeting the problems the SAG had raised earlier may have been resolved. But Five could not commit SYG on arrival of UNTAG and date of election. Hence, Ahtisaari trip was thought essential and could have served to distinguish prospective unilateral December election from “real” elections and test SAG sincerity. The idea of Ahtisaari trip not have been accepted, we have since sought to emphasize the necessity of some sort of contact between SYG and SAG, whether in New York or elsewhere. We have made it clear to SAG on a number of recent occasions that time for a negotiated settlement is running out, that an internal settlement will have no international support and will not work, and that they will be held accountable for any actions they take in Namibia or against Angola to exacerbate the situation. As for SAG intentions, even the SAG probably does not know what they are, but this should become clear in the next month. Just as we have cautioned SAG, we hope that GRPA will urge SWAPO to refrain from actions which could exacerbate present delicate situation. Jorge acknowledged need for restraint at delicate point in negotiations but said that South Africa daily continued violence against Namibia, Angola and even people of South Africa.

4. Angolan security:

Although Jorge had said at outset that security concerns had been adequately discussed, after Namibia discussion he raised it in a very pointed form: “If we were convinced that SAG was about to carry out

---

3 Reference is to Rhodesia’s November 1965 unilateral declaration of independence from the United Kingdom.
further aggression against Angola, what would the US do?” The GRPA was not seeking an immediate reply, but wished USG to think about it. Moose replied that we would not undertake to answer this question in the abstract. Much would depend on the circumstances of such an event. Origins of and responsibility for violence are often difficult to determine with so many armed forces in the area. In any event, we would take back to Washington the question raised by Jorge. McHenry observed that SAG tended to forget that SAG presence in Namibia and thus on Angola’s border was illegal but SAG nevertheless blames everything on SWAPO. Jorge’s question underscored the need to concentrate on resolving the cause of the problem. In reply to Moose’s request that he elaborate on his earlier reference to “physical presence of SAG forces in Angola,” Jorge cited Nov 11 Neto speech which describe SAG trucks crossing into Angola with “men and equipment” of SAG army; SAG helicopters landing in Angolan territory, unloading personnel, “planning actions,” and rescuing UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi; SAG hot pursuit of SWAPO forces into Angola; firefights between SAG and GRPA forces; and SAG overflights of Angolan territory “to select targets for attack.”

5. Normalization of US-Angolan relations:

Jorge observed that despite a variety of contacts at various levels, GRPA believes USG had not given serious consideration to normalization. GRPA wished to establish and maintain relations will all states on basis of universally accepted principles without any preconditions and without regard to system of government or alignment. On this basis a number of capitalist countries have asked to establish relations with GRPA. GRPA’s position is that diplomatic relations “must first pass through phase of de jure or de facto recognition.” Hence in establishing relations with US, first step is US recognition of People’s Republic of Angola. “This means that for purposes of normalization the first step will have to be taken by the US.” GRPA position is that any or all trade or technical cooperation should take place within a formal framework of diplomatic relations. (GRPA had previously said it would study our offer of humanitarian assistance and did so again on this visit. Moreover, Jorge ignored three mentions which we made of trade as an agenda item for these talks.) Noting a certain volume of trade already exists, Jorge said that “these developments are jeopardized for lack of a formal framework.”

6. US response on normalization

Moose said US position on normalization was clouded by events of recent past and took into account: a) attitudes of US body politic; b) origins of Angolan Government; c) its relations with other governments; d) GRPA’s role in politics and security in South-Central Africa;
and e) presence of foreign military forces and their prospective role in neighboring countries.

Moose acknowledged obvious importance which GRPA attached to its sovereignty, its deep concern for its security, and its aspirations for the well-being of its people.

Moose said we would convey GRPA positions to President and Secretary. Moose said there were many important areas in which USG and GRPA could work together and that many serious concerns were shared together. US looked forward to continuing cooperation on these issues and, in any event, neither had any choice as issues at stake were too important for either to ignore.

7. Obstacles to normalization

Jorge asked Moose to elaborate on factors which inhibited normalization since, in his view, these were obstacles that did not normally govern establishment of relations between states. The GRPA viewed such questions as foreign troop presence as internal affairs. One thing was quite clear, Jorge said: There were no pre-conditions on the Angolan side to the establishment of relations.

Moose said that he had spoken not of conditions but of considerations in terms of US public opinion and policy implications. Moose said it was quite clear that the GRPA and the Angolan people came to their independence at a time when the American people did not clearly understand the realities surrounding those events, and that confusion remained in the American mind as to what had happened when it was all over. Continuing disaffection today in certain areas of Angola tended to perpetuate questions arising from the war such as the degree of GRPA control and popular support. Moreover, continuing large presence of foreign combat forces might somehow be related to the internal dissidence and be injected into the future politics of the region.

Jorge said Angolans appreciate the frankness with which Moose had spoken. He categorically denied the validity of “opinion in certain circles that the government of Luanda is not the Government of Angola.” It simply is not true, he said, that vast areas of Angola are not under GRPA control, as skeptical journalists accompanying Belgian Fon Min Simonet had acknowledged following recent visit to alleged UNITA and FNLA strongholds. Jorge concluded that US public opinion suffers from same false impression resulting from general American lack of awareness of international developments. GRPA by contrast had carefully prepared Angolans for normalization of Angola’s relations with Zaire, which had not been easy to accept.

Reverting to question of Cuban presence as obstacle to US normalization of its relations with Angola, Jorge asked rhetorically whether
US in recognizing Djibouti had taken into account the presence of some 7000 French troops there at the time.

8. Next steps in relations

Concluding, Jorge said GRPA was prepared again to take up normalization question once USG found itself in a positive frame of mind and could see its way beyond these various conditions. In meantime GRPA wishes USG to know that it has control over all its territory although it continues to have to contend with terrorist acts which, in the end, count for little. GRPA would also continue its policy of establishing relations with those countries which wished to do so.

9. US press access to Angola

Acknowledging that US had great deal still to learn about Africa, Moose suggested that better US press access to Angola could aid this process immeasurably. It was within GRPA power to take facilitating measures to create better understanding for Angola within US. Jorge replied that GRPA would take Moose’s suggestion into account.

10. Americans in prison

Asked if USDel had other points it wished to raise, Moose said we would like to have GRPA permission for one member of delegation, for humanitarian reasons, to visit American citizens incarcerated at Luanda. Jorge said he would see what could be done.

Moose raised specific case of AmCit George Gause who had been in prison for a considerable time on charges of reportedly illegal possession of firearms but had never received a trial. On last visit to Angola, USDel had been unable to see Gause because he was hospitalized. Moose stressed that, whatever their actions or the individual merit of their respective cases, all citizens have equal rights to our concern under US law. Jorge expressed unfamiliarity with Gause case but undertook to bring it to attention of the competent authorities to see what might be done. (Comment: Visit did not materialize but assistance of Fon-Ministry officials and of the Italian Amb has been enlisted in getting to the prisoners mail and packages which delegation had brought out.)

11. Closing statement:

Jorge expressed appreciation for USDel’s visit and for frank and open approach taken to the talks. He hoped better US understanding would develop of Angola’s people, its party and govt which would lead to establishment of relations. In this regard he said he trusted US would not be last country to recognize Angola. Jorge asked Moose to convey to highest authorities in USG Angola’s desire to establish a fully independent country, one truly independent also economically, so that the Angolan people might enjoy the full benefits of their hard-won independence.
12. Comment follows septel.4
13. S/S please ensure appropriate lateral distribution.

Cutler

4 Not found. The conversation between Jorge and Moose was reported in telegram 12235 from Kinshasa, November 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850070–1823)

33. Memorandum From Jerry Funk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, March 23, 1979

SUBJECT

Angola

Vibrations on Recognition

As you are aware from my report of conversation with Tsongas,2 he and others of our friends on the Hill are agitating for Angolan recognition. (C)

There continues to be modest agitation within State/AF in favor of such a move. The arguments run along these lines:

—U.S. presence useful in encouraging continued Angolan cooperation on Namibia
—Angola has been cooperative on stabilizing the Zaire border, and Shaba
—Recognition will encourage Neto on his “opening to the West.”
—U.S. presence could help to counter Soviet/Cuban presence.
—U.S. commercial interests would benefit.


2 In a March 22 memorandum to Brzezinski, Funk reported on his March 21 meeting with Senator Tsongas, in which they discussed the disagreement between the administration and Congress over the recognition of Angola. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 3/13–31/79)
There is validity in all of this. The argument really comes down to the tactical issue joined in my talk with Senator Tsongas,—is the best way to get rid of the Cubans to demand that quid pro quo before recognition, or to recognize and then work on the problem from closer quarters? (C)

Today, David Morse (Mobutu’s new attorney, who just returned from seeing his client in Paris), tells me that Senator McGovern (last week) asked him (Morse) to ask Mobutu if he would like to see U.S. representation in Luanda. Morse tells me that Mobutu said yes, and would do all he could to facilitate it. (Morse will report this to McGovern today). (C)

The point is, I think we can expect pressures from the Hill to grow in favor of recognition.³ (C)

Immediate Problem

Angola has been making noises recently about several potential aircraft purchases,—including Bell helicopters, C–130’s, and 747’s,—all just talk to date. (C)

But Rockwell International has informed State that the Angolan Ministry of Defense wants to buy 12 Rockwell Turbo-Commander 690–B aircraft (executive propjets) at $900,000 a copy, for surveillance purposes. (C)

(Note: Past sales to Angolan Airlines include three 737’s from Boeing,—approved without condition,—and two 707’s from third countries. And we approved the sale of two L–100’s (C–130’s) to the Angolan cargo airline “for civil and commercial purposes.”) (C)

The issue now is whether to approve the sale of 12 Rockwell surveillance aircraft, and if so, under what conditions.⁴ (C)

The preliminary and informal indications I get from State are that they will probably recommend to the Secretary a “wait and see” policy, while they try to get a feel for the climate on the Hill. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

1. We should weigh in early as being opposed to the Rockwell sale, as it has direct military application.⁵ (C)

Against Sale _____ For Sale _____

³ In the right-hand margin next to this sentence, David Aaron wrote: “Fine let them grow into a chorus.”

⁴ Aaron and Brzezinski both wrote “no” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

⁵ Brzezinski checked and initialed the option “Against Sale.” Aaron concurred and wrote “my view” in the left-hand margin next to the option.
Wait for more Hill reactions ______
Other______

2. That we adopt an *active* line. That we are in favor of “a series of steps toward normalizing relations, but should not start with full recognition, as demanded by MPLA, and that we hope for some meaningful reduction of the Cuban potential for further African adventurism”.\(^6\) (C)

Yes______ No______ Other______

\(^6\) The “yes” option was checked, presumably by Aaron who highlighted the option and wrote “That has been our policy all along if by Cuban potential you mean Cuban troop levels. DA” below it.

---

34. **Memorandum From the United States Representative to the United Nations (Young) to President Carter and Secretary of State Vance\(^1\)**

New York, March 27, 1979

**SUBJECT**

Recognition of Angola

The present political turmoil in South Africa requires contingency planning. The information scandal\(^2\) and possible elections in South Africa threaten to undermine the peaceful change we have sought to nurture in southern Africa. We must try not to let this happen. One step we can take is to normalize relations with Angola now. This step will give us greater diplomatic leverage and influence in the critical

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 3/13–31/79. Secret.

\(^2\) The scandal involved a series of allegations and disclosures about the misappropriation of secret funds controlled by Dr. Cornelius (Connie) Mulder’s Department of Information in 1978. The scandal led to Mulder’s resignation in November 1978 and to B.J. Vorster’s resignation as State President on June 4, 1979. Cabinet changes were announced on June 14. (*Keesing’s Contemporary Archives*, 1979, pp. 29835–29836)
months ahead. It will further our political and economic interests in southern Africa.

Our Policy

For the past two years, our policy objectives in southern Africa have been:

1) stable conditions to facilitate trade and development;
2) political and economic approaches toward majority rule and democratic conditions;
3) minimizing Soviet influence, violence, and chaos which impede our objectives.

We have approached these objectives by attempting to serve as a bridge between South Africa and the Front Line States. We have worked in cooperation with our western allies to find a common ground for negotiated solutions to southern Africa’s conflicts.

With great difficulty, we have maintained a mediating role and preserved a somewhat tarnished credibility among all parties. We have contained violence and limited internationalization of conflicts though we have been unable to produce meaningful settlements of either Rhodesian or Namibian situations.

Turmoil in South Africa

Now we see South Africa threatened again with internal scandal which eliminates the immediate possibility of their contributing positively to change. It will take many months before they might emerge with a government strong enough to give leadership without creative external pressure.

This increases the potential for Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in Namibia and the further military involvement of South Africa in Rhodesia as they seek to create a “laager type unity” to diffuse their internal pressures.

It will inevitably mean more calls for sanctions from African states and will continually put us on the defensive in regard to Soviet-Cuban propaganda and expanded military efforts.

Domestic Implications

A Senate vote to send observers to Rhodesia and/or end sanctions\(^3\) returns us to the days of the Byrd Amendment and brands the U.S. once again the supporter of racism and colonialism.

This will be more difficult to deal with now than in the 60’s and 70’s. African states are stronger economically and politically and will

\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 225.
tend to exercise that power in the UN, trade negotiations, OPEC (Nigeria, Angola, Gabon).

At a time when we must increase exports to help in our control of inflation and unemployment, it effectively poisons the atmosphere for our corporations and puts them at a disadvantage against the German, Japanese, Eastern Europeans, and now Brazilian competitors.

We can also suffer severe set-backs domestically. While there is little in the way of an organized African policy among Black voters, any collapse of our African policy will be used to confirm the growing cynicism and racial distortion of Administration policies.

The Front Line States

It is now of critical importance to strengthen our relations with the Front Line and Nigeria. Events are escalating rapidly. Our ability to influence events are rapidly being diminished by the naive Congressional moves toward Ian Smith. This pushes Africa away from us and literally forces them toward Soviet dependence.

It is very much in our national interest to minimize a cold war view of Africa. We can demonstrate our continued superiority and concern by emphasizing the “development aspects” of African politics in lieu of temporary frustrations of Western efforts on liberation and majority rule.

Development has always been our major weapon in competition with the Soviets. Our private sector is capable of putting millions of dollars into investment and technology in African development. Nowhere is this more appreciated than in those states where Soviet influence has been dominant but is now waning. Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola are key examples of countries whose development has been stifled by Soviet exploitation and inefficiency.

Angola

The normalization of relations with Angola would provide us with a method of demonstrating our strength. It would permit Angola to become genuinely non-aligned. It would provide the basis for Cuban withdrawal and put us in a better position to prevent or to deal with possible chaos resulting from the explosive conditions in Rhodesia and Namibia.

---

4 Not further identified. Reference is presumably to an invitation by a group of Republican Senators for Smith and members of the Executive Council to visit the United States in October 1978, “for the purpose of winning official US support for the transitional Government and its programme.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, pp. 29438–29439)
There is considerable business interest in Angola. Gulf Oil is anxious for additional energy concessions. Boeing is involved in Angola’s airport development. The European community has begun work on several infrastructure projects.

Angola has been very helpful in our attempts to find a UN solution for Namibia. They brought SWAPO along even when it required real pressure. They have several interests in a Namibia settlement, but one important factor is their desire for recognition by the U.S.

They responded very positively to our urgings that they end the Katangan attacks on Zaire, and with great effort, they began removing the Katangans away from the border.

They have conducted a series of private and government negotiations with South Africa. The private talks resulted in Anglo-American and DeBeers taking over their diamond production. But while the government talks went well, the Angolans find themselves humiliated by the bombings of their territory by South Africa and only pro forma criticism from the West.

Now we find the Angolans balking a bit at additional support for the Secretary General’s report on UNTAG. There have been difficulties in communication technically, but there is also some obvious disillusionment on their part. Most African states give us some of the blame for the military power of South Africa and Rhodesia. This is especially true in Angola where they fought for years against Portugal’s NATO-supplied weapons.

The next months will be critical for our efforts in southern Africa. We will be required to influence events and contain disaster without military involvement. Full diplomatic involvement with all the Front Line States, including Angola, will be essential if we are to have any possible change of:

1) continuing supervision of UNTAG;
2) monitoring flow of refugees into Namibia;
3) preserving credibility sufficient to perform in potential Rhodesian collapse or escalation; and
4) influencing possible political re-integration of UNITA into Angolan government.

Angola, along with the other Front Line Presidents, worked to negotiate a peaceful solution to the conflicts in Namibia and Rhodesia.

In telegram 918 from USUN, March 5, the Mission reported on a conversation between the British and the Angolans as follows: “1) Messages from the Five concerning a) liaison offices; b) need for early reply to the Secretary General’s proposals had been considered by President Neto and advisers until 2.00 am this morning; 2) Neto had subsequently telephoned Waldheim direct to say Angola could not (repeat not) agree establishment of an UNTAG liaison office.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790101–0713)
These goals are not to be seen as bargaining points with Angola. They are in our interest and only possible if we have a well-respected Ambassador on the scene cultivating relations at the highest levels of the Angola government. A chargé d’affaires will be treated accordingly and have little influence within Angolan events, though it would be a strong signal to other African states.

The combination of a strong U.S. Embassy and the increase of U.S. business activity would assure us of a non-aligned Angola willing and able to wean herself from total Soviet dependency.

35. Memorandum From Jerry Funk of the National Security Council Staff to [name and title not declassified]  

Washington, May 7, 1979

SUBJECT
Oral Message for Savimbi (U)

In accordance with instructions from Dr. Brzezinski, you are requested [less than 1 line not declassified] to relay an oral message, from Dr. Brzezinski for Dr. Savimbi, to the appropriate UNITA contact. (S)

The substance of the message should be simply that Dr. Brzezinski has received and personally reviewed Dr. Savimbi’s letter of January 13, 1979, and that the views expressed are not being ignored. (S)

Jerry Funk


2 In a May 1 memorandum to Brzezinski, Funk recommended sending Savimbi an oral message notifying him that his views were not being ignored. Brzezinski approved the recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1–12/79)

3 In his January 13 letter to Brzezinski, Savimbi cautioned that U.S. recognition of the MPLA would encourage Soviet/Cuban expansionism. He emphasized UNITA’s ability to survive Cuban pressure and noted that UNITA’s ideals were in concert with the United States and the free world. (Ibid.)
36. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 9, 1979, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT
Summary of Meeting Between Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Dr. Armenio Ferreira, Lisbon Representative of the MPLA

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Brzezinski
Dr. Ferreira
Jerry Funk, NSC
Juan Valadez, Escort-Interpreter

Dr. Brzezinski welcomed Dr. Ferreira to the U.S. on his private visit and enquired as to the health of his wife who had undergone heart surgery the week previous in Cleveland. (S)

Dr. Ferreira thanked Dr. Brzezinski for his hospitality and his concern, and noted that he had learned a great deal about Dr. Brzezinski from the Polish Ambassador in Luanda. (U)

In response to Dr. Brzezinski’s question, Ferreira said candidly that President Neto was in the process of surrounding himself by men he could trust, as he had now survived two coup attempts,—the last of which was a clear effort by the Soviets to oust Neto. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked if he thought Neto could survive without Cuban support, and Dr. Ferreira responded affirmatively, asserting that once the South African threat to Angola is removed, the Cubans will leave, and that the Cubans are not needed to deal with UNITA, but only to defend against South African raids. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then stated that it was our intention to have good relations with all truly independent African nations, irrespective of ideology, but not with puppet governments. He said that he was reassured by Dr. Ferreira’s remarks, and that the U.S. does respect President Neto’s attempts to create a new society under difficult conditions. (S)

He continued to say that the U.S. wants the South Africans out of Namibia, as a means of creating conditions for stability in Southern Africa as a whole. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that while he recognized that the Angolans viewed the Cubans’ continued presence as a response to South Africa, the Cubans’ policy rationale for being in Angola was not dependent

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 122, 8/1-13/79. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office and concluded at 5:30 p.m.
upon the South African presence in Namibia, and that Cuban policy was not entirely determined in Havana. (S)

He stated that he felt there was a basis for cooperation between Angola and the U.S. in trying to avoid making Angola the object of East-West competition, and that such cooperation would lead to better relations. (S)

Dr. Ferreira then asked if that meant normalization. Dr. Brzezinski responded that normalizing a relationship was a process, and that a part of the process would be to begin to send the Cubans home as a result of any change in the Namibian situation. He noted that a Namibian settlement was important, for without it, South Africa could become more assertive and exacerbate the situation for both the U.S. and for Angola. (S)

Therefore, he concluded, the U.S. and Angola should each try to move toward taking tangible steps that would create the conditions for settlement. (S)

Dr. Ferreira responded by asserting that President Neto was independent of Moscow, (who had after all, tried to remove him), and not subservient to the Cubans. He was and remains a nationalist and an anti-fascist. He reaffirmed that Angola was willing to normalize relations with the U.S. “tomorrow.” (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then said that he appreciated and understood Angola’s position, but that he hoped Dr. Ferreira would understand our concern that Cubans should not be allowed to remain in Angola, when they were there not to defend against South Africans, but for their own and for the Soviets’ reasons. (S)

He restated that the U.S. has no doctrinal or ideological problem with Angola, but that the major concern is that Angola not be used by the Soviets and Cubans for their own purposes. (S)

Dr. Ferreira then enquired if Dr. Brzezinski understood that there were no Soviet or Cuban bases in Angola, as President Neto had refused all requests for foreign bases. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that he realized this but that U.S. concern about Cuban forces in Angola and their ultimate objectives remained. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then thanked Dr. Ferreira for coming to see him, and stated that he hoped such contacts would continue, and would serve as the basis for bringing long-range stability in Southern Africa,— and cooperation between Angola and the U.S. (S)

The meeting ended at 5:30 p.m.

Comment. In comments to Jerry Funk immediately after the meeting, Dr. Ferreira expressed “surprise” at Dr. Brzezinski’s “sympathetic understanding”, and said that he was truly delighted to hear him speak positively of the possibility of moving toward normalization. (S)
37. Memorandum From Donald Gregg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\footnote{1 Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Subject Files A–E, Box 25, Angola 7 May 1978–September 9, 1979. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote in the left-hand margin: “DA Should M Alb be brought in? ZB.”}

Washington, September 12, 1979

SUBJECT
Anti-Cuban Covert Action in Angola (S)

On 7 September CIA sent a short memo (Tab A) saying in effect that there are opportunities for anti-Cuban covert action in Angola that CIA could undertake were it not for the Clark Amendment. I called CIA to ask what they would like to do if the Clark Amendment were repealed. The CIA response was that it did not want to get “too far out front” in seeming to push for a covert action program in Angola. I replied that the death of Neto and the coming Angolan power struggle which is forecast by recent intelligence (Tab B) argued for CIA to be more forthcoming in terms of outlining possible covert action options which the recent situation appears to make possible.\footnote{2 Tab B, Intelligence Information Cable TDFIRDB–315/15861–79, September 11, is attached but not printed.}

The result of this dialogue are talking points on “Cuban and Angola” attached at Tab C. CIA characterizes these as “informal, and in-house thoughts about a problem.” I assured CIA that I would make clear that it was I that had asked for these thoughts. Frank Carlucci has seen the Tab C attachment and has agreed to its being sent down. (S)

I call particular attention to the proposed covert action options outlined in paragraph six of Tab C. Several of them appear to be particularly worth consideration at this time. The immediate problem, however, is the Clark Amendment. Paragraph seven of Tab C spells out the problem posed by the Clark Amendment very clearly. (S)

I also attach at Tab D a piece of analysis from CIA indicating that while Cuba has some problems in Angola it may be a tough presence to dislodge.\footnote{3 Tab D, a September 10 paper entitled “Cuba: Havana’s Interests in Angola,” is attached but not printed.}

What this adds up to in my view is both an opportunity (in Angola) and a problem in Congress (the Clark Amendment.) I recommend that the following steps be taken. (S)
1. Request CIA to come up with a covert action program designed to reduce or remove the Cuban presence in Angola. This program should be written as though the Clark Amendment does not exist. (S)

2. This program should be judged on its merits and if it appears worth undertaking, CIA should be instructed to take quiet soundings with the two intelligence oversight committees to ascertain their views on the merits of the program and the chances of quietly repealing the Clark Amendment.4 (S)

3. Direct CIA to ascertain as best it can what other covert action opportunities are represented by the various factions which will contend for power in the wake of Neto’s death.5 (S)

Final Comment

This issue is a clear illustration of the way in which this country (read Congress), in a burst of moralistic zeal, has hamstrung itself in terms of dealing quietly and covertly with a promising situation in Angola. (S)

An attempt to repeal the Clark Amendment would most probably become a contentious issue which would draw attention to the fact that the United States was trying once again to influence events in Angola. The only hope is that recent developments in and around Cuba may have changed Congressional viewpoints sufficiently to allow quiet repeal of the Amendment. I think it is worth trying.6 (S)

---

4 Brzezinski underlined “quietly repealing” in this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin “amending.” Aaron wrote in the right-hand margin: “That is not possible except in connection with Charters.”

5 Brzezinski initialed and checked the approve option.

6 Aaron wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: “ZB, How about a modification of the Clark amendment that would add ‘Except that this provision should not preclude whatever actions may be necessary to curb Cuban military intervention in Angola and elsewhere in Africa.’” Brzezinski drew an arrow from his earlier margin comment “amending” to this comment and wrote “good.”
Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^7\)

Washington, September 7, 1979

SUBJECT
NSC Interest in “Morale of Cuban Advisors in Angola”—A Possible Exploitation of Relations Between Cubans and Angolans

REFERENCES
Your Memorandum of 3 August 1979\(^8\)

1. Attached is a memorandum which responds to your query on what CIA is doing to exacerbate tensions between Cuban soldiers and the local population in Angola.

2. Although the Agency continues to carry out a worldwide propaganda campaign exposing Soviet and Cuban interference in Angola, we are legally restricted from taking a more direct course in exploiting this Cuban vulnerability.

ALL PORTIONS SECRET.

Stansfield Turner\(^9\)

1. The reporting on tensions between Cuban soldiers in Angola and the local population is correct. These frictions are long-standing and have been featured in many of the propaganda items cited in paragraph 3 below.

2. We believe it would be useful to exacerbate this vulnerability but we are precluded from taking additional action by the so-called Clark Amendment (Section 404a of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976). This legislation prohibits CIA from supplying military or paramilitary support to anyone in Angola.

---

\(^7\) Secret.

\(^8\) Brzezinski forwarded Intelligence Information Cable TDFIR DB-315/13526–79 to Turner under an August 3 covering memorandum that noted the cable “reports that there is general resentment among the Angolan population against the Cubans in that country and that relations between Cuban advisors and their Angolan ‘apprentices’ are tense.” Brzezinski asked if the information was reliable and, if so, “what are we doing about this?” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country File, Box 13, Cuba: 8/1–14/79)

\(^9\) Carlucci signed for Turner.
3. Since the November 1977 Presidential Finding on exposing the Cuban and Soviet role in Angola, we have conducted a worldwide propaganda campaign on that subject. This effort may have had some indirect impact on the internal Angolan situation. This continuing campaign has included:

a. Worldwide Propaganda. We have placed more than 500 major items in the world media and briefed liaison government contacts in 45 countries.

b. Radio into Cuba. Since March 1979, we have prepared three broadcast scripts monthly for a [place not declassified] radio station heard in Cuba. These items focus on the economic waste of Cuba’s African adventures.

c. Informing Cubans. Four packets of press clippings in Spanish, English and French, all of which condemn the Cuban role in Africa, have been sent to field stations for distribution to local Cuban officials.

4. In sum, we have not had policy authority to take advantage of this opportunity in a direct and effective manner.

All portions of this document are SECRET.

Tab C

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
Cuba and Angola

1. The continuing large Cuban presence in Angola, and the spread of Cuban troops to other countries in Africa such as Ethiopia and Congo Brazzaville, represents a growing threat to the stability of Africa. Castro’s military imperialism is succeeding in Africa partly because of the lack of Western support to those who oppose his activities.

—Cuban influence in Africa particularly in Angola and Ethiopia is pervasive and growing.

—The indigenous elements which oppose Castro in Africa are too weak to overcome Cuban military effectiveness.

2. U.S. Administrations have sought to reduce Cuban adventurism in Africa.

10 Secret; Sensitive
In 1975–76, the Agency spent $30 million on political and paramilitary support of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against the Soviet/Cuban backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). This program was halted in early 1976 by the Tunney-Javits Amendment to the CIA Appropriations Act. The Clark Amendment of 1976 imposed a permanent prohibition on military and paramilitary support to anyone in Angola.

In November 1977, a Presidential Finding directed the Agency to publicize the facts about Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola. This activity continues in terms of worldwide propaganda radio broadcasts into Cuba and efforts to reach Cuban officials abroad.

In early 1978, Dr. Brzezinski stimulated an Agency review of covert action options in Angola. Action to pursue any one of these options was foreclosed because of the Clark Amendment.\footnote{Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.}

In April 1978 the DCI told the SCC it would be necessary to go to Congress before conducting any covert action in Angola. Congressional, including Senator Clark’s, opinion was sought, with the result that a Congressional source told the press that the Agency was reconsidering covert action in Angola. The resultant publicity caused the Administration to deny that any such program was being actively considered.\footnote{Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph in the left-hand margin.}

Several unsuccessful attempts have been made since then to alter the Clark Amendment to permit U.S. Government aid to the MPLA regime.\footnote{Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.}

State has authorized the sale of jet transport aircraft to the regime, arguing that the Clark Amendment does not apply to private sector sales to Angola.

3. Drafts prepared by State for the current policy review on Angola contain the following U.S. policy objectives:\footnote{Brzezinski underlined “State.”}

—Continued Angolan help for a Namibian solution;
—Significant reduction, total withdrawal if possible, of Cuban military forces (from Angola);\footnote{Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this and the following point.}
—Reconciliation between Angola and Zaire, with attendant border security and stability in the area;
—Full operation of the Benguela railroad with attendant benefits
to the economies of the region;
—National reconciliation of the major political/ethnic groups,
especially the integration of UNITA into the body politic of Angola;\textsuperscript{16}
—Reduction of Soviet influence, including a denial of naval/air
facilities, and a more non-aligned position on the part of Angola;\textsuperscript{17}
—Protection and enhancement of our commercial interests.
Also, at this time the merits of formal U.S. diplomatic recognition
of the MPLA are under review.

4. The African country which offers the best potential for covert
action against Cuba is Angola.\textsuperscript{18} This is because:
—An entrenched armed opposition, UNITA still maintains effective
control over one third of the country, and inflicts meaningful
casualties on Cuban troops (over 1,500 killed since 1976).\textsuperscript{19}
—Two other guerrilla groups, FNLA and the Liberation Front of the
Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC), tie down major Cuban forces in northern
Angola and Cabinda, and also inflict some losses on the Cubans.\textsuperscript{20}
—Frictions exist between the Cubans and both the ruling MPLA
and the Angolan people.\textsuperscript{21}
—Angola is the only place in Africa where a viable armed opposition
such as UNITA exists and which appears to have some chance of
thwarting Castro militarily.\textsuperscript{22}

5. Given necessary executive and legislative approvals, as well as
the State Department’s concurrence, and appropriate funds, the Agency
could through existing and quickly renewable covert contacts and
mechanisms take steps to:\textsuperscript{23}
—Encourage senior MPLA officials to insist on drawdowns of the
Cuban military presence;
—Increase the cost of the continuing Cuban presence in Angola;

\textsuperscript{16} Brzezinski underlined “integration of UNITA” and placed a checkmark in the
left-hand margin next to this point.
\textsuperscript{17} Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin.
\textsuperscript{18} Brzezinski underlined this sentence.
\textsuperscript{19} Brzezinski underlined “UNITA,” and the phrase “inflicts meaningful casualties
on Cuban troops,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
\textsuperscript{20} Brzezinski underlined the phrases “Two other guerrilla groups,” and “also inflict
some losses on the Cubans,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to
this point.
\textsuperscript{21} Brzezinski underlined “Frictions” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin
next to this point.
\textsuperscript{22} Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
\textsuperscript{23} Brzezinski underlined this sentence and placed a checkmark in the left-hand
margin next to the following three points.
In general make the continuing presence of Cuban troops in Angola an embarrassment to the Cuban Government.

6. Examples of the kind of new covert action activities that might be quickly established include:

—Encourage and recruit MPLA politicians who have come to resent and oppose the continuing Cuban military presence in Angola;

—Promote agreements between certain MPLA leaders and UNITA troops which would enable UNITA to focus its armed attention on Cuban forces;

—Stimulate other nations to increase military support to UNITA to enable UNITA to expand its effort and increase Cuban casualties in Angola;

—Fund UNITA efforts to enable UNITA spokesmen to present its case against Cuban involvement in Angola to world opinion makers;

—[3 lines not declassified] to provide external security for Angola. This would of course require guarantees and inducements for UNITA to secure its cooperations;

—Utilize covert action channels to other African leaders to bring significant pressure for a reconciliation between UNITA and MPLA, a condition of which could be a significant reduction of Cuban forces;

—Let the MPLA know that if U.S. efforts to secure the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola fail, the U.S. will explore other options to attain that result.

7. We conclude that the Agency could conduct the above activities in Angola, with some chance of affecting the Cuban military presence there. The initiation of any of these activities would require the repeal of the Clark Amendment. The Clark Amendment prohibits giving assistance of any kind to anyone which would have the direct or indirect effect of augmenting the capacity of anyone to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola. This has been broadly interpreted to preclude the kind of activities noted above. An attempt to repeal the Clark Amendment would probably result in a debate in Congress, and the press, in which the proponents of repeal would be met with the same arguments which caused the passage of the Clark Amendment.

24 Brzezinski underlined the phrase “new covert action activities.”

25 Brzezinski placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this and the following three points.

26 Brzezinski placed two checkmarks in the left-hand margin. Aaron placed a question mark in the right-hand margin and wrote “Non starter.”

27 Brzezinski underlined the phrases “a reconciliation” and “a condition of which could be a significant reduction of Cuban forces,” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin.
in the first place. Thus we believe that a major Administration effort would be required with Congress as well as the press and public, to repeal the Clark Amendment. It should also be noted that the House, in voting on the Foreign Aid Bill for FY 80, specifically prohibited even indirect aid to Angola through international financial institutions to which the U.S. contributes funds.  

All portions of this document are SECRET.

28 Brzezinski highlighted this paragraph and underlined the sentence “The Clark Amendment prohibits giving assistance of any kind to anyone which would have the direct or indirect effect of augmenting the capacity of anyone to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola. This has been broadly interpreted to preclude the kind of activities noted above.” He also underlined the sentence “Thus we believe that a major Administration effort would be required with Congress as well as the press and public, to repeal the Clark Amendment.”

38. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the United States Representative to the United Nations (McHenry) to President Carter

Washington, October 23, 1979

SUBJECT
Angola After Neto: Next Steps

Neto’s death may give us an opportunity to look for ways to follow up on the progress that has already been made toward attaining key U.S. objectives in dealing with Angola. This progress includes:

— the reconciliation between Zaire and Angola and subsequent stability in the region;
— Angola’s willingness to collaborate with us toward a settlement in Namibia;
— as a front line state, Angola’s willingness to be helpful on Britain’s Rhodesia initiative;

2 Neto died in Moscow on September 10, while undergoing treatment for cancer.
—Angola’s opening to Western political and economic ties, specifically as an oil producer, and her denial of base facilities to the Soviets;
—Neto’s indication, just before his death, that a settlement in Namibia would be followed by a significant reduction of Cuban troops.

Several African leaders—Mobutu, Tolbert and the Presidents of Cape Verde and the Congo—say that President dos Santos and the rest of the Angolan leadership intend to follow Neto’s policies; and President dos Santos’ reply to your message of condolence supports this view. However, our African friends also advise us to move quickly to seize the opportunity provided by the moderate succession process to encourage continuance of the Angolan opening toward the West.

We believe that it is in our interest to have more frequent contact and a continuing dialogue with the Angolans. It was quite clear under Neto, and is still the case, that the Angolan condition for closer relations with us is the establishment of diplomatic relations, without preconditions. We believe as well that we should now address the issue of normalization with the Angolans and that we can do so in ways which will advance our interests substantially with the dos Santos government. What we propose is to offer recognition without preconditions, but handle it in such a way as to reinforce the Angolans’ motivation to respond with a reduction in Cuban troop presence and a forthcoming position on our other interests in the area.

We recommend the following:

—send Frank Wisner, our Ambassador to Zambia and a man who knows the issues, to Luanda for talks with dos Santos.

—Wisner’s brief would be to reiterate to the Angolans our views on the range of issues outlined above, seek dos Santos’ views, and confirm that the new regime indeed wants to continue to work with us.

On the question of diplomatic relations, Wisner would be authorized to say:

a) that we understand the importance of this question to the Angolan side, including the insistence that normalization take place without preconditions.

b) we are prepared to normalize without preconditions and begin talks on the modalities for establishing our diplomatic presence. At the same time, the Angolan side must realize that the continued presence of Cuban combat troops will be a burden on our new relationship. Congressional and public concern about the large-scale troop presence will continue to hinder any consideration of assistance programs.³

³ Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “I need to know dos Santos’ reaction before we’re bound by a commitment. J.”
c) Neto understood this and had indicated that there were indeed circumstances—like those surrounding a Namibian settlement—which could lead to a withdrawal or reduction of Cuban combat troop presence. What is the position of the dos Santos government in this regard?

We believe this approach to dos Santos at a time he is setting the new Angolan government’s policies could have a positive impact. We would send a welcome signal to the new regime, reaffirm our commitment to a settlement in Namibia and to stability in the region, and we would obtain a current and direct reading of Angolan views. Our offer to recognize without preconditions could even make clearer to the Angolans their own interest in beginning a draw-down of the Cubans, with or without a settlement in Namibia.

Such a move would also be welcomed by the African moderates, the Front Line states and Nigeria, as well as by key Western European leaders who favor gestures that could have the effect of lessening Angolan dependence on the Soviets and Cubans.

In accordance with our discussion of the issue, we are consulting with some of the key people on the Hill.4

---

4 Carter neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation. In an October 29 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski recommended approval of the Vance/McHenry memorandum, and Carter checked the approve option. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 125, 11/1–14/79)

---

39. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance**

Washington, November 5, 1979

SUBJECT

Next Steps on Angola (S)

With reference to your memorandum of October 23,2 the President has approved the dispatch of Ambassador Wisner to Luanda. He has

---

2 See Document 38.
also approved the general approach outlined in your paper, subject to the following:

(a) that the Angolans be informed that the United States is prepared to normalize on the assumption that the new government of Angola will seek to enhance its independence by gradually eliminating the Cuban presence. Moreover, until significant reductions take place, the Angolans should know that there is no possibility of the diplomatic relationship leading to any other relations, notably economic assistance;

(b) the President also wishes to know Dos Santos’ reaction before the United States is bound by a commitment. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

40. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 8, 1979, 3–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
NSC Meeting with Jonas Savimbi of UNITA

PARTICIPANTS
Jonas Savimbi, Head of UNITA (Angola)
Jerry Funk, Staff Member, NSC

SUMMARY

Jonas Savimbi met with NSC staffer Jerry Funk for 1½ hours Nov 8 in a private confidential meeting set up through the AFL–CIO. Savimbi makes credible claims to political and economic support from eight specified Black African countries, plus Saudi Arabia, France and China, and minimal cooperation from South Africa. He contends that the MPLA government of Angola is at a crucial stage, and in great need of U.S. recognition and the economic assistance which they have not gotten from the Soviets. He asks that we think in terms of pushing hard for a “global political solution”,—meaning that we could begin exploratory talks with dos Santos in terms of a package: we give recognition and economic assistance, and in return we insist on a significant

---

reduction in the Cuban military presence and some genuine movement toward an MPLA–UNITA political reconciliation. Savimbi feels that such reconciliation is possible within the next year and would quickly lead Angola out of the Soviet/Cuban orbit. He recognizes that dos Santos is not yet his own man and may have some difficulty in accepting such a package.²(S)

Background to Meeting, Atmospherics

Savimbi is in the U.S. on a visit of about one week, under the aegis of the American Socialist Party, was received by the AFL–CIO, and given a forum in Washington by Georgetown CSIS, the Carnegie Face-to-Face meetings, and others. This private meeting with NSC was arranged by the AFL–CIO, after an earlier meeting was aborted when the ASP “handlers” in NYC “inadvertently” leaked the news of the earlier appointment to the press, and it was denied by Funk. The second meeting was more discretely handled, sans ASP. (S)

Savimbi, who is very security conscious, arrived for the meeting at the AFL–CIO (AALC) office, (where Funk was waiting), accompanied by his own security man and two D.C. uniformed police. (S)

Savimbi is an impressive man,—very intelligent, well-informed, pragmatic, articulate, sensitive, strong-willed,—no ego problems. He began by apologizing for the “amateurish performance” of his hosts in leaking the previous meeting date, saying that he wanted to establish genuine conversation with the U.S. government, and did not need that kind of publicity. He expressed gratitude for the ease with which he got his visa (in Dakar) and for Dr. Brzezinski taking the interest to hear him out. (S)

In the ensuing 1½ hours his emphasis was on finding a viable political solution to the Angolan problem. He was logical in his presentation and answered questions easily. (S)

View of the MPLA

Savimbi sees the MPLA government “at a crossroads”,—they are in deep trouble economically, their military and civilian logistics are in disarray, and the population and the leadership is frustrated with the Cubans. The MPLA leadership recognizes the need for U.S. and Western economic help, since it is not forthcoming from the Soviets/Cubans, and they feel an increasing danger of an uprising by the black population of the Luanda area. (S)

² An unknown hand bracketed this paragraph in the right-hand margin and underlined the portion beginning with “He asks” and ending with “the next year” and the last sentence in the paragraph.
Savimbi sees dos Santos as a weak person, a compromise, interim president,—selected because he was black, generally inoffensive to most, and controllable. If a Congress is held next spring on schedule, dos Santos will not be re-elected, and the most probable successor is Lopo do Nascimento, former Prime Minister, who was removed by Neto last year because he had too strong a political base. Lopo, a black, is seen as strong, moderate and pragmatic by Savimbi, and “the true representative of the people of the Luanda area,”—i.e., the urban Kimbundu. (S)

Savimbi sees Lucio Lara (party theoretician) and Iko Carreira (Defense), both mullatos (and therefore not viable “presidential timber”), as the number one and number two strong men, who are using dos Santos to keep control. He is not certain if they will be able to work with Lopo, but if Lopo is pushed to the top, he will soon be his own man,—whereas dos Santos can never be. (S)

(Note: Savimbi was aware of rumors that Lopo do Nascimento, who had been “exiled” to be a high level functionary in the ECA, Addis, was going home. I could not confirm to him, for security reasons, that this was so. He is returning at the call of dos Santos, probably with the approval of Lara and Carreira.) (S)

Savimbi refused to claim that he was in direct contact with any top-level MPLA leadership, but said that he had many excellent sources of information which he could rely on. (S)

View of Cuban/Soviets.

Savimbi sees the Cubans as ineffective in guerrilla warfare, and certainly not enthusiastic warriors. (S)

More importantly, he sees a growing perception in the rank and file, and in the leadership of MPLA that the Cubans are inefficient, incompetent, increasingly arrogant, unhelpful “foreign intruders.” (S)

But he recognizes that Angola has become important to Cuba for its own political and economic reasons, and therefore he feels that they would be loath to leave Angola, even if asked,—and could well overthrow any MPLA government who leaned too hard on them. (S)

He sees the Soviets as generally content with the status quo,—an MPLA government propped up by the Cubans,—and not interested in a more direct role for now. But should the status quo be seriously threatened, they would try to encourage the Cubans to act to preserve it. (S)

View of SAG/SWAPO/Zaire.

Savimbi is critical of SAG’s internal politics, (“we share no values”), but willing to “do business” with them,—“much as the rest of the nations in the area do.” (S)
He says that he has few real differences with SWAPO, since they, (the Ovimbundu of UNITA, and the Ovambu of SWAPO) are very close ethnically and neither are “really concerned much with ideology.” Their occasional fights have been over serious tactical problems, such as life-and-death water-hole ownership in the desert. Generally, he says, “we simply try to avoid each other.” (S)

Regarding Zaire, Savimbi feels that Mobutu is quite understandably serious about his rapprochement with MPLA, but that he maintains contact with UNITA. Mobutu has cut aid to FNLA, but that Holden Roberto still remains a political force as leader of the Bakongo people. (S)

Mechanics of the War.

Savimbi says he is able to operate at will through more than one-third of the country, and could take urban centers for short periods of time, but could not now hold them without air support. (His description of the territory he holds squares with CIA maps.) (S)

He claims to have virtually total loyalty from the people of the area he controls. He says he is able to get much of his food and materiel from raids on MPLA units and stores. He has been supplied with Chinese arms (direct assistance), and has received food, fuel and light transport from SAG (on a commercial basis.) (S)

Savimbi states that the establishment of a DMZ on the Namibian border would present some problems for him, but none that could not be overcome. He feels he could continue with supply via isolated airstrips, and via coastal landings. (S)

Aid to UNITA.

Savimbi claims to be getting political and some economic aid from Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Upper Volta, and Liberia. He claims political and substantial economic aid from Saudi Arabia, France, and China, and the cooperation of South Africa. (S)

Of those African countries listed as friends, he seems particularly close to Senegal. He carries a Senegalese passport, and is returning to Angola via Morocco, and Senegal. (S)

Savimbi is also very close personally to Kaunda, who took personal care of Savimbi’s mother in Zambia for some time. (Note: Savimbi suggested that Kaunda could serve as a trusted channel of communication to him, as they are in close and regular contact.) (S)

UNITA’s Objectives.

Savimbi says that UNITA is firmly committed to a unitary state, and would not participate in the Balkanization of Angola. He says that
there must be a strong central government, but one that can allow for some sort of regional autonomy to meet the needs of the “ethnic groups now excluded”—i.e., the Ovimbundu of UNITA and the Bakongo of FNLA. (S)

He emphasizes that over the past four years, UNITA has clearly proven that they do in fact represent the legitimate political interests of the Ovimbundu, some 40% of the population, and that therefore there can be no viable government of Angola which excludes MPLA. (He makes a similar case for the inclusion of FNLA, though they represent a much smaller group.) (S)

He also makes a strong point that while he is a “democratic socialist”, he is first a nationalist, and shares “the basic human and political values with the U.S.” (S)

Potential for Solution—U.S. Role.

Savimbi believes that there can be no military solution—that there must be and can be a political solution. (S)

Since the MPLA needs U.S. and Western economic aid so badly, the U.S. is in a strong position to assist in finding a “global” solution.—by offering to move to recognition on a “package basis”. He says, we should offer to talk about recognition and aid, and in return demand a substantial reduction of Cuban military presence, and some movement toward internal reconciliation with both UNITA and FNLA. (S)

He makes the point that if we simply give recognition, we lose leverage. (S)

He also asks that we encourage the continued help he is now receiving from mutual friends, and quietly encourage others in Africa, Europe, and Asia. (S)

He feels that in order to bring MPLA along we would need to be able to put some coercive pressure on the Cubans and Soviets not to interfere in a settlement process. He also feels that the OAU could play a constructive role by providing some sort of “presence” to guarantee non-intervention by the Cubans, and to guarantee the security of UNITA and FNLA leadership during the “reconciliation period.” (S)

But, he emphasizes, the essential role can be played now by the U.S. if we have the political will to exchange recognition and aid for removing Cubans and internal reconciliation. (S)
41. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, January 4, 1980

SUBJECT
Angola Policy

The President has read your reclama on next steps in Angola. He has noted that you should consult on the Hill, and has directed that you report the results of your consultations.\(^2\) I include a copy of your reclama and your original memo on which his decision is based.\(^3\)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance and the United States Representative to the United Nations (McHenry) to President Carter

Washington, December 21, 1979

SUBJECT
Angola—Next Steps

We continue to believe that US interests in Angola and southern Africa would be best served by immediate recognition of the Luanda government.

In our memorandum of October 23, 1979 we recommended that Ambassador Wisner (in Lusaka) travel to Luanda to inform the Government that the United States will recognize Angola but to state also that

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 110, Angola: 8/79–3/80. Confidential.

\(^2\) Brzezinski underlined “The President has read your reclama” and “He has noted that you should consult on the Hill” in the previous two sentences and highlighted them in the right-hand margin. Brzezinski sent a copy of both the reclama and the October 23 memorandum to President Carter under a December 21 covering memorandum on which Carter wrote “cc Cy. Zbig—Consult on Hill. Let me know results. I’m inclined to move on it. J.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 4, Angola: 1–12/79)

\(^3\) Not attached. Printed as Document 38.

\(^4\) Secret; Nodis.
close relations could not exist without a significant reduction of the Cuban military presence.

To condition recognition on Angola’s agreement to reduce Cuban troops, as had been decided, will not advance the current situation and could be counterproductive. In past contacts, the Angolans have strongly reacted negatively to any linkage of US recognition to a drawdown of Cuban troops. President Neto, before his death, held that Cuban support was necessary to bolster Angolan security in light of South African attacks from Namibia against Angola; South African support for UNITA; and tensions between Zaire and Angola. Without entirely accepting Angolan reasoning (i.e. UNITA will probably continue to be a force to be reckoned with but probably on a smaller scale), we would note that the Zaire situation has been largely resolved but the Namibia problem remains despite far-reaching Angolan efforts to reach a solution. In sum, Angola’s security concerns remain despite their forthcoming posture. In their view, the Cubans will remain so long as the South Africans remain in Namibia as a direct threat and with ready access to UNITA.

The dos Santos government appears to be at least publicly well-disposed toward the United States, although pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban elements in the leadership continue to challenge those more favorably disposed to greater cooperation with the West. President dos Santos warmly confirmed this posture in response to your letter on the death of Neto. An Angolan government official informed us November 27 that the new leadership in Angola would respect the assurances given earlier by Neto’s representative that the Cubans would be withdrawn upon a Namibia settlement.

The dos Santos government continues to be helpful on a number of southern African issues. As a Front Line state, Angola demonstrated its willingness to assist Britain’s Rhodesia initiative, and the successful reconciliation with President Mobutu owed in great measure to the Angolan desire to restore stability on its northern border. In July, 1979, the Angolans broke the logjam in the Namibia negotiations by proposing creation of a demilitarized zone, which the South Africans recently accepted (subject to certain conditions). Since it is now South African foot dragging which is slowing progress on Namibia, it would be contradictory to continue telling the Angolans that we must have movement on Namibia (and from their side a consequent reduction in the Cuban military presence) before we could consider diplomatic relations.

We believe this is a propitious moment to inform the Angolans of our willingness to recognize the Government of Angola albeit with little hope of warm relations without significant Cuban withdrawal. In doing so we would demonstrate that the US is prepared to join our
allies (who have already recognized Angola) in offering an alternative to Angolan reliance on the Cubans and Soviets. Most Africans, including Liberia, Nigeria and the other Front Line states believe firmly that we should take the step. Continued isolation of the Angolans will leave them dependent upon the Eastern bloc, while the establishment of US/Angolan relations could serve as the first step toward bringing Luanda out of the communist orbit. Diplomatic relations, at the outset, would facilitate economic/commercial relations and promote a healthy exchange of views. Although PL-480 and AID bilateral assistance to Angola must await greater public and congressional acceptance in the United States, they represent formidable means of convincing the Angolans of our interest in their peaceful and steady development.

Our present policy gives the Soviets and Cubans the opportunity to foster instability in southern Africa and within Angola itself. Our willingness to recognize Angolan cooperation on issues of mutual concern and engaging rather than attempting to isolate them would serve to demonstrate our resolve to challenge the Cubans and Soviets in southern Africa.

It is worth recalling that because we had good relations with Mozambique we were able to enlist Samora Machel’s support in the final hours of Lancaster House to bring Robert Mugabe to initial the ceasefire. The Angolans are in a position to play the same role with SWAPO as regards Namibia.

42. **Memorandum From William Griffith of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**

Washington, January 18, 1980

**SUBJECT**

Afghanistan and Angola

Analysis (all supported by CIA analyses):

a. Savimbi’s revolt is gaining, not losing.

b. The Luanda government is weak and factionalized, largely between mulattos and blacks.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 63, Persian Gulf: 1/77–1/81. Secret; Sensitive; Outside System. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Brement, Blackwill, Funk, and Rentschler. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner: “DA, review in a mini-SCC. ZB.”
c. The Cubans are doing badly in Angola.

d. Therefore, Luanda (especially the mulattos) cannot get rid of the Soviets and Cubans.

e. Savimbi wants to form a coalition without the mulattos, which would then get rid of the Soviets and Cubans.

The invasion of Afghanistan (and the above analysis) objectively outmode the Vance/McHenry proposals for U.S. unconditional diplomatic recognition of Angola. On the contrary, they require, under specific conditions, U.S. arms aid to Savimbi.²

U.S.

a. Until now I have been opposed to this, because Savimbi still has some ties with Pretoria—the kiss of death in black Africa. But Afghanistan changes the situation. Moreover, Funk’s conversations with Savimbi convince me that Savimbi does want a coalition.³

b. This is the best project for us to cooperate with [less than 1 line not declassified], and even [1 line not declassified], would probably support it, and [less than 1 line not declassified] is rapidly reviving ties with Angola.

c. Our precondition to Savimbi must be that he cut all ties with Pretoria and that he be supplied arms via Zaire and Zambia, and by sea. We should supply him, via [less than 1 line not declassified], with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons.

RECOMMENDATION: That you have a SCC meeting on this soon and that a working group be set up to explore this with France and Portugal.⁴

Blackwill and Funk have read and concur with this memorandum.

---

² Aaron bracketed this paragraph and underlined “U.S. arms aid to Savimbi.” At the end of the memorandum he wrote: “The trouble is that it is against the law.”

³ See Document 40.

⁴ In a February 6 handwritten note to Brzezinski, Aaron wrote: “ZB—I could explore on the margins of my meeting Friday. It is against the law for CIA to do anything on this. DA” Brzezinski initialed the note and wrote “OK.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 63, Persian Gulf: 1/77–1/81)
Namibia

43. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State¹

Cape Town, February 4, 1977, 1525Z

166. Subj: Namibia: International Acceptability of Turnhalle² Proposals. Ref: (A) Cape Town 0164³ and 0165; (B) State 019705.⁴

1. During recent conversation with Pik Botha (ref tel B), Secretary Vance counseled that SAG refrain from taking any decisions that might foreclose the possibility of an internationally acceptable settlement. The proposals being developed by the Turnhalle Constitutional Committee and Mudge’s scenario for drafting of final constitution as described in ref tels A raise serious doubts about international acceptability of what SAG has in mind for conducting Namibia to independence. A unitary state with powers focused in central government seems to be in the making. There is nothing, however, to indicate they are thinking of involving the UN or finding formula for SWAPO and other groups participating except in remark made by Mudge to Summerhayes that perhaps outside observers could witness referendum of final constitution prior to independence.

2. I doubt that UN or SWAPO would be willing to participate at that late stage. But they might be willing to do so if there were more meaningful participation at an earlier period. For example, if instead of the interim government appointing a constitutional commission to draft the final constitution, as Mudge suggested, it were to call for an elected constitutional convention on a basis in which SWAPO and other groups would be free to put up and freely campaign for delegates,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086-0956. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² The Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in Windhoek involved a series of meetings from 1975 to 1977, which sought an internal settlement for Namibian independence. The conference excluded SWAPO.

³ In telegram 164 from Cape Town, February 4, the Embassy discussed the progress at the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference toward “agreeing on bases for interim government in Namibia.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770041-0069)

⁴ In telegram 165 from Cape Town, February 4, the Embassy transmitted the text of Chapter II, “Protection of Fundamental Rights” for Namibia’s interim government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770041-0068)

⁵ In telegram 19705 to Cape Town, January 28, the Department reported on Botha’s January 25 meeting with Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P84008-0031) The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is printed as Document 260.
and the UN could participate in conducting the elections and observing the proceedings as well as being on hand to help arrange the subsequent referendum, then the chances of the SAG meeting basic elements for international acceptability would be met or at least the criticism of the more extreme anti-South African elements substantially deflected. In order to work out such an arrangement, it might be possible to get representatives of the Namibia interim government, SWAPO and UN together with some form of SAG presence.

3. I submit this suggestion because I think the time is rapidly approaching when we and the British, and possibly the French, need to discuss this aspect with the SAG. Perhaps this idea merits discussion with Tony Duff when he comes to Washington for high-level consultations next week.

Bowdler

44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Zanzibar

Washington, February 5, 1977, 2250Z


1. During the South African Ambassador’s meeting with Secretary Vance on January 25 the Secretary raised with Botha the question of an interim government in Namibia. Secretary Vance on that occasion said “With respect to Namibia, we have told the Front Line Presidents, the Nigerians, and other African leaders that we remain committed to

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zanzibar: 1/77–1/81. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information to Cape Town. Drafted by Wisner; cleared by Helman (IO), Tarnoff, Goldsmith (S/S), and Habib; approved by Schaufele.

2 In telegram 1950 from London, February 3, the Embassy reported on Young’s meeting with SWAPO’s London representative, Peter Katjavivi. Young emphasized the administration’s commitment to a Namibian settlement. He noted that new obligations and responsibilities would be imposed on SWAPO and warned against “sloganeering.” Young also suggested that the Department consider telling Vorster that a provisional government established by the Turnhalle Conference would complicate the issue and would be considered the equivalent of the “internal option” in Rhodesia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77)

3 See Document 260.
Namibian independence and a negotiated settlement which will achieve this objective. They know our good offices remain open. We are currently reviewing what steps will move the settlement along and we trust that your government will continue to refrain from taking any decisions that might foreclose the possibility of an internationally acceptable settlement.”

2. Botha called me on February 3 with reference to the President’s statement on Southern Africa last night. Botha said that the US had made a distinction between South Africa on the one hand and Rhodesia and Namibia on the other. He sought reassurance that we continue to hold to our view. Botha said that he regarded the President’s statement as a bland one not unlike statements made in the past. Speaking privately, he foresaw problems in our relations if South Africa concludes the United States is treating all three Southern African questions in the same manner. I told Botha that United States policy supports majority rule in the region.

3. I took advantage of his call to turn the subject to Namibia and South African intentions with respect to an interim government. I reminded Botha of the point which Secretary Vance had made. Botha defended the work of the Constitutional Committee of the Turnhalle Conference. I replied that whether or not an interim government was logical from South Africa’s point of view, it would not be internationally acceptable. The United States expected that South Africa should not let matters go too far, and thereby preclude the possibility of reaching an internationally acceptable agreement. Botha agreed to pass my message to his government.

Vance

4 Reference is to Carter’s “Report to the American People” in which he noted that Andrew Young was “on a visit to Africa to demonstrate our friendship for its peoples and our commitment to peaceful change toward majority rule in Southern Africa.” The President spoke at 10 p.m. from the White House library. The address was broadcast live on radio and television. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 76)

5 The Turnhalle Constitutional Conference started discussions in September 1975. The Committee was unable to reach an agreement on the structure of the interim government until March 9, 1977. (Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28366)
45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, February 18, 1977, 1606Z

37591. Subject: Namibian Settlement.

1. We have decided to make another attempt to unblock the current impasse on Namibian negotiations by gaining the acceptance of all the pertinent parties, starting with the South Africans. Of the Seven Point Proposal which was developed in September, 1976 after consultations with the Front Line Presidents and the SAG and refined in communications thereafter.2

2. At base the proposal calls for parallel Geneva conferences on Namibia at which the Namibians, including SWAPO and Turnhalle representatives, meeting together under UN auspices would determine the shape of a future independent Namibia and then together negotiate the details of South Africa’s withdrawal from the territory and its future relations with the independent state. South Africa has agreed in advance to accept the results of the conference among the Namibians.3

3. South Africa has previously accepted the Seven Points and has made some additional concessions and SWAPO and the Front Line states are aware of its agreement.4 In addition South Africa has agreed that only a representative delegation from Windhoek will attend the international conference and has agreed to a substantial release of political prisoners.5 SWAPO has not accepted the South African proposal and encouraged by the Front Line states is sticking to its basic negotiating preconditions, including its demand for direct talks exclusively with the SAG.6

4. We have called in Ambassador Botha and requested his government’s reconfirmation of its agreement to the proposals.7 If that is received we will re-approach Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama and Obasanjo and urge them to use their influence with SWAPO to accept the Seven Points or modifications thereof as the basis for negotiations. In these

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Davidow (AF/S); cleared by Wisner (AF/S) and Sebastian (S/S); approved by Schaufele. Sent for information Priority to Gaborone, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Lagos, and Maputo.


3 Not further identified.


5 Ibid.


7 See Document 260.
conversations we would note that while we take no position on the substantive merit of the Seven Point Proposal, it seems to us to present a course worthy of serious consideration.

5. For London: We intend to inform the British Embassy in Washington of our initiative and you should do the same with the FCO. We will keep you informed of developments.

6. For other addressees: No action necessary at this time. Any thoughts you may have on how to refine our approach would also be appreciated.

Hartman

---

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, February 26, 1977, 1953Z


1. The South African Ambassador called on Assistant Secretary Schaufele on February 26 and delivered a memorandum of record summarizing our exchanges with the South African Government on Namibia. The South Africans are not prepared to reconfirm the 7 Point Proposal for a Namibian settlement but are willing to discuss some basic points unquote.

2. The South African memorandum points out that the South African Government will have great difficulty in slowing the pace of the Turnhalle Conference and reminds us that we have been adequately warned that this would be the case. In light of the advanced stage of Turnhalle deliberations some of the Seven Points have for practical purposes been overtaken unquote. The memorandum closes by saying that the SAG is prepared to discuss some basic points unquote with US.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770067-1231. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Wisner; cleared by Bridges (S/S); approved by Schaufele. For an explanation of the status of the Embassy in Cape Town, see footnote 1, Document 153.

2 Not found.

3 See Tab 2, Document 264.
3. In presenting his memorandum Botha stressed his government’s interest in seeing moderate government set up in Namibia and Rhodesia. South Africa, he pointed out, has no interest in replacing a minority white regime in Rhodesia with a minority black regime whose only political support is military muscle. This, he said, appears to be Britain’s intention. Similarly in Namibia moderate Africans, including many of SWAPO’s original founders, are seeking to create an independent Namibian Government and South Africa agrees they have a better claim than does SWAPO’s present leadership.

4. In reply Schaufele told Botha that he does not agree with Botha’s description of British intentions in Rhodesia. The British do not intend to hand over power to Robert Mugabe and his freedom fighters. They have argued, with our support, against the Front Line States’ intention to give the Patriotic Front exclusive recognition and the Front Line Presidents appear to be having second thoughts. The British have held to their view that free and fair elections must precede independence.

5. With respect to Namibia, Schaufele told Botha that the situation was not as stark as he painted it. We have indications some African nations are uneasy with SWAPO’s continued intransigence and might be willing to play a more forceful role. Schaufele also reminded Botha that we face a Security Council debate on Namibia which will have unfortunate consequences for his government if it cannot be proved that an internationally acceptable settlement is being sought. Botha said the points Schaufele made were most helpful, and he would communicate them to Cape Town. He and the Assistant Secretary agreed to examine in greater detail next week what the SAG and we have in mind.

6. Would appreciate your comment and suggestions.

Vance

---

4 In telegram 1744 from Lagos, February 14, the Embassy summarized a conversation between Young and Obasanjo, in which the role of Nigeria in dealing with SWAPO was discussed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770052-0561)

5 The UN General Assembly’s Special Committee held meetings on the question of Namibia from February 25 to March 14. The Special Committee asked the Security Council to consider measures against South Africa, including an arms embargo, as provided for under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, p. 898)
47. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, February 28, 1977, 1050Z

275. Subj: SAG Response on Namibia. Ref: A) State 037592; B) State 043645; C) Cape Town 0166.

1. SAG response to our approach on Namibia reflects firmness of decision taken last November to press forward with Turnhalle as alternative most likely to serve South Africa’s longer term interests as they perceive it. I doubt very much whether at this stage SAG can be diverted from following through with Turnhalle formula unless: (a) prospective referendum in the white community (Pretoria 893) derails the whole effort, or (b) there is basic change in SWAPO attitude and conditions.

2. A number of factors contribute to SAG growing inflexibility on Turnhalle. Failure of the Kissinger initiative to make any significant headway with Sam Nujoma and growing SWAPO terrorist activities along Angola-Namibia border during this period were among the main reasons for decision to press forward with Turnhalle. Experience with Geneva talks on Rhodesia highlighted difficulties in trying to reach a negotiated settlement with black nationalists. Recent statements by Nujoma and other SWAPO leaders are regarded by South Africans as underscoring SWAPO intransigence and therefore futility of trying to negotiate with them. Public statements by US spokesmen regarding

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770068-0578. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

2 In telegram 37592 to Cape Town, February 18, the Department outlined several steps to “break the impasse on Namibian negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086-0025, N77001-0604)

3 See Document 46.

4 See Document 43.

5 On November 25, 1976, Vorster met with the Constitutional Committee and warned them that if progress was not made quickly, he would provide them with a constitution. He also ruled out the possibility of an international conference involving SWAPO. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28366)

6 In telegram 893 from Pretoria, February 25, the Embassy reported that a draft ordinance calling for a referendum for South West African whites to consider the Turnhalle proposals as a means to form an interim government and gain independence was announced in the South West Africa legislative assembly on February 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770067-0034)

7 On January 28, Peter Katjavivi was reported to have said that the interim government would result in warfare, which might engulf Southern Africa. Katjavivi blamed South Africa for the situation. On February 4, Sam Nujoma declared that SWAPO was committed to a “military solution,” and that only an international conference would end the conflict. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28367)
majority rule for Namibia and South Africa have increased SAG apprehension over USG’s ability to play role of disinterested broker in helping to work out an acceptable solution.

3. Faced with what he regards as an unpromising negotiating situation, Vorster has in effect decided to proceed with his own “internal solution” for Namibia and take his chances that time and circumstance will eventually bring about acquiescence, if not acceptance, by the world community. If he can get the whites in south west to accept black and brown participation in government as now contemplated in the Turnhalle proposals and through that acceptance general support for the Turnhalle solution from his Afrikaner constituency in South Africa, he will have passed what he regards as a major political hurdle at home. With this achieved, he will see what adjustments might be made in along the way the Turnhalle formula to make them more acceptable to Western countries and Third World moderates. I have no specific insight into the “basic points” which Botha said SAG was willing to discuss but among them may well be ways in which the US and other Western countries might assist in helping to overcome some of the objections to the Turnhalle, such as in holding country-wide referendum of final constitution mentioned by Mudge (Cape Town 0164).8

4. From the US standpoint, it is preferable to have Turnhalle and SWAPO meet and work out a solution among themselves as contemplated in the Seven Points. But at this stage I doubt very much that Vorster or the Turnhalle can be persuaded to accept another hiatus unless there are concrete indications of basic changes in the SWAPO conditions, particularly with regard to such points as prior commitment to withdraw South African troops and negotiations directly with the SAG. The Department will be in a better position to judge what these possibilities are. In the end I would not be surprised if the most that can be hoped for is to allow Turnhalle to follow its course without either acceptance or rejection and to introduce (preferably while the Turnhalle is still functioning) a mechanism that will assure UN involvement and SWAPO participation in fashioning the final constitution for an independent Namibia after December 31, 1978. This approach may represent greater tacit endorsement of the results of Turnhalle than SWAPO, the black Africans and the UN may be willing to accept. It may also represent a greater risk than Vorster and the Turnhalle may be willing to venture. But it could afford a practical, democratic way for overcoming SAG-Turnhalle objection to UN involvement and testing SWAPO’s real strength inside Namibia.

---

8 See footnote 3, Document 43.
5. Essentially what must be traded is tolerance of what the SAG-Turnhalle have done to date and cessation of SWAPO terrorist operations for release of political prisoners and clear-cut commitments by the SAG-Turnhalle that (a) the UN will play a role in leading Namibia to independence, and (b) SWAPO will have every opportunity to establish its true following, and participate on the basis of that following, in the mechanism established to determine the future government. This might be achieved if the UN were allowed to (a) participate in organizing and conducting the selection of candidates to the constitutional conference which will eventually have to be convened to write the final constitution, (b) observe the proceedings of the conference, and (c) remain in SWJ to oversee the transition to independence. A substantial UN presence for this purpose, coupled with release of political prisoners which would be the counterpart to cessation of SWAPO guerrilla operations, would be reassuring to SWAPO as it campaigns for, and participates in, the constitutional conference. Under this kind of arrangement, [garble] should be tolerable to allow SAG-Turnhalle to proceed with the interim government as now contemplated in the clear understanding that this is a provisional arrangement. Furthermore, elections to the constitutional conference might be done on an ethnic group and at-large basis which would reflect the Turnhalle approach and at the same time give SWAPO an opportunity to compete within population groups as well as on a national scale. If the South Africans were willing to entertain such a proposal, they might persuade the Turnhalle to take the initiative in consulting Waldheim and key black African leaders or to ask the SAG to do so on their behalf.

6. For the moment we need to find out what the “basic points” are that Botha wants to discuss. I am skeptical that at this late stage he will advance proposals for trying to bring SWAPO and Turnhalle together along the lines of the Seven Points. He is more likely to explore what the US and other Western states would like to see the Turnhalle do to make it more acceptable, including involvement in some kind of referendum. Once Botha has disclosed what the SAG has in mind, I would like to take another look at the possibilities which might be disclosed.

Bowdler
48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, March 5, 1977, 2207Z

49696. Exdis—Cape Town for Ambassador from Asst. Secretary. Subject: South African Position on Namibia. USUN for Ambassador Young.

1. I submitted the following memorandum to the Secretary.

2. Summary. The South African Ambassador called on me on March 4 and said his government has not ruled out an internationally negotiated settlement for Namibia. Many of the Seven Points offer a framework for continued negotiations. However, the South Africans feel they are obliged to bring the Turnhalle Conference along in this matter and believe a way must be found to convince Turnhalle it has a stake in a negotiated settlement. Botha indicated he would be in touch with his government and agreed to continue talks next week. I urged him to remind his government of the importance of moving ahead expeditiously.

3. The South African position on a Namibian settlement. The South African Ambassador met me March 4 to continue our discussion on Namibia which we began on February 26. Botha, in reviewing the Seven Points, and speaking “personally,” indicated that many of the Seven Points offer a framework for continued negotiations. He allowed that the question of a United Nations relationship, however, would have to be considered carefully and asked what we meant by repeated references to the fact that the United Nations would convene a Geneva conference.

4. I reminded Botha that we had kept Waldheim informed of our consultations and expected at some point the United Nations would have to legitimize the negotiating process. Botha wanted to make sure we understood South Africa would not finance the costs of a conference. I told Botha that we had always understood this to be South Africa’s position.

5. Botha took great pains to defend his government’s position on Namibia. Reviewing United Nations criticism of the way South Africa had dealt with Namibia, Botha pointed out that his government had...
made substantial concessions. Apartheid was being brought to an end, and the country would not be subdivided into “bantustans”. A date of independence had been set and the South Africans meant to respect the date. South Africa had allowed the people of Namibia to decide the territory’s future. In response to my comment that the Turnhalle is ethnically based, Botha agreed, but said that the Turnhalle’s experience proved that the black delegates were prepared to work together on an inter-tribal basis. National leaders are emerging and the founders of SWAPO are returning to the territory to participate in the political process. Presumably referring to the three tier government structure being considered in Turnhalle, Botha said that once black majority rule has been achieved, the new government will be able to reshape arrangements for the territory in a manner satisfactory to the country’s needs. The South African Government would not be able to interfere and Namibia will no longer be an issue in South African domestic politics. The South African Parliament would not have six white members from Namibia.

6. With respect to Walvis Bay, South Africa intended to retain sovereignty which was its internationally recognized right. If a moderate regime emerged in Namibia, Botha, as Foreign Minister, would be prepared to negotiate a modification in Walvis Bay’s status.

7. South Africa could not turn the territory over to Sam Nujoma’s SWAPO. Nujoma does not enjoy majority support and if he took power bloodshed would ensue. The chances of radicalization would be great and Botswana would be threatened by its turbulent neighbor. Botha allowed that South Africa would then have a serious domestic political problem. The government would be seen to have turned power over to radicals and have permitted chaos.

8. South Africa had every reason to wish to settle with SWAPO. SWAPO had approached the South African Government to say that if power were transferred directly to SWAPO, it would allow South African troops to stay in the territory and would expect South African administrators to help govern. As attractive as this solution might have been, his government could not turn its back on the Turnhalle.

9. I told Botha that I would not take exception with his description of the internal situation in Namibia or the potential impact of Namibia on South African domestic politics. Nevertheless, South Africa had to be aware that the Namibian situation has been internationalized. Too many parties are involved in the issue for South Africa and the Turnhalle to ignore their say in the outcome. The United Nation’s authority

4 December 31, 1978.
5 Reference is to the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference.
in the matter is now a fact of international life and South Africa has to live with that fact. The Turnhalle itself must be aware that any government which results from its deliberations will have great difficulty in securing international recognition and, in all likelihood, will be subject to continuing international opposition. SWAPO’s external support would not diminish and violence would continue, possibly escalating. The United States has taken a stand in the United Nations and is under an obligation to seek an internationally acceptable settlement. Pressure can only grow on us if such a settlement is not reached.

10. Botha accepted my points and said that for this reason, he assumed his government was prepared to let the search for an international agreement continue. The problem which the South Africans face at this juncture is one of bringing the Turnhalle along. Some way, he suggested, must be found to convince Turnhalle that its interests would be served by international negotiations. Botha asked if we, the EC–9 or the United Nations might be prepared to help convince the Turnhalle delegates of the wisdom of this approach. I deflected Botha’s inquiry.

11. Botha raised the EC–9’s demarche of early February and said that all the points made by the EC–9 were acceptable to South Africa except the community’s reference to the United Nations. He suggested that we meet again after he has had a further opportunity to consult Cape Town and, in addition to a further discussion of the Seven Points, consider the questions raised in the EC–9 demarche. I agreed and expect to see Botha later next week to continue talks.

12. Comment. I am encouraged by the approach Botha took. Although he said he was speaking “personally,” he is too careful a diplomat to do so without reflecting official views. Without committing South Africa specifically, in effect, Botha appears to be saying his government is receptive to renewing the validity of the Seven Points. He is probing for some way to bring the Turnhalle delegates along, but we will have to be careful, since we do not wish to give the impression we will associate ourselves with the Turnhalle. In another round of talks with the Ambassador, I hope to be able to pin him down further and obtain sufficient assurance that South Africa is prepared to seek an internationally acceptable settlement so that we can reopen talks with the Africans.

Christopher
521. Subj: Meeting With PM Vorster on Namibia. Ref: Cape Town 0519; 2 State 076299 3 and previous.

1. This message covers the highlights of an hour-long meeting with PM Vorster at which I handed him aide memoire and made oral points on behalf of the five governments. He was accompanied by FonMin Botha and DFA Secy Brand Fourie. In a separate message there will follow my assessment of the meeting. 4

2. After reading the aide memoire carefully and listening to the oral points, 5 PM reacted by saying that “to put it mildly, he found this approach very strange indeed.” Showing considerable irritation, which continued throughout the meeting, he made these points about the document:

A) You talk about self-determination through a fully democratic process. After watching the Turnhalle process for two years, now you tell us that it is not good enough.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770121–1115. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa, and Pretoria. Sent for information Immediate to USUN.

2 In telegram 519 from Cape Town, April 7, the Embassy notified the Department that the aide-mémoire was delivered to Vorster at 4 p.m. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770121–0907) The aide-mémoire is printed as Tab A, Document 50.

3 In telegram 76299 to Cape Town, April 6, the Department approved the language for questions and press guidance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770119–0034)

4 In telegram 526 from Cape Town, April 8, Bowdler gave his assessment of the meeting. He noted that Vorster faced two limitations to “call the tune,” in Namibia: the need for the white population to accept what the Turnhalle does and the awareness that he must retain the cooperation of the non-white delegation. Bowdler suggested that it might be better to seek fulfillment of UN Security Council Resolution 385 (see footnote 3, Document 50) after the interim government was set up. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770123–0455)

5 In telegram 1000 from USUN, April 2, the Mission provided instructions for the Namibian démarche. The spokesman for the Five was instructed to make the following points orally to Vorster: “The Five Governments are convinced that an internationally acceptable settlement to the Namibian problem must be found urgently.

The Five are prepared to work with South Africa in finding such a solution. The views of the Five Governments on the nature of a settlement are contained in the aide memoire.

“The Five Governments urge a prompt response and are prepared as a group to enter into discussions with the South African Government to consider its response and to work with South Africa towards a solution consistent with Security Council Resolution 385.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770114–0052)
B) You speak of supervision of the United Nations. There is the whole history of Dr. Escher sent out by the UNSYG as his representative to work with us on SWA. After reaching certain understandings with him, he returned to New York but we heard nothing further from the SYG.

C) You call for an end to SAG administration in SWA. Our attitude on this is very clear and has been repeated many times. We have said that we want to end our administration of the territory.

D) Regarding political prisoners, he was not aware of any political prisoners being held in SWA. If you refer to people convicted by the courts as common criminals, these fall outside the terms of your note.

E) With respect to people returning to SWA, he found this very strange since there is no hindrance to people coming back, including SWAPO people. Why do your governments bring this up? They know this, or don't they want to know?

3. Botha then entered the discussion focusing first on lack of Western recognition for what the SAG had done and then expressing dismay over the fifth paragraph of the aide memoire which he described as a "veiled threat." He referred to the Kissinger-Vorster talks on Namibia in which our position was described as "extremely reasonable." Botha said SAG willing to be reasonable but will not be hammered. Much of subsequent conversation centered around this paragraph with PM and Botha referring to it as "obnoxious" and "unnecessary" given the SAG stated position that it was prepared to talk about these matters as reflected in the response to the EC–9 demarche and in Botha’s recent conversation with President Carter. At one point Botha suggested that the paragraph be revised but the PM did not support him on this.

4. In the face of the PM’s and Botha’s criticisms of the aide memoire, their efforts to draw us into a discussion of substantive points, and questioning of the motive in making a demarche with the “veiled threat,” I made the following points at various stages in the conversation, supported by my colleagues:

A) The aide memoire represents a sincere effort to open a new stage of discussions looking toward a solution consistent with Resolution 385. Without entering into polemics, the unacceptability of Turnhalle has been known to the SAG for some time.

---

8 See Document 269.
B) The proposal for discussions should be looked at as part of the effort to avoid confrontation in the UN with adverse effects for South Africa.

C) We were not in a position to discuss substantive points in a possible settlement, this being a matter better left to the proposed discussions.

D) We could not tell him how the proposed discussions would be conducted, this being a point on which we expected further guidance from our capitals in the near future. In the meantime, we hoped for a prompt response to the aide memoire.

E) No one was proposing that SWA be turned over to SWAPO which my government does not recognize as the sole representative authority of Namibia, but that all political groups should be allowed to participate peacefully in determining Namibia’s future, including SWAPO.

6. In the end the PM said he was prepared to give his response to the aide memoire right away. He put it in these terms: “We are prepared and have always been prepared to have realistic discussions—as with the UNSYG and naturally with your governments—but as far as SWA is concerned, we are not rpt not taking any decisions on their behalf. We have not interfered with the Turnhalle Conference and cannot stop its momentum. We cannot and will not prescribe for the people of SWA. It is their country and their future. Within this framework I am prepared to enter into discussions with whoever wants to discuss SWA in a constructive spirit. It was not necessary to threaten us to come to this point. I shall expect to hear from your governments where and when the discussions will take place.”

Bowdler
No. 360–77  Washington, April 8, 1977

SUBJECT
Vorster’s Reaction to Namibia Demarche

Ambassador Bowdler reports that Prime Minister Vorster was quite irritated with the Namibia demarche made April 7. He and Foreign Minister Botha were particularly upset over the fifth paragraph of the aide-memoire (full text at Tab A), which Botha characterized as a “veiled threat.”

Vorster was defensive about other points, claiming (erroneously) that this was the first time we had spoken against Turnhalle, although it had been going on for two years, that the UN Secretary General had dropped the ball on talks with South Africa, and that there were no Namibian political prisoners.

Bowdler stressed to Vorster the sincerity of the Western demarche, observing that the proposal was an effort to avoid confrontation in the UN which could have adverse effects for South Africa. Bowdler added that it was not our intention to turn Namibia over to SWAPO, but that all political groups, including SWAPO, should be allowed to participate peacefully in determining Namibia’s future.

Vorster begrudgingly acknowledged South Africa’s willingness to discuss the question, qualifying it by noting that South Africa cannot and will not prescribe for the people of South West Africa (Namibia): “we have not interfered with the Turnhalle Conference and cannot stop its momentum.” Vorster concluded, “Within this framework, I am prepared to enter into discussions with whoever wants to discuss South West Africa in a constructive spirit. It was not necessary to threaten us to come to this point. I shall expect to hear from your government where and when the discussions will take place.” (Interestingly, Vorster did not automatically assume, as had the West, that the talks would take place in Namibia or South Africa. That might be a helpful point should we wish to persuade Vorster to meet you outside South Africa.)

---


2 See Document 49.
A copy of United Nations Security Council Resolution 385 is at Tab B.3

Tab A

Final Text of Group of Five Démarche to South Africa on Namibia4

undated

Following is Final Text of Group of Five Demarche to South Africa on Namibia

A. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, in view of their special responsibilities as members of the Security Council of the United Nations, have jointly reviewed the problem of Namibia.

B. The Governments are deeply concerned by the situation in Namibia and agree that progress is urgently required to achieve an internationally acceptable settlement.

C. The Governments believe that a Namibian settlement must be acceptable to the international community. The interim government now being considered by the Turnhalle Conference does not meet the standards of international acceptance and only a final settlement which is based upon the conditions of the Security Council Resolution 385 can obtain international acceptance.

D. The conditions for a settlement in Namibia are contained in Security Council Resolution 385. These conditions include an early exercise by all the inhabitants of Namibia of their right to self-determination through a fully democratic process under the supervision of the United Nations and the peaceful participation of all political groups, including SWAPO, in this process. The Resolution also calls for an end to South Africa’s administration of the territory, release of political prisoners and the return to the territory of Namibians living in exile.

E. The Governments wish to make it clear that in the absence of early South African agreement to pursue a settlement which will meet

3 Tab B is attached but not printed. UN Security Council Resolution 385, adopted unanimously on January 30, 1976, reaffirmed the United Nation’s legal responsibility over Namibia, demanded that South Africa leave Namibia, demanded that South Africa allow for a UN-sponsored election, and called for an end to the policy of Bantustans and the release of all political prisoners.

4 Confidential.
the foregoing principles and be internationally acceptable, the governments will be obliged to reconsider their previous positions regarding proposals for stern action by the United Nations and will be compelled to examine a new range of measures intended to obtain South African compliance with applicable resolutions of the United Nations Security Council concerning Namibia.

F. It is the view of the Governments that international negotiations under United Nations auspices continue to be the best way to bring the parties to an agreement on how the process to independence should proceed.

G. The Governments note from the South African Government’s reply to the nine countries of the European Community that the South African Government, too, sees virtue in continued discussions. The Governments wish to have the South African Government’s views on how the conditions for an internationally acceptable settlement will be met. The Governments request an early response from the South African Government.

H. The Governments have noted the South African Government’s reference to the United Nations Secretary-General in its response to the nine countries of the European Community and would welcome the South African Government’s views on how his good offices could be used in working towards a settlement.

51. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, April 20, 1977, 0633Z


1. Following is “agreed working paper” developed in Western Five experts’ meeting in NY (ref tel):


2 In telegram 1166 from USUN, April 20, the Mission conveyed the results of the meeting held in New York on April 19 among the Western Five. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770136–0960)
A. Objectives

Objectives of initial talks with South Africa should be:

First, to obtain S.A. agreement that purpose of negotiations will be to develop an internationally acceptable settlement consistent with SC Res 385;

Second, parties primarily concerned must be provided with opportunity to participate in development of any settlement;

Third, all parties concerned must avoid steps which will foreclose possibility of arranging an internationally acceptable solution. Consequently, it is essential that S.A. suspend implementation of Turnhalle constitution.

B. Venue and timing

It was agreed that talks should begin in Cape Town on April 27. Venue of future talks remains to be decided.

C. Participation

(1) Initial participants in talks should be Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, UK and USA, together with S.A.;

(2) There would be subsequent participation by Namibian political groups (including those represented at Turnhalle and SWAPO), and UN SYG.

D. Role of other states

Influential African states such as Front Line States and Nigeria could play an important role.

E. Indicative elements of a political process in Namibia consistent with Security Council Res 385 (to be presented orally)

1. Preamble

Five govs do not propose to negotiate with the SAG a scenario for a political process in Namibia that would be compatible with SC Res 385. This is task of SA Govt with parties mainly involved.

However Five, each of which is represented in SC, would work to obtain a fair hearing for a political process that they could honestly appraise as being consistent with Res 385.

Five recognize that SAG has made right decision in treating international territory of Namibia as entitled to unitary and independent nationhood. Five also recognize that SAG has an important role to play in process of bringing Namibia to independence.

Five consider that a political process for Namibia which could gain wide acceptance would include, but not be limited to, those elements listed below. Elements suggested are illustrative only; undoubtedly
alternatives could be devised by SAG and others. Any serious proposal for an internationally acceptable political process would have to be considered as a whole in order for those mainly concerned to be able to make a reasoned judgement as to its acceptability.

2. Elections

Elections would be held for a new Constituent Assembly whose task would be drawing up of a constitution for Namibia. There are a variety of ways to conduct electoral process. One adult/one vote would be its basis; other factors might be introduced to accommodate minorities. Voting would be by secret ballot with provision to enable full participation by individuals who cannot read or write.

3. UN supervision and control

Elections would take place under supervision and control of UN. A UN elections commissioner, supported by International Civil Service of UN Secretariat, would be appointed by SYG. Disputes concerning participation in, or conduct of, electoral process would be settled by an independent body of jurists appointed by SYG, Chairman having a casting vote.

4. Campaign process

SAG would immediately abolish application of all legislation and regulations which could impede full and open participation by all adult Namibians in political process. All persons and all political parties, regardless of political views, would be enabled to participate in process of political education and campaigning. There would be full freedoms of speech, press and assembly. Campaign process, like elections themselves, would be supervised by UN elections commissioner. Elections would take place after an appropriate period following installation in Namibia of UN elections commissioner.

5. Participation by returnees

All persons born in or recognized as inhabitants of Namibia who are not now in Namibia would be enabled to return and participate in political process.

6. Detainees

All political prisoners would be promptly released. This would enable them to participate throughout campaign. Independent body of jurists would resolve any disputes.

7. Transfer of power

In consultation with those mainly involved, SAG would develop a plan for its withdrawal in stages from Namibia to prepare for a smooth transfer of power at end of political process.
F. Informing others

Promptly after confirming with SA that talks will begin on April 27, Five will inform SYG, Front Line States, and SWAPO that they will begin talks with SA in Cape Town on that date regarding implementation of SC Res 385, and will give them an account afterwards. Thereafter, date and purpose of talks with [will?] be confirmed to press. On conclusion of talks Five delegations will recommend to their govs briefing points for interested parties.

Young

52. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, April 28, 1977, 1000Z

643. Subj: Namibia Talks. Refs: (A) Cape Town 0632, (B) USUN 1167.

1. Summary. Contact Group met twice with SAG officials April 27. At the morning session, CG presented position of the Five governments as contained in “agreed working paper” prepared in New York last week. Foreign Minister Botha reserved comment on all but one point, viz, that the SAG not proceed to implement the Turnhalle constitution. After implying that Vorster government would be prepared to refrain from introducing legislation to give legal status to the Turnhalle constitution, he declared that Vorster was committed to establishing an interim government in Namibia. If the Five governments were opposed to this, there would be no point in continuing the talks. After morning meeting was adjourned, the CG conveyed to Botha questions

---


2 In telegram 632 from Cape Town, April 26, Bowdler summarized the Contact Group’s preparations for the meeting with the South Africans: “Group agreed that no delegation would comment to media during talks, and that upon completion of talks, we would prepare a joint statement. At the same time it was recognized that developments during the talks might make statement necessary although this would be avoided if possible. Group also agreed that it would not rpt not meet with representatives of Turnhalle Conference whom SAG has brought to Cape Town to be available for discussions with us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770148-0378)

3 See Document 51.
aimed at clarifying what he meant. In afternoon session he said SAG
did not intend to set up an interim government, but merely intended
to implement some “administrative rearrangements” that would be
consistent with UN wishes and would facilitate process leading to an
internationally acceptable form of independence for Namibia. He then
responded to other aspects of the CG presentation. Meeting was
adjourned until 10 a.m. April 28 to give both sides time to consider
points which had been raised. Although first day’s discussions were
basically exploratory, serious differences emerged. Not the least of
these is the evident continued desire of SAG to avoid UN supervision
and control of elections. Further, it unclear whether “administrative
rearrangements” represents a significant concession or is no more than
a device by SAG to install an interim government based on the unac-
ceptable Turnhalle constitution. End summary.

2. The first meeting between Contact Group and South African
officials took place this morning. At outset, Prime Minister Vorster
spoke to CG for a few minutes. He welcomed group and said that “it
is not beyond us to find a reasonable and satisfactory solution” to
Namibian problem. There were many interested parties to this issue,
but, he stressed, people of South West Africa themselves are most
directly concerned. Therefore, he had arranged to bring some Turnhalle
representatives to Cape Town. He strongly recommended that CG talk
to them, as well as to SAG. He then left the meeting, turning SA side
of it over to Foreign Minister Botha.

3. After both sides had agreed that neither would make any com-
ment to the media during the course of the talks, Ambassador McHenry,
speaking on behalf of the CG, told Botha (Foreign Secretary Brand
Fourie also was present) that at some future stage all the interested
parties had to be involved. However, we regarded it as premature to
talk to Turnhalle people here in Cape Town now.

4. Responding, Botha urged CG to reconsider that decision. He
said we had met often with SWAPO, in fact had done so just before
coming to Cape Town. Now we had an opportunity to meet with men
who “represent the overwhelming majority of the people of South
West Africa.”

5. CG replied that we had not met with SWAPO in New York last
week, but had merely informed SWAPO that we were going to Cape
Town to discuss Namibian problem with SAG. Delegates of the four
other governments spoke in support of Ambassador McHenry, sharing
the view that it would be premature to meet with Turnhalle representa-
tives now, although at some future time they could be included in a
negotiating process.

6. Speaking again on behalf of CG, McHenry, after introductory
remarks, presented orally the points contained in the agreed working
paper developed in New York by the Five governments (see paras 1 through 7, ref tel B).

7. Botha stated that his government would need time to study the points that had been presented. However, there was one point which he wanted to discuss, i.e., our third objective regarding suspension of the implementation of the Turnhalle constitution. He said that the SAG was “firmly, irrevocably committed” to institute an interim government for Namibia. He said that SAG had made concessions by no longer standing in the way of an independent, unitary state, by making a significant start in eliminating discrimination based on color, and by agreeing to an early date for independence. Now, however, SAG was being pushed further—further to a point beyond which it had no control over the course of Turnhalle.

8. Continuing his argument, he referred to talks with Kissinger after the South Africans had presented their Seven Points on Namibia. Botha said, Kissinger had stated that the United States could ask no more of South Africa, that South Africa had been most reasonable, and that the United States would not push South Africa beyond the Seven Points. Now, however, Botha continued, the new American administration was not honoring those views and South Africa was indeed being pushed further. At some length, he described the development of Turnhalle over the past two years. It was the blacks, not the whites, represented in Turnhalle who had decided that they wanted to do. A “foundation was laid for a new era” in SWA. He lamented that “not only do we get no credit, but now we are confronted with a demand that the work of Turnhalle not be implemented.”

9. He went on to say that he was prepared to discuss with the Prime Minister postponement of the introduction in Parliament of the formal detailed constitution, as SAG was prepared to do on May 20. But if CG was to tell him that it would object to an interim government, then there would be no point in continuing the talks.

10. During ensuing discussions, CG delegates pointed out that implementation of an interim government would be an element that would further complicate the problem of Namibia. An interim government would not be, as Botha had termed it, “just an administrative rearrangement”. With agreement to study the matter and discuss it further in the afternoon, the meeting was adjourned. CG subsequently decided to have British Ambassador ask Botha to explain with precisely he had meant when he referred to the possibility of postponing the legislation to introduce a new interim constitution for Namibia.

4 Not further identified. The Seven Points (South African Basis for a Proposal 9/19/76) are printed as Tab 2, Document 264.
in the South African Parliament, and whether the interim government or administrative rearrangement to which Botha referred simply meant the implementation of the Turnhalle interim constitution by another name.

11. During afternoon session, in response to those questions, Botha explained that what SAG had in mind was to avoid the irrevocable step of putting into law the Turnhalle constitution, upon which “all future arrangements would have been based.” Clearly implying that Vorster would agree, he said he was prepared to ask Vorster and the Cabinet not to introduce legislation to implement the constitution.

12. He then explained that “interim government” was not the correct terminology; what he had meant to convey to the CG was that SAG would turn over to local authorities in Namibia some of the governmental functions now being carried out by the SAG. This, he said, would “make your task easier,” for it would involve a rearrangement to eliminate some of the control that South Africa exerted over the territory. Moreover through this arrangement, some aspects of discrimination could be eliminated without reference to legislation by the South Africa Parliament. He added that Vorster had made a commitment to the Turnhalle people to make these administrative changes. He could not tell the people of Namibia that not only would the Turnhalle constitution not be introduced, but also that there would be no “administrative rearrangements.” He then went on to say that the authority for the administrative rearrangements could be provided by means of a decree by the State President.

13. Questioned about what would be the basis of authority for the running of those departments which would be taken over by the Namibians, and just how this would work, Botha was vague. He did not know what would be the juridical basis of the new government, since SAG had not had time to consider this. He said that adaptations would have to be made. He emphasized that the workings of these new administrative arrangements would not be based on the proposed Turnhalle constitution, and he noted that he was not talking about an interim government, for these administrative rearrangements would not include substantial attributes of a government. What was involved would be a continuation of the present administrative situation in the territory but with a devolution of some administrative functions to local people, some of whom could be Turnhalle representatives.

14. After being asked whether he would want to discuss other aspects of the CG presentation, Botha said that, after talking to Vorster and to Turnhalle people, he had prepared a summary of what he believed Turnhalle group would accept. He then read the following:

(A) “We accept that all the inhabitants of the territory have the right to participate in a fully democratic process in the exercise of their right to self determination.
(B) “We further accept that before independence, elections will be held in terms of a constitution.

(C) “We have not been hammering out constitutional proposals over a long period for nothing. On the other hand, we do however fully accept that a constitution cannot be imposed on the inhabitants. In circumstances where some organizations allege that the Turnhalle Conference was not constituted in such a manner as to truly represent the majority of the inhabitants, we are prepared to test the draft constitution on a country-wide basis before elections in terms of the constitution are held.

(D) “We are prepared to allow and would welcome international observation in respect of such testing of the acceptability of the final constitution. We are not prepared, however, to submit to outside supervision and control. It will be a further condition that the Five powers now involved will be represented during such observation. It must further be clearly understood that such powers will grant recognition to an independent South West Africa in the event of such draft constitution being accepted by the majority of the inhabitants and independence then being obtained based on such a constitution.

(E) “There is not objection to peaceful participation by all political parties and groups in (1) testing of the draft constitution or (2) the elections to be held in terms of the draft constitution. The term ‘peaceful’ is of paramount importance. There could be no question of peaceful participation if any individual, party or group involved has a gun in hand, or is directly involved with associates outside the territory with guns in their hands.

(F) “It is obvious that South African administration will come to an end at independence.

(G) “Regarding returnees, there is no objection as long as returnees come in peace.”

15. Botha stated that he believed that the foregoing points constitute dramatic progress and comply with the basic elements of UN demands over the years. He claimed that he had extracted concessions from the Turnhalle people after a “blunt presentation” by him of what the CG had told him in the morning.

16. It was agreed to adjourn until tomorrow in order to give Botha more time to discuss the matter with the Turnhalle people and to allow the CG to study the points he had made before making any comment about them.

17. Although both sides put a lot on the table, we believe that the two sessions were essentially exploratory. During the morning Botha was aggressive and truculent. However, by the afternoon, when it apparently had become clear to him that his reference to installing an
“interim government” was a serious stumbling block, and after he was able to offer the possibly somewhat more acceptable idea of an “administrative rearrangement”, he put on a different face.

18. These first two sessions show that despite some concessions, we have a long way to go to achieve an acceptable basis for negotiations between the parties directly involved. South Africans have, at least initially, rejected UN supervision and control of elections. Although accepting the idea of some form of elections, they continue to think in terms of referendum regarding the constitutional proposal by the Turnhalle Conference. They did not address the question of political prisoners. They have injected a rider that the Five Powers will grant recognition if Turnhalle constitution is accepted by voters.

19. Moreover, despite Botha’s attempted explanation, at this point we do not know the substantive difference between an “interim government” and “administrative rearrangements”. It may be that there is no real difference.

20. On the basis of our assessment of Botha’s presentation, we expect that after we consult with our Contact Group colleagues, together we and they will iron out the unresolved differences that still exist between us and the SAG. Having done that, we will see what they have to say. However, we do not, of course, intend to get involved in negotiations and will make that clear to them.
53. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, April 28, 1977, 2330Z

650. Subj: Namibia Talks. Ref: A) Cape Town 0643; B) Cape Town 0644.

1. Summary: A number of interesting developments came out of April 25 [28] meetings between Contact Group and Vorster and Botha. “Administrative rearrangement” which Botha had talked about earlier (ref tel A) involves a devolution of power to a body of South West Africans whom the State President will appoint and empower to carry out some administrative functions in Namibia which now are in the hands of the SAG. This “administrative authority” will not be based either structurally or functionally on Turnhalle constitution (although appointees will be drawn largely from Turnhalle participants). Turnhalle constitution will not be implemented by SA Parliament. Vorster and Botha said that, based on CG’s explanation, they have entirely new conception of what un-supervised elections involves. Vorster indicated he could live with this. CG will press for more details about the proposed administrative authority for Namibia. It will also probe more on questions of political prisoners and SWAPO participation in the political process—questions concerning which the SAG has not yet provided satisfactory answers. End summary.

2. At opening of this morning’s meeting with Pik Botha and Brand Fourie, Michael Shenstone of the Canadian delegation delivered agreed talking points (ref tel B) on behalf of the contact group. In reply, Botha focused on the last point, i.e., our reiterated concern about possible adverse consequences arising from installation of an interim government, and our request for details of what SAG has in mind regarding this subject.

3. Botha repeated that Vorster is irrevocably committed to “a more centralized form of local government, or ‘administrative rearrange-

---


2 See Document 52.

3 In telegram 644 from Cape Town, April 28, the Embassy reported on the morning Contact Group meeting, and included the agreed talking points for their 10 a.m. meeting with the South Africans. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770148–0971)
ment,’ or whatever one terms it.” He said that because he had not yet had sufficient time to discuss this thoroughly with Turnhalle representatives, he was unable to provide us with clarification of what exactly was meant by administrative rearrangements. However, he stressed that SAG proposal is (a) not contrary to substance of Resolution 385, (b) involves no more than devolution of more “unitary administration” (as opposed to homeland or ethnic based government functions) to people of SWA, and (c) necessary as a prelude to any other changes along lines of 385.

4. Comment: Privately Fourie has told CG members that Botha cannot tell us at the negotiating table that the transfer of control over some administrative functions from SAG to SWA will make it possible for the abolition of racially discriminatory laws and regulations. If South Africa retained full control, Fourie said, it would be difficult for the Vorster government to do [some]thing of this sort for SWA which it was in no way prepared to do in South Africa itself.

5. Remainder of morning session centered on question of UN supervision and control of elections. Botha said Turnhalle people were fearful that UN, because it had recognized SWAPO as sole, legitimate representative of Namibian people, would not be impartial in any involvement in Namibia. In hour-long exchange on this subject, the CG tried to answer the fear (which SAG obviously shared with Turnhalle). CG members cited the record of previous cases of UN supervision of elections. They emphasized the impartiality of UNSYG Waldheim and importance of his role in Namibian settlement. We pointed out what supervision and control of an electoral process could involve, and that it did not mean administrative or governing control of the country, and we talked in general terms of a juridical element which could handle disputes that could arise concerning the electoral process. We also noted that what we were saying was indicative and by way of explanation; we were not in a position to make any specific proposals to the SAG.

6. Vorster was present for afternoon session, which began at 3:30 pm. Botha opened by summarizing the two major points of the morning’s discussions. He then said that CG had given him a completely new understanding of what UN involvement might mean. He regarded this as a breakthrough on a problem which he said had been an obstacle to settlement over the past three decades. The constructive attitude that Botha and Vorster displayed throughout the afternoon represented

---

4 Reference is presumably to UN Resolution 3111(XXVIII), the 1973 decision to declare SWAPO the “authentic representative” of the Namibian people. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1974, p. 26339) For text of the Resolution see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973, pp. 735–737.
a significant turnaround from the tough, uncompromising stance taken in yesterday’s meetings.

7. Turning first to the matter of “administrative rearrangements” for Namibia, Vorster endeavored to answer our questions about what the South Africans had in mind. According to him, existing ethnic-based governments controlling given areas within Namibia would continue to function. But overall administration of the territories for those functions which are not carried out by local authorities would be transferred from SAG to an “administrative authority” composed of South West Africans. Before going further, he said he was doing his best to meet a commitment to the Turnhalle group on the one hand, and our “demands” on the other. In terms of the latter, he would defer introduction of legislation to implement the Turnhalle Conference. To meet his commitment, but in a way compatible with what we wanted, he said: “I see no other way than we agree that a law be passed by Parliament to empower the State President to call into being a central administrative authority for the entire territory which would function until such time as elections can be held.”

8. After further probing by CG, he gave future outline of what was involved. He said the establishment of the administrative authority would not involve the Turnhalle constitution as such. The State President would have to appoint “certain people, who will have to be empowered to enact ordinances to administer the territory until a duly elected government comes into being.” At the very least some of these people will be those now participating in Turnhalle Conference. He could not leave out “the acknowledged leaders of South West Africa.”

9. The administrative authority would not have the composition and structure as is detailed in the Turnhalle draft constitution. It would be a “committee” which would make the day-to-day decisions regarding the administration of the territory. Functions such as, for example, water supply, which now is administered by the South African Department of Water Affairs, would devolve to the new central administrative authority of SWA. Asked that if in the event control of the Department of Bantu Administration would be given over to Windhoek, whether the administrative authority would have the power to desegregate education throughout the territory, Vorster replied, “it would have the right.” He said there would be no central legislative apparatus such as the three-tier form of government, or the kind of national assembly provided for in Turnhalle constitution.

10. The South African State President, Vorster said, would retain the power to veto any enactments of the SWA administrative authority. He said this would be done to avoid any “possible runaway legislation” which would be contrary to the interests of the Five Western governments. Implication was that if the administrative authority took actions
which could upset progress toward a settlement, Vorster could intervene.

11. Responding to questions, he said that the administrative authority would do the “ground work for elections,” and (importantly) that elections would be for a Constituent Assembly to draft the final constitution. CG told Vorster that he had given us useful information, but we were not authorized to accept or reject his proposals. (At one point we did this when he said that “if you give me the green light,” he would have the new governmental setup in Namibia in place within two or three weeks.”) Nevertheless, his proposal for a central authority was such that it would not necessarily complicate our task. However, we would need further details concerning the administrative authority. Vorster stated that his idea of the kind of central or administrative authority he had outlined was brand new, in response to the presentation by the CG the previous day. Consequently, he could not provide further details at this time.

12. Referring to CG’s explanations regarding UN supervision of elections, Botha repeated that he thought this represented a “forward step.” Vorster asked to hear more on this, and CG members responded accordingly. Vorster then responded that “United Nations involvement to the extent you have described is something I can consider.” He said the elections and their supervision appeared to him to be basically no different for [from?] the way elections are conducted in South Africa. But he pleaded that we avoid use of the word “control”, for this would be taken by his people and the people of South West Africa as total control by the UN over the governing process prior to elections, and not just careful supervision of the electoral process.

13. Vorster said that all who want to return to South West Africa to participate in peaceful elections could do so, as long as they are “seen to come back peacefully.” The question of political prisoners presented a difficulty, however, he said he would not release persons who were “convicted of criminal offenses.”

14. The meeting concluded with CG members reiterating that we could give no guarantee that South African proposals would be accepted. Furthermore, we needed to have more discussions concerning matters which had not been satisfactorily explored. Vorster said he was very impressed with the mood and substance of the discussions thus far, he believed real progress had been made, and that indeed we might achieve what has been considered as impossibility.

15. Comment: We believe talks have resulted in some progress. Establishment of a “central administrative authority” composed largely of Turnhalle participants could pose serious problem, especially since we still do not have sufficient details about this body. However, fact that Turnhalle constitution will not be implemented, and that the
Namibia 127

administrative authority will not be patterned on features of that constitution, offers some encouragement. But we cannot make even a tentative judgement from here without more details.

16. Vorster’s and Botha’s expressed reaction to discussion on meaning of UN supervision of elections, and their stated agreement that elections will be for a Constituent Assembly to draft the final constitution appear to be positive factors with respect to our objectives.

17. Unresolved is problem of Vorster’s indication he would not send [bend?] on issue of political prisoners. Question of SWAPO participation could present us with further difficulty, and we need more details on structure of new administrative authority and how it will operate. We intend to explore all these issues tomorrow, which probably will be last day of talks. We will also discuss the matter of next steps in moving forward to establish a framework for a negotiating process.

Bowdler

54. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, April 29, 1977, 1250Z

656. Subject: Namibia Talks. Ref: Cape Town 0650.2

1. Summary. This morning the Contact Group presented to Vorster and Botha another set of talking points. These summarized our understanding of what we have covered to date, including our position on the topics we have discussed and what we believe to be the South African position on the same matters. Vorster will consider these and respond at meeting later today (April 29). Before adjourning, however, he brought up the subject of who would assume, after independence, the burden of certain financial and other practical responsibilities now borne by SAG. CG responded that this would have to be worked out by SAG and others during future negotiations.

2. Contact Group met again with Vorster, Botha and Fourie at 11 a.m. today. Speaking on behalf of the group, the German Ambassador
made the following points which CG had worked out together before the meeting:

3. April 29, 1977

As we did yesterday, we thought it useful to review our discussions thus far in the light of the three objectives which we set forth in our initial presentation. We believe it particularly important to do so now in order to insure that our reports to our governments and [garble—any future?] discussions we may have with the South African Government or the other parties involved will reflect our discussions as accurately as possible.

At the same time we recognize the illustrative nature of our discussions and the need to add greater specificity to some points.

Objective number one

It is agreed that the purpose of future negotiations should be to develop an internationally acceptable settlement on the Namibian issue consistent with Resolution 385. There are a variety of ways in which the essential elements of Resolution 385 can be implemented. It is also agreed that possible ways of implementing these elements might be as follows:

(1) Elections. There would be elections, on the basis of universal sufferage, for a Constituent Assembly whose task would be to draw up the constitution for an independent Namibia. Voting would be by secret ballot with provision to enable full participation by individuals who cannot read or write.

(2) International involvement in elections. Subject to further discussions, it should be possible to develop a system of UN involvement in the elections so as to ensure that elections are held on a free and fair basis. Such a system might include a UN elections commissioner, supported by the International Civil Service of the Secretariat and appointed by the Secretary General. Disputes might be settled by an independent commission of jurists appointed by the Secretary General which could include South African jurists. UN conduct of elections elsewhere might serve as a guide. We should like to underscore the illustrative nature of these provisions.

(3) Campaign process. The elections commissioner would ensure that nothing would impede full and open participation, in a peaceful manner, by all adult Namibians in the political process. He would approve the regulations drawn up for the electoral process. All persons and all political parties, regardless of political views, would be enabled to participate in the process of political education and campaigning. There would be freedoms of speech, press and assembly. The campaign process, like the elections themselves, would be supervised by the UN elections commissioner. Elections would take place after an appropriate period following installation of the elections commissioner.
(4) Returnees. All persons born in or recognized as inhabitants of Namibia who are not now in Namibia would be enabled to return and participate in the political process. Returnees would be expected to participate in peace.

(5) Transfer of power. In consultation with those mainly involved, the SAG would develop a plan for its withdrawal in stages from Namibia to prepare a smooth transfer of power at the end of the political process.

Elements of Security Council Resolution 385 on which no agreement has been reached

(1) Detainees and political prisoners. We suggested that all political prisoners be released and that in case of a dispute as to who is a political prisoner, the dispute would be decided by the commission of jurists. The SAG responded that it could release detainees but would not release persons sentenced by courts for criminal acts. Clearly, there is a difference on what constitutes political prisoners and since this is a major element of Resolution 385, we will have to have further discussions on it.

(2) Legislation and regulations. We suggested that South Africa waive the application of all legislation and regulations which might impede the full participation of all Namibians in the political process. The SAG suggested that some of this would be taken care of by the regulations for the electoral process. The Five will review legislation and regulations and suggest to the SAG those which in our view would need to be changed.

Objective number two

(1) We take from these talks and from the need to explore further some of the points discussed that we should in due course establish a process for continued discussions with the SAG. Since there are additional parties concerned, we will also need to have discussions with them.

Objective number three

(2)[(1)] We expressed concern that all parties in the negotiations avoid steps which might foreclose possibilities of arranging an internationally acceptable solution. In this regard we emphasized the serious consequences which might follow from the implementation of the Turnhalle draft constitution.

(3)[(2)] The SAG has suggested that it might not submit the Turnhalle constitution to the Parliament. At the same time the Prime Minister is committed to the return of some of the responsibilities now exercised by the SAG to a central administrative authority for Namibia. This might be done by a South African law which authorized the State
President to establish such an authority. Detailed plans for such an authority have not been completed. However, it would not be the Turnhalle interim government by another name. Ultimate powers would be reserved to South Africa; however, the central authority would be empowered to repeal discriminatory and other legislation.

(4)[(3)] The Five said that they could offer no considered views about the extent to which the proposal might complicate their task without more information on the proposed administrative re-arrangements. Administrative re-arrangements in line with, or seen to be in line with, the substantive content of Turnhalle would surely further complicate the search for an internationally acceptable solution. The Five said that it would be useful to have the additional information at an early date.

4. Responding, Vorster said he would need time to study what we had presented and suggested adjournment until later in the day. He went on to say, however, that he wanted to bring up something not mentioned in CG talking points. He said he was committed to establishing, in addition to a central administrative authority, regional governments for those people of SWA who do not now have local authority (i.e., Damaras, Hereros).

5. Comment: This is bound to muddy the waters, but we cannot judge to what extent this could make it more difficult to progress further toward a negotiated settlement. Damage, or relative absence of it, could depend on the form and composition of the central administrative authority when it is established. End comment.

6. Vorster and Botha then went on at some length, and with considerable vehemence about some practical problems associated with SAG withdrawal from the territory. Their argument centered on: if South Africa is going to be “chased out” of Namibia by the UN, South African voters will not stand for it if they are asked to continue to pay for service which SAG now providing to the territory. Vorster implied that SAG might, if pressed, withdraw immediately, causing a breakdown of essential services. He said that if the UN is going to assume responsibility, it should provide for a “trust fund” such as that being provided for Rhodesia. A decision on international financial support for Namibia could not be postponed.

7. CG members stated that we would take note of what Vorster had raised. We pointed out, however, that we had assumed that this matter would be addressed in a plan for withdrawal prepared by the SAG and taken up in future negotiations. We then agreed that we would add the following at the end of the fifth talking point (transfer

---

3 Reference is to the Zimbabwe Development Fund.
of power) which we had just presented: “This plan will clearly have a number of financial and practical implications which will have to be considered at the appropriate time.”

8. Comment. This obviously is an important part of a transfer of power and will have to be worked out in the process of reaching a settlement. Vorster and Botha expressed their concern about this matter with a certain amount of bluster. We think they introduced it into the record as much or more for domestic political purposes than for concern about continuing to meet financial and other obligations the SAG has regarding the territory. End comment.

9. We will resume our meeting with Vorster, Botha and Fourie at 3 p.m.

Bowdler

---

55. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, April 29, 1977, 1835Z

661. Subject: Namibia Talks: Final Meetings. Ref: Cape Town 0656.

1. Summary: SAG and Contact Group agreed this afternoon to a modified version of the talking points that the CG had presented this morning. Talks now represent a confidential working paper which the Five governments can use for discussions with the UN and other involved parties. Changes which the CG accepted do not in our view represent unacceptable substantive differences from points we had made in the morning meeting. The CG will prepare an assessment of the meetings with the SAG and make recommendations regarding next steps. Assessment and recommendations will follow by septel tomorrow. End summary.

---


2 See Document 54.

3 See Document 54.

4 See telegram 667 from Cape Town, April 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770152-0461)
2. Before the full delegation of the Contact Group met with Vorster and Botha this afternoon for final session at 4:30, Five members met with Fourie and Botha to work out agreed changes to the talking points we had presented this morning. After CG had reviewed the changes, we met with Vorster and Botha and came to agreement on differences that still existed.

3. According to Vorster, Botha and Fourie, their main concern was to avoid agreeing to use of language which, if it came into the public domain, could cause them domestic political problems. Thus, for example, they asked that we use some other term than “electoral commission”, because in South Africa the term “commissioner” carries a strong connotation of political power and authority.

4. Full text, with changes indicated within parentheses, follows:

“3. As we did yesterday, we thought it useful to review our discussions thus far in light of the three objectives which we set forth in our initial presentation. We believe it particularly important to do so now in order to insure that our reports to our governments and any future discussions we may have with the South African Government or the other parties involved will reflect our discussions as accurately as possible.

At the same time we recognize the illustrative nature of our discussions and the need to add greater specificity to some points.

Objective number one

It is agreed that the purpose of future negotiations should be to develop an internationally acceptable settlement on the Namibian issue. (We have emphasized that it should be) consistent with Resolution 385. There are a variety of ways in which the essential elements (of such a solution) can be implemented. It is also agreed that possible ways of implementing these elements might be as follows:

(1) Elections. There would be elections. On the basis of universal sufferage, for a Constituent Assembly whose task would be to (decide upon the) constitution for an independent Namibia. Voting would be by secret ballot with provision to enable full participation by individuals who cannot read or write.

(2) International involvement in elections. Subject to further discussions, it should be possible to develop a system of UN involvement in the elections so as to ensure that elections are held on a free and fair basis. Such a system might include a (UN special representative appointed by the Secretary-General and supported by such officials) of the Secretariat (as might be necessary.) Disputes might be settled by an independent commission of jurists appointed by the Secretary-General which could include (an equal number of) South African jurists, (the President having a casting vote.) UN conduct of elections elsewhere
might serve as a guide. We should like to underscore the illustrative nature of these provisions.

(3) Campaign process. The (UN special representative) would ensure that nothing would impede full and open participation, in a peaceful manner, by all adult Namibians in the political process. He would (have to be satisfied as to the fairness of) the regulations drawn up for the electoral process. All persons and all political parties, regardless of political views, would be (free) to participate (peacefully) in the process of political campaigning (and the elections.) There would be freedoms of speech, press and assembly. (The UN Special Representative would have to satisfy himself, at all stages, as to the fairness of the campaign process as well as the election itself.) Elections would take place after an appropriate period following (appointment) of the (UN Special Representative.)

(4) Returnees. All persons born in or recognized as inhabitants of Namibia who are not now in Namibia would be (free) to return and participate (peacefully) in the political process.

(5) Transfer of power. In consultation with those mainly involved. The SAG would develop a plan for its withdrawal in stages from Namibia to prepare a smooth transfer of power at the end of the political process. (This plan would clearly have a number of financial and practical implications that would have to be considered at the appropriate time.)

Elements of Security Council Resolution 385 on which no agreement has been reached

(1) Detainees and political prisoners. We suggested that all (Namibian) political prisoners (inside and outside Namibia) be released and that in case of a dispute as to who is a political prisoner, the dispute would be decided by the commission of jurists. The SAG responded that it could release detainees but would not release persons sentenced by courts for criminal acts. Clearly, there is a difference on what constitutes political prisoners and since this is a major element of Resolution 385, we will have to have further discussions on it.5

(2) Legislation and regulations. We suggested that South Africa waive the application of all legislation and regulations which might impede the full participation of all Namibians in the political process. The SAG suggested that, (if any such existed,) some of this would be taken care of by the regulations for the electoral process. The Five will

5 In telegram 700 from Cape Town, May 4, the Embassy reported on a joint document written by the Contact Group, which addressed the issue of Namibian political prisoners. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770156-0700)
review legislation and regulations and suggest to the SAG those which in our view would need to be changed.

Objective number two

(1) We take from these talks and from the need to explore further some of the points discussed that we should in due course establish a process for continued discussions with the SAG. Since there are additional parties concerned, we will also need to have discussions with them.6

Objective number three

(1) We expressed concern that all parties in the negotiations avoid steps which might foreclose possibilities of arranging an internationally acceptable solution. In this regard we emphasized the serious consequences which might follow from the implementation of the Turnhalle draft constitution. (The SAG emphasized the necessity for the cessation of all kinds of violence.)

(2) The SAG has suggested that it might not submit the Turnhalle constitution to the Parliament. At the same time the Prime Minister is committed to the return of some of the responsibilities now exercised by the SAG to a central administrative authority for Namibia (and to the establishment of additional local authorities in such areas where they do not presently exist.) This might be done by a South African law which authorized the State President to establish such an authority. Detailed plans for such an authority have not been completed. However, it would not (per se) be the Turnhalle interim government by another name. Ultimate powers would be reserved to South Africa; however, the central authority would be empowered (inter alia) to repeal discriminatory and other legislation.

(3) The Five said that (while the proposal might not necessarily complicate their task) they could offer no considered views about the extent to which (it) might (do so) without more information on the proposed administrative re-arrangements. Administrative re-arrangements in line with, or seen to be in line with, the substantive content of Turnhalle would surely further complicate the search for an interna-

---

6 In telegram 1375 from USUN, May 5, the Mission provided talking points for briefings on the April 27–29 Cape Town meetings. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 118, Young Andrew: Trip to Africa Briefing Book [II]: 5/77) In telegram 1397 from USUN, May 6, the Mission reported on a meeting with Waldheim to discuss the Cape Town meetings and next steps in the negotiating process. (Ibid.) In telegram 543 from Maputo, May 15, the Embassy informed the Department that Nujoma received a briefing which covered the talking points. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770198-0903)
tionally acceptable solution. The Five said that it would be useful to have the additional information at an early date.

(4) (The SAG reiterated what it had stated as long ago as 1967, namely, that its policy was that the inhabitants of South West Africa must themselves ultimately decide their own future. In the meantime, it was South Africa’s task and duty to help them to advance economically, socially and politically, to the stage where they were able to do so.)”

Bowdler

56. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Vorster

Washington, May 26, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Vice President Mondale has given me a full report on his talks with you at Vienna. I believe the talks were useful in clarifying the issues and insuring that we each clearly understand the position of the other. I welcome your support for the British and American effort to pursue a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. A negotiated solution remains the best way to achieve a de-escalation of violence.

On Namibia, I think a process has begun which can lead to an internationally acceptable solution. I will be looking forward to your next meeting in Cape Town with the five Western members of the Security Council. I would hope we will receive from you at that time your detailed views on an interim administrative authority, the release of Namibian political prisoners, and plans for the withdrawal of South Africa. I will be following these important discussions closely.

Namibia is one of the most urgent issues in Southern Africa. I welcome the positive steps taken by the South African Government which involve agreement to hold nationwide elections, in which all can participate, including SWAPO, for a constituent assembly to devise

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 18, South Africa: Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster 3–12/77. No classification marking.
2 See Documents 158, 276, and 278.
3 Reference is to the Anglo-American proposal.
4 The meetings took place June 8–10. See Documents 58–60.
a permanent constitution for Namibia. Your willingness to agree to UN participation is also welcome for this is essential to insure international acceptance of the outcome of the electoral process.

The critical point is the nature of the interim civil authority. I note your commitment to an interim authority that draws upon the work of the Turnhalle Conference. I would hope that as you develop your detailed thinking on the nature of an interim administrative authority, you would do so with a view to making it representative of Namibian political forces and impartial as to the election and the constituent assembly and the ultimate permanent government to emerge in Namibia.  

I see no reason why your commitments and those objectives cannot be reconciled. If this can be done, the stage will be set for a prompt, orderly transition in Namibia that will be internationally acceptable and that will contribute to peace, security and stability in Southern Africa.

Progress on Namibia will also provide a positive framework for dealing with other issues of Southern Africa in a constructive and cooperative manner. As Vice President Mondale told you, my government has an enduring commitment to peaceful solutions insuring human dignity for all and full political participation in all of Southern Africa. To be peaceful, change must come promptly. The United States is determined to work together with our European allies and with the concerned African states to shape a congenial international framework for the rapid and progressive transformation of Southern African society and to help protect it from unwarranted outside interference. As the Vice President also indicated, positive action on your part will be openly welcomed by the United States. I hope that your upcoming meetings with the five-nation contact group will make significant progress and open the door to a hopeful future.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

---

5 In a June 21 letter to Carter, Vorster gave the South African perspective on discussions with the Contact Group and proposals for Namibian independence. Vorster noted that the South African Government had agreed to the following: the appointment of an Administrator-General to serve as interim authority during the transitional period; the release of South West African detainees and political prisoners, "provided that South West Africans detained in other countries were also released;" the need for the continuation of public services and the maintenance of law and order during the transitional period; and the need for a phased transfer of power. Vorster wrote: "Above all we should guard against the possibility of extremist demands wrecking the chances of a solution which is now in sight. I told the contact Group that if the opportunity were not to be lost there should be no dragging of feet. I for my part envisage the holding of elections for the Constituent Assembly within six months." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 18, South Africa: Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster, 3–12/77)
New York, June 3, 1977, 1537Z

1756. Capetown for Embassy. Subject: Briefing of UNSYG Waldheim on Vienna and Capetown Talks. Ref: (A) State 123224, (B) 1708 USUN.

Summary: In response to Ambassadors Young and McHenry’s briefing on the Vice President’s talks with Vorster in Vienna and the status of the Capetown talks on Namibia, UNSYG Waldheim showed particular interest in the projected UN role in the Namibian settlement. He suggested Namibian Commissioner Ahtisaari as the best candidate for SYG Special Representative in the transitional period in Namibia. He indicated that his office was generating some study of the whole question of the UN involvement. End summary.

1. Ambassadors Young and McHenry called on UNSYG Waldheim June 2 to brief him on the Vice President’s meeting with Vorster in Vienna and the status of the Capetown talks with the South African Government on Namibia. (UK’s Ambassador Murray readily ceded his assignment to brief the SYG in light of planned meeting with Waldheim on Vienna talks.) The Secretary General expressed warm appreciation for the briefing and strong support for our various negotiating efforts in Southern Africa. He said he believes the international community is generally positive toward these efforts, despite some skepticism that they can actually succeed.

2. Waldheim focused primarily on the question of UN involvement in the Namibian settlement. He said that this was a critical issue in the negotiations and one on which we must proceed with extreme care. He said his past experience is that the South Africans tend to keep definitions of such things as a UN role vague and then manipulate implementation to suit their purposes. On this issue, care is particularly essential because SWAPO’s Sam Nujoma was concerned with the point in his discussions with Waldheim in Maputo.


2 In telegram 123224 to all African diplomatic posts, May 27, the Department provided talking points on Mondale’s meetings with Vorster to brief host governments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770190–0548) For the records of the Mondale/Vorster meetings, see Documents 158, 276, and 278.

3 In telegram 1708 from USUN, May 28, the Mission reported on a meeting of the Western Five on the next round of talks with the South African Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770190–1049)
3. Waldheim said Nujoma of course stipulated, among other conditions, that Namibian elections must be under UN control. SYG said he hoped that the Group of Five contact group would find out from the South Africans in their next talks in Capetown just what they envisage as the UN role in the transitional political process. McHenry said the SYG’s representative in Namibia must be able to satisfy himself at every step that the process is fair and is consistent with Security Council Resolution 385. Young raised the related facet of a role for the Council for Namibia.

4. Waldheim said Nujoma commented that the SYG’s rep should not be someone from outside the UN system. He recalled the disastrous Escher Mission of 1972.\(^4\) The Special Rep should be someone familiar with the UN’s structure, procedures and internal politics and with the substantive history of the Namibian problem. Waldheim said he had been thinking that Namibian Commissioner Ahtisaari might be the best choice for this job. Ahtisaari is knowledgeable, balanced and competent (unlike his predecessor), and he has the confidence of SWAPO and the SYG’s office. Waldheim also thought he should be acceptable to the Western and other members of the UN interested in the problem. Appointing Ahtisaari would solve the problem of a role for the Council, since Ahtisaari could continue to wear two hats in relation to the Namibian problem. Waldheim said he had another two or three names he could put forward if Ahtisaari were unacceptable for some reason (he mentioned the new Finnish Perm Rep Pastinen for one), but he thought Ahtisaari would be a particularly apt choice. He suggested that the Western Five attempt to sound out the South Africans on this idea during the course of their upcoming talks in Capetown.

5. McHenry suggested that it might be useful if the SYG would stimulate some concrete thinking in the Secretariat about the nature of the UN involvement in Namibia. Beyond the selection of a Special Representative, there are many detailed questions that will have to be planned. Young suggested it might even be useful in the negotiations with the SAG and other parties to have in hand a preliminary UN study of its role, rather than waiting until the negotiations produced an urgent need for such planning. Waldheim acknowledged the utility of some work on this and said he had ordered that a study be started.

6. Waldheim referred to the likely need for some kind of peacekeeping forces as part of the UN role and said they could be organized, depending on South African acceptance.

Young

---

58. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State

Cape Town, June 8, 1977, 1750Z

931. Subject: Namibia Talks: Second Session. Ref: Cape Town 0924. ¹

1. Summary: Vorster participated throughout all of the afternoon session first day of talks. He said our rejection of SAG’s version of a Transitional Administrative Authority meant an impasse, since he was committed to it. Later, however, Botha told us that SAG prepared to scrap idea of Turnhalle participation in TAA in favor of an interim authority formed and headed by an “administrator-general” appointed by SA State President. Other subjects discussed during afternoon were UN involvement, Walvis Bay, political prisoners, and repeal of discriminatory legislation. End summary.

2. Transitional Administrative Authority (TAA): Prime Minister Vorster led off the afternoon session of today’s (June 8) talks. In long discourse he said he failed to understand our rejection of SAG’s proposed role for Turnhalle in the TAA. He said, “If you shoot them down, I see no solution to the problem of South West Africa at all.” If we did not accept Turnhalle majority in TAA membership, he would either pull South Africa out of Namibia “straight away” or accept the Turnhalle constitution (“and take my chances with the international community”).

3. Contact Group members responded to the effect that we had made it clear all along and would make it clear again that a TAA which was merely Turnhalle by another name would be unacceptable internationally. Vorster stated that he did not agree with our position and that he did not believe it would be worthwhile to continue at this time to carry on with this aspect of our discussion on Namibian issue. However, later in discussion Vorster read to the group a preliminary draft of legislation which would enable the State President to establish a central administrative authority, provide for additional local governments and remove Walvis Bay from its administrative relationship to


² In telegram 924 from Cape Town, June 8, the Consulate reported on the opening session of the Namibia talks. The talks broke down over the composition of the Transitional Administrative Authority (TAA), which Botha insisted could be dominated by Turnhalle representatives. The Contact Group rejected the idea. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770204–0240)

³ See footnote 2 above.

388-401/428-S/40012
X : 40012CH01
08-26-16 04:50:29
PDFd : 40012A - odd
Namibia. Vorster stated that he would provide copies of the legislation to Contact Group members prior to its submission to Parliament.

4. After we had discussed other matters (paras 7 through 12 below) and were about to adjourn for the day, FonMin Botha, who 15 minutes earlier had excused himself, returned with another bit of drama: “Gentlemen, there has been a new development.” He said SAG could not accept a TAA consisting of more than 17 members (11 of whom would be from Turnhalle). However, it was “just possible” that Turnhalle representatives (some of whom are in Cape Town and have been conferring with SAG) might agree to release Vorster from his commitment to establish an interim authority composed largely of Turnhalle people. If this happened, SA State President would appoint an administrator-general who would form an interim authority.

5. Botha asked that we not breathe a hint of this to anyone, including press, Turnhalle reps, or anyone who SA acquainted with latter. After we had agreed, Botha and Fourie said that at some point the SAG would have to tell the public that Turnhalle-based TAA had not been instituted because CG had rejected it. We voiced no objection to this.

6. Comment: It was obvious to all present that this about-face had been carefully staged, and was put into play when it was clear we would not agree to what SAG wanted regarding the TAA. To avoid impasse on question of composition of TAA, and to save face, Vorster and company have decided upon formula involving a “release” of Vorster’s commitment to Turnhalle and a switch to an administrator-general who would assume many governing powers now in hands of SAG. This presumably, in their view, would meet with our and UN’s approval. We, of course, will not commit ourselves on this and, moreover, will seek further details tomorrow (e.g., would administrator-general have an advisory council and, if so, what would be its composition?).

7. Nature of UN involvement: McHenry made presentation on nature of UN involvement, using talking points based on corresponding language in Contact Group’s terms of reference. Vorster’s initial reaction was that this raised new issues which he would want to discuss with his colleagues. By way of example, he noted that description of composition of commission of jurists varied from that contained in summary points of agreement and disagreement prepared at end of April meeting. His recollection of earlier document was that there would be equal number of jurists from South Africa and from outside, with chairman being member of outside group and having casting

---

4 See Document 54.
vote in case of tie. New presentation suggested that the five-member commission would have two South Africans and three outsiders.

8. CG members pointed out that if there is an apparent difference in the descriptive language, no change in the original concept was intended. The only other question on UN involvement raised by Vorster was whether the CG could give him some idea of the number of people that would be involved in the UN presence. McHenry declined to give any figure, noting that UN SYG would have to decide on the basis of operational requirements.

9. Walvis Bay. After Vorster read to group the draft of proposed legislation enabling the State President to provide for administration of Namibia, we noted that it explicitly excluded Walvis Bay and that, as the Prime Minister had acknowledged in numerous speeches, the question of Walvis Bay was sure to be a subject of future controversy. We specifically did not wish to get into the legal factors involved but felt it necessary to flag an issue sure to be controversial. Vorster reacted immediately and negatively. If the group wanted South Africa to give up Walvis Bay, then the talks might as well cease. He recited history of Walvis Bay, noted that it was not a part of the mandate. Botha added that UN itself had called for respect of former colonial boundaries. Was the group also going to raise the question of the Orange River which, he said, was entirely in South Africa? Following Vorster and Botha presentations we repeated again that the SAG had itself acknowledged that there would be claims on Walvis Bay and that while we did not wish to discuss the question, we did not wish our silence to indicate that we were unaware of an issue bound to raise a controversy. Issue was then dropped.

10. Political prisoners. McHenry reviewed briefly the previous Cape Town discussions of political prisoners, noting that the Prime Minister had undertaken to provide his views on the release of political prisoners and, in the event of disputes, the submission of cases to the proposed international commission of jurists appointed by the UN SYG. He also stated that in support of our view that all Namibians should be free to participate in the political process, we had raised the matter of detained elsewhere with those governments (Tanzania and Zambia); however, we would not accept or characterize our actions as a “deal” or “linkage”. Vorster responded by stating his agreement to release Namibian detainees held by South Africa provided, and it was a proviso he repeated several times, Namibians detained elsewhere were also released. He also agreed to submit to the proposed interna-

---

5 See Document 55.
tional commission of jurists individual cases where there was disagreement over whether the individual’s act was “political” or “criminal”.

11. Murray (UK) suggested that South Africa should not wait until the formation of the commission to begin the release of political prisoners. Vorster did not take up this point (though we intend to raise it again) and he and Botha went into an obviously planned reading of list of charges about Namibians held in Zambia and Tanzania. The paper from which they read had earlier been delivered to Contact Group Embassies by Prof. Mburumba Kerina, former Namibian exile now head of Namibian “foundation” widely believed to be funded by SAG.6

12. Repeal of discriminatory and restrictive laws: Vorster said this question should pose no problem because Turnhalle delegates want repeal of discriminatory laws and will be in position to request under the enabling legislation. McHenry noted that in addition to discriminatory laws there is other legislation (e.g. terrorism act) which could work to restrict the electoral process. He asked whether these would also cease to apply. Vorster responded that laws against terrorism are not discriminatory but in the end conceded that the TAA will have authority to ask for repeal of any laws applicable in SWA. McHenry observed that while the TAA may have freedom to make such request, the State President reserves ultimate right of decision and there may be categories of laws (e.g. in jurisdictional areas reserved to SAG) which he may exclude. Vorster’s response was that it would be “inconceivable” that the State President would not do what TAA asks. Furthermore, if there are problems, the matter could always be taken up with the SAG. McHenry noted this is complicated subject which CG members would want to consider further among themselves before returning to discussion with SAG.

13. Vorster then asked that we discuss the question of a phased withdrawal. We, however, preferred to defer this matter until next session (we wanted to carefully prepare our talking points before getting into this). Vorster agreed, but asked us not to adjourn until Botha returned to the meeting. Moments later he did and presented us with his “new development.” Our next meeting is scheduled for 11 a.m. tomorrow.

Bowdler

---

6 Paper not found.
59. **Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State**

Cape Town, June 9, 1977, 1825Z

945. Subject: Namibia Talks: Botha and Fourie Meet with CG’s UN-based Members. Ref: Cape Town 0943.

1. United Nations-based members of the Contact Group met at 4 pm Thursday, June 9, with Botha and Fourie to resume UN involvement discussion which had adjourned inconclusively earlier. Murray (UK) noted that we had already given our general views on nature of UN involvement, at which point Botha repeated objections voiced informally that UN must not get into administration of the territory.

2. Murray stated that we could provide some general illustrative points on the UN role, but that specifics awaited development by the UN SYG. We were currently examining UN precedents, recognizing, of course, uniqueness of Namibia. The SYG would have to satisfy himself that:

   A. All discriminatory legislation was repealed;
   B. Proposed electoral laws and regulations were fair;
   C. Nothing impeded that full participation of all Namibians in the political process;
   D. There was full freedom of the press, assembly, etc. and that there was equal access to media. (Botha objected strenuously to provision of time for any faction on state-run radio.);
   E. There was no intimidation by South African police or military. (Botha said he’d lose his job and that perhaps he should have stayed in Washington, but sighed in resignation when told this essential to lend credibility in light of continued presence of SA military.);
   F. The electoral roles and registration are comprehensive and correct;

---


2 In telegram 943 from Cape Town, June 9, Bowdler reported on the first session of talks on June 9: “With Vorster in attendance, Contact Group and SAG met from 1100 to 1300 today (June 9). CG gained semi-additional details about the SAG’s proposal for an Administrator-General for Namibia, and received copy of enabling legislation that will be introduced tomorrow (June 10). However, remainder of session was unproductive. Vorster tried and failed to get formal backing of the CG for certain of SAG’s plans regarding the Administrator-General, and he balked at notion that the third round of talks should be held in New York or somewhere else than Cape Town.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770206-0354)
G. Actual voting and registration were correct and comprehensive; and

H. Actual balloting is secret, free of improper influence, and the results properly counted and certified.

3. There was brief discussion of each point but in the end Botha undertook to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister.

4. Prior to arrival of larger group at 4:45 pm, small group returned to question of political prisoners. Murray reiterated that it would be helpful if SAG did not wait for the establishment of the commission of jurists before releasing some prisoners. Besides creating good will, SAG could help to reduce burden on jurists. Botha took the point but gave no position. On jurists, group thought confusion with Geneva-based ICJ could be eliminated if Namibia group were called something else, e.g., panel of jurists.

5. McHenry recalled that SAG had promised consider favorably Vice President Mondale’s suggestion that South African-held Namibians be returned to Namibia jails. Fourie noted that “Justice” Minister Kruger had publicly stated approval of concept in principle, but facilities not available until completion of new structures. At this point Botha started long recitation that SAG did not want to be criticized for movement of prisoners from modern, clean, ICRC-approved SAG prisons to dirty and inadequate Namibia jails.

6. McHenry suggested that it would be helpful if SAG would provide particulars in its possession on Namibians currently detained or imprisoned, whether holder is SAG or another country. Botha initially suggested that South Africa had provided info last year on Namibians it held, but seemed to back off when told that we had records of requests but no fulfillment. SAG will look into the matter.

Bowdler
60. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, June 10, 1977, 1750Z

960. Subj: Namibia Talks: Final Day. Ref: Cape Town 0946.2

1. Last night and this morning (June 10) the Contact Group prepared a draft paper summarizing the proceedings of our talks with the SAG. At 1100 hrs we met with Vorster, Botha and Fourie, and presented them with the paper (which, as before, will be treated as a “non-paper”). We adjourned for an hour while they reviewed it. When meeting resumed, they suggested a number of minor changes which we accepted, one substantive change which we rejected (they did not press us on it) and several sentences of historical background to South Africa’s claim to Walvis Bay. Full text follows:

Begin text

2. As in the case of our first meeting,3 we thought it useful to review this second round of discussions,4 in order to ensure that our reports to our governments and any future discussions with the South African Government and the other parties involved will reflect our discussions as accurately as possible.

3. We recalled that our mandate for the current talks remains as before. First, we believe that Security Council Resolution 385 provides the most acceptable basis for a settlement of the Namibia question. It is a balanced document which, if implemented, will lead to a valid act of self-determination on the part of the people of Namibia. Second, we are not empowered to negotiate a specific agreement with South Africa. What we hope to do is explore with the South African Government and with the principal parties concerned possible solutions consistent with Security Council Resolution 385 so that the people of Namibia can decide freely how they wish to govern themselves.

4. The second round resulted in further clarification of the elements of what might become an internationally acceptable solution. The Con-

---


2 In telegram 946 from Cape Town, June 9, the Consulate reported on the last session of the second day of talks on Namibia. The session was largely devoted to the subject of South African withdrawal from Namibia and South Africa’s financial responsibilities. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770206–0401)

3 See Document 58 and footnote 2 thereto.

4 See footnote 3, above, and Document 59.
tact Group acknowledges the South African Government’s contribution to this result. The Contact Group emphasized that the complexity of the issues and the need to prepare the way for direct consultations between the South African Government and the UN Secretary-General would require time for additional contact between the contact group and the other parties. The Contact Group agreed that we would move with all deliberate speed in this effort. The South African Government emphasized that the entire electoral process for a Constituent Assembly should be completed by 31 December 1977.

Results of previous briefings

5. The Contact Group reviewed the results of our previous talks with various Namibian political groups, including SWAPO and the Turnhalle participants; various African governments; and other parties with particular interests in Namibia, especially the UN and its Secretary-General. Their reactions varied. However, the Contact Group informed the South African Government of our belief that there is a possibility of enlisting broad support for a settlement along the lines of our last presentation.

Nature of transitional administrative arrangements

6. The Five were informed initially that the South African Government had in mind establishing a central administrative arrangement consisting of from 17 members, which would have executive as well as legislative powers in those areas of responsibility not reserved to the South African Government during the transitional period. Eleven of those members were to be representatives of the different ethnic groups which participated in the Turnhalle Conference, with the remaining members chosen on a different basis.

7. In response, we restated our view that any transitional arrangement should not prejudice or appear to prejudice the outcome of the political process. In particular, it should not be based exclusively on ethnic considerations. The possibility of the appointment of a non-political South African person or persons as a channel between the central administrative authority and the South African Government was raised.

8. Following these exchanges of view, the earlier formula was changed. The State President would name a single Administrator-General who would constitute the interim authority to administer the territory during the transitional period. The Five expressed interest in this approach, noting that it could remove some of the political difficulties of the previous proposal. We indicated that we would welcome an assurance that the Administrator-General would not employ any political grouping in an institutional fashion, whether advisory or otherwise. We also expressed the hope that the Administrator-General would
from the outset bear in mind that in his functions in relation to the electoral process, he will act in cooperation with the UN Special Representative and that his decisions will need to take account of this fact.

9. The South African Government indicated that the Administrator-General and his staff would be impartial. They also confirmed that the UN Special Representative would at all stages have to be satisfied as to the fairness of the political process.

10. The South African Government informed us that the legal basis for the new transitional authority is to be an enabling provision adopted by the South African Parliament which authorizes the State President to make by proclamation such laws as may be necessary, to repeal or amend any now applicable, and to regulate in such areas where repeal or annulment of laws make this necessary. It was understood that a bill would be presented to the Parliament on June 10 and adopted probably during the week of June 13–17. In presenting the bill, the Prime Minister might indicate that the legislation is “consistent with discussions with the Contact Group, with a view to reaching an internationally acceptable solution.” The South African Government also stated their intention to establish regional governments for the Damaras, Hereros, Tswanas, and Namas. The Contact Group stated that this was not a matter on which we wished to comment. The matter of local government would ultimately have to be decided by Namibians themselves.

Nature of UN involvement

11. We emphasized that our governments attached particular importance to United Nations involvement in free elections in Namibia, as called for by Resolution 385. We reminded the South African Government that we were only now beginning to consider the details of the UN role. We recalled our earlier statement that UN conduct of elections elsewhere might serve as a guide, although there were always special considerations to be taken into account. We did not yet have the views of the Secretary-General nor others concerned. Our preliminary view was, however, that an adequate UN presence throughout the transitional period could:

—Greatly assist in the achievement of orderly, rapid and internationally acceptable movement to a free and independent Namibia; and

—Give indispensable assurance to all parties mainly involved of the impartiality of the transitional administrative arrangements and the electoral process.

12. To this end we thought that the UN presence should begin at the earliest possible stage in the transitional process. The South African Government indicated that they would welcome the presence of the UN Special Representative in Namibia as soon as possible after the appointment of the Administrator-General.
13. We explained that the UN presence at its peak could involve a substantial number of persons but the number would best be determined by operational requirements. These persons would, of course, be responsible to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in Namibia.

14. By way of illustration, we suggested that the UN Special Representative, assisted by his staff, should have the responsibility of satisfying himself:

— That existing legislation is non-discriminatory and does not impede the full participation of all Namibians in the political process;
— That the proposed electoral legislation is adequate;
— That the political campaign is fairly and peacefully conducted (e.g., impartiality of the administration, freedom of movement, strict observance of the electoral regulations by the political parties and others, impartiality of official information, guarantees against the possibility of intimidation from whatever quarter;
— That the registration of voters is properly and comprehensively carried out;
— That voting is secret and free from improper interference by anyone;
— That the votes are properly counted and the results properly declared.

15. The South African Government said that they saw no objection to an approach along these lines. They said they were ready to accept appropriate arrangements for which there were suitable precedents.

16. We recalled our earlier suggestion for the establishment of an international commission (hereafter referred to as panel) of jurists to settle disputes which might arise in the electoral process. The panel might consist of four members appointed by the Secretary-General half of whom would be South Africans. The President, designated by the Secretary-General, would have a casting vote. The panel should be autonomous and empowered to take final decisions.

Repeal of discriminatory and restrictive laws and regulations

17. We were informed by the South African Government that this issue should pose no problem because (a) its new legislation will authorize the State President to make any changes in the laws that are necessary; (b) the people of Namibia want to repeal discriminatory legislation; and (c) this would be one of the functions of the Administrator-General and it would be inconceivable that the State President would not respond to his proposals in this regard. We noted that in addition to what are regarded as discriminatory laws, there might be other legislation that could be used to impede the full participation of
all Namibians in the political process. In response to our inquiry whether these laws would also cease to apply, we were told that the broad authority under the new legislation would permit repeal or amendment of any such laws applicable in Namibia (including any laws in the field reserved to the South African Government).

Detainees and political prisoners

18. We restated our view that all Namibians wherever held as detainees and political prisoners should be released so that they can participate in the political process. We made it clear that while we recognized the distinction between political prisoners and common criminals, we could not accept that simply because a prisoner had been convicted by the courts for crimes under existing law—some of which might in any case have to be changed in Namibia before the elections—he was necessarily ineligible for classification as a political prisoner. We recalled our suggestion that in the case of disputes as to who is a political prisoner, the dispute in the final instance would be decided by the panel of jurists appointed by the UN Secretary-General. We suggested that the South African Government take three additional steps:

A) move all Namibians detained and imprisoned in South Africa to penal institutions in Namibia;

B) begin to release Namibians even before the establishment of the panel of jurists; and

C) provide us with all relevant information in their possession regarding Namibians wherever detained or imprisoned.

19. We told the South African Government that we would continue to work so that all Namibians would be free to participate in the political process. However, we could not accept that the release of such persons in one country should be contingent on the release of persons held elsewhere.

20. The South African Government stated it would release Namibian detainees provided Namibians detained in other countries were also released. They also agreed that disputes as to who is a political prisoner could be submitted to the panel of jurists. The South African Government raised no objection to the transfer from South Africa to Namibia of Namibians detained and imprisoned in South Africa, but stated that this was not practical until the completion of adequate facilities in Namibia. We stressed the need for such facilities as soon as possible.

21. Finally, the South African Government agreed that it should be possible to provide the Five with relevant information on Namibians wherever detained or imprisoned.
Transfer of power and withdrawal of elements of authority

22. We indicated our view that during the transitional period law and order must be maintained and public services continued.

23. We asked the South African Government, in consultation with those mainly concerned, to move quickly to draw up plans for a phased transfer of power/withdrawal which should take place, progressively throughout the transitional period, beginning with the appointment of the Administrator-General.

24. To facilitate international acceptance, two steps are essential:

   A) The UN Representative must be kept closely informed in all phases of the plan;

   B) The withdrawal must be completed by independence, subject to whatever arrangements the new Namibian Government may have made for the future.

25. To overcome any deficiencies in trained personnel in Namibia, we would advise the closest consultation with the UN Special Representative, who may be in a position to assist in meeting problems which will arise.

26. With regard to the maintenance of public services, we hope that the South African Government, in pursuit of the shared objective to ensure an orderly transition and promote stability in the area, will continue to lend their cooperation.

27. With regard to security, an open and fair political process to determine the future structure of an independent Namibia is the best guarantee for maintaining internal tranquility and the integrity of its borders.

28. The South African Government raised a question about South African investments and debts in Namibia. They inquired about compensation. Moreover, they noted that certain public services are heavily subsidized by the South African Government and asked who was going to make up the difference when their responsibilities ceased. We said that if these issues are to be raised, they should be spelled out by the South African Government in drawing up their plan for a phased transfer of power/withdrawal. They can only be addressed in that context.

Walvis Bay

29. The Contact Group stated that we did not wish to address the substance of the question of Walvis Bay; however, we felt it necessary to draw attention to an issue which was sure to be controversial. For their part, the South African Government stated that Walvis Bay had been annexed by Great Britain as part of the Cape of Good Hope in 1884 and always internationally recognized accordingly. As such it had
in 1910 become part of the Union (later the Republic) of South Africa. Because of certain administrative difficulties and for no other reasons, it had since 1922 been administered as if it were part of South West Africa, just as the territory as a whole had similarly been administered as if it were an integral part of South Africa, and as the Caprivi Zipfel had been administered from Pretoria. The Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations had even questioned the right of South Africa to do this exactly because Walvis Bay was not part of the territory. It is the intention of the South African Government to restore the administrative status quo of Walvis Bay as it existed prior to 1922.

Venue and timing of further talks

30. The Contact Group stated that it now would be necessary to have extensive discussions with other parties concerned. These would take place as soon as possible. The South African Government again emphasized the need for rapid progress. We would be in touch with the South African Government about further talks with them as soon as possible, bearing in mind the desire of all concerned to reach the earliest acceptable solution of the Namibia question.

End text

31. Two postscripts to the above:

A) Yesterday Vorster and Botha had resisted the idea of a future meeting with the Contact Group elsewhere than Cape Town. Today at lunch, Botha and Fourie told us they were willing to go anywhere at any time to meet with us again on Namibian question.

B) Botha told us privately that he and Vorster have in mind selecting a South African judge to be the Administrator-General for Namibia. When it was noted that "there are judges and then there are judges," Botha replied that they would not select someone who would add to their problems. He also indicated that he is canvassing DFA staff to see what officers might be seconded to Administrator-General.

Bowdler
Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, June 11, 1977

1. Namibia Talks: Preliminary Assessment—Our preliminary reaction to the second round of talks on Namibia between the Contact Group and South Africa is cautiously encouraging. Although the South Africans initially proposed an administrative arrangement that would have included fairly heavy Turnhalle representation, they backed away from this in the face of Contact Group rejection and agreed to appoint a single Administrator-General to run the territory during the transitional period. They also appear to have accepted the Contact Group’s admonition that the Administrator-General should not employ any political grouping (e.g., Turnhalle) in an advisory or other institutional fashion and have indicated that the Administrator-General and his staff would be impartial. He will also, by virtue of the enabling legislation, have the authority to repeal or modify discriminatory laws and regulations, including laws previously reserved to the South African Parliament.

Of special significance, if the South Africans follow through, is their confirmation that in order to reach an internationally acceptable solution a UN Special Representative would at all stages have to be satisfied as to the fairness of the political process. The South Africans indicated that they would welcome a UN Special Representative as soon as possible after the appointment of an Administrator-General and said they could accept appropriate aspects of a UN presence for which there are suitable precedents.

The South Africans also indicated that they could accept a Panel of Jurists appointed by the Secretary General to settle disputes arising in the political process and consider distinctions between political and criminal prisoners. They also undertook to release Namibia detainees and move all Namibian prisoners to institutions in Namibian territory.

Many important elements of a final settlement package must still be developed, including details of South Africa’s phased withdrawal, the number and functions of UN staff, how to deal with financial questions, and—most importantly—how to bring South African officials into contact with the other principal parties, especially Waldheim and SWAPO representatives. However, Botha and Fourie told

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 6/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “To Cy.”
McHenry that they are willing to go anywhere at any time to meet again on Namibia.  

2 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Good—Hold this together.”

62. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, June 23, 1977, 0133Z

2003. Capetown for Embassy. Subj: Namibia—Western Five Meeting With the SYG.

Summary: Western Five met with SYG Waldheim June 22 to pursue discussion of UN role in Namibian settlement. Waldheim and his staff argued that the UN role could not be defined until limitations on the role of the Administrator General was made clear. This reflected the views of African reps with whom he met June 21. Contact Group urged that concrete work start immediately on UN role. It was agreed that the group would meet with SYG again early next week. End summary.

1 Western Five Power reps met Wed morning June 22 with SYG Waldheim to discuss further the UN role in evolving Namibian settlement. In setting scene for meeting, Waldheim recalled briefing June 17 on the most recent Capetown talks by Group of Five and agreement to resume discussion following SYG’s study of the Capetown results and discussion with African members of Security Council and Chairman of African group (Senegal) June 21. He included in meeting Assistant Secretary General for Special Political Questions Farah, who he said would be deeply involved in developing the UN role.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, South Africa: 6/77. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, and Cape Town. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 In telegram 1988 from USUN, June 21, the Mission transmitted the report of the June 17 Waldheim briefing. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770222-0077)
2. Recapping his discussion with Africa reps June 21, Waldheim said they raised now-familiar points:

—Role of SYG’s Special Representative
—Special Representative’s relationship with Administrator General; Waldheim commented that the Africans had made very clear their view that the Special Representative’s power and functions must be at least equal with that of the Administrator-General, if not superior.

—Presence of South African troops; Africans insisted that elections cannot take place in the presence of South African troops. Therefore UN control must be made unchallengeably clear.

—Role of the Council for Namibia; Waldheim said Senegal, as the June Chairman of the African group, specifically mentioned this question. Involved is the African aversion to even implied recognition of the legality of South African presence in Namibia.

—SWAPO’s June 15 statement and SYG’s conversation with Nujoma during May conference in Maputo.

3. Waldheim outlined principal problem he saw in persuading Africans to support plan being developed through the discussions of Western Five. While all of the above points are now familiar, Waldheim said these African concerns must be accommodated in some fashion if the Africans are to be brought along. In summary, Waldheim characterized the African reaction to what they had learned of the Capetown talks as “rather skeptical.” He went on the comment that recent “leaks” to the press about the contents of the Capetown talks have not been helpful. Waldheim recounted MauritianPerm Rep Ramphul’s complaint that he read about the latest Capetown efforts in the press before he received authoritative briefing from the participants.

4. Farah spoke in general support of the SYG’s capsulization of the encounter with the African group yesterday. He also suggested that, since some Africans (e.g. Benin) have complained that oral briefings are an imprecise basis for reports to govs, it would lend more weight to the Western initiative if the areas of agreement and disagreement with South Africa which have emerged thus far in the talks could be reduced to writing.

5. Farah went on to say that he would summarize the main concerns of the Africans as being the nature and form of the transitional authority in Namibia. Specifically Farah said that the Africans are concerned about the power of the South African appointed Administrator-General in relation to the SYG’s Special Representative. They suggested that the Administrator-General should be appointed by a disinterested third party, and should not be a South African appointed by the South African Govt. Members of the Contact Group responded to these concerns by explaining the approach the Westerners are attempting to talk
out. Waldheim acknowledged this line of thinking and said the Africans are prepared to recognize the progress achieved by the Contact Group in relation to Turnhalle but they always come back to these other concerns. Some Africans have told him explicitly that they will follow the lead of SWAPO. The SYG said it therefore is crucial that SWAPO be persuaded on these points and he intends to undertake talks with Numoma in Libreville. He said the Africans fear that they will be drawn into an unwanted relationship with South Africa if the relationship between the Administrator-General and UN Special Representative is not clarified.

6. The Contact Group argued that rather than commencing with a clear legal definition of the limitation of the power of the Administrator-General, it is essential that, with the assistance of the SYG, they begin to develop concrete and detailed ideas about the role of the UN. Only in the context of such specific ideas can a sound perception of the required scope of powers and function of the Special Representative be developed. If we can describe what is required for the function and status of the Special Representative, in order to implement SC Resolution 385, the relationship between the UN Representative and Administrator-General will become clear. If the SYG believes his Special Representative must be granted more relative power than has thus far been ascribed to him in the general discussions with the South African Govt, the Contact Group will have to return to the SAG for further discussion of this point. It is crucial, however, that the SYG commence now with a concrete planning effort to define the UN role required for full implementation of Resolution 385.

7. Speaking in the course of this discussion, Farah continued to maintain that Africans have impression that the Administrator-General appointed by South Africa would continue during the transitional period to make all decisions. The role of the SYG’s Special Representative would appear to be merely observational. The Africans would strongly prefer that the UN Representative be made clearly responsible. Farah said therefore, in order to commence drawing up viable plans for the UN role, they must know the limits placed on the power of the Administrator-General and the nature of the function he is to serve. Farah also argued that it would be premature for the SYG to undertake detailed planning, or especially talk about it with any of the parties, until the outline of agreement on these central matters becomes clear.

8. Members of the Contact Group rebutted these arguments at various points, insisting that our first task is to develop ideas about the UN role, which can include clear notions of necessary limitations on the power of the Administrator-General. Ambassador Young described the difficulty of moving SWAPO and other African attitudes from armed struggle to wholehearted involvement in a free and demo-
cratic political process in Namibia. He said SWAPO, in a sense, has been thrown behind the pace of developments by the South African strategy of rapid concession in some key areas. He hoped the SYG would lend his weight to an effort to persuade the Front Line States, Angola and SWAPO, to participate in the kind of process we are trying to develop. Arguing legalities in effect plays into South African hands. We need now to move to consideration of practical ideas for defining the UN role and implementing Resolution 385.

9. After extensive discussion, the SYG said he found the clarification of Western Five thinking highly significant and helpful. He said he understood the notion that his staff should commence immediately to develop a plan defining the function of the UN Special Representative in all of its essentials required to implement 385. If his perception of the power that must be attributed to the Special Representative exceeds that which has been discussed with the South Africans, the Contact Group would undertake further discussions with South Africa. He also agreed that it would be useful to discuss the Namibian statement with Africans in Gabon with the purpose of reassuring all Africans that the Group of Five is playing fair. He acknowledged that the reaction of senior governmental leaders often is more understanding than that of their Rep at the UN.

10. It was agreed that the Western Five would meet with the SYG again early next week. Waldheim is scheduled to meet South African Foreign Minister Botha Friday, June 24, and he will consider further our discussion today and be prepared to go on with exploration of the problem.

11. Comment: The Secretary General’s response was disappointing. It appears clear that he is reluctant to be seen by the Africans to be supporting a Western initiative which the Africans may reject. While he resists moving until the Africans give a green light, they in turn are unwilling to give their approval before they receive a persuasive demonstration that the UN role in Namibia during the transitional period will carry unquestioned authority sufficient to guarantee an outcome free of South African control.

12. Next week’s discussion with him may clarify whether he is willing to push ahead with the necessary work to shape the UN role in the settlement. We believe we must come up with some of the ideas on which we can base a definition of the essential UN role. Without it, we will not be in position to talk persuasively with the Africans. It becomes all the more important, therefore, that the Pelcovits study be pressed forward as rapidly as possible.³

Young

³ Reference is to a study on UN involvement in the Namibian electoral process, prepared by Nathan Pelcovits of Johns Hopkins University.
63. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, June 25, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

Namibia

I talked to Kurt Waldheim about Namibia and got further details on the concerns of the African members of the Security Council. They are concerned about two points:

—1. The relationship of the UN Representative to the South African-appointed Administrator. Kurt said that he assured them that, after talking with Botha, the UN Representative would be independent and not subordinate to the Administrator;²

—2. The presence of South African troops in Namibia during the election; this is a more difficult question, which I had already discussed with Botha. The way around would be the substitution of a UN police force.³

Kurt said that there was a great deal of suspicion on the part of the Africans because of their past experience with the South Africans. They were afraid that they might end up being used in a situation where there was the appearance of an independent election without any guarantee of such a result. Kurt told me that Botha seemed highly emotional and that he (Kurt) was concerned about Botha’s health. Kurt said that he was going to attend the OAU meeting and would talk with the African leaders about Namibia.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 6/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: "To Cy."

2 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “This should work out.”

3 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “No chance on this. UN observers max we can expect.”
64. Communication From the Group of Five to the South African Government

New York, undated

Communication From the Five to SAG

The Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States wish to express their considerable surprise and disquiet at the announcement by the South African Government on July 6 of the appointment of an Administrator General for Namibia. In their view the announcement of this appointment is not consistent with the spirit of the Cape Town talks. In this connection, we relied on the statement by Prime Minister Vorster that he would not be taking any action during July and that it was his intention to appoint the Administrator General during August and indeed we conveyed this information to the Secretary General and other interested parties. We considered this interval to be necessary in view of our discussions with other parties and the importance we attach to the Administrator General discharging his functions in cooperation with the U.N. Special Representative from the outset. Moreover, in view of the role which members of the Contact Group have been playing, it would be normal to expect prior notification with respect to such an announcement.

The Five Governments believe this announcement will add to the difficulties of the delicate discussions in which they are engaged in order to bring about an internationally acceptable solution to the problem. It is therefore even more important to coordinate the timing of the assumption by the Administrator General of his responsibilities with the appointment and installation of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Similarly, given the inter-relationship between...
the duties and the responsibilities of the Administrator General and the Special Representative, we request that the proposed duties and responsibilities of the Administrator General be discussed with the Five well in advance of their promulgation.

65. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, July 9, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

2. The UN and Namibia: The Namibia Contact Group in New York has begun a detailed study of what might constitute a UN role in Namibia. The Group is looking at a variety of options, ranging from monitoring the fairness of the political process, to police activities, civil operations, and peacekeeping (replacing South African troops), or all three.

Formulas for a UN role will have to come from the Contact Group. It is clear, from what Kurt Waldheim told Andy Young in Geneva, that he will not move out in front with his own ideas in the absence of a green light from the Africans—and African suspicions of South Africa’s motives have still not been overcome by what the Contact Group has achieved thus far.

Next week, we will be working with the Contact Group to develop a negotiating position (including the nature of a UN role) and strategy for talks in New York with SWAPO. We expect SWAPO will be ready to meet on July 18 or soon thereafter. One objective in those talks will be to convince SWAPO to give Waldheim a green light.

We will be contacting Nyerere and the Nigerians for support in assuring that SWAPO does come to New York. We also will be looking for ways to convince Waldheim to begin contingency planning on a UN role.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 7/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “Cy.”

2 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Waldheim should move. S Africa has done well so far.”
66. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Vorster

Washington, July 12, 1977

Thank you for your letter of June 21\(^1\) in which you reviewed the most recent discussions between the representatives of the Western members of the Security Council and your government on the question of Namibia. I found your comments very useful regarding the South African viewpoint on what has been accomplished to date in these consultations.

I believe these discussions have resulted in additional important steps being taken toward an internationally acceptable settlement of the long-standing Namibian problem on the basis of Security Council Resolution 385. Your government’s forthcoming response has been helpful to this end, and I note the affirmative approach you have taken up to now.

However, much remains to be done. We believe the exercise of restraint and a spirit of cooperation on the part of all concerned parties hold real promise of bringing about a peaceful transfer of power. We will continue working with other Western members of the Security Council more fully to engage other parties who are directly concerned with Namibian independence, including the United Nations, in order to move the process of settlement to a successful conclusion.

The steps to be taken in the future must be made with full attention to maintaining the broadest possible support. It is therefore particularly important that the definition of the duties and responsibilities of the Administrator-General is taken with full consultation with the Western members of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General.

If a settlement along the lines being explored is ultimately agreed upon, the Administrator-General and the United Nations Special Representative will have to work together at all stages to ensure the fairness of the political process for Namibia. It would therefore be important that they begin their work at the same time.

Looking ahead to our continuing efforts to arrive at a settlement, I want to emphasize to you the importance of your government drawing up a plan for a phased transfer of power in Namibia. Such a program, which we ask that you provide to the Contact Group, could

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 48, South Africa: 7–8/77. No classification marking.

\(^2\) See footnote 5, Document 56.
serve to advance the prospects for an internationally acceptable settlement.

In closing, Mr. Prime Minister, I want to emphasize two points. My government will continue to do its best to encourage an internationally acceptable settlement of the Namibian question in the shortest time possible. You are to be commended for your statesmanship in bringing about the possibility of a constructive solution to this long-standing problem. A continuation of your leadership in a positive direction will be welcomed by the United States.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

67. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter¹

Washington, August 2, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

Namibia. The August 1 talks between the Western Contact Group and Vorster and Botha demonstrated some favorable evolution of the South African position on Namibia.² The crux of the South African presentation was that they will make no further concessions until SWAPO shows its willingness to negotiate seriously.

On specifics, Vorster told the Contact Group that:

—He will delay official action on the Administrator-General until August 22 which should give us more time to work out arrangements with SWAPO and the UN.

—Grudgingly, he is willing to accept the appointment of Ahtisaari as the Secretary General’s Special Representative whenever the Security Council provides Waldheim a mandate for Namibia.

—He will not present a phased troop withdrawal plan absent an expression of SWAPO’s willingness to cease military operations. If

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 8/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “Warren.” Vance travelled to the Middle East August 1–11 to review the peace process.

² In telegram 3807 from Pretoria, August 1, the Embassy reported on the meetings between the Five and Vorster and Botha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770275–0751)
SWAPO meets this condition, he is willing to withdraw some troops prior to elections.³

³ Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “We should pressure Waldheim to move—should I write him?”

⁴ In an August 13 memorandum to Carter, Young summarized the meetings between the Five and SWAPO, which concluded on August 11. He wrote: “We succeeded in engaging SWAPO in serious discussions within the framework of Security Council Resolution 385, and thus our previous discussions with South Africa. However, it was clear that two fundamental issues separate SWAPO and South Africa. SWAPO insists on the withdrawal of all South African troops before elections and their replacement by a United Nations peacekeeping force. It also wants the United Nations to play the dominant role in the transitional period leading to independence.” Young noted that this would not be acceptable to South Africa. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 45, Africa: Southern Africa: 3-8/77)

---

68. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 5, 1977, 10:30 a.m.–noon

SUBJECT

Summary of the President’s Meeting II with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania

PARTICIPANTS

United States
The President
The Vice President
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose
Ambassador James Spain
Ambassador Donald McHenry
Mr. Henry Richardson, NSC Staff

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 116, Tanzania: 5/77–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
During the press opportunity, the President asked Nyerere whether he had slept well; he hoped he had gotten some rest.

President Nyerere replied that indeed he had gotten some rest, but that last night and this morning had been a very lively time. (The press opportunity ended and the talks began.)

The President began by saying that he and President Nyerere had a brief talk last night after the dinner. I just wanted to reiterate a few points that we agreed on. We agreed that we would move expeditiously towards getting an agreement for a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. We see Smith as the most difficult problem, and then Vorster. If we can bring them around, then we and the Front Line States can agree on the basic principles of a settlement. This is an opportunity to make a last, strong effort for a peaceful settlement in this situation. If we are unsuccessful, a long and bloody conflict is sure to follow. The settlement would be based on the principle of one person, one vote; majority rule, free elections during the interim period, one army built predominantly on the basis of the Patriotic Forces by the government emerging from the elections, with the United Kingdom being the legal authority during the interim period in conjunction with a Commonwealth or UN peacekeeping force to keep order. I asked President Nyerere, and he agreed, if he could arrange a meeting of the Front Line States, including top-level U.S. and U.K. participants, to confirm these proposals and develop needed implementation. Vance will meet with Botha in London and then with Nyerere. After that, we will see what basis there is to proceed further. The United Kingdom might have some qualms about some of our proposals, and I do not want to speak for them in this situation. Do you concur in these statements?

President Nyerere said, that explains our position fully.

The President asked, with Nyerere’s concurrence, Acting Secretary Christopher to notify Secretary Vance of the agreements reached.  

---

2 No record of the conversation was found. Many of these issues were discussed during the August 4 morning meeting between Carter and Nyerere. See Document 164.

3 Vance was in Damascus and Amman to review the Middle East peace process with President Assad and King Hussein.
Nyerere agreed to this.

(The discussion then turned to Namibia.)

The President said that he wanted Nyerere’s advice on Namibia. SWAPO has been difficult. I understand that Sam Nujoma is now in New York. The South Africans have been surprisingly cooperative in abandoning the Turnhalle concept and agreeing to an Administrator General. Recently, however, they have backed off somewhat. But they have agreed to the basic principle of majority rule and eventual withdrawal of their forces. The problem would seem to be getting someone to speak for SWAPO. We would like to see South Africa forced to comply with the latest proposal from the Five Power Contact Group. You can help this process by encouraging Secretary General Waldheim to move. I understand he plans to appoint Atashaari as UN Special Representative. I don’t know the man and don’t know whether he would be acceptable, but I want him to be acceptable to you. Generally, I would appreciate your advice on Namibia.

Nyerere asked Ambassador McHenry to give the latest position on Namibia, so that he might comment on it.

McHenry stated that a SWAPO delegation was arriving in New York to begin talks August 8. We have proposed the following to South Africa: there will be free elections for a constitutional assembly, which would then produce a constitution for Namibia covering all aspects of local and national government. All Namibians regardless of their past activities will participate in the elections. There must be certain preconditions for the elections to be deemed fair, such as freedom of the press, and some method of balloting not requiring literacy. The UN Special Representative has a role in the interim arrangement and in all phases of the transitional process. He must be “satisfied” as to all phases of those procedures. Notwithstanding the diplomatic compromise that “satisfied” represents, in point of fact nothing could be issued without his approval. The interim Namibian process will be supervised by the Administrator General and the Special UN Representative. The Administrator General is to abolish racially discriminatory and also restrictive legislation. Namibian returnees could re-enter without fear of arrest or harassment. Relative to political prisoners, the South Africans want linkage between their release of political prisoners and the release of Namibians held by Tanzania and Zambia, in order to insure that all such prisoners are released. They have indicated that they will release some prisoners immediately if those in Tanzania and Zambia are released. There was a disagreement between the South Africans and the Contact Group relative to the definition of political prisoners. Vorster first took the position that all such persons had been convicted in a court of law and, hence, were not political prisoners. The Five Power Contact Group did not agree, which resulted in understandings
(1) that all Namibians would be returned; and (2) that a special tribunal
would be appointed by the Secretary General composed of four mem-
ers, two from South Africa, with the Secretary General appointing
the president, who has a casting vote. This will serve to retain the
control of the tribunal in international hands. The tribunal will decide
who is or is not a political prisoner.

We have asked South Africa to submit a phased withdrawal plan
to be discussed with other involved parties, and have taken the position
that all its troops should be out by the date of Namibian independence,
subject only to a prior agreement between the government of Namibia
and the South African government. South Africa has not yet produced
such a plan. At least part of their reluctance stems from not knowing
SWAPO’s military objectives. The responsibility of the UN Secretary-
General and of his Special Representative would extend to all instru-
ments of South African authority not yet phased out of the territory.
Since the last talks with South Africa, the Five Power Contact Group
has worked to develop a plan of operation for the UN Special Represent-
ative in Namibia. Until the full scope of the UN role is developed vis-
à-vis the Administrator-General, the full picture is not conveyed. As a
first thought, it would seem that the United Nations would need up to
one thousand people to efficiently monitor events throughout Namibia.
This would not be a peacekeeping force, but only those required for
sufficient observation.

Nyerere said, if we were not dealing with South Africa, I would
say go ahead with the plan as it is. I have gotten word that Nujoma
wants to come and see me from New York, but now I heard that he
wants to return to Africa.

McHenry said that, as of last evening, there were no plans for him
to return to Africa.

Nyerere said, your problem is Vorster, ours is SWAPO.

The President said, your problem is as big as mine. I can understand
the natural inclination for Nujoma to want to protect his position. But
Vorster has gone as far as he can go until there is some movement
from SWAPO.

Nyerere said, I agree. We agree about elections, the principle of one
man, one vote, etc.; there is no problem here. Our problem is with the
processes which lead to these results. In Zimbabwe, we hope that the
British will come in, with sufficient muscle, to supervise elections. In
the case of South Africa, ideally, in Namibia we could tell them to get
out so that the UN could supervise elections. But we have been telling
them to get out for a long time, and they have not yet done so. We
now need arrangements to satisfy all of us that the elections will be
fair. And then we can recommend these arrangements to SWAPO.
Two kinds of withdrawal are needed by the South Africans from Namibia. First, there must be administrative withdrawal. We can appreciate Vorster’s political problems, and are willing to respond somewhat to them. However, we must be satisfied that he is actually pulling out, that there is some movement in that direction. At the same time, there must be a coming-in of the UN as the *de jure* authority in the situation. Secondly, there must be a military withdrawal by South Africa, and here we need some power. The UN must answer this question, and it must have a sufficient military presence that reassures SWAPO and everyone else. SWAPO might say “when South African troops leave, we will take over.” But the position of the Front Line States is that, when South African troops leave, SWAPO will take over from UN troops (*sic*). We accept some continued South African presence, in order to make it easier for Vorster to pull out, provided that he is not sabotaging the process. But at the same time, we also need a visible and effective entry into Namibia by the United Nations.

During the interim period we need to feel sure that the UN has sufficient power. Nujoma will stick to legality; we will tell them to instead stick to the substance of reality. South Africa has agreed that the UN Special Representative will have to be satisfied as to the interim process. But Security Council Resolution 385 says “supervision and control.” If this is really the position of the Five Power States, and Vorster understands this, and we are satisfied with the reality that the situation will really be one of UN supervision and control, we can tell SWAPO to accept those arrangements.

Relative to the Secretary-General, Salim has reported to me on these matters. There would seem to be two problems. First, the United Nations is the legal authority in the situation and the Secretary-General symbolizes that authority. He wishes to be sure that he has African backing for steps that he might take, at the risk of our denouncing him. Secondly, the United States will have to reassure the Secretary-General against the possibility of being ridiculed as ineffective. We can give him political reassurance; you can give him power. The UN presence must be paid for. He will want this assurance. Until then, he is reluctant to say what he wants and possibly risk a confrontation with South Africa. In short, he will ask for something that is already going to be given to him.

*The President* said, your analysis has been very helpful to me. I had been very critical in my own mind up to this point of the Secretary-General, and now I understand his position better. In our letter to Waldheim, we can make clear our support of the Five Power initiative and our support for him.

*Nyerere* said, we will give him political support. I will probably have more trouble with Sam than with the Secretary-General.
The President asked Ambassador McHenry whether any further points needed to be made on Namibia.

McHenry said the question of South African withdrawal needed further attention. We are now at the point where South Africa is asking, what is the other side going to do? We have to be aware that we are operating here in a situation of mutual distrust. South Africa believes that the minute they withdraw their troops SWAPO will march in. SWAPO thinks that if it reenters Namibia with South African forces still there, and the process breaks down, they will be at a distinct disadvantage because they will have disbanded their forces and their camps. There is an effort here needed to break down the suspicion. The question is, what can we count on SWAPO to do if we can get South Africa to withdraw.

Nyerere said that once we find that South Africa is serious about getting out, in my view, they will be replaced by UN troops. Once elections have taken place, the South African troops should go. However, we realize that South Africa will not totally withdraw. We, if there is a sufficient UN presence for purposes of balance, are willing to tell SWAPO to stay armed but to stay out of Namibia. For this to happen, South Africa should begin to pull out in such a way as to reassure SWAPO that fair elections will take place. We will reassure SWAPO on this point if sufficient UN forces are brought in to do the job. SWAPO needs the reassurance of the United Nations.

McHenry asked, what if SWAPO stays armed, elections are held that most observers agree are fair, and SWAPO loses? SWAPO may not be willing to accept the results of such elections, and will then be an outside armed force sitting on Namibia’s borders. This represents a legitimate concern among other groups in Namibia.

Nyerere said, only SWAPO and South Africa have the armies. Do these people want both of those armies inside of Namibia at the same time?

McHenry answered, we could ask SWAPO to withdraw, disarm, and then reenter. Simultaneously, we could ask South Africa to withdraw.

The President asked, what if SWAPO loses the election?

Nyerere replied, the UN would be there to provide military forces.

The President said, I believe that the SWAPO army will be loyal in the case of many of its personnel to Namibia as an independent state rather than to SWAPO.

Nyerere said that SWAPO will almost certainly win the elections.

The President said, if SWAPO loses, the United Nations should prevail. Namibia is a new country. I cannot imagine that SWAPO would oppose a new independent Namibian government.
Ambassador Spain asked what kind of UN presence would be required to insure fair elections?

Nyerere replied, SWAPO demands UN troops to guarantee the fairness of the election.

The President said, it is my understanding that the UN force could be relatively small. The fact that South Africa is willing to embark on a course of negotiations and ultimately pull out indicates that Vorster does not want to destroy his relationship with each of the Five Powers. But, in any case, we could not have a UN force as large as the South African military presence in Namibia. I cannot imagine South Africa attacking UN forces in the middle of the elections. This indicates that there is some common ground, which may be able to be met by an agreement on the size of the UN force.

Nyerere said, if South Africa and SWAPO differ on the size of the force, I am suspicious of South Africa. The size of the UN force is the Secretary-General’s problem. It needs to be sufficient for us to be able to reassure SWAPO.

The President asked what was the next move in the situation.

McHenry answered, he would meet with Nujoma in New York on August 8.4

The President said that Vance will, in his discussions with Botha, bring up these questions.

Nyerere said that he hoped that Nujoma would not decide to leave and go back to Africa.

The President said, before we get into bilateral discussions about US/Tanzanian relations, I want your comments on Angola and the large number of Cubans there. I would hate to see the concept perpetuated of encampments of Cuban troops remaining in Angola and other countries. We feel that neither the United States nor the USSR ought to be sending forces to Africa, because it greatly increases the risk of conflict. We regard the Cubans as surrogates of the USSR. It is difficult for us to understand how African leaders can condone this situation. I do not know whether Neto can survive without the Cuban troops. I know that his opposition is supported in part by South Africa, and we might help here. The Cuban presence first declined, but now it has increased to approximately 20,000 troops. Moreover, it is impossible for us to normalize relations with Cuba while this situation continues.

Nyerere said, I think we have finally found a question on which we totally disagree, but perhaps it is a matter of interpretations. The Cubans were generally not in Angola prior to independence. The MPLA

4 See Document 69.
fought without Cuban support; the FNLA did not fight at all. I know Holden Roberto better than I know Neto. Mobutu was very reasonable during this time, and prohibited his country from being used as a Portuguese base against the MPLA. The MPLA had to move to Dar es Salaam. I got the Chinese to train them and provide them arms, and we opened the eastern front. They then went on to fight and win.

The President asked, do you equate UNITA with South Africa?

Nyerere said, not entirely. A small group in UNITA did fight for independence, and they were an element in the tripartite negotiations with the Portuguese just prior to independence. But an anti-MPLA fear developed; some of this was related to events in Lisbon, where a pro-Soviet Portuguese communist party was emerging. It appears that there was a real effort around April 1975 on the part of Western countries to stop the MPLA from taking over and to stop the communists in Portugal from taking over. I was worried about this hostility being transferred to the MPLA, since they had fought and died for independence. I expressed these fears to British and American ambassadors, and told them that the Portuguese communists were not going to win because we had talked to the Portuguese soldiers and the army would not let this happen. But your people were determined to stop the MPLA.

The President acknowledged that this was basically true. But why does Cuba still need (sic) to be there?

Nyerere said, the South Africans and the Zaireans began to move military forces into Angola before the country became a sovereign state. Certainly Neto must have told Castro that he was in trouble. The Cubans must have been enroute to Angola prior to the date of independence. The MPLA had every right to ask them to come. As for the question of why they are still there, let us finish the problem of Namibia first.

The President said, I do not doubt that UNITA has some South African support. But UNITA and South Africa are not identical.

Nyerere said that if you keep South Africa out, the Cubans will leave. They are linked in this way with the Namibian problem.

The President expressed doubts as to whether South African troops were still operating in Angola.

Nyerere said, the MPLA can deal with UNITA but it cannot deal with South Africa. From time to time South African troops cross the border into Angola. I have been arguing Neto’s case for the Cubans coming to Angola, but I have told him I cannot argue his case that they can stay. The Cubans must leave at some point. We have talked to my friend Mobutu, who behaved well at first, and asked him, why are you causing Neto so much trouble? Here, Mobutu is being silly.
I agree that the Cubans should not be there. But once Namibia is resolved and the South Africans are no longer on the Angolan border, the situation will improve.

*The President* said, I feel, and I may be wrong on this, that Neto can only stay in power among his own people if he is supported by Cuban troops. Cuban troops in that number are not needed to combat outside pressures. I have no preferences between MPLA and UNITA. I believe that the Angolan people should decide between them.

*Nyerere* said, there is no doubt that Neto’s popularity has declined, largely because of conditions brought on by the civil war. But we must ask, where was UNITA in the war for independence?

*The President* said, we know Cuba has forces and people in varying strength in 13 African nations. Angola is a reservoir of Cuban troops which can spread. It is difficult for Western democratic states not to rally to support UNITA, because it appears that Cuba has forced its will on the people of Angola. There is no outside army in Angola that justifies that Cuban presence.

*Nyerere* answered, Angola is an independent state notwithstanding the presence of such a large number of Cubans. Examples could be cited for the French in Djibouti and Senegal, where no one argues that they are any the less independent. Moreover, Angola was the first (sic) African state to be attacked by South Africa.

*Brzezinski* said, if the proportions of Cuban troops to Cuban population and Cuban troops to Angolan population are examined, the Cuban involvement in Angola is greater than US involvement in Vietnam.

*Nyerere* said, Vietnam is not applicable here. The Cubans are now fighting the South Africans. If you remove South Africa, the Cubans will pull out. I can assure you of that. We will embarrass them. The Cubans may not always be needed to fight South African troops, but the South Africans are engaged in a pattern of sabotage.

*The President* said, we will use our good offices with respect to the South Africans on this point.

*Nyerere* said, I have advised Neto to keep the Cubans around as long as there is a South African threat. South Africa wants an acceptable Angolan government on its border.

*Brzezinski* asked whether we could let the Angolans fight it out among themselves after the Cubans leave.

*Nyerere* said, I will promise you that the Cubans will get out. But what about the French who have an army in several parts of Africa? I cannot control them.

*Christopher* said, I would like to return to Zimbabwe for you to touch on a couple of points which were mentioned in yesterday’s session. The first is that, assuming the United Kingdom takes over in an
Namibia 171

interim period in Rhodesia, the United Kingdom wants the Rhodesian police to be able to remain and operate in conjunction with a British and UN presence. The second point concerns insuring that the settlement is a fair one as regards white Rhodesians.

Nyerere said, the army is key. If the situation had been such that the transition was a purely constitutional change, then the new government could inherit the army. In the present situation, the new government may have to inherit other structures, especially the civil service which will be useful to them. I assume that this will be true also for the police. But the ideological leadership of the police would have to be removed and it would have to be cleaned up. For example, those people who were prominent in arresting Nkomo’s people would have to be removed. This is possible. But the army is different.

The President said, we understand. But what of the white citizens in Rhodesia?

Nyerere said, I have talked about this to the British. I agree that all whites who desire to stay should be allowed to live in Rhodesia on the same basis as everyone else. I don’t believe, however, there will be many whites staying; in fact, I am sure of this, as illustrated by examples in Algeria, Mozambique, Angola and Kenya. I have told the British that they should help answer the question that is now posed to the whites with respect to their farms, etc., by making it possible for them to go if they wish to. The British have told me that they cannot go to Parliament for money to make it easy for British to get out of Rhodesia, but only for money to enable them to stay. The new Rhodesian constitution should protect those who are staying.

Christopher asked whether this meant that the white settlers should get fair settlements for their property.

Nyerere said yes. But the new government will have no money.

The President asked, what would happen in the case of a farm of 1,000 acres which is sold during the interim period?

Nyerere answered, I don’t know. In Tanzania the farm probably would not be sold to a single African, but would be used on a cooperative basis.

The President said, we need some way to repay the cost of that farm to the farmer.

Nyerere said, the new state of Zimbabwe would probably split up the farm, since one of their problems is the inefficient holding of large tracts of farm land. But I don’t know.

The President said, I could listen to your advice and counsel all day on these and other points about these matters. Do you have other points to raise?

Nyerere said, I have no other points to raise. If you keep South Africa out of Angola, I will ask Cuba what they are doing in Angola.
The President told Nyerere how much he had profited from these talks, that he hoped they would stay in close contact, and that he hoped Nyerere would never feel reluctant to contact him either through diplomatic channels or by personal letter whenever he wished.

Nyerere said he would gladly do that.

(The President then presented Nyerere with a book of satellite photos. He told Nyerere that the United States could assist Tanzania through satellite photos with respect to agricultural and other matters, and if Tanzania wished this kind of assistance, let him know through Ambassador Spain. Nyerere said that he would. In return, Nyerere presented the President with three volumes of his writings, noting that he had not written every word of all of them, but that often words can make an impact.)

The President rose to end the meeting at 12 noon.

---

69. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 9, 1977, 0351Z

2531. San Jose for Ambassador Young. Dept please pass to Sec Vance immediate. Subject: Namibia: First Day of Western Five Talks With SWAPO. Refs: A. USUN 2487; B. USUN 2516.

1. Summary. First day of Western Five talks with SWAPO consisted primarily of: (1) Western Five presentation of three-part statement, per refelts; (2) SWAPO opening presentation which consisted essentially of reiteration of past SWAPO public statements; and (3) discussion of withdrawal of SAG troops. In course of this discussion, Nujoma accepted concept of phased withdrawal, stated that withdrawal would have to be completed several weeks prior to election day, and agreed

---


2 In telegram 2487 from USUN, August 4, the Mission transmitted the draft text of talking points for the SWAPO talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770280-0488)

3 In telegram 2516 from USUN, August 6, the Mission transmitted the revised text of talking points for the SWAPO talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770282-0226)
that, given adequate neutralization of SAG troops by UN observers, electoral
process (including campaigning) could coincide with the withdrawal
process. Nujoma also agreed that ceasefire could be first step in withdrawal
procedure. He insisted, however, that process of phased withdrawal of SAG
troops coincide also with phased introduction of UN troops. End summary.

2. First session of Western Five talks with SWAPO took place August 9 [8] from
1000 to 1145. Session consisted of Western Five presentation of three-part
statement, per refelts.

3. Second session took place August 8 from 1500 to 1730. Atmosphere was
calm and business-like, as was case in first session. SWAPO President was
first speaker of afternoon session, and, following opening remarks, he proceeded to read paper containing SWAPO’s proposals for a negotiated
settlement in Namibia (see para 8). Both remarks and paper essentially reiterated past SWAPO public statements. Primary points made by Nujoma during opening remarks and subsequent comments were: “(1) Single biggest obstacle in way of negotiated settlement
is presence of SAG troops in Namibia. (2) Role of UN Special Representative must be more clearly defined; SWAPO certainly will not accept
appointment of Administrator General by SAG. (3) Western Five must
recognize total distrust which SWAPO feels for SAG. (4) Insincerity of
SAG is evidenced by fact that SAG continues to give public support
to Turnhalle individuals. (5) SAG creation of tribal armies is nothing
but ground-laying for eventual Namibia civil war.

4. Following Nujoma’s remarks and reading of paper, discussion ensured centering around issue of withdrawal of SAG troops. In course
of discussions, Nujoma accepted concept of phased withdrawal (over
period of perhaps seven months), stated that withdrawal would have
to be completed several weeks prior to election day, and agreed that,
given adequate neutralization of SAG troops by UN observers, electoral
process (including campaigning) could coincide with the withdrawal
process. Nujoma also agreed that ceasefire could be first step in withdrawal
procedure. He insisted, however, that process of phased withdrawal of SAG
troops coincide also with phased introduction of UN
troops.

5. In an attempt to further delineate SWAPO’s position, Amb. McHenry then raised question of whether SWAPO would be willing
to allow even token SAG force, under UN supervision, to remain in
Namibia until and beyond election day. McHenry’s view was that
token SAG force would allow Vorster to maintain validity of SAG
juridical position and would underline SAG participation in political
process. Nujoma reiterated his position that all SAG troops must be
out of Namibia several weeks prior to election day.

6. Second session adjourned with understanding that third session
would consist of further comments on question of withdrawal and
then discussion of transitional administrative arrangements. Fourth session would concern political prisoners.

7. Comment: Western Five decided to confront largest obstacle first by discussing withdrawal. SWAPO revealed some flexibility and willingness to talk seriously, which resulted in some important understandings being achieved. End comment.

8. Following is text of paper read by SWAPO entitled “SWAPO’s proposals for a negotiated settlement in Namibia”.

**Quote.**

SWAPO’s Proposals for a Negotiated Settlement in Namibia

**Introduction**

Since the beginning of the initiative by the Five Western members of the Security Council towards a solution, acceptable to both the Namibian people and the world community, SWAPO has been closely following, through briefs, the developments concerning the talks between the Five and South Africa.

It is our considered opinion, however, that to date nothing substantial has been achieved which would warrant optimism on our part. If anything, the developments thus far have confirmed our grave doubts about South Africa’s sincerity and readiness to end her occupation of Namibia.

With specific reference to the second round of talks between the Five and the South Africa Government, SWAPO finds that agreements contained in the package resulting from the talks constitute a negation of Resolution 385 and, hence, are totally unacceptable to us.

For instance, the agreement concerning the so-called Administrator General has nothing to do with Resolution 385; and the very fact that South Africa has gone ahead with the appointment of the so-called Administrator-General without reference to the UN is a clear indication that the whole exercise is being deliberately conducted outside the framework of Resolution 385.

Furthermore, the calculated coining of a new concept of UN “involvement” as opposed to UN supervision and control is another clear indication that there is an attempt to evade UN’s full and explicit role in the resolution of the conflict.

As far as SWAPO is concerned, the agreement between the Five and South Africa do not indicate any sincere readiness, on the part of South Africa, to release Namibian political prisoners whom South Africa has imprisoned solely because they opposed her illegal and

---

4 The second round of talks took place June 8–10. See Documents 58–60.
oppessive occupation of our country. On the contrary, the package talks about a panel of jurists to determine who the political prisoners are, as if the South African Government did not know who they are. This idea of a panel of jurists is irrelevant and therefore totally unacceptable.

While discussions are being entered into between SWAPO and the Five acting on their own behalf or on behalf of South Africa, certain principles must be settled and South Africa made to pronounce herself clearly on them. These principles are as follows:

1. Territorial integrity of Namibia
   South Africa must publicly announce in categorical terms that she will fully respect and observe the territorial integrity of Namibia.

2. Withdrawal of armed forces
   South Africa must undertake publicly to withdraw all her armed forces from Namibia as a pre-condition to the holding of elections.

3. Free election
   South Africa must unreservedly accept the principle of free elections in Namibia based on universal adult suffrage.

4. Unimpeded progress to genuine independence
   South Africa must clearly state her acceptance of complete and unconditional independence for Namibia and undertake to do nothing that will impede the progress or complicate the road to genuine independence.

5. Respect and preservation of the public property of Namibia
   South Africa must commit herself to safeguarding all public property of Namibia including Namibia’s treasury and reserves so that the same will be handed over to an independent Namibia. South Africa must undertake not to sabotage, destroy or remove from Namibia any such property.

6. Respect for sovereignty of independent Namibia
   South Africa must publicly commit herself to respecting the sovereignty of independent Namibia and undertake not to do anything that will undermine or derogate from such sovereignty.

Withdrawal mechanics

Upon South Africa publicly committing herself to the principles above, talks will then be held between SWAPO, UN and South Africa on the mechanics and modalities involved in the achievement of independence.

A. Withdrawal of armed force

After South Africa has publicly undertaken to withdraw all her armed forces from Namibia, a logistical programme for such withdrawal will be discussed.
SWAPO appreciates the fact that such withdrawal can reasonably not take place over night and, that in order to create a climate of peace leading to peaceful transition, and to ensure confidence among all the Namibian people, particularly between whites and blacks where today a racial conflict and hatred exist promoted deliberately under the discriminatory laws of South Africa, such withdrawal should be interchangeably phased out, that is, the United Nations peace-keeping force taking over the positions of the withdrawing South African armed forces. This process should start immediately and should not take more than three months from the date of agreement on the withdrawal of all South African armed forces.

During this withdrawal period, the UN moves its administrative machinery into the country to take over the administration and public security and embarks on the organization for elections.

B. Elections

SWAPO commits itself to fair, genuine and democratic elections under U.N. supervision and control.

SWAPO’s position is that it is not necessary to hold election twice before independence, i.e., first to elect a constituent assembly and then to elect an independence parliament. This process would be confusing, expensive and time consuming. Of course, SWAPO sees the need for certain constitutional issues to be settled before independence in order that independence elections can be based on such settled issues, but such process is long over due.

SWAPO maintains that this can be achieved by a meeting to be attended by SWAPO, South Africa and U.N. Here, too, SWAPO should be free to bring in anyone as part of its delegation. SWAPO leaders in detention in Namibia or South Africa whose presence is requested by SWAPO should be free from detention and allowed to attend.

It goes without saying that such election should take place after the conditions on withdrawal of the armed forces as stipulated above have been fulfilled.

SWAPO is of the view that if such elections are to be genuine, free, fair and democratic the whole process for electioneering campaign and the holding of the election itself should start one month after the completion of the withdrawal of all South African armed forces and that the electioneering process should not exceed eight months.

C. U.N. Peace-keeping Force

In order to ensure U.N. supervision and control of elections, SWAPO proposes that there should be a U.N. peace-keeping force in Namibia.

D. Size of the U.N. Peace-keeping Force

In the view of SWAPO, it is not necessary for the United Nations to raise a force of the same number as the South African armed forces,
i.e., about 50,000; for, in conditions of peace such a number of troops is not necessary and, indeed, has never at any time been justified. South Africa was forced to station such an inordinately large numbers of troops for the purpose of terrorizing and suppressing the people. The required size of the United Nations peace-keeping force must be sufficiently large to ensure effective control of the transitional arrangements.

SWAPO would willingly take part in discussions of the United Nations as to the financing and composition of the United Nations force. Unquote

Leonard

70. Telephone From the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 10, 1977, 0338Z

2545. Georgetown for Ambassador Young. Dept please pass to Sec Vance. Subject: Namibia: Second Day of Western Five Talks With SWAPO—Afternoon Session. Ref: USUN 2534.1

1. Summary: Fourth session of Western Five talks with SWAPO took place pm August 9. Discussions centered around two items: 1) relationship between Administrator-General and UN Special Representative, and 2) concept of panel of jurists to decide disputes as to who are political prisoners. With regard to first item, SWAPO accepted proposal for a Special Representative who would have effective veto


2 In telegram 2534 from USUN, August 9, the Mission reported on the August 9 morning session with SWAPO, noting that Nujoma changed his position regarding the withdrawal of South African troops. During the August 8 session (see Document 69), SWAPO agreed to allow troops to withdraw during the UN-sponsored transitional period before independence. At this meeting, Nujoma insisted that “South African troops would have to be totally withdrawn before SWAPO would risk taking any part in political process.” Nujoma also outlined a scenario for the UN takeover of Namibia that included a meeting of SWAPO, SAG, UN and/or Western Five Representatives to work out a timetable for South African troop withdrawal; a general cease-fire; departure of South African troops over a three month period and their replacement by UN troops; UN control of civil and military administration of Namibia; and free elections under UN auspices to choose a new government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770286–0785)
power over Administrator-General. SWAPO also agreed that, while Special Representative’s veto power could for political reasons be described in terminology less offensive to South African Government, such veto power would have to be recognized by all parties concerned. SWAPO further stated that, given Special Representative’s veto power, SWAPO would withdraw its opposition to appointment of Administrator-General by South Africans. With regard to panel of jurists, SWAPO agreed that mechanism is needed to review cases of political prisoners, but rejected concept of independent panel of jurists in favor of placing this responsibility in hands of legal section of Special Representative’s staff. Second day of talks began with SWAPO’s disavowal of seeming agreements of first day. (Reftel) It remains to be seen whether tomorrow will begin with disavowal of seeming agreements of today. End Summary.

2. Afternoon session of second day of Western Five talks with SWAPO took place August 9 from 1600 to 1830. Because SWAPO had asked that further talk about troop withdrawals be deferred until the Five could present more specific ideas on scope and timing. Discussions centered around two other items: 1) relationship between Administrator-General and Special Representative; and 2) concept of panel of jurists.

3. With regard to relationship between Administrator-General and Special Representative, SWAPO expressed its need to know exact powers of Special Representative. SWAPO asked specifically what the Five meant by their statement that the Special Representative would have to be “satisfied” as to fairness of political process. The Five responded that power of the Special Representative, as understood by the Five and by South Africa, amounts to an effective veto. However, use of the words “veto” or “approval” is for political reasons offensive to the South African Government; therefore, the Five have described to the Special Representative’s role in terms of “satisfaction”. The change in terminology does not result in change in meaning. SWAPO accepted concept of a Special Representative who would have effective veto power over Administrator-General. SWAPO stressed that, while the Special Representative’s veto power could for political reasons be described in terminology less offensive to the South African Government, such veto power would have to be recognized by all parties concerned.

4. Given SWAPO’s acceptance of Special Representative with effective veto power over Administrator-General, Ambassador McHenry questioned whether such power did not make SWAPO’s stated opposition to a South African Administrator-General irrelevant. SWAPO agreed that, given veto power, they would withdraw their opposition to appointment of Administrator-General by South Africa.
5. With regard to concept of panel of jurists, SWAPO accepted that a mechanism would be needed to establish status of prisoners as political or criminal; however, SWAPO could not accept panel, as such. SWAPO suggested that legal section of the Special Representative’s staff be given responsibility of deciding these cases. SWAPO’s opposition to panel is based on presence of South Africans on panel and on past unfortunate experience with another independent international panel, the International Court of Justice (which in 1966 declined to rule on merits of charges brought against South Africa for its continued occupation of South West Africa). After stating their arguments in support of panel, Five agreed to consider proposal of SWAPO.

6. Comment: Discussions on particular points have been extensive and at times difficult, but we believe they have been useful in clarifying for SWAPO the basic approach of Western Five, as well as proposals that have emerged from our talks with South Africa. It is too early to know SWAPO’s final attitude toward any individual items or to package as a whole. Morning session today (reftel) began with SWAPO’s disavowal of seeming agreements of yesterday. It remains to be seen whether tomorrow will begin with disavowal of seeming agreements of today. End comment.

Leonard

3 In telegram 2555 from USUN, August 10, the Mission reported on the morning session of talks with SWAPO, which was largely devoted to the issue of Namibian prisoners and a possible timetable for the transitional period. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770288–0743) In telegram 2560 from USUN, August 11, the Mission reported on the August 10 afternoon session, which focused on SWAPO’s reaction to the illustrative timetable presented by the Five that morning. Nujoma suggested alterations which the Mission believed would make the timetable less acceptable to the South African Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770289–0011)
71. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, August 12, 1977, 0015Z

2566. Port of Spain for Ambassador Young. Department please pass to Secretary Vance. AmEmbassy London please pass to Ambassador McHenry. Subject: Namibia: Non-paper Approved by Western Five and SWAPO August 11.

1. Following is Non-paper, approved by Western Five and SWAPO at conclusion of talks August 11 summarizing the views expressed by both parties during August 8–11 talks in New York. 2

Quote:

1. We thought it useful to review our talks in order to insure that our reports to our governments, and any future discussions with SWAPO and other parties involved, will reflect our discussions as accurately as possible.

2. We recalled that we neither sought a Security Council mandate for our initiative nor was one suggested by the Council. But our initiative rests firmly on Security Council Resolution 385, which was adopted unanimously. We recalled our belief that Security Council Resolution 385 provides the most practical basis for a settlement of the Namibian question. It is a balanced document which, if implemented in all its essential elements, would lead to a valid act of self-determination on the part of the people of Namibia.

3. We further emphasized that we were not empowered to negotiate a specific agreement with SWAPO. What we hope to do is explore with SWAPO and the principal parties concerned possible solutions consistent with Security Council Resolution 385 so that the people of Namibia can decide freely how they wish to govern themselves.

4. Our talks resulted in further clarification of the elements of what might become an internationally acceptable solution. We acknowledge SWAPO’s contribution to this result.

5. We reviewed the results of our previous talks with the South African Government. We presented, for illustrative purposes, some of

---


2 In telegram 2570 from USUN, August 12, the Mission reported on the final day of talks between the Five and SWAPO, during which the Non-paper was approved. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770290–0797)
our thoughts on the possible nature and extent of the United Nations’ role and responsibility in the political process.

6. The Five suggested that South African military forces might be withdrawn progressively throughout the transition period and that procedures (such as monitoring by the UN and confinement to base) might be used to assure that South African military forces still to be withdrawn did not interfere in the political process. In any event South African military forces would be completely withdrawn by independence, subject to the views of the new government.

7. SWAPO stated its agreement to a ceasefire and said that it had no objection to a phased withdrawal thereafter. They believed however that the withdrawal process must be completed within three months of a ceasefire and before campaigning began for elections. They would not agree to the presence in Namibia of any South African military forces during elections. In an effort to probe the SWAPO position, the possibility was explored of the continued presence of a limited but confined and monitored South African force until much later in the political process (e.g., the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the installation of the new government, or independence). SWAPO reiterated its view that all South African forces must be withdrawn before the election campaign could begin.

8. In addition, SWAPO insisted that the South African military forces must be replaced by UN armed peacekeeping forces, the number to be determined by operational requirements. They believed that such forces were necessary in order to maintain the ceasefire and to provide the measure of confidence needed by the Namibian people. They did not believe that these tasks could be performed by civilians on the staff of the Special Representative or by unarmed military observers. However, they had no objection to attaching the military personnel to the staff of the Special Representative.

9. In expressing their views on the pace of the South African withdrawal, SWAPO agreed, in principle, to phases involving a ceasefire and confinement to base by both South African and SWAPO forces. They believed that South African withdrawal from Namibia should be completed before the beginning of the election campaign and that prior to this the final contingent of South African forces should be confined to a single base near the South African border.

10. The Five stressed that a plan for a phased withdrawal must be an integral part of a proposed settlement. However, political and practical realities were such that it was unlikely that South Africa could be persuaded to agree to the pace of withdrawal suggested by SWAPO not to the confinement of South African troops to a single base near the South African border. South Africa would probably insist on the maintenance of some forces in Namibia for a longer period of time.
Moreover, while we appreciated SWAPO’s concerns about the presence of South African military forces, we believed that these might be met by neutralization procedures and that measures beyond these procedures were unnecessary. For example, the Five expressed the view that the duties envisaged by SWAPO for a UN peacekeeping force could effectively be carried out by either civilian or military observers attached to the staff of the Special Representative.

11. SWAPO inquired about measures to ensure the neutrality of South African police who they stated were trained and armed to perform quasi-military functions. Their view was that the police should be disarmed. The Five stated that the Special Representative would have to ensure that there was no intimidation from any quarter. However, they had worked out no specific procedures which the Special Representative might follow in performing this task. This was one of the questions which would need to be addressed in contingency planning.

Aspects of UN presence

12. The Five outlined the relationship which might be established between a United Nations Special Representative and an Administrator-General, through which the essential elements of Security Council Resolution 385 could be implemented. The Special Representative would be physically present with a substantial staff throughout the transitional period leading to independence. He would work in close cooperation with the Administrator-General. The Special Representative, assisted by his staff would have the responsibility of satisfying himself:

— That existing legislation is non-discriminatory and does not impede the full participation of all Namibians in the political process;
— That the proposed electoral legislation is adequate;
— That the political campaign is fairly and peacefully conducted (e.g., impartiality of the administration, freedom of movement, strict observance of the electoral regulations by the political parties and others, impartiality of official information. Guarantees against the possibility of intimidation from whatever quarter);
— That the registration of voters is properly and comprehensively carried out;
— That voting is secret and free from improper interference by anyone;
— That the votes are properly counted and the results properly declared.

13. The Five explored with SWAPO the nature and scope of a United Nations presence in Namibia during the transitional period. There was agreement that:
A) A UN presence must be installed in the territory from the outset of the transitional period and must be effectively represented in all parts of the territory.

B) A UN presence must involve substantial numbers of international civil servants. The exact number of civilians required would have to be determined by operational requirements.

C) A primary task of the Special Representative would be to ensure the creation of conditions necessary to hold free elections, including the repeal of all discriminatory laws and regulations, implementation of the freedoms of press, assembly and movement and measures to guarantee South African non-interference in the political process, prior to any elections.

14. SWAPO believed that the representative of the Secretary-General would have to have the power to approve the actions of the transitional administration, insofar as the transitional process is concerned. Subject to this condition, SWAPO would not oppose the appointment of an Administrator-General by South Africa. The Five replied that they had indicated to South Africa that the Administrator-General would have to perform his task to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.

15. The Five also suggested that advance contingency planning by the UN Secretariat would be necessary if the UN presence is to be installed from the outset. SWAPO indicated that it had no problem with the UN Secretariat commencing such planning in connection with the implementation of Resolution 385, bearing in mind, of course, that no formal action could be taken in advance of Security Council approval.

Detainees and political prisoners

16. The Five stated their view that all Namibian detainees and political prisoners, wherever held, should be released so that they might participate in the political process. They recalled their suggestion that disputes as to who is a political prisoner might be decided by an international panel of jurists. The panel might consist of four members appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General, two of whom might be South Africans. One of the four would be designated President of the panel by the Secretary-General, and he would have a casting vote.

17. SWAPO accepted that a mechanism would be needed to settle disputes as to who is a political prisoner; however, SWAPO did not accept that an independent panel was the best mechanism. SWAPO suggested instead that the legal section of the Special Representative’s staff be given the responsibility of deciding these disputes.

General

18. SWAPO and the Five agreed that there had been a frank and useful exchange of views and that there exist possibilities for a negoti-
ated settlement of the issue consistent with Security Council Resolution 385. They agreed to meet again at an early date. Unquote

Leonard

72. Letter From President Carter to United Nations Secretary General Waldheim

Washington, August 19, 1977

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I have received a report on the discussions between SWAPO and the five Western members of the Security Council, and I am pleased with the evidence of progress toward an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibia question.

Your contribution, now at this point in the negotiations, would appear especially important. SWAPO wants the United Nations to play an authoritative and effective role throughout the political transition to ensure the integrity of that process. I believe that SWAPO's confidence can best be won if you and your staff define in detail the role which the UN should play during the transition. SWAPO has indicated that, if you should raise the matter, it would have no objection to your initiating contingency planning for this role. I believe your doing so would enhance the likelihood of a peaceful solution in Namibia. You can depend on the full cooperation of our delegation in any contingency planning you may undertake.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter


2 In an August 11 memorandum to Carter, Christopher listed SWAPO's concessions: 1) “A ceasefire can take place after the parties have reached agreement on general proposals for Namibian independence,” 2) “South Africa can appoint an Administrator General, provided all sides understand that the UN Special Representative has a veto over his actions,” and 3) “SWAPO will not oppose contingency planning by Waldheim for the UN role in Namibia.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 8/77)
73. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, September 27, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

Namibia. On Monday² the Contact Group had its final two sessions with the South Africans, with Vorster attending the last meeting. The South Africans withdrew their earlier proposal on troop withdrawal³ and presented a new illustrative proposal which the Contact Group believes provides a basis for future negotiations. The new South African plan is no longer conditioned on Cuban withdrawal from the southern portion of Angola, though they made it plain that their troops would reenter Namibia in force if there were any “Cuban tricks”. Serious problems remain, however, as the Five pointed out to Vorster and Botha:

—The South African target date of next March for the election is still too early to permit full SWAPO participation.
—The South Africans resist a formulation which says that the UN representative would have the rights of “supervision and control” in the elections, as provided for in the basic Security Council resolution on Namibia.
—The South Africans still want more troops in Namibia until the election than would be acceptable internationally.
—The problem of demobilizing pro-South African Namibian militia is inadequately dealt with.

The South Africans agreed to submit their new plan in writing by the end of the week, and the Contact Group will meet in New York after their return to prepare its assessment of the talks and recommendations for next steps.⁴ We think there is still some give in South African

---

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 9/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “Warren.”
² September 22. In telegram 4978 from Pretoria, September 22, the Embassy reported on the meetings. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D70345-0685)
³ In a September 23 memorandum to Carter, Christopher summarized two meetings between Botha and the Contact Group. On the issue of troop withdrawal, Christopher noted that “the South Africans have demanded ‘watertight guarantees’ that the Cubans would not move against Namibia.” The South African plan called for the UN to bring about the withdrawal of all Cuban troops from a substantial portion of Southern Angola (to north of the Benguela Railway), and allow 8000 South African troops to remain in Namibia until election day. (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 9/77)
⁴ Carter wrote “C” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
positions and that we can keep the talks going. However, given South Africa’s desire to move ahead to establish a sympathetic regime in Namibia, time is of the essence.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

74. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 17, 1977, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Talks between President Carter and President El Hadj Omar Bongo

Participants for the US
The President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Brzezinski
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose
Henry Richardson, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Participants for the Organization of African Unity
President Bongo
William Eteki, Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity
Martin Bongo, Foreign Minister, Gabon
Rene Kombila, Gabonese Ambassador to the United States

The President: I am pleased and honored to welcome you back into the United States, both in your capacity as President of Gabon, and as leader of the OAU. Your advice and counsel and your assessment of prospects for stronger actions by the OAU will be welcome. I am honored and pleased to have you here. It appears that you have had very exciting tasks and challenges facing you in your first three months as Chairman of the OAU. I would be interested to have your opinion on the prospects and problems faced by the OAU, and your assessment of the prospects for renewed peace in Africa.

Bongo: I thank you very much for your warm welcome on behalf of myself, my delegation, and on behalf of the OAU. Your receiving us is a measure of the importance which you attribute to Africa. With

---

1 Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Sensitive. Brackets are in the original except those that indicate omitted text. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room and adjourned at 3:40 p.m.
respect to African problems, I will turn over the discussion to Mr. Eteki, Secretary-General of the OAU, and then after his remarks I will comment on the political aspects of these problems.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Southern Africa.]

Eteki: There are two problems: 1) African Liberation; 2) Intra-African Conflict. Both are serious. As we all know, the first includes the problems of Namibia and Zimbabwe. The recent interest by the United States in Southern Africa we find very encouraging. Obviously, the United States is already well aware of the Anglo-American plan for Zimbabwe. The OAU does not reject this plan and accepts it as a first step leading, however, to complete and not a sham Zimbabwe independence. On this point we have refused to compromise. The OAU currently assists liberation movements to carry on armed combat in Zimbabwe. If the Anglo-American plan fails, we will continue this course of action.

But we are following with interest the implementation of the plan and the activities of the United States. We are uncertain of the details of the plan, and we are uncertain of the intent of Smith and the white minority relative to Zimbabwe liberation. For us the most important point is the integration of those whites who are acceptable into the liberation army; other issues are details. The OAU does not reject the plan; we are following it with caution toward the goal of complete independence for Zimbabwe.

Bongo: I agree with all the Secretary-General has said. The Front Line States apparently wish to dominate the Zimbabwe negotiations and perhaps influence events towards the acceptance of the Patriotic Front. But we must recall that at the OAU Summit at Libreville, the OAU decided to support the Patriotic Front and other parties in Zimbabwe [sic].\(^2\) The Anglo-American Plan should be expedited; if not, we do not know who might come to power. Another Angola must be prevented. The problem is that Smith wishes to maintain the Rhodesian army as it is, and in this respect the Plan is helpful.

However, the Representative of the UN must supersede the British Resident Commissioner in authority, and we believe that this is an African position. The UN is the representative of all the people, and therefore it is only right that its representative should predominate. Further, the OAU must be taken into account in the Zimbabwe peace settlement. Otherwise, there will be difficulties and complications in its implementation.

---

\(^2\) The OAU Summit was held in Libreville, Gabon, July 2–5. For statements regarding OAU recognition of the Patriotic Front and other nationalist groups, see *Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977*, p. 28522.
Eteki: I wish to say a brief word on Namibia, of which the US is well acquainted. We are encouraged by the US effort. It would be the simplest solution if the South Africans and the Namibians could negotiate a Namibian independence settlement. This however is not possible, and therefore we are supporting SWAPO in its liberation struggle. We are glad that the original plan for a constitutional conference was dropped. This now produces the situation that the most important element is the withdrawal of the South African army, and the introduction of UN troops in a first phase of a settlement, so that SWAPO can organize inside of Namibia. The freeing of political prisoners is also an important issue. If these occur, then we think that Namibia can be independent by the end of 1978. SWAPO is the appropriate spokesman for the Namibian people. We appreciate all the US efforts, but believe that the pressure on South Africa should now be redoubled.

Let me say a word about the situation in South Africa itself. South Africa is trampling on human rights. We are aware of your deep convictions and support of human rights, and are sure that the United States will take all steps to oppose this situation. There are two problems: 1) the problem of human rights, and 2) the political problems. We are aiding the two South African liberation movements,\(^3\) and in view of events such as those in Soweto,\(^4\) we have no choice. We regret that the US gives the impression of tendering indirect aid to South Africa by its economic ties; this is contrary to UN resolutions and actions. Accordingly, we would appeal to the United States to support the fight for human rights in South Africa.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Southern Africa.]

The President: I appreciate your helpful explanation and outline of your problems. You have a full agenda. It is apparent that under the strong leadership which both you and Secretary-General Eteki are providing, you are attacking those problems. On Zimbabwe, we have been working closely with the British, the Front Line States, the United Nations, and with the OAU and the nationalist leaders. We are determined to use all of our influence to persuade Smith to step down. We are working for free elections under the principle of one-man, one-vote, and to have the army built around the liberation army in a Zimbabwe settlement. The UN adds a legitimacy that supports all of our efforts towards a settlement. I have no way of knowing what

---

\(^3\) The African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress.

\(^4\) Presumably a reference to the June 16–24, 1976, Soweto (South-Western Townships) uprising, a series of student-led protests reacting to the use of Afrikaans for instruction in all-black schools. The official death toll was 176. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1976, pp. 27886–27888)
Smith’s intent is, but we will exert pressure to persuade him to comply with the Anglo-American proposal.

We have been occupied with Namibia. South Africa has offered to withdraw all of its troops except for some 150 troops along the border. I have no objection to complete withdrawal by South Africa, and hope they will agree, but I do not believe they will. I hope, then, that SWAPO will agree on South Africa’s retaining one base with a small number of troops in an isolated area which the United Nations can secure, and that these arrangements evolve in a way favorable to the future government of Namibia. I wish to stress the importance of SWAPO’s cooperation. South Africa has agreed on UN observers, on free elections, on majority rule, and on independence for Namibia before the end of 1978. We need moderation from SWAPO, and cooperation from South Africa. If too much is expected from South Africa in these negotiations, my guess is that they will not withdraw their troops. I hope we can negotiate an agreement allowing a limited number of South African troops to stay in place in an isolated area during the preparatory stages before the elections.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Southern Africa.]

75. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, October 18, 1977

4. Status of Namibia Negotiations in New York: We have reached a new plateau in the Namibian negotiations and will have to advance fresh proposals if we are to reach a settlement. The Western Five Contact Group will meet again with SWAPO Wednesday, but it is

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 10/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote “Cy” at the top of the page.

2 October 19. In telegram 3910 from USUN, October 20, the Mission reported on the Contact Group’s final meeting with SWAPO. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770385-0179)
apparent from the three formal sessions\(^3\) we have had and our private discussions with Sam Nujoma that there are fundamental differences between SWAPO and South Africa on three key issues:\(^4\)

1. Withdrawal of South African military forces, which SWAPO insists must take place before the election but South Africa doesn’t want to complete before independence;
2. Release of political prisoners, with SWAPO refusing to free dissident elements detained in Tanzania and Zambia, and South Africa insisting that both sides release detainees; and
3. The status of the enclave of Walvis Bay, claimed by both.

The Contact Group members do not believe that they can bridge the gap between the parties on these issues during the present negotiating round. The Group has now recommended that the Five develop a settlement proposal which represents a compromise between the South African and SWAPO positions which could command international support.\(^5\) In order to obtain the acceptance of this document by both sides, pressure will have to be brought to bear on both SWAPO and

\(^3\) October 14, 15, and 17. In telegram 3821 from USUN, October 15, the Mission reported on the Contact Group’s October 14 talks with SWAPO. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770378-0480) In telegram 3830 from USUN, October 16, the Mission reported on the Contact Group’s October 15 meeting with SWAPO, during which SWAPO rejected the South African withdrawal proposal: “The Contact Group proceeded to explore with SWAPO the question of whether and under what conditions SWAPO would be willing to consider the presence of a limited contingent of South African troops in Namibia during the electoral process. The Group emphasized that the question was not whether the South Africans would withdraw but only how quickly and under what safeguards that withdrawal would be completed. In response, SWAPO consistently maintained that under no circumstances would SWAPO agree to the presence of any South African troops in Namibia after the start of the electoral process.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770380-0025) In telegram 3843 from USUN, October 17, the Mission reported on the Contact Group’s October 17 talks with SWAPO. Based on SWAPO’s refusal to compromise on the issue of political prisoners and its opposition to the concept of a panel of jurists which would handle disputes regarding political prisoners, the Mission was not encouraged by the prospects for success in the next round of talks among the Five, South Africa and SWAPO and recommended “that our best strategy to keep the door to a negotiated settlement open would be for the USG to take the lead to quickly develop plan for settlement which would take interests of both parties into consideration but require necessary concessions from each; get the Five to agree to the plan; and then do our best to sell it to the Frontline and Nigeria and, if successful in that, present it to South Africa and the UN.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770381-0550)

\(^4\) In an October 10 memorandum to President Carter, Vance noted several problems with the South African position: An insistence on an early election—March rather than June 1978; a desire to maintain 4,000 combat forces in Namibia, even after elections; and a refusal to consider UN peacekeeping forces. (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 10/77)

\(^5\) In telegram 3859 from USUN, October 18, the Mission sent a draft memorandum with a proposal for a settlement and asked for Bowdler’s comments. Young noted that the proposal had been given to the Western Five. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 115, South Africa: 8–10/77)
South Africa. We are in the process of developing proposals to be discussed initially within the Contact Group.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

76. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**

Washington, December 9, 1977, 0256Z

294068. From UNA. Following repeat Lagos 114201 sent action Brussels, Paris, info Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lusaka, Pretoria, Maputo, to SecState 08 Dec 77.


The following draft assessment has been prepared by us and Bill Bowdler. We have presented it to our contract group colleagues, all of whom have agreed to the first six paragraphs of the text. The German and Canadian also agree with the remainder of what we have written, but the French and British are still deliberating over the conclusions put forward in the last six paragraphs. Full agreement on this assessment will, at best, be delayed and perhaps not achievable. Because we believe that you may find our views useful now, we are transmitting the assessment in its current draft form.

The South African position

1. Throughout our negotiations, South Africa has shown that it will not agree to any negotiated settlement which in its view would adversely affect the Turnhalle’s prospects of power. It recognizes, however, that an internationally acceptable settlement which assured prospects of a Turnhalle victory would be in South Africa’s best interests, since a Turnhalle victor in an election which the UN had determined to be free and fair would deprive SWAPO thereafter of much of its international support. South Africa also wishes to ensure, in so far as possible, that a successor government in Namibia will co-operate with it, safeguard its considerable investments in the territory, and provide a buffer between it and Angola. The South African Government proba-
bly still remains anxious to avoid a rupture with Western countries. It has therefore sought to avoid appearing so obdurate in the negotiations as to incur accusations that it was not making any serious effort at a settlement.

2. The latest round of negotiations with South Africa has confirmed these trends. In addition, the South Africans once again expressed concern that the situation within Namibia is deteriorating, and said that their supporters in the territory are accusing South [garble] faith. This probably contributes to their desire to have early elections in Namibia, and in any event it provides them with a pretext for their insistence on elections by the first week in June. The major reason for their haste continues to be, in our view, their aim to give the Turnhalle an advantage over SWAPO in an election campaign, if SWAPO were to participate. Consistent with this, the South Africans continue to assist the campaign efforts of the Turnhalle through various means, e.g., media propaganda, financing, use of vehicles, etc. (They attempt to justify this by referring to the amount of international support where [which?] SWAPO enjoys.) While some South Africans would still prefer to reach an internationally acceptable settlement, the National Party’s recent election victory may have strengthened the government’s conviction that there is much to be said for pressing ahead with their own plans for Namibia irrespective of Western (not to mention UN) opinion.

3. The South Africans shifted their position to a certain extent in the current round of talks. They may have wished to show that they remain flexible, and they may have calculated that the other side would not accept our own ideas, let alone anything South Africa might propose. Whatever the reason, the South Africans have now accepted, albeit with conditions which have little chance of acceptance, to monitor observance of the ceasefire and the conditions agreed to regarding the status of military forces during the transition period. They have said that they may reduce the size of their own proposed residual contingent by a quarter. They have been prepared to postpone again the date of elections. None of these shifts, however, is inconsistent with moving towards an internal solution designed to impress outside opinion with the reasonableness of South African conduct. Their residual contingent will still be three times as large as the UN military element. The South Africans are probably concerned to preserve the minimum military contingent consistent with their general desire to retain a presence which will reassure white Namibians and blacks who oppose SWAPO that they are not abandoning the territory to SWAPO. A military pres-

---

2 December 2–3. In telegram 6589 from Pretoria, December 2, the Embassy reported on the first session of talks with the South African Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770448–0520)
ence of the scope which the South Africans want would also have a psychological effect on Namibians who might otherwise support SWAPO.

4. Since our first meeting with them SWAPO has shown a readiness to discuss terms for a settlement which falls short of their own stated position and that of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Thus, SWAPO accepted that the de facto presence of the South African civilian administration could not be removed; and they have also accepted the continuing presence of the police. They appear to have reached agreement among their leadership at an early stage on a negotiating position which has not varied since in any significant respect. In particular, they insist that all South African forces should be withdrawn from the territory prior to the beginning of the election campaign. They deeply distrust the South Africans. But in addition their objective is to gain power, and they believe that a continuing South African military presence would be a psychological disadvantage to their cause, just as its removal would be seen as a very considerable victory for them.

5. At our last round of talks, Nujoma and his colleagues showed an uncharacteristic brusqueness in their dealings with us.

The Front Line States

6. Nyerere and Khama showed signs of disenchantment with SWAPO, and both would accept a compromise solution in Namibia. Most Front Line leaders felt that the proposed UN military element would have to be substantially greater than that in our proposal (which South Africa wants an even smaller force). But in terms of effective influence upon SWAPO, the two most important Front Line countries

---

3 May 15.

4 See footnote 3, Document 75. In telegram 3574 from Lusaka, November 27, McHenry and Petterson reported on the meeting between the Contact Group and SWAPO, during which SWAPO rejected the Western Five proposal. The report noted that Nujoma interrupted McHenry to say that SWAPO objected to hearing the Contact Group’s proposals before they were put to the South African Government. Nujoma charged that the Five were, “playing a game as if you were an agent of South Africa.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770439-0527)
are Angola and Zambia. It is too early to judge to what extent these countries would be willing to accept effective monitoring of SWAPO bases within their borders, and more generally to what extent they would be prepared to press SWAPO to agree to a settlement if, as now is the case, SWAPO showed themselves reluctant or opposed.

Conclusions

7. It was evident during these talks that the South Africans continued to follow a two-track approach to a Namibian settlement. As long as the Contact Group remains active in the search for an internationally acceptable solution, the SAG wishes to be seen as cooperating with the effort and wishes to avoid being blamed for intransigence and obstructiveness. On the other hand the SAG is clearly proceeding with step designed to advance an internal solution should the Five Power negotiations falter.

8. What came into sharper focus during this round of talks is a South African unwillingness to accept terms which would unduly risk the ability of its clients to win the elections or inhibit the SAG’s ability to reestablish its military control in the northern area should it consider it necessary. This is reflected in the insistence that:

—Even parity between South African and UN forces is unacceptable and the ratio should be around 3.1 in their favor;
—Platoon size units of South African forces must remain in the eight forward bases;
—UN personnel must be restricted in terms of their geographic distribution and function;
—If the South African forces are to be monitored by the UN, likewise UN units must be monitored by corresponding South African military observers.

9. Brand Fourie’s remark in an unguarded moment that platoon units in the forward bases are designed to provide the necessary holding action until South African reinforcements arrive\(^5\) shows a lack of confidence in the UN Special Representative’s ability to maintain a “visible peace” in the border area and gives credence to the contention of SWAPO and others that the SAG is unwilling to remove its military influence in the area. An interesting feature of the discussion on withdrawal was a shifting of emphasis in the SAG rationale for maintaining its forces in the border area. Heretofore the weight of its arguments was that the Cuban-MPLA threat made this necessary. This time they hardly mentioned this aspect, arguing instead the need to offset the

---

\(^5\) The Embassy reported this in telegram 6592 from Pretoria, December 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780008–1035)
UN military presence now contemplated by the Contact Group and to monitor UN forces so that their presence does not influence the elections.

10. The SAG spokesmen made it equally clear that while the international effort to find a settlement proceeds, unilateral steps leading to the independence of Namibia during 1978 will continue. The edicts put out by the Administrator-General since the third round of talks must be seen in this light. Botha’s categorical statement that elections will be held on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday of the first week of June adds further concreteness to their plans.6

11. From the start the SAG has been dubious of the Contact Group’s ability to work out a settlement. It has worked along with the Five Powers because it has not wanted to run the risk of obstructing an effort that would predispose them against South Africa and aggravate an adverse world reaction. At the same time the South Africans have been careful to limit their “concessions” to areas where their ability, or that of their clients, to insure a favorable outcome of the process is not compromised. A SWAPO victory remains unthinkable and unacceptable to South Africa.

12. There is probably some further give in the South African position but the limits are being rapidly reached. The stand taken on withdrawal of South African forces and the size and disposition of the military element of the UNTAG is clearly indicative of this. The SAG can only be expected to make further concessions when it is confronted with public situations where failure to do so places responsibility on the SAG. Persuasion is not likely to make them move. They have been building what they regard as a convincing record of their “reasonableness” during the four rounds of talks which they have every intention of making public if the need arises. They would like to place the responsibility for any failure of the talks on SWAPO or on so-called new demands by the Contact Group, or at least to ensure that the focus is not on themselves. They would hope that this would persuade some or all of the Five Western members of the Security Council not to take a stand in support of pressure against South Africa. This hope could well be based on their belief in the possibility that when pressed, the Western Five will not apply the “stern measures” alluded to the Five-Power demarche of last April.7

13. The most helpful next step would be for the Contact Group to develop a fair settlement proposal which carefully (and persuasively)

---

6 Transmitted in telegram 6605 from Pretoria, December 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770450–0457)
7 See Tab A, Document 50.
balances the built-in influence which the SAG would retain during the transition (civil administration, police, infrastructure, etc.) with a neutralizing UN presence. The leverage which making such a proposal public will have on the SAG will vary in proportion to the Contact Group’s ability to enlist the public support of the Front Line Presidents and SWAPO.

14. If we could get SWAPO to agree to our proposal, we would put the South Africans in a weaker negotiating position. They would be confronted with the risk that they would be viewed as the party which was standing in the way of a negotiated settlement. However, without the intercession of the Front Line, SWAPO is unlikely to move from its current stance on South African troop withdrawal. Nyerere has tried and failed to get Nujoma and company to be more flexible. The French report that Kaunda also tried and failed. Therefore, if any Front Line pressure could be mobilized, to be effective it would require the willingness of at least the Angolans and Zambians to intercede. Moreover, the backing of Nigeria could be crucial. Obviously, it will be difficult to get the agreement necessary to mount such an effort. We do not rpt not have much time. Either the South African counterproposal could leak, deliberately or otherwise, soon, engendering a “we told you so” response from the Africans and unwillingness to compromise at all on the troop withdrawal question. Or South Africa could announce and begin to implement steps leading to an internal settlement. Or, finally, the South African authorities could take further repressive actions in the territory which would confirm in the minds of the Africans their deep distrust of the SAG and effectively close the door to any compromise on TNDT.

Easum

Unquote

Christopher
77. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, January 24, 1978

SUBJECT

Namibia Negotiations

The five-nation Contact Group initiative on Namibia is moving into a critical period. After a generally unsuccessful round of negotiations in November–December of last year,\(^2\) the Contact Group decided that a round of “proximity talks” between South Africa and SWAPO in New York, based on a Contact Group settlement proposal, offered the best hope for achieving the necessary breakthroughs and averting a collapse of this effort.\(^3\) After considerable difficulty in arranging a time for these talks, the Contact Group agreed January 20 to propose to the parties that negotiations at the foreign minister level be held in New York February 10–11, 1978. The concept of holding the talks at the foreign minister level was approved by Secretary Vance, who has indicated that he would be available only on February 11 but that the talks should open on the 10th as proposed. The attached paper presents the major issues to be covered in the talks, the positions of SWAPO and South Africa, and the implications of the talks for the United States and the other members of the Contact Group.

Peter Tarnoff

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 67, PRC 052, 2/17/78, Southern Africa—Rhodesia. Confidential.

\(^2\) See Document 76.

\(^3\) In telegram 5768 from USUN, December 22, 1977, the Mission reported on a December 21 meeting in which the Contact Group agreed to hold a round of “Proximity Talks” in New York. The meetings with the South African Government and SWAPO would be held at the same time, but in separate locations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770476–1049)
STATUS OF THE NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS

Introduction

The negotiations conducted by the Contact Group aimed at reaching an internationally acceptable solution to the Namibia problem have reached a decisive phase. In an effort to avert a breakdown of the talks and develop a compromise solution, the members of the Contact Group agreed January 20 to propose to South Africa and SWAPO a scenario for a round of proximity talks to be held in New York February 10–11 at the foreign minister level. Two days of preliminary talks at a lower level will be held on February 8 and 9. In the case of South Africa, this proposal will be made expressly contingent upon that country’s refraining from unilateral actions bearing directly upon issues under negotiation.

This latter point is of considerable importance in view of South Africa’s present determination to announce an election date for Namibia during a parliamentary “no-confidence” debate which opens January 30. The Contact Group has pointed out that this would be a unilateral move, prejudging negotiations, and has urged South Africa not to take such a step, thus far to no effect. It is likely that SWAPO would refuse to attend the proximity talks should South Africa proceed with this announcement.

In the days ahead, the Contact Group will have to make crucial decisions to enhance the possibilities for the success of the talks, and to deal with the contingencies that they may stall or break down entirely.

Remaining Issues

The latest series of talks between the Contact Group and the South Africans, SWAPO and the Front Line States failed to produce solutions for the two major remaining issues, the demand by South Africa that some of its troops be allowed to remain in Namibia through independence and the status of dissident SWAPO members currently held prisoner in Tanzania and Zambia. An increasingly important, though perhaps secondary issue, concerns the date of the Namibian elections. The South Africans have gone so far as to inform the Contact Group that

---

4 Confidential. Drafted by Thomas N.T. Niles (IO/UNP) on January 20.
the elections will be held during the first week of June 1978, and that they plan to announce the date around January 30. A South African cabinet meeting scheduled for January 24 may provide the occasion for key discussions on the Namibia problem. SWAPO could not accept June elections under any circumstances as this would not allow them sufficient time to return to Namibia and mount an effective campaign. If the South Africans go ahead and announce the election as planned, this will probably end any hope, at least for the time being, of a negotiated settlement.

South Africa’s Position

In discussing South Africa’s position on the Namibia question, we must start from the fact that South Africa is illegally occupying Namibia. This fact was recognized by the International Court of Justice in 1971 and by the United Nations Security Council in 1976 (Resolution 385 of January 1976). South Africa itself does not claim sovereignty over Namibia; it acknowledges a trust relationship to the Namibian people and an international responsibility to bring the region to independence. However, the South Africans are doing all they can to ensure that their influence over an independent Namibia is maximized. Consequently, while negotiating with the Contact Group the South Africans have been moving ahead with their preparations for an “internal solution” which they could rapidly bring into play if the Contact Group’s effort collapses.

SWAPO’s Position

As its maximum objective, SWAPO wants South Africa out of Namibia lock, stock and barrel prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign. This would include not only the South African armed forces but also the police and the civil administration. In view of its recognition by the UN General Assembly as the “sole authentic representative” of the people of Namibia, SWAPO would prefer to take power in Namibia without running the risk posed by free elections under UN supervision. However, during the negotiations SWAPO has agreed that the South African civilian administration can remain in place up to independence, they have accepted on a de facto basis the position of the South African Administrator General, and they have agreed that the post-independence government of Namibia should emerge from free elections supervised by the UN. SWAPO has steadfastly refused to accept any South African troop presence in Namibia after the beginning of the electoral campaign, a position which reflects the profound mistrust which SWAPO feels toward South Africa. SWAPO clearly believes that its chances in the elections would be severely compromised by the intimidating presence of the South African military. Just as South Africa has proceeded on the dual tracks of negotiating with the Contact Group
and preparing the “internal solution”, so SWAPO has followed a dual policy of negotiating while preparing for a lengthy guerrilla campaign if the negotiating track proves fruitless.

**U.S. Interests**

The United States is committed to an internationally acceptable solution in Namibia. The consequences of standing aside and acquiescing in a South African “internal settlement” would be a lengthy period of guerrilla war in Namibia with an increasingly active Soviet role in support of SWAPO plus serious damage to the position of trust which we have built up over the last year among the Africans. The salient fact in the African and UN view of the problem is that South Africa has no legal right to be in Namibia. Consequently, no internal solution engineered by South Africa could gain international acceptance, and such a development would rapidly lead to demands in the United Nations for punitive action against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter. The Western countries at the same time might well find the adoption of such sanctions both in conflict with their efforts to find solutions to other problems, such as Rhodesia, and unpopular domestically. Although the decision would be difficult for all the Western countries, we doubt that in the final analysis any one of us would be prepared to be seen internationally as South Africa’s protector on this issue.

Consequently, our basic interest continues to be an internationally acceptable solution along the lines proposed by the Contact Group. Should this prove impossible, we and our Allies will face a hard choice of either agreeing to sanctions against South Africa, resisting African pressures for such sanctions, or finding some new basis on which to continue the initiative of the Contact Group. Making such a renewed effort credible in the eyes of the Africans will be difficult.

1. Following is final text of Western Five proposal for a Namibian settlement:

Quote: January 31, 1978
Proposal for a Settlement of the Namibian Situation

I. Introduction

1. Bearing in mind their responsibilities as members of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Governments of Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States have consulted with the various parties involved with the Namibian situation with a view to encouraging agreement on the transfer of authority in Namibia to an independent government in accordance with Resolution 385, adopted unanimously by the Security Council on 30 January 1976.

2. To this end, our governments have drawn up a proposal for the settlement of the Namibian question designed to bring about a transition to independence during 1978 within a framework acceptable to the people of Namibia and thus to the international community. The key to an internationally acceptable transition to independence is free elections for the whole of Namibia as one political entity with appropriate United Nations supervision and control. A resolution will be required in the Security Council requesting the Secretary General to appoint a United Nations Special Representative whose task will be to ensure the establishment of conditions that will allow free and fair elections as required by Resolution 385. The central task of the Special Representative will be to ensure the fairness and impartiality of the electoral process. The Special Representative will be assisted by a United Nations Transition Assistance Group.


2 In telegram 319 from USUN, February 1, the Mission reported on the January 31 Contact Group meeting in which they discussed preparations for the Proximity Talks and finalized the Western Five proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780047–0460)
3. The purpose of the electoral process is to elect representatives to a Namibian Constituent Assembly which will draw up and adopt the constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia. Authority would be transferred during 1978 to the Government of Namibia.

4. A more detailed description of the proposal is contained below. Our governments believe that this proposal provides an effective basis for implementing Resolution 385 while taking adequate account of the interests of all parties involved. In carrying out his responsibilities the Special Representative will deal with the official appointed by South Africa (the Administrator General) to ensure the orderly transition to independence. This working arrangement shall in no way constitute recognition of the South African presence in and administration of Namibia.

II. The electoral process

5. In accordance with Security Council Resolution 385, free elections will be held, for the whole of Namibia as one political entity, to enable the people of Namibia to freely and fairly determine their own future. The elections will be under the supervision and control of the United Nations in that, as a condition to the conduct of the electoral process, the elections themselves, and the certification of their results, the United Nations Special Representative will have to satisfy himself as to the fairness and appropriateness of all aspects of the political process at each stage. In the discharge of his duties, he will have at his disposal a substantial civilian section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group. He will report to the Secretary General of the United Nations, keeping him informed and making such recommendations as he considers necessary with respect to the discharge of his responsibilities. The Secretary General, in accordance with the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, will keep the Council informed.

6. Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a constitution for an independent Namibia. The constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of government. Every adult person who is determined to be a Namibian citizen will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the delineation of electoral constituencies, the preparation of voters rolls, and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and
press shall be guaranteed. All of these electoral procedures will take effect only after the United Nations Special Representative has satisfied himself as to their fairness and appropriateness. The implementation of the electoral process, including the proper registration of voters and the proper and timely tabulation and publication of voting results will also have to be conducted to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.

7. The following requirements will be fulfilled to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative in order to meet the objective of free and fair elections:

A) Prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign, the Administrator General will repeal all discriminatory or restrictive laws, regulations, or administrative decisions which might abridge or inhibit that objective.

B) All Namibian political prisoners or political detainees held by the South African authorities will be released prior to the beginning of the electoral campaign and permitted to participate fully and freely in that process, without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Any disputes concerning the release of political prisoners or political detainees shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative.

C) All Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the territory of Namibia will be permitted to return and participate fully and freely in the electoral process without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment. Suitable entry points will be designated for these purposes.

D) The Special Representative with the assistance of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other appropriate international bodies will ensure that Namibians remaining outside of Namibia are given a free and voluntary choice whether to return. Where necessary, provision will be made to attest to the voluntary nature of decisions made by Namibians who elect not to return to Namibia.

8. A comprehensive cessation of all hostile acts shall be observed by all parties in order to ensure that the electoral process will be free from interference and intimidation. Annex A describes provision for the implementation of the cessation of all hostile acts, military arrangements concerning the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, the withdrawal of South African forces, and arrangements with respect to other organized forces in Namibia and the forces of SWAPO. These provisions call for:

A) A cessation of all hostile acts by all parties and the restriction of South African and SWAPO armed forces to established bases under UN monitoring.
B) A phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1500 South African troops within twelve weeks and prior to the official start of the political campaign. The remaining South African force would be restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello or both and monitored by United Nations personnel and would be withdrawn after the certification of the election.

C) The demobilization of the citizen forces, commandos, and ethnic forces, and the dismantling of their command structures.

D) A military section of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group to ensure that the provisions of the agreed solution will be observed by all parties. In establishing the military section of UNTAG, the Secretary General will keep in mind operational and logistical requirements.

E) Provision will be made for SWAPO personnel outside of the territory to return peacefully to Namibia through designated entry points to participate freely in the political process. The Special Representative will be required to satisfy himself as to the implementation of all these arrangements and will keep the Secretary General informed of developments in this regard.

9. Primary responsibility for maintaining law and order in Namibia during the transition period shall rest with the existing police forces. The Administrator General to the satisfaction of the United Nations Special Representative shall ensure the good conduct of the police forces and shall take the necessary action to ensure their suitability for continued employment during the transition period. The Special Representative shall decide when it is appropriate for United Nations personnel to accompany the police forces in the discharge of their duties. The United Nations Special Representative will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter.

10. Immediately after the certification of election results, the Constituent Assembly will meet to draw up and adopt a constitution for an independent Namibia. It will conclude its work as soon as possible so as to permit whatever additional steps may be necessary prior to the installation of an independent government of Namibia during 1978.

11. These transitional arrangements and the actions of the parties in carrying them out shall in no way prejudice the territorial claims of any party.

12. Neighboring countries shall be requested to ensure to the best of their abilities that the provisions of the transitional arrangements, and the outcome of the election, are respected. They shall also be requested to afford the necessary facilities to the United Nations Special Representative and all United Nations personnel to carry out their
assigned functions and to facilitate such measures as may be desirable for ensuring tranquility in the border areas.

Annex

Abbreviations appearing in Annex:
AG—Administrator General;  
SAG—South African Government  
SWAPO—South West Africa People’s Organization  
SYG—Secretary-General of United Nations  
UN—United Nations  
UNSR—United Nations Special Representative  
UNSC—United Nations Security Council  
UNTAG—United Nations Transition Assistance Group

Timing:
1. At date unspecified:
   UN: UNSC passes resolution authorizing SYG to appoint UNSR and requesting him to submit plan for UN involvement. SYG appoints UNSR and dispatches UN contingency planning group to Namibia. SYG begin consultations with potential participants in UNTAG.
   2. As soon as possible, preferably within one week of Security Council action:
      UN: SYG reports back to UNSC.  
      UNSC passes further resolution adopting plan for UN involvement. Provision is made for financing
      3. Transitional period formally begins on date of UNSC passage of resolution adopting SYG’s plan:
         SAG: General cessation of hostile acts comes under UN supervision. Restriction to established bases of all South African forces including ethnic forces.
         SWAPO: General cessation of hostile acts comes under UN supervision. Restriction to established bases.
         UN: As soon as possible: UNSR and staff (UNTAG) arrive in Namibia to assume duties.
         UNSR makes necessary arrangements for coordination with neighboring countries concerning the provisions of the transitional arrangements.
4. Within six weeks:
   SAG: Restriction to established bases continues. Force levels reduced to 12,000 men.
   SWAPO: Restriction to established bases continues.
   UN: Appropriate action by UN High Commissioner for Refugees outside Namibia to assist in return of exiles.

   Other action:
   All UN activity continues.
   Establishment in Namibia of provisions to facilitate return of exiles. Establishment and publication of general rules for elections. Release of political prisoners/detainees wherever held has begun. Completion of repeal of discriminatory laws and restrictive legislation.
   Dismantlement of command structures of citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces, including the withdrawal of all South African soldiers attached to these units.
   All arms (other than personal), military equipment, and ammunition possessed by members of citizen forces and commandos confined to drill halls under UN supervision.
   AG to ensure that none of these forces will drill or constitute an organized force during the transitional period except under order of the AG with the concurrence of UNSR.
   AG with concurrence of UNSR determines whether and under what circumstances those military personnel performing civilian functions will continue those functions.

5. Within nine weeks:
   SAG: Restriction to established bases continues. Force levels reduced to 8,000 men.
   SWAPO: Restrict conditions to established bases continues. Peaceful repatriation under UN supervision starts for return through designated entry points.
   UN: All UN activity continues.

6. Within twelve weeks:
   SAG: Force levels reduced to 1500 men, restricted to Grootfontein or Oshivello or both. All military installations along northern border would by now either be deactivated or put under civilian control under U.N. supervision. Facilities which depend on them (e.g., hospitals, power stations) would be protected where necessary by the UN.
   SWAPO: Restriction to established bases continues.
   UN: All UN activity continues.
   Military section of UNTAG at maximum deployment.

   Other action: Completion of release of political prisoners/detainees wherever held.
7. Start of thirteenth week:
   Other action: Official start of election campaign of about four months’ duration.
8. On date established by AG to satisfaction of UNSR:
   Other action: Election to constituent assembly.
9. One week after date of certification of election:
   SAG: Completion of withdrawal.
   SWAPO: Closure of all bases.
   Other action: Convening of Constituent Assembly
10. At date unspecified:
    Other action: Conclusion of Constituent Assembly and whatever additional steps may be necessary prior to installation of new government.
11. By December 31, 1978 at latest:
    Other action: Independence

Leonard

79. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, February 12, 1978, 1527Z


1. Summary: As agreed earlier by the Five Foreign Ministers, Secretary Vance, acting as Chairman, queried Botha regarding South African positions on outstanding issues including:
   —Size of the UN civilian and military forces in Namibia
   —Restriction of SAG troops to two bases in Namibia
   —UN monitoring of ceasefire, SAG and SWAPO forces and infiltration

---

Botha made his expected historical, moral and legal justification of South African stances but without histrionics. SAG positions were re-stated and clarified but, other than willingness to reduce troops in Walvis Bay in return for withdrawal of Cuban forces in Angola and general description of South African contacts with Luanda, nothing new was said. There were no concessions and no new ground was broken. End summary.

2. The Foreign Ministers of the Five Contact Group nations met with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha February 11 to obtain clarification of the South African position on certain issues stemming from the proposal of the Five for a Namibia settlement. Acting as Chairman, Secretary Vance made the opening statement and put most of the questions to Botha, with other Foreign Ministers joining in as they felt appropriate. Botha provided the South African position on the following subjects:

3. Size of the UN civilian and military forces in Namibia: Botha replied that, in keeping with South African’s agreement that the UN Special Representative (SR) could satisfy himself regarding the fairness of the political process, the SR could place several of his people at each polling place so that there could be as many as 2400 poll watchers alone, without considering the many logistics and administrative personnel who would presumably be assigned to Windhoek. This would be the largest such UN contingent in history. As for the UN military wing, Botha repeated the South African position of December 3; reluctantly and against the opinion of the anti-SWAPO leaders of Ovambo-land, South Africa agreed to 2,000 UN observers. Of these, 1000 must be placed in Angola to monitor SWAPO bases there and the others at various points in northern Namibia near the troubled areas. The SAG would have preferred not to have a precise number of UN military personnel, had originally hoped that the “observer corps” could be as few as 125 but went to the figure 2000 when it was proposed to them.

4. Restriction of SAG troops to two bases in Namibia: Somewhat disingenuously, Botha stated that, up to the time he first read the proposals of the Five, he had been under the impression that South Africa would maintain platoon size units at approximately eight “points for the protection of logistic, communications, storage and staging installations” in northern Namibia under UN monitoring. Some of these sites are located in towns where there are hospitals, waterworks and other public service institutions (comment: the implication was that the troops at the sites somehow help with the public service missions of these organizations.), while others are purely military. Botha did not make it clear if South Africa continues to insist that they be able
to maintain the small units at the northern sites although he indicated that their presence was primarily for psychological and maintenance purposes.

5. Size of residual SAG force in Namibia: As the bare minimum level of troops which will be necessary to maintain order and security, particularly in Ovamboland if this should be necessary, Botha insists on retaining 3000 soldiers, 1400 combat troops and 1600 logistics personnel. Other than SWAPO, no Namibian leaders wanted the level of South African troops reduced to a figure lower than 5000 and consequently they were seriously concerned when they learned that the SAG had agreed in December to reduce the number to 3000. Now SWAPO, which claims erroneously that there are 50,000 SAG soldiers in Namibia, is taking the minimum figure of 3000 as a starting point and trying, with the support of the Five, to halve it. UN forces would be unable to provide logistics for the South African combat troops: in fact the South African army may have to assist the UN with its logistics.

6. UN monitoring of ceasefire, SAG and SWAPO forces and infiltration: According to Botha, South Africa has agreed in principle to: UN monitoring of their restriction to bases and their eventual withdrawal, UN monitoring of the ceasefire, and UN monitoring of the border situation, which would include SWAPO activities.

7. Political prisoners: South Africa holds about 60 Namibians, most of whom have been properly sentenced by South African courts. The remainder can be freed but release of the sentenced majority is dependent upon creation of “a watertight mechanism” for the release of SWAPO’s political prisoners in Tanzania and Zambia. Botha does not accept the Zambian claim that the prisoners they were holding have resigned from SWAPO and elected to become refugees in Zambia, but noted that the now scrapped proposal for a panel of jurists would have provided a means to deal with disputes of this and other sorts which would arise during the course of the transitional process. South Africa would like to see some alternate mechanism involving a third party for the settlement of disputes.

8. Status of Walvis Bay: Walvis Bay is an integral part of South Africa, as affirmed by international law and treaty. The SAG could not give the enclave away even if it wanted to. Under the South African Constitution, only the Parliament could do that. It matters not if the new Namibian Government is friendly, Walvis Bay is South African and any other status is out of the question. However, if the new Namibian Government, regardless of its feelings towards South Africa or its ideological preferences, wants to use the port of Walvis Bay and its other facilities, this could be worked out, as was done in somewhat similar circumstances with Mozambique. South African troops in Walvis Bay are not counted among those which the SAG would leave
in Namibia. South Africa would agree to the reduction of its troops in Walvis Bay only in return for the withdrawal of the 23,000 Cubans in Angola.

9. With respect to Angola, Botha also noted, very confidentially, that South Africa had had a series of promising meetings with the Neto government in Pretoria and in Angolan cities, but that, inexplicably, the process had come to an end (he did not say when). The Angolans had made proposals less harsh than those of the Five, including only verified withdrawal from the immediate border area.

10. Comment: The meeting served to clarify for the Ministers the South African positions on the issues generally regarded as the most contentious. No concessions were offered but these, if they come, are more likely to appear during the restricted session planned for later in the day.

Young

80. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, February 12, 1978, 1659Z


1. Summary: The Western Five Foreign Ministers met with SWAPO morning of February 11. Discussion focused on key settlements issues: South African troop withdrawal, size and nature of the UN presence, monitoring of SWAPO forces, release of political prisoners, Walvis Bay, and conditions affecting post-settlement use of the present police force. For the most part, SWAPO reiterated its previous positions, including those contained in its February 11 proposals given the Five, however, we noted some SWAPO flexibility on the size of the UN presence. On Walvis Bay, SWAPO adopted a rigid posture. Nujoma stated that there

---


2 In telegram 478 from USUN, February 10, the Mission transmitted the text of SWAPO’s proposals to the Five. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780063–0699)
could be no ceasefire if South Africa continued to occupy the enclave. End summary.

2. The Western Five Foreign Ministers met with SWAPO morning February 11. Atmosphere was businesslike and discussion focussed on key issues which will have to be resolved if a settlement is to be reached.

3. South African troop withdrawal. Jamieson of Canada, who chaired session, questioned Nujoma on SWAPO’s February 10 proposal to confine a 1500-man SAG residual force at Karasburg in southern Namibia. The SWAPO President explained that since all South African troops, “including those at Walvis Bay”, would ultimately be withdrawn to South Africa, there was “no need” to confine them at Oshivello and Grootfontein in the north. When the Secretary and Jamieson pointed out that the Five’s proposal fulfilled requirements for UN monitoring and rapid post-election withdrawal, Nujoma countered by stating that SWAPO simply did not want any SAG troops “in the center of our country.” (Comment: Having made what it portrays as a major concession, SWAPO showed no further “give” on this issue.)

4. Size and nature of the UN presence: There appeared to be some flexibility in SWAPO’s stated requirement for 5,000 UN troops and 1,000 civilians. SWAPO seemed basically willing to leave a decision on the numbers required up to the Secretary General, although Nujoma added that this was “not entirely” the case because it depended in part on the “situation”. When pressed by the Secretary on actual numbers, Nujoma said two or three thousand UN troops would be too few but that SWAPO “could accept 4,000.” (Comment: We understand that the Secretary General found SWAPO forthcoming on this issue.)

5. Defining the relationship between the UN Special Representative (UNSR) and the SAG Administrator General remains a serious problem. SWAPO continues to insist that the UNSR have all real administrative power and control and that what it terms the “senior South African civil servant” have only clerk-like, subordinate functions. Nujoma stated that the UN must control the entire administrative process during the transition. SWAPO does not accept our formulation of having the UNSR satisfy himself with the Administrator General’s actions even though we pointed out that this gives the UNSR the power of veto.

6. Monitoring of SWAPO forces. SWAPO is willing to [be] cooperative on the monitoring of its “soldiers in Namibia.” However, it will not permit monitoring of SWAPO camps in neighboring countries and refused to discuss any arrangements the Five might seek to make with these countries on the grounds that it would not be right for SWAPO to discuss matters impinging on their sovereignty.

7. Release of political prisoners. SWAPO repeated its pledge that for the “sake of a settlement” it was prepared to release the “eleven counter-revolutionaries” (in Tanzania) “at an appropriate time.”
Nujoma emphasized that there could be no linkage with the release of Namibian political detainees held by South Africa. Concerning SWAPO detainees in Zambia, Nujoma denied there were any, said that the persons involved who were at a camp at Mahemba (phonetic), had resigned from SWAPO, and claimed that the UNHCR was familiar with the situation. With regard to a procedure for settling disputes on the release of political detainees, Nujoma said SWAPO felt the UNSR’s legal section could deal with such cases. He brought up the panel of jurists concept for the purpose of rejecting it once again.

8. Walvis Bay: SWAPO rejected any notion that the status of Walvis Bay could be decided after independence. Nujoma stated that there would be no ceasefire if South Africa continued to occupy Walvis Bay, and that the territory would have to be part of any agreement SWAPO might sign. He told the Five that SWAPO wished Walvis to be an official part of its discussion with them. (Comment: Walvis Bay has taken its place as a new and difficult obstacle to a settlement.)

9. SAG police: SWAPO repeated its demand that the UN assume command and control of the police as part of any agreement. However, Nujoma seemed amenable to permitting the police to continue their normal law and order duties as long as they were limited to sidearms and deprived of their “machine guns” and other heavy weapons.

Young

81. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, February 12, 1978, 0200Z


1. The Foreign Ministers of the Western Five met pm February 11 with representatives of the Frontline States and African members of the Security Council. The two-hour meeting provided a valuable exchange of views on the most pressing issues concerning a Namibian
settlement. It was especially significant because of the presence of three African Foreign Ministers as well as other special emissaries, who contributed greatly to the quality of the exchange. The African representatives present included: Angola: Ambassador Figueiredo as well as Mr. M.A.D. Rodrigues and Miss Olga Lima from Luanda; Botswana: Foreign Minister Mogwe and Ambassador Tlou; Gabon: Ambassador N’Dong; Mauritius: Ambassador Ramphul; Mozambique: Sergio Vieira, Special Assistant to the President, and Ambassador Lobo; Nigeria: Deputy Permanent Representative George; Tanzania: Foreign Minister Mkapa and Ambassador Salim; Zambia: Foreign Minister Mwale and Ambassador Konie.

2. Following is an account of the most significant views and comments expressed by the African representatives:

A) Size and location of residual South African Force: Western Five stated that SWAPO had agreed to the presence of 1500 South African troops in Namibia during the electoral campaign and insisted that those troops be confined at Karasburg in the southern part of Namibia. Foreign Ministers Mkapa (Tanzania) and Mwale (Zambia) both heralded this as a major concession. In addition, Nigeria and Zambia expressed support for SWAPO’s insistence on Karasburg. Foreign Minister Mogwe (Botswana) rounded out discussion of the item by stating that, before worrying about the location of the residual force, the Five should, first, get the South Africans to accept 1500 as the size of the force, and, second, get them to accept that the UN force would be larger than the South African force. After that is done, Mogwe believes that SWAPO will be prepared to talk about location.

B) Size of the UN military presence: Like Mogwe, Mkapa also believes that the UN force must be larger than the residual force. Foreign Minister Genscher (FRG) responded that he was quite sure that the UN military presence would be considerably larger than the residual force. He added that the determination of the size would be left to the UN Secretary General, who would keep in mind the operational and logistical requirements, and that the Five will not let financial considerations be a barrier.

C) Control of the police: Both Gabon and Mozambique expressed concern for controlling police. Sergio Vieira of Mozambique described the army-like characteristics of the police and then echoed SWAPO’s call for the insertion of a UN command structure over the police.

D) Walvis Bay: Vieira reminded Five that it is not only SWAPO which says that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia; it is the entire international community which holds this view. He further stated that a guarantee must be obtained from South Africa that when their troops withdraw from Namibia they will not be sent to Walvis Bay. Nigeria also questioned whether South Africa would expect to retain any troops in Walvis Bay during the electoral campaign.
E) Role of the UN Special Representative: Throughout the meeting considerable time was spent discussing the relationship between the Administrator General and the UN Special Representative. Tanzania and Mozambique were most vocal in support of veto power and the power to initiate action for the Special Representative. Secretary Vance assured them that the Special Representative’s powers, as described in the proposal, amount to veto power and that South Africa understands this, but Mozambique urged that the understanding be put in writing—perhaps in a secret document. Tanzanian Foreign Minister Mkapa explained his position on this matter by saying that he has the utmost sympathy for the person who emerges as the Special Representative and is therefore trying in advance to ease that person’s burden by attempting to clarify the Special Representative’s powers in advance.

3. Near conclusion of the meeting Sergio Vieira, in characteristically precise and thorough manner, detailed several additional concerns. He urged that the white “settlers” in Namibia should not be allowed to vote unless they first provide assurance of their intention to become Namibian citizens. His view is that many whites will decide to leave after the elections, and still others will remain but decide not to become citizens. He argues that some citizenship requirement should be included in the voter registration process.

4. In conversation between Mission Officer and Tanzanian Ambassador Salim following meeting, Salim discussed SWAPO’s insistence on including Walvis Bay in any settlement. He realized that a settlement was practically impossible if Walvis Bay was included, and he presumed that SWAPO would in the end not insist on inclusion of Walvis Bay at the expense of a settlement. He argued, however, that tactically SWAPO has to inject the issue of Walvis Bay into the talks at this point. SWAPO has much more leverage with the Five now than will an independent Namibia. The Five have not committed themselves even privately on the issue of Walvis Bay, and SWAPO is wise to work for a commitment which could be drawn on later by the independent government of Namibia.

Young
82. **Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State**

New York, February 13, 1978, 0206Z


1. The Contact Group met with Brand Fourie February 12 shortly before noon and just before his departure for South Africa. The purpose of the meeting was to review orally with him refinements under consideration in the proposal paper based on conversations over the past three days and to get his reaction.

2. With regard to the level of the South African residual force and its concentration in two areas in north central Namibia, Fourie had no comment other than reaffirm the SAG position. On the size of the military components of the UNTAG, he asked whether the general reference to consultations in arriving at the figure could include a specific mention of the Administrator General. He was told that this would be difficult but that a more general reference to the principal parties might be included.

3. Fourie had no comment to make with regard to the language on the civilian component of UNTAG except the specific limitation on the weapons the police can carry. He foresaw difficulties in the restriction to sidearms only. While on normal patrol duty in towns that would be adequate; for those operating in more open country it might be impractical only to carry pistols. He cautioned against including language to meet one point that could give rise to further complications.

4. On the description of relations between the UN Special Representative and the Administrator General, Fourie pointed out that the role of the UN Special Representative should be focused on the electoral process and not the whole range of everyday general administration. Such a broad definition could get him deeply involved in aspects where the question of impartiality in the electoral process would not arise. The Contact Group members pointed out that many aspects of everyday administration could affect the electoral climate and the UN Special Representative will need to satisfy himself on these aspects as well. Fourie suggested that instead of leaving it completely open-ended, language might be found for narrowing the scope. He suggested use of the concept of action bearing on the “political process.”

---

5. Fourie also raised a question of making specific reference to local and regional government in specifying the purview of the UN Special Representative. He suggested that use of the term “on a countrywide basis” would be preferable. Members of the Contact Group suggested that perhaps the language might read “countrywide basis and at all levels.”

6. With respect to Walvis Bay, Fourie was asked whether Namibians in the enclave would be allowed to vote. He replied there is no problem on this score since the electoral regulations will cover that aspect. There are plans for polling booths to be established inside Walvis Bay for Namibians to cast their vote. Provisions will also be made for Namibians in South Africa to vote.

7. Just before the meeting broke up, the British delegate asked Fourie how soon his govt would be reaching a decision on the proposals. In this context, he also asked whether Botha would find useful an elaboration of the points just covered once these have been drafted. Fourie said that he did not foresee that decisions in Cape Town would be taken in the next few days. Consultations within the govt will be necessary as well as consultations with groups in South West Africa. This will take some time, certainly more than the next two or three days.

Young

83. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

New York, February 13, 1978, 1550Z


1. Summary: In bilateral meeting with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma February 12, Secretary Vance once again explained the position of the Western Five on major issues that had emerged in the talks between the Five and SWAPO.²


² See Document 80.
(A) We will accept whatever recommendation the UNSYG makes regarding the size of the military and civilian components of the UN force.

(B) The UN Special Representative (UNSR) has what amounts to a veto over actions of the Administrator General; if there are differences between him and the AG, the UNSR can offer suggestions; if the differences are not reconciled, he can take the matter to the Security Council; and we shall try to devise some intermediate mechanism for settling disputes.

(C) Full provisions will be made to monitor the activities of the police.

(D) Walvis Bay is a question which should be put aside for now.

After some discussion, Nujoma accepted our position and explanations regarding the size of the UN force, the relationship between the Administrator and UNSR, and the monitoring of the police. However, he was adamant on the subject of Walvis Bay, insisting that the Western Five must declare that Walvis Bay is part of Namibia. In addition, he insisted that SWAPO would accept a residual South African military presence only in the extreme southern part of the territory. End summary.

2. The Secretary met with Nujoma at USUN late afternoon February 12. He told Nujoma he appreciated the opportunity to meet so that he could clarify the Five’s positions on some major issues and, at the same time, answer any questions that SWAPO might have.

3. The Secretary said he believed we have a unique opportunity and it would be tragic if we lost it. All of us must lend our best efforts to make this initiative successful. This will take courage, but the objective of an independent Namibia is in the best interests of all, particularly the people of Namibia.

4. He said that the Five would endeavor to clarify particular points that had been raised in our discussions. These would be put to paper and given to SWAPO. As he saw it, the key outstanding issues are:

   (A) The size of the UN force: The Secretary said he wanted to make it crystal clear that whatever the SYG recommended regarding the military or civilian component of the UN force would be supported by the Five. He and the other four Ministers are confident of the SYG’s judgement.

   (B) The respective roles of the Administrator General and the UNSR: The Secretary carefully spelled out (when appropriate, reading from the text of the proposal and a draft paper elaborating on some aspects of the proposal) how the Administrator General could not take any actions affecting the political process without the approval of the UNSR. He also explained how the UNSR could take initiatives, and
what recourse he could have in case of disputes. At first Nujoma was
unpersuaded, asserting that the UNSR would have no effective power
and that the South Africans would be able to manipulate the entire
administrative machinery. However, careful explanations by the Secre-
tary and Ambassador McHenry apparently brought him around to our
point of view . . . Nujoma said that the relationship they had described
and the recourse open to the UNSR were quite appropriate unquote.

(C) Restrictions on the police: The Secretary assured Nujoma that
adequate arrangements would be made to monitor the police effec-
tively. He mentioned the two-men-in-a-jeep concept. Nujoma took no
exception to this formulation.

(D) Walvis Bay: The Secretary made the point that the Five believe
the question of sovereignty over Walvis Bay is one which should be
put aside for now. Nujoma did not comment immediately on this, but
the issue was raised again later in the discussion. (See para 6 below).

5. McHenry raised an additional point, the issue of who would
make a judgement in cases of dispute as to who was a political prisoner.
He noted that the Five had dropped the panel of jurists idea, which
SWAPO had opposed. He then asked Nujoma for his reaction to the
concept of appointment by the SYG of an official who would decide
in cases of dispute between the Administrator General and the UNSR
regarding political prisoners. A lengthy discussion ensued on this sub-
ject. Nujoma argued repeatedly that the UNSC or his legal staff should
resolve disputes on prisoners. He said he regarded an appointee of
the SYG as someone who would be political in nature and therefore
unqualified to make decisions about Namibian prisoners. After more
discussions on this problem it became apparent that there might be no
difference between what the Secretary and McHenry were proposing
and what Nujoma had in mind. It was a question of expressing this
in such a way as to eliminate any doubts Nujoma and SWAPO might
have, and the Secretary said the Five would undertake to put our ideas
on this in writing and present them to SWAPO.

6. Returning to Walvis Bay problem, the Secretary stated that the
Five understood SWAPO’s position regarding who should control the
enclave. We were not asking SWAPO to change its position. However,
we believed that SWAPO should reserve its position now and get on
with the business of elections and independence. McHenry pointed
out that no troops withdrawn from Namibia could be placed in Walvis
Bay and that, moreover, Namibians residing in Walvis Bay would be
able to vote in the Namibian elections. Nujoma took strong exception
to the suggestion that SWAPO should reserve its position on Walvis
Bay. He equated this with having SWAPO accept South Africa’s claim
to sovereignty. Careful explanations of the need to defer resolution of
the Walvis Bay issue until after independence failed to move Nujoma.
7. He declared that SWAPO wanted the Western powers to declare that Walvis Bay is a part of Namibia. He said if the issue was not resolved before independence, SWAPO was convinced it would have to fight South Africa to gain Walvis Bay for Namibia. He said SWAPO could not negotiate with South Africa, which was a quote fascist, ruthless regime. Unquote. Nor could SWAPO accept having quote an enemy within striking distances from Windhoek unquote.

8. The Secretary said that the two major outstanding issues were Walvis Bay and the location of the residual South African military force. With regard to the latter issue, the Secretary said he had listened to Nujoma’s arguments the previous day that the South African residual force should be confined to a base in the extreme southern part of the territory. However, he still could not understand why SWAPO could not accept our proposal for a residual force confined to one or two bases in the north under close supervision by a large UN military force. Nujoma said SWAPO would continue to refuse to accept the presence of any South African troops in that area. It was immaterial to SWAPO if they had to continue their guerrilla warfare for years solely on this issue. He maintained that the Western Five had no appreciation of the distrust and hatred SWAPO soldiers felt for their South African adversaries. He complained that SWAPO had made concessions, but that on this issue the Five were quote pushing us into a corner unquote. SWAPO had expected some accommodation by the Five to SWAPO’s views, but the Five were unwilling to do so on this important matter.

8 [9]. Summing up, the Secretary repeated that it was clear that Walvis Bay and the location of a residual force of South African troops were the two major issues yet to be resolved. With regard to other matters we had discussed, the Five would consider the suggestions that had been made during the past two days and would present SWAPO with certain revisions to the Western Five proposal. At Nujoma’s request, he briefly outlined the South African’s difference with the Five and explained Botha’s reason for returning to South Africa.

10. Nujoma expressed his appreciation for the help SWAPO has received from the United States over the years. He said that an independent Namibia would want to have diplomatic relations and trade relationship with the United States. There would be need for some adjustment, in that a new trading relationship would have to be on an quote equal basis unquote. He asked the Secretary to convey to President Carter his thanks for the arrangements which had been made for SWAPO during their stay in the United States.
84. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, February 17, 1978, 0252Z

570. For Embassy Capetown. Subject: Namibia: Contact Group Discussion of Clarifying Language With SWAPO. Ref: A) USUN 528; B) USUN 554. 3

1. Summary: Contact Group met February 16 with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma to discuss clarifying language contained refs A and B. Nujoma was completely unyielding on those points discussed. He reverted to his past insistence on the superiority of the Special Representative over the Administrator General and on a minimum of 5000 soldiers as the size of the UN military presence. End summary.

2. Western Five Contact Group met 0800 February 16 with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and ten other members of SWAPO delegation for discussion of clarifying language contained ref A (and revised ref B). Ambassador McHenry began by noting the Contact Group’s effort through this new language to meet SWAPO’s stated concerns as expressed to the Foreign Ministers, and he expressed the Group’s desire to find as many areas of agreement as possible so that the continuing areas of substantive dispute can be established and focused on. McHenry then stated that we had not made any changes in the proposal regarding Walvis Bay or the size and location of the South African forces. He explained that these are definitely areas of substantive disagreement and the clarifications are intended to deal only with those issues on which the parties appear generally to agree. In order to focus discussion, Group presented only the clarifying language which specifically addressed six primary issues discussed in detail below. For ease of understanding, this clarifying language was presented to SWAPO in an informal paper which juxtaposed the new language and the old. Following receipt of the paper and an explanation of the

---


2 In telegram 528 from USUN, February 15, the Mission reported on clarifications of the Western Five proposal for a Namibian settlement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780069–0037)

3 In telegram 554 from USUN, February 16, the Mission reported on SWAPO’s refinements to the clarifying language in telegram 528 from USUN, February 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780070–0943) For telegram 528 from USUN, see footnote 2 above.
language, SWAPO requested a short adjournment for further consideration.

3. Following an adjournment of an hour and a half, SWAPO returned to provide Group with its reactions, and discussion ensued as follows:

A) The relationship between the Administrator General and Special Representative: The conversation centered around the proposed sentence: “If he (the SR) is not satisfied with any measure envisaged which affects the political process, it shall not take effect.” SWAPO rejected this sentence as inadequate because in their view it does not clearly establish the superiority of the Special Representative over the Administrator General. Despite our efforts to persuade them that such superiority was clearly implied and that we were attempting to find a formula acceptable to both sides, SWAPO insisted that the Special Representative have the right of approval not simply of satisfaction.

B) Mechanism for settling disputes regarding political prisoners: At issue was the sentence: “Any disputes concerning the release of political prisoners or political detainees shall be resolved to the satisfaction of the Special Representative acting on the independent advice of a jurist of international standing who shall be designated by the Secretary General to be the Special Representative’s Chief Legal Adviser”. SWAPO objected to this mechanism arguing that “there is no need to create a separate authority” from that of the Special Representative. We replied that no separate authority would be created and that the proposal was based on their own suggestion that disputes be handled by the Special Representatives’ legal staff. SWAPO’s suspicions of anything which seems even remotely independent of the Special Representative and perhaps their inability to understand fully the concept, prevented us from convincing them of the value of this mechanism which by design is stacked in their favor. SWAPO, therefore, prefers the original language of the proposal on this point. (On the other hand, South Africa objected to the original language.)

C) Size of the UN military presence: Contrary to the position it took in conversation with Secretary Vance last weekend, SWAPO insisted that a minimum size must be stated and recommended 5000. SWAPO insists that this is too important a matter to leave in the unrestricted hands of the Secretary General.

D) Police forces: SWAPO made no comment on the language relating to the weapons restrictions on the police but insisted that the police force be placed under the operational control of the Special Representative. As with the relationship between the AG and SR, SWAPO is here insisting on superiority.

E) Provision regarding arms, military equipment and ammunition of citizen forces and commandos: In this regard SWAPO simply stated
that they preferred the original language minus the parenthetical words “other than personal” to the clarifying language.

F) Timing of release of political prisoners: Here SWAPO reiterated its call for the release of all political prisoners within two weeks of the Special Representative’s arrival.

4. Unable to obtain any movement on SWAPO’s part, the Contact Group suggested that the meeting be adjourned and reconvene later in the afternoon so that the Group and SWAPO could have time to reflect on the morning’s discussion. Nujoma replied that SWAPO was available for further meetings but only if there were additional issues to discuss. Nujoma made it clear that SWAPO was not interested in further talk on these points. His closing remarks were that if another meeting were called to discuss these points again, SWAPO would simply restate their present views.

5. Comment SWAPO’s positions today seemed brought about by a lack of self-confidence and a strong sense of suspicion. SWAPO seems afraid of getting caught in something they don’t fully understand. SWAPO appears suspicious of all parties involved, and Ambassador Salim (Tanzania) has acknowledged SWAPO’s suspicions of even the Frontline States. End comment.

Leonard

85. **Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State**

Salisbury, April 17, 1978, 1315Z


1. Summary: Secretaries Vance and Owen and Amb. Young, accompanied by American and British staffs, met at Foreign Minister Pik Botha’s home in Pretoria evening of April 16 for talks that focussed mainly on Rhodesia and Namibia. With Botha were Foreign Secretary Brand Fourie and Neil van Heerden, Botha’s Special Assistant. As

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780164–0275. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, London, Lusaka, Bonn, Paris, USUN, Ottawa, and Pretoria. Vance was in Salisbury to meet with members of the Transitional Government and British Foreign Secretary Owen.
expected, Botha raised a series of questions about features of the Western Five’s proposal.\textsuperscript{2} He professed concern that unless he could give certain assurances to the people of Namibia, or satisfactorily answer some questions raised about aspects of the proposal, it would be impossible for the South African Government to accept it. Discussions were candid and businesslike. For a change, Botha did not subject us to usual display of bombast and, in general, he did not resort to emotional rhetoric, except to describe “terrorism” in Namibia and to stress the serious political risks he claimed he faces in trying to sell the Western proposal. His principal concern was the security question, i.e. the withdrawal of South African military forces from Namibia and the dangerous consequences he said this could have for the Namibian people. Holding to the proposal as it is written, Owen, Vance and Young addressed Botha’s expressed concerns and at the same time made clear their belief that it is in the interest of all for South Africa to accept the proposal.\textsuperscript{3} End summary.

2. After discussion of Rhodesian problem (septel),\textsuperscript{4} Owen broached the topic of Namibia by observing that if Namibian settlement effort went well, it could have positive effect on Rhodesian situation and on UK and US bilateral relations with South Africa as well. Botha said there had been movement in the right direction on Namibia, but he feared it “was slipping away”. He then proceeded to point out problems the SAG has with the Western Five’s proposal.

3. Botha began with the issue which later both he and van Heerden privately described as the crux of South Africa’s difficulty with the proposal: withdrawal of South African residual military forces from Namibia within one week following certification of election of Constituent Assembly. He said this provision of the proposal has caused him great trouble with South West Africans. For example, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) simply would not accept this. He then launched into description of the growing enmity between Hereros and Ovambos, the danger of assassination which DTA leaders face, and the fears of Ovambos who oppose SWAPO that in the event of South African troop withdrawal, they could be confronted with invasion by Cuban and SWAPO forces. Were he to tell Namibians he would have to respond negatively if the majority of the Constituent Assembly,\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{2} In telegram 1102 from USUN, March 25, the Mission transmitted the text of the revised Western Five proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign File, D780132–0163)

\textsuperscript{3} In telegram 818 from Cape Town, April 25, the Embassy informed the Department that the South African Government accepted the proposals. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780176–0694)

\textsuperscript{4} See Document 208.
freely elected by the Namibian people, asked South Africa to keep its troops in the territory, “the proposal would be shot down”.

4. Owen said the proposal does not put withdrawal after certification of the election in a negative way. He explained that the proposal does not say that if the Constituent Assembly voted to keep South African troops, they could not, under any circumstances remain. He said if the Constituent Assembly voted in favor of retaining troops in Namibia, “we would have to look at it”. Vance said that in the event of such a request by the Constituent Assembly, obviously the Security Council would have to take a fresh look at the matter. Botha disagreed with Owen’s explanation, saying that from the way the proposal is written, one could only conclude that South African troops could not remain. Owen said he did not accept that assertion and maintained that the proposal was a political not a legal document. Botha stated that the SAG preferred the language in the proposal as it was before December 3. Vance and Owen said they would give further consideration to this matter and that it might be useful if they and Young discussed this later alone with Botha. Owen reminded Botha that Secretary Vance and he represented only two members of the Five and could not speak on behalf of the three others.

5. Botha said that in discussions he had had with groups in Namibia, it was pointed out to him that in one part of the proposal it is stated that the Administrator General and the UN Special Representative would work together, but that elsewhere in the proposal the implication is that the Special Representative is “the top guy”. Botha said he had told the DTA his understanding was that the two officials must work closely together if the agreement is to succeed. Vance, quoting from the proposals, assured Botha that his interpretation was correct, that the Administrator General and the Special Representative would work together. Later in the discussion Botha said South Africa and the DTA remained absolutely opposed to the concept of UN supervision and control. However, he had explained to the DTA that this had been qualified in the proposal in that the term supervision and control meant that the UN Special Representative had to be satisfied. The DTA had expressed fear that this could mean the UN Special Representative would have control of the political administration of the territory. However, he had told them this was not the case. Fourie said he understood that the wording which states the UN Special Representative must be satisfied was formulated to take account of the SAG’s problem with the phrase “supervision and control”. Owen smiled and said he could not object to that explanation. Ambassador Bowdler pointed out that the inclusion of the words supervision and control was important for obtaining UN approval.

6. Returning to the question of the security of the territory, Botha asked if the US and UK would be willing to provide military assistance
if the Cubans crossed the northern border. Vance said that if the parties agreed to the proposal, and the UN implemented it, he found it hard to believe that even the Cubans would move into Namibia against the UN force and also the South Africans residual military force. After Botha reiterated that Ovambos who oppose SWAPO fear the possibility of intrusions by hostile forces, Owen said for this very reason we need a “credible, sizeable UN force in the area.” He went on to say that in the unlikely event of a Cuban invasion, the UN would immediately be challenged in a way that the world could not ignore. He said in a situation of this kind, in which British and UN credibility would be challenged, and in which the UN Secretary General would ask for help, Britain, which was deeply involved in the Namibia question, “would know how to respond.” Botha persisted that he needed to be able to give some assurances to the Ovambos (specifically Ovambo traditional leader Njoba). Owen replied that we might have to think of giving the Namibian people as opposed to the SAG, some kind of assurance. He and Secretary Vance noted that with respect to the security of Namibia, the UK and US have as vested an interest as does South Africa in the presence of a strong UN force.

7. Botha stated that unless the Administrator General was consulted as to which countries would provide contingents of “military observers,” it would be “extremely tough” for South Africa to accept the proposal. Vance responded that there was no question about this, inasmuch as it is standard practice for consultations to take place concerning the composition of any UN force.

8. Turning to another subject, Botha said the reference in the proposal to “installations” at Rundu, Oshakati, and other border locations was incorrect. These were towns; the installations were on the outskirts. He then asked why we could not accept the presence of no more than a platoon of troops at each of these installations. Owen answered, “Pik, you know perfectly well why”. Vance said that we understood the anxiety about the security situation, but this merely underscored the need for a credible UN force. Owen said that perhaps South Africa should begin deploying police in the area, so that they could be present when the military forces were withdrawn.

8. [sic] Ambassador Young observed that another reason for a strong UN force in Namibia is the likelihood of “wrangling” within SWAPO. If the South Africans acted to control any outbreak of intra-SWAPO strife, they would be condemned. This would not be the case if the UN force, which would be there to offer protection for all to take part freely in the political process, dealt with the problem. Botha did not disagree but said SA “put it to the public that law and order is the responsibility of the Administrator General and police.” Fourie added that a strong UN force would have to act on the basis of agreement
between the Administrator General and UN Special Representative. Vance and Owen repeated that the working relationship between the Administrator General and Special Representative was a critical element of the proposal.

9. Botha then brought up Walvis Bay. He said South Africa had "made it clear that if any concession was made to SWAPO on this, the proposal is completely unacceptable." Owen noted that Walvis Bay is not mentioned in the proposal and that we believe the issue should be resolved by South Africa and the Namibian Government after independence. Botha responded that he could not bind himself to any statement that South Africa would have to negotiate the future of Walvis Bay. Owen said that this was not the case, all we were saying was that it is our position that Walvis Bay is a matter which should be negotiated.

10. Botha asserted that the way the proposal is phrased, the Administrator General has no say regarding the return of Namibians who are held in Zambia and Tanzania. Only the UN Special Representative and the jurist appointed by him would have a role in determining who should be returned. It was important that the families of those Namibians who are detained in Zambia and Tanzania be permitted to speak to them to ascertain they had not been forced to decline to return to Namibia, and to tell them what the real situation in Namibia is so that the detainees would have a valid basis on which to make their decision. Vance and Owen assured him that the proposal placed no bar against a procedure of this sort. Organizations like the Red Cross and Amnesty International could take an active interest in Namibian detainees. They said further that the US and UK are very sensitive to human rights issues. They added that the British and American Governments would not be selective regarding the release of prisoners in South Africa and Namibia and those in Zambia and Tanzania.

11. At this point, the meeting was adjourned for dinner, following which Vance, Owen and Young sent [met] separately with Botha.

Vance
86. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations**¹

Washington, April 28, 1978, 0207Z

108494. Exdis, Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: The Secretary’s Meeting With Sam Nujoma.

1. Summary: The Secretary met with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma and Nigerian Foreign Minister Joseph Garba April 27 for a discussion of Contact Group’s Namibia proposal and SWAPO position toward it.² Secretary stressed that the Namibian situation had reached a crucial turning point and that all parties had an opportunity to take the steps needed to ensure an independent Namibia. Were we to fail at this point, the Secretary stressed, we would not be able to forgive ourselves for passing up this chance. Nujoma presented the SWAPO position along familiar lines. He stressed SWAPO’s willingness to negotiate but claimed that the proposal as it stood was unacceptable in several key areas. At the end of his presentation, Nujoma gave the Secretary a copy of SWAPO’s response to the Contact Group’s proposal (text septel).³ Garba, who together with Nigerian President Obasanjo had originally suggested the meeting, attempted to play a mediatory role and at the end of the meeting gave Nujoma an alternative draft statement developed by the African Foreign Ministers yesterday in New York (text septel)⁴ for SWAPO’s use. Following the meeting, Ambassador McHenry had a further session with Nujoma and SWAPO UNRep Gurirab in an effort to dissuade SWAPO from issuing their statement of rejection of proposal, but as he was leaving the building, Nujoma advised reporters that SWAPO would be issuing a statement later in New York today. End summary.

2. The Secretary opened the meeting pointing out that the Namibia negotiations had reached a critical and historic point which opened the opportunity for all sides to take the necessary steps which would

---


² See footnote 2, Document 85.

³ In telegram 108386 to USUN, April 28, the Department transmitted SWAPO’s response to the Contact Group proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–0679)

⁴ In telegram 108383 to multiple posts, April 28, the Department transmitted the alternative draft statement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780181–0356)
ensure an independent Namibia emerging from elections to be held this year under the Contact Group proposal. The Secretary pointed out that the failure of the parties to grasp this opportunity would be a tragic development for which they would not be able to forgive themselves in the future.

3. Garba replied to the Secretary’s remarks by stressing the desire of the African Foreign Ministers to move ahead with the Namibian initiative. He noted that Nujoma was under pressure to make a statement on the SWAPO position and Nujoma wished to clarify certain points with the Secretary. The idea for the meeting, Garba pointed out, originated with President Obasanjo who had urged Nujoma to ask to see the Secretary.

4. After expressing his appreciation for the Contact Group’s efforts, Nujoma launched into a recitation of SWAPO’s objections to the Contact Group’s proposal. As expected, he cited the problem of Walvis Bay, which he said the SWAPO Central Committee insisted had to be recognized as an integral part of Namibia. He said that the Five Contact Group members or the United States must make a statement that Walvis Bay is an integral part of Namibia, and he added that this point also had to be included in any Security Council resolution on Namibia. He recalled that the Secretary had told him this was not possible during their meeting in Dar es Salaam but he insisted that a statement of this type was essential. Otherwise, SWAPO would end up in a war with South Africa under very dangerous conditions. Walvis Bay, he claimed, was a symbol of colonialism and he referred to the US War for Independence by force of arms against colonialism as justification for SWAPO’s position.

5. Nujoma then turned to the role of the UN Special Representative, referring in this connection to the South African statement that the Administrator General would be in charge during the transitional period. He expressed concern over the explanations and clarifications which the Five had given to Botha which he said included assurances on the status of Walvis Bay and the paramount position of the Administrator General. The Secretary noted that our clarifications had not covered Walvis Bay and had not in any way confirmed the paramount position of the Administrator General.

6. Turning to the problem of the Namibian police, Nujoma claimed that Contact Group proposal would leave the police intact under the Administrator General, which would leave SWAPO in a very weak position. On the location of South African troops, Nujoma cited SWAPO’s major concession of allowing a 1,500-man South African force to remain in Namibia during the election period but restricted to Karasberg in southern Namibia. If this South African troop presence is simply a face-saving device for Vorster, as the Contact Group claims,
Nujoma asked why they could not be in southern Namibia. He acknowledged a need to reassure the white settlers in Namibia but insisted that the South African forces had to be restricted to Karasberg or some other point in southern Namibia.

7. Turning to the tactics followed by the Five, Nujoma complained that it was “premature and unfair” for the Five to have tabled their proposal in the Security Council. He noted SWAPO’s view that more meetings were needed to resolve the issues which he cited and stated that SWAPO “certainly cannot accept your proposal as it is now.” He stressed, however, that SWAPO was prepared to make further concessions and said that they were prepared to meet with the Five and, hopefully, with South Africa as well. Nujoma also objected to the statement by Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson in the General Assembly that the Contact Group proposal was in final form. This, he said, was unacceptable to SWAPO, and he added that “we hope that those assisting us would not seek to impose their will on us.” At this point, Nujoma handed over SWAPO’s reply to the Contact Group proposal.

8. In reply, the Secretary reviewed his discussions with Nujoma in Dar es Salaam and how the US was prepared to meet the SWAPO position on Walvis Bay. The Secretary said that the US statement was constructive and should meet SWAPO’s needs. He stressed, however, that we could not state that Walvis Bay was an integral part of Namibia. The Secretary reminded Nujoma that we were prepared to make our statement at an appropriate time and said that he thought the other members of the Five would be prepared to make similar statements. Referring to Nujoma’s reference to US War for Independence, the Secretary acknowledged SWAPO’s struggle and pointed out that now SWAPO had a chance for an independent Namibia. If this chance were allowed to drop, the Secretary pointed out that this would be a tragedy for all concerned. As regards the South African statements, the Secretary reminded Nujoma that these were for internal consumption and that the position of the Contact Group was clear. The Secretary pointed out that during the February proximity talks, we had explained to SWAPO why the South African residual force could not be confined to a point in southern Namibia. He reminded Nujoma how far the Contact Group had moved South Africa off the SAG’s original position and stressed that the residual South African troops would be closely

---


6 In telegram 1672 from Dar es Salaam, April 16, the Embassy reported Vance’s meeting with Nujoma. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978)
monitored by the UN. South Africa’s acceptance of this point is a major breakthrough, the Secretary pointed out.

9. Ambassador McHenry reiterated the Secretary’s point that Vorster’s statement was for internal consumption. The Contact Group had made it clear that the police are also under the control of the Special Representative. He pointed out that the “two men in a jeep” principle would give the UN control over the police force, which in any case would be largely disarmed under the Contact Group proposal. McHenry stressed that SWAPO should look at the proposal and not at what Vorster said in public, and he pointed out to Nujoma that the presence of 5,000 UN troops would represent a qualitative change in the situation in Namibia. On this point, the Secretary quoted from Foreign Minister Jamieson’s statement at the April 25 General Assembly session that members of the Contact Group “would view with great concern any actions during the transition period which could threaten the security of Namibia and its prompt achievement of independence, and would act accordingly.”

10. The Secretary said that he felt very strongly on this point and that Mr. Jamieson’s statement should be taken by SWAPO as a solemn assurance of the Contact Group’s position. The Secretary stressed that the US and its partners were involved in the Namibian problem on a long-term basis and they are committed to making their proposal work. If we succeed in this effort, the Secretary pledged to use his influence with Congress to obtain approval of US development assistance for an independent Namibia.

11. Ambassador McHenry reviewed for Nujoma the way in which the relationship between the Administrator General and the Special Representative is treated in the Western proposal, stressing that the use of the word “satisfied” means in effect that nothing could happen in Namibia without the approval of the Special Representative, who in any event had substantial powers of his own. He suggested that SWAPO in its acceptance of the proposal could very well make a statement noting that the Special Representative must approve actions by the Administrator General. As far as the timing of the Contact Group’s tabling of their proposal, McHenry said we concluded that the time had come to put the proposal on the table. He noted that there

---

7 In telegram 1732 from USUN, May 1, the Mission reported on Vance’s meeting with Tanzanian Foreign Minister Mkapa on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0220) In telegram 1733 from USUN, May 1, the Mission reported on Vance’s meeting with Mozambican Minister of State Montiero on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0235) In telegram 1736 from USUN, May 1, the Mission reported on Vance’s meeting with Angolan Foreign Minister Jorge on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0244)
were many points remaining at issue with South Africa when we tabled the proposal but we went ahead.

12. Turning to the SWAPO statement, the Secretary said he would study it but stressed his view that it would be a very serious mistake for SWAPO to make a statement rejecting the Western proposal. This would be a tragic loss, he said. Nujoma replied that SWAPO will not reject the proposal but would propose amendments to it. McHenry pointed out that a statement to this effect would be viewed as a rejection. Nujoma fell back to referring to Vorster’s statement, to which the Secretary urged that SWAPO pay no attention to what Vorster said. The Secretary said that our proposal stands for itself and that SWAPO should refer instead to the statement by the FRG Ambassador at the April 26 General Assembly session regarding our assurances to South Africa. He stressed that there were no secret understandings between the Contact Group and South Africa.

13. Nujoma suggested further meetings to discuss the proposal. The Secretary said Nujoma could meet in New York with Ambassadors Young and McHenry, but he again urged that SWAPO refrain from issuing any statement until they talk with Young and McHenry and the African Foreign Ministers. At that point, Garba handed Nujoma the statement developed by the African Foreign Ministers. Garba said it was a very balanced statement and stressed that the African Foreign Ministers in New York had agreed to it. (Comment: While Garba’s document does pose some problems for the Contact Group, it is vastly superior to the SWAPO statement in that it is an acceptance in principle of the Contact Group proposal, with the caveat that SWAPO will need additional clarifications of points of concern to it. Garba’s statement undoubtedly reflects the growing exasperation of other Africans with SWAPO’s tactics and may well provide a basis on which we can work in the future. Nujoma was clearly taken by surprise and not at all pleased by Garba’s move. End comment.) Nujoma agreed to look at the statement but raised the question of South African arrests of SWAPO supporters in Namibia, at which point the meeting concluded.

14. During a follow-up meeting with Nujoma and Gurirab after they had reviewed Garba’s paper, McHenry suggested that SWAPO avoid issuing its statement but follow essentially the same tactic that Vorster had followed, i.e., issue a statement of acceptance which puts SWAPO’s interpretation of the issues of principle concern to it on the record. Nujoma did not explicitly reject this approach but kept returning to the issue of Walvis Bay, on which he continued to insist upon a Contact Group statement that it was an integral part of Namibia. On the question of the location of South Africa’s residual force, McHenry urged that Nujoma take into consideration the extent of South Africa’s concessions and pointed out that the South African residual force under
UN monitoring and control would hardly be a threat to SWAPO. As far as Walvis Bay is concerned, McHenry pointed out that all the Namibian parties, even the DTA, say that Walvis Bay is part of Namibia. Even South Africa is probably ready to negotiate this issue. However, Vorster views this as part of his country and we cannot force him out of it. He closed with a strong request that Nujoma refrain from issuing any statement at this time, to which Nujoma said that SWAPO, as a political organization had to make its own decisions and that SWAPO’s judgment of the situation was different from that expressed by McHenry.

15. For London: Garba advised us this morning that he will be seeing Prime Minister Callaghan tomorrow (April 28) at 10:00 a.m. You should get a copy of this telegram to the FCO as well as copies of the SWAPO statement and the statement drafted by the African Foreign Ministers which are being transmitted septels. You should also advise British that during brief private session with Garba following meeting with Nujoma, the Secretary asked that Nigerians continue to lean on SWAPO to be more forthcoming. On Rhodesia, the Secretary asked that Nigerians keep pressing Patriotic Front and said that we would be working with Front-Line and Salisbury Group. He advised that we were working with UK to establish better communications with Smith. As regards the April 26 Salisbury announcement, the Secretary told Garba that we did not regard this as flat turndown, that we believe door is still open, and that we will be following situation very closely in coming period.

Vance

87. Letter From President Carter to Zambian President Kaunda

Washington, June 26, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of June 13 concerning the Luanda Summit and commenting on the situation in Namibia. Laying the groundwork


2 Kaunda’s letter was transmitted in telegram 2127 from Lusaka, June 14. Kaunda noted that the two main issues in negotiations with SWAPO and the Contact Group were Walvis Bay and the location of South African residual forces. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 107, 6/78)
for the Luanda meeting is but one more example of your unstinting and crucial efforts toward a peaceful, internationally acceptable settlement.

I enjoyed tremendously our discussions and fellowship during your recent visit. Your wise advice and counsel, and your consistent courage in meeting the difficulties for Zambia from this dangerous situation, help sustain us as we push towards just and peaceful resolutions of problems in southern Africa.

As you undoubtedly know, representatives of the Five in Dar es Salaam have received President Nyerere’s report on the Summit and have been in contact with him about the next steps in the Namibia negotiations.

At President Nyerere’s request, we have already informed the South Africans of the views expressed at the Frontline Summit, and they maintained positions they have taken in the past. Our settlement efforts are clearly entering a difficult phase, but one we hope will lead to a successful conclusion.

The two remaining major issues, Walvis Bay and the location of the South African residual force, are of considerable importance, given the interests both SWAPO and South Africa feel are at stake.

Before the Luanda meeting, the Contact Group informed you of the position which the five governments would be prepared to take in the Security Council on the Walvis Bay issue in the context of SWAPO’s acceptance of our proposal. I note that in your letter you make the point that Walvis Bay should be part of an independent Namibia. That position is quite similar to our own. I am confident that the representatives of the Contact Group and the Frontline states in New York, who are now working on this matter, will be able to devise a mutually acceptable formulation of a Security Council resolution. The United States takes its involvement in the Walvis Bay question most seriously as part of a Namibia settlement.

The issue of the South African troops during the transitional period must also be treated with great care. We are confident that the substantial UN presence we envisage will eliminate any offensive threat to Angola or Zambia. At the same time, we are aware of the important psychological factors involved for SWAPO, and we hope that we can find a way to satisfy these concerns without giving South Africa a reason to withdraw its acceptance of the Five’s proposal.

---

3 See Document 209.
4 In telegram 1175 from Cape Town, June 13, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Botha, during which he was given a report of the Front Line summit and a copy of the Luanda communiqué. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780246–1236)
I hope that the Five will be able to move forward quickly towards the Namibia settlement we all desire. I am heartened by the fact that you and I are working together, in the context of our personal friendship. I look forward to your continuing insights on attaining our shared goals.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

88. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, July 12, 1978

Namibia. There has been a breakthrough in the Namibian negotiations. After two days of negotiations in Luanda, the Contact Group and SWAPO reached agreement on our proposal.² With respect to security, SWAPO agreed to the positioning of a 1,500-man South African force at one or two locations in northern Namibia, but asked the Contact Group note its “preference” that the force be located at only one site.

On Walvis Bay, the Contact Group and SWAPO agreed to a Security Council resolution calling for the “initiation of steps to ensure the re-integration of Walvis Bay” into Namibia. We believe the agreed text can be presented in the Security Council in such a way as to make it clear that the issue should be resolved in negotiations between South Africa and an independent Namibian state.

A joint press statement was issued noting that after two days of “frank and cordial negotiations,” the parties had agreed to proceed to the Security Council as soon as possible to conclude a just and peaceful settlement. SWAPO and the Front Line States said they wished to take our proposal to the OAU Summit (which opens July 17) to obtain its endorsement.³

---

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 7/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

² In telegram 22215 from Paris, July 13, the Embassy provided a detailed account of the negotiations in Luanda between the Contact Group and SWAPO. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780287–0544)

³ In telegram 3301 from Khartoum, July 22, the Embassy reported on Nujoma’s July 20 address at the OAU Summit. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780302–0027) For the OAU response see Keeling’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 29259.
The Contact Group will now prepare for its presentation to South Africa at the end of the week. The South Africans may have problems with the Walvis Bay formulation, and we will have to present the matter carefully.  

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

4 In telegram 4013 from Pretoria, July 15, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Botha and noted: "Botha’s immediate reaction was to say that it was his ‘sad duty’ to inform us that our stated position on the Walvis Bay problem ‘terminated the whole process of negotiations between us.’ He said that our views on Walvis Bay ‘deviated substantially and drastically’ from what we had repeatedly told the South African Government before. There was virtually no hope left of proceeding with our proposal.”

(National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780291-0393)

89. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Embassy in South Africa

Bonn, July 17, 1978, 1659Z

13051. From Secretary Vance for Ambassador. Department pass White House. Subject: President Carter Letter to Prime Minister Vorster.

1. Following is text of letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Vorster dated July 17 which you should deliver to Vorster after concerting with the local Ambassadors of the other four in the Group of Five. It is important the letter be delivered today, July 17, if at all possible.

2. Begin text:

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Fifteen months ago our governments undertook an unprecedented initiative—a collective diplomatic effort by the Five Western members of the Security Council to find a peaceful settlement of the problem of Namibia. We recognized the difficulties involved but accepted them because of the need to find an alternative to the violence and instability which seemed inevitable in that critical part of Africa.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 102, 7/78. Secret; Niac Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to the Department of State. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. President Carter and Vance were in Bonn on a State visit and to attend the G–7 Economic Summit.
Now after fifteen months we are on the verge of a breakthrough which could change the course of history in Southern Africa. We have arrived at a final proposal which your government accepted on April 25 and which SWAPO accepted without change on July 12. The Frontline states have endorsed the proposal, as have a broad spectrum of political parties in Namibia. The proposal also enjoys wide international support and we stand ready to move promptly into the Security Council for its implementation.

When South Africa first announced that it accepted the proposal, our governments immediately hailed your decision as an act of statesmanship. There is no doubt that we could never have arrived at the point we have without a willingness on your part to persevere, and to take a broad view of the various issues in the interests of arriving at an internationally acceptable settlement.

It became apparent at an early stage that there was one issue which could not be addressed as part of the proposal, Walvis Bay. The positions of the parties were so diametrically opposed that our governments repeatedly took the view that it could not be included as part of the proposal. Progress on the proposal was only possible because of a general willingness to permit this issue to be addressed after independence. As you will recall, we stated both publicly and privately to you that, as Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson said before the General Assembly on April 25: “We consider that all aspects of the question of Walvis Bay must be subject to discussion between the South African Government and the elected Government of Namibia.”

Our governments have continued to maintain this view and have resisted all pressures to include the question of Walvis Bay as part of the proposal. At the same time, the importance of Walvis Bay to the future of Namibia is inescapable, a point which South Africa has also implicitly acknowledged through the willingness it has expressed to us to negotiate with the independent Government of Namibia on this issue. Although Walvis Bay was not part of our proposal, we welcomed this willingness because Walvis Bay is critical to the future of Namibia economically, is linked to it geographically and ethnically, and is regarded by the international community as essential to the viability of Namibia. We continue to believe that Walvis Bay cannot be part of the proposal but that all aspects of the question must be the subject of discussions between South Africa and the elected Government of Namibia.

---

2 In telegram 818 from Cape Town, April 25, the Embassy reported that Botha accepted the Five’s proposal on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780176–0694)
3 See Document 88.
Namibia. This is the position we have taken, and it is the position we shall continue to take in the future.

We stand by the proposal we have placed before the Security Council and we pledge our support to the faithful implementation of its provisions.

Mr. Prime Minister, we have come to the point where an historic opportunity now rests with you to create conditions which can lead not only to peace and prosperity in Namibia but also to a new and improved political climate in the whole region. We know that the path of violence promises the opposite. An internationally acceptable settlement of this long-standing issue is now within our grasp. We therefore urge you personally to continue to help attain this great prize.4

May I also say that I am pleased with the report from Ambassador Smith concerning his discussions during his recent visit to your country.

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter

His Excellency Balthazar Johnnes Vorster, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa, Union Building, Pretoria. End text.

3. Signed original of letter being air pouched.

Stoessel

---

4 In telegram 4178 from Pretoria, July 23, the Embassy transmitted a letter to Carter from Vorster, explaining his government’s position on Walvis Bay and expressing gratitude for Carter’s “understanding.” (National Archives, RG 59 Central Foreign Policy File, D780302-0999)
New York, July 28, 1978, 0121Z

3040. Subject: Namibia: Secretary Vance’s Meeting With Secretary General Waldheim.

1. Secretary Vance called on Secretary General Waldheim early July 27 to review a number of subjects. Since the meeting took place before commencement of today’s Security Council actions on Namibia, this quite naturally was the first subject covered. The Secretary was accompanied by Ambassador Young, Assistant Secretary Maynes and PolMin (notetaker). The SYG’s Deputy Executive Assistant, Albert Rohan, also sat in.

2. The SYG was obviously eager to receive an up-to-date briefing on the current status of negotiations on the Namibia question and prospects for Security Council action enabling the Secretary General to appoint his Special Representative. He said he had heard that the Western Ministers were hoping that South African Foreign Minister Botha’s instructions would permit the Council to act promptly July 27. The Secretary commented that Botha had indicated to him the previous evening that Botha’s earlier meeting with the Secretary General and Commissioner for Namibia Ahtisaari was extremely helpful. Botha gave the impression that he was encouraged by the Secretary General’s discussion of plans for implementation of the Western proposal. Botha also seemed to receive a very positive impression of Ahtisaari and was encouraged further by that. The SYG remarked that much would depend on the instructions Botha received from Vorster, but the Secretary’s meeting with Botha July 26 no doubt helped considerably.

3. Waldheim said there would be many difficulties in implementing the proposal. He said his talk with Botha highlighted the basic differences in South Africa’s approach to the UN involvement in Namibia. Botha objected to the notion of “peacekeeping forces” or military observers. Waldheim told Botha that he did not mind what the various

---


2 The UN Security Council acted on the recommendation of the Five, enabling Waldheim to appoint the Special Representative (Ahtisaari), on July 27. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, p. 889)

3 In telegram 3026 from USUN, July 27, the Mission reported on Vance’s July 26 meeting with Botha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2690)
parties called the UN force, but he must go ahead in accordance with the plan and accepted UN practice. Botha also showed various concerns about the composition of the force, which he insisted should be decided by the Special Representative and the Administrator General. Waldheim said this perception concerned him, because it is the Secretary General who should make decisions about the composition and other aspects of the UN force. Botha spoke clearly against the inclusion of black Africa and “Easterners,” by which he apparently meant “Socialist” countries. He mentioned Morocco, Egypt and other North Africans as acceptable participants. Waldheim said he is not personally particularly keen on including Eastern European nations, but it is clear that the force must have a geographic balance. He suggested the possibility of Romania as the participant from Eastern Europe. Ambassador Young and Mr. Maynes mentioned Fiji and Argentina as possibilities.

4. The Secretary also mentioned Brazil, which he understood possibly had some interest in participating. He said Botha had been disturbed by an early mention of Nigeria, which had emerged in South Africa papers as a decision already taken without consultations. He said he thought a large part of South Africa’s concern about Africans related to its need to be consulted on these matters, as much as an unalterable basic objection to blacks. The Secretary suggested that many of these questions would smooth themselves out naturally when the consultative process commences. Waldheim interjected that he had made clear to Botha that no decisions on contributor nations have been taken. He went on to say that Obasanjo of Nigeria had told him in Khartoum that they were interested in participating. Waldheim said he told Obasanjo only that they would be “looking into” the question of troop contributions.

5. Waldheim said that after the Security Council passes the enabling resolution, he hopes later on July 27, he intended to send a survey team of 40 to 50 men to Namibia. Then in two or three weeks, based on the report of the survey mission, the Secretary General would present his report to the Security Council and ask it to establish the UN force to permit full implementation of the Western proposal. He commented that of the Europeans he has approached informally thus far, most were interested in police and other civilian functions and very few of them were eager to discuss a military contribution. Waldheim said he very much hopes Canada will make a significant military contribution. The Secretary expressed his view that the Canadians would be willing to contribute something. He asked whether the Finns, and the Swedes, for example, have been approached. Waldheim said he has until now hesitated to approach countries like those formally.

6. Ambassador Young commented that the problem in Namibia will lie heavily in the area of police and other for a purely military
function; therefore, provision of a highly competent police force would seem to be critical to the success of the plan.

7. The Secretary returned to Botha’s comment about the participation of black Africans in the UN force. He thought South Africa in the end would not say no, but it would continue to have various concerns about composition of the force situated along the northern border because of obvious political sensitivities. Waldheim said Botha was nonetheless very outspoken against the participation of any black African nation. He told Waldheim that he was opposed to the participation of any “regional” force except from North Africa. Ambassador Young asked whether Sudan and Kenya had been considered. Sudanese troops are well-trained and competent and Kenya had said that, while it does not want a role in Rhodesia, it might be interested in Namibia.

8. Secretary Vance, turning to the scenario for the afternoon’s Council meeting, said he believed it was important that the Council agree to conduct the vote on the resolutions first, with all statements to follow. The Secretary General said he had talked to Salim, who indicated that the Africans want to make their statements before the vote. Ambassador Young noted that Ramphul of Mauritius has been most difficult figure with which to deal on the African side. He said he thought this in part revolved around Ramphul’s need for constant attention and suggested that it might have some helpful psychological effect if the Secretary General had a word with Ambassador Ramphul. The SYG said he thought that it was a good idea and he would chat with him.

9. Waldheim with the Secretary’s agreement, then called Ahtisaari into the room. Ahtisaari briefly discussed the problems ahead as he saw them at present, partially reflecting his conversation with Foreign Minister Botha. He too noted the potential difficulties in Botha’s insistence on what would amount to a veto right over the selection of contributors, including Nigeria and Eastern European states. Ahtisaari believed that the selection of participants would present a number of delicate issues. The Secretary again emphasized the need for consultations in this process to forestall the kinds of concern that Botha had expressed about Nigeria. He urged that Ahtisaari work closely with the Administrator General in Namibia in the process of consultations.

10. Ahtisaari said that in his talk with Botha July 26 he had outlined the major elements of a mandate for the UN operation in Namibia, and he had the impression that Botha had no disagreement with Ahtisaari’s interpretation of the broad mandate. Ahtisaari said he had tried to reassure Botha that the UN function will be fundamentally of a monitoring character, and that the UN has no other ambition in Namibia.

11. Waldheim mentioned Botha’s concern about the size of the UN force. Botha apparently expressed irritation that UN and other sources are already speaking of a five-thousand man force, whereas Botha said
previous talks had always been in the range of two to three thousand.
Waldheim told Botha that the number will in the end depend upon
discussions of requirements to fulfill the plan. He also noted that
SWAPO’s concerns are just the opposite—they desire a large number
for the sake of psychological security. Ahtisaari said these decisions
must be in the hands of the Secretary General and consultations should
be undertaken only after decisions have been made.

12. The SYG said Sam Nujoma of SWAPO had expressed the hope
that their views also could be taken into account in forming the force.
The Secretary General commented that a UN operation of this kind,
to be successful, must have the cooperation of all parties. In other
words, every effort must be made to win the full cooperation of South
Africa as well as SWAPO, since it will be crucial to success.

13. Ahtisaari commented that Botha would have preferred that
Ahtisaari proceed to Namibia for his survey alone, but after discussion
it appeared that Botha had accepted the need for a sizeable survey
team. The SYG interjected that the Federal Republic of Germany was
reluctant to provide the aircraft to take Ahtisaari’s survey team to
Namibia. Waldheim asked the Secretary to be responsive to the urgent
request for airlift assistance which was being transmitted to the US.
The Secretary said he wished to be as helpful as possible and would
examine any such request for help in a positive way.

14. Looking ahead to implementation of the proposal, Ahtisaari
commented that he would of course insist that the registration of voters
recently conducted by South African authorities be redone. After the
UN force has fully established itself and ensured a calm atmosphere
in the territory, he thought registration of voters might be conducted
around October. Then, because of the time needed to carry out the
proposal and the practical prospect of a rainy season during the winter
months, he thought he could anticipate elections in March or April,
1979. Ahtisaari asked about our thoughts about the duration of the UN
mandate. He said he would prefer a 12-month mandate. Ambassador
Young recalled that SWAPO had indicated a desire for a mandate of
at least six months.

15. Ahtisaari also raised the need to commence now thinking ahead
to the problems of technical assistance to an independent Namibia.
He said during the transition period there would be requirements to
guarantee food supplies for the populace, determine the degree of
South African repatriation that is likely to ensue and generally protect

---

4 In an August 8 memorandum to David Anderson, Leo Reddy noted that a U.S.
Air Force plane was loaned to the United Nations for the Special Representative’s visit.
(Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—
to the extent possible the infrastructure of Namibia. During the initial transition period, perhaps the most important effort will be research and surveys of these needs and training of Namibian personnel.

16. The Secretary General, finally, recalled that Botha had again remarked that the South Africans would withdraw from Namibia only after a ceasefire. Waldheim asked who is to determine when a ceasefire has occurred. He pointed this out as a further indication of the many difficulties they are likely to have with South Africa in the implementation of the plan.

Young

91. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, September 1, 1978, 0449Z

3400. Nairobi please pass to Ambassador Young and Asst Sec Moose. Subject: Namibia: Western Five Meeting With Fourie August 31. Ref: USUN 3358.2

1. Summary. The Western Five Ambassadors and Charges met August 31 with Brand Fourie to discuss the Secretary General’s report on the implementation of the settlement proposal. Fourie focused the discussion on what he termed the two “major problems”: the size of the force and the role of the UN police. Surprisingly, he did not address the election date issue. Nevertheless, he stated that the two major problems were of crucial concern: (a) the force was simply too large—a size never envisaged by (and totally unacceptable to the South Africans; (b) UN police were not envisaged; the function proposed must be limited to accompanying the existing police; and those performing that function must not have “executive duties”. We replied that we believed that the UN had no intention of giving the UN police “executive duties” and that the confusion was the result of misinterpretation


2 In telegram 3358 from USUN, August 30, the Mission transmitted Waldheim’s August 29 report on the implementation of the settlement proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780354–0695)
and imprecise drafting of the report. We urged Fourie to raise the issue with Waldheim. On the size of the force, we argued that in accepting the proposal South Africa had agreed to the tasks to be performed by the UN force and to leave the size of the force up to Waldheim. Waldheim was simply making a technical decision that a 7500-man force would be necessary to fulfill those tasks. We urged that Fourie and Botha talk with Waldheim about the UN’s rationale for the 7500-man force. Fourie agreed to recommend to Botha that he meet with Waldheim but repeated throughout our meeting: “My government will not accept this report as it stands.” Underlying Fourie’s comments is a fundamental distrust of the U.N. and concern that every contingency must be agreed upon in advance of South African acceptance. End summary.

2. The Ambassadors and Charges of the Western Five met pm August 31 at their own request with South African Permanent Secretary Brand Fourie to discuss the Secretary General’s report (reftel) on the implementation of the settlement proposal on Namibia. Fourie was accompanied by Neil Van Heerden, Adriaan Eksteen, and John Viall. (Foreign Minister Botha declined to meet with the group even though in observance of his rank the group had offered to call upon him.) The conversation, which lasted an hour and a half, was candid and direct but never unfriendly.

3. After briefing Fourie on the state of play in the Security Council, the Five asked him for his comments on the report. Fourie replied that the two major issues which he wanted to discuss were the size of the military section of UNTAG and the role of the UN police. He mentioned that there were other issues of concern, including the date of elections, to be discussed later but added that he thought these two would be “enough of a headache” for today. Later in the meeting, when the date of elections again came peripherally into the conversation Fourie asked: “What’s the point of taking on other issues (e.g., election date) if we can’t solve the really major ones?”

4. UN police force. The group then took up with Fourie the question of the police force. Fourie immediately took issue with that portion of paragraph 29 of the report which states: “The duties of the civil police element of UNTAG will include taking measures against any intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter . . . .” He described the responsibility for “taking measures” as amounting to executive authority and stated: “Nowhere in the Western Five proposal is the establishment of a UN police force with executive duties discussed.” Ambassador McHenry replied that he did not believe that it was the Secretary General’s intention to give the police executive authority. The Secretary General was, he believed, simply trying to fulfill the tasks required of the UN in the proposal. There
was the need for the UN to be able to accompany the police, and the SYG was stating his desire for trained individuals for the task. The number was small considering the large number of South African police. Para nine of the proposal makes clear that primary responsibility for maintaining law and order shall rest with the existing police forces; but para ten of the proposal states that the Special Representative “will take steps to guarantee against the possibility of intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter”. In the end Fourie acknowledged that if the role of the UN police was to accompany the existing police, that was ok, but South Africa could not consent to an “executive” role for UN police. McHenry again reiterated that he did not believe that that was the UN’s intention and urged Fourie to question the UN on that point.

5. Size of the UN military force. When the conversation turned to the second “major issue”, Fourie argued on predictable lines: A 7500-person UN force was never envisaged by South Africa; South Africa had indicated their opposition to a large UN military presence to the Five; South Africa was never consulted by Ahtisaari on the size of the force as it had expected; and that a UN force that large simply cannot be sold to the South African Cabinet. He argued that the task of the UN force was to “monitor” and that monitoring did not require 7500 men. The SAG will not withdraw its forces unless there is peace, he said, “and if there is peace why do you need 7500 soldiers to monitor it?” He reiterated often: “My government will not accept this”. Ambassadors McHenry and Richard (UK) replied that specific numbers had been removed from the proposal precisely because we wished to make the question technical rather than political. South African Government had accepted the tasks of the UN force as outlined in the proposal (which included more than “monitoring”) and had agreed to whatever size force the Secretary General deemed necessary to fulfill those tasks. Determining the size was therefore a purely technical matter for the Secretary General to decide. Both urged Fourie to ask Waldheim to explain why he needed so many people.

6. Fourie persisted, returning frequently to the fact that South Africa had not been consulted. Fourie added that “until the numbers and composition of the force are settled not a single UN soldier will be allowed to land”. The Five replied that the South Africans had never been told that they would be consulted on the size of the force. They had been told that they would be consulted on its composition and Waldheim’s report indicated that they would be. We reminded him however that South Africa had been told explicitly that they could not veto. Fourie, however, was not convinced. We suggested that part of their concern was obviously related to composition. Fourie agreed but stated that even if composition was acceptable (and an acceptable
composition would include no state which had helped SWAPO) the numbers were still too large. Pressed to indicate an acceptable figure Fourie replied “2000”. We urged that he and Botha speak with the Secretary General. He said that he would recommend a meeting with Waldheim but that verbal assurances from Waldheim would not be enough “for the Cabinet, as long as the numbers stand”.

7. Comment. The main sticking point seems clearly to be the size of the force, and we are certain that this is a real problem politically for Botha within the South African Cabinet. It seems that Botha has sold the Cabinet on the settlement plan on certain assumptions and one of those was that the force would be small and in any event preponderant power would be South African when the police and other forces were considered. Fourie stated specifically: “If my Foreign Minister were to try to sell seriously this report with the 7,000 figure, it would be the end of him. It simply cannot be sold”. The UN figure will have to be explained to the South Africans by Waldheim, and some solution will have to be found. One possibility might be for the UN to contract out the logistical responsibilities of the force to local commercial firms and thus reduce the force by 2300. Perhaps some ground can be gained by some UN assurances on composition. Needless to say any such changes or assurances may be unacceptable to SWAPO and the Frontline.

8. The problem of the police seems to be one of misinterpretation and imprecise UN drafting, which can hopefully be cleared up. Nevertheless, it is an issue on which the South Africans place great emphasis as evidenced by their categorization of it as one of the two “major problems”. We are surprised by Fourie’s downplaying of the election date issue and wonder whether Botha may not raise it in more sizable proportions. However, Fourie may have shed some light on South Africa’s position when at one point during the conversation one of the Five quoted from the annex of the proposal. Fourie replied that he thought the annex was illustrative and added: “if this annex is law, then we are going to stick to the date (for elections).”

9. At any rate, the South Africans are digging in. We have informed Waldheim of our conversation with Fourie, and he is prepared to discuss the issues with Botha. Waldheim said that he too had initially been concerned about the size of the force but that General Philipp (Ahtisaari’s military advisor) had insisted convincingly that a force of that size was from a military point of view essential. Perhaps Philipp, who established great rapport in Namibia with SADF General Geldenhuys, can convince Botha and Fourie. Even that, of course, may not be enough to solve the “political problem” back home in the Cabinet. End comment.

10. Ahtisaari later called Ambassador McHenry to say that he had heard of the South African comments. He said he would stick by the
report and that we would now see whether South Africa was serious in its acceptance. Comment. We agree. End comment.

Leonard

92. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Embassy in South Africa and the Department of State

New York, September 26, 1978, 0546Z

3790. Subject: Namibia: Meeting of Western Five Foreign Ministers September 25.

1. The Western Five Foreign Ministers met for an hour and a half Monday evening, September 25, to discuss Namibia. All agreed that it is essential to make clear to the South Africans our determination to see a successful conclusion of our settlement effort and the seriousness with which we view this matter. The Five Ministers subsequently agreed:

(A) To request a formal Security Council meeting for Thursday, September 28, to adopt the Secretary General’s report;

(B) To recall the Five Ambassadors in Pretoria for consultations with the Foreign Ministers in New York on Thursday;

(C) To be available while in New York to meet with the representatives of the various Namibian political parties (in recognition of the importance of all the parties and in order hopefully to influence the new government.

2. The Ministers agreed that these decisions should be made public, and in a press conference following the meeting, the Contact Group did so. With regard to meeting with the Namibian political parties, the Ministers did not decide to invite such meetings but rather to make publicly known their willingness to meet. SWAPO President Nujoma is still in town; Andreas Shipanga is scheduled to arrive shortly; Namibia National Front Representatives O’Linn and Rukuro are here; neither the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance nor Aktur have delegations from Namibia present, but the DTA has a resident representative here. The Ministers wish to hold all of these meetings on Thursday or Friday,

---

and we expect that delegations from the DTA and possible Aktur may wish to travel to New York for the occasion.

3. In the discussion of likely motivations behind the South African decision on September 20\(^2\) and possible methods of reversing that decision, British Foreign Minister Owen suggested that South African fears over the implementation of the Five’s settlement proposal led to the South African decision. He added that the decision would not be reversed unless we could: (1) provide meaningful assurances on the composition and staging of the UNTAG military force (on staging he suggested a guarantee that one or two of the seven battalions be stationed outside Namibia on standby); or (2) induce a change in the position of the DTA. FRG Foreign Minister Genscher believed that composition was the crucial issue for South Africa and that assurances on that might affect the SAG position.

4. Ambassador McHenry replied that South Africa had already been given numerous opportunities to discuss assurances on size and composition of the force and had spurned those opportunities. He suggested that South Africa had made a political decision more fundamental than the Secretary General’s report and that therefore assurances like those discussed above would only produce a change in SAG policy if a South African will to change developed first.

5. The conversation remained inconclusive, but it was clear that the British and Germans wished to explore such possible assurances further before considering more drastic action. The conversation was notable for the fact that the subject of sanctions was carefully avoided, despite Secretary Vance’s efforts to bring it into the discussion. David Owen did state late in the meeting that if additional assurances failed we would have to consider what action is open to us to bring South Africa into line. He quickly added, however, that he did not see any action which the Five might take which would have an immediate effect on the situation. There are some actions, he noted, which Canadian Foreign Minister Jamieson commented the Five would have to consider at some point what actions each of the Five might be able to support in the Security Council. With implicit reference to full economic sanctions, he added, “I think we (Canada) can do it, but it’s not going to be all that popular.”

6. For Pretoria: As we have already announced to the press it is the unanimous view that you and your colleagues should proceed to

\(^2\) In telegram 5578 from Pretoria, September 20, the Embassy transmitted Vorster’s press statement, in which he rejected the UN solution and announced South Africa’s intention to hold elections in Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780384–0052)
New York in time to arrive for meetings on Thursday, September 28. Specific travel orders will be sent septel from Department.

Young

93. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Pretoria, October 16, 1978, 1823Z

Secto 12027. Department pass White House for Dr. Brzezinski. Subject: October 16 Meetings on Namibia.

1. There follows a summary report of today’s meetings on Namibia.

2. The Foreign Ministers met this morning at 8:30 with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and Brand Fourie for about two hours. The Prime Minister opened the meeting by reading a paper containing his analysis of the strategic situation in Africa with particular emphasis on Southern Africa. I responded on behalf of the Five, giving our own analysis, stressing recent developments in the North Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East, as well as the situation in Africa. I ended with a review of the Namibian and Rhodesian problems and gave our views on the consequences of the failure to consummate internationally recognized settlements of both of these situations. Each of the other Foreign Ministers then spoke briefly stressing various matters, but each made the point that if we fail to achieve an internationally recognized settlement in the case of Namibia, the ones who will benefit most will be the Soviets and the Cubans.

2. The Prime Minister excused himself and we then entered into a detailed discussion of the specific problems that have to be dealt with in resolving our differences on Namibia. This second meeting lasted about two and one-half hours. Pik listed the items as: (a) elections, (b) requirements for consultation, (c) police force, and (d) the number of UN troops and their composition. After he had completed his statement, I suggested that we put aside for the moment the elections problem, which we all agreed was clearly the most difficult, in order

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 10–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Vance was in Pretoria to discuss Namibia with South African officials.

2 Not found.
to see whether we could resolve our differences on the other matters we faced. Pik agreed at the outset that we could put the police matter aside as we were in basic agreement on that. I gave further clarifications based upon the Secretary General’s introductory statement to the UN on the question of troop numbers and composition. After considerable discussion, Pik agreed that insofar as composition was concerned, he thought this matter could be worked out satisfactorily, although he said he wanted flag his lingering doubt about the good faith of the United Nations. After a good deal of discussion back and forth, we reached a general understanding as to the dimensions of the problem relating to the number of UN troops. We further agreed that we believed these issues could be worked out if UN Special Representative Ahtisaari could sit down with Judge Steyn, General Philipp, and South African General Geldenhuys.

3. We then agreed, after considerable discussion, that we believed the requirement for consultation could be worked out satisfactorily if the Secretary General would be willing to send Ahtisaari, back to Namibia.

4. This then brought us face-to-face with the question of the election date. We first stated that there could be no elections in December, as currently scheduled, but that we believed it would be possible to work out a fixed date in May or June.\(^3\) Again it was agreed that this would require further consultations between Judge Steyn and his colleagues on the one hand and the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the other hand. We had a brief further discussion of the impossibility of accepting any elections in December. Pik maintained that it would be impossible to put off those elections,\(^4\) saying that Judge Steyn had already indicated that he would resign if the elections were not held, and that politically there was no way they could move off this plan. We reiterated that if this were done there could be no internationally recognized settlement and that we have been unable to find a way around this problem.

\(^3\) Carter underlined “May or June” and wrote in the right-hand margin: “Why not April as we agreed?”

\(^4\) Carter underlined “It would be impossible to put off those elections.” In his press statement on September 20, Vorster maintained that the Western Five proposal provided for elections and independence by December 31 and for a run-up period of seven months before elections. He argued that this was possible when South Africa agreed to the proposal on April 25. (See footnote 2, Document 92.)
5. We then adjourned for lunch, agreeing to discuss the matter in the afternoon if we had time and, if not, at the working dinner to be held with the Prime Minister this evening.

Vance

5 In telegram Secto 12044 from Pretoria, October 17, Vance reported on his October 16 afternoon meeting with Botha, Fourie, and General Malan: “It is clear that we are coming down to the crunch. The odds remain heavily against our being able to work out an agreement regarding unilateral elections in Namibia in December. However, after discussions late this afternoon, Pik and the others are now re-caucusing with the Prime Minister and Cabinet tonight.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 103, 10/1–19/78)

94. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Botha

Washington, October 11, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Now that you have assumed your high office, I want to address frankly and in a constructive spirit the problems which have been deterring an improvement in relations between our countries.

The emphasis you placed in your recent letter on peace and cooperation in dealing with some of the grave problems which face southern Africa accords with my own view. I note particularly your desire to discuss problems that have arisen between South Africa and the rest of the family of nations.

With respect to Namibia, we worked diligently with the other Western nations to achieve international approval for a settlement that preserves the rights of all the parties and offers the only real opportunity that we can see of ending violence and achieving a stable, lasting solution fair to all. Loss of this opportunity will make it infinitely more

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 18, South Africa: Prime Minister Pieter Willem Botha, 9/78–2/80. No classification marking. Vance delivered this letter to Botha on October 16. See Document 95.

2 In telegram 5929 from Pretoria, October 5, the Embassy transmitted the text of Botha’s letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780408–0366)
difficult in the future to build the support necessary to bring about and sustain a peaceful solution. I earnestly request that you personally give your support for a resolution of this problem, and move toward an election on a specific date, and with United Nations forces to be present as recommended by the Western nations. Secretary Vance can discuss these matters with you in more detail.

It is also my hope that you can be helpful in resolving the increasingly critical Rhodesian situation. We are gravely concerned that the refusal of the Executive Council in Salisbury to meet and negotiate realistically with the other parties means that nothing will be done to arrest the accelerating deterioration of the situation there.

I am asking Cy Vance to deliver this letter to you, and your meeting with him will provide an opportunity for a fuller discussion of these matters.

If progress can be made on current problems in southern Africa, I believe it would be useful for the two of us to discuss these matters personally.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

---

95. **Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State**

Pretoria, October 17, 1978, 0130Z

Secto 12036. Dept pass White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Namibia: Call on Prime Minister P.W. Botha.

1. I had a 45-minute conversation with Prime Minister Botha this afternoon during which I delivered to him your letter. He read the letter and said that he highly appreciated that you had taken the trouble to write to him again. Noting that one thing that had been established was the will to talk to each other, he said at the outset that he would be dishonest if he did not say that South Africa had its grievances: the U.S. is a big country whereas South Africa is a small country, but he

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 19, 10/78. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Niacl Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 94.
believed it could make its own contribution on the basis of mutual respect.

2. I stressed the importance that you place on finding peaceful solutions in Namibia and Rhodesia, and said that you are concerned about the dangers of Soviet penetration in the African continent as well as other areas of the world, and are particularly concerned about the dangers in Southern Africa. I pointed out that we believe we have made good progress over the past 18 months working with the Western Five and the relevant parties to develop a solution for the Namibia problem. Noting that it would be a tragedy if we were to fail, I said we had come to see if we could find a way to move forward in a search for a solution that would receive international approval. A solution in Namibia, I said, could have important spill-over effects particularly in Rhodesia. I stressed our concern about the rapid deterioration of the situation in Rhodesia and a feeling that if we could get Namibia back on the track, it could have a positive effect in Rhodesia.

3. I noted your feeling that we should try to improve our bilateral relations. I said that we would like to establish a dialogue in which we could share our concern about the relations between our countries, including the difficult question of South Africa’s racial policies. I noted your view that if we could solve our Namibian problem and continue our cooperation on Rhodesia, we would like to invite the Prime Minister to the U.S. for personal discussions between the two of you.

4. Prime Minister Botha said that he did not want to oversimplify the situation; however, South Africa is aware of the problems existing not only for the U.S. but for the rest of the world in the Southern African situation. The South African attitude is not based on any lack of understanding, but South Africans must live in their own country and just as the U.S. has commitments, it has commitments. Thus in Namibia they regard it as important to give the people of the territory an opportunity to designate their own leaders, he noted that it is their view the elections should be free and that those elected should be free to talk to whomever they wished. He stressed: quote if for one moment we were to agree that elections should be postponed, we would have chaos in South West Africa. Unquote. The Namibian problem has been on South Africa’s shoulders so long that they would like to be done with it, but they are determined to let the people come forward with their own leaders.

5. At this point Botha digressed to Rhodesia and expressed the view that he thought the U.S. should have let the internal agreement go forward. He noted that he agreed with us that if the situation in Rhodesia could not be kept under control, Southern Africa was headed for catastrophe. In this regard, he maintained that the problem in Southern Africa is not really terrorism but the power behind terrorism.
The time had come, he said, for the West to say quote stop unquote. Even in Zambia people are tired, as evidenced by Kaunda’s recent statement on the use of the Rhodesian railway. He related the story of a conversation he had with a chief in the Caprivi Strip who said that relations across the border were good and that people came over from Zambia to buy sugar, salt and other commodities which they could not get in Zambia any more. Botha felt that Africa’s problems can be reduced to just a few: they need to learn to produce food, use money in the right way, and be trained to live without the gun.

6. Botha then said that he was not hard-headed nor trying to be unpleasant, but quote I am not going to allow South West Africa to be placed in the same conditions. I am going to fight (first). Unquote. He expressed the view that we are forcing Rhodesia to go the way of Mozambique and Angola, then said that South Africa is alone and privately I must not ask him to do something his people would not accept. Quote don’t force me to be in a position where my people will say I have betrayed them. Unquote.

7. At this stage I pointed out to him that if elections are held in December, then we see no way that those elections can receive international approval, which would mean that it would not then be possible to proceed with the program laid out in the Western Five proposal. I suggested that if, on the other hand, we could set a firm date in May or June and find some way to make sure that the elections would go forward on that date, then we would have made it possible for the elections to be held in a way that would win international support. I could not see how that would not be in any way a betrayal of his principles—indeed quite to contrary. I expressed the belief that we should continue to work together to try and find a solution that would be internationally accepted. Secondly, on Rhodesia I said I honestly did not know what Smith wanted; that he tells one person one thing at one time and then tells someone else something entirely different at another time. I said this had happened to me just last week. I said I found it hard if not impossible to deal with people like Smith whom you could not trust. I concluded that unless there is to be an all parties conference I was afraid that we could see no progress and further Soviet and Cuban penetration and influence.

8. Prime Minister Botha said that the intrusion of Cubans in Rhodesia could change the whole situation and noted that South African Parliament would have to take such a development into account. Quite apart from anything Smith may have said, he thought that as the three black leaders were already committed to the internal government, every effort should be made to help it to work.

9. As far as Namibia was concerned, Botha argued that the postponement of elections had already led to a lot of trouble. If South
Africa were to postpone it again, the whites in Namibia would turn around and say the South Africans had betrayed them and the blacks would say that South Africa had adopted SWAPO’s plan. The moment one plays into the hands of SWAPO, there will be another Angola. The whites in South West Africa would not take this lying down. Botha implied that the Portuguese had done so in Angola. The West must allow South Africa to quote take it where we know it (sic) because we know it so intimately. Unquote.

10. Botha said the SAG does not want to set up a government in Namibia. The SAG first wants to know who represents Namibia before talking to Waldheim and others. Any attempt to force South Africa would only lead to confusion.

11. I emphasized that we believed that without international approval, there would inevitably be increased conflict in Namibia and that there would be a danger that those who won an election in which only part of the people participated would say that they had a right to govern on behalf of all.

12. Botha disputed the last point, however, he said the local leaders wanted stability and indicated that there was no doubt that if forced to choose between stability and international acceptability, they would choose the former.

13. I emphasized the impartiality of the UN, noting particularly the impartial and fair role which it had played in the Middle East particularly in UNIFIL. This was in response to Botha’s statement that all South Africans had lost all faith in the UN’s fairness and impartiality. I mentioned also that actual implementation of a Security Council mandate by the Secretariat is a different situation than what happened in the General Assembly, such as the G.A. resolution that SWAPO is the sole representative of the people of Namibia. Moreover, I said, the Five Western powers were prepared to take steps if necessary in the Security Council to reinforce the impartiality of the UN.

14. Botha referred to the invitation from President Carter and said he thought that it only could do good if the U.S. and South Africa could sit around a table to discuss their problems; however, he added, there is a vast difference between South Africa and the Middle East. Israel is not an outcast; South Africa is. There is no embargo against Israel but actions have already been taken against South Africa. Quote One day we will erect a monument to the West saying, they forced us to look out for ourselves. Unquote Botha said another difference was that in Palestine national homes are welcome whereas in South Africa they are not (a reference to the world’s rejection of the apartheid concept of tribal homelands in South Africa). Botha said that he must be convinced that the UN would accept South Africa and listen to it again. Since it was the UN that made South Africa an outcast, as long as this
exists there is no way of arguing on the same grounds as in the Middle
East. It would be a long time before he could accept impartiality of
the UN. Referring once again to the UNGA’s recognition of SWAPO,
he commented that SWAPO was Marxist-oriented and had been from
the outset; that it was formed in Cape Town and not in South West
Africa.

15. At this point I pointed out the importance of working with the
Front Line States and their cooperation in enforcing the UN plan on
SWAPO, but Botha replied that Front Line States were not masters of
their own destinies, that they have to rebuild their own economies. He
noted that Malawi had cooperated with South Africa and they are now
making progress. Swaziland had also cooperated with South Africa
and is making progress, but Lesotho quote is trying to use a big stick
unquote and is not even in a position to help itself like the Transkei.
Botha concluded that he was prepared to go out of his way to find
solutions in Southern Africa and that he was prepared to discuss the
differences with the U.S., but he said we should not ask him to be
untrue to what he believed to be his own duty.

16. At supper tonight he said he had reflected on our conversation
and felt there was a real basis for trying to improve our relations. He
asked me to stay over until Wednesday and to try and work out a
solution to Namibia that both he and we could live with. I agreed to
do so and said I would talk to my colleagues about this. We got along
well at dinner and have a meeting scheduled for tomorrow\(^3\) at 8:30
a.m. to see whether we can with our colleagues work out an acceptable
formula which we will review with Tuesday p.m. or Wednesday\(^4\)
morning on a working trip to Capetown.

17. The going is tough but the door is still ajar.

\text{Vance}

\(^{3}\) October 17.
\(^{4}\) October 17 and 18.
96. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Secretary’s Aircraft, October 18, 1978, 2115Z

Secto 12069. Subject: Report on Conclusion of Talks on Namibia. Department pass to White House for the President from the Secretary. Ref: Secto 12050; Secto 12070.

1. We have just concluded our discussions in Pretoria. We have agreed with the South Africans that our proposals made over the last three days are still on the table (which was sent to you last night—Secto 12050). Proposal A was presented first and is the version which the South Africans are currently considering; Proposal B was the alternate, also sent last night (Secto 12069) while Proposal C emerged today.

2. The South African Government has called the “leaders” of Namibia (excluding SWAPO) for a meeting tonight in Pretoria. The South African Government will put draft Proposal A (our joint statement) to the Namibian leaders, and Prime Minister Botha will urge them to approve it. He anticipates that they will. In addition, he will inform them of a unilateral statement which he would make containing the following points:

A. South Africa military forces will begin their withdrawal only when and if there is a complete and comprehensive cessation of hostilities.

B. Since the date of elections is predicated on South African withdrawal, a continuation of violence can therefore interrupt and delay indefinitely South African withdrawal and, therefore, the date of elections.

C. To prevent any party from unilaterally delaying the holding of elections, it is necessary to fix a date and that the elections will proceed even if South African forces have not been withdrawn.

3. Tomorrow morning, the Prime Minister will call a Cabinet meeting and will also urge the Cabinet’s approval of Proposal A, as amplified by the oral statement. Brand Fourie told me that it is his belief that the Prime Minister has the votes to get this through the Cabinet. At about noon or so, the Prime Minister will hold a press conference...

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–2745. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Vance was en route to Geneva to meet with the U.S. delegation prior to SALT negotiations in Moscow.

2 Not found.

3 Telegram Secto 12070 from the Secretary’s aircraft, October 18, transmitted the text of the draft joint statement by the South African Government and the Western Five on Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780427–0509)
at which time he will read the joint statement and his oral unilateral statement, which will then have been approved by both the Namibians and the Cabinet. Our Embassies will be informed shortly before the statement that this is being done. We will then wish to inform our press in each of the Contact Group countries of the decision of the South African Government on the joint statement. We will also issue our oral statement in response to the Prime Minister’s oral statement. Our oral statement is as follows:

“The fixing of a date is necessary to provide a firm framework for the electoral process and to reduce uncertainty. The proposals of the Western Five adopted by the Security Council establish a number of prerequisites before the official political campaign starts. In this connection the South African Government stressed that the withdrawal of South African troops would only begin upon cessation of hostilities. The Five pointed out that this would be brought about following notification to the Secretary-General of an agreed cease-fire. No party can be allowed to delay unilaterally the holding of UN supervised elections. If the agreed date of the election appeared to be at risk through acts of violence or intimidation or any other failure to carry out the provisions of the proposals, it would be for the Secretary-General to bring the matter immediately to the Security Council and the governments of the Western Five undertake to support necessary action in the Security Council. The Five Western governments undertake to maintain observers in Windhoek during the transitional period and to do everything possible to ensure the implementation of the proposals leading to elections on the agreed date.

“The Five Foreign Ministers are confident that the Security Council would respond promptly and effectively to any situation where the agreed date of the election appeared to be at risk and would maintain that election date and that there will therefore be no case for any unilateral action.”

I will hold a press conference at that time in Geneva announcing the above and answering questions from the press on the record. I will probably expand on my on-the-record statement with a backgrounder.

4. I shall be prepared to make public the other two proposals, Proposals B and C, depending upon the circumstances and agreement which we will reach throughout the night with our Contact Group colleagues.

5. I called Kurt Waldheim on an open line immediately before leaving Pretoria and filled him in on the fact that we had made a number of proposals which were still under consideration, and that we would be prepared to speak to them definitively tomorrow after the conclusions of the South African Government are announced. I will be in touch with him by telephone as soon as we hear that South Africa
has made its announcement. Tonight I urged him to get Ahtisaari prepared to go to Windhoek tomorrow, or as soon thereafter as possible. (745’s reaction was generally favorable, but he wants to look at the fine print.

6. Although we don’t know yet what the final outcome will be, I believe the visit was useful. We have had a full and frank discussion of the gut issues and I believe that the South Africans and ourselves have a better understanding of each other. They are particularly appreciative of your personal message, and I feel that P.W. Botha is aware of the importance of not closing the doors which would open a road to generally better relations between our two countries. He understands very clearly that they are tied to what happens in Namibia.

7. My guess is that the press will probably play the trip in a negative vein, in part because of the pessimistic speculation which will continue until the South African decision is announced, and in part because so much depends upon the meeting between Ahtisaari and Judge Steyn.

8. I think it is important that we convey to the African states as promptly as possible the actual situation. We have not deviated from the proposal of the Contact Group. The Five are working on joint instructions to our Embassies in the African nations and members of the Security Council. They will be making joint demarches as soon as possible. Our representatives at the UN will be working on plans for the Security Council meeting on October 23, which undoubtedly will be a tough session. It may be delayed if Ahtisaari is about to meet with Steyn.

9. Obviously, we were unable to reach agreement on the December elections and we will be pressed hard to say what we will do if the South Africans proceed. I will try to reach agreement among the Five on a response along the following lines: It is our hope that early discussions between Ahtisaari and Steyn will provide a basis for the immediate implementation of the Secretary-General’s report. However, as stated in paragraph 5 of the communique, we saw no way of reconciling the proposed December 4 election with Security Council Resolution 435.4 Hopefully the South Africans themselves, realizing the firmness of our position, will find a way of dealing with the election question in such a way as to permit Ahtisaari to begin his work at an early stage. We realize that for the time being this situation is not satisfactory and that within a very short time it will be necessary for the international

---

4 UN Security Council Resolution 435, which reaffirmed the United Nation’s legal authority over Namibia, was adopted on September 29. The vote was 12–0 in favor of the resolution, with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union abstaining. China did not vote. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, pp. 915–916)
community to decide on what steps it must take if the Secretary-General reports that he is unable to implement our proposals.

10. I will be meeting with Nimieri in Khartoum tonight to fill him in on the gist of what has happened. He has kindly agreed to receive me at 2:00 am this morning. Hans-Deitrich will be doing the same in Lagos at approximately the same time. We are entrusting the discussions with Juliu to Jim Spain and his colleagues. Jim has as good a relationship with Nyerere as anybody I know.

Vance

97. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, November 16, 1978, 1616Z

290834. Subject: Namibia: Message From the Secretary to Foreign Minister Botha.

1. Ambassador should hand deliver following personal message to Foreign Minister Botha from the Secretary as soon as you can arrange to do so. You should let Botha know in manner you feel most appropriate that we were surprised by ticker reports that Botha has recently belittled the possibility of the Western powers agreeing to sanctions against his country. He would be wise to make no such assumption about how Western governments would react if South Africa turned her back upon an internally agreed solution in Namibia:

2. Begin quote: Dear Pik:

With the conclusion of the latest phase of the Security Council’s debate on Namibia, I believe that it is of the utmost importance that South Africa move rapidly to hold the discussions with UN officials.
as provided for in our joint statement of October 19.\(^3\) I understand that domestic political considerations prevent your departure from South Africa prior to November 26. However, you are doubtless aware of the fact that the Secretary General must report to the Security Council under Resolution 439\(^4\) on November 25. Consequently, I strongly urge that you send Brand Fourie or another senior South African official to New York to initiate discussions with the Secretary General as soon as possible. These discussions would, I hope, lead to agreement on the remaining outstanding issues and agreement on a date for UNTAG to deploy in Namibia.

On the subject of your discussions with the Secretary General, I was concerned to learn that your Charge in New York, Mr. Eksteen, had informed the Secretary General that you would not be in a position to reach firm agreements with the Secretary General but that you would have to return to Pretoria prior to reaching a decision. This approach could well be interpreted in the UN as a delaying tactic on your part. Mr. Fourie’s prior visit would, I hope, clear away the preliminary phase and allow you to reach a firm agreement with Secretary General Waldheim since your government would have had an opportunity to review Mr. Fourie’s discussions prior to your departure for New York.

There is also a fundamental point which vitally affects the prospects for an internationally accepted settlement of the Namibia dispute and the future of our bilateral relations. I am most concerned at conflicting reports regarding remarks by Judge Steyn and others to the effect that a Constituent Assembly would be formed on the basis of December 4–8 elections and that this assembly would draft a constitution. If these comments accurately reflect your government’s intent, I must say that they do not conform to our discussions in Pretoria.

If your government should permit the unilateral formation of a Constituent Assembly in Namibia or otherwise endorse an internal settlement, your government will be responsible for the failure of UN efforts to resolve peacefully the Namibian problem and the results that would follow.

In view of the urgency of this situation, I would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible. Sincerely, Cy. End quote.

\(^3\) See footnote 3, Document 96.

\(^4\) UNSC Resolution 439 (1978), adopted on November 13, condemned South Africa’s decision to proceed with elections in Namibia in early December, in contravention of UNSC Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), and called upon the South African Government to cancel immediately the planned election. The resolution required Waldheim to report on the progress of implementation by November 25. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, p. 916)
98. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Mission to the United Nations and the Department of State

Pretoria, November 21, 1978, 1721Z

6962. Cape Town for the Ambassador. Subject: Namibia: Pik Botha Message to Waldheim.

Late this afternoon (Nov. 21) Pik Botha convoked the Pretoria Five to provide them with the text of a message he had just sent to Waldheim regarding his (Botha’s) and Fourie’s visits to New York. Report on the meeting with Botha septel.²

Begin text:

1. Your Excellency,

Some misunderstanding appears to be developing about the efforts to resume consultations on the implementation of Resolution 435,³ as clarified by the joint statement issued by the South African Government and the Five Foreign Ministers on 19 October 1978.⁴ The question of such consultations should also be viewed in the light of paragraph 3 of the joint statement. The paragraph reads:

Quote

The South African Government and the Five Foreign Ministers accordingly believe that it would now be appropriate for the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Mr. Ahtisaari, to resume his discussions with the South African Administrator-General of Namibia within the framework of Security Council Resolution 435 which endorsed the Secretary-General’s report. The aim of these discussions would be to work out the modalities of the proposed elections under U.N. supervision and to fix a date for these elections. The Five Foreign Ministers therefore intend to recommend to the Secretary-General that he should instruct Mr Ahtisaari to proceed to Windhoek as soon as possible. In addition, it was regarded as appropriate to recommend to the Secretary-General that he begin consultations on the composition of the military component of UNTAG.

Unquote

² Transmitted in telegram 6963 from Pretoria, November 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780479–0768)
³ See footnote 4, Document 96.
⁴ See footnote 3, Document 96.
2. We have been ready to receive Mr Ahtisaari since the 19th October but for weeks nothing happened. About a week ago, the idea of a discussion between the two of us was raised. You were advised that it would be virtually impossible for me to get to New York before the 27th of this month. Nevertheless, when it became clear that it would be helpful if consultations could start before the 25th, I agreed to send Mr. B.G. Fourie, South African Secretary for Foreign Affairs, to New York, to be available on the 24th November. If it would further facilitate the resumption of consultations, he could possibly depart this evening to be in New York tomorrow the 22nd, although this would entail the cancellation of important appointments. The resumption of the consultations has, however, been delayed since last Friday by disagreement as to the interpretation of the basis and format of the envisaged discussions. From exchanges of views between you and South Africa’s Deputy Permanent Representative, as well as between myself and the Five, it appeared that you had in mind substantive discussions on the outstanding issues that would enable you to “give something positive to the Security Council”. This, in the light of your discussions with our Charge d’Affaires on the 16th November, meant that you expected Mr Fourie to bring some positive message to you that would satisfy the Security Council.

3. At the same time we received intimations from the Five to the effect that the envisaged consultations should indicate “significant progress toward implementation of Resolution 435.” This, together with other suggestions received from individual members of the Five, implied that there would be no or very little opportunity for reporting back to the South African Government and other parties concerned and for consultation with them. This contrasts sharply with the procedure that was envisaged for Mr Ahtisaari’s visit. It was all along assumed that he would have to report back to you on his discussions here and in Windhoek and would have to return to New York for further consultations there.

4. You are aware of the complexities and dimensions of the problem. I trust that you will realise how difficult it would be to reach finality without the possibility of further discussions with the South African Prime Minister, the South African Government, the Administrator General and other parties concerned. This applies equally to my discussions with you, which, depending on your reactions, can still take place on the 27th November. In fact, when I informed the Ambassa-

5 In telegram 4988 from USUN, November 14, the Mission reported on a conversation between Waldheim and McHenry, in which Waldheim discussed the South African response to his request for a meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780468–0268)
dors of the Western members of the Security Council of my willingness to proceed to New York, it was conceded by them that, just as it could not have been expected of Mr Ahtisaari to reach finality here, it would be equally unreasonable to deal with the outstanding issues in New York other than on an ad referendum basis.

5. In conclusion I wish to emphasize that both in your envisaged discussions with Mr Fourie and subsequently with me, we shall make every effort to clarify the more important points of interest to the Security Council. However, to avoid subsequent misunderstanding, I have endeavored to explain to you why it could not reasonably be expected that I should commit the South African Government to viewpoints which we have not yet discussed and which the parties of South West Africa would not have considered. I would therefore appreciate your reaction as soon as possible.

6. Please accept, Your Excellency, etc. End text.

Edmondson

99. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, November 26, 1978, 0038Z


Summary. SYG Waldheim’s Special Rep for Namibia, Martti Ahtisaari, briefed MisOff Blacken late Nov 24 on status of talks with South African State Secty for FonAff Brand Fourie. Talks with Fourie have resulted in some clarification, but have not resolved basic issues. Key hang-ups remain South Africa’s (1) insistence upon establishing a fixed date for UN-supervised elections to be adhered to irrespective of whether a cessation of violence and a reduction of South African troops occurs; (2) size and composition of UNTAG; and (3) SAG refusal to agree to a date for UNTAG deployment until these issues are settled. Also Fourie has reaffirmed earlier SAG position that FonMin Botha

would not be able to make decision on date for UNTAG deployment without returning to South Africa for discussion with his Cabinet.

Concerning the December elections, SAG position remains ambiguous. While stating that the UN will not have to deal with the elected reps, the SAG hopes that UN will do so. Fourie has stated that the December “elections would give an indication whether the elected reps would represent the people of Southwest Africa.” Under direct questioning, Fourie responded that the UN-supervised elections would be for a Constituent Assembly. Ahtisaari said that Waldheim and he believe that no real progress will be achieved during the visit unless Botha will discuss and hopefully agree upon a phased implementation of the SYG’s report and drop his insistence upon setting a fixed date for the UN-supervised elections. Ahtisaari said that he and the SYG, in preparing the SYG’s report for Nov 25, had done their best to put a positive tone on a situation that remains negative. He inquired whether Secty Vance might be willing to talk with Botha to emphasize the importance of dropping SAG insistence on a fixed election date and instead agree to a date for UNTAG deployment and phased implementation of the SYG’s plan. End summary.

1. During two sessions Nov 24, SYG Waldheim and SR Ahtisaari concentrated on obtaining answers from Fourie to questions on outstanding issues. Essence of answers is provided below.

2. Cooperation by South African Govt:

Fourie referred to South African cooperation in the past but said that differences between the Western proposal and the SYG’s report had become apparent. The gap in understanding had been narrowed through subsequent talks, but had not been eliminated. The purpose of the present talks between Fourie and subsequently FonMin Botha with SYG Waldheim is to create understanding on the basis of which Res 435 could be implemented. Fourie said SAG’s sincerity is illustrated by the fact that although the SYG did not agree to send Ahtisaari to Windhoek as envisaged by the joint statement of Oct 19, the SAG was sending the FonMin to New York for discussions with SYG.

3. Deployment of UNTAG:

The kickoff date depends entirely upon reaching agreement on “outstanding points”. Main outstanding points were the establishment of a fixed date for the UN-supervised elections and reaching agreement on the size and composition of the UN force.

4. Provisional target date for the election under supervision and control of United Nations:

Fourie referred to the joint statement, para 3, in which it referred to Ahtisaari’s visit to conduct “discussions to work out the modalities of the proposed elections under United Nations supervision and to fix
a date for these elections.” Fourie then referred to para 4 of the joint statement outlining the SAG’s position which stipulated that the SR would consult with Administrator-General Steyn on all aspects of the SYG’s report. The South African Govt’s position is that the election date, once determined, would be a firm date, not a provisional one, and that no party could delay the election. The date should be adhered to irrespective of whether there is a cessation of hostility and a subsequent reduction of South African troops.

5. UN police monitors:

The SYG’s explanatory statement of Sept 29 had removed the SAG’s concern about the character and role of UN police. The exact number can be determined by Ahtisaari and Steyn on the ground.

6. Agreement on status of UNTAG:

Fourie stated progress had been made on the proposed agreement but a limited number of issues remain to be resolved. Given understanding on both sides, the obstacles do not appear insurmountable. He referred to it as a technical document.

7. Question of ceasefire:

SAG position remains as set out in a communication addressed to the Western Five on Sept 12. Fourie commented that “the reduction of South African troops in Southwest Africa will only commence if and when a comprehensive cessation of violence has been brought about.”

8. The December elections:

Fourie reviewed previous South African statement concerning elections, including para 4 of the joint statement. He said he could see no direct link between the December election and the subsequent UN-supervised election. Concerning the functions of those elected in December, he repeated ex-Prime Minister Vorster’s statement of Sept 202 which indicated all options remain open to them (those elected). The SAG will not prescribe to them. The body to be elected may:

- Decide to draw up a constitution or postpone the drafting thereof;
- Decide to proceed with the implementation of the proposal of the Five;
- Decide to accept the SYG’s report.

Fourie added that Prime Minister Botha had stated on Oct 19 that SAG would have the final say on these matters. The elections would give an indication whether the elected reps would represent the people of Southwest Africa. Fourie concluded with the following statement:

Begin quote

\[\text{See footnote 2, Document 92.}\]

End quote
Throughout the discussions with the Five and subsequently the South African Govt has made it clear that it is for the Five and the SYG to decide whether, after the elections in December, they wish to continue to negotiate with the SAG. We have never suggested that they should not do so. On the other hand, they would be free, if they so wish, to consult and hold discussions with the elected reps. We for our part would welcome such discussions. We have always in the past advocated contact between the Five and the various political groups in the territory. End quote

9. During subsequent give and take, Fourie indicated that the size of the voter turnout would be one factor in determining status of those elected in December. However, he also agreed that the body elected in UN-supervised elections would be a Constituent Assembly.

10. Ahtisaari told MisOff that from the UN’s point of view the principal objective during the Botha visit would be to persuade the South Africans to agree to the phased implementation of the SYG’s plan. Although the SYG could agree to setting a provisional date for the UN-supervised elections once a date for deployment of UNTAG is established, he could not agree to the South African demand for a fixed date for the UN-supervised election.

11. Fourie has made clear that FonMin Botha will not be able to agree to a date for deployment of UNTAG while he is in New York. Such a decision would have to be referred to the Cabinet. Ahtisaari inquired whether Secty Vance would agree to talk with Botha in an attempt to persuade him to drop his insistence on fixing a date for UN-supervised elections before agreeing to a date for UNTAG deployment and to cooperate in the phased implementation of the UN plan.

Leonard
New York, November 28, 1978, 1739Z

5423. Subject: Namibia: Secretary Vance’s Meeting With Foreign Minister Botha.

1. Secretary Vance met with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha during afternoon Nov 27 at Amb Young’s residence in Waldorf Towers to discuss Namibia. Botha was accompanied by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie. Amb Leonard accompanied Secretary Vance.

2. Botha started the meeting with a long background exposition revolving around how painful the charges of bad faith on the part of South Africa had been for him. He said the events of the past few weeks had done him personal damage politically. Botha said there was a bad reaction in South Africa and Namibia over his current visit to New York. He was accused of crawling on his knees to Waldheim.

3. South Africa had accepted the U.N. plan but that had been a controversial decision. They had agreed to eliminate racial discrimination in Namibia. They had agreed that there would be fair one-man, one-vote elections with the U.N. presence. Now South Africa was being asked to make final decisions immediately. Botha said he would try to persuade the body elected in December to convene itself before December 20 to begin consultations. He could not understand why the U.N. and the Western Five could not wait another couple of weeks for answers. Botha argued that it would have been better for South Africa to have rejected the UN plan weeks ago and proceeded with the December elections if it really was determined to have an internal settlement.

4. Nevertheless South Africa had accepted the U.N. plan and it could promise to use its best efforts to persuade those elected in December to accept the plan and cooperate in its implementation. He assured the Secretary that the SAG had no intention of using a good turnout as a basis for telling the U.N. that South Africa would not proceed with the Waldheim plan. But, no firm agreements could be made before the election was out of the way. South Africa would not be so foolish as to go back on its word and try to impose an internal settlement. A good turnout would be a basis for telling the Southwesterners that they had “made their point”.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2653. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis.
5. When Botha raised the issue of the numbers and composition of UNTAG troops the Secretary asked him why he couldn’t agree during this visit concerning these issues. Fourie said they discussed troop numbers in Pretoria with the Five Ministers, who had said that the number would not be above 4,550. The Secretary responded that it was not that simple, that the Ministers’ use of numbers was based on their information from SYG Waldheim. The Secretary reminded Botha that the Ministers had not promised the South Africans they could get a lower figure from the Secretary General. Their response had been merely that if the South Africans wished they could discuss a smaller size UNTAG military component with the SYG.

6. The Secretary said he wanted to address Botha’s concerns systematically. With regard to the Ahtisaari visit, the Ministers had thought there was a good chance for his visit. They had felt they had resolved three issues in their Pretoria meetings, but the December elections remained a problem. Then SAG statements concerning the significance of the elections and the invitations to observe the elections which had been issued to the UN press corps had heightened suspicions that South Africa was headed toward an internal settlement. The result was a real struggle in the Security Council after their return from Pretoria. A bad mood developed due to South Africa’s actions.

7. The Secretary said that due to the prevailing suspicions and negativism, some progress was necessary during Botha’s current visit. Otherwise, it would be difficult to keep the process alive. He suggested that Botha discuss and agree upon—even if ad referendum—a date in January for the arrival of UNTAG in Namibia. If no progress is achieved he warned that we would be headed toward Chapter 7 actions, including sanctions, under the Charter of the UN. He urged that Botha try to clear up the question of the composition and number of UNTAG troops.

8. Amb Leonard assured Botha that we do not question his good faith but many govts do not think there has been an unconditional decision on the part of the South African Govt to accept and implement the UN plan. This suspicion has been reinforced by South Africa’s insistence on going ahead with the December 4 elections. We need some progress from this current visit to be able to handle these suspicions.

9. Concerning sanctions, Botha remarked that he was under the impression, gained from some African govts, that there was no strong pressure toward sanctions. The Secretary and Amb Leonard assured him the opposite was true.

10. Referring again to the elections, Botha explained that once they were carried out there would be a whole new ball game. He implied that the way would be open for implementation of the UN plan. The South African Govt would tell those persons elected that they had won the elections and could do so again under UN supervision. Even though
the proclamation under which the elections are being held indicates that the body elected would be a Constituent Assembly and draft a constitution, that does not mean the constitution would be approved by the South African Govt. He could not discount totally the possibility that an internal settlement would develop but he believed that such a development would be “highly unlikely”. He referred to a statement by Democratic Turnhalle Alliance official Dirk Mudge last week to the effect the UN supervised elections would produce a Constituent Assembly. He said that he (Botha) had drafted that statement for Mudge.

11. Again, on the subject of number and composition of UNTAG military personnel, the Secretary suggested that Botha meet with Waldheim alone to discuss this matter. It was something that the South Africans and the Secretary General would have to work out. The Five could make no commitments.

12. During the meeting, Botha indicated that his five p.m. meeting with Waldheim would be cancelled. He would phone Prime Minister P.W. Botha to inform him of the discussion with the Secretary and the suggestions that had been made. In addition, a cable would be sent. They would expect a response tomorrow morning before meeting with the Secretary General.

13. Comment: We believe that some progress was made during the meeting with Botha and Fourie. The tone of the meeting was not bad. The South Africans understand the things that must be done to keep the process moving.

14. This is a partial report on the Secretary’s meeting with Botha, but covers, we believe, the major points concerning Namibia. A more complete memcon of the discussion is being prepared. As the cable has not been reviewed by the Secretary, we are transmitting it to the Dept for review and appropriate distribution.

Leonard
Meeting—Thursday, Nov. 30, 8:45 AM

JC: What are South African attitudes on peace and outside world?

B: Optimum. There will be disillusion with the Russians. B will disappoint the Russians. Mozambique already wants closer economic relations with South Africa. We also opened railroad line to Zambia.

JC: What about Namibia? Will you carry out the UN resolutions?

B: That is our will.

JC: Do you speak for the Prime Minister?

B: Yes. The decision must be up to the people. We can’t conclude the agreement for the people.

JC: After the election, when will the UN be there and have election?

B: If the body gets together by Dec. 20, the final decision could be had by end of December.

JC: Cy, when will sanctions be listed?

CV: If there is no decision, during December.

B: It takes 8 days to count the votes. We will do our utmost. If the UN can’t wait a few weeks, there is no use to have good intentions. We accepted in April to have elections this year.

JC: but why can’t you give a specific answer in a month? It could prevent serious sanctions.

B: We will endeavor to do so. The body will meet on Dec. 20.

JC: So can’t you provide within the month.

B: I will speak to the Prime Minister.

JC: We would prefer to avoid sanctions. This may be the last opportunity.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, South Africa, Republic of, 3/78–1/80. Secret. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Vance, Brzezinski, Brand Fourie, and Roelof Botha. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room and concluded at 9:35 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

2 Unilateral elections were held December 4–8. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) won 80 percent of the vote. (Keeling’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, p. 29465)
CV: Reach the Waldheims 4 points (?)\(^3\)

B: We distrust the UN—it supports SWAPO. I cannot sell the UN plan without having the countries of origin of the UN troops.

Discussion of size of UN forces.

CV: Realistic figure would be 4,500.

B: The West never mentioned more than 3,000; now suddenly the UN is talking about 7,500.

JC: What countries would you accept?

B: Indonesia, Morocco, Iran, Sudan

JC: Nigeria?

B: No

CV: Nigeria doesn’t want it. Yugoslavia or Russia might be acceptable.

B: I will check with the Israelis on their experience.

Discussion again of Waldheim’s 4 points.

B: I will try to get the Prime Minister to adopt the 4 points, maybe with some very small changes.

JC: I agree that the UN force should not have some radical elements. Composition more important than numbers. You be flexible on the number; we will help on the composition.

JC: Your relations with Angola?

B: We have had personal contacts. Fourie has been there.

JC: We have found Neto eager to improve relations with the West.

B: It’s also in our interest.

CV: You should send someone soon.

B: I am willing to do it.

B: What about your meeting with the Prime Minister

CV: If there is progress on Namibia.

JC: I am not sure now it will be constructive. Waldheim’s proposals are minimal.

B: I am thinking of a broad discussion of South African problems.

---

\(^3\) In telegram 5562 from USUN, December 1, the Mission transmitted Waldheim’s Four Points: “A. South African Government should reiterate its willingness to cooperate in the implementation of Resolution 435; B. SAG should indicate its willingness within month to conclude its consultations with ‘the parties concerned’ on the principles of implementing Res 435 and communicate the results to the SYG; C. South Africa should reaffirm that it retains authority in Namibia pending the implementation of the UN proposals; and D. South Africa will continue consultations with the UN on outstanding points in an effort to resolve them.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780496–1049)
JC: Until Namibia is resolved, I couldn’t do it, but I would like to when it is resolved.

102. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Botha

Washington, December 11, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received your letter of December 4, and commend your wise decision to send Pik Botha to the United Nations to discuss implementing Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia with the Secretary General. I gather that his talks with the Secretary General were useful, particularly in enabling your Government to respond affirmatively to the four questions posed by the Secretary General.

Mr. Botha’s visit also enabled him to hold extended discussions with Secretary Vance, and gave me an opportunity to meet with him. I welcomed these discussions and the opportunity they provided your Government to express its willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in implementing Resolution 435. As I know you understand, your full, prompt and good faith implementation of that Resolution will be the central factor in determining whether or not the Security Council decides to take decisive steps under Chapter VII. That same constructive action by your Government also cannot help but improve relations, not only between our two governments, but also between South Africa and the international community generally.

Thus, I urge you quickly to establish with the United Nations an early date for deploying UNTAG, with elections to take place thereafter according to the provisions of the plan outlined in the Contact Group proposal to which your Government has agreed.

As I indicated to the Foreign Minister, I am confident that the important matter of the composition of UNTAG can be worked out in

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 18, South Africa: Prime Minister Pieter Wilem Botha, 9/78–2/80. No classification marking.
2 In telegram 7190 from Pretoria, December 4, the Embassy transmitted the text of Botha’s letter to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 103, 12/78)
3 See Documents 100 and 101.
consultation with the Secretary General. I have the highest regard for the Secretary General’s sense of responsibility in this regard. In the past, in areas such as the Middle East and Cyprus, UN forces coming from various countries have acted with impartiality and professionalism. With this record in mind, both Egypt and Israel agreed at Camp David that there had to be a UN Peacekeeping Force stationed in the Sinai after Israeli withdrawal.

I can assure you that the United States, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, will make every effort to ensure that the United Nations effectively and impartially carries out its mandate under Resolution 435. I know you can count fully on a similar attitude on the part of France and the UK, and of the FRG and Canada for the period remaining to them on the Security Council.

Again, I thank you for sending your Foreign Minister and for your letter.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

103. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, February 20, 1979, 1853Z

707. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: (C) Message From Secretary General to the Heads of State of the Frontline States, the Five; Nigeria and Sudan.

1. (C–entire text).

2. Para three below contains the text of identical telegrams concerning Namibia sent late last night (Feb 19) from Secretary General Waldheim to the Heads of State or Government of the Frontline States,
the Five, Nigeria, and Sudan (as OAU Chairman). Mission comment follows septel.²

3. Following is text of telegram.

Begin text:

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the recent visit of my Special Representative, Mr. M. Ahtisaari, to Southern Africa³, in connexion with the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). On the basis of my Special Representative’s findings, I am now in the process of finalizing my report⁴ to the Security Council, which I hope to submit by the end of this week.

I should mention that while both the Government of South Africa and SWAPO have agreed to co-operate in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435, they give differing interpretations as to certain practical aspects of implementation. I intend to address myself to these questions in my forthcoming report to the Security Council. I have already had an opportunity of discussing these matters with representatives of the Frontline States as well as representatives of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The purpose of this letter is to bring to your attention these issues, together with my views as to the manner in which they can best be settled in accordance with Security Council Resolution 435, and to enlist your support. The outstanding issues and my proposals are set forth in the annex to this letter. In addition there remains the question of the military component of UNTAG. Here again, the positions of the parties still need to be reconciled. In preparing my initial suggestions,

² In telegram 712 from USUN, February 21, Young reported on the Contact Group’s concerns about Waldheim’s message: “In particular the Group regretted that Waldheim had failed to emphasize: (a) the urgency of resolving the remaining issues (the idea that the opportunity for implementation is here and that delay may be very costly); (b) the balanced nature of the solutions he proposed for the remaining issues (the Contact Group draft had gone to great lengths to show the differing points of view on the various outstanding issues and therefore to display the reasonableness and even-handedness of Waldheim’s proposed solutions). In addition, the overall brevity of the ‘outstanding issues and proposals’ section of Waldheim’s message resulted in a lack of precision and comprehensiveness.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790079–1058)

³ Ahtisaari visited South Africa and Namibia January 13–22.

⁴ In telegram 802 from USUN, February 26, the Mission transmitted Waldheim’s report to the UN Security Council. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, Information Management Section, 1979 Briefing, Fact Sheets, Visit, and Conference Books for the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and other Senior Officials, Lot 80D110, Box 1, Namibia, Proximity Talks, March 18–20, 1979) The February 26 report is summarized in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 1071–1072.
which have already been brought to your attention, I had to balance a number of factors: equitable geographical distribution, reasonable political acceptability, willingness of the proposed troop-contributing countries to participate, and in the case of logistics the capacity to perform the required tasks. In the present circumstances, I continue to believe that my original suggestions best meet these requirements.

I realize that the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 is possible only with the co-operation of the parties. I am also aware of the importance that your government places upon achieving a settlement resulting in a free Namibia and the establishment of peaceful conditions in the area. I deeply appreciate the invaluable assistance you have already extended to us, and in this spirit I address this urgent appeal for your support which is vital to the success of our current endeavour.

I am addressing identical letters to the Heads of State or Government of Angola, Botswana, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zambia; and to the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity.

I take this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim
Secretary General
United Nations

Outstanding issues and proposals

The following would form the basis for the proposals which I intend to incorporate in my report:

(1) Return of Namibians and SWAPO personnel

Regarding the return of Namibians, I would request the South African Government scrupulously to adhere to the relevant terms of the proposal which make clear that all Namibians are to be permitted to return without risk of arrest or intimidation. Suitable reception facilities would be operated under the close supervision of the UNHCR, and returnees would be free to travel onward to whatever part of the country they might wish. In this connexion the proposal provides for the peaceful return of SWAPO personnel from outside the territory through designated entry points. This would mean without arms or military equipment.

(2) Monitoring of restriction to base of SWAPO armed forces

I would emphasize that the proposal makes no provision for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases outside Namibia. However,
any SWAPO armed forces inside Namibia at the time of the ceasefire would be restricted to bases designated by the Special Representative and monitored by UNTAG.

(3) Role of the Security Council

I would make clear that there is no basis, in regard to the proposal, for unilateral determination actions by any party. Should implementation of any aspect of the proposal be jeopardized by the failure of any party to carry out its provisions, I would bring the matter to the attention of the Security Council.

(4) Co-operation with neighboring countries

I would refer to the assurances of co-operation which I have received from the neighboring countries in regard to the terms of the proposal concerning the transitional arrangements. In order further to facilitate this co-operation, I have sought the approval of the Governments of Angola, Botswana and Zambia for the establishment of UN liaison offices in their countries.

(5) Ceasefire arrangements

In accordance with normal practice the ceasefire should apply simultaneously to both South African and SWAPO armed forces. To this end I would address identical letters to both parties proposing a specific hour and date for the ceasefire to begin. In that letter I would also request both parties to inform me in writing of their agreement to abide by the terms of the ceasefire.

End text.
104. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, February 28, 1979, 0440Z

831. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Draft Message From the Five Foreign Ministers to South African Foreign Minister Botha.

1. (C—Entire text).
2. The Contact Group approved ad referendum pm Feb. 27 the following draft message from the Five Foreign Ministers to South African Foreign Minister Botha. As discussed septel, the Group believes it most important that this message be delivered to Botha prior to his departure for Windhoek (pm Feb. 28 or am March 1).\(^2\)
3. AmEmbassy London: Please pass text immediately to FCO.
4. Begin text of message:

1. We are writing to you at this time about Namibia, because the settlement has reached a critical phase and because our Ambassadors in Cape Town have conveyed to us your current concerns.
2. In our view the Secretary General’s report on implementation is fair and reasonable. It reflects a positive approach and makes practical proposals which we support.
3. We are disturbed, however, by the indications in the statement by Prime Minister Botha on 26 February and by your remarks to our Ambassadors that you believe decisions inconsistent with the proposal, and therefore unacceptable to you, have been taken and are being concealed from you. We have been closely in touch with the Secretary General about the implementation of the plan. There were of course suggestions which were inconsistent with the proposal, or clearly unacceptable or unworkable. However, none of these are included in the report or in any sense agreed to.
4. We should like to set out for you our understanding of the basis on which the Secretary General’s report was written. On some issues it proposes solutions in practical terms for the problems which UNTAG

---


2 In telegram 830 from USUN, February 28, the Mission summarized the February 27 Contact Group meeting, which focused on possible actions “the Five might take to influence upcoming events concerning Namibia.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128–1578)
will meet on the ground. We cite, for example, the measures proposed to ensure the peaceful return of Namibians.

5. On some other issues the report is not so detailed. We realize that you would have preferred the report to deal specifically with the means by which SWAPO will be restricted to base in the neighboring countries. We are confident that the Secretary General will in practice be able to deal satisfactorily with this question through the establishment of UNTAG offices in the neighboring states.

6. The difficulty is however that this has become very much a public issue, and the more so it becomes, the more difficult it is to solve. We are sure it can be solved if all those concerned display the necessary discretion and political sensitivity.

7. We should also like to address the question of how to deal with SWAPO military personnel inside Namibia at the start of the ceasefire. If there are no SWAPO armed forces in the territory at that time, there will be no problem. If, however, there are such personnel who identify themselves as such at the start of the ceasefire, they will, under the Secretary General’s proposal, be restricted under UN monitoring to locations to be designated by the Special Representative after necessary consultation. These arrangements seem to us to be fair and practical. The people involved have the right to stay in the territory and should be encouraged to reveal rather than conceal their military status. On the other hand, it is clear that the number of SWAPO armed personnel in Namibia cannot be permitted to increase after the ceasefire begins.

8. The time to implement the proposal is now. Delay will only jeopardize the settlement. Neither side will be completely satisfied by the Secretary General’s proposals. But we think that a real and honest effort has been made, and that the balance between the concerns of both parties is being struck as fairly as it ever can be.

9. We urge you to respond positively to the Secretary General by March 5.3

End text.

3 In telegram 472 from Cape Town, March 6, the Embassy transmitted Botha’s detailed letter to Waldheim. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790103-0828) In telegram 489 from Cape Town, March 7, the Embassy transmitted Botha’s letter regarding the message from the Foreign Ministers to Vance. Botha expressed concerns about the prospects for negotiations on Namibia: “The position adopted by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council and his pronouncements on some key issues of the settlement plan have assumed the ominous appearance of an expectation of failure. In the light of Dr. Waldheim’s report and in particular the serious deviations from the final settlement plan it is my belief that the process which until recently had generated hope and confidence for a successful resolution has now reached an impasse.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790105-0317)
105. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, March 1, 1979, 1115Z

414. Dept also please pass to White House and USUN. Subject: Namibia: Talk With Prime Minister Botha. Ref: (A) State 48936; (B) Helman/Edmondson KY–70 telecon.

1. S–entire text.

2. South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha received me at his residence from 0715 to 0725 local this morning (March 1) just prior to his 0730 departure for a flight to Windhoek where he and Foreign Minister Pik Botha will consult with the “Constituent Assembly” about the implications of Secretary Waldheim’s February 26 report to the Security Council on Namibia.

3. I conveyed to him the information in ref (A), but he was obviously not impressed. When I said that we believed South Africa’s concern regarding SWAPO camps in Angola and Zambia will be satisfactorily met, he interrupted to say he did not agree. Although I put strong oral emphasis on the phrase “the full range of its (the U.S. Government’s) existing intelligence capabilities,” the Prime Minister did not respond to that point in particular nor did he ask any questions about it. He simply said, at the end of my presentation, “But what about the camps inside South West Africa? You are addressing the wrong issue.” He then went on to claim that the Western Five had “left South Africa in the lurch” by going along with something new that was never in the

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 3/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 In telegram 48936 to Cape Town, March 1, the Department transmitted the following message for either Pik Botha or P.W. Botha from Vance: “We believe that the UN will be able to establish effective civilian liaison arrangements in Zambia and in Angola which will provide a basis for monitoring SWAPO camps in those countries. As a consequence, we believe that South Africa’s concern regarding those camps and their monitoring will be satisfactorily met. At the same time, we want the SAG to know that we take most seriously our responsibility as participants in the negotiations leading to the present settlement to which South Africa has agreed. In light of that, we wish the SAG to know that the U.S. plans to employ the full range of its existing intelligence capabilities to monitor those SWAPO camps. This will provide us with added information regarding those camps. (FYI, you should make no commitment to Botha that we will supply photos or information. End FYI). With that information, combined with other normal monitoring activities, we believe that South Africa can have high confidence that the camps will not be used in a fashion which might undermine the successful implementation of the Namibia agreement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2335)

3 Not found.
agreement; there had never been a provision for SWAPO camps to be established in South West Africa.

4. I made some of the points that the Five had previously made with Fourie, but the Prime Minister was not interested and replied instead that South Africa had been deceived by the UN. He hinted (as Pik Botha and Fourie had done earlier) at some kind of underhanded dealings at the UN, or by the UN. I said I had already heard these general allegations but did not know what he was referring to. “Then, you had better check,” he said. I replied that the only thing I knew of were reports that had circulated concerning some of SWAPO’s most extreme original demands, but that any examination of these demands would show that SWAPO had not won any of them. At this point he only repeated his hint about deceitful action by unspecified parties and suggested that President Carter would be concerned if he knew what was going on behind the scenes. I said I would faithfully report his views and any specific information he wished to convey but I did not comprehend the real nature of the charges he was making.

5. After a solemn, dramatic statement that “a representative of the United States should be ashamed,” Botha said that I should report his view that (a) the Western Five have “left South Africa in the lurch,” and (b) the UN Secretary General and the Western Five are more interested in pleasing the Frontline African States and SWAPO than in cooperating with South Africa.” I responded “with all due respect” that this was not true, that neither the Western Five, nor as far as I could tell, the UN, favored one party over another in the long process of negotiations that had gone on; we were all trying very hard to find a workable solution, not the ideal of any one party or group. He reminded me that he had told Secretary Vance that he would not sacrifice stability to win international acceptability. I said we were aware of and respected his position but sincerely believed that the settlement procedures outlined by the Secretary General were workable ones that required no such sacrifice.

6. The Prime Minister asked if I was aware of Sam Nujoma’s latest speech to the OAU. I said that I had seen the local press reports and also received some good summaries. Botha thought this showed how impossible it was to deal with SWAPO; he did not acknowledge my counterpoint that it could equally be seen as evidence that neither the West nor the UN was “favoring SWAPO.”

7. Botha asked if I had a written message. I said no, adding that I understood Secretary Vance was speaking to the Foreign Minister by phone but that I had been asked to convey the message I had just given him (ref A) personally because of the highest level sensitivity attached to it.

8. Botha was formally polite and controlled throughout but not in a mood to argue substance. He repeated not just once but several times
over that the West had left South Africa “in the lurch,” had accepted (from SWAPO) things that were never included in the original proposal, and was more eager to please the Frontline and SWAPO than to cooperate with South Africa. At the end he escorted me to the door and thanked me for coming; I wished him a good trip to Windhoek.

9. The foregoing has to be weighed in the light of the mood reflected by Pik Botha in his telephone conversation with the Secretary, and by Fourie in his meeting with the Cape Town Five last night (septel). While it is often difficult to factor out the personal feelings of these men from their tactical maneuvering and to predict what their next actions are going to be, they certainly project a sense of self-righteous outrage at the current UN and Western position on implementation of the Namibia settlement plan and a determination not to concede on their major points of concern. We will attempt an assessment of the situation in a later message.

Edmondson

---

4 In telegram 413 from Cape Town March 1, the Embassy reported on Fourie’s meeting with the Cape Town Force. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790093–0311)

---

106. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, March 1, 1979, 2043Z

49690. For Ambassador Edmondson from the Secretary. Subject: Namibia: Message From the Secretary to Pik Botha.

1. Confidential (Entire text).

2. When I talked with Pik last night at 11:00 pm Washington time, he placed particular stress on the South African view that they have been deceived by the UN which has been doing everything possible to assist SWAPO. The flavor of our conversation was quite similar to

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790093–0899. Confidential; Niac Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Thomas Niles (IO/UNP) and Vance; cleared by Newsom, Maynes, and Keeley; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to USUN.

2 No memorandum of their telephone conversation was found.
the talk you had with the Prime Minister a bit later (Cape Town 414).\(^3\)
I told Pik that I would look into his charges on an urgent basis, and I believe that we must deal with this problem of South Africa’s feeling of having been tricked if we are to be able to move ahead on Namibia. However, in order to respond to the SAG’s charges, we need some specifics, not just allegations that the UN is in SWAPO’s corner. Please deliver the message from me to Pik contained in para 3 below as soon as possible following his return from Windhoek.\(^4\)

3. Begin text. Dear Pik: As I promised to do when we talked last night, I have given urgent attention to your view that South Africa has been the victim of duplicity and deception by and at the UN during the recent discussions of the Namibia question. I believe that we must get to the heart of this matter and resolve the problems which have arisen. We have invested too much in the search for a peaceful settlement in Namibia and the stakes are too high for us to allow this initiative to fail at the last minute.

In order to help me resolve this matter I would appreciate your help in providing me with specific facts and leads I could pursue. You may be sure that whatever you provide me will be treated with absolute confidence. If this suggestion is acceptable would you please give this information either to Ambassador Edmondson for transmission to me personally or send it to me through Ambassador Sole in Washington.

I feel sure that this latest problem can be overcome, as all of the previous ones have been, and that you can reach a final agreement with the United Nations on the arrangements for the transitional period.

With warm regards, Cy. End text.

Vance

---

3 See Document 105.

4 In telegram 433 from Cape Town, March 2, the Embassy informed the Department that the Secretary’s message was delivered to Brand Fourie at 7:30 a.m. Edmondson noted that he delivered it “with a personal covering note to Pik asking him to let me know of any response I should convey or if I should indicate that something would be coming through Don Sole in Washington.” In a discussion about SWAPO armed forces in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire, Edmonson noted that Fourie said “it had been agreed” that any such persons would either have to give up their arms or be arrested if they did not leave the territory. (His previous contention was that they had to be restricted to their bases outside Namibia.) I said I had never heard of such agreement and wondered if he could cite the date when this was discussed. He thought he could do so from verbatim records the SAG had kept.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790095–0798)
107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town and the Mission to the United Nations

Washington, March 6, 1979, 0022Z

54634. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: Botha’s Response to the Secretary. Ref: A) Cape Town 433; B) State 49690.

1. (C–entire text)

2. South African Ambassador Sole called on the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary March 5 to deliver text of Botha’s response to the Secretary’s message (ref B) requesting specifics on South African charges of UN and Contact Group duplicity in recent Namibia negotiations. Botha’s response (text in para 5 below) does not provide the degree of detail which the South Africans have already leaked to the press in support of their charges (such as in Fleurde Villiers March 4 Sunday Times article cited in Cape Town 441). Response from the Secretary being prepared and will be sent septel.

3. In explaining the South African position, Ambassador Sole, who was accompanied by South African UN Charge Ecksteen, generally went over familiar ground. He noted that the letter gave particular attention to the issue of UNTAG composition, although he said that he personally believed that South Africa could accept any composition package proposed by the Secretary General as long as it did not include Nigeria or one of the Front Line States. Sole explained the emphasis on the composition issue as indicative of South Africa’s view that it had been tricked and deceived throughout the recent negotiations and that its views had been completely ignored. The key issue, Sole pointed out, was the lack of confidence in the UN’s objectivity which the recent negotiations have engendered among people in South Africa and in Namibia itself. Confidence in the UN’s objectivity was very much undermined, he said, and he doubted that it could be restored. South Africa was being presented with a fait accompli, he claimed, because it was clearly impossible for Waldheim now to back off and assume a

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790102-0557. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Niles; cleared by Gerald B. Helman (IO), Robert V. Peeley (AF), Peter S. Bridges (IO/UNP), Jackson (P), George H. Mitchell (S); approved by Christopher.

2 See footnote 4, Document 106.

3 See Document 106.

4 Telegram 441 from Cape Town, March 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790099-0676)

5 See Document 108.
position more favorable than that contained in his February 26 report to the Security Council.

4. In discussing the question of SWAPO bases in Namibia, Sole stressed that there were no such bases now and that the establishment of a base would attract additional armed SWAPO personnel leading to a progressive build up of SWAPO forces in the country. He suggested that unarmed SWAPO personnel could cross the frontier, obtain arms from secret arms caches in Namibia and then claim to be members of SWAPO’s armed forces. Ecksteen interjected that South Africa simply could not understand what was going on in New York. He cited as an example Ambassador McHenry’s statement that the section in the annex dealing with monitoring of SWAPO bases was a mistake, and he asked how it was possible for South Africa to proceed on this basis. Sole referred to “aggressive” SWAPO statements, noted that there were new sabotage incidents in the country including an attack on a railroad south of Windhoek, and said that somehow these remaining issues must be resolved. There must be monitoring in Angola and Zambia and there could be no SWAPO bases in Namibia. Sole said that the “South West Africans” will not accept SWAPO bases in Namibia and that “we won’t overrule them.”

5. The Secretary noted that he did not have the details on these matters at hand and asked the Deputy Secretary to get the information together for a response.

5 [sic]. Following is text of Botha letter:

I appreciate receiving your letter of 2 March 1979 and I am encouraged by your views that we must get to the heart of the matter.

We have for some time now been extremely concerned about information which has come to our attention concerning the developments surrounding Mr. Ahtisaari’s visit to the Frontline States and the preparatory work in New York leading to the Secretary-General’s final report. This information derives from sources which hold no brief for South Africa, neither do they stand to gain anything from it.

During Mr. Ahtisaari’s visit to South West Africa and South Africa from 14 to 22 January 1979 he categorically refused to discuss with the Administrator-General and with myself the question of the composition of the military component of UNTAG, on the grounds that he had not been authorized to do so by the Secretary-General, who had

---

6 Transmitted in telegram 49690; see Document 106.
7 In telegram 258 from Pretoria, January 15, the Embassy reported on the January 13 meeting between Ahtisaari and Brand Fourie in Johannesburg and a meeting later that day with Edmondson and German Chargé Michael Schmidt. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790020-0988)
reserved for him personally the question for consultations with the parties in New York. This fact the Secretary-General, specifically emphasized in his letter to me on 1 January 1979 (S/13002). We eventually accepted the position and resorted to conveying our comments in this regard directly to the Secretary-General. However, we subsequently learnt that, while Mr. Ahtisaari had been requested to press Mr. Nujoma in Luanda to arrange for SWAPO’s response on the Secretary-General’s initial proposal on composition to be conveyed to the Secretary-General in New York without delay, Mr. Ahtisaari nevertheless had felt perfectly free to exchange views on this subject with Mr. Nujoma during their meeting in Luanda. Moreover, Mr. Ahtisaari and the Secretary-General thereafter changed their proposal in this regard without even consulting South Africa.

As you know, composition has all along been a very important aspect for South Africa—you will recall our conversation with President Carter and what he said about our right to insist on a well balanced force. We also emphasized that composition was more important than numbers.

You yourself will recall that also during the discussions with the Five South Africa was time and again assured that it could afford to be less concerned about the actual size of the component since its views on composition would be taken into account. Consultation on composition was in keeping with long-standing United Nations practice which recognizes the necessity of paying due regard to the views of the host country. It was emphasized that practicalities and the importance of the cooperation of the receiving country made it impossible for the United Nations to emplace forces in a country without its agreement. We need therefore have no fears on that score, we were told. To avoid any future misunderstanding South Africa, for its part, repeatedly pointed out that it would not be willing to accept countries who had in the past identified themselves with the aims of SWAPO. Their forces could not be expected to act with absolute impartiality.

In actual fact, the South African Government was presented with a “working model” by the Secretary-General and, in an effort to reach agreement, the South African Government indicated its acceptance of forces from certain countries hostile to South Africa and parties in South West Africa, other than SWAPO. Indeed as far as the infantry
battalions were concerned, we accepted at the outset Ghana and Romania from the “working model.”

In the course of the “consultations” South Africa proposed several African countries, none of which was accepted. It also suggested several Asian, Latin American and Western European countries—all of these suggestions falling within the pattern of equitable geographic distribution—and yet again none was accepted.

The process of consultation therefore, simply amounted to a procedure whereby the same “working model” was repeatedly presented to us as the only feasible group of countries. This implied that either the “working model” had to be accepted or UNTAG could not be emplaced.

In regard to the “two further countries” to provide infantry mention by the Secretary-General in his letter dated 1 March 1979 to the Security Council it is significant that he omitted Canada, which was included in the original “working model” and which incidentally was accepted by South Africa. Is this because Canada is a member of NATO and SWAPO has in the meantime made clear its attitude so far as NATO countries are concerned?

A second major concern to us relates to the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council.

When an early draft of the Waldheim report was discussed with the Five in New York, terminology was inserted to the effect that a form of monitoring of SWAPO would take place. Upon preparing the redraft this sentence was omitted by the Secretariat but it was reinserted when this became apparent. When presenting the redraft to the Frontline States, Mr. Ahtisaari in response to a question, stated that the particular phrase had nothing to do with South Africa’s request that SWAPO bases be monitored.

When Mr. Ahtisaari was in Cape Town and the question of monitoring on both sides was discussed, there was no suggestion that SWAPO would not be monitored outside South West Africa. Indeed Mr. Ahtisaari was appreciative when South Africa indicated that it was willing to allow monitoring south of the Orange River, since this would ease his task when he discussed this with the Frontline States.

I do not have to remind you of the utmost importance we and all the parties in South West Africa, with the exception of SWAPO, attach to the necessity of effectively monitoring both sides, as is clearly required by the annexure to the Western proposal.

We were appalled by the Secretary-General emphasizing in the annexure to his letter sent on 19 February 1979 to President Carter and eleven other Heads of State and Government, including those of the Frontline States, Nigeria and the Sudan, that the settlement proposal “makes no provision for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO bases
outside Namibia.”” We were shocked to learn of the endorsement of this interpretation by the Five.

Are the relevant provisions meaningless and, if so, I presume they are equally meaningless in so far as the South African forces are concerned?

Furthermore, if that is the attitude of the Secretary-General and of Mr. Ahtisaari, what was the purpose of the Special Representative’s discussions with us on this question during his Cape Town visit? The question therefore arises: When did the Secretary-General and Mr. Ahtisaari discover—or when were they informed—that the proposal and its annexure contained no such provision? Clearly this occurred after Mr. Ahtisaari’s visit to South Africa. And for one of the Five to tell us ten months after accepting the proposal in its final and definitive form, that the presence of a vital provision in its annexure is a mistake and should have been omitted is incomprehensible.

In addition a totally new and amazing concept was introduced in the Secretary-General’s report, namely the provision to restrict “to base at designated locations inside Namibia, to be specified by the Special Representative,” SWAPO personnel.

Throughout the discussions, over 23 months, it was abundantly clear that there were no SWAPO bases inside South West Africa and the possibility of creating such bases was never even considered.

The preparations of the letter and annexure in question came to our notice during discussions with the Secretary-General and his staff and with members of the Western Five. The letter with annexure was prepared and despatched (under the authorization of an Assistant Secretary-General for special political questions) without Dr. Waldheim approving the final version and in the “absence” of Mr. Ahtisaari on a visit to Washington, D.C. When the particular sentence was pointed out to the Secretary-General he intimated that the letter and annexure had been coordinated with, approved by and sent out with the full knowledge of the Western Five. The Five in turn, tried to disassociate them from some of the contents of the letter and the annexure.

Thus, South Africa was again confronted with a statement in an official United Nations document. We know from experience that once anything has gone into such a document, South Africa has no chance of having it deleted.

We are fully aware of certain preposterous claims by SWAPO and that these were in fact listed in one of the earlier drafts of the report. For the sake of expedience these were omitted in the final draft and

---

9 Transmitted in telegram 707 from USUN, February 20. See Document 103.
replaced by the phrase “differing interpretations and perceptions regarding the implementation of certain provisions of the settlement proposal.”

These are some examples of incidents which have come to our knowledge. You will appreciate that they give rise to a strong feeling on our side that we have not been dealt with fairly. As you yourself have indicated, on several occasions, mutual trust underpins this entire undertaking. We can accept that a certain amount of intrigue is unavoidable in negotiations of this nature but the above goes much further and destroys the confidence that this exercise can be carried out impartially and in the best interests of all the people of Namibia.

I must reiterate that we have become doubtful of the ability of the Five Western powers to comply with their commitment in terms of their settlement proposal.

Vance

108. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations and the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, March 14, 1979, 0059Z


1. (C–entire text)

2. The Acting Secretary met March 13 with South African Ambassador Sole to hand over US response to South African Foreign Minister Botha’s letter of March 5, 1978 [1979]. Our response rejects Botha’s allegations of bad faith and deception leveled at members of Contact Group and the UN Secretariat. The Acting Secretary advised Sole that Secretary Vance had asked him to respond to Botha’s March 5 letter and pointed out that the Secretary had approved the text of both the letter to Foreign Minister Botha and the annex.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790116–1158. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Niles; cleared by John H. Trattner (D), and Paul Hare (AF/S); approved by Maynes. Sent for information Immediate to Bonn, London, Ottawa, Paris, Lagos, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Gaborone, and Pretoria.

2 See Document 107.
3. After scanning the letter and the annex,³ Sole said he wanted to make the general comment that in his view the most difficult problem facing the world today is one of communication. He said that it was his impression that Foreign Minister Botha was persuaded that the UN had deceived South Africa. In this connection, Sole made a rather obscure reference to the fact that the Afrikaans as a group tended to be somewhat naive. The implications of this remark were unclear. It might mean either that Sole believes Botha had been too trusting in the fairness of the Western negotiators or that, as a parochial people, the Afrikaaners did not understand the give and take of a difficult negotiation.

4. Sole noted that he had just returned from a meeting with Pik Botha in Zurich attended by South African diplomats from Western Europe and the Americas, and he reported that Botha feels very strongly that he has not been treated honestly. Botha also made clear, according to Sole, that the two issues in question, namely, effective monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighboring countries and the inadmissibility of SWAPO bases in Namibia are “not negotiable for South Africa.” Despite this very firm statement, Sole then proceeded to imply that there could be some flexibility on the South African side. He recounted that during his October 1978 visit to Namibia, he had encountered grave suspicion of Western favoritism of SWAPO. As far as bases were concerned, he noted that if there were “200 or so armed SWAPO people in Namibia” the Five believe that they should be confined in the country. However, Sole pointed out that the local tribal forces must surrender all of their arms and be disbanded. These forces would feel discriminated against, if SWAPO were allowed to maintain its arms under UN monitoring.

(Comment: Sole appeared to be implying that there could be some trade-off here between a small SWAPO base under UN monitoring and the maintenance of the ethnic forces, also under UN monitoring. End comment)

5. Turning to the question of monitoring SWAPO bases, Sole pointed out that Namibia’s northern frontier was 1,000 miles long and that you would need one man every ten meters to monitor it effectively, i.e., roughly 160000 men by Sole’s calculation, while UNTAG would have no more than 2,500 men on the border and would thus be unable to control SWAPO infiltration.

6. Sole said he reckoned that as many as 7,500 armed SWAPO personnel would come across the border into Namibia and then request to be restricted at bases there under UN monitoring. Both during the

³ In telegram 62937 to Cape Town, March 14, the Department transmitted the letter from Christopher and the annex. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790118–0390)
meeting, and during a subsequent discussion, we attempted to point out to Sole that this behavior by SWAPO would be a very serious breach of the cease-fire and that the United States and the other members of the Contact Group would surely not defend SWAPO should it behave in this manner. As usual, Sole appeared receptive to our arguments, but it remains to be seen whether we would be able to satisfy the SAG on this point.

7. The Acting Secretary pointed out that we provided a very detailed and careful response to Foreign Minister Botha’s charges both because of the seriousness of the charges themselves and because of the importance we attach to finding a solution to the Namibia problem. He explained that we see the proposed Proximity Talks as providing a forum for the resolution of the remaining problems, and stressed in this connection our view that it would be most desirable to put an end to public recriminations regarding alleged deviousness and duplicity. Sole said he could not agree more with the Acting Secretary as regards the latter point but then added that Nigeria’s participation in the Proximity Talks would not set well with South Africa. (See septel4 for discussion of this issue and timing of South African response to invitation to Proximity Talks.)

8. In conclusion, the Acting Secretary called attention to the unfair and highly personal attacks on Ambassador Donald McHenry which have appeared in the South African press. He told Sole that we do not regard these attacks as being only against Ambassador McHenry, but also see them as aimed at the United States Government. The Acting Secretary said that we were very concerned about these attacks and asked that Sole report his concern and that of the Secretary to Foreign Minister Botha. Sole agreed to do so and said he personally deeply regretted these attacks. He said that he had never had any doubt about the honesty of Ambassador McHenry, whom he said he had known for many years.

9. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Acting Secretary expressed to Sole our grave concern over developments in Rhodesia. Sole said that this concern was fully shared by the Government of South Africa and noted that during his meeting in Zurich with Foreign Minister Botha March 9, Botha had said that the “fullest possible pressures” had been put on Ian Smith to persuade him not to run in the April 20 elections. Smith’s decision to do so, despite South Africa’s views, had been the cause of a “deep disappointment” in Cape Town, Sole noted.

4 Telegram 61960 to USUN and Cape Town, March 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790116–0972)
10. Text of Acting Secretary’s letter to Botha and annex will be sent to Cape Town and USUN. In view of length of document, we do not plan to send it to other addressee posts unless posts specifically request it.

Christopher

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, March 16, 1979, 0233Z

64211. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Namibia: Proximity Talks. For Ambassador Edmondson from the Secretary. For delivery to Ambassador Edmondson at 6:30 a.m. Friday.

1. Confidential entire text.

2. I would like you to deliver the following personal oral message from me to Foreign Minister Botha at opening of business tomorrow:

Begin quote

Dear Pik:

I believe that the Proximity Talks may well represent the last chance to obtain a peaceful, internationally acceptable settlement. If we are not to lose this chance, it is imperative that we all meet in New York.

Let me assure you that the talks are for the purpose of reaching an understanding on the implementation of the proposal in order to remove all misunderstandings that could complicate UNTAG’s deploy-

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–2346. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Maynes; cleared by Lake, Moose, and Vance in substance; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to USUN and the White House.

2 In telegram 609 from Cape Town, March 16, the Embassy transmitted Botha’s reply: “Dear Cy. Thank you for your letter conveyed to me telephonically by Ambassador Edmondson this morning. I assume that you decided on this response after you had had an opportunity of studying my letter despatched to you yesterday in which I stated that the South African Government could not be a party to the re-negotiation of the settlement proposal. Indeed you agree that the ‘talks are designed to discuss implementation of the proposal and not to re-negotiate the proposal.’ In the meantime I have also despatched my reply to your letter of 13 March 1979. On the basis of these exchanges I am preparing to proceed to New York to participate in the discussions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–1529)
The talks are designed to discuss implementation of the proposal and not to re-negotiate the proposal.

I and the other Ministers are prepared to meet with all parties from Namibia to discuss implementation of the proposal and I urge you to encourage all the parties in Namibia to go to New York.

At the same time, I cannot stress too strongly my hope that we can move away from continuing public exchanges.

I am looking forward to seeing you in New York. A great deal is at stake in our ability to make these talks succeed. I believe we can.

Warm regards. Cy.

End quote

3. Please add to Foreign Minister Botha that Secretary also looks forward to early private meeting with Botha in New York.

4. Secretary has informed Ambassador Sole that he was sending foregoing message to Botha.

Vance

---

3 In telegram 61135 to Cape Town, March 13, Vance wrote Botha: “Your government has raised serious substantive issues, which I believe can and must be dealt with promptly. My objective, and I feel sure my four Contact Group colleagues fully share it, will be to use the Proximity Talks as a forum in which these outstanding issues can be resolved, so that UNTAG can be deployed without further delay. I ask you to join with us in that effort, for it remains deeply in the interests of both of our nations that our endeavor succeed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790115-0424)
110. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State

Cape Town, March 16, 1979, 1204Z

598. From Embassy Cape Town. Dept please pass USUN and White House per ref tel. Subj: (C) Namibia Proximity Talks: Delivery of Secretary’s Oral Message to Foreign Minister Botha. Ref: State 64211.


2. I reached Pik Botha by telephone at 0830 Cape Town time March 16 and, at his request, read him the Secretary’s oral message (ref tel). He asked me to read it slowly so he could take notes; he later read it back to me with amazing accuracy.

3. At the end he said he was not quite clear what the Secretary meant by saying the Proximity Talks are for the purpose of reaching an understanding on the implementation of the proposal and not to re-negotiate the proposal; he wondered if I had any additional explanation. I said I could not embellish the Secretary’s words and had been given no additional explanation to provide him on this point. I thought it was clear.

4. Pik then asked whether something new was implied in saying that the Secretary and other Ministers were prepared to “meet with all parties to discuss implementation.” I said I took it at face value and would not wish to interpret it further. It was consistent with what we had said earlier, which the Cape Town Five explained to Fourie yesterday, i.e. that we had notified various parties of the talks and said that if they should wish to send representatives to New York at the time of the talks the Five would certainly make arrangements to meet with them and that, given the shortness of time, they cannot be assured an opportunity to meet with all (and I put oral stress on all) five of the Foreign Ministers, but we will make every effort to arrange Ministerial-level meetings. I said it was unfortunate that an issue had been created on both sides over the question of status and the semantic problem of invitation versus noninvitation. It was my impression that the format of the talks being proposed was essentially the same as for those last year except that we had taken the initiative of notifying internal parties and saying that if they wished to be in New York at that time, arrangements would be made to meet them. I added that it

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 3/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

simply complicated matters and made it harder to get to the real issues if arguments were stimulated over status. In this connection I quoted back to him a statement made to me by Neil Van Heerden last night to the effect that the SAG “had never insisted on the other parties being given principal status.” I said if this were the case and if we could deal with the substantive issues of implementation as opposed to procedural ones, then surely we could get things going.

5. Pik did not confirm Van Heerden’s statement but thanked me for conveying the Secretary’s message and said he would immediately inform the Prime Minister. He added that he would let me know of any reply.

6. We subsequently learned that Pik personally telephoned Kirkpatrick of the NNF and someone (probably Mudge) in the DTA to let them know of the Secretary’s letter. Kirkpatrick told us this morning that it was obvious even last night that Pik wanted to “get the show on the road.” Marais of the DTA told the British Embassy that news of the Secretary’s letter was “what we needed.”

7. British Ambassador Scott said he had received instructions from Dr. Owen to support the Secretary’s message with a similar one from him in which Owen said all who go to New York “will be met at Ministerial level.”

8. Comment: It appears that the messages from the Secretary and Dr. Owen have broken the log jam. Present indications are that NNF, SWAPO–D, DTA, Aktur, and Bishop de Vries, are planning to come. Internal SWAPO is also apparently planning to have at least three of their members join the SWAPO delegation. One hopes there will be time to hammer out the main issues between the SAG and SWAPO in the time available.

Edmondson
111. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

New York, March 19, 1979, 2217Z

Secto 3004. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (U) Namibia: March 19 Meeting of Contact Group Ministers and Front Line and Nigerian Representatives.

1. (C—entire text).

2. Contact Group met at Ministerial level at 1000 am March 19 with representatives of the Front Line and Nigeria to discuss major issues holding up a Namibia settlement. Angola did not attend. Following is detailed account of the meeting.

3. Vance—We appreciate the work of the Front Line (FL) and Nigeria have done with the Contact Group (CG). This has led to substantial progress. In resolving the remaining problems, we need your judgment and advice. I wish to invite the FL and Nigeria to express their views.

Mogwe (Botswana)—(The Foreign Minister pointed out that the meeting would have to be kept short because the FL wished to be present at the Security Council (SC) while Angola presented its case against South Africa in connection with South African raids into Angola.)

Let’s identify the issues. We are prepared to address them, but what are they?

Vance—We have identified the following issues:

A) Confinement to base of SWAPO forces in Namibia;
B) Confinement to base of SWAPO forces in neighboring states;
C) UNTAG troop composition, which is under discussion by the Secretary General with South Africa and SWAPO. The SYG is meeting with SWAPO and South Africa to discuss the third. Let us address the first and second.

Harriman (Nigeria)—On the two questions of confinement to base inside and outside of Namibia, what are the proposals and is there any sign of disagreement with SWAPO?

---


Vance—We haven’t spoken with SWAPO about this yet. SWAPO wants their meeting with us postponed until after the SC meeting (on the Angolan complaint).

McHenry—On the issue of SWAPO outside of Namibia, what is needed is a positive statement indicating that SWAPO accepts the idea of restriction to base. The SYG believes the wording of the SWAPO letter to him leaves some doubt whether SWAPO accepts restriction to base outside of Namibia. The problem on the second point is not whether SWAPO accepts restriction. It is a feeling on South Africa’s part that SWAPO may try to abuse this situation. Summarizing, SWAPO has accepted “inside” restrictions but remains vague about those “outside.”

Owen—What we are trying to do is to build up confidence we are not renegotiating the plan. The FL position statement in Luanda was most helpful. There may have been a misunderstanding about liaison offices. An armed UNTAG presence in neighboring countries was never contemplated. Civilians would be used. We should concentrate on whether we can get a mechanism for liaison between the governments of the FL and UNTAG forces on the Namibia border. Past UN peacekeeping operations have always had contact with governments across borders. There is a practical, concrete need for liaison between UNTAG forces and Angolan, Zambian, and Botswana forces. These are confidence building measures which could help and which don’t contradict the settlement proposal.

Mogwe—On the civilian front, the liaison officers would provide contact between the UN and the FL governments. On patrolling, Botswana has accepted the principle of “scrupulous observance” of the proposal. Patrolling along the border is a technical problem to be worked out between commanders of the UNTAG forces and the Botswana forces.

Owen—We agree. It’s important that the SYG have contact on the national level and that UNTAG have contact with national forces. We need language of that sort which will help build confidence, perhaps using the Luanda communique (as a foundation). It is also of vital

---

3 In telegram 955 from USUN, March 7, the Mission transmitted the text of Nujoma’s March 6 letter to Waldheim. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790104–0841)

4 In telegram 756 from Lusaka, March 5, the Embassy transmitted the text of the March 4 press communique, in which the Frontline States wrote the following: “(I) In accordance with the UN plan, SWAPO armed forces inside Namibia will be confined to base and monitored by the UN. (II) In accordance with the UN plan, there will be no monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. In this connection, the summit and SWAPO, while categorically rejecting South Africa’s demand to have SWAPO forces outside Namibia monitored, reaffirmed their commitment to scrupulously ensure the observance of the ceasefire agreement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790101–0405)
importance that South Africa give a commitment on its side. The South African bombing raids must not go on. Language and practical arrangements are needed.

Harriman—We must give emphasis to the fact that UNTAG forces will be along the border. The FL have agreed to “scrupulously observe” the proposal. With regard to the liaison concept, I understand that two of the FL States have agreed.

Owen—There is anxiety about the border for both South Africa and SWAPO. There are technical aspects to these issues.

Vance—There are technical means that have been used in monitoring elsewhere. They can be made available to UNTAG forces. This is what the Foreign Secretary has been referring to.

Chakulya (Zambia)—My silence is a recognition of what Botswana has said. The mechanics must be worked out between the UN forces and the FL. Details would be worked out with individual FL governments. They are prepared to do everything possible. Details must be worked out in the field. Monitoring of SWAPO cannot be done outside of Namibia. It is not acceptable for any outside force to come into Zambia. However, Zambia is prepared to accept any settlement progress. Zambia is a UN member and is waiting to play its part.

Foum (Tanzania)—Can we be informed about the attitude of South Africa following the Luanda communique, which shows how far the FL are willing to go?

Vance—The CG Ministers have not yet had a chance to meet with South Africa. We are meeting with Foreign Minister Botha this afternoon. It is important to have the views of the FL before sitting down with South Africa.

Honwana (Mozambique)—We’ve discussed among ourselves the points being made, here and at Luanda, and have come to complete agreement among the FL. Nevertheless, we are surprised about the main issues holding up implementation. The FL States have gone a long way. They are the ones who need to have their confidence boosted. South Africa has shown that it is the party having the greatest difficulty complying with the plan, witness the South African Air Force’s bombing raids (in Angola). If we were to have full confidence we should ground the South African Air Force. The FL have given every sign of willingness to cooperate. If South Africa doesn’t cooperate, we can raise new issues ourselves. We must know from South Africa what their problem is, what is their difficulty, are there any new demands? If we know these things, then we can discuss matters further.

Vance—We will have to wait until afternoon to clarify the restriction-to-base-inside-Namibia concept. We support the SYG’s position. It would be helpful to have the position of the FL.
Mogwe—The ceasefire shouldn’t be an occasion for anyone to lose any advantage they may have. There are no SWAPO bases in Namibia that we know of. Even SWAPO wouldn’t claim that. But they say they have people in Namibia. The problem is the term “base.” Couldn’t we speak of “designated areas?” We will need clarification from SWAPO.

Vance—We’ll have to ask SWAPO.

Mogwe—Yes. We can’t say anything until we talk with SWAPO.

Owen—What is the problem about numbers? The problem is that SWAPO has mobile forces. It is being elevated into a basic problem by South Africa. Can’t we put it back into perspective? We must try to defuse two issues as major problems. Then we would have no obstacles to implementation.

Chakulya—SWAPO has already indicated how many fighters it has in Namibia. It has already given the numbers to the SYG. It is difficult to discuss this issue until we’ve had the opportunity to discuss it with SWAPO.

Vance—We hadn’t realized a number was being used for SWAPO inside Namibia, although we had a number they suggested for bringing inside from outside.

(End of session).

4. Asked by the Secretary in a subsequent discussion for specifics on SWAPO armed forces in Namibia, Chakulya reverted to the 2500 man figure which Nujoma first cited in his February 10 meeting with Ahtisaari. However, we do not take this as a definitive statement of the African position.

Vance

---

5 Not found. In telegram 583 from USUN, February 10, the Mission transmitted a message Nujoma read to Ahtisaari, which contained “SWAPO’s comments and recommendations to the UNSYG on the implementation of the UN plan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790065–0669)
112. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

New York, March 20, 1979, 0158Z

Secto 3005. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Contact Group Meeting With SWAPO March 19.

1. (C—entire text).

2. Contact Group met at Ministerial level March 19 with SWAPO delegation to Proximity Talks. Following is detailed report of that meeting.

3. Vance—On behalf of the Contact Group I am glad to have the opportunity to meet with you. We are near to a Namibia solution, what is needed now is a constructive approach which will make it possible to implement this solution. We support the Secretary General’s report² but some details remain to be settled before the report can be implemented. If the settlement is to work, we must have the full cooperation of all parties in every detail. We will meet with South Africa later this afternoon to confirm this with them. We hope you could confirm your readiness to allow the ceasefire to begin and to refrain from infiltration of armed personnel. We are taking action to get South Africa to refrain from raids on your bases in Angola. We urge you and South Africa to support the Secretary General’s proposal for UNTAG composition. If we can agree on these matters, we can get on with implementation of Resolution 435. I would appreciate knowing your views on these and other matters.

SWAPO—First, Honorable Minister, let me apologize for the absence of our President Comrade Nujoma. Unfortunately your invitation came when he was already engaged in a program and he was not able to disengage himself. Let me assure you that SWAPO will nevertheless seriously consider the matters which are to be discussed. Also, let me thank you, Honorable Minister, for inviting us once again to New York to discuss Namibia. As your guests in New York we would like to know more of the purpose and your proposed end result of this meeting. On our part, we thought the SYG’s report was clear enough. We thought that there were only some administrative problems to be discussed with the SYG’s staff but when we received your


² Waldheim’s February 26 report, which served as the working settlement proposal. See footnote 4, Document 103.
invitation, we thought we had better come to New York and learn about any remaining problems. We would like to know what you feel are the remaining unresolved details. Also, we should like to remind you that 14 days ago in Luanda we stated our position clearly. The present meeting is taking place against the backdrop of South Africa wanting to get rid of SWAPO. We are being forced into negotiations with South Africa and we do not accept them. No one can do this to us. We are spilling Namibian blood and we will eventually win. However, the question should be asked why South Africa is attacking neighboring countries when the South Africans already had their invitations from the Contact Group to come to New York. The answer is they do not want this solution and this possibility weighs very strongly on our minds. We have always fought this war of liberation on Namibian soil and not on the soil of neighboring countries. You mentioned the ceasefire. In an earlier discussion, in New York or elsewhere, we said that we and the Frontline would scrupulously observe the ceasefire. We say it again now. We have Namibian soldiers fighting inside Namibia. The proposal provides that they are to be restricted to base. We have no problem with that. Now someone is bringing up the new element of monitoring SWAPO bases outside Namibia but we don’t accept anything like that. If the Front Line is willing to guarantee the ceasefire, what more can anyone want? We are here at your invitation and we hope to learn from you.

Vance—The hoped for result of this meeting would be agreement on the three outstanding issues. The first issue will be the treatment of armed SWAPO forces inside or outside Namibia. The second would be the ceasefire and you have answered that by saying that you would scrupulously observe it. The third would be the composition of UNTAG and Waldheim has informed me that this is a detail which has yet to be worked out. Perhaps some of my colleagues would like to comment.

Van Well—I should like to emphasize that solutions to these problems are very urgent. We understand that SWAPO agrees with this view. We endorse fully the Secretary General’s report of February 26 which is wholly consistent with earlier documents. We had hoped the Secretary General’s report would be sufficient to give the green light to the settlement, but this was not the case. The question now relates to details regarding treatment of armed SWAPO personnel inside and outside Namibia. We thought this was sufficiently clarified but this was not so and we are willing to help the Secretary General to get further clarification.

As we see it, there are three possibilities for armed SWAPO personnel in Namibia: Lay down their weapons and join the political process; keep their weapons and join the main SWAPO armed forces outside Namibia; or stay in Namibia and keep their arms, but be subject to
monitoring by UNTAG. We thought the question of the treatment of SWAPO personnel outside Namibia was clear and finalized with the agreement to scrupulously observe the ceasefire but this must now be further clarified. We believe there are further details to be worked out on such matters as liaison offices and on cross border relations with UNTAG. Some parties in the Front Line feel that this can be done with military representatives and others feel that more clarification is necessary.

SWAPO—You mentioned three possibilities. The report of the SYG takes care of the questions of monitoring. When we met with the military delegation of the Secretary General we told them this. We think that a false impression was created in Pretoria, Cape Town, and elsewhere that it would be easy to tell the neighboring countries that SWAPO bases should be monitored. This was settled in the SYG’s report which makes it clear that SWAPO forces inside Namibia should be monitored. We even suggested a number of SWAPO forces to be maintained. There may be fewer of our troops in Namibia at the time of the ceasefire; we don’t know. As to external monitoring, we have the word of the Front Line States. Are they being questioned as to the sincerity of what they say? We were going to discuss UNTAG composition with the Secretary General but we have no problem with discussing it here if you want to bring it up. We do have a problem with liaison offices. Will they be civilian or military? We need clarification on this and we were going to ask the Secretary General about it. We think the Secretary General is being overly strict in trying to reach an accommodation on this. We have said for some time that we are ready to sign a ceasefire agreement.

Vance—Let me say this on composition—we are not suggesting that it should be discussed here, but it should be settled before everyone leaves New York since the settlement cannot go forward until we have agreement on UNTAG composition. On liaison offices, if you had been present at our discussion with the Secretary General, you would know that we intend that these should be staffed by civilians, but you should hear this from the SYG. We wanted to clarify the other outstanding issues because, as Dr. Van Well said, the time is now and we should go ahead with clarification on these points so that the settlement can go ahead.

Owen—You are correct about the impression that got around about monitoring and South Africa did make too much out of it. You will find the question of links between UNTAG officers and liaison officers across the borders to be acceptable to the Front Line States. Also if you could put what you said about observance into language, that would be helpful. You said “by the time of the ceasefire” there might be 2500 armed SWAPO troops in Namibia. This causes problems as, let’s be
blunt about it, South Africa fears large scale infiltration. We don’t know what your strategy is on bases. You might want to declare all your men in Namibia, in which case you might have more than 2500 men. Or you might have them assemble in your bases outside. A clear statement of your intention regarding your forces in Namibia might be helpful here.

SWAPO—As I said in the beginning the question of restriction inside or outside Namibia is covered in the SYG’s report. All our forces in Namibia should be confined to base but we see no reason to talk about leaving them there or bringing them out. When the ceasefire is signed, we will be able to tell our forces to obey. We don’t want these people to lie around Namibia so that when the ceasefire is violated SWAPO will be blamed. So we are saying the UN should give them bases and even count their arms and ammunition. This was taken care of in the Secretary General’s report. We even went as far as bringing in the Front Line States. Now we are wondering why this matter is being reopened. This is one of the points where we are in full agreement with the proposal. Restriction of SWAPO forces to base in Namibia is included in the proposal and is the one and only correct option for us to choose. We will not have our forces lay down their arms or to leave Namibia. We are agreed with the Secretary General’s latest report that SWAPO forces inside Namibia should be restricted to base and would not be prepared to entertain either of the other two options which Van Well mentioned. If we are talking about no deviation from the plan, this is what we should do. You mentioned Angola which has scrupulously agreed to the ceasefire. If in the case of liaison offices you are talking about the same offices which are already there this is ok, but if there are to be new offices, you must be planning to bring in different people. When Waldheim told Neto on the phone of his proposal for liaison offices Neto replied that he did not understand English well and requested that the information be sent to him via telex. When the telex arrived, Neto understood that the SYG was referring to a military office and he rejected the idea. We also rejected. However, President Kaunda and Seretse Khama were told something different—they were told that the offices would be peopled by civilians. If there are to be civilians in the liaison offices, we would have no problem.

Vance—Do we understand then that you accept the idea of UN liaison offices in the Front Line States including Angola provided they are staffed by civilians?

SWAPO—We say this for SWAPO. We have said this before in Luanda.

Vance—But there could be communication between the civilians in Angola and UNTAG in Namibia.

SWAPO—Do you mean the UNTAG military in Namibia?
Vance—No, civilians.

Stirn—Time is pressing and something must be done now. We are not trying to renegotiate anything. We agree with the UN decision and are just trying to implement their principles. Experience shows that it is important to agree in advance on the details of implementation. We must achieve a situation such that everyone can be confident of fair implementation and there will be no misunderstanding. You took the action you deemed necessary, and it took you where you wanted to be. We have no problem with this in principle. You should now consider, in light of the political process, whether there is still a need for armed SWAPO forces inside Namibia. Will this be good for you in Namibia during the political process or would it be useful to have 200–300 SWAPO people monitored in Namibia under arms? On the other hand, might it not be more to your advantage to have your forces outside Namibia so that you would be prepared to take further action if it appeared necessary.

SWAPO—It does seem that, in spite of our repeated statements, the stand of the Five does not take account of SWAPO’s position regarding restriction to base. The plan does not talk of confining SWAPO troops to base in Angola or Zambia. It was never discussed that SWAPO armed forces should leave Namibia. We are now being confronted with a tactical move to accommodate the South African desire to have SWAPO troops outside Namibia. This amounts to a renegotiation of the proposal and we do not think that this is advisable. We have never accepted monitoring outside by UNTAG nor SWAPO troops leaving Namibia and our position on these matters has not changed. In addition you must consider that there is a war on in Namibia. The idea of a ceasefire as a first necessary step recognizes this. We originally did not want the South African forces to remain in Namibia during the transitional process. Comrade President Nujoma used to insist on this. Now if the presence of SWAPO armed forces during the transitional period might constitute a hindrance to the electoral process how about the presence of South African forces? We cannot wish the present reality in Namibia out of existence. It was agreed that there is need for restriction of troops in Namibia and the case should be closed on that.

Vance—I think we understand your position very well. Do any of my colleagues have any questions.

Jamieson—Is it then a fact that you want to stay with the monitoring by UNTAG of your forces in Namibia? You want to stay with that position and the other alternatives are of no interest to you at all?

SWAPO—The other options are not solutions.

Owen—Let us make clear if you accept restriction to your bases outside Namibia under your agreement with the Front Line States.
You don’t accept UNTAG monitoring outside Namibia, but do you accept a similar role for the Front Line?

SWAPO—I do not understand the need for the question, as SWAPO has agreed to the ceasefire and the Frontline States have given specific undertakings to you and the Secretary General in this regard. We do not foresee problems which would necessitate a public statement on this. We do not accept the concept.

Vance—Paragraph 12 of the SYG’s report of Feb 26 says that all SWAPO forces in neighboring countries will be restricted to base and you say you accept the SYG’s report.

SWAPO—It is not an either/or situation. We disagreed with paragraph 11 of the SYG’s report and intended to bring large numbers of our forces into Namibia. Now, however, we have dropped that and only talk about our forces already inside. The Secretary General’s report says that there shall be no monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia and this is correct. I think the recent formulation is stretching the point and this is one of our reservations on this.

Young—You said something a minute ago which could be very important. You said that no SWAPO troops will be infiltrated into Namibia, in effect, after the ceasefire. If by that you mean there will be no movement of troops from outside Namibia into Namibia we could perhaps support this with South Africa.

SWAPO—We dropped our demands for a three-week delay between the declaration of the ceasefire and its implementation and we have also dropped the idea of bringing in troops after the ceasefire.

Owen—Are you prepared to stop your infiltrating prior to implementation of the ceasefire?

SWAPO—No.

Young—But South Africa is likely to mount a major military effort to stop you and there could be some major military battles just before the ceasefire takes effect.

SWAPO—Either one has a ceasefire or one does not.

Young—We could interpret the delay between the declaration and the implementation of the ceasefire as a period needed for SWAPO and South Africa to inform their troops of its terms. If SWAPO could then view the ceasefire as being in effect from the time they agreed to it and use the interim period only to inform your troops while halting infiltration, this would be a big help. You should talk with the SYG on this. This might also help us to address the potential problem of South African bombing of your outside bases during this interim period.

Owen—Also we must clarify the question if SWAPO accepts paragraph 12 of the SYG’s Feb 26 report.
SWAPO—Suppose we wanted to send 200 of our troops to school as students. That paragraph would tie them to artificial restrictions.

Owen—No it wouldn’t. They would no longer be armed forces in that situation and there would be no problem there.

SWAPO—They are either armed forces in bases or they are not. What is the problem here?

Owen—Failure to restrict your forces to base after declaration of a ceasefire would permit your people to develop new bases along the border. South Africa fears this. As we have been unable to get UNTAG monitoring, we have had to accept the Frontline undertaking. It is extremely important that you let them carry out their undertaking and that you not establish new bases along the border.

SWAPO—Let us return to the statement in the Luanda document. In any case, according to the plan, there should be no monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia but the Front Line has promised that the ceasefire will be scrupulously observed. We can send our people to school as students under this. Why not take the Front Line’s word?

Vance—The distinction is whether your people are armed. If so they should be restricted to base.

SWAPO—I think that the Luanda statement is the best formula here.

Owen—I do not. You may be associated with the Luanda statement, but South Africa is not. We are trying to get everyone associated with the Secretary General’s report. We can hardly tell South Africa that you have agreed to the letter of the plan if there is a disagreement on the first sentence of paragraph 12.

SWAPO—There is a question of confidence here; of trust. This questions our sincerity when we say that we will observe the ceasefire. After all, what guarantee do we have that South African forces, as they withdraw, will not interfere with the electoral process?

Young—It is not a question of confidence or trust. You said that you agree with the Secretary General’s report. For the first hour of this meeting, both of us were saying that we agree with the SYG’s report. As long as you still say that you agree, we have no problem.

SWAPO—As long as it doesn’t imply that we promise anything regarding restriction of SWAPO forces outside Namibia as a result of the reinterpretation of the plan by the SYG, we agree.

Young—But questions of the movement of troops and the establishment of new bases during the ceasefire period would establish new elements which go well beyond the terms of the SYG’s report.

SWAPO—We do not accept that portion of the SYG’s report which includes restriction of our troops outside Namibia. We do not ask
South Africa to restrict their troops inside South Africa. There is no justification for asking us to do this outside Namibia.

Owen—If you insist upon this, South Africa will want to interpret paragraph 11 of the SYG’s report to mean that there should be no SWAPO forces under arms in Namibia monitored or not. Do you want to trade off on this?

SWAPO—But our position is in keeping with the proposal on this subject.

McHenry—Do you, under your interpretation of the ceasefire, feel that you would be permitted to establish new bases near the border? If so, you can hardly expect others to observe the ceasefire.

SWAPO—We have said that we will observe the ceasefire scrupulously. We are not going to try to throw the South Africans out of Namibia.

Owen—If you hold to your objections in paragraph 12 and South Africa insists upon its interpretation of paragraph 11, are you prepared to make a trade off?

SWAPO—Monitoring of SWAPO forces inside Namibia, as described in para 11 of the SYG’s report, is provided for in the plan.

Jamieson—So is the restriction of SWAPO forces outside Namibia.

SWAPO—Where is this provided for in the plan?

Owen—It was always our interpretation that the plan provided for the restriction of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. The question of the treatment of SWAPO forces inside Namibia only arose when it became a problem what to do with armed SWAPO personnel in the country. Again I have to ask whether you want to trade off on these two issues?

SWAPO—I’m not sure I understand the sequence here. First the plan applied to our forces outside and then outside but not inside or was it inside but not outside and now only inside? (laughter)

Owen—We are not trying to renegotiate anything. We can accept the SYG’s report. We thought you could also. But apparently you cannot live with the first sentence of paragraph 12. South Africa cannot live with paragraph 11. We would prefer that you accept all of the SYG’s report. This would make it easier for us.

SWAPO—If anything was ever said indicating that SWAPO accepted restriction to base of its forces outside of Namibia, this was very wrong.

Jamieson—My memory is quite clear on the negotiating sessions where this subject was discussed. Many of your own spokesmen mentioned that you had no bases inside Namibia. Yet you agreed to the restriction of SWAPO to base therefore you must have been referring to SWAPO bases outside Namibia.
Van Well—We know that you have bases outside Namibia and that they are under attack by South African forces. We believe you when you say that you will observe the ceasefire. Is it perhaps the word “restricted” that bothers you in this formulation? Could you live with “remains in bases” as a voluntary undertaking on your part?

SWAPO—Obviously the aspect of compelling us to stay in our bases is disturbing, but I am concerned at the misunderstanding of our position on this subject. We would never have agreed to anything including restriction to base of our forces outside Namibia.

Vance—We are running way over our appointed time. I believe we have identified one area on which we have strong differences and we will have to come back to this in future meetings.

Vance

113. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

New York, March 20, 1979, 2347Z

Secto 3013. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (U) Namibia: March 19 Meeting of Contact Group Ministers With NNF and SWAPO (D).

1. (C–entire text).

2. Representatives of the Namibia National Front (NNF) and SWAPO (D) met with the Western Ministers at 3:45 pm March 19. Brian O’Linn and R. Rukoro spoke for NNF; Andreas Shipanga for SWAPO (D).

3. Vance—The Contact Group (CG) stands behind its proposal. It is fully committed to democratic elections. It will follow the whole transition process with this end in mind. There has been a misunderstanding following the Feb 26 report of the SYG. We believe the report is consistent with our proposal. The SYG is working with us to ensure that SWAPO bases outside Namibia and SWAPO’s armed personnel inside cannot interfere with the political process. The SYG is working...
on who would qualify for confinement inside Namibia and under what conditions. Therefore, we believe SWAPO armed personnel would have no impact. We hope the transition process can start as soon as possible and that remaining issues can be resolved here in New York.

O’Linn (NNF)—The NNF has several concerns. The latest SYG interpretation is extremely vague. It doesn’t provide for monitoring in Angola and Zambia by UNTAG—and not merely by the Front Line (FL).

Regarding bases inside Namibia, in a de facto sense there is none in the territory. No party should get a psychological or military advantage as a result of the ceasefire. We agree with the SAG statement on this.

The bases issue could turn out to have no great significance on the other hand, there could be 20 instead of 5 SWAPO bases.

The NNF would like further clarification on what is meant by “bases”. We note that within a week of the election results’ becoming known South African forces must withdraw. The plan also says that SWAPO bases must be closed. Does this mean guerrillas could pick up arms and be let loose on the public?

The NNF does not share the SAG and DTA attitude that dates are that significant. We want a solution.

The NNF interprets the SYG’s report to mean that there would be no monitoring outside of Namibia. We think that this is inconsistent with the plan. Regarding bases inside Namibia, it is also inconsistent, but if it could be shown that it doesn’t have the meaning we attach to it then it could be a different matter.

Vance—We are talking of implementation details. Clarifications are in order. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the SYG’s report relate to restrictions on SWAPO bases in Namibia and outside Namibia.

Richard (UK)—On SWAPO bases inside Namibia, the proposal is clear, but unfleshed. In the course of discussions, it became clear that the question of SWAPO guerrillas who might be in Namibia hadn’t been adequately dealt with. We felt the problem would have to be neutralized.

Regarding use of the term “base”, the main concern was to identify and concentrate. Perhaps, “designated area” or “reception area” should have been used. But unfortunately, “base” was used. That SWAPO did at one time propose marching 2500 guerrillas into Namibia was not directly connected.

---

3 Not further identified.
As for monitoring bases outside Namibia, this was raised by the SAG. We said we would try to get this, that it was desirable. We said we would do our best, but that it was not called for in the original plans. Botswana and Zambia have agreed to the establishment of liaison offices; Angola has not, although there may be some confusion over composition—military or civilian.

O’Linn—If the purpose is to “neutralize” SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia at a ceasefire, would they later be able to get back their arms? That would make them the only political party with arms in Namibia. What would be the precise procedures? On the second point, we understand that the SYG replied to the SAG citing the importance of monitoring—monitoring by UNTAG. What justifiable objections would sovereign Front Line States have then to monitoring?

Richard—(Quoted para 11 of SYG’s Feb 26 report) Nuts and bolts would have to be worked out by the SYG when he finds out how many of the (armed SWAPO personnel) there are.

McHenry—Concerning the assertion about what the SYG said on monitoring, the SAG’s Dec 22 letter spoke in general terms. SYG never said monitoring by UNTAG (outside of Namibia).

Shipanga (SWAPO–D)—We’ve accepted the Five power proposal, the SYG’s September report, and with certain reservations, his latest report. There are uncertainties in Namibia because of the present situation. There is black unemployment. White liberals are leaving. Many whites, after the so-called December elections, have lost faith in local politicians. They are becoming desperate. SWAPO–D issued a Feb 28 statement that the atmosphere created by the South African radio and some local politicians is destructive. Whites believe the West is trying to push Namibia into the hands of Marxists. The threat of an action plunging the country into disaster must not be taken lightly. Meanwhile, Sam Nujoma is causing concern and strengthening the hand of those who want to go it alone. Some whites are forming secret armies. This can’t be taken lightly.

The Five have made every effort to bring about a peaceful settlement. Uncontrolled events—from South Africa and Sam Nujoma—are

---

4 In telegram 322951 to Pretoria, December 23, 1978, the Department transmitted the text of the December 22 letter to Waldheim. The letter read in part: “Questions on which there should be further consultation, such as the size and composition of the military component of UNTAG, and other matters which have already been brought to the attention of the Western powers, be resolved satisfactorily with the Administrator-General. Special reference is made to paragraph 12 of the settlement plan accepted by the South African Government on 25 April 1978 with a view to monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighboring states.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780531–0126)
dashing the people’s hopes. SWAPO–D has issued a public statement condemning the SAG raids (into Angola).

On the monitoring of SWAPO forces in neighboring countries, the Front Line know fully the background. Only if it is true there are no bases outside Namibia, then is there no problem. But when the SYG’s Representative has to designate bases in Namibia, then we cannot understand it. We already have tribal armies, which are really terrorist armies. The Ovambo home guard has beaten and shot at SWAPO–D representatives. Citizens army and commandos support most extreme causes. Namibia needs real demilitarization. We believe in a peaceful transition to independence. We cannot agree to any creation of military bases in Namibia. Since Nujoma is not here, what guarantee can we have about anything decided here?

Vance—The purpose of the Five’s proposal and the SYG’s report was and is to provide a method for disarming those who have weapons so there can be elections free of intimidation. The suggestion regarding armed SWAPO personnel is meant to take care of that problem, to ensure that they won’t wander around armed. That also applies to the other groups to which you referred.

McHenry—Citizens commandos and forces are to have controls placed on them. The command structure will be broken down. Arms are to be monitored. The citizens force is to be demobilized and controlled. On armed SWAPO personnel in Namibia, the plan is to put some controls on them. Our concern is that this has been confused with bringing armed men at the time of the ceasefire into Namibia from outside. The SYG wants to see that the ceasefire is not abused. The SYG must or would have some procedures in mind.

Shipanga—Will they (armed SWAPO personnel) be confined to specified locations with arms?

McHenry—Yes. Restricted to locations designated by the Special Representative, with arms.

Shipanga—There are two dangers. First, the number and location—whether 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. SWAPO personnel in a camp might try to break out; the SAG would consider it a major violation and reply.

McHenry—That’s why we have the UN force.

Shipanga—Second, citizens commandos and tribal armies giving up arms while SWAPO has its would be impossible.

McHenry—It is entirely possible that the SYG might use the same procedures on citizens forces, tribal armies, and on SWAPO. It would be unwise to have too much specificity, but SYG will have to decide these matters.

Shipanga—SYG should make more clear what he means.

McHenry—It would be useful to get some indications of the SYG’s thinking in your discussions (with him).
O’Linn—Our fears haven’t been eliminated. The question of eliminating guerrillas wandering around remains. We are told the intention is to disarm them. Now we are told they will retain arms. South African forces would withdraw, and SWAPO would then be the only political party with armed guerrillas. Also, how do we know how many armed bases they would have? There is danger of intimidation and psychological fear.

Vance—We think it can be clarified and we will get in touch with the SYG about such a clarification.

O’Linn—(Reads from SYG’s January letter about UNTAG mandate;\(^5\) quotes concerning restriction to base.) If there were no bases in Namibia, then it must mean bases outside Namibia. The only reasonable assumption is that it must mean monitoring outside. The SYG says that there are no specific provisions for monitoring outside. This needs clarification.

Vance—In our meetings with the Front Line, we came to the understanding that “scrupulous observance” of the ceasefire meant that it would be done and that military people in their countries would have appropriate liaison with UNTAG forces so that the means would be there to do so. There has been a proposal for a civilian link. So far, Botswana and Zambia have agreed, but Angola has not yet done so.

Shipanga—Knowing some of the governments concerned, we can’t honestly trust their word that they’ll observe the ceasefire, especially when they can’t contemplate what one termed in today’s Security Council debate as the “legal representative” losing.

Owen—It would be extremely serious for any Front Line country to connive with forces crossing the border with a UN force—including units from African states—on the border. It’s monitoring of the border and ways of doing so to which I attach most importance. A combination of the Front Line’s commitment and the UN force is surely a good safeguard against penetration of the country.

Regarding monitoring of forces in Namibia, how this is done is important. Restriction to base is to prevent armed SWAPO personnel from wandering around with arms. Unfortunately, the term “base” is not a good one. When armed personnel go to designated areas, then anyone outside would be in violation. It is extremely important with South African forces, ethnic forces, and SWAPO forces that there be weapons control. The SYG will have to grapple with the problem and strike a balance with the overall concept, the need for reassurance, and for necessary detail.

---

\(^5\) Text of an advance copy of Wardheim’s letter was transmitted in telegram 7 from USUN, January 2. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790002–0418)
Vance—We will be keeping in touch with you on questions that should be answered.

Rukoro (NNF)—Secretary General Waldheim’s latest report is a proposal with the objective of overcoming the problems of SWAPO guerrillas in Namibia. It is subject to further clarification.

On bases, aside from psychological effects and the matter of principle, there is no logical reason in favor of the provision for confining armed people inside the country. It is not conducive to a peaceful climate. There is a major risk of abuse, especially in the absence of clear definitions of “base” and procedures to be used. The Five should come out with their own position on these matters. It is hard to see how paragraph 11 is not a fundamental departure from the spirit of the Western proposal. Should any party—especially Mr. Nujoma’s—have armed men, it could use them as a threat. As a matter of principle, we are against paragraph 11. SWAPO guerrillas should get two options: either report to UNTAG, surrender arms, and join the political process, or go to an existing SWAPO base or wherever they came from.

We have experience in African politics. We know what would happen. Should SWAPO lose, we would have no guarantee. Our destiny is at stake and we don’t want to take a risk.

(Turning to question of SWAPO bases outside of Namibia, Rukoro quoted selectively from SYG’s implementation reports.) There is no doubt who would monitor SWAPO bases in Zambia and Angola—it is UNTAG. Until these questions are answered, there will be real problems.

McHenry—I think we should go over on the working level the elements of the proposal. On the last point at no point is UNTAG any place else but Namibia. End of session.

Vance
114. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

New York, March 21, 1979, 0155Z

Secto 3016. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Meeting of Contact Group March 20 8:30 AM.

1. (C—entire text).
2. Contact Group met for one-half hour internal discussion before arrival SAG delegation.
3. Vance—We only have 35 minutes until Pik comes. The South Africans have requested that there only be three on each delegation. I agreed. Before they come, we have three things to discuss: A) our approach to Pik Botha; B) the Angolan Resolution in yesterday’s UNSC meeting\(^2\) and C) how to deal with the Front Line States about the implications in paragraph 12 relating to SWAPO forces. First let’s discuss the meeting with Pik. A draft paper was circulated giving some ideas. Do you have any comments?

Jamieson (Canada)—I tried to think last night about what would happen. Botha will probably go through his same routine especially about the composition of UNTAG. One thing occurred to me, we must try to identify the number of SWAPO armed forces inside Namibia. If we’re only talking of two or three hundred and if we could put an upper limit on these forces, it would seem more credible. There also seems to be a lack of confidence in the Front Line States’ ability to monitor. There seems to be no possibility of an UNTAG presence in the Front Line States.

Vance—It is clear that there can be no UNTAG presence there, but there needs to be an agreement between responsible officials of the Front Line States and UNTAG ceasefire experts. Also the Front Line will have to lean on SWAPO as regards the restriction of SWAPO forces to bases.

Jamieson—We need a better definition of bases. We don’t know how much mobility is involved. Do SWAPO forces have to be confined

---


\(^2\) UNSC Resolution 447 (1979), condemned South Africa’s aggression toward Angola and demanded that South Africa “respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of Angola.” The resolution was adopted on March 28, by 12 votes to 0, with France, the United Kingdom, and the United States abstaining. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 225–233)
to bases or is it enough if there are no incursions into Namibia? Could we advance the idea that “confined to bases” means not crossing the border. Or would it be better to corral them in one location. Another problem occurs to me also. What would be the legal status of the SWAPO soldiers once they arrive in Namibia? Will SWAPO wish to have them active in the political campaign or prefer them to keep their arms and stay out of the campaign. They can’t have it both ways. Maybe we can draw SWAPO out on this question. If SWAPO is looking for an activist group, people who might be used as election cadres, perhaps we would have some leverage. We come back to the three alternatives for SWAPO forces: A) stay out of the country, B) return to the country disarmed as civilians or C) keep their arms and stay in camp.

Vance—What are the provisions for registration and participation in the elections?

Lapointe (Canada)—The agreement calls for peaceful participation in the elections by everyone in the country.

Stirn (France)—I would like to suggest a question to be asked of Pik Botha. Would the SAG accept the idea of two or three hundred SWAPO troops being assembled near the frontier? What guarantees would there be that these people would not go back and forth across the frontier?

Owen (UK)—SWAPO numbers have become very difficult. We can limit SWAPO to about 100 or 1500 but perhaps its better not to mention any numbers.

Stirn—I only use two to three hundred as a tentative figure. Let’s see where Pik would suggest placing these people.

Owen—I think we should toughen up the draft in the ceasefire letter and be more specific. One thing might be to find out if SWAPO’s forces had been in Namibia for at least a month.

Vance—How could we prove that?

Owen—We would have to require some sort of evidence. I think we should tell Botha that his bombing raids have incurred international odium. It seems to me we need a strict implementation of the ceasefire which would tie in with the Angola resolution and the Security Council. We need to find out about this concept of bases which after all came from the South African generals.

Jamieson—I would like to ask if Pik is likely to maintain his standard line or whether there might be some deviations this time.

Vance—Pik says he is under tight instructions, but of course he can communicate quickly with South Africa if need be.

Owen—We need people earmarked to deal with each of the different internal groups. We must try to separate them from the South Africans; otherwise that will be their only source of information.
Jamieson—Do we need to think more about the ultimate disposition of SWAPO forces after the election?

Vance—That’s answered on page 2. Another problem arises—that of “designated locations” in the Feb 26 report that came out in the plural. I think we need to stick to one location.

Jamieson—I agree. We should not be too specific, if we’re talking of 2500 or so we’ll need several locations, but if there are only a few people involved, one location should be enough.

Van Well (FRG)—We may need another report from the SYG to solve this problem. It has to be made clear that the placement of SWAPO forces in bases can only be valid on the day of the ceasefire. However, that implies that there must be some idea in advance of how many to expect. Only those appearing on the day of the ceasefire can be regarded as legitimate armed personnel. I think we might consider two designated locations, each able to provide for up to 200 people. These would have to be prepared in advance. We must tell Botha that he has to accept the idea of these locations. They will be centers not military bases. In this respect it would be analogous to the camps where the SAG army will be placed under similar guidelines. The internal parties asked who UNTAG would consult with. I expect this means the Administrator General. The August report of the SYG which everyone seems to accept, says that there will be monitoring of the bases in which troops are restricted. We could ask the Front Line States to monitor the forces in the centers in their countries. This might help Botha. Perhaps UN liaison officers would be able to go along with Front Line monitors and operate together. I agree with Mr. Jamieson that it is fruitful to find out the number of SWAPO forces involved. We have to know how many will arrive in Namibia, train personnel to look after them, find locations, etc. SWAPO must know how many people they will bring in on the date of the ceasefire. We should launch an appeal to them to tell us. After all, they know the exact number of SAG military personnel.

Vance—This has been very helpful. Now let’s move on to the Angola resolution. Is it coming up to a vote today? Does it involve sanctions? I don’t believe anybody has seen it yet.

Owen—I think we should do our utmost to spin out the debate on the Angola resolution and stall for time. That way we can tie together what we are doing here and get the ceasefire letter sent out at the same time.

Vance—I share that view.

Jamieson—Will there be any move to have Angola agree to the monitoring of outside forces?

Owen—What other meetings should we schedule?
Vance—Let’s get through with the South Africans first. Then we can caucus among ourselves and decide what to do. Maybe we should see the Front Liners later.

Jamieson—What is your assessment? I’ve heard both sides are against the agreement but maybe South Africa will want to keep it on the rails.

Vance—My view is that Pik would like to keep it going. He will be difficult, but he has not come here to sabotage the talks.

Owen—I have to go home at 8:00 tonight but I could come back Thursday or Friday.

Van Well—We must keep in mind the UNSC debate. What happens there depends on progress here. If we state that there is no progress here, the debate will become a violent one. We could change this around and come to an agreement by working at night. However, we should not open up the prospect of a long conference. We have to keep the pressure on them and tell them that we need to come to a quick agreement. Also, we can’t hold off the Security Council debate for too long.

Vance—Is this place reasonably secure? There is a Reuters dispatch which states that Mr. Rhodie will make public his paper about the scandals which can force Pieter Botha to resign. Anyway, we should wind up here by Wednesday or Thursday so that by the end of the day we should have the outlines of an action paper.

Stirn—I agree. I have to leave tonight and I can’t come back until Saturday.

Vance
115. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

New York, March 21, 1979, 0100Z

Secto 3015. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Contact Group Ministerial Meeting With South African Foreign Minister Botha March 20.

1. (C–Entire text).

2. Western Contact Group met with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha, with each delegation restricted to Ministers plus three participants, for two and one half hours March 20 to discuss outstanding Namibia issues. Botha, who insisted he had no instructions to go beyond South African interpretation of implementation of the settlement proposal, repeated firm SAG insistence on need for UNTAG monitoring of SWAPO bases outside Namibia and opposition to establishment of such bases inside. After lengthy discussion, during which he evaded a request to continue the discussions at the working level, Botha announced that he must return to South Africa tonight to report to his Prime Minister. Detailed report of meeting follows:

3. Vance—Pik, we had a chance yesterday during a very full day to meet with the Front Line and all the other internal parties as well as SWAPO.2 We discussed with each group their positions on paragraphs 11 and 12 of the SYG’s Feb 26 report which concerned the monitoring of SWAPO forces inside Namibia and in neighboring states. We did not get into composition because we knew that you would be talking with the SYG on this. I guess we would like to know how you want to proceed, Pik.

Botha—Well Cy, I think we should immediately proceed to the question of what is to be implemented. Do the Five want to implement the original settlement proposal or the latest Waldheim report? I have no instructions to discuss deviations from the original proposal. The South African position is clear, there should be no deviation. SWAPO should be restricted to base wherever the bases exist and there are no SWAPO bases in Namibia. I must ask why the Five advised Waldheim that SWAPO bases outside Namibia need not be monitored without even coming to us or consulting us? This, if I may submit respectfully, is contrary to the whole thrust of the proposal. We cannot support the

---


2 See Documents 112 and 113.
concept of the establishment of SWAPO bases inside Namibia. This is
not the proposal, was never discussed, never raised. Furthermore we
informed the SYG on Dec 22 that we wanted elections in Namibia
before September 30, 1979.\textsuperscript{3} We cannot go on like this. South Africa
wants to withdraw from Namibia. The financial responsibility of our
presence there weighs heavily on my government. There are one or
two other minor points to be cleared up. We are consulting with Wald-
heim on composition but this is not an insurmountable problem. But
the problems posed by paragraphs 11 and 12, where the West gave
Waldheim bad advice, may be insurmountable and we should discuss
them right away.

Vance—Let’s start then with paragraph 12. In our view this is the
simplest to deal with and if we can settle this then we would isolate
the problem posed by paragraph 11. Since issuance of Waldheim’s Feb
26 report, we have obtained from the Front Line their assurance to
scrupulously observe the ceasefire. This is a useful step, and they
reaffirmed their position in this regard to us yesterday, because it
shows that they would cooperate. Yesterday they indicated that their
own people, probably military, would get involved in assuring the
observance of the ceasefire and would liaise with UNTAG to see that
there is no unauthorized border crossing.

Van Well—We should be careful not to cling to certain words or
notions but ask what is meant by them. We used the word monitoring
with reference to UNTAG monitoring and so its repetition with regard
to the SWAPO bases outside Namibia may have produced concern
within the Front Line. But if we look behind the words to see what is
meant by them, we may find room for agreement. The Front Line
indicated that they will cooperate with UNTAG in the maintenance of
the ceasefire and therefore I suggest that we concentrate not on the
words used here, but on the performance of tasks. It never was sug-
gested by us that UNTAG should monitor SWAPO outside Namibia.
But if we look at what the Front Line have promised to do and find
ways to describe their promise in a concrete and detailed fashion I
think there is something we could achieve. We announced in our talks
today the need for more details on the Front Line pledge on what
they are going to do. We ought to concentrate on that.

Botha—May I just ask, what is your interpretation of Waldheim’s
report of 29 August\textsuperscript{4} when it refers to the monitoring by UNTAG of
SWAPO forces and the restriction of those forces to base? What does

\textsuperscript{3} In telegram Tosec 150061/322951 to Pretoria, December 23, 1978, the Department
transmitted the text of the December 22 letter from Botha to Waldheim. (National
Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780531–0126)

\textsuperscript{4} See footnote 2, Document 91.
this mean, particularly when read in the clear language of item 3 of the annex to the settlement proposal?

Vance—As I read it it says that border monitoring is the responsibility of UNTAG, although UNTAG is not specifically mentioned, but that this cannot be done without the cooperation of neighboring states to prevent unauthorized SWAPO infiltration.

Botha—On Dec 22 I wrote a letter to Waldheim which included the word “with a view to the monitoring of SWAPO forces in neighboring states.” He replied in January that certainly paragraph 12 is an important element of his report and that neighboring states have responded that they would cooperate fully with the United Nations in ensuring that UNTAG is able to carry out its mandate. We never had any doubt as to the meaning of these words. I submit that these documents mean, and can only mean, that SWAPO forces should be restricted to their bases wherever they exist. I discussed this with Ahtisaari in Cape Town in January. At no time did he contradict this. In fact he said he would be proceeding to the Front Line States to discuss these matters. Then the Five gave Waldheim their unfortunate advice but there is no provision in the documents on which to base this advice. This has brought on an impasse.

Vance—I can only point to paragraph 12 of the SYG’s report. In furtherance and implementation of the terms of that paragraph we now have the statement of the Frontline that they will scrupulously observe and see that the ceasefire is observed. Yesterday they restated that position. It seems to me that this is wholly consistent with paragraph 12 and the other documents to which you refer.

Botha—It is good to know that the Front Line are willing to cooperate, but I must ask if Angola has accepted the concept of UN liaison offices.

Vance—To the best of my knowledge they have not. As you know Pik, this situation has been complicated by your recent raids into Angolan territory.

Botha—The conflict as I see it, Cy, is that Waldheim had assured me that he had the assurance of cooperation from the Front Line. Then he received that bad advice from the Five.

Vance—I am not familiar with the advice which you mention. I must defer to one of my colleagues on this.

McHenry—At no time did the Five suggest to Waldheim that there is no need of monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. We told him that the proposal does not call for the monitoring of SWAPO forces

---

5 See footnote 4, Document 113.
outside Namibia by UNTAG. There is a difference. We never gave 17 clarifications to Waldheim. I know the letter you mean, but it did not originate with us.

Owen—The problem here is that for two years we have been trying to negotiate the best monitoring situation for Namibia. Ahtisaari took your offer for the monitoring of South African forces inside South Africa as a quid pro quo for the monitoring by UNTAG of SWAPO forces outside Namibia but the issue of sovereignty caused the Front Line to reject this suggestion. You have a fair point when you say that Zambia and Botswana have accepted liaison offices but that Angola has not. SWAPO informed us yesterday that it would have no problem with the establishment of civilian liaison offices in Angola. We might well get Angolan agreement to this. Of course you have been kept informed of developments on this question all along.

Botha—I was told that we needed less troops in Namibia because after the Security Council had passed its resolutions neighboring states would accept their terms as curbs on their sovereignty. Waldheim reaffirmed this in his letter to me through his reference to the assurances of cooperation by neighboring states. I find it incomprehensible that I should have to argue this point at all.

Vance—What does monitoring mean? Must it be by UNTAG or could the neighboring state itself monitor and maintain appropriate contact and liaison with UNTAG? As long as the job gets done I don’t see what difference it makes.

Botha—Apart from the clear language on this subject which such an arrangement would contradict, there is the question of effectiveness. I suggest that the Front Line are incapable of monitoring SWAPO’s bases effectively at the present stage of their history. I have proof. We have lost four locomotives on the line running through Zambia to Zaire. It is in the interest of President Kenneth Kaunda that this line continue to function but he has informed us that he has no control over the activities of those who destroyed the locomotives. The same would certainly be the case in Angola and will soon be true of Botswana.

Vance—But the question of your railroad lines and conditions inside Zambia are all tied up with Rhodesia.

Botha—Nevertheless the fact remains that neither Angola or Zambia could do it. Why should our integrity on monitoring be questioned? Once we deviate from the language of the proposal, we run into trouble.

Vance—Where do we deviate?

Botha—The proposal was written by the Five, not by us. In its annex, it states that at the beginning of the transitional period, the South African Government has the duty to observe the ceasefire, it mentions the restriction to base of all hostile forces including SWAPO.
It notes that as soon as possible UNTAG arrives and UN military personnel begin monitoring of South African and SWAPO troops restriction.

Vance—That is all in Namibia.

Botha—If SWAPO has no bases in Namibia where then must the monitoring take place?

Vance—The plan says nothing about bases outside of Namibia. You can monitor the border and restriction to base in Namibia. There is nothing that says that monitoring of SWAPO outside Namibia should be done by UN troops.

Botha—Of course, it says UN forces commence monitoring of troop restrictions, and what troop restrictions? The restriction to base.

Vance—Quite frankly, I would read that differently.

Owen—As I remember it, the argument was that SWAPO said that it had bases in Namibia. The agreement was that if SWAPO could show it had a base in Namibia that base would be monitored.

Botha—but no one here can show me a SWAPO base in Namibia. They are all outside and if not monitored, they can be moved right up to the frontier.

Stirn—I think there has been a misunderstanding having to do with the term base. SWAPO has bases outside Namibia but not inside. Inside, it is merely a question of getting together the armed SWAPO people to avoid disruption of elections. This site would be located near the border and some such action has been requested by some of the internal parties. This would not be a base, which is a site from which military operations can be launched. There is a vocabulary problem here which we must get around.

Botha—I agree with the need to overcome the vocabulary problem. We all know that SWAPO has bases and that they launch attacks from these bases. The individual SWAPO guerrillas know where their bases are located. The language of the proposal clearly requires restriction to base of both SWAPO and South African forces on the monitoring. There is no possibility of any other interpretation.

Owen—There is no dispute that we should try to get the best arrangement for monitoring of SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia. Let us leave this aside and try to identify what sort of monitoring procedures you think would be helpful to have.

Botha—The same as are applied to South African units. There should be one UN command which monitors or restricts troops wherever the bases are. That is the way to achieve tranquility, to ensure the tranquility of the northern border.

Owen—What is the mechanism inside Namibia for the monitoring of South African troops?
Botha—This is to be decided by the military experts. As far as we are concerned, this has been clarified during the Ahtisaari visit to my country. Gen. Philipp worked this out with Gen. Geldenhuys point by point according to the terms of the settlement proposal. I admit that Ahtisaari did not agree with the results of Philipp’s efforts but while we did not really like the document, we could live with it to facilitate implementation.

Van Well—it is not fair to compare the restriction of South African and SWAPO forces because the needs are different in each case. Inside Namibia one needs to prevent disruption of elections. In the Frontline it is necessary to prevent border-crossing. We should identify substance and not waste time on semantics. Outside of Namibia monitoring is intended to prevent border-crossing and here we have received very solemn promises from the Frontline States. I agree that these provisions will have to be clarified as confidence has not grown to such an extent that promises could be accepted at face value. They must be made more concrete. But the objectives of monitoring inside Namibia and inside the Frontline States are different.

Botha—If the leader of one of the democratic parties of the territory asked you for a guarantee, with South African troops reduced to 1500 to two sites, with SWAPO established in bases in Namibia and no monitoring of SWAPO bases outside Namibia, with General Philipp claiming that his troops would be withdrawn if opposed by violence, if under these circumstances a Democratic Party leader asked what security would be left to him if a major border crossing should be made—what would be your answer?

Van Well—we are ready to talk about ways to maintain the border. There are technical means, liaison, and concrete detailed clarification of liaison agreements. You have a point on the size of SWAPO forces in Namibia but I repeat let’s deal with substance and not words.

Botha—I am dealing with substance and fact. You may not recognize it but the people who live inside are human beings. If you can convince them of the rightness of your position I will be guided by their views.

Vance—the mandate for UNTAG says that they could use force in self-defense which is defined to include attempts to prevent them from carrying out their assigned tasks. This is what should guide UNTAG action and not Gen. Philipp’s comments.

Owen—we are at the old dilemma of specificity versus flexibility. We should concentrate on the substance of the border arrangements.

Botha—You have stated your positions and I have stated mine. I can’t carry it further and I think I am wasting your time.

Owen—we need to bring things closer to what you, we, and the Frontline all want. We agree that there must be monitoring of SWAPO
forces outside Namibia. There is a need to flesh out the details of the monitoring in practical language. People have been reluctant to do this hitherto and I understand why this is so but we may now have to look at this.

Botha—If SWAPO genuinely wants to participate in a settlement, why will they not submit themselves to UNTAG monitoring? Why, once we have decided on all the situations and structure, included more UN troops than were ever used in any other plebiscite, and a budget for UNTAG larger than that of the Namibian territory for a whole year, why should SWAPO not submit itself to monitoring as we will?

Owen—We have been talking about this for some time. Whether we can do something with civilians as well as with the UNTAG military is a legitimate question. We are dealing as practical politicians with what is negotiable.

Jamieson—We come down to the extent of your confidence in the willingness and capability of the Frontline to carry out monitoring. If this is truly the problem then it is only a question of whether we can develop an acceptable supervisory mechanism through the UN liaison offices.

Botha—We are becoming a more reluctant partner in these negotiations. We are beginning to get demands from the parties to permit them to form their own armies because apparently one must have a gun to get anything in Namibia. If you can convince the parties, many of the problems we have would be solved immediately. Waldheim mentioned to me a growing suspicion that we are not really interested in this settlement. If I reflect on developments in Namibia, the removal of most of apartheid, the development of conditions permitting one man, one vote elections, the development of policies diametrically opposed to those practiced in South Africa while one party with guns refuses to be monitored, then the whole question becomes too technical for me. I cannot give the internal party any assurance that SWAPO will not wait across the border to continue the war once they lose the election. If this keeps up I will have to give the internal parties the right to form their own armies. Nkomo in Rhodesia developed an army in three years. DTA could [do] so in three months. Would these internal armies then be given their own bases to be restricted to as is proposed with SWAPO?

Jamieson—I don’t question your bona fides and I think you raise an important point. We want to get through the remaining issues before such a situation develops. We have been categorical in our support for the monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia. The question is one of mechanism. We must reinforce our own convictions to determine if there is a way this can be done. If UNTAG were going to do it some
of your internal parties would be saying that they could not do it effectively either. It is not a question only of semantics but as my German colleague has said we must find a way to make progress on substance.

Vance—Pik, I don’t question your bona fides either. But we must cut through this and find a way to move toward a settlement. This may be our last chance and if we don’t succeed we may face a Rhodesia situation where the whole thing will deteriorate and go to hell in a hand basket.

Young—We started these negotiations with the need for the Frontline to respect the results of a free election. We still have their agreement. We recognize your fears regarding Frontline monitoring of SWAPO. However the Angolan experience with the Katagans on the Zaire border is relevant here. If SWAPO loses I think you would have no trouble in getting Angola and Zambia, with a little support from us, to move SWAPO forces away from the border. The Frontline is interested in political stability in Namibia and in their own territories and the Frontline surely will guarantee that there would be no massive infusion of arms from the USSR to a SWAPO which lost a UN supervised election. Western military guarantees to the newly elected Namibian Government would have to take this into account. We have had a similar experience with the Palestinians, whose existence depends upon the UN, and who have been very cooperative with the UN in Lebanon. We can get similar guarantees from the Frontline in Namibia, which was one reason we insisted on so many UN troops. Finally we can get guarantees from the Five to ensure that the results of the elections are respected.

Owen—There is a problem with confidence here. We realize that you have the internal parties in Namibia and that you must take account of their views and to some extent so must we. What we must do is get language to enable everyone to be confident that the seven month electoral process is satisfactory. It is important that the UN remain in Namibia after the elections to ensure confidence. All the arguments made here today have convinced me of the essential rightness of the size of the UN force. We have that and now we must produce satisfactory language on the monitoring of SWAPO forces inside and outside Namibia, which would be the Secretary General’s language but which we can all accept. This is going to take a little time but we must keep on until we do it.

Botha—We have reached the crux of the matter. We would not be able to reduce any South African troops with unmonitored SWAPO troops across the border. The potential for war would exist and the UN would give us no assurances through monitoring. We must have such assurances from the UN military commander and SWAPO must
have the same assurances regarding the monitoring of South African forces or they won’t return. We cannot overcome this problem and get to monitoring unless we have a tranquil situation and you cannot have that with unmonitored SWAPO troops across the border. Also there is a difference of opinion here. I don’t want to quarrel with you. Over these long negotiations I have gotten to know you well. My problem is, I’ve gotten to like you. But I can’t take this further. I have instructions only to discuss the implementation of the proposal. I have taken note of the views expressed here but I can do no more than report back and consult with the internal parties.

Vance—Do you want also to talk about paragraph 11 and then consult with your government and representatives of the parties? What do you suggest be done after that?

Botha—I will have to return to South Africa after this discussion. I have no control over the internal parties. They can stay and you may wish to have further discussions with them but I have to go back and report to my government.

Owen—We all have other arrangements and perhaps we can reassemble. But we should agree that our officials all get together to define monitoring in a way consistent with the UNTAG mandate. One way would be to trust the word of the Frontline. You have made some fair points, there are problems here. Another way would be to have UNTAG on the ground in the Frontline states, but we tell you that this is not negotiable. But is there not some middle way to define the monitoring of the bases and the surveillance border in such a way as to meet the concerns of all the parties? We must create some language for the Secretary General to deal with this problem. A go was had at this in Cape Town but there were some problems at that time. No one is making a commitment that the end result of the work of our experts would be acceptable but let us make a commitment that our officials will look at this problem. We all could leave people here and for the next three or four days they should bed down and work on this. We can then assemble later.

Botha—I agree that the Frontline would prefer good monitoring arrangements. To some extent they are being held hostage themselves. Isn’t there some way of getting one or two UN people, isolated from the Frontline capitals and way out in the bush, at each SWAPO base to assure UNTAG that the SWAPO forces stay in their bases and do not misbehave? We will tell you just where all the bases are within two or three days of their establishment.

Owen—I think we can get UN civilian liaison offices in the Frontline capitals. There can be visits to bases and communication with UNTAG. One of the advantages to a UN operation is that we can blur the distinction between civilian and military. We did this to your advantage
in describing the number of military in UNTAG. The point is that the UN must not put itself in a position where it gets itself into trouble during the transition.

Botha—That is my point. There is no sense in bluffing ourselves and I would be lying to you if I said there is any chance of my government accepting anything which does not include a monitoring of SWAPO forces outside Namibia.

Owen—We agree that the SWAPO forces must be monitored. We must find a half way house between the two poles of Front Line monitoring and UNTAG monitoring. The question is the definition of the mechanism.

Botha—it is not a question of not accepting the Front Line assurances. It is that we believe that the Front Line lacks the capability.

Van Well—It is important to determine the correct starting point. I agree that the Front Line want an improvement of the situation but their point of departure is their own sovereignty in their own territory and not UN control. If you start talking in terms which do not make it clear what monitoring means, there is a problem. We must say that we accept their assurances and then work out the details of how the Front Line is to cooperate with the UN liaison offices in terms of these assurances and how they maintain cooperation and communication along the border. I am fearful that if we return to simple undefined monitoring of bases we will be in trouble. We have reached a crucial point. The Front Line wants to go ahead but we have little time left. This is a larger question than Namibia. It includes our relations [with] South Africa and with African states. We will continue talking with the internal groups but need an understanding with you or talks with internal groups won’t help. It is important when you leave here that we part on a constructive note. This might also influence the course of the Security Council debate.

Botha—What is the relevance of your remark on relations with South Africa?

Van Well—if the Namibia effort succeeds, it will have a salutory effect on our relations. If it fails, it will start a very lively debate in all our countries.

Botha—I have taken note and will report to my government.

Vance—we should turn to paragraph 11, but before doing so I note that time is short and if we do break up without a mechanism for trying to find a half way house, as David described it, the opportunity for resolution of the Namibia question may be lost, which could lead to serious consequences with escalating violence in Namibia and so forth. Now, on paragraph 11, if one were talking about a base, no strike base, because we have had too much border, away from popula-
tion centers, into which any SWAPO personnel under arms will be placed on the day of the ceasefire and if the SWAPO personnel could be limited in numbers would this be a solution to your problem? I raise this because it seemed that, in the paper which you and Philipp drew up, this is a political problem to be dealt with.

Botha—Let me begin by saying that I don’t like the implication of what the Five were saying a minute ago. We take into account the tremendous consequences for our bilateral relations of the Namibia effort as well as possible Security Council action. If we are going to discuss the Security Council, then I will have to ask you to excuse me so that I can go and state our case before that body. But I don’t think that this is the place to discuss our bilateral relations, I just wanted to get that off my chest. The problem is the impression that this would make internally if any member of SWAPO could come armed to base, they would acquire a status which they had not achieved before the ceasefire. Even if we limit the number of these to 200–300, what if 3000 show up? There is no way to know how many could come. Do we put 300 in a camp? What about the remaining 2700? The problem is that we would be departing from what we consider to be the terms of the proposal. It is clear that all parties should go to their established bases. This is a term that was first used by the Five. We are going to run into the awful situation, if we continue in this vein, of my party having to consider demands by the internal parties that their armed personnel be restricted to base to match the political and military advantage accruing to SWAPO. Further, the plan makes provisions for the peaceful return of SWAPO personnel to participate in the political process. I assure you we never discussed the concept that SWAPO personnel in Namibia would have the right to their bases. I know that you see this as facilitating the establishment of tranquility, but my problem is that this was never negotiated and there is severe fear among the internal parties that this is a ploy on SWAPO’s part. There is no way to ensure that 10,000 SWAPO followers might not come forward. Our concern is based on the attitude of the parties and that SWAPO not achieve something as a result of the ceasefire which they had never achieved in practice. Apart from random terrorism, there has been no effective SWAPO campaign in Namibia which makes it different from Rhodesia. Basing SWAPO internally would alter that situation by giving them an unearned military advantage. I have just received a message that Andreas Shanika, a member of the Ovambo Provincial Assembly, was murdered yesterday by SWAPO. Moreover, the Security Council session on Namibia is underway. If we agree under these circumstances, there would be increased confusion among the parties in Namibia. I am prepared to take you there if you ever have the time, so that you can see for yourself. We spend a lot of time and effort on maintaining
stability among the sensibilities of the Namibian people. If we reach an agreement which does not take these sensibilities into account, the agreement will fall apart, and sanctions will be imposed against us. We have accepted that sanctions will be imposed on us, on Rhodesia, or South West Africa or apartheid and we are making our plans accordingly.

Vance—We listened to the other parties for seven hours yesterday and as a result we have a better understanding of their fears and concerns. As far as the matter of a location where SWAPO people might go on the day of the ceasefire, however, this originated in the session between Philipp and your people.

Stirn—I believe that the way Pik has introduced the problem is the right way to set about it. The practical problems must be addressed. We agree that armed SWAPO personnel in Namibia during the transitional period could have a disruptive effect on the elections. It would be difficult to chase them out of Namibia. The practical solution is to find a place where these people could be put, where their arms could be taken away from them if necessary. To avoid the appearance of an entrenched base, it could be sited in some no man’s land near the border.

Botha—I have taken note of your view. I cannot take it any further. I will have to discuss this with the SAG and the parties. However, on the matter of the origin of the question of the internal bases for SWAPO forces I have consulted with General Geldenhuys. You are correct that in his discussions with General Philipp, this point came up. Apparently, General Philipp said that SWAPO claimed that they have bases in Namibia. This is explained further by the section of the document which refers to restriction to base and closure of bases and which would not make sense unless it also referred to any SWAPO bases which might exist in Namibia. Therefore, if such bases exist, they will also come under UNTAG monitoring. This also refers to other SWAPO bases outside Namibia which should be subject to monitoring.

Vance—I understand, perhaps incorrectly, that the question came up in discussions as to what we should do with SWAPO personnel whom we find in Namibia with arms after the ceasefire. And the solution reached was to put them in some camp.

Botha—This is not a difficult problem. Each guerrilla knows where his base is. It was to give them time to get back to those bases that Waldheim provided for the ten day period of delay in his original ceasefire letter. Otherwise, the guerrillas would have every incentive to remain in Namibia.

Vance—We thought the intent of the ten day period was to give SWAPO time to inform its commanders of the ceasefire so that their troops could in fact stop fighting.
Botha—If this is the case it is an open invitation to SWAPO to cross the border in large numbers.

Owen—There will be a practical problem if SWAPO gathers in groups of 20 in houses on ceasefire day and claims those houses as bases. No one has been able to accept the February 26 document but the problems that it addresses are problems which will face all of us in the implementation of the proposal. All that is necessary is for us to make a commitment to see if there is a mechanism to address these problems to produce some form of workable agreement. Ultimately this must come under the Secretary General’s authority and we cannot infringe on this but we must get an arrangement which all parties can live with which would be sensitive to the problems of the national sovereignty of states but within the mandate of UNTAG.

Botha—Whenever we talk about sovereignty, we are overrun, overruled, and ignored by these same Front Line States. Why not talk about elections in Angola? I don’t think we should make too much of this sovereignty question. We want to find a way out of this impasse but my government must also deal with the internal parties. Concerning the operational implementation documents, much of this was drafted by Philipp himself. It was not a question of his agreement to something which we had prepared.

Jamieson—When we went to Namibia there was a general assumption among us that there should be no SWAPO monitoring or bases inside Namibia, but inside the territory people were concerned that the issue of armed SWAPO personnel in country would arise and they did not know what should be done with them. This problem is addressed by the solution of internal bases. It is not my intent that simply anyone could appear and claim to be a guerrilla and be included in the SWAPO bases. But the alternative to basing seems to be taking your chances on SWAPO personnel in Namibia causing disruption during the elections.

Botha—There was another option which we discussed, which was either they hand over their arms and participate peacefully, or return to their established bases.

Jamieson—I agree that this should be an option, but I was playing back to you the comments of some of the democratic parties in Namibia. What do you do if they don’t lay down their arms or return to their established bases?

Botha—We would respect the ceasefire only if there is a real ceasefire. If they want to return to Angola then there is a real question which you could fairly put to me if we should shoot the SWAPO personnel after they have laid down their arms and are simply returning to their bases. The police would still be there. The fact is that the ten day period would give SWAPO plenty of time to return to their bases. I should
like to thank you for having received the parties at these discussions. I don’t know the extent to which any progress was achieved with them as I have seen only the NNF and plan to leave later this afternoon which would get me back to South Africa on Friday. I cannot take this farther, now I simply must go back. This is not a walkout on my part since, after all, we did not envisage that the talks would go on longer than two days. Now I will talk to my government and the parties and will inform you of my government’s position.

Owen—Wouldn’t it be possible to leave General Geldenhuys behind with our people, the representatives of SWAPO, the Front Line, and possibly the internal parties to see if we can work out an implementation arrangement which has the confidence of everyone? If we can’t we can’t, but we have got to work out the appropriate detailed guidance for the parties in the field at some point. If we succeed, your government will have something rather more concrete, as will we all, on which to base our decisions. If not, we will just be talking to one another, things will slip, we will lose time, fall afoul of winter weather for the elections and will begin talking about elections in 1980 rather than in 1979. This will be frustrating for everyone.

Botha—I appreciate the spirit in which your suggestion is made. The problem is that I must consult personally and very thoroughly with my government. This cannot be done by phone or cable as we might be listened into by the Russians who have a very good deciphering capability. [omission in the original] Foreign Ministers with much more power than I have. Also we haven’t got as many people as you. You have armies of experts and we are a small country. I myself do some of our drafting late at night; that’s why you may not like it all. But I have to speak personally to my Prime Minister.

Van Well—Let us be clear about what situation we leave here. We all have to report back to our governments. But I share Dr. Owen’s concern for a follow-up on our problems so as to avoid leaving the impression that this meeting was a failure. It was called to bridge a complicated situation; to improve that situation and avoid slippage. This is why I endorse Dr. Owen’s suggestion for keeping our governments engaged in discussion on matters of principle that were raised here. It is, however, my impression that the question of internal bases is the principal concern of the internal groups. Various statements on five bases, the number of SWAPO troops to be based in Namibia. And so forth, have aroused concern and we have to deal with this concern. From our discussion with SWAPO, it seems that this has become a point of prestige. I think they have no ulterior motive on the use of these bases. They just want to make the point that they can have them. We all agree that there must be careful restriction on these troops to prevent disruptive incidents. I would welcome it if we could stay in
touch, and, ad referendum and without commitment, we could elaborate a structure to work out a commitment on what to do with armed SWAPO personnel in Namibia.

Botha—I appreciate your sentiments.

Vance—I support Dr. Owen’s suggestion and hope that you will convey this support to your government. I think it makes sense to try to do this and hope it might be possible. When do you plan to say something to the press and what to you expect to say?

Botha—Very little. It would really depend upon the questions which the press puts to me. I hope they won’t be too severe.

Vance—What do we say about where we go from here?

Botha—Every side must decide what it wants to say to the press, but I won’t close any doors. My major thrust would be that we have had discussions, exchanges of views, and that I feel it to be in all our interests that I report back to my government. Something like that.

Owen—It would be helpful if we could add that in light of your discussions with the Prime Minister it might be possible to meet at the technical level along the lines that we suggested or that the Ministers might get together again.

Botha—Yes certainly.

Owen—Also some Front Line Foreign Ministers will be coming and Waldheim has agreed to meet with some of them. SWAPO will still be here and we might be able to build something on this.

Vance—in any case we will be waiting until you have talked by phone to your Prime Minister before we say anything to the press.

Botha—Yes I will not say anything to the press until after I have talked to the Prime Minister. Cy, I will call you immediately after I have spoken to P.W.

Jamieson—One thing we will not say is that we are all returning to our respective bases.

Correction: para 12, para 1, line 10, should read “the monitoring of the bases and the surveillance of the border. . . .”

Vance
116. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

New York, March 21, 1979, 1114Z

Secto 3018. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (U) Namibia: March 20 Meeting of Contact Group Ministers and Front Line and Nigerian Representatives.

1. (C–entire text).

2. Contact Group met at Ministerial level early afternoon March 20 with representatives of the Front Line and Nigeria for a discussion of major issues holding up a Namibia settlement. Angola did not attend. Detailed account of meeting follows.

3. Vance—We met with SWAPO yesterday afternoon and with Pik Botha for two hours this morning. Our concerns centered on two items: SWAPO forces in neighboring states and SWAPO forces in Namibia.

On the question of SWAPO forces in neighboring states, we emphasized the Luanda statement that the Front Line (FL) would ensure that implementation of the plan was carried out scrupulously. We discussed this with South Africa in general terms. Yesterday, however, talking with SWAPO, we ran into a serious problem which we did not mention to South Africa this morning.

In our discussions with SWAPO, a serious question arose as to whether they accept the first sentence of paragraph 12 about restriction to base. If it is a fact that they don’t accept it, it would be a serious problem. We believe the FL should take this up with SWAPO since it would undermine the settlement effort.

On paragraph 11, bases inside Namibia, we discussed this with SWAPO and South Africa. We believe it needs to be made more concrete what is expected to be entailed in the implementation of paragraph 11. In our view, it might be possible to bridge the differences between the parties.

At the end of today’s meeting, the South African representatives took note of our views and said they would return home to discuss

---


2 See Document 112.

3 See Document 115.
these issues with their government. They said they would get back in touch with us.

On the UNTAG composition issue, the South Africans saw it as not being insurmountable. We are left to deal with paragraphs 11 and 12 and the need to make things more concrete. Again, I must highlight the problem on paragraph 12.

Owen—A lot will depend on the response of the various parties today, but through intensive consultation we may see our way through. We need a half-way house between the two poles of no UN involvement in monitoring and total UN monitoring. We must work on what is meant by having SWAPO armed personnel in Namibia and the anxiety that has been aroused about infiltration. We must find a way of discussing this as a matter of arms control. I find it extraordinary why SWAPO would want to put its people in bases inside Namibia. We need to clarify matters and to reopen negotiations (sic). We have got to have more detail and must sort matters out.

Van Well—This is a useful exercise that should and can be continued. The SYG’s February 26 proposal can be accepted, but on the two points—paragraphs 11 and 12—we need more details.

On the bases outside Namibia, there is a tendency to give the liaison offices the special mission of communicating with neighboring countries. It is important that the sovereignty of the FL be respected. If it is possible for Angola to accept liaison in connection with the already existing UN office in Luanda, it would help clarify the situation. We will also have to discuss the terms of reference for liaison offices. There is also the question of the border. We will need to work on language ensuring coordination, verification, and cooperation.

On the internal side, there is a confusing situation. We don’t know SWAPO’s objective in establishing such bases. We discussed three possible ways of dealing with SWAPO armed personnel in Namibia with SWAPO. SWAPO said it wanted such bases, but it gave no indication of the number, size, and so on. This problem has caused apprehension on the part of the internal groups and has complicated matters. It is important that we find out more from SWAPO about the proposed set up so orderly procedures can be considered and a more detailed ceasefire letter prepared. The ten-day period for SWAPO to inform its troops shouldn’t be used by SWAPO to build up its presence inside Namibia. We believe that urgency must be attached to this issue.

Vance—We will be meeting with SWAPO this afternoon.

Stirn—The core of the matter is the quest for confidence and trust. If things go smoothly, we can go on to work out the details. There are no major obstacles. It is just a matter of resolving difficult implementation details. We must make every endeavor to move in this direction.
Vance—Have any of the FL countries had a chance to discuss with SWAPO the apparent SWAPO change of position on paragraph 12?

Mogwe (Botswana)—One of the issues SWAPO doesn’t 100 percent agree with is on the liaison offices. We have accepted it because we have understood the concept of the liaison offices. If we start trying to extend the role of the offices, that will lead to trouble. So far as Angola is concerned, it has not accepted having a liaison office. They’ve said that there are already UN offices in Luanda, so why is there a need for a new office? Maybe they will accept additional staff in these offices. However, we don’t want to be associated with any monitoring.

SWAPO’s position as you have outlined it to us is new to us. SWAPO hasn’t raised it with the FL Presidents at any stage. Maybe it is a result of their being exposed to daily attacks by South African forces—even Rhodesian forces. What guarantee do they have that they will receive protection?

Vance—When we asked SWAPO about the disposition of its personnel outside of Namibia, SWAPO never gave us a serious answer and only said that restrictions could certainly not apply to its members who might be “going to school”.

Mogwe—Details must still be worked out because of these differences.

Honwana (Mozambique)—I agree with what Minister Mogwe said about the role of the liaison offices. Mozambique is associated with documents such as the Luanda statement. Mozambique feels that it would be best if no new issues were introduced.

I don’t see the question of restriction to base in neighboring states as a difficult issue. The FL have already pledged to make sure that SWAPO complies with the settlement proposal. The FL States already control the SWAPO presence on their territory—even every bullet and every rifle. Otherwise, there would be a dangerous situation. They will continue to do so.

On confidence building for South Africa, they say they have doubts. The Five should prevail on South Africa to stop the mistrust. We could also have cause for mistrust. However, as sovereign FL States we have given our pledge through the SYG, so South Africa should have confidence.

The exact details have to be worked out. In each country, in Angola, in Zambia, the situation is different. Each has developed its own means of effecting control. It would be difficult to work out a single document on how SWAPO is to behave at the time of the ceasefire vis-a-vis the neighboring states. As for SWAPO’s restriction to base, the “school” problem, and so on, these are details. The important thing is that the FL States will and can guarantee that things should work out.
Vance—We are concerned about SWAPO’s apparent change of position on the question of restriction to base. We have not discussed this with South Africa. What we need to know is what are SWAPO’s intentions?

Honwana—I’m not prepared to comment on that. Maybe the stopping of mistrust is most important. Are the Five confident that the FL will comply with ceasefire terms?

Vance—Yes, we are.

Honwana—Then we are on the way. The other is detail, not a main issue.

Owen—While we accept it, the important thing is that some don’t. We’re losing some of our friends in Namibia—those who refused to take part in the (December) elections. The important thing is to see that the UNTAG mandate is fulfilled. We may have need for some give. Without raising the sovereignty question, we need give and confidence on the liaison office issue.

Harriman (Nigeria)—This is definitely an element we’ll have to discuss with SWAPO.

On the question of confidence, at the ceasefire there will be 30,000 or more South African troops in position. They won’t have to move away immediately after the ceasefire. Why are they worried?

About the bases inside, three options were cited yesterday on what might be done with SWAPO personnel. The best option would be to put them in locations—maybe “base” is not a good term to use. I don’t understand fully SWAPO’s position on this given the experience of the Windhoek bomb. Anyway, I don’t see that this is a serious problem.

Jamieson—Do the FL representatives believe that SWAPO will cooperate as a sine qua non of the FL’s assurances on the plan’s implementation.

Foum—Luanda was a commitment of the FL to cooperate. We feel SWAPO will cooperate if South Africa undertakes to do so. With daily South African attacks going on now, how can we expect SWAPO and Angola to go along now? The real question is how we can get South Africa to assure that it will go along and cooperate.

Jamieson—The South Africans stated this morning their desire for a period of tranquility so that the election process could go on.

Foum—We hope to see this attitude reflected in the Security Council.

Chakulya (Zambia)—I’m worried about the time factor. South Africa set the date of September 30 for the elections—I’m not sure whether this was decided on with SWAPO. Only a few months are left, and we have reached no conclusion. South Africa has deliberately created problems over monitoring and the FL countries. This monitor-
The confidence question has been mentioned a couple of times. If South Africa believes it enjoys the trust of the world, the FL States also want to enjoy this trust. SWAPO doesn’t exist in thin air. They are in Zambia and Angola, where there are governments. These governments accepted their presence there. It is not fair for South Africa not to accept the sincerity of the FL Heads of State. As to the claimed lack of ability of the FL to implement the Luanda understanding, we are prepared to and will discuss details arising from commitments made by our Heads of State. However, details will have to be discussed on the spot. South Africa must be made to learn to trust our leaders and SWAPO, because sooner or later it is going to have to learn to live with a SWAPO government. Confidence can only be proved through action. Speaking of the question of restriction to base, how could it be right to say that the aggression, attacks, and killing caused by South Africa in the FL countries are valid reasons for the South Africans to change their mind about how far they can trust?

SWAPO has a responsibility to these (FL) countries. The question of SWAPO’s restriction to base is not an issue for South Africa. We run our own affairs and know how SWAPO operates. I’ve heard, although I’m not certain, that SWAPO has 400 men or less in Namibia. Why with 30,000 or more troops and powerful machinery are they scared?

It is time for South Africa to demonstrate to us what they are saying about being trusted. It is up to the Five to go back to them. I hope another time consuming round of Proximity Talks going into June or July won’t be necessary. South Africa is using a tactical method of delay to try to make sure that SWAPO loses the election. The time factor is of tremendous concern. The FL should be trusted.

Vance—The question of time is of the greatest importance and concern to us. South Africa is also concerned about time. The lack of confidence on both sides—SWAPO and South Africa—is a fact of life. Ways must be found to lessen this lack of confidence. Restriction to base is part of the proposal. That’s why SWAPO’s comments yesterday gave us such a shock. . . We have just learned that South Africa is leaving behind members of its party to discuss necessary details.

Owen—We must keep the momentum going. Unless we are able to flesh things out in detail, we won’t be able to restore confidence. We have to grapple with this problem.

Van Well—I was struck by the concern of the internal people over their lack of information and clarity on the question of restriction to
base in Namibia. We need to try to find orderly procedures to resolve this and not to leave it in the clouds.

Jamieson—Everyone has said they accept the SYG’s report. Therefore, we shouldn’t try to minimize SWAPO’s departure in such a fundamental way from it. It would be a wide wedge, if known, for those who don’t want to see progress here.

This morning, Botha raised no question over lack of confidence in the FL’s commitment and desire for a peaceful solution. The concern this morning was that if SWAPO deliberately flaunted the FL then no one would be able to do anything about it. You and your countries are the key. We couldn’t have gotten so far without you.

Chakulya—On the 400 SWAPO, it has only been mentioned. Its only what some have said.

End of session.

---

117. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State

New York, March 22, 1979, 0811Z

1238. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: (C) Namibia: Contact Group Ministers Meet Front Line and SWAPO Together March 20, 4:00 pm.

1. (C–entire text).

2. Contact Group met with Front Line Ministers and SWAPO representatives. Front Line Ministers had previously talked to SWAPO representatives and persuaded them to join in meeting with CG. Meeting was opened by Botswana FonMin Mogwe.

3. Mogwe (Botswana)—We appreciate the chance to meet you again2 and we took the liberty of inviting SWAPO along. There are three areas which we would like to discuss (a) liaison offices, (b) designated areas inside Namibia and (c) the first sentence of paragraph 12 (of the SYG’s Feb 26 report). On the first point, SWAPO does not favor liaison offices, but the decision as to whether to accept them is not up

---


to SWAPO, but to the Front Line states. Angola has not accepted the idea. SWAPO, like Angola, thinks that the function of an UN office already in country might be extended, not for monitoring, but for certain liaison functions.

As for bases inside Namibia, we hope that the matter has been cleared up. SWAPO requests bases inside Namibia. We have raised the question with them about their introducing people from outside after the ceasefire or three weeks later.

They say that is not so. When the ceasefire day arrives, SWAPO is not interested in introducing people from outside Namibia. Only their people inside should be confined to bases. SWAPO cannot estimate the numbers at this point because a wartime situation still exists. We are waiting for D-Day.

The third point, which worried us all, refers to the first sentence of paragraph 12. SWAPO tells us that they accept the principle in that sentence which is also reiterated in the Luanda communique. The main question is, who will do the monitoring. SWAPO accepts confinement to bases, but this will be monitored by the countries concerned, not by liaison officers. Liaison officers would be the wrong instruments to do this.

Vance—I am pleased to hear that you accept the first sentence of para 12. This is very important. The SYG said that he got the same understanding from his talk with you. We would also like to thank SWAPO for coming to this meeting which had originally been scheduled for a little later in the day.

Chakulya (Zambia)—I also would like to thank SWAPO for agreeing to that sentence.

Muyongo (SWAPO)—I sent a small paper to the Ministers, so I won’t go into yesterday’s discussions again. I think Dr. Owen brought one point up, though, which was not answered. The question was who was to do the monitoring—liaison officers or the officials of the neighboring states. We will not permit liaison officers to monitor our bases.

Owen (UK)—That puts the main onus on SWAPO and the Front Line States. We need some sort of linkage between UNTAG and the Front Line States in discussing the fulfilling of the UN mandate. This might take the form of supervision or control, which could not be done by UN civilian personnel. But what is necessary in other words, is to return the surveillance or information function to UNTAG.

---

3 Not found.
Muyongo—We enjoy close cooperation with neighboring countries where we have been living. Their Heads of State have agreed to “scrupulously observe” the ceasefire agreement. So the question of further control does not arise.

Owen—The point is that the interpretation of this is not just up to us. We believe in what you say. If we had been the only ones involved, we would have had an agreement years ago. We don’t doubt the Front Line Presidents’ intentions, but others do.

There are two different positions here. One is complete surveillance by UNTAG military elements. That’s what South Africa wants. The other is inspection only by Front Line officials. What we are looking for is a “half-way house” something between these two, or an area which will set up procedures to provide for contact between UNTAG and Front Line officials.

Vance—This liaison is really a problem to be worked out between the SYG and the Front Line States.

Mogwe—I agree. We have accepted this in principle.

Chakulya—Yes, fine, Zambia agrees too.

Van Well (FRG)—We have all agreed to the undiminished responsibility of the Front Line States. There is no problem of sovereignty here. All we want is some form of liaison. For example, could liaison officers accompany Front Line representatives around the countries to observe SWAPO forces? Or are they restricted to capitals?

Hunwana (Mozambique)—Our experience is that we all have UN refugee offices in our countries. We have worked out procedures with them, for example, as to how to visit refugees, how their food should be delivered, information about their camps, what to do about attacks by Rhodesia or South Africa, etc.

The same procedure should take place with UNTAG. We will arrange locally how the liaison offices will operate. The principle has been accepted. It is difficult at this point to define every detail. There is no problem unless negotiations are reopened. If we reopened them, even those countries which have accepted the idea of liaison offices would have to look at the question again.

Chakulya—There can be no “half-way house” or “three quarters way house.” The UN will send representatives from headquarters or from UNTAG for discussions in the capitals. As UN members we want to see the plan fulfilled. I don’t see Dr. Owen’s point. This is all I can say. I don’t see any problem. There shall be no monitoring. Our minds are clear.

Vance—I won’t speak for Dr. Owen, but I do think these explanations answer his questions. The question is one between Front Line States and the UN.
Mogwe—It can’t all be worked out in advance. Some points must be worked out on the spot.

Vance—Do you have any questions about point 2 (designated locations within Namibia)? I understand that no one will be introduced into the country after ceasefire day. What happens in the ten-day period between the signing of the acceptance letter and the actual ceasefire?

Muyongo—What we have in mind is that our internal forces would be regrouped and told where to go.

Vance—Does that mean nobody new will be sent in?

Muyongo—Nobody new will be needed there.

Young—That point should be made very clear. The South Africans are very nervous about that ten-day period. They might shoot at everyone they think is entering. A clear understanding is needed to prevent incidents.

Muyongo—During our ten-day reorganizing period, if we are attacked, we won’t sit on our hands. Can we get promises SA won’t attack us?

Young—The image they see is one of thousands of SWAPO cadres coming across the line, saying “here we are, put us in bases”. That’s what those people down there fear. We’ve said we don’t see it that way, but if they see a lot of people moving around, they will try to stop them. We should avoid such situations.

Muyongo—As the SWAPO representative, I will not talk about DTA or the other groups. The problem is with the South Africans. Our forces are different from theirs. Theirs have fixed bases; ours have mobile ones. Our forces need to be told where to go. Can we be told they won’t attack us. We repeat that we don’t intend to send anyone across the border.

Mogwe—We have not only assurances from SWAPO but also commitments from the Frontline States. The logistics need to be worked out.

Vance—I think it’s clear. What Andy was talking about was protecting the SWAPO people while they are regrouping.

Honwana—SWAPO needs quite a long time to communicate with its soldiers. They have no sophisticated means of communications like the South Africans. On ceasefire day every single South African soldier will know about it. You have SWAPO’s assurance that once the letter is signed, the war is over. Afterwards there will be no further movement across the border. We don’t want them shot at while they are regrouping. So please send this assurance to the SAG. The Five should tell SA to stop shooting at SWAPO at the same time.

Vance—I think that’s helpful. We will transmit the message.

McHenry—UNTAG will arrive before the ceasefire, but they will not have time to deploy, so there could be some problems. We must think about that more, but we will transmit your message.
Vance—That makes sense, and we will transmit this information.

Chakulya—I have a follow-up question. While there are assurances from the Front Line States and SWAPO, can we have assurances from SAG that they will not attack SWAPO camps while they are regrouping, not only within Namibia, but outside as well?

Vance—We will transmit that message. This has been very helpful to me.

Young—Do you plan to do something publicly with your statement? On page 2, there is some confusion. Now that we have an understanding, perhaps the statement could be rewritten to reflect what we have done.

Gurirab—Let’s agree the statement is confidential.

Mogwe—I hope we haven’t committed ourselves to something new. I haven’t seen the statement.

Owen—We have clarified the problem outside the country; what about inside now?

Young—What members of SWAPO forces are we talking about inside Namibia (10,000–20,000 or 100,000)?

Muyongo—No one can tell the figure. The war is still going on. We are speaking of numbers on that particular day, i.e. ceasefire day. Don’t squeeze us.

Jamieson (Canada)—We are not squeezing; we are only seeking clarity. Would you prefer to have your forces confined to base only or could they have other options? For example, would they prefer to return to bases outside the country or would they perhaps remain inside to take part in the political campaign? What are the options you want for your people?

Muyongo—I hope you don’t think all of Namibia is full of SWAPO soldiers. We will tell them to go to a given base and that is what they will do. They will then be confined to base.

Jamieson—But we have heard that if everyone was in camp, there would be no problem.

Muyongo—If everyone in Namibia was in SWAPO, they would all be in camp. We solved this problem yesterday.

Van Well—It is legitimate to ask about motives. There will be an election campaign. You would think they would prefer that to staying on base. Also there must be some preparation. We need an orderly procedure. If there are 10, 50, 200 or 3000, it makes a difference in facilities. We need an indication of the dimensions of the problem.

Foum (Tanzania)—We are beginning to have apprehensions. SWAPO is a political organ with a political wing and a military wing. SWAPO has said that its military operatives will be confined to camps. The others will be free to take part in the political process.
Mogwe—The Front Line must go to the UN meeting. Maybe you would like to stay on with SWAPO?

Muyongo—What we are discussing now is after the ceasefire is agreed to. Are there other motives behind this? It is SWAPO’s business to see who takes part in political activity, nobody else’s. People confined to base will take orders from us. Why is there such interest in this question now?

Vance—I don’t understand the questioning of motives. There are no hidden or ulterior motives. What we are attempting to do is to clarify the problem and to clear up misunderstandings. Today’s clarifications have been useful. Mr. Van Well’s questions had no motives behind them.

Gurirab—I appreciate that. However, we inferred from the question and the way it was brought up yesterday that an attempt was being made to eliminate the “restriction to base” part of the agreement. If we were wrong, we will stand corrected. We simply are not interested in the other two options.

Vance—There was no attempt to eliminate that at all; only to clarify. We asked if all your people would go into camps and your answer was “yes”. (Gurirab nodded agreement) So again, thank you all very much for coming.

Young

118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, March 26, 1979, 1423Z

74945. Subject: Namibia: Message From the Secretary to Foreign Minister Botha.

1. (C–entire text)

2. Embassy should deliver following message in para 3 below from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Botha as soon as possible.2

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790139–0523. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Niles; cleared by Newsom, Keeley, Maynes, Janin, and Tarnoff; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to USUN.

2 In telegram 695 from Cape Town, March 26, the Embassy reported that the Secretary’s letter was delivered to Fourie at 6:45 p.m. Fourie agreed to “get it to Botha as soon as possible, though he was not sure he could do so before tomorrow morning.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790139–0739)
3. Begin text:

Dear Pik:

Since our meeting in New York on Tuesday, I have reflected further on the Namibia issue and how we might be able to resolve the few remaining problems. I continue to believe that we are close to a solution and that the remaining issues can be resolved in a manner which fully protects your legitimate security interests. My Contact Group colleagues and I outlined these possible solutions to you during our March 20 meeting, and discussions have continued in New York between Mr. Ecksteen and the Contact Group on these matters. We look forward to receiving your reaction.

I believe, on the basis of the discussions which members of my delegation and I had with representatives of the internal parties that there is very substantial support within Namibia itself for the type of settlement which the Contact Group has developed. Moreover, we found the representatives of the parties generally interested in the types of solutions which we suggested for the remaining issues.

As you know, the talks in New York were complicated somewhat by the refusal of Angola to take part, although this did not prevent the other Front Line States from playing a very helpful role. During our private meeting as well as during your meeting with the Five Ministers, I made clear to you that this shift in Angola’s position had come as a result of your continued attacks on SWAPO bases in Angola. Given the pivotal role which Angola must play in this situation, I believe it is of the utmost importance that South Africa do nothing which will make it more difficult to obtain Angola’s support for a settlement. It is clear to us that the Angolans’ assessment of South Africa’s seriousness in seeking a peaceful settlement will go far to determine the position they take. It is my impression that SWAPO has now accepted all aspects of Dr. Waldheim’s plan. Consequently, I would like once again to appeal to you to ensure that the attacks by your forces against targets in Angola and Zambia cease. The members of the Contact Group will, at the same time, use the channels of communication available to us to urge similar restraint on SWAPO.

On this same subject, I want to call to your attention an interesting point which emerged during a meeting which my colleagues had with representatives of the Front Line and SWAPO after our meeting on

---

4 In telegram 1262 from USUN, March 23, the Mission reported on the March 22 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790134-0019)
5 See Documents 112 and 113.
March 20. At that time, we were told that SWAPO would undertake to end infiltration of armed personnel into Namibia at the time of its signing of the ceasefire letter.

This would mean that infiltration would cease during the ten-day period leading up to a ceasefire, which would respond to many of the concerns which you have raised. I urge that your government give careful consideration to this possibility. Sincerely, Cy. End text.

Vance

6 See Document 117.

7 In telegram 81319 to Cape Town, March 30, the Department transmitted Botha’s response. Botha expressed dismay over Angola’s role in the negotiating process and justified South Africa’s operations against SWAPO, which he accused of deliberately provoking the response: “If the Angolans are concerned about our actions against SWAPO it is up to them to put an end to SWAPO’s violence against South West Africa emanating from their territory.” He also expressed doubts about the cessation of SWAPO infiltration during the cease-fire period. Botha added: “I undertook my last visit to New York in difficult circumstances. The protracted negotiating process, with so many disappointments at times when we thought we had firm agreements, has made this an arduous road, producing distrust, uncertainty and skepticism among the people of the territory. They believe that their vital interests are being sacrificed and that alien forces, in distant countries, are at play determining their future. And in this process irrelevancies, political motives, prejudices, etc. are allowed to prevent the people of South West Africa from making their voices heard through the democratic process of free and fair elections. That is all they are asking: to be left in peace to make the determination of their own future. Cy, is that, after all, too much to ask? Why then can’t the democratic process be implemented? Why should irrelevant and secondary factors and unwilling participants be given so much leverage over the settlement process if the answer is so obviously clear?”

National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790150–0094)

119. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Botha

Washington, March 31, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your government now faces a crucial decision regarding Namibia as you consider the proposals developed during the recent Proximity

Talks in New York.\textsuperscript{2} As you make the historic decision about what course your government will take, I wanted to offer to you my observations.

In my letter, which Secretary Vance gave you on October 16, 1978,\textsuperscript{3} I stressed the importance which the United States attached to an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia and the beneficial consequences which would flow from such a settlement for all parties. Events since that letter have only served to re-confirm my belief.

At the beginning of my Administration, I decided that the United States would make a major diplomatic effort to resolve peacefully two burning problems—the Middle East conflict and the mounting violence in southern Africa. My purpose in both cases was to demonstrate that peaceful change and accommodation were possible. In both cases, my efforts were designed to reverse policy trends that were very adverse to all of us in favor of stability, development and security for the two regions.

In this context, I believe that an objective weighing of the benefits of the UN plan confirms that it offers the best solution for the people of Namibia and for all of the countries of the area, including South Africa. Through the UN plan, the continuing pressure of international and economic isolation or the threat of continuing guerrilla warfare can end for the new Government of Namibia. Granted international recognition, it can turn to the major problems of Namibia’s internal development.

Without international recognition, none of this will take place and nothing will be solved. The continuing violence inside Namibia will feed on the escalating violence in Rhodesia. The long, permeable borders of Namibia will increasingly be crossed. International involvement and opportunism will increase.

None of this need happen with the acceptance of the UN plan. While no one could promise that your acceptance of the plan offers an absolutely risk-free solution to the problem of Namibia, I believe this course of action is far and away the best for all concerned.

In your review of the situation, I urge you and your colleagues to reflect on how far we have come. In a situation of mounting guerrilla warfare and total mistrust, we have built on two years of painstaking negotiations, and we have developed a plan which SWAPO now completely accepts. This plan requires a guerrilla organization to test its strength at the ballot box in competition with other parties in Namibia.

\textsuperscript{2} March 19–23. See Documents 111–114, 116, and 117.
\textsuperscript{3} See Document 94.
We have the firm commitment of the Front Line states to support the process. For our part, as in the Middle East, my Administration is determined to press ahead, to insist on scrupulous adherence to the terms of the agreement by all sides, and to use favorable developments in Namibia to strengthen the forces of order, accommodation and regional peace.

The positive experience of cooperation in solving the Namibian problem can create a new atmosphere in your country’s relations with your neighbors and with the outside world, including the United States. I want very much to see such a development and I urge your government to join us in working towards this objective.  

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

4 In telegram 84266 to Cape Town and USUN, April 5, Vance transmitted Botha’s April 3 reply to Carter, in which he made the following points: The SAG agreed to the UN proposals on April 25, 1978, which called for SAG and SWAPO forces to be restricted to base and monitored by UNTAG. The latest UNSG report now says SWAPO will not be monitored by UNTAG, but by the Front Line, which was not acceptable to SAG. The proposals also now included establishment of bases inside Namibia for SWAPO forces there at the time of a ceasefire, creating new bases for SWAPO. This was not acceptable and negotiations should proceed based on the original proposals. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790155–0313)

120. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Botha

Washington, April 6, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing you again because I believe we are at a point where understanding each other is of extraordinary importance.

As you approach your final decision on Namibia, I hope you will weigh its implications for our relations as well as for the region.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 4/1–18/79. No classification marking.
It is my conviction that your decision presents opportunities as well as risks.

The risk is clear. Should the UN plan fail to receive South Africa’s support, I believe that UN measures against your country would be inevitable.

I hope that it will not come to this. There is no reason why it should.

If the Namibia issue is put behind us, there is an opportunity we can seize to move on to other matters and to improve our relations.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

---

2 Below his signature Carter wrote: “p.s. If there is agreement on the UN proposals, I believe it would be useful for us to get together at an early date. In the meantime, consultations among our advisors on Southern African problems should continue.”

---

121. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable

TDFIR DB–315/06486–79 Washington, April 6, 1979

COUNTRY
South West Africa (Namibia)/South Africa/Angola/Zambia

SUBJECT
Possibility that the Namibian Internal Parties Will Reject the Waldheim Report and Form an Interim Government (DOI: Early April 1979)

SOURCE
[2 lines not declassified]

Summary: The Namibian internal parties met South African Ministers in Windhoek on 2 April 1979 to discuss their reaction to the 19–23 March proximity talks in New York. With tacit SAG encouragement,
the internal parties seem disposed to reject the UN proposals and to introduce an interim government after 9 April. End of summary.

1. A prominent Namibian politician commented in early April 1979 on the mood of the internal Namibian political parties in the aftermath of the visit to Windhoek on 2 April 1979 by South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha and South African Foreign Minister R.F. Botha and in the light of current moves by the internal parties toward agreeing on a stand on the issues hindering the implementation of the Western proposals. He said that unless UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim and the Western Five came out with a formula that could satisfy the internal parties’ objections to the issues of South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) bases inside Namibia and of monitoring SWAPO bases outside Namibia, the Constituent Assembly would probably pass a resolution on 9 April 1979 calling for the formation of an interim government to take over the responsibility of governing Namibia and of negotiating Namibia’s independence directly with the UN and Western Five. This resolution would probably be accepted by the South African Government (SAG) and might win the support of the Namibian National Front (NNF) and SWAPO (Democrat-D) who now saw little alternative to abandoning the Western proposals.

2. At a military briefing given by South African General Jannie Geldenhuys on 2 April 1979, the internal parties were told in balanced and unemotional terms that the UN and Western Five’s proposals for the monitoring of SWAPO bases were inadequate from a military point of view. Geldenhuys said that the technical surveillance devices suggested by Waldheim were of doubtful value and that Angolan President Augustinho Neto, had no control over southern Angola. He also said that both Neto and Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda were being unreliably briefed by their officials.

3. At their meetings with P.W. and R.F. Botha on 2 April 1979, the internal parties were assured that the SAG would not act except in accordance with the internal parties’ wishes. P.W. Botha made a plea to the internal parties to put aside their ideological differences for the time being and to produce a united decision on accepting the proposed clarifications to Waldheim’s report S/13120 of 26 February 1979. He said the SAG would abide by that united decision, whatever it was. P.W. Botha pointed out the inherent dangers in accepting the proposed clarification and stressed once again the UN and Western Five’s constant breaches of faith and the continuous concessions made by the SAG. The politician said that he gained the clear impression that the SAG, which had previously wanted to see the implementation of the Western proposals, now hoped that the internal parties would reject them.

4. At a caucus meeting on 2 April 1979, immediately after the meeting with P.W. and R.F. Botha, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
(DTA) came within an inch of agreeing to put a resolution to the Constituent Assembly to adjourn indefinitely and summon a national convention of all the internal parties under the terms of the original Turnhalle Agreement to decide Namibia’s future. Remembering that this would restore to Aktur its right of veto, the DTA decided that the Constituent Assembly should negotiate with the NNF and SWAPO (D) the latter’s participation in an interim government. The DTA also decided that it would go ahead even if the NNF and SWAPO (D) refused to participate.

5. The DTA was determined to take over the governing of Namibia by way of an interim government. Efforts by the Constituent Assembly to remove racial discrimination in the territory had been constantly blocked by Aktur and the SAG was not prepared to fight Aktur. The DTA found itself in an intolerable situation whereby it was losing support daily to SWAPO because of its failure to fulfill its election promises. The DTA had no intention of declaring independence unilaterally but it wanted to be in a position where the UN and Western Five had to negotiate directly with the DTA as an interim government on its own terms. The DTA foresaw a situation in which UN Special Representative Marti Ahtisaari would make continuous concessions to SWAPO against which the Western Five would be unwilling to intervene, and it was determined that this should not happen.

6. The politician said that the DTA would hold bilateral meetings with the NNF and SWAPO (D) before 9 April 1979 with a view to securing their acceptance of the DTA’s proposal that the Constituent Assembly should pass a resolution on the formation of an interim government. These bilateral meetings could lead to an all parties meeting depending upon the response of the NNF and SWAPO (D). Whether or not the DTA secured their acceptance, the politician expected the Constituent Assembly to proceed with its resolution on 9 April 1979. [less than 1 line not declassified] comment: The SAG has given Waldheim's clarifications to the internal parties. The Constituent Assembly will probably proceed with its resolution on 9 April. However, the Western Five might clinch NNF and SWAPO (D) acceptance of the UN position if they made public the clarifications agreed upon in New York. In this case, the united front of the internal parties would be broken and the SAG might refrain from closing the door.)

7. ACQ: [1 line not declassified].

8. Field dissem: [2 lines not declassified].
122. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State

Cape Town, April 9, 1979, 1230Z

830. For the Secretary. From Embassy Cape Town. Dept also pass White House. Subject: (S) Namibia: Delivery of President Carter’s Letter of April 6, 1979 to Prime Minister Botha.

1. (S–entire text.)

2. I saw South African Prime Minister P.W. Botha at 1220 p.m. today, April 9, accompanied by Secretary for Foreign Affairs B.G. Fourie. I handed Botha the April 6 letter from President Carter which I had handcarried from Washington.

3. The meeting was short. Prime Minister Botha read the letter through once and said, “this is a threat,” as he tossed the letter onto the coffee table. “It is not intended as a threat, Mr. Prime Minister,” I replied, but he quickly interjected, “it is a threat,” and handing it to Fourie said, “there is nothing to discuss.” I repeated that it was not a threat but an expression of concern about the situation and hope that the UN plan would be put into effect. P.W. took the letter back from Fourie and read aloud the paragraph which reads: “The risk is clear. Should the U.N. plan fail to receive South Africa’s support, I believe that U.N. measures against your country would be inevitable.” I pointed out that this simply noted a risk that exists, but P.W. asked rather snidely, “who sabotaged the UN plan?” I said I thought the plan was still alive and could be implemented. He scoffed and, rising, made it clear that the conversation was over. He extended his hand, shook mine, and quickly said goodbye, his anger, if aroused, was well controlled.

4. Fourie escorted me the short way from the Prime Minister’s office to the open elevator without comment, then returned to the Prime Minister. I hope to see him later to see if P.W. had more to say after I left.

Edmondson

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 4–5/79. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 120.
852. From Embassy Cape Town. Department also pass White House. Subject: (S) Namibia: Follow-up to Delivery of Carter-Botha Letter. Ref: Cape Town 830.2

1. S–entire text

2. I saw Brand Fourie this afternoon and tried to see what further reaction, if any, there had been to the letter I delivered to P.W. Botha yesterday from President Carter (reftel). Fourie was his usual friendly self but said little to elucidate where things may go from here on Namibia.

3. I explained that because of the more flexible position P.W. Botha’s government had been taking on certain domestic issues, including a well-received proposal that Plural Relations Minister Piet Koornhof had advanced for settlement of the Crossroads’ squatter problem,3 I had been encouraged to hope that with an internationally accepted settlement in Namibia the atmosphere would be greatly improved for U.S.-South African bilateral relations. Accordingly, I was very disappointed that South Africa had not yet accepted the UN plan for Namibia and that P.W. Botha reacted negatively to President Carter’s letter.4 I was frankly puzzled that Botha still seemed to act as if he believed there had been some kind of duplicity—some “sabotage of the UN plan” involved in the Western position. I wondered what it all meant, where we stood now, and where we go from here.

4. Fourie replied that he was not sure. In any event, P.W. will be answering President Carter’s letter, although he had reacted to the one sentence in the letter (the fourth paragraph) as if I had come in with a pistol. P.W. was still prepared to go ahead with the original plan, but regarded the Secretary General’s report as a deviation. The annex

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 4–5/79. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
2 See Document 122.
3 In telegram 804 from Cape Town, April 6, the Embassy transmitted Koornhof’s Crossroads statement, in which he announced the South African Government’s decision to relocate many of the residents and their families to a new township to be constructed near the squatter camp. He also said that influx control regulations would be strictly enforced and that black labor in the Western Cape would be more expensive due to higher fees and penalties levied on employers. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790157–0749)
4 See Document 120.
to the letter from the Western Five had helped a bit, but the Secretary General still had to issue a clarification. (I noted that the SYG was awaiting the SAG reply, which Fourie seemed to acknowledge.) In any event, while the issue of monitoring SWAPO forces in neighboring countries was difficult, Fourie did not think Botha could ever accept the idea of a SWAPO base or bases in Namibia, which had been an entirely new element. The monitoring issue was debated all along, but the base issue came out of the blue. I said I would not rehash the issue with Fourie, as the Five Ministers had already dealt with it as effectively as possible at the Proximity Talks. The point was that we had achieved very significant commitments from SWAPO and the Frontline States—not ideal from all points of view perhaps, but sufficient to permit a pragmatic solution that might never offer itself again. I was only disappointed that the Prime Minister was unwilling even to discuss it in its broader aspects.

5. Fourie at this point said the SAG was beginning to experience a new problem in Namibia: i.e., that having done away with ethnic representation and discrimination in the territory, the Administrator General was increasingly being asked to decide on certain issues between the contrasting views of different groups and that these issues, when submitted to the SAG, involved decisions that ran against the trend in South Africa, making them very difficult indeed. Fourie’s implication was that the SAG did not like this decision-making task. He did not carry the implication further to suggest the need for a responsible legislative body in the territory itself, but the hint was there.

6. Fourie noted that the Department had called Ambassador Sole in to protest Foreign Minister Pik Botha’s remarks about Don McHenry. Unfortunately, I still have only news reports of the protest, so commented only that I had not yet received a text. I added, however, that

5 In telegram 90013 to Cape Town, April 11, the Department transmitted text of the April 9 press statement following the meeting between Newsom and Sole: “The Department of State today called in the South African Ambassador to protest strongly the remarks directed at the United States and at Ambassador Donald McHenry by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. R.F. Botha, in Parliament on April 3, 1979. Similar remarks were made on April 5 by the South African Minister of Economics. During the April 3 parliamentary session, the Minister of Foreign Affairs referred, by implication, to the United States and to Ambassador McHenry as being among South Africa’s ‘enemies,’ an allegation which is totally unfounded. The United States, together with the other members of the Contact Group, has actively pursued a peaceful settlement to the Namibia problem, which we believe would be in the interests of all the parties, including South Africa. Ambassador McHenry has played a key role in the negotiating process. We categorically reject the allegations of improprieties made by the South African Foreign Minister. Unfounded charges of this sort must end if the parties are to turn to the real business at hand of concluding the Namibia negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790165–1147)
even before Pik’s latest remarks I was asked by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and other senior officers in the Department why it was that the South Africans always seemed to pick on McHenry. I said that McHenry worked under instructions of the Secretary and others in the Department and was a highly professional diplomat. Some of the allegations I had heard about “behind the scenes” activities, such as suggested by Sunday Times reporter Fleur de Villiers, were quite ridiculous and I thought it unstatesmanlike at the least for Botha to repeat such stuff. In the circumstances such charges would strike Americans as being essentially racist. Fourie demurred, and I said I was talking about impressions that might be created without regard to motives. Fourie admitted that the chemistry between Pik Botha and Don McHenry was not very good.

7. Fourie noted that he had called in some other Ambassadors to protest the appeals they had made in case of the Mahlangu execution but had not called me in as they would be answering directly the letters received by the President and Prime Minister from President Carter. When I commented that it would hardly be appropriate to protest to me about a communication from my Chief of State, Fourie said that is what he had advised.

8. At the end of our conversation, Fourie said he was leaving tomorrow for 4 days fishing with his son over Easter. He hoped the people “up there” (Windhoek) would keep talking another week as things would be less busy in Cape Town. He spoke of retiring in a year or two, when he would be “out of it all.” He sounded less tired.

---

6 In telegram 850 from Cape Town, April 10, the Embassy reported on Botha’s April 10 remarks attacking the Department and McHenry in The Argus: “The Argus reported that Pik charged that instead of protesting to Ambassador McHenry for his role in the Namibia settlement negotiations, the Department was attempting to get out of the mess McHenry created by ‘protesting to us (the SAG) for revealing his role.’ Botha reportedly charged that Ambassador McHenry had played a vital role in ‘deviations’ from the original settlement plan and it was not necessary to prove Ambassador McHenry’s alleged role because ‘he knows that this is so and that he did it to try to get the cooperation of SWAPO.’ Ambassador McHenry, the Foreign Minister charged, believed the only way to achieve peace in Namibia was to install SWAPO in power.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790165–0442)

7 Reference is to a March 4 article in the Sunday Times in which de Villiers analyzed the current status of the Namibian negotiations. As reported in telegram 446 from Cape Town, March 5, de Villiers noted: “Add to that in turn a history of diplomatic duplicity on the part of certain Western negotiators who, while bemoaning the lack of trust between the participants, proceeded to fuel South African suspicions of double-dealing, a UN Secretariat liberally seeded with men who have long believed that SWAPO membership was a ticket to a UN heaven, and Western diplomats who believed that South African politicians do not have to account to their party or their electorate, and you have the simple recipe for failure.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790101–0320)

8 Presumably a reference to Documents 119 and 120.
than resigned, though Brand Fourie is a good diplomat who usually just smiles and does not let on what he really thinks.

Edmondson

124. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State

Cape Town, April 11, 1979, 1530Z


1. (Confidential–entire text)

2. Following in paragraph 3 below is text of letter dated April 11, 1979 from Prime Minister P.W. Botha to President Carter. The signed original, which was handed to Embassy Political Counselor by DFA Liaison Officer Neil van Heerden (Acting for DFA Secretary B.G. Fourie who is on Easter vacation) is being forwarded by pouch. Van Heerden’s general comments on Namibia are reported septel; his only comment about the letter per se was that P.W. had regarded President Carter’s letter of April 6 as a threat, although an inquiry to Ambassador Sole in Washington had brought the reply that no threat was intended. This is mentioned in P.W.’s reply, but ironically my own direct assertion of this point to P.W. Botha (Cape Town 830) is not mentioned. The salient feature of the letter is a carefully crafted repetition of South Africa’s position that the Secretary General’s report of February 26, 1979 introduced unacceptable deviations from the UN plan, specifically on the issues of monitoring SWAPO bases and allowing the establishment of such bases in Namibia. The letter dismisses the clarifications resulting from the recent Proximity Talks and says that the SAG will be influenced by the consultations in which Namibia’s “democratic

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172–1512. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 The April 11 conversation with Van Heerden is reported in telegram 869 from Cape Town, April 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790167–0148)

3 See Document 120.

4 See Document 122.

5 See footnote 2, Document 112.
parties” are currently engaged. It is an unencouraging, essentially negative reply.

3. Begin text of letter: “Dear Mr President

Thank you for your letter of 6 April 1979 which was handed to me by Ambassador Edmondson on 9 April 1979. I appreciate your candour and am sure you expect the same frankness from me. I also agree with you that we are at a point where understanding each other is of extraordinary importance.

We stand by the U.N. settlement plan which categorically provided for the monitoring of SWAPO bases and did not provide for the establishment after cease-fire of such bases in the territory.

Any objective analyst would agree that the Secretary-General’s report of 26 February 1979, introduced deviations which materially alter the proposal which we originally accepted and increase the already considerable risks involved to a point where the safety of the people of South West Africa can no longer be guaranteed. The 16 points which were subsequently submitted to us by the Five Foreign Ministers, do not affect these deviations.

The South African Government has stated all along that it would be guided by the wishes of the people. The leaders of the democratic parties are currently engaged in consultations on these important matters. The South African Government will be influenced by their views.

I was perturbed by your reference to the implications for our relations with the United States and the inevitability of U.N. action against South Africa, as this seemed to me to be a direct threat. This I immediately pointed out to your Ambassador. Subsequently, our Ambassador in Washington was informed that no threat was intended. I would be grateful to receive your confirmation.

As in the past, we remain ready to discuss the implementation of the original settlement proposal as well as Southern African issues in general, without accepting the right of others to dictate to us. Sincerely, P.W. Botha”. End text.

Edmondson

---

6 In telegram 1306 from USUN, March 25, the Mission transmitted the 16 points of the Contact Group, which included assurances from SWAPO and the Front Line States that the cease-fire agreement would be strictly enforced outside of Namibia and that SWAPO forces in Namibia at the time of the cease-fire would be under UNTAG supervision. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790137-0859)

7 See Document 121.

8 See Document 122.
125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, May 7, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

3. Namibia: South Africa Rejects Contact Group Proposals. South Africa today advised the Contact Group that our clarifications of Waldheim’s February 26 report were insufficient to overcome their “major objections.” The note also stated that it had agreed to a request by the Namibian “Constituent Assembly” to establish a “National Assembly” in the territory, which will have the power to repeal existing legislation but not to initiate new laws. Its major function will supposedly be to dismantle the structure of apartheid. The South African note claims that this action does not change the status of Namibia and reiterates the SAG’s readiness to implement the “original” Contact Group Proposal. The South Africans advised us that their note will be published tomorrow. We anticipate that there will be immediate African demands for Security Council action against South Africa and a meeting before the end of this week is a distinct possibility. The Contact Group will be working on a common approach, with the position of the new UK Government, the major question mark.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 5/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote on the top of the first page: “Cy.”

2 See footnote 6, Document 124.

3 In telegram 1083 from Cape Town, May 7, the Embassy transmitted the South African Government’s reply to the March 26 letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790207–0142)
126. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to
President Carter¹

Washington, May 14, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

5. Formation of National Assembly in Namibia: The South African Administrator in Namibia today proclaimed the transformation of the Namibian “Constituent Assembly,” created as a result of the unilateral December 1978 elections, into a National Assembly with the power to legislate anything except Namibian independence. The South Africans are reportedly saying that this closes no doors to an internationally acceptable settlement; however, the formation of an interim government is likely to be seen, particularly in Africa, as another step towards a unilateral declaration of independence.

The South African action will be strongly condemned by the UN General Assembly session on Namibia which will open May 23; demands for Security Council action and sanctions seem a certainty.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]


² For a report of General Assembly action pertaining to Namibia, including a call for Chapter VII sanctions against South Africa, May 23–31, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 1075–1080.
127. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 30, 1979, 2:30–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT
Summary of the President’s Meeting with UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, July 30, 1979

PARTICIPANTS
President Jimmy Carter
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Andrew Young, Permanent US Representative to the United Nations
Charles William Maynes, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Dr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, NSC Staff
Jerrold Schecter, NSC Associate Press Secretary
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim
William Buffum, Under Secretary General for Political Affairs
Albert Rohan, Director, Executive Office of the Secretary-General

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Namibia.]

Namibia. Waldheim sees some limited progress, even though it is not “highly visible”. His recent conversations with Neto in Luanda persuade him that Angola is interested in a continuing negotiating process, as are Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania. He feels that sanctions on South Africans are not appropriate at this time in the light of two developments: first, Neto’s acceptance of liaison arrangements between Angola, Zambia, and Botswana and the prospective UN force (UNTAG); second, the improved chances for a 100-kilometer demilitarized buffer zone to be controlled by UNTAG on the Angolan side with Angolan patrols, and in the South by UNTAG with South African patrols. He felt that this provided a good chance of solving the problem of monitoring SWAPO forces now being harbored in neighboring countries. Neither SWAPO nor South Africa has yet responded, and Waldheim hopes the Front-Line states will pressure Sam Njomo, while


2 In telegram 3041 from USUN, July 18, the Mission transmitted a report from the British Ambassador to Angola on Waldheim’s discussions with Neto. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790323–1056)
Ambassador Murray on his trip tries to influence the SAG on behalf of the Western Five. (C)

The President wondered aloud if the two sides in this dispute really want a settlement, to which Waldheim’s reply was that in his view much depends on how the Rhodesian situation turns out. (C)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Namibia.]

128. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 22, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

8. Namibia. All of the black African parties have reiterated their support for the UN settlement plan, although SWAPO continues to insist that it will not allow disarmament or expulsion from Namibia of its troops at the time of a ceasefire. We continue to believe that this problem can be overcome if South Africa accepts the demilitarized zone along the northern Namibia border. Having already visited Angola, Namibia and Botswana and talked with SWAPO, UNTAG Military Commander Prem Chand is in Namibia on the fourth phase of his discussions of the proposed DMA. He will be joined by Waldheim’s Deputy Urquhart and UN Special Representative for Namibia Ahtisaari for discussions with the South Africans in Cape Town in early March. South Africa may raise operations by Savimbi’s UNITA in southern Angola as a possible obstacle to implementation of the DMA. We will recommend that the UN hold firm against any proposal for UNITA participation in the Namibia negotiations and point out to South Africa that UNITA is neither a party in the settlement nor a genuine threat to its success.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 40, State Department Evening Reports, 2/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “Cy” and “cc Zbig.”
Washington, November 22, 1980

1. Namibia: South Africa yesterday accepted the U.N. Secretary General’s proposal for an all-parties “pre-implementation meeting” on the UN Plan for Namibian independence. The meeting would be held January 7–14. South Africa has agreed that if “trust and confidence” can be established among the parties, implementation of the U.N. Plan can start by March 1, 1981, with a view to independence by the end of the year.

Although we consider South African acceptance of the implementation date a significant achievement, representatives of the Front Line States in New York are skeptical about the South African linkage of implementation to the prior establishment of “trust and confidence.” These Front Line States envoys won’t block the meeting, but they apparently want to go ahead with the U.N. General Assembly debate on Namibia, scheduled to begin early next week. We have instructed our Embassies in the Front Line States to join their colleagues from the Western Contact Group in demarches urging delay of the debate. Although it is the Security Council and not the General Assembly which will supervise the U.N. plan, we fear that the inevitable hard-line African statements and resolutions in the General Assembly could prompt South Africa to withdraw its agreement to the pre-implementation meeting and the implementation date, on the grounds of U.N. partiality to SWAPO. (C)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 41, State Department Evening Reports, 11/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum at the top of the first page.
2 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “South Africa has no intention of reaching an agreement re Namibia.”
130. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter

Washington, January 13, 1981

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Namibia.]

4. Namibia Pre-Implementation Conference: The Namibia Pre-Implementation Conference will end in Geneva tomorrow with little to show for its week’s work. South Africa has stalled, apparently because it believes the leading internal party, the DTA, needs more time before it can beat SWAPO in a fair election. Although South Africa has made a major issue of UN support for SWAPO, it refused to negotiate on a package of actions to ensure UN impartiality once a date was set for implementation of the UN plan. Pik Botha told the Cape Town Five today that South Africa could not agree now to implement the UN plan since it would result in a SWAPO victory. He said South Africa was prepared to face the international reaction to its position. Representatives of the Western Five Contact Group in Geneva proposed a Heads of Government message to South African Prime Minister Botha, but London rejected the Contact Group draft and Don McHenry, the Canadians, and the Germans rejected the British redraft, which would have been much softer on the South Africans. The message, in either case, would not have changed the South African position, and the Western Five can still send a post-conference message trying to get South Africa to show some movement.

The UN will probably wind up the conference tomorrow with a summary of what happened, implicitly critical of South Africa, but noting the contact which took place between the parties and expressing the hope that South Africa will reconsider its position. The UN statement may also include some mention of the impartiality package offered to South Africa, which will serve to get that proposal on the public record.

African reaction to the failure of the conference may result in either a debate on Namibia at the UN General Assembly when it resumes January 15 and/or pressure in the Security Council for sanctions. We will be consulting with our Contact Group colleagues and Waldheim on how to hold the African reaction in check while we pursue the problem further with South Africa. (C)

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 41, State Department Evening Reports, 1/81. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.
Rhodesia

131. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, January 25, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

3. Rhodesia: In the wake of Ian Smith’s January 24 statement, we have undertaken an urgent review of what we can do to salvage the Rhodesian negotiations. We told the press today that despite Smith’s rejection, we support British proposals for a negotiated settlement. As a result of our encouragement, the British appeared in somewhat better spirits today, although our Embassy in London reports they are still uncertain about what can be done. In Parliament, Secretary of State Crosland voiced disappointment but stated that the situation is still under review. He has also instructed Geneva Conference Chairman Richard to stay in Africa in order to talk to the South Africans and the Rhodesian Nationalists before returning to London this weekend.

South African Ambassador Botha called on me this evening to convey the South Africans’ surprise at the Smith decision after Pretoria had told the Rhodesians not to reject the Richard proposals out of hand. I then asked Botha to have his government convey to Smith a message along the lines of the attached talking points. I stressed the point that an outright rejection of the British proposals by Smith would face stiff US opposition including a determined effort to review the sanctions currently in force with a view toward closing any loopholes. When Botha asked me whether your administration would encourage

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77. Secret. A stamped notation reads: “The President has seen.” Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “cc Vance.”

2 In a January 24 speech Smith rejected the British settlement proposals claiming they were unacceptable as a basis for further negotiation in Geneva, and called for an internal settlement which would exclude Nationalist leaders involved in the armed struggle. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28309) The British proposals are in Tab 1 to Document 264.

3 During the Department of State’s Daily Briefing on January 25, Frederick Brown said that the United States regarded the British proposals as “an acceptable basis for negotiation.” (New York Times, January 26, 1977, p. 3)

4 In telegram 1357 from London, January 25, the Embassy reported on the status of the Rhodesian negotiations. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77)

5 See Document 260.
Congressional repeal of the Byrd Amendment\textsuperscript{6} even if Smith showed greater flexibility on a settlement, I told him frankly that we would have to move ahead with repeal in any case, adding that Smith has shown absolutely no willingness to move forward.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Attachment

Talking Points for Meeting Between Secretary of State Vance and the South African Ambassador (Botha)\textsuperscript{7}

Washington, undated

—President Carter has asked me to convey through you to your Prime Minister the assurance that the United States will continue its search for peaceful solutions to the problems of southern Africa.

—We have given the Front Line Presidents and other African leaders similar assurances.

—Ian Smith’s January 24 speech greatly complicates the Rhodesian negotiation. His rejection of the British proposal is contrary to what we understand he planned. An internal solution to the Rhodesian problem is not realistic, and as we have told Smith it will receive no American support.

—We are trying to keep the door to negotiations open and have said publicly the British proposals are a basis for continued talks. Smith must realize no settlement can be based on the five points alone. His statement that he is willing to negotiate the original five points with flexibility is no help at all.

—Smith has given the Africans an opportunity to reject further negotiations. If a deadlock is reached, he must be aware that he will be faced with American opposition.

—We will move to repeal the Byrd Amendment and will review our policy of sanctions with a view to closing any existing loopholes.

—Until an interim government is formed Rhodesia cannot count on American interest or sympathy, nor will it emerge from its current state of isolation.

\textsuperscript{6} The Byrd Amendment to the Military Procurement Act (1971), allowed for the importation of Rhodesian chrome in violation of UN sanctions. Carter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph: “We should move on this.”

\textsuperscript{7} Secret.
—We are prepared to continue our search for a negotiated settlement and are discussing what can be done with the British. We need to have your government’s views on what steps can be taken to correct the present situation and expect to stay in close consultations with you.

—With respect to Namibia, we have told the Front Line Presidents, the Nigerians, and other African leaders that we remain committed to Namibian independence and a negotiated settlement which will achieve this objective. They know that our good offices remain open. We are currently reviewing what steps will move a settlement along. We trust that your government will continue to refrain from taking any decisions that might foreclose the possibility of an internationally acceptable settlement.

—Your government may wish to communicate the gist of my remarks on Rhodesia to Salisbury.

—We have maintained useful communications to your government through you. We wish to continue to use your good offices and will rely on Assistant Secretary Schaufele’s meeting with you regularly to make sure that our communications remain as effective in the future as they have been in the past.8

---

8 Carter wrote next to this paragraph: “ok J.”

132. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1

Washington, January 29, 1977

1. Rhodesia: Peter Ramsbotham came in this morning to express his government’s appreciation for the early and helpful reception which you gave him.2 Ramsbotham also asked that we maintain our pressure on Smith. He reported that experts in London are studying alternative approaches to relaunch the Rhodesian negotiations. The British wel-

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77. No classification marking. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “To Cy.”

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Ramsbotham, Vance, and Brzezinski from 4:30 to 5:10 p.m. in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
come consultations with us, perhaps as early as the end of next week.\textsuperscript{3} We are urging the British to move their review forward quickly and will meet them as soon as they are ready. I will address the Rhodesian problem on Monday in my press conference and will announce our support for a repeal of the Byrd Amendment.\textsuperscript{4}

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

\textsuperscript{3} Carter wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
\textsuperscript{4} Carter wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence. Vance reported the administration’s position on the Rhodesian negotiations during a January 31 press conference. The position included continued support for the British proposal, opposition to the “internal solution,” and an effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment. For the text of the press conference, see Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, February 21, 1977, p. 137.

133. \textbf{Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia}\textsuperscript{1}

\begin{center}
Washington, January 29, 1977, 0034Z
\end{center}

20461. For the Ambassador. Subject: Message to President Kaunda.

1. Please pass the following message to President Kaunda.

2. “Dear Mr. President: The President has written you to say I would be in touch.\textsuperscript{2} I want to take an early opportunity to write you about the Rhodesian situation. I appreciated the message of encouragement you sent me through Mark Chona and profited from his report of your views.

3. “Needless to say, Ian Smith’s January 24\textsuperscript{3} speech came as an unpleasant surprise to us. As you know, we have supported the British proposals on Rhodesia as a basis for further negotiations and had


\textsuperscript{2} In telegram 17342 to Lusaka, January 26, the Department transmitted a message from President Carter to President Kaunda, in which Carter expressed his commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Rhodesia and Namibia. Carter also mentioned that Vance would consult with Kaunda “on future steps we might take, and ways in which we can work together to achieve solutions for Southern Africa’s difficult problems.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Zambia: President Kenneth D. Kaunda, 1–12/77)

\textsuperscript{3} See footnote 2, Document 131.
hoped that Smith and the Zimbabwean nationalists would do the same. Of course I recognize that during the course of negotiations concessions by all the parties will be necessary if a solution is to be reached. We continue to support the framework of a settlement which the British have advanced. We regret that efforts to reach a satisfactory negotiated settlement have, for the moment, at least, been rebuffed. Smith’s attitude has produced a new and more dangerous situation in Rhodesia and Southern Africa.

4. “Smith’s reference in his speech to an internal solution is unacceptable and we have so stated in public. We have told him that if a deadlock is reached, he will be met by stiff American opposition. As an indication of our position, the President has asked me to tell you that the administration will seek the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. We are beginning efforts with the Congress to work towards that end. We have asked the South Africans to communicate our message to Smith.4

5. “I will be making a statement to the press on Monday in which I will reconfirm the United States’ commitment to majority rule, our intention to pursue a negotiated settlement and will restate our opposition to the course Ian Smith has indicated. We are in close consultations with the British Government and will over the course of the coming days give careful thought to the next steps. As our review of the situation proceeds, I expect to stay in close touch with you and look forward to having your thoughts. I hope all parties will move forward in the period ahead in a manner which will contribute to a renewed search for a peaceful solution.

6. “I understand you will be in Tanzania at the same time Ambassador Andrew Young is visiting. I would appreciate your receiving him and providing him with your assessment of what lies ahead.

7. “I know of your long dedication to the cause of peace in Southern Africa and the independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia. Your vision and courage have long impressed me. The present situation is a difficult one, but I am certain that, if we join together and persevere, a successful conclusion will be reached.5

8. “Respectfully, Cyrus R. Vance.”

Vance

4 See the attachment to Document 131.
5 In telegram 337 from Lusaka, February 4, the Embassy transmitted a reply from Kaunda to Vance. Kaunda welcomed the administration’s commitment to majority rule in Southern Africa, but said that Smith’s announcement left the Frontline States “no choice but to support the Nationalists fully in their intensification of the war of liberation.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zambia: 1/77–5/78)
134. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 2, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

6. Rhodesia: Andy Young is in London today and is seeing Ivor Richard and other British officials. The British view the situation in southern Africa with alarm and fear that Rhodesia is developing into a new Angola.

The British continue to regard South Africa as the key to a settlement and believe that only we have the influence necessary to obtain South African cooperation. At the same time, they are worried that the South Africans will not give in to US pressure if they sense hostility in Washington.

The British will require considerable support from us if they are to carry forward the Rhodesian settlement. The African Presidents are making this same point and I know that Andy will hear it in Africa.3

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77. Secret.
2 In telegram 43 from Zanzibar, February 4, the Embassy reported on Young’s February 2 discussions in London. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zanzibar: 1/77–1/81)
3 Carter wrote in the right-hand margin: “When our policy is evolved, we’ll push hard. J.”
135. **Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**\(^1\)

London, February 3, 1977, 1350Z

1951. Department pass to Ambassador Young. Subject: Ambassador Young’s Meeting With Foreign Secretary Crosland.

1. Amb Young, Cooks, Keogh and Seitz saw Foreign Secretary Crosland (with Tony Duff) February 2. Crosland opened on Rhodesia with the flat statement that “We have no idea what to do next. It’s as simple as that.” He said that Secretary Vance’s recent statements had been very helpful,\(^2\) but he fears that Smith will nevertheless go for an internal option. If the fighting escalates and Cuban forces are introduced, Smith will count on a swing in US/UK public opinion, which along with the South Africans, will bail him out. Young asked for suggestions from the British on actions the U.S. might take concerning Rhodesia.

2. Foreign Secretary Crosland again said that the British found Secretary Vance’s recent statement on Rhodesia extremely helpful. The U.S. must get across in Africa the idea that the “Smith regime has had it”, that it cannot rely on the U.S. for support.

3. Crosland reported on what he called a very uncalm interview between Ivor Richard and President Kaunda of Zambia.\(^3\) He asked Young to try to learn two things during his trip:

---

1. What, in calmer moments, Kaunda and Nyerere think might be next steps.

2. What tack the Front Line Presidents plan to take regarding Muzorewa and Sithole.

Crosland said it would be “embarrassing if we were compelled to drop Muzorewa.” He added that it would be “very hard for us” to adopt Nyerere’s suggestion that Geneva be reconvened with only the UK and the Patriotic Front in attendance, with the results to be forced on Smith.

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

\(^2\) See footnote 4, Document 132.

\(^3\) In telegram 299 from Lusaka, February 1, the Embassy reported on Kaunda’s meeting with Richard in which the British were subjected to “rude abuse during an emotional diatribe on Western responsibility for the continued supply of oil going to Rhodesia in spite of the embargo.” Kaunda also stated that he would not attend the Commonwealth Conference in London, and that Zambia and the United Kingdom “had now come to a parting of the ways.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zambia: 1/77–5/78)
4. Crosland said the South Africans are in a “cleft stick” on Rhodesia. They can’t put more pressure on Smith because of their own public opinion, but neither can they back him fully and openly. Crosland said Vorster can communicate with Smith, but for the moment the South Africans do not know what to do.

5. Ambassador Young said he was positive about the progress made so far. Since Ambassador Richard began his efforts, at least some cohesiveness had been achieved by the nationalists. Front Line Presidents now had some leadership which they could in some sense control. Young said he did not rule out getting the nationalists to agree to a reasonable set of proposals. He stressed that a major problem remains the security concerns of the white community. “They won’t volunteer for chaos,” Young said, and added that he would explore with Kaunda and Nyerere the question of assurances to the whites. He reported that among early U.S. moves would be a successful effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment. There would be some opposition in Congress to repeal, but this could be overcome since an important liberal democrat from a steel-making district changed his position to favor repeal. (John Dent-D. PA.)

6. Tony Duff suggested that the Ambassador on his African trip point out to those he meets the dangers of ratifying the Patriotic Front as the sole representative of the Zimbabwean people. Another “SWAPO situation”, he said, would infinitely complicate the problem. Crosland agreed.

7. Young noted the increasing willingness to accept radical solutions, and shifts in frame of reference in which Rhodesian developments were discussed. He concluded by remarking that he believed it important to discuss these matters with the Nigerians.
London, February 3, 1977, 1625Z


1. During his brief stop-over in London, Ambassador Young managed to meet and talk with most Whitehall figures involved in the problems of Southern Africa. Several themes worth noting came out of these discussions.

A.) The British sense that recent efforts to resolve the Rhodesian problem have run out of steam, or at least that phase one of the exercise is at a close;

B.) They have no real ideas how to proceed with a phase two and cannot come up with suggestions until they have a better picture of the plans of the Carter administration. They are anxiously looking for signals from Washington and probably hoped for more definite directions from Ambassador Young;

C.) The British know they cannot directly or through Vorster get to Smith. They therefore regard the new Washington/Pretoria relationship as crucial and the centerpiece of whatever new policy emerges. Until that relationship is established, there will not be much of a British policy for the U.S. to support;

D.) They expect that American and British policies will continue to be step in step in Southern Africa but they are at the same time faintly uneasy. Do we share the same view of the Patriotic Front? Do we share the same view of sanctions on South Africa? Do we share the same view of Soviet intentions? Probably yes, but maybe.

E.) The British believe negotiations are still possible and all parties except Smith continue to look for an acceptable settlement. Vorster remains a willing partner. But the British are disturbed that events in

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 In telegram 1952 from London, February 3, the Embassy reported on Young’s meeting with Commonwealth Secretary General Ramphal and Nigerian Commonwealth Representative Emeka Anyaoku. Ramphal urged the United States to “use its leverage with South Africa to press Ian Smith, repeal the Byrd Amendment, take additional steps to halt the recruitment of U.S. mercenaries, and insure that there is no slacking of pressure on the Namibia.” (Ibid.)

3 See Document 135.
Southern Africa are fast becoming uncontrollable. Decisions by the OAU and the attractions of the guerrilla war as a “soft option” may make efforts at genuine negotiations irrelevant.

2. Ambassador Young’s meeting with Sonny Ramphal was disturbing. Although some of Ramphal’s remarks may have been played for Anyaoku’s ears, his comments on the Patriotic Front had the sound of a bandwagon. He belittled Muzorewa and declared that “all Africa” would soon support the Patriotic Front. The conversation implied the dilemma that may soon face us: If one urges consideration for the Bishop one is anti-African.

3. The Ambassador’s visit underscored the high expectations which people hold for the Carter administration and for Young personally. He forcefully expressed the administration’s commitment to majority rule, and there was barely a door he could enter without being ambushed by photographers and journalists.

4. The Ambassador’s prediction about the Byrd Amendment is the best news Africanists here have heard for a long time.

Spiers

---

4 See footnote 2, above.

5 Telegram 1952 reported that Ramphal told Young that the Front Line’s endorsement of the Patriotic Front was, “the only means to ensure the continuation of the military struggle that would force Smith to a negotiated settlement.” (See footnote 2, above.)

6 As reported in telegram 1952 Young told Ramphal and Anyaoku that the prospects for repeal of the Byrd Amendment were “very good in view of the administration’s firm commitment to that goal and the change of mind among traditional opponents of repeal in the U.S. Congress.” (See footnote 2, above)
To State: No distribution except to Mr. Harold Saunders.

1. The decision of Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith to seek an “internal solution” has the full support of the armed services and security chiefs. These officers have advised Smith that such a solution is the only one now possible which would lead to moderate African majority rule in Rhodesia. Smith has been advised that an internal solution can be made to work if agreement can be reached with any combination of Nationalist factions which would include African National Council (ANC) leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa as the initial center piece in a coalition government. The only exception is Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union, who probably could not be included in any initial coalition. Smith’s advisors have told him that a political solution must be sought and Smith has fully agreed. He has been told that Rhodesia cannot indefinitely survive the combination of a sophisticated military attack from neighboring states and increased international economic pressure.

2. The Rhodesian Government has decided that it is not possible to work out a solution that would include all the competing Nationalist factions. Smith and his advisors agree that the Geneva Settlement Conference was a failure because the British, under pressure from the Front-
Rhodesian Government leaders are agreed that an “open
minded” attitude on the part of the United States and, to a lesser
degree, the United Kingdom, is required if the internal solution is to
have a real chance. The Rhodesians see no possibility of a moderate
solution if the views of the Front-Line Presidents prevail because the
Presidents’ solution will lead to a Mugabe victory and through that to
Mugabe’s subservience to Mozambique President Samora Machel and
the USSR. Given the current British position on the role of the Front-
Line Presidents, the Rhodesian leaders believe it will be very difficult to
get Nkomo into active participation with Muzorewa. An open-minded
attitude on the part of the United States would permit the necessary
overtures.

4. Smith will meet South African Prime Minister John Vorster in
Cape Town on 9 February to explain why the Rhodesian Government
believes an internal solution is viable. Smith and his advisors believe
the chances of convincing Vorster of the correctness of this route are
good after they point out to him the “dead ends” which would result
from continued British efforts and the participation of the Front-Line
Presidents. Smith will reassure Vorster of his intention to pursue major-
ity rule and achieve it within two years.

5. Field Dissem: [1 line not declassified].
138. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 8, 1977, noon

SUBJECT
Consultations with British on Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS
United Kingdom
Ambassador Ivor Richard, British Ambassador to the United Nations
Sir Peter Ramsbotham, British Ambassador to the United States
Sir John Moreton, Minister of Embassy
Sir Antony Duff, Under Secretary of State
Mr. Clifford W. Squire, Counselor of Embassy

Department of State
Secretary of State Vance
Deputy Secretary-Designate Christopher
Under Secretary Habib
Assistant Secretary Schaufele
Deputy Assistant Secretary Edmondson
Mr. Jeffrey Davidow (notetaker)

Ambassador Richard began with his impressions of his past day and a half of meetings in the Department. He noted that a lot of coordination still needed to be done, especially in defining the linkage between the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. He said that he had encountered a dilemma, which was most clearly expressed in his meeting with Assistant Secretary-designate Maynes, concerning relations with South Africa: “If you judge South Africa on the basis of its contribution to a Rhodesian settlement, they need a plus. If, however, the judging is done on the basis of their own internal situation, they deserve a large minus,” he said.

Secretary Vance stated that the problem of how best to approach South Africa would be discussed in a Policy Review Committee meeting which he would chair that afternoon. It would not be a meeting at which final decisions would be taken. In the meantime, however, Britain and the United States must face up to the problems presented by the tabling of harsh Security Council resolutions, including those that

---

1 Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1977. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 9 by Davidow; cleared by Edmondson; approved on February 23 by Twaddell. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office.

2 See Document 265.
will ask for sanctions against South Africa. The United Nations Security Council held nine meetings in March on the question of sanctions against South Africa. For a summary of the meetings, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977*, pp. 134–140.

Records of Richard’s other meetings with Department of State officials were not found.
quently Under Secretary Habib suggested reversing the order of points two and three or, preferably, combining them and softening the flat rejection of an immediate transfer of complete power as contained in point number two.

In response to Secretary Vance’s question about the possible acceptability of the propositions, Ambassador Richard stated that he believed that there was no reason why the nationalists should not accept them. However, the key to their success would be Vorster and his ability to sell them to Smith. Ambassador Richard noted that he believed that we should begin the process of consultations on the propositions with the whites, Vorster and Smith. In response to a question asked by Secretary Vance he acknowledged the contrary argument that if we do not clear them first with the nationalists, the same problems that we had at Geneva will develop again and the nationalists will up their demands.

Secretary Vance asked what we had to lose by pressing the propositions. Richard responded that we had nothing to lose and at the most there would be simply another rejection by the Rhodesians for which Smith would have to bear the responsibility.

Secretary Vance noted that Vorster and Smith would be meeting tomorrow and asked if we should be saying anything to Vorster now.

Assistant Secretary Schaufele said that the intelligence analysts believe that Vorster will not agree to anything at their first meeting; that he will hear Smith out on the latter’s plan for an internal solution. Vorster will simply not accept a cosmetic solution. Ambassador Schaufele reported that we had received a message from Harold Hawkins stating that no decision would be made at the Vorster-Smith meeting. He noted that Ambassador Richard would be meeting February 9 with South African Ambassador Botha in New York. Richard said that he believed that we should not pass Botha any specific message, but give him a general idea of what we are thinking about. Ambassador Habib asked how London would react to the propositions, to which Richard replied that they would have to be cleared there, but it would help if “we could say that you’ve smiled on them.” He said it would take at least a week to clear the propositions in London.

5 In telegram 178 from Cape Town, February 7, the Embassy reported on a discussion with Harold Hawkins: “Hawkins said that Smith is determined to press on with the ‘internal solution’ and as opener in talks with Vorster will undoubtedly try to enlist his support. Hawkins does not expect Vorster to accept such a solution but hopes that out of the meeting will come an understanding to encourage the UK and US to come up with a new formula ‘somewhere between the Kissinger and Richard packages’ which the British ‘with a large measure of US involvement and support’ will be able to negotiate with the Nationalists and Front Line Presidents.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–0954) Hawkins’s message was not found.
Sir Antony Duff noted that his Minister was looking for something to keep the consultations going; to keep the nationalists engaged. Ambassador Schaufele agreed that concerted action was necessary but noted that one disadvantage of keeping the consultations going is that if the new propositions run into a roadblock, we would be hard pressed to continue. Mr. Edmondson noted that Smith was likely to be a roadblock and that this would be the danger of going to him and Vorster first.

Ambassador Ramsbotham stated that he had not been at the previous day’s talk, but was wondering whether the Nigerians or the OAU might not come through with some positive suggestions on getting negotiations going again. He specifically mentioned President Senghor as someone who might be helpful in this regard. Ambassador Schaufele noted that he had “spent a lot of time leaning on that thin reed” without success and stated that the best we should hope for would be Senghor’s influence in keeping the OAU Foreign Ministers from going beyond the line that the OAU Liberation Committee took concerning recognition of the Patriotic Front.6

Under Secretary Habib pointed out that a main issue was how to communicate our thoughts to the South Africans. He suggested that we should be doing something special in presenting our position to Vorster. Richard agreed that it was basic that we should talk to the South Africans as well as with the nationalists. Ambassador Schaufele noted that Vorster would be under pressure to decide soon South Africa’s position on Smith’s internal option. He suggested that both Britain and the United States separately engage Vorster in a discussion of why it is in his best interests to come to a Rhodesian settlement. Secretary Vance said that we certainly could do that.

Ambassador Richard said that he would be returning to London and that the British ideas would be sorted out next week. During the week of February 20 the British would return to Washington for further consultations.

Secretary Vance stated that the idea of the propositions is worth pursuing and that we will follow this course. In the meantime, we will weigh in with the South Africans about the need to not let the situation stagnate and to tell them that we will be coming to them within a few weeks with specific thoughts. Ambassador Schaufele said that the South Africans are already aware that we are reviewing the Rhodesian situation, both internally and with the British. Ambassador Richard said that he would make these points with the South Africans when he meets Ambassador Botha on February 9.

6 In telegram 294 from Lusaka, February 1, the Embassy reported on a meeting between Richard and OAU Secretary General Eteki. Eteki held that the OAU Liberation Committee would back the Patriotic Front because they were the ones doing the fighting: “The object of the fighting and therefore of the recognition was to force Smith into negotiations.” Eteki also said that the OAU would probably withdraw its recognition of Sithole and Muzorewa. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 88, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 1–6/77)
Ambassador Schaufele noted that we have told the South Africans not to go too fast in relation to Namibia. He recognized that the EC–9 had also made a pitch in this direction which Sir Antony Duff characterized as “a preemptive defensive move.”

Ambassador Habib asked if crossing Vorster on Namibia at the UN would cause him to disengage from his association with us regarding Rhodesia and Namibia. Richard responded that he doubted that this would be the case; that Vorster is pretty realistic about the UN and so far has only expected help in protecting him from some of the more idiotic resolutions, e.g. the Lesotho matter. He noted that we cannot give Vorster a concrete bribe for his assistance. Vorster might ask for direct help in relation to a sanctions vote, said Ambassador Richard, but then immediately noted that the British would not vote for sanctions in any event.

Ambassador Ramsbotham suggested that Britain and the U.S. get together to discuss their long term objectives and policies towards South Africa. Secretary Vance agreed and said that the U.S. was beginning its policy review that afternoon.

Ambassador Richard suggested that, though he was not wedded to the idea, there was some thought that Britain might want to draw the EC–9, as well as Canada, New Zealand and Australia, into the Rhodesian negotiating picture. Ambassador Schaufele and Under Secretary Habib noted that such action would risk over-pressuring Vorster as well as possibly scaring him off.

PROPOSITIONS

1. There will be a genuine transition period of limited duration from minority to majority rule.

2. There will be no immediate transfer of complete power to the Nationalists at the outset of the interim period; but there will be a nationalist majority in the Council of Ministers.

3. There will be an immediate transfer of power from the Rhodesian Front to the interim government but the minority will have a substantial voice in the interim period.

4. A British Resident Commissioner will be appointed with sufficient residual powers to enable him, during the interim period, to play an effective balancing role.

---

7 In October 1976, Lesotho brought a complaint against South Africa for closing the border between Lesotho and South Africa, adjacent to the Transkei. Prime Minister Jonathan asserted that the closure was an attempt to coerce Lesotho into recognizing the Transkei. UNSC Resolution 402 (1976), adopted by consensus on December 22, called on all member states not to recognize Transkei or any other Bantustans and to provide assistance to Lesotho. It also condemned South Africa’s actions and called upon them to reopen the border. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1976, pp. 167–170)
5. The process to majority rule must be irreversible, peaceful and orderly and must take place within a defined period of time.

6. The interim government must be established by agreement between all the parties and must be representative of the main strands of Rhodesian opinion.

7. There must be guarantees from all concerned that upon the establishment of the interim government etc. war will cease. Sanctions would also be lifted.

8. The tasks of the interim government will be to run the country, to supervise the creation of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, to draw up the independence constitution and to arrange for the holding of elections.

9. Free and fair elections must be held in Rhodesia before legal independence will be granted.

10. The independence constitution will be based on a non-racial society. It will provide for the protection of property and there will be a Bill of Rights to guarantee individual rights and freedoms.

11. The interim government and the independent government will accept the cooperation of an internationally sponsored Zimbabwe Development Fund, the aims of which will be to assist with the economic development and social re-structuring of the country.

139. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 10, 1977

SUBJECT
Options for the Rhodesian Negotiations

The Geneva Conference on Rhodesia broke down over the failure of the participants to agree on only one of the five points suggested by Secretary Kissinger as a basis for settlement. On Point 1, the principle of majority rule within two years, and on the basically procedural Points 2 (convening a conference to organize an interim government),
4 (agreement of the UK and Rhodesia to pass enabling legislation) and 5 (lifting of sanctions once an interim government is established) there was substantial agreement. Agreement could not be reached, however, on the all-important third point which dealt with the composition of the interim government, and therefore determined under what conditions and by whom power would be exercised during the interim period. The Africans came to believe that the provisions of Point 3 left the whites in a dominant position in both the Government and Security Forces. In turn, Smith flatly rejected the nationalists’ counterproposals, transferring almost all power to the nationalists during the interim period.

After the Geneva breakdown the British developed a compromise proposal providing for a balancing British presence to serve as an arbiter between black and white in the interim government.\(^2\) Ivor Richard attempted to negotiate these proposals as the basis for further progress toward a settlement. Ian Smith rejected the proposals on January 24, thereby raising the question of where we should go from here.\(^3\)

The options available to us range from deliberate inaction through various initiatives and degrees of U.S. involvement designed to resuscitate old proposals or try new ones. The major alternatives are set forth below.

We have committed ourselves to discuss next steps on Rhodesia with the British during the week of February 21, when they will have finished their own review of the issue. We are considering the following options.

**Option 1. Reconvening the Geneva Conference on the Basis of General Principles.** We have discussed with the British the possibility of reconvening the Geneva Conference on the basis of general principles which could be drawn from existing British, Nationalist and Rhodesian proposals for a settlement. These principles could include *inter alia*.

(a) a commitment to orderly settlement; (b) the establishment of a transitional government; (c) the transfer of most but not all power to the Nationalists during transition; (d) a British willingness to play a balancing role in the government; and (e) agreement that elections would take place before independence. We and the British would seek

---

\(^2\) The British Government announced the indefinite adjournment of the Geneva Conference on January 11. Richard developed proposals for an interim Rhodesian Government and gave them to Ian Smith on January 21. The proposals called for the establishment of an interim government, to be followed by an end to the guerrilla war and UN sanctions and the establishment of a trust fund. The proposals also called for a British resident commissioner. (*Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977*, p. 28309)

\(^3\) Smith claimed that the acceptance of the British proposals would lead to immediate black control of Rhodesia and questioned the role of Front Line Presidents over the Rhodesian settlement. (Ibid.) See Document 131 and footnote 2 thereto.
South African, Rhodesian and African agreement to these principles and if they were accepted the British would call for resumption of the Geneva conference. We would also seek Ian Smith’s and the Nationalists’ commitment to come to final terms once the Conference was reconvened.

Option 2. Reconvening Geneva on the Basis of all Existing Proposals. Alternatively, we and the British could seek a resumed conference on the understanding that all proposals advanced to date continue to be open for negotiation, including the Five Points which Smith accepted from Kissinger in September but which the Nationalists have rejected. This would allow Smith to save face. However, prior to the conference, we would require Smith’s private agreement to drop the Five Points as soon as the conference resumed and negotiate in a manner that would lead to a rapid settlement. We would seek South Africa’s guarantee that Smith would keep his word and proceed to negotiate an acceptable settlement.4

Option 3. Reconvening Geneva as a Constitutional Conference. We have discussed with the British the possibility of sidestepping the tough question of transitional arrangements and reconvene Geneva as a constitutional conference. The parties would come together to negotiate a constitution for an independent, majority-ruled Zimbabwe as well as the terms of an election which would precede independence. We judge this option less likely to succeed than the preceding two options. The parties could become ensnared in protracted debates over constitutional issues.

Option 4. Suspending Efforts. We and the British might suspend efforts and allow for a hiatus in discussions that might last as long as three to six months, returning to the issue if the prospects for a settlement improve. During the hiatus we would continue consultations with all the parties to ascertain on what basis a new conference could be convened. Violence is certain to escalate during the period and the Soviet Union may deepen its involvement. We would run the serious risk of further polarization between the parties, making even more difficult the task of bringing them together.

Option 5. Encourage a Greater International Role in Negotiating or Supervising a Rhodesian Settlement. We might consider a wider showing of responsibility for the Rhodesian problem. This might involve a UN or Commonwealth role in sponsoring a conference, chairing a conference or serving as an administrator in a transitional government. Any

---

4 Carter circled options 1 and 2 and wrote in the left-hand margin: “best of 5 for now, then increasing U.S. role.”
such arrangement would be complex and could only move forward with strong African support.

Pressure on Rhodesia

Whatever option is chosen, an increase in our pressure on the Smith regime is required. The most obvious and logical step is the repeal of the Byrd Amendment which would have a significant psychological and financial impact upon the Smith government and would confirm to Africans our commitment to majority rule in Rhodesia.

There are other steps available to us. We have under inter-agency study proposals which would expand UN-approved sanctions, and others which would make more restrictive U.S. regulations administering our sanctions program. Specific possibilities include cutting off the remaining sources of dollar flows to Rhodesia, applying sanctions forcing U.S. subsidiaries operating abroad to abide by regulations governing trade with Rhodesia, and developing plans to apply diplomatic pressure to obvious sanction-busting nations.

With regard to the latter possibility, South Africa’s role as Rhodesia’s principal trading partner is central to effective sanctions. We might consider telling Vorster that failing rapid movement toward a negotiated settlement we will contemplate actions designed to encourage South Africa to comply with sanctions.\(^5\) Our possible tools include requiring end-user certificates for, or limiting the export of, goods to South Africa which we believe are being reexported to Rhodesia.

In the final analysis, the influence South Africa can bring to bear offers the only decisive way to bring Smith to terms. Therefore, we must conduct our relations with the South Africans in such a way that makes it clear that our future relationship with them will be affected by their actions regarding Rhodesia and Namibia, as well as their handling of their own race relations.

U.S. Role

There is substantial disagreement on what the proper role of the United States should be in attempting to foster a negotiated Rhodesian settlement. President Kaunda of Zambia has suggested that we eclipse the British, whom he views as ineffectual, and take a leading role in seeking a settlement. President Nyerere of Tanzania has, on the other hand, asserted that Britain, as the colonial power, must bear the prime responsibility for Rhodesia. He has suggested that we concentrate our principal efforts on the Namibian problem. If we decide to abandon our current role of lending full support to the British (which I do not

---

\(^5\) Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this sentence: “Secondary boycott.”
believe we should do at this time) and assume the lead in negotiations as suggested by Kaunda, we could consider the following steps:

a. Adopt a leading role in bilateral consultations to win support for new or revised proposals, engaging in further shuttle diplomacy as needed.

b. Emphasize U.S. interest in any reconvened conference by sending a high-level observer with authority to assist the chairman to negotiate.

c. Alternatively, adopt a more active part in a reconvened Geneva conference, perhaps offering to co-chair it.

140. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 10, 1977

1. Southern Africa: South African Ambassador Botha told us this morning that the Smith-Vorster meeting yesterday revealed that the Rhodesians “have had a change of heart and are convinced of the necessity for majority rule”. According to Botha, Vorster came away from his talks with Smith persuaded that the Rhodesians are at the “end of the road” and willing to:

—grant majority rule in 15–18 months;
—accept that Kissinger’s five points can no longer serve as the basis for discussions with the African nationalists; and
—drop their “internal solution” formula.

Alleging that the Rhodesians have had a genuine “change of heart”, the South Africans want to have a high level exchange of views with the British and ourselves on how best to proceed. I have asked Botha to come in to see me on Saturday morning to get further details of the Smith position. If a real change has occurred we will work rapidly to get the talks between the interested parties back on track. Smith is sly, however, and we need more than assurances from South Africa that he has become more flexible. We will soon be suggesting ways to smoke him out to see if a real change has occurred.

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote: “To Cy, good!”

2 See Document 141.

3 Carter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Call me.”
4. Hill Appearance: As you know I testified in favor of the Byrd amendment before the Clark subcommittee this morning. The Senators were very supportive of our position and the session went well. The full Committee is expected to report Clark’s repeal bill on February 22, and it should pass the Senate by early March. Final passage in the Senate is almost certain although there are likely to be attempts to slow it down with a filibuster. We will be able to muster the necessary votes to obtain cloture. In the House, passage is not a certainty, but Congressman Dent’s conversion and strong push from you and me should put us over the top.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

4 An unknown hand added an asterisk and wrote in the left-hand margin “repealing the.”

5 Vance and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Julius L. Katz both testified before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 10. For text of the statements, see Department of State Bulletin, February 28, 1977, pp. 170–174.

6 Carter wrote “C” in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.

141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, February 12, 1977, 2315Z

32724. London for Schaufele and Seitz only. Subject: The Secretary’s Meeting With Ambassador Botha. Cape Town for Ambassador Only.

1. Summary. Botha called on Secretary Vance February 12. In repeating the Prime Minister’s message as passed both to Assistant Secretary Schaufele and Ambassador Bowdler, Botha emphasized the South African belief that Smith is now irrevocably committed to major-


2 In telegram 2436 from London, February 12, the Embassy transmitted a synopsis of Vorster’s message. (Ibid.)
ity rule. The Rhodesians know the Five Points\(^3\) are no longer negotiable, and, in a similar vein, the internal solution is also in question. Maintaining the momentum of the negotiations, Botha argued, is vital and he called for an early high level meeting which would include representatives of the United States, South Africa and Britain. The Secretary did not close the door to a high level meeting, but said he preferred discussions at the level of Assistant Secretary to begin on February 16 to define specific proposals which would lead to a settlement. End summary.

2. In his call on the Secretary, the South African Ambassador said that his Prime Minister had had little contact with Smith since September 1976. Vorster decided that it was time to review the bidding. Without being specific, Botha said a number of factors had emerged which led the Rhodesians to realize they were at the end of their road. He repeated his Prime Minister’s message that the Rhodesians are irrevocably committed to majority rule in two years or less and are prepared to set up an interim government. Smith is willing to overcome procedural obstacles and a new initiative is possible if managed correctly.

3. Elaborating on the point of irreversibility, Botha said that, in Vorster’s view, the Kissinger proposals had foundered because of deep African suspicion that Smith was not sincere in his commitment to majority rule. If irreversibility can be proved beyond question, the South Africans hope that African suspicions will subside and a settlement will be reached. While the South Africans have misinterpreted Smith in the past, they are convinced that not only Smith, but his principal collaborators, have undergone a “change of heart.”

4. In order to take advantage of the change in Salisbury’s mood, and to avoid a further escalation of emotions (Botha cited the recent killing of Catholic missionaries), Britain, the United States and South Africa had to meet quickly at a high level and decide basic objectives and work out ways to reach a settlement which will be so reasonable that the Africans cannot reject it. The objective which South Africa seeks is one of putting itself in a position where it can guarantee irreversibility. Botha said that he realized how tight the Secretary’s schedule is and suggested that a meeting could take place between the Prime Minister, Assistant Secretary Schaufele and the British.\(^4\)

5. The Secretary agreed that a clear definition of the negotiating process was required and it was in all of our interests to avoid proposals

\(^3\) See Tab 1, Document 264.

\(^4\) In telegram 2630 from London, February 14, the Embassy reported that the British Government was not prepared to engage in trilateral talks on Rhodesia. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 1–3/77)
which would lead to further, fruitless discussion. Nevertheless, and while not closing the door to a later meeting at higher levels, the Secretary said he preferred an initial exchange at the level of Assistant Secretary to discuss details and an agenda. In the final analysis, Smith’s sincerity can only be tested on the basis of the firm and realistic proposals. It is in all of our interests to prepare these proposals carefully. A high level meeting would create expectations. The Secretary agreed we should move forward quickly and recommended that Botha meet Assistant Secretary Schaufele on February 16. With respect to the British, they might participate and send a representative from the Foreign Office. Botha agreed in principle but did not leave the impression the South Africans have clearly defined proposals in mind.

6. The Secretary raised with Botha Smith’s statement of February 10 after his return to Salisbury. Botha urged that we not take the Smith statement seriously. It was, in fact, a “breach of faith” and did not, in his government’s judgment, represent Smith’s real views. The Secretary reminded Botha that Smith had all too frequently made unhelpful statements and that these statements contributed to the atmosphere of suspicion.

7. The Secretary asked whether Smith realized the internal option will not work. Botha said he could not answer the question categorically. Vorster had told Smith the Five Points were no longer “fashionable” and said the Rhodesians realize that, in effect, the Five Points are dead. Botha continued, somewhat ambiguously, to some extent, their realization includes the internal option, for if the Five Points are not “fashionable” nor could an internal option based on the Five Points work.

8. With regard to the question of who would represent Rhodesian Africans in the negotiations, Botha said that Vorster felt one of the reasons Geneva failed was the division among African parties. Nkomo and Mugabe may have the guns, but Muzorewa has the votes. It is important, he said, to bring together a negotiating team which speaks for black Rhodesians. A divided Nationalist side can only produce claims and counter-claims which serve each group’s interests and complicate a settlement. The Secretary replied that it would be impossible to reach a settlement if Nkomo and Mugabe were excluded. Botha said that Muzorewa could not be excluded either, but did not say how the South Africans plan to address the issue of African representation.

5 In a February 11 memorandum to Carter, Vance mentioned that Smith’s statement reaffirmed his previous negotiating position and his intention to proceed with the “internal option.” (Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77)
9. In closing, the Ambassador discussed his government’s view that Machel is committed to a peaceful settlement and is joined in this respect by Khama and Kaunda. He warned that Nyerere’s views change frequently and he is more interested in avoiding black conflict than in achieving peace. Nevertheless, it is Vorster’s opinion that if the Africans realize how committed Smith is to majority rule in a reasonable period, a settlement can be obtained.

10. We have informed the British of the Secretary’s discussion with Botha and of our intention to discuss specific steps with Botha on February 16. The British Embassy reports that Crosland will review the Rhodesian situation the morning of February 14; the question of who will represent the British will not be decided until then.

11. Comment. It was not clear from Botha’s presentation what the South Africans have in mind. Botha gave no indication that the South Africans have detailed proposals to discuss. He left us with the impression that the South Africans are more interested in an approach which will hook Smith. They may have in mind coming to agreement with us on general principles and an approach which would force Smith to draft his own terms of settlement.

Vance

142. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 22, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

4. Southern Africa: Discussions with the British: Yesterday we began discussions in Washington with the British on Southern Africa. Unfortunately we learned that they had not made significant progress in their review of Rhodesia and had not come up with very many new suggestions on how to pursue a settlement. We found them:

—still shaken by the failure of the Richard mission to Africa;

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “Cy.”
—disoriented by the death of Tony Crosland\(^2\) who had been the strategist for the Rhodesian negotiations; and

—concerned that the new administration’s opposition to apartheid could cause Vorster to withhold endorsement for a peaceful transition to majority rule in Rhodesia.

We are telling the British that we will not go out of our way to unduly provoke South Africa although from time to time it may be necessary for us to express our views on its racial policies in public and in the United Nations.\(^3\)

We and the British delegation will meet with Botha tomorrow here to explore how the South Africans see the negotiations with Smith and to discuss what settlement terms Pretoria favors. The South Africans want these issues discussed at a high-level meeting with us and the British but we will tell Botha that we do not yet see any useful purpose served by such a meeting at this time. Meanwhile we will be keeping the key Africans informed of our talks with the South Africans, and continue to remind Botha how much importance we attach to maintaining parallel consultations with the Africans as well as avoiding an approach which excludes any of the nationalist parties.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

\(^2\)Crosland died February 19 from a cerebral hemorrhage.

\(^3\)Carter wrote in the right-hand margin: “We are going to have to be forceful soon.”

---

143. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, February 23, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

6. Southern Africa: South African Ambassador Botha told the British and ourselves today that his government believes that Smith will negotiate seriously a transfer of power if the nationalists can agree on a single black leader for him to deal with. Botha suggested that a referendum be held to pick this African leader, and he pledged that South Africa

\(^1\)Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1-2/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “To Cy.”
would deliver Ian Smith if such a vote were held. This is in effect the “internal options” which we have previously rejected.

Neither the British or ourselves responded formally to Botha’s proposal but neither of us believe it is a proposal with which you should be associated. The referendum proposal has already been rejected by the Front Line Presidents and the Patriotic Front. Such a vote would lead to a victory for Bishop Muzorewa who does not control the freedom fighters. It is likely therefore that a Muzorewa victory would lead to a civil war along Angolan lines. The British will be studying Botha’s proposal for several days, but I am convinced that we and the British will have to go to the South Africans very soon to tell them that we see no merit in pursuing such a course of action.

This afternoon I received the British team that has been consulting with us over the past several days. I stressed the importance we attached to maintaining momentum in the Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations. We expect to proceed in Rhodesia on the basis of general principles to reopen negotiations. Regarding Namibia we expect to pursue the 7-point program worked out last year leading toward a conference on Namibia which takes into account the needs of all parties. We expect resolutions to be underway in the U.N. Security Council next month on the questions of Namibia and apartheid. Rather than try to re-draft African resolutions we settled on the idea of drafting in advance our own resolutions. I trust that it will be possible for the British and ourselves to agree on a common draft although there have been some differences between us on how we approach certain aspects of the Rhodesian and Namibian problems.

---

2 At a meeting in Lusaka January 8–9, the Front Line Presidents gave their full support to the Patriotic Front as the group most involved in the struggle for independence. President Nyerere said that the importance of other movements would be “measured in relation to the struggle.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28202)

3 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “Consult w/me first.”

4 See Tab 2, Document 264.
144. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter

Washington, March 31, 1977

SUBJECT
Effectiveness of Sanctions against Rhodesia

REFERENCE
Presidential Directive/NSC–5 (March 9, 1977)

1. In response to your directive, attached is an analysis by CIA of the effectiveness of UN sanctions against Rhodesia.

2. In summary, the analysis concludes that sanctions will not be effective so long as South Africa continues to act as a conduit for Rhodesian trade. Indeed, we believe Pretoria is unlikely to abandon or weaken its close economic support of Rhodesia. For example, exports of Rhodesian chromite can be easily blended with South African ore and will then be extremely difficult to detect and probably legally impossible to substantiate. Detection of the origin of Rhodesian exports of ferrochromium—a processed form of chromite—is presently impossible. Because of their general disinclination, and the difficulties in identifying goods of Rhodesian origin, other Western countries have preferred not to enforce—or simply to ignore—the sanctions.

3. As regards other sanction initiatives against Rhodesia, an Interdepartmental Group chaired by State is exploring such possibilities. They will forward their report separately and shortly to Mr. Brzezinski.

Stansfield Turner
Admiral, U.S. Navy

---

2 See Document 268.
3 See Document 149.
The Effectiveness of UN Sanctions Against Rhodesia

Despite a decade of UN sanctions, Rhodesia’s economy still ranks about fifth in sub-Saharan Africa, and its manufacturing sector is probably second only to South Africa. The trade embargo had its greatest effect in the first year (1966). Tobacco, until then the country’s largest foreign exchange earner, and other agricultural exports were particularly hard hit. Two years later, however, the economy showed definite signs of recovery. In 1968 the GNP rose above the 1965 level and it continued climbing rapidly until the world recession took its toll in 1975. Internal problems—military claims on the work force and investor and consumer uncertainty—have prevented recovery; GNP stagnated last year. Exports, however, buoyed by foreign demand for minerals and metals, were the one area beginning to show signs of life in the second half of 1976.

South Africa holds the key to a real enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia. Sanctions would work only if Pretoria complied fully, or if the UN were to impose and enforce a trade embargo against South Africa. Strong foreign demand for Rhodesia’s minerals, together with Salisbury’s willingness to cut export prices and pay premium prices for imports, has encouraged traders to operate under the guise of dealing with South Africa—and Mozambique until the latter closed its border to Rhodesian rail traffic in March 1976.

Pretoria is unlikely to abandon or weaken its close economic support of Rhodesia. It has supplied essential petroleum products and has accommodated Rhodesian exports and imports in its transport network. Pretoria almost certainly has provided documentation, indicating South Africa as the origin of Rhodesian goods. “Business as usual” has been Pretoria’s policy from the inception of sanctions, in part reflecting the government’s concern that any successful sanctioning of Rhodesia might whet appetites to try an embargo of South Africa.

Industrialized countries also have helped Rhodesia weather the sanctions. Besides the Byrd Amendment permitting US chrome imports, Japan, West Germany, Netherlands, France, Belgium, Swit-
zerland, Italy and others have not enforced—or simply ignored—the sanctions. The UK has levied large fines on violators it convicts but finds it difficult to prove that sanctions have been bypassed.

With South Africa acting as the conduit for Rhodesian trade, it is nearly useless to try to identify goods as Rhodesian origin. South Africa produces in abundance many of the principal exports of Rhodesia: chrome ore, ferrochrome, copper, asbestos, gold, meat and sugar. It imports identical categories of goods: machinery, transportation goods, petroleum, and cereals.

The Chrome Example

The recent repeal of the Byrd Amendment\(^6\) prevents the direct import by the US of Rhodesian chromite and ferrochromium and of products from any country “containing chromium in any form which is of Southern Rhodesian origin”. We believe that the latter will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to enforce so long as South Africa acts as a middleman.

The quantities directly exported by Rhodesia to the US in 1976—31,000 tons of chromite and 43,000 tons of ferrochromium—could easily be mixed into South African exports. According to expert opinion, it would be extremely difficult to detect and probably legally impossible to substantiate the inclusion of Rhodesian with South African chromite. The mixing process itself would simply involve loading into a ship’s hold from two jointly operated conveyor belts, one containing Rhodesian ore and the other South African ore. In the form of ferrochromium, it would be impossible to determine the origin of the product. Therefore, short of tracing each carload from its point of origin in Rhodesia to its entry into the hold of a US-destined ship or to a ferrochrome plant in South Africa which is supplying only the US market, it would appear highly unlikely that a clear-cut determination of a falsely certified shipment could be made.

In addition to South Africa, other countries that ostensibly adhere to the UN sanctions have in the past imported Rhodesian chrome and also could act as a conduit in the future for such shipments to the US. Circumstantial evidence, for instance, links both Japan and West Germany with such activity in earlier years. In 1970, both indicated far larger imports of chromite from South Africa than were recorded by South African trade statistics on exports to those countries; the difference presumably represented chromite originating from Rhodesia. [4 lines not declassified]

\(^6\) The House of Representatives approved the repeal March 14, the Senate March 15, and Carter signed it March 18.
US Trade Leverage

With the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, the already small US economic leverage on Rhodesia has disappeared. Efforts to influence Salisbury through US oil companies operating in South Africa also would not have much impact. Rhodesia imports only about 30,000 b/d and in the last analysis, South Africa could react to US pressure on the oil companies by nationalizing them.

[1 section (10 lines) not declassified]

Enforcement Problems

[less than 1 line not declassified] an effective embargo against Rhodesia is impossible without the full cooperation of South Africa. [less than 1 line not declassified] almost all Rhodesian exports and imports pass through South Africa. Given that most Rhodesian export commodities are also produced in South Africa, it is impossible for the importing country to determine the origin of goods imported from South Africa. South African officials are apparently quite willing to make false certificates of origin for Rhodesian goods, especially when such goods have been partially processed in South Africa.

Similarly, countries exporting to South Africa have no assurance that their goods will not be transshipped to Rhodesia. [less than 1 line not declassified] the South African Official Secrets Law prevents inquiries about the ultimate destination of South African imports. [less than 1 line not declassified] the case of Mobil Oil Corporation. When Mobil asked Pretoria where its oil was being sent—presumably in order to comply with UN sanctions—the company was told to “watch out” as it could be accused of “espionage”.

Even without the South African connection, [less than 1 line not declassified] certain enforcement problems would remain. [less than 1 line not declassified] despite Swiss official adherence to the UN sanctions, Swiss banks are extensively used for payments to Salisbury and that bank secrecy prevents tracing of such payments. Given the large profits to be made in Rhodesian trade, firms and middlemen in many countries are eager to find ways to bypass the sanctions. Although governments may have a fairly accurate idea of the activities of their nationals, proof in the legal sense is almost impossible to obtain. [less than 1 line not declassified] there have been only two prosecutions outside the UK (both in West Germany) for sanction violations.

The British themselves have successfully prosecuted a number of sanctions cases, and they believe that the large fines levied have served as deterrents to such activity by UK nationals. They feel that the close

---

7 Reference is presumably to South Africa’s Official Secrets Act 16 (1956).
attention that HM Customs gives to Rhodesian trade has been a major factor in UK successes. They admit, however, that they are forced to drop many cases because of lack of evidence.

Rhodesian Resiliency

[less than 1 line not declassified] the Rhodesian economy has been able to adapt to sanctions far better than had been predicted. Real economic growth averaged 7% annually through 1974, and the later falloff was more the result of world recession and diversion of men and materials for the guerrilla war than of sanctions. Import substitution industries, including such capital and technology intensive industries as iron and steel, have been developed. Agriculture has been diversified away from export commodities such as tobacco in order to supply the domestic economy with a variety of foodstuffs and raw materials.

Positive Effects

Despite the lack of economic impact, [less than 1 line not declassified] sanctions are valuable for their psychological and political effects. [less than 1 line not declassified] the “drip by drip” campaign in the UN has focused attention on the problem and made it politically costly for some countries to evade sanctions. [less than 1 line not declassified] they recently gained the cooperation of Botswana in curbing utilization of Francistown as a declaration point for false import certificates.

[less than 1 line not declassified] there is room for stepped up public and diplomatic support for sanctions by the US and other developed countries. [2 lines not declassified] some African countries would be hurt by increased public attention to sanctions; Botswana, Zaire, Zambia, etc., still buy Rhodesian foodstuffs and need such supplies more than Salisbury needs the foreign exchange involved.

[less than 1 line not declassified] When sanctions began 11 years ago the Prime Minister publically proclaimed the Smith regime would fall in a matter of weeks. We have held from the beginning that sanctions would not work so long as South Africa refused to go along.
145. Memorandum of Conversation

London, April 1, 1977

SUBJECT
Africa

PARTICIPANTS

US
Secretary Vance
Mr. Habib,
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Mr. Spiers,
Charge D’Affaires, Embassy London
Mr. Schaufele, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Mr. Seitz, Embassy London

UK
Dr. David Owen, Foreign Secretary
Mr. Ted Rowlands,
Minister of State, FCO
Sir Michael Palliser,
Permanent Under Secretary, FCO
Mr. Philip Mansfield,
Assistant Under Secretary, FCO
Mr. Ewen Ferguson,
Foreign Secretary’s Office
Mr. Patrick Laver, Rhodesia Department, FCO

Rhodesia

The Secretary said that he had had the opportunity to read the draft brief which Mr. Owen would take with him to Africa. Our initial impression is that the outlined strategy is encouraging and we are therefore positive about moving forward on Rhodesia. He asked what pitfalls Owen foresaw.

Owen said he would like to discuss his brief by attacking it. There are three main problems he sees with the proposed approach. First is the question of participation. Both the attraction and the danger of the paper is that it provides for progress towards negotiations without Smith. We have perhaps allowed Smith too often to obstruct progress, he said. We should genuinely encourage Smith to attend a conference while insisting that the conference is based on an assumption of majority rule in 1978. If Smith refuses to attend, then we will deal with the

---

1 Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1977. Secret. Drafted by Raymond G. H. Seitz and approved on April 26 by Twaddell. The meeting took place in the morning in the Foreign Office. Vance was in London to brief Callaghan on meetings with Soviet leaders.

2 Reported in telegram 5342 from London, March 31. The brief was divided into three parts: a strategy section on restarting the Rhodesia negotiations; Annex A, which outlined a possible constitution for an independent Rhodesia; and Annex B, which was a timetable. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box I20, Zimbabwe: US/UK Consultations: 4/77)
Nationalists. But, Owen said, if the UK is to conduct a conference only with the Nationalists, it would not want to be alone. An American role would be vital, for Britain would not want to be in the position of a single white participant negotiating with the Nationalists and holding the colonial ball.

The problem of participation also arises vis-a-vis the Nationalists, the Foreign Secretary went on. The conference could not go forward without Nkomo and Muzorewa. A conference could probably be arranged without Mugabe or Smith. If Smith did not attend, perhaps other Rhodesian whites could be invited. Owen here digressed to say he had an open mind about the suggestion that HMG establish a liaison office in Salisbury. He said information on developments in Rhodesia is limited and such an office could also provide a conduit to other whites inside the country. Owen said he recognized, however, that establishing such an office would be full of dangers and he is not inclined for the moment to make a decision one way or the other.

The second and perhaps central snag in the plan, Owen continued, is the possibility of some sort of success. If constitutional agreement can be reached without Smith, then the pressure will be enormous to impose the agreement. It is difficult to see how an agreement could be imposed, but pressure will then begin to focus exclusively on the US and the UK.

The third problem, Owen said, is that with little likelihood of an interim government, the eventual transition to majority rule might take place in circumstances of increased guerrilla violence and a collapsing white administration. The three month lead-up to independence could well be a period of disorder. The UK cabinet would therefore be reluctant to agree to a resident commissioner without some well organized peacekeeping force.

The Secretary asked whether the risks and violence would be measurably increased if Mugabe were not included in an agreement. The British side replied that much of what transpired would depend on the attitude of the front line Presidents. But if the agreement included Nkomo and Muzorewa, the security situation would likely be manageable. The Secretary expressed misgivings about a Soviet role in any effort to create or administer a UN peace-keeping force. He asked whether the Commonwealth might not be a more promising alternative. Owen replied that the Commonwealth might be inclined to play a role were the atmosphere in Rhodesia reasonably peaceful. The Nigerians would be crucial in this decision, he added. Schaufele stated that the white community would surely want something like Canadian participation which would only be possible in peaceful circumstances. Owen said that because of the Soviet presence in the United Nations the Commonwealth option remains a serious one.
The Foreign Secretary said that he would now like to address a broader problem bearing more directly on US/UK relationships. He said, assuming that we do in fact go ahead with the process and complete everything envisaged in the paper without Smith, and all the legal processes are completed, we would then face the problem of how to handle the inevitable pressure to bring down the Smith Government. Vorster is important but probably not crucial because he must operate within his own limits as well. The Foreign Secretary postulated that if the processes were successful then pressures in the United Nations for sanctions against South Africa would be great, perhaps coming to a head as early as next February. HMG could not become involved in this initiative if the only real result would be a chapter 7 finding in the United Nations.\(^3\) “It would be like loading the gun myself,” he said, “and then putting the gun to my head.” We must together decide on a sanctions strategy and particularly where we should draw the line to resist demands for sanctions. “If we do go into this broad strategy on Southern Africa issues,” Owen went on, “we must know that you stand with us. We cannot be left alone to veto sanctions resolutions and thereby expose ourselves to economic retaliation from the black Africans.”

The Secretary asked whether Owen was seeking an understanding that for at least a year or so the British could expect the Americans to follow their lead on sanctions resolutions in the United Nations. Owen replied negatively but said that Britain must know how far the US is prepared to go on these issues. Britain could never accept an overall “blunderbuss” resolution, and therefore it should be decided—hopefully with the US—exactly where to draw the line in the United Nations. Britain is not prepared to accept overall sanctions, Owen said, not only for the obvious economic reasons but also because such moves would likely be politically counter-productive. Michael Palliser added that sanctions would likely prove ineffective in any case. South Africa must be convinced that its own interests are involved in the peaceful and early solution to the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia. Owen said that Vorster must see that a short time scale is required in both these countries, and at the same time we must see that decades may be required for a satisfactory evolutionary process within South Africa. “We must make this distinction,” Owen concluded.

The Secretary said the President had recently told Ambassador Botha that the US would not expect overnight change in South Africa.

---

\(^3\) A Chapter 7 finding in the United Nations allows the Security Council to determine if a government’s actions constitute a threat to peace or an act of aggression, and stipulates what actions, up to and including military force, can be taken to restore peace.
but that the process of change had to start soon.\footnote{See Document 269.} There must be a real beginning down this road, and the South Africans must be constructive on the issues of Rhodesia and Namibia if they are to win time for themselves. The Secretary added that he is presently studying a paper on South Africa and can therefore not respond precisely to Owen’s questions on the limitations of sanctions. He added that the President had not raised the question of Chapter 7 in his conversation with Botha but had referred to mounting pressures in the United Nations.

Owen said HMG would prefer not to cross the threshold of a Chapter 7 finding even if it applied initially only to arms. Surely Vorster can see the same danger, Owen continued, and logically should see the situation the same way we do. The West should not fire the gun now, he said, but rather hold it over Vorster’s head. Frankly, Owen continued, we in the government here are worried about what direction the US is going to take on this question. You will find the same anxiety in France, he said. Habib suggested that sanctions would not necessarily mean an across-the-board economic blockade; they could be applied selectively as may eventually be the case over Namibia. Michael Palliser pointed out that effective selective sanctions would not necessarily require action by the security council. Real pressure could be applied voluntarily, for instance a French threat to stop supplying spare parts.

Owen said that if events developed in such a way that the US split from the UK and France over the issue of sanctions, such a step was bound to have a very disturbing effect on Atlantic relationships. Such a division would have a major impact on long-term Western cohesion, with one possible consequence being the development of a SAG “Laager” mentality and eventually of a Nazi state in South Africa of horrible dimensions. Owen said that he was not expecting pledges from the Americans before Britain again launched itself down the Rhodesian road but it was important for the US to know about British concerns and that we together openly see the real problems this may lead to.

Owen then returned to the tactical questions of the new Rhodesian effort. He asked, referring to his brief, whether the US would be prepared to play a major role at a renewed conference. The Secretary replied that the US is ready to co-sponsor the conference and to field a strong delegation. We will attend plenary sessions and speak at the meetings. The Secretary reaffirmed that the US is prepared to go side by side with Britain in the current effort. Rowlands pointed out that the front line presidents might insist on a similar status but that this problem should not be regarded as a sticking point. The Secretary said
that he believed the best way for the US to express its support of Owen’s trip would be through our ambassadors in the respective capitals.

The two parties agreed that Owen should tell Smith that the current effort foresees majority rule in Rhodesia in 1978. He will also tell Smith that the question of the franchise is something to be worked out among the delegations in the conference, but that we anticipate one man one vote would likely be the only acceptable conclusion. Owen said that in his discussions with black leaders he would want to put forward three or four points that might underscore US/UK cooperation. He will inform the black leaders that the US is prepared to co-sponsor the conference, that we are agreed the conference is based on the prospect of majority rule in 1978, that we are open on the question of the franchise, and that the Zimbabwe development fund remains a central ingredient for the settlement. Owen added that US endorsement would also make it easier for him to sell the plan to his cabinet colleagues.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Namibia

There then followed a brief discussion of Namibia. Schaufele said there is a possibility that the South Africans may look for a new negotiating framework between April and June when the South Africans will be considering in Parliament the results of the Turnhalle conference. Owen said we can expect growing pressure for a Chapter 7 finding on Namibia and Habib pointed out that the legal arguments for Chapter 7 are stronger in the case of Namibia than in the case of South Africa.

Owen concluded the meeting by referring to recent allegations of sanctions breaking by BP and Shell. He said that HMG may shortly decide to investigate the charges which among other benefits might show the South Africans a tougher attitude. Schaufele said that we might also consider making coordinated demarches to other countries urging them to tighten up sanctions enforcement, a suggestion with which Owen agreed.
146. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, April 2, 1977

Southern Africa Situation: Dr. Owen’s Brief. The British have given us a draft of Dr. Owen’s plan for his April mission to Africa and a new try at a Rhodesian settlement. Owen proposes trying to reconvene the parties to begin negotiating an independence constitution for Rhodesia. If Owen obtains agreement during his mission, the British plan would include a preliminary conference in Vienna early this summer, followed by a full-fledged constitutional conference in London, elections in Rhodesia before the end of 1977, and independence by March 1978.

The Owen plan assumes Smith might not agree to join the process. In that event, the British would assemble the nationalists and, with our backing, seek Rhodesian acceptance at a later date. The British count on heavy American support and even co-sponsorship of the negotiating process. They hope we would carry a substantive share of the costs and contribute to the financing of an interim administration which would lead Rhodesia during elections. The Owen proposal also foresees the possibility of peacekeeping forces.

Yesterday in London, the Prime Minister told Cy that neither he nor the Cabinet had yet approved the Owen plan, and wanted to have the U.S. reaction.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 4/77. Secret. Carter wrote in the left-hand margin on the first page: “I don’t yet know what we want. We’re floundering still.”

2 See footnote 2, Document 145.

3 In telegram 5825 from London, April 7, the Embassy reported on Muzorewa’s negative reaction to Owen’s brief. In telegram 5880 from London, April 11, the Embassy reported on Nkomo’s negative reaction. In telegram 1485 from Dar es Salaam, April 11, the Embassy reported Mugabe’s negative reaction. In telegram 1497 from Dar es Salaam, April 12, the Embassy reported that Nyerere agreed with the Owen proposal, but questioned the desirability of formal U.S. participation in a constitutional conference. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 76, United Kingdom: 4–6/77)
147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, April 8, 1977, 2316Z

79685. Subject: Letter From Secretary to Dr. Owen.

1. Following is reply from Secretary Vance to letter from David Owen which was delivered here yesterday by British Embassy (Owen letter will be repeated to you septel). Secretary’s reply should be transmitted to Dr. Owen at earliest possible convenience.

2. Quote Dear David:

Thanks very much for your letter.

I have discussed the proposed course of action on the constitutional conference with the President and the Vice President. They are agreed in principle subject to evaluation of the results of your talks with the various leaders. The President wants me to emphasize the necessity for early progress as he feels the situation will worsen with the passage of time.

I agree with most of the points which you will stress in your meetings in Southern Africa. However, I do note some new elements or points of possible difference which we should iron out before you leave.

(1) It was my understanding that the question of the franchise would be worked out among the delegations in the conference. In your letter you say that “these elections would in our view need to take place on the basis of an unrestricted franchise.”

(2) We are in accord that the Zimbabwe Development Fund remains a central ingredient for the settlement. In your letter you say that you would state in your talks that the fund would be suspended if the post-independence government violated the constitution.

Tactically, it might be preferable to tell Smith that the question of the franchise would be worked out at the conference, even though it is likely that only a one-man one-vote formulation will be acceptable in the final analysis. I am, however, open to suggestion on this point and would welcome your views.

With regard to the Zimbabwe Development Fund, I agree that if the post-independence government violated the constitution in some

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770123–0948. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Donald K. Petterson (AF/S); cleared by Schaufele and Habib and in S/S; approved by Vance.

2 In telegram 80725 to London, April 11, the Department transmitted Owen’s letter to Vance. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 107, 4/77)
flagrant manner, we might well suspend the Zimbabwe Development Fund. However, I think that it would be a good tactic not to state this to any of the parties now. My understanding is that, for purposes of the negotiations, the fund is an inducement for both blacks and whites to reach a settlement. It would seem to me that if we talk about the fund as suggested in your letter, we could arouse black resentment and white uneasiness.

I agree that, as you point out in item (5), a constitutional guarantee of individual human rights need not carry a guarantee of minority rights. Basic rights of all the people of Zimbabwe would, under the kind of constitution you are proposing, be protected. Again for tactical reasons, I believe it would be preferable to state this in that manner—positively—that minority rights are best guaranteed in this way.

I agreed that it would be desirable for our Ambassador in Cape Town to inform the South Africans that the proposal which you will outline has the support of the United States. However, it might be awkward for Ambassador Bowdler to call on Vorster and tell him this personally before you have seen Vorster and have explained our joint position on Rhodesia. I propose to instruct Bowdler to pass the word to Brand Fourie or Pik Botha before you arrive that indeed we are in agreement with what you shall convey to Vorster.

I understand that you also would like us to talk to Smith in Cape Town after you have seen him, to make it clear to him that we fully support what you will have told him. I will instruct Bowdler to be prepared to do this.

Best wishes, Cy. End quote.

Vance
148. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, April 14, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

4. David Owen’s Trip: The verdict is not yet in on what David Owen has accomplished in his African trip. He has seen all the Rhodesian Nationalists except Sithole, also Vorster, Smith and the key African Presidents with the exception of Kaunda and the Nigerians. As you know, we have endorsed his intention to meet Neto in Angola. While somewhat encouraged by the results of his conversations so far, Owen does not underestimate the difficulties which lie ahead.

Nyerere’s and Machel’s reactions to Owen’s proposal for a Constitutional Conference were positive and even the somewhat negative responses of Nkomo and Mugabe were muted. African concerns with Owen’s proposal include the fear that greater American involvement could stimulate Soviet opposition; they also want to know how Smith can be forced to accept a settlement and what will be arrangements for security forces in Rhodesia after an agreement is reached. We have a disturbing report from British intelligence indicating Machel may have had second thoughts and that he and Kaunda will oppose the Owen initiative. While this might not prove to be the case, it is a reminder that support from the Front Line Presidents is far from assured.

Vorster voiced no objection to pursuing negotiations on the basis of Owen’s proposal and Smith did not reject the idea. We cannot exclude the possibility that when Smith sees Owen for a second time in Salisbury on Saturday, Smith may reject the Owen initiative. He is under considerable right-wing political pressure. The South Africans would like us to believe that the prospects for Smith’s acceptance are good. The South African Foreign Minister called us today to say that South Africans have moved Smith along further than has ever been the case and Smith will not reject the British proposals. The South Africans asked that we not be taken aback by negative public statements which Smith will have to make to satisfy his right-wing critics.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 4/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.
2 Owen visited Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Cape Town, Gaborone, Lusaka, and Salisbury April 11–16.
3 Owen visited Luanda and Lagos on April 17.
Owen seeks no more than agreement in principle from the parties to the process which he is discussing. Once back in London he will review the results of his trip with the British Cabinet and then be in touch with us on next steps.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

149. Report Prepared by the Interagency Group on Rhodesia

Washington, undated

REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY GROUP ON RHODESIA

SUMMARY: As an element of the State Department’s southern African policy review, the Bureau of African Affairs convened an Interagency Group, composed of representatives of other State bureaus and the Departments of Justice, Commerce and Treasury, to determine what actions, subsequent to the repeal of the Byrd Amendment, the United States could take to demonstrate opposition to, and increase pressure on the Smith regime in Rhodesia.

The measures which the Interagency Group adjudged to be practical and advisable at this time relate to the following issues:

A. Chrome—The Department of Treasury will institute testing and certification procedures to ensure that Rhodesian chromium, ferrochrome, and certain chrome-bearing steel products produced in third countries from these Rhodesian minerals are not imported into the United States.

B. The Rhodesian Information Office—The United States actively supports and co-sponsors a resolution in the United Nations to expand...
sanctions to operate against overseas offices of the Smith regime. If passed, the Treasury Department intends to take action which will terminate the functioning of the Rhodesian Information Office as an official voice of the Smith regime and to prevent the establishment of any official Rhodesian offices in the future.

C. Sanctions and bilateral diplomacy—The State Department will inform certain foreign governments that the USG is genuinely concerned about violations of sanctions and express our willingness to assist those governments in their enforcement attempts.

D. South African trade—The US will introduce a resolution into the Security Council which will require member states to take specific steps to ensure that their trade with South Africa, particularly with respect to chrome imports, does not involve goods which might be diverted to, or from, Rhodesia.

E. Foreigners in the Rhodesian Army—The U.S. will introduce a resolution in the UN to require member states to take steps to discourage the enlistment of its citizens into the Rhodesian military.

The Interagency Group seriously considered, but determined to make no recommendation concerning the possibilities of prohibiting the use of U.S. passports for travel to Rhodesia, reinterpreting U.S. sanctions regulations to govern U.S. corporate subsidiaries overseas, and prohibiting the re-export of goods produced with U.S. technology from South Africa to Rhodesia.

[Omitted here is discussion of the five issues.]

3 UN Resolution 31/154B was adopted by the General Assembly on December 20, 1976, by a vote of 124 to 0 with 7 abstentions. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1976, pp. 159–160)

150. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

London, May 6, 1977, 2009Z

Secto 4002. For Tarnoff and Lake. Subject: Secretary’s Consultations on Southern Africa.

UK Participants:
- Foreign Secretary David Owen
- Minister of State Ted Rowlands
- Permanent Under Secretary Michael Palliser
- Deputy Under Secretary John Graham
- Assistant Under Secretary Philip Mansfield
- FCO Africa Adviser Denis Grennan
- Private Secretary Ewen Fergusson
- Rhodesia Department Head Patrick Laver
- Central Africa Department Head Martin Reid
- Press Adviser Hamilton Whyte

US Participants:
- The Secretary
- Press Spokesman Hodding Carter
- Political Counselor William Woessner
- First Secretary Raymond Seitz

Date: May 6, 1977; The Foreign Office

1. Foreign Secretary Owen opened the discussion of Rhodesia with a comment that he is not pressing for a decision on an announcement of next steps nor for a decision to convene a conference. He said that we should not totally commit ourselves to a formal conference until there appears to be more assurance of eventual success. Nevertheless, the momentum of the initiative must be maintained. Owen then explained the failure to arrange a meeting with Joshua Nkomo for that morning. Attributing Nkomo’s demand that Owen come to his hotel as a manifestation of Nkomo’s insecurity, both physical and political, Owen said that we can not be seen to be manipulated by the Patriotic Front.

2. Owen expressed his belief that the US and UK should go ahead jointly with bilateral consultations and in the process downgrade the...
issue of American participation at a conference. He pointed out that
discussions cannot be confined to constitutional questions but would
also need to address the problems of the transition and of post-inde-
pendence stability. He said he understood the US reluctance to negoti-
ate the details of a constitution which was essentially a British legal
Parliamentary exercise. At the same time, Owen said, the UK will need
American help on the basic structure of a constitution, such as the
franchise and possible constitutional safeguards for the white commu-
nity. Owen said that while we must become accustomed to differing
public and private positions by the Patriotic Front, the US and UK
must remain in harmony. He mentioned the necessity that we “keep
in line” in Maputo and that the 5 Western Powers should act in concert
at least on the question of Namibia.²

3. The Secretary complimented Owen for his outstanding trip
through Southern Africa.³ He said that the US was prepared to enter
into a phase of intensive bilateral joint consultations. We will undertake
these discussions either together or individually depending on the
wishes of each party. The Secretary welcomed Owen’s remark that it
was not necessary for the United States to involve itself in the details
of a constitution but expressed our willingness to support the British
on matters of constitutional principle. He informed the Foreign Secre-
tary that we are prepared to assign a senior diplomat to the proposed
Consultative Group. He further suggested that the US and UK
promptly inform the Front Line Presidents and the Nationalists of our
decision. We would then follow with a simultaneous public announce-
ment not later than Wednesday, May 11.

4. Owen asked whether we would be prepared to join the group
on its visits to Salisbury. The Secretary replied affirmatively so long
as the headquarters remained outside Rhodesia.

5. The Secretary said he would inform Joshua Nkomo of our deci-
sion during his meeting with the ZAPU leader later in the afternoon.⁴
He said our Embassies will be asked as soon as possible, perhaps
tonight, to also inform the Front Line Presidents and the Nationalists.
Owen agreed that we should move quickly to give advance notice to
the interested parties. He said he would plan to announce our decision
in Parliament on Wednesday, May 11, and that John Graham, heading

² The conference took place May 16–21. In telegram 1504 from USUN, May 12, the
Mission reported on the consultations among the Western Five and the guidelines for
the approach of the Five to Maputo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy
File, D770168-0307)
³ Owen visited Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Cape Town, Gaborone, Lusaka, Salisbury,
Luanda, and Lagos April 11–17.
⁴ See Document 151.
the group, is prepared to depart for Africa on May 16. The Secretary agreed and suggested that in the interim we exchange views on specific negotiating tactics.

6. Ted Rowlands urged that the Secretary attempt to convince Nkomo that the current initiative was “in deadly earnest”. He said that Nkomo will likely complain to the Secretary that constitutional consultations are just another paper exercise. Owen echoed Rowlands’ suggestion. He said that the Nationalist leaders had not yet absorbed the importance of the change in administration in the United States. “They still talk about the CIA and Allende”, he went on. “I keep telling them that you’re more radical than we are.” Owen emphasized that the US and the UK must stick together throughout what is bound to be a controversial process. He said the joint approach had had a strong impact inside Rhodesia, for it underscored the serious nature of the venture. He indicated that the political mood among the whites is already changing, and he referred to a letter he received recently from the President of the Rhodesia Farmers’ Union which revealed a real desire to improve racial relations. Owen said it is difficult to assess Ian Smith but that he is inclined to believe that Smith has undergone a measure of change. “Smith is still capable of falling back; he always has his life lines out. But I think he can be brought along in the momentum and that he understands the South Africans won’t accept any deviousness.”

7. The Secretary explained the purpose of the Vice President’s forthcoming meeting with Prime Minister Vorster. He said that the Vice President will inform Vorster that the United States will be looking closely at South African efforts to resolve the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia. But he will also let Vorster know that unless there is real change within South African society, relations between our two countries cannot help but be affected. Owen said that he was deeply pessimistic about internal change in South Africa and the Secretary added Pik Botha’s comment that the South Africans “won’t commit suicide”. Owen described Vorster as “old-worldy. He doesn’t think the Africans are inferior, just different. He wants to talk about the domestic situation in South Africa but he builds his conversation on a false premise and one cannot address the premise. It will be very difficult.” Owen added that he agreed with the Mondale Mission and said that such efforts will necessarily have a cumulative effect on South Africans. He added, however, that it is important that black governments understand that evolution within South Africa will take time.

---

5 See Document 158.
The pace of change there will be very different from what can be expected in Rhodesia and Namibia.

8. In response to the Secretary’s inquiry about Angolan President Neto, Owen said that he had left Luanda with a better impression than he had expected. Neto had not denied his association and limited support for the Katangans, but he had strongly rejected any suggestion that he masterminded the incursions into Shaba. He said that Neto seemed obsessed by his internal difficulties and that confusion seemed to reign in the Angolan Government. “Mozambique is civilized and organized in comparison to Angola.” Grennan expressed his belief that the MPLA leadership wishes to be pragmatic and non-confrontational but they find themselves in the Soviet pocket and dependent on the Cubans.

9. The Secretary described our interest in discussing normalization with the Angolans once they had demonstrated a constructive attitude in the Nigerian mediation effort. (Owen here asked whether the United States would object to the sale of some sensitive telecommunication equipment by the UK to the Angolan Government. The Secretary replied that we had no objections.) Sir Michael Palliser said the situation in Angola was reminiscent of Guinea when the French departed, leaving the Guineans no option but to turn to the East. The Angolans, he said, have no alternatives. The Secretary agreed.

10. The two Secretaries then discussed Zaire. They agreed that it was important to take a firm stand on the issue of territorial integrity, but that so far as possible this African problem should be solved by the Africans.

11. The Secretary described for Owen the administration’s planned approach to Congress on the issue of the Zimbabwe Development Fund and the aim to win congressional approval in principle. Owen emphasized that the fund is a major psychological and political element for bringing along the Rhodesian white community. He said he had underscored to the whites that the Fund was not designed as a “buy off”, a statement which had disturbed the Rhodesians. He said he had received the impression that former Secretary Kissinger had committed himself to a great extent on the concept of a safety net. Owen pointed out, however, that the Fund “legitimizes” the US involvement in the negotiating process but said he recognized our own political difficulties.

12. The Secretary asked about British strategy during the consultations, whether they would approach the hard or easy issues first. Graham said they would clarify their approach over the next few days, but they would plan to set aside the question of a conference and, instead, ask the parties about their thoughts on a constitution and the problems of the transition. The Consultative Group would develop the process and extract basic principles leading eventually to an outline
draft constitution. At the same time the UK and US would reserve a final decision on “this is how it will be.” Owen said there would be a constitutional lawyer on the British team, and if all went well, the group could establish a technical, constitutional unit. There would be no need for the United States to participate at this level. As an aside, Owen also mentioned that the FCO was looking at the idea that independence should be granted at the beginning of the electoral period, but this would require close consideration.

13. Both Secretaries agreed on the danger of becoming involved in the politics of Nationalist leadership. There followed a brief discussion on the forthcoming Maputo conference. Owen said that the Western Powers should not attempt to negotiate the resolutions of the conference. We should stand aside, listen and advise, but not be drawn in to a declaration. The Secretary said he agreed in general. Owen said he approved of Ambassador Young’s decision to attend the conference, commenting that the Ambassador’s commitment to the issues had a very favorable impact in Africa.

14. On Namibia the two Secretaries agreed that the results of the Five-Power demarche6 and discussions with the South Africans were encouraging.7 Grennan said that it may be difficult to get Nujoma into the negotiations because he is unsure of his own position within SWAPO and within Namibia. He suggested Front Line pressure on Nujoma may be essential. Ted Rowlands said that we run the danger of an embarrassment by our own success. If SWAPO will not come along then Vorster would seem free to go ahead on his own. We have sought to avoid a mediating role but we are already in it, he concluded. Secretary Vance agreed that the “administrative arrangements” in Namibia could be a dangerous imitation of the Turnhalle constitution.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia and Namibia.]

Vance

---

6 See Tab A, Document 50.
7 See Documents 52–55.
151. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department
of State

London, May 6, 1977, 2254Z

Secto 4004. For Tarnoff and Lake. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting
With Nkomo.

Participants:
ZAPU President Joshua Nkomo
ZAPU Deputy, External Affairs, Daniel Madzimbamuto
The Secretary
Mr. Brzezinski
Hodding Carter, Press Spokesman
Raymond Seitz, First Secretary
Date: May 6, 1977; Britannia Hotel.

1. Nkomo expressed his pleasure in meeting the Secretary. He said
he had read extensively about the new administration but also wanted
the administration’s views on Zimbabwe and on
what the US can do to help.

2. The Secretary told Nkomo: a) We are determined to work for
the independence of Zimbabwe in 1978 under majority rule and that
this is a fundamental tenet of administration policy; b) We recognize
military pressure will continue but believe that independence can be
obtainable in a shorter time through negotiations; c) The repeal of the
Byrd Amendment reflects our determination; d) We have consulted
closely with the British and believe that consultations about a constitu-
tion can help achieve a negotiated settlement; e) If there is progress in
the consultations we are prepared to put pressure on Smith to move;
f) We do not wish to negotiate the details of a constitution which should
properly be left to the Zimbabweans and the UK; g) We wish to be
helpful on questions of principle and to offer our support, financially
and otherwise; h) There are limits to our ability but we believe we can
have a constructive influence; i) We seek Nkomo’s advice on how best
our role should be defined; j) The British will open a special office in
Africa to carry on consultations, and we will assign a senior officer to
help in the process; k) We will consult jointly with the British or sepa-
ately depending on the wishes of the individual parties; l) The British
have our full support in this endeavor and we are ready to contribute

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2111.
Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.
fully; m) We do not seek to impose any form of government on the people of Zimbabwe.

3. Nkomo responded with a long description of the Geneva Conference, of its failures, of Nationalist grievances against the British, and of Owen’s initiative, much along the same lines as has previously been reported to the Department. He pronounced Geneva dead. He said in his discussion with Owen he had emphasized the need to define concepts such as “majority rule” and “surrender of power”, and had appealed to Owen to recognize that Zimbabwe is in a state of war. Efforts must be directed to removing the cause of the war after which a constitution will fall into place.

4. Nkomo said he had warned Owen that US “cosponsorship” invited unmanageable controversy. US participation in a conference would open the door to big power politics. “If the US can assist by means other than getting into a conference, please do so.”

5. The Secretary told Nkomo that we had agreed to cosponsor a conference, but that after the Foreign Secretary’s trip we had jointly consulted on what we could do short of cosponsoring and how we could get around the question.2 A conference might in the end only be a Lancaster House exercise. But we believe we can help move the process forward by separate and/or joint consultations. This is a change in framework, the Secretary said, which seems to meet the objections of the Patriotic Front. We will take part in the consultations but not in the details of constitutional negotiations.

6. Nkomo was reluctant to give his reactions to the Secretary’s explanation. Madzimbamuto said that the consultations which the Secretary described will obviously help shape a constitution and that a Lancaster House conference would merely be a rubber stamp to what had already been agreed. The exercise, therefore, is internationalized. He asked what would stop the parties meeting with other powers during this process. The Secretary answered that nothing could stop consultations with anyone, but that the United States was in the best position to assist the process of negotiations. Nkomo said that he welcomed US assistance but along the lines of the present meeting. “We cannot have a conference in bits and pieces.”

7. The Secretary reiterated that we are prepared to sit in the consultations jointly or separately and stressed that if the United States did not play such a role, Britain might not be willing to begin the process. When Nkomo objected that the Secretary’s description sounded like US participation in a series of small conferences, the Secretary said that if a realistic process is not commenced, then there will be no

---

2 See Document 150.
independence in 1978. In response to a question by Madzimbamuto
the Secretary said that the consultative office will not be located in
Salisbury.

8. When the Secretary asked whether the process as he had outlined
it was satisfactory, Nkomo replied that he did not know. “If it means
a decentralized conference with something centralized later, my fears
are still there.” Mr. Carter pointed out that there seemed to be little
difference between what the Secretary had proposed and what Nkomo
had described.

9. The Secretary asked that if an American sat in on the British
consultations, would that be useful? Nkomo was unsure of his response
saying at first that he had no objection and then later that he would
need to think more on the question. Such a US role would be acceptable,
his said, if it did not get out of hand. The Secretary reassured Nkomo
that we did not wish to involve ourselves in constitutional details.
Madzimbamuto offered the description that “the Patriotic Front is meet-
ing with the British but the British happen to have an American
adviser.” Nkomo said that this sounded better but that he did not fully
understand and would still want to think about it. He emphasized that
he sought strong US assistance as he had sought assistance from all
parts of the world.

10. After some more reflection, Nkomo asked the Secretary if we
were in effect “ruling out cosponsorship”, to which the Secretary
answered affirmatively. The Secretary said we will want to talk further
with the British on next steps. Nkomo returned to the question whether
cosponsorship had been ruled out. The Secretary agreed, saying there
was too much concern about the word and that our real purpose was
to assist the process.

Vance
152. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, May 9, 1977, 0432Z


1. At earliest opportunity you should inform FonMin Botha or Brand Fourie of US–UK agreement on next steps in Rhodesia using talking points in para 2 and informing them that we and British are planning make simultaneous announcement along lines of draft text in para 3.

2. Talking points:
   A. The U.S. and U.K. are planning to announce simultaneously the next steps in Rhodesia negotiations on or before Wednesday, May 11.\(^2\) We feel it is important for you to know and understand what our plans are before public announcement is made.

   B. The Carter administration has agreed to become more actively involved in the negotiations leading to a Rhodesian settlement than we have hitherto been.

   C. This willingness serves as an indication of our continuing interest in Southern Africa. We feel that our desire to assist Rhodesia to independence is not only consistent with our principles, but also serves as a counterweight to Soviet designs for the region.

   D. Continued violence in Rhodesia increase the possibility of foreign intervention. A negotiated settlement is therefore of growing urgency.

   E. As the negotiations concerning a Rhodesian constitution evolve, there will be many issues that can only be resolved through compromise and moderation. We hope that South Africa will continue to play an important role in helping Mr. Smith to understand the realities of his situation.

   F. We have consulted closely with the British and agree with them that consultations about an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements could help achieve a negotiated settle-

---

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770166–0250. Confidential; Niatc Immediate; Exdis. Cleared in S/S; approved by Seelye. The text of this telegram was transmitted to Washington in Secto 4011 from London, May 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–1263)

\(^2\) On May 11, Vance and Owen announced the establishment of the Anglo-American Consultative Group, consisting of John Graham and Stephen Low. For text of the statement, see Department of State Bulletin, June 6, 1977, p. 609.
ment. Accordingly, we have agreed to work closely with them in carrying out a new phase of intensive consultations with the parties that were present at the Geneva Conference.

G. We believe bilateral consultations are essential to provide some basis for discussion among the parties and for a settlement. It would be futile to rush to another conference before there is some agreement on basic principles.

H. We see our role in the consultative process as facilitating agreement on basic principles and helping the British seek a real basis for settlement.

I. If there is progress in the consultations, we are prepared to ask the Front Line States to urge the Nationalists to accept a just settlement. There are limits to our ability, but we believe we can have a constructive influence.

J. To pursue the bilateral consultations, the U.S. will assign a senior official to work closely with the head of the group. Occasional visits to Rhodesia may be necessary and the U.S. official will accompany when appropriate.

K. We will conduct consultations jointly with the British or separately depending on the wishes of the individual parties.

L. We do not wish ourselves to negotiate the details of a constitution. This should properly be left to those immediately concerned and the U.K.

3. Begin text: The U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Dr. David Owen, have considered the problem of Rhodesia in the light of the latter’s trip to Africa. Both governments wish to reiterate their common determination to work for the independence of Rhodesia under majority rule in 1978. They have been encouraged by their contacts so far to believe that detailed consultations about an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements could be a satisfactory way to achieve this. They have, therefore, agreed that Britain and the United States should now enter into a phase of intensive consultations with the parties. For this purpose, the British Government has decided to establish a consultative group to make contact with the parties which will visit the area as necessary, including Salisbury. It will be headed by Mr. J.A.N. Graham, Deputy Under Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Mr. Vance has agreed to appoint a senior United States official to work with the head of the British Consultative Group.3 End text.

Christopher

3 In telegram Tosec 40246/107353 to Tehran, May 13, Tarnoff informed Vance that Low had accepted the position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770168-0491)
153. Telegram From the Embassy in Cape Town to the
Department of State

Cape Town, May 10, 1977, 1920Z

751. Subj: Informing SAG and Rhodesian Rep of US–UK Agreement to Begin Joint Consultations on Rhodesia. Ref: State 104967, 2 and 104966. 3

1. Pursuant to refelts, I saw Fourie at 1700 local today, May 10, and Hawkins at 1830 to advise them of US–UK agreement on next steps in Rhodesian negotiating process. Both had been advised along similar lines by British Embassy over weekend.

2. Fourie expressed appreciation and hope for success but had no further comment. Instead he asked about fate of Rhodesia Fund in light of reports Congress had diverted requested appropriations to assistance for Front-Line States, which, he commented, “will of course serve the exact opposite purpose.” I said I would relay his query to Department.

3. Hawkins took careful record of talking points, saying “This is of particular importance and must be gotten right.” He hoped simultaneous US–UK announcement about entering into a phase of intensive consultations with the parties could be held until tomorrow, May 11, or at least for a few hours to allow him time to get his message through to Smith. Hawkins said it was important to make two points: (1) The new position appeared to be a move away from the co-sponsorship earlier discussed by Owen, a yielding to Nkomo. Smith will take some convincing. He is in a very delicate and difficult domestic political situation. It is dangerous to give the appearance of “treating him like a poor relation.” There is no predicting what a politician will do, but “to his credit,” Smith has been forebearing. (2) It is almost entirely ruled out that all the parties can be brought along by the US–UK effort.

4. Hawkins gave me a copy of Owen’s message to Smith (the British Embassy supplied a copy as well, and a copy of Smith’s reply. Texts follow.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770164–1166. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. The primary location of the U.S. Embassy was in Pretoria, where the majority of the executive branch of the South African Government was located. The Chief of Mission and members of the Country Team relocated to Cape Town when the South African Parliament was in session. When Parliament was not in session the Embassy in Cape Town reverted to Consulate status.

2 See Document 152.

3 In telegram 104966 to Cape Town, May 9, the Department transmitted talking points for a meeting with Harold Hawkins, outlining the US–UK agreement on the Rhodesian negotiations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770166–0248)
5. Owen message to Smith (May 7):

Quote. I have been considering the matter we discussed when I saw you in Cape Town and Salisbury in the light of your own comments and of the reactions of the African parties involved. I have maintained the closest touch with the US Government and Mr. Vance and I today discussed the problem. We have concluded that the next step should be for us to enter into detailed discussions with the parties to establish if we can find common ground on the form of a constitution for an independent Rhodesia and on the transitional arrangements to bring it into effect. For this purpose we should be setting up a consultative group which will be setting off for Central Africa in the near future. Mr. Vance and I are in total agreement that this must be a joint operation. But if some of the parties find difficulty at this stage in talking to us together, we are prepared to see them separately, on the clear understanding that we shall nevertheless be operating jointly.

The British leader of the group will be Mr. John Graham. The US Government will be announcing their representative shortly. The party will be flying to Lusaka in the first instance and from there will be ready to meet the other parties at their mutual convenience. They will of course be visiting Salisbury but it is not my intention at this stage at any rate to set up an office there on a continuing basis. However, if later on this seems desirable I believe, as you told me, there would be no objection on your part.

An announcement to this effect will be made early next week but I wanted you to know in advance. I know that I can count on you to give Mr. Graham full co-operation and I hope we can indeed carry things forward to a successful conclusion. This is certainly my intention. End quote.

6. Smith reply to Owen (May 10):

Quote. Thank you for your message of 7th May. We shall certainly co-operate fully with Graham and his colleagues and I hope they will visit Salisbury at an early stage. I have noted your remarks about Nkomo’s attitude but I must say that your reaction to it does not seem to be in keeping with your forthright statements to me here and in Cape Town. The failure of Mr. Ivor Richard to stand up to the obdurate demands of the Patriotic Front was the cause of the collapse of the Geneva Conference. If the British and United States Governments keep on giving in to their demands the present initiative will have little chance of success.

We have reliable information of a considerable build up of ZAPU terrorists in Zambia on the north bank of the Zambesi and a clear indication of their intention to launch attacks into Rhodesia with the connivance of Dr Kaunda. If these should develop then, in the interest of
our own security, we shall have no alternative but to mount preemptive
strikes across the river against the terrorist base.

I have given you my assurance of our readiness to cooperate fully
in your new initiative but the climate for this will be gravely impaired
if there should be an escalation of terrorist incursions out of Zambia.
I would therefore urge you, in the interests of the peaceful settlement
we both desire, to use your good offices with Dr. Kaunda to prevent
an escalation which would seriously jeopardise your initiative.

It is clear that Nkomo’s intention is to build up very quickly a
ZAPU army operating from Zambia to match that of ZANU base in
Mozambique. You will readily appreciate the long term dangers inher-
ent in this development. End quote.

7. The “long-term dangers”, Hawkins commented, is an obvious
reference to the quite possible existence of competing ZAPU and ZANU
armies in Rhodesia after the transition to majority rule.

Nelson

154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in
Cape Town

Washington, May 15, 1977, 0405Z

Tosec 40311/110991. Nairobi for Amb. Low, White House—Brze-
zinski. Subject: Our Response to Rhodesian Threat in Zambia. Lisbon
for A Lake SP, with the Vice Presidents Party. Ref: (A) Lusaka 1303
(B) Lusaka 1300.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770172–0273.
Confidential; Niat Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Dennis W. Keough (AF/S); cleared by
Schaufele and Brzezinski and in S/S; approved by Christopher. Sent for information
Immediate to Lusaka, London, Nairobi, Lisbon, the Secretary’s delegation, the Secretary’s
aircraft, and the White House.

2 In telegram 1303 from Lusaka, May 14, the Embassy transmitted a message from
Kaunda, in which he expressed his “deep resentment” of the role that Owen played in
informing him of Smith’s threat to mount pre-emptive strikes against ZAPU bases in
Zambia. Kaunda warned that an escalation of the conflict would jeopardize the work
of the Consultative Group. He urged Carter to pressure the British, South Africans, and
Smith not to “encourage a situation whose consequences will be felt far beyond this
region.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770171–0642)

3 In telegram 1300 from Lusaka, May 13, the Embassy reported on a May 13 meeting
between Deputy Chief of Mission John R. Clingerman and Zambian Foreign Minister
Mwale, discussing Smith’s threat of a preemptive strike into Zambia. Mwale noted that
Kaunda would address the nation on May 16, “alerting the nation to the peril it faces.”
(National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770169–0978)
1. We are repeating to you reftel (A), which contains text of letter from President Kaunda to President Carter, in which Kaunda expresses deep resentment of role played by British in informing him of threat from Ian Smith. Smith indicated in message to David Owen, which Owen passed to Kaunda, that Rhodesia might have no alternative but to mount preemptive strikes against ZAPU bases in Zambia to blunt major offensive against Rhodesia reportedly planned for late May.

2. You should seek appointment with Hawkins as soon as possible and pass to him the following points:

   A) President Carter has received a message from President Kaunda conveying the latter’s concern over the possibility of preemptive Rhodesian strikes against Zambia intended to blunt a reported ZAPU offensive.

   B) We want to tell you that we share President Kaunda’s concern. We would consider a strike against Zambia a very serious matter, indeed.

   C) Escalation of the Rhodesian conflict across another international border carries grave risks of foreign intervention. Rhodesia cannot improve its prospects for future by such action.

   D) We expect that the Salisbury authorities will refrain from any actions, such as a strike against Zambia, which will defeat the possibility of the present attempt to negotiate a settlement.

3. You should also seek an appointment with Brand Fourie to convey to him substance of the message you have given Hawkins.

   You should add the following points:

   A) We hope that South Africa will work to prevent actions by Smith which will compromise our efforts to find a negotiated settlement, but which will gain little if any military advantage for the Smith regime.

   B) Smith should be aware that threats of preemptive action may have effects that are the opposite of what he may intend.

   C) In the delicate situation which exists in the region, South Africa should urge Smith to concentrate efforts on negotiations, which is the

---

4 In telegram 787 from Cape Town, May 15, the Embassy reported that the points had been passed to Hawkins just after noon. Hawkins said that he would transmit the message to Salisbury and “get an official reply.” Hawkins told Deputy Chief of Mission Nelson that “Rhodesia would respond to an attack from Zambian soil; there would be no preemptory strike.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770172-0642)

5 See footnote 2 above.

6 See footnote 4, Document 155.
course which will offer the best hope for the kind of settlement which is in the interests of all the countries in the area.

Christopher

155. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia

Washington, May 15, 1977, 0408Z

Tosec 40312/110995. Nairobi—for Ambassador Low, White House—Brzezinski. Subject: Message From President Carter to President Kaunda. Lisbon for A Lake, S/P with the Vice President’s party. Ref: Lusaka 1303.²

1. You should arrange to deliver as soon as possible the following letter from President Carter to President Kaunda in response to his message contained reftel.

2. Quote. Dear Mr. President: I have received your urgent message of May 14 and share your concern at any further escalation of the conflict in Rhodesia that would involve Zambia. It is precisely to avoid this kind of thing that we have agreed with the British to undertake a new initiative to find a peaceful solution in Rhodesia.

Expansion of warfare and violence can only harm the interests of all the parties in the area. It is our hope that all will act in a manner which will leave open the path to peace. In this regard you can be assured that we will be in close touch with the British to find ways to urge caution and restraint upon Ian Smith.³

While we have no information to confirm what you say about South African involvement in Rhodesian military planning, I have issued instructions for representations to be made in Cape Town in order that both the South Africans and Rhodesians might know the

¹ Source: Carter Library National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Zambia; President Kenneth D. Kaunda, 1-12/77. Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to London, Cape Town, Nairobi, Lisbon, the Secretary’s delegation, the Secretary’s aircraft, and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Edmondson; cleared by Brzezinski and Schaufele and in S/S; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770172–0274)

² See footnote 2, Document 154.

³ See Document 154.
seriousness with which we would regard any Rhodesian incursions into Zambia. This is no time for threats from any side.

I know of the dedication and sacrifice that you and your nation have given to the cause of peace in Africa and we will continue to work with you to preserve our strong hope that negotiations rather than warfare will be the path taken to bring about independence for Zimbabwe. Only negotiations can yield the kind of settlement which is in the interests of all the countries of the area. End quote.

3. Please advise delivery of message and any Zambian response.

Christopher

4 In telegram 789 from Cape Town, May 15, the Embassy reported that Fourie was informed of Carter’s message to Kaunda at 5:30 p.m. Fourie said that he would inform Vorster and remarked: “It would help a great deal if the Prime Minister could advise Smith that we had been equally firm with Kaunda about threats and escalation from his side.” Deputy Chief of Mission Harvey Nelson assured Fourie that the United States had made clear to Kaunda and others “that the expansion of violence will only harm the interests of all concerned.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770172–1089)

5 In telegram 1305 from Lusaka, May 15, the Embassy reported that the message was delivered to Mark Chona to be passed to Kaunda at 10:30 a.m. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770172–0603)

156. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, May 17, 1977, 1045Z

806. SecState pass USDel Secretary Immediate. Madrid for Ambassador Bowdler and A. Lake with Vice President’s party. Subj: Our Response to Rhodesian Threat to Zambia. Ref: Cape Town 0787.

1. I received at noon today, May 17, the following letter from Hawkins in response to my approach of May 15.


2 See footnote 4, Document 154.
2. “I have been asked if you will kindly arrange onward transmission of the following personal message from my Prime Minister to President Carter:

“Begins—Thank you for your message 15th May conveyed by your Ambassador in Cape Town.³

“I assure you that I have no intention of initiating an escalation of hostilities on the Zambian border. It was my realisation of the serious consequences of such escalation that caused me to ask Dr. Owen to use his good offices with Dr. Kaunda to prevent the planned incursions of ZAPU terrorists from Zambia into Rhodesia. If these should develop they would pose a serious threat to the lives and safety of Rhodesians, black and white. I must ask you to appreciate that it is a prime responsibility of the Rhodesian Government and the security forces to protect the civil population against terrorist attacks. We cannot be expected to tolerate a situation where these attacks can be mounted with impunity from neighbouring territories.

“I was therefore grateful to Dr. Owen for pointing out to Dr. Kaunda the serious consequences of an escalation by either side. I hope that in reply Dr. Kaunda has given a similar assurance to mine that he will not permit an escalation of terrorist attacks from bases in his country. Ends.

3. “I would appreciate it very much if you could expedite the passage of the foregoing.

4. “An identical message has been sent to the British Prime Minister. Many thanks.

“Yours sincerely, H. Hawkins”.

Nelson

³ See Document 154.
157. Memorandum From Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Schaufele) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 17, 1977

SUBJECT

Status Report: Rhodesian Sanctions

The following is a status report on actions taken or contemplated to increase further the pressure upon the Smith regime through a more stringent enforcement of sanctions or an expansion of them. This message is in response to inquiries contained in your memorandum of April 27.² We have discussed in general terms with the British closer U.S.–U.K. bilateral cooperation on sanctions enforcement, and we will want to keep in close contact with them on the issues referred to below.

1. Closure of the Rhodesian Information Office

Our agreed upon strategy to force the closure of the Rhodesian Information Office as an official agency of the Smith regime is predicated upon the passage by the UN Security Council of a resolution, which we and the British formulated, expanding sanctions to operate against the regime’s overseas offices.³

The resolution, originally expected to be passed in March, has been delayed by the insistence of many African states, actively supported by the Soviets, on an amendment directing all UN member states to apply against Rhodesia the full range of sanctions available under Article 41, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. If applied, total sanctions would cut off all forms of contact, communication, travel or commerce with Rhodesia, virtually denying its existence. We have traditionally opposed such a complete cut-off as contrary to the free flow of ideas and as a poor precedent for the UN.

The resolution is presently scheduled to come before the Security Council on May 26. If the Russians and radical Africans successfully incorporate an amendment demanding unlimited sanctions, we will have to consider joining the UK and France in a veto. An acceptable compromise may still be possible if the Africans can be convinced that a veto could stiffen the resistance of the Salisbury regime.

² See footnote 2, Document 149.
³ Reference is to UNSC Resolution 409, proposed by 15 powers and adopted unanimously without a vote on May 27. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, pp. 180–181)
However, if no compromise can be reached we will have to determine whether to continue with the current strategy of UN action preceding a USG move against the Rhodesian Information Office or to develop a new tactic for closing that office.

2. Importation of Chrome

Because of numerous and strenuous complaints from many of our key trading partners that the certification requirements originally issued by Treasury had prevented nearly all imports of chrome-bearing metals, Treasury has agreed that it will accept, until June 19, blanket assurances from foreign firms or their governments that their exports do not contain Rhodesian chrome. This will give us another month to work out certification procedures acceptable to Treasury and to our trading partners.

If we are to fulfill our moral commitment and legal obligation to prevent Rhodesian chrome from entering the United States, we shall need the cooperation of those countries which supply us products, particularly specialty steels, which contain chrome in its various forms. To do this, we shall have to avoid even the appearance of using our import controls as devices to restrict trade and protect U.S. steel producers. This is a matter of considerable sensitivity to many of our trading partners, since we have imposed import quotas on specialty steel products. In negotiating with other countries procedures to be followed for certifying that our steel imports do not contain Rhodesian chrome, we must pay particular attention to avoid requiring measures that are more rigorous than necessary or that impose American methods on countries whose own methods are adequate for our purposes. We must also maintain flexibility in dealing with individual problems such as those of suppliers who cannot certify that their products do not contain Rhodesian chrome because they bought semi-finished materials from the United States at a time when we did not prohibit the importation of chrome from Rhodesia. If we pay due attention to these matters, we should be able to find ways of keeping out Rhodesian chrome while maintaining good trade relations with our major commercial partners.

3. Sanctions and Bilateral Diplomacy

After discussing the matter with the British Government, the State Department instructed our embassies in most of the industrialized western countries, as well as Japan, to approach their host governments to note that with the repeal of the Byrd Amendment the U.S. is now in full compliance with its international obligations in relation to Rhodesian sanctions. The Embassies were also instructed to state that we are willing, in the spirit of co-operation, to discuss methods of improving the enforcement of existing sanctions with foreign governments. The responses were generally polite and cooperative in tone. Most countries
made a point of noting their full compliance with sanctions (not necessarily an accurate representation of the truth) and expressed willingness to engage in further conversations. Some countries used the occasion of the demarche to express concern over the Treasury certification procedures referred to above. In any event, those approached should now understand that we view sanctions as a legitimate topic of bilateral discussion and the stage has been set for further consultations. In this, as in other activities relating to the sanctions enforcement, we must maintain close contact with the British before taking further steps.

4. Service of U.S. Citizens in Rhodesian Armed Forces

As the Report of the Interagency Group indicated, it is a criminal offense under current U.S. law for any U.S. citizen to enlist in the U.S. for service in the Rhodesian armed forces, or for any person to recruit a U.S. citizen in the U.S. for such service. However, U.S. law does not prohibit American citizens from serving in the Rhodesian armed forces if they enlist outside the U.S., thus allowing several hundred U.S. citizens to fight for the Smith regime without threat of U.S. punitive action.

To deal with this problem, the Report of the Interagency Group recommended that action be taken within the UN Sanctions Committee in the form of a proposed resolution to be adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such a resolution would require States to take appropriate measures to ensure that their nationals and persons in their territories do not enlist for service in the Rhodesian armed forces or recruit others for such service. In addition to applying present U.S. law against enlistments in the U.S., the U.S. Government would enforce such a resolution under the authority of Section 5 of the UN Participation Act (which authorizes the President to enforce Security Council sanctions) by prohibiting U.S. citizens from accepting any remuneration or financial support while serving in the Rhodesian armed forces.

The U.S. Mission to the UN has been instructed to consult with the UK Mission in New York on the desirability and feasibility of pursuing such a proposal in the Sanctions Committee. If these consultations suggest that an initiative along these lines would be fruitful, we will proceed with it, hopefully in conjunction with the UK and in cooperation with other western members of the Sanctions Committee.

It is possible that other actions will be required by U.S. authorities to deal effectively with the problem of the service of U.S. citizens in the Rhodesian armed forces. We understand that the Justice Department has recently been investigating allegations that U.S. laws have been violated by alleged activities of persons in the United States to facilitate such enlistments. We intend to request Justice to provide a
report on the results of those investigations, so as to provide a basis for interagency consideration of possible additional U.S. Government actions to deal with this problem.

5. U.S. Corporate Subsidiaries and Sanctions Policy

Under current U.S. policy existing Treasury and Commerce regulations restricting trade with Rhodesia do not apply to foreign U.S. corporate subsidiaries. A serious source of possible violations is the approximately 350 US subsidiaries located in South Africa, but violations by US owned companies in other countries could occur.

A decision to require foreign U.S. subsidiaries to respect the Rhodesian boycott would have political value, but implementation would not be without problems and potential costs. Several questions should be resolved before such a decision is made.

—Will U.S. regulation of foreign subsidiaries enhance the effectiveness of the Rhodesian boycott?

A U.S. initiative might spur some countries to apply sanctions more rigorously. In South Africa, it could force companies into a position of breaking either U.S. or South African law relating to the boycott.

—Can regulations be effectively enforced?

Effective enforcement might be possible for subsidiary exports directly to Rhodesia. However, for re-exports by non-American third parties, violations would be almost impossible to detect or prevent unless other nations enforce sanctions more effectively.

—Would unenforceable regulations have any value?

While significant political and deterrent value could exist initially, both of these could be undermined if regulations were not enforceable.

—Will regulation of foreign U.S. subsidiaries be at odds with other U.S. policies?

Would the proposed action be counter to our policy concerning the Arab boycott, and consistent with the loosening of trade restrictions affecting Cuba?

A State Department paper on this topic will be prepared by May 23.

An Interagency paper will be prepared by June 1.

6. Certification of U.S. Exports to South Africa to Discourage Re-export to Rhodesia

The Interagency group recommended discussions with the British on a proposed UN expansion of sanctions to compel member states to take steps to discourage re-export of their goods from South Africa to Rhodesia. The issue is whether the political benefits from tighter Commerce controls even before comparable controls are put into effect by other UN members will compensate for the increased paperwork burden that will be placed on U.S. exporters.
We would implement the proposed UN resolution by requiring that special destination control notices be placed on invoices and bills of lading on all shipments to South Africa stating that re-export to Southern Rhodesia is prohibited. Existing Commerce regulations require such notices only for certain items of strategic significance, export of which to South Africa is not otherwise prohibited. Current regulations governing these goods prohibit re-export to any country contrary to U.S. Government regulations, which would include Rhodesia. The Commerce position is that the proposed requirement applied to all goods would impose an administrative burden on U.S. exporters that could not be justified unless all other UN members agreed to the same requirement. State believes that the initiation of such restrictions even before the UN resolution is put into effect would demonstrate to the South African Government that we are concerned about diversion of U.S. goods to Southern Rhodesia.

State and Commerce will endeavor to reach an agreed interagency position by June 1.

7. Promotion of Tourism to Rhodesia

As the Report of the Interagency Group noted, the Treasury Department has interpreted its current Rhodesian sanctions regulations to allow U.S. travel agents to promote and assist travel to Rhodesia by U.S. tourists. Treasury believes that such activity by U.S. travel agents is simply incidental to the right of U.S. citizens to travel to Rhodesia. The State Department, however, believes that commercial operations in the U.S. to promote such tourism violate the letter and spirit of the UN sanctions program, and should be viewed as prohibited under the present Executive Order.

This interagency difference of opinion has not yet been resolved. It appears that an options paper will be required to resolve it. State will draft such a paper by May 23, and request interagency clearance and recommendations by June 1.
158. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, May 19, 1977

SUBJECT
First Meeting Between Vice President Mondale and Prime Minister Vorster:
Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS
United States
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Ambassador Donald McHenry, USUN
Ambassador to South Africa William Bowdler
Mr. A. Denis Clift, Adviser to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Mr. James Johnson, Executive Assistant to the Vice President
Mr. Jay Kenneth Katzen, USUN (note taker)

South Africa
Prime Minister B.J. Vorster
Foreign Minister Botha
General van den Bergh
South African Ambassador to the United States Donald Sole
Mr. Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Franklin, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Eksteen

A photo session took place with the participants at the conference table from 0930 to 0950. At 0950, the Vice President and Mr. Aaron met with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Botha for a private conversation in the Vice President’s office, adjoining the conference room. This meeting was by prior agreement, and lasted 35 minutes. The full meeting began at 1025, and is summarized below:

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: As I understand it, we will discuss the three questions of Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa in that order. I suggest we begin with the South African appraisal of the Rhodesian situation, then I will give you our own views.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Did you see Foreign Secretary Owen?

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, South Africa: 5/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Katzen on May 21. Mondale was in Vienna for meetings with leaders of the Austrian Government and Prime Minister Vorster. The meeting took place in the Hofburg conference room from 10:25 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.

2 For memoranda of conversation on Namibia and South Africa see Documents 276 and 278.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I will on Monday. Secretary Vance saw him at the London Summit, and I know the status of the initiative.\footnote{Reference is presumably to the Quadrapartite meeting held on May 9. Documentation is scheduled for publication in \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.} The United States will support the effort to develop a constitution which will lead to elections and independence in 1978. The original suggestion was for a constitutional conference. Now, we are beginning bilateral consultations which will support Owen’s objective.\footnote{See footnote 2, Document 152.} The nature of these consultations has not yet been determined but, hopefully, a consensus will result on the constitution. We have appointed Ambassador Low to participate with the British. I want you to know confidentially that Ambassador Low will shortly be getting a higher position in the State Department. He is among our ablest officers, and is very experienced in African affairs. We hope that our efforts will lead to a consensus and that South Africa will encourage Mr. Smith to work with the process and for free elections with all participating, leading to a new government in Rhodesia in 1978. We have not developed details concerning the constitution. The consultative group will be in Salisbury May 22–23. The United States wants to support the entire effort, but we will not be getting into the details.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Let’s go back briefly and look at the history of the negotiations. In 1973 and 1974, Mr. Smith had discussions concerning a possible settlement. After the failure to reach a settlement with Mr. Wilson on “Tiger” and “Fearless” and the failure of Alec Home’s visit, Smith talked with the ANC and Muzorewa. These talks failed in August 1974. At that time, the South African Government contacted the President of Zambia, and exchanged emissaries. General van den Bergh went six or seven times to Lusaka. Toward the end of 1974, Zambia asked for assistance to get Nkomo and Sithole out of detention, asking that they be allowed to go to Lusaka for discussions with the so-called Front Line. We contacted Smith and although he initially was unfavorable, Smith agreed to release them. At our own expense, we flew Nkomo and Sithole several times to Zambia—well over half a dozen times. Also on behalf of the Zambian President, and following requests by Machel and Nyerere, they were released at our behest. We were as helpful as we could be. The objective was that in Rhodesia, blacks and whites should come together. The meetings in Salisbury and Lusaka were arranged by South Africa. We also sent a South African railway train to the bridge at Livingstone, and brought the parties together. I was there, and Kaunda was, but unfortunately, they didn’t find each other. South Africa at all times was prepared to
help, and is prepared now. It is not our business to get into the details of the settlement. Smith is willing to find a solution and is understanding. Smith will accept majority rule, which means black rule. He and his people are reconciled to this. But he has a difficulty: with whom is he to negotiate? Geneva was a shambles and it is a shame that it ever happened. The sides were pulled apart there. Mugabe has a two to three percent following; Nkomo ten to twelve percent; Muzorewa seventy percent; Chirau and the others have the rest.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: What is your view on the Owen mission?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We will not stand in its way. I am sure that Owen told you that South Africa could not be faulted in the least. We are prepared to listen to any proposals and to give answers. As an indication of my interest in a settlement, and this is confidential, two months ago I met Chivanduka, the No. 2 man in the ANC, in Capetown. We will extend the help we can.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There are many disparate groups, with different objectives. In order to have the process lead to a government, we need to set into place the negotiating track and a constitution which will allow the elections people want.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I agree entirely.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We don’t want to choose the leaders; that is not our role. There should be integrity, fairness and equality in the system. But there is a big gap between where we are and our objective.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If an election were held tomorrow in Rhodesia, Muzorewa would be chosen overwhelmingly.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Maybe, but we need elections.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I agree.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The crucial elements are fairness, equality, integrity, and participation by all Rhodesians. That is our objective, and we believe it will lead to a moderate government. There are difficulties on the way to it: white leaders see a threat and believe it is possible, by blocking the process administratively, and for instance, weighing votes, to frustrate the system. There are also blacks who would lose in an election and who would prefer to be anointed. We oppose both of these and, therefore, support the Owen effort to reach a constitution through consultations with all parties. We are aware that all parties won’t agree, but the best chance is elections on a fair non-discriminatory basis. South Africa can help by pressing those participating in the process with whom you have influence to accept the process and the results of fair elections. We will encourage others to agree to the process, a constitution, and the results of the elections. Let’s be frank.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Fine.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There is resistance to the Owen idea. Smith still hopes to retain power. That is why I ask South Africa to press Smith to agree to the process, a constitution and elections—not just to agree to what Smith wants.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We have passed that point. Smith has accepted. In fact, because of that, he has had a rebellion within his own party. Nine left the party, and he expelled them. They had refused to accept the Owen proposal. Smith has resigned himself to the situation. Smith’s difficulty is that while he has accepted black majority rule, it is unclear to whom he is to give it. If one could achieve the ideal, it would be to have a referendum among blacks to elect a leader. It would be the easiest thing in the world for Smith to meet with him and turn over power. On the other hand, if someone on the outside wants Nkomo and Mugabe put in power, no settlement would be possible.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The Rhodesian leader should be chosen in an open plebiscite. That is our final line. It is not for us to choose one leader. The blacks have rejected an “internal option”. The Owen mission seeks to circumvent that process and, instead, to have a constitution with elections of integrity, leading to a process which chooses a leader to run the government. One problem at Geneva was the disagreement over who got anointed. It broke down over rivalries. We want consultations leading to a constitution leading to elections which will choose a leader. We don’t exactly accept the point that Smith has agreed to the process. At Geneva he wanted a disproportionate political role for whites, with a blocking possibility which was unacceptable to the black majority in Rhodesia and to international opinion. We want you to persuade Smith and his government to join in the Owen process and not limit your position to accepting what Smith agrees to. We want you too to agree to the result, and to get Smith to. If you only agree to what Smith wants, we won’t get the result needed. Others will also require pressure. We are sure that some blacks also don’t want elections.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It’s a pity that Rogers and Schaufele aren’t here. That Sunday when we met, Dr. Kissinger and Smith agreed

---

5 In an April 13 Intelligence Memorandum entitled “Rhodesia: A Political Challenge to Prime Minister Smith,” the Central Intelligence Agency described the backlash from the right wing of the Rhodesian Front Party. (Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Foreign Trip Files, Box 122, Vice President’s Visit to Europe, 5/14–23/1977: Meeting with South African PM Vorster on Africa [1])
to the initial Five Points. In my presence, when Smith intimated he could accept, I said—and Dr. Kissinger was there—that if you accept but don’t adhere, I will drop you. I can’t go any further than that. But I did go further. I said I would guarantee that Smith honors his commitments. I said that to Kissinger with Smith present. I can’t do any more. If Smith agrees to the election process, I will support the results.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We appear to agree on that point. We say that a government should be headed by the winner of fair and popular elections. We don’t want to say this necessarily will be a black. The figures may say otherwise. In the United States, for instance, we have the experience where a white has been elected from a primarily black electorate and a black from a primarily white electorate. For instance, the mayor of Los Angeles, which is ten percent black, is a black.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We cannot equate the U.S. situation to Rhodesia or South Africa.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: But this can occur. Let’s not say what color will be elected. That is up to the Rhodesian people.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I have no quarrel with that.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: All will participate, none will be excluded. Those outside will return home and participate, and there will be universal suffrage. Do you have any problems with that package?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Smith and the Rhodesian people feel a need for negotiations between his people and a black leader, to prepare for elections.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Maybe we are talking about different things. The Owen mission wants a constitution which will lead to elections, where a government will be chosen to govern Rhodesia. It is not to choose people to negotiate with Smith.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I am not informed on that score yet.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: If it were otherwise, we would be back to the “internal option”, which we cannot accept.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: There is another element. Rhodesia is small, but it is sophisticated. I have spoken to many Rhodesians. They recognize that they can’t run Rhodesia with so few whites. They need whites to remain. They don’t want a repeat of Angola and Mozambique.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The more prompt progress is to honest majority government, the greater is the likelihood of avoiding

---

that. We can avoid war and protect personal liberties, property, freedom of religion and independent choice and, thereby, make Rhodesia a more attractive possibility.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Guarantee is needed for the whites from you or Owen. I am not informed of your views on this. A guarantee is needed of law and order, that there will be no expropriation, no confiscation. Otherwise, the whites will leave. Mugabe has said that they will take over property, that there will be trials by people’s courts, a Marxist government and expropriation. If this is so, forget about a solution.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The process envisaged would lead to a constitution, which then would involve popular elections with constitutional protection of rights of property, free speech, religion...

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: an independent judiciary...

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We would hope the system would spell this out and, thereby, people will be encouraged to remain in Rhodesia. Among the elements to discuss in the negotiations are security and the integrity of the election process. That is, the details would be worked out in consultations, including discussions in Salisbury next week. That is our objective. It would help if South Africa would be forthcoming and say you will influence those with whom you have influence, to accept the process and the results and that South Africa will, too. I predict that if leaders are selected this way, you will have moderation. But I can’t predict what a lawless government would do. You know the saying, “if there is no law in government, there is no sense going to law school”. The longer a delay, the more the radicals will be frustrated and cause changes which will involve them taking power, and will allow the Soviets to enter the scene. The last thing the Soviets want is a democratic secure Rhodesia. That would send them to bed crying. That is why we need your help.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If these objectives were stated publicly, I have no doubt that the white Rhodesians and the majority of black Rhodesians would accept, and you would have the full backing of the South African Government insofar as necessary. These assurances must be given so that there is no doubt that Rhodesians can accept them. Coupled with that, you would proceed on the Fund we discussed, and then we can have a settlement. All right. You will look to me on Smith and I will look to you on Nkomo and Mugabe. If you can guarantee Nkomo and Mugabe will fall into line, I will guarantee Smith does.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I don’t know yet whether we can get the support of all, but it is our intention to pursue that objective through the Owen mission, to try to get the Front Line support, and to do what we can to accept and support the new government once
established. If so, we would support it, and the Fund, and I am confident Congress will be forthcoming.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If so, I will be alongside you.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: So that what we want are: your support, hopefully public, for Owen; for you to press Smith to negotiate for a settlement providing for majority rule through fair elections in 1978; independence within that date; for you to work with us with such a government so chosen; and for you to help us reduce tensions which will tear at the process. Does that make sense?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If you guarantee the points discussed before: freedom of property, no expropriation, an independent judiciary, and so on.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I have discussed what we seek: a bill of rights, protection, due process. We hope for a multi-racial Zimbabwe, and the possibility for all who wish to to stay. I can’t guarantee the results. But our goals are free speech, freedom of assembly and religion, equal protection before the law, due process of protection of property—in the United States, property cannot be confiscated without compensation.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: That is the system in Rhodesia today.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There also would be an independent judicial tribunal. This isn’t a Mondale bill of rights, but these are the general lines we are thinking about.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I understood Owen to say that he would consult with the parties and then the British, with U.S. backing, would draw up a constitution which would be put to the people, then presented to the British Parliament. If the constitution embodies all these points, and the Fund would have to be embodied in it, then, the whites would accept.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Would you press Smith?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I don’t like the word “press”. The word is unfortunate. I have never pressed Smith. I talk sense to him.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: That’s like what Lyndon Johnson used to say, “reasoning together”.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Never ask me to press him, or say it publicly. I will repudiate it.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We want an internationally acceptable solution. Smith is respected for his obstinacy. You can play a role.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It is best to leave that to me.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The public impression is that you still support him. If you don’t want to “press” him, there may be a better formulation for what you can do to indicate your commitment.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The problem in Rhodesia won’t be Smith. General van den Bergh knows that. Nkomo and especially Mugabe will be the problem.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I know the problem is not only Smith.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It is about twenty percent Smith and eighty percent Nkomo and Mugabe.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We want to move toward the election of a Rhodesian leadership quickly, with the expectation that it will thereby be moderate.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I still think it is best to elect a black to talk to Smith. But Owen and you say no to that. I accept that. The second best solution is to do as Owen says: that is, to draft a constitution with all the elements you have mentioned and US/UK guarantees that the government would be upheld and not be overthrown from outside, and that sanctions will be lifted. Then, the whites in Rhodesia will cooperate, as would South Africa.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: In the meantime, Smith should participate seriously.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We have advised him and believe he will. We would like the United States to urge the terrorists to hold their horses and help create a good atmosphere.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let’s discuss that last. We want the Owen initiative to succeed. We want a constitution calling for equal and fair participation in Zimbabwe elections. We hope then to have a consortium, a Zimbabwe Fund, to help in the economic development, growth, infrastructure, and training of the young, moving the country on the path to economic stability. We also are prepared to consider other types of help to strengthen against the threats you describe.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If so, we will have settlement; if not, we will have none.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We can’t guarantee that the people of Zimbabwe will choose a government that will reject public ownership. Even in the UK certain parts of the economy are publicly owned. But we want guarantees, with a judiciary, prohibiting violations through confiscation, prohibiting the violation of rights of assembly and religion. The people’s wishes are always so determined in a democracy. But there are public post offices, railways, and airlines in many countries. With this constitution, such decisions would be made with guarantees.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: What is the ordinary Rhodesian concerned about? The farmer is concerned about the confiscation of his property. The pensioner worries about the loss of his pension. The
city dweller worries about the loss of property. If you can guarantee that not only the Fund will protect him, but that you will uphold the government and that compensation will be paid in the case of confiscation, I can’t foresee any difficulty.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: If we have our way, the constitution will say that no property can be taken without compensation and due process. The Zimbabwe Fund, though, can’t be used simply to buy out whites.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It had never been intended simply for security.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The Fund is intended to train the young, to improve agricultural techniques and infrastructure. It would provide essential capital for the economy. It would be the government’s responsibility, with an independent judiciary, to protect against expropriation.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: In the State Department, our talks reached an advanced stage. There were documents which were UK/US documents, not ours, which confirmed that. The terms in those documents stated that a formal guarantee was given that a scale…

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: a sliding scale
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: …of compensation would be paid if things went bad and people wanted to leave.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Yes, there has been a change.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: This is the first time I hear of it. Owen told the Prime Minister that the Fund is still alive.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is. Let me read from our conception of it. The original plan was a safety net to be used if the government did not provide compensation. Many Rhodesians feel that that was its intention. But it could not be simply be a buy-out fund. The objective of the Fund would be to build the confidence of whites and to ensure fair treatment. We couldn’t support and pass a bill in Congress for a buy-out fund.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: We now hear this for the first time. This is a dramatic and radical change. It will make it impossible for us to continue. We don’t negotiate with Congress, but we have negotiated with the United States and with Owen. This is very serious and I am very upset. I have misled my Prime Minister and my government. I know of the difficulties with Congress.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: This is not a misunderstanding. This is what we were told.

---

MR. LAKE: The Fund, by contributing to an independent Zimbabwe, would underwrite an economy of the type of government described by the Vice President, thereby helping to build confidence. Although there would not be compensation from the Fund, this doesn’t mean that other methods could not be worked out.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: The whole basis for our approach in getting Smith was the US/UK paper on the Fund. This was the basis for our understanding.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It was Annex C.\(^8\)

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: This presents us with severe problems immediately.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Under Kissinger, it was described as you say.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: This was a British Paper.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: In the United States, there has been much public discussion and congressional debate. The conclusion was reached that it would not be a buy-out fund, but it would be used to develop the economy, equal economic growth and opportunity. The protection should be in constitutional guarantees, protected by an independent tribunal.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Originally, the Zimbabwe Development Fund had a dual purpose. It was to help develop infrastructure, and it was to do everything it could to help the whites remain. But, in case they wanted or had to leave, there would be a sliding scale of compensation payable by year. The people are encouraged to stay. But this is a radical departure now from what we and Smith were told.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I regret the breakdown in communications. But, in the United States, there was public discussion of the question.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Owen told us several weeks ago that.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Foreign Minister Botha discussed the question in the State Department.\(^9\)

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Senator Clark agreed with the Fund as we had thought it was set up. The previous Administration had discussed it with Congress. We had discussed it with Smith.

---


\(^9\) See footnote 7 above.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Mr. Fourie told me that the British Ambassador had confirmed several weeks ago that the Fund was still all right.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There has been much public discussion of the question in the United States. Testimony has been heard. I regret that communications have broken down.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: This is the first time we heard about it. That the Fund was all right was confirmed by the British only 14 days ago.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: But did the British describe it?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Owen said that the Fund was very much alive then. The British representative later confirmed it.

MR. FOURIE: Please reread your statement.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: There would be provisions for the “fair treatment of whites, whose confidence is essential”.

MR. AARON: The objective remains to have the whites stay. The program we can support would maintain the economy against radicalization. It would offer the means for the government to provide compensation and encourage a moderate economy. A buy-out fund would encourage the whites to leave.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: What if the Zimbabwe Government says it won’t compensate despite the constitution, which doesn’t mean anything anyway. We have the documents. Now, this is a change.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA (to Prime Minister Vorster): I was there in Washington talking about this.10

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER (to Foreign Minister Botha): To whom were you talking?

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA (to Prime Minister Vorster): Rogers, and a black gentleman. There were three or four British gentlemen, including Duff. We discussed it in details. There never was any doubt. This places the whole thing in jeopardy. We can’t go back.

MR. LAKE: The Zimbabwe Development Fund is intended to support a healthy economy. The Fund, as constituted before, would not do that.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: “Fair treatment” doesn’t mean a buy-out. Rather, the whites would share in the development process.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: You should have communicated this to us. Did you tell the British?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: They knew. I thought you did.

---

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: I have an 11 September 1976 State Department document here which lists the elements of the Fund.\footnote{Not found. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 234.} They include providing capital to develop the industrial and agricultural economy, national development, technological and financial assistance, and training for blacks. Paragraph five lists the essentials which would be in the constitution. Zimbabwe would respect property, and there would be no confiscation. Pensions would be continued, and there would be a safety net to compensate on housing. This was the Zimbabwe Adjustment Fund. This was the latest information we got and was the basis for our work.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is close to noon now. I propose we do two things: we will inquire in Washington. I have described the views of the new Government. Let’s see what we can do. Secondly, I acknowledge that the Fund is a matter requiring further discussions with the parties concerned, to have all participating. The Congress opposes a buy-out. This is a difference which may not be reconcilable. I am surprised that with all the discussion that has been going on in the United States, it had not been communicated to you.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: I remember Senator Clark said publicly that if we spent half a billion dollars a week in Vietnam, it would be worth one and a half billion dollars to save lives in Rhodesia. Since the senior congressional committees had agreed, we had been assured that the Fund was going ahead.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I know the views of the Congress on the buy-out aspect.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: This is not a buy-out fund.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let’s talk about this later.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The Fund would back up the constitution.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It still will, but our Government won’t pay for acquiring property. Rather, we will for training and so on. Let’s have lunch and explore the matter later in the consultative group. Let’s have a word on the violence going on. As I understand it, the British relayed the Smith-Kaunda message.\footnote{See Documents 154 and 155.} The other day, Smith struck into Botswana. They already have been in Mozambique. There has been violence on both sides.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Yes.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We should wind down the level of violence, in an effort to promote peace.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: OK.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I would hope that South Africa could help persuade Smith.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We have done so on numerous occasions. But Smith says he doesn’t have the bases in Mozambique and Zambia. They don’t strike soldiers or police, but civilians, women and children, who are abducted and killed. The Rhodesian Government is responsible for its blacks, too, and must protect them. Most of its citizens are black. The Front Line should play it down, too, but instead, has played it up. Therefore, we are saddled with the problem. We both regret it. What is there to do? The approach should be not only to Smith but to the Front Line presidents.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: As a practical matter, we can’t move unless progress is made on negotiations. We would hope to reduce the incursions and through this, diminish the military operations and eliminate them as we near elections. We do need the Front Line support. Otherwise, there will be an escalation.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I agree, and this help must come from both sides.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Are you a lawyer?

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I have had 20 years of practice.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Well you know what I mean, then, when I say this is like the lawyer in the middle of a couple about to be divorced. Let’s try to reduce the violence. You use your good offices and we will encourage those with whom we have some say.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The Front Line presidents should encourage a reduction of violence.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We have stated our opposition to the killing, and will continue to do so.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The violence should cease during the negotiations. If the violence continues, Smith will continue to strike back.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It probably is unrealistic to expect that. But let’s try to restrain them and reduce it.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: You don’t need to convert me. Someone should speak to Mugabe and Nkomo.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We are not encouraging them. We have spoken to them and we will continue to.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I don’t blame you, but you have influence.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We have some. If we ask for an end to violence now, it won’t succeed, but we will use our good offices, and hope you will use yours.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: You can call on me. There was a period when we also encouraged a de-escalation, but it must be more than a one-sided effort.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let’s meet again after lunch.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: In view of the way things are going, and this new element, we are talking about the Owen effort and the constitution in a vacuum. We need a constitution as soon as possible, to have the guarantees incorporated in it. We have to see it and then, using the constitution as a basis, see where we go. This is the best way, as a practical politician and a lawyer, that I can see to proceed.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We can’t see all the details now, but we can move now to support the process. One of our ablest men is in the consultative group. We agree on general outlines and principles for an election by all Zimbabwe citizens, and that the government will be a new one. Also, that we will encourage the parties concerned.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We need a constitution first. We all will reserve our rights until we see the constitution.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We need general agreement. That is all we can expect now. I suggest that we refrain from press comments at this time.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We don’t talk to the press unnecessarily.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We try not to talk to the press at all.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We will not talk to them, but leaks scare me.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We say that in Washington, Top Secret is James Reston and Secret is The Washington Post.

The meeting broke up into private discussions at 1220, and adjourned at 1230.

13 Reference is presumably to Stephen Low.
159. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, May 23, 1977, 1724Z

8531. Dept please pass to Vice President’s Office and NSC for Dr. Brzezinski. Subject: Uncleared Draft Memorandum of Conversation: Mondale-Owen, May 23, 1977.

Participants
US: Vice President Mondale
   Mr. Lake, S/P
   Mr. Aaron, NSC
   Ambassador McHenry, USUN
   Mr. Clift, Vice President’s Office
   Mr. Katzen, Vice President’s Office
   Minister Spiers, Charge, Embassy London
   Mr. Seitz, Embassy London
UK: Foreign Secretary Owen
   Minister of State Judd
   Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Under Secretary
   Phillip Mansfield, Assistant Under Secretary
   Martin Reid, Head, Southern Africa Department
   Patrick Laver, Head, Rhodesia Department
   Ewen Fergusson, Private Secretary
   Hamilton Whyte, Press Office

1. The Vice President described for Dr. Owen his talks in Vienna with Prime Minister Vorster. He called the exchanges candid, correct, and nonconfrontational. On Rhodesia, the Vice President said, Vorster had agreed to language which committed South Africa to the Owen Mission, that is, to elections in which all would take part and which would result in independence in 1978. The Vice President said he aimed to win Vorster’s commitment to the negotiating process and to its intended conclusion. Moreover, Vorster accepted this strategy regardless of the position of Ian Smith.

2. The Vice President said that the two parties had been unable to agree on the question of violence in Rhodesia but had recognized that the fighting would continue. The Vice President described Vorster as

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2515. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See Document 158.
surprised to learn that the Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF) was intended to be developmental in nature and not a “buy out” of white Rhodesians. The South Africans had argued that the greatest merit of the Fund now seemed to have been rejected. The Vice President commented that Vorster should have been forewarned of this new concept not only because of public statements in the United States but also because of Dr. Owen’s straightforward talk on the same subject.

3. The Vice President said he told Vorster that the United States hoped that a new Rhodesian constitution would include provision for the protection of individual rights and might therefore serve to allay some fears in the white community. Vorster appeared to have limited confidence in the effectiveness of such constitutional mechanisms.

4. Owen expressed his satisfaction with the Vice President’s report and said he was particularly pleased to learn that Vorster had not “hedged” on the objective of an independent Rhodesia in 1978. He remarked that the problem of universal suffrage might still prove an obstacle to successful negotiations. The British, he said, had resisted publicly espousing one-man one-vote in order not to foreclose negotiations, but he expected US influence would have to be brought to bear on the issue. Owen said he anticipated some form of eventual agreement on universal suffrage, including women, but that there would likely be haggling over the minimum age.

5. The Vice President asked about the timetable the British had in mind for the completion of the process. Owen answered that it was difficult to be specific on dates because the armed struggle can at any moment radically alter the pace of events and the atmosphere of discussions. Nevertheless, he said that the first round of talks conducted by the Consultative Group would be completed shortly, and that the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference in London would afford an unique opportunity for carrying forward the negotiations. Three of the Front Line Presidents will be here at that time, plus the Nigerians, plus several of the black Nationalist leaders. By the end of the conference, Owen went on, we should have a better understanding of what could be achieved. It may then be necessary, towards the last part of June, to go back to the whites. Owen said that he did not exclude the possibility that he himself would make another trip to Southern Africa.

6. In response to the Vice President’s question on the role of the Patriotic Front, Owen said he was “relaxed.” He said that it was politically difficult for the Front to negotiate and fight at the same time. Nevertheless, Nkomo likely prefers a political settlement and will take advantage of whatever political opportunities present themselves so long as he retains his confidence of eventual electoral success.

7. Owen said that it is difficult for the US and the UK to accept the armed struggle and at the same time work for a de-escalation of
the violence that will help the negotiating process. Attempts to reconcile these two forces—the fighting and the talking—run the danger of sacrificing our credibility with one group or another. “It is a delicate balance,” the Foreign Secretary said. He added that the greatest danger would be to fail to take account of white opinion. The Western position at the Maputo Conference seems to have struck about the right balance, due largely to the efforts of Ambassador Young.

8. Owen also said that the ZDF would play an important role in maintaining Western credibility with the white community in Rhodesia. He said he agreed that the Fund could not be used for “buying out” purposes but that whites must be convinced that general developmental assistance for an independent Zimbabwe will contribute to the country’s stability and therefore to its attraction for the whites. He said he recognizes US political sensitivity to the issue. Owen then mentioned the question of pension rights which he described as extremely important in order that white public servants remain in Rhodesia in the post-independence period. The Vice President said he would find it difficult to conceive the Fund as providing for pension rights and that the issue must be carefully discussed between our two governments. Lake suggested that the Fund itself could not include pension rights but might have a budgetary off-set function which could release money for this specific purpose. He noted that the details of the ZDF should be worked out later in the process of negotiating a political settlement. Owen agreed but commented that the question of pensions, which former Secretary Kissinger had perhaps oversold, remains important in the eyes of the white community and, most likely, in the eyes of both major parties in Parliament. The Vice President reiterated that we must proceed with care in developing the terms of the Fund so that it is acceptable to the donors and to Congress. Lake pointed out that the Congress will likely object to any arrangement which seems specifically designed for white interests. The Africans, too, have problems with the Fund, and it is therefore probably best to leave the arrangements general for the moment and define them more specifically later. Owen suggested that the US and the UK begin to discuss the issue at an experts’ level.

9. In response to Lake’s question about the timing of elections, Owen suggested that by the end of the Commonwealth Conference, the British may be able to put together the broad outlines of a constitution. They would then set about winning agreement among the parties to ten or twelve basic principles, after which British constitutional experts would fill in the details and prepare the required legislation. Owen noted that Ian Smith claimed that the Rhodesian Parliament itself must pass any constitutional bill by a two-thirds majority. While this may be a stalling tactic, it could also reflect an element of Rhodesian
pride. In any event, if the principles can be agreed in June, the details can be developed in August and September. Draft legislation could be introduced to the House of Commons by the end of November and could presumably emerge from Parliament by the following February.

10. The important remaining issue, Owen said, will be the nature of the interim government. It is conceivable that some or all of the parties may ask for a return to colonial status. The British response, Owen said, would depend in large part on the US and on the support we would be willing to offer. In any event, at this delicate juncture, the British would not want to be sucked into taking responsibility for Rhodesia. The UK is prepared to undertake a role for a specific period of time but not to guarantee that the violence will stop or, for example, that the guerrillas will be successfully integrated into the armed forces.

11. Lake asked to what degree it might be necessary to impose constitutional and transitional arrangements on the parties. Owen replied that it is difficult to predict how the initiative will unfold and what amount of pressure may be required. Much will depend on the de-escalation of violence after the agreement of constitutional principles. There must then be a gradual re-integration of the guerrillas and the introduction of outside elements such as Commonwealth personnel. Moreover, much will depend on whether Smith proves intractable on every issue along the way. The Vice President interjected that we had talked to Vorster precisely because we wished to give him the reasons why he must press Smith to cooperate. A great deal will depend on successful communication with the South Africans.

12. The Foreign Secretary pointed out that the proposals for an interim government which had developed under Ivor Richard’s direction in January remained on the table. Perhaps these would be picked up when the time came for discussing transitional arrangements and we could thus avoid developing another formula. Owen said that Vorster had left him with the impression that Smith would be prepared to step down if satisfied with the equity of the constitution and if not pressed publicly. Owen agreed with the Vice President that Vorster has considerable influence in the equation. He referred to a statement made by Smith which indicated that he had no illusions about the consequences of deceiving the South Africans. It is therefore necessary, Owen went on, to convince the South Africans that what is offered is good and fair. Owen again mentioned that if constitutional principles can be developed by the end of June, he may return to Southern Africa sometime during the following month.

---

3 See Document 131.
13. Lake pointed out the danger of appearing to the Front Line Presidents and to the Patriotic Front to have sided with the whites. We run this danger even if the Patriotic Front is recalcitrant during the consultative process. It is important, Lake said, that if the current initiative fails, it be clearly seen that the white element has been the cause of obstruction. We cannot afford to isolate ourselves from the Nationalists. Owen said that while he agreed with Lake, he nevertheless contended that it would be impossible to undertake this process without making enemies. The whites are important, but any negotiations with them are bound to be criticized by the blacks. While the future of Zimbabwe is unquestionably one of African rule, there is a danger that the whites may simply surrender any measure of responsibility for the country and this would inevitably lead to civil war.

14. The Vice President commented that our objectives must be to moderate both sides without exacerbating the situation. We must talk about this strategy in detail, he said. He suggested that meetings at all levels between our two governments continue, and he assured the Foreign Secretary that we support his efforts. We have no illusions about the difficulty in succeeding. The Vice President said he did not relish his two days with Vorster but that Vorster needed to know how fully we support the Owen Mission. He again stressed that US–UK talks are crucial. Owen agreed, suggesting that exchanges continue through working groups and offering to come to Washington at any time it may prove necessary. Lake noted that the working groups would prove invaluable in avoiding misunderstandings as to which party may be veering in which direction. The Vice President and the Foreign Secretary agreed that such talks should begin soon.

15. The Vice President then asked McHenry to describe the Namibia portion of the dialogue with the South Africans. McHenry said that while the South Africans had not appeared prepared to discuss the question in depth, they nevertheless seemed to be backtracking from the discussions carried out by the Contact Group three weeks ago in Cape Town. In particular, Vorster implied that the Five had been concerned about the name of the central administrative authority and not about the substance. Our suspicions that Turnhalle may in fact prove to be the basis for an interim government came close to confirmation. Vorster had spoken of interim arrangements in ethnic terms. The Vice President had made clear that the nature of the interim government was vital and that any effort to “stack the deck” would make meaningless whatever followed. Vorster seemed committed to Turnhalle and it is not clear yet how we can extract him from that commitment.

16. On the question of political prisoners, McHenry continued, Vorster agreed to the concept of an international commission of jurists and appeared to accept the suggestions that prisoners would be trans-
ferred to Namibia. He also raised the question of Namibians held in Zambia and Tanzania, and we agreed to pursue this point. McHenry stated that in the likely event that South African proposals for an interim arrangement prove unacceptable, we ourselves may be obliged to put forward an alternative plan. McHenry said that the Vice President had made it abundantly clear to Vorster that Turnhalle, no matter how presented, is unacceptable.

17. The Vice President stressed that it is imperative to move quickly on the Namibian issue. It is possible that the next series of meetings could produce a formula for an interim authority which Vorster could accept. If the West can clear this hurdle, and come to a satisfactory agreement on prisoners, then the rest would appear to fit into place. Prompt progress on Namibia will have a favorable influence on the Rhodesia process and will help create a more moderate mood in all of Africa. Failure, on the other hand, makes the other problems even more insoluble. The Vice President confessed he was slightly less pessimistic than McHenry. He explained that the South Africans want international acceptability and the best place they can find it is in Namibia.

18. Owen agreed that the crucial question in Namibia is the nature of the interim authority. He pointed to the inevitable pressures and challenges which will present themselves in the United Nations and emphasized the desirability of joint US–UK talks about these problems. “We need to know how far we can go,” he said. “It will test our credibility in Africa.” It was agreed with the Vice President that Owen could discuss these issues with Secretary Vance in early June in Paris and that this meeting would be preceded by detailed preparations at the working level. Owen added that the Paris meeting would have the additional asset of bringing in the French and Germans who appear more concerned on Namibia than on Rhodesia.

19. Owen congratulated the Vice President on his meeting with Vorster. It was important to convey the message directly, he said. There has been too much doubt in the past. The Vice President commented that he expects more progress on Rhodesia and Namibia if we press South Africa on its domestic problems. The talks in Vienna have been of fundamental importance for our longer term interests in Africa, he concluded.

20. Non-African topics were not discussed during the meetings.

Miller
160. Memorandum of Conversation

Paris, June 24, 1977

SUBJECT
Rhodesia, Namibia, and Others

PARTICIPANTS
United Kingdom
David Owen, Foreign Secretary
John A. Graham, Deputy to the Permanent Under Secretary of State
Ewen Ferguson, Principal Private Secretary to David Owen

United States
The Secretary
Senator Abraham Ribicoff
Ambassador Stephen Low
Peter Tarnoff, Executive Secretary

The Secretary began by saying that he shared Dr. Owen’s concern about the need to move ahead quickly on Rhodesia. He favored progressing with deliberate speed as long as the necessary preparation was adequately done. It would be helpful for top British and American officials to sit down together and go over the details of Owen’s proposals before the Foreign Secretary goes back to southern Africa. The Secretary said that he would be available for such consultations at any time.

In response to a question from Dr. Owen, the Secretary said that he would favor the Foreign Secretary going to southern Africa sometime in the latter part of July. Owen agreed, stating that HMG could not make any crucial decisions in the month of August and, therefore, had to act beforehand. He expressed his hope that it would be possible for him to travel to southern Africa during the week of July 18. Owen then explained that a serious problem exists on the future of law and order in Rhodesia. With respect to universal suffrage, there would be no problem with the Patriotic Front or the Front Line Presidents although such a provision, of course, leaves no safeguard to the whites. Owen would favor having the black nationalists agree to include 20 additional white and black members (10 of each) in the Zimbabwe legislative body in order to assure racial and tribal representation there. However,

---

1 Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on July 20 by Tarnoff and approved on August 4 by Jacklyn A. Cahill (S). The meeting took place in the OECD Building. Vance was in Paris to attend the OECD Ministerial meeting.

2 Reference is presumably to Owen’s brief (see Document 146).
if the new Zimbabwe leaders reject this approach, Owen would not want to waste his leverage on this idea. He added that the most difficult problem to resolve might be the pension rights accorded by the previous Rhodesian governments.

The Secretary asked how such pensions would be paid, adding that there could be no U.S. funding for them. Graham explained that half the outlay would come from existing funds, and half would have to come from current revenues. He added that no U.S. contribution to this financing would be requested and explained that the nationalists do not want to accept these obligations for political reasons. Low interjected that he thought that a new Zimbabwe government would accept responsibility for the payment of the pensions. Owen suggested telling the new Zimbabwe government that, if the pensions are paid, it would obtain access to Rhodesian government assets valued at £250 million which are currently being held in British banks. Since the Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF) has now changed considerably from the original Kissinger model, Owen suggested using the fund in a way to reduce the chances of the Zimbabwe government reneging on its pension obligations. The total of the pension costs over a five-year period would be approximately £750 million, which is roughly equivalent to the amount proposed for the ZDF. Since the Zimbabwe government would need Western financial support during the difficult transition period, donors should insist on making any such assistance subject to acceptance by the new government of all the provisions of the new constitution. Although payment of pensions would not be spelled out specifically, this would be understood to be one of the obligations that the new government would assume.

The Secretary said that the new Zimbabwe government could not, in any case, draw freely from the ZDF. Owen replied that the Fund’s trustees should use normal criteria for any projects proposed by the government, but that funding would continue only if constitutional provisions were honored. Otherwise, the trustees would simply freeze disbursements.

Senator Ribicoff interjected his personal view that there would be some support among Southern representatives in the U.S. Congress for compensation of the Rhodesian whites. Mr. Vance pointed out that the ZDF is presently being considered in the House. It would only be endorsed in full if specific projects were described in some detail. Owen said that a judicious use of the ZDF would provide some confidence for the whites at least for a five-year period. Low pointed out that ZDF

---

funds in their entirety should be available to finance development projects.

Owen then commented that much work still needs to be done on the package that he prepared for dealing with Rhodesia. Graham and Low would renew their consultations starting on July 6. He found the several Zimbabwe nationalists difficult to move once they have definite ideas on a subject, however unrealistic. Once whites and blacks agree on universal suffrage, however, much will be achieved. Owen predicted that the Patriotic Front would back his proposals for universal suffrage but might refuse to go along on the pension scheme. The nationalists might refuse to fund pensions for some white Rhodesians, although it might be possible for the U.K. to get these “undesirable elements” out beforehand and find a way to pay them off.

Turning to the position of the different nationalist leaders in Rhodesia, Mr. Vance mentioned recent reports that Mugabe was principally a front man for the guerrillas “in the bush.” Nkomo was being supported by the Soviets, and there was a good chance for a split between these two. The Secretary said that he hoped that the nationalists would be able to present a common front in dealings with the Salisbury regime. Owen said that he would do his best to get the nationalists to agree on the package he would be proposing. He would hope to get the contributors to the ZDF on board as well. Owen would try to present a clear and straightforward proposal that would be acceptable to the nationalists, although they might have problems accepting the obligations which the previous Rhodesian governments had accepted. Low pointed out that the Front Line Presidents had all accepted such obligations in their own constitutions and could be expected to encourage the independent Zimbabwe government to do likewise.

The Secretary said that Foreign Minister Botha had told him earlier in the week that it was necessary for the US and the UK to draft a constitution and then “ram it down the throats” of all concerned. Owen responded by saying that he anticipated real difficulties in the transition period. It was absolutely necessary to maintain law and order in order to satisfy the “sensible white moderates” whose allegiances could be funnelled off from Smith. These moderates would ask, “How can a free election take place with guerilla warfare continuing?” After elections, the new Zimbabwe government will be responsible for internal security. But during the caretaker period, Owen asked, can the guerillas be convinced to respect the truce? Time is of the essence, Owen added, and then he went on to explain the need for a peacekeeping force in Zimbabwe. Stressing that he did not have HMG authority for his

4 Vance and Botha met on June 21. For Vance’s report to Carter, see Document 281.
proposals, Owen said that such a peacekeeping force could unfortunately not be from the UN. The Secretary said that the Soviets would veto any UN force and Low added that most Africans would oppose it as well. Owen said that either all UK or Commonwealth forces were conceivable but that an all British force would not be politically acceptable in the UK. It would be possible, with luck, to get a Commonwealth force established. Some Commonwealth governments are reluctant to participate and it would be difficult for the UK to press them because the US could not be part of such an operation. Owen then explained that a Commonwealth force would not come into existence without agreement on the constitution, a transition period, and acceptance by the Rhodesian Front. On the first day of the transition, the British Internal Commissioner, “who would constitute the area’s administrative authority” would have the Commonwealth force at his disposition. The force would have to remain in Rhodesia for 3–6 months, during the transition period, and its main mission would be to supervise free elections.

In response to a question from the Secretary, Owen explained that the Patriotic Front forces would remain alongside any Commonwealth forces. The Rhodesian forces, however, would be disbanded, although individual members would be invited to sign up with a new Zimbabwe Defense Force. Owen said that he would expect the Front Line Presidents to support such a scenario although he did not know whether Muzorewa and Sithole would agree to it. Nkomo would also be reluctant although he might be pressured to agree. The new Zimbabwe Defense Force would have as a major task to integrate the guerilla elements, while most of the white officers who currently lead the Rhodesian forces would have to be removed and be paid off by the British during the transition period. Within 6 months, an indigenous force would have to be formed that will be acceptable to a new government and incorporate many ex-guerillas. Some of the officers in the Commonwealth force might be persuaded to stay on after the transition period to officer the Zimbabwe Defense Force.

Owen then explained that the new government in Zimbabwe would probably want to retain Rhodesia’s airforce, (almost all [of] which is white), for prestige reasons. It might be possible to get New Zealand or even Nigerian or Kenyan officers to serve as the leaders of the 1200-man airforce. On the ground, Owen said, he would conceive of 3 batalions of 6–700 men each, one Gurkha, one UK, and one Commonwealth. The Nigerian attitude about participation is unsure at this point although Lagos could afford to do so. Ghana is interested in providing a batalion but could not pay for it. Kenya has its own security problems. India might be willing to participate. The Canadians and Australians are hesitant about making any commitments—they prefer
to wait-and-see, fearing that their force might get “sucked in,” since no one can guarantee that the guerrilla war would stop completely during the transition period. Hopefully the Front Line Presidents would agree to moderate the guerrillas. Much depends on Nkomo’s views of his own chances in the electoral battle. If Sithole heads up the ANC, he can bring pressure to bear on Nkomo.

Owen then asked what “psychological support” could be expected from the United States for the Commonwealth force. If Ghana needed financial help or if transportation or logistical support were necessary, would the U.S. be able to provide some concrete aid, he asked. The Secretary said that there was a precedent for supplying both logistical support and air transportation for international peacekeeping forces. He would have to look at whether supplemental funding would be necessary for such support or whether it would be possible to pay for it in another way. The Secretary stressed that he could make no promises on this, but he would not rule out some U.S. support for the operation.

Senator Ribicoff said that his first impression was that Owen had made a rational and fair proposal. If the Commonwealth force was designed to stop bloodshed between whites and blacks, he had the feeling that Congress would go along if the President convoked the Democratic and Republican leadership to discuss the issue. Protecting white lives and pension rights would be important to the Southern members of Congress in particular. The “symbolism” of such an action would be favorable.

Owen said that he would be in close touch with the Secretary on this. He needed, by July 1 if possible, an indication of the United States’ attitude on providing logistical support. The more assistance the U.S. provides, the less fearful the Rhodesian whites will be since they are now thinking of a Vietnam-type fight in the jungles in order to preserve their rights and property. Owen underlined that he would not commit a Commonwealth force that would have to fight white Rhodesians. The Secretary then added that participation by Australia and New Zealand would have a favorable political impact in the U.S., where public opinion is used to being on the same side with these countries as well, of course, as with the U.K. Owen said that the Australians and New Zealanders might provide “a couple of majors,” but it would be hard to mix too many elements without running into command problems. The Indians might be especially helpful, and the Commonwealth force was feasible provided that agreement was also reached on the constitution and the ZDF. Owen explained that the Patriotic Front does not want him to come to southern Africa with a previously negotiated package, because once proposals are formally on the table, they are difficult to modify. The British package must also appeal to
the South African government, Southern sentiment in the U.S., the U.S. Congress and the Tories, not to mention the French and the Germans whom Owen said would probably be willing to go along.

Graham suggested that the $1.2 billion originally envisaged for the ZDF might be more than the new country could absorb, and that it was conceivable to think of a smaller sum for the fund. Owen replied that it was dangerous to think of a reduction now given the need for leverage on the pension issue. The Secretary expressed his doubts about the transferability of ZDF monies to the pension account. He added that it was difficult enough as is to keep the ZDF alive with Congressman Mahon. Senator Ribicoff added that his sense of the Senate as a whole was that the body was very uneasy over the prospect of a slaughter of the whites in Rhodesia. Knowing the Senate, Ribicoff said that Owen’s attempt to protect all Rhodesians would be appealing. He urged the Administration to not concentrate exclusively on the African Subcommittee on these issues but to involve the President, the Democratic and Republican leadership, and to try to encourage “middlemen” to work on Congressional attitudes.

Owen then suggested that each contributor to the ZDF could choose whether to earmark funds for pension guarantees or not. However, if there was to be a renegotiation on the sums to be provided and the way disbursements would take place, this would open the ZDF to serious challenge. Graham mentioned that the ZDF might underwrite the foreign exchange costs involved in guaranteeing the pensions and thereby generate counterpart funds within Zimbabwe which could be spent on local projects. Owen added that HMG now has two cabinet-level committees working on the law and order and pension questions. The Foreign Secretary himself is working not only on the contents of the Zimbabwe package but on how to present it to the Cabinet and the British public. Turning to the Mozambique situation and the related debate in the UN, Owen said that he was very reluctant to apply sanctions against South Africa because of his concern that this would cause the SAG to turn down his Zimbabwe package. Owen then asked whether he should informally present his package to the SAG before discussing it with the Africans and Western countries.

The Secretary said that after his talk earlier that week with Botha, he believes that something has changed and that the SAG really wants to disentangle itself from the Rhodesian problem. The Secretary added that if he were Vorster, the Zimbabwe package would be more convincing if the other governments concerned were already on board. However, there might be some virtue in giving Botha an indication of the way Owen is thinking of proceeding. Graham suggested that the British Ambassador in South Africa inform Fourie on what is being considered with respect to the constitution and law and order problems, emphasizing the consultative nature of the discussion with SAG.
The Secretary said that he would leave to Owen the decision on whether to talk to Botha now or later, adding that after the British package was put together he would want to put it to the President and probably to the Congressional leadership. Owen said that he needs more of his own cabinet colleagues on board before proceeding further with the package and the Secretary expressed understanding for this dilemma. Owen said that governmental and public opinion in the UK had to be softened. He had told the Commonwealth Conference that HMG was going for universal suffrage. He said that there was a tendency for the Rhodesian and South African governments to be surprised at the evolution of British policy on this issue. Although Owen has begun to talk about the Commonwealth force idea with some governments that might contribute, he asked that US officials not comment publicly on the idea at this stage.

Low said that the most difficult question to resolve is the Patriotic Front’s role in guaranteeing law and order during the transitional caretaker period. Owen responded with the hope that the Patriotic Front soldiers could be gradually integrated into a Commonwealth force. It was absolutely necessary to do something for the young guerrillas who want to stay in the army. At the recent Commonwealth conference the more reasonable leaders concentrated on the need for a steady transfer of power to the guerilla forces. Nkomo himself was reluctant to discuss the constitution without some talk about how the transfer of power would take place. Owen thought that it might be appropriate to use the term “crusaders” rather than “guerillas.” He added that the British resident commissioner would oversee the integration of the nationalist forces which are presently fighting for independence and would rightly demand a leading role in the new Zimbabwe Army. All suitable candidates from both the guerilla and Rhodesian defense forces should be considered for membership in the new Zimbabwe Defense Force. The Front Line Presidents would only accept a final package that acknowledged the Patriotic Front’s primacy in the armed struggle.

The Secretary said that the US would like to have HMG’s analysis of the military situation that a Commonwealth force would have to face in Zimbabwe, and that a British team might come from London to Washington for this purpose. Owen responded affirmatively, noting that he was still working on the basic structure of his initiative. A starting point was the need to convince the military that it would not be confronting a guerilla situation in Zimbabwe. He again asked to have by July 1 a preliminary reaction from the Secretary as to what kind of support the US might be able to give to an eventual Commonwealth force.

**Namibia**

Raising Namibia, the Secretary said that the Western governments should all weigh in with the SAG to insist on receiving the name of
the proposed administrator of the territory. He expressed concern that Waldheim might have problems with the Security Council on this issue and the U.S. and U.K. need to make clear to Botha that Waldheim needs his help in order to head off Security Council involvement. Botha told the Secretary that the SAG will withdraw all its forces at independence when the responsibility for peacekeeping will lie with the UN. The unanswered question has to do with who polices the territory during the interim period. The Secretary said that he told Botha that a thin-out of South African forces during this transition period would be welcome, particularly if the UN peacekeeping force [is] already in place. Botha expressed understanding for the Secretary’s point, did not specifically turn it down, and said that the SAG was also concerned about working out compensation for turning over the railroads, hospitals and other installations in Namibia. The Secretary added that it was necessary for the Western powers plus Waldheim to keep in close contact on developments in Namibia. Owen responded that the five Western countries, individually or together, should reiterate to the SAG the need for an independent legal figure to be named administrator and that South African forces should be reduced during the transition period. The only security threat to Namibia comes from its border with Angola and the UN peacekeeping force could well be stationed along this frontier. There would be no SWAPO endorsement of the overall plan unless immediate reductions in South African forces were part of it. In response to the Secretary’s comment that Botha had remarked that the SAG would push for early election to the assembly by the end of the year, Owen said that speed was of the essence since he did not want the Namibian settlement to conflict with the timetable being negotiated with respect to Rhodesia.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia and Namibia.]
Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, June 29, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Supporting a Commonwealth Force for Rhodesia. As you remember, David Owen approached Cy last week in Paris on the possibility of our providing assistance to a Commonwealth force in Rhodesia. He argued that US support would give a vital “psychological boost” to the operation, an assessment we share. Since Owen will soon be discussing the proposal with his Cabinet colleagues, he asked us to convey our informal reaction by the end of this week.

It was understood with Owen that no American forces would be directly involved in peace keeping activities within Rhodesia. Furthermore, the Commonwealth force would be sent only if agreement were reached on the larger constitutional issues, including a peaceful transition to majority rule, and there were sufficient guarantees that guerrilla warfare within Rhodesia would cease. With these conditions in mind, we have looked into the question of possible support for a Commonwealth force and have come up with the following initial findings:

1. Legal Considerations:
Under the above assumptions, the War Powers Act and its Congressional consultation requirements do not apply. However, given the sensitivity of such an initiative, early consultations with Congress would be required to facilitate endorsement (or, at a minimum, diminish opposition) to our backing for the peacekeeping operation.

2. Transportation:
The Department of Defense could use U.S. Air Force aircraft to lift one or two battalions of peacekeeping troops of other nations to Rhodesia and provide logistical transport thereafter. Such support could be approved by you as Commander-in-Chief. The U.S. Air Force would expect to be compensated for operational costs from other budgets.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 6/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “To Cy.”

2 In telegram 7016 from the Secretary’s aircraft, June 24, Vance reported on the meeting with Owen during which he asked “whether the US could give some forms of support for a 2000-man Commonwealth force to be stationed in Zimbabwe for the 3 to 6 month transition period.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2510) See also Document 160.

3 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “agree.”
Funds could come from the Secretary of Defense’s contingency fund and the Presidential contingency fund.  

3. Communications Support:

Since Commonwealth forces would be involved, we assume that the British would be in the best position to provide communications support for the various units. This would make sense in terms of equipment compatibility and standard operating procedure. For us to supply equipment would almost inevitably require American operators, which is ruled out by our understanding with Owen on U.S. involvement.  

4. Financial Support:

While transportation support could be supplied, underwriting the upkeep of the force would be considerably more difficult for us. Any substantial expenditure of funds would probably require supplemental funding. We are precluded by law from paying foreign troops, but the Security Supporting Assistance Program might be able to finance rations and resupply, assuming certain statutory requirements can be met.

If you agree, Cy will relay our preliminary reactions to Owen. He plans to stress that we would like the British military’s evaluation of the mission of such a Commonwealth force before making commitments to support it. In addition, he will repeat to Owen that we would plan to consult extensively with the U.S. Congress and our own Department of Defense before extending a firm commitment of any kind. 

---

4 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “ok.”
5 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph: “ok.”
6 In telegram 153440 to London, July 1, the Department asked the Embassy to deliver a message to Owen from Vance. Vance wrote: “We believe it will be possible for us to assist in transportation and possibly logistical support. We will have to look at the matter more precisely when we know the nature and extent of the requirements.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2524)
7 Carter wrote below this paragraph: “My preference would be to provide transport for the forces, and then not a sustained involvement. Let the Commonwealth countries provide logistical support. I’m not adamant on this. J.C.”
162. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, July 7, 1977

1. Rhodesian Negotiations: The latest developments relating to our Rhodesian settlement efforts are not good.

—The Anglo-American Consultative Group got little satisfaction from its July 7 Lusaka meeting with Nkomo. Nkomo did not, as he had promised, present the Group with the Patriotic Front’s constitutional or transitional proposals. Nkomo appeared to be insisting that negotiations henceforth be conducted among the Patriotic Front, Smith and the British, thus brushing aside a future role for the Consultative Group and excluding Nkomo’s competitors, Sithole and Muzorewa. Nkomo argued for Patriotic Front civil and military control of Rhodesia during the interim period, after Smith’s surrender. He expressed interest in the possibility of a Commonwealth peacekeeping force and did note the desirability of elections during the transitional period.

—Smith set the stage for the Consultative Group’s meetings in Salisbury by vowing never to hand Rhodesia over to the Patriotic Front and by welcoming the proposed return to Rhodesia of Sithole. Smith’s statements raise the possibility again of a move toward an internal settlement, involving Sithole and perhaps Muzorewa.

—Zambian Foreign Minister Mwale returned from the OAU summit flushed with what he regarded as the success of that organization’s endorsement of the Patriotic Front. He told the Consultative Group not to count on Zambian support to push through a settlement based on a negotiated constitution.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 7/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote “Cy” at the top of the first page.

2 In telegram 1917 from Lusaka, July 7, the Embassy reported on the Consultative Group’s meeting with Nkomo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770241–0594) Carter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence and the previous paragraph: “We must publicly espouse early elections. I favor also Commonwealth peacekeeping force—we should not let Patriotic Front veto everything.”

3 Carter wrote in the right-hand margin next to this sentence: “Good. My guess is that Nkomo would lose.”

4 In telegram 3325 from Pretoria, July 7, the Embassy reported on Smith’s July 6 news conference in which he declared that “there could be no hand-over to the Patriotic Front ‘at any cost.’” Smith said his government was “willing to work with Ndabaningi Sithole as it was obvious that Sithole had had a change of heart and wanted a peaceful settlement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770241–0586)

5 In telegram 1918 from Lusaka, July 7, the Embassy reported on the Consultative Group’s meeting with Mwale. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770241–0602)
Mwale may not reflect the exact views of Kaunda, and both Smith and Nkomo may be engaging in public posturing to impress each other and their respective allies. The Consultative Group, which includes our Ambassador to Zambia, has gone to Salisbury and will return to Lusaka. Subject to the results of the rest of the trip, we think our future course should be for the Group to close out this round in London and work out a package which I can discuss when David Owen comes here later in July.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

163. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 23, 1977, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Summary of the President’s Meeting with British Foreign Secretary David Owen

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The President
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Ambassador Kingman Brewster
Ambassador Andrew Young
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Henry Richardson, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary David Owen
Ambassador Peter Jay
Mr. Ewen Fergusson
Sir John Moreton, British Embassy

During the press opportunity, the President expressed his pleasure to Foreign Secretary Owen at seeing him and being able to talk about the difficult situation in Southern Africa, and perhaps a little about the Middle East. Owen, in turn, brought the Prime Minister’s best wishes to the President. He noted that sometimes the Prime Minister thought

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Country Chron File, Box 15, Great Britain, 1–7/77. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting ended at 10:55 a.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
that we might be pressing for too much in Southern Africa, and in any case the House of Commons had to be dealt with on the issue. The President responded that he has been catching flak with regard to Southern Africa by those who say that from our following the British lead we still appear to be a British colony (laughter). Owen said that both leaders in these matters had managed to hoodwink the other’s press. (The press departed and the talks began.)

The President expressed his pleasure with the personal relationship that existed between himself and Owen and between their two governments, and felt that they could talk in a friendly spirit without restraint. He needed to understand the Zimbabwe situation and what next steps should be taken, and was looking to Owen for advice. He believed that majority rule on the basis of one man, one vote should be brought about as quickly as possible, but he doubted the possibility of building a consensus or unanimity in this situation among the Front Line states. If Smith should come forward with a fair (sic) proposition, we might consider agreeing with it. But this has not happened. It is essential to us that our views be compatible with those of the British Government. The results so far of your attempt to construct a Commonwealth peacekeeping force for Rhodesia have been disappointing, but I feel that you have sufficient influence to turn this issue around.

Owen noted the deep-seated resistance on the issue of providing troops for Rhodesia. It has been such in Britain since 1965, and represents a difficult threshold, even under the rubric of a Commonwealth force. For these reasons, constructing a peacekeeping force may be easier under UN auspices. Our efforts to now indicated that Canada was uninterested in a Commonwealth force, and Nigeria showed a lack of enthusiasm compared to what it had previously exhibited at the Commonwealth conference. Nigeria did show somewhat more enthusiasm for the idea of a UN force. The real problem was the Nigerian distrust, and the distrust of Africans generally, of Smith. We must not think that everything (sic) that whites in Rhodesia may do is wrong. We have swept away from the whites certain constitutional safeguards. This raises the question of linkage of such future constitutional safeguards with the Zimbabwe Development Fund. There must be increased linkage between the Fund and concept of one man, one vote, which would be implemented as follows: if Rhodesian blacks get one man, one vote, they would agree to honor all entrenched pension rights and the United Kingdom would then put up 1.2 million pounds to finance this program.

The President asked whether property rights were included as rights to be protected under the Zimbabwe Development Fund.

Owen answered in the affirmative, that some property rights were involved as well as provisions for protection of leasehold rights. The
problem is that Rhodesian whites have always insisted on a blocking vote to protect these privileges. But if the concept of linkage were implemented, the Zimbabwe Development Fund would serve a similar purpose.

The President asked whether Smith could accept the idea of one man, one vote.

Owen answered he thought Smith was close to doing so. If everything else in a Rhodesian proposal fell into place, and if there is a solution on the law and order issue, then with South African pressure on Smith, a one-man, one-vote proposal might be accepted.

The President noted that Owen was speaking in the past tense and asked him whether he had given up finding a solution to this problem.

Owen responded that he had not given up but many ticklish problems remain. Included were the problems of the continuation of the fighting, and the rivalry among nationalist leaders. Nkomo wants power for himself.

The President asked whether Nkomo wanted an election.

Owen responded that he does want an election, but he wants to win it, or, you might say, rig it. We have some sympathy for his position; he has fought hard over a number of years and sacrificed much. Nkomo has never said that he wouldn’t accept an election.

The President asked whether he would do so as a first step toward his seizing power.

Owen responded that this was uncertain. Nkomo has never publicly disowned elections, but he has now upped the ante in the transition phase to attempt to rig the elections. It must be kept in mind that only one year ago it was Nkomo and Smith who were negotiating together. On the political spectrum, Nkomo would fall somewhere between Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Hastings Banda of Malawi. If history had taken its normal course, Nkomo would today be a respected member of the Commonwealth. He was in effect driven by a series of exacerbating circumstances into guerrilla warfare.

The President asked whether Nkomo feels obligated to the Soviet Union.

Owen responded, not really. He is paid and receives support from an amazing variety of sources, including the Governments of Britain and South Africa. Further, this issue is linked with the rivalry between the Shona and Matabele tribes in Rhodesia. We will never be able to devise a solution acceptable to all parties. We must get a solution that attracts the greatest support. The internal solution is dangerous because it would lead to a lack of acceptance by Africans, and internationally, and ultimately we would be backing a loser. But it is equally impossible for us to support the Patriotic Front, in part because of the risks that
it carries to white Rhodesians. If we could only bring Nkomo into
the negotiations, this would go far toward solving the problem. One
possibility here is pressure through Kaunda. We might try to convince
the Front Line Presidents that in fact the armed struggle has now been
won successfully, that Smith is on his way out, and on this basis urge
the Front Line Presidents to use their influence to bring the Patriotic
Front into negotiations.

Brzezinski asked whether the internal solution proposed by Smith
may be seen as a possible transition step, say lasting six months, on
the way to a black-majority-ruled Rhodesian Government.

Owen answered that this could quite possibly be the case.

Young stated that one result of giving support to the internal solu-
tion, for that reason or any other, would be to push the Patriotic Front
into a tighter alliance with the Soviet Union.

Owen agreed. As far as we can tell, Kaunda up to this point has
probably rejected offers of Cuban aid. It would present us a very serious
problem if Rhodesia should launch a raid into Zambia, more serious
than their Mapai raid into Mozambique. We would simply have to
do something. The danger of internationalizing the conflict would be
greater in that situation than was the case with Mapai.

Vance said that as he saw it, we had four basic options:
1. to continue our attempt to get a negotiated settlement;
2. to support some form of an internal solution;
3. to impose some kind of outside solution;
4. to back off or walk away from the whole problem. Number 4
would seem unacceptable. Number 3 would seem to produce the worst
of all possible worlds. We should not rule out number 2, but number
1 is better, and perhaps elements of number 2 could be worked in.

The President said that if the effort to get a constitution can succeed,
then he was for it. But none of the parties involved seem to be in favor
of it. We should find some position which is right, fair, and acceptable
internationally. A solution based on majority rule and one man, one
vote is a defensible position. If this happens, through an internal solu-
tion, then we can put pressure on Nkomo on this particular basis. We
might proceed by announcing that the Patriotic Front indeed has been
successful, and we can give public recognition to their efforts in strug-
gling for their people. We might call for an open election on the basis
of one man, one vote; we might espouse a peacekeeping force, which
would probably be a UN force; we might reconfirm our support for
the Zimbabwe Development Fund. This would put the United States
in a reasonable position to move off dead center on this problem, and
on that basis we would deal with opposition from whatever source it
comes. We cannot agree to install Nkomo by fiat, no matter how much
African support he might have. There is some hesitation about Nkomo in the United States and in Congress; Muzorewa is probably the most popular black Rhodesian leader in the United States.

Owen responded that we already have basic agreement on the idea of a constitution based on one man, one vote and on the Zimbabwe Development Fund. The key is who supervises the election. The United Kingdom is willing to live up to the proposals that it has already put forward. We might consider a solution to this problem similar to that in the Namibian situation. But the question is whether the fighting will stop, especially if the situation was such that the election would be supervised by the Rhodesian defense forces, and Nkomo was invited to return. There is much risk in this situation. The United Kingdom is very exposed here, with only uncertain possibilities as to the result. The war could well go on. Further, any support that we gave such a proposed solution could easily be sold to the world as support for a rigged election.

The President asked what was the legal status of the United Kingdom in this situation, and what was its legal status as recognized by the United Nations.

Owen answered that the Rhodesian Government is an illegal regime. The United Kingdom is the legal authority in the situation, and under existing UN resolutions can appoint a governor general. In any case, the United Kingdom was obligated to live up to its legal responsibility.

The President added that the question was what would UN response be to a resolution introduced by you which calls for elections on the basis of one man, one vote, and included provisions for a Zimbabwe Development Fund with fair provisions to protect white security. We must move off dead center on this issue.

Owen agreed that if we do not soon state our views publicly we will be trounced. The transition period is the problem; there would seem to be no way presently to remove Smith. If he went, the situation would change. If he is weakened by the forthcoming election, there would also be a change.

The President asked what was the status and the relationship of the present Rhodesian armed forces to the future of Zimbabwe.

Owen answered that under some conditions, the structure of the present Rhodesian forces might be useful to an independent Zimbabwe. This leads to the point that we must convince the Front Line states of the dangers of continuing armed struggle. We must also convince Smith on this point.

The President asked if the Nationalists unite, how would this help solve the problem.
Owen answered that South Africa would probably respond to the promise of stable (sic) black leadership in Rhodesia. South Africa has already responded to the initiative by the United States at Vienna in several ways.

The President said that there was a good chance of South Africa’s giving quiet support here.

Owen said that we basically already have this, except that the law and order issue remains a problem.

The President asked whether Owen was fearful of UN involvement.

Owen responded that it was a slow process.

The President doubted whether it was any slower than the current pace of present events (laughter).

Owen expressed the opinion that the construction of a Commonwealth force under present circumstances was almost impossible.

The President said that there was some indication that the Canadians would cooperate on a UN peacekeeping force in Rhodesia, and also from his contacts with Prime Minister Fraser that Australia would do so. The UN could serve as an incentive toward a settlement, a way of communicating our position to the world, and a forum in which to resolve the problem. We should aim to get an agreement acceptable to as many of the parties as possible, and then deal with the rest of them.

Owen stated that we must be more explicit in this situation about the linkage between provisions of a negotiated Zimbabwe constitution and the Zimbabwe Development Fund.

The President stated that Congressional support would be much easier to mobilize if he could take a clear position on Rhodesia to Congress, even though there was some fear of the outcome under a Nkomo-dominated solution. We could take a legal proposition to the UN. The United Kingdom could make a proposal on elections, on a UN force, all with US endorsement. We need eight or ten principles clearly stated as a basis of mobilizing support. In any case, I need something to take to Congress by way of a clear position.

Owen said that there were useful parallels to be drawn between the Rhodesian and the Namibian situations, but the law and order problem still remained. He is not convinced that all ought to rest on the United Nations. The UN peacekeeping force will probably have to do actual fighting in Rhodesia, and there is little past UN experience to meet such a situation. Also, a Rhodesian settlement should come out of Rhodesians themselves fighting. There are many good men there who, by circumstances, have been driven to violence.

---

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Fraser on June 22. (Ibid.)
The President agreed.

Owen continued that what was needed was a path for those good men to be led back to peace. The UN was useful here as a focus and a credible cloak. Moreover, a United Kingdom High Commissioner in Rhodesia could be appointed under a UN arrangement.

Vance said that if the Commonwealth force is impossible, then there would seem to be no choice but a UN peacekeeping force. It may be easier to get African support in the UN.

Owen agreed. We must develop principles and hold to them, even should an internal solution otherwise occur. The danger is our being maneuvered into supporting a white-supported internal solution. This would put the entire US initiative in Southern Africa into question.

The President said that the problem was not with our attitudes in the situation, but with our resolve to take action. More people trust our inclinations and our sentiments than they do our willingness to act. We cannot allow the situation to drift, because that would produce a vacuum into which undesirable consequences would flow. We can put a proposition to the United Nations which is fair to both black and white Rhodesians, including the proposal of a peacekeeping force. We can leave enough flexibility in such a proposal for the Front Line leaders to disagree with in the United Nations. This would form the basis for proceeding toward a multinational solution. The legal role of the United Kingdom would lend authenticity here, and it must play that role. What we need is a proposal that is fair as far as possible to all parties concerned.

Vance said that some of the pieces for such a proposal are already in place, for example, the constitution, the proposal for a British High Commissioner. A solution to the issue of law and order is the primary ingredient lacking.

The President stated that he saw no alternative to carrying a proposal to the United Nations.

Young saw the appointed British High Commissioner as the key to some of these issues. Arnaud de Borchgrave of Newsweek had suggested to him previously that we ought to install Chidzero, who is the number two man at the UN and a Rhodesian, as Rhodesian High Commissioner. He seems to have kept in touch with all Rhodesian parties and is well respected as an international civil servant. But the Front Line Presidents may not be ready to approve a High Commissioner at this time. I have explored possibilities of expatriate Rhodesian administrators being brought into the situation. One question is whether a 50 percent black Rhodesian army would be acceptable to Nkomo. Any such proposals must be sufficiently detailed to attract support from Nyerere as a major Front Line leader, and also from
South Africa so they can pressure Smith to accept it. What we may need to look for is a possible administrative solution to the Rhodesian problem, as opposed to a military solution, because there are already enough troops in Rhodesia.

Owen stated that he saw a UN proposal as of equal difficulty to a Commonwealth forces proposal, though this was perhaps because he had just gotten bruised in the British Cabinet on this issue; a formal decision had not been put to the Cabinet on this question. Should a resident commissioner be appointed for Rhodesia, he would be effectively under me. On the Namibian model, a parallel UN person could possibly act in conjunction with such a commissioner. I am openminded on this.

Young said that there were probably several potential Rhodesians in the United Kingdom who had the experience to run fair elections during the transition period.

Vance wished to express a partial difference of view. The Finnish Government is willing to commit troops. The Nigerians are possibly willing. A UN peacekeeping force is possible. In this context, some of the present Rhodesian forces might be retained for the future.

Owen stated that he would be very pleased to show in this situation that the United Nations actually worked. In order for a viable UN proposal to be implemented, strong logistical and other support was needed. Above all, the momentum in the situation toward a settlement must be maintained.

The President said that he did not understand Owen’s feeling about the negative consequences of a UN force. Even if it does fail, there are still advantages in going to the UN. We must get off dead center.

Owen agreed. If in the middle of all of this an internal solution is implemented, so be it.

The President agreed.

Owen asked whether if everyone accepts the UN proposal except the Patriotic Front, we would still go ahead with it. We risk a situation where the Patriotic Front has an effective veto in the UN, and this will lead to criticism by Rhodesian whites and South Africa. This in turn would produce a difficult situation, which is why we must at least examine the possibility that a modified internal solution will emerge.

The President said that if free and fair elections could be devised for Namibia to get a settlement there, we would not need to search the African bush for SWAPO in order to conclude an agreement.

Young responded that the difference was that SWAPO did not have much of a military force in Namibia, but the Patriotic Front did have a military force in Rhodesia.

The President asked whether the Patriotic Front’s military force would in five years’ time be equal to that of white Rhodesia.
Young said he foresaw a long drawn out conflict with the Soviet Union providing weapons to the Patriotic Front.

The President answered that this seems to be close to the present situation. We have no expectations of dramatic action emerging from the UN. Our proposal there must be fair to white settlers so as to gain South African support.

Brzezinski stated that the problem would not seem to be whether the proposal is fair to Rhodesian whites, but whether they believe that such arrangements would endure. We must create enduring arrangements. In this connection, we must support the Patriotic Front in order to get an agreement, but the agreement should produce enduring arrangements that promise continuing protection for Rhodesian whites. Accepting an internal solution would seem to lead to getting short-term arrangements which would then collapse.

The President stated his belief that whites in Rhodesia would yield to strong South African pressure. We will never be able to devise a solution that would please Rhodesian whites. An ultimatum from Vorster is the key to Smith’s accepting a settlement proposal. We could never devise a transition arrangement that Rhodesian whites think will endure that we in turn know will collapse.

Young said that in the past the Front Line states have been romanticizing violence and armed struggle, but there has recently been some softening of their attitude in this regard. The Angolan example has been instructive, as has been the costs of warfare to Mozambique. We must convince the Front Line states of the dangers of war to their own countries.

The President asked whether any of the Front Line states were actually in favor of continuing warfare.

Young answered that all of the Front Line states want a Rhodesian settlement, but their positions are frequently inconsistent from day to day.

The President stated that we need to have a proposal formulated by the time Nyerere arrives, before it is made public. Such a proposal must be fair as much as possible to both whites and blacks.

Owen said that when he was in Africa he stated that there could be no solution if one side had a veto in the situation, and was criticized for saying it, but still believes it. If South Africa agrees to a proposal incorporating one man, one vote, and if Smith goes, and if fair elections are promised, and such a proposal goes to the UN, then South Africa may ask whether Rhodesian forces can remain to safeguard whites.

The President said he thought they could.

Owen agreed. The problem is that in the past we have allowed one party to have a veto in the situation. We must get away from this. If
one party proposes to go off on its own toward a separate solution, that should not stop other parties from proceeding as they have planned.

The President said that if we cannot supply a solution agreed to by everybody, we should go ahead with what we have and negotiate with the others on that basis.

Aaron said that up to this time we have been assuming that the Patriotic Front was the barrier to getting an agreement. In reality, it would seem that the Patriotic Front was closer to agreeing with us than was Smith. The problem in the situation may well be Smith.

Owen said that the Patriotic Front has moved toward us to some extent, but that South Africa may even be closer to agreeing with our proposal. Smith responds best to pressure. He is taking the white man’s position as a reflex political option, though he is probably personally not racially prejudiced. We need a credible position to get his agreement. Up to now we have thought that we needed to deliver the Patriotic Front for a settlement. This might be possible. Mugabe, for all of his reputation, does not really seem to be a thorough-going Marxist. If the Front Line states give us strong support, we might scare Nkomo into agreeing with some variety of an internal solution. But this would depend on Front Line support.

Young stated that the President must be able to say that our position cannot be vetoed by the Patriotic Front.

The President said that on his upcoming visit, we can stroke Nyerere and give him the first right of comment on the proposal we will have developed before it goes public.

Owen agreed. Nyerere has legitimate claims to being an African statesman and he could be very helpful. Also, he is very influential with Kaunda, who in turn is close to Nkomo.

The President noted that Owen thought more of Nkomo than Vance did.

Owen said that Nkomo has survived through difficult circumstances; he is a politician. I have the same feeling about Sithole, but not about Muzorewa. You feel you can do a deal with Nkomo.

Vance said that Nkomo may well be the one who must play a key role here.

The President expressed his gratitude for the long and courageous efforts of both the British Government and Owen personally in properly taking the lead in the difficult Rhodesian situation. You have more than gone the second mile on a series of complex questions. The United States will continue to give its strong support. There is no possibility of an open split between our two governments. If we have differences, we will keep it quiet. If we go to Vorster with our proposal which will be fair to both whites and blacks in Rhodesia, then I believe we can
get Vorster to put extreme pressure on Smith. Vorster might well want to use such an action to in part redeem his international reputation.

Owen said that South Africa presented very difficult problems, but he believed that Vorster did not want conflict with the British and the United States on Rhodesia and Namibia.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

164. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 4, 1977, 11 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of the President’s Meeting I with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania

PARTICIPANTS

**United States**
- The President
- The Vice President
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher
- Ambassador Andrew Young
- Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose
- Ambassador James Spain
- Mr. Henry Richardson, NSC Staff

**Tanzania**
- President Julius Nyerere
- Benjamin Mkapa, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- John Malecela, Minister for Agriculture
- Anthony Nyakyi, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ambassador Paul Bomani, Tanzanian Ambassador to the U.S.
- Captain Joseph Butiku, Private Secretary to President Nyerere
- Samy Mdee, Press Secretary to President Nyerere
- Professor Justinian Rweyemamu

During the press opportunity in the Cabinet Room, the President remarked that the Cabinet, with the addition of Secretary Schlesinger, had just been enlarged from 11 to 12, and that other officials such as Ambassador Young held cabinet-level rank and participated in Cabinet meetings. President Nyerere answered that from his experience the

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 116, Tanzania: 5/77–11/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House.
smaller the country is, the larger the number of people in the Cabinet. (Laughter) (The press opportunity ended and the talks began.)

_The President_ said that in the brief time he and President Nyerere had spent together he found that he liked Nyerere. He hoped the same was true for Nyerere. I am looking forward to an unstructured discussion of our mutual concerns, especially in southern Africa. I have much to learn from Nyerere, and hope that throughout the course of the day we can discuss southern African problems as well as relations between the United States and Tanzania. I think for Zimbabwe we have the same ultimate hopes: majority rule on the basis of one person, one vote. We would like to see this come about with a minimum of violence and, I will be frank on this point, fair treatment of Rhodesian whites, with those wanting to stay being encouraged to do so. But the hope for peace at the moment is not now great. I look forward to getting your thoughts on the substance of these problems and your impressions of the personalities involved.

_Nyerere_ said that he hopes that the President, relative to Zimbabwe, would give him more information on British/US plans for resolving this situation. But we can say we are agreed on the general objective of minimizing violence, and independence on the basis of majority rule, one man, one vote. You note that I still say one “man”, one vote and not one “person”, one vote.

_The President_ said that we have a women’s liberation movement in this country that has forced those changes. (Laughter)

_Nyerere_ continued that at one time we quarreled with the British over the concept of majority rule, which they could not accept, for Rhodesia. Independence on the basis of majority rule has now been accepted. But the question is what do we actually do? What are the British-US ideas? If you give me your ideas, I can then act like a British monarch and both warn and encourage. (Laughter) What is needed is additional pressure. We have been forced to apply the pressure of guerrilla warfare in Zimbabwe, even though in our own history Tanzania came to independence by conferences and agitation without firing a shot.

As of 1974 or 1975 we were still encouraging talks with Smith. Kaunda even talked with Vorster to persuade him to put pressure on Smith to resolve this problem. Had Smith agreed, things would probably now be resolved, and Zimbabwe would today be a member of the Organization of African Unity. But now we have fighting, which is going on right this minute. The question is whether the fighting will be long and bitter, or whether, with the application of Western pressure, it will be of shorter duration. Let me state the problem.

We have, and we have had, problems of unity among the Nationalist leaders since 1974. Both your country and mine have been under
the British empire. I only believe half heartedly in the multi-party system; there are many parties in Rhodesia. But I do not (sic) believe in a multi-army (sic) system. We are just beginning to get the Nationalists to accept this. I hear that Joshua Nkomo is going to Havana to talk to the Cubans. I am also meeting the Cubans later, and I may have to warn them on giving arms to Nkomo. In any case, I want to find out what they are going to do.

If Smith had accepted proposals made in 1974 to agree with the Nationalists, then a constitutional change would have been possible with a new government inheriting the present army and police. The situation would have been one of subsequent gradual changes under a constitutional framework. In 1975, after we had given up talking, Nkomo, nevertheless, kept trying until it was clearly impossible; only then did he begin guerrilla warfare.

Now, the problem is that we have two armies. One will have to go, and that is Smith’s army. It cannot become the independence army, just as the French army could not become the independence army of Algeria. In 1974, Rhodesia was a political (sic) problem, and it could be said that a solution is possible if Smith politically could be removed. Now, Smith and his army (sic) must go. Therefore, I am interested in your suggestions on what we can do to apply joint pressures to solve this problem. Secondly, I am interested to know what happens during an interim period. Let us assume that under pressure from the both of us the fighting stops, elections are organized and contested, and the winning party emerges. Who is the power (sic) during this interim period? I would not wish the boys with the guns to fight their way into Salisbury. Who will be the power in lieu of this possibility? Does this make sense to you? We hope that with your help the situation will not deteriorate into a fight to the finish.

The President replied that it would be contrary to our policy to support the anointment of a particular leader for Zimbabwe without the participation of the people of Zimbabwe. I could not go to the American people and ask them to support such a situation. You have therefore answered one of my questions with respect to holding elections to choose the government of an independent Zimbabwe.

I do not know all of the answers to your questions. The British cabinet met yesterday to consider alternative proposals towards a solution. I understand that on August 12th Vance will meet with Botha in London. If possible, I would like for you and Vance to meet, perhaps in London, so that he can report to you what happened in his meeting with Botha. I received a dispatch this morning from Prime Minister
Callaghan of Britain which was encouraging.\(^2\) The United Kingdom has a unique role in this situation, and they have not relinquished their responsibility.

We believe it is desirable to draft a constitution that would meet your approval and that of the Front Line States and the Nationalists and other parties, if possible, such as Smith and Vorster. The British, perhaps, understand better and are further along on the constitutional questions than we are, and the British Parliament has a special role in this situation. But we are clear that such a constitution must be based on the principle of one man, one vote majority rule. However, we ourselves do not wish to write a constitution for Zimbabwe.

I hope that you do not foreclose the possibility that some of the present members of the Rhodesian armed forces might be able to serve under other leadership in Zimbabwe. I agree that there should be one army with its people acceptable to Zimbabwe’s new leadership. We are envisaging an interim arrangement that will (1) earn the trust of the people of Zimbabwe, and (2) be strong enough to maintain law and order. We have not yet fully resolved the details of this arrangement with the British. Two options have been discussed: a UN peacekeeping force or a Commonwealth force. I believe that the United Kingdom is willing to choose a person who meets with your approval and that of other parties, as an interim leader in Zimbabwe. This will create a possibility for peace.

If the Front Line Presidents and the United Nations agree that this is a fair proposal, I am willing to put greater pressure on Smith and Vorster then we have done before. However, my own attitude on these steps is not dependent on theirs. I hope that Smith and Vorster see cooperation on these matters as in their own interests. If a settlement is not obtained, then the fighting will be long and bloody with an uncertain outcome.

But we are concerned with the lack of coordinated opinion among the Front Line States. For example, we are uncertain whether you will accept free elections in Zimbabwe, or wish to install some one person as leader. We cannot accept the imposition of some leader without elections, and the American people could not accept this. Also, there is a problem of how to set up procedures that respect the pension and property rights of white Rhodesians. I wish to be frank on this matter. The United States, perhaps, can help to some extent financially here. I feel that the time has now come that we and the United Kingdom,\(^3\)

\(^2\) In telegram Tosec 80118/183318, August 5, the Department transmitted the text of Callaghan’s letter to Carter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–1259) Vance was en route from Damascus to Amman to review the Middle East peace process.
combined with your good offices, can move towards a settlement. South Africa can cut Smith off if it wants to. Canada, West Germany, France, and the United States have influence useful in ending the war. If the latter know that our proposition is fair and that it has your support, we can line up their concurrence and support to go forward. However, we are still in the formative stage on these issues.

Nyerere stated that there are no differences between us on the question of a constitution. Smith is the problem.

The President said we are committed to the principle of majority rule, one man, one vote, and Smith’s opposition does not change that.

Nyerere said that he understood that. In 1974, I was willing to accept, and encouraged the Nationalists to accept, a limited franchise majority rule in Rhodesia, and not one man, one vote. Tanzania came to independence with a reserved minority franchise, but after independence this was abolished. But Smith would not accept such a proposal in 1974. The government of Zimbabwe should be an elected government. But the chances of elections are limited if the war continues. We want elections to be under the principle of one man, one vote by the people of Zimbabwe.

We have supported the Patriotic Front as the ones with the army; since they have the army, we must talk with them. The OAU recognized this, up to the point of elections (sic). After that, the people of Rhodesia will determine the leaders. This leads to the question of whether we will be able to end the war and enable elections to take place. All of the British colonies in southern Africa have had elections, although eventually the army takes over. (Laughter) I am not choosing Nkomo or anyone else, but I am supporting their fighting forces.

At one time I told Nkomo, along with Sithole, who was with him then, that, if they wished, a constitution could incorporate special provisions to protect minorities, and I recommended that they be firmly committed to the principle of protection of minority rights. Nkomo had no problem with this. The army is the problem. Last year the British sent out Ivor Richards, and we had discussions. I was surprised to learn that the United Kingdom was planning on re-entering Rhodesia without an army. I asked them, where is your power? The British were being naive; the Rhodesians represent a rebel (sic) army; taking an oath to the Queen is insufficient to resolve the situation. Nor will a transfer of command to British commanders alone solve the problem. If they managed to do that, I have told the British that they will have appeared to have replaced Smith, without changing anything of importance.

Now, the army is key! (sic) We cannot use the Rhodesian army. Relative to the question of using some members of the Rhodesian army, the issue is how. Which of the two armies is to be the base (sic) army? This is a serious question. At that time, the British saw the Smith
army as the base (sic) army. But now the Zimbabwe army must be the base army.

After independence, I believe that the power structure, the economic system, and the civil service will remain, with few changes, in Zimbabwe for a number of years. The army will be the key new element contributed by the new independent Zimbabwe government. But this does not mean that some of the people in Smith’s army cannot be picked up for the new army.

Ambassador Young stated, I agree with your analysis. If we had one new army we could muster power and create a situation for elections. Our problem in the United States is to prevent civil war from breaking out in Rhodesia. We can muster support for an orderly (sic) transfer of power. I would suspect that if a transfer of power took place and civil war followed, that would bring down the government of Britain. It perhaps would not bring down this government (laughter), but we must deal with that issue around this table. We do have the moral authority to tell Smith what to do. Yesterday the largest bank in the world told me that they would provide no more money to South Africa (Interjection by Nyerere: Good.) There is a sentiment growing in this country that will support our exercising leverage on Vorster toward bringing about majority rule in Zimbabwe. But we have no leverage on the Nationalists.

Nyerere said that he would relate a little history. ZAPU was originally the popular party. ZANU broke away in 1963. I perhaps made a mistake when I urged Nkomo to return to Rhodesia; he could not fight his struggle from Dar es Salaam. I urged him to return and even threatened to deport him if he wouldn’t, and he eventually did. At that time Sithole was organizing to break away, but I did not know that. Both Nkomo and Sithole were detained in Rhodesia. This had the effect of freezing Nkomo’s popularity where it was; Sithole had virtually no popular base. Meanwhile, the Mozambique and the Angolan revolutions began, and then the Zimbabweans wanted to fight, but how were they to do so with two parties? I suggested that ZANU join FRELIMO if they wanted to fight, and this is what they did. When Nkomo was released from detention, ZANU by that time had a fighting group with some experience with FRELIMO. Nkomo’s people had organized a smaller force, and suspected me of being pro-ZANU, which was not the case. I advised them to form a single army and tried very hard to get them to do this, but at that time I was unsuccessful. Eventually, I got the fighting forces to come together. I will tell you that we have a camp in Tanzania with 5,000 members of this army. We are accepting recruits for only one army, and we make fighting for one army a condition for recruitment for each of these people. We discovered that ZANU had infiltrated these recruits; we have now
removed some 350 of them and will keep them in Tanzania until Zimbabwe becomes independent. We are determined (sic) to train a single army. We have that ability because we are doing the training in camps in Tanzania. I cannot promise that this army will be 100% unified, but we will do the best we can because we do not want a civil war.

Moreover, we are keen to end this war because Zambia and Mozambique have had no chance to develop. They finished one war and immediately started another. There are more people being killed in this war in Mozambique than there were in its war of independence. When Podgorny came, and began handing out arms, I asked him whether he wanted a civil war. Eventually, he agreed that this was undesirable. I am not certain whether this attitude led to his recent demise or not. (Laughter) I have also told the Chinese, who are assisting us in training and supplying arms, that we will only have one army.

The President asked how many troops there were in the Rhodesian army.

Young answered, about 12,000. There may be some potential for forming a black army for the interim period out of this force.

The President asked what did Nyerere think of a UN peackeeping force for the interim period?

Nyerere said, I would accept it if the United Kingdom accepted it. I told the British that they needed some muscle. From their point of view in the Rhodesian situation, a Commonwealth force might be easier. But I don’t mind which one it is, if it gets the situation through the interim period.

The President said that he could accept either force. If we issue a public call for a Commonwealth force, this may put pressure on the British cabinet to agree to it. I don’t know about the other parties in the situation. Perhaps we could persuade Uganda to participate. (Laughter)

Nyerere replied, not only Uganda but also South Africa. (Laughter) Nkomo has said that he wanted power transferred “to us”. He is just throwing his weight around. (Interjection by Young: And he has a lot of weight to throw around. (Laughter)) We need to establish conditions to enable elections to take place. I have no problem urging my Front Line Nationalist colleagues to accept this in order for the UN to come in and play their proper role.

The President said, I am very encouraged by what you say. If we can set this proposal down cohesively, and get Botha to understand the situation, can Andy and David Owen meet with the Front Line States to demonstrate that we mean business?

Nyerere said, yes.

The President said, I want Vance to meet with Nyerere.
Christopher said that this might be arranged from the present schedule Vance was now on.

The President asked whether the Vice President had any comments; the Vice President said that he agreed with all that had taken place.

Christopher asked what, in more detail, would be the reactions of the Nationalists to the proposal that there should be elections for an independent government?

Nyerere said that all will accept elections. I will tell them to prove your popularity by helping us to shorten the war, if indeed you are so popular. Formerly, Nkomo’s group was the most popular. And now the roles of fighting and negotiations relative to Nkomo, Sithole, and the Bishop have changed. Now, Nkomo and Mugabe are identified with the fighting. When the Bishop first returned to Rhodesia he was very popular, perhaps because he had previously been identified with a willingness to fight. In this respect, Nkomo’s popularity might now be going up and the Bishop’s might be falling somewhat.

The President said, the one thing we can do is decide whom to ask Smith to endorse. (Laughter)

Nyerere said that Sithole is now Smith’s boy and, while this may not be the kiss of death, it is certainly the kiss of sickness.

Brzezinski asked, what would be the role of this proposed UN force? Would it supervise and organize the elections?

Nyerere said, I don’t know. I hope that the Smith army will be gone. If so, it will hand over to a British or a UN force. Let us assume that legal authority will rest with the British. The UN force, in conjunction with our efforts, will serve to give muscle to the British. The British will organize the elections on that basis.

Young asked whether Nyerere agreed that this meant that a cease fire could be arranged before the elections took place.

Nyerere said that he agreed, by all means.

The President suggested that the talks adjourn for the Vice President’s luncheon. He looked forward to seeing President Nyerere tonight at dinner and then at tomorrow’s talks where they could cover the subjects of Namibia and Angola and bilateral relations with Tanzania. Meanwhile, Nyerere had access to all of his Cabinet members, should he have problems or matters to bring up with them.

The President rose to end the meeting at 1215.
165. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the White House and the Department of State

London, August 13, 1977, 0019Z

Secto 8159. White House for the President and Dr. Brezezinski only from the Secretary. Department for Acting Secretary and Peter Tarnoff only from the Secretary. Subj: Owen-Vance Talks With Botha.

1. After Owen and I conferred for two hours this morning to review key substantive points and tactics, we met with Pik Botha for five and one-half hours.

2. Botha came not as a strong advocate for a particular line on the Rhodesian issue, but more to listen and probe regarding the scope of the U.K.–U.S. proposals and what we expect of South Africa. He was uncharacteristically restrained and, at times, almost resigned in his attitude. The atmosphere was good and the discussion was straightforward and open throughout the session.

3. Botha did, however, express his government’s apprehension about what they believe to be the U.S. and U.K. intention to apply increasing pressures on South Africa regardless of progressive moves it may take in its domestic situation. In this he followed closely the line PM Vorster had taken in a speech last Friday when Vorster accused the U.S. of following a strategy of “strangulation with finesse.”

4. Owen carefully described the constitutional framework, the Zimbabwe Development Fund (ZDF), and transition arrangements. He took pains to explain how the Fund would operate to reinforce the confidence of whites and maintain economic activity.

5. During the ensuing discussion, Botha sought clarification of a number of key issues including:

— Constitutional safeguards for whites;
— Timing of the public release of the proposals;
— Our plans for consultations with Smith;
— A scenario for implementation;
— Consequences, if any, of the parties rejecting the proposals; and
— Whether the U.K. and the U.S. are determined to stand by the results of the process.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 8–10/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Vance was in London for meetings with Owen to discuss Rhodesia.
6. Following is the essence of the discussion of each of those five points:

A) Botha wanted to know about blocking mechanisms which might be built into the constitution to protect white interests. We explained these would be incompatible with the concept of one person, one vote and would be rejected by the Africans. We went on to explain that certain features are designed to build a climate of confidence, e.g., restraints on the amendment of certain provisions of the constitution, the linkage between the new government’s performance on its obligations and the continued availability of funds from the ZDF, and the lifting of sanctions. Botha noted that it would be helpful to make the bill of rights non-amendable for an initial period of years. We agreed to consider this.

B) Botha repeatedly urged that we not make our proposals public until after the Rhodesian elections. He argued that their publication could undermine Smith’s efforts to achieve the electoral mandate he is seeking, or force him into a premature public rejection of the proposals. Responding, we emphasized the importance of maintaining the present momentum given the distinct possibility that fighting could accelerate sharply in coming weeks, thus posing even more serious problems. We also pointed out that the Front Line Presidents would be suspicious of a delay and, besides, there is no guarantee that Smith would be more amenable after the election.

C) Botha asked if we expected South Africa to sell our proposals to Smith. We replied that to do so would serve South Africa’s interests as well as ours. Without committing himself in any way on the substance of our proposals, Botha undertook to take soundings in Pretoria and Salisbury early next week. We noted that Owen and Andy Young would then be travelling to Africa to consult with the Front Line Presidents and Rhodesian Nationalists. In this connection, David Owen and I now agree that he and Andy should try to see the Front Line before talking again with the South Africans.

D) At Botha’s request, Owen described in considerable detail the process of implementation which we envisage beginning with next week’s consultations in Southern Africa extending through our presentation to the UN Security Council, and culminating in action by the British Parliament to enact a new constitution. We stressed our determination to go forward with this process without allowing any of the parties to exercise a veto.

E) Botha asked what the consequences would be should Smith reject the proposals. This gave us an opportunity to make the point that South Africa’s support of Rhodesia would lead to a strong reaction in the UN, including sanctions against South Africa. Botha reacted strongly and hinted that action against South Africa would force them
to close their borders with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, thus imposing severe hardships. We told Botha we hoped that the sanctions threshold would not have to be crossed and emphasized we were not looking for a fight.

F) Near the end of the discussion, Botha asked (1) whether we would stand by whatever government that emerged from the process; (2) whether we accepted the fact that fighting might continue after elections, and (3) whether we would go ahead even if Mugabe would not accept our plan. We emphatically assured him we would accept the results of fair elections regardless of the outcome; that we recognized that there could be fighting not only after the elections but also at any time during the transition period; and that Mugabe’s refusal to play ball would not deter us.

G) Botha made clear that he was not authorized to express any definite views on what we had told him, but would have to consult with Vorster. He seemed impressed by our resolve to move ahead (including UN action, by the detailed nature of our planning and by the fact that we were putting the proposal to them without first clearing it with the Front Line and the Nationalists. I also think that, expecting the worst from us, Botha was favorably impressed by the non-confrontational presentation of the package. I believe, moreover, that the Shah’s recent warning to South Africa regarding oil shipments to Rhodesia and South Africa’s worsening financial situation have had a sobering effect on South Africans.

7. Botha told us that their Cabinet meets next Tuesday and that we would be informed of their reaction shortly thereafter.

Vance
Secretary’s Aircraft, August 13, 1977, 2020Z

Secto 8169. Subject: Discussions With Muzorewa and Nyerere.

White House for the President and Dr. Brzezinski only from the Secretary. Department for Acting Secretary and Peter Tarnoff only from the Secretary.

1. At 8:00 this morning I met for 45 minutes with Bishop Muzorewa and six of his lieutenants. He led off by reading from a letter he had sent to David Owen protesting that the UK and the US are dealing only with the Patriotic Front, which he said has no real following in Zimbabwe, and the Front Line Presidents, who he charged have no right to make decisions for the Zimbabwe people.

2. During the conversation, I stressed that we are not dealing with any group or groups at the exclusion of any others. I pointed out that we had been consulting with all of the parties including him. I went on to say that leadership of an independent Zimbabwe should be determined by free elections. I also stated that an internal settlement could not succeed because it would lack international support, that the UK and US will proceed apace to lay our proposals before all the parties involved, and that we expect him not to undercut our effort.

3. Muzorewa’s complaint that we fail to appreciate he is the real leader of Rhodesian blacks, and that the Front has no following, is a theme he has played many times. He had little else of substance to say, but I do believe he understands that we fully intend to carry out our plan.

4. From this meeting at the Embassy, I went to meet Nyerere. I gave him a general account of yesterday’s meeting with Foreign Minister Botha. He reiterated the concern which he attached to the composition of the future Zimbabwe Army. Specifically, we asked whether Botha understood that when we say Smith must go, we mean “Smith and his army.” My response was aimed at making it clear to Nyerere where we stood on the question of the future disposition of the fighting forces, and to ascertain his position on this matter.

5. I said that clearly the Selous Scouts, some other specific units, and certain individuals in the Rhodesian Army would have to go.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 8-10/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 165.
Under our plan, during the transition period the UN would help train an army for Zimbabwe, drawing from the present Rhodesian Army and the Patriotic Front forces.

6. Nyerere took no exception to this, but he did emphasize that the post-independence force should [garble—"be based"] on the present guerrilla forces. In response to our suggestion, he agreed that the independence government might well "accept some people and elements from the Smith army.” Importantly, he agreed that the Resident Commissioner could call on both the Rhodesian Army and the liberation forces during the transition period if needed to augment the police and UN forces.

7. When I said that when Smith steps down there must be a ceasefire, and that we hoped he would use his influence to bring this about, he replied he "took it for granted” that when Smith goes there will be a ceasefire.

8. I told Nyerere that I hoped that he could convene the Front Line Presidents early next week to meet with Owen and Andy. He said he could not promise a date but would put the suggestion to his colleagues.

9. Don McHenry then gave Nyerere a rundown on the Five-Power talks with SWAPO in New York. Don said we had made some progress, but cited certain important points on which SWAPO was not sufficiently flexible to permit us to return to the South Africans for further negotiations. Nyerere reserved [garble—comment] but after the meeting told Don that he would try to be of help to us getting SWAPO to take a less rigid line.

10. He told me he appreciated his very good meeting with you. He said he was sticking his neck out and that he would support us in our effort. Although we discussed only a few points, the clarification of the future role and status of various armed forces during the transition period was important.

Vance

---

3 See Documents 69–71.
4 See Document 164.
167. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, September 12, 1977

SUBJECT
Rhodesia: A Status Report and Recommendations for Action

The State of Play

No one expected the Owen-Young talks with the Front Line,2 Patriotic Front,3 other Nationalists,4 South Africans5 and Rhodesians6 to result in unqualified support for our settlement proposal. Our success to date lies not so much in acceptance of the proposal as it does in the fact that none of the parties has rejected it, and also in the degree to which it, rather than the armed struggle, is the present focus of attention. Our task now is to sustain this focus and gain momentum by getting talks started between the British Resident Commissioner, a UN Special Representative, and leaders of the nationalist and Rhodesian military forces.

It was clear in the talks in Lusaka that the Front Line states view a negotiated settlement as decidedly in their interests. No one is more realistic about this than Machel, but he and his colleagues will have to be convinced at each step of the way that Smith is definitely on his way out and that the path to majority rule will be irreversible. The Patriotic Front is unenthusiastic about the proposal. Nevertheless, there are features of it which they like and they have not gone so far as to reject our initiative. Ian Smith’s obvious preference is for an internal solution. However, there is little he can do in this regard without the

---

2 In telegram 2583 from Lusaka, August 28, the Embassy reported on the August 27 meeting with Nyerere, Kaunda, Machel, Dos Santos, and Masire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770311–0138)
3 In telegram 2578 from Lusaka, August 28, the Embassy reported on the morning meeting with Nkomo and Mugabe. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770311–0058) In telegram 4405 from Pretoria, August 28, the Embassy reported on the second round of talks with Nkomo and Mugabe. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770311–0189)
4 Not further identified.
5 In telegram 4458 from Pretoria, August 29, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Vorster, Botha, Brand Fourie, and South African Ambassador to Rhodesia Olivier. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770312–0481)
6 In telegram 11372 from Nairobi, September 2, the Embassy reported on the September 1 meeting in Salisbury with Smith and his Cabinet. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770382–0818)
acquiescence of Bishop Muzorewa and/or Reverend Sithole, and for
the moment they favor the UK-US proposal. Smith can be expected
to try to convince them that our plan is a non-starter insofar as their
interests are concerned. Clearly, Vorster is not inclined to put any
pressure on Smith.

Plan For Security Council Action

Our immediate goal at this time is a limited one. Together with
the British we will seek Security Council approval for the Secretary
General to designate a special representative to join with the UK Resi-
dent Commissioner-designate and enter into negotiations with the com-
manders of the Rhodesian and nationalist forces. The purpose of these
talks will be to establish terms for a ceasefire and to discuss a wide
range of military matters relating to the internal security arrangements
during the transitional period and beyond. Andy Young and his UK
counterpart have suggested that we go to the Security Council with
the proposal for the UN representative around September 20. We agree
with this timing.

In order to obtain Security Council approval we have to work to
achieve the strongest possible African backing in the United Nations.
We will have to rely primarily on the Front Line states and Nigeria to
to ensure that the three Africans on the Security Council (Benin, Libya,
and Mauritius) support the resolution we are proposing. Ambassador
Young is now sounding out the Africans at the UN and is relatively
confident that their support will be forthcoming.

Planning The Next Steps

At this point it appears likely that U.S. pressure on South Africa
will not be necessary to gain agreement from Smith to participate in
the internal security negotiations. This, however, is not certain. Further,
over the longer term it is likely that it will be necessary to apply
considerable pressure on South Africa to gain Smith’s acquiescence in
the entire settlement package.

We have made a clear commitment to the Front Line that, if we
have African support for our proposals, we will do all we can to
obtain Smith’s resignation and Rhodesia’s return to temporary British
administration. We have stated our willingness to apply strong pres-
sure on South Africa toward this end: in your conversation with Nyer-
eere you specifically mentioned oil as a likely lever.

It is certain that pressures at the UN from African, non-aligned
and communist countries for measures against Rhodesia and South

---

415 (1977) was adopted 13 to 0 with 1 abstention on September 29.
Africa will build very quickly if we do not receive an early indication of Smith’s willingness to acquiesce in the settlement package as a whole.

To forestall this, it is imperative that we are perceived as being willing, and even preparing to bring the necessary pressure on Vorster and Smith at a later date, if necessary. We should move ahead on two tracks: (a) immediate actions, even if mainly symbolic, to demonstrate our serious intent; and (b) planning for the hard moves against South Africa that might be necessary.

One step that we have already begun which will help convey the message that we are serious about applying increased pressure on Rhodesia involves a “Core Group” of major trading nations (US, UK, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and Iran) which will meet for the first time on September 13. From this meeting, we hope to gain agreement from these nations to more strictly enforce current sanctions against Rhodesia. At the very least, this would symbolize to South Africa and others the intent of the West’s commercial leaders to bring about a settlement of the Rhodesian question. We will also ask that each member of the Core Group underscore to South Africa their support for the US/UK proposals.

Decisions Ahead

If Rhodesia shows no willingness to participate in negotiations regarding a ceasefire and transitional arrangements, or if it enters these negotiations but stalls, we will have to make clear again (as we did in London with Botha) to South Africa that Rhodesian intransigence will lead to actions in the UN and elsewhere which will inevitably have negative effects on it.

We must, therefore, determine what steps might be taken, especially in the critical area of arms and whether there are appropriate actions in relation to the oil issue which we might undertake. We are urgently discussing these issues within the Department of State and will consult with other interested agencies to develop proposals which we hope to present to you for your endorsement within the coming weeks. We are critically aware that time is of the essence. I will suggest to Zbig that the Policy Review Committee meet next week to consider these essential questions.

---

8 See Document 165.
Rhodesia: The Parties to the Dispute

The major parties to the Rhodesian dispute have entered a new round of political and military maneuvering following the announcement of the UK–US settlement proposals and move to involve the UN in a settlement. The Rhodesian and South African governments, the four Rhodesian nationalist factions, and the five front-line African presidents all favor some form of political solution. Most of the parties, however, have little hope that there will be any early resolution of the dispute, and are keeping their options open as they try to strengthen their positions. Neither the Rhodesian government forces nor the nationalist guerrillas are strong enough militarily to impose their will on their enemies.

The Smith Government

The UK–US proposals add to the growing pressure on Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith. He and much of the white community find some of the proposals unacceptable and want further negotiations. They are particularly concerned about provisions for the disbandment of much of the present security forces during a transition period before a new government comes to power. Smith is trying to move ahead with his own internal plan for a settlement with moderate blacks which would exclude what he views as the more radical nationalist groups.

Smith’s chief asset in recent years has been the divisions among his black nationalist opponents, which he again hopes to exploit with his current settlement plan. His victory in the recent election, in which his party captured all of the seats in parliament reserved for whites, has enabled Smith to solidify his position as Rhodesia’s dominant white political figure that had been threatened by the defection of 12 right-wing members of parliament last spring. Smith also counts on South Africa to continue to provide support vital to his government’s existence, including some military supplies and trade routes through which almost all of Rhodesia’s exports and imports pass.

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 80T00071A, Production Copy Files (1976–1979), Box 10, Rhodesia: The Parties to the Dispute. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Drafted in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis and coordinated within the Central Intelligence Agency.
Smith is facing a number of problems, however, that eventually seem certain to bring down his regime. The country is experiencing a serious drain on its limited white manpower. Rhodesia has less than 270,000 whites, compared to more than six million blacks, and the net emigration rate for whites has been averaging more than 1,000 a month. This exodus, coupled with extended military call-ups as a result of the guerrilla war and low business confidence in the future are contributing to a decline in the country’s economy.

The Rhodesian security forces, which now maintain about 20,000 personnel on active duty, are still able to defeat any guerrilla groups they can find. Cross-border raids into Mozambique and warnings about similar raids into Zambia have apparently set back plans of guerrillas based in these countries for larger attacks. Nevertheless, hit-and-run raids by the guerrillas in widespread areas of Rhodesia are keeping the security forces stretched thin and lowering white morale. An escalation of these attacks or a collapse of settlement efforts could sharply increase the white exodus.

**South Africa**

South African Prime Minister Vorster has been urging Smith to reach a settlement with the black nationalists since 1974, and he is concerned that the West will take a harder line toward South Africa if Smith rejects the Anglo-American proposals. Although South Africa is unlikely to increase its military support for Rhodesia if the fighting increases, and Vorster now seems particularly anxious for an early settlement, he probably will not much put pressure on Smith to accept the UK-US proposals. The South Africans have consistently maintained that they will not force the Smith government to accept a settlement by cutting off Rhodesia’s foreign trade routes.

South Africa does not want a radical Zimbabwe government on its border, and fears that this could happen under the UK-US proposals. The South Africans would prefer a government headed by the moderate black leaders whom Smith is trying to involve in his internal plan, and may hope, as Smith does, that such a government would eventually win acceptance from the West and the black African countries.

**The Nationalists**

The Rhodesian nationalists are as divided as ever, despite numerous attempts by the front-line presidents and others to persuade them to unite. There seems to be virtually no chance that the leaders of the four main nationalist factions, which foresee each other as rivals for power in an independent Zimbabwe, will agree to any meaningful cooperation.

The two black leaders whom Smith wants to include in his settlement plan—Ndabaningi Sithole and Bishop Abel Muzorewa—are com-
peting for political position inside Rhodesia. Although both have been considering a deal with Smith, they are unlikely to join forces. Both have expressed support for the UK–US proposals because they believe they can win a fair election, but they are concerned that the proposals might lead to a transfer of power to their rivals. They also believe that Smith will reject the UK–US proposals, and they may decide that their interests will be best served by seeking a deal with him.

*Sithole,* who was almost written off as a nationalist leader last year, may be gaining strength among Rhodesia’s blacks. An astute politician who has stature as the founder of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in the early 1960s, Sithole recently gained the support of several nationalist leaders who defected from Muzorewa’s faction. Sithole is not now associated with the ZANU leadership, but he may have some sympathizers among guerrilla commanders ostensibly loyal to ZANU. Sithole claims to be in touch with these commanders inside Rhodesia and says they are disenchanted with their faction’s weak political position.

Sithole’s chief problem lies in his inability to develop any organized military following because of the front-line presidents’ support of his rivals and their denial of bases and training to his cadre. He also must build his political organization from scratch, since he was in jail or in exile for some 13 years before he returned to Rhodesia last July.

*Muzorewa* probably has the largest following of the nationalist leaders, and his African National Council has operated legally inside Rhodesia since 1971. Much of his personal popularity stems from his opposition to an unpopular settlement-plan proposed by the British in 1971.

[2 lines not declassified] His Council is in disarray as a result of the recent defections to Sithole. The opposition of the front-line states has also prevented Muzorewa from procuring military training for his followers, although he probably has some supporters among the guerrillas.

*The Patriotic Front,* a nominal alliance between Robert Mugabe of ZANU and Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), is supposed to direct most of the Rhodesian guerrillas. Despite the efforts of the front-line presidents to persuade the two factions to cooperate, ZANU and ZAPU run separate guerrilla operations from bases in Mozambique and Zambia respectively. Although the two factions generally operate in different areas of Rhodesia, their guerrilla forces have clashed on several occasions, detracting from the effort against Smith. There have been indications that Nkomo wants to hold back most of his guerrillas from the fighting until after a settlement so that they can be available for possible use against ZANU.

Leaders of both of the Front’s factions have been critical of some aspects of the UK–US proposals. They realize that they lack the political
strength inside Rhodesia to win a free election and want their own forces, rather than a UN force, in control during the transition period so that they can determine the results of an election.

_Nkomo_ has strengthened his position vis-a-vis Mugabe, largely by rapidly building up the ZAPU guerrilla force in Zambia during the past year. Although ZAPU probably maintains less than 500 guerrillas inside Rhodesia, it may have nearly 10,000—some of whom are still undergoing training—at bases in Zambia. This force has increased from about 1,500 late last year. ZAPU cadre are also receiving military training in Angola, Cuba, and the USSR, some of it in conventional warfare rather than guerrilla tactics. ZAPU has long enjoyed close ties with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets have increased arms deliveries to ZAPU in recent months.

Nkomo, the foremost nationalist leader since the 1950s, has maintained his political stature among Rhodesia’s blacks. He is more experienced than his rivals and apparently is viewed as the senior partner in the Patriotic Front by some of the front-line presidents.

Unlike his three rivals, however, Nkomo’s political position suffers from the fact that he draws most of his support from a minority tribal group—the Ndebele—which represents only about 15 percent of Rhodesia’s black population. Moreover, his organization inside Rhodesia has been weakened by recent arrests of its cadre by the government, and may also be damaged because Nkomo now operates from outside of Rhodesia. Although Nkomo’s position as the ZAPU leader does not appear in danger, the faction’s growing military strength apparently has led to increased rivalry among lower level leaders.

_Mugabe’s_ ZANU still maintains the largest guerrilla force. It may have nearly 3,000 fighters inside Rhodesia at any given time, and at least another 1,000 at bases in Mozambique. ZANU may also have up to 20,000 personnel awaiting or undergoing training in Tanzania and Mozambique. The ZANU guerrillas get arms from the USSR and East European countries channeled to them by the front-line presidents. ZANU leaders have complained, however, that their force is not as well armed as the Soviet-equipped ZAPU force. China apparently agreed recently to send more military aid to ZANU, with which it has had close ties in the past.

The ZANU leadership is badly divided by personal rivalries. Mugabe serves only as the faction’s political spokesman, and has no control over the military effort. The ZANU guerrillas are handicapped by poor training and lack of discipline, and they have not performed well against the Rhodesian security forces. Moreover, neither Mugabe nor any of the other ZANU leaders are well known among Rhodesia’s blacks and they have practically no political organization inside the country.
Front-Line Presidents

The presidents of Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana, and Angola are all involved in the effort to overturn white rule in Rhodesia, but only the first three play an important role. Tanzanian President Nyerere, who has reacted favorably to the UK–US proposals, acts as the unofficial chairman of the presidents, and sometimes mediates between his colleagues. Tanzania provides training bases for ZANU forces, serves as a conduit for arms largely to ZANU, but also to ZAPU, and has sent several hundred troops to Mozambique to help protect against Rhodesian cross-border raids.

Mozambique and Zambia, which border on Rhodesia and where virtually all of the trained guerrillas are based, are in the forefront of the military effort against the Smith government. Mozambican President Machel, like Nyerere, has indicated his support for the UK–US settlement effort. Machel continues to support the guerrilla struggle more extensively than his fellow presidents, however, and he would prefer a “revolutionary” government in Zimbabwe. His closest ties are with the ZANU leaders, who are based in Mozambique, but it is not clear whether he fully supports Mugabe.

Zambian President Kaunda also supports the UK–US effort, but fears it will not succeed in forcing Smith from power. A staunch supporter of Nkomo, Kaunda is worried that Smith will implement his own plan and freeze Nkomo out of a settlement. Kaunda has been under considerable criticism from domestic opponents for supporting the guerrilla war, which has contributed to Zambia’s growing economic problems. Although in recent months Zambian troops have frequently initiated shooting incidents with Rhodesian security forces across their common border, Kaunda has been more cautious than Machel in giving direct military support to the guerrillas because he fears Rhodesian retaliation.

Botswanan President Khama and Angolan President Neto are both preoccupied with internal problems and play only a secondary role in the Rhodesia situation. Although Botswana tries to discourage armed guerrillas from entering Botswanan territory, it serves as a transit point for ZAPU recruits crossing the border from Rhodesia enroute to Zambia. Botswana lacks sufficient military strength to keep out either the guerrillas or Rhodesian security forces pursuing them. Neto has supported Nkomo in meetings of the front-line presidents, and recently allowed ZAPU to set up training bases in Angola. Soviet weapons are forwarded through Angola to the ZAPU force in Zambia.
169. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, September 20, 1977, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
South Africa and Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Vance
Richard Moose
Anthony Lake

United States Representative to the United Nations
Ambassador Andrew Young
Anne Holloway

Defense
Charles W. Duncan
RADM Gerald E. Thomas

CIA
Adm Stansfield Turner
David Cohen

FEA
John O'Leary

The PRC met on September 20 to consider pressures that could be brought to bear to force South Africa to, in turn, pressure Rhodesia toward a settlement on acceptable terms.

It was agreed that we would probably not be called upon for at least two weeks, and probably longer, to take specific actions, although an irresponsible act by Smith could force our hand at almost any time. We can probably obtain the UN procedural resolution setting up the negotiating machinery without getting involved in substantive discussion of sanctions. It was further agreed that meanwhile we must project publicly a resolute approach, and we should as soon as possible clarify in our own minds what pressures we would be prepared to apply under varying circumstances.

Since Smith continues to be willing to talk and the South Africans continue to support an international settlement, there is no reason at this time to apply any pressures on South Africa or on Rhodesia. We

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 66, PRC 041, 2/11/77, Southern Africa. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
will face such measures, however, if Smith later balks. They should be applied in graduated steps after appropriate advance warnings.

In all cases, we should seek to get parallel actions by our allies and others.

The first set of pressures to be applied if the need arises would include:

- Printing destination control warnings on goods exported to South Africa stating that these goods may not be re-exported to Rhodesia. We would seek to multilateralize this procedure but would be prepared to carry it out unilaterally.

- A mandatory UN embargo on arms sales to South Africa for violating the UN embargo by sending arms to Rhodesia. (This would have the added advantage of breaking the Israel-South Africa arms link.)

- “Grey area sales” of military-related equipment would continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but perhaps with some tightening as a signal to South Africa. (It was suggested that a tightening of these pressures might be most appropriate for use in the Namibia context where the issue of South African military withdrawal could be a major obstacle.)

A second set of pressures would follow closely after these:

- Jawboning US oil companies to urge their South African subsidiaries not to engage in the export of oil to Rhodesia. (This would be largely symbolic.)

- A selective validated export licensing system covering exports to South Africa of goods (including but not limited to oil) that are particularly important to Rhodesia. Under the system, South Africa would have to undertake that it would not re-export these items to Rhodesia and supply end-user certificates to that effect.

A third category of pressures could come much later and only in extreme situations. It could include the following measures (which were not, however, discussed in any detail by the PRC):

- A full system of end-user certificates, perhaps under a new UN Security Council resolution, covering all items.

- Extension of our sanctions regulations to cover South African subsidiaries of US oil companies, with similar action by home countries of the other majors and Iran. Perhaps extend this to items other than oil.

- Suspension by the US and other Western governments of official trade (e.g., EXIM) credits and guarantees for South Africa.

- Full UN oil sanctions against South Africa as a means of keeping it from supplying oil to Rhodesia, perhaps preceded by a system of “non-supply certificates” which would require South Africa’s agreement to cut off oil to Rhodesia in order to receive any shipments itself.
(This would be ineffective, except perhaps in psychological terms, since Rhodesia’s requirements are relatively small and South Africa has stored up large reserves.)

It was decided that *certain potential pressures should be kept in reserve* for forcing South African compliance in other areas (apartheid, nuclear weapons) and not used in connection with Rhodesia or Namibia. These included:

—Reductions in US personnel and governmental activities in South Africa.

—Restrictions on US investment and banking activities in South Africa.

The PRC devoted particular attention to oil matters in view of widely held concerns over the potentially dangerous precedent which could be set by using oil for political purposes, and the anticipated difficulty of applying effective oil sanctions against South Africa without a near-blockade. It is for this reason that oil-related pressures are at the bottom of the list; Defense would go no further than jawboning; Treasury and Energy oppose even that action. Energy also urges that if we must move on oil, this be done in the context of moving on other items as well.

Finally, it was decided that we would abstain on or oppose the Indian UN resolution which calls upon member states to re-examine their oil export policies toward South Africa, unless Ambassador Young found it necessary for tactical purposes to support it.
170. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, September 26, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR
  The Vice President
  The Secretary of State
  The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
  South Africa and Rhodesia

  The President has reviewed the conclusions of the Policy Review Committee meeting of September 20, 1977,\(^2\) and has approved the following initial measures for use if necessary to force South Africa and Rhodesia toward a settlement on acceptable terms:

  — Printing destination control warnings on goods exported to South Africa stating that these goods may not be re-exported to Rhodesia. The U.S. should seek to multilateralize this procedure but the President is prepared to carry it out unilaterally.

  — A mandatory UN embargo on arms sales to South Africa for violating the UN embargo by sending arms to Rhodesia.

  — “Grey area sales” of military-related equipment would continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, but perhaps with some tightening as a signal to South Africa. Tightening pressures should be given special consideration in the Namibia context where the issue of South African military withdrawal could be a major obstacle.

  Implementation of any of the above measures must be authorized specifically by the President.

  The President also instructs the US Representative to the United Nations to abstain or oppose the Indian UN resolution. Should Ambassador Young conclude that the US should support the resolution for tactical purposes, he may request reconsideration of this instruction.

  David Aaron

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 66, PRC 041, 2/11/77, Southern Africa. Secret. The memorandum was also sent to Blumenthal, Kreps, Young, Turner, Brown, and O’Leary.

\(^2\) See Document 169.
171. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 11, 1977, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Talks Between President Carter and the US Delegation, and Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo and the Nigerian Delegation: First Session

PARTICIPANTS FOR THE US
The President
Vice President Mondale
The Secretary of State
Dr. Brzezinski
Ambassador Andrew Young
Ambassador Donald Easum
Ambassador Donald McHenry
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose
Henry Richardson, NSC Staff (notetaker)

PARTICIPANTS FOR NIGERIA
Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo
Commissioner Joseph Nanven Garba
General Martin Adamu
Ambassador Olujimi Jolaoso
Mr. J.A. Oladel Akadiri
Mr. Haruna Bin Musa
Mr. M. Arzika

(The President and General Obasanjo held one-half hour private conversation prior to the discussion. The discussion commenced at 11:30.) (The press opportunity ended.)

The President: We are pleased to have General Obasanjo and the Nigerian delegation here today, and we are grateful for the improvement in relations between our two countries, and for our friendship. In the past, the United States’ perception of Africa was not well informed, nor was it accurate. We value the visit of Nigeria because we value its advice and counsel, and because we feel that we can go forward on this basis for the benefit of the peace and prosperity of Africa.

I have great admiration for General Obasanjo, whose country is in the process of showing democracy can work, and who has contributed much of benefit to his people. We have also noted the debate process

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 10/6–31/77. Secret; Sensitive. Brackets are in the original except where inserted to indicate omitted material. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room and adjourned at 1:12 p.m.
on your constituent assembly, and the progress towards a constitution,
which we admire.

We have looked forward to your visit, not only to strengthen the
strong bonds which tie us at present, but to work towards an improved
relationship for the future.

Today, if there is no objection, I would like to suggest that we
discuss international affairs. Should we wish to do so, tomorrow we
can consider bilateral issues.\(^2\)

I am grateful for our common efforts towards a negotiated settle-
ment for Zimbabwe. As you know, that is a very difficult situation,
and I would appreciate hearing your position.

Obasanjo: My delegation and I are grateful for this opportunity to
exchange views on international and bilateral issues. We must note
that this opportunity would not have been possible without your will
and determination, and the policies of your government that enabled
it to occur.

In the past, the policies of US administrations have left Africa
disappointed. I wish you to understand, with respect to any reaction
you may get from Africans which is less than enthusiastic, that the
taste of disappointment needs time to disappear under the influence
of the sweet taste of action. Therefore, if you are met with doubts in
spite of your good intentions, you should understand this residue of
distrust. We have concluded that, unlike past American administra-
tions, your Administration has a distinct feature: it has had a definite
African policy from its conception. We appreciate this change, although
sometimes distortions appear in the press which hide the truth.

On Rhodesia, there are two ways that people have looked at the
possibilities for a solution. One: it is not a question of negotiation, but
of guns. Two: the guns should now be silenced and negotiations are
most appropriate.

We believe where there is sufficient goodwill, relative to the option
of negotiations, there is some hope for progress. But you must remem-
ber that negotiations have been occurring in Rhodesia already for 12
years. It is for this reason that we support the groups who are waging
the armed struggle there. But, maybe at this stage, we can perhaps
find a solution to that problem which builds the requisite confidence
among the different racial and ethnic groups in that territory. We must
emphasize our unflinching support for the freedom-fighters. But your
proposal,\(^3\) we feel, has sufficient in it to make it work, pending the
working out of details.

\(^2\) Carter met with Obasanjo on October 12, from 10:30 a.m. to 12:05 p.m.

\(^3\) Reference is to the Anglo-American proposals, released by the British on September
1. See footnote 3, Document 182.
Therefore, we can say that on the two fronts above, things are going fairly well. When things have advanced sufficiently and all “thinkables” have been worked out, the armed struggle can end. For now, the armed struggle should be continued. If my recent experiences in three African countries which are bearing the brunt of this struggle are any indication, their will to continue that struggle is steadfast.

We have cooperated on the Anglo-American proposals so far; there is merit in what has been put forward. There is a basis on which we may now move in a specific direction. Prem Chand has been appointed by the Secretary-General under the Security Council resolution. The question is, where do we go from here? Our understanding is that Lord Carver and Prem Chand will go around to various parties, including us, the Front Line States, Smith—we might question the relevance of this, and Vorster. The efforts will hopefully produce a detailed program for implementation.

However, there is an area which is beclouded: how to remove Ian Smith. This is the crux of the matter: until Smith leaves, our (sic) support for the Anglo-American proposal will still be, in a way, half-hearted. How Smith will leave is still unclear. Only you, Mr. President, can tell us in a believable fashion how this will happen. The British cannot do so because they lack the capacity. Can we get to this question before we move on?

The President: I cannot now spell out exactly how Ian Smith will depart. I consider it encouraging that Smith has not yet rejected the Anglo-American proposal. As the weeks go by, the progress of this proposal through the UN conferences and the transition period can be assessed. Vorster knows how deeply we feel about this matter, and we have made that clear to him. I think we can assume that Smith is feeling substantial pressure. But I cannot now predict his actions.

If Smith chooses to fight and cause more bloodshed, we cannot control his actions. I can think of no other choices except the two that you have outlined, and I think that if Smith sees that he has only these two choices, he will see the inevitability of losing. I cannot now spell out to you exactly what we would do under what set of circumstances, should he continue to fight; these are all contingencies, and I am not clear in my own mind on our exact course of action. But if we see that we are not making progress on the proposal, then I will consult with you before we decide on any next steps.

4 At a September 2 press conference, Smith voiced concerns over specific elements of the proposals, but did not reject them. On September 28, Smith told the Rhodesian House of Assembly that the proposals would be voted on by the white electorate and a rejection by them would negate the settlement. (Keeng’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28648)
Obasanjo: This is good enough for us but not for some of our colleagues.

The President: Which ones?

Obasanjo: I went around to several African countries, and some expressed doubts. I said, this is the first time that the US Government is putting its full weight behind a Rhodesian proposal; things are being worked out that will lead to direct or indirect pressures on South Africa, including sanctions and oil sanctions. Now, it is necessary for us to know that no stone will be left unturned when the time comes, though we do not necessarily need to know all the details. In our opinion, it is presumptuous to think that Smith will cooperate. We do not expect this. He will have to give up. And if you use the word “cooperate”, in this respect, it will sound hollow to some of our colleagues.

In addition, we do not know the details of the recent meeting between Smith and Kaunda in Lusaka. According to the information we have, Kaunda said that we are “back to square one.” This is an important element in our considerations. We might not be able to know the details of such a meeting, but we are concerned.

The President: I understand your concern. We have had extensive discussions with Vorster and Botha. It is obvious that Smith is looking for an internal solution. We hope that by now events have blocked the possibility of his making an agreement with Sithole or Muzorewa to this effect. We have made it clear to South Africa that sanctions will be applied, including those against South Africa, if progress is not made. But we believe that it is easier for Smith and South Africa to cooperate if the pressure applied to them is done in private. Smith has now had ample opportunity to reject the proposal if he wanted to; it is significant that he has not.

I see no choices other than either a violent solution or a negotiated settlement. Smith indeed has endorsed the principle of one man-one vote. We intend to proceed with determination; we will apply sanctions if necessary.

Obasanjo: It is important to us to know whether you have absolutely rejected an internal solution in Rhodesia. For us, this is no solution.

The President: An internal solution is not what we would prefer. But in this area, you and the Front Line States have more influence.

---

5 See Documents 170 and 285.

6 Smith, Van der Byl, and Gaylard met with Kaunda on September 25. “According to a Zambian Government statement on October 1, the meeting had achieved ‘nothing of significance’ and a Zambian Government spokesman said on October 2, that the Rhodesians had merely ‘set out their attitude towards the Anglo-American settlement plan’ and explained why they objected to certain aspects of it.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28650)
than we do. We do not know the attitudes of the Rhodesian people, and whether there are any circumstances under which they might accept an internal solution. You have influence in these matters.

Obasanjo: My sounding from the Front Line States is that an internal solution is no solution.

The President: I agree. The earlier we rule out an internal solution, and exert all our efforts for an internationally acceptable solution, the better. I understand that Mugabe, Sithole, Muzorewa and Nkomo all have not opposed an internal solution, because they do not want to be put in a position where they are admitting they might not be able to win a free election. The Smith-Kaunda meeting may well have closed the door on an internal solution. But I do not want to publicly respond in some final manner to that situation, because this is rightly an African question. We have no other goals in Zimbabwe except to pursue the successful implementation of the Anglo-American proposal.

Young: At the Security Council, we have agreed that the UN representative will talk with Lord Carver. The question is: what are Nigeria’s expectations of the United States’ role in those negotiations? Should the United States participate in some way in those talks?

Obasanjo: We consider that the credibility of the present Anglo-American proposal stems from US participation. We respect Lord Carver, but the facts of credibility might be somewhat different. We understand, however, that the British may have to do most of the talking, and the United States do the listening, in its current diplomatic role, just as was the case when Andy visited Lagos. This is the Front Line position: if that posture is necessary to facilitate the US backing the Anglo-American proposal, then fine.

The President: By taking this action, the United Nations lends authenticity to our presence in Rhodesia, since we have no other interests there.

Obasanjo: This is why we supported the UN action, since the United States has no colonial responsibilities in the situation, such as does Britain. At first the British wanted the Commonwealth to be the organization to take action, but we opposed this because the Commonwealth has no teeth.

The President: We hope, in this connection, that Nigeria will provide substantial forces for the UN Peacekeeping Force envisaged for Zimbabwe. Nigeria has the trust of most if not all of the parties (except for Smith), and you have our trust.

Obasanjo: You’re right that during the transition period, the question of UN troops is important. However, more important is the period after the transition. Our position is that a national Zimbabwe army must be built and trained which is loyal to the country of Zimbabwe.
The President: We agree.

Obasanjo: After the transition, the United Nations will withdraw. The United States and Britain will also withdraw. We do not want trouble in Zimbabwe after you withdraw.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Southern Africa.]

The President: I was thinking about Angola as an issue we might discuss. General Obasanjo and I discussed this subject before the meeting this morning. We have a serious problem with the Cubans being in Angola, and I want the Cubans out. I think that you agree in principle, but I understand your position to be that so long as Savimbi continues to be allied with South Africa, Neto must retain the Cubans for protection against South Africa. We have no preference as to who should lead Angola, and want nothing there. Our hope is that Savimbi and Neto will negotiate a solution. At the moment, we are uncertain how much aid South Africa is still providing Savimbi. We have some information that other governments are providing him aid. We have no connection with him. We are not pushing for any solution, and we believe that Cuba in this situation is largely an agent of the Soviets. We are concerned, but we are in no hurry to take any action. We could hope for a Soviet assurance that if South Africa withdraws from Namibia, then the Cubans will leave because Neto will no longer have any need for them. In this connection, I believe that Savimbi has substantial indigenous support in Angola. I would like your views on this.

Obasanjo: Thank you. As I said earlier, I do not believe any African leader is happy about the presence of any foreign troops in Africa. We want the Cubans out, but only when some kind of accommodation is reached about Savimbi and his external supporters. From considering the history of Angola, Savimbi must be receiving aid from South Africa. We know that the previous US Administration knew this.

The President: Originally, [sic] we were working more closely with Neto.

Obasanjo: When I met Neto last year, he had a group of ultra-lefts in his camp which he didn’t know what to do with. This situation led to the aborted coup against him last May, and this I hope is the worst that he will suffer. Indications are that he is now more a master of his own house. Before the Cubans leave, Angola needs a period of security in both the North and the South for its borders, during which Neto will have time to build up the confidence to ask the Cubans to leave. There has been some dispute about the number of Cuban troops in Angola; they have fluctuated up and down. If our intelligence is accurate, we may now have the true position on that.

---

7 No record of this meeting was found.
point. I think we can get Neto agree to withdraw the Cubans after the security of Angola’s borders is assured. In this respect, we would hope that the South Africans would soon withdraw from Namibia. We want to keep in touch with you on this. Angola must resolve its own internal contradictions, and when this happens, the occupation of Cuban troops can be ended.

*The President:* We have no intention to intervene in Angola, politically or otherwise. Such an assurance by Neto about the withdrawal of Cuban troops will be helpful.

*Obasanjo:* We will try to do this. Neto also has a problem with his own army; it is largely a guerrilla army which needs to be retrained and disciplined into a regular army.

*[The President then asked Ambassador McHenry to bring the discussion up-to-date on the question of Namibia.]*

*McHenry:* In our meeting in Lagos, South African troop withdrawal was not discussed in detail. Two weeks ago, the last round of discussions between South Africa and the Contact Group touched on the question of South African troop withdrawal and Cubans in Angola. The South Africans argued that one reason for maintaining their bases along Namibia’s northern border was the Cubans in Angola which pose a threat to Namibia and South Africa. It was a difficult round of discussions. We have a long way to go. We have encouraged them on the issue of withdrawal. Our posture is that we are now considering a South African proposal which clearly has faults. It says that under UN observation, the South Africans would reduce their troop strength from 23,000 down to 4,000 in two months. Of the 4,000, South Africa wants approximately 1,400 (two battalions) to remain as combat forces stationed at an isolated base in Achibello. They wish to retain their eight bases on the northern border with a platoon (30 men), “so they can be turned over intact to the new government.” The physical conditions of northern Namibia mandate a certain amount of logistic support to supply the basics. Therefore, to the 1,400 combat troops plus the approximate 270 men at the bases, the remainder would be troops providing logistical support. South Africa has also offered this logistical support for the UN forces, and they have agreed to restrict their military forces to base, with UN observation on this point.

---

8 In telegram 9550 from Lagos, August 23, the Embassy reported on the meeting among Young, Moose, McHenry, Petterson, and Sam Nujoma, which “centered on withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia, the powers of the UN Special Representative, and SWAPO’s continued fears about the South African Government’s ‘massive’ assistance to Turnhalle and establishment of ethnically-based military forces in the territory.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770304-0251)

9 See Document 73.
Rhodesia 501

The President: What is wrong with the South African proposal?

Obasanjo: May I answer that question? The problem with Namibia is one of confidence. We recognize that there are both white and black Namibians to whom this applies. It must be recognized that black Namibians cannot trust South African troops for anything.

The President: What is the percentage of black and white troops involved?

McHenry: The South African troops involved are largely white. There is a catch. There are approximately 1,600 other black troops trained as an ethnic army; they are used mainly to guard public facilities and for a limited amount of patrolling.

Obasanjo: South Africa’s primary concern would seem to be the Cunene Dam. I understand that most of this project lies in Angola. If Angola agrees to maintain and service this dam, I do not see why South Africa would worry. As we said in Lagos, anything short of total troop withdrawal by South Africa is unacceptable. Also, there is again the question of confidence. Could we say that we could not also do without a UN troop presence to inspire this confidence?

Young: Would the UN troops actually confine the South African troops to base?

Obasanjo: Why is this important?

The President: By bringing Angola into the discussion, the South Africans seem to be trying to justify their own presence.

Obasanjo: South Africa does not want to lose Namibia.

The President: Thirty-five people in each of these bases would not seem excessive. What is your opinion on the UN force?

McHenry: We must remember that the South Africans distrust the UN and UN forces. Normally we think of the UN as a neutral presence, but this is not the South African view. One of the objections that we raise to the South African plan agrees with that raised by General Obasanjo. Why could not civilians maintain each of those bases?

The President: I have not kept informed on all details of the situation. We have had difficulty in finding Sam Nujoma. I do not want to speak for South Africa here, but they have come a long way in these negotiations. Are the South Africans willing to consider a counter-proposal?

McHenry: Yes. But we need help in pinning down SWAPO to talk seriously and to take a political view of the situation. The proposal that the South Africans could retain one base to save face has previously arisen, and SWAPO rejected it then. There is, however, a catch in the situation. South Africa proposes to keep their troops precisely in the middle of Ovambo, which is a SWAPO stronghold.
**Obasanjo:** If pinning down Sam Nujoma is the issue, that is no problem. It is unacceptable for the South Africans to maintain a string of bases. However, a proposal whereby one base in the south of Namibia is retained, from which the South Africans would withdraw before the election, is possible; we could help sell this to SWAPO. The South Africans are not innocent, as we all know.

**Young:** I was afraid that the last round of talks with the Contact Group in South Africa were going to break down. The Contact Group was there at the time that the Biko case was breaking. I consider that getting them to talk about troop withdrawal in that atmosphere is progress. But we must be aware of the games that the South Africans play.

**Obasanjo:** You have talked to the South Africans, and we have not. If you say this is progress, we will accept from you that this is progress.

**McHenry:** Yes, I believe that this is progress. It is the first time that we have engaged the South Africans on specifics, facts and figures. It is a first step. We must now talk to SWAPO in New York.

**The President:** What is the question about elections? South Africa wants elections in March? We want elections in June?

**McHenry:** Yes. But in March many troops will still be present to intimidate SWAPO. We prefer June in order to give SWAPO time to reestablish itself. This is an important element of fairness. SWAPO did propose that South African troops be confined to a single base away on the southern tip of Namibia. There is no face-saving element for Vorster. And giving Vorster a way out has been the key to our progress so far.

**Vance:** What is the Contact Group’s view relative to concrete proposals to be made after the meeting with SWAPO?

**McHenry:** We will meet with SWAPO this Friday, and then there will be another round of Contact Group discussions with South Africa. We hope to take to South Africa proposals on the basis of which we can propose an overall position for a fair settlement. Then we will undertake to convince SWAPO to go along.

**Obasanjo:** This is okay, but there must be a period of non-interference in Namibia by South African troops. Either they must withdraw completely, or be _completely [sic]_ garrisoned. If the latter, we need some kind of force in order to prevent their very presence from being intimidating. And SWAPO’s army must be retrained into a proper army for Namibia as soon as possible.

---

10 See footnote 9, above.
11 Steve Biko died on September 12 while under South African detention.
12 October 14.
Rhodesia 503

[The President repeated the essential points of our position on Namibia as previously discussed by Ambassador McHenry.]

Vance: It is necessary for us to maintain the momentum in these negotiations.

Young: I hope that you can meet with Sam Nujoma in New York.

Obasanjo: If I can, I will.

The President: I understand that you have other points that you wish to raise?

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Southern Africa.]

172. Telegram From the Embassy in Botswana to the Department of State

Gaborone, November 6, 1977, 1530Z


1. Summary: We found substantial acceptance of the principles of the Anglo-American proposal among both Nationalists and regime officials but firm opposition from Smith and his Ministers. They did not reject the idea of meeting with the Patriotic Front in Malta but would not send military officials and contend that there should be a political-level meeting with Nationalists and the regime in Salisbury first. Government and security officials listened carefully to Lord Carver’s proposals on law and order during the transition period and the creation of a new army. They raised a number of problems but refused to give any reactions to it. All accepted further talks but nothing specific was agreed upon. Smith seems prepared to drag things out quite a bit further. End summary

2. During the four days in Salisbury, Carver, Chand, Weir and Low with various other members of the parties met first with Rhodesian security chiefs on Wednesday afternoon Nov 2, government officials

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2275. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

2 Telegram 265910 to the White House, November 7, repeated telegram 985 from Gaborone, November 7, in which the Embassy reported on the conversation with Rhodesian security forces. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 11/77)
Thursday morning, Muzorewa and Sithole Friday Chinamano on Saturday, and Smith and three Ministers on Sunday. I had a private meeting with Gaylard, and Weir and I met with the South African representative. We also had a number of social contacts with private and regime officials.

3. No meeting had been arranged with Smith. When we raised this point on Thursday, it became clear that the regime first wanted to satisfy itself that we were meeting with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau (ZUPO). Since Graham was already scheduled to meet Chirau and we did not want to load the circuit any heavier in terms of our relations with the Patriotic Front, we decided against a meeting with him. This apparently irritated the Rhodesians who kept asking whether the meeting had been arranged while we finalized a place and time for the Smith encounter. At that occasion, Smith’s first comment was to express his dissatisfaction with our failure to see Chirau.

4. In virtually all the meetings, Lord Carver explained at some length and detail his proposals for maintenance of law and order during the transition period and the creation of an army for an independent Zimbabwe (ZNA). He stated that he was basing primary responsibility for law and order on the police force. His objective he said was to reduce the number of armed men at the time the transition period began to a considerably smaller size on independence day. In the process, he sought to build a force which owed allegiance to no political figure. He would start off by eliminating a number of elements of the present Rhodesian forces including all purely white units or subunits. The force to be created would consist of six to eight battalions, three of the presently existing Rhodesian African rifles, and three to five which were either from liberation forces or the citizenry at large (as the statement on law and order put it: “open to all citizens”). There would as well be a reserve force (or National Guard) of perhaps twelve battalions made up of men from liberation forces. The arms for these

---

3 In telegram 2762 from Gaborone, November 7, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Rhodesian Government officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077-2265)

4 Telegram 265925 to the White House, November 7, repeated telegram 2760 from Gaborone, November 7, in which the Embassy reported on the meeting with Muzorewa. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 11/77) Telegram 266078 to the White House, November 7, repeated telegram 2761 from Gaborone, November 7, in which the Embassy reported on the meeting with Sithole and six of his supporters. (Ibid.)

5 In telegram 18518 from London, November 10, the Embassy summarized the meeting with Chinamano. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770415-1195)

6 In telegram 3353 from Lusaka, November 7, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Smith. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0976)
forces would be held by the regular army. Carver described his plan to have forward control points to process liberation forces back into civilian life, reserve or active service. He described the need gradually to integrate the command structure of the liberation forces into the army.

5. Prem Chand contributed relatively little to the formal conversations. He outlined his ideas about the achievement of a cease-fire explaining that at least one month was needed from the time agreement was reached until the cease-fire could come into effect. During this period, he would want to assign liaison and observer groups to various units both inside Rhodesia and, he insisted, in Frontline countries, too. Regarding the maintenance of law and order during the transition period, he acknowledged that UN forces would find any resort to force difficult and at one point told government officials that there would need to be access by the police to help from constituted forces other than the UN.

6. The meetings with Nationalist leaders showed a substantial common ground on the principles of the Anglo-American proposal. Sithole listed all those with which he agreed and Muzorewa indicated that he supported the British role in the transition period. Meetings with regime officials also indicated that the discussion had now proceeded beyond the principles of the proposal although there was lengthy discussion of law and order in the transition period and the independence army. It was clear, however, that the same tacit acceptance of the principles of the proposals did not extend to Smith and the political level above the security chiefs and government officials. It was widely said that Foreign Secretary P.K. van der Byl was the leader of those opposed to the proposal. His public statements during our visit attacking Carver, associating the Zambian attack on a Victoria Falls hotel with his visit and other comments, certainly bore this out. Smith, too, made public statements indicating the proposal had been widely rejected and possessed major flaws.

7. We had some difficulty keeping the political and military areas separate. The Nationalists all claimed to control substantial proportions of the liberation forces. Muzorewa said he controlled most of those within Rhodesia and claimed that even if we successfully negotiated a cease-fire agreement with Patriotic Front his forces would not necessarily accept it. He insisted on being consulted at all stages of cease-fire discussions and threatened to reserve support of the proposal in the event he was not. He did concede that most of the forces outside the country were controlled by the Patriotic Front and accepted that a cease-fire with those forces could be separately negotiated on condition however that the cease-fire with forces inside the country be negotiated with him. Sithole claimed that we were refusing to visit operational areas where he could show us his military support. He brought two
military officers with him who had a brief private discussion with colonels Reilly and Rous. Lord Carver however instructed his military officials to have no further contact with Sithole’s group. Colonel Reilly remained in Salisbury for further discussions with Rhodesian regime security chiefs under Johanny Graham’s supervision. He will leave with Graham on Wednesday.

8. All of the Nationalists brought up in one form or another the need for some way to participate in running the country during the transition period. Lord Carver suggested to each of them that a list be drawn up of those who would have direct access on request to him. He also called attention to the provision in the proposal allowing for the possibility of an advisory council. He said he would give the matter further consideration.

9. At all three formal meetings with the regime as well as during private contacts we pressed the need to continue discussions on the transition period with the Patriotic Front at Malta. The initial reaction was entirely negative. Gaylard found all kinds of reasons why Smith would turn it down. By Saturday evening, however, he had agreed that it made sense and agreed to support the idea with Smith, providing we accepted that similar meetings would be held in Salisbury with Nationalists there. Smith himself started out extremely negative towards the idea contending that we were putting the cart before the horse and what was needed now was not cease-fire conversations but political conversations between political figures on the constitution and transition period. He said he could certainly not send security people to such a meeting and ended up by saying he thought that political meetings should be held first in Salisbury.

10. Comment: On this, my fourth visit to Salisbury, I was more impressed than before with the normality of life in the city and the obliviousness of many people to the war going on. True, the paper was dominated by our talks and the war. TV news contained incidents largely devoted to killing of “terrorists” and, by them, of black Rhodesians. For one reason or another, I received a general impression that while the Rhodesians did not want to close off the discussions and there had been considerable acceptance of the provisions of the proposal, nevertheless there was no likelihood of its early acceptance. On the contrary, they might be prepared to drag it out for some time.

11. It is probably early to say where we now are in the process. We will want to have the results of Johnny Graham’s constitutional discussions before that can be fully assessed. The Rhodesians and probably the Nationalists inside the country expect that we will have another meeting with the Patriotic Front. The DAR meeting was widely advertised as a flop but even among those who accept its positive feature in the willingness to continue talks there is criticism of the fact
that we have not yet entered into detailed discussions on the transition period, maintenance of law and order and creation of a ZNA. The PF says it won’t talk further with us without the Rhodesians but I wonder whether they can really maintain this position in view of the fact that (1) they claim the UK represents the Rhodesians, and (2) they were eager after Ivor Richards talks to negotiate a settlement with the British alone.

12. We are certainly not stymied. The South African representative in Salisbury agreed to urge the regime to attend the Malta talks but it seems to me unlikely that much pressure can be brought from South Africa until after the election at the end of this month. The Rhodesians seem to understand this. Their unwillingness to move ahead may be based on this and their judgment that the recent UN resolution will provide them with a respite from pressure from South Africa as well as perhaps their desire to see whether anything will come of the talks with Kaunda.

13. In spite of the progress made in acceptance of the principles of the proposal, we seem to be a long way from agreement on the transition period particularly if we have to start off at Malta considering the PF’s plan.

14. There will certainly be further thoughts to be forwarded in the next few days.

15. Department please pass Lusaka and other posts as desired.

Norland

---

7 In telegram 3357 from Lusaka, November 8, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Olivier. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0971)

8 In telegram 3361 from Lusaka, November 8, the Embassy reported on the meeting with Kaunda. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0968)
173. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, November 14, 1977, 2246Z

18732. From Moose. Rome for Ambassador Young only. Subject: Rhodesia: Talks With the British.

1. We met Monday afternoon and evening with Owen, Carver and company in a series of satisfactory discussions on next steps. The British agreed with substance of our working paper, and with need to move expeditiously to bring Rhodesia negotiations to a head. Much of the conversation centered on immediate considerations relating to the Malta talks (which was now scheduled for about November 25) and follow-on. It was our general feeling that though Mugabe to date was the only one to accept the talks, it was more likely that in the end either both he and Nkomo or neither would come to Malta. No one was optimistic that the Malta talks, if they took place with both PF leaders, would produce much, but everyone agreed that we had to go through with the exercise, inasmuch as the invitation has been extended. We saw a certain advantage in having an opportunity to expose the PF to the details of our proposals on military aspects of law and order, and political organization of the transition period. It was recognized that Nkomo would table his own proposals and probably register negative reactions to the discussion.

2. We concluded that following Malta it would be necessary to meet with Muzorewa and Sithole again. Carver was reluctant to return to Salisbury for such a meeting and Owen suggested that he call them to London.

3. During the course of the talks the British came a long way toward recognizing that the next major step must be a reference back to the Front Line. If the meeting at Malta and subsequent talks with Muzorewa and Sithole take place, then the Front Line meeting will be afterwards. But if the Malta meeting falls by the wayside, we will proceed directly to meet with the Front Line. The British accepted our position that we need to move ahead promptly and to present the Front Line with a total package on which we can stand. Our position with the Front Line will be based on our willingness to proceed provided we have their support.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2535. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Maputo, Pretoria, and Rome.

2 In telegram 18646 from London, November 13, the Embassy transmitted the text of the working paper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2543)
4. Owen was agreeable, if hesitant, to accept that we must proceed with whichever groups are prepared to go along with us. We all agreed, however, that this step would have to be considered more carefully if we get to it. In a private conversation with Moose, Owen had no problem with Moore’s suggestion that the presentation to the Front Line be made by a high level political figure; he himself would be prepared to go and he hoped that Andy Young would accompany him.

5. We reviewed and jointly approved British messages to Nyerere, Machel, Nkomo and Mugabe, noting the invitation to Malta, Mugabe’s acceptance and the hope that Nkomo also would agree to attend. The idea of a similar message to Kaunda was considered and rejected, in view of the fact that Nyerere would be seeing him on Friday and it would be better not to complicate that meeting.

Streator

174. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, November 29, 1977

Attached is Cy Vance’s summary of the current situation as he sees it in regard to Rhodesia.

I have certain reservations about simply moving straight down the old path without taking into account the fact that Kaunda, Smith and Nkomo all do not support the Anglo-British plan.

I therefore believe Cy’s proposals require some serious discussion and have scheduled a PRC meeting for Thursday, December 1.

Do you want to give us any guidance?  

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 9–11/77. Confidential; Nodis. A stamped notation reads: “The President has seen.” Carter initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the page: “Did not send to State.”

2 Carter wrote in the margin below this: “Yes—Identify a) mandatory elements of US/Br plan & b) those on which some flexibility might be discussed with British, listing any options. JC.”
Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, November 29, 1977

SUBJECT
Rhodesia

Ian Smith’s conditional offer to talk with internal Rhodesian nationalists about majority rule is not, in our view, likely to produce a viable “internal settlement.” Muzorewa and Sithole, to whom Smith addressed the offer, have cautiously welcomed it, but said they will have to examine any conditions very carefully. They seem to be insisting on the inclusion of external nationalists in settlement negotiations and that they will accept nothing short of a genuine transfer of power on the basis of one man, one vote. Smith is unlikely to settle for less in the way of assurances to the whites than he has demanded in connection with the British-American plan, including a blocking vote for whites. This alone could deter an internal deal.

Nevertheless, we expect Smith’s statement to have a significant short-term impact. It could induce a more reasonable attitude on the part of Nkomo and Mugabe, and even serve to reunite Kaunda with his Front Line colleagues in support of an open election. The Patriotic Front may well be alarmed by the prospect of an election in Rhodesia from which they were excluded. They might fear that if a black government takes power, support for the Patriotic Front from elsewhere in Africa might fade, leaving the Patriotic Front isolated.

At the same time, it is still our view that a majority rule election from which the Patriotic Front is excluded would signal the start of a new round of violence in Rhodesia, with the Patriotic Front disrupting elections and/or attacking a black Rhodesian government which it would portray as a front for white interests. It is precisely this eventual-

---

3 Confidential; Nodis.
4 In telegram 6496 from Pretoria, November 30, the Embassy provided a transcript of Smith’s November 24 press conference. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770445-0185)
5 Carter underlined this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: “ok? adequate? (as crucial elements).” In telegram 6386 from Pretoria, November 25, the Embassy informed the Department of Fourie’s understanding of Muzorewa and Sithole’s position. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770437–1128)
ity, one which would likely invite increased outside involvement, which our plan seeks to avoid.

While it may be tactically useful to have Nkomo worried about the possibility of an internal settlement, we must be alert to the danger that the Front Line or Patriotic Front may charge collusion on the part of the British and ourselves with Smith in Smith’s latest move. Some of the press commentary suggests a British willingness to consider Smith’s offer. In part this interpretation is traceable to Owen’s rather positive comments on the Smith statement in contrast to our own statement which was more guarded. We are making clear to the press, the Front Line, and the Nigerians our misgivings about Smith’s offer and our will to press on with our proposal. Without going so far as to appear to reject Smith’s movement towards one-man, one-vote, or to relieve the pressure on the Patriotic Front we are emphasizing the importance of elections open to all, and of avoiding a civil war.

We have now reviewed the current situation in the light of the inconclusive Carver round and Smith’s statement. We conclude, as we always have, that it is essential to press ahead with the British-American plan. Indeed, in the light of recent events, it is more important than ever to demonstrate that our plan is still alive. Our energetic espousal of independence for Rhodesia and our active engagement in efforts directed toward that end have been a major contributing factor in our improved relations with the OAU states.

I plan to see David Owen during my December 7–9 visit to Brussels for the Nato Ministerial meeting. I would like to be in a position at that time to agree with him on a course which would move our proposals ahead. Subject to your concurrence, I intend to say to Owen:

—We strongly believe we should move ahead and avoid a passive or temporizing defensive posture.

—If we cease working for a genuine democratic transfer of power in Rhodesia, the only alternative to Smith’s inadequate proposals will be escalating violence and growing pressure on us to remove Smith, but without concurrent Front Line and Patriotic Front agreement to a follow-on process designed to ensure an orderly transfer of power by democratic means.

—We should move as quickly as possible to complete staff work on the various components of our proposals so as to present them to a meeting of the Front Line Presidents before Christmas.

—Specifically we should complete the draft constitution and an elaborated proposal on transition arrangements, including peacekeeping provisions.

---

6 See Document 172.
—At the same time we should agree on a new strategy for pressures to induce South Africa to bring Smith to accept our proposals, so that we can give assurances to the Front Line on this matter, confident that we really know what we can do.

—On the basis of President Carter’s affirmations to President Nyerere\(^7\) and General Obasanjo\(^8\) that we are prepared to take the necessary steps to implement our plan (once African support for it has been achieved), we are prepared to decide with them upon various measures to induce South Africa to press Smith.

—The South Africans may respond favorably without pressure being placed upon them, since South Africa’s best interests would be served by a stable settlement in Rhodesia. But some pressure may be necessary, and we want to be prepared.

—At the proposed Front Line meeting, we suggest that David Owen and Andy Young lay out our elaborated proposals and invite them to comment particularly on those provisions such as plans for the transition and future of Zimbabwe army, which will necessarily be incomplete because of the lack of cooperation of the Patriotic Front.

—We would ask the Front Line states to endorse our final proposals and give us their full support in securing Patriotic Front acceptance of the plan. We would provide, in return assurances that our influence would be used to secure Smith’s acquiescence once we had complete African support.

I have already written to Owen emphasizing the need for quick movement on our part and raising these general topics as areas for concentrated study over the next few days, before we meet in Brussels.

Pursuant to your affirmation that the U.S. would take the necessary measures to put our plan into effect once African support had been obtained, I am prepared to discuss the issue of pressures with Owen in Brussels in the terms laid out above. If you believe, however, that a PRC meeting to obtain general agreement on this course of action is necessary, such a meeting could be scheduled for December 3.

---

\(^7\) See Document 164.
\(^8\) See Document 171.
175. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, December 1, 1977, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS
State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Assistant Secretary Richard Moose, African Affairs
Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning
USUN
Ambassador Andrew Young
Stoney Cooks, Executive Assistant
CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner
William Parmenter

JCS
Lt. General William Smith
NSC
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
Henry Richardson

This meeting considered next steps on Rhodesia in light of Ian Smith’s recent offer to negotiate with Muzorewa and Sithole on a qualified basis of majority rule towards a Rhodesian settlement. Discussion focused on a moderately active approach versus an active approach, the difference lying mainly in the speed with which the United States and the British move towards meeting with the Front Line states to confirm their acceptance of the Anglo-American Plan. Sithole’s views expressed during his recent visit to Washington, as they related to Smith’s offer of talks, were noted. A fundamental question was whether the Front Line states must express unified agreement for the Anglo-American plan before the United States committed itself to force Smith out.

It was generally agreed that unless the United States gave fresh indication of its willingness to remove Smith, events including the

---


2 See footnote 4, Document 174.

3 In telegram 273087 to London, November 15, the Department, reported on the November 14 meeting between Vance and Sithole. The Department noted: “He has refused to become involved in an internal settlement because it would ruin his credibility. He believes Smith would be prepared to accept a settlement if he can save face, is given an honorable way out, and can be assured that whites who remain in Rhodesia will be treated fairly.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2459)
Chomoio raid into Mozambique by the Rhodesians would force our hand, so that we would be faced with a possible Security Council resolution on oil sanctions, presenting a decision on a US veto. In this connection, there was some indication that Kaunda may be moderating his position on installing Nkomo without elections somewhat back toward the Anglo-American Plan.

There was general agreement that Kaunda’s personal emissary, Mark Chona, should be treated warmly, including seeing the President. The importance of continued communication with the Nigerians was discussed and agreed.

It was suggested that the Special Requirements Fund might be used to buttress Botswana and Lesotho against the detrimental effect of possible oil sanctions against Rhodesia, as a signal of US determination.

Secretary Vance summed up:

—General agreement on the moderate active approach; he would talk on this basis with Owen on December 7. This would exclude an early Front Line meeting with Ambassador Young and Owen. He will urge Owen to send Carver to see Machel.

—The United States should prepare to act affirmatively on oil sanctions on a graduated basis, if necessary. If the issue poses the question of a US Security Council veto, it should be most carefully negotiated towards foregoing such a veto.

—The US should attempt to dissuade African states from bringing an oil sanctions resolution to the Security Council, but in response to African pressure, which might come within the next week, the British or the US would initiate an "Indian" resolution on oil sanctions calling on all nations to review their domestic oil policy on the activities of overseas subsidiaries which might be engaged in violation of sanctions against Rhodesia.

—The United States will seriously consider initiating a resolution of condemnation in the Security Council against Rhodesia for the Chomoio raid.

—The possibility of declaring Mozambique a disaster area for PL-480 purposes, and extending aid to it on that basis will be urgently explored.

—The Secretary will immediately contact the British on the oil question, discuss the dangers of having the US-British hand forced, and suggest that the British take the initiative in introducing an Indian resolution.

---

—The Secretary will seek the opportunity to publicly announce humanitarian aid to Mozambique, if this proves possible, and to publicly condemn the Rhodesian raid.

—In this connection, State will be consulting appropriately with Congress.

176. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, December 4, 1977, 0139Z

289251. Subject: The Rhodesian Raid on Chimoio.

1. As stated publicly by Department spokesmen, recent Rhodesian raid on Chimoio has stirred great concern in Washington. As more complete reports reach us, it is clear that many civilians were killed as well as guerrillas. We believe that point must be made to Smith and South Africans that this reliance on raw military power poses great risks for long term prospects for peaceful future for all inhabitants of Southern Africa apart from immediate deleterious effects for attempts to reach a negotiated settlement.

2. Accordingly, unless you see strong arguments, against such a course, you should at the first opportunity convey to Hawkins and Fourie the following points:

—More complete reports including eyewitness accounts have now made clear that substantial number of women and children as well as young men were killed in the raid on Chimoio.

—[garble] deplore this tragic loss of human life, which not only underlines the urgent need for a settlement but calls into question the sincerity of any protestations by Rhodesian officials that they want to negotiate a solution.

—The bitterness engendered by these deaths as well as those of large numbers of guerrillas must have the most serious consequences for present attitudes about negotiations but also for the long term

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770449–0605. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Dennis W. Keogh (AF/S); cleared by Edmondsen and Moose; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Maputo. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Lagos, Gaborone, and London.

2 See footnote 4, Document 175.
prospects for a lasting settlement which would include a future role for all residents of Rhodesia.

—Whatever the short run military advantages gained from the attack, these will be outweighed by the anger and frustration which some Africans will carry with them for years to come.

—Moreover, such actions do no good for the public image of whites in Southern Africa in the US and Europe as the press play on these events erodes whatever sympathy they may enjoy.

3. You should also say to Fourie that as we had predicted to the SAG following an earlier attack on Mozambique this action is leading to sharply mounting pressure in the UN for expanded sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa.

4. We are pouching for you to pass to both the SAG and Hawkins copies of photos and stories on brutal methods employed by Rhodesians given prominent play December 3 by both Washington papers (front page in the Star) which will underline the last point in graphic terms.

5. For London: you may share this cable with FCO.

Vance
1. At earliest opportunity, you should seek an appointment with President Machel to pass to him the following oral message from President Carter concerning the recent Rhodesian raids and their aftermath (reftel):

   Begin text: I have asked Ambassador Depree to convey to you my own sorrow and that of all Americans at the tragic and senseless events of recent days which have so deeply affected the people of Mozambique and Zimbabwe and those everywhere who respect human dignity. I want you to know that we are taking steps to make it unmistakably clear to the Smith regime that we condemn such actions and would take a most grave view of any repetition. This tragic killing of innocent women and children and the destruction which accompanied it make it more urgent than ever that no time be lost in bringing independence and majority rule to Zimbabwe. In this regard, we understand that the British Government will be approaching you concerning the possibility of your meeting at an early date with Lord Carver, accompanied by Ambassador Low, and General Prem Chand so that they may discuss the details of the settlement proposals with you and learn your views. It is our desire to help Mozambique assist those who have been the victims of the recent attacks and who have been displaced from their homes in Zimbabwe by the fighting. Accordingly, we are looking to the possibility of providing additional funds to the UN High Commission for Refugees for its refugee programs in Mozambique. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770449–0671. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by James Nach (AF/S); cleared by Vance, Moose, Brzezinski, Marianne Spiegel (S/P) and Leonard Pompa (AID/AFR/SA); approved by James E. Thyden (S/S). Sent for information Immediate to Pretoria. Sent for information to Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, and London.

2 In telegram 1455 from Maputo, December 2, the Embassy transmitted Machel’s request for assistance to prevent additional Rhodesian raids. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0043)

3 See footnote 4, Document 175.

4 See Documents 176 and 178.
2. As you may already know from Ambassador Lewen, Prime Minister Callaghan is sending a message along lines similar to the President’s response.

3. For London, you may share this message with FCO.

Vance

178. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, December 6, 1977, 1100Z


1. I conveyed the points on Chimoio raid contained in ref tel to Hawkins on Monday, Dec. 5. In the absence of Fourie and his Deputy, Van Dalsen, DCM saw next in line, John Becker, Under Secretary, North and Latin American division of DFA. The latter made no comment other than to ask confirmation DCM was expressing views of USG and to say our approach would be brought to the attention of Foreign Minister Botha that same afternoon. Hawkins, however, reacted sharply. Hawkins said that this is another example of America’s “double standard” and “selective morality”. He asserted that the Anglo-American negotiating initiative was dead because the PF did not want a negotiated settlement but only a solution through the gun. Despite this USG condemns Rhodesia for taking defensive action. I told Hawkins that Rhodesians deceive themselves if they think that the Anglo-American effort is dead. It is very much alive and is being pursued. There can be no justification for the Chimoio in terms of the long-term interests of whites in Rhodesia despite any immediate advantage that might have been gained.

2. Hawkins countered that the raids were specifically aimed to spoil the PF offensive which was being planned for the start of the rainy season. At the two centers hit some 3,000 guerrillas were being assembled and supplied with the arms coming mostly from Maputo.

---


2 See Document 176.
If they had been allowed to infiltrate Rhodesia, it would have taken 18 months to root them out with untold loss of life in Rhodesia among whites and blacks. It is tragic if women and children were hurt during the raids, but clearly the exercise was pre-emptive action against guerrilla concentrations.

3. I repeated arguments contained in talking points and stressed that Anglo-American proposals are very much alive. Hawkins promised to convey message to Salisbury.

Bowdler

179. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Brussels, December 8, 1977, 1542Z

Secto 12013. Lagos pass McHenry. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary’s Meeting With Owen.

1. Secretary Vance met with David Owen morning of December 8. They agreed on number of steps that could be taken in order to push forward the Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia. They also recognized that both the timing and manner of implementing these steps would to some degree depend on whatever develops in Smith’s internal talks and the results of a possible meeting with Nkomo in London.

2. The Secretary asked for Owen’s view on a visit to Maputo by Lord Carver. Owen said he had no difficulty with the proposal and that Lord Carver was anxious to go. The Foreign Secretary, however, said he understood Chissano had informed us that a visit would not be possible until after Machel’s return from Nigeria and probably, therefore, some time in January. The Secretary said we might nevertheless be able to advance the timing of the Carver trip, particularly if we enlisted Obasanjo’s support. Owen agreed that we should make the appropriate contact with the Nigerians.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770456-0935. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Pretoria, Lusaka, Maputo, Lagos, London, USUN, Dar es Salaam, and Gaborone. Vance was in Brussels for the NATO Ministerial meeting.
3. The parties discussed at some length the status of the independence constitution and the provisions for the transition. Owen reported that the constitution was close to a final version, and that Lord Carver’s staff had also worked out more detailed proposals for the composition of the army and the role of the United Nations forces. Moose commented that the inclusion of an Advisory Council in the transition government was a positive addition, but that the proposal could be cast in a more positive fashion. Owen agreed and added that some amplification was needed in the description of how the police would function during this period and suggested a closer supervisory role for the UN forces in relation to the police as a means of allaying Patriotic Front suspicion of Smith’s police. There then followed some discussion on the advisability of publishing the draft independence constitution. The parties agreed that this might be a useful instrument for maintaining pressure on both Smith and the Patriotic Front and for stiffening the negotiating hand of Sithole and Muzorewa. We will consult further on the possible timing of publication.

4. The Secretary and Owen also agreed that the time was right to bring the South Africans abreast of developments. They concluded it would not be appropriate for Lord Carver to visit Pretoria, and agreed instead that Brand Fourie should be invited to London. Owen felt it would be especially worthwhile to describe to Fourie in some detail our plans for law and order in the transition and for the new Zimbabwe army. The British will contact Fourie with an invitation to come to London within the next two weeks. The Secretary suggested Dick Moose might also join the discussions and said that a decision as to whether the meeting should be publicized or not ought to be left to Fourie.

5. The Secretary asked for Owen’s thoughts on how the US and UK should react to expected demands in the United Nations for oil sanctions against South Africa. He described the draft Indian resolution and asked whether Owen agreed it would be tactically advisable to put forward a draft ourselves in the expectation that a stronger resolution might be proposed by an African group. Owen responded that the Indian resolution presented legal difficulties for the UK particularly on questions of jurisdiction over subsidiaries operating abroad. Holloway described our belief that pressure is building in the UN that the US and UK should consult on tactics before the General Assembly adjourns.

---

2 In telegram 2878 from USUN, September 2, the Mission transmitted the text of the draft. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770319-0459)
later this month. Owen agreed to review the issue and said he would be back in touch with us within a week.

6. The Secretary raised the question of whether we should be working toward a meeting with Front Line Presidents. Owen said he supported the objective but questioned the timing. He agreed that if a meeting could indeed be arranged, it ought to occur some time before the February OAU conference and suggested late January as a possibility. He said he was still uncertain whether a meeting with the Front Line Presidents could in fact be arranged and at what level we should participate.

Vance

180. Letter From President Carter to Zambian President Kaunda

Washington, December 9, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for sending me your latest thoughts on the Rhodesian problem. And I appreciated the opportunity to speak to you personally on the telephone December 6, and to have reaffirmed our continuing cooperation on resolving this problem. I am sending this letter by Mark Chona from my meeting with him.

You know how highly I value your experience and counsel, and how much I respect your commitment. I am glad that you understand the United States’ deep commitment to help bring majority rule to Zimbabwe. I am glad, too, that we agree that the transition to majority rule must come as soon as possible, to avert further violence and bloodshed among people who have already seen too much of both.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Zambia: President Kenneth D. Kaunda, 1–12/77. No classification marking.

2 In telegram 3576 from Lusaka, November 27, the Embassy transmitted Kaunda’s letter and memorandum to Carter. (Ibid.)

3 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter spoke to Kaunda from 4:07 to 4:15 p.m. on December 6. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

4 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Chona and Zambian Ambassador Ngonda on December 9 from 4:45 to 4:55 p.m. (Ibid.)
I will carefully consider the ideas you present in the memorandum accompanying your letter. We agree that the democratic ideal to which your nation and mine subscribe dictates that Zimbabwe’s new leaders be chosen without intimidation and violence. I understand your fear that the transitional period envisaged under the British-American proposals will not create the right atmosphere for peaceful elections. But in the spirit of candor which characterizes our relationship, I must say that, while organizing and holding free elections without violence during the transitional period will not be easy, it should not be impossible. With goodwill and determination from the parties and states involved, including your country and mine, it can be done.

In the coming weeks we shall be consulting further about the appropriate steps to take toward our shared goal of majority rule and independence for Zimbabwe. We will take your concerns very seriously as we try to ensure that the elections can be conducted without intimidation or conflict.

I was very glad to hear from Ambassador Low that you have accepted, in principle, my invitation to pay a State Visit to the United States in 1978. Although we both know from experience how events can alter such plans, I hope that next spring we will have the opportunity to sit down together and continue our dialogue in a personal spirit of shared commitment, friendship, and common purpose.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

---

5 See footnote 2 above. Kaunda’s memorandum, entitled “The Anglo-American Proposals: The Election Option,” criticized the British position that the transfer of power should be through general elections before independence. Kaunda argued that it would be “unwise to hold elections before the independence.”
181. **Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts**

Washington, December 13, 1977, 1835Z

297008. Subject: Additional Points in Vance-Owen Discussion of Rhodesia, December 8, 1977. Ref: Secto 12013.2

1. In addition to points contained reftel, the following items were also discussed in the course of the Secretary’s breakfast with British Foreign Secretary David Owen on December 8, 1977.

2. The provisions of the proposed transition arrangements dealing with an Advisory Council were noted. It was suggested and the two Secretaries agreed that when presented, this feature of the transition arrangements should be cast in the most positive form. As it now stands in the British draft the limitation that the Council is to be strictly advisory with no real powers, stands out a bit too starkly. Moose suggested recasting its presentation so as to specify areas of particular concern to the Council. It was agreed, nevertheless, that the Council should remain advisory only.

3. Owen noted that Smith may be seriously thinking of trying to provide some sort of role for himself in the transition or post-independence government. We have various intelligence reports that suggest this is his wish. All were agreed that Smith’s inclusion in any transition or post-independence government would be unwise.

4. Moose noted that various parties had reported Smith’s alleged concern over his own personal safety. Owen recalled that the British proposal does provide for amnesty and indicated that his government was prepared to provide additional assurances in this respect (Owen also noted that when we had presented the plan to Smith in Salisbury, some of the Rhodesians had asked whether the amnesty would include forgery and perjury).

5. The two Secretaries agreed that UN Secretary General Waldheim should be briefed on the results of the discussion at the earliest possible opportunity.

Christopher

Unquote

Christopher

---


2 See Document 179.
182. Letter From President Carter to Tanzanian President Nyerere

Washington, December 30, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter of December 13, which reached me a few days ago, added to the warmth of the Christmas season. Because the identity of our views on the Rhodesian situation is so marked, I am optimistic that 1978 will see the creation of an independent, majority-ruled Zimbabwe.

I agree that we must move forward rapidly and for this reason I attach great importance to Dr. Owen’s invitation to Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe to join him in serious negotiations. As you point out, the roles of the respective parties during the transition period remain to be defined. This is the kind of thing we expect representatives of the Patriotic Front to discuss in London or wherever the meeting is held. Talks with them will demonstrate that our settlement effort, aided by your support and assistance, continues to proceed.

For this meeting to succeed, however, we should avoid any precipitate moves in the UN or elsewhere which could complicate or divert attention from our efforts. I hope that you and our other African friends agree and will collaborate with Andy Young to this end.

The British White Paper of September sets forth a reasonable, logical and comprehensive plan to transform Rhodesia from minority to majority rule. It requires Mr. Smith to relinquish power. It neutralizes Rhodesia’s armed forces, and creates a new Zimbabwean army which, as we agreed, will be based on the liberation forces. We are determined to take all appropriate measures to implement these proposals.

Settlement attempts which ignore ideas like these do not merit our support because they do not provide for lasting peace. For this reason, I share your concerns about the recent initiatives of Mr. Smith. In this

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Tanzania: President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, 1/77–5/78. No classification marking.
2 In telegram 306770 to multiple posts, December 24, the Department transmitted the text of Nyerere’s December 13 letter to Carter. It was noted that the letter was delivered to the Department on December 21 by the Tanzanian Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770437–0493)
3 In telegram 206698 to all African diplomatic posts, August 30, the Department transmitted the text of the British White Paper. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770312–0901)
4 In telegram 6377 from Pretoria, November 25, the Embassy summarized Smith’s November 24 press conference, during which he committed himself “to the principle of majority rule based on ‘adult suffrage’ provided there are constitutional guarantees for whites. He also revealed that on this basis Muzorewa, Sithole, and Chirau had agreed to talks beginning next week aiming at an internal settlement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770437–0493)
connection, I agree with you that it is important for Reverend Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa to see that our efforts can bear fruit in the near future.

Your letter reminds me of how similar our goals for Zimbabwe are. We, like you, do not wish to impose a particular economic or political system on Zimbabwe or to choose its leaders. Rather, we wish to end a situation which offends the conscience of the world. We want to give its people an opportunity to select their leaders in an atmosphere free from fear. It is imperative that the new government be perceived by them and by the world as duly constituted and deserving of international and domestic support.

The coming year will be a momentous one for southern Africa and I appreciate your friendship and advice in meeting the challenges that will arise.

Please accept my best wishes for a very happy holiday season.

Warmest regards,

Jimmy Carter

183. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House

Washington, January 30, 1978, 2236Z

24416. Exdis Distribute as Nodis for Dr. Brzezinski. Following repeat Valletta 0117 sent action SecState info USUN New York 30 Jan 78.


1. We knew that the restrained demeanor of the PF during the morning session was no guarantee that the familiar tough positions would not re-emerge. Nkomo’s lunchtime statements to Dick Moose (reiterated at the outset of the afternoon session) did seem, however, to offer the prospect of some running room. On that basis, we had decided before going into the afternoon that we would keep the session short (in keeping with a private suggestion from Nkomo) and avoid...
getting into specifics. We would not lay down our revised transition proposals (as Owen was disposed to do) but wait for the PF paper\(^3\) promised by Nkomo at lunch. Nevertheless, Owen did press Nkomo for PF views on the transition but backed away when Nkomo clearly played for time. For some reason Owen then layed out a very general outline of our various Advisory Council ideas. When Mugabe reacted sharply to these saying the PF had “not been fighting to end up with seats on some Advisory Council” Nkomo moved quite deliberately to cut off what clearly would have become a confrontation.

2. On the basis of this episode and his own conversation with Nkomo at lunch, David Owen believes that Nkomo is far more disposed to deal than is Mugabe. His thinking immediately runs to how the two can be split and Nkomo gotten together with Smith. He sees the Anglo-American plan as the instrument for bringing this about.

3. Andy and I have proposed to Owen that we hear the PF on their proposals in the morning, but avoid coming to blows over what we fully expect to be unacceptable elements. In the afternoon we would lay down our elaborated transition proposals (which Owen has unfortunately already foreshadowed). Following some discussion we would break for the day, giving us time for further reflection and informal contacts. A Wednesday morning session might then be our final meeting and we would hope to end with agreement to consider the results at a later date.

4. Both we and Owen agree that our plan should be kept in play. In some manner yet to be determined we would get quickly to Muzorewa and Sithole following these talks to reassure them that they are not being frozen out and to warn them against closing a deal with Smith. At the same time we would consider whether Nkomo’s seemingly more flexible attitude offers any longer term prospects. In this connection both Nkomo and Mugabe are seeking private meetings with Andy and these may give us further insights. We will also seek to find out what Vierera, Machel’s very astute observer, is thinking.

5. These are obviously only musings on the first day’s events. All in all, it was not a bad day. We had expected fiery rhetoric and demands that we denounce the Salisbury talks. Perhaps the PF just wanted to

---

\(^3\) In telegram 25578 to the White House, January 31, the Department transmitted a copy of the Patriotic Front’s proposals for the transition period, which was received late in the evening of January 30. The Department noted that the text “embodies known PF positions, with central element being transfer of power from Smith to PF-controlled governing council at beginning rather than end of transition period.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Europe, Box 23, 1/18–31/78)
establish a reasonable image and will re-emerge tomorrow united on a hard line.

Laingen

Unquote

Vance

184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, February 1, 1978, 0143Z

25973. Fol rpt Valletta 0118 action SecState USUN NY info Cape Town, Dar es Salaam, Gaborone, Lagos, Lusaka, Maputo, Pretoria 30 Jan 78. Quote


1. Following is full text of first day’s sessions (morning and afternoon) of January 30 between UK/US, chaired by Foreign Secretary Owen and Ambassador Young, and Patriotic Front.

2. Owen opened hour and a half morning meeting by saying that he had not and will not waiver from the basic principles of the Anglo-American proposals as a basis for an internationally acceptable solution for Zimbabwe. Although he did not claim that only the Anglo-American Plan (AAP) would work, he insisted that its principles must be observed if a Rhodesian settlement is to be seen as fair by international opinion. To achieve that, it was impossible to exclude any significant section of opinion in Rhodesia. Owen admitted that it was difficult to negotiate on any one element of a Rhodesian settlement package apart from the others. He observed that no ceasefire could be achieved until the persons concerned with fighting agreed on such issues as law and order, the transitional arrangements and the independence constitution, and he recognized that those doing the fighting would not lay down their arms until they felt the process had become irreversible. We had tried to lay out our plan in such a way that the time scale and its irreversibility would be evident. Referring to the Geneva experience, Owen alluded to the problems which had arisen working out arrange-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780047-0719. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Davidow (AF/S); approved by Edmondson.
ments for an interim government, and pointed out how this experience had shaped the present emphasis in the AAP on a British Resident Commissioner balanced by a UN presence. He noted the other elements which the plan contained, including the proposals for the new Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), changes in the police force, the transition period and the independence constitution. He insisted that the UK and US public would measure the whole package by the yardstick of fair, free elections. Again asserting UK-US seriousness about the talks, Owen offered to explore any area which the PF wished.

3. Responding, Nkomo said it was useful to have met because it was urgently necessary to clarify the purpose of the talks between the UK and the PF. The PF had believed, when the British assigned a military man, Lord Carver, to meet with them and when the Secretary General had also appointed a military man as his representative, that it was understood the talks would be between those who were engaged in combat. The PF agreed that the subject of the meeting should be the interim arrangements which had to be settled as a prerequisite to a ceasefire. There could be no ceasefire, he said, until it had been made clear that the new set-up (the transitional arrangements) represented what the PF had been fighting for.

4. Nkomo argued that the interim arrangements were not simply a “political set-up”, but rather a “political set-up in the context of a military situation.” He said that the PF was not opposing other black political leaders, or trying to block free, fair elections. The PF had taken up arms to bring about a change in Rhodesia, and believed it necessary that the PF “superintend” what they were trying to bring about. He thought that the UK and the UN understood the nature of the transition, which was from a “war situation” to independence, and not a normal colonial transfer of power.

5. Nkomo, noting the presence of the Americans at the table, said in his view the US was there only to lend strength to the British position and did not really have a role defined in the proposals.

6. Nkomo did not agree that elections were the crucial element in Rhodesian settlement, but only one element, albeit an important one. He feared that the need for elections could be used to delay the formal coming of independence. He could see a situation in which in the months preceding a scheduled election there were riots and disturbances, and these could be used as pretexts to delay both the elections and independence.

7. Nkomo regretted not having been able to meet earlier with Lord Carver to discuss military disputes. He closed his presentation by asking Owen if the group had assembled to discuss substantive issues with a view to implementation of the AAP as modified by these discussions.
8. Owen said his answer was yes. On those points on which we could make firm commitments, we would make them. If firm commitments were impossible, we would say so. Owen pointed to Nkomo’s use of the term “superintend” as a point on which considerable detailed discussion would be necessary, as it could be a major problem.

9. Ambassador Young intervened to say that there was no question but that the UK and the US were in Malta as a result of a military situation, but that situation had not brought Smith to Malta. Because the PF’s military pressure had not brought Smith down, the UK–US had agreed to use diplomatic pressure either to bring Smith down or to the negotiating table. But that effort had in part depended on Front Line agreement and essentially on PF agreement to the principles of the plan. It also depended in part of the willingness of the South African Government to take some action at the appropriate time to replace Smith. Through no one’s fault, that had not worked out. Since Steve Biko’s death\(^2\) our chances for South African cooperation were much less. The Front Line Presidents had been divided on the principles of the AAP, and there had been other disagreements on some elements of the plan. Our effort now, he said, should be to try to come up with arrangements which may not be all that the Patriotic Front wants but would be all it needed. He reaffirmed that the US had never waivered in its support for the AAP, and for an internationally acceptable solution.

10. Moreover, Ambassador Young stressed, we had seen our plan as focusing on the military situation. One of the keys to undercutting Smith, we believed, was to remove the threat of civil war after independence. This would cut sharply into the willingness of many of Smith’s supporters to go on fighting.

11. Robert Mugabe then asserted his belief that the UK–US team regarded this forum as no better than discussions with Muzorewa, Sithole and Chirau.\(^3\) The PF, he said, saw this forum as the only possible way to bring about peace and an irreversible process leading to independence. This would cut sharply into the willingness of many of Smith’s supporters to go on fighting.

12. Mugabe asked if the UK was committed to finding peace, or if it still believed that the PF was only one of many parties to the

\(^2\) See footnote 11, Document 171.

\(^3\) Reference is presumably to the Carver-Chand talks. See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 172.
Rhodesian quarrel. He said the PF had been given the impression by Owen and Young in Lusaka that the only parties were the PF, the British and the Rhodesian Front (which the PF considered part of the British side). Therefore, when Lord Carver said he was going to Salisbury to get the views of the internal Nationalist parties, the PF considered this an act of duplicity. If the UK wanted to bring about peace, then it should talk to the PF to the exclusion of parties that had no military forces. Mugabe concluded by sharply asking Dr. Owen where he stood on this issue.

13. Owen, refusing to rise to the bait, said he stood behind the British-American proposals of September 1. They attempted to straddle the problem which Mr. Mugabe had defined. There was no question but that military problems must be discussed with people who had military capabilities. We were trying to arrange a meeting between the two fighting forces and there was no dispute on such a need for the meeting or about the idea that only persons who commanded military forces could discuss military topics. But on non-military matters, if we seek to exclude other parties, then we will be unable to justify that action. This meeting is an attempt to clarify those aspects which are military. But there should be no doubt that the UK would treat all persons who seek to run in an election equally. Nonetheless, there were important elements which the military men must discuss.

14. Nkomo asked if we could agree that a ceasefire can only be discussed intelligently if we know what will take the place of the present set-up, and that knowledge of the internal arrangements are important to the ceasefire. He returned to this point a number of times. Owen agreed that it was impossible to achieve a ceasefire unless these matters were clarified. [garble] arrangements if others besides the fighters enter into discussions. Following those talks we could discuss an independence constitution and purely political arrangements. Owen agreed but insisted that some elements of the interim arrangements would not relate only to a ceasefire.

15. Nkomo argued that ZIPA and the young men and women who make it up were not a political instrument acting in favor of some people. ZIPA, he said, is a military instrument fighting for all the people of Zimbabwe. He understood, however, the difficulty faced by Dr. Owen, how to separate “the Siamese twins” of military and political topics so that they survive the operation. But he must assert that the young people who are doing the fighting were part of Zimbabwe and were greatly interested in what kind of a settlement was negotiated.

4 For text of the proposals, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, pp. 28645–28648.
16. Owen agreed that this was the precise problem. We recognized the PF claim to have a role and refuse to accept that the transition period would see no role for its liberation forces. At the cost of some criticism, we had made provision for this in our plan. We accepted this as a reality but had a problem in agreeing that “superintending” should carry through to such things as demarcating constituencies and administering elections. We understood the PF point of view but they had to be aware that if the British Government was going to take responsibility for the settlement it must be passed through the House of Commons, and the House would not agree to one party in an election superintending that election.

17. Owen said that if the PF won a military victory, it could make its own arrangements and write its own constitution. But in the ambiguous situation which existed, the PF could not expect him to negotiate with the other side, when they still retained some substantial military capability, as though they had been defeated. Moreover, the British could not ignore the claims of the other Nationalists.

18. Nkomo quickly said he thought we had arrived at a practical problem. Here we must pinpoint what we mean by the question of superintending the ceasefire. It was complicated question and we should now discuss what it means. He said that he believed Dr. Owen had given a commitment that the fighting forces should discuss the prerequisites for a ceasefire, and this meant discussing the interim arrangements. The framework must be agreed and then fit in with the other political elements. Although there were other aspects to be considered, Nkomo said the general supervision of the arrangements must be in the hands of those doing the fighting.

19. Ambassador Young said he thought that the issues had been defined very well. He was very pleased that we had come so far in such a short time. Working in this spirit, he said he thought we could get much further. He believed that since we had made such progress it would be good to break for lunch on this very good note, with one clear problem now defined on the table.

20. As the morning meeting broke up, Nkomo and Mugabe raised again an issue that had been brought up before the formal session had gotten underway. They suggested that for the rest of the sessions the observers of the Front Line and Commonwealth States be invited to sit in on the meeting. Owen resisted this at first but said he was willing to discuss it further, and finally (at lunch) agreed that Front Line observers could attend further sessions but at the request of, or as part of the PF delegation. The Front Line observers were willing to attend on this basis, but the Commonwealth representative (Nigerian) probably will not do so. We favored allowing them all in without condition, but Owen was adamant.
21. Comment: We got off to a good start, even though Foreign Secretary Owen was disappointed at his inability to dissuade PF from tabling their plan. Owen fears that a PF proposal will add undesirable rigidity to further discussions. Nevertheless, the meeting had a generally serious and businesslike tone, with cordial atmosphere and little of the expected rhetoric or bombast from the PF. Owen kept his initial comments short and positive, and Nkomo responded in kind. Only emotional moment came when Mugabe accused British of duplicity over Lord Carver’s discussions with Muzorewa and Sithole, a charge to which Owen did not respond.

22. PF seems anxious to explore possibilities for moving towards some measure of agreement on interim arrangements. Both Nkomo and Mugabe arrived with sizeable delegations (26 and 19 respectively), including both military commanders and legal advisors, again conveying an impression of intent to pursue serious negotiations. Further substantive comment follows septel.  

23. Atmosphere at lunch, hosted by Ambassador Laingen for all delegations, including observers, was also very cordial, with good interaction on all sides. Private discussions which Owen and Young were able to conduct with Nkomo and Mugabe during lunch were similarly cordial and free of rhetoric.

24. Over lunch in separate conversations with Joshua Nkomo both David Owen and Dick Moose developed some new insights into the PF position, or perhaps more accurately, Nkomo’s own outlook.

25. Nkomo told Moose that when he spoke in the morning session of the PF “superintending” the transition he did not have in mind an “exclusive exercise of power” but they did want to be able to “direct” what was done. He denied that the PF wanted to “do everything”. Most functions, he said, could be performed by others so long as the PF had some means of ensuring that “the direction is not lost.” Nkomo also said that the “structures” which might be created for this purpose could include “others” but that these “others” need not be named.

26. David Owen told us that in his conversation Nkomo evidenced awareness of the domestic political problems posed for the US and UK Governments by the internal talks and the PF position on the transition. According to Owen (who may have led him on) Nkomo acknowledged that Mugabe was a “problem”.

27. Nkomo also suggested to Moose that the afternoon session be cut short so that the PF could work on a paper which it wished to present containing transition and constitutional proposals. Although

\[5\] See Document 183
the paper was already written, Nkomo said, it needed a bit of touch-
ing up.

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.

29. Nkomo responded by reiterating that the proposals for “super-

28. Afternoon session began shortly after 3:00 pm with the Front Line observers (Mozambique) present, as was agreed in the morning session. Owen began the session by restating the agreement reached at the conclusion of the morning session, i.e., that delegates would now begin to discuss the relative responsibilities of the Resident Commissioner of the Nationalist parties during the interim period, to include provision for a special military role for those actually doing the fighting. Owen acknowledged that the decision on where to draw the line in dividing the responsibilities during the interim would be a very difficult one.
several other parties. This predisposition of non-agreement in effect constituted a vetoing of the talks with little progress being made. However, if the Patriotic Front came to agreement at the end of the current talks, then the UK and US, given their prior commitment, would have to deliver Smith. Young described two ways in which this might be done. For example, if the Patriotic Front were to come to direct agreement with the Rhodesian Front on military arrangements, perhaps this might quicken the process toward majority rule. On the other hand, if that scenario did not occur, then the US and UK would have to apply pressures through the South Africans on Smith and that might take an extended period. Young cautioned that the Patriotic Front should not exclude the shortest possible route to gaining majority rule, i.e., through negotiation, and indicated that the upcoming Proximity Talks on Namibia in New York\textsuperscript{6} could provide a good indication of SAG’s current attitude toward an internationally acceptable solution in Rhodesia as well.

33. Both Nkomo and Mugabe objected vigorously to the idea that Smith could be persuaded to negotiate the transfer of power directly with the Patriotic Front. They insisted that we must come out of the present talks in Malta with the framework on which the US, UK and PF agreed is reasonable and fair. The US and UK must then use their powers to remove Smith and implement the agreement. Mugabe emphasized that the PF position is to negotiate with Britain and not with Smith. Owen agreed that our purpose now is to move to a situation in which at least we and the PF are in agreement and Smith is the one who must then be moved toward acceptance.

34. Owen suggested that pending the completion of PF papers for the interim arrangements, the conference might go on to discuss other areas. He noted that the British had completed documents outlining the independence constitution, the structure of the interim government, the structuring of the national army, the role of the UN force, and the role of the police. He mentioned in particular the need for discussion of the role of the Resident Commissioner, noting that the British paper provided for a transitional council, a military council to supervise the transitional military arrangements and a council to advise on establishment of the ZNA.

35. Both Nkomo and Mugabe balked at the idea of discussing other areas before their own proposals were tabled. Mugabe in particular bristled at the mention of a transitional council, pointing out that the ZNA had not fought all these years merely for a position on an advisory body. Neither saw any merit on embarking on the kind of discussion

\textsuperscript{6} The Namibia Proximity Talks took place February 11–12. See Documents 79–82.
Rhodesia

Owen had proposed since they had no clear idea as to where it might lead.

36. They reiterated their readiness to discuss the role of the Resident Commissioner vis-a-vis their own role during the transition and stated, in response to Owen’s prodding, that they were not insisting on an exclusive role for the PF during the transition. Owen again pressed to find out how soon the PF papers would be ready and urged that they be turned over this evening in order to allow time for careful review. It was agreed that the conference would recess until 10:00 am January 31.

Laingen

Unquote

Vance

185. Telegram From the Embassy in Malta to the Department of State

Valletta, January 31, 1978, 2130Z


Summary: In a three hour afternoon meeting with Nkomo, Mugabe and a restricted group, Owen outlined his improved proposal for a “governing council” and military advisory group for the transition period. In spite of encouraging indication at lunch that the PF was looking for a compromise they resisted our proposals and continued to criticize our refusal to accept their desire for a substantial and visible role in the interim government. End summary.

1. We met in small group with delegation leaders plus two, and UN reps. Although Angolan observers arrived this afternoon, Front Line reps were not included in session. Meeting lasted about three hours, devoted to revised US/UK proposals for transition period.

2. Owen began by describing our new proposal based on the desire expressed by the PF to assume greater responsibility during the transition period. He proposed a council made up of eleven members, two representing each of the five parties at Geneva with the Resident Com-

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780046–0937. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to USUN, Pretoria, Cape Town, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Lagos, Gaborone, and Mbabane.
missioner as non-voting chairman. UN Rep would have observer status. “Swallowing hard”, Owen agreed to call the body a “governing council”. The Resident Commissioner would be obliged to consult on all matters except those relating to external affairs, defense and internal security and the recommendations of the electoral commission. He would have the authority to legislate but could be overruled by two-thirds of the council which by the same vote could also initiate and pass legislation which he had not proposed. (text by septel)

3. The British also distributed another paper describing the two military advisory committees: The cease-fire maintenance committee and transitional military committee (text by septel). They pointed out that representation on the first of these would be limited to the military commanders (i.e. PF) while all parties would be members of the second, the function of which was to consider matters related to the formation of the independent Zimbabwe National Army.

4. Nkomo, Mugabe and their advisors questioned the Anglo-American delegations in detail about the proposals. They asked: Why representation should be based on Geneva and what special recognition was given to the fact that they, who had been doing the fighting, were responsible for bringing about the transition period. They complained that the proposal equated them with Muzorewa and Sithole who together with Smith would have a majority voice which they at most could only block. Nkomo complained that he could never sell such a proposal to the men who had brought about Smith’s departure. At one point he emotionally claimed that the proposals were aimed at the dismantling of his forces. Mugabe asked why so much power should be given to the Resident Commissioner. Young and Carver argued that the pressure of opinion exercised through observers in the press, the UN and the people of Zimbabwe would force the Resident Commissioner to act responsibly to prevent arbitrary and unfair action. He would be acting “under the public gaze”. The powers reserved to the Resident Commissioner were normal; they could not be exercised by a committee, they stressed how far we had gone in an attempt to meet PF demands.

5. There was a lengthy discussion of the police forces. Nkomo stressed that PF presence in the armed forces, police and judiciary is of enormous importance. He said that the police force could not be
left as it exists. He and Mugabe claimed that they could provide their own men for the force and insisted that the matter could not be resolved unless we agreed to a mixed police force. They complained that most of the police were engaged in political repression; that it was a biased organization and that it would take much too long to correct its abuses. Owen and Carver explained the difficulties of dealing with an untrained force or one that had been hastily organized. They said that as soon as agreement was reached the future chief of police would study the force to eliminate political elements and those engaged in unacceptable activities.

6. Owen and Young each referred on different occasions to the broader parameters of the discussion. Owen said he would not take a proposal to the Cabinet which did not have the support of the Front Line, and in particular the neighboring countries of Zambia and Mozambique. Andy Young described the many advantages which would accrue to the PF if it accepted the proposals including: Smith’s departure, dismantling of the army, depolitization of the police, independence, one man one vote, end of discriminatory legislation and the right of legislative authority in specific areas. At another stage he noted that if agreement was not achieved and a military solution was pursued, the US would have to review its position. One of the things it could do was to strengthen the surrounding states.

7. Comment: While the PF showed no give during the course of the afternoon, there was an easy give-and-take and an exploration in greater depth than we have ever had before with them on the problems a transition government would face. It was frankly looking for some way to demonstrate to its own forces a visible and substantial role in the structure of the transitional government. Though Owen was willing to go further than he had ever gone before, his maximum position clearly did not satisfy them. Nevertheless, we believe they recognized that Owen was making a genuine attempt to listen to and take seriously their concerns. Clearly there is no basis for agreement visible at this stage. The PF can claim to its critics that it has given our proposals serious consideration but not that it is willing to accept anything less than control over the transition period.

Laingen
186. Telegram From the Embassy in Malta to the Department of State

Valletta, February 1, 1978, 1730Z

140. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Summary of Discussion at Final Session of Malta Meeting.

Summary: At final session of Malta round February 1, Owen reviewed in detail course of previous discussions and suggested, with Amb. Young's endorsement, that it might now be appropriate to adjourn for reflection with view to meeting again in near future. Nkomo took opportunity to reiterate PF's views on importance of interim arrangements, stressing PF's insistence on prominent political role, opposition to UN peace keeping force and concern over retention of existing Rhodesian police structure. Owen offered to provide PF with copies of revised UK papers on the transition (which were given to ZANU, ZAPU and FL observers after the meeting), but Mugabe resisted Owen's suggestion that papers be published. PF readily accepted idea of subsequent meeting, proposing that it take place in Africa, but indicating they would consider suggestion by Owen and Young that next round take place in New York one day before start of Proximity Talks on Namibia. End summary

1. David Owen opened the final session of the Malta meeting by asking where we might go from here. Ambassador Young suggested that since we now have a clear understanding of each other's positions it might be the time to consult with those at home and consider our responses.

2. Nkomo agreed but before continuing complained about a BBC report which had suggested that the PF had accepted a greater role for the UN in Zimbabwe than was actually the case. Owen apologized for what might have been an unfortunate interpretation by BBC. He went on to recap for the plenary session the discussion yesterday afternoon. He reviewed extensively the points at issue, and explained some of the thinking behind suggestions for the transitional period which had been put into the Anglo/American proposals (AAP) to meet some of the anxieties of the Patriotic Front. He suggested that through participation in the governing council, the PF could have a genuine role, but one that would not be dominant. He added that the UN role provided a new aspect to the decolonization effort which gave the PF

---

the opportunity to appeal any injustices to the UN Security Council. In closing, he promised to provide position papers on the governing council, the cease-fire committee and the UN Zimbabwe force, as well as the over-all transition paper (a revised version of the present Annex A) to the PF and the Front Line later today.

3. Nkomo in response reviewed the points at issue, focusing on the interim arrangements. Again he argued that the PF as representatives of the people of Zimbabwe had the right to dominant role. The names he said who would be missing from the governing council under the PF’s plan had no right to appear there because they had no forces. Smith was included not because the PF liked him but because he had a fighting force, as did the PF.

4. Nkomo said the PF saw no role for a UN peace keeping force because he believed the military commanders of the two sides should agree on what should be done. The commanders of the Rhodesia Defense Forces would agree to do so to preserve their own interests. He again insisted the PF police should be introduced into the existing police forces in Rhodesia to restrain them from further injury to the population. Foreign UN observers could not do this because they would not know what was going on.

5. Nkomo said the PF wanted to complete the task of decolonization working with the UK, but since they were the senior partners the UK should work with them, since the PF controlled the situation.

6. Owen responding said Nkomo had made a very impressive statement. He agreed that the interim arrangements had become a crucial issue. Discussion, he said, had focused on the comprehensive nature of the settlement procedures. He said in light of the discussions which we had had it would be appropriate now to break off the talks for relections. We should now decide on procedures for further consultations, as well as what we were to say to the press. He asked if the PF objected to the UK publishing an elaborated White Paper.

7. Mugabe responded saying that he agreed with Owen’s point made yesterday that publication entrenches proposals and that therefore the UK should not publish its new proposals. Owen agreed and asked if we should meet again, to which Mugabe agreed with alacrity. Owen suggested that a future meeting should be decided upon when they had found a way to narrow the gap between the two sides.

8. Ambassador Young, pointing to the need for a firm press line, reminded the conference that there had been competition in the press between the Malta talks and those in Salisbury. He said that the more hope and trust that could be generated in Malta the greater the pressure

---

2 See Document 184.
on Smith. He said that the participants have an obligation to show some movement as soon as we can, and pointed out that this would help in obtaining South African pressure on Smith. Without South African cooperation, removal of Smith might be a long hard process. He hoped that in addressing the press we could show that the approaches we had taken here in building hope and trust were workable. He ended by saying that he believed that we should be working to replace the military risks being run by many young people fighting in Zimbabwe with political risks for a few political leaders. The future of Zimbabwe, he suggested, was more important than the political ambitions of any one sitting here at the conference table. The British and Americans were prepared to take some part of those political risks.

9. Nkomo then pressed for agreement in principle for a future meeting in Africa. Owen at first resisted but then suggested an early meeting in New York February 10, in conjunction with the Proximity Talks on Namibia. Young suggested that New York would be an excellent location because it was a center for world communications. Nkomo indicated only that PF would consider possibility of meeting in New York. It was agreed to say to the press the future meetings would be planned without specifying time or place.

10. Mugabe then asked if the US and UK could not condemn the Salisbury talks in discussions with the press. Young responded that to condemn the Salisbury talks was to encourage them, by encouraging Muzorewa and Sithole to agree they had no where else to go. After some wrangling, during which the Zimbabweans visibly bridled at Owen’s suggestion that the internal Nationalists claim to be operating within the context of the Anglo-American talks, a general press line was agreed on.

11. It was agreed that in general we would say to the press that the meeting had involved serious detailed discussion in which it became clear that a settlement package must be judged as a whole and not on its separate elements. The focus of the talks had been on the transition period, and some differences had emerged. Nonetheless, we planned to have future meeting, after a chance for reflection.

Laingen

---

3 Reference is presumably to the on-going Salisbury talks between Ian Smith and the “internal” Nationalists, in an effort to reach an internal settlement.
Washington, February 7, 1978, 0044Z


1. Para 2 below contains text of Secretary’s response to letter received Saturday, February 4 from David Owen concerning Rhodesia. Embassy London is requested to deliver it to FCO as soon as possible. For your information para 3 contains text of Owen’s letter to the Secretary.

2. Quote Dear David:

Thank you for your letter of February 5. I have discussed the Malta meetings at length with Dick Moose and Andy Young. They agree with your assessment of the meetings as useful in providing an opportunity for face to face contact with the Nationalist leaders. They also noted that, with the rhetoric stripped away, we were able to get a good fix on the Front’s position and measure the distance that separates us from them.

I agree that we should approach the Front Line once again in an effort to have them urge compromise on Nkomo and Mugabe. Dick Moose is discussing the tactics of this approach with Peter Jay.

I look forward to assessing the Rhodesian situation with you when we meet in New York. Sincerely, Cy Unquote.

3. Dear Cy:

Andy Young and Dick Moose will have told you of our 3 days in Malta. We had an extremely interesting time and it was a good opportunity to get to know the leading members of the Patriotic Front, some of whom I had not previously met. In that sense the meeting was a success. But on substance, I think we have to accept that we have come up against a crucial difference between us and the Front. In the paper which they put down they demanded a dominant role in the transition and a whole lot of other things which, taken individually,
it might be possible to improve in negotiation, but which, taken together, amount to a thoroughly unattractive and unacceptable package. The dominant role of course must be a sticking point for us since, as I said in the House of Commons yesterday, we could not accept the responsibility of conducting free and fair elections in the country if we did not have, with the United Nations, effective control with which to carry it out. We cannot compromise on this and I formed the impression that for the Front also their dominant role is not negotiable. As you know well, in agreeing to administer Rhodesia during the transition, we are putting ourselves at risk for a breakdown in law and order. We stretched our credibility near to breaking point in having the Zimbabwe National Army based on the liberation forces. The quid pro quo was the Front Line Presidents clear acceptance of continuity of police and civil service during transition. This position is now in grave danger of being eroded. We have rightly offered the UN civilian police role but we can go no further without critically upsetting the balance of the whole package. We have been as flexible as we can but now we must put steel into our position and, as we agreed with the President, stand firm on the high ground of what is fair and stick to it.

We have offered them another meeting but with a critical proviso that we have some greater measure of agreement first on the basic fundamentals of our proposals. We must do what we can to make a success of it, though I believe that another inconclusive meeting would be gravely damaging to the credibility of our initiative. For the moment, however, it certainly suits us to remain in contact with the Front in that it puts pressure on Ian Smith, and I have no doubt that the Patriotic Front for their part see advantage in keeping us engaged in discussions since they will calculate that this will prevent us from encouraging the Salisbury talks.

I think, therefore, that we must make another effort with the Front Line Presidents. If we are to do this it should be done in time for them to act with the Front before the possible meeting on the 10th, in case the Front tell us that they can manage a meeting in New York on that date. In practice I doubt if they will, but equally we cannot let it run too long and run the risk of being identified with an intensification of the arms struggle. We must try to pin them down to something well before the end of the month. I am asking Peter Jay to discuss how we might do this with your people. But I hope you agree with me that this is the right approach.

Once again I enjoyed working with Andy, Dick and the others. Looking forward to seeing you on the 11th.

David Owen.
188. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, February 17, 1978, 3:30 p.m.

Attendees

\textit{State}

Secretary Cyrus Vance
Assistant Secretary Richard Moose
Director, Planning Staff, Tony Lake

\textit{Defense}

Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
Deputy Assistant Secretary Walter Slocombe
LGEN William Y. Smith, JCS

\textit{CIA}

Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director
William Parmenter, NIO

\textit{USUN}

Ambassador Andrew Young
Dr. Anne Holloway

\textit{NSC}

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Reginald Bartholomew

Thomas Thornton (notetaker)

The situation. The announcement of an agreement among Smith and the “internal” nationalist leaders marks a new stage in the Rhodesian problem\(^2\) even though it leaves many problems unsolved. It is not certain that the black signatories will hang together and major questions, especially relating to the army and the form of the transitional government, are still open. We cannot estimate with confidence how the Patriotic Front (PF) leaders will react if a settlement seems to be gathering momentum. The Front Line Presidents would also be faced with difficult problems relating to their economies, domestic political situations and relations to their guerrilla clients. Although the military situation is not likely to be any worse for the Rhodesian government in the short term, the prospect of greatly increased Soviet and Cuban involvement looks likely if the PF does not join a settlement. The FL states may, against their own interests, accept an enlarged Cuban and Soviet presence even though this may have little short-term impact on the PF capabilities, given their low absorptive capability. The political costs for the US, especially in terms of complications of our Africa policy, could be great.

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 67, PRC 052, 2/17/78, Southern Africa—Rhodesia. Secret; Sensitive. The minutes are not attached and were not found.

\(^2\) On February 15, Smith and the “internal” Nationalists issued a statement announcing an agreement had been reached “on constitutional issues.” The final agreement was signed on March 3. (\textit{Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978}, pp. 28944–28946)
US domestic factors. Public opinion welcomes the apparent settlement and will react negatively if we seem to be opposing it. Even Sen. Clark and Rep. Solarz tell us they find it hard to maintain distance from the internal settlement. We cannot just put our heads down, however; we need to do something to maintain the initiative without committing ourselves prematurely for or against the internal settlement.

Analysis and response. Our objective remains movement towards a solution of the kind offered by the Anglo-US proposal: majority rule emerging from an electoral process, preferably in a peaceful manner. The momentum created by the Anglo-US proposal contributed to the positive aspects of the internal settlement. The internal settlement can be a significant step in the capitulation of the Rhodesian whites—the start of an inexorable and accelerating transfer of power once they see that black rule is becoming a reality. The touchstone of the success and acceptability of the Salisbury agreement will be how rapidly it promises to get Smith out. It may be able to do this more rapidly than either continued guerrilla struggle or the Anglo-US plan.

In public we should take some of the credit for the positive aspects of the Salisbury agreement and describe it as a possible “constructive step, provided it leads to a rapid transition to majority rule.” We should view it with restraint, however, and keep our options open.

If we are to play an effective role in the settlement process (we will have to, in order to protect our political position), then we must keep the initiative and maintain our credibility with all parties. To do this, we need to inform ourselves better on the prospects for a rapid transition to black rule under the Salisbury proposals. We also need to coordinate with the British (who are under great domestic pressure and probably would be glad to see us carry the ball by ourselves for a while). Further, we should take the next step in our dialogue with the PF and Front Line presidents—in terms of telling them that they bear a burden of responsibility for the Salisbury proposals because they failed to respond adequately to the Anglo-US plan. We should not put ourselves in the position of offering new proposals, but, rather, ask them what suggestions they have now beyond sterile calls for us to oust Smith. Our goal should be to build a bridge between the PF and Salisbury parties, drawing the former into the settlement process and thereby giving it more credibility, while reducing the danger of protracted guerrilla warfare. We would not push the Anglo-US plan at this point but keep it on the table as a standard against which any settlement must be judged, and a possible vehicle for bringing all parties together.
Action assignments

1. CIA should prepare an analysis of a situation in which the internal settlement moves forward while Nkomo and Mugabe continue to fight. Military aspects should be given particular attention.\(^3\)

2. STATE/AF should prepare press guidance reflecting the sense of the meeting and clear it, after which it will be promulgated and binding on all US Government officials and spokesmen.

3. If we come under pressure in the UN in the form of resolutions likely to reduce our flexibility, we should seek delay. USUN should build a case for this by briefing key Africans on our views and plans along the lines described above.

4. Assistant Secretary Moose and Stoney Cooks (USUN) should travel as follows: to London to meet with the British and talk to Sithole;\(^4\) onward to a place in Europe where they can meet with Muzorewa (depending on his schedule); thence to Africa to meet with all parties to the situation including Rhodesians, Front Line Presidents, PF leaders and South Africans. This trip should be started as soon as possible. The mandate of the team is: to coordinate what we are doing with the British; to learn from Sithole and Muzorewa, to the extent possible, what the prospects are under the Salisbury agreement for a rapid removal of Smith and transition to real black rule; to find out what the PF and Front Line presidents realistically want to do and want us to do; and without making specific proposals or commitments, to encourage a linking of the internal settlement with the PF.

---

\(^3\) Not found.

\(^4\) See Document 190.
189. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 21, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

3. Rhodesia: Sithole Discusses Internal Settlement with Owen: In conversations with Sithole in London, David Owen reviewed the broad outlines of the Salisbury agreement on constitutional principles and made several suggestions which would make the arrangements more acceptable to international opinion. Sithole seemed to accept David’s points. David also asked Sithole for his ideas on how to bring Nkomo into the internal talks, but Sithole, while acknowledging that Nkomo was an important figure who would be welcome, had little to offer on this.

The British are clearly anxious to explore the possibilities of splitting Nkomo from Mugabe. Dick Moose is off to London tonight to discuss with David our negotiating strategy.

Sithole’s version of the arrangements for an interim government coincides with what we know from press reports: a Council of State with one seat for each of the three black leaders, one for Smith, and a neutral chairman, and a Council of Ministers of the same proportions. The parties have already agreed to constitutional safeguards which reserve 28 seats for whites in an independence parliament, with power to block changes in the constitution; and a general formulation on the make-up of a new army which provides for no more than a promise of amnesty and integration into the Rhodesian Defense Forces of guerrillas wishing to join.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 2/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “Cy.”

2 In telegram 2831 from London, February 20, the Embassy reported on Owen’s meeting with Sithole. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780077–0546)

3 In telegram 2876 from London, February 21, the Embassy reported on the second meeting between Owen and Sithole. Sithole held that “a place in the transition should be provided for Nkomo . . . Nkomo, however, cannot expect a special place in the transition nor would he be welcome if he represents foreign interests. Nkomo and his army must submit themselves to a general political agreement which transfers power to the people of Zimbabwe, not to any particular individual or group.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780078–0432)

4 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Give me a simple tabular comparison. Prospective internal settlement vs our minimum requirements.” See Document 192.
190. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom**

Washington, February 26, 1978, 2059Z

49711. For Ambassador Brewster only. Subject: Rhodesia: Letter From Owen to Vance.

Following is text of signed letter from Owen dated 24 February 1978 and delivered to Department for the Secretary on February 26. Response sent septel.\(^2\)

Begin text:

Personal and Confidential

Dear Cy:

I have spent about five hours discussing Rhodesia with Dick Moose over the last few days and this has been very valuable. I am sorry I was not able to devote more time to it but I leave tonight for Jordan and Israel and I also had to spend some hours this week talking to the Rev. Sithole. I think we have stiffened him considerably along agreed lines about our joint concern over the issues of substance still to be decided in the Salisbury talks. I was, however, sorry that Dick Moose decided not to meet Rev. Sithole. I attach great importance to demonstrating to the world that we are open to all the parties to the dispute and in my view we would be unwise to underestimate Sithole's ability or his toughness as a politician. I believe he could well eventually establish a working relationship with Joshua Nkomo and together they could become a formidable combination. Certainly I cannot see how either alone has sufficient electoral strength to beat Bishop Muzorewa, although any predictions so far ahead of an election are hazardous.

For the first time since we started our joint initiative I detect the possibility of a different analysis of the problem. This is potentially serious and is why I write. Let me assure you that I will not take any unilateral decisions. The differences may be exaggerated by having to compress into a short space of time a difficult analysis and I certainly think it is wise for us all to stop and think. I am not so certain about my own analysis that I am not open to argument and could well change my view, particularly if I felt that you and I differed, for to my

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 111, 2/18–28/78. Confidential; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Edmondson. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2167)

\(^2\) See Document 191.
knowledge that would be the first time we had differed on any significant issue anywhere in the world since we started working together.

Working backwards, we start, I am sure, from an agreed position. Our long-term objective, besides bringing about a genuine transfer of power and fair and free elections for Zimbabwe, must be to prevent increased Cuban involvement in the Rhodesian situation, which would cause us to lose our current influence on Zambia, and as a lesser, though important, priority to keep Mozambique genuinely non-aligned and if possible with an improving relationship with both our countries. At the same time, we both want to keep good relations with the OAU and retain the momentum of our African policies. However, we need to be tough-minded about what exactly the OAU is. For example, Mauritius’ UN Representative, Krishna Ramphul, takes a line with the UN which is frequently at total variance with that of his own government. There is a feeling amongst some African countries that, over the last year, our two countries have tended to respond only to the vocal and radical voices in the OAU. Even the countries fairly close to Rhodesia are not united and their leaders are privately worried that we tend to lean over too much to accommodate the Patriotic Front, for example. This is thought, if not said, by Botswana, Zaire, Kenya, Malawi and Ghana, while further afield the Arab African states and the French-influenced African states are not as solid on the Patriotic Front as one would think from the decisions of Libreville and Tripoli.

Now, as to the way forward, our initiative always had as its greatest weakness the point on which the Front-Line Presidents not unreasonably focus, namely how we remove Smith or, as President Kaunda puts it “how to bell the cat.” We were able, by a mixture of confident assertion and letting it be known that we were planning for oil sanctions, to convince most people that we meant business, but this was only ever a credible strategy in a scenario in which we were able to convince all the main Rhodesian Nationalist leaders of our proposals, where they were solidly on board and where we only faced an intransigent Smith holding out for white minority rule. We do not face that situation now. We have not been able to rally all the Nationalist leaders to our proposals, and the world sees Mr. Smith as making very significant moves in the direction of a genuine transfer of power in agreement with Bishop Muzorewa whom the world sees as the most popular Nationalist figure inside Rhodesia. Malta opened a chink of light but, as I said to you in New York, there are still major differences and we for our part have very little room, if any, to make more concessions. Frankly, I believe that even if we managed to get the Patriotic Front to support our proposals, we would be a laughing stock if we proposed that we should apply oil sanctions against a Salisbury agreement in the present situation. We could also be severely attacked for backing
the forces of violence in an attempt to overthrow a genuine democratic settlement. That is certainly how people here would see it.

I know that most of your people would agree with this analysis but it is important to state this brutally and frankly now because if we can agree on this then we must surely be extremely careful in giving any credence to the view that our main emphasis now should be on trying to get the Patriotic Front to agree to our proposals. Reality dictates that our objective now should be to accept that we will have to somehow widen the area of agreement so that we aim to achieve a settlement at a point, and I do not know where it will be, somewhere between the Salisbury talks and the Anglo/US initiative. Such a settlement may not involve a complete ceasefire but it should aim to minimize the fighting. If you accept this analysis then our task is in a variety of different ways to get the Front-Line Presidents and all the parties to the dispute to recognize that this is the direction in which we are all going to have to go.

Furthermore, it means that if we are to achieve that point of maximum agreement at least one of the Nationalist leaders, and realism dictates that will probably be Joshua Nkomo, must come into some arrangement involving Smith, Muzorewa and Sithole. This does not mean coming in on the basis of the Salisbury talks but widening out from the progress we have made so far and the progress made in the Salisbury talks. How to achieve it is very difficult. I tend to believe, and may well be wrong, that if it were possible by clandestine means to involve Nkomo before the Salisbury talks firm up on an agreement, this would be better since I rather doubt that they will be prepared to give much once an agreement has been fixed and it will then be harder to involve Joshua Nkomo and prevent him taking the route of violence. I well recognize that to do this without alienating the Front-Line Presidents is extremely difficult. But again we must analyze what the Front-Line Presidents are, in particular the relationship between Nkomo and President Kaunda is crucial. My fear is that if we ignore what is going on in Salisbury on the basis of a policy of non-contamination we could find ourselves in a situation where Salisbury reaches agreement but we are identified solely with the Patriotic Front. The only way the Patriotic Front will then be able to influence Salisbury is to increase the violence. This in the short term can only be brought about by reinforcements, probably Cuban, and we, instead of being the negotiators, will become identified with the violence, particularly if we are committed to implementing our proposals through having brought the Patriotic Front to agree to them.

Now I do not underestimate in any way the difficulty of walking this tightrope. But I detect in the US position, and I hope I am wrong, a slight tendency to want to avoid making some of these choices and
to feel that by sticking only with the Anglo/US initiative and with the OAU we can stay clean and on the right side. I should stress that I am not saying that we should in any way retract our support for the principles of the Anglo/US initiative. It remains the right policy for us to have pursued, for it offered the hope of a ceasefire. But holding resolutely to that now will not, in my view, achieve either a ceasefire or a negotiated settlement, or a reduction in the violence. Yet in order to exert influence on the negotiation we must not be seen to move precipitately off the Anglo/US initiative. I well recognize that if the Patriotic Front came to us genuinely wanting to discuss our initiative, it would be difficult for us not to respond, but again I stress to you as I did in New York that the onus must be on them to indicate what movement they are making in our direction. If they did indicate such movement we should have to be careful to avoid the danger (which I have described) that we should be expected to deliver on our proposals, when in fact it is no longer in our power to do so. Instead we should aim to use any movement on their part towards us [as] a means of paving the way to direct talks between them and the Salisbury Group—and if that meant Joshua separating from Mugabe, he would be able to do it under the respectable umbrella of our proposals. But in the absence of a clear indication that they are prepared to move towards us in this way (or at least that Joshua is), I do not think that we should have another meeting with them, at any level.

I am sorry for this long letter but I think we should both be clear. I do not believe the present Salisbury settlement is viable and I am very worried about the situation outside the main centers, particularly in the Tribal Trust lands. There are nearly five million people there and it was there that Bishop Muzorewa rallied support and ensured rejection of the 1971 proposals as being unacceptable to the people as a whole (see the enclosed piece by Xan Smiley). Bishop Muzorewa may well start to toughen his demands in the Salisbury talks and we must watch closely his links with Robert Mugabe. If the Salisbury talks fail, in part because of our attempt to stiffen the terms, we must ensure that we are in a position to unify all of the four Nationalist leaders behind our proposals, in which case we would then only face Mr. Smith. This is another reason why we must not back off our proposals but, equally, why we must not offend Bishop Muzorewa.

I enclose a leader [letter] from the New Statesman which represents my views and mainstream Labour Party views.³ For your amusement, on the other side of the page is an account of what it is like to have

³ Presumably the article by Smiley and letter in the New Statesman were attached to the original letter delivered to the Department of State on February 26, which was not found.
one’s African policy subjected to questions day by day in the House of Commons. We can and will withstand domestic party political pressures.

I will let you know what happens in the Middle East. With best wishes, yours ever,

David

End text.

Vance

---

191. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

Washington, February 26, 1978, 2159Z

49706. White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Rhodesia: Response to Owen Letter\(^2\) and Talking Points for Use With Front Line and Nigeria. Ref: State 49593.\(^3\)

1. Please pass following message to FCO for Foreign Secretary Owen from Secretary Vance:

Dear David:

I have studied your letter, and I believe that there are really no substantial differences between us as to our objectives or our assessment of the circumstances which affect our immediate actions. Clearly we cannot, at this juncture, focus our efforts on the continued pursuit of the Anglo-US Plan ignoring the significant talks going on in Salisbury.\(^4\) At the same time, as you point out, we cannot retract our support of the principles of the Anglo/US Plan or be seen to abandon that initiative. To do so would undermine our ability to pursue common, long-term objectives in Southern Africa and advantages which we both

---

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2174. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Drafted by Keough; cleared by Moose; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Dar es Salaam, Pretoria, Lagos, Lusaka, Lilongwe, Maputo, Gaborone, USUN, Cape Town, and the White House.

\(^2\) See Document 190.

\(^3\) In telegram 49593 to multiple posts, February 25, Vance transmitted the draft instructions for a joint U.S.–U.K. approach to the Front Line Presidents and Nigeria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780087–0592)

\(^4\) Reference is to Smith’s negotiations with the “internal” Nationalists to reach a constitutional settlement.
recognize the Anglo/US Plan offers as a possible bridge between the Salisbury parties and the external Nationalists.

I believe that the only significant difference which may exist between us at the moment has to do with the nature and degree of interest which we are disposed to evidence to the Front Line governments with regard to further discussion of the plan. In my view it is important that we maintain a continuing dialogue with the Front-Line about developments in Rhodesia at this critical juncture. And, I do not believe that we can be successful in this if we show no disposition to be willing to continue discussion of the plan with the Patriotic Front. At the same time, I don’t believe that we have to chase after them.

After studying the views of our Ambassadors in Lusaka, Dar and Maputo, we have put together, as you and Dick Moose agreed, a set of talking points designed for joint use by UK and US Mission Chiefs with the Front Line. As you will see, they seek to walk a careful line between too much and too little interest in further pursuit of the Anglo/US Plan. I would appreciate your views on them. The Front Line Presidents may be meeting later this week and I think our approaches should be made before that meeting convenes.

I look forward to hearing about your trip to the Middle East.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Cy. End message

2. Following are proposed draft talking points for use with FL and Nigeria:

Begin text.

—We continue to share with you as the primary goal in Rhodesia a genuine transfer of authority to the majority of the population through a process which guarantees the opportunity for the people of Zimbabwe to choose their own leaders under impartial circumstances. The AAP so far seems to us to provide the best way to achieve this result.

—Divisions within the PF, and its continued insistence on a dominant role for itself during the transition period have kept us from moving ahead with the AAP.

—We do not think that an internal settlement is assured: Indeed our reaction has been one of healthy skepticism.

—At the same time, frankly, developments in Salisbury have created a situation which we cannot ignore. The apparent acceptance by Smith of one-man-one vote has given many people the impression that he has at last accepted a genuine transfer of authority to the majority of the population. Nevertheless, despite strong political forces in our own countries we have not accepted the Salisbury agreement.
We recognize that in fact the Salisbury talks are a long way from achieving an overall agreement which embodies a genuine transfer of power. We cannot pass judgment until the details of an agreement are known, but whatever comes out will be compared to the British-American Plan and must meet the essential test of a relinquishment of power by Smith.

As one might assume, the purpose of Rev. Sithole’s recent visit to London was to seek endorsement of the Salisbury talks. Dr. Owen explained in some detail our serious concern that the agreements now being negotiated in Salisbury will not produce a genuine transfer of power and therefore could not be counted on to end the war or win international acceptance. We are also making clear to the internal Nationalists our desire to achieve a settlement that would include all the parties.

We want to get your views on how to proceed in circumstances where PF will not agree to our minimum essentials and Sithole, Muzorewa, and Smith may reach some agreement in Salisbury. [Omission in the original.] [garble] for all of us.

It would also be helpful for us to have your views on how we could continue discussions on details of the Anglo-American Plan, keeping in mind the importance of its being a plan that all parties can be brought to accept.

Another meeting with the PF that only ends in disagreement over the powers of the Resident Commissioner and over control of the police and military forces would be harmful to our cause. It would strengthen Smith’s hand and leave us further from a satisfactory solution than ever, as well as subject us to a great deal of criticism which would tie our hands.

Moreover, the gratuitous attack on our two governments in the PF statement of February 25 raises questions about whether the PF is interested in such talks, and complicates our political problem even further.

We remain committed to the principles of the AAP and we have been deeply appreciative of your support for our efforts to achieve our mutual goal, an independent majority-ruled Zimbabwe. We look forward to continuing to have your help and understanding as we work towards that goal in the critical days ahead. End text.

Vance

192. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, February 27, 1978

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

3. Comparison of Anglo/American Proposal with Rhodesian Internal Agreement: I attach for your consideration a comparison of the elements of the Anglo/American plan and those of the internal agreement, in tabular form.²

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State³

undated

COMPARING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS WITH THE SALISBURY TALKS

The announcement in Salisbury of an agreement⁴ on some principles to be embodied in a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe has engendered a debate on the relative merits of what has been agreed so far in the internal talks, compared with the Anglo-American proposals. A major problem we have had in assuring the significance of the Salisbury talks has been that so far nothing has been published in written form or formally promulgated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN</th>
<th>SALISBURY ARRANGEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. TRANSITION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization of Transition</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of power to British Resident Commissioner, assisted by a UN presence and advised by a governing council.</td>
<td>Formula undecided. Smith wants Council of State consisting of 4 whites (including himself as chairman) plus Muzorewa, Sithole and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 2/78. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.
² See footnote 4, Document 189.
³ Confidential.
⁴ See footnote 2, Document 188.
Chirau. The Africans want 3 Africans and Smith, plus an “independent” chairman chosen by the four.

Ceasefire

A ceasefire, negotiated in advance by the parties, would go into effect at the outset of the transition period, and would be monitored by the Resident Commissioner supported by the UN peacekeeping force.

No plans have been made to negotiate with the major guerrilla forces for a ceasefire. The Salisbury participants are said to accept the view that as blacks are seen to take control of the government, support for the guerrillas, and thus the warfare, will dwindle. Disaffection for the war would reportedly be accelerated by an amnesty, the terms of which are not defined.

Elections

Electoral process to be free and impartial, administered by the Resident Commissioner, supported by the police and the UN presence.

Exact electoral process not yet specified—presumably to be carried out by the “transitional Administration” on which there is still disagreement.

Police and Armed Forces

At the beginning of transition, the Resident Commissioner will appoint a new police commissioner, and UN police observers will monitor police activities. The armed forces, under command of the Resident Commissioner and monitored by the UN force, will be restructured into the new Zimbabwe National Army, based on the liberation forces with acceptable elements of the current Rhodesian Defense Forces.

No changes have been announced concerning the police. There has been reportedly an agreement that ex-guerrillas will be eligible for the Rhodesian Defense Forces which will presumably remain Zimbabwe’s military arm.
International Presence

The Anglo-American plan calls for a Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, who would assist the Resident Commissioner, a UN peacekeeping force, UN civilian police observers, and additional UN presence to observe the election. Some hope has been expressed to the press in Salisbury that there would be international observers for the election, perhaps from Britain, as well as the world press. But it may be difficult to obtain international recognition of the neutrality of any observers if Smith remains as Chairman of the Council of State.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES

Form of Government

Mixed Presidential-Parliamentary system. Form of government not specified, but presumably present Parliamentary system would continue.

President is chief executive, elected by an absolute majority of the newly elected members of Parliament, who must have declared their Presidential preferences in advance.

Representation

100-person National Assembly to be chosen in 1-man, 1-vote elections; 20 specially elected members to represent interests of minorities. Specially elected seats can be eliminated after 8 years. Reportedly, 100-person National Assembly, divided between 72 seats chosen on common roll, 20 seats chosen by whites-only roll, 8 seats nominated by present Parliament (this ensures all 28 seats will be controlled by present government). Need for white seats to be reviewed after 10 years.

Constitutional Amendment

Some constitutional provisions (Bill of Rights, Specially Elected Members, Amendment of Constitution) are “entrenched” and cannot be amended for 4–8 years. In effect, 28 whites in Parliament can block changes in “entrenched” clauses in constitution, which still must be defined.
years, and then only after
general election, and must gain
\( \frac{3}{4} \) vote in Parliament.

**Bill of Rights**

Provides for right to life, liberty; protection from slavery and deprivation of property without compensation; privacy of home and property; fair trials; freedom of conscience and expression; private schools; freedom of association, freedom of movement, and freedom from discrimination.

Agreement has apparently been reached that the constitution should have a Bill of Rights, but no details on what rights should be protected have emerged.

**Independent Judiciary**

Judges to be appointed by President; subject to discipline of Judicial Review Commission.

Reportedly agreed that independent judiciary necessary; no further details. Present personnel may continue in office.

**Public Service Commission**

Appointed by President for fixed term, will have power to appoint persons to all civil service positions except for certain specified, politically sensitive posts to be filled by the President, or under purview of the courts or the Parliament (staff positions).

Three-man Public Service Commission agreed, with one black reportedly to be appointed per year for three years. Purpose said to be “to maintain standards.” Presumably most present officeholders will stay on.

**Pensions**

Pensions of officers compulsorily retired to facilitate reconstruction of civil service can be freely remitted abroad. Other pensions to be discussed. (Indirect facilitation of payment of pensions would be made through Zimbabwe Development Fund.)

Pensions guaranteed, and may be freely remitted abroad.
Dual Citizenship

Whether to allow dual citizenship reportedly subject for further discussion. If not allowed, five-year grace period for dual nationals to make decision of which to choose.

193. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, March 6, 1978

SUBJECT
Guidance on Rhodesia

As a result of our conversation with the President today, the following decisions on Rhodesia were taken:

1. The United States should seek the convening of a conference of the nationalists, the front-line countries, and—if possible—Smith to try to bring agreement among them on the basis of the Anglo-American plan, incorporating the positive features of the Salisbury settlement.

2. We will not support the Salisbury settlements nor condemn them. We will remain committed to the Anglo-American plan, and seek to bring the Salisbury settlement into conformity with it.

3. We will not support a veto by the British of the Nigerian Resolution. We will abstain with an explanation of our vote. However, we should also work to develop a resolution which all can support.

4. We should go forward with planning for a May visit from President Kaunda of Zambia.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material; Country File, Box 88, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 1–4/78. Secret; Sensitive.

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Mondale, Vance, Young, Brzezinski, Aaron, and Jordan from 2 to 3 p.m in the Oval Office. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

3 See Document 192.

4 Reference is presumably to UNSC Resolution 423 (1978), adopted March 14, by a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions (including the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, and Canada). (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, p. 227)
The Department of State should prepare a country paper on Zambia, outlining its economic and military needs and the extent to which U.S. assistance might be made available.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

194. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts

Washington, March 9, 1978, 0055Z

60166. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Bishop Muzorewa, March 8.

Summary: In conversation with Secretary, Muzorewa appealed for US support for internal settlement. In his presentation and in response to Secretary’s questions on details March 3 Salisbury Agreement, Muzorewa stressed his pragmatic approach toward negotiations, acknowledged that agreement was less than ideal, but defended position that most important consideration is that by end of year desired goal of independent, majority ruled Zimbabwe will have been reached. He asserted that Smith would remain Prime Minister in name only during the transition and that real power, including control of army and police, will pass to Executive Council. Muzorewa reiterated standard line that US and UK place too much emphasis on opinions of Patriotic Front, Front Line Presidents and OAU. He reaffirmed belief that majority of guerrillas will desert to support the internal settlement and that the only threat of civil war is between Mugabe and Nkomo. Muzorewa did not ask for lifting of sanctions, but picking up on idea suggested in his conversation with Owen, urged US support UN humanitarian assistance during transition. He was evasive about meeting with other Nationalists, but said he would consider the possibility. Muzorewa wants to speak at UN and Secretary encouraged him to do so, promising US support for his appearance there. End summary.

1. UANC leader Bishop Abel Muzorewa met with Secretary for one and a half hours morning March 8. Muzorewa was accompanied

---

by UANC officials Bulle, Nyandoro, Joyce Mutasa, and US Rep Nhamuswa. Assistant Secretary Moose, Tony Lake (S/P), Gerald Helman (IO), and Davidow (AF/S notetaker) also attended.

2. Secretary began meeting by thanking Muzorewa for his letter to the President, and welcoming opportunity for frank exchange of views. Muzorewa’s presentation, which was not well-focused, was explanation of what had led to Salisbury Agreement. UANC had accepted Anglo-American plan, but when it became apparent that some parties were trying to “highjack it,” UANC decided to be pragmatic and respond to Smith’s approach to negotiate. Negotiations were undertaken on basis that Smith put into writing a pledge that majority rule would come on the basis of adult universal suffrage, a major new concession on Smith’s part. After agreeing to universal suffrage at age 18, UANC felt that it had achieved its principal goal. It agreed with need for constitutional safeguards to allay white fears and to encourage whites to stay and not leave economy in ruins. Bishop said it was necessary to compromise on question of specially elected seats and other elements of agreement because Smith is the power to reckon with. In relation to the defense forces, it was agreed that guerrillas “in the bush” could return and that they would be merged with acceptable units of Smith’s army. The transitional government will implement this. Bishop stressed he was convinced that majority of Rhodesian blacks accept agreement and appealed to the USG to “take a courageous lead to endorse and accept what we have done.” He said door was open to those outside to return and help in the many tasks to be accomplished by December 31. He said Nkomo’s criticism of the settlement cannot be taken seriously. He had been willing to accept a lot less from Smith when they negotiated alone.

3. Secretary responded by noting that he would be meeting with Owen that afternoon for further discussion on Rhodesia. He noted that there is much in the Salisbury Agreement with which US could agree in principle, e.g., universal suffrage, majority rule, bill of rights, independent judiciary. We hope that as each of these principles is spelled out, they would as a package provide for a genuine transfer to majority rule. While the rights of the minority must obviously be

---

2 Not found.
3 For the full text of the March 3, Salisbury Agreement, see Keusing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, pp. 28945–28946.
4 Nkomo criticized the agreement on several occasions. Following the initial announcement on February 15, Nkomo pledged that “the war continues.” In a joint statement issued on February 26, he and Mugabe said: “We are resolved in our total condemnation of the sell-out agreement reached in Salisbury between Black puppets and the rebel fascist settler regime.” (Keusing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 28946)
5 See Document 196.
protected, this concern should not be distorted into a continuation of white privilege.

4. Secretary noted that those African states most intimately involved have expressed great reservations about the agreement. They do not perceive it as a genuine transfer of power: Smith and his Parliament retain authority during the transitional period, and white control via reserved seats and a blocking mechanism in the new government are seen to be excessive. Moreover, the process is seen not to be irreversible. Also the agreement is criticized as offering little hope for ending hostilities because it contains no provisions for participation by the other Nationalists.

5. Secretary noted that while we understand Muzorewa’s argument that guerrillas will come to his support, in the short run we estimate warfare will escalate and there will exist a greater possibility of Soviet, Cuban, and South African intervention. US continues to believe that the principles embodied in the Anglo-American proposals offer the best prospects for an internationally acceptable Rhodesian settlement. Only when an internationally acceptable settlement evolves, will the US be able to endorse it. The Secretary asked for the Bishop’s comments regarding African criticism of the Salisbury Agreement.

6. Muzorewa stated that he did not feel criticisms were serious, that agreement was superior to what other nations had negotiated regarding transfer of power. He asserted that Smith will remain Prime Minister in name only. Real power will pass to the Executive Council, which will govern. Smith will not be able “to tell the Army what to do or not to do.”

7. In response to Secretary’s question, “what happens if he changes his mind?”, Muzorewa responded that this was “very unlikely, I can almost rule it out.” Smith had burned his hands with UDI and wouldn’t do “such a childish thing again. He won’t go back on things he has agreed with us.” Bishop again stressed that pragmatic approach necessitated recognizing the need to bring about transition within the current framework of the constitution, but that Parliament will be subordinate to the Executive Council, which will order it to do certain things, such as passing the budget, necessary for the transitional government.

8. In response to further question from Secretary about control of the army, Muzorewa said that the army would no longer be under Smith, the Executive Council would exercise power and the Army itself would be under the Ministers of Defense (one white, one black). He repeated that he was not terribly satisfied with everything in the agreement, particularly the composition of the Council of Ministers, but noted that the basic question remains whether the agreement as a whole serves the greater good. He said he is confident that it does.

9. Muzorewa raised issue of civil war and said that it was absolutely wrong to assume that a war would develop between internal and
external Nationalists. Majority of guerrillas will desert the external Nationalists. The only danger of civil war is between Mugabe and Nkomo. Muzorewa brushed off the Secretary’s question concerning the likelihood of heavy Soviet and Cuban involvement in continued warfare by noting that, if that happens, “they will be fighting Zimbabwe, not Mr. Smith, and that is a different ballgame.”

10. In series of pointed questions, Moose noted that our reading of agreement does not make it clear that Smith will not control Army during the transition. He noted difficulties of asking guerrillas to lay down arms and place trust in Smith and asked what would be attitude of black majority on Executive Council or black Minister of Defense toward continued cross border operations against Zambia and Mozambique. Muzorewa responded that the first act of the transitional government will be to announce an amnesty. He repeated that Army will be under control of Executive Council and stressed that Smith has indeed changed and that independence will come. Muzorewa did not respond to the question about cross border operation, but in a later, brief conversation, Nyandoro told Lake and Davidow that the Bishop would never permit a recurrence of the recent attack on Zambia. Contradictorily, however, he said that if the Patriotic Front gave them trouble “we could push them back and have lunch in Lusaka.”

11. Muzorewa said that he was sorry it was not clear in the Salisbury Agreement that the transitional government would control the military forces, but he argued it is implicit in the section where the future of the Army is discussed. He then proceeded to read the section outlining the functions of the transitional government. His voice grew fainter as he proceeded down the list, which includes no specific reference to Executive Council control over the Army, and finally trailed off. However, he maintained his assertion that the Executive Council would control. Bulle noted that it was necessary to maintain the current army in place during the transition to maintain white confidence. However, the Army is already 82 percent black and is being built up to be 95 percent African.

12. Nyandoro then entered conversation. He argued that the US has pushed Smith to the wall, bringing about his concession to majority rule, that the agreement reached is much better than other transitional arrangements arrived at (e.g. Algeria and Zambia), and that US must now accept it. He said UANC was not asking for US to approach the UN to lift sanctions, to which Secretary interjected that we could not do so. Picking up on idea, which Owen had planted, but not referring to the UK FornMin, Nyandoro asked that the US use its influence to arrange for humanitarian assistance to rehabilitate the people affected by the war.

13. Noting that the need for free elections impartially conducted is at the heart of the Anglo-American proposals, Lake asked a series
of questions about specific details concerning the proposed elections. Would legislation be required? What would be the nature of outside observers? Who would run elections? What sort of provisions would be made for those outside to reinstate themselves as political actors, considering that they would have to do so under the current police and army?

14. Muzorewa responded in general terms noting that the external Nationalists were losing opportunities and that the process was open to them. The police, like the army, will be under the Executive Council and not Smith. He said UANC would prefer the US and UK Governments to provide supervision of elections but would consider alternative sources of observers if US/UK do not wish to do so. Some legislation from the Rhodesian Parliament would be necessary to set up electoral process, but conduct of elections would be responsibility of transitional government. Lake asked if Muzorewa saw a problem in that Smith and his Parliament would therefore have a veto over the electoral and transitional process. The Bishop responded that Smith had assured him that his parliamentary caucus supports his actions and will not back out of the agreement.

15. Secretary noted that Owen had raised with Muzorewa the possibility of the British and Americans calling a conference at which all Nationalists groups would be present to see if their differences can be bridged. He asked for Muzorewa’s views on this. Bishop responded that he had consistently said that all Nationalist groups should be involved and “if you think that something could be gained from a conference, we would be willing to look at it.” The Secretary urged Muzorewa to speak at the UN if the other Nationalists speak. Muzorewa agreed.

16. Moose noted that our questions about nature of Salisbury transitional arrangements stem from our concern, shared by the Front Line Presidents, that the general perception of those arrangements is not one of effective black control. Therefore, there might be mounting violence and it would be difficult to carry out elections. Such a situation might deny realization of precisely what Muzorewa seeks. Moose asserted that we carry no brief for one Nationalist group or another. At Malta we might have reached an agreement with the Patriotic Front if we were willing to compromise our beliefs and to give the Patriotic Front a predominant role or advantage. We rejected to do so because it would have been inconsistent with our desire for a fair and reasonable agreement, and with our commitment to insure that the internal Nationalists had a fair chance in elections. We seek to establish a process that would get all parties involved, leading to a lasting settlement and an end to the war. Moose noted that while there can be agreement on constitutional principles, there can be no real settlement unless there
is agreement on a fair transitional process. Therefore, US wants to try
again to reach an agreement based on Anglo-American proposals in
which Bishop could gain everything he has achieved in Salisbury plus
assurances of international acceptability.

17. Bishop noted that Moose’s points were fair, but did not seek
to answer them. Instead, he and Nyandoro launched into criticism of
the US for allowing Cubans to meddle in Zimbabwe’s future and to
call the tune in Southern Africa. Secretary noted that we are indeed
concerned by possibility of a major Cuban presence in Zambia and the
dangers this would pose for Kaunda. Lake added that it is precisely
the free electoral process at the heart of the Anglo-American proposals
which, if conducted, would prevent the Cubans from calling the tune.
Muzorewa finished the meeting by noting that he continued to look
up to the US as a principled nation that would do the right thing. He
met briefly with the Secretary privately after the other parties had left
the room.

Vance

195. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Summary of Meeting Between President Carter and British Foreign Secretary
David A.L. Owen

PARTICIPANTS
President Carter
Secretary Vance
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
Assistant Secretary Moose
Thomas Thornton
British Foreign Secretary Owen
British Ambassador Peter Jay
John Graham, British Foreign Ministry
Ewen Fergusson, British Foreign Ministry
Stephen Wall, British Foreign Ministry

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski
Office File, Country Chron File, Box 15, Great Britain: 8/77–3/78. Secret; Sensitive. The
meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.
Owen began with an overview of the Rhodesian situation. He pointed out that the Cuban danger had various aspects. We should keep in mind that a collapse of the internal settlement, for whatever reason, could leave us with an obligation to the patriotic front to oust Smith. We obviously lack the capability to do this and the PF could well turn to the Cubans and Soviets for support. In this circumstance, we will be perceived by many to be cooperating with the Cubans de facto.

Owen stated on the one hand that we cannot stretch the Anglo-American plan much further through concession to the PF. At the same time the internal settlement as now constituted is not viable. We need to find a settlement ground between the AAP and internal settlement and particularly seek to include Nkomo. We should also enlist South Africa’s support to put pressure on Smith.

The Africans are trying to push and split the US and UK. The United States has achieved a position of great prestige in Africa but now must show strength. We have pressure to bring to bear on the PF; specifically, Zambia is in very shaky shape and needs help from us.

The President said that we should stick to the AAP, adding to it elements from the internal settlement in so far as they are compatible. It would be desirable to have a conference in which all parties participate. We should consider however whether all invitees would come; whether South Africa would support it; and how we might best propose it.

Owen agreed with the need for a conference but emphasized that we would have to do a lot of ground work first. We might have to fall back to the “Proximity Talks” model as some of the parties were unwilling to meet with others. He believed that South Africa would lend support, hoping that Smith and Nkomo would get together and make a deal.

Owen had recently spoken with the French and Germans. They will go along with us at the UN and abstain if a resolution comes to vote. Owen would prefer to cast a veto but since the United States does not want to he will go along with us. He urged that we issue a strong explanatory statement in view of the Chapter 7 implications of the resolution. The American and British explanatory statements should be closely parallel. The UK will not at this time let it be known that it will not cast a veto. It may be able to gain some leverage over the resolution if it still has this threat in hand.

Both the UK and the US agreed that no resolution at all would be preferable and there are several ways of attempting this. Owen raised

---

2 See footnote 4, Document 193.
the possibility of the British President of the Council simply announcing from the chair that the US and UK would call a meeting of concerned parties. This would have to be coordinated first with the Africans. In general the New York situation would have to be played by ear.

The President concluded the meeting by noting a general agreement on the matters discussed. We should move ahead with deliberate speed, and knowledge of the willingness of the British to join us in abstention should be kept to the very narrowest circle.

196. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Posts

Washington, March 16, 1978, 1648Z

67790. Subject: Rhodesia: British Foreign Secretary Owen Visit to Washington. Ref: State 060429.²

Summary: During one-day visit to Washington, March 8, Owen met privately with the Secretary, and then with the President for about 20 minutes to discuss Rhodesia.³ Following that meeting, Owen met for several hours with Secretary Vance, Tony Lake (S/P), Dick Moose (AF), IO Deputy Assistant Secretary Helman, AF Deputy Assistant Secretary Edmondson, and others, to discuss the Rhodesian situation. Owen was accompanied by Johnny Graham, Ham Whyte, Ewen Ferguson, and Steven Wall, as well as Minister John Robinson from UK Embassy Washington. The following summarizes the discussion at that meeting. The key decision was that the British and the US would jointly sound out President Nyerere and Brand Fourie on the idea calling a meeting of all parties to the Rhodesian conflict for the purpose of bridging differences between them. End summary.

1. Secretary Vance began the meeting asking Owen’s advice on how to handle meetings with Nkomo and Mugabe. It was agreed that Owen and Vance would not see the Patriotic Front leaders together

---


² In telegram 60429 to Dar es Salaam and Cape Town, March 9, the Department informed the Embassy that Owen and Vance had agreed to call for all parties meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780105–0736)

³ See Document 195.
because a joint US/UK meeting with the Patriotic Front would seem to be a continuation of negotiations on the AAP. Mr. Moose suggested that it would be better for Mr. Vance to see Nkomo and Mugabe by himself, on the rationale that they were in the United States and he wanted to take advantage of that opportunity.

2. Turning to the question of a meeting among all the Nationalist parties to continue the search for a Rhodesian solution, Secretary Vance said that he believed the sooner we moved on setting up such a conference, the better. Owen agreed saying he was prepared to participate as soon as possible. Owen asked what our next step would be: Should we go directly to Smith and the South Africans? Secretary Vance asked if we wanted the South Africans to weigh in with Smith on the importance of attending such a meeting. Owen agreed, and then turned to the question of where and how such a meeting might be arranged. He suggested a proximity formula.

3. Mr. Vance asked about setting up a conference in New York. Owen agreed that might be best, and Vance said that we had a good reason for it since the Nationalist parties were in New York. Graham raised the problem that might be caused for the USG if Ian Smith were to appear on New York television, and Moose pointed out that Nkomo had said he might have to leave the United States March 9.

4. Turning to the basis for such a conference, Moose said he wanted to clarify our purpose. Would we try to build on the internal settlement, to try to get at least Nkomo into it? Could it be improved so as to get Nkomo in? Owen said Nyerere had suggested we try to “marry” the internal arrangements with the AAP. He thought it important to avoid saying we were building on either the internal settlement or the AAP. We might be trying to marry the two solutions, but it would not be wise to say so publicly.

5. Vance returned to the question of the problem that might be caused by having Mr. Smith in New York. What domestic problems might this cause us? What problems would it cause with the Front Line representatives in New York? Lake replied that it would be more of the latter, but he thought that a meeting could be held outside the UN context but in New York. Lake added that if the conference were not based either on the AAP or the internal settlement, but on the principles of the AAP, this would give the Front Line some flexibility in reacting to the suggestion for the conference. Moose added that he thought it would give Nkomo some flexibility as well.

6. Edmondson raised a problem which had bedeviled the Geneva negotiations: Smith’s claim to be Prime Minister of a Rhodesian Government. Owen said we should avoid raising Geneva, but should offer an
invitation to all the parties from the Malta and Salisbury talks. Who would come from Malta or Salisbury would be their own affair. At Geneva he said the British should have turned aside arguments over petty issues such as name plates and titles and threatened to break off the conference if such arguments continued. He lamented that Ivor Richard had not been sent there with sufficient clout to do that.

7. Mr. Vance suggested that a location such as Arden House, one hour outside New York, would offer enough privacy to avoid that problem. Owen suggested that proximity talks would also avoid such a problem and suggested that we might start on that basis.

8. Moose agreed that beginning with proximity talks was an excellent idea. If a situation followed in which we were negotiating with parties at some distance, this might offer a way out of problems at the United Nations. He thought this was the way to proceed unless we believed we could hold all the parties together in New York long enough to get agreement. He suggested a round in New York and then a later round at some neutral African locale such as Kenya. Graham said that there were no neutral African spots.

9. Secretary Vance then confirmed that we would try to hold the meeting in New York City since we had most of the parties there and had their attention. Lake said Smith could come but might not want to come to New York. He could send a delegation however.

10. Owen then turned the conversation to discussion of a draft invitation which the British had prepared which would invite all the parties to the Malta and Salisbury talks to a meeting which could give effect to common objectives, including independence for Zimbabwe in 1978; a new government elected by universal adult suffrage, in conditions that will permit free, fair elections. After some discussion, the draft was modified to read as follows: Begin text. Formula for invitation to new Rhodesian conference. It is common ground that: (a) Zimbabwe should become independent in 1978; (b) the Government of Zimbabwe should be elected by universal adult suffrage; (c) elections must be held in conditions that will permit them to be conducted freely and fairly. Accordingly, the British and US Governments, who on 1 September put forward proposals designed to give effect to these principles, invite all the parties to the Malta and Salisbury talks to meet with a view to widening the areas of agreement and establishing an acceptable machinery for achieving these common objectives. End text.

11. Lake raised the question of whether the Front Line should be invited or not. Secretary Vance said he thought we would want them

---

4 The Malta talks involved the Patriotic Front, while the Salisbury talks were between Smith and the “internal” Nationalists.
there. Lake pointed out that without pressure from the Front Line, it was unlikely that the Patriotic Front would attend. Graham said that the Front Line wanted a conference, but Secretary Vance pointed out that this was on the basis of the AAP. Owen raised the question of whether the formula would allow Prem Chand or Lord Carver to attend. Vance agreed saying that they had participated in the Malta talks.

12. Owen said he thought it would be difficult for Smith to attend if the invitation were based on the text of the AAP. Vance said he thought we should try this invitation and see if they would buy it. Owen said the basic problem is that Smith won’t accept simply handing over to the British. On the other hand, Nkomo wants to be President of the interim government and wants Smith out. Some kind of an arrangement like that might be made to work, although Bishop Muzorewa would not like it. Owen insisted that Smith would not accept reimposition of UK authority. Smith did not want a large UN force either, but could take UN observers and a UN Mission.

13. Owen said that Nkomo simply brushed aside provisions for the specially elected members and did not seem overly concerned about them. On the other hand, the South Africans had told Smith that insisting on 28 members was ludicrous. Botha had told Owen this during the Namibia talks in New York. Moreover we know, Owen said, that Smith had been authorized to settle for less, if only three less. Moose suggested that the 28 white seats might be traded away by Smith in the context of bringing Nkomo into the agreement. Moose returned to the issue of the governing council. He pointed out that as presently structured (if it included Chirau) Nkomo and Mugabe would find themselves outnumbered two votes to four and would, therefore, oppose it. Owen answered that the way out of the difficulty was to give Nkomo a pre-eminent role.

14. Further discussion followed on the text of the invitation as to whether the US and UK should state their commitment to the AAP or whether this was too rigid a formulation. Owen suggested that the UK and US Governments would say that they had put forward a plan designed to give effect to basic principles and therefore invite all the parties to a meeting. Secretary Vance agreed with that formulation.

15. Vance asked how we should proceed to negotiate participation. Should we go directly to Salisbury and to whom should we speak first? Owen suggested we go privately to Fourie in confidence as we have before. He asked if we could go to Nyerere and South Africa at

---

5 The Proximity Talks on Namibia took place February 11–12 in New York. See Documents 79–82.
the same time. Vance said he thought so. We ought to see Nyerere right at the outset. Lake added that since we were seeing Nkomo the next day, having some reaction from Nyerere in general terms could be important in softening up Nkomo’s resistance in attending a meeting. Owen agreed. He added his inclination to go through the South Africans to get to Smith. Mr. Vance pointed out that as Nyerere had suggested the idea of a conference, it would not be good to spring it on him without warning. Owen said we must be careful because we did not want the process to come unstuck as had happened with the AAP. The Front Line and South Africans are pressure points through which we might approach the PF and Smith. Graham pointed out that such pressure does get their backs up and lead to resistance. Vance insisted on the merits of going first and quickly to Nyerere and the South Africans and then promptly to the parties.

16. Owen asked about attendance. If we got both the Patriotic Front and Smith on board, then he suggested we could have a conference. Moose stressed the benefits of getting a quick response from Nyerere. He suggested we might gain some working time by moving the Nkomo and Mugabe meeting with Vance to Friday morning. Mr. Vance pointed out that his schedule would not allow that, although he might be able to meet with them in the afternoon. Mr. Vance summed up the decision on this point by saying it seemed fair to him that we should go quickly to both Nyerere and the South Africans and get their reactions to the invitation, and that we should do it jointly. Owen agreed.

17. Owen asked when Vance could devote some time to such a meeting. Mr. Vance said it might be possible next week. After reviewing his calendar, Mr. Vance suggested March 20, or March 16 and 17. Owen agreed those dates were acceptable to him. Vance and Owen also agreed, although we would be prepared to begin on a proximity basis, we would wait for reactions before deciding on that.

18. Moose raised the question of how to respond to Nyerere if he asks if the AAP were the basis of the new invitation. Mr. Vance said we would refer him to the text of the invitation. Lake added that we could say the language of the invitation was framed to show we are standing by the principles of the AAP. Owen thought we should tell Nyerere that there was not much room for maneuvering at this point. Vance said we should get his reaction. He added that following that we could have Ivor Richard issue the invitation in his capacity as Chairman of the Security Council.

19. Vance turned again to the question of whether to hold the meeting in New York City or elsewhere. He suggested Arden House, which is a large, commodious place outside New York with facilities for communications and accommodations. It was pointed out that the delegations were likely to be large and to need separate accommoda-
tions. Owen suggested that the Rhodesian talks be held where the Namibian talks had been convened (USUN New York) and Mr. Vance agreed.

20. Vance turned to the question of UN tactics. Graham said the UK probably ought not speak. Helman pointed out that Ambassador Young was in no hurry to speak. Owen suggested that perhaps the best approach was for him to return directly to the UK. Helman suggested that once the invitation had been put out, pressures at the UN would be reduced. Owen asked if we got a favorable reaction from Nyerere and South Africa, would we then go public. Vance suggested that we would first convey the invitation to Nkomo, Mugabe, and Muzorewa and simultaneously to the Front Line. Lake stressed the importance of not doing it seriatim. We should plan to go some hours ahead of publication to the other Front Line Presidents. Mr. Vance suggested that we should have some idea of the Nationalists’ reaction before we publish the invitation.

21. Owen asserted that a conference without Smith would be hopeless. Vance said that we could tell him that if he could not attend, he should send a deputy. Lake pointed out that a conference without the Patriotic Front was also useless. Owen said the hardest to get a favorable reaction from was Smith. Owen and Vance agreed that if either Smith or the PF refused the invitation, there could be no conference, and Graham suggested we make that point to Nyerere. Owen said this was one advantage of going through the South Africans who could hold Smith to any acceptance; he was so slippery.

22. Moose said Nyerere’s response was likely to be that he was willing to do his best but he would want to know if the basis of the invitation was the AAP. Owen said we should point out that this was our position, as discussed with President Carter, and it was an open offer on the table. Vance agreed with that.

23. Lake returned to the question of attendance at the conference. He asked whether we would go ahead if any of the parties refused to come. Vance and Owen agreed that if Muzorewa and Sithole and the PF all agree to come to a meeting, the conference could go ahead. In the present circumstances, Smith’s attendance was not necessary.

24. Vance asked about observers. Owen suggested that we not admit them into the conference room. Vance agreed, and Helman added that this could be handled as with the Namibia Proximity Talks by having a frequent briefing session with the Front Line. Moose reminded the group that the Front Line had been annoyed by their exclusion from the conference at first in Malta. Vance said he was somewhat worried about the Front Line Perm Reps in New York and would prefer some Foreign Ministers. This raised the question of whether we should invite Botha from South Africa. Vance said we should leave it up to the Foreign Ministers. If they want to be there, that was up to them.
25. Owen pointed out it would be better not to call the meeting a conference but simply say we were inviting the parties to meet, and Vance agreed.

26. Turning to the issue which might be discussed at the conference, Owen asked what points we could suggest to marry the positions together. Lake reviewed a memo prepared in the Department which ought to find common ground on a number of issues.

27. Owen again raised the question of whether he should stay on in Washington or return to the UK. He preferred going. After some discussion, it was agreed that he would return to the UK.

28. In considering the position at the UN, Moose raised the question of involving Tanzanian Ambassador Salim in our effort. Owen said he thought we would do better to stick to the present arrangements. Helman said Salim might help reduce African resistance in allowing Muzorewa to speak. Owen asked if we would not have the votes to put that across. He said he felt very strongly about this and Lake agreed it was not merely a matter of politics but of principle. Owen said he would even split with the US on this issue because it would be the beginning of the end for the UN.

29. Owen again returned to some of the issues which might be discussed at the conference, including representation in Parliament, control of the military forces, UN involvement in elections, and amnesty. He pointed out that Smith would not accept the “based on the liberation forces formula” and would resist a UN peacekeeping force. Lake agreed that the military problem was the most difficult. Moose said that was true unless Nkomo entered into an agreement. A further issue might be raised if the government council were endowed with legislative powers. Lake suggested, and it was agreed that in reviewing the issues during the meeting, our approach would be to point out the suggestions in the AAP and in the internal arrangements to cover a particular issue. We could point to the disagreements and ask for the parties’ suggestions on how to bridge the gap. We need to frame an agenda covering these key questions.

30. Owen returned to the situation at the UN. He said that the most urgent problem was how to handle voting on the African resolution. He noted that President Carter had been surprised to hear the British view that the African resolution was mandatory. If the UK abstained, they would have to give a very powerful explanation of vote on operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present draft. Moreover, paragraph 2 would prevent any form of relationship with anything out of Salisbury. The British Government would be most reluctant to come to any deci-

---

6 See Document 195.
sion on such a question until after the completion of the transition period, an election, and independence. Helman argued that the resolution was not mandatory. Owen insisted that it would be harmful to find ourselves in the position of having condemned the internal settlement. He argued for a strong explanation of vote from both the US and UK. The UK felt very strongly that it could not support operative paras 3 and 4 of the present draft.

31. Helman suggested that the resolution might not come to a vote if it looked as though there would be as many as six abstentions, especially including all of the Western Five. That would weaken the force of any resolution. Owen repeated that he must make a clear explanation of vote, but he did not believe we should get into tactics of redrafting various resolutions. Vance agreed.

32. Mr. Vance asked Owen in light of the discussion, what was his schedule. Owen said he planned to return to the UK that evening. That would cool the situation at the UN and with Mugabe and Nkomo. Mr. Vance asked about the press, and Owen suggested that he and Vance see them together. Mr. Vance suggested we draft an agreed statement, as most of the press would have pulled out by that time. The meeting concluded with the drafting of the following joint statement, as well as the referenced telegram.

33. Begin text of statement: Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Owen met this afternoon with President Carter and then held further conversations at the Department of State. The discussions were concerned primarily with the question of Rhodesia. There was full agreement that the two governments will jointly continue their efforts to facilitate a settlement among all the parties, in accordance with the principles the two governments have previously put forward: Free and fair elections, a transition to majority rule and independence, and respect for the individual rights of all the citizens of an independent Zimbabwe. End text.
Washington, March 12, 1978, 0519Z

63462. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With Patriotic Front Leaders, March 11.

1. Following is summary of pertinent points of subject meeting.

2. In their meeting with the Secretary, Nkomo and Mugabe rejected the idea that the US and UK move rapidly to bring together all the parties to the Rhodesia dispute for a meeting designed to bridge the differences between them.

3. During protracted discussion on issue, PF leaders said that at Malta meeting Owen had withdrawn his invitation for a further get-together in New York at the time of the Five Power Conference on Namibia (Nkomo asserted that Owen had done this when the parties went downstairs after the formal meetings had ended). Assistant Secretary Moose and UK Embassy Minister Robinson countered that the invitation remained on the table and had been reaffirmed on more than one occasion.

4. Nkomo and Mugabe asserted that US–UK unwillingness to proceed toward further negotiations with them as agreed in Malta, coupled with official Anglo-American statements noting “acceptance” of the internal settlement or characterization of it as “significant step” indicated to them that the US–UK are abandoning the Anglo-American proposals.

5. Secretary countered that the proposals, as we have made clear publicly, remain the yardstick by which we would measure any other settlement attempt. He argued that now is the time to bring all the parties together to resolve differences. Nkomo said that our current proposal will lead to “an appeasement meeting” at which the US and UK would try to “marry” the Anglo-American proposals and the Salisbury Agreement. Such an effort, he argued, would constitute an implicit recognition of the Salisbury Agreement as a legitimate basis for negotiation. PF is categorically opposed to this.

6. With greater enthusiasm for the Anglo-American proposals than the PF has hitherto demonstrated, they argued that negotiations should pick up where they were left off in Malta. They continually characterized the Malta meeting in terms which had originally been used by

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780110–0700. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent to London, Lusaka, Cape Town, Maputo, and Dar es Salaam. Drafted by Davidow; cleared by [garble] (D/A), and Frank G. Wisner (S/S); approved by Moose.
Lord Carver and Prem Chand to describe the initially proposed Malta meeting for November 16. According to Nkomo and Mugabe, the January 31 Malta meeting and subsequent meetings which were supposed to have evolved from it were concerned primarily with reaching agreement on military matters. They argued that this approach should be continued and the next stage in negotiations should be confined to discussions on military matters, including a ceasefire, among themselves, the British and Smith.

7. The PF leaders asserted that they had never excluded the other Nationalists but that Muzorewa and Sithole had excluded themselves by becoming Smith’s puppets. There would be room for them in further negotiations on constitutional matters but only after the military arrangements had been worked out.

8. The Secretary suggested structuring the proposed all-parties conference in such a manner that subgroups could discuss specific issues. In such a way the PF would be able to engage in negotiations on military matters as they have demanded.

9. Nkomo and Mugabe refused to entertain this as a possibility, arguing that in effect the only way the US and U.K. can clearly demonstrate that we are not abandoning the Anglo-American proposals is by entering into direct public negotiations with them which would not accord any status to the Salisbury conferees or the internal settlement.

10. Nkomo and Mugabe returned to New York Saturday evening where they are scheduled to meet with Ambassador Young. They will fly to London the following day for a Monday meeting with Owen.

Vance

---

2 In telegram 4346 from Dar es Salaam, October 31, 1977, Spain reported on the meeting among Carver, Chand, and the Patriotic Front. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072-2339)
3 See footnote 3, Document 185.
4 In telegram 4037 from London, March 13, Brewster reported on Owen’s meeting with the Patriotic Front. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780112-0026)
Dear President Nyerere:

I am grateful for your thoughtful letter of March 3 on Rhodesia. As usual, your views contributed greatly to my understanding.

As you know, together with the British, we quickly acted on your suggestion to Prime Minister Callaghan and me that all the principal parties in the Rhodesian conflict be invited to meet. I still think this remains the best way to handle the situation in the present circumstances.

Your support has done much to obtain wide acceptance for the Anglo-American proposals as a basis for an enduring Rhodesian settlement, perceived by Rhodesia’s majority as bringing a definitive end to minority rule. At Malta, we and the British agreed that Africans must play important and substantial roles in the governance of Zimbabwe during the transitional period. However, that interim period itself should not be used by any one faction or group to expand its authority or power. We cannot acquiesce in demands either from the Patriotic Front or from other nationalists that they be accorded a predominant position during the interim period. We continue to seek the implementation of the principles embodied in the Anglo-American proposals and will not associate ourselves with any arrangement that does not include them.

Secretary Vance has urged Bishop Muzorewa and Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe to give serious consideration to attending a meeting of all the parties. We have also presented the idea to other parties and have received noncommittal or negative responses. The Patriotic Front leaders, whose initial reaction was one of rejection, argued that the United States and Great Britain are attempting to propel them into the Salisbury agreement. They asserted that by meeting with the internally based nationalists they would grant the Salisbury agreement legitimacy.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 19, Tanzania: President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, 1/77–5/78. No classification marking.
2 In telegram 940 from Dar es Salaam, March 3, the Embassy transmitted the text of Nyerere’s letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2698)
3 See Documents 194 and 197.
4 Telegram 789 from Lusaka, March 12, transmitted Kaunda’s comments on the proposal. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780110–0984)
5 See footnote 5, Document 191.
and recognition it does not deserve. Finally, they insisted that all military and transitional arrangements should be negotiated solely with the Patriotic Front, leaving negotiations on constitutional issues that would include other nationalists for a later date.

Secretary Vance told Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe that it is not our intention to abandon the principles of the Anglo-American proposals, to accord any legitimacy to the Salisbury agreement, or to persuade the Patriotic Front to accept the Salisbury arrangements. We do recognize that there are certain matters relating to the ceasefire and the disposition of military forces during the transitional period which must be negotiated with the Patriotic Front, and that this fact must be taken into account in any negotiating process. Despite the initial responses, we continue to believe that an all-parties meeting would provide an opportunity to reach a settlement based on the principles of the Anglo-American proposals. I hope that you will be able to counsel the Patriotic Front leaders to accept the idea of an all-parties meeting without unnecessary preconditions.  

It is a source of great satisfaction to me to enjoy your confidence and support as we together seek a just solution for Rhodesia. And even beyond what we can accomplish on this difficult issue, I place the highest value on maintaining the friendship between our countries.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

---

6 In telegram 1326 from Dar es Salaam, March 28, the Embassy transmitted Nyerere’s response to Carter. In the letter, Nyerere noted: “I think I can say that we achieved success in overcoming all the major reservations or objections which the Patriotic Front leaders have been expressing at Malta and elsewhere to the Anglo-American Proposals. I am convinced that the remaining problems are minor ones and could be quickly cleared up if a follow-up to the Malta meeting was held prior to the conference of all the Rhodesian parties.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780134-1196)
Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent letters detailing Zambia’s position on Rhodesia. Ambassador Young has also informed me of his frank conversation with you. I appreciate your openness and sincerity in discussing this difficult issue, and your support for the proposal for a meeting of the principal parties to the Rhodesian conflict.

The Smith regime’s violation of Zambian territorial integrity has been unanimously condemned in the Security Council. In addition, we and the British have made it clear to the Rhodesians that such actions intensify the trend towards violence in Southern Africa. The toll in human lives and suffering is measureless and tragic. Please accept my personal condolences and those of the American people for the deaths of Zambian citizens who died in this attack on your nation.

I share your concern over the Salisbury “internal settlement” and I have said publicly that it is inadequate to the task of achieving a negotiated and peaceful resolution to the Rhodesian crisis. In his statement in the United Nations Security Council on March 14th, Ambassador Young dwelt at length on the serious deficiencies of these internal arrangements. He pointed out that they do not provide for a genuine transfer of power to the African majority through a fairly conducted and irreversible transitional process.

Ambassador Young also restated the determination of the United States to pursue a Rhodesian settlement based on the principles enunciated in the Anglo-American proposals; I reaffirm that commitment to you now. We have not waivered in our dedication, nor will we abandon our principles. The language in the Front Line-Patriotic Front commu-

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Zambia: President Kenneth D. Kaunda, 1–10/78. No classification marking.

2 In telegram 74712 to Lusaka, March 23, the Department transmitted the text of Kaunda’s March 8 letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780127–0924) In telegram 67150 to Lusaka, March 16, the Department transmitted the text of Kaunda’s letter, which was received on March 14 in a diplomatic note from the Zambian Embassy. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1476)

3 In telegram 970 from Lusaka, March 23, the Embassy reported on the March 22 meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780128–0145)

4 Reference is to UNSC Resolution 423 (1978).

5 For text of the remarks, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book I, p. 495.

nique issued at Dar es Salaam on March 26\textsuperscript{7} contains unwarranted distortions of our position. Confrontational rhetoric does nothing to further our common interests and, indeed, makes it more difficult for me to develop the support necessary to pursue them.

The task ahead of us is extraordinarily difficult. Our pressing goal is to obtain the agreement of all the nationalist leaders. While we have set no preconditions for the meeting we have suggested, such a meeting would be based on the principles of the Anglo-American proposals. The participation of the Salisbury conferees would in no way legitimize the arrangements they have entered into in Salisbury.

We must find a formula that will encourage Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole to recognize that the way to achieve a genuinely enduring settlement is not through the inadequate arrangements they have now. Simple condemnation of these two men, however, will force them further into isolation. They must be made to see that there is an alternative to the arrangement they are caught up in with Smith.

While Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe have publicly stated their support for the Anglo-American proposals as a basis of negotiation, they continue to maintain positions that are inconsistent with the impartiality and built-in checks and balances of the proposals themselves. We cannot accept any one group’s predominant position during the transitional period and beyond. At the heart of the Anglo-American proposals is the need for an impartial, transitional mechanism, which will not favor one group over another. The Salisbury agreement does not provide for this, nor regrettably, does the current position of the Patriotic Front.

I hope that you and your Front Line colleagues will encourage the Patriotic Front to participate in the type of meeting we have suggested. We are prepared to examine interim steps that might facilitate their participation.

I deeply regret that I will not be able to accept your kind offer to travel to Zambia while I am visiting Africa, but I know you will understand how important it is for me to get back for the resumed session of Congress. I await with great anticipation the opportunity that I will have for a full discussion of these issues with you during your visit here in mid-May.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

\textsuperscript{7} In telegram 1295 from Dar es Salaam, March 26, the Embassy transmitted the text of the communiqué. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780132–0475)
Lagos, April 1, 1978, 10:40 a.m.

SUBJECT
Talks Between President Carter and the US Delegation, and Lieutenant General Olusegun Obasanjo and the Nigerian Delegation: First Bilateral Session

PARTICIPANTS FOR THE US:
The President Dr. Brzezinski
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Andrew Young
Ambassador Donald Easum
Ambassador Donald McHenry
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Richard Moose
Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning, Department of State
Henry Richardson, NSC Staff
Parker Wyman, Embassy Lagos

PARTICIPANTS FOR NIGERIA:
Lt General Olusegun Obasanjo
S.M. Yar’Adua
Brig J.N. Garba
Mr. Yaya Abubakar
Ambassador E.O. Sanu
Ambassador J.A. Oladel Akadiri
Ambassador Haruna Bin Musa
Mr. S.O. Falalu
Ambassador O. Jalaoso

The talks began at 10:40 a.m. when the President and General Obasanjo entered for the press opportunity.

The President spoke of the good relationship between Obasanjo and himself. Obasanjo suggested that they discuss international matters that day, and at the next session take up economic and trade questions.2 (The press opportunity ended)

OBASANJO: I welcome you on behalf of the people and government of Nigeria. We feel and believe that this visit is an indicator of U.S. African policy and a manifestation of your personal commitment to your ideals as a man of conviction. We have always known America

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 4/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Dodan Barracks. President Carter was in Lagos on a State Visit March 31–April 3.

2 The next meeting took place on April 2. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa.
to play a role in the world, but equally important are the principles on which you act of human rights and freedom for all people.

If we seem somewhat urgent in recalling these principles, it is because we believe that the United States holds these principles to be fundamental. Our discussion this morning should cover international matters, with whatever residue from those discussions being taken up in the second session. (Obasanjo then introduced his delegation.)

OBASANJO: When we met in Washington, D.C. we discussed several things. The Angola situation was discussed. Zimbabwe is now a current problem, and Andy Young was recently there and I would like to have his thoughts. Namibia is also of concern as well as the Horn.

Since our talks in Washington, the Angolan situation has changed somewhat for the better. Since we made our effort to mediate in the Angolan-Zaire dispute, that border has not been closed. We agreed to send a mission to mediate and we did. When Neto recently visited here, all went well. He indicated more confidence in the security of his northern border, though he still has problems with UNITA in the southeast. We expected that Neto’s instability would be lessened with the outside assistance that he received.

Our impression is that as soon as he is confident of his security, and he seems to be more so since the May coup attempts, which was especially indicated by his coming to Nigeria, the situation could be improved. This is as much as we can say.

THE PRESIDENT: We have no contact with UNITA or Savimbi. Our information, which is only secondhand, is that the number of Cubans in Angola include approximately 20,000 troops plus 4,000 civilians. Our information indicates that UNITA has also increased its strength. Cuban troops which were sent from Angola to Ethiopia have been replaced. Neto appears to have dropped out of sight and there are indications he might be ill. The question is whether the UNITA threat will have to be completely removed before the Cubans leave. The logic of this is that the Cubans might stay indefinitely. If this became the situation and the Cubans remained in Angola permanently, it would be of concern to the United States.

OBASANJO: If Namibia was neutralized, would this help the situation?

THE PRESIDENT: It would help, but it is doubtful if Savimbi would collapse. We have no relations with Savimbi. But our information is that help from South Africa to Savimbi is exaggerated. He evidently has substantial local support.

---

4 Reference is to the failed coup attempt by Nito Alves on May 27, 1977.
OBASANJO: Savimbi benefits from his tribal affiliations with the people in that region of Angola.

THE PRESIDENT: It would be a move in the right direction for the Namibian border to be neutralized by a settlement for Namibia bringing majority rule.

OBASANJO: I agree; that will help the situation.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Southern Africa.]

OBASANJO: After our talks in Washington, there were changes in the Zimbabwe situation, especially the emergence of the internal settlement. The Anglo/American Plan (AAP) ran into problems and gave us choices to make.

We have supported the AAP all along. At the time we first supported it, there was no internal settlement, only the problem of gaining liberation. The internal settlement is a threat factor in the situation, and it will not bring peace. We fear and shudder to think of civil war in Zimbabwe. We can imagine a scenario of the military forces of Muzorewa, which would likely be supported by Vorster, opposing the forces of the Patriotic Front with their outside support. It would be a grave situation.

The AAP is the only choice to prevent this, and I don’t know how you will get it back on the rails. It is your proposal.

THE PRESIDENT: Our proposal? I thought it was your proposal! (laughter)

OBASANJO: I am delighted that you are personally committed. You cannot be seen to abandon it. If the Patriotic Front can be convinced that the AAP has more in it than they formerly thought, it may be possible for them to accept it. Frankly, we were surprised by the success of the Malta talks, since our immediately previous talks with the Patriotic Front did not make us optimistic. If we are to act, we must do it speedily before the internal settlement solidifies. Time is not on our side. The more that Muzorewa and the other nationalists in Salisbury enjoy the trappings of office, the more they will wish not to give up their office. If we are not giving up on the AAP, we must act fast.

THE PRESIDENT: We have no indication that Nkomo and Mugabe accept the AAP.

OBASANJO: They do accept the AAP.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you certain of that?

OBASANJO: They do now. They will probably have areas they want to talk about. The Patriotic Front now realizes they cannot ask

---

5 See footnote 3, Document 194.
6 See Documents 183–186.
Britain to take over with responsibility, via a resident commissioner, if he will have no power. They are more amenable to the UN forces. A Governing Council could be fashioned to be more advisory than executive, though its advice could be strong. The Patriotic Front will accept a governing council of Zimbabwean leaders not exclusively Patriotic Front.

**THE PRESIDENT:** Andy has been in Africa during the last week, meeting with the Front Line presidents. Nkomo and Mugabe have indicated their support of the AAP only as a basis of negotiation, but will not accept it without substantial changes. We are completely committed to the AAP. We are not going to invade Rhodesia to enforce it, and we are now doing all we can to keep the British on board. Andy’s statements have caused them to reaffirm their support. Our feeling is that for the United States to relate directly to these problems as African problems is in the best interests of the United States. We have no preferences among Zimbabwean leaders. After an interim period—six months or more, we are not particular about the exact time. We wish to see democratic principles operating in Zimbabwe similar to those in Nigeria. My impression is that Nkomo may not have as strong a political base as Muzorewa. It is conceivable, since he has been out of the country some time, that Nkomo might need a period within Rhodesia to reestablish his political base. If it were 6, 8, 10 months, we would not abandon the Plan.

To maintain the support of the American people for the AAP, which currently is not strong (as I told you), there must be (1) UN presence (2) UK authority and (3) free elections. Free elections would give the world a sense of the wishes of the Zimbabwean people. The issue of the armies of Zimbabwe is the most difficult. The AAP provides for a Zimbabwean army to be based on the liberation forces, but we want to make sure that there will be no extermination of whites in Rhodesia. We want to prevent civil war. We share your concern that war could break out with Muzorewa and Vorster on one hand, against Nkomo and Castro on the other; this would surely lead to a wider conflict which we do not want. In every sense, we agree with you that the only basis on which to proceed is the AAP. If Mugabe refuses, or Nkomo, we must work out next steps with you, the Front Line and the UN.

**OBASANJO:** What is our next move?

**THE PRESIDENT:** We discussed that at length between Brazil and here, but we have no clear schedule. We need your advice and your thoughts. We would like to have communication with all parties to see what the next steps might be, but we are not wedded to a strict sequence.

**OBASANJO:** The Front Line and the Patriotic Front see the AAP as a basis for settlement; they do not see the plan as being dead. Where
do we go from here? As long as Smith is a factor there is no solution to the Zimbabwe problem under the AAP. Smith must go. As long as he is there, everyone will be suspicious of everyone else. Why can’t Smith be removed?

_THE PRESIDENT:_ Through what means? How? The Patriotic Front has been trying for several years. The Front Line has tried. It is difficult to think how to physically remove Smith.

_OBASANJO:_ I asked this during our first session when the AAP was presented. I was under the impression that this planning had been taken care of, relative to putting pressure on South Africa to in turn pressure Smith. I thought that I understood this also in talks with Andy.

_THE PRESIDENT:_ We can talk frankly on this. After our meeting, I concluded that it was in our interest to become more involved with Africa than perhaps the American people would currently wish to be. We put forward the AAP after I had met with Owen, and Andy also played a part here. Initially, we got almost no support from the Front Line presidents. After the internal settlement became a possibility, then the Front Line states and the Patriotic Front began to look at the AAP. The Patriotic Front has still not told us that they accept the plan. If they would accept it, this would put great pressure on Smith and Vorster to do the same. Otherwise, the issue remains in doubt, and creates a public image of the Patriotic Front being adamant while Muzorewa and the other nationalists are moving with Smith towards majority rule. You and I know that this is not true, but the Patriotic Front has not yet agreed to the AAP. We need the Patriotic Front to make public statements on this point in order to put more responsibility on the United States and Britain.

If it was clear from public statements that Nkomo and Mugabe did indeed adopt the AAP, not as a basis for negotiation, but as the basis for settlement, I could go to Congress. I could talk about protection for settlers, a democratic constitution and free elections, but that’s not my understanding of the Patriotic Front position.

_ANDY YOUNG:_ When the Patriotic Front meets in a room with the Front Line States or with Nigeria they agree to the AAP. But when they go back to their military and get back with us, they change their position. We spent three months trying to get them to meet Lord Carver. There were problems as to where such a meeting would take place plus other minor matters, and all of this took time. Meanwhile Smith and South Africa were moving fast and managed to seize the initiative.

_OBASANJO:_ Your point is well taken. You are saying we have not done enough to enable you to do more. Andy may be right. We had

---

7 See Document 163.
no problem with Nyerere. My speech in Kitwe (Zambia) supporting
the AAP was cleared with Nyerere and Machel, and with the Patriotic
Front. I saw Nkomo from midnite to 1:30 but I didn’t see Mugabe.
Kaunda did not fully understand the AAP, and the problem of getting
rid of Smith bothered him. I went to great lengths to reassure him that
Smith would not be a factor and I believe I was successful in this. The
same thing happened with Nkomo, but he seems to have slipped, as
Andy says.

Getting rid of Smith is a critical point for us. We will try to move
the Patriotic Front on this issue.

ANDY YOUNG: It comes back to the question of the military com-
danders. The political leaders—Nkomo, Mugabe and Nujoma feel a
little insecure. I don’t know about Tongogara\(^8\) and Rex Nhongo.\(^9\)

OBASANJO: What were their views?

ANDY YOUNG: Tongogara doesn’t talk much about politics. He
seems to think that it is in the long range interest of ZANU to keep
on fighting and that it can outlast anyone. If ZAPU forces move over
to fight out of Mozambique, it might be under a joint command, but
not as ZAPU. The danger for the US (and even more so for the
UK) is to launch such a process as this which puts us on your side
pushing for a settlement, only to have it undermined.

OBASANJO: Didn’t we say originally that the UN forces would
cure this? They must fight if necessary.

THE PRESIDENT: Would the UN send forces into Rhodesia, espe-
cially without Patriotic Front acceptance?

ANDY YOUNG: No. Our effort to put UN forces into Lebanon
was successful because Lebanon requested them very strongly and the
Soviets did not cast a veto. We strongly backed Lebanon, though the
Israelis did not. Analogously, we have been trying to find someone on
the African side to play the sergeant, to line up everyone for
negotiations.

VANCE: I am not sure that if the Patriotic Front and some of the
nationalists agreed to UN troops that the UN would refuse to send
them; they might do so.

OBASANJO: Muzorewa would not agree to such a plan.

GARBA: When Prem Chand was appointed, this should have been
followed up. The Security Council should meet, the Secretary General
and Prem Chand could report to it, leading to a Security Council

\(^8\) Reference is to Josiah Magama Tongogara, commander of the ZANLA guerrilla
army.

\(^9\) Reference is to Solomon Matuswa, also known as Rex Nhongo, supreme com-
mander of ZIPA.
resolution adopting the AAP. This could hold everyone in place and serve as a basis for putting UN forces into Zimbabwe. This could possibly be our next move.

OBASANJO: There may be a problem. The socialist countries do not like the AAP because it takes the play away from them. Fighting in Southern Africa is in their interests. Anything that solves the problem except by military means is against their interests. If we do not support the AAP, we are playing into their hands. In that case we will have no choice but to be on the side of those who fight; we could not side with those who are allied with South Africa. Unfortunately, I can see a situation where Nigeria and the U.S. would wind up on two different sides.

THE PRESIDENT: I agree with what you say. The socialist countries prefer armed struggle. They supply the arms and the blacks die. If a war breaks out, it would be a very great challenge between the US and the USSR. South Africa would also be involved. Prospects for peace in Namibia and Angola would be lost. You would be involved, as you described. At this point I see no differences between us and you. Let us be frank. In the eyes of the white western world, the Patriotic Front have rejected the AAP, and the Front Line States have been successful; the Patriotic Front is relying on Soviet bloc assistance. Though the impression in the west is that Smith is untrustworthy, he has at least made a move toward majority rule. I don’t think Smith will do anything to turn over power to any black government unless faced with very great pressure. We need as much harmony on the AAP—you, me, Front Line States, the UN—so as to bring peace and some protection for whites in Rhodesia who are willing to remain and equitably share in the country. We must spread support for the AAP beyond me and Callaghan and you—sometimes—and the Front Line States. Meanwhile, the internal settlement gathers momentum. Though it is not difficult for us to support the AAP, it is difficult for the United Kingdom. Legally, the U.K. has responsibility in this matter. We will try to hold them to the Plan, and I refer to this in my speech.

On Namibia, we have the same problem with Sam Nujoma. We need his acceptance. The world thinks that Nujoma and South Africa have rejected the Five Power Contact Group Plan. I am afraid South Africa will move unilaterally in Namibia towards its own internal settlement. Black leaders in Africa must mobilize world opinion to bring pressure on Nujoma to accept the plan in order to prevent this from occurring. Smith and Vorster wish to stay in power in Rhodesia and Namibia. At the moment, the U.S. and Britain are not getting much support.

OBASANJO: Let us return for a moment to Zimbabwe. Since progress was made in Malta, why not have another Malta Conference
followed in a day or two by a meeting of all the parties, that would
then lead to a meeting of the UN Security Council to adopt the AAP
proposals.

VANCE: That fits with our thinking. We have made great efforts
to set up an all-parties meeting, but we consider it essential.

OBASANJO: Can you put pressure on South Africa?

ANDY YOUNG: The U.S. has no leverage on South Africa since
the arms embargo and our relations are terrible. We cannot now get
Smith to attend an all-parties conference unless there is either South
African pressure or the military situation gets so much worse that his
military advises him to meet.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there a possibility of sequential meetings?
Malta, then Smith and Muzorewa?

VANCE: Malta, closely followed by all parties.

OBASANJO: What if Smith refuses to meet?

THE PRESIDENT: What if Andy and Owen went to see him? If
Smith won’t come to a meeting, then go and see him.

ANDY YOUNG: That might be possible.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps the UN would give support if the
Patriotic Front would support such a meeting.

GARBA: The Patriotic Front is not quite that intransigent.

OBASANJO: That’s o.k. Smith turned down the AAP after talking
with Lord Carver. We were disappointed that Lord Carver did not
come away from that meeting with more. This, unfortunately, has been
downplayed.

THE PRESIDENT: Both have rejected the AAP. Subsequently Smith
moved to set up the internal settlement. He may be lying. But there has
been no move on the other side—we are divided. We need unanimity
around the AAP. It would be good if we could reconvene the Malta
Conference and get a public commitment from the Patriotic Front to
accept the AAP with only minor details to be worked out, and then
we can take that to the world community. Otherwise, it is very difficult
if we are the only ones supporting the Plan.

OBASANJO: Can you keep the British on board?

VANCE: The U.K. will go along if there is only a short time elapsed
between the reconvened Malta Conference and an all-parties
conference.

OBASANJO: The all-parties conference could possibly be delayed.

THE PRESIDENT: Would Smith refuse to see Andy Young and a
British representative if they came there?

ANDY YOUNG: I met with Salim and told him that the Patriotic
Front—Front Line Meeting could be held in Dar-es-Salaam and that
another meeting with Smith was then possible in someplace such as Mauritius.

THE PRESIDENT: Someone could go to Salisbury if Smith will not come out. If the idea of a Malta Conference is accepted by the Patriotic Front and the Front Line, and the internal settlement parties reject it, we can move on that basis.

OBASANJO: Separate meetings might not work. We need a joint meeting with everyone there to avoid suspicion and distrust.

ANDY YOUNG: We must include South Africa in this process; perhaps this is possible through Namibia. It is not possible through Rhodesia. We want to tell Sam Nujoma that with his agreement, we could guarantee that there would be a UN force in Namibia—the rest of the Contact Group would push the British on this point.

If South Africa agrees with the Five on Namibia, they will not let Smith jeopardize their interests by creating a war on their northern border, and will force him into the AAP. But without a united Africa group in the UN, the USSR will veto. Even without SWAPO’s agreement, the USSR will hesitate to veto if the Africa Group is unified.

OBASANJO: We must consult with SWAPO, and it will be difficult to find him. I fear that he will go off half cocked on this question. There are two issues that must be resolved: (1) Walvis Bay; (2) the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the responsibilities there of the South African police. It is important to build confidence in the people of Namibia about elections.

VANCE: Our position is that the UN Secretary General should decide at what strength the UN forces should be deployed.

OBASANJO: Will there also be UN police in Namibia as well as troops?

ANDY YOUNG: We are proceeding along the lines of the “two men in a jeep” concept. This means that in the UN Observer Team there will be one UN official that will accompany the responsible officials in the South African forces to monitor their activities.

MCHENRY: The Secretary General should be authorized to do whatever he feels is necessary in the situation. We believe that the two men in a jeep concept satisfies these requirements.

OBASANJO: O.K.

THE PRESIDENT: The UN is more deeply involved in Namibia already than in Rhodesia.

VANCE: On the issue of the size of South Africa forces, we have proposed that 1,500 would remain in one of two camps in the North. In the Proximity Talks in New York, 10 SWAPO stated their position

---

10 See Document 81.
and agreed with us on the number of 1,500 but said that these must be located in the south of Namibia.

OBASANJO: Why cannot a compromise be reached on this point?

MCHENRY: From our talks with the South Africans and the history of these negotiations, the provisions in the current proposal already represent a compromise, especially in moving those troops back from the northern border. They will be confined to base, surrounded by UN forces, and this would provide sufficient guarantees; South Africa has not yet accepted this. Proposing to move them to the south would rub Vorster’s nose in the dirt, he would dig in his heels and there would be no settlement.

OBASANJO: Our effort then will be to try to get to SWAPO before April 10th. What about the question of Walvis Bay?

VANCE: There is a serious legal question on Walvis Bay. It must be resolved by negotiation. If we push to negotiate the question now, we will not get a settlement in Namibia. After such a settlement is in place, South Africa will probably go along. It is both a legal and a political matter, but we believe that it must be resolved as a political matter.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the UN position on this question?

MCHENRY: It is confused. Walvis Bay was ignored as an issue until about two years ago. Historically, it is not a part of the original League of Nations Mandate. When Southwest Africa was delivered to South Africa under the Mandate, Walvis Bay was to be administered as if it were a part of Namibia. In historical, ethnic, political, and economic terms, Walvis Bay is part of Namibia. However, South Africa has a strong legal case and therefore we must argue on the basis of practical political realities. But even the Turnhalle Group agrees with SWAPO that Walvis Bay should be part of Namibia.

OBASANJO: Perhaps you can get a private concession from South Africa that this will eventually happen.

THE PRESIDENT: We can express an opinion, but the question must be negotiated. To inject it now as an issue would kill the Namibian settlement.

ANDY YOUNG: Walvis Bay is no good to South Africa without the land surrounding it which belongs to Namibia. South Africa thinks that SWAPO is communist, and they are concerned about their future relations with an independent Namibia. If South Africa thought that

---

11 In an April 10 letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Western Five submitted a proposal to achieve Namibian independence in 1978. For provisions of the proposal, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978*, pp. 881–882.
a relationship similar to that which they now have with Mozambique would evolve, they would probably think it over.

MCHENRY: The issue of Walvis Bay has been blown all out of proportion. Vorster is emotional on the legal issue. But South Africa is willing to say that all Walvis Bay questions, including sovereignty are subject to negotiations, but they will not concede the question of sovereignty in advance. They possibly wish to hold Walvis Bay as a card vis-a-vis Namibia in the future.

OBASANJO: How much time do we have? On Zimbabwe, I understand that the next move by you would be to convene the Malta Conference and then a general all-parties conference. We will make the Patriotic Front and the Front Line see that they need to accept the AAP with only minor modifications. This would lead to a Malta Conference and then a general all-parties conference followed by a Security Council meeting.

VANCE: I should mention here that we will be tabling our proposal on Namibia in the Security Council on April 10th, and hopefully Nujoma could be contacted before then.

OBASANJO: We might spend five minutes on these questions at tomorrow’s session.

End of First Session
201. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, April 7, 1978, 2:30–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Horn of Africa, Angola and Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS:

State
Cyrus Vance
William C. Harrop
(Dep. Ass’t. Sec./African Affairs)

Defense
Harold Brown
Charles W. Duncan, Jr.
(Deputy Secretary of Defense)
David E. McGiffert
(Asst. Secretary/ISA)

CIA
Stansfield Turner
James Potts
(Chief, Africa Division)

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Chairman)
David Aaron

NSC
Paul B. Henze (Notetaker)
Thomas Thornton

JCS
General David C. Jones
(Acting Chairman, JCS)

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Angola or Rhodesia.]

Angola:

The group agreed that the possibility of support for Savimbi, with the aim of complicating the Cuban position in Angola, would be desirable to explore. In light of the importance of Congressional attitudes it was decided that key Congressmen should be discreetly consulted on their attitude, e.g., on provision of communications equipment or other non-lethal help. State, CIA and the White House will take soundings in the next few days with Javits, Church, Zablocki, Hamilton, Cannon, Clark, G. Hart, Boland, Bayh and possibly others.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 10, SCC Meeting: #77 Held 5/15/78, 4/78–5/15/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed the Summary of Conclusions at the top of the first page.

² Carter wrote: “ok,” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence. An unknown hand wrote below the paragraph: “Not to be initiated until after the conclusion of the Vance trip to Africa.”
Rhodesia:

Possible overt and covert ways of bringing Nkomo into a relationship with the Salisbury government were discussed. It was decided that we first need to know exactly what the British are doing. CIA will put together everything it knows about this and the Secretary of State will pursue this subject when he meets shortly with Nkomo and David Owen.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Angola or Rhodesia.]

In a March 31 memorandum to Aaron, Thornton offered his preliminary thoughts on ways to bring Nkomo into the internal settlement. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 45, [Africa]: 9/77–11/78) The Central Intelligence Agency responded to Thornton’s memorandum on April 7, with a more detailed analysis of possible covert actions. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 119, Zimbabwe: 3–9/78)

See Documents 202 and 204.

202. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Dar es Salaam, April 14, 1978, 1325Z


1. Summary: Secretary Vance and Owen decided morning April 14 that goal of Dar es Salaam meeting is to gain PF agreement on essential principles of Anglo-American proposals (AAP), which could then be used to moderate Salisbury Group’s hard line against further negotiations with the PF. Owen repeatedly stressed that Front Line and others must understand that AAP cannot be imposed by UK/US on group. Accordingly, Owen repeated UK position against binding agreements on details with the PF which might later have to be broken at an all parties meeting. Uppermost in Owen’s mind is desire not to

1 Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to Lusaka, Pretoria, London, Gaborone, Maputo, Cape Town, and Lagos. Vance was in Dar es Salaam for meetings on Rhodesia with British Foreign Secretary Owen and leaders of the Patriotic Front.
limit options and flexibility of UK/US in case parties themselves (notably Nkomo and Smith) are able to work out a deal outside bounds of AAP. End summary.

2. Secretary Vance and Owen met alone briefly at Ambassador Spain’s residence morning April 14 and were then joined by Ambassador Young, Lord Carver and members of respective delegations for further discussions.

3. Owen began group discussions by noting that an important objective of Dar meetings must be to convey to PF and FL understanding that the AAP is an outline for a negotiated settlement, that whole range of details, including cease fire, must be negotiated among the parties and that there can be no imposition of the AAP on the Salisbury Group. He said that FL is “hankering” for agreements in Dar which could be imposed upon others and this must be counteracted. He noted, however, that we would lose FL support if we adopted position of simple arbiter between the parties without advancing our own proposals. We must walk a thin line to get the PF more on board the AAP, but without setting in concrete agreements that would have to be broken up with “pneumatic drills” at an all parties meeting. In response to inevitable PF question, we will say that anything we agree to here must be consistent with AAP and that we will support it at an all parties meeting. However, we cannot agree to be “locked in without flexibility.”

3. Secretary Vance agreed with Owen’s approach, noting the importance of leaving Dar having created a sense of progress in negotiations and with agreements on general principles with the PF. There ensued discussion on what these principles should be and how to structure the negotiating scenario with the PF. Owen noted that we should plan our Dar conversations keeping in mind the issues that are of most concern to the Salisbury Group. He identified two, the role of the Resident Commissioner,2 and our proposed military arrangements “based on the liberation forces” as particularly upsetting to the Salisbury Group.3 Low and Graham added the UN role as another major issue.4 In reflecting on these Salisbury concerns Owen elaborated on possible new approaches which might form the basis of agreement

2 The Anglo-American Proposals called for the Resident Commissioner to “administer the country, to organize and conduct the general election . . . and to take command, as Commander-in-Chief, of all armed forces in Rhodesia, apart from the United Nations Zimbabwe Force.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28646)

3 According to the Anglo-American Proposals, a new army loyal to the people and Government of Zimbabwe would be established. Enrollment would be open to all citizens, but based on the Liberation Forces and include acceptable elements of the Rhodesian Defence Forces. (Ibid.)

4 Reference is presumably to the United Nations Zimbabwe Force.
among the parties themselves. In doing so, he pressed his point that we should not commit ourselves to firm agreements here that would limit our flexibility to accept a settlement achieved by the parties themselves, not in total accord with the AAP. He noted that “we are all adults—we know what’s going on,” in an apparent allusion to continuing Smith-Nkomo contacts.

4. During discussion of role of UN Ambassador Young said that there could be no settlement without a UN force: “It would be suicide for us.” Owen doubted that a UN peace-keeping force would be needed under all circumstances, but agreed that some UN presence if only to observe elections, is mandatory and that we could not back off on question of a UN role of some sort. UN involvement is necessary to get international acceptability for a settlement and our ability to facilitate UN acceptance should be biggest selling point for continued cooperation with UK/US settlement effort in Salisbury. Graham and Low noted that the Salisbury Group was particularly adamant in its loathing for all things UN. This was exacerbated by the Security Council’s refusal to allow Muzorewa to speak. Low argued that Prem Chand’s presence in Salisbury would be like waving a red flag. However, Owen said that Waldheim had told Chand that he could go to Salisbury, if the FL do not object. Amb. Young asserted that Chand’s personality and prestige as a civil servant would diminish opposition to him. Graham and Low disagreed, but it was left that Chand would probably go on to Salisbury, if he wanted.

5. Discussion on the role of Resident Commissioner focused on his authority over police and military arrangements. Lord Carver repeated that there could be no give on his position that he could not make changes in the police before he had appointed a new Commissioner of Police. He specifically repeated this when Edmondson asked about the possibility of disbanding the para-military police support units. Owen noted the possibility that the parties themselves could come to agreement on the composition of the military force, but that under no circumstances could a British Resident Commissioner become involved in a situation in which some guerrillas were left armed and outside of the country, not under the control of the RC as a guarantee exacted by the PF (meaning Nkomo) as price for settlement. In relation to Owen’s mention of the possibility of a non-UK transitional administrator Lake suggested that we use the term Resident Commissioner and Neutral Administrator interchangeably and not refer only to the latter, lest this raise PF and FL apprehensions about our withdrawal from support of the AAP. Owen agreed, though Lord Carver noted obvious distinction between RC acting as agent of HMG and Neutral Administrator operating only as Chairman of Governing Council or with additional responsibilities agreed to by the parties.
6. The Secretaries agreed that we would maintain our position on composition of Governing Council despite fact that this would probably be unacceptable to the PF. At best, PF would argue for at least a 50–50 division of representation between itself and the Salisbury Group. Owen, noting that in the Salisbury Agreement the Executive Council keeps power over the military, said that we should not exclude the possibility of the Governing Council being granted the same authority if such is agreed to by all the parties in further negotiations.

7. Owen said that he was very relaxed about how to structure the meeting with the PF, scheduled for 4 p.m. today, and thought that we might begin by asking what they wanted to talk about. It was further decided that in raising issues we would first talk about the UN presence, then proceed to the composition and role of the Governing Council, and then onto the role of the Resident Commissioner/Neutral Administrator.

8. Secretary Vance noted that he would stress in his meeting with President Nyerere, which followed immediately upon the US/UK morning discussion, the favorable effect there would be in Salisbury and elsewhere to public agreement with the PF on general principles relating to amnesty, the police UN presence, Governing Council and the participation of all parties in the settlement process. The Secretary noted he would stay away from the question of the Resident Commissioner’s powers unless President Nyerere raised it. He also noted that he intended to hold the FL to their Lagos promise to obtain a PF public statement agreeing to participate in an all-parties meeting.

9. In discussing the Salisbury and all-parties talks Owen noted a recent statement by Muzorewa’s representative in Scandinavia and David Smith’s comments in Salisbury to Low and Graham which indicate that there might be more flexibility in the Salisbury position than was apparently indicated in the formal Low-Graham meeting with the Executive Council representatives. It is an irony of history, noted Owen, that Ian Smith is probably now more flexible about negotiations with the PF than his African associates. It was agreed that the Salisbury Group wants to flex its muscles and establish its position of power before even considering negotiations. Owen pointed out that we are on the horns of a dilemma; it is really too early to expect the Salisbury

---

5 Not found.

6 In telegram 2049 from Pretoria, April 11, Bowdler reported on the Graham-Low visit to Salisbury. During a meeting with deputies to the Executive Council, Graham explained the proposal for an all-parties conference: “They said they refused to enter into any negotiation of the internal agreement, meet anyone outside of Salisbury or participate in a meeting that included representatives of the Front Line, though they offered discussions in Salisbury with Nkomo and Mugabe if the latter would renounce violence.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780155–0653)
Group to act on further negotiations, but we must nevertheless try to convince them in order to maintain our credibility with the FL. He noted that it was also important to make a strong demarche to the Salisbury Group and to the South Africans before the Executive Council “crosses the Rubicon” and orders raids into Zambia which might trigger Cuban involvement. Owen said he would not object to going directly to Cape Town to express our concerns to Vorster himself in order to wake Salisbury and South Africa up to the great danger of Cuban involvement, whether the internal settlement is working out or not.

10. In relation to the site of an all-parties meeting, Owen expressed preference for Rhodesia and thinks that Nkomo could be made to see advantages for him in that venue. Failing that, the talks should take place at Livingstone Victoria Falls in order to get negotiations “into a Rhodesian context.”

11. The most significant point of difference in Vance-Owen meeting emerged over discussion of observers’ role. Owen repeated his concern that we should not set precedent at this meeting which we might have to live with at an all-parties conference. He wants to make clear that the observers are here at invitation of the PF and the Tanzanians, and expressed some concern about the Mozambican objection to the presence of the Nigerians. The Secretary responded that we should not make an issue of the observers, let them sit where they wanted, but not at the table itself. He agreed with Owen that they should not speak during the meetings. The Secretary argued for flexibility and rejected Owen’s request that we reach a decision now on not having observers at an all-parties meeting. He and Owen then agreed that the matter of observers at an all-parties meeting should be left open, and, of course would have to be discussed with the Salisbury participants in any event, if such a meeting looked like a real possibility.

Vance
203. Telegram From the Embassy in Tanzania to the Department of State

Dar es Salaam, April 14, 1978, 1310Z

1664. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary’s Meeting With Nyerere.

1. Summary: Secretary met with President Nyerere morning April 14 for hour’s discussion of key points preparatory to Malta II meeting in Dar es Salaam. Nyerere remained generally supportive of US/UK approach. He accepts that it is crucial that President Commissioner have powers of “both the Head of State and Prime Minister”, although he still argues in favor of some kind of special role for the Patriotic Front among the Nationalists. He did not dispute the fact that any “all parties” discussion cannot be confined solely to the Anglo-American Plan, but we will not know how well he reflects (or has influenced) PF attitudes until we meet with him this afternoon. He still wants to “save” Bishop Muzorewa. End summary.

2. Secretary and US delegation (Young, Spain, Easum, Low, Lake, Edmondson and Thornton) met with President Nyerere morning April 14 for hour’s discussion. Nyerere was accompanied by Foreign Minister Mkapa and other Tanzanian officials. President’s letter to Nyerere was handed over at end of meeting. US meeting with Nyerere took place after two-hour session between Secretary and Dr. Owen (including Lord Carver, Graham, and other UK officials—septel). This was in turn followed by a separate Owen and British delegation meeting with Nyerere.

3. In response Secretary’s query as to how Nyerere saw the Patriotic Front’s current position, the President said that the PF now accepted the major premises of the AAP but there could be problems during Malta II on details. He thought the UK and the PF could work them out.

4. The Secretary queried President Nyerere on a number of specific points, which the Secretary indicated he believed to be important. Nyerere’s replies were:

A. He had not discussed the question of amnesty with the PF. He did not know how they felt about it.

---


2 Document 198.

B. The division of function between the Resident Commissioner and the Nationalist leaders was the essential point. Nyerere thought there was agreement in principle on this. The Resident Commissioner would have to have the powers of “both a Head of State and a Prime Minister”. Nyerere did not want to get into details. He argued for “non-equality” in favor of the PF in the political as well as the military field. He believes the PF should have a special position but made clear that the division of functions between the Resident Commissioner and governing council was more crucial than one seat more or less on the government council.

C. Nyerere believed that the Patriotic Front would go along with our present thinking on the police.

D. A UN presence in Rhodesia would not be a problem to the PF, although they would probably wish to define its role in maintaining law and order.

E. PF was prepared to go to an all parties meeting.

F. Nyerere appeared to accept, albeit somewhat reluctantly, that such an all parties meeting could not be confined solely to the AAP and would be open to all questions on all points.

G. According to Nyerere the PF would after all have some questions about Lord Carver’s military plan. Nyerere’s position (which probably reflects current PF views) was that we should not try to deal with numbers at the beginning. We should accept that the liberation forces were the “base” of the new army. Once we had defined the Patriotic Front forces, how many wanted to go home and how many wanted to stay, etc, we could then turn to defining which Rhodesian defense force people would be added to them as “acceptable elements”.

5. Toward the end of the meeting Nyerere reemphasized his hope that we would stick to the Anglo-American Plan. After Ambassador Low, at the Secretary’s request, had given Nyerere a brief fill-in on his and Graham’s meetings in Salisbury,4 Nyerere reiterated his desire that we should try to find some way to “save” Bishop Muzorewa. He emphasized that Muzorewa, unlike Sithole and Chirau, was a real leader. Muzorewa wanted elections. Why did he prefer the kind contemplated under the Salisbury Agreement when he could have internationally acceptable ones under the AAP?

6. Comment: Nyerere remains supportive in principle of the US/UK approach. He still seems reasonably flexible. We will have a better idea of how well he reflects PF views after our meetings with them. These are scheduled to get under way at 4:00 p.m. April 14 and to continue through Saturday. (Nkomo is still insisting on leaving no later

---

4 See footnote 6, Document 202.
than 5:00 p.m. Saturday.) Nyerere apparently accepts, at least partially, the importance of trying to get South African and Rhodesian cooperation in any settlement.

Spain

204. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Dar es Salaam, April 14, 1978, 2322Z


Summary: In course of meeting afternoon April 14, Patriotic Front leaders Nkomo and Mugabe presented positions on three crucial elements of settlement. PF willing to accept UN peace-keeping force under certain conditions, but continues to demand effective control over the police during the transitional period—PF proposes new composition and functions for the Governing Council which reduces the Resident Commissioner’s role to titular head of the army and generally powerless member of Governing Council on which PF will predominate by two to one. End summary.

1. After brief opening remarks by Owen in which he expressed hope that we could pick up where we left off in Malta, Nkomo began his presentation with predictable PF questioning concerning whether agreements reached in Dar es Salaam would be binding ones. He and Mugabe asked whether Dar was to be a “serious” meeting or simply another round of consultations. Owen responded that he hoped we could reach agreements on the AAP and move to a meeting of all parties with those agreements. Secretary Vance stated that we would hope to be able to go to an all-parties meeting with common views. Ambassador Young pointed out that “All of our cases are stronger if we are able to reach consensus. We will be in no position to move forward if there is no consensus among us.” Owen noted that as there must be a negotiated settlement, certain things such as the ceasefire

will have to be agreed upon by all parties. He did note that “we stand behind our proposals we put down in September.” In response to Nkomo’s question, “What happens if Salisbury says no to all-party talks?” Owen responded that he would not give up attempts to reach a final agreement.

2. Mugabe said that Owen’s responses were “not very assuring.” However, with some prompting from Secretary Vance, Mugabe and Nkomo proceeded to outline PF positions on three essential elements: (a) composition of Governing Council, (b) role of the UN force, and (c) police.

3. Governing Council (GC)—PF has changed position from Malta at which they suggested a 4–1–1 ratio (PF-Resident Commissioner-Rhodesian regime) for the GC. New position is that GC should be composed of twelve members (eight PF, three Rhodesian regime, and Resident Commissioner). Ministries of Defense and Law and Order should be held by PF members. The GC itself would have full legislative authority over all matters. Resident Commissioner would be Supreme Commander who would exercise powers on advice of GC. The only reserved power of Resident Commissioner would relate to combatting an external threat.

4. In response to heavy, but polite, questioning from Owen, Vance and Carver, Nkomo and Mugabe said that PF-controlled Ministries of Defense and Law and Order would be in day-to-day charge of defense forces. Decisions would be reached by consensus between GC and the Resident Commissioner. They discounted possibility that there would be differences among the Ministers and the Resident Commissioner.

5. Owen responded that PF’s position is fundamental change from what is envisaged in the AAP. In effect, PF proposed cabinet form of government in which military commander, in this case the Resident Commissioner, would act under direction of Governing Council. If such were the case, there would be no need for a Resident Commissioner with the powers and functions outlined in the AAP to administer the transitional period. Repeating on several occasions that he was not necessarily opposed to such a system, Owen nevertheless clearly stated that the British Parliament would not accept responsibility for administering the transition under such circumstances. He asked the PF to stop playing with words and to recognize that they were suggesting a fundamental shift in approach.

6. In relation to the 8–3–1 balance of the GC, Owen noted that it would be difficult to convince the world that free elections could be held when one of the parties contesting the election maintained a two to one majority on the Council.

7. With some passion—notable in a meeting characterized by subdued tones—Nkomo argued that the world fully understood what was
happening in Rhodesia and that the gains won by the sacrifices of the people of Zimbabwe must be safeguarded against erosion during the electoral process.

8. Secretary Vance noted that the real question is the major change the PF has put forward about the powers of the Resident Commissioner. Mugabe interjected that it was a change for the better. Nkomo said that the PF has come a long way to meeting the Anglo-American suggestions, to which Owen asked good-naturedly if he were saying that with a straight face. Mugabe asked how we have modified our position since Malta, how far had we gone to meet the PF’s point of view. Ambassador Young noted that balance of power on the GC is not of great importance. In his view, whole GC is a waste of time and if he were running an election campaign he would not put his best people on the GC, but in the countryside to get votes. “All I am concerned about is free and fair elections to give the people of Zimbabwe a chance to choose a new government,” said Ambassador Young. Nkomo noted that because the Americans had defeated the British, “you didn’t have to have them conduct your elections—if you did, you’d know what we are worrying about.”

9. Nkomo, obviously anxious to have Owen make a counter-proposal on the GC numbers question, asked once again if the UK–US had developed any new thinking on the issue. Owen responded that at Malta we had modified our position significantly away from the total power we had initially thought necessary for the Resident Commissioner. Owen did not offer any new position on this matter.

10. UN forces—Mugabe noted that at Malta PF had accepted role of UN in observing elections. PF has now reconsidered its position about presence of UN peacekeeping force and “although we remain opposed to such presence, we are prepared to consider a UN force provided the role and functions are clearly defined as nothing more than to supervise the process of decolonization.” Mugabe also said that the term of the UN force must be restricted to end with the granting of independence. In response to Secretary Vance’s and Owen’s specific questions about the nature of the PF’s objection to a UN peacekeeping force, Nkomo and Mugabe provided no details except to indicate that the UN force’s role in supporting the civil power would not be acceptable if the civil power’s intention was one of recolonization.

11. Owen noted that the UN force does not come under the control of the Resident Commissioner but rather is the responsibility of the UN Secretary General. He asked General Chand to comment. With considerable precision, Chand noted his agreement that there must be a clearcut mandate for the force, which the UN has learned from past experience. He asserted that with daily liaison with all the political parties and the military commanders, the UN would be able to supervise the cease-fire and otherwise aid the peaceful transition.
12. Police—Nkomo noted that the whole question of the UN role depended on what other forces would be in existence. He said that at Malta Anglo-American position was that both PF and Rhodesian armies would be kept in barracks and that law and order would be maintained by the police on the assumption that they were a civil and neutral force. This assumption is totally unacceptable to the PF, which views the police as an element of the forces it is currently fighting. Nkomo said that the PF is prepared to work with acceptable elements of both the police and military forces but that these must be incorporated into “the forces for change,” that is, the PF. The UN could observe the maintenance of law and order by the PF-controlled police force. In response to a sharp question from Owen, Nkomo responded that he was thinking of a ratio of two to one in favor of the PF for the composition of the police force.

13. Owen noted that at Malta we had responded to the anxiety of the PF about the police by putting forward the concept of a UN police role. “There is no sense beating around the bush,” said Owen, “with two to one PF predominance in police we could not convince the world that there would be free elections.” Mugabe interjected that the British would accept if it were two to one in favor of Smith. Owen ignored the barb and countered with, “We think we could neutralize the police force with changes that would be made by the new Commissioner.”

14. In closing the meeting, Owen summed up the PF position on the Governing Council, the police and the UN force. In describing the latter, he emphasized that the PF was still opposed to the concept but would accept it, if the UN role were clearly defined. Secretary Vance noted, and Nkomo and Mugabe agreed, that in fact the PF was accepting the UN force.

15. Front Line was represented at meeting by Mwale (Zambia), Mkapa and Slaim (Tanzania), Mogwe (Botswana) and Deputy Foreign Minister Lima (Angola). Garba arrived near the end of the meeting. Chissano and Vieira reached Dar after the afternoon session. Observers did not address the meeting.

Comment: After meeting, Tanzanian representatives noted in private conversation that PF’s positions could hardly be considered resumption of Malta. Ambassador Salim noted that he believed the PF was putting forward an intentionally hard line as a preliminary bargaining position. Owen’s performance was restrained but, as in the case of his summary of the PF’s position on the UN force. He was apparently interested in helping the PF paint itself into the narrowest of corners. Carrying through on the attitudes adumbrated in his morning conference with the Secretary, Owen did not reject anything proposed by the PF, but simply and purposefully noted that such terms could
not be accommodated in the settlement worked out under the Anglo-American Proposals.

Vance

205. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Dar es Salaam, April 15, 1978, 2004Z

Secto 4058. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary’s Meeting April 15 With Nyerere.

1. President Nyerere requested private meeting with US–UK afternoon April 15. Secretary, Dr. Owen, Spain, Graham, Tanzanian Foreign Minister Mkapa and Presidential Secretary Mdee were present.

2. Nyerere said he had just finished meeting with Front Line and Nigerian Foreign Ministers. He would continue to urge on the Patriotic Front the importance of defining functions of Resident Commissioner so that RC had all the powers he needed. He brushed aside question of division of seats on Governing Council, saying that if Resident Commissioner had power he needed, that was all that counted during transition period. However, political realities of PF power should be reflected on Council.

3. Nyerere thought question of clarifying UN role could be worked out. (PF now preparing paper on this.)

4. However, Nyerere has come to believe that PF case on police role is strong one, and the Front Line cannot deny them something in this area. The existing police are really Smith’s. They don’t have to go, but they must be balanced with PF’s own people. “What is wrong with three-men-in-a-Jeep?”

5. Owen responded that he understood the reasons for many of the PF’s demands. Perhaps, in a subsequent and different set of circumstances, they might be practical. However, the proposals to take power in key areas out of the RC’s hands, to give dominant power to the PF on the Council, and to change the whole character of the police appara-

---

tus were simply not part of the Anglo-American Plan. Apart from their being new and retrogressive, they would upset the fragile balance of the AAP. Owen did not see how we could accept them.

6. Secretary emphasized that Resident Commissioner was key part of AAP. He saw no possibility for success if his power diluted. Equity and representative character were important on Governing Council: To the other parties and to international opinion, including that in the US. He asked if PF insistence on police role grew out of their desire when they came home to Zimbabwe for visible manifestation of their successful struggle. Nyerere said “not primarily,” it grew out of need to “balance” regime police force. He asked US–UK to give all we could on police force. At end of meeting all agreed on importance of not letting efforts of past year go down drain.

7. Comment: Nyerere was testing temper of US–UK before making his final approach to PF. Nyerere can be counted on to be helpful on powers of Resident Commissioner. But key issue is going to be on police, and all we can expect there is that he will reflect US–UK strong feelings on the subject. All we have for sure at the moment is agreement (confirmed by PF in private meetings this morning) on the continuing desirability of an all parties conference.

Vance

206. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Pretoria, April 16, 1978, 1325Z


Summary: Third meeting of full delegation began late afternoon of April 15th after day of negotiations amongst principals, observers

Rhodesia

and President Nyerere (reported septels).\textsuperscript{2} PF outlined its concept for mandate of UN force which allocated to UN responsibilities which under AAP are the concern of RC, and made only passing reference to supervision of ceasefire. Anglo-American side objected to PF's UN force ideas although Secretary did note some agreement on substance. PF proposed that RC would be Commander in Chief with full executive powers in defense and law and order, to be exercised in consultation with responsible Ministers. Governing Council would have legislative powers in all fields and all executive power except in areas reserved to RC. PF said 8–3–1 ratio proposal April 14 for Governing Council was negotiable but that PF predominance on the GC was not. Nkomo and Mugabe reacted strongly to Owen-Vance assertion that PF proposal to create Governing Council with executive power, thus limiting authority of RC, as well as demand that one group have dominant position in transitional administration are inconsistent with basic principles of AAP and constitute fundamental alterations to White Paper and can not be accepted. Both sides repeated essentially the same positions on police as delivered in sessions April 14. PF said that they did not insist on 2 to 1 ratio in its favor, but argued that, as in military arrangements, PF is prepared to integrate into its forces acceptable elements of Rhodesian police. Carver reviewed proposals for creation of ZNA. Both sides noted agreements on ceasefire and on formation of ZNA must be worked out in advance of transition. Recurring themes in Owen’s presentation April 15 were a) because of changing situation, we may now be approaching time in which proposals and negotiations should reflect existence of two groups (PF and Salisbury) rather than five entities (Geneva participants); and b) though PF proposals are inconsistent with AAP, they are legitimate topics for negotiation among the parties themselves. End summary.

1. Following agenda had been agreed to between principals prior to the meeting: UN force; powers of Resident Commissioner (RC); Governing Council (GC); police; armed forces; and civilian administration. All but the last were discussed during the meeting.

2. UN force: Mugabe recapped PF’s position on UN forces as stated April 14, i.e. PF will accept, if UN force mandate clearly defined as

\textsuperscript{2} Telegram Secto 4028 from Dar es Salaam, April 14, reported on the meeting between Vance and Owen. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780167–1219) Telegram 1664 from Dar es Salaam, April 14, reported on Vance’s meeting with Nyerere. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780160–1110) Telegram Secto 4039 from Dar es Salaam, April 14, reported on the meeting among Vance, Owen, and the Patriotic Front. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780161–0867) Telegram Secto 4058 from Dar es Salaam, April 15, reported on Vance and Owen’s private meeting with Nyerere. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780163–0046)
assisting progress of decolonization and if mandate terminates at independence. He proposed the following functions for the force:

A. To restrict to barracks, disarm and dismantle all units of the Rhodesian Army and Air Force;
B. To undertake its control and to store all air force planes and weaponry;
C. To guard all Rhodesian forces in barracks and to ensure that they remain so until independence;
D. To maintain State security jointly with the PF forces (including guarding of the borders); and
E. In event of a threat to the security of the State to consult with the commander of the Patriotic Front forces in order to give mutually agreed advice to the RC. Mugabe also said “The composition of the UN force in terms of the countries supplying the units must be acceptable to the Patriotic Front.” The UN civil police force will act in an observer capacity in relation to the new integrated police force.

3. Secretary Vance asked whether function D—maintenance of State security jointly with the PF forces—should also include reference to acceptable elements of the Rhodesian Defense Force. Mugabe agreed. The Secretary’s question about adding the same phrase to point E elicited a similar but less explicit answer.

4. After brief initial questioning by Carver, Vance asked Chand to comment. In sum, Chand noted that all of the functions listed were in some way relevant to UN military and police roles but not in the form spelled out. He related each of the functions to tasks outlined in the Anglo-American ceasefire/UN force proposals, without identifying them as such. He noted that all tasks would have to be and said all these things must be accomplished in cooperation with the RC or with the Ministers of Security. In relation to the composition of the forces, Chand noted that the Secretary General normally consults with the parties most concerned.

5. Nkomo obviously anxious to move on, noted that the points were negotiable and that there was no need to go into detail. Secretary Vance made it clear that as General Chand had pointed out there are serious questions whether the functions described by the PF are properly those of the United Nations. Lord Carver noted that the biggest omission in the PF’s list of functions was that of supervision of ceasefire. Mugabe conceded that this function should continue to be included. Carver also noted that the fundamental difference between AAP and PF proposals is that under AAP principal responsibility for ensuring smooth and peaceful transition rests with the RC acting through the commanders of the relevant forces. The UN role is to observe that it is done. Secretary Vance reaffirmed Carver’s point noting that the PF
is asking the UN to do much that is properly the responsibility of the RC. Ambassador Young said that the PF had set out guidelines which would have to be discussed in greater detail when the Security Council debated the question of the mandate. Secretary Vance noted that the PF would have to be substantially reworked to reflect the proper authority and responsibilities of the UN forces as reflected in the comments of Carver and Prem Chand.

6. Powers of Resident Commissioner: Reading slowly and repeating himself for clarity, Nkomo offered the PF position on powers of the RC. He specifically stated that the proposals are made on the assumption that agreement will have been reached on the military and police presence of the PF. Describing this position as a major concession on the PF’s part, he stated the following: “The Resident Commissioner shall be Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and police and shall have full executive powers in defense and law and order provided that such power shall be exercised after consultation with the responsible Ministers. The Governing Council should have legislative power in all fields and executive power in all fields except law and order and defense.”

7. British Legal Adviser Steele asked whether, in PF’s formulation, RC would have overriding executive power to put aside GC legislation in relation to defense and law and order. ZANU lawyer Mbaka noted that power legislation resides in the Governing Council and that the RC would not have discretion to accept or reject legislation in these matters. Steele then asked whether the RC would be allowed to exercise executive power in other fields if he felt it was necessary to fulfill his law and order and defense functions, e.g. requisitioning transport. Mbaka responded that the PF proposals were principles and details had not been worked out. However, in a rather tentative fashion he seemed to acknowledge that the RC would be able to override Ministers not only in defense and internal security, but in other areas as well in completion of his reserved executive powers. To this, Owen murmured “quite good” and Mugabe quipped that “Owen was overjoyed about our loss.”

8. Governing Council: Nkomo stated that it is essential that PF keep dominance in terms of numbers on the GC. However, PF understands that 8–3–1 ratio may appear to be too big and is prepared to reduce the numbers in negotiations. Secretary Vance responded that giving dominance to any one of the parties is inconsistent with the AAP. “It is something I could not accept.” Mugabe reacted sharply, “Would you like us to be quite prostrate and lose everything?” He said if PF is to be involved in the ceasefire its status should be reflected in the Governing Council. Owen noted that PF’s argument that it must have predominance in the GC to ensure that the ceasefire and the
transition not see an erosion of its power could be used by the other parties as well in an effort to claim predominance. Nkomo responded that the PF’s claim, however, was based upon its victory in the war: “We have won—we got Smith to change and we brought him to accept majority rule.”

9. Owen then introduced a concept which he was to repeat on several occasions during the rest of the conversation. He noted that AAP had been based upon the need to deal with five separate parties (the Geneva participants). The UK had never accepted the PF’s position that the Salisbury Group should be dealt with as one element. However, if in Salisbury it becomes apparent that the Executive Council demands to be dealt with as an entity, the UK will have to look at the whole negotiating situation again on the basis of dealing with two parties rather than five. This would affect questions relating to balance of power on the GC.

10. During conversation that ensued, Nkomo with some urging from Mugabe changed his phraseology from “dominance” to “predominance” and then to “a simple majority” to describe PF’s representation on the GC. Ambassador Young noted that PF’s proposals had completely changed situation. We had hoped to be able to travel to Salisbury in total agreement on the AAP with PF. We would have been in position to sell agreement to other parties. However, now we have to go as a mediator. Nkomo and Mugabe said that they could not accept that position. Young noted that their position was understandable but that right now we can’t deliver Smith. He asserted that PF “had changed the ball game today.” The people in Salisbury would have to feel they had been defeated before they could accept the PF plan. “If they would agree on the terms you have offered, we would be thrilled,” stated Young, but he made it clear that this was not likely.

11. Owen’s position in discussion of PF’s proposals for GC was that it was a fundamental change of what was proposed in the White Paper or discussed in Malta. Repeating the line he established April 14 on PF proposals, Owen noted that he was not saying that the PF’s position was necessarily wrong. He did not reject it—“it may be the way things are moving”—however it could not be an acceptable formulation under the AAP. An executive GC is inconsistent with the AAP. Secretary Vance said that while he understood the PF position, it would not provide for a neutral transitional authority. He noted that, if in fact it turns out that the Salisbury participants contend that they are one group, it may prove to be a different story. Owen repeated that we might be at the point of changing from negotiations among five parties to one of negotiations between two parties. He stressed this may have major significance because the type of Governing Council with executive powers which the PF is demanding will necessarily require negotiation among the parties to determine the representational balance.
12. Police: As agreed before the meeting, the UK–US side presented its position on the police question. Owen reviewed the evolution of Anglo-American thinking noting that initially Nationalists had been concerned about possibility of counter-coup from Smith’s army and that it had therefore been agreed that those forces should be neutralized and a new army be created based on the liberation forces. However as part of that understanding the Resident Commissioner would be able to use the existing police force to maintain law and order during the potentially difficult days of the transition. He said that Lord Carver’s insistence in Salisbury that a new commissioner of police would have to be appointed was one of the issues that most incenses the Rhodesian Front. He noted that in response to continued PF anxieties about police, we had put forward at Malta suggestions for a UN police presence. Owen noted that the PF had essentially maintained the same position at Malta as it does in Dar on the police. The strength of PF feelings had obviously intensified, however. He noted that PF’s position on police constitutes a major change in the AAP which would be unacceptable. Secretary Vance noted that if one of the parties has a predominant position in the police as well as in the Governing Council, world opinion could not be satisfied of the fairness of the transitional process.

13. Nkomo responded to the Secretary that it was very sad that the UK/US were being so intransigent. Lengthy and sometimes heated conversation ensued in which Nkomo and Mugabe argued that the current police force is an integral element of the force fighting the PF—police functions are controlled by the combined operations command. Therefore, the same type of approach adopted in relation to the Rhodesian Army was called for. The PF is prepared to integrate acceptable elements of the current police force into the Patriotic Front police. Nkomo made the point that the UN police force would be able to observe the fairness of the integration. Nkomo and Mugabe pressed hard for Owen and Vance to agree to accept the PF position, at least as a basis for further study in Washington and London. The Secretaries refused to do so. Owen said that we must stick to the AAP on this issue and could not accept such a fundamental change. However, he noted that while PF’s position on police could not be accommodated within AAP, it is the sort of thing that the PF would have to discuss with the other parties. Ambassador Young and Secretary Vance supported Owen’s position. Young restated that maintenance of the police as the basic instrument of law and order during the transition was “a trade off” for basing the new army on the liberation force. PF rejected this strongly.

14. In response to Nkomo’s request, Carver, with his customary precision, went over his proposals for the ZNA. He explained how starting with approximately 80,000 armed men, divided more or less
equally between the PF and the Rhodesian regime, a new army would be created. ZNA would be composed of 10,000 regular troops, 4,000 reserve elements and an unarmed Zimbabwe National Guard of about 10,000 spread around the country in company units. During the transition period all armed forces would be reduced to meet the requirements of the new army. Purely white units would be abolished, including the territorials. In the ZNA the balance between white and black would approximate that of the population. He stated that the acceptable elements of the RDF would be the current three battalions of the Rhodesian African Rifles which would be merged with “four or five infantry battalions from your force.” Support elements would be drawn from both and with exception of transport planes, the air force would be grounded.

15. Nkomo asked whether the forces would be merged before or after transition day. Carver responded that this would happen after transition day as the transition itself could only come about when agreements had been reached on the terms of a ceasefire and the size and shape of the ZNA. Carver asked whether the PF accepted that on transition day PF commanders would come under the authority of the Resident Commissioner in order to take the necessary steps to carry out agreements on the ceasefire and ZNA. Mugabe responded that this was acceptable as long as all issues are worked out in advance of transition.

16. Owen noted that many of the defense and police issues raised by the PF could be discussed in direct talks. When questioned, he defined direct talks as an all-parties meeting with the UK and US present. Secretary Vance noted that it was agreed that we would try to get an all-parties meeting sometime in May. There was some confusion expressed over dates with both Vance and Nkomo indicating that the other had noted that April 25 was impossible. Finally, Secretary Vance stated that we would attempt to arrange an all-parties meeting for April 25th, but if that proved impossible, we would try for May. Ambassador Young noted that it is doubtful that the Salisbury people would want to meet now. Nkomo warned that he did not want a repeat of what happened when Carver was unable to set up a meeting in Malta with Smith last November and the PF sat waiting for months for further negotiations. Mugabe said that PF is very interested in UK-US reactions to PF proposals, in particular those relating to the Resident Commissioner and the military and police force. Secretary Vance noted that there seemed to be agreement in substance on the UN force but that language must be clarified.

17. Nkomo asked that an agreed press line be developed. He suggested that the press be told that a large measure of agreement had been reached except in areas where the US and UK would consult
further on the PF’s proposals. Owen responded that this would be unsatisfactory in that he was not prepared to consider further certain of the proposals within the context of the AAP. Secretary Vance suggested that the principals meet again after dinner at the State House to work out an agreed press line, noting areas of agreement and disagreement.

Vance

207. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Secretary’s Aircraft, April 17, 1978, 2124Z


1. In five hours of meeting April 17 with Executive Council (Smith, Muzorewa, Chirau and Sithole) and associates, Secretaries Vance and Owen and Amb. Young argued for favorable Rhodesian response to our call for an all-parties meeting. They asserted that a roundtable conference could provide appropriate vehicle for reaching lasting and peaceful settlement, involving the Patriotic Front as well as the parties to the Salisbury Agreement. US/UK side also noted value of getting United Nations involved in the settlement effort and in the transitional process in order to secure international acceptability, which would confer legitimacy on the new government.

2. On the other hand, failure to continue negotiations would raise possibility of escalating violence and Soviet/Cuban involvement. Even if all-parties conference failed, Owen and Vance noted, Salisbury Group’s willingness to make another effort at negotiations would increase its prestige and world estimation of Executive Council. US/UK goal remains assisting Rhodesians to create circumstances in which free and fair elections to choose new government could take place.

3. Smith and company predictably pressed for UK/US support for the internal settlement, asserting that it fulfilled the democratic

---

principles of the Anglo-American Proposals and conceded to the Africans the majority rule for which they had long fought. Another meeting like Geneva, they argued, would only serve to confuse the Rhodesian people, more than 80 percent of whom, they allege, support the internal settlement, and make them think that an irreversible process to majority rule had not indeed begun. They said that the US/UK should use their influence on the Front Line to bring the Patriotic Front into negotiations in Salisbury. “The door is open” theme was repeated on several occasions.

4. With considerable bravado Sithole asserted that program to have guerrillas lay down arms was meeting with success and would increase in pace as soon as mechanisms providing assured safe return were put into effect. Agreeing to a meeting with the Patriotic Front would inhibit this program, he argued. He offered and Owen accepted, to have a member of the British team stay in Rhodesia to meet with some of the guerrillas who have crossed over to his side. African members of the Executive Council individually were emphatic in rejecting all-parties meeting. Smith said that it was necessary to maintain morale and confidence of Rhodesian people. However, he took point about value of acceptance would have in improving Salisbury’s Group image. We are “betwixt and between,” but, Smith said, final decision would take into account rest of the world. In sum, Salisbury Group agreed to consider seriously the proposal.

5. In separate, private conversation David Smith and Gaylard said they thought that while all-parties meeting may be premature, they wanted contacts to continue and did not want to see door shut on negotiations.

6. Rhodesians tried to pin UK/US to accept results of possible referendum which they contend would demonstrate overwhelming majority support for the internal settlement. Owen and Vance refused to make any commitment on this issue. However, repeated leitmotif of Owen’s presentation was that US/UK are not trying to stop progress of internal settlement. Rather, we would urge them to get on rapidly with the process. HMG would determine whether elections were held in conditions allowing fair test of peoples’ will, and, if that were the case, would assess results to determine whether granting of independence would be appropriate.

Vance
208. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Secretary’s Aircraft, April 17, 1978, 2355Z


1. Summary: Owen and Vance summarized the progress and problems of the Dar meeting for Botha and Fourie, Owen noting certain similarities between Patriotic Front proposals and the internal settlement structure of Executive Council. Botha and Fourie described the internal Nationalists’ commitment to the settlement and optimism that Smith would turn over on December 31. Success of the internal settlement depended chiefly on significant progress in de-escalation of fighting especially in the eastern areas, during the 4–6 weeks. African support would grow as the power of the African leaders was recognized. The world would accept them when it became clear that Smith would indeed leave. Owen stressed the danger of an interim period in which parties tested each other’s military power with possibility of strong Soviet-Cuban support for the PF. To Vance’s and Owen’s repeated requests for South African support of an all-parties conference, Botha noted that his relations with the internal Nationalists were very delicate and he remained non-commital. In a later, private meeting he was more forthcoming. End summary.

2. The first hour of the meeting between Botha and Fourie on the one side and Vance, Young, Owen and their party on the other related to Rhodesia. Vance and Owen led off by describing in some detail the Dar meeting, noting the areas where we had made progress (e.g. on UN forces and contingent acceptance of Resident Commissioner’s powers in defense and law and order) and describing the problems over a) PF insistence on dominating the Governing Council; b) still narrowly defining the powers of the Resident Commissioner and c) demanding a substantial presence within the police force. Owen noted that the proposal now being put forward by the PF for a Governing Council was similar to the arrangement worked out for the transition period the internal settlement, even down to the titles of the Ministers of Defense and Law and Order. We had made it clear at Dar we could not accept domination by the PF and held the line on the police. But

---


2 See Document 85.
in view of the broad similarities on the Governing Council issue Owen said it might be that the two sides could work out something in a joint meeting. The PF had accepted to go to a further meeting, and took an April 25 date. We raised the vital issue of amnesty, Owen continued. He got the feeling this could be negotiated. It would be no difficulty with Nkomo; Mugabe was harder, but it could be negotiated. Owen also noted that Carver had given his description of the army, and met no obvious problems. Vance said the Front Line States had apparently had some influence with the PF on the Governing Council issue. On the police, some of the Front Line representatives might have been swayed by PF arguments. But Nyerere understood the importance of the points we were making on the issue.

3. What worries us, we said is that a conflict which hitherto had been between black and white, if left to continue, could well deteriorate into a civil war between the blacks which could have drastic consequences in making positions more rigid and in easily becoming internationalized.

4. Botha replied that he thought there was a greater danger of the conflict becoming a tribal one. Nkomo’s support was restricted to Matabeleland. A Salisbury-Bulawayo struggle is a real danger. Sithole, he said, had done most of the fighting and feels [he] has earned the settlement while Nkomo’s people had not really become engaged. It was important to leave the door open to Nkomo, and Mugabe too for that matter. The internal Nationalists are determined to proceed with the internal settlement [and] will inevitably attract increasing popular support as the Rhodesian people see them acting as leaders in authority. Muzorewa and Sithole have really no place to go. They are tied to Smith. But they are convinced that the December 31 independence promise is a genuine one. When the world saw that the settlement process was irreversible and Smith would indeed leave, it would support it. Fourie and Botha expressed confidence that at least half of the African nations would accept it even though they did not move immediately to recognition.

5. Owen acknowledged that if the settlement was legitimate in terms that a genuine election was held and Smith did step down, Britain too would have to go along. But he said that his concern was over the intervening period. Soviets and Cubans would make a considerable effort to thwart it. In these days of surrogate troops, situation can polarize very quickly. If we dropped our impartial attitude toward the parties, we could lose African support quickly and find ourselves facing hostile African nations supported by Cubans and Soviets.

6. Owen also said that without a settlement, South Africa itself could become the butt of sanctions efforts. The lifting of sanctions on Rhodesia could be important to economic stability there. It is hard to
see—we will not see—an end to sanctions out of a purely internal settlement, Owen said. Botha later remarked that if there were further sanctions against South Africa, it would change the whole situation. “The whole of Southern Africa would have to look at itself in an isolated way.” It has great resources and sophisticated leaders. Young responded that we have never wanted sanctions against South Africa and indeed have often deflected pressures for them at the UN.

7. Brand Fourie saw two cardinal issues: The success of the interim government over the next 4–5 weeks and de-escalation of the fighting. Botha added that if a sizeable group—60 per cent to 70 per cent—of fighters joined the internal group, the evidence of support would be overwhelming. He did not predict this would happen but said that until the result becomes clear, which would take 6 weeks or so, we would not be able to move either side. If such events took place in the east, it could present a real threat to Kaunda. The black military force which has been built up in Rhodesia is one of the strongest in Africa.

8. Young said that we are maintaining the AAP partly as a safety net in the event one or the other group falls apart. Either is possible. The internal settlement may begin to fail. Strains within the PF are great, particularly among Mugabe’s supporters who believe Nkomo may join the internal group and are looking forward to inheriting Soviet-Cuban support when that happens. Vance said we must try to get all the parties together. We may not succeed, but nothing is lost by trying. (Botha nodded.) Botha said he thought the idea of the AAP as a safety net was a constructive one. Vance and Owen came back to the importance of getting the parties together for a meeting and asked Botha’s support for such an initiative. The internal Nationalists must understand the importance of continuing to find an internationally acceptable settlement. Botha pleaded that he had to be very careful about his relationships with Muzorewa and Sithole who may, like Transkei Chief Matanzima, seek to distance themselves from South Africa. He acknowledged that the internal settlement leaders had proposed an overall long-term economic agreement with South Africa but still refused to go beyond saying that he took note of our request to support the all-parties meeting. At a smaller meeting with Vance, Owen and Young, however, he indicated willingness to be of assistance in this regard but emphasized that the SAG needs to be very, very careful how they go about it.

Vance
209. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 17, 1978, 11:13 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Meeting Between President Carter and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Richard M. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Ambassador Stephen Low, United States Ambassador to Zambia
Ambassador Donald McHenry, United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Thomas Thornton, Member, National Security Council
President Kenneth D. Kaunda
R.C. Kamanga, Member of the Central Committee
Siteke Mwale, Minister of Foreign Affairs
D.C. Mulaisito, Special Assistant (Politics) to the President
M.J. Punabantu, Special Assistant (Press) to the President
J.M. Mwanakatwe, Minister of Finance
A.B. Chikwanda, Minister of Lands and Agriculture
Putteho M. Ngonda, Ambassador of Zambia to the United States

After a few minutes alone in the Oval Office the two presidents entered the Cabinet Room and the meeting began at 11:13.

The President welcomed Kaunda and noted their shared goals. He presented two books to Kaunda including one of space photographs and offered our space services to Zambia if they desire. He suggested that the morning discussion be on international questions; bilateral issues could be taken up at Secretary Vance’s lunch, and tomorrow morning the two presidents could discuss remaining bilateral matters and international questions. He asked Kaunda to start with an assessment of the political situation in southern Africa.

Kaunda cited his high esteem for the President and his valuable leadership. He felt that problems could be discussed as among brothers. Kaunda reviewed the broad African independence struggle and his own role including his attempt in 1966 to convince Salazar that the

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 5/78. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
Portuguese should give independence to their colonies to avoid a holocaust. He got no reply to this nor from a subsequent letter to Caetano. He also discussed his meetings with Vorster in broad outline.

Kaunda said South Africa claims to act in the interest of the West and in the name of Christ but in fact they do the opposite of his teachings. Carter’s stand on human rights has brought a new fresh air to these issues. Zambia senses the coming danger; it doesn’t take sides between East or West. Its policy is pro-man, the creation of God. He referred to his last visit here when he challenged the United States. He gives Kissinger credit for coming to him later and admitting that had America listened to Kaunda the Angola problem could have been avoided. Kissinger referred to Zambia as an ally; this was not accurate because he saw things in an East-West context while Zambia views it as a human problem.

Turning to Angola, Kaunda said that Neto wants to be non-aligned but another faction, which is gaining strength, wants to align with the USSR. He will discuss this in detail with the President in private. He thinks the situation in Mozambique is healthy.

Zaire creates security problems for Zambia; people cross the border to find food, etc. Kaunda has told Mobutu to find a political solution in Shaba. There is no economic development taking place there now and driving out the Katangans will not provide the answer. Mobutu must be helped to understand the problem better.

The President asked if the Katangans would have a future role if Mobutu would accommodate them.

Kaunda replied that it could become an East-West problem but the majority of Katangans are not interested in socialism.

The President asked if there was Angolan or Cuban support.

Kaunda replied that he did not know what the Cuban role was. In any case it is just an effect; the cause is within Zaire. Kaunda added that his relations with Mobutu are warm. Mobutu cannot reorganize Zaire without foreign help. The administration is corrupt. Kaunda had suggested that Mobutu study the Tanzanian and Zambian administrative systems but Mobutu did not do so.

In Rhodesia Kaunda assessed the situation as favorable. For the first time the US and UK agree with the UN, OAU, Patriotic Front and Front Line presidents. Only Salisbury stands aside.

The President asked if Mugabe and Nkomo would accept the Anglo-American plan.

---

Kaunda replied they would and the Dar Conference was a great success.  

The President agreed that the main problem is with the Salisbury Group but the Patriotic Front did raise difficulties in Dar.  

Kaunda said that Sithole's statement about accepting the Anglo-American plan is genuine. Zambia has some background on this. The churches in the United States should put pressure on Muzorewa whose hands will soon be bloody.  

The President countered that Nkomo has never said he would accept the Anglo-American plan. His reservations cause us great concern. If Nkomo and Mugabe were to accept it we would have more influence on Muzorewa. Zambia can help us on this.  

Kaunda said that the Patriotic Front accepts the plan as a basis for negotiation. He said it was a mistake to have meetings only at the Foreign Minister level; there should have been negotiating committees in constant session.  

Secretary Vance cited the Low-Graham mission, but the Salisbury Group would not talk to us. Things may be changing now and we will try to bring the sides together at the working level.  

Ambassador Low said he and Graham will seek to develop areas of agreement based on the Dar meeting.  

Secretary Vance said that progress was made in Dar. The question of power-sharing has to be worked out around a table and maybe now is the time. With regard to the police, Nkomo is giving serious consideration to our idea for a three-man type of operation.  

The President said that Muzorewa's involvement with the American Methodists is close and perhaps we could encourage them to talk to him.  

Kaunda said that the Western efforts were succeeding well in Namibia before the South African raid. After his return there will be a Front Line Summit to persuade SWAPO that the raid was a South African trick to break up negotiations and SWAPO should not play into South African hands. After that, Foreign Minister Mwale will be in further touch with the United States in New York. The United States should make a strong statement on Walvis Bay.

3 Kaunda, Nyerere, Machel, and Khama met March 25–26 in Dar es Salaam, where they insisted that the United Kingdom and the United States convene a meeting to follow up on the January Malta talks. Vance and Owen met with Nkomo, Mugabe, General Prem Chand, Field Marshal Carver, and envoys of the Front Line States in Dar es Salaam April 14–16. See Documents 204–206.  
4 See footnote 6, Document 202.
Secretary Vance described the US position and said it was very close to Zambia’s. We did not want to address the matter in legal terms however since South Africa has a better case.

Kaunda replied that Walvis Bay was a legal part of Namibia only since last year.

The President said we do not want to address the legal question. Sam Nujoma has been difficult to pin down and has not accepted proposals that he should have. He has given South Africa basis for creating an internal settlement. We condemned the South African raid but Nujoma must not use it as an excuse. We stand staunchly behind our proposal and hope Zambia will urge SWAPO to accept it.

Ambassador McHenry noted that the objective situation has not changed although the climate has. The need for movement and the fairness of the proposals remain. Some elements in SWAPO seem not to have studied the proposals.

Kaunda noted that there were many points of view within SWAPO but the important thing is a collective decision.

The President asked if SWAPO had agreed to meet the Front Line. Kaunda said they could hardly refuse.

Secretary Vance noted that two weeks ago he had met with the Foreign Ministers of Mozambique and Angola and had useful conversations. He pointed out that a Namibia solution is especially important to Angola and the opportunity must not be allowed to slip by.

Kaunda said it was very good that Vance meets with the Angolans and is not held up by protocol.

The President said just don’t praise him publicly about doing it (laughter). What are the future chances for Savimbi to join the government and the Cubans to leave?

Kaunda suggested they could discuss that privately. Turning to South Africa, Kaunda reviewed his contact with Vorster in 1975 and noted the increasing trend toward bloodshed since then. A crisis is approaching. What is the role of the West in this unique historical situation? Carter’s firm stand is gratifying for majority rule is the only answer. The West must remove all support from the racist regime. Kaunda recognizes the limitations posed on Carter by the private enterprise system but capitalists should certainly see that the situation was a bad investment. It will explode and make the French Revolution look like a picnic. Western countries are now supporting South Africa in all critical areas. To diffuse the situation this support must be removed.

5 Vance met on April 30 with both Monteiro and Jorge.
so that Pretoria will recognize that they stand alone. This cannot be done overnight but the West must do what it can to prevent an explosion.

No African leader takes a racial approach, Kaunda added, but this will become increasingly tempting. Racism is growing among South African blacks and the explosion will be compounded by an East-West element (Kaunda compared the situation to his warning to Salazar in 1966). In Rhodesia the Sino-Soviet dispute compounds the situation. We do not want to see that conflict fought out in Salisbury. Within South Africa there are also pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet tendencies. The West must move quickly in its own interest and, even more, on moral grounds. Zambia appreciates what Citibank has done. Others should be stimulated to do the same in America and Europe.

The President said he shares Kaunda’s analysis but has constraints on his action. He noted the arms embargo as an important pressure and said the South Africans treat him as a whipping boy which he considers to be an honor. We are trying to encourage business leaders to bring their influence to bear in South Africa; we have made some progress and some Europeans are joining in. This is not however the time for an all out attack. First we must resolve Rhodesia and Namibia; the South Africans know that they will be next.

Frankly there is a problem with US public opinion, notably concerning Rhodesia. There is much American support for the Internal Settlement based on the false premises that Smith is telling the truth. We unwaveringly support the Anglo-American plan and when the British falter we try to rebuild their support. There are limits to what we can do without public support. If the Soviets and Cubans become more detectably involved in Rhodesia there will be a strong growth of support here for the Internal Settlement. I would deplore that. I agree that we are making progress; Smith’s concessions result from the pressure of the Anglo-American plan and Front Line support for it. We should renew our efforts on Rhodesia and work with Muzorewa and Sithole within the bounds of propriety. We will work with the Front Line to get all parties to the table and we have a reasonable chance of success.

Speaking of Namibia the President is not pessimistic although our influence is limited. We need Zambia to urge SWAPO. We are seeking an end to all forms of apartheid. We will continue full efforts on Namibia and Rhodesia and keep pressure on RSA through implementing the UN measures and working through our private enterprise system. This will be possible as long as the American public does not

---

6 In early March, Citibank decided to stop loaning money to the South African Government and government-owned manufacturing and utility enterprises.
think that Nkomo and Mugabe are communists and atheists. I think this is near your position.

*Kaunda* agreed that Rhodesia and Namibia must be taken on first but we should start planning now for the South Africa problem and do things like Citibank is doing.

The *President* reassured Kaunda that while some of his predecessors misled Vorster privately on our views on apartheid, he has never done so. This message was clearly carried by Vice President Mondale.  

*Dr. Brzezinski* said that Vorster’s hostile reaction to the President is the best evidence of this.

*Vice President Mondale* said ironically that he had a marvelous three days with Vorster.

The *President* noted that Kaunda was due to go to lunch and that they will have a private talk this evening. We are eager to help Zambia with its economic challenges (we have some similar problems at home) and we have studied what additional help we can give.

The *President* concluded by noting that Kaunda’s schedule in the United States is an excellent one and that his helpful and frank comments are much appreciated.

The meeting concluded at 12:30.

---

7 See Document 278.

---

210. **Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Bennet) to Senator Robert C. Byrd**

Washington, July 14, 1978

Dear Senator:

Attached is a paper which summarizes the serious concerns we have about the Helms Amendment. The situation in southern Africa is so delicate at this moment that we feel U.S. interests throughout

---


2 The Helms Amendment proposed lifting sanctions against Rhodesia and promoting the internal settlement.
Africa could be seriously jeopardized if the Senate were to reject the President’s policy.

I will take the liberty of sending you more detailed material as the issue develops.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

Opposition to the Helms Amendment

—The recent Namibian development is a concrete demonstration of what can be accomplished through negotiations when our bona fides as an honest broker, seeking to end minority rule peacefully, are accepted by the parties.

—Acceptance by South Africa and the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) of our proposal for a peaceful transition to majority rule represents an historic step toward peaceful solutions in southern Africa generally, but the process is at an extremely delicate stage.

—Unilateral lifting of UN trade sanctions against Rhodesia now would be viewed as a major reversal of American policy and would seriously injure our interests throughout Africa. It would jeopardize the fragile Namibian settlement by seeming to indicate that we no longer are concerned about African opinion.

—in Rhodesia, even participants in the “internal settlement” are privately acknowledging the inadequacies of the March 3 Salisbury Agreement. The Salisbury Agreement has apparently not attracted wide popular support nor proven attractive enough to induce large numbers of guerrillas to give up their arms.

—Mugabe and Nkomo, as well as the internal nationalists, have accepted the principle of elections. Mugabe and Nkomo have accepted the essential features of the U.S.–UK plan, including free elections.

3 No classification marking.
—The disagreement is over who will be in a dominant position during the elections. Each side seeks that dominance; our plan proposes a neutral transition authority.

—Lifting the embargo would destroy our credibility with the front line states whose support is essential if Mugabe and Nkomo are ultimately to participate in a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Rhodesia. The front line states played a central role in the progress made in Namibia; we must not lose their cooperation at a critical time in Rhodesia.

—It would convince many that the U.S. has abandoned its consistent position of refusing to take sides with any of the parties to the Rhodesian dispute. Our credibility and effectiveness as mediators would be seriously damaged.

—It would make extremely difficult a negotiated end to the violence, with the consequence of escalation of fighting, perhaps involving Cuban, Soviet and South African forces, which would only increase and prolong the suffering, destruction and instability in the region.

—It would place the United States once again in the position of not complying with the legal obligations of adhering to UN resolutions which we have supported.
211. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, July 18, 1978, 1403Z


Summary: Smith maintained his willingness to attend private meeting of principals to “explore the Patriotic Front’s position.” Graham and I outlined the basis of their position along lines set out at Dar. Smith asked for a paper on the subject which we agreed to give him to take up with his colleagues on the Executive Council. While he gave no concessions, he at least has agreed to enter into discussion with us on the substance of an all parties meeting. End summary.

1. Graham and I met with Ian Smith and Jack Gaylard for about forty-five minutes Monday noon, the meeting was businesslike and friendly. There was a complete absence of any hostility in the atmosphere.

2. Graham noted that we were leaving that evening for London to confer with Secretaries Vance and Owen. After meetings with all the parties including Front Line Presidents, we have concluded that a conference is now possible. Mugabe said he was prepared to attend a meeting in Zambia on the 5th and 6th of August, though Nkomo was concerned about the possibility of failure and wanted to wait. In the meantime he had promised to be in touch with us again. Graham noted the Front Line Presidents’ disposition to assist positively as they had in reaching an agreement between the parties on Namibia. He reviewed the basis on which he thought agreement might be possible and asked Smith whether he had discussed the matter with his colleagues on the Executive Council.

3. Smith said he was waiting for a definite proposal before discussing it with his colleagues. He felt it still would be useful to have a meeting among the six to “see what the others had to offer.” He acknowledged that the present arrangement was not going well but

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Europe, Box 24, 7/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Paris. Sent for information to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Maputo, and Pretoria. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Documents 204 and 206.

3 In telegram 11316 from London, July 18, Brewster transmitted the text of the non-paper requested by Smith. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Europe, Box 24, 7/78) For the text, see paragraph 9 of Document 213.
he said that could always change. He said there were some areas where the cease-fire was taking hold.

4. In discussing a settlement the important thing still was to maintain the confidence of the whites. I responded by saying that we had become convinced after talking to many persons over a number of months that the white population’s willingness to remain depended on ending the war and a return of economic prosperity rather than any legal protections in a constitution. Smith added that law and order must be protected which we agreed was part of ending the war. I then added that we know what the Patriotic Front’s position would be at a conference. They approached it as we did on the basis of our proposals as elaborated at Dar. When he asked us what these we outlined what we thought were the basic points—replacement of the 69 constitution; a council headed by a Resident Commissioner or a neutral chairman who controlled law and order; elections after a brief period which, however, might extend beyond December 31; a revised and agreed independence constitution; and provisions for creation of a new security defense force which included Patriotic Front forces. Smith picked up the last of these which he said he would have difficulty accepting. We noted that there must be some way in which the Patriotic Front’s forces could be incorporated into the new society. We were not asking, as he claimed, that he disband his defence force. They would perform a major function in the new force. Patriotic Front forces would be brought into both the active and reserve forces. We thought that with further study they would find that Lord Carver’s plan was a practical and reasonable solution to the problem which provided a compromise they themselves were moving towards.

5. We pressed Smith on timing noting that consideration of the constitution was moving ahead and he would be forced soon to ask for approval in the Executive Council and go to a referendum with it. It would then be more difficult to consider alternatives. We said we thought the Front Line would be willing to help on the more difficult areas where we had not yet achieved agreement with the Patriotic Front—composition of the Governing Council, the make-up of the police and the security forces. However, they were asking us whether Smith was prepared to “be reasonable” on the five principles stated above. We did not believe that they, any more than we, were prepared to press the Patriotic Front to move on them. Smith took exception to our description of these points as “reasonable.” We accepted they could be characterized as one wished but we believed they were a minimum basis for discussion at a conference. We discussed composition of a Council saying the PF was now asking for a majority as was the Salisbury Group. Analysis but [of?] that would have to be worked out at a conference.
6. Smith said that according to his information Mugabe and Nkomo were drifting further apart. I replied that they may be but whatever one's assessment of the relation between ZANU and ZAPU, or for that matter the unity of ZANU, a way must be found to take account of and include the ZANLA elements which were now doing so much fighting inside the country if peace were to be assured.

7. Smith asked us for a piece of paper containing the bases for discussion at a meeting which we had described to him. We agreed to furnish them later in the day (transmitted septel). He said he did not know what his colleagues view of them would be. I pointed out that they had already accepted them last September. Smith's retort was "That was before I talked some sense into them" with a slight smile. He undertook to discuss the subject of a meeting and the basis for it as set out in our paper with his colleagues if they returned to the country by next Tuesday the 25th (Sithole and Muzorewa are both abroad).

7. Comment: Smith gave away nothing at the meeting but he did not move backwards. On the contrary he affirmed his willingness to go to a conference under our auspices of the six principals. Further, for the first time he began focusing on the substance of such a meeting. Thus we feel we have made useful progress in finally getting down to a discussion with Smith on the substantive basis of discussions at an all parties meeting.

Brewster

---

4 See footnote 3 above.
212. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, July 28, 1978, 8:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Rhodesia

PARTICIPANTS
US
The Secretary
Donald K. Petterson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs

Zambia
Mark Chona, Special Assistant to the President
Dr. Kasuka Mutukwa, Deputy Permanent Representative, Zambian Mission to the UN

After a discussion of the Namibia situation, Chona brought up Rhodesia. He asked for the Secretary’s assessment. The Secretary reviewed the status of the internal agreement and his recent conversation with Bishop Muzorewa. Chona then said that President Kaunda wanted to emphasize he is gravely concerned about Rhodesia and believes that time is of the essence. We are approaching the point where an all-parties meeting will be unattractive to the Patriotic Front. The Secretary said he agreed that indeed this is the case.

Chona said that at Khartoum Robert Mugabe seemed to accept the idea of an interim meeting of the principals, as a preliminary to an all-parties meeting. Chona expressed his belief that Nkomo “has no problem with this.” Chona was surprised to find at Khartoum that Mugabe was not averse to attending a meeting in Zambia. Mugabe had also suggested Mauritius. Chona told the Secretary that a meeting could be held at Mfuwe Lodge in Lunagwe National Park in northeast Zambia. There is a runway at the Lodge which is large enough to handle required air traffic. In Chona’s view Smith is the key to get the black members of the Salisbury group to agree to an interim meeting. He said once we get Smith, the others will fall in line. In addition, it would be useful to enlist President Banda’s support, for he has considerable influence with Sithole. He might also be useful in getting Muzorewa’s agreement to attend. Chona went so far as to say, “At this hour perhaps Banda will be crucial.”

1 Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis MemCons, 1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Donald K. Petterson (AF/S); cleared by Arthur A. Houghton (S). The meeting took place at the UN Plaza Hotel.
The Secretary asked how well Nkomo and Mugabe worked together. Chona answered that Nkomo has confidence in Mugabe, who “is not a yes man.” The Front Line, he maintained, will be firm and helpful on the Rhodesian matter. He said the Zambians have some leverage with Nkomo. As for Mugabe, we will need the help “of Nyerere or Machel or both.”

Bringing up the interim meeting again, Chona told the Secretary, “Dr. Owen must be there and possibly you too.” President Kaunda wanted to stress that, “this must be a decisive meeting.”

The Secretary said that both he and Dr. Owen would attend the all-parties meeting. As for the interim meeting, his attendance would depend on when it would be held. He was sure, though, that Owen would attend. Chona said the all-parties meeting would be crucial, but the interim meeting itself was highly important for it “will set the pace.”

The Secretary concluded the meeting by repeating that he agreed fully on the importance of moving rapidly. He and Dr. Owen would do all they could to help bring about an interim meeting, an all-parties meeting, or both. He emphasized his belief that it is critical that the Front Line devote the same amount of attention to Rhodesia and push as hard as they had on Namibia.

213. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts


190872. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary’s Meeting With Muzorewa, July 28.

Summary: In hour long meeting Muzorewa rejected Secretary’s argument that there would be much to gain and nothing to lose by participation in all-parties meeting. Bishop characterized such a meeting as a waste of precious time and argued that Nkomo and Mugabe were welcome to join the Executive Council. Positions Bishop took in

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 112, 7/15–31/78. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to London, Lusaka, Pretoria, Maputo, Gaborone, Dar es Salaam, Lagos, and USUN. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Davidow; cleared by Arthur Houghton (S); approved by William Harrop (AF). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
conversation were predictable repeats of his previous statements. He intends to spend five days in London where he will repeat his Washington argumentation in favor of immediate lifting of sanctions. End summary.

2. Muzorewa was accompanied by personal aid Muzenhamo, US Representatives Nyamuswa and Zhuwarara, and Cleveland attorney Glen Billington. (Prior suggestion by Muzorewa’s staff that Ken Towsey of Rhodesian Information Office also accompany him was discouraged by Department). Harrop (AF), Hansell (L) and Davidow (AF/S notetaker), joined Secretary.

3. Bishop began with justification of his presence in Washington where he has been lobbying for passage of Helms Amendment. In 1972 he had travelled to US to mobilize international community to apply mandatory sanctions, but situation had changed, Smith had agreed to hand over power to majority and sanctions now punishing people they were meant to help. Smith has assured him that he “is not going to pull a fast one, another UDI.” Sanctions should be removed so that transitional government can start to resuscitate economy and to help displaced people. He was “puzzled, almost shocked” by USG attitudes. Two empty chairs wait on Executive Council for Nkomo and Mugabe. They have excluded themselves from the transitional government. Those who want to help should tell them to join the majority.

4. Secretary responded that until a new, legal government is established in Rhodesia we will not lift sanctions. Lifting at this time would not gain international support, would lead to greater polarization, and would undermine our ability to bring the parties together. We will direct our efforts to getting parties to negotiate an agreement, leading to a ceasefire which, in turn, would allow elections to be held in conditions of peace. There is nothing to be lost and much to be gained at an all-parties meeting. Each party would come without prejudice to its own position. We and the British would stand by principles of Anglo-American Proposals, but would accept any settlement reached by the parties themselves.

5. In a rambling response Bishop asserted that his party had initially welcomed the AAP while Patriotic Front had shouted it down. He had been surprised when US–UK met with PF on Malta without inviting him. Past conferences had sought to get Smith to step down and to develop a new constitution. Smith has agreed to hand over power to the majority by Dec. 31. A new constitution will be ready within two

---

weeks. Everyone will be able to participate in elections. What then was the need for another conference?

6. Secretary asked if elections can be held without a ceasefire. Bishop responded that a tremendous deescalation of the war is taking place. Secretary noted that, in fact, fighting appears to be escalating and that the Bishop’s comments on the success of the ceasefire seemed inconsistent with what Mr. Smith had said (at his July 18 press conference).³

7. Muzorewa said the guerrillas are becoming desperate and as a result are exclusively attacking soft targets such as mission stations. Since March 3 he has had over 16 meetings with guerrilla leaders. In some places guerrillas and security forces are working together as “forces of the transitional government”. Even without a ceasefire, elections would be possible. He and Chikerema had visited several operational areas and thousands of people had come to hear them speak. Muzorewa argued that Smith’s statement on the ceasefire had been distorted by the press, and said he would make available the full text of Smith’s remarks to the Secretary.

8. Secretary returned to initial question of what is to be lost by sitting around a conference table. Muzorewa responded that time would be wasted. He referred to the unsatisfactory Geneva experience and said that it would be foolish to sit for 2–3 months talking to the PF while they consult with their bosses in Moscow, Peking and the Front Line.

9. Secretary responded that it was not beyond the realm of human capabilities to avoid the time problem, for instance by discussing the agenda beforehand. Muzorewa asked whether we had an agenda in mind. The Secretary gave him a copy of the following, repeating on several occasions that it was a nonpaper containing only suggestions of some topics which might be discussed. (The Secretary did not mention that same paper had been previously passed to Smith via Gaylard).⁴

Begin text: Principal subjects for discussion at a meeting of all the parties at principal level.

1. A transitional constitution, which would supersede the 1959 [1969] constitution and would provide for an administration, neutral as between the parties, through a Council, the composition, method of operation and chairmanship of which would be matters for discussion.

³ Smith said that the constitutional agreement promising black majority rule by December 1978 “would not be carried out unless there is a cease-fire.” (Los Angeles Times, July 18, 1978, p. A2)

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 211.
2. The provisions for holding of free and impartial elections at the end of the agreed transitional period.

3. The independence constitution, including the composition and powers of Parliament (e.g. special white representation and entrenchment).

4. Military and associated arrangements. This would cover the formation of armed forces for the independent country from the existing fighting forces and the integration of the rest of those now under arms into peacetime society. It would also cover arrangements for a ceasefire backed by a UN force. End text.

10. Harrop asked whether it was realistic to expect the PF to participate in elections run by Smith’s administration; the AAP speaks of UK supervision and UN observation. Muzorewa stated that the UANC had never rejected outside observers; a UN presence would be welcome. Secretary asked whether UN could supervise a ceasefire and the operations of the police. Muzorewa said he “wouldn’t quarrel with this as long as composition was right.” The Executive Council has already said that it would welcome a neutral body to supervise or observe. (Bishop repeated the phrase “supervise or observe” at several points, conveying the impression that he saw no difference between the two).

11. Harrop noted that this is precisely the type of issue which could be discussed at an all parties meeting. But the Bishop responded that there was nothing further to discuss, the West had been misinformed, a settlement had already occurred. Nyamuswa, turning his attention to the nonpaper, asked what the status of the Salisbury Agreement in such talks would be. The Secretary responded that the Salisbury Agreement exists: it would be one of the things discussed at a meeting. Referring to the first point on the nonpaper, the Bishop said the issue had already been covered, the new constitution would be almost a duplicate of that proposed in the AAP, but better, because it was freely agreed to by blacks and whites.

12. Secretary noted that the fourth point presented toughest set of questions. Bishop responded that Salisbury Agreement provided for integration of forces. He then digressed to assert that Lord Carver wanted to dismantle totally current security forces and turn country over to Patriotic Front. The Secretary denied this. Bishop said U.S. regards the Patriotic Front as “saints”. (Secretary interjected that he could assure the Bishop that we do not). With some emotion Muzorewa rejected Ambassador Young’s comments on responsibility for the missionary massacre and alleged that Young had claimed that he (Muzorewa) is responsible for ordering the murder of children.5

5 In a July 13 interview published in Le Matin, Young said that if the massacre of 13 British missionaries on June 23 had been a carefully planned operation then “it could only have come from the Smith camp.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 29176)
13. Muzorewa stated that real danger is possible civil war between Mugabe and Nkomo. If there is conflict between Executive Council and PF, however, it will be a “responsible civil war” between democracy and Marxism. Muzorewa argued that U.S. is acting on assumption that Nkomo and Mugabe control all the guerrillas, but that this is false, Nkomo’s army is split down the middle and he has admitted it.

14. As meeting drew to close Muzorewa urged Secretary to visit Rhodesia to see situation for himself and restated argument that sanctions now operating against people they were originally meant to help. Secretary responded that he had no plans to visit Rhodesia, but would be willing to travel to the area again to attend an all-parties conference. He repeated U.S. position on sanctions, and noted that the Bishop’s position is different because he believes in his heart that Smith has turned over power. Bishop noted that turnover has also been placed on paper; power lies in the Executive Council. But, the Secretary noted, decisions are only by consensus, and Smith, therefore, can still control events. The Bishop denied this, saying that “decisions are made by consensus without unanimity. If the three blacks don’t want something, Smith can’t do it. If Smith and two blacks want something, then the third black is unlucky”.

Vance

214. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 28, 1978, 0219Z

Summary: Secretaries Vance and Owen met for nearly two hours in New York September 26 to review next steps in the Rhodesia negotiations. They were joined on UK side by Minister of State Ted Rowlands and UKUN Ambassador Richard and on US side by Ambassador Young, Under Secretary Newsom, Assistant Secretaries Moose and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 9/24–30/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Lagos, Maputo, Gaborone, and Pretoria. Sent for information Immediate to London. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by George Moose (AF/S); approved by Richard Moose. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–1377)
Maynes, Ambassador Low, and by miscellaneous others. Owen described the Callaghan-Kaunda meetings in Kano,\(^2\) emphasizing Kaunda’s growing anxiety over the escalation of the Rhodesian conflict and the threat to Zambia’s security. The two Secretaries were able to resolve most of the major issues relating to our restatement of the AAP, including those sections dealing with the composition of the transition Governing Council, its relationship to the Resident Commissioner, the timetable for independence and security arrangements during the transition. They agreed on the urgency of convening an all parties meeting, at the latest by the end of October. At the end of the meeting, Owen suggested that in deciding how to handle the Smith visa request, the US might consider linking a Smith visit to the convening of an all parties meeting, perhaps in New York. End summary.

1. Kano meeting: Owen described the Callaghan-Kaunda talks in Kano as very positive. Discussion of UK’s “betrayal” of sanctions as revealed in Bingham report\(^3\) assumed minor proportions. Kaunda sought mainly to underscore his growing anxiety over Rhodesian situation. Both he and Nigerians fear time is approaching when PF will opt for military solution and forego further negotiations. Kaunda was aware of ZAPU plans for major Soviet-encouraged strike into Rhodesia, which he feared would provoke vigorous retaliation from Rhodesians and possibly South Africans. (In this connection both Owen and Secretary Vance noted recent unconfirmed reports indicating South African involvement in operations in Mozambique.) Kaunda worried that resulting escalation of the war could threaten Zambia’s security and generate strong pressures for turning to Soviets/Cubans for military help. Kaunda has no illusions about the risks of inviting the Soviets in, and he knows that Cuban Premier Castro described him to Prime Minister Trudeau as a “Western stooge.” Nevertheless this course might be forced on Kaunda in order to avoid a military humiliation by the Rhodesians. To avoid this chain of events, Kaunda urged that we move immediately to convene an all parties meeting. He also sought increased UK economic assistance to ease Zambia’s serious BOP and import problems, which Owen implied UK had agreed to provide. In summation, Owen described meeting as having placed Kaunda back on track with respect to our settlement initiative, at least for the next few weeks.

2. Revised Anglo-American Proposals: Discussion then turned to substance of the revised AAP which we intend to present to parties

---

\(^2\) Callaghan and Kaunda met in Kano, Nigeria, September 22–23.

\(^3\) The Bingham Report, released September 19, exposed the violation of Rhodesian oil sanctions by British Petroleum and Shell, and disclosed that Harold Wilson was aware of the violations.
shortly as basis for convening an APM. Owen took the Secretary’s suggestion on the need to present a simplified document that would stress US/UK preference for one settlement formula. (As a result of working level meeting in Washington on Sunday, British had already prepared a redraft of their original paper along these lines.)

Discussion then focused on specific issues.

3. Composition of Transition Council: Owen reviewed various attempts over the past several months to get agreement from the parties on a formula for representation on the Governing Council, all to no avail. March 3 agreement had changed the situation by adding Chirau to equation and polarizing internal vs. external parties. As a result, formula based on parity between Salisbury Group seemed most logical solution. Although the internals, Sithole and Muzorewa particularly, will certainly balk, the PF and Front Line would accept nothing less and in fact will continue to demand more. Secretary Vance agreed that parity formula is the only one that makes sense, but questioned whether this should be written into the revised AAP. Owen acknowledged that committing ourselves in writing to parity for ULA was a bold step, but that failure to state our position would be misleading and could complicate matters later. It was therefore agreed after considerable discussion, that parity formula would appear in the revised AAP.

4. Council Chairmanship: Secretary Vance stated strong US preference for retaining UK Resident Commissioner as effective Chairman of Governing Council, as envisioned in original AAP. This would clearly establish the impartiality of the transition process and assure smooth functioning of government in the event of a deadlock among the Council members. Owen noted that, in response to demands from all parties, the legislative and executive powers of the Governing Council have been greatly increased over what was proposed in the original AAP, with a corresponding diminution of the Resident Commissioner’s authority. Consequently, Owen argued, making RC Chairman of the Governing Council would embroil him in every controversy and encourage parties to behave irresponsibly. Thus he favored having a separate Council Chairman elected from among the Council members themselves, but he acknowledged that this could only work if there was agreement among the parties as to both the arrangement and the specific Chairman. Secretary Vance indicated that while he had no objection in principle to the idea of a separate Council Chairman elected by the parties, our proposals should make clear that in the absence of

---

4 September 24. In telegram 250859 to multiple posts, October 3, Christopher transmitted the text of the revised Anglo-American Plan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1-16/78)
specific agreement among them to this arrangement, the RC would chair the Council. Owen agreed to this formulation.

5. Dominance during the transition: In noting our willingness in principle to accept the idea of a separate Council Chairman, Secretary Vance nevertheless took pointed exception to Owen’s having agreed with Kaunda that the PF should hold the position of Council Chairman. Our advocacy of position that gave the PF dominance during the transition could destroy our credibility with other parties as neutral mediators, as well as our public position of supporting an impartial settlement. Owen agreed that the questions of whether there should be a separate Council Chairman, and if so who, were best left to the parties themselves to decide.

6. Timetable for independence: Secretary Vance indicated his clear preference for a six-month transition period with elections prior to independence, as opposed to Owen’s option B formulation in which independence would be granted after a three month transition and a referendum, with elections deferred until sometime after independence. Owen explained that option B was designed to take account of the PF’s demand for a longer period leading up to elections. If the PF insisted on this position, HMG could not accept to exercise responsibility for an indefinite period of longer than six months, especially when the powers of the Resident Commissioner would be greatly diminished from those envisioned in the original AAP. The Secretary indicated his understanding for the British reluctance to be involved in a lengthy and indefinite transition but suggested that the solution lay in sticking to our original proposal of a fixed six-month transition period with elections before independence. Moreover, he favored vesting in the RC rather than the Council all the powers needed to administer the transition, including full control over the police. Our position on these issues should be clearly stated in the revised AAP. Owen agreed that option B should remain in the proposal only as an alternative in case the parties refused to accept a fixed transition period.

7. Other issues: After brief and inconclusive discussion of whether the Council should have the power to dismiss present justices on the high court, it was agreed to leave this issue for resolution at an all-parties meeting. With respect to military arrangements, it was agreed that we would stand on Lord Carver’s proposals for the creation of a new army.\(^5\) The revised AAP would not explicitly state that the new

\(^5\) In telegram 2752 from Gaborone, November 6, 1977, Norland summarized the Rhodesia talks during the Carver/Chand visit to Salisbury. Carver proposed that the new Zimbabwe Army eliminate all-white units or subunits and “consist of six to eight battalions, three of the presently existing Rhodesian African Rifles, and three to five which were either from Liberation Forces or the citizenry at large.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2275)
army would be “based on the liberation forces,” which Owen and Ted Rowlands argued would only reignite the internals’ strong emotional reaction against this formulation and create another obstacle to convening an all-parties meeting. It would, however, include a reference to Owen’s statement on law and order of September 1, 1977, which states that position, and the annex outlining Carver’s plan would make this clear. In addition, our talking points for the PF and Front Line would make it clear that we have not withdrawn from our commitment to basing the new army on the Liberation Forces. On the organization of the police, the revised AAP would include a provision for police monitors, as agreed by Owen and Kaunda at Kano as a way to accommodate the PF’s demand for a greater role in this area. Because the internal Nationalists have become identified with the regime, the idea of three-men-in-a-Jeep (PF–UN–internal Nationalists) no longer made sense, and we should now think in terms of monitoring teams composed of two men (PF and UN) plus a police official who would serve as liaison. Otherwise, the Carver proposals for the police would stand, and the RC would retain full authority over the police at all times during the transition period.

8. All parties meeting: Taking into account the sense of urgency displayed by Kaunda at Kano, Secretaries Owen and Vance agreed that an all-parties meeting should be convened as quickly as possible, by the end of October at the latest. Once completed revision of the AAP is in the hands of the parties, the Front Line, Nigeria and South Africa, and after a brief period to obtain their reactions and comments, we would issue invitations for an all-parties meeting at a fixed time and place and meet with whichever parties attend to finalize our proposals. As agreed by the two Secretaries, we would shortly thereafter take the proposals to the UN Security Council for approval. There was insufficient time to complete the discussion of the timing and modalities for completing these steps, and the details were left to be worked out at the working level.

9. Smith visa: At the conclusion of the meeting Owen raised the subject of the Executive Council’s (EC) request to visit the US. While allowing that this is an issue for the US to decide, he volunteered the suggestion that we consider linking a possible visit by Smith and the EC with our plans to convene an all-parties meeting. He noted that convening the APM in the US, possibly in New York, would provide the incentive that has thus far been missing to get the EC to attend. At the same time, it would create an opportunity to further the negotiating

---

6 Owen’s statement, issued in Salisbury, reaffirmed that the Zimbabwe National Army would be “open to all citizens, but it will be based on the Liberation Forces.” (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1977, p. 28648)
process and might make it easier for the administration to justify a decision to allow Smith to visit. Secretary Vance took note of Owen’s suggestion but indicated he would have to give the matter further consideration. In the meantime he suggested we continue to look for alternative venues for an APM. In this connection, the possibility of Kano was considered briefly, but Mauritius emerged as the venue most likely to be acceptable to all parties.

Christopher

215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Zambia and the White House

Washington, October 2, 1978, 0242Z

249885. For Ambassadors/Charges. Subject: Rhodesia: Letter to President Kaunda.

1. Following is the text of letter from President Carter and PM Callaghan to President Kaunda, which is to be delivered jointly by you and your British counterpart at earliest possible moment October 2. Detailed instructions follow septel.

Begin text: Dear Mr. President:

There have been a number of new and troubling developments in the last week or so. The recent leadership crisis in South Africa has introduced new uncertainties for our promising efforts to resolve the Namibia question. We are nonetheless determined to persist in our efforts to bring about an internationally acceptable settlement in Namibia in accordance with the proposals worked out by the Western Five members of the Contact Group.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 103, 10/1–19/78. Confidential; Niat Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Dar es Salaam, London, Maputo, Lagos, Pretoria, and Gaborone. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by George Moose (AF/S); cleared by Petterson; approved by Moose. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840157–2059)

2 In telegram 249886 to multiple posts, October 2, Christopher transmitted the U.S.–U.K. talking points and detailed instructions to be used with the Front Line Presidents. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78.

3 Vorster announced his resignation as Prime Minister on September 20. Pieter Willem Botha was elected Prime Minister on September 28. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1978, p. 29333)
We are also deeply concerned about the course that events are taking in Rhodesia. Notwithstanding the clear evidence that the internal settlement is not working, the Salisbury parties have continued to cling to their present course and to resist attempts to bring them into negotiations. If nothing is done to break the current impasse, it soon may be impossible to find common ground for a just and fair settlement. Cy Vance and David Owen had extensive discussions about these disturbing developments in New York last week. Following their talks we have agreed on the need to take immediate steps to break the deadlock. We know from the Kano meeting that you share this sense of urgency. David and Cy have given considerable thought to the question of how we might persuade the internal parties to abandon their present course and rejoin the negotiations. This will not be easy. They have invested so much in their present enterprise that they now find it difficult to admit the failure that is so clear to everyone else.

We have all along thought that the only way to get agreement on a settlement was to bring the parties together at a meeting at which they could, without help, resolve their outstanding differences. It had already been agreed that the invitations to such a conference must be without preconditions if there was to be any chance of getting all parties to agree to attend, but that our two governments would remain firmly committed to our joint proposals for a settlement. That remains our view.

One of the obstacles to convening a conference has been the failure of the parties to agree on a venue. One side or the other has objected to all the places previously proposed. For this reason, and because of the urgency we attach to the need for early progress towards a settlement, we propose to offer New York as the venue for an all-parties meeting that we are prepared to convene in the very near future. We believe that none of the parties should find this location unacceptable. It has the advantage of being close to the United Nations, where it will be easy for us to keep you and the other Front Line Presidents informed of developments. Moreover, the location has the added advantage of permitting both Cy and David to remain for as long as may be necessary to bring the parties to agreement.

None of us can guarantee success. We write now to convey our deep concern and to seek your urgent counsel on this proposal. Like you, we wanted to achieve a greater measure of agreement between

---

4 See Document 214.
5 See footnote 2, Document 214.
6 In telegram 249884 to Dar es Salaam, October 2, the Department transmitted a similar letter to Nyerere. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78)
the parties before calling a conference. But if we delay any longer, we believe that the divergences between the parties will only grow, as will the loss of life, the bitterness and the racial tension which can destroy Zimbabwe. We hope that we can count on your support.\(^7\)

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter
Jim Callaghan

Christopher

---

\(^7\) In telegram 3510 from Lusaka, October 9, the Embassy transmitted Kaunda’s response to Carter’s letter, in which Kaunda declined to support an all-parties meeting in New York. (National Archives RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780413-0614) In telegram 4304 from Dar es Salaam, October 4, the Embassy transmitted Nyerere’s refusal to endorse an all-parties conference. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 103, 10/1–19/78)

---

216. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts\(^1\)

Washington, October 14, 1978, 2109Z

261346. Pretoria pass Secretary’s party. Subject: Rhodesia; Secretary’s Meeting With Smith and Sithole, October 9.

Summary: Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young met for two hours October 9 with Ian Smith and Reverend Sithole. No progress was achieved in convincing the Salisbury Executive Council to attend an all parties conference, or to accept the Anglo-American Proposals (AAP) as the framework for settlement negotiations. Smith and Sithole rehearsed familiar arguments for why the US and Britain should support, at least in principle, the internal settlement, claiming that Western support is all that is needed to make the Salisbury Agreement succeed. Secretary Vance and others on the US side stressed that the US remained

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 10/1–16/78. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Lusaka, Gaborone, Lagos, USUN, London, and Pretoria. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by George Moose (AF/S); approved by William Harrop (AF). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840166–1730)
committed to a fair settlement that was acceptable to all parties, and
that to abandon that position would only invite an escalation of the war
with inevitable disastrous consequences for Rhodesia and the whole
of Southern Africa. Smith and Sithole professed to have no faith in
British and American assurances that an all parties meeting could
achieve a settlement, or that the US and UK would remain fully commit-
ted to any settlement that might be agreed. They saw no reason to
abandon their present course, which they claimed was on the verge of
succeeding. The only thing to which Smith would commit himself was
that he would think about what the US had said. Secretary Vance
indicated his readiness to meet with Smith and Sithole later in the
week but ruled out the possibility of meeting with President Carter.
End summary.

1. Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young met for two hours
October 9 with Ian Smith and Reverend Sithole. They were joined on
the US side by Assistant Secretary Moose, Policy Planning Director
Lake and Ambassador Low. The UK was represented by Ambassador
Jay and Counselor Bill Squire. Smith and Sithole were accompanied
by Cabinet Secretary Jack Gaylard, Smith's private Secretary John Snell,
Sithole's assistant Stephen Mafara, and Rhodesian Information Office
Director Kenneth Towsey.

2. Secretary Vance opened the meeting by asking Smith and Sithole
to present their views on the present situation. Smith described the
present problem in Rhodesia as being one of terrorism and how to end
it. The Executive Council was convinced that many guerrillas would
join the internal settlement if only the US and the free world would
indicate their support for it. Sithole characterized the present struggle
as one between a black minority outside and a black majority inside
the country. The issue was no longer one of majority rule, since that
had already been conceded in the March 3 agreement. The US and
Britain should take the lead in supporting the democratic settlement
embodied in the March 3 agreement. Western support, said Sithole, is
all that is needed to make the internal settlement succeed.

3. Vance explained that the US saw the situation very differently.
The situation was becoming increasingly dangerous and the prospect
of a tragic civil war more real. A way must be found to end the conflict
before it is too late. The US and Britain had tried to help by putting
forward proposals that could be acceptable to both sides. Those propos-
als provided for a neutral transition period that would give all parties
a fair chance to participate in free elections. There was nothing to be
lost and much to be gained by a conference at which all parties could
sit down together and resolve their differences.

4. Smith and Sithole rehearsed various arguments for why the AAP
could not work and why the Salisbury parties were reluctant to go to
another conference. A UN presence, they agreed, could not assure law
and order and would not be impartial. The Patriotic Front was not
interested in elections and would work to undermine any settlement
that might be achieved. Rhodesians, including the guerrillas, had no
confidence that the British would stand by an agreement and make it
work, since the British had refused to accept their responsibilities in
the past. The US had given previous assurances that it would stand
by the Kissinger Five Points\(^2\) and that the Africans would adhere to
them; but in the end the US and Britain had yielded to the ever increas-
ing demands of the Africans. (This was a theme to which Smith returned
repeatedly throughout the discussion.) What assurances could Rhode-
sians have now that a new agreement would be any more successful
than the previous one put forward by Dr. Kissinger?

5. Sithole agreed that were the Executive Council to attend an
all parties meeting, Rhodesians would lose confidence in the present
arrangement. The Salisbury Agreements already provided for fair elec-
tions. The Rhodesian Security Forces had fully honored the terms of
the amnesty in the March 3 agreement. The external parties were free
to return and participate on the same basis as the other parties. He
asserted that Nkomo was not interested in elections, only in being
leader. The British as well as the Front Line were attempting to impose
Nkomo as the leader of Zimbabwe, but the people would never accept
to have their leaders imposed from outside. He reiterated that there
was no reason why the internal settlement could not work, if only it
were given British and American blessings.

6. Vance and Moose attempted repeatedly to bring the discussion
back to present realities. The key reality was the Patriotic Front had
no confidence that they would be treated fairly under the internal
settlement. Smith himself had acknowledged that the internal settle-
ment had not worked as well as expected. He had expressed disappoint-
ment with the failure of his black colleagues to persuade the guerrillas
to lay down their arms. It was clear to everyone that a new arrange-
ment was required. Looking at the situation objectively, as outsiders, the
principle \[principal\] obstacle to a settlement was the lack of trust. An
arrangement was needed that would give all parties confidence in the
process leading up to elections, and this is why the AAP proposed to
put responsibility for the supervision of elections and of all military
forces in impartial hands. The PF had accepted this principle. If the
Salisbury parties were to accept it as well, there was a good chance
that a settlement could be reached.

7. Smith asked why the US did not believe the present arrangement would operate fairly. Nkomo, said Smith, had told him in Lusaka\(^3\) that he was prepared to come back and participate in the present arrangement, although Nkomo would have demanded a special price for his participation. Nkomo had said that he could bring Mugabe along, and Smith had accepted this. It was only because of Nyerere, Smith asserted, that the planned meeting with Nkomo and Mugabe had been broken up. He repeated that the internal settlement was a going concern, and there was no reason to give it up. He remained skeptical that another conference could succeed. There was less chance of success now than at Geneva. The Executive Council’s agreement to attend a conference would seriously undermine Rhodesian confidence in the present arrangement.

8. Smith argued that Zambia and Mozambique wanted peace. All that was needed to convince them to accept the Salisbury Agreement was for the U.S. and the West to indicate their support. Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young pointed out that, even if they wanted, Mozambique and Zambia could not force the PF to accept an agreement that didn’t include them. Machel and Kaunda were sincere in their desire for a settlement, but the only settlement that would be acceptable to them and to the PF was one in which the PF was fairly represented. In the absence of such a settlement, the war would intensify. US support for the internal settlement—which at best could only be moral support—would be met by a corresponding increase in Soviet and Cuban material support for the PF. The result would be both predictable and disastrous. Mr. Moose pointed out that U.S. diplomacy had helped to neutralize the Soviet and Cuban role by offering the alternative of a political settlement that was supported by the Africans. The Soviets would not oppose a settlement that the Africans supported.

9. Secretary Vance reiterated that a settlement was still possible if only the parties would agree to discuss their differences. He noted that Smith and Sithole seemed concerned that a meeting might not succeed, and emphasized that the US and Britain intended to prepare carefully for a meeting in advance to give it greater assurance of success. The issues must be narrowed to those of substance, and there must be a common understanding of what should be discussed. The U.S. set no preconditions for attendance. We and the British continued to regard the principles of the AAP as a sound basis for a settlement; but we did not insist that the Salisbury parties accept that position before coming to a meeting. He asked that the Executive Council think again seriously about what could be gained by going to a conference, and

\(^3\) In telegram 2976 from Lusaka, August 24, the Embassy reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2313)
what could be lost by throwing away the opportunity to reach a settlement.

10. Ambassador Young emphasized that the US had no intention of walking away from the situation in Rhodesia. If a settlement were reached, it would do all it could to see that it was implemented. Smith asked whether this would include the introduction of U.S. troops in the event the settlement broke down. Vance replied that there was no circumstance in which the U.S. would agree to send troops to Rhodesia. He wanted to be clear on this point. There was much that the U.S. could and would do to achieve a settlement and to implement it, including financial and logistical support. Others, including the British, might provide troops, but the US could not. Smith indicated that Vance’s response was not very comforting. He offered nevertheless to think again about the points that had been made as well as our proposal for an all parties meeting.

11. Before adjourning, Smith asked whether, given the Secretary’s departure for South Africa on Friday, there was any possibility of his meeting with President Carter. Vance replied that he saw no prospect of such a meeting so long as the present situation (and by implication Smith’s attitude) remained unclear. Vance offered, however, to meet with Smith and Sithole later in the week if they so desired. Smith indicated he would consider the offer but made no commitment to another meeting.

12. Note to addressees other than Pretoria: Foregoing, for your information and background, is version which was not fully cleared prior to departure of Secretary’s party for Pretoria.

Christopher
217. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, October 25, 1978

SUBJECT
Contingency Plan for Rhodesia

The President is concerned that Smith’s acceptance of an All-Parties Conference could lay the groundwork for a situation in which the next Congress would force removal of sanctions on Rhodesia, even though no acceptable settlement had been reached.

Would you please have your staff prepare a brief strategy paper addressing the following points:

—What further steps should we take to ensure that the APC does in fact take place?
—What steps should we take to increase the chances that the APC will produce an acceptable settlement?
—If there is an APC that produces no acceptable settlement, how can we best avoid being left in a position where the Salisbury group can claim that it has done its part to substantially fulfill the Case-Javits requirements?
—What additional steps should we take to reduce the chances that the new Congress might revoke sanctions against the President’s will; and, if that should happen, how can we minimize damage to our African and global policies?

Could you please have this report forwarded to the NSC by November 6?2

Zbigniew Brzezinski

---


2 The Department of State responded to Brzezinski’s request in a November 14 memorandum transmitted by Tarnoff entitled “Rhodesia: Strategy for the Coming Weeks.” (Ibid.)
218. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts

Washington, November 22, 1978, 0232Z


1. British Prime Minister Callaghan has proposed a new initiative on Rhodesia to assess the current situation there and to determine whether conditions are such that he can call an all-parties meeting early next year. Callaghan called President Carter over the weekend to discuss the proposal and to request US support for the initiative. Department agreed and so advised British Embassy November 20.

2. Initiative will take the form of high-level mission to the Front Line capitals, Lagos, Pretoria, and Salisbury led by Cledwyn Hughes, Chairman of the Parliamentary Labor Party and a personal friend of Callaghan’s, and Sir Antony Duff of the British Foreign Office. They currently plan to begin their tour November 28 in Dar es Salaam. They will then go on to Maputo, Lusaka, Pretoria, Salisbury, Gaborone, Luanda, and Lagos, and then backtrack through the capitals, as necessary, over what they estimate will be a three-four week period. Mission’s primary objective will be to consult with all the parties to the Rhodesian conflict to assess whether conditions are such that Callaghan can personally call an all-parties meeting in London early next year with a reasonable hope that it will be successful. At the same time they will attempt to assure all the parties of continuing US/UK commitment to our policy and our support for the Anglo-American Proposals as the best basis for an acceptable negotiated settlement. They will also seek advice on how to proceed if the Front Line/Nigeria do not believe conditions are present for a potentially successful meeting.

3. For Lusaka: British have requested and we have agreed that Ambassador Low should accompany Hughes and Duff on their tour. If the schedule as presently contemplated holds, this would mean you

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 11/18–30/78. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis Distribute as Nodis. Sent to Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Lusaka, Pretoria, Gaborone, and Lagos. Sent for information Immediate to London, Kinshasa, and Conakry. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Schmiel (AF/S); cleared by George Moose (AF/S), Keeley, and Wisner; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840166–1712)

2 In telegram 294215 to multiple posts, November 20, the Department provided press guidance on Young’s trip to Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780478–0370)
would have to make arrangements to be in Dar es Salaam on November 28 to link up with British. Please advise if this can be arranged. We will keep you advised on further developments and possible changes in timing.

4. British are sending instructions today to their Ambassador/High Commissioners in Front Line capitals and Lagos to deliver personal messages from Callaghan outlining the purpose and nature of the Hughes mission. Instructions are also being sent for oral presentations to the PF, the Salisbury parties and South Africa. British hope to make these presentations November 22, and have requested that they be made jointly in keeping with our past initiatives on Rhodesia. Since, however, messages are from Callaghan, our participation would be mainly supportive. Therefore, unless you perceive objection, you should coordinate with your UK counterparts to arrange to participate in their approaches. (This would include presentations to ZANU and ZAPU in Maputo and Lusaka, and to SAG and Hawkins in Pretoria.)

5. In light of initiative and mission’s travel plans, Ambassador Young has been asked to delay his contemplated trip to Maputo, Dar es Salaam, and Lusaka until after Hughes mission has had an opportunity for its initial consultations in those three capitals. Department has suggested that Young travel to Dar, Maputo and Lusaka after completion of AAI conference in Khartoum December 1. We have suggested, however that he go ahead as planned with his stop in Lagos later this week before going to Khartoum.

6. Department wishes to express its thanks for the important, useful, and excellent analyses and comments concerning Rhodesia and our next steps there many of the addressees have contributed over the last few days. They were especially welcome since we were at the time in the process of taking stock and planning our next moves. Our proposed first step was to send Ambassador Young and Dick Moose to the three Front Line capitals to get a better feel for the current situation and to help create a better atmosphere for the negotiations. The British initiative came in the middle of and overtook our planning. Your thoughts and suggestions were nevertheless greatly appreciated and in the weeks ahead will provide us with a useful framework for determining where we must concentrate our efforts if a negotiated settlement for Rhodesia is to be reached.

Christopher
Lusaka, December 21, 1978, 1000Z


1. Cledwyn Hughes, Member of Parliament, was asked by Prime Minister Callaghan to travel to Africa as his personal representative to advise him on the prospects for an all parties meeting. Mr. Hughes, accompanied by Sir Antony Duff of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, visited Africa from November 27 to December 13. The mission went to Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, Pretoria, Salisbury, Gaborone, Maputo, Luanda and Lagos. I accompanied Mr. Hughes throughout the trip and participated in all his discussions. The following has been closely coordinated with Mr. Hughes. We are in full agreement on all its points.

2. Begin text:

Rhodesia: An all parties meeting

1. The terms of reference given to Mr. Hughes by the Prime Minister required him in essence to answer two questions:

   (A) Would all the parties to the Rhodesian conflict be prepared to attend a meeting to consider a negotiated settlement?

   (B) If so, would there be a reasonable chance of such a meeting producing a successful outcome?

2. Our answer to the first of these questions is that they probably would attend, to the second it is “no”. Mr. Hughes could not therefore recommend to the Prime Minister that he should convene an all-parties meeting at present. But he strongly recommended that we should nevertheless continue to do everything we can to work for a negotiated solution; and we should be ready to act (rapidly if necessary) to bring the parties together as soon as an opportunity presents itself to do so with more hope of a successful outcome.

3. Mr. Hughes very much regretted having to advise the Prime Minister in these terms. The mission brought home to us above all else, a real awareness of the depth of the human tragedy that is being played out, day after day, in and around Rhodesia. More and more men, women and children are being killed or maimed. The means of livelihood of others is being destroyed, the economy of the neighboring countries is being distorted, with effects which will be felt for years to come.
come. Additionally, there are grave political implications, everything suggests that the situation will get worse, not better in the foreseeable future. This is why we feel so strongly that, even if an all-parties meeting is unlikely to be a helpful move at present, we have a duty to do our utmost to keep open the possibility of achieving a peaceful settlement through negotiation.

The attitude of the parties

4. The Salisbury parties\(^2\) appear convinced that the new course they have now set for themselves—a referendum of the white electorate, an election on 20 April, and thereafter the formation of a “government of national unity”—will help them gain the confidence of the people of the country and lead to acceptance by the international community. They have given little if any attention to the updated Anglo-American Proposals we gave them on September 20 in Washington. They are under no effective pressure from the South African Government to negotiate an alternative arrangement with the Patriotic Front. They see the reported high turnout in the Namibian election as a factor in their favour which will encourage the South Africans to support an “internal” solution in their case as well. They suspect that President Kaunda is weary of the presence of ZAPU on Zambian soil and prepared to keep the “southern route” open in spite of humiliation from Rhodesia. Nevertheless they have said that they would attend an all-parties meeting without preconditions. The ability to comply with the terms of the Case-Javits legislation is of considerable significance and their stated willingness to attend an APM appears to fulfill the first of those terms.

5. As for the Patriotic Front, it is true that Joshua Nkomo\(^3\) now says that it is for the “generals” to arrange a settlement. But he seems to mean by this that there will be a negotiated cease-fire followed by a political settlement on the basis of a programme much “simpler” (and of course more favourable to the PF) than the AAP.

6. Robert Mugabe,\(^4\) for his part, insists on the prior acceptance of conditions which we know to be wholly unacceptable to the Salisbury

\(^2\) The Hughes mission held a series of meetings with members of the Executive Council. In telegram 7265 from Pretoria, December 7, Low reported on the meeting with Smith and Gaylard. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790005–0109) In telegram 7271 from Pretoria, December 7, Low reported on the meeting with Sithole, Muzorewa, and Chirau. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0047) In telegram 7263 from Pretoria, December 7, Low reported on the meeting with the entire Executive Council. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0042)

\(^3\) In telegram 4223 from Lusaka, December 2, Low reported on Nkomo’s conversation with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780499–1018)

\(^4\) In telegram 7297 from Pretoria, December 9, Low reported on Mugabe’s meeting with the Hughes mission. At that meeting Mugabe insisted that the Rhodesian Defence Force, including police, be disbanded as a precondition to attending an all-parties meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780526–0257)
parties. But if an all parties meeting were announced by the Prime Minister, I believe that the Patriotic Front would attend. Their reluctant acceptance would be accompanied by public statements listing the conditions upon which they would negotiate.

The parties’ supporters

7. The South Africans\(^5\) have not yet assessed for themselves the impact of the proposed government of national unity about which they were not informed. Prior to its announcement, their position had been that an all-parties meeting should not be held until after the election on 20 April. I think that after talking to the Rhodesians again they will adhere to this policy. But in any case they have no role to play in persuading the Rhodesians to attend a meeting which they have already agreed to come to. The South Africans’ importance would lie in their willingness or otherwise to exert leverage on Ian Smith to make the substantial concessions necessary for a settlement if and when a meeting is held. There is no sign at present that they are ready to do so. Mr. Hughes has suggested that their continuing reluctance to play a more effective role is something the Prime Minister may wish to discuss with President Carter.

8. The Front Line Presidents are divided. Kenneth Kaunda\(^6\) is tired of the war, unsure in his management of his own country’s worsening problems, and less and less able to control the activities and policies of ZAPU. Nevertheless, he would probably support an all-parties meeting, if only out of desperation. So would Samora Machel\(^7\), who sees no incompatibility between fighting and negotiating, provided the result is the same. Julius Nyerere’s\(^8\) attitude is more problematical. In a sense he is the most committed of all to the pursuit of a negotiated settlement because he is the most fearful of the consequences of a civil war between ZAPU and ZANU. But he is also the most apprehensive of the consequences of a conference that fails. Such is his insistence on “pinning Smith down” that he might well consider actively opposing a confer-

---

\(^5\) In telegram 7264 from Pretoria, December 7, Low reported on Pik Botha’s meeting with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780508–0966) The meeting with Brand Fourie was reported in telegram 7180 from Pretoria, December 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780498–0898)

\(^6\) In telegram 4227 from Lusaka, December 3, the Embassy reported on Kaunda’s meeting with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780497–0552)

\(^7\) In telegram 1597 from Maputo, December 8, De Pree reported on Machel’s conversation with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780508–0476)

\(^8\) In telegram 5200 from Dar es Salaam, November 29, Low reported on Nyerere’s discussion with the Hughes mission. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780523–0301)
ence which was not held on the basis of prior concessions by Ian Smith of a kind which we cannot hope to extract at present. But I do not believe any of the other Presidents\(^9\) would do this, and in the final analysis I believe Nyerere would go along with a meeting if the Patriotic Front did. Seretse Khama,\(^10\) for his part, will clutch at almost any straw which offers a chance of rescuing Botswana from its present plight.

The prospects of success

9. But if, as I believe is probable, all the parties would come to a meeting at present, especially if it were backed by the personal prestige of the Prime Minister, is it likely, or even reasonably likely, that it would succeed? I regret to say that I think not. All the parties would come to a conference now with profound reservations. Each side in the war is convinced that it can reach its goal—or at least not lose—by continuing to follow its own present policies. Thus the Patriotic Front would attend believing that it can achieve its aims by war, but that there is nothing to lose by attempting to achieve them by negotiation before military victory comes. The Salisbury parties would attend believing that they would lose nothing by again offering a place to the Patriotic Front within the internal settlement. They are convinced, with some justification, that there is no future for them in a country ruled by the Patriotic Front; and that, if the latter will not modify its claims, they can hope to survive by following the patch they have mapped out for themselves in the 3 March agreement. The chief motive of each side in the negotiations will not be to seek an understanding, but rather to demonstrate that the other is unreasonable and intransigent, and thus to strengthen its own claim to external support and sympathy. This is a prescription for breakdown, subsequent intensification of the war and increased Communist involvement.

10. It does not, of course, follow that the British Government should decline to convene an all-parties meeting solely because failure is more likely than success. Even if this were the appreciation, a decision to hold a conference might be justifiable.

For instance:

(A) It is arguable that no possible opportunity of success, however remote, should be left unexplored.

(B) An unsuccessful meeting might demonstrate the intransigence, or lack of good faith, of one party or the others, and thus discourage public support for it.

---

\(^9\) In telegram 15265 from Lagos, December 13, Low reported on the meeting with Obasanjo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780514–0082)

\(^10\) In telegram 3908 from Gaborone, December 8, Norland reported on the meeting with Khama. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0899)
(C) The chances of holding a successful conference, however slim they may appear now, may in fact be dwindling and may never improve.

11. On the other hand, if a conference were held and failed:—

(A) The failure of the conference would in itself reinforce the determination of the parties to pursue unilaterally the courses which they have set for themselves.

(B) It might consequently be very difficult to bring the parties together again at least for many months.

(C) There could be serious immediate damage to our relations with Africa.

(D) Beyond that, we would come under heavy pressure from African sources, supported at the United Nations, to move on to other measures—e.g. the application of sanctions against South Africa, the supply of arms to the Patriotic Front and even British military intervention.

(E) In their anger and frustration, the Patriotic Front and the Front Line Presidents would turn more and more to the Soviet Union and its allies for support.

A conference later

12. But, as I have already said, the situation in and around Rhodesia is such that there should be no question of announcing a decision against calling an all parties meeting now in terms which closed the door against the possibility of convening one in the future. Furthermore, the present situation is not static. It contains within itself great potential for change, in ways which we cannot confidently predict at present. We therefore have a duty to be alert to exploit any new opportunity for a negotiated settlement which may present itself in the future and to take advantage of it quickly.

Before or after 20 April

13. The main new factor which we positively know will affect the Rhodesian situation in the medium term is the election scheduled for 20 April. We need therefore to consider whether advantage would lie in working for an all-parties meeting before or after that date.

14. The considerations arising before the internal election are not likely to be very different in kind from those we have to take into account at present. But there are variable factors. One is the attitude of the South Africans. They are not at present inclined to work for an all-parties meeting until after the election. We cannot rule out the possibility that they might be persuaded to exert the necessary leverage on Mr. Smith to negotiate constructively and in good faith before 20 April. But I think the chances are slim, either that we could persuade them or they could persuade Mr. Smith.
15. Another factor for change, however, is the security situation. If this worsens, as it probably will, and if the Salisbury parties are forced to postpone their election again or at least to lose some of their present confidence, they might become less determined on their present course of action and more ready to make concessions. Conversely, of course, this would no doubt lead the Patriotic Front to strengthen its demands.

16. After an election, we shall be in a different situation, though a good deal will depend on the complexion of the government of national unity and on whether Mr. Smith will be a member of it (he is still equivocating in public about his political future). Much will also turn on whether the regime can make convincing claim to have achieved a high turnout of voters. It can be argued that a high turnout will strengthen the new “government’s” confidence and encourage it to approach negotiations in a reasonable frame of mind. It is more likely, however, that it will simply add to the new leadership’s determination to cling to office. A low turnout might dispose the Salisbury parties to be flexible. Conversely it might lead the Patriotic Front to step up its demands. What is certain is that we can do nothing to affect the results ourselves, though we should seek to exercise some influence over the way in which it is interpreted by the international community. The situation will undoubtedly offer more potential for change than it does at present, though this is not an argument for postponing until after April 20 any further attempt to achieve a negotiated settlement.

Presentation

17. If the Prime Minister accepts the conclusions Mr. Hughes’ recommendations set out at the beginning of this report the question arises as to whether and how it should be presented in public, given that various different audiences are being addressed. A rather fuller private explanation to the parties and governments concerned will also be necessary.

18. So far as a public statement is concerned Mr. Hughes suggested that, if one is to be made, in addition to setting out the Prime Minister’s conclusions on his advice, it might make the following points:

(A) Mr. Hughes’ findings make it clear that the parties are very far apart and there is at present no possibility of bringing them close enough together to get an agreement.

(B) The British and U.S. Governments remain firmly committed to the search for a negotiated settlement.

(C) Meanwhile, the Anglo-American Proposals though neither immutable nor intended to exclude other possibilities if the parties can agree on them, remain available as the best basis we can see at present for an eventual settlement.
(D) The British and U.S. Governments will continue to consult together about any further steps which may be taken to improve the prospects for a successful negotiation and to prepare to take advantage of any opportunity which may occur to promote a peaceful settlement. End text.

Low

220. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, February 19, 1979, 1930Z


2. Summary: Dick Moose and Tony Duff, accompanied by Ambassadors Edmondson and Scott, and George Moose, met for four hours February 19 with Brand Fourie and General Dutton to discuss situation in Rhodesia. Morning session was devoted almost entirely to respective assessments of military, economic and political situation in Rhodesia and surrounding areas. Afternoon session, in which Funk also participated, mainly devoted to presentation of US–UK views on what should and could be done now to avert worsening situation and to move toward internationally acceptable solution. While Fourie, and Dutton generally agreed with our assessment of present military and economic situation, Fourie in particular was inclined to give most optimistic interpretation possible to prospects for a solution emerging after April 20. Duff and Moose stressed frailty of assumptions on which Fourie tended to base his more optimistic assessment and dangers for all of us of simply leaving matters to chance. Fourie did not reject suggestion that the SAG should join with UK and US in attempting to influence and impose some kind of structure on developments in order to try to ensure an internationally acceptable resolution to the Rhodesia conflict. However, he indicated that SAG’s participation in effort to promote a settlement based on impartially administered and supervised elections was a major proposition that would have to be carefully considered.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 1–2/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.
at political level. He did not know how soon he could promise SAG’s considered response, but held open possibility of further discussions on Wednesday morning (February 21).  

3. As previously agreed, Duff took lead in morning session in outlining purpose of visit and our desire to reach, if possible, shared assessment of current situation in Rhodesia and surrounding states and common appreciation of where events are likely to lead over next several months. He noted that idea of discussions with SAG grew out of Owen-Vance talks in Washington and our shared concern over steady deterioration in Rhodesia and diminishing prospects for viable political solution. Moose underscored Duff’s statement that if it was possible to reach common appreciation of the situation and its likely consequences, our hope was then to reach agreement on what our three governments, working together, might do to alter the present course of events.

4. Duff proceeded to give joint UK/US assessment of current military situation, to which Fourie and Dutton took little exception. Fourie did question our perception of a growing Front Line (FL) receptivity to greater Soviet/Cuban assistance and involvement, implying that economic difficulties, food shortages were creating greater internal opposition to the war and to FL support for ZANU and ZAPU. We noted that one of the more alarming aspects of situation is that growing military and economic problems created by the war appear to be breaking down previous FL resistance to outside intervention. Fourie also questioned our view that Cubans, despite heavy commitments elsewhere in Africa, might become more involved on behalf of Mozambique and Zambia. In general, however, both Fourie and Dutton agreed that while collapse was not imminent, both military and economic indicators—and leaving political factors aside—suggested a steady deterioration.

5. Fourie was less prepared, however, to accept our assessment of gloomy political prospects facing Salisbury. While a month ago he would have accepted that the position of the internal black leaders was weakening, he now felt that their political standing had been enhanced by virtual certainty that Smith would no longer be a factor after March 12 (nomination day) and by the January 30 referendum’s overwhelming approval of majority rule. In this connection, he cited Muzorewa’s recent rally which turned out an estimated 150,000 supporters and Salisbury’s claims of increasing “feelers” from ZANU (Mugabe) since the referendum. Fourie also predicted that whites would cease to play a “confrontational” role in Rhodesia politics after April 20, and this

---

2 See Document 221.
too would enhance the position of the internal black leaders. He held out the possibility that Muzorewa might now be in a position to win an absolute majority in Parliament (51 seats) and that the overall turnout in the April elections might be higher than previously anticipated. He acknowledged that Smith’s predictions of immediate international recognition following the elections were unrealistic and were not believed by anyone. What Muzorewa and Sithole did see, however, was prospect for a gradual change internationally, wherein sympathy on the part of some states would eventually lead to recognition and broader support.

5. Fourie summarized by saying that he saw little, if anything, that could be done before April 20. The PF seemed in no mood to negotiate. After the elections, there would be a clearer picture of the extent of black support for the new black government, and to what extent PF guerrillas might defect. Thereafter, depending upon how the new black leader (presumably Muzorewa) viewed the situation, new negotiations between the internal and external parties might be possible. Fourie thought it likely that the attitude of either ZANU or ZAPU toward joining the internal settlement might change after April 20. Personally he felt it would be easier for Salisbury to negotiate separately with the two wings of the PF, and that it would be easier for Muzorewa to come to terms with ZANU than with ZAPU.

6. Moose and Duff countered by challenging the overly optimistic premises on which Fourie’s assessment seemed to be based. It was far from certain that Smith really intended to leave the scene, and his most recent public statements suggested that he \[he\] would not. There was no assurance that Muzorewa, if he won, would be prepared to negotiate with the PF, either together or separately, or that whites in the government would permit him the flexibility to do so. Nor could we conceive of either ZANU or ZAPU moving to join the internal settlement except on condition that power be transferred to them. The January 30 constitution was unacceptable as a basis for a deal with the PF and would severely cripple any chance the internal leaders might have of drawing broad black support. Rather than greater flexibility, the April elections are likely to produce a situation in which there is less flexibility for negotiations.

7. Moose and Duff concluded by stressing that while Fourie’s optimism might be borne out, there was a strong likelihood that it would not. The one certainty is that the war will continue. We must therefore weigh the costs of doing nothing in the interim and leaving everything to chance. In our view we could not afford to wait because there is

---

3 The new constitution, published on January 2 and approved in the House of Assembly on January 20, was submitted to the white electorate on January 30. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, p. 29578)
likely to be even less flexibility in the positions of both sides in six months than there is now.

8. Without acknowledging that he accepted our line of reasoning, Fourie proceeded to ask what we, in light of our assessment, thought could be done in present circumstances. Duff and Moose suggested that this might be a convenient place to break and resume discussions in the afternoon.

9. When discussions resumed in the afternoon, Moose began by reiterating weakness of the premises on which Fourie seemed to base his optimistic assessment of prospects for post April 20 negotiations. In particular, he noted that Fourie’s assessment seemed to assume that the international context would remain static. It seemed to ignore the increasing scale of the fighting, the declining resistance of the FL to outside assistance and involvement, and the likelihood of increased pressures in the UN for measures against Rhodesia or possibly South Africa. In this light, SAG’s seeming equanimity about the situation, and the prospects for its own increasing involvement, however reluctant, was difficult to understand. Clearly the SAG has an interest in Rhodesia, which is not entirely consistent with Salisbury’s. Likewise, the Front Line has an interest in a solution that conflicts with that of the PF. It should therefore be possible to find a way to work together, as in Namibia, to find a solution that serves not only SAG’s interests but ours and the Front Line.

10. Fourie noted that our assessment of what was possible in present circumstances seemed unrealistic. The SAG’s position was based on the recognition that there was nothing that could be done now to bring the internal and external parties together. Therefore the best thing to do was to allow for the emergence of a new situation after April 20. Duff and Moose pointed out that since SAG seemed to accept the necessity for further negotiations, would it not be better to begin now to set up those negotiations.

11. Fourie did not disagree with our suggestion that impartial elections seemed to offer the “best” basis for a solution. But he argued that our previous efforts to achieve solution through the AAP had floundered because Salisbury could not accept the arrangements under which the elections would be held. In particular they could not accept that the new Zimbabwe would be based on the liberation forces. He noted that the issues relating to the transition arrangements would have to be dealt with if both sides were to agree to impartially administered elections. There would have to be a ceasefire. There was the question of who would maintain law and order, since he doubted that the UN could or would accept that responsibility. The Namibia example was not encouraging, since a final agreement there had still not been reached. Moreover, Rhodesia was even more difficult.

12. Duff and Moose acknowledged that a solution would not be easy. Many aspects of the AAP might still be relevant. It was unfortu-
nate that the parties had not given AAP elements, such as Lord Carver’s proposals, the consideration they deserved. Our hope now was to begin a new and hopefully simplified process of negotiations beginning with the acceptance by both sides of impartial, internationally supervised elections. If this is accepted, then there would be a basis for further discussions.

13. Fourie asked whether we saw this process beginning before the April elections and indicated that he saw little prospect that Muzorewa or Sithole would come out publicly in favor of UN supervised elections at this stage. Duff replied that ideally we would like the Salisbury parties to set aside the April 20 elections in favor of UN supervised elections. In any event, we would like Salisbury’s acceptance at some point that there must be UN-supervised elections, without specifying when. For our own purposes, we will take the view that the April 20 elections are irrelevant to the process of achieving an internationally acceptable settlement. What we should focus on is what is necessary to have UN-supervised elections.

14. Duff asked Fourie whether he thought SAG would be prepared to work with us, and with the Front Line, to gain the acceptance by Salisbury and the PF of UN-supervised elections. Fourie said he could not reply on behalf of his government. SAG’s decision to become involved would be a major one and would have to be carefully considered at the political level. Duff acknowledged that at some point the discussions might have to be carried on by our respective Ministers. Fourie did not know how soon we might expect a definitive response, but promised that it would be a matter of days rather than weeks. Duff and Moose expressed our hope that SAG would take our ideas in the full seriousness with which they were presented and offered to remain in Cape Town through Wednesday morning if Fourie saw any utility in a further meeting. Fourie replied that the SAG has always highly prized the goal of an internationally acceptable settlement in Rhodesia and would give our ideas serious consideration. He agreed that it would be useful to keep open the possibility of a final meeting on Wednesday morning.

15. Comment: While the SAG appears to share our general assessment of the military situation, Fourie, at least, clearly believes there will be time for a future round of political negotiations on the part of a new black government with some or all of the external Nationalists. If the SAG has a clear idea of how this would work, Fourie did not reveal it. Based on what he said, the SAG’s current objectives seem to be the departure of Smith and the installation of a black government. Fourie was extremely reluctant to consider embarking on a process in Rhodesia which would present even more of the sort of difficulties which currently plague the Namibia negotiations.

---

4 See Document 172.
16. In recent weeks, Fourie has seemed not to be in close touch with Pik Botha. The latter is doubtless preoccupied with Namibia (primarily in sounding off to the press) and, with the opening of Parliament, domestic politics, including the still bubbling “Infogate” scandal. Fourie at least gave us a thorough hearing, the results of which he and General Dutton will undoubtedly pass up the line to their superiors.

17. Unfortunately for us, a Cabinet meeting is scheduled tomorrow morning and a question period in Parliament during the afternoon. These commitments militate against Fourie’s being able to brief Pik Botha fully and Pik’s being able to consult the Prime Minister. Our Wednesday meeting may, therefore, be nothing more than a formality except that Fourie may seek some further clarifications from us.

18. If further inquiries by Fourie seem to open the way to a more detailed discussion, we may go into our concept of the basic principles for an internationally acceptable election. The Department will note that we did not do this today, nor did we put oil sanction proposition directly to Fourie or broach the possibility of a public statement on elections. Fourie’s manner was so guarded that we saw little point and some risk in pushing these matters further than we did. Our initial judgment is that, as we anticipated, it is going to be exceedingly difficult to get the SAG to take the large step we have in mind. Thus we decided not to risk scaring them off or seeming to be threatening.

19. We plan to talk with Duff tomorrow about how a possible Ministerial level meeting might be structured. Duff also plans to suggest a meeting with David Owen in London on Friday morning. We plan to leave Cape Town Wednesday noon by train for Johannesburg and take the overnight plane Thursday for London. If the SAG chooses to pursue further what we laid down today, we will revise our schedule. If, after receiving this message, Washington wants us to push further into our talking points, whether or not Fourie gives us a natural opening—we can do so Wednesday morning.\(^5\)

Edmondson

\(^5\) In telegram 43215 to Cape Town, February 20, the Department provided further instructions for the second meeting with Fourie, which included reiterating U.S. concern about outside intervention by the Soviets and Cubans and emphasizing that the internal black leaders would be less inclined to negotiate with the Patriotic Front about a second round of elections and vice versa. The Department noted: “We believe there should be a clear statement at the closing session of what the US and UK are asking of South Africa and Salisbury: A public commitment to the principle of UN supervised elections, agreement to negotiations between the PF and Salisbury on that basis, and South Africa’s private commitment to seek Salisbury’s acceptance of the basic elements of a settlement that would underlie impartial elections.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 2/14–28/79)
221. **Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State**

*Cape Town, February 21, 1979, 1100Z*

335. Dept pass NSC for Brzezinski and Aaron. Subject: Rhodesia: Moose/Duff Final Discussions With Fourie. Ref: Cape Town 0310.2


2. Summary: Moose and Duff accompanied by Edmondson, George Moose, Funk and Reid (UK) saw Fourie for final one hour session this morning (February 21) and used occasion to reinforce arguments presented February 19 and to make precise what we expect in the way of cooperation from SAG. Fourie acknowledged that Smith’s recent public statements raised doubts about his intentions to step down and indicated that the SAG did not discount possibility of increased Soviet/Cuban involvement. Fourie said he had tried to discuss our presentation with Pik Botha, but had been unable to do so because of Pik’s preoccupation with other matters. He reiterated his promise to give our ideas prompt and serious attention. End summary.

3. Following the February 29 [19] meetings, Duff had sent over to Fourie text of Smith’s statement in Parliament indicating his intention to stay on until the new internal government elected in April achieves international recognition. Duff noted that this cast serious doubt about SAG’s scenario for post-election negotiations, which assumed that Smith would no longer be on the scene. Fourie acknowledged that Smith’s statement contradicted SAG’s expectation that Smith would not stand for election and said that Smith’s continued presence would greatly affect the whole situation. He indicated that SAG would seek clarification of Smith’s intentions.

4. Moose underscored our concern, which Fourie seemed to dismiss too lightly, over recent indications of Soviet-Cuban willingness to become more involved in the Rhodesian situation. He noted standing Soviet offer of massive assistance to Zambia and possibility that Kaunda, in his increasingly desperate situation, might accept, especially in the face of continued Rhodesian attacks.3 He further stressed related

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 20, 1–2/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 220.

3 In telegram 4515 from Lusaka, December 29, 1978, the Embassy reported on Zambia’s security concerns and the distinct possibility that the Zambian military might force Kaunda to accept Soviet and Cuban assistance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790005–0802)
factor of how PF and Front Line might interpret activities by SAG, such as joint operations with the Rhodesians and other direct military support. There was a real danger that such actions might become an excuse or trigger for greater Soviet-Cuban involvement, which should be of concern to South Africa. Fourie asked for clarification of our reference to joint SAG-Rhodesian operations, to which Duff and Moose responded that there were rumors of SAG support in the form of air crews and transport and SAG patrols in Mozambique and Rhodesia. Fourie denied that SAG sought any military involvement in Rhodesia, indicating that a conscious decision not to become involved was made at the time SAG decided to withdraw its police units from Rhodesia. (It is possible that he was not aware of the reported presence of SAG helicopters and crews in Rhodesia.)

5. Fourie said his government did not dismiss the possibility of greater Soviet/Cuban involvement, although he argued that the PF did not want direct assistance from outsiders in the fighting since this would undermine their political appeal inside Rhodesia. Duff noted that our immediate concern was that the Soviets and Cubans would become involved to the extent of aiding in the defense of the Front Line States. This, however, could begin to create an attitude of greater receptivity to outside assistance which could affect the PF as well. There was also the danger of a black civil war, as in Angola, in which the Soviets could become involved on behalf of one side. The ultimate outcome could well be a regime in Rhodesia that was indebted and beholden to the USSR and Cuba. Fourie acknowledged the logic of the argument and reiterated that his government did not discount or ignore this possibility. Duff again underscored the point that any indication of SAG’s direct involvement on behalf of Salisbury could have disastrous consequences in terms of the attitudes of the Front Line and PF toward a greater Soviet/Cuban role.

6. Moose again questioned Fourie’s assumption that negotiations would be easier following the April elections. The whole history of Muzorewa’s and Sithole’s involvement in the internal settlement argued against their being more flexible once they were installed in office. Having compromised so much to achieve their goal, it was hard to see how they would be more flexible. If anything, they were likely to be even more rigid. There was a real danger that the elections would only freeze the situation and make progress impossible for several months, by which time a solution might no longer be possible.

7. Duff and Moose concluded the session by seeking to clarify what we were expecting in terms of cooperation from SAG. Fourie understood that our objective was to bring about impartial elections under UN supervision. Duff noted that specifically what we wanted was SAG’s acceptance of this objective and its agreement to join with
us in bringing it about, each of us bringing to bear what influence he can with the parties. Moose stressed that in accepting the objective of UN-supervised elections, it must be understood that other problems would have to be resolved in order to make this possible. This included the problem of dealing with the various armed forces, the establishment of a neutral transition administration, and issues relating to the constitution. What we were seeking was a clear indication of SAG’s willingness to work with us in solving these problems. It is not our intention to present a full blown plan, but rather to simplify the process beginning with the acceptance by both sides of UN-supervised elections. Once this was accepted, we could begin from there to establish the necessary conditions to make this possible.

8. Fourie said he had tried to present our ideas to Pik Botha, but implied that this had not been possible owing to Botha’s (and perhaps his own) preoccupation with other matters, especially Namibia. He undertook to do so as soon as possible and promised that our views would be given serious consideration.

Edmondson

222. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 23, 1979

SUBJECT
Rhodesia—The Lowenstein Formula

PARTICIPANTS
David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
David Aaron, National Security Council
Anthony Lake, S/P
William C. Harrop, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF
Robert V. Keeley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, AF
Thomas Thornton, National Security Council
Marianne Spiegel, S/P
Richard Jackson, P
Anne Holloway, UNA
Allard Lowenstein, Private Citizen

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Aaron, David: 1–12/79. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Keeley and Spiegel; approved on February 27 by Richard Jackson.
Mr. Lowenstein opened the meeting by saying that in his conversations with various parties in Southern Africa, he had found sufficient overlaps to believe that there exists an option which should be pursued. The opportunity to pursue it is evaporating rapidly. Pursuing this option would do two things: (1) prevent a civil war; and (2) even if it failed it would demonstrate that the Administration has been doing all it can to prevent that denouement from coming about. Mr. Lowenstein hastened to add that he had obtained nothing in writing and had concluded no negotiations. He had found that several of the key parties thought this to be an acceptable approach in general terms. In its essence the proposal would be to transpose the Namibia solution into one applying to Rhodesia.

Mr. Lowenstein then outlined his proposal as follows: The first stage would be the resignation of Prime Minister Smith. This action would precipitate other events. We would in turn reexamine the question of sending observers for the April 20 elections. The April 20 elections would be declared to be “transitory”. The new government emerging from those elections would renegotiate the terms and conditions for a new set of elections. The new elections would be supervised by the United Nations. A new constitution could then be drawn up and submitted to a broad referendum.

For its part the United States Government would, as the above process moved along, reassess the question of sanctions. The Patriotic Front would be encouraged to participate in drawing up the terms for a second round of U.N.-supervised elections. This scenario appeals to Smith, Kenneth Kaunda, the South African Government and the British Government. Mr. Lowenstein said that Kaunda had told him the Front Line and the Patriotic Front would be attracted by this formula, but it was essential that Smith resign first. He said Kaunda was anxious that Lowenstein return to Salisbury to get this nailed down.

Mr. Lowenstein then said he wished to state the price of not trying to work with this formula, noting that we have nothing to lose if we do try it. If Smith stays on in power Congress is likely to send observers to the April 20 elections and then lift sanctions. Congress would take these actions on its own and we will obtain nothing in return. The end result of this will be to make us irrelevant in Africa. Even if this formula doesn’t work the Administration would have been seen to be trying to find a solution and, at a minimum, Smith would have stepped down, and the elections that will be observed will have been described as transitional.

\[2\] In telegram 570 from Lusaka, February 19, the Embassy provided a summary of former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Lowenstein’s meetings with Pik Botha, Smith, Muzorewa, Kaunda, Nkomo, and Chona. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0054)
This formula, Mr. Lowenstein continued, will only work by what is termed in the Law “simultaneous closing,” that is by taking one step at a time, with each step making the next step possible but by no means guaranteed. This is the only way such a thing could work when no party trusts any other party to stand by the agreement. We are under great time pressure. Congress is moving ahead. Smith will get what he wants from the Congress without making any concessions in return. The SAG agrees about the time pressure. Everyone he talked to in South Africa, from all parts of the political spectrum, agreed that Rhodesia is disintegrating, and if there is a collapse there it will rule out any possibility of achieving majority rule in South Africa itself. Lowenstein stressed that in his talks with the South Africans he had offered no trade-offs for their cooperation on Rhodesia. We would need the help of the South African Government in making sure that Smith would step down. In London Lowenstein had talked with some of Callaghan’s key aides, who had later sent him word that the Prime Minister would be happy to see this formula tried out.

Newsom asked if obtaining the resignation of Smith was possible. In response, Mr. Lowenstein said that Ambassador Young had stressed to him that the essential first step was to get Smith to leave. Mr. Lowenstein said that he had a very long and blunt talk with Smith on this subject and Smith had at first resisted but had finally agreed that he would step down “if all these other things could flow.” He had mentioned the date of March 3, the anniversary of the internal settlement. Smith had agreed that if the other aspects of Lowenstein’s proposals could be worked out, he would resign. Smith had outlined what he termed the long history of betrayals by American diplomats. In effect Smith was offering to trade his resignation for a lifting of sanctions. Mr. Lowenstein noted that he had not “nailed down” the details of the specific quid for Smith’s resignation but when he had returned to Salisbury to attend the Muzorewa rally, he had had long talks with Gaylard in which he had spelled out the Namibia-type formula.

Mr. Lowenstein noted that he had returned to Salisbury after his phone conversation with Mr. Thornton of the NSC in which he had asked whether he ought to return to Salisbury a second time to pursue the ideas he had explored with Smith. Later on Mr. Lowenstein had talked with Jones (Hawkins was also present but said practically nothing) in Pretoria, and Jones had expressed concern that no answer to Smith’s offer had yet come back to him. Mr. Lowenstein had then talked again with Mr. Thornton from Cape Town and had asked if the USG had any interest in pursuing this approach. Mr. Lowenstein had then gone on to Lusaka. Kaunda’s position was that we should get Smith to step down, after which we could take whatever position we wished on observers. In London, Mr. Lowenstein had discussed with his British contacts the problem that would be posed if observers were to be sent by Jesse Helms and Mrs. Thatcher.
Mr. Newsom asked who would replace Ian Smith if he resigned. Mr. Lowenstein said it would be David Smith. Mr. Aaron asked Lowenstein to confirm in outline the scenario he was proposing. It was described as follows. The first step is Smith’s resignation. The April 20 elections would be declared to be transitional. In return we would send observers to these elections. If the observers reported that the elections were OK we would lift sanctions. (Lowenstein pointed out that if they were not fair, he would not support a lifting of sanctions.)

The new government elected on April 20 would then negotiate the terms of a second round of elections under UN supervision. This second round would produce a constituent assembly which would prepare a new constitution which would replace the one adopted in January.

Mr. Lowenstein made the point that this scenario could have the effect of encouraging the conservatives in our Congress to get Smith to resign and to have the April 20 elections redefined as transitional. Mr. Lake pointed out that Salisbury would have to commit itself in advance of April 20 to UN-supervised elections. Mr. Aaron stated that the scenario outlined above would have to be arranged as a package deal, not a step-by-step process one step at a time.

Ms. Holloway said she had earlier spoken with Ambassador Young who believes that the formula presented by Mr. Lowenstein is not workable, although it might have been two years ago. The military situation makes it impossible to hold the scheduled elections, much of the country is under martial law, and conditions are such that elections cannot be held. Ambassador Young does not believe that Ian Smith will actually step down, noting that Smith has used this as a promise or threat several times without carrying it out. Young believes that trying to work with this scenario would stretch our credibility with the Africans to or beyond the breaking point. Were we to attempt something of this kind it would require a decision at the highest level in our government to change our policy away from what we have been working on for the past two years, that is the Anglo-American Plan. Ambassador Young feels that although the Congress may on its own send observers to the April 20 elections and may act to lift sanctions, the Administration should avoid any association with either of these. The Ambassador feels that the Administration would be undermining all that it has been attempting to do for the past two years if it took any other course. There is no analogy with Namibia in his opinion. The U.S. sent no observers to the Namibian internal elections. The Contact Group proceeded with its own settlement plan.

Mr. Lake expressed the view that the Lowenstein formula does not really cancel out the Anglo-American proposals, as it could be adapted to encompass them. He stressed that we need to limit the damage that can be done to our policy by Congressional actions on
observers and sanctions. There is no need for us to abandon our position on a settlement—in obtaining Salisbury’s agreement to negotiate toward UN-supervised elections we could reiterate our belief those elections should be held under conditions outlined in the Anglo-American proposals, e.g., neutral transitional administration, UN peacekeeping, etc.—but we do need to do something in the way of damage control on the Hill. In Lake’s view the main problem with the Lowenstein formula is that the Patriotic Front must take on faith that the post April 20 government in Salisbury would negotiate in good faith and that UN-supervised elections eventually would take place. There is no guarantee that the black leaders who would be elected would carry out the plan. Mr. Newsom said that this aspect of the scenario would be like having the DTA in Namibia negotiate a settlement with SWAPO after the Namibian internal elections.

Mr. Aaron stated that our problem at the moment is that we do not have a viable policy on Rhodesia and therefore we don’t have a defensible position on the Hill. Mr. Lowenstein’s proposal has the merit that it focuses attention on the fact that the illegitimate Smith regime is still in power in Rhodesia and the elections to be held on April 20 are also illegitimate.

Mr. Lowenstein stated that he has no trust in Ian Smith, but the point is if Smith refuses to resign after agreeing to do so he will lose his support in the Congress. Mr. Lowenstein agreed that a high level decision is necessary. He also stressed that it is crucial that we discuss the scenario with Nyerere, and he was sorry he was not able to do so himself. If we do not check it out with Nyerere the latter will take it to be a Kaunda initiative. Mr. Lowenstein disagreed with Mr. Aaron and argued that the formula could not be worked out as a package deal but must be arranged one step at a time. However, he noted that prior agreement by major actors such as the U.K., the SAG, Kaunda and Nyerere at least would be necessary.

Mr. Lake said that with the Anglo-American proposals still available we are well positioned for the future even if we granted that there exists a perception here that we do not have a policy. The problem with the Lowenstein scenario is that there is no assurance the internal black leaders will stick with the deal after April 20. They are mistrusted by the leaders on the other side. Mr. Lowenstein commented that if they refuse to cooperate the South African Government could cut off their supplies. Mr. Aaron pointed out that the Patriotic Front might be unwilling to negotiate in good faith as well.

Mr. Lowenstein mentioned that he had talked with both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in South Africa although he had not presented his formula in detail as this had been prior to his exchange with Ian Smith. Mr. Lowenstein said he would be meeting on Tuesday
with the Congressional ad hoc group on Southern Africa which has
been organized by Messrs. McCloskey, Downey, Tsongas and Hatfield.
He noted in this connection that Jesse Helms is no doubt telling Smith
not to make any concessions as he can get observers and lifting of
sanctions without making any concessions.

Mr. Lowenstein was asked if he had discussed with the South
Africans the idea of their cutting off supplies to Rhodesia. His response
was that he had not gotten into any specifics of that sort with the SAG.

Mr. Lake stated that it would hurt us in the Congress if it was
perceived that Smith had made an offer to step down and the Executive
Branch had refused the offer. Mr. Lowenstein said he certainly would
not say anything of that kind as he fully supported the Administration
and didn’t want that sort of impression to come out. But, he said, three
weeks have now passed since the offer was made and time is running
out. During these three weeks no doubt Smith has been hearing from
his friends in Congress that he can win on the questions of observers
and sanctions without giving up anything.

Ms. Holloway expressed concern that we avoid actions which
would lose us our status as mediators and honest brokers. She pointed
to genuine constraints that exist upon our ability to act.

Mr. Newsom inquired as to the promises the SAG had made. Mr.
Lowenstein responded that there had been no specific promises. Mr.
Newsom then said we need to do something now, but he had reserva-
tions on a major aspect of the formula, namely that the internal black
leaders elected on April 20 may not wish to proceed with the second
round of elections. Mr. Lowenstein admitted that this posed a problem
but he averred that Chirau and Muzorewa had used words which
indicated support for his proposal. He felt they could be brought along
if we were willing to use our leverage, although this is not what they
want. He noted that if sanctions are lifted there could be a real improve-
ment in the morale and military posture of the Salisbury side.

Mr. Lake then summarized by saying that we face three choices:

1) Stick with the Anglo-American proposals and maintain a pas-
   sive stance for the time being. This will cause us to lose the battle on
   the Hill.

2) Pursue the Lowenstein formula in some fashion, while realizing
   that the black leaders in power after April 20 will not follow through.
   Nevertheless, this would put us in a better position vis-a-vis Congress.

3) Make a major fight on the Hill against the lifting of sanctions.
   If we choose this option the President or the Secretary would have to
   lead the fight if we were to have any chance of winning.

Ms. Holloway said that Ambassador Young would certainly be in
favor of the third option. Mr. Lake said we might want to think about
a combination of the second and third options.
223. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, March 1, 1979

SUBJECT

Official Observers for the April Rhodesian Internal Elections

After the Rhodesian internal elections in April, you will be required, under the terms of the Case-Javits Amendment, to make a determination as to whether the signatories to the so-called “internal settlement” agreement have fulfilled that amendment’s two conditions, one of which requires the holding of free and fair elections open to all political and population groups and observed by “impartial, internationally-recognized observers”. If you make a positive determination, the United States will no longer enforce internationally-binding United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia.

The factual basis for your decision will be guided in part by who observes the elections, the degree of international recognition these observers enjoy, and their judgments as to the election’s fairness and openness. In that context, it has been suggested that the Administration designate official observers so that a better judgment can be made. Also, Senators McGovern and Hayakawa are introducing a resolution instructing the Congressional leadership to appoint bipartisan, impartial observers from outside Congress. Finally, there is a likelihood that a considerable number of journalists, governmental and non-governmental observers from other countries, and perhaps even a few Congressmen will be present in Rhodesia during this election. At present, none of these groups have been internationally recognized as required by the Case-Javits Amendment.

If the Administration were to designate official observers, it would violate our international legal obligations by awarding a degree of legitimacy to the Smith regime and the internal settlement. It would also be interpreted negatively by important African states and others and would seriously erode our negotiating capability. As a result, I

---

2 The elections were held in two stages. The election for white members was held on April 10 and for black members April 17–20.
3 The Case-Javits Amendment, approved July 26, 1978, required President Carter to lift sanctions against Rhodesia if he determined the Salisbury elections were free and fair and that the Government of Rhodesia demonstrated a willingness to negotiate in good faith at an all-parties conference.
recommend that the Administration not send official observers to the Rhodesian internal elections.\(^4\)

I also recommend that the Administration take a neutral position regarding Congressionally designated observers. To oppose Congress’s sending observers would only increase the chances for an undesirable Congressional resolution calling on the Administration to designate observers.

Finally, I recommend that the Department make the Administration’s position on these questions known in the testimony on the McGovern-Hayakawa bill which will take place on March 7.\(^5\)

---

\(^4\) In a March 6 memorandum, Aaron informed Vance that the President approved his recommendation not to send official observers to the April elections. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 3/1–12/79)

\(^5\) Moose testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 7, explaining the administration’s position. (Department of State Bulletin, May 1979, pp. 45–47)

---

224. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable\(^1\)

FIRDB–312/00702–79 Washington, March 2, 1979

COUNTRY
Rhodesia

SUBJECT
Belief of Senior Rhodesian Security Officials That 29 January 1979 Meeting Had Significant Impact on Smith’s Political Plans (DOT: Late February–[less than 1 line not declassified] 1979)

SOURCE
[5 lines not declassified]

1. After discussions with colleagues and with the British Ambassador to South Africa on 25 February 1979, senior Rhodesian security officials believe that the private talk between Prime Minister Ian Smith

and a private American citizen, Mr. Allard Lowenstein, on 29 January had great impact on Smith. In reconstructing events, these officials believe that it was after the discussion of lifting economic sanctions in return for Smith’s early resignation that the idea became planted in Smith’s mind for the first time that he could delay his planned resignation and bargain for a major Western concession in return for resigning. The officials trace Smith’s sudden public waffling on the issue of when he would resign to 29 January, the day of the meeting.  

2. ACQ: [less than 1 line not declassified]  
3. Field dissem: [less than 1 line not declassified]

---

2 See Document 222 and footnote 2 thereto.  
3 In a March 7 memorandum to Aaron, Funk wrote: “Apparently Pik Botha believes that Smith should resign prior to 20 April, and had assurances from Smith that he would. Rhodesian security officials concur in the necessity for Smith’s resignation. They now feel that ‘Smith’s sudden public waffling on the issue’ is causally related to Lowenstein’s discussions with Smith on 29 January.” Inderfurth wrote at the bottom of the page: “David, I think you should step in—if you have not already done so—and straighten out the Lowenstein mess. Rick.” Aaron wrote below this: “I have DA.”

---

225. Letter From Representative Thomas Downey to President Carter

Washington, March 5, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

As Members of Congress who are strongly concerned about United States policy toward southern Africa, we are writing to express our opposition to the Concurrent Resolution sponsored by Senators McGovern and Hayakawa which proposes sending American observers to the April elections in Rhodesia.

Our opposition to this proposal is based upon close study and lengthy discussion of this issue, and our decision to oppose the McGovern/Hayakawa Resolution has not been taken lightly. Though the entire Rhodesian question is extremely complex and fraught with nuances,

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 186, PRC 100 Rhodesia, 4/5/79. Unclassified.
2 Reference is to Senate Concurrent Resolution 8 which was introduced on March 1 and sought to provide impartial observers of the Rhodesian election.
we feel that the basis for our strong objection to the presence of official American observers at the proposed elections in Rhodesia is clear and basic to the entire case in question. Our reasoning is as follows:

1. The constitution which is the basis for the holding of elections in April is an illegitimate document. Not only have the potential Black voters had no voice in the recently held Whites-only referendum, the constitution approved by that referendum has obvious racially motivated imbalances built into the legislative and judicial system it would establish.

2. For the United States to send official observers to monitor the elections sanctioned by this illegitimate and racially biased document would be construed by the world, and particularly by other African nations, as a recognition by the United States of the legitimacy of the present regime in Rhodesia as well as the government emerging from those elections.

3. This tacit acceptance by the United States of the internal settlement would be believed by the world at large despite any conditional language which may be included in the McGovern/Hayakawa Resolution.

4. The presence of American observers and the appearance of American acceptance would surely be used to full effect by supporters of a racially imbalanced society in Rhodesia, in much the same way that Ian Smith’s visit to the United States last year was publicized as a diplomatic victory for Smith’s policies. The conditions and justifications for his visit were quickly forgotten, but his presence in Washington is well remembered.

5. There is a clear danger of entrapment for U.S. policy in becoming identified with the inherently unstable regime which is likely to emerge from the April elections in Rhodesia. The American position must be carefully considered in the event that the often projected scenario of civil war in Rhodesia among rival power groups in that country should occur.

6. American policy must also take into consideration the relationship this country desires for the future with Black African nations and with the future government of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Our official actions at this time will have a profound effect on those future relationships.

3 January 30.
4 The constitution retained white leadership in the military, police, judiciary, and civil services. For its provisions, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, pp. 29578–29579.
5 October 7–20, 1978.
For all the above reasons we urge you not to accept any plan for sending official American observers to the April elections in Rhodesia. Furthermore, we urge you to ensure that the United States Department of State takes and maintains a clear and unequivocal position not only on the observer issue, but on American policy in southern Africa in general. We feel that it is essential for the moral prestige and public image of America, as well as being in our national interest, that the United States present to the world a positive and undeniably consistent African policy.

Thank you for taking into consideration our carefully considered views on this serious issue.

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Downey  
Member of Congress

Andrew Maguire  
Member of Congress

Cardiss Collins  
Member of Congress

Senator Paul Tsongas  
Member of Congress

Anthony Toby Moffett  
Member of Congress

Pete Stark  
Member of Congress

Ronald Dellums  
Member of Congress

George Miller  
Member of Congress

---

6 See Document 227.
WASHINGTON, MARCH 6, 1979

SUBJECT
Rhodesian Strategy

Our strategy must address four basic difficulties:

1. If the US and UK cannot achieve some progress in negotiations now, a settlement after the April 20 internal elections will be far less likely. Lack of progress will also hurt efforts to prevent a Congressional lifting of sanctions.

2. At the same time, the UK and US cannot easily overcome Salisbury’s reluctance to proceed toward a broader settlement before April 20, or easily discourage its expectation that elections will bring a US lifting of sanctions and improve the internal parties’ negotiating position.

3. African nations, already suspicious, will react strongly if we move away from basic principles of the AAP or lift sanctions.

4. But if the UK and US appear only to be offering the same Anglo-American Proposals, and are not pressing a position that is both easily understood and has a chance of succeeding, we are unlikely to impress either Salisbury or Congress that a viable alternative exists to the internal settlement.

It is unlikely, in fact, that any Anglo-American initiative can succeed. But we need, at the least, a strategy that will help us weather the coming storms. In the coming weeks, I recommend that a strategy along the following lines be pursued. It was worked out in consultation with Andy Young and the NSC staff.

1. Issue a clear, public message to all parties a) to accept the principle of UN-supervised elections, and b) to agree to negotiate on elections arrangements. At the same time, state that we will support a lifting of sanctions when an agreed transition process leading to UN-supervised elections has begun. We would prefer that negotiations on this process begin before the April 20 elections; at the least, we would hope that the principle of UN-supervised elections be accepted before April 20.

This would provide us with a simplified statement of a position on what constitutes fair elections and when sanctions should be lifted.

---

And it would push Smith toward taking a clearer position on the central issues of the AAP.

(A statement to be made in a meeting Andy Young and I would hold with reporters is attached, Tab A.)

2. A public call on the parties to accept UN-supervised elections would be preceded by approaches to the Front Line States and South Africa in order to:

—Inform them that the statement will be made; urge their support for acceptance by all parties of the principle of UN-supervised elections, and negotiations on that basis.

—In this context, press for South African response to Moose/Duff presentation.

—At a minimum, seek Front Line assistance to avoid immediate Patriotic Front rejection of the appeal.

3. Depending on Front Line and South Africa’s reaction to this approach, consider sending UK/US representatives to Salisbury to

a) reiterate the proposal for UN-supervised elections and negotiations on that basis; b) press on political, business, and military leaders the view that progress in negotiations before the April 20 elections is essential.

4. In presentations, note that the Anglo-American Proposals outline our position on the conditions for UN-supervised elections; once the parties have agreed on the fundamental principle of such elections, productive talks can be held on these or other proposals for elections arrangements. But emphasize the simple appeal for UN-supervised elections, rather than the whole AAP.

5. When the issue arises, note that Smith’s departure could facilitate negotiations among the parties on arrangements for UN-supervised elections. But discourage emphasis on Smith’s resignation as the primary goal. Reasons include: the central issue is Salisbury’s willingness to negotiate toward UN-supervised elections, not Smith’s departure; to focus too much on Smith’s resignation would encourage the view that the Administration opposes per se Smith and the white minority he represents; the price of Smith’s resignation may be too high.

---

2 Attached but not printed. Vance made the statement on March 17. (Department of State Bulletin, June 1979, p. 22)

3 Moose and Duff met with Brand Fourie on February 19 and 21 to discuss the South African role in Rhodesia. In addition to seeking acceptance for impartial UN-supervised elections, Moose and Duff sought South Africa’s assistance on a variety of issues including: the various armed forces; the establishment of a neutral transition administration; and issues relating to the constitution. See Documents 220 and 221.
6. With Congress, South Africa and Salisbury emphasize the likely serious costs in East-West terms of failure to achieve a negotiated settlement: substantially increased Soviet and Cuban involvement; significantly reduced Western influence and increased communist influence; threats to stability of moderate independent governments; radicalized struggle, concluding with white exodus; serious consequences for how change is likely to come in South Africa itself. Salisbury and South Africa should make every effort toward a broad settlement now, while it is still possible; the United States will not come to Rhodesia’s military assistance as the situation deteriorates.

7. When asked the Administration’s position on the April 20 elections and sanctions, emphasize:

—We are working toward a UN-supervised elections process. Observers and lifting of sanctions would be appropriate to such elections. The U.S. would put itself on the losing side by lifting sanctions prematurely.

—We will faithfully observe the provisions of Case/Javits, making the required Presidential Determination concerning the April 20 elections on the basis of all of the information available. The Administration will not send its own observers to these elections, since to do so would imply official recognition of elections which cannot resolve the Rhodesian problem, gain international support, or end the conflict. The question of Congressionally sponsored observers is for Congress to decide.

While we believe this strategy could ease problems with Congress over Rhodesia, we still will face a difficult situation in making your determination under Case/Javits and, in the likely event that is negative, in preventing a Congressional lifting of sanctions.

With your approval, we’ll begin consultations with the UK on this strategy.

Recommendation

That you approve the Rhodesian strategy outlined in this memorandum.4

4 There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the Rhodesian strategy, but in a March 7 memorandum, Aaron informed Vance that Carter had approved the recommendations. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 3/1–12/79)
Dear Mr. Downey:

I am replying on behalf of the President to your letter of March 5 in which you and a number of your colleagues raised the issue of sending observers to the Rhodesian elections in April. The Administration appreciates having your views on this question.

As you know, the Administration has decided that it will not send observers to the April elections. Were the United States to send official observers, it would be contrary to our international legal obligations with respect to Rhodesia and could be construed as giving a degree of legitimacy to the Smith government and to the so-called internal settlement. Moreover, it would make our negotiating effort more difficult, seriously erode U.S. credibility with the Front Line and other African states, and encourage Salisbury’s hopes that additional U.S. moral and material support would be forthcoming.

The Administration nevertheless recognizes the independent authority of the Congress to inform itself, as it deems appropriate, on developments concerning current international issues, including Rhodesia. At the same time however, we would urge the Congress, in the course of its deliberations on this issue to consider the reasons which have led the Administration to decide not to send observers.

The goal of our Rhodesia policy continues to be a fair and enduring settlement through which the people of Rhodesia, black and white, would be able to choose their future leadership in a secure atmosphere free from the intimidating effects of war. We believe that the best path for reaching this goal lies through the acceptance by the parties of impartially-administered, UN-supervised elections open to all. We firmly believe that our efforts to promote a fair settlement that can be accepted by both sides offers the only reasonable hope for ending the
war and avoiding an outcome perilous for both the people of Rhodesia and for American interests in southern Africa.

Sincerely,

Douglas J. Bennet, Jr.\(^5\)

\(^5\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

228. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter\(^1\)

Washington, March 26, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

2. Rhodesia. In his recent visit to Salisbury, Ambassador Low found most Rhodesian politicians determined to proceed with the scheduled April elections, optimistic about a relatively high turnout, and convinced that Muzorewa will emerge the winner.\(^2\) Few give serious thought to a subsequent election under UN supervision, but Muzorewa and Sithole speak of “keeping the door open” and many anticipate the possibility of further negotiations with at least one of the external parties. In this regard, accommodation between Muzorewa and Mugabe is widely viewed as offering an end to the fighting but Muzorewa’s dependence on white political and military power will make such a deal virtually impossible.\(^3\)

Smith’s continued involvement in politics is now largely accepted—even by those who previously opposed him—as essential to maintaining white confidence and possibly to a future political accommodation with the external parties. There is nevertheless a recognition that the war will not only continue but escalate.

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 39, State Department Evening Reports, 3/79. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “Cy.”

\(^2\) Low visited Salisbury March 21–24. In telegram 76365 to London, March 27, the Department transmitted the conclusions resulting from the meetings with Rhodesian politicians. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790141–0789)

\(^3\) Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “I need a better assessment of what to do if election turns out well.”
229. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, March 30, 1979

SUBJECT

The Rhodesian Elections

You asked for additional information concerning the upcoming internal elections in Rhodesia and how they will affect our Rhodesia policy. The Rhodesians have not announced a timetable, but the phased election process is expected to begin April 10 and culminate in the installation of a new administration in late May or early June. The following is an approximate timetable:

April 10 —White Rhodesians vote to elect 20 white members of parliament.
April 17–21 —Blacks vote to elect 72 black members of parliament from slates put forward by the internal black leaders.
Late April —The 50 white members of the current parliament meet to nominate 16 candidates for the remaining 8 white seats in the new parliament.
May 1 —Results of the April 10 (white) and April 17–21 (black) elections are announced.
May 7 —The 72 black parliamentarians and 20 elected whites meet to elect the remaining 8 white members of parliament from the 16 candidates previously nominated.
May 10 —The 72 blacks nominate 10 black members to the new 30-member senate; 10 white senators are nominated by the 28 white parliamentarians; and 10 others are nominated by the council of tribal chiefs, with 5 from each of the 2 principal tribes.
May 17 —The house and senate meet jointly to elect a state president.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 4/1–18/79. Confidential.
2 See footnote 3, Document 228.
May 21 — The president appoints a new prime minister, presumably from the party or coalition that holds a majority of seats in the house.

May 28 — The prime minister appoints a 20-member cabinet, on which each party will be represented in proportion to the number of seats it holds in parliament.

June 1 — The old parliament is dissolved and the new administration installed.

Ian Smith’s Rhodesia Front party is expected to win all 28 white seats. Black voter turnout will depend upon a variety of factors, but could exceed 50 percent. Earlier Rhodesian predictions of a 20 percent black turnout may have deliberately understated the expected turnout in the hope that a higher level of participation would be interpreted as a significant demonstration of black support for the internal settlement.

Despite declining support, Muzorewa remains the most popular of the internal black leaders and may win an absolute majority of seats in the new parliament. This would assure his appointment as prime minister. If he fails to win an absolute majority, the 28 white members of parliament could play a pivotal role in selecting the prime minister. In any event, whites will be able to block amendments of the constitution and major legislation, which require a 78 vote majority, for at least 10 years. They will be assured at least 5 cabinet posts and continued control over the military, police, civil service and judiciary through their dominance of extra-parliamentary commissions. Ian Smith will likely remain in the cabinet, possibly as defense minister.

**THE CASE-JAVITS AMENDMENT**

The installation of a new administration will trigger the second condition of the Case-Javits Amendment (attached), which requires that you make a determination, either positive or negative, on the fairness of the elections as a prerequisite for the lifting of sanctions. (While the legislative intent of the first condition of the amendment would appear to have been satisfied by the agreement of the Salisbury parties to attend an all-parties conference, it can be argued that Salisbury’s unwillingness to engage in meaningful preparatory discussions raises justifiable doubts about their willingness to “negotiate in good faith.” It would be difficult, however, to sustain a negative determination on the amendment on this basis alone.)

The extent of voter participation is among the factors that must be taken into consideration in making your determination. In this connec-

---

3 Attached but not printed.
tion, the conference committee report stipulates that a low turnout caused by guerrilla activities to disrupt the election should not necessarily preclude a positive determination. By the same token, however, the report states that the possibility that many people may refrain from voting as an expression of opposition to the internal settlement should be taken into account in considering a negative determination.

The legislation also requires a judgment as to whether “all the people of Rhodesia and all organized political groups have been given a fair opportunity to participate fully in the election without regard to ethnic identity or political affiliation.” Thus, consideration must be given not only to the manner in which the elections are conducted, but also to the conditions under which they are held. Without prejudging the outcome or your determination, it is possible to identify a number of factors that will have to be weighed, including:

—The inability of black Rhodesians to vote in the January 30 white referendum that approved the constitution on which the new government is to be based; and the likelihood that many blacks may boycott the elections to demonstrate their disapproval;
—The state of war and enforcement of martial law throughout most of the country;
—The announced intention of the Patriotic Front to disrupt the elections;
—Whether Salisbury’s offer of conditional amnesty to the guerrillas is a meaningful offer of full political participation;
—The ban on Patriotic Front political activities and the detention of an estimated 3,000 ZANU and ZAPU supporters;
—Pressures already being exerted by security forces, Rhodesian authorities, tribal leaders, and white employers to ensure a high black voter turnout;
—Evidence of intimidation by the 10,000 newly recruited “auxiliary” forces to compel support for Muzorewa or Sithole.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Whether positive or negative, your determination on Case-Javits will have an effect on future policy options:

—Many in the public and the Congress are predisposed to regard the April elections as deserving of recognition and support. A negative determination is therefore likely to trigger a move in the Congress to lift sanctions over the Administration’s objections. To avoid a veto, proponents of such a move will seek to attach a sanctions lifting amendment to a critical piece of legislation. Defeating such a move would require a strong Administration campaign. Even though it could prove unsuccessful, a strong campaign would be essential to maintaining the credibility of our opposition to the lifting of sanctions.
—African states and most of the international community are already disposed to regard the April elections as inherently illegal and unrepresentative, and a device to perpetuate white domination. Soon after the new government is installed, we expect the Africans to convene the Security Council and present a resolution condemning the internal settlement process and declaring the elections null and void. Thus a positive determination on Case-Javits would damage our standing and credibility internationally and in the United Nations and our ability to influence future events in southern Africa, and could lead African governments to withdraw their support for our Namibia efforts. It would also alienate important domestic constituencies, including liberals and blacks. National black leaders in particular have already indicated that they will devote active attention to the way the Administration handles the Case-Javits Amendment.

The strategy which you approved March 7/4 was designed to position the Administration to manage these inevitable domestic and international pressures in the weeks ahead by:

—Re-emphasizing our commitment to a fair and impartial settlement;

—Stressing that, whatever the outcome, the April elections will not solve the Rhodesian problem or end the conflict, and the consequent need for the U.S. to preserve its ability to influence developments and work for a settlement in the future;

—Stating positively the conditions under which the Administration would support lifting sanctions and extending recognition to Rhodesia in order to provide our supporters an alternative to the positions of those actively lobbying on behalf of the internal settlement.

It is nevertheless important that whatever determination is made on the elections be broadly credible and supportable with both our domestic audiences and the international community. We will need to be able to cite the best possible sources of information about the elections. The fate of the McGovern-Hayakawa resolution5 to send congressionally-sponsored observers is still uncertain; but we are likely to have reports from a variety of sources, including journalists and private organizations, our own and British diplomatic reporting, and covertly collected intelligence. In order to defend against criticism that the Administration lacked firsthand information about the elections, we also intend to:

—Task the CIA for as much reporting as possible on the elections; and

4 See footnote 4, Document 226.
5 See footnote 2, Document 225.
—Arrange for low-level, unpublicized visits by Department officers immediately prior to and after the elections. In so doing, we will make clear that these visits do not alter our decision not to send official observers.

LOOKING AHEAD

Given the present preoccupation of the Salisbury parties with their elections, the focus of attention in South Africa on the information scandal and Namibia, and the elections in Britain, the prospects for early progress on Rhodesia are not promising. Given this situation, the strategy you approved March 7 places us in the best possible position to weather the problems and uncertainties of the weeks ahead.

We have carefully avoided raising expectations of a new diplomatic initiative that could commit us more deeply without producing a solution. Moreover, we have on record a clear and simple restatement of our policy which is both defensible domestically and credible with our friends in Africa and elsewhere.
230. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, April 12, 1979, 3:30–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Rhodesia and Angola (C)

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Mr. Richard Moose (Asst Sec, Bureau of African Affairs)
Mr. Anthony Lake (Director, Policy Planning Staff)
Douglas Bennet (Asst Sec, Congressional Relations)

Defense
Dep Sec Charles Duncan
Dr. Owen Roberts (Director, African Region)

Treasury
(3:45 p.m.) Secretary Michael Blumenthal

JCS
Lt General William Smith

CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Mr. Frank Carlucci (Deputy Director)
Mr. William Parmeter (NIO for African Affairs)

USUN
Amb Donald McHenry

White House
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

NSC
Mr. Jerry Funk

The meeting arrived at the following conclusions: (U)

Concerning Rhodesia:

—It was agreed that we should maintain our present position of support for a political process which would lead to internationally supervised elections as the best way to achieve a just and viable settlement. (S)

—We should, however, assume a generally low profile and avoid the expectation of new initiatives. (S)

—Without prejudging the President’s Case-Javits determination,² should he find negatively, this finding should be stated in positive terms which indicate his intention to reconsider if events appear to be leading the parties toward a genuinely viable settlement. (S)

—We should, in general, be seen to be less active in pursuit of settlement of Southern African problems, to the extent events will permit, without abandoning principle, to insure that we remain in a credible position with the several parties to assist in the settlement process when and if new opportunities arise. (S)

Concerning Angola:

—There remains a division of opinion on the question of recognition of Angola. (S)

—State essentially argued that recognition would allow us to exert more influence on Angola, and that this would be helpful in reaching settlement in Namibia, as well as in moving Angola toward a genuinely non-aligned position. (S)

—Dr. Brzezinski argued that the question is one of tactics and timing,—and that the time is not now. (S)

—with respect to tactics, it was argued that recognition would have little influence on a Namibian settlement, nor would it help to move the Angolans away from the Cubans in the face of a continuing broadly-based UNITA insurgency. (S)

—with respect to timing, it was argued that the President may well have to make a negative determination on Rhodesian sanctions, which will be unpopular on the Hill. At the same time recognition of Angola will be perceived as a weak retreat from a long-standing policy, for no gain. Since there are no immediate benefits to be gained by recognition at this time, it was argued that the President should delay consideration of recognition until the situations in Angola and on the Hill are more favorable. (S)

Background

The discussions were a continuation of those held at a PRC meeting on April 5, 1979, in which it was agreed to develop rather precise details concerning Rhodesian options for consideration at this meeting.³ A great deal of staff work was done in preparation for this meeting.

2 Some members of Congress lobbied for the lifting of sanctions following the Rhodesian internal settlement announcement. The Case-Javits Amendment was a compromise that required the President to lift sanctions if the Rhodesian Government agreed to negotiate in good faith with all parties on relevant issues, and held free and fair elections in which all Rhodesians were allowed to participate.

3 See Document 354.
particularly with respect to an option which was an outgrowth of ideas being widely discussed by former UN Ambassador Allard Lowenstein.4 (S)

Consideration was also given to the idea of presenting an integrated package of proposals to South Africa, and ultimately the other parties, concerning Namibia and Rhodesia, and indirectly, Angola.5 (S)

The meeting, it should be noted, was held against the backdrop of charges that morning by the South African Government that the U.S. military attaches had been engaging in illegal air reconnaissance. This was seen as a well-considered and deliberate step in hardening SAG attitudes toward cooperation with us on Southern African problems. (S)

It was agreed that in the light of present South African actions and attitudes, it would not be useful at this time to submit a package of proposals to SAG, but rather that we should deal with the separate issues on an individual basis, while recognizing, of course, their interrelationships. (S)

To recapitulate:

—On Rhodesia, it was agreed that we should maintain our present public policy on the principle of internationally-supervised elections, but in a less active, low-profile manner. Should the President find negatively on Case-Javits, he should keep the door open to reconsideration should the parties begin to move toward a viable settlement. (S)

—On Angola, there remains a division of opinion on the question of recognition. (S)

---


5 Tarnoff forwarded a revised discussion paper entitled “Southern Africa” to Brzezinski on April 11. The discussion paper noted: “South Africa is acutely aware of the interrelation of Southern African problems and views each issue from a regional perspective. It is important, therefore, that in trying to secure a Namibian settlement, we present it as part of an overall package addressing the problems of the region as a whole.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 1–4/79)
231. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, April 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Representative to the Security Council, USUN

SUBJECT
President’s Decision on Recommendations of PRC Meeting on Southern Africa, April 12, 1979 (C)

The President has approved recommendations on Rhodesia and on Angola (where a division of opinion was reported), as follows:

Rhodesia: That we maintain our present policy on internationally supervised elections, but in a less active, low profile manner. (S)

Angola: That we delay further consideration of recognition of Angola until there appears to be likelihood of a more positive response from the Angolans, and a less negative response from the Hill. (S)

Regarding Angola, the President added this note: “We’ll wait to decide after Case-Javits determination.” (S)

David Aaron

---


2 See Document 230.

3 In an April 12 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski summarized the conclusions of the PRC meeting and suggested Carter approve the recommendations on Rhodesia and Angola. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 1–4/79)
232. Message From British Prime Minister Callaghan to President Carter

Washington, April 21, 1979, 0342Z

WH91026. Deliver at opening of business eyes only. The following is a retransmittal of a Cabinet Office Line message previously received at the White House.

Following for President Carter from Prime Minister.

Dear Jimmy

Like us, you and Cy Vance will be closely watching the progress of the election now taking place in Rhodesia. It is bound to provoke a lot of public debate in both Britain and America, and I look forward to sharing with you our assessments of the outcome. In any event I am sure that we can expect strong and conflicting pressures from various quarters either to dismiss the result out of hand as of no significance; or to go straight for recognition of the new regime and the lifting of sanctions. I am equally sure that we ought to resist these pressures. The Anglo-American commitment to a comprehensive solution, through a ceasefire and internationally-supervised elections, will still make sense whatever happens inside Rhodesia this week.

But the immediate aftermath of the Rhodesian election may give us a fresh opportunity to show that our commitment is still relevant. We may also need to move quickly to influence both sides in the war in favour of peaceful solutions before there is a further hardening of attitudes. Public opinion will in any case be looking to us for a lead.

My own commitment to preside at a negotiation between the parties, which was the basis of Cledwyn Hughes and Steve Low’s mission to Africa last year, still stands. But such a meeting would have to be carefully prepared, and I believe it would be a mistake now, as it would have been then, simply to announce that I propose to call the parties together.

What I do have in mind, however, is to announce that I have decided to ask Cledwyn Hughes to be ready to return to Africa after our election and to advise me whether circumstances have changed since his last visit in such a way as to enable a negotiation to start. As to the timing of such an announcement, in normal circumstances I

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 20, United Kingdom: Prime Minister James Callaghan, 10/78–8/80. Confidential; Eyes Only. Callaghan’s message was originally transmitted via the Cabinet Office Channel, which was a direct line between Carter and Number 10 Downing Street.

should prefer not to make any comment until the full result of the Rhodesian election is announced on or around 30 April. But the Rhodesians are already beginning to leak forecasts of the turnout, and this will increase the pressures on both of us to respond sooner—perhaps as early as this weekend. I therefore believe that instead of commenting formally on the final election result when it is announced, which would in itself confer some status on the election, it would be better to make our position clear now. I realise that you have to make a Presidential Determination, but I gather this is unlikely to come before the end of May and, hopefully, we may be able to start the process of negotiation before then.

In saying that I proposed to ask Cledwyn to resume his mission, I should naturally like to say also that I had been in touch with you before taking my decision; that Cledwyn would (as before) be accompanied by Steve Low; and that Cy Vance would be ready to attend a meeting under my chairmanship if they reported positively. But I appreciate that this may pose difficulties for you when we are in the midst of our own election campaign, and I would therefore welcome your views on how far, if at all, I might go in this direction when I make my statement. I enclose a draft of the sort of statement which I am thinking of making.\(^3\)

With warm regards

Jim Callaghan

---

\(^3\) Enclosed but not printed.
233. Message From President Carter to British Prime Minister Callaghan

Washington, April 21, 1979, 2236Z

WH 91031. Please deliver at earliest opportunity on Sunday, April 22, 1979.

Dear Jim:
I appreciate and share your assessment of the difficult situation and conflicting pressures we are likely to face in the immediate aftermath of the elections now taking place in Rhodesia. I also agree that the situation created by the elections may present a new opportunity to test the prospects for a settlement based on the Anglo-American commitment to a comprehensive solution through a cease fire and internationally supervised elections.

However, in order not to suggest that I have made up my mind in advance on the Case-Javits determination, I would prefer that your reference to our joint effort be along the following lines:

“I have been in close contact with President Carter, who has worked closely with us on this matter in the past and will continue in the search for a just and viable settlement.”

I do not rule out sending an American representative on such a mission, but prefer that we not say so at this time.

I look forward to being in touch with you in the next few weeks to consult on the situation in Rhodesia and on the timing of any new initiative.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 20, United Kingdom: Prime Minister James Callaghan, 10/78–8/80. Confidential.
2 See Document 232.
234. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, May 16, 1979, 2158Z

124702. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary’s Reply to Message from Muzorewa.

1. Confidential (Entire text)

2. The following is Secretary Vance’s reply on behalf of President Carter to Bishop Muzorewa’s message of May 10. It should be delivered to Rhodesian rep as soon as possible. Department does not plan to publish text but will confirm that a response has been sent.

3. Begin text: Dear Bishop Muzorewa:

Your message of May 10 has been forwarded to President Carter, who has asked me to reply on his behalf. The President and I, too, have watched with concern and dismay the tragic conflict in your country. The violence not only has brought untold suffering to the people of Rhodesia and its neighbors, but also poses a threat to the security and stability of the entire region.

While we remain ready to continue our role as a mediator with absolute neutrality among the parties to the conflict, we must all recognize that it is the parties themselves who ultimately hold in their hands the decisions that will determine whether Rhodesia’s future will be one of peace and harmony, or will be filled with further violence and bloodshed.

As you are aware, President Carter is obliged by U.S. law to make a determination on the commitment of the Rhodesian administration to good faith negotiations and on the nature and conduct of the recent Rhodesian elections. He has pledged to do so faithfully no later than two weeks after the new administration is installed, based on his personal assessment of all the information available to him. I would stress that we remain convinced of the continuing need for a process that can lead to a broader agreement among the parties and an end to the

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790222-0436. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Eugene D. Schmiel (AF/S) and George R. Moose (AF/S); cleared by R. Moose, Jackson, Lake, Wisner, and Funk; approved by Vance.

2 In telegram 1116 from Cape Town, May 10, the Embassy transmitted a message to Carter in which Muzorewa requested the immediate removal of sanctions and recognition of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Government. Muzorewa said that further delay would only increase the death toll in the ongoing war. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172-1469)

3 Reference is to the Case-Javits Amendment.
war. I am convinced that this is what the people of Rhodesia most earnestly desire and most urgently deserve.

In the days and weeks ahead, my government will be giving renewed thought and attention to how we can help to make that shared goal a reality. I hope and trust that you and other members of the new administration in Salisbury will urgently do the same, and that it will be possible for us to continue our communication with you as part of our dialogue with all of the parties. Sincerely, Cyrus Vance. End text.

Vance

235. Draft Memorandum of Conversation

London, May 21, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Ambassador Brewster
Anthony Lake
George Vest
Richard Moose
Hodding Carter

UK
Lord Carrington
Sir Ian Gilmour
Ambassador Jay
Richard Hull
Sir Michael Palliser
Sir Antony Duff
Derek Day
Michael Yarnold
Hamilton Whyte
Stephen Wall

SUBJECT
Rhodesia

Lord Carrington introduced Rhodesia by pointing out that the Tory government’s attitude is different from its predecessors. British governments had long held to the Six Principles which must be met if Rhodesia is to return to legality. The remaining test is the one of acceptability to the Rhodesian people as a whole, he said, and the breakthrough here began with the Kissinger initiative in 1976. The

---

elections in April ended this process, and Lord Boyd’s report to the Prime Minister concluded that the elections were as free and fair as possible under the circumstances. The report also stated that the new constitution was enveloped in the elections and the vote signaled acceptance of this new arrangement.

At the same time, Lord Carrington went on, there are obvious international implications in deciding how to proceed with the question. Relations with the Commonwealth and other African states, with the EC and with the US could be affected. Nevertheless, the Tory government feels duty bound to return Rhodesia to legality, to remove sanctions, and to gain international acceptability. This sentiment represents the man-in-the-street opinion in Britain and is not confined to the Conservative Party. In any event, it is impossible to foresee a renewal of sanctions by the House of Commons in November.

Sir Antony Duff gave his impressions of his recent visit to Salisbury. The mood there remains reasonably confident, he said. The black Prime Minister might form his government quickly, perhaps before the end of the month, with Smith included as minister without portfolio. Still, the government clearly needs advice on how to move forward in order to make themselves more acceptable internally and externally. Muzorewa is aware of this, although it is too early to suggest amendments to the constitution. But Muzorewa has sent conciliatory letters to the Front Line and may do the same to both wings of the Patriotic Front. He has reaffirmed the offer of amnesty to the guerillas and sent teams to more moderate African capitals.

Duff continued that the Bishop wants help in gaining international acceptance. Although he has not given much thought to negotiations with the Patriotic Front, there has been some contact with ZANU. Muzorewa is primarily concentrating on being Prime Minister, forming his government, and looking beyond the PF to OAU opinion.

Carrington said that the British government feels it must be seen to be moving forward. Duff was dispatched to Salisbury for that reason and another senior official will begin longer visits there shortly, gradually easing himself into a semi-permanent presence. This representation is important in order to push the Bishop in the right direction. Carrington continued that the British will also begin consultations with the Front Line and Commonwealth colleagues. This mission will not be undertaken by a minister, because it is only tentative. But the British

2 In telegram 9856 from London, May 18, the Embassy transmitted the “conclusions” from the 200-page Boyd report. The report noted: “neither Patriotic Front party proffered candidates for election. Despite this we think that the result represented the wish of the majority of the electorate of the country however calculated.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790226-0719)
intend to send a special emissary to the Front Line before the end of the month, and then possibly on to Nigeria. This emissary would have two objectives:

(a) To put forward the proposition that the situation in Rhodesia has altered significantly and the drift is in that direction; it is important that African leaders gradually accustom themselves to the inevitable;

(b) To receive whatever ideas these African leaders may have on how best to push the Bishop towards a political/constitutional position which would enhance his international acceptability. Carrington concluded with the hope that the UK and the US can remain in stride on this issue. He noted that our respective governments are responding to different rules. It is more important for the British, he said, to return Rhodesia to legality rather than to lift sanctions, whereas the sanctions issue is more important in the US.

The Secretary assured Carrington that Washington appreciated the new reality in Rhodesia. The President has not yet made his decision over the Case/Javits amendment. Time is running out, however, because we are committed to making a finding within two weeks after the new government in Salisbury is installed. At the moment we are wrestling with various options, and the British position is much in mind. The Secretary stressed that we too want to keep in step. Nevertheless, he went on, if we lift sanctions now we would be seen as lining up with South Africa against black Africa, and this in turn would present the Soviets with increased advantage.

The Secretary explained that we are now examining a solution along the lines of a conditional acceptance of the results of the April elections, e.g., sanctions will be lifted if certain things take place. No decision has yet been made on this but as examples of conditions we might like, the Secretary mentioned:

(a) Revision of the constitution;

(b) Progress towards some form of an all-parties meeting, but without allowing the PF to have a veto; and

(c) An election after such a meeting and under some form of international supervision; simultaneously, the amended constitution would be ratified in a referendum. This is only one of the options, the Secretary said, and these conditions are not meant to be definitive.

Mr. Lake added that we of course would not stand in the way if the parties themselves agreed on some other formula. Mr. Moose stressed that it is important to keep in mind the problems which face the Front Line Presidents. Their problem is a practical one as well as an emotional issue on one of principle. They need a credible alternative to a continued war. The Front Line will need something from us in order to be in position to pressure the PF to reconsider its own position.
Reasonable change in Salisbury would make this easier for the Front Line.

The Secretary then briefly described the Congressional picture. In the Senate, he said, there is a clear majority in favor of lifting sanctions now. He estimated the measure would carry by a 5–10 vote majority. The situation in the House is quite different. Congressman Solarz is convinced that the strategic dangers in South Africa are great. Solarz recently completed hearings which aired the idea of a conditional acceptance. He could probably block a move to lift sanctions at the committee stage. Although the attitude of the House as a whole is more difficult to predict, even observers such as Freedom House and Bayard Rustin did not recommend that sanctions should be lifted now. Whatever its outcome, this debate would be a divisive political battle in the US.

Lord Carrington responded that there was little likelihood Salisbury would find the three conditions which the Secretary had enumerated attractive. He said it is in Muzorewa’s interest to preserve the present constitution in order to maintain the confidence of the whites. He said the idea of an all-parties meeting is so well worn that it would likely be received with a “horse laugh.” Carrington would find more interesting the possibility of conducting a test of acceptability on the constitution as it now stands.

Duff echoed Moose’s earlier remarks that the Front Line will need something at least to help them save face. But this would take time. He suggested that perhaps the President could make his acceptance conditional but without specifying the conditions. This formula would give more time to develop ideas with the Front Line and prepare the ground before November. Otherwise the Front Line and others would likely reject the conditions as well. Mr. Lake suggested as a possibility that amendments to the constitution could perhaps lessen the white grip on the political structure but safeguard and even strengthen the protection of minority rights, including social and economic rights. The white-chaired commissions were particularly objectionable.

Carrington gave his opinion that the PF would not accept the basis of an all-parties meeting if it were only intended to tinker with the present constitution. They would want something more fundamental than that. Mr. Luce suggested that both the US and the UK held a common objective and should therefore work to a common time scale. The sudden imposition of conditions would be too fast. At this point,

---

3 On May 15, by a 75–19 vote, the Senate called on (but did not require) Carter to lift sanctions within 14 days of the formation of a black-majority government. (Congress and the Nation, vol. 5, 1977–1980, p. 77)
Lord Carrington suggested that officials of both sides meet separately to discuss these issues further while the main meeting continued on to other subjects.

Luce, Duff, Day, Moose and Lake returned to the session one hour later. Mr. Lake reviewed what had been discussed. He said the British planned to send a high-level political emissary to the Front Line but had proposed that someone else, possibly Amb. Easum, might brief the Nigerians separately. He said we appeared to have two common goals: building on the Salisbury arrangement and conceiving a policy which might bring peace and international acceptability. Lake said the separate group had discussed a possible new option. If the Presidential determination were negative, we could state that the question of sanctions would be kept under close review without, however, specifying precise conditions which must be met. This would give Salisbury, with our help, the opportunity to reach accommodations with opposition elements both inside and outside Rhodesia. The President might offer a general formula, emphasizing democratic principles, human rights, and the removal of racial discrimination. Our two governments could be more precise on background.

Lake noted that such a general formula would help us diplomatically and aid the British in exploring various avenues, but might not help us as much in explaining our policy domestically because of its vagueness. The Secretary expressed some misgivings that this policy would not be sufficiently clear for the administration to defend on the Hill.

The Secretary and Lord Carrington agreed to resume talks on Rhodesia and to discuss Namibia on Wednesday, May 23.4

---

4 See Document 235.
236. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House

London, May 24, 1979, 0129Z

Secto 4025. Department for Christopher only. White House to Dr. Brzezinski for the President. Subject: Meeting With PM Thatcher.

1. Secretary Vance met for an hour with PM at No. 10; also present were Foreign Secretary Carrington; Lord Privy Seal and House of Commons Foreign Affairs Spokesman Sir Ian Gilmour; Brian Cartledge, P.M.’s Private Secretary for International Affairs, and U.S. Ambassador Brewster.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Rhodesia.]

15. Discussion then turned to Rhodesia. Mrs. Thatcher indicated she was not at all happy about going to Lusaka for Heads of Commonwealth Governments Meeting. Secretary reported on Ambassador Spain’s conversation with Nyerere. While bitterly opposed to recognition, Julius Nyerere admitted new reality in sense that “after all the chap does have a government.” At same time insists on changes in constitution. Peter Carrington then reported on morning deputation of Commonwealth High Commissioners. They rejected election as a fraud, constitution a sham. Carrington reported that he urged Commissioners to take up the constitutional defects with Muzorewa. Obviously Carrington hopes to bring this about by way of de facto recognition as well as feeling that Commonwealth appeal would be better received than UK pressure. Carrington then indicated that Richard Luce would tonight leave for Lusaka and Namibia. Someone would be sent as an FCO representative to spend virtually all his time in Salisbury as a source of information and point of contact. Emissary would be sent to try to convince Nigerians and Front Line Presidents that it was worth trying to negotiate with the Bishop. He hoped David Harlech would be persuaded to take this on. This mission would also be likely to include touching base with Nkomo and Mugabe. Secretary said Harlech would be excellent.

16. Mrs. Thatcher interposed the emphasis that some forward movement was essential otherwise positions would freeze. Absolutely essential to move toward a regime which we all could recognize.

17. The interesting thing about this conversation was desire for movement tempered by caution. No lecturing or hectoring. No blame directed toward predecessors or Anglo-American Proposal, David

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840171–0149. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.
Owen or Andy Young. All-in-all fairly convincing that the PM does not wish to rush in where predecessors have feared to tread. At same time, she is not likely to be patient with infinite procrastination.

18. Session ended. All cordial and Mrs. Thatcher obviously had great respect for Secretary and seemed unusually relaxed and forthcoming. At same time, it is clear she somewhat scares her sophisticated Ministers. All-in-all not at all a basis for optimism on substance of Southern Africa, but quite reassuring on grounds that we are dealing with a rational and cooperative government at the top as well as down the line.

Vance

---

237. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, June 1, 1979

SUBJECT
Case-Javits Determination Options (S)

The attached material from State sets forth the two negative options which Cy discussed with the British last week.2 (A positive determination statement has also been prepared as a contingency, but is not included in this package.) (S)

A brief description of the two negative options are at Tabs A and B.3 (U)

Option A. The “commitment to lift sanctions if Salisbury makes certain improvements” is essentially the “conditional acceptance” option you looked at with interest last week. It sets forth some fairly specific conditions which would have to be substantially met before sanctions could be lifted,—including constitutional improvements, a referendum, and some form of new elections, unless all parties arrived at an entirely different solution. (S)

Option B. The “negative determination with commitment to keep sanctions issue under review” is the “conditional rejection” option

---

2 See Documents 235 and 236.
3 Tab B is attached but not printed.
presented last week. It differs from Option A in that the conditions it sets forth are very general in nature. (S)

Our objectives should include the following: (S)

— to preserve our good will with the several African states and the Third World.

— to maintain a neutral stance that will allow us to influence movement toward a viable solution.

— to provide a strong leadership on the Hill which could prevent the lifting of sanctions by the House.

— to force the U.K. to “get out front” on the sanctions issue and to the extent possible, put some distance between ourselves and the U.K. without an open break.

— to be seen to be making a considered judgment which is consistent with the terms of Case-Javits, and at the same time is just and reasonable.

— to demonstrate a recognition of changing circumstances which could form the basis for a viable settlement, and to show a willingness to be flexible in helping to achieve such a settlement. (S)

While both options would further these objectives, it would appear that Option A (with more precise conditions) would be more effective in furthering all objectives except the last—as it would be seen as less flexible than Option B. That in good measure is its strength in that it forces the British out in front, requires the Congress to ignore the call for UN-sponsored elections and a more equitable constitution. It also means that should the Congress overrule us, we at least will have had the “right” position. (S)

Option B is apparently preferred by the British as it fits more readily with their present strategy of waffling until we go first. (S)

Reporting. Both State options say that you will report to Congress after six months. I think it preferable that you say that you will direct the Secretary to report on a regular basis, say monthly. This could help to prevent a psychological build-up to a “new Case-Javits determination” next December. 4 (S)

Timing. The scenario presented at Tab C is important, and includes a thorough briefing schedule for people on the Hill. We should also consider a special early briefing for the Black Caucus, 5 and perhaps follow-up briefings for select non-governmental organizations who should be helpful in supporting your determination on the Hill. (S)

4 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Monthly better.”

5 Tab C is attached but not printed. Carter underlined “a special early briefing for the Black Caucus,” and wrote “no” in the left-hand margin.
(We have some reason to hope that the AFL–CIO will reaffirm their pro-sanctions position on about June 6, and this support could be critical.)

At any rate, I feel you should prepare to make your announcement as early as possible, perhaps on Thursday, June 7, and no later than Monday, June 11.

I suggest that we have a final decision and a strategy meeting on Tuesday, June 5, with Cy, Andy and the Vice President.

Draft Statement. At Tab D is a draft negative determination statement prepared by State. The “excerpts” to each option (under Tabs A and B) would be inserted for pages 10–12 of this draft, as applicable.

RECOMMENDATION

That we establish a schedule of action consistent with the scenario attached, with a Thursday, June 7, announcement date, and that pending final decisions and modifications growing out of our meeting on Tuesday, June 5, we begin to work on final drafts of your determination and background briefing, consistent with the “conditional acceptance” option, (defined conditions) at Tab A.

---

6 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Push this quietly.”

7 Carter placed a question mark in the left-hand margin. Carter made the announcement of a negative determination on June 7. For text of the announcement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 1012–1014. Vance explained the decision in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 12. For text of his statement see Department of State Bulletin, August 1979, pp. 26–29.

8 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “ok.”

9 There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Beneath the recommendation Carter wrote: “Bristish status—history

“No goverment (except S.A.?) recognized

“Case-Javits amendment

“Assessed carefully

“Determination

“4% of population is white

“Muzorewa, etc. chosen by Smith

“Even whites, only 40% approved up or down vote

“Constitution written, approved by 4%

“no broad referendum

“Cannot be amended to provide equality unless overcome veto by 4%

“Parliamentary vote—white=7 blacks

“White 4% will continue to control police, military, civil service, judiciary

“Elections—75,000 soldiers deployed—peaceful almost 2/3 voted

“Informal political parties affiliated with opposition were banned and prohibited by gov’t from expressing opposition to the elections—not permitted to hold rallies or meetings or to advertise in Rhodesian newspapers.” An unknown hand wrote “Blame on both sides” next to this handwritten point and drew an arrow pointing to it. An unknown hand wrote “NO” next to “Muzorewa etc. chosen by Smith” and “Even whites, only 40% approved up or down vote.”
COMMITMENT TO LIFT SANCTIONS IF SALISBURY MAKES CERTAIN IMPROVEMENTS

Description

Having reached a negative determination on the basis of certain major flaws in Salisbury’s arrangements, we could suggest ways those flaws might be corrected that would warrant a lifting of sanctions. These could include (a) improvement in the Salisbury constitution to allow true majority rule while protecting the rights of the minority; (b) a popular referendum under impartial supervision on the improved constitution; and [(c) at the same time as the referendum, new elections open to all parties.] However, we would make clear our willingness to lift sanctions if all the parties, internal and external, agreed on an entirely different solution.11

Analysis

Constitutional improvements. The Presidential announcement would describe generally the improvements we would seek. In press backgrinders and testimony we would provide greater detail, citing:

—More equitable white/black representation in parliament and elimination of the white blocking vote on most constitutional changes and major legislation;
—Elimination of white control over the police, military, civil service, judiciary and other commissions;
—Provisions to ensure expeditious removal of de jure and de facto discrimination;
—As alternative assurances for whites, specially entrenched protections of individual rights, including property and pensions.

These improvements would eliminate a major criticism of the internal settlement.12 They might also be acceptable to many in Congress as a justification for maintaining sanctions as a lever. However, it is likely that Muzorewa would have to reject a call for explicit constitu-

10 Secret. Brackets are in the original.
11 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Specifics exceed Case-Javits.”
12 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “May be better to describe these defects vs advocating solutions.”
tional changes. Constitutional changes alone would not necessarily improve the de facto conditions of Rhodesian blacks and would not offer a basis for settlement of the fighting. Were we to make this our sole criterion for lifting sanctions, we could expect strong African criticism. Some of our European allies would also be concerned that failure to pursue a solution to the war would exacerbate tensions generally between the West and the Third World. The British now seem more aware of the need to deal with international implications of the war. This will be reinforced in their consultations with other governments.

Elections. By including impartial elections open to all parties among our objectives, we are far more likely to gain African and international support. We could make clear that if fair and impartial elections were held, we would lift sanctions even if the Patriotic Front refused to participate.

This approach would find support among those in Congress who believe the Administration must seek to maintain sanctions to broaden and improve the internal settlement, and must set forth specific conditions under which sanctions would be lifted. However, Congressional opponents would regard new elections as an unreasonable and impracticable goal. The British believe they would be rejected immediately by Muzorewa. Unless we could convince the British to support elections and pursue that objective actively, then our position on the Hill would be further weakened.

In short, including elections would make our position more attractive to the Africans and provide a fair basis for a settlement. This is important to our credibility in Africa, even if the will to settle remains lacking among the parties. But elections are likely to be rejected by Muzorewa, many in the Congress, and the British.

Referendum. If new elections are not sought, our principal objective could be an impartially-(probably UK-) supervised referendum on an improved constitution. To allow a true test of opinion, we should insist that the ban on internal ZANU and ZAPU and other opposition parties should be lifted. This approach might be more readily accepted by the British and might help mitigate African and liberal domestic criticism of our abandoning elections. It would nevertheless encounter resistance from Salisbury and its Congressional sympathizers.
238. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State

London, June 27, 1979, 2018Z

12590. Dept also pass to Tokyo for the Secretary. USUN Eyes Only for Ambassador Young. Subject: Rhodesia: Moose/Lake Meeting With Duff/Day.

Summary: Moose and Lake met with Duff and Day following their session with Harlech (septel). While Harlech had presented the conclusions of his trip, he did not draw any policy conclusions. Duff was prepared to go further, although he underscored that much of the FCO thinking remains tentative and the round of consultations will not end until the Commonwealth Conference in August.

Duff said the FCO had now identified three “essential ingredients” for a new initiative: a) as the legal authority Britain must offer a solution; b) the constitution must be improved in several important respects; c) there must be a genuine effort to accommodate all the parties. Harlech will go to Salisbury July 2 to begin the next round of consultations. He will stress to the Bishop that a) he must demonstrate he is in control of the government and able to improve the African lot; b) that improvements in the constitution are necessary; c) lifting sanctions will not solve his fundamental problems. In addition, they will suggest that Smith is an impediment. The British hope we will make the same points to Muzorewa in Washington and add the belief that he must work closely with the British to find a solution.

It is apparent that the British still intend to lift sanctions in November. But they hope to retain leverage with Muzorewa by arguing that this will not resolve his problems.

It is not clear how and when a British initiative will unfold. Constitutional proposals will likely form the centerpiece of their initiative in the hope that if this can be agreed, a subsequent, wider, political process of accommodation will flow from it. They accept the point that having a fair proposal on the table would allow the Frontline to press the PF and strengthen our position vis-a-vis the Frontline.

Duff noted privately that British policy is evolving in useful directions—i.e., towards recognition of the need for efforts at accommoda-

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Europe, Box 26, 6/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Pretoria, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Maputo, Gaborone, Lagos, and USUN. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 In telegram 12589 from London, June 27, the Embassy reported on the session with Harlech. (Ibid.)
tion among the parties as well as progress in Salisbury. We noted the evolution in U.S. policy which also tends to bring us closer together.

The conversations were encouraging. The British, or at least the FCO, are clearly working towards more than simply trying to make Salisbury barely acceptable. They are prepared to launch their own initiative, they are open regarding our own role in the process. It is thus clear that we will have no problem “keeping the British out front”, and, to mix the metaphor, also staying in step in the coming few weeks. They want our immediate support with Muzorewa and the Africans, and in view of their current position, we believe we should give it.

Down the road, of course, we may well run into differences on what would constitute a fair proposal for a political accommodation. But the trend is encouraging. End summary.

1. Moose and Lake met with Tony Duff, Derek Day, Robin Renwick, and Peter Barlow June 27. Day led off with his impressions of Rhodesia following his three-week visit to Salisbury. Overall, he found a widespread and genuine desire to finish the war and return Rhodesia to normalcy. The whites are frustrated by the consistent demands of the security forces and the bleakness of the economic picture; the blacks suffer from growing intimidation and harassment, general disruption of their lives, and receding employment prospects. Day believes that all are willing to pay a price for a settlement. Their idee fixe, however, is that the lifting of sanctions and recognition by the US and UK will bring this return to normalcy. Day said he had not made much headway in efforts to explain that the situation is more complicated than that. The mere lifting of sanctions would not result in a deescalation of the fighting.

2. Day said the Muzorewa government is becoming “a government of national disunity.” The Bishop is encountering growing political opposition as the parliamentary parties continue to fragment. Still, the whites see the leadership alternatives to Muzorewa as worse and they want to reinforce the Bishop’s position. There is declining interest in Nkomo.

3. Beyond these immediate political problems there is growing African skepticism about what Muzorewa can deliver. So far there has been no winding down of the war and no visible improvements in the African lot. The Bishop said nothing in his Presidential address.

4. Day said that the heavy hand of the whites is still pervasive in Salisbury. Little has changed in governmental operations. The whole burden of advice going to the Bishop flows through the same efficient machinery. The bureaucracy in Salisbury lacks the political sensitivity that normally would be expected from a new government. Muzorewa is sensitive to this white presence, and while Day believes that hardly
anyone regards the constitution as inviolate, the Bishop fears major changes could provoke a white exodus.

5. Renwick then took up the conversation. He described the South African attitude as expressed by Fourie as accepting that neither the U.S. nor the UK will lift sanctions in the immediate future. They also know that Smith must go and assume there may be some leeway for negotiated change. Renwick said Richard Luce has now touched base with a number of African moderates who are impressed by Muzorewa’s achievement and unimpressed with the Patriotic Front and their inadequacies. None of these moderates, however, feel the Salisbury arrangement provides a sufficient basis for a solution. They, too, believe Smith must go and the constitution must be changed.

6. Lake said that our policies and continuing congressional consultations will require that we define in the coming period what we mean by “progress”, e.g. what changes can be generated from inside Rhodesia and what efforts can be mounted there to reach an accommodation with the other parties. Duff answered that while Britain has not yet set a firm course, the results of the Harlech and Day missions have clarified the initial ingredients of a new policy. These are: (a) The UK as the legal authority must be involved in the solution; Muzorewa, while an important new factor, cannot provide a solution on his own; (b) There must be some improvements in the constitution, e.g. the number of white seats, the veto power, the white dominated commissions; and (c) There must be an attempt to find agreement among all the parties. Lake said the key on the constitution is whether it is explicitly based on the Salisbury version or whether it is presented as something new. Duff said that the British are examining the option of putting forward a constitution as the centerpiece of its initiative. By incorporating initial changes, the document would be consistent with the draft constitution of the AAP but nonetheless appear as a version of the present Salisbury constitution. Questioned about ways of bringing the parties together and the difficult but important issue of how to offer the Patriotic Front a fair process of political accommodation, Duff said he personally believes we should focus on the constitution and only subsequently tackle the problem of the political process that would flow from it, including the possibility of new elections. We emphasized the importance both of a fair proposal and of giving no one a veto over a fair political process.

7. The British are still undecided how and when to begin the new initiative. Day will return to Salisbury on July 1 followed by Harlech the next day. Harlech will press Muzorewa to demonstrate that he is indeed in charge of the new government and that the situation of the blacks is improving. Without being specific, he will also press for Muzorewa to recognize there must be changes in the constitution. The
FCO will share his brief with us and let us know the results of these explorations and suggest similar points we might make to Muzorewa when the Bishop arrives in Washington. They believe it is important we specifically stress to Muzorewa that (a) the lifting of sanctions will not help him gain wide international recognition or end the war; (b) he must consider important constitutional changes as well as make a serious attempt to accommodate the Patriotic Front; and (c) we must all work together, especially the Bishop with the British. When Muzorewa comes to London after Washington, Mrs. Thatcher intends to make the same points. We promised to report on our talks with Muzorewa and to suggest particular points the British might wish to pursue with him in London.

8. As this effort with Muzorewa unfolds, the British simultaneously plan to inform the Frontline and African moderates of the general conclusions of Lord Harlech’s mission. They will stress their belief that extreme resolutions at the OAU Conference would only further complicate the Rhodesia problem. The British hope that we might make the same point in our contacts in Africa.

9. For the moment, Duff said, they view the Commonwealth Conference in effect as the conclusion of this initial phase of consultations, although there is an argument to be made for outlining the new policy at the conference. He said that Harlech found little enthusiasm for the idea of a Commonwealth Contact Group on Rhodesia, largely because it would be viewed as a British device for shunting its responsibility. At this stage, Duff does not foresee either an all parties conference or a shuttle. Neither is ruled out for later but both involve a process that runs the danger of bogging down. He initially argued that the Frontline should not be deeply involved in whatever process unfolds, but then agreed with our point that they are the key to PF performance.

10. While Lord Harlech may come to Washington in mid-July, the British now have in mind that the key US–UK consultations about both policies and diplomatic process should take place soon after the Commonwealth Conference, perhaps during the second week in August.

Brewster
239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Brazil

Washington, July 17, 1979, 1625Z


Quote: State 178632. Subject: Rhodesia: Secretary's Meeting With Muzorewa.

1. Summary. Secretary Vance met with Bishop Abel Muzorewa alone today for approximately one and a half hours. The Secretary made all the points set forth in the messages to the President from Prime Minister Thatcher as well as those conveyed in Ambassador Brewster’s conversation with Ian Gilmour. It was agreed that discussion of the need for constitutional changes would be continued tomorrow at Muzorewa’s meeting with the President and the Secretary. The Secretary found it significant that Muzorewa concentrated on the question of recognition and at no point mentioned sanctions as such. Secretary Vance found Muzorewa more self-confident than at his last meeting with him. While not negative, Muzorewa was essentially non-responsive to the Secretary’s main points. End summary.

2. Secretary Vance opened the conversation by asking Bishop Muzorewa’s view of the current situation in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia (Z-R). Muzorewa acknowledged that he was having a hard time and that the answer to his problems depends upon what the UK and US will do. If these governments support him he would be accepted by a large

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790323–0403. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Gerald J. Whitman (ARA/ECA); cleared by Richard V. Fisher (S/S); approved by Madison M. Adams, Jr. (ARA/ECA).

2 July 11. In telegram 178815 to multiple posts, July 11, the Department announced the recall of telegram 178632 to change handling to Exdis and the destruction of all copies. Addressees were informed that the report was shared with the British Embassy in Washington on July 11. The telegram was re-sent with the correction. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790314–0664)

3 None found.

4 In telegram 13282 from London, July 9, the Embassy reported on the conversation: “Gilmour said the Prime Minister had just answered the President saying she would like us to concentrate on building Muzorewa’s confidence. He suggested we make clear to the Bishop that we and the British are still working closely and that he must show he is an effective leader of his new government. Moreover, we should let the Bishop know that the British genuinely want to work with him to find a solution. Gilmour also thinks it important that Muzorewa be disabused of his illusions, particularly that if Britain recognizes Salisbury most of the world will follow suit.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0634)

5 See Document 240.
number of other states and a momentum would build to his benefit. If the UK and US do not support him, it will be difficult for him to survive. The war was not going well and the Patriotic Front are prepared to fight on.

3. Secretary Vance told the Bishop that the British Government is faced with the decision whether to recognize the Government of Z-R. This question is up to them. The British have recognized the progress which has been made, are prepared to work with Muzorewa and wish to ensure the widest possible acceptance of Z-R. It is critical that Muzorewa be prepared to engage in this process.

4. In order to find a solution to the Rhodesia problem there would need to be changes in the constitution such as elimination of the white blocking power, greater black representation in the public services and defense forces, together with a genuine attempt to achieve a wider agreement permitting an end to the war.

5. Secretary Vance recalled that Muzorewa had previously told him that the present constitution was not one which he had wanted to sign. Muzorewa had said at the time that he had to take what Smith had offered or break with Smith and go his own way. Muzorewa had said that he did not like the 28 white seats and that he wished that they were not there. In view of this, the Secretary asked why it was not now possible for Muzorewa to undertake changes. Muzorewa responded that if he were to go back on provisions such as the 28 white seats he would be accused of breaking his word to the whites. This would be difficult for him politically and would make it impossible for him to hold the whites in the country, and that he needed them.

6. Secretary Vance said that he understood that problem, but suppose the British said that in order to achieve legal independence the constitution would have to be changed to remove the blocking powers and to do away with various entrenched clauses. Muzorewa could then say to the whites that these changes must be made in order to achieve legality. Muzorewa responded, thoughtfully, “I take your point.” The Secretary said that the President would want to talk about what Muzorewa was prepared to do. It was agreed that this would be discussed further tomorrow.

7. Shifting the focus, the Secretary asked why the Bishop should not jump at the chance to increase greatly the number of black Rhodesians in the armed services, police and civil service. Muzorewa responded that he obviously would like to do so, but that he did not have enough qualified people available. For example, Muzorewa had found his own office staffed by five white persons. All but one, George Smith, have now been replaced by his own people. Smith, however, was a competent person and he was glad to have him (George Smith is accompanying the Muzorewa party).
8. Muzorewa noted that the army is already 82 percent black. But the Secretary commented that the officers are almost entirely white. Muzorewa said that he could not replace the white officers, for example, who could take General Walls’ place? The Secretary responded that the real problem was that Muzorewa did not have the power to replace an official such as Walls: the whites could block such a change. Muzorewa responded that the Secretary did not understand the constitution, that it did not prevent him from making such changes. (Note: According to our reading of the constitution Muzorewa is absolutely wrong on this point and the Secretary may take this point up with him tomorrow.)

9. Secretary Vance asked Muzorewa why he did not get rid of Smith. Muzorewa argued that he needed Smith to hold the whites. Asked under what circumstances Smith could go, Muzorewa’s response was that Smith would go in exchange for recognition. The Secretary asked how Muzorewa could be sure; Did he trust Smith? Muzorewa believed that he could trust Smith but that Smith would not leave in return for the prospect of future recognition. Secretary Vance expressed doubt that Smith could be trusted and pointed out that until Smith is gotten rid of Z–R’s neighbors will never accept the new government.

10. Pursuing the question of neighboring parties, the Secretary asked Muzorewa about Nkomo and Mugabe. Muzorewa said that he had written to both but had received no reply. The Secretary asked whether Muzorewa would be prepared to invite them to a meeting. Muzorewa seemed willing to consider this but the subject was not pursued and there was no discussion of what Nkomo and Mugabe might be invited to discuss.

11. Muzorewa said that he had written the Front Line Presidents but that they would not talk to him; his only contact had been an indirect one with President Nyerere. The Secretary expressed the belief that Nyerere would be prepared to accept a new government in Z–R if the constitution were amended, if Smith were gone and if Muzorewa were to make a genuine effort to reach agreement with the Patriotic Front. Nyerere would not allow the Patriotic Front to play a blocking role. If the Patriotic Front were to refuse a genuine offer this would not inhibit Nyerere from making his own decision. The Secretary on the other hand doubted that President Samora Machel, was prepared at this time to have anything to do with Z–R authorities. Continuing, he felt that Kaunda’s attitude would depend on Nkomo and that Neto had too many problems of his own, particularly with Namibia, to be interested in Rhodesia.

12. At one point the Secretary asked Muzorewa about Chikerema and Sithole. Muzorewa replied, “Chikerema is feathering his own nest and you know about Sithole.”
13. The Secretary asked Muzorewa what he expected out of the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. In Muzorewa’s view that will depend upon what the UK and US do or don’t do. The Secretary expressed belief that the Commonwealth would recognize the realities of the new situation provided Muzorewa was prepared to move. Otherwise, he said, the outcome will be bad from Muzorewa’s point of view.

Vance

Unquote

Vance

240. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, July 12, 1979, 0030Z

179368. Subject: Rhodesia: Bishop Muzorewa’s Meeting With President Carter.

1. Summary. President Carter met today (July 12) with Bishop Muzorewa at Camp David. Secretary Vance was the only other person present for the substantive discussion. The President made all of the points which Prime Minister Thatcher had suggested. The Bishop’s response followed the lines of his conversation yesterday with Secretary Vance.² On the return helicopter flight, Muzorewa implied to Secretary Vance, for the first time in his Washington visit, that he has begun to consider the possibility [of] changes. In doing so he raised the question of what the British Government would do to help him if he lost the confidence of the whites. End summary.

2. In his meeting today at Camp David with Bishop Muzorewa President Carter, accompanied by Secretary Vance, stated the U.S. position on Rhodesia in terms similar to those employed by Secretary Vance yesterday (July 11). Early in the conversation the President reiterated the points suggested by Prime Minister Thatcher, including:

—Muzorewa needs wide international acceptance;


² See Document 239.
—Z/R constitution must be changed particularly the blocking power;
—There must be a real transfer of power, including in the civil service, judiciary, police and military;
—Smith must go; and,
—The war must be brought to an end.

President Carter did not discuss either new elections or a constitutional referendum.

3. Bishop Muzorewa responded to the President’s points along the same lines he had used with Secretary Vance yesterday. He argued that the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia did in fact support the constitution. President Carter said that he did not agree with him.

4. On the return helicopter ride to Washington, the Bishop sent his aides to one side in order that he might speak privately with Secretary Vance. He asked what he should do: Would it be enough just to remove the 28 seat white blocking power? Secretary Vance said that the Bishop must go back to fundamental principles. The Bishop must gain the support of his people. In order to do this he must demonstrate that a real transfer of power has occurred and that he is in fact governing the country. Simply removing the white blocking power would not be enough. Real changes must be made. The USG will not specify these as they must be worked out by Muzorewa with the British. Secretary Vance then underscored the basic points made by the President, including the need for Smith to go and a demonstration that the constitution is supported by the people. Secretary Vance emphasized the necessity for the Bishop to do his utmost to make possible an end to the fighting.

5. Muzorewa said that he would “go talk with the British” but that “they must answer one question: If I do these things and lose the whites, what are British prepared to do to help me in a continuing war? I run a real risk of losing them (the whites).” Secretary Vance questioned whether this were truly the case. Muzorewa conceded, “well, it is a risk.” He observed that he had the feeling that the Americans and the British “saw things very much alike.” Secretary Vance confirmed that this was the case.

6. Secretary Vance told Muzorewa that the USG wished Muzorewa well; that we fear he will fail if he does not make serious changes. The Bishop commented that the Secretary’s words were “The first comforting thing I have heard.” Secretary Vance told Muzorewa that Z/R had great potential, that it was a fertile land with potential for industrial development. Z/R could be very successful if there were peace. It would be tragic to see it torn apart, its people hurt and their
aspirations blocked. On parting the Bishop said that he hoped to see Secretary Vance in Z/R “soon.” Secretary Vance replied, “someday.”

7. Comment: Muzorewa’s question about the sufficiency of removing the white blocking power was the first indication during the Washington visit that Muzorewa is taking seriously our insistence upon change. His question about the possible flight of whites, and the active support he might then expect in a continuing war, points up the importance of emphasizing to Muzorewa that making the kind of progress which Africans will regard as fair is essential if the war is to be brought to an end.

Vance

241. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and the Director of the International Communication Agency (Reinhardt)¹

Washington, July 13, 1979

SUBJECT

Descriptive Terms for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Groups² (U)

The President has approved the following more neutral terms³ for referring to the contending forces in the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian conflict:


² In a June 22 handwritten note to Vance and Brzezinski, Carter wrote: “I agree with Pat re propaganda designations. Suggest to me for government-wide use something better than ‘patriotic front’ and ‘liberation forces’ vs ‘Salisbury Group.’ Expedite, J.C.” (Ibid.) Carter was referring to remarks made by Senator Patrick Moynihan on June 12 when he said: “The use of those terms, the choice of those words, is fatal to the object of neutrality. I repeat, the choice of such words is fatal to the object of neutrality. When you have described one side as the ‘liberation forces’ and the other side as a group in the capital, you have summoned all the imagery of political legitimacy of the 20th century and put it on the one side and denied it to another. That is not only fatal to neutrality but, I suggest, it is fatal to clear thinking about this phenomenon.” (Congressional Record—Senate, p. S 7389)

³ In a July 6 memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski informed the President of the terminology developed by State and the NSC. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 7–12/79)
—The government in Salisbury will be referred to as the “Muzorewa Government” or the “Muzorewa Administration.” It should not be referred to as the “Government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.” (C)

—With regard to the external forces, in our diplomatic usage, greater emphasis should be given to the terms “ZAPU and ZANU,” “Nkomo-Mugabe Forces,” and “External Forces.” When appropriate, they can be called “guerrilla movements.” Use of the term “Patriotic Front” should be de-emphasized; this term should not be used at all for domestic U.S. audiences. (C)

—In referring to both sides together, we should use “Internal and External parties,” or “black leaders on both sides.” (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

242. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, July 21, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Zimbabwe.]

2. OAU Summit—The OAU Summit ended today with the passage of a resolution recognizing the Patriotic Front as the “sole legitimate and authentic representative” of the people of Zimbabwe. The resolution also equates the lifting of sanctions against Rhodesia with recognition of the Muzorewa government, and calls upon member states to apply sanctions against any state which recognizes the Muzorewa government or lifts sanctions against it. Apparently only the Ivory Coast and Zaire entered reservations.

Several African representatives at the meeting have commented that the resolution should not be viewed as inconsistent with further negotiations between the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa government. Many supported the resolution primarily as a means of halting

---


2 The OAU summit was held in Monrovia, Liberia, July 17–21.

3 For a summary of the resolution, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1979, pp. 29841–29842.

4 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “I’ve noticed that Muzorewa has a poor memory & a vivid imagination re his U.S. talks.”
what they consider the “creeping recognition” of the internal settlement by the UK and US.

3. **Visas for Rhodesians**—We are receiving an increasing number of requests for visas from Rhodesians, both within and supporters of the Muzorewa government. I have instructed that we should consider each request on a case-by-case basis, while generally giving more sympathetic consideration to those who carry non-Rhodesian travel documents, such as UK passports.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Zimbabwe.]

---

**243. Letter From President Carter to Senator Stennis**

Washington, September 25, 1979

To Chairman John Stennis.

I am deeply concerned about the attempt to legislate the immediate lifting of sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia by accepting the Senate version of the Defense Authorization Bill. The acceptance of the Byrd amendment would do serious harm to the conduct of our nation’s foreign policy.

The British, with the unanimous endorsement of the Commonwealth nations, convened the Lancaster House Conference in which all the parties to the Rhodesian conflict are participating. Some important first steps have been taken there, but many difficult negotiations lie ahead.

The Congress has already expressed its views on the Rhodesian issue with the recently passed State Department Authorization, and it

2 An identical letter was sent to Representative Melvin Price, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services. (Ibid.)
3 The Helms Amendment to the 1980 Defense Department authorization bill (S 428) required Carter to lift the trade ban immediately. (Congress and the Nation, vol. 5, 1977–1980, p. 77)
4 The conference convened on September 10.
5 H.R. 3363, Section 408, recognized the power of the President to make the decision regarding the continuation of sanctions. The law directed Carter to promote a speedy end to the Rhodesian conflict and terminate sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, unless Carter reported to Congress that termination was not in the national interest. The law also stipulated that sanctions were to be terminated by Congress on November 15, if it did not agree with the President’s determination. On August 15, the bill became Public Law 96–60. (Congress and the Nation, vol. 5, 1977–1980, pp. 75–78)
would be a great mistake for the United States to disrupt the negotiating process at this time with new legislation mandating an immediate lifting of sanctions.

It is not in our national interest to lift sanctions immediately. Therefore, I must reemphasize my firm opposition to any legislation directing me to do so. I urge that the Conference strike Section 802 of the Defense Authorization Bill.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

244. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, November 13, 1979

SUBJECT
Rhodesian Sanctions

Section 408 of the State Department Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 (P.L. 96–60), requires you to terminate sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia by November 15 unless you determine that it would not be in our national interest to do so and so report to the Congress. In order to avoid legal controversy as to timeliness, the determination and report contemplated by the statute should be made, if at all, no later than Wednesday, November 14.

While the negotiations at Lancaster House are still in progress, I believe you should not decide to remove sanctions. Lifting sanctions could jeopardize the negotiations, and undermine our ability to urge flexibility on the external parties and the Front Line states. We can best preserve our impartiality and avoid getting out in front of the British by maintaining sanctions. We could not credibly defend under international law a lifting of sanctions by the United States when there had been neither a British action “returning Rhodesia to legality” nor Security Council action terminating sanctions.
Background

The British government has stated in Parliament that it will not seek to renew the Order in Council specifically applicable to sanctions against Rhodesia.\(^2\) The order will lapse on November 15. However, as the British have pointed out publicly, the great bulk of UK sanctions relating to direct trade and the transfer of funds will continue under general legislative authority. These will not be revoked until the British Governor arrives in Salisbury, at which time the UK will regard Rhodesia as having “returned to legality.”

The British decision not to renew the Order in Council will weaken our position on the Hill. The basis on which you justify a determination not to remove our sanctions will influence the support which our opponents will be able to muster to overturn such a decision.

There are three options: 1) to announce your decision to maintain sanctions in view of the ongoing negotiations at Lancaster House, but state you would keep the situation under continuous review; 2) to announce your decision to maintain sanctions, but state you will move to remove them as soon as the British return Southern Rhodesia to legality and a British Governor arrives in Salisbury; or 3) to announce your decision to maintain sanctions, but state you will lift sanctions when a British Governor arrives in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections begins. We rule out lifting sanctions at the present time, since such a step would clearly be premature.

In choosing among the three options, we face two competing considerations. The more specifically we tie ourselves to following the British lead (as in Option 2), the better the chance of heading off a Congressional reversal—but the less we can maintain flexibility until we see what the final UK proposals look like, retain some influence over UK decisions, and maintain credibility with the Africans and in the UN.

Under Option 1, you would have maximum flexibility to decide sanctions policy at the conclusion of Lancaster House on the basis of the positions of the various parties, as well as the fairness of final British proposals and any relevant action by the Security Council or by third countries. But because no commitment would be made to lift sanctions under specific conditions, this would be most difficult to sustain with Congress.

Under Option 2, you would make a commitment to lift our sanctions when the British lifted their remaining sanctions, regardless of

\(^2\) The Southern Rhodesia Bill, introduced in the House of Commons on November 7, stipulated that Section 2 of the 1965 Southern Rhodesia Act pertaining to sanctions would not be retained. The bill was enacted on November 14. (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1980, p. 30175)
whether a settlement among all parties had been reached or whether the final proposals could be defended as offering all parties a fair chance in impartial elections. This would remove such influence as we might have with the British during the final days of the conference and would damage our credibility with the Front Line and Patriotic Front. However, it would enhance our chances of success in both Houses of Congress and could win the support of such key Congressional leaders as Byrd, Church, Wright and Zablocki in blocking a hasty move to lift sanctions.

Under Option 3, you would convey to Congress and those involved in Lancaster House a general intent to lift sanctions when the UK began implementing its proposals, but would still leave open your final decision on sanctions depending on whether those proposals could be defended in good faith as impartial. If the UK reached agreement with Muzorewa alone on arrangements that clearly would bias elections, you could conceivably withhold immediate endorsement and maintain sanctions in order to seek alterations that would improve the proposals and enable us to press for Patriotic Front acceptance. On the other hand, if ZAPU and/or ZANU rejected impartial arrangements, and the British proceeded with Muzorewa (and perhaps one or the other of ZAPU and ZANU), you could support this and lift sanctions. With Congress, we would point out that the UK proposals thus far have been impartial and great progress has been made on that basis, but we should not make our final decision until the process is concluded. This may gain some Congressional support, although some will still argue that Muzorewa already has made great concessions and that the Administration should not be left with discretion which our opponents believe would be used to press for arrangements more favorable to ZAPU and ZANU.

Option 3 would commit us to lift sanctions if you determined an impartial elections process was underway, whether or not the Security Council acted to remove sanctions or other countries joined in a consensus that the basis for sanctions had ended.

Whatever your decision now, circumstances affecting sanctions policy will evolve rapidly. The UK intends to wrap up Lancaster House one way or another as soon as possible. If there is an early breakthrough with the Patriotic Front on elections arrangements, complete discussions of ceasefire arrangements would follow quickly. If there is not, the UK may move quite quickly to install a Governor in Salisbury on the basis of arrangements agreed to by Muzorewa alone, perhaps without ever spelling out UK ceasefire proposals. Congress has thirty days to act on a resolution of disapproval on your determination. Expedited procedures in the Senate mean that even a sympathetic Foreign Relations Committee leadership could hold back the resolution
for no more than ten days. Precipitous action in the House is less likely, however, due to a number of factors: a more sympathetic attitude among Foreign Affairs Committee members; an upcoming one week recess; and the more cumbersome procedures for expediting consideration of a resolution.

A final consideration is the attitude of other Western countries to the British approach to sanctions. The UK has pressed the EC as well as the US for a commitment now to lift sanctions when a British Governor arrives in Salisbury and, in the British view, legality thereby is restored. London argues that even if the Patriotic Front is excluded and the Security Council therefore does not lift sanctions, the restoration of legality by the UK removes all basis for enforcement of sanctions. The EC members, except possibly France, have been reluctant to agree to lift sanctions without reference to the Security Council or to give the UK a blank check when they do not know its plans for the final stage of negotiations.

Before your decision has been transmitted to the Congress, I would propose that the State Department brief key members of the Congress (Church, Byrd, Javits, McGovern, Zablocki, Wright, Brademas, Solarz) with the objective of building support for our position and deterring any early moves for a Congressional override. Depending on whether these leaders see an early, serious effort to overturn your decision as likely, we would decide whether to seek high-level hearings and mount a major effort with Congress.

Attached is a recommended Presidential Determination\(^3\) and three alternative justifications depending on which option you choose.\(^4\)

_Recommendations:_

I recommend—

1) That you approve the Option 3 justification (Tab 4), so that we will not lose all influence now over the negotiations; but in the end I believe we will support whatever decision the UK reaches because of the great strides they have made already toward majority rule and an impartial process.

_Approve:_

Option 1_____

Option 2_____

Option 3_____

\(^3\) Not attached. Printed as Document 245.

\(^4\) Justifications for Options 1 and 2 are attached but not printed.

\(^5\) Carter approved Option 3 and initialed the right-hand margin.
2) That you approve Congressional consultation on the basis of the justification option that you approve.  
6 Carter approved the recommendation.

3) That you sign the determination at Tab 5. 
7 See footnote 3 above.

Tab 4

Paper Prepared in the Department of State 
8 Secret.

Washington, undated

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 408 (b) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1980 AND 1981 CONCERNING SANCTIONS AGAINST ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA

PROBLEM

Section 408 (b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, requires that sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia be terminated by November 15, 1979, unless the President determines that it would not be in the national interest of the United States and so reports to the Congress.

JUSTIFICATION

Encouraging progress has been made in recent months toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; however, the negotiations presently being conducted by the United Kingdom with the parties have not yet been concluded, and differences still remain. A termination of sanctions at this stage could lead all the parties to harden their positions and would jeopardize the chances for a successful settlement for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The British Government has not yet concluded negotiations that would end the rebellion in Rhodesia. They have stated that this will occur when the British Governor arrives in Salisbury and assumes authority. At the present time, the great bulk of British sanctions remain in force and none of our major allies has taken action to terminate sanctions.

The negotiations are now at a critical stage. We hope they will be rapidly and successfully concluded. While the talks continue, it would
be premature for the United States to alter its position on sanctions. We would, however, be prepared to lift sanctions when a British Governor assumes authority in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections has begun. Our policy will continue to be that no party should have a veto over fair settlement proposals.

This issue will be kept under continuous review and the President will promptly notify the Congress when conditions warrant the lifting of sanctions.

245. Presidential Determination

No. 80–6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT

Maintenance of Sanctions Against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Under Section 408 (b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981

Pursuant to Section 408 (b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 (93 Stat. 405), I hereby determine that it is in the national interest of the United States to continue sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at this time.

You are requested, on my behalf, to report this determination promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

You are further requested to report to me immediately upon the conclusion of the present Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia being held in London, describing the conclusions of that conference and your recommendations for action by the United States with respect to the termination of sanctions.2

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

Jimmy Carter

---


2 See Document 244.
246. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, November 21, 1979, 10:15–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Attacks on Zambian Road and Rail Links\(^2\) (U)

PARTICIPANTS

\textit{STATE}

Assistant Secretary Richard Moose
Mr. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning
Mr. Paul Hare, African Bureau, Southern Africa

\textit{CIA}

Mr. Bruce Clark, Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
Mr. William Parmenter, NIO for Africa

\textit{DOD}

Mr. Robert Komer, Advisor to the Secretary
Mr. James Woods, ISA, Africa

\textit{White House}

Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs

\textit{NSC}

Mr. Jerry Funk, Staff Member

It was agreed that:

—The Rhodesian raids, cutting virtually all Zambian international road and rail links, were directed primarily at Zambia rather than directly at guerrilla infiltration

—The raids will have a devastating effect on the Zambian economy, already faced with a very serious maize shortage and general dislocation

—The overall effect is two-fold: (1) to endanger the Lancaster House cease-fire talks by making it impossible for Kaunda to continue his cooperation, and (2) to create a situation which could possibly lead to intervention by Cuban technical and support personnel, and perhaps eventually military units,—though this later event is not believed imminent

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 118, Zambia: 1/79–2/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found.

\(^2\) In telegram 4175 from Lusaka, November 19, the Embassy reported on an attack by Rhodesian security forces on Zambia’s major remaining overland routes to the outside. The report noted that the attack severed all road and rail access to Tanzania, Malawi, and southern Zambia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790532–1053)
—Specifically, we should:
—Condemn the raids
—Urge the UK to persuade the Muzorewa government to exercise restraint
—Be responsive to Kaunda by expressing our deep concern and our intention to be helpful,—preferably by a Presidential message
—Explore with the Zambians, (and as appropriate, with the UK) various proposals, including an engineering survey team, airlift of bridging materials and crews, PL-480 assistance, and other security support assistance, such as transport and commodity aid
—Encourage our European friends to be responsive to Kaunda with respect to the raids and their economic impact. (S)

Finally, in arriving at these conclusions, and in discussion on the necessity of OMB and AID reprogramming, it was noted that we have been generally neglecting the critical need for security support assistance in our overall defense posture, and that we should urgently address this imbalance. (S)

**Detailed Memorandum of PRC Meeting**

Aaron said he had asked Warren Christopher to convene this meeting because of our concern over Rhodesian attacks on Zambia road and rail links, and the possibility of this resulting in Soviet/Cuban involvement. He said we wanted to explore possible U.S. reactions, including assistance to Zambia. (S)

Moose (acting as chairman in lieu of Christopher) said there were three elements of concern: (1) that we get UK to urge General Walls to exercise restraint, (2) demonstrate our support for the cease-fire talks by being responsive to UK requests for airlift assistance, and (3) encourage our European friends to be responsive to Kaunda with respect to the raids and their economic impact.

---

3 In telegram 301679 to Lusaka, November 20, the Department transmitted Hodding Carter's press guidance: "We are deeply concerned by the latest Rhodesian attacks on lines of communication and bridges in Zambia. We condemn the destruction of what are clearly economic targets in that country. We believe these attacks are particularly unfortunate in light of the on-going talks at Lancaster House which hold such promise for bringing a peaceful resolution to conflict in the region." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790535–0153)

4 In telegram 4236 from Lusaka, November 23, Wisner transmitted the text of Carrington's conversation with Walls: "We have made it clear to Walls that any further action by the Rhodesian security forces at this stage in Zambia could have very serious consequences in relation to the conference and to the safety of British citizens in Zambia. Please tell Muzorewa that, while we are aware of the problems which confront the Rhodesian authorities over infiltration, the conference itself and any prospect of a successful conclusion of the negotiations will be at risk if Rhodesian raids into Zambia continue." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790542–0771)

5 See footnote 4 above.

6 See Document 247.
(3) to be psychologically and materially supportive of Zambia. He noted that Ambassador Wisner suggested that we be responsive with SSA,—which could well be directed toward bridging and transport,— and to respond with PL 480 assistance. (S)

He then suggested we look at SAG and Z-RG motives,—are they really responding to ZIPRA infiltration, or are they acting with a wider political purpose? (S)

Parmenter said that raids would have some modest effect on infiltration, but it seemed clear that there was a wider purpose. There had been no recent surge of troop movements into Zimbabwe, and that the steady effort in this regard was meeting with mixed results. He noted that all parties were looking beyond the immediate situation to position themselves for the cease-fire and the elections. He felt it was likely that General Walls felt that attacks on the Tan-Zam railway link had been effective in bringing Kaunda to cooperate at the Lancaster House meeting, and more of the same would be effective in gaining further concessions. But it is also quite likely that Walls is proceeding with a grander plan to cripple Mozambique and Zambia before the cease-fire can be effected, and is ignoring day-to-day political changes. (S)

Lake asked if there were reports from London that Walls did in fact state that he wanted to attack Zambia before any cease-fire interfered with those plans. (S)

Parmenter said there were such reports. (S)

Moose noted that the UK was key to the whole problem, and that while they seemed to be reluctant to put pressure on Walls, we could not be certain, as they were not sharing this with us. He said we were in position of trying to look over their shoulders at their cards, and trying to give advice while they were on a winning streak. Thus, while they may not listen very carefully to us, we had expressed our concern, but that perhaps we should move up to a Vance-Carrington message. (S)

Aaron said that the only way to get the UK to move on this issue is for us to move ourselves, and bring them along,—and that we should tell them directly that we feel their response thus far has been inadequate. We should note that Kaunda has a case in his grievance with the UK, especially after his role at Lancaster House. (S)

Lake and Komer agreed with that assessment. (U)

Parmenter noted that Kaunda’s press conference statement\(^7\) on the raids had been emotional, but quite moderate regarding mobilization,

\(^7\) In telegram 4196 from Lusaka, November 20, Wisner reported on the press conference. Kaunda held the British responsible for the attacks and called for an independent Commonwealth monitoring force. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790534–0900)
and that he said he “did not wish to internationalize the war.” Thus, it was not likely that Kaunda was on the verge of actually calling in Cuban troops. (S)

Aaron said that his immediate concern was not that Cuban military units would be called in, but that Cuban bridge construction parties and other support units would be involved, thus establishing their presence. Therefore, he felt we should make a responsive gesture to forestall that event. (S)

Lake suggested that we try to encourage the Germans and Scandinavians to offer assistance as well. (U)

Clark suggested that the best first step was to send in a US engineering survey team, to help Kaunda get a better feel for the true nature and dimension of his transport problem. (S)

Aaron and Komer agreed that this would be useful. (U)

Lake asked about Congressional reaction. (U)

Komer said that he felt this would depend on the status of the cease-fire. (U)

Aaron asked if we could reasonably propose to the UK that they supply Bailey bridges and crews, and that we fly them in. There was general agreement that this could be done. (S)

Moose noted that we could have a problem on the Hill if we move such men and materials prior to a cease-fire, but that in the meantime we could send in a survey team, ask OMB and AID to reprogram funds, and move on PL 480 assistance. (S)

Komer said that this brought up a broader issue,—our inability to be responsive to key and essential security support assistance, at a time when we are in a generally critical situation and forcing defense spending up. This, he said was terribly inconsistent, and prompted his general argument that DOD might consider asking that considerable funding be moved from the regular DOD budget to SSA, where it would be effective and complimentary in building up our overall strength. (S)

Aaron concurred with this argument, and noted that we seemed in danger of starting to move toward a “fortress America” concept. (S)

Moose stated that it was certainly time to move toward an expanded SSA program for African nations. (S)

Aaron noted that we should ask Secretary Brown to make the argument for shifting funds to SSA. (S)

Parmenter said that, finally, with respect to Zambia, the food stocks were thought to be adequate to March only, and this estimate is probably based upon a continued normal inflow. Thus, the immediate food problem may well require assistance with internal transportation and distribution. (S)
Aaron, as a final note, said that decision to respond to UK airlift request for cease-fire support was with the President, and should not be held up to incorporate with any responses on the Zambian situation. (S)

The meeting adjourned at 10:45 a.m. (U)

247. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown

Washington, November 23, 1979

SUBJECT

UK Request for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Cease-Fire Airlift Assistance (C)

The President has directed that we respond positively to the request from the government of the United Kingdom to assist in the airlift of approximately 80 vehicles and 12 helicopters from the United Kingdom to Salisbury, on a reimbursable basis. (C)

The airlift should be done concurrently with the assumption of authority in Salisbury by the British Governor. U.S. aircraft should fly as directly as possible to and from Salisbury, and should avoid the use of landing facilities in the Republic of South Africa. (C)

In addition, the President has authorized the expansion of this participation in the cease-fire process to include the airlifting of a small contingent of Kenyan troops from Nairobi to Salisbury, to act as monitors. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski


2 In telegram 22785 from London, November 16, Brewster transmitted the British request. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175–1603)

3 In a November 19 memorandum for the files, Nick Spiliotes summarized the November 19 interagency meeting on the British request for assistance. In addition to the requested airlift assistance, the NSC suggested an airlift of 40–50 Kenyan troops. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 7–12/79)
SUBJECT
Rhodesia

Lord Carrington raised Rhodesia with me during our December 10 meeting. After briefly describing where things stood at the Conference, he asked that we support HMG’s final cease-fire proposal as fair and reasonable, and that on the arrival of the British Governor in Salisbury (now scheduled for this week), we recognize the Governor’s authority and immediately lift our own sanctions against Rhodesia. Without this kind of support from us, Carrington believes the PF may continue to hold out and that the good chance for an all-encompassing settlement will be lost.

I told Peter that we could support their detailed cease-fire proposals both publicly and with the Front Line states. They will be developing in the next day or so a final olive branch for the Patriotic Front on the issue which will make it clear that to the degree the PF forces implement a cease-fire, the need for any deployment of Rhodesian security forces is reduced. This is the final issue to be negotiated in reaching a final settlement on the basis of the recent agreement in principle on a cease-fire.

With regard to our lifting sanctions when the Governor General arrives, I emphasized that this depended on our ability to show that, in accordance with our previously stated position, a process leading to impartial elections had actually begun. In particular, I reiterated that their setting an electoral date would be particularly helpful.

In subsequent discussions with Tony Lake and Peter Tarnoff, Tony Duff said that fixing a final date for the elections now could produce a negative reaction from the PF, but that the British might still be able to do so if it would guarantee that we would lift sanctions. After discussion of this and other ways in which the British could meet our concerns, they came up with the following statement Lord Soames could make on arrival in Salisbury:

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 120, Zimbabwe: 12/79. Secret. Christopher forwarded the memorandum to Carter under a December 11 covering memorandum. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

2 In telegram Secto 12007 from Paris, December 10, Vance provided notes on his meeting with Carrington and Thatcher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790569–1090)
The electoral process has already been set in train by ordinances which come into effect today establishing the powers of the election commissioner and making provision for the election council. All parties which can agree to campaign peacefully will be able to do so freely. All parties which wish to participate in the election should register by 28/31 December (date to be decided). The British Governor is taking today the legislative action necessary to bring into force those parts of the Independence Constitution required for elections to be held.

I believe that this statement meets our concerns, and that we should first consult with Congressional leaders and then go back to the British saying that we can lift sanctions within a day or so of Soames’ arrival.3

The trickiest aspect of this is that there may not yet be an agreed settlement at that time. We have written to Helms that our position depended on there being an agreed settlement; without one, we would consult with Congressional committees on what to do when the Governor General arrived and UK sanctions were lifted.

I recommend that, even if there is no final settlement, we suggest to the committees that we lift sanctions with the British, paying particular attention in these consultations to the Black Caucus.4 I have a number of reasons for suggesting this:

—It is consistent with the November 14 determination5 and the letter to Helms.6
—The final British proposals are fair, and we have said many times that no party should be allowed to have a veto over our sanctions policies by holding out against fair offers.
—With Soames’ statement, our position would be defensible at home and in Africa. Andy Young has publicly said, for example, that if the PF does not accept fair settlement proposals, we should lift sanctions anyway.
—If we do not support the British, we would encourage PF intransigence.
—If we did not lift sanctions ourselves, the Congress would likely do so very quickly. We should lift on our terms, and portray it as a positive rather than negative development.

3 Carter underlined the last phrase of this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Consult, let me know results.”
4 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “do so & Solarz.”
5 See Document 245.
6 Not found. An unsigned, undated copy of a letter to Helms is attached to a December 3 memorandum to Vance from Brzezinski, who noted that Carter had no objection or changes to the letter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 89, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 12/79)
249. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and Frank Moore of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter

Washington, December 13, 1979

SUBJECT
Congressional Consultations on Lifting Sanctions on Rhodesia (U)

Per your instructions, we consulted with key Congressional leaders and members of the Black Caucus. In addition to the time pressure created by Mrs. Thatcher’s visit, you are being pressed by Senator Helms’ warning to us that he will move his disapproval resolution Friday if he has not received assurances by that time that sanctions will be lifted. In light of the British position, he would have no problem winning on the Senate floor.

The consultations were pretty much as might be expected: Byrd, Stevens, Pell, Zablocki, and Fenwick supported early action and indicated that we should show solidarity with the British. Church said he would support you either way. Javits said he would support lifting, but at one point indicated that it might be a good idea to wait until Monday when the House will consider a bill identical to his and Church’s calling for lifting sanctions at the time of the arrival of the British Governor or January 1, 1980, whichever is earlier. Wright, on the other hand, thought it would be better to lift before the bill comes to the House floor.

Bill Gray did not think you should lift now. Because he is a key member of the Black Caucus, we are reporting his views at some length. He believes that to lift without agreement is not in our best national interest and would offend Africa and the Third World. He believes we should not be pushed into an unwise course of action by Helms. His principal concern is that we demonstrate sensitivity to proposed procedures at the UN, and he would like to see at least informal UN acceptance along the lines suggested by McHenry. He says it is important to us that we not show disregard for the UN at a time we are relying on it in relation to Iran.

Dick Moose, who spoke with Gray, reported that at no point did Gray question your good faith in dealing with the Caucus and other black groups, even if you were to lift without agreement. Gray’s con-

2 See footnote 4, Document 248.
cerns are substantive and not political. His public reaction even in the worst case would be reasonably stated in substantive terms. Gray appeared impressed with the fairness of the ceasefire arrangements and the UK steps to implement elections. “A thoroughly decent reaction.” (C)

Charlie Diggs and Cardiss Collins are circulating a Dear Colleague letter urging you not to lift “until an election procedure is agreed upon” and “until there is evidence that the ceasefire will be effective.” They also urge the U.S. not to act until there has been appropriate action by the Security Council. (C)

Moose, who saw the letter, comments, however, that its tone is moderate, suggesting that it is designed to gain the widest possible acceptance. There is no reference to the fact that you were backing off a commitment to the Black Leadership. (C)

Solarz would certainly support and expect prompt lifting of sanctions in the event of an agreed settlement (within 48 hours). Solarz believes there may be a risk in lifting sanctions before the Lancaster House Conference is over because if we do so and the Conference thereafter fails, our action in lifting sanctions could be cited as a reason for its collapse. He would not suggest that we wait a long period of time to see if it would succeed and would agree that at some point we would have to make our own decision on the basis of the fairness of the proposals. (C)

If you were to decide to lift before the Conference is over, Solarz would not volunteer any criticism; however, he would feel bound to say he has misgivings along the above lines, i.e., that our action might be responsible for the failure—if he were asked, which he most certainly would be. He accepts Moose’s judgment that proposals are fair and is impressed by steps the British are taking to set up election procedures. (C)

At the end of the day, we had not yet been able to reach O’Neill and Parren Mitchell. We will get you a separate report.³ (U)
SUBJECT
Rhodesian Sanctions (U)

State, NSC and the White House staff, as well as Ambassador McHenry have engaged in extensive consultations regarding the lifting of sanctions on Rhodesia. (S)

In sum, it is clear that should you not lift, Senator Helms will move a resolution on the Senate floor by mid-day tomorrow, with probable success. On the other hand, should you lift prior to an agreed settlement, the Black Caucus and others will be angered and frustrated. (S)

In addition, this issue is of utmost importance to the UK, and should you not lift, or at least express strong support for the UK and an intention to lift, Mrs. Thatcher will be left in an “extremely awkward position.” (S)

Although we cannot be certain, it now seems quite probable that the Patriotic Front forces will reach final agreement within a very few days. If so, any Black anger at lifting would probably be of limited duration. (S)

It appears that you have essentially two options:

(1) To lift sanctions, proclaiming that your conditions have been met, i.e., the Governor has assumed authority and a process leading to impartial elections has begun.

(2) To announce your unconditional support for the UK’s assumption of authority, and for the settlement proposals and agreements, but stop just short of a final lifting,—by saying we expect a settlement momentarily, and therefore will be setting in motion steps to lift. (S)

Option one has the advantage of decisiveness, although it runs the risk of Black anger, particularly if final settlement is long in coming. (S)

Option two will probably have the effect of really pleasing no one, although it would probably tend to blunt Black anger. Its main advantage would be to buy time for a few more days during which we hope the Patriotic Front will come to final agreement. On the other hand, it will tend to further prolong the situation and make your
ultimate decision to lift sanction look like caving to the British or being rolled over by the Congress.

It is desirable that you issue a statement prior to noon tomorrow in advance of the Helms resolution. Appropriate statements for both options are now being drafted. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve Option One.² (U)
State concurs.

---

² Carter approved the recommendation and wrote below it: “Carefully notify Congress & press. I suggest midnight 12/16/79 J.”

---

251. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, December 17, 1979

SUBJECT
Execute Order for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Cease-Fire Airlift Assistance (C)

Pursuant to my memoranda of November 23, 1979,² and December 13, 1979³ concerning airlift support for the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian cease-fire arrangements, the President has directed that we commence operations as soon as practicable, in coordination with the United Kingdom. (C)

In addition, the President has authorized, if practicable, that we airlift a quantity of tents from the United States to Rhodesia, on a reimbursable basis. (C)

---

² See Document 247.
³ In a December 13 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Vance and Brown that the “airlift support shall begin only upon execute orders from the President, or on his orders as relayed by me or by my deputy.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 7–12/79)
Upon commencement of operations, you are authorized to declassify these orders. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

252. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 17, 1979, 10:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
The President’s Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Kingman Brewster
Ambassador at Large Henry Owen
George Vest, Assistant Secretary of State
Robert D. Blackwill, NSC Staff Member
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Margaret Thatcher
Lord Carrington, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Sir Nicholas Henderson, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sir Robert Armstrong, Secretary to the Cabinet
Sir Michael Palliser, Permanent Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Sir Frank Cooper, Ministry of Defense
Michael Alexander, Private Secretary to the PM
George Walden, Principal Secretary to the Secretary of State

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

Moving on to Rhodesia, the President congratulated Lord Carrington for his extraordinary success in the Lancaster House negotiation and said he was eager to hear how prospects looked now after a slight interruption over the weekend. We had lifted sanctions at midnight last night which was another indication that the U.S. would continue to be Britain’s full partner in this effort to bring peace to Southern

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 37, Memcons: President: 10–12/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
Rhodesia 731

Africa. The President added that there should be no hesitation on Mrs. Thatcher’s part to ask us for help in the period ahead, and we would do everything possible to be responsive. (S)

In reply, Mrs. Thatcher said she was delighted to be sitting in the White House; it was a great emotional experience to be in the United States as Prime Minister for the first time. She thanked the President for everything the U.S. had done on Rhodesia, and especially for its efforts during the last few days. Noting that Lord Carrington had done extremely well in the negotiations, the Prime Minister indicated that the UK had come up against Patriotic Front hesitation at the last moment over the weekend. But she was still hopeful and stressed that prompt U.S. action in the last few days had been important in trying to assure the success of the Lancaster House discussions. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

The President next asked for the UK’s latest reading on the Rhodesian situation. Lord Carrington replied that, as always, the last hurdle was the most difficult. They had brought the Patriotic Front to agreement on a constitution, on transitional arrangements and on the cease fire. The sticking point now was the Patriotic Front’s assembly areas. These areas were around the outside of the country and not in the middle. This seemed to be sensible since the Patriotic Front did not wish to be surrounded by Rhodesian security forces. Britain wanted to leave them where they were—on the outside areas of the country. With 17 or 18,000 Patriotic Front guerillas inside Rhodesia, Lord Carrington thought 15 assembly areas was about right. He said he was extremely surprised when the Patriotic Front did not agree. Carrington thought that the Front was trying to get a political advantage by putting more of its people in the center of the country. This problem was particularly difficult to deal with since the Patriotic Front argued that it had 35,000 troops inside Rhodesia, which the UK knew to be untrue. (S)

Nonetheless, and to try to find a compromise, Lord Carrington over the weekend had offered the following: (1) if Britain found that it was wrong about the size of the Patriotic Front force inside Rhodesia, it would reassess the situation with a view to adding more assembly areas; and (2) it would now give the Front an assembly area in the center of the country. Carrington thought these proposals might do the trick. President Machel had been particularly helpful by putting pressure on Mugabe. Carrington said that Nkomo wanted to sign, but that Mugabe really did not want to sign. The last word from London was that it appeared that there would be a majority within the Patriotic Front to initial the final documents. Reflecting on Britain’s negotiating style through the Lancaster House negotiations, Carrington said that they had been forced to issue ultimatum after ultimatum all the while indignantly denying that they were issuing ultimatums. But there was no other way to bring the Patriotic Front around. (S)
Carrington thought that with a bit of luck we should get a cease fire, but even then, the situation would be messy. Both sides were suspicious and it was doubtful the Patriotic Front would assemble all their forces. We were unquestionably in for a difficult period and it was important, Carrington said, to hold the election as soon as possible. (S)

The President asked if the Muzorewa group was opposed to giving more assembly areas to the Patriotic Front or whether that was a British position. Carrington replied that it was a bit of both. Salisbury thought that a larger number of assembly areas would endanger their political prospects. Nonetheless, Britain had agreed to give the Front one area in the center of the country and would consider creating more areas if it was wrong about the total number of Patriotic Front troops inside Rhodesia. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher added that, in general, Salisbury had been quite helpful and had accepted the idea that the Patriotic Front have an assembly area in the center of the country. The President asked if the UK would set a deadline for the Patriotic Front’s acceptance of the agreement. Carrington replied that he would not break up the conference although the Patriotic Front might seek to make him do so. Whatever happened, Britain would say that the Patriotic Front could join the process but the election period would begin if the Front did not soon initial the agreement. Secretary Vance asked if a problem would be created by continued infiltration of Patriotic Front troops into Rhodesia during the transition period. Lord Carrington replied that the Front would certainly try, but that he hoped that Machel and Kaunda would stop it. The President said that we were prepared to help Britain as this process continued. Carrington noted that the U.S. had been fair all the way along, and the President responded that we thought so too. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher opined that Nkomo was a natural politician but that Mugabe was a typical communist obstructionist. The President asked if the Communists had been helpful in this endeavor and Carrington responded that they had provided no help at all. Gromyko had been decidedly hostile in his conversations with Carrington on the subject and both the Soviets and Romanians had been supplying arms to the guerilllas. Carrington said there was a good reason for this. Trouble in Southern Africa suited Soviet interests very well. Dr. Brzezinski observed that it was odd that the Romanians had been supplying arms to the Front. Mrs. Thatcher stressed that Britain would go ahead with the election because that was the right thing to do. It would not be an easy task for Christopher Soames, but the UK would press on. She
then asked if the President would like next to discuss the Middle East. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Rhodesia.]

---

253. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 8, 1980

SUBJECT

Diplomatic Relations with Zimbabwe

Assuming that the transition to genuine majority rule is accomplished through free and fair elections, we will want to establish diplomatic relations with the independent state of Zimbabwe as soon as practicable, and to open an embassy there. The establishment of an eight man mission, which we believe would be an appropriate size in Salisbury is expected to cost approximately $1,478,000 in FY–80 and would require no further appropriated funds.

It would be helpful to have your approval in advance so that planning may begin.\(^2\)

---


\(^2\) Carter checked the approve option.
254. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, February 19, 1980

SUBJECT
Diplomatic Relations with Zimbabwe

The President has read your memorandum of February 8 on the above subject and approved, in principle, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe, with a final decision on implementation to be made following the elections, February 27–29. (C)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

2 See Document 253.
3 The United States established diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe on April 18.

255. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, February 22, 1980

SUBJECT
Airlift Support for the British in Rhodesia

The British Government has formally requested US airlift support to return a number of Puma helicopters from Salisbury, Rhodesia, to the UK early in March, after the February 27–29 pre-independence elections. The request is for two C–5A sorties. These helicopters were among the cease-fire monitoring materiel which we and the British

airlifted to Rhodesia in December under an arrangement authorized by the President.\(^2\)

In keeping with our policy of support for the British effort to resolve the Rhodesian problem, the Department of State recommends that the President approve the requested airlift support on a reimbursable basis in coordination with the United Kingdom. Also, since it is still unclear what the security situation in Rhodesia will be at that time, we recommend that our participation in the airlift be contingent on a stable security situation in which there will be no danger of harm to either the crew or the aircraft participating in the airlift.\(^3\)

Peter Tarnoff

---

\(^2\) See Document 247.

\(^3\) In a February 27 memorandum to Vance and Brown, Brzezinski wrote: “The President has directed that we provide requested airlift support to the United Kingdom, on a reimbursable basis, to return a number of Puma helicopters and associated material used in the Rhodesian cease-fire operation from Salisbury to the United Kingdom following the scheduled election process, contingent upon a stable security situation which precludes damage to participating USAF crews and aircraft.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 89, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 1/80–1/81)
256. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, March 27, 1980

SUBJECT
Aid to Zimbabwe: Reply to Prime Minister Thatcher

Issue
Prime Minister Thatcher’s message to you (Tab 1) appealing for US support for the new government of Zimbabwe, to take office on Independence Day, April 18 raises the issue of US assistance to that country. Our delegation to the Independence Day ceremonies may wish to make an announcement concerning our assistance plans. This memo recommends bilateral assistance levels of $15 million in FY 80, and up to $30 million in FY 81. Due to the very tight assistance budgets in FY 80 (which did not contain funds for Zimbabwe), we shall have to reprogram within current Economic Support Fund levels for southern Africa for this fiscal year as well as in FY 81. Finally, attached at Tab 2 is a suggested response from you to Mrs. Thatcher on our assistance plans for Zimbabwe.

Proposed Program
To provide the new government of Zimbabwe with a visible, quick-disbursing assistance program and to demonstrate our support for our UK ally, we are proposing a US assistance program of $15 million in 1980.

The British estimate total reconstruction needs in 1980 at $44 million and that over the next three years, Zimbabwe will need more than one billion dollars worth of longer-term assistance. Our program will address these needs and support the successful conclusion of a very

---

2 Attached, but not printed. In a March 23 message to Carter, Thatcher requested significant financial assistance for Zimbabwe, noting that Mugabe had “for the moment” pursued moderate policies and actions. Thatcher wrote: “There is no doubt in my mind that Mugabe’s ability to hold this course will be crucially affected by the readiness of the West to provide economic help. Although Zimbabwe is potentially a wealthy country, the immediate problems of reconstruction after the war are daunting. The new government will have to convince its supporters that moderate policies pay. In particular they will attach the highest importance to agricultural development.” (Ibid.) Carter wrote at the top of the first page of this message: “Zbig—Give me a State-OMB–NSC option paper. C.”
3 Attached, but not printed. See Document 257.
significant accomplishment in sub-Saharan Africa. As we stated at the
time of the Lancaster House Talks, this effort should be undertaken
within a wider development concept for southern Africa as a whole.

Our funds would principally support reconstruction and rehabilita-
tion activity primarily in rural areas for such needs as rebuilding and
restocking health clinics, schools, and cattle dips, thereby helping to
resettle the returning refugees. The FY 80 funds would be repro-
grammed from the $60.5 million in ESF monies for Southern Africa.

In considering possible sources of funds, we have not recom-
mended the use of development assistance or a PL–480 program for
Zimbabwe. Even small amounts of DA, if in fact reprogrammed, would
have to come from programs of importance to us and would be less
appropriate for quick disbursing reconstruction assistance than ESF.
PL–480 Title I food aid is also inappropriate since Rhodesia has been
a food exporter; Title II is fully programmed in FY 80, unless and until
we get a PL–480 supplemental. Some amount of Title II to meet specific
humanitarian needs could be made available in FY 81, but it is too
early to foresee any such emergency needs within Zimbabwe now.

For FY 81, we propose an assistance program of up to $30 million in
southern Africa ESF monies for projects to be developed in consultation
with the Government of Zimbabwe. The $30 million would be drawn
from a $90 million proposed ESF level for southern Africa in FY 81.
Illustratively, the program could include:

—Additional rehabilitation/reconstruction activities, e.g., rebuild-
ing war-damaged health clinics and schools;
—Vocational/technical training;
—Agricultural services directed to African small farmers;
—Regional activities;
—Low-cost housing for low-income urban dwellers;
—Assistance for small-scale enterprises.

The provision of $30 million for Zimbabwe would reduce funding
for other activities in southern Africa. The remaining $60 million,
assuming the full $90 million ESF appropriation, would preserve our
ability to help the other majority-ruled countries there and to support
promising southern African initiatives toward regional cooperation.
The funds provided to Zimbabwe may be used within Zimbabwe to
support activities developed in a regional context.

Given the importance of American support for Zimbabwe and its
immediate needs, we consider a $30 million program of US assistance
to Zimbabwe in FY 81 to be necessary and justifiable at this time.
Recommendations:\(^4\)

**FY 80**

That you approve a $15 million grant assistance level to Zimbabwe in FY 80. This money would be reprogrammed within current ESF levels for the southern Africa program.

**FY 81**

That you approve a planning level of $30 million for Zimbabwe from ESF for southern Africa on the assumption that Congress does not cut your request for $90 million.

Attached is a recommended reply to Mrs. Thatcher. This message assures her of your continued support for the process of peaceful change in Zimbabwe and explains that despite the current stringent budgetary situation we will be able to allocate $15 million for Zimbabwe this fiscal year and up to $30 million for FY 81.

**Recommendation:**

That you sign the draft letter to Mrs. Thatcher at Tab 2.

\(^4\) There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendations, but in a March 31 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski stated that Carter approved: “15 million in grant assistance for Zimbabwe in 1980 from Southern Africa ESF; and approved in principle grant assistance in 1981 from ESF at a level of $25 million.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 44, Rhodesia: 1980)

## 257. Letter From President Carter to British Prime Minister Thatcher\(^1\)

Washington, March 31, 1980

Dear Madame Prime Minister:

Thank you for your message on Zimbabwe.\(^2\) I appreciate your thoughts on the role Western nations can play in building on the achievements of Lancaster House.

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 89, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia): 1/80–1/81. No classification marking.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 256.
Now that we are so close to the fulfillment of our common objectives in Zimbabwe, I agree that we should act quickly and visibly to honor our general commitment to assist in the agricultural and economic development of Zimbabwe.

Various obstacles have prevented us from giving as much assistance to southern Africa as we would like to give. Nevertheless, we have taken a number of steps that we hope will help to meet Zimbabwe’s immediate needs without weakening our continuing assistance to other nations in the region.

In January we pledged $5 million to the UN High Commission for Refugees to assist in the refugee repatriation effort. We have now identified an additional $15 million to assist in rural rehabilitation and for reconstruction and/or resettlement within Zimbabwe. We will therefore have committed $20 million to Zimbabwe from appropriations for this fiscal year, which ends September 30, 1980. For Fiscal Year 1981, my government expects, with Congressional approval, to extend additional economic support to Zimbabwe at the level of $25 to $30 million.

It is my intention to ask my representative to the Zimbabwe Independence ceremony to discuss this program with the new government during his stay in Salisbury next month.

In the days ahead, we will stay in close touch with your government on these most important matters.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter
258. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 27, 1980, 3–3:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Jimmy Carter
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State
Donald McHenry, Ambassador to the United Nations
Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Robert Keeley, Ambassador to Zimbabwe
Frank Press, Office of Science & Technology Policy
Henry Owen, Special Representative for International Summits
Louis Martin, White House Staff
Jerry Funk, NSC Staff
Paul Hare, Department of State
Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister of Zimbabwe
Bernard Chidzero, Minister for Economic Planning
Elleck K. Mashingaidze, Ambassador-designate to the United States

SUBJECT

Meeting with Prime Minister Mugabe of Zimbabwe (U)

The President and Prime Minister met with photographers and then joined the other members of the parties in the Cabinet Room. (U)

The President warmly welcomed the Prime Minister on his first visit to Washington. The entire world was thrilled on seeing Zimbabwe admitted into the United Nations and admired the stature, courage and sensitivity with which the Prime Minister was guiding his nation. The United States was pleased to have played a small role in this outcome. Our two nations had a common commitment to peace and justice in southern Africa and this occasion provided an invaluable opportunity to forge closer bonds and a process of consultation. (C)

The Prime Minister said how grateful and inspired he was to be in Washington. Yesterday, he had paid tribute to the United Nations; today he wished to express gratitude and joy for the support his cause had received from the President and the United States during the struggle for independence. (C)

Mugabe traced the history of the negotiations and referred to the efforts of Andrew Young, Don McHenry and Cyrus Vance to achieve

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President 8–11/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
2 An unknown hand crossed out “official” at this point in this sentence.
3 August 25.
a diplomatic solution. Those efforts had helped pave the way for the subsequent Lancaster House negotiations. He also expressed appreciation for American financial and material support, especially in the area of refugees. This had given his people hope. (C)

*Mugabe* said that the beliefs which had united us as allies in the past should continue. There were vast areas where our interests converge and we can derive inspiration from them. He repeated that he wanted the alliance between the two countries to endure. (C)

*Mugabe* said his country was in desperate need of aid. Zimbabwe cannot cope unless additional aid is received. His various ministries estimated that Zimbabwe required $350 million over the next two years for immediate reconstruction alone, such as for the repair and restoration of feeder roads, health clinics, schools and housing. This amount did not address larger issues such as the overhaul of the railroad system which desperately needed to be electrified and modernized. He said that the overall development requirements would mount upward to $4 billion over the next 4–5 years. However, the most pressing need at the moment was for reconstruction. (C)

*Mugabe* noted that the British had pledged 75 million pounds but much of this assistance had to be allocated for paying military instructors and for other services. There was little left over for the reconstruction and development requirements. He wished to leave the message that democracy will be made permanent in Zimbabwe if it can be consolidated by sufficient economic development. (C)

*The President* responded that considerable thought had been given to Zimbabwe’s economic needs. The country was blessed with considerable resources, and a strong infrastructure, physical and human. It resembled in some ways the situation in Europe after World War II. (C)

*The President* said that because of our budgetary cycle we had not been able to plan fully for an assistance program for Zimbabwe. He noted, however, that he did anticipate increasing our assistance levels in the months ahead, and that we want to move ahead quickly in such areas as the Housing Investment Guarantee Loan Program. (C)

*The President* referred to the possibilities in the private sector. The Chamber of Commerce trade mission in June had been very successful. He intended to send his Science Advisor, Frank Press, to Zimbabwe next month. These efforts need to be reinforced to promote investment and trade. There was, for example, a proposal to establish closer working relations between the two Chambers of Commerce in the United States and Zimbabwe. The World Bank and the international finance institutions will also provide facilities to secure short and long-term loans and can be especially helpful in supporting such programs as the electrification of the railroad system. Finally, the Export-Import Bank now has under consideration an application from The Wankie
Colliery for the purchase of a drag line. He had taken a personal interest in this loan, and though a decision by the Bank had not yet been reached, the President thought it would be favorable. (C)

The President said we had a great interest in cooperating on political problems. We were involved through the Contact Group on the Namibia issue. There seemed to be an inclination on the part of the South Africans to delay on a settlement; the United States wanted an expeditious settlement. We need to cooperate closely on this matter through our Ambassadors and at the UN. (C)

The President said he would welcome direct letters from the Prime Minister on issues of concern. He did not want issues to fester and grow. He had a personal interest in establishing direct communications. (C)

The President concluded that we have a problem about different perceptions on levels of assistance. However, these differences can be narrowed. We need to work together to resolve this issue. (C)

Mugabe said he was glad the President had raised the issues of Namibia and South Africa. He agreed that South Africa was delaying on a settlement and felt it was necessary for the United States to take positive action to move South Africa toward an agreement. (C)

Mugabe recounted the meeting of the Front Line states and SWAPO earlier this year. Sam Nujoma was quite forthcoming at this meeting. Nujoma accepts the principle of attendance by the internal parties if a conference were convened to iron out final agreement on the UN plan. In response to a question from the President, Mugabe said the negotiations would, however, have to be principally between South Africa and SWAPO. On other points, Nujoma agreed there was no need for SWAPO bases in Namibia after a cease-fire, though some sort of facility would be needed to look after the fighters during this period. On the DMZ, Angola and Zambia agreed to an increase in the number of South African bases in the DMZ as long as they were not in support of UNITA. (C)

Mugabe thought South Africa might be acting like a delinquent because at times they believe they have the support of the West, especially in vetoing sanctions. The threat of economic sanctions was required both with respect to Namibia and to give encouragement to the liberation movement in South Africa, which was in a much more difficult situation than during his struggle for independence. An oil boycott had also been discussed though Mugabe realized this would pose problems for Zimbabwe, which receives 85% of its oil imports through South Africa. However, he did not believe sanctions would have to be imposed if the threat were made sufficiently clear by the West. (C)

The President said our position on Namibia and apartheid had been made very clear. One had to consider the effect, however, of the
devastation of the South African economy on the region as a whole. Our ultimate goals are the same. How we reach them is a matter of joint work and consultation. (C)

The President said one of our problems in the Southern African region was the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in Angola. We would very much like to see a stable Angola and see the Cuban presence removed. (C)

In concluding, the President asked if there were any additional points to be raised. Mugabe asked if the difference on the level of aid was a result of budgetary constraints which he could appreciate, or were there ways to make Congress more responsive to Zimbabwe’s needs? The President referred to his earlier remarks on the budget process and predicted the amount of aid to Zimbabwe would increase and receive Congressional support. (C)

The President then escorted the Prime Minister to the East Room for a reception in his honor. (U)
South Africa

259. Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-4

Washington, January 21, 1977

TO
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
South Africa and Rhodesian Negotiations

The President has directed that the Policy Review Committee, under the chairmanship of the Department of State, undertake a review of U.S. policy toward Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia.

The review should:
1. Review the current status of the Rhodesian and Namibian negotiations, including the negotiating positions and indigenous public support for all participants. The positions of the Front-Line states, and other African and non-African governments involved, should be included.

2. Review current U.S. policy toward these negotiations and identify policy options for future U.S. roles in the area, including timing of the negotiations, and the effects of different U.S. policies on our relations with other black African states.


1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #5 Held 3/22/77, 3/77. Secret.
2 The Front Line States involved in the previous negotiations were Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique.
5. Assess the possibilities of the repeal of the Byrd amendment\(^3\) by Congress this year and the effects of repeal or non-repeal on the status of the Rhodesian conflict and on U.S. relations with African states.

6. Examine likely reactions by Congress and the American public to various U.S. options.

The review should be no longer than 30 pages. It should be completed by January 31, in time for consideration by the Policy Review Committee immediately thereafter.\(^4\)

The President has further directed that a comprehensive, long-term review of Southern Africa be undertaken by the Policy Review Committee. The review will be due in the spring and a follow-on tasking memorandum will be forthcoming.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

---

\(^3\) The Byrd Amendment prevented the President from restricting imports of strategic metals from non-Communist countries. (Congress and the Nation, vol. 3, 1969–1972, p. 892) On March 15, 1977, Congress enacted legislation (H.R. 1746) which retained the Byrd Amendment, but suspended its provisions involving imports from Rhodesia. Additionally, the bill required foreign steel suppliers to certify that their products did not contain Rhodesian chromium. (Congress and the Nation, vol. 5, 1977–1980, p. 47)

\(^4\) See Document 264.
260. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 25, 1977, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
United States
The Secretary
William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Peter Tarnoff, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Frank G. Wisner, AF/S (notetaker)

South Africa
R. F. Botha, Ambassador
Jeremy Shearer, Minister

SUBJECT
The Rhodesian Negotiations

Vance: Did you have a message to convey to me?

Botha: This is the first opportunity we have had to meet. I want to express my congratulations to you on your assuming your official duties. You hold one of the key posts in the world and the responsibilities which fall upon you are heavy. I wish you good luck.

Vance: Thank you. I appreciate that.

Botha: I sent a message to Bill Schaufele earlier to say that my government had advised the Rhodesians not to shoot down the British proposals. We believed that Smith would not shoot them down but would give them sympathetic consideration. The news yesterday took us by complete surprise. There was no consultation between my government and Smith on the position he took. Ivor Richard is now in Johannesburg. The British Ambassador, Sir David Scott, called Cape Town and spoke to Brand Fourie. Scott said that Richard was available to meet the Prime Minister if the Prime Minister wished. That was an unfortunate way to put the case. We had to reply that there was nothing immediate but I don’t know if Richard went to Cape Town or not.

My Prime Minister had two friendly and useful meetings with Richard. I was present at the first. During those meetings, my Prime Minister said that the talks in Geneva had not gone as well as we had

---

1 Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS Memcons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on January 26 by Wisner; approved on February 10 by Twaddel. The meeting took place in the Secretary’s office. Vance’s talking points for this meeting are attached to Document 131.

2 Botha’s message to Schaufele was not found.

3 See footnote 2, Document 131.
hoped. We have no doubts about the merits of the case. Secretary Kissinger cleared the Five Points which we discussed in Pretoria with President Kaunda and Nyerere. We understood that the Presidents had agreed to the Five Points as put to them by Secretary Kissinger. We received through your Ambassador in Pretoria a message confirming the fact that Kaunda and Nyerere had seen the points. Kissinger recommended that two points be added. He said that it would be possible for Smith to mention in his speech that the Ministers of Defense and Law and Order stay in white hands and that the Chairman of the Council of State could be a European. To confirm exactly what we understood to be the Five Points, your message spelled them out once again. On the basis of that message, we sent a signal to Smith. We mentioned no difficulties in obtaining African agreement. Had we known there were difficulties, we would have cited them. We were thus in good faith in transmitting exactly what you gave us. Smith was pleased and thereafter made his September 24 speech.

It came to us as a great shock when the situation changed. Smith’s speech was greeted in newspapers throughout the world. His commitment to majority rule was hailed. Kissinger’s achievement was called a miracle. But on the Sunday after, the Front Line Presidents met in Lusaka and shot down Smith’s offer. Let me repeat we had understood that the Secretary had discussed the Five Points with the African Presidents and that they had accepted them. Had we known that the Points had not been cleared with the Africans, we would have warned Smith differently. We would have said that he could advance the Five Points with the addition as his maximum position and then fall back at a later point. This, in our judgment, is where the negotiations went wrong.

No South African Prime Minister has ever gone back on his word. We assured Secretary Kissinger that we would hold Smith to whatever he announced. We knew there would be a great deal of suspicion among Africans that Smith would break his guarantee. We had hoped that we could dispel this suspicion with our own guarantee that Smith would agree to majority rule in two years. That’s what the whole war has been about. When the Prime Minister agreed to hold Smith to his

---

4 The proposal for a Rhodesian settlement, the Five Points, is printed in Tab 1, Document 264.
6 Not found.
commitment, I can assure you that had Smith moved back we would have moved.

Faced with this back-sliding, the Prime Minister feels that the rug has been pulled out from under him. We can only hold Smith firmly in the context of the Five Points. These are the facts, as we see them.

In Geneva, black suspicions were whipped up. Certainly, the Rhodesians contributed. There were documents circulated that the Rhodesians did not intend to keep their word and would carry on the struggle, but even more important, there was a great deal of jockeying for power among the black delegations which went to Geneva and their demands increased.

When Ivor Richard was received by my Prime Minister, we repeated our understanding of what happened to him. We were surprised to learn that the British were saying the Five Points were purely American proposals. This, we know, is not the case. We knew that Secretary Kissinger left Zurich for London to discuss British papers. We have the documents and they are typed on British stationery. We had always understood the process to be a British plan which was based on American leverage. All of this has given us to be suspicious of the British. I don’t understand why all the parties don’t put their cards on the table. This is not the time to play tricks. It’s the time to move openly, and we don’t like the British assertion that they were kept in the dark by you.

Despite this, my Prime Minister listened to Richard and Richard said that if he could get an African commitment on the British proposals, as well as a commitment to stop the war once an interim government was formed, could he count on South African support. The Prime Minister said yes Richard could proceed and that he would consider talking to the Rhodesians based on the results of Richard’s meetings with the Africans. He could, of course, make no commitment as to the position we would take.

Richard then returned to see my Prime Minister and he had nothing definite in hand. His talks were only at the interim stage. I understand Richard did not even expect a firm reply from my Prime Minister. Then, we got your message asking that we use our influence with Salisbury. 9 Despite everything, we passed our desire that the Rhodesians not reject the British proposals. Then came Smith’s speech.

We are interested in a peaceful solution, but we have come to the reluctant conclusion that it doesn’t matter what we put into play because the black side will advance new claims which are more radical.

9 Not found.
Every American and British move is seen by them as weakness. You can’t achieve a solution if this goes on.

Your predecessor saw us frequently. We were told that our attitude on Rhodesia and Namibia was reasonable. We were told that we had acted honorably. We were told that the process launched could lead to understanding, but we would like the United States Government to say that South Africa has been reasonable. Otherwise, there will be erosion of the peace potential. The change in proposals has given Smith a chance to get off the hook and we can’t hold him with the same degree of firmness that we could have held him to the Five Points. The Front Line Presidents have concluded they have a green traffic light. They have you on the run. You are scared of Soviet intrusions and will go to any lengths to try to head this off. Thus, they are prepared to leave their position open until victory is fully on their side.

I saw the Tanzanian Ambassador, Bomani, on January 20. He and I talked at some length and I reminded him South Africa sought a peaceful solution. I asked him if an independent Rhodesia under black rule within a reasonable period was not both of our nation’s objectives. I asked him if his government did not want Rhodesia to emerge with its economy intact. He agreed. I then said I did not understand why we could not work out problems together.

Bomani replied that the Africans had to recognize Mugabe. The Africans are not interested in Muzorewa, even if he has a majority of the votes. We don’t need, Bomani said, majorities of this sort in Africa. It’s not voting majorities we are interested in, but power. I understand the Africans predicament about Mugabe and Nkomo and trying to control the war. But they run a serious risk of turning Muzorewa against Mugabe and producing the very war they are trying to stop.

I asked Bomani why the Africans couldn’t agree to elect one black leader. He would then negotiate a settlement with Smith and consult on how elections could be carried out and independence achieved. Bomani told me that Mugabe would continue the civil war. If these are really his views, then what he is saying is that a few men with guns must rule the situation. We will have another FRELIMO or something like the MPLA in Angola. This is an awesome possibility. We simply can’t give up majority rule and let it be replaced by gun rule.

I told Bomani that we, the British and the Americans have tried to reach a settlement. Bomani questioned his President’s acceptance of the Five Points. He said Nyerere had never agreed to Kissinger’s proposals. I disagreed and told him what had happened, but I said, whether you believe me or not, at least you can admit that we have acted in good faith based on the assurances we received from the Americans. Bomani said that Vorster must play a key role. I told him that we can’t play if the carpet is continually being pulled out from
under our feet. In the end, there will be a bloodbath. This, Bomani agreed, must be avoided.

I also discussed with him the Seven Points on Namibia. I told him the United States had assured us these were reasonable propositions. We knew the conditions that Nyerere had said would be acceptable—moving the conference from Windhoek to someplace outside of Africa so that there would be no manipulation, as well as some way to include SWAPO. You know how difficult accepting SWAPO was for us. SWAPO is Communist-based with white origins. We know all about it. But we said we would make a conference possible in which SWAPO could take part. We believed these were the points that Nyerere asked you. But I must say we feel left in the lurch by the United States.

Vance: What points are in the lurch?

Botha: The United States did not stand by the Five Points. Nor did the British, even though South Africa was prepared to stand by them. We don’t expect you to support South Africa or whitewash us, but where apartheid is not in the picture and where we are contributing to peace we hope you will back us. Otherwise, we don’t know how to continue. I told Bill Schaufele that we might think about getting together at a high level—South Africa, the Front Line states, the British, the United States and France. If debates in the United Nations proceed as they have in the past, there will be trouble. We have the same aim, but we must be frank to realize that you cannot produce agreements through trip after trip and exchanges which produce misunderstandings. A high level understanding could close the process and make it work.

Vance: Thank you. Let me reply. I have talked to The President and he has asked me to convey his assurance that the United States is going to continue its search for peaceful solutions to the problems of southern Africa. He wants that message to be passed to your Prime Minister.

We have given similar assurances to the Front Line Presidents and other African leaders.

Needless to say, Smith’s January 24 speech greatly complicates the Rhodesian negotiations.

—The internal solution is not realistic and as we have told Smith the United States will give it no support.

—We are trying to keep the door to negotiations open and have said publicly the British proposals are a basis for continued talks. Smith must realize no settlement can be based on the Five Points alone. His

10 The Proposals for a Namibian Settlement, the Seven Points, is printed as Tab 2, Document 264.
statement that he is willing to negotiate the original Five Points with flexibility is no help at all.

As a matter of fact, Smith’s rejection of the British proposals has given the Africans an opportunity to reject further negotiations. If a deadlock is reached, he must be aware that he will face nothing short of stiff American opposition.

We will move to repeal the Byrd amendment and will review our policy of sanctions with a view to closing any existing loopholes. Until an interim government is formed, Rhodesia cannot count on American interest or sympathy, nor will it emerge from its current state of isolation.

As I have said, we continue our search for a negotiated settlement and are discussing the matter with the British. We need to have your government’s views on what steps can be taken to correct the present situation and expect to stay in close consultation with you. With respect to Namibia, we have told the Front Line Presidents, the Nigerians, and other African leaders that we remain committed to Namibian independence and a negotiated settlement which will achieve this objective. They know our good offices remain open. We are currently reviewing what steps will move the settlement along and we trust that your government will continue to refrain from taking any decisions that might foreclose the possibility of an internationally acceptable settlement.

Your government may wish to communicate to Salisbury the gist of my remarks on the Rhodesian question.

We have maintained useful communications to your government through you. We wish to continue to use your good offices and I am asking Assistant Secretary Schaufele to stay in touch so that our communications remain as effective in the future as they have been in the past.

Botha: Could I ask a question?
Vance: Yes.

Botha: When you say that the internal solution will receive no American support, have you told Smith that?
Vance: Bill, when was it?
Schaufele: In Geneva, we told Smith. Not now.

Botha: You mentioned the Byrd Amendment. What are your intentions there?
Vance: There is a bill to repeal the Amendment.

Botha: Would you shelve it if Smith came back to the conference table?

Vance: The bill is moving through the Congress but if asked the Administration will say that it supports repeal.
Botha: Even if Smith shows flexibility?

Vance: We must be frank. As far as the Byrd Amendment goes, it should be repealed.

Botha: But if Smith is negotiating, is it wise under these circumstances to move forward? Shouldn’t Smith be given some kind of encouragement.

Vance: Smith has shown no flexibility.

Botha: I appreciate the time you have given me.

One more question. Mr. Young, my new colleague, has asked me to meet him. When I do, I will have to say that statements like those which refer to the pressures we can bring to bear are not helpfully made in public. You must leave it to us.

Vance: I understand.

261. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Washington, January 28, 1977, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT
Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS

South Africa:
Ambassador R. F. Botha

U.S.:
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Brzezinski inquired whether Mr. Botha was related to the General Botha of Boer War fame. Botha replied that he was. Brzezinski related that as a child he had refought the war many times with his toy soldiers, and had always been on the side of the Boers. Botha replied that he was happy to hear it. Brzezinski then added: “I’m always in favor of national liberation movements—consistently”. Botha replied “I’m not so happy to hear that”.

Botha explained that his purpose in coming to see Brzezinski was to tell him that South Africa feels that “we’ve been let down by the

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Memcons: Brzezinski: 1–9/77. Confidential. The meeting took place at the White House.
Americans”, and why. Out of last year’s extended conversations in Germany, Switzerland, etc., had come a series of papers which constituted “at least an understanding, at most an agreement”. As far as South Africa was concerned these were not British proposals but were a joint British-American effort. They culminated in the well known 5-Point Plan which was “typed on American typewriters”. Two points were not spelled out, and were included in brackets. These concerned the proposal for white ministers in the two security positions, and a white Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Botha acknowledged that Kissinger made no promises on these at the meeting in Pretoria where he, Smith and Volster were all present.

At that meeting, Botha said, Smith accepted the 5-Point Plan in principle. It was a very painful, solemn, but “touching and sincere” meeting. Upon reading the plan, Smith turned to Kissinger and said “so you want me to sign my own death note”. But Botha emphasized that whatever happened later, at that time Smith did accept the 5-Point Plan as the basis for serious negotiations.

A few days later, the American Embassy informed the South African government that the plan could now include the two bracketed points, and again according to Botha, the new version was typed at the American Embassy. The Americans gave the South Africans and the Rhodesians “no warnings, no caveats” that this would be anything other than a bona fide negotiation plan. Smith accepted this and presented the 5-Point Plan unchanged in his statement of September 24. But just a few days later the African front-line Presidents met, and started to shoot down these proposals.

Botha then talked at length of the key South African concern that a plan be developed which would allow for an interim period so that the Rhodesian economy could be kept intact. Otherwise, Rhodesia’s fate would resemble Mozambique’s which is now dependent upon South Africa for food, energy and other forms of support. If the Rhodesian economy is not preserved, then whoever comes to power there—black or white—will simply have to depend on some outside nation for economic help, and there still will not be African rule.

Concerning the present status of negotiations, Botha said “there is no way we can get out of this unless an agreement is an agreement.” He urged that the Americans require all sides to stick to what they agree to. Only in this way can the government of South Africa play a constructive role in holding Smith to his agreement. But if Americans

---

2 The Five Point Plan is included in Tab 1 to Document 264.
continue to “tell blacks that you want peace at all costs, they will keep raising the price.” South Africa will not break its word. But now, “you are missing golden opportunities for peace.” Botha closed by emphasizing again that the only way to stop further Russian intrusion in Africa is through economic growth, and therefore through a gradual transition to majority rule that will not damage the Rhodesian economy.

Brzezinski replied that he was grateful to Botha for sharing his thoughts so openly with him, and emphasized that he cannot engage in negotiations since that is the job of the Secretary of State. However, he wanted to put the conversation in a broader historical context. He sees the problem in the Southern African arc as a case of adjustments to changing political and social conditions coming too late. If you compare Mozambique for example, to Nigeria or the Ivory Coast or Senegal, the difference is that in the latter case historical trends were understood and anticipated, while in Mozambique they were resisted until too late. The lesson for us all, and for South Africa in particular, is that we do live in a world of extraordinary change. The United States cannot afford to become involved in a struggle where objectively or subjectively it would be seen as being against blacks, nor would it accept a position where our policies would force blacks into an alliance with communists.

He remarked that we must remember that the aspirations of the Southern African blacks are “fundamentally legitimate” even if certain individuals may seem too radical or ill prepared to govern. The problem with Mr. Smith is that for years he has resisted these legitimate goals. This is why we have to take into account the mood of the African blacks.

Brzezinski emphasized that if the black-white struggle in Southern Africa also becomes a red-white conflict “it will be a disaster”. He added that no one in South Africa should be under the illusion that if this happens we will side with the whites against the blacks simply because that would be the anti-red position. Botha answered that “we have no illusions”. Brzezinski replied that he understood that, but believed that Salisbury may harbour illusions, and this would be very dangerous. Brzezinski emphasized that “the longer this goes on, the greater the chance for the two conflicts to interlock”. There is no opportunity for too many more delays. He closed by adding that Botha should understand that his position on Southern Africa was “not divorced from the human dimension” or from his personal admiration for the historical role of the South African whites—referring again to his opening remarks.

Botha remarked that he understood what Brzezinski was saying, but that he did not feel that Americans fully appreciated the South African “fear of domination”. Brzezinski replied that that was probably true, but that the South Africans should understand the overriding
need for accommodation. “Once you begin to see the radicalization of your younger black generations it will be too late”. Brzezinski added that from his own historical studies, he believes that once an urban working class acquires political consciousness the momentum is too great to stop.

Botha turned to the subject of Namibia, saying that he believes that there is real hope for peace, but “we won’t be able to turn the territory over to SWAPO—no one could survive that in South Africa”.

He closed with a very strong appeal to South African nationalism. “In South Africa we have never shared power. We fought the British, and our nationalism now is as strong as ever. We will do it again. We do not fear to fight as long as we don’t have to fight the Russians. Brzezinski asked: “But who’s going to keep them out?” Botha replied “if necessary we will raise an army of a million men—black and white”. Brzezinski said yes, they could do that, but isn’t it a “grim prospect”. Botha did not reply. Brzezinski finished the conversation by urging Botha that his government make sure that Mr. Smith has no illusions as to American intentions. He urged the need to “make it clear to Smith once and for all” that the U.S. will never intervene in the conflict on the side of a minority white government, even if the communists were involved.

262. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 3, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

5. South Africa: South African Ambassador Botha called Bill Schaufele today to ask whether your statement of last night favoring “majority rule in southern Africa” meant that the US favors majority rule not only in Namibia and Rhodesia but also in South Africa.

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1-2/77. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Carter wrote “Cy” and initialed the memorandum at the top of the first page.

2 On February 2, Carter delivered an address at the White House, which was broadcast live on radio and television. He said: “Our Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, left last night on a visit to Africa to demonstrate our friendship for its peoples and our commitment to peaceful change toward majority rule in Southern Africa.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book I, p. 76)
Schaufele replied that we support the principle of majority rule throughout the region, and he took the opportunity of Botha’s call to reiterate our strong urging that South Africa not take any action on Namibia that would be unacceptable to the international community.3

3 Carter initialed the bottom right-hand corner of this paragraph.

263. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 3, 1977

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South Funk, Subject File, Box 115, South Africa: Nuclear Issues: 3–4/77. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. 3 pages not declassified.]
1. Introduction

The urgent problems of southern Africa require decisions which will affect not only the possibilities of negotiated solutions to the Rhodesian and Namibian problems, but also our approach to the racial question in South Africa and consequently our relations with that country and the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, what choices the Administration makes on these questions will have significant domestic implications.

The United States cannot by itself shape the destiny of the people of southern Africa. We cannot impose blueprints for just societies in any of the southern African countries. But we do have influence which we can apply and which could have an important effect on the immediate and long-term future of that area consistent with US interests.

US Interests: US economic and strategic interests in southern Africa, while not vital to our national security or economic well-being, are nevertheless important, particularly in South Africa. These need to be viewed on a long-term basis as well as from a more immediate perspective: For example, with regard to South Africa, many believe we can best preserve our interests there by doing all we can to help stimulate peaceful progress to racial equality and eventual majority rule rather than taking a relatively passive approach and risk increasing danger of black-white confrontation.

Southern Africa represents a growing market for American products. We enjoy a favorable balance of trade in the region ($460 million with South Africa in 1975). US southern African investments, mainly but not solely in South Africa, now exceed $1.5 billion; it is in our interest that South Africa’s advanced nuclear technology be used for

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 1, NSC Meeting: #5 Held 3/22/77, 3/77. Secret. Prepared in response to Presidential Review Memorandum/NSC-4. Jeanne Davis sent the study, chaired by the Department of State, to Mondale Vance, Harold Brown, Turner, General George Brown, and Young under a February 5 covering memorandum. Brackets are in the original except where used to indicate where material has been omitted.
peaceful purposes; Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa are sources of strategically important minerals (e.g., 98% of the known free world reserves of chromium lie in Rhodesia and South Africa); for strategic reasons we have an interest in maintaining landing and overflight privileges for US military aircraft, retaining standby use of US space-tracking capabilities and, if required and politically feasible, having access to ship repair and logistical facilities; we would not want these facilities to pass into unfriendly hands; it is important that the Cape sea route stay open. (Within the Executive Branch, there are differing opinions about the relative importance of these economic and strategic interests. See page 30 below for discussion.)

In a broader context, a major US concern is to help find a peaceful avenue to settlements leading to self-determination and majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia, and to see an end to apartheid in South Africa. There are many reasons for this:

—One is humanitarian—to see a) an end to bloodshed and destruction and pervasive racial discrimination, and b) the accordence of equal rights to all the people of the area.

—Intensified violence in Rhodesia would probably have serious political and economic consequences in Zambia and Botswana, adversely affecting the attitude or even the stability and composition of their current moderate governments. It would also add to Zaire’s serious economic problems. And it would prolong the unsettled political and economic conditions in Mozambique.

—Violent resistance by blacks against efforts by whites indefinitely to maintain their domination in Rhodesia, Namibia or South Africa would increase the chances of increased Communist influence, major power confrontation in the area and a kind of involvement on our part which the American people do not want and would not support.

—Our policies for southern Africa, and especially how we deal with South Africa in the coming months and years, will have a major impact on our relations with Africa and will affect our position in the United Nations and other international forums.

—We must bear in mind the serious emotional and political impact that a mass white exodus or, far worse, widespread racial war in southern Africa would have within our own society.

Interconnected Problems: The major problems of southern Africa are closely interrelated. In terms of urgency, the Rhodesian problem is highest priority. The outcome of this question will affect the future of South Africa and is likely to have a bearing on progress toward a Namibian settlement. The way in which self-determination and independence are achieved in Namibia will have significant consequences for South Africa’s domestic situation and its status in the international
community. As for South Africa, developments in that country are certain to have a major impact on the future of all the rest of southern Africa. Because these issues are intertwined, in considering possible courses of action this paper, in addition to identifying options for each individual problem, also frames broad options affecting our overall approach to South Africa in the context of the entire southern African situation.

II. Effect of US Southern African Policies on Our Position in the UN and Other North-South Forums

Constituting one-third of the UN membership, the 48 nations of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) can form a formidable voting bloc on issues of importance to them. The primary unifying issues for the Africans are the racial and human rights problems in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia, and the ideological and practical issues of economic development embodied in the “new international economic order.” African attitudes toward the United States are based to a great degree on their perception of US policy and US action on these two issues.

In recent years the US has found itself isolated in UN forums from the mainstream of African and Third World opinion on southern Africa. In votes in the UN General Assembly and Security Council we have found ourselves in company primarily with Britain, France and Israel in opposing more drastic measures against South Africa for its apartheid policies and continued illegal occupation of Namibia. Our voting posture has drawn sharp criticism from the Third World and repeated demands that the US:

—support the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the UN Charter on the grounds either that South Africa’s occupation of Namibia or its apartheid policies constitute a threat to international peace and security;
—use our leverage on South Africa to effect internal change; and (ironically at the same time)
—cut off all business and trade with South Africa in order to hasten the demise of the white minority government;
—further tighten sanctions against Rhodesia.

We have reasonably good bilateral relations with most African states. However, faced with their own inability to effect change in South Africa and Namibia, the Africans, particularly the radical states, have used UN forums to portray the US as the major political and economic supporter of South Africa.

A Breathing Spell: The April 1976 Lusaka initiative by Secretary Kissinger and the subsequent negotiations and Geneva Conference

---

heightened African expectations (especially among our moderate friends) that the US was “at last going to bring about extensive change in southern Africa.” Consequently, these moves on our part to some extent diminished the usual kind of accusations against us at the UN. And in deference to the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia, then at a critical stage, the Africans agreed to a relatively moderate resolution on Rhodesia at the 31st UNGA.

The perception of a new direction in America’s southern African policy contributed, along with other factors, to better results for some of our efforts in international forums. At the UNGA session, the OAU and Non-Aligned meetings preceding it, and the UNESCO General Conference at Nairobi, many African states threw their considerable weight behind moderate positions on many issues of importance to us. For example, they played a major role in preventing the issues of Korea and Puerto Rico from surfacing at the General Assembly, and helped keep Middle East issues in check. In the absence of movement on apartheid and Namibia, however, the Africans intensified their UN rhetoric in resolutions endorsing armed struggle and Chapter VII mandatory sanctions against South Africa on apartheid and Namibia.

The election of President Carter and his designation of Andrew Young as UN Ambassador have raised African expectations at the UN that the US will play an aggressive role in pursuit of majority rule and independence in southern Africa. Our response to the breakdown of the Geneva Conference and our actions at the anticipated Security Council meetings on apartheid and Namibia this spring will be looked on by the Africans as key indicators of the commitment of the US in southern Africa. The attacks on US policies which were relatively subdued in 1976 probably would erupt against the US if the African states concluded that the new Administration had not moved far enough toward their position on southern Africa and international economic matters.

III. Rhodesia

[Omitted here are background information and material on the current status of negotiations.]

B. US Policy

Prior to 1976 the US Government avoided direct involvement in attempts to resolve the Rhodesian issue. The problem was viewed as primarily one of British responsibility to solve. However, the changed political and military situation in southern Africa led Secretary Kissinger to embark on his initiative, which was aimed at the achievement of majority rule with equal rights for all the people of Rhodesia. The primary consideration for this was to forestall increased Soviet and
Cuban involvement and the possibility of extensive influence on their part in the region. We have backed the latest British efforts and supported their proposals as a basis for further negotiations. With the encouragement of the Front Line Presidents and other African leaders, we have dealt with South Africa as a key to reaching a settlement.

Because of the importance attached to South African cooperation, the Administration decided that within the basic policy of restraint on our relations with South Africa, we would avoid taking any further restrictive actions which could have had an adverse effect on our relationship with the South African Government. We continued to criticize apartheid, in the UN and elsewhere, and deplored in general terms the recent violence in South Africa. But we did not, as we might have in the past under similar circumstances, condemn the numerous bannings and detentions which accompanied the recent unrest in South Africa.

Our willingness, together with the British, to organize a major international economic assistance program to smooth the transition to majority rule was an important factor in gaining Smith’s acceptance of the original terms for a political settlement. As long as the possibility of a peaceful settlement has not been irrevocably foreclosed, the Zimbabwe Development Fund could still be a factor in encouraging a negotiated solution.

The next steps in organizing the Fund will depend largely on the degree of progress achieved on the political front: if a political breakthrough is achieved, we should decide whether or not to proceed to the next phase of consultations with other prospective donors. In the absence of significant progress on the political front, further action to organize the Fund probably should be postponed.

C. Options

1. Press actively and immediately, in consultation with all the parties, for a new set of proposals justifying a fresh round of consultations in Africa.

While this would demonstrate our continuing commitment to a negotiated settlement, we would have to consider whether the prospects for success justified the commitment of US influence and prestige.

Now, following Rhodesia’s rejection of the British proposals, the involved black African states might not cooperate actively to get negotiations back on track, but rather would wait to see whether US/South African pressures bring Rhodesia into line. However, they and other African states are not likely to resent strongly an effort on our part for negotiations unless we based this on proposals far at variance with the British proposals.

There are different ways, singly or in combination, to implement this option: primarily through the British; a major effort at persuading the Front Line Presidents and other key African leaders; an attempt to
persuade South Africa to put pressures on the Rhodesians; or, if this produces no results, an application of our own pressures on the South Africans. A combination of these steps is probably preferable to employing only one of them.

2. *Suspend our efforts and allow for a “cooling-off” period that might last as long as six months.*

We would conclude that a breakdown is an indication that none of the parties is ready to negotiate realistically and that more time is needed to permit a new consensus to develop. The Rhodesians must come to the full realization that time is working against them and that greater flexibility will be required. The Front Line Presidents and the Rhodesian nationalists must come to understand that in all likelihood a solution by violence will lead to Rhodesian independence later rather than earlier.

While this might not meet with strong African disapproval, it could lead to the very conditions we have been seeking to avoid—escalating violence and opportunities for exploitation of the situation by the Soviets, and a general hardening of positions.

3. *Abandon our current efforts; tell all parties that we can do no more to get negotiations going again.*

This has the virtue of getting us out of an impossible situation, given the apparently irreconcilable differences between the Smith regime and the nationalists. It also would dissociate us from any solution, however promising at its outset, which could eventually end in civil war among contending black Rhodesian factions. However, obviously we would be relinquishing any possibility of using our influence to tip the balance in favor of a resumption of negotiations. Assuming this option would end hope for resumption of negotiations in the immediate future, violence could intensify, with increased potential for active Cuban combat involvement and greater Soviet influence.

*The Byrd Amendment:* This is likely to become a key issue during the First Session of the 95th Congress. Several members have tabled bills in both the Senate and House to repeal the measure. However, an informal sounding in the House by the repeal sponsors indicates now that in the absence of a strong Administration endorsement, their effort may fall short of approval by 20–30 votes. Prospects for repeal are considerably better in the Senate than in the House. Moreover, members of both houses have told us that a vigorous campaign by the Administration would improve prospects in the House substantially. Advocates of repeal indicate that as a temporizing measure (in order to rally support) they would like to have the Senate take the lead in debate. In the interim, Congressional sponsors look to the President for establishment of arrangements for close consultation between Congressional leaders and the Executive Branch.
A Congressional vote against repeal of the Byrd Amendment would encourage the Rhodesian regime to persist in rejection of negotiations, and would tend to confirm suspicions of many African and US critics of our current policy that the USG is really not committed to majority rule. Deferral of an effort to repeal, in anticipation of defeat, would have a similar but lesser effect.

Repeal, on the other hand, would have a psychological impact on Rhodesian whites and provide further evidence to the Smith regime that it cannot expect help from the US. Repeal would also be of significant symbolic importance to Africans, confirming our commitment to majority rule in Rhodesia and indicating that continued US involvement would be positive in terms of their interests during the period of interim government.

**Other Steps:** In addition to repeal of the Byrd Amendment, there are other non-diplomatic measures to which we might resort in order to help dispel doubts about our opposition to the continuance of white minority rule in Rhodesia and to add to our signals to Smith that we mean business. Any one of these would meet with the approval of African states and would be consistent in varying degrees with each of the options listed above. However, each poses a disadvantage or problem and an interagency group should look into the full consequences of implementation, if a decision is made to move ahead in this regard.

1. Cut off the remaining legitimate US financial inflow into Rhodesia. (This would deny funds to missionary and certain charitable organizations in Rhodesia.)
2. Cut communications with Rhodesia. (Would meet with strong domestic and some international resistance.)
3. Close the Rhodesian Information Office. (Would be opposed by conservatives in Congress and would pose a First Amendment problem.)
4. Tighten even further the travel of Rhodesians to the US. (Conservatives would oppose.)
5. Examine ways to block diversions of US products into Rhodesia.
6. If the Byrd Amendment is repealed, pursue internationally a tightening of sanctions with nations that have been lax in their enforcement.

**IV. Namibia**

[Omitted here are background information and material on the current status of negotiations.]

**B. US Policy**

Over the years the United States has consistently opposed South Africa’s illegal administration of Namibia and the imposition of apart-
heid to the territory. Since May 1970, the USG has officially discouraged American investment in Namibia. Ex-Im Bank guarantees and other facilities are not available for trade with Namibia. We maintain no permanent diplomatic or consular representation in the territory. And we have repeatedly pressed the South Africans to accede to the United Nations’ position on Namibia. But we have vetoed supporting UN resolutions calling for Chapter VII action against South Africa.

As part of our 1976 initiatives on Southern Africa, we have pressed South Africa to accept proposals for the negotiation of a Namibian settlement which, if accepted by SWAPO and the front line states, would lead to Namibian independence. In our discussions with the South Africans they have agreed to confirm a date of independence (December 31, 1978). They have also agreed to the convening of a conference under UN auspices at a neutral site, the inclusion of SWAPO in the discussions, and acceptance of whatever conclusions the Namibian parties negotiate at the conference. They have also indicated their willingness to assign a South African representative to negotiate at the conference bilateral issues affecting Namibia’s relationship with South Africa (troop withdrawals, financial arrangements, the status of Walvis Bay). In addition, the South Africans have said they would send only a small representative delegation from the Turnhalle Conference, thereby meeting SWAPO’s concern that its voice would be lost in a multitude of Namibian parties. South Africa also has agreed to release a substantial number of political prisoners prior to the convening of a conference.

However, as noted above, SWAPO does not appear disposed to move forward toward a Geneva conference on Namibia on the basis of the proposals offered, which they regard as incompatible with their expressed positions of favoring direct talks with South Africa under UN chairmanship and rejection of participation by the Turnhalle parties. With progress toward a conference stalled, the South Africans have given increased priority to a possible “internal solution” through the Turnhalle framework.

C. Options

The following are not mutually exclusive.

1. After determining where the South African Government stands on its seven points for negotiations on Namibia, explore carefully with the Front Line Presidents, Nigeria and SWAPO whether they are willing to consider the seven points as a basis for negotiations. In this process we would reaffirm our willingness to extend our good offices to develop a negotiating framework suitable to all the parties. At the same time, to prepare ourselves for the
possibility of an impasse, we should study the alternative of pressing for a settlement along the lines of UN Security Council Resolution 385.  

A negotiated settlement is still highly desirable and, according to available evidence, possible. Thus we should persist in exploring fully any avenues open to us in this regard. Our continued involvement would demonstrate that the Carter Administration is committed to an active role, which the Africans favor, in the effort to resolve the Namibian issue. A disadvantage of this approach is that it continues to commit US prestige and influence to what might be a futile task, if either the SAG or SWAPO, or both, are unwilling to bend at all from their stated positions. Consequently, we need to look into the ramifications of pursuing a solution much closer to the substance of UNSC 385.

2. Acknowledge that we have gone about as far as we can go and withdraw from active participation in the diplomatic effort in a manner suggesting our willingness to re-enter the scene should a change in the situation warrant it.

To temporarily pull back might give all parties time to reassess their positions and conceivably recognize the worth of the role we have attempted to play. It would also indicate that we are not willing to accept a Namibian settlement at any price, but only one which will create a truly independent and united Namibia; we do not want another Angola. The disadvantages of this option are that, as time passes, positions on all sides may harden, events within Namibia, e.g., the creation of an interim government, may proceed to the point that further negotiations become more difficult, and more opportunity is provided to the Soviets and Cubans to gain greater influence over SWAPO.

3. Accept SWAPO’s insistence on direct negotiations with the SAG and its other negotiation preconditions.

4. Adopt a harsher line toward the SAG in our bilateral relations and in the United Nations to try to produce SAG compliance with the terms of the Security Council requirements.

These third and fourth options offer the advantages of presenting an image of American policy toward South Africa which will be applauded and accepted by most African states and important US domestic and Congressional elements. The disadvantages of adopting SWAPO’s position and/or attempting to exert pressure upon the South Africans is that our influence with the SAG could diminish rather than increase. The South African tendency to go-it-alone and impose their

---

3 UNSC Resolution 385, adopted unanimously on January 30, 1976, reaffirmed the United Nation’s legal responsibility for Namibia and demanded that South Africa allow a UN-organized election for a new government, the release of all political prisoners, and South African withdrawal from Namibia.
own solution upon Namibia (which would undoubtedly be rejected by most of the international community) could be heightened. And a tougher US stance with the South African Government would be opposed by significant elements of public and Congressional opinion in this country.

5. Conclude that the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference currently meeting in Windhoek might, if not unduly rigged by the SAG, offer the best opportunity for Namibian independence and attempt to influence its deliberations.

Accepting the Turnhalle Conference action, which has been rejected by SWAPO and the African states as an instrument of South African manipulation, has the advantage of giving us a ground floor position on influence in whatever Namibian government might evolve from it. Further, South African appreciation of our acceptance of the Turnhalle might translate into more forthcoming South African attitudes leading to the creation of a truly multiracial and moderate Namibian state. The negative implications of this option are that we would associate ourselves with an enterprise which has little chance of creating a truly independent state and which has excluded SWAPO, Namibia’s dominant political force, from its deliberations. We would become in the eyes of many, both within and outside Namibia, accomplices in South Africa’s designs for the territory.

6. Take no position on the Turnhalle talks.

Taking no position on the Turnhalle would allow us to keep our options open in the admittedly unlikely event that the Conference in Windhoek does produce a government which is ultimately acceptable to world opinion. Conversely, not voicing a position on the Conference opens us to the charge that our noncommittal posture on an almost universally condemned endeavor would be tantamount to acceptance.

7. Under any of the foregoing options, directly warn the Soviets that whatever policy the Administration adopts does not encompass acceptance of wider incremented Soviet or Cuban influence or activity in the area.

A direct and unmistakable warning to the Soviets presents the advantage of possibly impressing upon Soviet policy makers a need for caution for themselves and their Cuban clients. On the other hand, a formal approach might encourage the Soviets to test our resolve by choosing a relatively remote area of the world in which to confront us. Such a direct warning might also lead to negative results should we be unwilling to or incapable of following through our implicit threats of some form of retaliatory action.

---

4 See footnote 2, Document 43.
Other Steps: Regardless of which approach we take regarding Namibia (but most consistent with Option 4), we could resort to any of several measures to demonstrate our opposition to the continuance of South African control over Namibia. An interagency group could be convoked to consider the desirability and feasibility of taking such steps, which include:

—legislation to deny tax credits to US firms which have investments in Namibia;
—participation in the Council for Namibia;
—support for efforts by the Council to restrict South African exploitation of Namibian resources.

V. South Africa

A. Major Alternatives for the US

Whatever we do on all the southern African issues, our relationship with South Africa has primary focus. A key element in this regard is the relative importance we attach, on the one hand, to our interests in South Africa, now especially including the Vorster Government’s cooperation in the Rhodesian and Namibian problems; and on the other hand, the effects any relationship we have with South Africa will have on our dealings with the rest of Africa and also on the US domestic situation. The moral issue of apartheid must figure into this along with economic and strategic considerations.

Decisions regarding specific approaches to our relationship with South Africa in connection with the totality of southern African issues should be made within a framework of one of the following three basic options. (More specific options regarding South Africa are presented and discussed in Section V.–E.)

1. Peaceful solutions to the Rhodesian and Namibian problems are of such immediate and fundamental importance to US national interests that our first priority must be to achieve them. South Africa is crucial to progress in this regard. The best way to encourage the South African Government to assume to the fullest its necessary role is for the US to work closely with it and to avoid actions which could drive the South Africans to a posture of non-cooperation, while maintaining the essential elements of our current policy of restraints on our relations with South Africa.

The advantage of this option is that it might provide the best avenue to get South Africa to put the kinds of pressures on Smith that would bring him back to the negotiating table, and to get South Africa itself to agree to compromises which could lead to an agreeable negotiating framework for Namibia. The major disadvantage is that it would force us to temper our approach to apartheid and leave us open to increased criticism from Africans and others who feel that if we do
not move more firmly against South Africa’s racial policies, we will be aiding and abetting those very policies. Moreover, although South Africa has been generally cooperative on Rhodesia and Namibia, as yet our effort to deal through them has not produced sufficiently strong pressures on Smith.

Once it perceived its own advantage in doing so, South Africa cooperated in producing proposals for a Namibian settlement and in getting Smith to Geneva on the basis of the five points. It is too early to know how cooperative they will be in coming to final resolutions of these two issues. As yet, South Africa remains the major support for the status quo in Rhodesia.

2. Recent events in Rhodesia and lack of progress on Namibia show that some way has to be found to get South Africa to push the Rhodesians harder as well as to be more flexible itself on Namibia. As in option 1, our first priority would be to solve the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. However, our tactical approach to getting the fullest measure of South African cooperation would differ, involving initially the offer of a limited inducement: we would tell the South Africans that they should move more firmly to bring Smith into line and do more to act in accordance with UN demands to accord self-government to Namibia. If they did this, we would continue our close consultative relationship and, moreover, let them know we would refrain from acceding to the mounting pressures on us to take certain actions to manifest more unequivocally our opposition to apartheid. (If this strategy were adopted, it would be important that whatever we do or avoid doing on South Africa’s behalf be confined to situations that would have only short-term effects—e.g., our position on resolutions that could come up in the UN. That is, we make sure we do not get locked into any position that could be construed as having a long-term favorable effect on the continuance of apartheid.)

If, however, the South Africans did not respond with pressure on the Smith regime, we would take more vigorous action along the lines of option 3 (below).

This option would serve the same purpose as option 1 but would have the advantage of, while possibly producing some South African movement on Rhodesia and Namibia, not involving ourselves in any action, or inaction, that could commit or appear to commit us to long-term support for South Africa. This option could be explained to the Front Line States and thereby avoid any misperceptions they might have about our attitude toward apartheid.

Nevertheless, in taking this general approach toward South Africa, if they took us up on our inducement we would continue to be subjected to criticism and pressures from some Africans and some in this country who want us to take measures now against South Africa. With respect to the South Africans, it could elicit either one of two different unfavorable
reactions: a) they could believe that our expressed concern about apartheid is not serious and therefore not feel any greater need to make really significant changes in their racial policies, or b) even this relatively soft-glove nudge by us could produce a refractory response on their part.

3. We would come to grips at the same time with each of the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa, treating each one separately on its own merits. We would state to the Vorster Government that the future of our relations would be determined not only by what they do regarding Rhodesia and Namibia, but also by how they handle race relations in their own country. We would tell them that we are taking this stance because of our principles, and our foreign and domestic imperatives. We could give them a short time to demonstrate clearly that they are moving away from apartheid, or instead of waiting we could begin immediately to take some steps to demonstrate to them and the rest of the world that we mean what we say when we express abhorrence of apartheid.

This option would provide to the world and to the American people a clear exposition of our commitment to human rights and our determined opposition to apartheid. It would, once underway, win approval of black African and many other countries, and defuse some strong criticisms we have been receiving here at home. It could help convince the South Africans that they cannot have the kind of relationship they want with us or count on our support, when or if they need it, unless they begin to dismantle apartheid. Our position in international forums would likely be improved. Since the SAG has not really moved decisively to end the Rhodesian and Namibian crises, it can be argued that stronger words and some actions by us against South Africa cannot worsen the situation.

However, there would be opposition to this approach in this country. And we would run the risk that we could lose South Africa’s willingness to be cooperative with us, even more than they have already, on Rhodesia and Namibia. There is also the possibility that a tough line by us will only contribute to South African intransigence and lead to more repression in South Africa.

B. Current Status and Background

For the better part of three centuries racial discrimination in one form or another has existed in South Africa. But in the past 30 years or so it has been extended and institutionalized in a way now unique in the world. White supremacy is maintained by a complex system of interwoven coercive economic and social controls. The South African system of laws in which a privileged minority maintains dominance over the majority is the only one in the world based on color.

Violence: The growing polarization of the races in South Africa and increasing militancy of young blacks, along with the essentially
inflexible attitude of the white ruling establishment, point to continued sporadic outbreaks of violence. The response to those who deplore this is that South Africa’s system of racism and repression constitutes a form of violence against South African blacks.

Because of the laws at its disposal and the power of its security apparatus, the government can probably forestall any widespread uprisings by blacks for the foreseeable future. But the longer that black aspirations are met with repressive measures and minor concessions, the more likely violent confrontation will become, possibly culminating in outside involvement.

The Prospects for Positive Changes: There are differing perceptions of change in the white community. Supporters of the government believe that it has gone to great lengths to meet black aspirations, has brought about significant improvements in the conditions of blacks, and is doing all it can to remove unpalatable aspects of discrimination. White liberal ferment is at an all-time high. Among English-speaking white South Africans, opposition to government policies is growing. Even Afrikaner public opinion leaders and some businessmen show growing dissatisfaction. But this vocal, articulate element of Afrikaner and English-speaking white society represents only a small percentage of the electorate—ten percent at best. It is generally believed that the bulk of the Afrikaner community, and many English-speakers, are opposed to any fundamental alteration of South African laws and customs. The vast majority of black South Africans, on the other hand, are strongly opposed to the system.

Recently, our Ambassador in Pretoria reported that key government figures, including Prime Minister Vorster and other Cabinet members, “adhere to the traditional apartheid policy both because of personal orientation and how they read the mood of Afrikanerdom. The rank and file prefer the system.”

Despite sustained internal and external pressures for change, positive modifications of apartheid have been marginal. The forces acting against fundamental changes in race relations continue to be formidable. The National Party’s approach to race relations remains very much influenced by traditional attitudes of innate conservatism, racial prejudice, and fear of black domination. In white society, these factors persist, rooted as they are in history and religion and sustained by an economic system dependent on cheap labor. Furthermore, racism has been fed by certain events in black Africa in the past decade or so (e.g., the Congo crisis, Amin’s excesses in Uganda) which have added to many whites’ certainty of their superiority. Political equality for blacks is equated with catastrophic black rule and “an end to Christian, western civilization.”

In any event, although the South African Government has made some adjustments in its racial policies and has indicated it will do more
to improve the condition of blacks, it insists it will not share political power in such a way that blacks would have full participation in the political process. The SAG and those who support its domestic policies maintain that “separate development” is the only way through which racial harmony can be achieved in South Africa.

C. US Policy

Over the past 25 years the US has consistently condemned apartheid. During the Eisenhower years, the US took a cautious position on the South African issue.

From 1961 through 1968, the US stance against South Africa hardened. We voted in support of resolutions condemning apartheid but abstained on those which called for specific measures against South Africa. We demonstrated our opposition to apartheid by unilaterally instituting a partial arms embargo against South Africa in 1962 and expanding that by supporting a voluntary comprehensive UN embargo in 1963. In 1964 we placed restrictions on the use of EX–IM Bank facilities to promote exports to South Africa.

In 1969, it was decided that the whites in South Africa would continue to retain power for the foreseeable future and that our interests would best be served by communicating with them, and all other ethnic groups in South Africa, in order to exert more influence on the course of events there. Another element of this conceptual shift was the idea that, as the South African economy developed, dependence on black labor would lead to the erosion of apartheid and move the South African Government away from its intransigence. At the same time, we would continue to show our opposition to apartheid through various restraints on our political, economic, and military relations with the South Africans.

Those restraints include public statements reiterating our opposition to apartheid; support for a USG-imposed arms embargo; a prohibition on naval visits; restrictions on military contacts; neither discouraging nor encouraging US investments in South Africa; denial of EX–IM Bank direct credits, except for discount loans up to $2 million, but extension of limited loan guarantees; encouraging enlightened employment practices by US firms there; refusal to recognize the Transkei; and maintenance of correct but not close government-to-government relations. Our policy includes a normal trade relationship and cooperation in the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. In recent months, because of the belief that South African cooperation is vital to the success of negotiated settlements for Rhodesia and Namibia, we have entered into greater consultation with the SAG on these issues.

Our South African policy has drawn criticism from black South Africans, most black African states, and critics in the US as supporting
the South African Government. It has been charged that the failure of the US to take firm, more decisive measures in opposition to apartheid is an expression of racism.

The South African Government would dispute the view that our policy supports its goals, and has been annoyed or dismayed by our opposition to its domestic racial policies. In this, the SAG has found support in this country from persons, both inside and outside the government, who believe we have not treated South Africa fairly and that our best interests lie in closer political, economic, and military ties with her.

D. Discussion of Specific Options on South Africa

The advent of the new Administration has given additional stimulus to arguments about what we should do about the South African question, including differing perceptions about the extent of influence the US can bring to bear on South Africa.

Some argue that US investments in South Africa, representing only 16% of total foreign investments in that country, are not substantial enough for us to be able to use that economic connection as leverage with the South Africans. Others maintain that our investments are more important than just the scope of direct US investment would indicate, for US interests have part-ownership in some major foreign firms and banks that are represented in South Africa. In any case, generally it is conceded that US-South African economic links present us with a possible means of exerting some influence on South Africa.

More important in the minds of many of those who are in one way or another involved in the question of US-South African relations, is the psychological factor. The very high value South Africa attaches to American friendship gives us leverage (how much is, of course, debatable). South African whites seek acceptance by, and much closer participation in, the Western community of nations. Moreover, they generally view the world as consisting of two camps—monolithic communism and the free world. They perceive themselves as locked in mortal combat with communist forces. And they believe that only the US has sufficient power to save them from destruction and their country from falling into the hands of black radicals aided and directed by the Soviet Union. Thus they want to convince us that they are deserving of a much closer relationship with us.

In any event, we cannot escape involvement in the South African question. Our position as a world power, our membership in the UN, our relations with the rest of Africa, and our present and future economic interests in South Africa all guarantee this. Moreover, the issue involved is one of the major ethical issues of our time. But our decisions must also take into account the viewpoints and the needs of our allies,
especially Great Britain, whose commercial relationship with South Africa is extremely important to the British economy.

Policy choices will affect many specific cases involved in the US-South African relationship. Some of these will require decisions in the very near future. For example, ERDA wants to enter into an agreement with SASOL, a South African government corporation, regarding the acquisition of economic information concerning South Africa’s coal gasification technology. And as noted in earlier discussion above, South African willingness to exert more pressure on Ian Smith could be crucial in forcing Smith to back down and agree to negotiate again. Moreover, South African cooperation is essential if there is to be a relatively rapid and peaceful transition to true self-determination and independence for Namibia. Another issue impending soon (before May at the latest) is how we will vote on probable UN Security Council resolutions calling for a Chapter VII finding, a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, and cessation of new investments in that country.

E. Options

1. Maintain our present policy. It is highly desirable to maintain a relationship with the white ruling establishment which permits a dialogue with them. By avoiding stronger measures against South Africa, we may obtain some modifications of its current racial policies. At the same time we would maintain the widest possible contact with black and brown South Africans and by the actions of official Americans in that country show clearly our opposition to restrictive racial practices there.

Because of South Africa’s key role regarding Rhodesia and Namibia we would avoid any actions that could significantly impair our current cooperative venture. We would, however, continue to criticize apartheid and would maintain the current economic and other restraints on our relationship. And we would take pains not to make decisions or take steps which could be construed as payment to South Africa.

The principal advantages of adhering to the approach we have taken toward South Africa over the past years is that we have access to the South African political leadership and can exert some influence on them. The extent of our influence on developments in South Africa has been limited, but it is preferable to having no influence at all. As noted in broad option 1, of current importance is our ability to work cooperatively with the South Africans on the Rhodesian and Namibian question. Moreover, the current economic benefits of our policy would be maintained, as would our access to minerals, our overflight and landing privileges and our access to South African naval intelligence on ship movements. Another factor in favor of this option is that some
Americans would react negatively to any fundamental departure from the way we have been handling the South African question.

On the other hand, the restrictive elements of our current policy have resulted in some loss of trade opportunities for American business. They also have promoted within the South African Government a negative attitude toward the US which at times adversely affects certain of our interests. Moreover, the policy has harmed our bilateral relations with some African countries, and our standing with the OAU and in international forums. Some influential Americans inside and outside the government, including some leading figures in Congress, consider our approach to South Africa as morally wrong and not in the best interests of the United States, and will oppose an Administration attempt to maintain the current policy. It can be argued that although certain economic and strategic interests are served by this policy, in the long run avoidance of a race war in South Africa (and its manifold adverse consequences for the US) and our clear identification with the cause of equality and justice for all South Africans is the best insurance we have of continued economic and strategic benefits to the US.

[The Defense and State Departments, as well as some outside experts, have differing views about the strategic importance of South Africa to the United States. Defense, acknowledging the need for consistency between our policies and basic American principles, notes that we must not lose sight of the importance to US security of unimpeded access to important minerals in South Africa and uninterrupted use of the sea lanes around Africa by ships supplying the US and our European Allies with Middle Eastern oil. Currently approximately 60–70 ships round the Cape daily and this would increase if the Suez Canal would close. Due to critical currents and sea conditions in the Cape of Good Hope area, desired sea lanes are restricted to approximately 30 miles, making sea traffic highly vulnerable to interdiction.

State agrees with this, but emphasizes that our relations with other African states and access to their mineral wealth and coasts must also be weighed, as well as the adverse long-term effect prolonged racial strife could have on the availability of South African minerals to the US. State also agrees that it is vital to keep African sea lanes open, but believes that if hostile military action were ever taken to interdict the route from Western European waters around the Cape of Good Hope to the Persian Gulf (a World War II type of scenario), it is unlikely that this would be done in the remote area of South African waters. State does not agree, therefore, that South Africa is highly relevant in this context.

Commerce and State also have different priorities which have led to disagreements in the past. Commerce’s brief is to expand US exports and it wants to do as much as possible within existing policy to achieve
this goal. State, recognizing the importance of exports, nevertheless believes that any expansion of USG trade promotion activities in South Africa would lead to unacceptably international and domestic political costs.

2. Using quiet diplomacy and consultations with the South Africans to achieve our ends, warn the South Africans that our relationship is reaching a watershed. We value our relations with South Africa, but unless it clearly turns away from apartheid, we will be forced to reconsider aspects of our relations. Privately convey this message to Vorster and keep a dialogue going through quiet diplomacy. Take no immediate steps to change our current relationship, but act as our interests dictate on specific issues.

This course of action would probably present, for a time at least, the same advantages and disadvantages as option 1: There would be no public perception of any change in our policy, disappointing some and encouraging others. The difficult moment under this option would come when we tried to decide whether it had been effective and, if not, what steps to take. Temptations to avoid action would be strong, but so would pressures to move ahead, perhaps too quickly. Moreover, the South Africans might not take our words at face value, so that the impact on that country could be limited.

3. Convey the message privately to Vorster, but begin to take steps that show we cannot in any event conduct business as usual. That is, modify our voting pattern in the UN; do not enter into any relationship such as the ERDA proposal; resume protests over events in South Africa when appropriate; etc.

This course of action (for example, in the UN) would send a clearer signal to the South Africans, and might to some extent mollify other critics of US policy. But it would not end such criticism, and would be sure to bring on attacks from conservative groups. It also could cause the South Africans to take the opposite course than that intended by the option; that is, instead of pushing the SAG toward more enlightened policies, it could lead to even more repressive practices in South Africa.

4. Make public the position we have taken with the South African Government (as per the two preceding options) and also begin to take some steps (see below) to demonstrate our need to at least modify our relationship.

This course of action, by destroying the confidentiality of our exchange with the SAG, would effectively limit its impact: the SAG remains unwilling to be seen as responding to pressures of any kind. Such a move could also end South Africa’s willingness to cooperate on Rhodesia and Namibia. On the other hand, an announcement of our approach to Vorster would provide a clear sign to the world that the Administration is moving away from past policies and places human rights considerations at the forefront of its concerns. It would
probably improve our relations with black Africa; if it were accompanied by symbolic rather than strong measures it could modulate conservative reaction within the US.

5. Take steps to manifest clearly our full opposition to the racial policies of the South African Government. We could do this with a statement that our actions are intended as pressures on South Africa to change those policies. Or we could state that, simply because of our feelings about apartheid, we are changing our current relationship with that country. Steps that could be taken in this regard include the following:

—Do not enter into any relationship with South Africa which would be construed as supporting SAG policies. For example, prohibit ERDA from an official relationship with SASOL.

—Raise the level and sharpen the tone of our public denunciation of apartheid.

—Cease all trade promotion activities including EX–IM facilities. Remove our commercial officers.

—Actively discourage investment.

—Remove our military attachés.

—Close a Consulate.

—Support a Chapter VII finding in the United Nations and a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

—Reduce other USG agencies’ activities in or connected with South Africa. (State is compiling a list of such activities. If we choose any of the options which either could or would include a cutback, an interagency group could be set up to study what, when, and how this could be implemented.)

This option would probably end whatever chances we have of influencing the South Africans in the near term to take positive steps toward solving the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. A result would be increased violence in Rhodesia and Namibia. Moreover, depending on the extent of the steps we take to draw away from South Africa, we could contribute to the “laager effect” (i.e., a refractory response by the Afrikaners in which they would resort to more repression in order to preserve the status quo). In the short term, some of the steps could adversely affect our economic and strategic/intelligence interests in South Africa. Although the black Africans might approve of what we are doing, in the long run they could be dissatisfied with anything short of all-out sanctions to bring the white ruling establishment to its knees. Thus if this option is adopted, lest we raise African expectations unduly, and thereby possibly encourage them to take actions we could not support, at the outset we should make clear both that our ability to influence the situation is limited, and that we are not going to become involved militarily.
A change of distinct magnitude from our current policy towards South Africa, while receiving support from some quarters in this country, would be opposed by others and could become an unwanted political issue for the Administration. It should be noted, too, that support for a Chapter VII finding could lead to demands in the UN for actions which we could not endorse and provide a precedent we do not want.

On the other hand, clear evidence that we are changing our South African policy would be a significant factor in improving our position in the rest of Africa. For a time, our stock would rise in the United Nations and other international organizations. We could encounter a more cooperative attitude from Third World countries on North-South issues. And the Administration would win approval from anti-apartheid elements in the United States. Finally, since in the long run white supremacy cannot last in South Africa, our economic, political, and strategic interests in that country will best be served by measures that clearly put us on record in support of the majority there.

6. In any basic approach we adopt toward southern Africa, except for maintaining our present policy, we could convene a White House conference of American business firms and financial institutions which have interests in South Africa. This could be done in coordination with other key investor countries.

We would issue a public invitation to representatives of the top fifty (or more) US firms established in South Africa to a government conference on “Doing Business in South Africa.” American banks doing business with South Africa would also be invited to participate. State and Commerce would organize and conduct the conference. We would circulate the principal conclusions of the conference and would closely monitor the performance of American corporations in light of these conclusions, bringing pressure to bear on corporations which failed to carry out changes in company practice.

Especially in view of the current problems of the South African economy, and the importance of loans by American banks to South African Government institutions, this course of action could have a far-reaching effect on the internal situation in South Africa. However, if this effort by the Administration had no appreciable effect, unless the Administration was moving in other ways to help induce change in South Africa, it would be regarded as no more than a half-hearted or ineffectual gesture.
Tab 1

Paper Prepared in the Department of State\textsuperscript{5}

RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT

Washington, undated

\textit{FIVE POINTS}

(Announced by Smith September 24, 1976)

—Rhodesia agrees to majority rule within two years.

—Rhodesian authorities will meet immediately with African leaders to organize an interim government.

—Interim Government will consist of:

—Council of State—Half African, half European, European chairman with no special vote. Functions to include legislation, general supervisory responsibility, supervision of drafting of Constitution.


—U.K. will enact enabling legislation. Rhodesia will also enact necessary legislation.

—Upon establishment of interim Government, sanctions will be lifted and all acts of war will cease.

(Also announced by Smith)

—Substantial economic support will be made available by the international community to provide assurances to Rhodesians about the economic future of the country. A trust fund will be established outside Rhodesia, which will organize and finance a major international effort.

\textit{BRITISH PROPOSALS}

(January, 1977)

—Guerilla activity will cease as soon as agreement reached on setting up of transitional government.

—British willingness to play part in transitional arrangement is conditional upon all other parties abiding by agreement.

\textsuperscript{5} Secret. Tabs 1 and 2 prepared by Davidow on February 1.
—British will appoint Interim Commissioner and Deputy Interim Commissioner to head transitional government.
—Creation of Council of Ministers (COM) composed of equal number from each Geneva delegation plus additional similar number of whites.
—Leaders of Geneva Conference would be members of Council of Ministers and form an inner cabinet (Advisory Council).
—COM to have full executive and legislative competence, subject only to Commissioner’s reserve powers.
—If agreement can be reached, an African will be First Minister of Council. If no agreement, other modalities, e.g. rotation of chairmanship will be determined.
—COM to appoint committee to draft constitution.
—Interim Commissioner’s residual responsibilities will include external affairs, defense, internal security, implementation of independence program.
—National Security Council will directly control defense and internal security. Council will consist of the leading members of Council of Ministers, and chiefs of staff of Army, Air Force and Police (appointed by Commissioner).

**Patriotic Front Proposals**
(December 2, 1976)
—Appointment by UK of Resident Commissioner on advice of prospective Council of Ministers.
—Commissioner will appoint Prime Minister in accordance with terms of the Geneva Agreement.
—Commissioner will have formal executive authority.
—Resident Commissioner and the Council of Ministers (COM) will be the legislative authority.
—The Resident Commissioner must approve all bills passed by the COM.
—COM will be comprised of 25 members, four-fifths, including the Prime Minister, will be from the Liberation Movement.
—COM will establish a constitutional committee to supervise drawing of new constitution based on one-man-one-vote.
—Council of Ministers can recommend removal of Commissioner by two-thirds vote.
—Amendment of the transitional constitution will require two thirds vote. Some chapters will be unalterable, e.g. judiciary, public service, amendment procedure.
MUZOREWA’s PROPOSALS

11/17/76

—UK-appointed Governor.

—Election on one-man-one vote basis to select a Prime Minister who, once elected, will distribute ministries in Executive Council.

—Executive Council to consist of Prime Minister and 34 members to be nominated by candidates for Prime Minister on basis proportional to the votes each received. An established minimum percentage of votes cast prerequisite for naming ministers.

—Executive Council will administer country, appoint commissions to draw up a constitution and supervise pre-independence elections.

—Legislature will be composed of all members of the Executive Council and shall have power to make, repeal and amend laws.

SITHOLE’s PROPOSALS

11/15/76

—Unicameral interim administration.

—Rotating chairmanship by five Geneva delegation heads.

—Legislative Council of 75 members (15 from each delegation) with authority to make legislation, exercise executive powers and prepare constitution.

—Administrative Council composed of three members of each delegation sitting in Legislative Council who shall each head a government department.

—Defense Council made up of five delegation heads with responsibility for internal security. Zimbabwe freedom fighters will form nucleus of defense forces.
PROPOSALS FOR A NAMIBIAN SETTLEMENT

Major Provisions Security Council Resolution 385
1/30/76

—Calls for free elections under UN supervision and control for the whole of Namibia as one political entity.

—Declares that in determining date, time-table, and modalities for elections there shall be adequate time for UN to establish necessary machinery and for Namibian people to politically organize for the elections.

—Demands South Africa solemnly declare acceptance of Resolution’s provisions for holding free elections.

—Demands South Africa withdraw its illegal administration of the territory.

—Demands South Africa release all political prisoners, comply with Declaration of Human Rights, abolish application of racially discriminatory and and repressive laws and practices, especially bantustans and homelands, and grant amnesty directly to all political exiles.

—Decides to meet again on or before August 31, 1976 to review South Africa’s compliance with the resolution, and appropriate measures to be taken under the Charter in case of non-compliance.

NOTE: In explaining U.S. note, Ambassador Moynihan stated that “. . . It is clear that the Council is leaving open the exact form of UN supervision of these elections, leaving it to be worked out subsequently by the United Nations. We believe in this way the Council wisely avoids prejudging the exact nature of the UN role until this matter can be specifically considered.”

South African Basis for a Proposal
9/19/76

1. The Constitutional Conference will be held in Geneva to conduct further talks on independence.
2. The United Nations will designate an observer to the Geneva Conference.

3. South Africa will designate a representative in Geneva to maintain contact with the participants to the Geneva Conference and in order to negotiate issues which bear on South Africa’s relationship with an independent Namibia.

4. The Conference will decide the modalities of the election and the nature of its supervision prior to final independence.

5. The work program of the Geneva Conference may include any aspect of the process of independence which any of the participants wish to raise.

6. Subject to paragraph 3 the South African Government commits itself to accept whatever constitutional proposals are approved by the Conference.


(SWAPo’s Conditions for Talks)

1/14/77

1. Geneva should be the venue for the Namibia Independence Conference. This Conference will not be an extension of the Windhoek Constitutional discussions. SWAPO categorically rejects the Turnhalle tribal talks under any circumstances. The Namibia Independence Conference in Geneva will be on entirely new basis reflecting the unity of the whole people of Independent and Sovereign Namibia as a unitary State.

2. SWAPO insists that before any talks the South African Government must release all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees. Some of the leaders now in detention, restriction and in prison are likely to be part of the SWAPO delegation to Independence Talks.

3. SWAPO has been and is still ready to talk with the South African Government regarding the modalities for transferring power to the people of Namibia under the leadership of SWAPO.

4. SWAPO demands that the participants at the Namibia Independence Conference shall be SWAPO, South Africa and the United Nations.

5. SWAPO demands that the United Nations shall convene and chair the Conference.
6. South Africa must make prior commitment to withdraw all its armed forces from Namibia and to end its repression of the Namibia population.

7. The date for independence must be within nine months from the start of the Geneva talks.

8. The Namibian Independence Talks must start immediately.

265. **Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting**

Washington, February 8, 1977, 3–4:15 p.m.

**SUBJECT**
South Africa and Rhodesia

**PARTICIPANTS**
The Vice President
  A. Denis Clift

*State:*
  Secretary Vance
  William E. Schauffele

*United States Representative to the United Nations:*
  Donald F. McHenry

*Defense:*
  Charles W. Duncan
  Leslie A. Janka

*CIA:*
  Enno Knoche
  William Parmenter

  *Treasury:*
  Anthony Solomon

  *NSC:*
  Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
  David Aaron
  Dr. Jessica Tuchman
  Michael Horniblow

At the meeting the participants agreed on recommended courses of action regarding US policy toward South Africa, US policy toward Rhodesia and US policy toward Namibia. Since these recommendations involve major issues and would in some cases mean a change in US

---

policy, it was felt they should be discussed at a National Security Council Meeting after Secretary Vance returns from the Middle East.  

I. US Policy Toward South Africa  

The participants all agreed on option 3 of the South African study.  

According to this option we would advise Vorster privately that our relations with South Africa are reaching a watershed and keep pressuring him to change South Africa’s apartheid policies.

Within four years we could not realistically expect them to abandon the concept of majority rule for whites but could for example push for significant changes in the educational system. In our discussions with the South Africans we would attempt to elaborate a positive vision of the future, a South Africa where whites would continue to live and play important roles.

While conveying this message to Vorster privately we would begin taking public steps which show that we cannot in any event conduct business as usual. If the question of sanctions comes up in the UN we might vote for some of them depending on their content, even if Britain, France and West Germany continue to vote against sanctions.

II. US Policy Toward Rhodesia  

There was general agreement that we should continue to support British efforts even though these efforts might fail. The British are considering a fresh approach which would be an attempt to get the involved parties to agree on broad principles. There was some discussion about the desirability of the US taking over from the British if their efforts fail but no conclusions were reached. Everyone agreed that for now the best course of action is to support the British as vigorously as possible.

III. US Policy Toward Namibia  

It was agreed that the US should take an active role and probe to see if fruitful negotiations are possible. The front line states would support more active US involvement. Although such an action might not succeed the consequences of failure would not be great and a success might create momentum toward settling other problems in the region.

---

2 The NSC meeting was held on March 3. See Document 267. Vance traveled to Jeruslsalem, Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Riyadh, and Damascus February 15–21 to discuss the Middle East peace process.

3 See Document 264.
Meeting began at 3:02 p.m.

*Secretary Vance:* Our relations with South Africa is the first item. Over the last 9 months we have sought South Africa’s cooperation to achieve our objectives in Rhodesia and Namibia. This led us to take certain courses of action. We are now faced with conflicting objectives. We on the one hand seek to obtain from South Africa agreement on firmer measures toward Rhodesia and Namibia. On the other hand we don’t want to give up on anti-apartheid and maybe want to strengthen our position. Yet we don’t want to be in the position of double crossing South Africa into making them believe that we are soft on apartheid. Yet we are faced with the problem of forcing them into a position where they won’t help. How can we resolve the conflict?

The paper presents 3 options. One is to maintain our present policy on the grounds that it gives us the best hope of influencing South Africa. The second option is to put more pressure on them. This second option however implies that we are not going to press them on the apartheid question if they cooperate with us on Rhodesia and Namibia. I must admit that option gives me great problems. The third option suggests that our relations would depend on what they do with respect to Rhodesia and Namibia and their internal problems. Perhaps there are other options, Zbig?

*Dr. Brzezinski:* I lean to option 3. As I see it there is no real choice. This issue will surface very quickly in the UN and elsewhere. The mood of the South African front line Presidents is changing. As I have said before the possibilities are there to transform this from a black-white conflict into a red-white conflict. Vorster is not doing us any particular favor by working on Rhodesia. He is acting in his own self interest. The issue at stake is the future of the entire Southern African arc. There is very little time left. We should start squeezing. I am in favor of option 3 in some fashion.

*Secretary Vance:* Would that push them into a dug-in position?

*Dr. Brzezinski:* It is not an easy question to answer. The record so far has been that other courses of action are not so hopeful. A conflict will come sooner or later. If it is later it will involve the spectre of Communism.

*Mr. Knoche:* I would like to comment on the nature of Vorster as a political leader in South Africa. He is not a decisive leader who is willing to get out in front. He rules his Cabinet on the basis of consensus. And there is little pressure from within the African community for him to change his policies.

*Mr. Duncan:* We are for option 3. This recognizes the indivisibility of South African problems and attacks them all together and demonstrates we do have a commitment on human rights. Secretary Vance
should talk privately to Prime Minister Vorster and take some public measures at the same time.

Secretary Vance: Supposing in March the question of sanctions comes up in the UN. It would of course depend on what sanctions. It would be a tough choice. It may happen and we might find ourselves split from Britain. If it is a reasonable kind of sanction we will vote yes.

Mr. Schaufele: We might find ourselves voting against the British, French and possibly the Germans.

Vice President Mondale: The British have gotten themselves out front in a mediating role which may fail. We should try to minimize their humiliation. It is the only action that Britain has going in international affairs reminding them they are an effective force in the world. If they fail we should act to soften the insult.

Secretary Vance: I agree. We should specifically keep this in mind when talking about next steps. They are now thinking of a new step. That would be to restate basic propositions and try to get agreement on those. However this idea still has to get through their foreign office.

Mr. Solomon: Even though we are showing opposition at various levels to apartheid, Rhodesia is still the priority issue. If we attack Vorster in public and apply pressure to him in private it might make it harder for him. We have argued publicly and with the third world that we don’t use multinational companies as an instrument of our policy. For us to call a conference in the White House with the multinationals would undercut our position globally.

Secretary Brown: I don’t disagree with option 3 but would place the emphasis on private communications. I think the risk of losing him (Vorster) would be tragic. He will be the key in Rhodesia.

Secretary Vance: The second option says to put more pressure on them and tell them that in the future we will be watching what they do regarding Smith and Namibia. If we take that position it implies that if they help us with Rhodesia and Namibia we would lessen our pressure on apartheid. This is dishonest and wrong.

Mr. Duncan: We concur.

Secretary Brown: The South Africans are realistic enough to know that our leader will be making statements about our policy which won’t be too well received in South Africa.

Amb. McHenry: These are separate issues and should be dealt with separately “Whatever advantage there is in going slow on apartheid would only be understood by diplomats. In the long term there is a need to come to grips with the central lesson in South Africa. We have no indication of how fast events will move and we don’t control events. There is a point at which all our good intentions will go down the drain because the possibility of a peaceful resolution is gone.
Secretary Vance: There is a consensus on option 3. Options 1 and 2 are unsatisfactory courses. Option 3 scares the daylights out of the British.

Vice President Mondale: What do we do in option 3?

Secretary Vance: Inform Vorster that our relations with South Africa depend on what he does about apartheid and in Namibia and Rhodesia.

Vice President Mondale: We would move him away from apartheid, to majority rule in Rhodesia and independence under majority rule in Namibia?

Secretary Vance: Yes and no separate deals with independent groups.

Amb. McHenry: I am not clear that the British are sure of their own views on this. They have behaved somewhat inconsistently.

Secretary Vance: Yes, there are differences within the British government itself.

Mr. Schaufele: They don’t want to do anything on Rhodesia which would affect their options on apartheid.

Dr. Brzezinski: The danger of our present policy is that it breeds illusions that our major concern is to resolve minor Rhodesian problems. This in turn breeds other illusions. If this is the beginning of a long and bitter historical process it is in our interest to accelerate this process. This is a fundamental policy decision. We must talk to South Africa in terms of a positive vision of change. This means we would assume a major role. The price of any other approach is high.

Secretary Vance: I agree.

Vice President Mondale: The President feels he knows something about this problem as a Southerner. He found that if you get the business community involved with and interested, that integration could work. The same forces could come to play in South Africa. That is why he wants to get the corporations involved. Any other policy would be alien to his traditions and beliefs.

Dr. Brzezinski: What follows from that is to complete our move toward more overt condemnation of apartheid.

Secretary Vance: Their position is quite clear. Under no circumstances would they accept majority rule in South Africa.

Dr. Brzezinski: Since they won’t deliver in Rhodesia anyway the effect on US-South African relations is not a high price.

Amb. McHenry: Basically as it operates majority rule and apartheid are the same thing.

Mr. Solomon: It is conceivable to have a society with no apartheid and still no democracy. They are not necessarily related to each other. There might be proposed sanctions. Would we support sanctions until
South Africa abolishes apartheid and majority rule. Or would we go along if it was just about apartheid.

*Amb. McHenry:* Let’s define apartheid. It is not just segregation. It also includes political participation. They are dead set against any black political participation if it would affect whites. They have created an elaborate structure which makes it impossible for blacks to govern any whites.

*Mr. Schaufele:* Yes and with white rule depending on black labor.

*Mr. Solomon:* For us to vote in the UN on sanctions and break with Britain, France etc is a serious measure. Will you try to work with them and negotiate the language?

*Secretary Vance:* Yes my guess is that we will have different kinds of resolutions.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* Young was asked about this and said it would not be realistic to expect majority rule in the next four years but we could expect some changes in their educational systems. In other words some kind of change.

*Mr. Aaron:* The options are mechanistic. Kissinger did not clarify the time limits. The problem is we don’t wish to create an enormous disincentive for South Africa. There are two choices. Buy time or fight it out in Rhodesia or Namibia. Our strategy is to avoid this and rightly so.

*Mr. Knoche:* We are seeking changes in their fundamental attitudes. This will require very close observation by this government. We now have [4 lines not declassified].

*Secretary Vance:* The specifics are on pages 31–33 of the paper. We are talking about something close to 3. Let’s now go on to Rhodesia. There are three options. I don’t think there is much of a problem in choosing between those alternatives. Is there anybody who feels we should not be working with the British? Supposing the next go-around with the British fails? What should the US do then?

*Dr. Brzezinski:* What will the next British effort be?

*Secretary Vance:* Possibly to get all sides to agree to a restatement of a basic set of principles.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* I lean toward option 1. However I have some uncertainties about the British. They have become political pleaders for South Africa. The Black African leadership does not really trust them. I don’t see how the British effort can succeed.

*Secretary Vance:* A lot of what you say is correct. Yet they were the colonial power and seem to be a logical mechanism. Nyerere is in favor of the British effort. Who would take their place? I have grave doubts that we could do it.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* It gains us time.
Secretary Vance: The British might succeed with our help.

Mr. Schaufele: We have to give them more help than we did last time.

Dr. Brzezinski: Perhaps it could become a joint effort.

Mr. Schaufele: The British started out on this partly because of their concern of relations with Zambia and other states in the region. In Geneva they had a difficult time with the nationalists and black leadership? The nationalists asked Britain to take a role in an interim government. The British found Vorster relatively reasonable but had trouble with Smith.

Amb. McHenry: The British have a historical and legal basis for assuming a role in an interim government. Maybe their attempt to get the parties to agree on basic principles will help narrow differences. They have to see what the various parties are looking for. The first proposal was pro white and the Africans rejected it. The African proposal was pro black and the whites rejected it. The advantage of the British proposal is that it puts a third party in as a blocking element. However some Rhodesians don’t trust the British to act in an objective way. The present shortcomings of getting people to accept an outside power is the need for all sides to have confidence in that blocking party.

Secretary Vance: Who should be the blocking party?

Amb. McHenry: I don’t know.

Mr. Schaufele: The blocking party can’t cut and run either.

Secretary Vance: What about some sort of institutional mechanism?

Mr. Schaufele: There is none that would be acceptable to all parties.

Dr. Brzezinski: Supposing it was the US?

Mr. Schaufele: I don’t know how acceptable we would be to the South Africans. They might wonder what we would do in a crunch.

Dr. Brzezinski: But it might be a great accomplishment.

Mr. Schaufele: It would mean major power involvement.

Mr. Duncan: And might bring a Soviet reaction.

Dr. Brzezinski: For now there is not much choice.

Secretary Vance: I am not sure Congress would support the idea of our being a blocking party.

Dr. Brzezinski: It is not inconceivable. If Congress was advised of what the options and consequences are they might feel differently. It is similar to the Sinai agreement.6

---

4 Reference is to the Five Points. See Tab 1, Document 264.
5 Reference is to the Patriotic Front Proposals. See Tab 1, Document 264.
6 Reference is presumably to the Sinai II Agreement, signed by Egypt and Israel on September 4, 1975.
Secretary Vance: The chance of getting involved in guerrilla warfare is much greater than in the Sinai.

Mr. Aaron: How about a role for the UN?

Amb. McHenry: There is a possibility of trying something but the problem with that is the Soviets would block it.

Mr. Schaufele: Perhaps there could be international guarantees.

Mr. Aaron: One of the problems with the British is that they have done a lousy job. Maybe we could do a better job at that.

Amb. McHenry: We should explore the concept of institutional arrangements.

Secretary Brown: The blocking power—it is not a physical thing is it?

Secretary Vance: No, but the blocking power is responsible for seeing that the situation does not deteriorate.

Lt. Gen. Smith: It would lead us down a slippery slope.

Secretary Vance: Zbig you may be right but where the idea leads scares the hell out of me.

Mr. Aaron: The trick is to get behind the British as a blocking power.

Mr. Schaufele: That means the crunch comes later.

Secretary Vance: This is about all we can do on Rhodesia today.

Mr. Solomon: I have one point about the Byrd amendment. With regard to the Arab boycott we are pushing for a positive certification rather than a negative one. We should be consistent with that on the Byrd amendment. When you give your testimony you could say that you support a positive certification.

Secretary Vance: Yes. Let’s go on to Namibia. There are seven options.

Mr. Duncan: We support option 4. This would align us with much of world opinion. There should also be frank discussions with the Soviets.

Secretary Vance: That has already been done. I have talked to the Soviets about this twice in the last week. Would option 4 accomplish anything?

Mr. Duncan: It is consistent with what we are saying to South Africa in other respects.

Secretary Brown: I agree. It is consistent and in tune with world opinion. It may not be productive but other courses may not be either.

Dr. Brzezinski: There are indications that South Africa may be moving on this anyway. Perhaps the issue may be resolved.

---

7 See footnote 3, Document 259.
Secretary Vance: I don’t really think that is the case. The British are encouraging them in this position. Their internal option rules out participation by SWAPO at all.

Mr. Schaufele: The British say there may be a real problem if the South Africans go to a unitary option.

Amb. McHenry: The current approach is not consistent with the Security Council resolution.\(^8\) We need to get back to the Security Council resolution. I have no problem with option 4. If you have a situation where there is free participation under the Security Council resolution, I have no problems. The Security Council resolution of January should be guiding us.

Mr. Schaufele: My principle problem with option 4 is that it would insure that South Africa would go for an internal option. If we want to have the Security Council resolution implemented, option 4 would not have that effect. There is now an indication of some give on both sides which should make another round possible.

Amb. McHenry: The problem is that paper differences would jump out in Geneva.

Secretary Vance: That raises the question of should we take a leading role. The British don’t want it and nobody else does. Should we go to the parties and try to see if there is some basis for Geneva talks and some give to the SWAPO position. Here you could make a better argument for a US role than in Rhodesia.

Mr. Schaufele: The front line states would support such an approach.

Mr. Solomon: The price of failure is not so great as in Rhodesia.

Amb. McHenry: The front line states would support an active US role.

Dr. Brzezinski: It might be a useful trial run which would generate momentum elsewhere in the region.

Secretary Vance: Option 1 is where I come out.

Amb. McHenry: The front line states would support an active role for the US but it is not clear in what framework. The question is up in the air. We should not come up with a policy leaning toward South Africa as does the present one. At the same time we should not get into the SWAPO bag.

Secretary Vance: I agree. We won’t find out unless we get into it. We need to probe and find out what the situation is and how best to move toward negotiations with agreed terms of reference.

---

\(^8\) See footnote 3, Document 264.
Amb. McHenry: I favor probing. The problem with option one is that it has us probing under the current framework.

Dr. Brzezinski: I favor a modified option 1. I have a procedural point. These are very fateful decisions which should be discussed at an NSC meeting.

Secretary Vance: I agree. You could have a meeting in my absence.

Dr. Brzezinski: It is important for you to be there as you may have to do some of the negotiating. We can wait one week and have the meeting after you return.

The meeting ended at 4:15 pm.

266. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, February 9, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

2. U.S. Business in South Africa: I met today with Leon Sullivan who has been developing a program to get American businesses with an important stake in South Africa (G.M., Ford, I.B.M., and others) to help bring about change in the country’s racial policies. Sullivan has a ten point program—including equality in compensation and hiring practices—that he plans to discuss with representatives of a number of U.S. concerns this afternoon. I told Sullivan that we welcomed his initiative and wanted to stay in touch with him (he will report to me tomorrow on his meetings). I will explore with Sullivan the best ways to implement and announce his proposals.²

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 37, State Department Evening Reports, 1–2/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “Cy.”
² Carter wrote next to this paragraph: “This is a good approach—every cumulative effort will help.”
267. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting


SUBJECT
South Africa

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
U.S. Representative to the UN, Ambassador Andrew Young
Admiral Stansfield Turner (CIA Director-designate)

Other Attendees
Defense
Deputy Secretary Charles W. Duncan

JCS
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith (Assistant to the Chairman)

CIA
William Parmenter (NIO for Africa)

WH
Stuart Eizenstadt
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC
Dr. Jessica Tuchman
Michael Hornblow

The President: I think everyone here knows the purpose of this meeting. The PRC has previously met on this subject and spelled out the options. This could be one of the most important NSC meetings of the year. I will start the meeting by calling on Cy to discuss Rhodesia and Andy to discuss Namibia and we will then go on to South Africa. We should arrive at as much of a consensus as possible and reduce the number of options.

Secretary Vance: On Rhodesia I have been meeting with the British to discuss next steps. This has been based on the assumption that the
British will be taking a lead role in consultation with us and that we will support them. We agree that it is desirable to try and restate a set of general principles and hopefully find some common ground which will permit everybody to return to Geneva. This is now before the British Cabinet and we expect approval in the next few days. We would plan to contact the leaders of the various countries through our Ambassadors and discuss the principles with them. This seems to me to be the best course of action. It was also the view of the PRC. It may fail but it is the best of the alternatives open to us.

The President: How do these principles differ from the ones considered by the PRC?

Secretary Vance: They are the same. In general they are not as precise as the previous 5 points and that might help us to get around some of the previous problems. The front line states view it positively. It will probably get Smith back to the table.

The President: Could you outline the points?

Secretary Vance: They are basically these (points to list in President’s briefing book).5

The President: Has British participation been considered?

Secretary Vance: Yes, they would basically play a blocking role.

The President: Do the British agree?

Secretary Vance: Yes.

The President: When would the election take place?

Secretary Vance: In 18 months.

The President: It would be a precondition for independence?

Secretary Vance: Yes.

Amb. Young: I have been talking with some of the black Africans. They are anxious to get back to the table. I met yesterday with Ambassador Salim of Tanzania. He said there is still not enough unity among the blacks. He said the Patriotic Front was just a convenient name and there was no substance to the unity. Nyerere felt and I too felt that the Blacks need to get together. Nyerere had hoped that the British could promote this. However I have talked to Richard about it and it is not in the works.

The President: What if Muzarewa won the election?

Amb. Young: The Blacks are committed to support him. They feel that he has been given access to the TV by Smith. They feel that in a fair election they would get more support than Muzarewa.

---

4 See Tab 1 to Document 264.
5 Briefing book not found. See Document 140.
Gen. Smith: To what extent has Smith indicated his support of the electoral process?

Secretary Vance: I don’t know.

Amb. Young: His distrust of the British is the key to his reaction. There is nothing in the British proposal which would assure a stable transition. He feels there is not enough of a British commitment.

Secretary Vance: Yes, he is worried particularly that the military power would fall in the hands of others if the British left.

The President: How about other Commonwealth involvement?

Secretary Vance: The British are willing to discuss this but they feel the most important thing now is to get the parties back to the table.

The President: Wouldn’t Smith feel better if there was some Canadian participation?

Amb. Young: The crucial thing in Kissinger’s plan was the idea of a development fund. I do not know where he intended to raise it. Perhaps from private sources. The figure is $2 billion and it is an important key. One of the problems with the transition is that the British don’t think they can afford to pay for an 18 month presence.

The President: The same thing concerns Smith, right?

Secretary Vance: Everyone feels we should wait to see what political progress is made. I was up on the Hill testifying on our budget yesterday. We have $100 million in our budget for such a fund. With us taking the lead such a fund could be put together.

The President: Isn’t it true that in Kenya there was a similar fund and the money was not used.

Secretary Vance: The difference is that this is a development fund in addition to being a security fund.

Mr. Parmenter: Rhodesia used to have a good economy. If with the backing of the Fund they can regain economic success then the white elements would have a chance to sell their property.

The President: I think Andy pointed out to me previously that Smith had sent out a team to two African countries to examine how the Whites were doing under black African governments.

Amb. Young: Yes, Kaunda’s assistant took some leaders into Kenya and Zambia so they could see how the whites were doing under an independent government.

The President: I have no argument with the position. I agree that Great Britain should maintain leadership while recognizing that we are the force behind the British and that we should do everything we

---

can to get the parties back to the bargaining table. We should continue to put pressure on Smith through Vorster since he is the only avenue to Smith. I read this morning in an Intelligence note\(^7\) that Vorster so far has acted in good faith. Since his last meeting with Smith, Vorster reports that Smith is less intransigent than his public statements would indicate.

*Vice President Mondale:* I have a question. Should we encourage a meeting of the black leaders?

*Secretary Vance:* I think the first thing to do is to work through our Embassies and encourage them to talk to the black leaders about a set of principles. We may at some point want them to have a meeting.

*The President:* What is the time schedule for that?

*Secretary Vance:* The first of next week.

*The President:* How about Geneva?

*Secretary Vance:* As soon as we can get the process in place.

*The President:* We don’t envision sending an emissary?

*Secretary Vance:* No. We would work through our Ambassadors and the British Ambassadors.

*The President:* Are there any other comments? No. Andy will you start off on Namibia.

*Secretary Vance:* There is one more thing. I am interested in discussing what additional sanctions if any we could impose on Rhodesia. Moving on the Byrd Amendment would be an important symbol in Rhodesia and with the Black Nationalists.

*The President:* Perhaps we should enforce the sanctions we have publically espoused and get our friends to do the same. What about the other nations?

*Secretary Vance:* The Japanese record is not good.

*The President:* We should speak to the Japanese. Stan will you get information on what other countries are trading with Rhodesia and give it to Cy and then Cy could speak to these other countries.

*Secretary Vance:* It is important to get our own house in order.

*Mr. Parmenter:* Most of this material is being diverted inside South Africa. It is not easy to get at the information.

*Secretary Vance:* I am talking more about things like chrome and the use of a boycott.

*The President:* We should tell Vorster that this surreptitious channeling is something that we are all aware of.

\(^7\) Not found.
Dr. Brzezinski: We could also ask the Agency to provide us with an assessment of Rhodesian dependence on oil supplies. It is a major item and its reduction would put a real squeeze on the Rhodesian military.

Adm. Turner: There is an E.O. which limits the things we can do with US companies. 8

Dr. Brzezinski: It will be hard to put the squeeze on the Japanese.

The President: There again we can express our concern. We can just ask them to give us an assessment of what they are doing with regard to Rhodesia and ask them what they could do to restrict that trade.

Andy could you now speak about Namibia?

Amb. Young: Namibia is part of the South African question. Under UN Resolution 385 majority rule is to come this year. 9 So far the South Africans have not abided by that resolution and have set up their own internal solution. They are seeking to turn power over to a tribally oriented government. We have told the South Africans that this solution is unacceptable to us. In the UN a group of 9 European countries have advised the South Africans that an internal solution is not acceptable. I am trying to find a way of keeping the UN from having another divisive rhetorical debate on the issue. I have sent a memo to the Secretary General. 10 I have not yet had a chance to discuss it with him but have discussed it with the West Germans and the British. It is an attempt to organize five Western members of the UN Security Council. This Committee however, is so biased that the South Africans have refused to deal with them. The five Western members could develop a common strategy and set up a Committee to talk to the South Africans about Resolution 385. In order for that to be effective we would have to have the willingness to say that if the South Africans refuse we would be prepared to vote in favor of a mandatory arms embargo to South Africa and declare Namibia a threat to the peace. We could expect good cooperation from the West Germans and maybe from the British and problems with the French. I think we would get a good response from the African leaders. The Tanzanian Ambassador did tell me at one point that if it looked like we were serious they would try to control the Soviets and the Libyans.

The President: Do the Soviets and the Libyans have relations with SWAPO?

---

8 Reference is presumably to Executive Order 11322, pertaining to trade and other transactions involving Southern Rhodesia. It was signed into law on January 5, 1967.

9 See footnote 3, Document 264.

10 Not found.
Amb. Young: Yes, good relations. SWAPO is generally recognized as the legitimate government in exile. SWAPO says that they are willing to take their chances in a free election but not in an election held hurriedly or sponsored by South Africa.

Secretary Vance: I understand that UN consideration of Namibia and Rhodesia has been put off from March to May.

Amb. Young: There is a change. Instead of considering South Africa they will be considering southern Africa.

Secretary Vance: I agree it would be useful to have a demarche by the five countries. But is the German Ambassador to the UN saying the same thing as their Ambassador in Washington? And I am not sure about the French and the British. But I agree with it. It is a positive step.

The President: You have had a chance to talk with the South Africans. What is their attitude?

Secretary Vance: Their recent attitude is that the Turnhalle Conference is so far along that it is too late to change. We have told them that we regard this as a serious matter and have asked that they reconsider their position. They have conveyed that message back to their government and we are awaiting a reaction.

The President: There is a June deadline?

Secretary Vance: Yes. I don’t know what will happen with SWAPO. It may mean increased problems and increase the chances for violence.

Mr. Parmenter: We agree. It could eventually lead to guerrilla terrorism.

The President: Who is the SWAPO leader?11

Mr. Parmenter: They have a leader in exile.12 We know very little about the SWAPO internal mechanisms.

The President: What kind of a person is he?

Amb. Young: He is a gentle, scholarly fellow. He does not seem to exert much leadership in meetings. The Nigerians are disappointed in him because they say he runs around the world playing President but does not exert much political or military leadership. He feels insecure in the political arena. He has travelled to Havana and Moscow seeking support, but there were no takers.

The President: Is he popular in Southwest Africa?

Amb. Young: It is hard to say. There is one SWAPO leader who is imprisoned in Southwest Africa and there is one in Tanzania.13 I don’t

---

11 Sam Nujoma.
12 Not further identified. Possibly a reference to Andreas Shipanga.
13 Not further identified.
think that SWAPO can do much militarily or politically for a while. The UN has the responsibility to sponsor the creation of a majority government there. We could not agree to a solution whereby the whole thing would be turned over to Sam Nujoma.

*The President:* How would you bring it to an end?

*Secretary Vance:* There are seven points.\textsuperscript{14} There are differing views on some points among the various parties. It is still worthwhile to see if we can make further efforts to reach an agreement to get discussions going on the basis of the seven points modified. We would require help from Nigerians with SWAPO and a slowing down of the South Africans.

*The President:* Is SWAPO willing to accept the seven points?

*Amb. Young:* They say they don’t want to talk at Turnhalle.\textsuperscript{15} They are willing to go to South Africa.

*Secretary Vance:* They want to talk face to face.

*Amb. Young:* The South Africans propose to send many of the Turnhalle conferees to Geneva.

*The President:* Does the UN have a presence in Southwest Africa?

*Amb. Young:* No and the Namibia Committee is a rhetorical group which has lost much of its credibility.

*The President:* Would they agree to the seven points?

*Amb. Young:* No, they are too loaded on the left.

*The President:* Would SWAPO be in sympathy with UN sponsored elections?

*Amb. Young:* Yes. But they say that all their leaders are jailed. They say that South Africa must let them out before there can be talks. South Africa has agreed to let a considerable number out.

*Secretary Vance:* They could release more. Now South Africa is waffling on the seven points.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* We have limited leverage with South Africa. Is it wise to use it up on Namibia.

*Secretary Vance:* It is all inter-related.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* Yes, but it is a question of focus.

*Amb. Young:* We have a lot of leverage with South Africa.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* On South Africa?

*Amb. Young:* Yes. They see it as being in their own self interest to work for a Rhodesian Government. They don’t know where they stand with this Administration. They felt they had a deal with the previous

\textsuperscript{14} See Tab 2, Document 264.

\textsuperscript{15} See footnote 2, Document 43.
Administration that as long as they cooperated with us on Namibia and Rhodesia we would not pressure them on apartheid.

_The President:_ Is that our position?

_Amb. Young:_ They won’t move on Rhodesia and Namibia until they know where they stand with you. They tend to feel that in the final analysis they may have to go it alone. Richard says that they are prepared to fight to the death. Our opposition is to their political system of apartheid, but we do share other things in common like an economic system. Richard says that they don’t understand that when we start talking about “majority rule”, they interpret majority rule as meaning that the blacks would take over tomorrow.

_The President:_ One of the things that impressed me Andy during that meeting we had on a Saturday a few weeks ago is the apparent concern that you have that we should not be too abusive to South Africa and that maybe there should be some means of accommodation.\(^\text{16}\) I want to have you work with me and the others to evolve a position on South Africa which is correct but as easy on them as possible. We must sell the American people and the South African leadership that we are acting in good faith but at the same time don’t want to turn over South Africa to the Reds. What could we do? How do you see the possibilities?

_Amb. Young:_ It is similar to the position Cy was talking about regarding Rhodesia. The African group in the UN does not want to put us in a corner. If there could be a general statement on principles, or a consensus statement from the UN Security Council it might be helpful and might prevent the area from being loaded up with Soviet arms. Nobody in Africa can deal with South Africa. Thus, they feel that any change depends on the U.S. Therefore, they are willing to go along with us. The passage of the Byrd amendment would increase our credibility. The Africans realize they could not do anything in five years. The Nigerians told me that from a security view the South Africans are impregnable. They are willing to follow our lead. If we could persuade 100 corporations to train 10 middle level blacks a year that would add up to 1000 new black middle class a year. That added to the colored and Asians would give you a majority and would give them a stake in the country. It would then be conceivable to keep the political system while abandoning apartheid. That is what we did in the South. The whites control the money and the blacks control the votes. I tried this out on Nyerere. He said “I am opposed to Vorster—he is my enemy but if you can do something with him, then go ahead”. Nyerere said that in Rhodesia it would be too late to have four black

\(^{16}\text{Minutes of the meeting were not found.}\)
cabinet members but in South Africa that would represent significant progress.

Secretary Blumenthal: I am not as optimistic as Andy regarding the chances toward progress toward universal franchise. The analogies with Atlanta are imperfect. We can take some steps—statements on human rights in the UN and disapproval of the ERDA contract. The best we can hope for is to use our influence to push them toward gradual progress in integrating the black and colored majorities into their economic system. We have to be careful in approaching US corporations. It has implications for other corporations in the world. There are multinational companies. We do not want the accusation made that they are an arm of the U.S. Government. Thus, a White House conference of the corporations makes no sense. We should work quietly to encourage them to do training. But make clear to them that they will be doing it on their own. South Africa is the last and toughest nut to crack. It will take much longer than five years. If we push too hard and too fast they will stonewall us. We should work with and talk with US corporations quietly.

Secretary Vance: I agree. On two occasions Sullivan has come to see me and told me what he planned to do. He wanted to know if that was inconsistent with US policy. I told him that it would be consonant with US policy but that it was your decision to make. Some of the leading corporations are in this group and there may be others which will join. We may then see corporations in other countries joining. A White House conference would not be the way.

The President: This action that has been announced is very significant and does compare with what occurred in Atlanta 15 years ago. This sort of thing is better handled when it is removed from the Government. We might ask Blumenthal to follow up letting them know we approve it and asking them about their quotas.

---

17 Reference is to the Energy Research and Development Administration contract with a South African Government-controlled company (Sasol) to purchase coal liquefaction technology. See Document 264.

18 Reference is to Reverend Leon Sullivan, who developed the Sullivan Principles, a code of conduct for U.S. companies operating in South Africa. The Sullivan Declaration, also known as the Statement of Principles, reads as follows: “A. Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities. B. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees. C. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time. D. Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs. E. Increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in management and supervisory positions. F. Improving the quality of employees’ lives outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, schooling, recreation, and health facilities.” The text of the statement was transmitted in telegram 45121 to Cape Town, March 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770070–0866)
Secretary Vance: They are all trying to set their own targets.

Secretary Blumenthal: We used to get pressure to move our operations to restricted areas. We decided we would not do that. That is another thing they could discuss.

Dr. Brzezinski: What the companies are doing is excellent. What we have to decide is about the central focus of our policy. Until recently it was to use South Africa to help obtain a settlement in Rhodesia and Namibia. Now perhaps the central focus of our policy should be the promotion of a moderate South African policy. The focus would be to promote the progressive transition of South African policy. It is a very important decision and we should be very explicit when we make it.

The President: The hang up is that in the normal political world we use short hand symbols like “majority rule”. That phrase strikes terror among the South Africans. What intermediate steps would be acceptable to Vorster? It is hard for us to say publicly that we are abandoning the concept of majority rule. We should encourage the companies. If Vorster raises hell for political purposes and also quietly encourages GM that is a good first step. That suits me as long as the next step is greater black participation. If we keep talking about “majority rule” it could be counter-productive and drive them into a closet.

Dr. Brzezinski: If we can promote the idea of a quiet evolution then a number of things can follow.

Secretary Vance: There could be difficult choices in the UN.

The President: That’s Andy’s responsibility.

Secretary Blumenthal: It is easier to agree on a goal than to decide on concrete steps. The real issue is what steps we should take to get there. It is a long run goal, fraught with great difficulty and probably lending to eventual unrest.

Amb. Young: Two years ago I said it would be 5–10 years before Angola and Mozambique became independent. Our planning should accept the fact that things happen faster than anticipated. We may be wrong about South Africa. The situation may not be so bad in South Africa. They are capable technically and morally of doing more than they are doing.

The President: You, Andy, take the responsibility in working with the State Department to describe a sequence of events we desire toward the liberalization of South African society. Consider also whether or not we should talk with Vorster directly. Should he be invited here? If we could we should alleviate South Africa’s concern that we are going to put immediate and absolute pressure on them for a revolution. We should spell these steps out in sequential terms without a time schedule. This could help me and give us more leverage on South Africa and Namibia.
Amb. Young: If this were leaked, I’d be ruined.

Secretary Vance: You could do it but it would be the State Department doing it.

The President: None of us around this table but you can understand the consciousness of the Black African and what would be acceptable to him.

Amb. Young: I feel more confident telling whites what is possible than telling blacks what is acceptable.

The President: Perhaps the two are close together.

Dr. Brzezinski: A Presidential directive is needed. We are now operating under NSSM 39.\textsuperscript{19}

The President: Cy, you can take the leadership on the paper. Andy will advise you on it.

Vice President Mondale: Mike, perhaps you should call the Presidents of the corporations and tell them the President appreciates what they are doing.


268. Presidential Directive/NSC–5\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, March 9, 1977

TO

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

ALSO

The Secretary of the Treasury
The United States Representative to the United Nations
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Southern Africa

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 3, PD 05 [1]. Secret.
After full consideration of the views presented at the meeting of the National Security Council held March 3, 1977, I have concluded that the U.S. Government will adopt a new focus in its policies toward the Government of South Africa. Our aim will be to promote a progressive transformation of South African society.

1. To implement this new policy I direct Secretary Vance, in consultation with Ambassador Young, to take the lead in drawing up a paper outlining a sequence of events designed to promote the progressive transformation of South African society, including specific steps the U.S. might take. The paper is to consider how, when and by whom this new focus should be made known to the SAG, to black African leaders, and to the American people. It should also include specific recommendations as to the U.S. position on: a Chapter VII vote in the U.N.; conclusion of the ERDA–SASOL contract; and U.S.–SAG nuclear cooperation.

2. I direct Secretary Blumenthal to speak with the presidents of the 12 corporations and ask them to expand their number, and outline specific steps to implement the principles they have adopted to govern their activities in South Africa.

In addition, I direct the Intelligence Community to study the effectiveness of possible sanctions (in addition to repeal of the Byrd Amendment) which the U.S. might apply against Rhodesia, including shipments of oil by subsidiaries of American-owned companies, and the possibility of enlisting the cooperation of other nations with major economic ties with South Africa.

---

2 See Document 267.

3 An undated paper, entitled “A New Approach to Relations with South Africa,” was sent to Brzezinski under a March 29 covering memorandum from Borg. (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 3, PD–05) For a summary of the recommendations, see Document 271.

4 See Document 144.

5 See Document 149.
269. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 23, 1977, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
South African Ambassador Botha Pays Farewell Call on President Carter

PARTICIPANTS
US:
President Carter
Vice President Mondale
Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
Zbigniew Brzezinski
William E. Schaufele, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
Thomas P. Thornton, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

South Africans:
Ambassador Botha
Jeremy Shearar, Minister, South African Embassy

President: I would like to congratulate you on your promotion and let you know that we will be very sorry to see you leave.2

Botha: Thank you very much. I think I would like to stay here, but of course I am looking forward to my job.

Vance: We are torn in our feelings. Glad to see you becoming Foreign Minister, but sorry to see you leave.

President: I have heard many good things about the work you have done here; about your great sensitivity and knowledge.

I particularly want to speak with you and discuss frankly some Southern African problems. These are among the most crucial matters that we have to deal with, and South Africa is a key to their resolution. I have been reticent thus far in public because I do not want to cause any problems. I have been grateful for the close working relationship that we have had with you. If I may, I would like to speak very frankly on three sets of issues:

First, with regard to Namibia, we have to be able to meet pressures coming out of the UN. We feel that you should move immediately to comply with UN resolutions to bring about a government in Namibia

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: President: 3/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting adjourned at 3:20 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

2 Pik Botha assumed his duties as Foreign Minister on April 1.
that would be representative of the black people. We understand, of course, your need for a friendly neighbor.

We know of the (Turnhalle) discussions; it will be hard for us to accept an outcome that does not include SWAPO. We will maintain our position. Ambassador Young has been trying to prevent developments in the UN that could lead to an arms embargo. Our hope is that there will be realization of the seriousness of this matter and, if possible, the SAG will take action.

We would be eager to express public appreciation for such action, and it would make it easier for us to work with you economically and diplomatically in the future.

The second area is Rhodesia. We have deferred to the UK in their efforts to bring the parties to Geneva and have appreciated what Prime Minister Vorster has done. We depend on the SAG for communication with Ian Smith.

David Owen will be going shortly to Southern Africa, although present political problems in the UK may delay him. In the near future I would hope that South Africa, the UK, the United States, and the front-line presidents could have extensive discussions to develop a joint concept for the transition to majority rule. I think we could then move ahead and eliminate the threat to peace.

Third, is the question of US-South African relationships. There is a real need on my part to understand your concept of what black-white relations will be ten to fifteen years from now so we can better know how to help.

Perhaps we could send someone to South Africa to talk to Prime Minister Vorster directly.

You know our position on black economic, social, and political participation. It is certainly your responsibility rather than ours, but we should consult. We can help orient the attitude of other countries in Africa and elsewhere if we have a clear concept of your ultimate goal and the degrees by which you intend to move. Please understand that we are not trying to tell you what to do.

I would appreciate hearing your comments.

Botha: Thank you very much for this great honor of receiving me and fitting me into your tight schedule. You have touched on the three main areas of concern; I have been in extensive contact with Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski, and Mr. Schaufele and have discussed the background of these matters with them, so I will not bore you with history.
The situation in Southern Africa may not be dangerous, but it is grave. With all respect, may I be equally frank with you?

We sometimes see the American attitude as lacking in depth. A great nation that can send machinery to Mars sometimes has difficulty in devoting attention to a small country such as we are. We feel you are using us as a target.

You must understand we have nowhere else to go. There is a great difference between the situation in South Africa and that in Rhodesia or Southwest Africa.

President: I fully understand that.

Botha: We have been in our land as long as you have in yours. We fought a war against colonialism 75 years ago. We cannot forget the atrocities that were visited on us. Now we Afrikaners have political power. Our history is one long struggle for us to maintain our way of life.

We are not interested in dominating blacks. We have always opposed colonialism. We are ready to divest ourselves of the governing of blacks. We do not, however, want to share power with anybody. We are a little people on our own.

Discrimination on the basis of color is, in my view, indefensible, and I have said this publicly. But we cannot abandon our own right to self-determination. Elsewhere in Africa there is no really freely democratic government. We, however, have a system where we can, for instance, go into court and sue our government.

The issue of race is not basic, and we must do something to eliminate discrimination as soon as possible. But we will not hand over power to anybody else and thereby destroy ourselves.

The blacks in America came to this country as slaves while those in Africa continue to exist as separate nations. We understand that black African states cannot be fully democratic. They have different interests and national aspirations.

We believe that these (black) nations can develop on separate land. You know that Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland exist as separate states. We have many people of each of these nationalities in our country, and perhaps these groups can be united to form independent nations.

There are vast potentialities for solving the problems of these peoples on a national, not a racial basis.

Sometimes, though, it seems that nothing good can come out of South Africa. We are surrounded by a wall of antagonism, and whatever we do is wrong. We are taking modest steps such as opening certain theaters and restaurants to both blacks and whites. Those of us who are promoting change, however, have a very hard time convincing our voters, especially when our positive moves are not appreciated.
President: I understand.

Botha: The State Department puts out releases that say these are just meaningless cosmetics. You must give us some recognition or encouragement when we move in the right directions. We must proceed on some basis of trust.

President: The sort of thing you have been saying is exactly what I was suggesting. We need a clearer understanding of your policies so that we can support you publicly. The time is coming to send someone who will represent me so that you can spell out what you hope to achieve. I cannot say in advance that we will agree with you, but that is our inclination. Please note that neither Secretary Vance nor I has made public criticisms of your nation’s policies.

You can help very much in solving the Rhodesia and Namibia problems.

Botha: Yours is a very reasonable attitude. May I hand over to you a message which our Prime Minister telephoned to me to give to you at this meeting. I translated it into English.

(The message is attached.)

As regards Rhodesia and Southwest Africa: We, as one of the allied powers, kept Southwest Africa away from the Germans in World War I. We administered it as a mandate through World War II. The UN has taken a number of political steps against our position, but there are still no judicial pronouncements to support the UN’s claims on Southwest Africa.

If we had three years ago offered what we are now offering we could have peace. Numerous people who used to be abroad with SWAPO are now sitting around the conference table. There will be a black majority government. We cannot hand over power to a black minority simply because they have guns. We can meet the substantive demands of the West; not, however, of the UN, which tends to be theatrical and where we can never get our point across. Southwest Africa is really not such a big headache.

President: When will there be a black government in power in Namibia?

Botha: We have only put one condition on inviting them (SWAPO) to negotiations—that the fighting must stop. They have not accepted it. We went a long way last September in accepting the seven points put forward by the former Secretary of State. Now it is March. And there must not be stagnation. The negotiations are moving forward.

---

5 Message was not attached. See Document 270.

Racial discrimination is being basically eliminated. We do not control the situation. Kissinger later gave me an eight-point program that SWAPO had forwarded through Zambia.² There was no flexibility in it, just a demand to hand over power. We cannot do this for the situation will be just like Angola where the MPLA and Soviets took over. The people of Southwest Africa are defenseless. We are ready to accept a black majority government but not a minority government on the basis of armed force.

The situation is similar in Rhodesia. We expect Smith to hand over power in two years, and we might be willing to give some guarantees. But the black factions must reach some arrangement among themselves.

President: Are you committed to support any particular black leader?

Botha: We will support anyone that has majority support—anyone who has the black jungle on his side (i.e., the one who controls the Bush). If such a leader emerges and can agree with Smith, this will lead to peace, for such a leader will be able to deal with the whites and will not have to take increasingly radical positions.

If you have any suggestions, we will try to sell them to Smith. Mugabe does not even command the support of the guerrillas, but we will accept Mugabe if the people choose him freely. Rhodesian and Southwest African problems can be solved in accordance with American principles. But we must move fast.

Vance: How can you get from Turnhalle to a transfer of power without bloodshed and chaos if SWAPO is not involved?

Botha: If there is a majority in power, it need not involve bloodshed.

Vance: But if SWAPO is not involved, won’t there be conflict?

Botha: We tried to get SWAPO to talk, but we cannot force them to.

Vance: Neither can we, but we can try.

Botha: The next best thing is to ensure that the people give majority support. It is the only guarantee—also for you who are also members of a minority in the world. We believe the Soviets are seeking to seize positions of power in Africa. The Africans may get fed up with them, but how long will that take? If the Cubans are in Rhodesia and a slaughter of women and children, black and white, takes place, my government will be under intense pressure. Once war starts in South Africa, it will be the greatest tragedy in the last thirty years. The problem is that we have only limited means to prevent this. I do not think you can say we are intransigent with regard to Rhodesia or Southwest Africa. Every time we have done something, we encounter more radical

² See Tab 2, Document 264.
demands. The front-line presidents just won’t compromise. We need time. It took you decades to integrate your society and under much easier circumstances.

President: Who is the most reasonable of the front-line presidents?

Botha: Khama. Despite some troubles we have with him, Kaunda is also reasonable. We have saved his life several times. We are able to cooperate fully with Machel on economic matters. These three desire peace. Nyerere seems to be jumping from one point to another. Despite ideological differences, we have no trouble with Machel.

We see the need for African development as a guarantee against communism. It can be done through hard, solid work, and we will be able to do it, but not if the Soviets are involved.

Brzezinski: What you have said is profoundly moving. We have great historical concern and empathy with you. These things can be done if they are done fast. I am impressed by your slowness in Rhodesia and Namibia. This weakens the moderates. You must keep ahead of the radicals, and concessions offered now are often too late. The locomotive of history could crush you—and us.

Botha: I agree fully, but how do we proceed?

Brzezinski: We must move rapidly with the SWAPO and Rhodesian situation.

Botha: Some things are inevitable and can be brought about through will power. Who would have thought a year ago that the Governor of Georgia would be President of the United States.

President: We want to plan to send someone to South Africa. We will have to work out the time and be sure the visit would be productive. We will also consult with the British. In the meantime, I hope you will be putting information together and outlining your concept for a very rapid solution for Rhodesia, Namibia, and a description of your government’s (domestic) plan for the future. I would like to comprehend an overall settlement.

Ambassador Young has good rapport with the black Africans. If we, you, the British, and perhaps Machel and Kaunda could agree on a basic settlement, we could put it into being.

The UN decision on Namibia is hard to undo. The SWAPO involvement will be difficult, but the longer we delay settlement the more certain it is that future radical leaders will reject changes that would be possible now. The situation will deteriorate rapidly. Your government will suffer. We are not in a posture of abuse to you. We have not made statements to embarrass you. South Africa is the key to the solution in Southern Africa. You can help us, as outsiders, in finding a solution. Our government now has the trust and confidence of many black African leaders. These are proud nations but often weak. They would benefit from a solution.
There are many options and we have all been going in different directions. A picture of a comprehensive settlement could lead to an unacceptable settlement. It will require strength and boldness.

I am glad to accept this invitation of Prime Minister Vorster to send someone. I did not know of his offer beforehand. We will send somebody to meet with you and the front-line presidents.

We will miss you here in Washington.

(End of Meeting)

270. Message From South African Prime Minister Vorster to President Carter

March 23, 1977

Why must we confront one another, why must we quarrel with each other?

Is there no way in which we can sort out our differences?

For my part I am prepared to receive a special envoy from the President for thorough discussions of the problems of Southern Africa.

The demands of time and the grave magnitude of the issues involved in the search for peace make the use of normal diplomatic channels inappropriate.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 114, South Africa: 1–3/77. No classification marking. Ambassador Botha delivered the message during his farewell call on Carter. See Document 269.
SUBJECT

South Africa: Follow-Up to the NSC Meeting

In PD/NSC–5, following the NSC meeting on South Africa, you directed Cy Vance and Andy Young to draw up a paper outlining “a sequence of events designed to promote the progressive transformation of South African society, including steps the U.S. might take”. The response is attached as Tab A.

In summary, the paper recommends that:

—We make our general approach known through public statements, as you did in your UN speech.

—Inform Vorster forcefully that our relations will suffer if South Africa does not make rapid movement away from apartheid.

—Take promptly a series of steps to distance ourselves from South Africa (e.g. strengthen our voluntary arms embargo; review our nuclear policy; restate opposition to homelands—the list is on pp. 5–6).

—Keep in mind a set of benchmarks by which we can judge South African progress (examples are provided on p. 4) but do not make this list known publicly or to the South Africans. State Department could monitor South African progress.

—According to performance, implement further sanctions or rewards, examples of which are listed in Tab B.

Since the paper was written before your decision to have a representative meet with Vorster, it does not reflect that possibility.

The study correctly points out that a mechanical sliding scale relating benchmarks, rewards and punishments is not feasible. At the same time, however, the paper could have been more specific in a number of ways and hence more helpful. For instance, there is no suggestion

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 47, South Africa: 4–6/77. Secret. A copy was sent to Mondale. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “I would like V.P. comments.”

2 See Document 267.

3 Tab A is attached but not printed. Brzezinski revised this sentence to read: “The response is attached at Tab A; I suggest you only scan it.”


5 Tab B is not attached.
as to timing (i.e., how soon should the South Africans take action and in what sequence) nor can we get very far if the criteria for South African action are set forth only in terms of “move toward” or “express intention”.

My staff will be in further touch with the Vice President’s office and with State to see if more specificity is possible or useful.

272. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, April 16, 1977, 0200Z

85992. Eyes Only for Amb Bowdler at OOB from the President. Subject: Meeting With Prime Minister Vorster.

1. I would like you to meet as soon as possible with Prime Minister Vorster to discuss further my March 23 conversation with Foreign Minister Botha about sending an emissary to meet with the Prime Minister. I look forward to learning Vorster’s reactions to the following points which I would like you to convey to Vorster from me:

2. I have learned of the preliminary South African reactions to UK Foreign Secretary Owen’s visit regarding Southern Rhodesia, and to the Western demarche on Namibia. The United States supports these initiatives. We are prepared to play a role in a constitutional conference on Southern Rhodesia, and believe that the framework advanced on Namibia—UN Security [Council] Resolution 385—offers the best basis for resolving that question peacefully, and in a manner acceptable internationally and internally.

3. I believe that it could be mutually profitable for a U.S. emissary to have a full and candid exchange of views with Vorster on Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and the future political evolution of South Africa, all questions for which Prime Minister Vorster has an important responsibility. My emissary would set forth our position concerning the need

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086-0022. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Brzezinski; cleared by Carter and in S/S; approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

2 See Document 269.

3 See Tab A, Document 50.

4 Adopted unanimously on January 30, 1976, the resolution required South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and reaffirmed the United Nation’s legal responsibility over Namibia. For text of the resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1976, pp. 782–783.
for progress on all three matters, and our belief that U.S. relations with South Africa are approaching a watershed.

4. Progress on these issues will allow us to build the kind of positive relationship we would like to see between our two governments.

5. If real progress can be made at such a meeting, I am prepared to have a high-level emissary, conceivably Vice President Mondale, meet with Vorster.

6. Should, on the other hand, it be unlikely that a meeting at this time will produce significant results, it might, quite frankly, be preferable to await a more propitious moment, and continue our contacts through normal diplomatic channels.

7. I would appreciate it if he would convey his own candid views to me through you. Vorster may also wish to use this occasion to give you the assessment of the situation in Southern Africa which Foreign Minister Botha told me his government would be preparing for us.

8. For Ambassador Bowdler: Should Vorster raise the question of where a meeting would be held, you should reply that the place would be worked out depending upon circumstances existing at the time. Should he specifically mention meeting in South Africa, you should say that this is not excluded, but would depend upon whether significant concrete developments could be achieved, pointing out that this would be needed in order to present a positive framework for the contacts with South Africans of different races and political beliefs which a high-level emissary would have to have during a visit to South Africa. Best regards.

Christopher
273. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Cape Town, April 19, 1977, 1540Z

591. Please pass Eyes Only for the President from Ambassador. Subj: Meeting With Prime Minister Vorster. Ref: State 085992, Cape Town 0568.

1. Over lunch today I conveyed to Prime Minister Vorster the points contained in your message. He was accompanied by FonMin Botha and OFA Secretary Brand Fourie. The luncheon was somewhat hurried because the Prime Minister had to hasten back to Parliament for the budget debate.

2. After my presentation the Prime Minister first asked that I go over the second paragraph of the points, particularly the section expressing need for progress on Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. He then inquired whether the special emissary would be coming to South Africa. I told him this was not excluded. It would depend, however, upon whether significant concrete developments can be achieved. Such developments would be needed in order to establish a positive framework for contacts with a cross-section of South Africans of different races and political persuasions which a high-level emissary would be expected to make during a visit to South Africa.

3. FonMin Botha then entered the discussion to inquire what was meant by significant results. He asked whether the results referred to had to be anticipated before the decision was taken to send an emissary or could flow from the discussions after he arrived. The Prime Minister joined in this request noting that conversations with former Secretary Kissinger last year produced good results which flowed from the talks. The fact that it was not possible to implement them did not detract from their positive quality. He added that he did not think it possible to state in advance what the results might be since these would depend upon the understandings reached. He said he did not know what more he could do on Rhodesia except support the Owen effort, which he was prepared to do. On Namibia, the discussions with the Five Powers were pending and the wishes of the SWA people had to be taken into

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 45, Africa: Southern Africa: 3-8/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

2 See Document 272.

3 In telegram 568 from Cape Town, April 16, the Embassy informed the Department that Bowdler was invited to lunch with Vorster on April 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800020–1200)
consideration. He displayed sensitivity on the domestic front saying that South Africa could never accept dictation on domestic policy.

4. I reassured the Prime Minister that no one was talking about dictating. You were interested in an indication of his views on actions which South Africa might take to advance peaceful settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia and his thinking on how progress might be made on the domestic front. This would be helpful in deciding whether a visit by a high-level emissary at this time would be useful.

5. The Prime Minister’s response to my efforts to draw him out was evasive. He said that results cannot be anticipated. They should flow from the conversations and not be committed to paper in advance. He asked that I convey to you that “he thinks it would be worthwhile to have the discussions” and that “he was sure that positive results can flow from the discussions.” Later on he said that the discussions would: (a) produce a better understanding of the situation, (b) clarify misunderstandings and misconceptions, and (c) promote peace in Southern Africa which we are all looking for.4

6. When the discussion turned to latest developments in Rhodesia and Namibia, the Prime Minister was slightly more forthcoming. On Rhodesia he said he wanted to reiterate to you his support for the Owen effort and to guarantee that he would see to it that Smith lived up to whatever agreement is reached. On Namibia, he said that leaders of the groups participating in Turnhalle would be coming to Cape Town next Friday, April 22. He would be seeing them. Among the items to be discussed is the Five-Power demarche. He wanted to acquaint them with its terms. (Botha added later that the discussion would also include the implications of the demarche for Turnhalle.) Implementation of the Turnhalle Agreements depended on their wishes. If they want action this parliamentary session, they must ask for it by the middle of May. He stressed that enabling legislation for an interim government decides nothing on a permanent basis because the decisions on the shape of the independence government remain to be taken. I noted that setting up an interim government would compli-

---

4 In telegram 92271 to Cape Town, April 23, the Department wrote: “We consider Vorster’s response to be insufficient. The President’s message made it clear that we are not disposed to have a high-level emissary meet with Vorster unless there are real prospects for progress. In order to make an adequate assessment of the prospects, we need a clearer idea about what positive steps South Africa is prepared to take regarding Rhodesia, Namibia and the future political evolution of South Africa itself. Neither Vorster nor Botha did this during their conversation with you. Accordingly, you should convey to Botha and through him to Vorster (unless you have separate opportunity to see PM) that before we can send an emissary to meet somewhere with the Prime Minister, we must have a much fuller explanation from them of the SAG’s intentions regarding Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa’s racial situation.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086–0029)
cate reaching an internationally acceptable solution. He disagreed asserting that it makes it easier. On the domestic front, he was reluctant to speak beyond saying that he would be happy to explain to the emissary what his longer term plans are.

7. In the end the Prime Minister asked that I convey to you his interest in receiving the Vice President. He is convinced that it would lead to positive results but was no more specific. He said that if you had any particular questions, he would be happy to try to answer them. It was clear that he regards the ball in our court, having given what he regards as a favorable response.

Bowdler

274. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to
President Carter

Washington, May 10, 1977

SUBJECT
Objectives During Visit to Europe for Talks with Vorster and European Leaders

We are in the final preparatory stage for my forthcoming visit in your behalf to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom.

As currently scheduled, I will depart for Lisbon this Saturday for meetings with President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares on May 16; talks with King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suarez in Madrid on May 17; and with Chancellor Kreisky in Vienna on May 18.

The talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster are set for Vienna on May 19 and 20. I will then travel to Belgrade on the afternoon of May 20 for meetings on May 20–21 with President Tito and members of the Yugoslav leadership; then to London on May 22 to debrief Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen on the Vorster meetings.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 45, Africa: Southern Africa: 3–8/77. Secret. Carter wrote at the top of the first page: “Fritz—Read notes—J.C.” None of the tabs is attached.
2 See Documents 158, 276, and 278.
3 See Document 159.
There are three basic elements to the visit, each of priority importance to your foreign policy objectives. My purpose will be:

—to demonstrate in Portugal and Spain the United States’ support for their return to democracy;
—to convey to Prime Minister Vorster your policy toward Southern Africa including the United States’ views on the role South Africa must play in current efforts to resolve the Rhodesian and Namibian problems, and on the approach South Africa must take within its society if our relations are not to suffer;
—to emphasize to President Tito the importance your Administration places on Yugoslavia’s independence, political unity and territorial integrity.

I do not plan to become a negotiator on contentious issues in any of my meetings, but I do anticipate an in-depth discussion with Vorster. The following paragraphs summarize principal issues I expect to be raised during the visit, review the approach I plan to take, and request your guidance.

Southern Africa—Talks with Vorster. The principal purpose of the meeting with Vorster is to convey authoritatively to the South Africans our new policy on southern Africa: that we seek a progressive transformation of South African society as well as a constructive South African role on Rhodesia and Namibia. Our relations are at a watershed; their future depends on South African actions on all three questions.

A secondary objective will be to seek from Vorster a number of specific assurances—particularly on Rhodesia and Namibia. Whether or not Vorster gives such assurances, our meeting will make clear to South Africa—and equally important to the rest of Africa—exactly where we stand.

I would plan to begin our meeting with a private session to set the agenda and to establish the following general framework for our discussion of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

—South African actions are pivotal for the future of all southern Africa.
—We are gravely concerned about the implications of a gathering racial war in the region: for the destruction that it would bring to all the peoples of the region, for the ensuing growth in the Soviet influence in Africa, and for the divisive impact this could have on the United States and its allies and friends.
—We have been going through a transition in our own society of which we are justly proud. We will not turn our back on this experience in our foreign policy. This makes it inconceivable that we could support governments pursuing contrary principles, or remain politically neutral in a struggle for basic human justice.
—It is imperative therefore that the South African government understand clearly the fundamental character of our position. We all have a stake in progress. We would welcome positive South African actions that can lead to an improvement in our relations and a suppor-
tive American response. But we are at a watershed, and a lack of progress will inevitably affect our relations for the worse.4

On Rhodesia, I will review where we stand on the new negotiating effort and press him:

—to use his influence with Smith in support of a reasonable agreement on a settlement, including elections and a transfer to majority rule.
—to not just take the position that South Africa will enforce what Smith will agree to, but that Vorster will make a public commitment to acknowledge an internationally recognized Zimbabwe during 1978, and follow through.5

On Namibia, I will reinforce the Contact Group’s efforts by urging flexibility and cooperation in working toward a solution, based on UNSC Resolution 385, which is internationally acceptable. Specifically, I will ask that:

—He not establish a central administration authority that would be the unacceptable Turnhalle interim government by another name.
—He lend his fullest cooperation in facilitating an agreement with the UN Secretary General on the holding of elections for a constituent assembly in which all interested parties are consulted and can participate fully, and on other problems impeding an internationally acceptable solution.6

On South Africa, the toughest issue, I want to make clear that the strength of our support for a progressive transformation of South African society is not tactical, not conditioned on the help they give us on Namibia and Rhodesia. (I will put the point to Vorster more delicately—that we look for progress on three issues.) I would like your endorsement of this approach as our fundamental strategy—recognizing if the South Africans change course on apartheid, we will do all we can to help them over the tough times ahead.7

In elaborating our approach, I will explain that while it is not our role to define the specific actions South Africa should take, Vorster should understand:

4 Carter checked the approve option.
5 Carter checked the approve option and wrote in the left-hand margin: “a) Nkomo made very bad impression on Cy & D Owen, I believe. Muzorewa may be better—keep our options open but feel Vorster & Andy out. b) Stability after elections important.”
6 Carter checked the approve option and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Free elections would suit us—provided all contenders given an equal chance. S. Africa will have to lend military stability.”
7 Carter checked the approve option and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Fritz—Listen a lot but make our position clear—you have plenty of time with him.”
—our deep and abiding commitment to racial justice, reinforced by our recent experience. He should not misjudge or underestimate the depth of America’s dedication to human rights.\(^8\)
—our consequent inability to accept the apartheid system in South Africa.\(^9\)
—our conviction that there must be full and equal political participation and economic opportunity and justice accorded to all South African people. Otherwise there will be no peace.
—our judgment that the system South Africa defends is encouraging the growth of Communist influence in South Africa and our determination not to let our antipathy to communism draw us into actions contrary to our basic values. Moreover, the best way to beat communism is to move toward social justice.\(^10\)
—that these circumstances underline the need for a new direction in South African policy.
—that if such a new and positive course can be charted, South Africa will have our support and understanding. The press of international events makes such action urgent.
—that without such a change, the United States, more in sorrow than in anger, will pursue the course (both bilaterally and in the UN) dictated by its principles, values and sense of justice.
—the choice is South Africa’s.\(^11\)

**Public Handling:**

Our general approach will be to keep expectations for concrete achievements realistically low. I plan to make clear that it fits in with our overall policy to support majority rule and the progressive transformation of South African society. I will make clear our willingness to work with the South Africans to this end should they choose to accompany us on this road.

Prior to the meeting, I plan to explain to the press in general terms the purpose of the meeting. The statement I propose to use is at Tab B. This is designed to counteract suspicions over the purpose of the talks without prejudging the outcome.

If Vorster is receptive to our approach, at the end of the session, I would brief the press. The most favorable outcome I can foresee is outlined in the statement at Tab C. This will have to be scaled downward to reflect unachieved objectives.

If the meeting fails to elicit a favorable Vorster response, I plan a statement consistent with our overall objective of making America’s new policy clear to the world. This will:

\(^8\) Carter wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin next to this point.
\(^9\) Carter wrote in the margin below this point: “Get from Andy degree of flexibility & minimum acceptable progress year by year.”
\(^10\) Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “Possibility of S. Africa working with other nations to help poor [unclear] in Africa. If they don’t remain pariahs.”
\(^11\) Carter checked the approve option.
show the Africans our determination to work change in South Africa as well as Rhodesia and Namibia and thereby give added credibility to our overall Africa policy;

—increase the pressure on Vorster.

I believe this is essential despite whatever risk there may be of making Vorster even less disposed to cooperate on Rhodesia and Namibia.12

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Southern Africa.]

12 There is no indication of either approval or disapproval, however, Carter wrote in the margin below this recommendation: “ok, but sequential progress should be condoned. Let Vorster tell you what they will do & how long it will take. Measure this against Andy’s expectations. Don’t set our requirements so high as to obviate any cooperation. He must get credit for what he does, & not appear afraid of us.”

275. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, May 10, 1977, 0440Z

Tosec 40133/106075. For Secretary from Christopher. Subject: Conversation With Foreign Minister Botha on Young Visit.

1. Summary. Following our telephone conversation, I called Foreign Minister Botha at 2:00 a.m. Pretoria time to relay our deep concern over their aide memoire2 and to ask for a reconsideration of their decision in order to take into account our mutual long term interests

1 Source: Carter Library, Donated Material, Papers of Walter F. Mondale, Overseas Assignments—Trip Files, 1977–1980, Box 15, African Mission—5/77: Situation Reports and State Africa Group Meetings [2]. Confidential; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Bowdler; cleared by Seelye; approved by Christopher. Vance was in London to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting.

2 Regarding Young’s proposed visit, the May 9 aide mémoire noted: “In all those circumstances such a visit now presents the South African Government with obvious problems. It is accordingly suggested that a visit to South Africa by Ambassador Young be postponed until a more opportune time.” (Ibid.)
as well as problems with the holding of the Vienna meeting. He indicated he would talk to the Prime Minister first thing in the morning, and that he would be much helped by my suggestion that the visit could be narrowed in time and content. End summary.

2. At the outset of his response, Botha said that he wanted to be candid about the main problem with the visit. Never in his experience had he come across the phenomenon of continued insults and derogatory remarks from a high official of another country. In the past, the State Department and the USG had always opposed South Africa policy, but in a way that they could handle. Botha noted that he had gone out of his way since returning to his country to be helpful and to facilitate favorable action on the outstanding problems of Southern Africa.

3. I told Botha that I very much appreciated his candor. I indicated that we had high expectations for the Vienna meeting but if the SAG adhered to the position taken in its aide memoire it would put us in a most difficult position vis-a-vis the holding of those talks as well as presenting a longer term problem.

4. Botha said that they were not turning down the Young visit, but rather asking for its postponement. He noted that it came in the midst not only of the Vienna meeting but also a series of other plans which he had involving the BLS countries. Increasing in his candor, he went on to say that the atmosphere in South Africa is very bad for Ambassador Young. The bad feeling is not restricted to the Afrikaner community, but is shared by the English as well. Botha went on to note that he was impressed by his meeting with President Carter and came back to South Africa determined to work for a solution of the Rhodesian and Namibian problems. But the “continued torrent of insults” make it especially difficult to create an atmosphere in which he could get approval for the changes in attitude and policy which are required.

5. At this point, I referred to his earlier statement regarding postponement, and asked him about the time frame he had in mind. He was hesitant in his reply, saying only that it is hard to be specific and that the month of May is bad. He went on to say that if it is difficult for us to go ahead with the Vienna meeting, it could be put on ice. I responded that we would not wish to do this, considering that the talks could have a very beneficial long term result. I asked whether limiting the Young visit to a meeting with businessmen and seeing a

---

4 Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.
5 See Document 269.
few people in the Embassy would not be a less difficult alternative for them.

6. Botha responded by asking me whether we were keeping track of what Young was saying about South Africa. I told him that Young was not going to South Africa for the purpose of causing difficulties. Young had made clear to us that his visit would be brief and was willing to limit it to the businessmen’s dinner and the meeting with a few people in the Embassy. He never intended to make the visits reported in the press.

7. Botha said they had irrefutable evidence that the statements attributed to Young came from the US Mission in New York. Botha continued that now we were exerting pressure on them to allow the visit. What are we to think, Botha asked rhetorically, if we meet in Vienna and there is another torrent of statements against South Africa. I hastened to point out to Botha that my call was not intended to be unwarranted pressure. I was trying to reason with him on the basis of the long term interests of the two countries. Again, I asked him to reconsider taking into account the implications if they insisted on their position in the aide memoire.

8. Botha’s response to this was that he would have to take it up with the Prime Minister the first thing in the morning. To be even more frank than he had already been, he noted that their main difficulty was that if the visit were to take place and conditions created where people were killed, then the situation would be “awful for us here.” I told Botha that I had known Andy Young for a long time and knew him to be a man of peace and not violence. He has always tried to avoid violence. The principal purpose of his going to South Africa would be to meet with the businessmen and a few people in the Embassy and not go to the university or other places. I asked him whether we could consider the aide memoire to be set aside while we worked this thing out. Botha said that he had maintained the aide memoire under very close wraps and no mention had been made of it in South Africa. He made an indirect reference to conditions which might be understood regarding the visit. Sensing that he was suggesting that there might be understandings at this end on the scope of the visit, I made the specific suggestion that Andy might arrive in South Africa on Saturday to meet with a few people at the Embassy and have dinner with the businessmen. He would leave either that night or early the next morning for the Sudan. Botha seemed interested in this

---

6 In an interview with the Associated Press, Young replied “yeah” when asked whether he considered the South African Government to be illegitimate. (New York Times, April 16, 1977, p. 1)
schedule and said that he would speak to his Prime Minister first thing in the morning and get in touch with me tomorrow by telephone.

Christopher

276. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, May 19, 1977

SUBJECT
Second Meeting Between Vice President Mondale and Prime Minister Vorster: Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa

PARTICIPANTS
United States
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Ambassador Donald McHenry, USUN
Ambassador to South Africa William Bowdler
Mr. A. Denis Clift, Adviser to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Mr. James Johnson, Executive Assistant to the Vice President
Mr. Jay Kenneth Katzen, USUN (Note taker)

South Africa
Prime Minister B.J. Vorster
Foreign Minister Botha
General van den Bergh
South African Ambassador to the United States Donald Sole
Mr. Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Franklin, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Eksteen

The meeting began at 1445.

Vice President Mondale: I have looked into the Rhodesia question. The only reference I have found is a memorandum of conversation between Owen and the South African Government several weeks ago, in which Owen said it would be difficult to get sponsors if the Fund

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, South Africa: 5/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on May 21 by Katzen. Mondale was in Vienna for meetings with leaders of the Austrian Government and Prime Minister Vorster. The meeting took place in the Hofburg Conference Room from 2:45 to 6 p.m.

2 During the morning meeting, there was a dispute over the purpose of the Zimbabwe Fund. See Document 158.
were interpreted as a buy out. Owen knows the Congressional views, and the Congress didn’t support the Fund for only buy out purposes.

Prime Minister Vorster: Owen never mentioned this to me.

Mr. Fourie: The question asked was, “Is the Fund dead?”, and the answer was, “No, it is very much alive”.

Vice President Mondale: We support the Fund, but not the buy out aspect envisaged by Dr. Kissinger. We support stability in a future Zimbabwe through constitutional guarantees, a swift move to elections, which will create a moderate government and, as we develop details of the Fund, we would be willing to shape assurances of protection and help to property owners. This would be part of the consulting process.

Prime Minister Vorster: We reserve our position. We will have to go back and look at the minutes.

Vice President Mondale: The position of the Congress and our own position are clear. The original plan was for a buy out Fund. It now would be a way to have provisions which will reassure all. Perhaps the money from the Fund could be used for expenses within Rhodesia, which would release other funds which could be used for that purpose. We hope that a post-independence Rhodesia would be secure for all.

Mr. Fourie: You have mentioned a desire to include protection for those with property. Would that include pensions?

Vice President Mondale: I can’t get into details. But we believe, yes. And property at a real market value.

Prime Minister Vorster: We reserve our stand. We will have to clear up the matter with the British.

Vice President Mondale: In an effort to produce a constructive hopeful environment, could you agree to the following language?: “The South African Government agrees to support British/American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe . . .

Prime Minister Vorster: Rhodesia . . .

Vice President Mondale: “. . . can achieve independence during 1978”.

Prime Minister Vorster: I will consider it and reply before you leave. I already have told the Five my position concerning South West Africa. South Africa is not occupying the territory, but is administering

---


4 For Vorster’s position, expressed in response to a démarche by the Five, see Document 49.
it, and has done so since entrusted to by the Mandate. We do not want one inch for ourselves. It is not part of South Africa, and we would not incorporate it if you wanted us to. South West Africa belongs to various peoples; they are independent people, have different languages, different cultures, different levels of development, and different numbers. We always wanted it to come to independence as an entity although, for a period, we explored establishing separate development—which is what they wanted. From 1967, we agreed that the peoples would determine their own future. Six years ago, Secretary General Waldheim came to South Africa. As a result, he agreed to send a personal representative to South Africa and South West Africa. He was Dr. Escher, a Swiss diplomat in Vienna. Escher and I came to an understanding, in writing. We both signed it. I received a copy of Escher’s report, and that was the last I heard. The fact is that Escher was ignored: such is the nature of UNO. Both Waldheim and Escher reproached us, saying that we were keeping the people of South West Africa from each other. As a result, to the satisfaction of Waldheim and Escher, I brought the leaders together, to know each other, and to work together. I have kept to this obligation. Meetings have been held and agreement was reached to work together. The Ovambo people, which constitute 47% of the population, have an elected, adult suffrage, one-man one-vote government. They have had several elections. In the last one, two years ago, all Ovambos who had left were invited back, with the agreement that nothing would be held against them. Many came. The only requirement was to come in peace. SWAPO had a chance to participate in the elections, which were held as elections are held in South Africa and the United States. The Okavango, who constitute 50,000 of South West Africa’s 800,000 people, also have an elected government, with a cabinet, and ministers. South Africa never, from the Mandate, governed either Ovambo or Okavango. The Basters have 16,000 out of 800,000 people. They are proud of being Basters. They will come up on the street and introduce themselves as Basters. They have their own constitution. They also have governed themselves and have laws which apply only if the Basters want them applied. The Damaras, and there are 65,000 of them, haven’t a government yet. Nor do the Hereros, who are 43,000. They all want a government and have asked for it, and we owe them governments. From the Escher/Waldheim meetings, the South West African authorities decided to hold a conference which led to the meeting at Turnhalle. This was serious work. By a miracle a consensus approved a constitution. South Africa is committed to giving them a constitution. We warned the parties

5 Waldheim travelled to South Africa and Namibia March 6–10, 1972.
of this commitment and have told them that by mid-May, they would be asking for it. After all, they drew it up. I have no desire to interfere. Had it not been for the Five, I would have given them that constitution. But the Five objected seriously. I stuck my neck out far by agreeing not to have the South African Parliament approve the constitution. Rather, the State President will. But, I suggested that the contact group see the people in Windhoek. Turnhalle is not my friend: it is my enemy. That is the situation. Now our attitude is—and no one will get us away from this—that it is their situation to decide.

Vice President Mondale: As I understand it, agreement was reached with the Five that there would be elections, with all participating.  

Prime Minister Vorster: There was no agreement. The Five said they had to go back to their governments. We said we had to go to speak to the people at Turnhalle. I don’t know what happened. I didn’t see the people at Turnhalle. But you should know that 95% of the white electorate approved the Turnhalle constitution the other day.

Vice President Mondale: Secondly, I understand that agreement was reached for the UN to have a representative present to satisfy the fairness of the elections and the electoral process.  

Prime Minister Vorster: To give it international credibility. Yes.

Vice President Mondale: Thirdly, that South Africa agreed to withdraw instrumentalities of government in phases.  

Prime Minister Vorster: “After the installation of a government”.

Ambassador McHenry: We discussed the development of a program for the withdrawal of instrumentalities after the electoral process.

Vice President Mondale: That was the situation then on withdrawal. There were no agreements on detainees and political prisoners, or restrictive laws. But we found these discussions very hopeful.

Prime Minister Vorster: I also agreed on 31 December 1978 as the date for independence.

Vice President Mondale: There was progress and we were glad of it. There also were problems and we’d like to discuss them.

Prime Minister Vorster: Fine. What happened in the later talks you had after the Capetown meeting?

Ambassador McHenry: As agreed, we sent representatives to Windhoek, to speak to Internal SWAPO, the National Front, church leaders and others. We also have spoken since to External SWAPO, the Front Line Presidents and members of the Security Council. There

---

7 See Document 54.
8 Ibid.
9 See Document 55.
was a full gamut of reactions, running from the belief that real progress had been achieved to the feeling that no progress had been reached. There also was suspicion over the trust-worthiness of South Africa. In general, the questions asked were the same as those asked in Capetown: What is the “central administering authority”? There was concern over the extent of UN involvement which would be necessary to overcome suspicion. The question of political prisoners had to be resolved. There must be a phased withdrawal. South Africa could be in a position to intimidate, thereby upsetting the environment for free elections. These were the basic questions; there also were other ones. The reaction of the Turnhalle group was different. They suspected any UN role. They were disappointed over the delay in ratification, but were open.

Prime Minister Vorster: Only this morning I received a telegram from them asking the status of the constitution.

Vice President Mondale: The United States supports Security Council Resolution 385.\(^\text{10}\) That requires an impartial interim administering authority, which would not prejudice the future government by tilting. In order to be consistent with Resolution 385, it must be a neutral authority. Secondly, we need fair and equal participation in a national election. Its purpose should be to create a constituent assembly, leading to a constitution and a governing process. What does South Africa have in mind?

Prime Minister Vorster: We already explained this to you. Most of the people already have their own governments; there are some without. The Hereros and Damaras want local government. My government and I are committed to give it to them. Normally, there would have been a law approved by the South African Parliament before the end of June but, to accommodate the Five, rather than Parliament, I agreed that the State President could promulgate it. I understood that the Five looked favorably upon this. I am also heavily committed to give them a constitution, if they want it. But again, as I have said, I agreed that rather than Parliament, the State President will promulgate it. This is an absolute minimum. The South African Government will give the Damaras and Hereros local government and give an interim government to South West Africa. The people are elected under a system the same as that which we seek to apply in Rhodesia.

Vice President Mondale: What is the central authority?

Prime Minister Vorster: Whereas the Ovambos would have been entitled to 47% participation in the central authority/interim government, they won’t ask for it. The government will have representatives

\(^{10}\) See footnote 3, Document 264.
of each population group. At the most, there will be two whites and eleven non-whites. That is the way they are used to working.

Vice President Mondale: This is a very serious matter from our own standpoint. It was our hope that South Africa would accept national elections with all Namibians participating, leading to a constituent assembly, which would create a constitution. The structure would have free and equal elections, without an intimidating environment. As in Rhodesia, many leaders want to be anointed.

Prime Minister Vorster: The leaders in South West Africa have been elected.

Foreign Minister Botha: In Rhodesia and South West Africa, like it or not, there is a central authority.

Vice President Mondale: We want a neutral administrative authority doing all the necessary functions, while elections are conducted leading to the preparation of a constitution.

Foreign Minister Botha: Elections are not ruled out.

Vice President Mondale: That’s our objective. The Turnhalle structure was rejected both by the UN and the United States. You don’t need my sermons, though. But I can tell you that the equivalent of the Turnhalle conference, as the central authority, would be rejected.

Prime Minister Vorster: An election was envisaged. Turnhalle would prefer a referendum of all South West Africans, with equal voting and adult suffrage, concerning the issue of a constitution, i.e., to ratify the Turnhalle constitution. I believe that this is the fair way. If you think it is not representative, test it. No harm is done by doing that.

Ambassador McHenry: At Capetown, the Foreign Minister suggested that the Turnhalle constitution would not be submitted to Parliament. Rather, administrative rearrangements would be made to create a central administering authority. The term “interim government” was not used.

Foreign Minister Botha: I dropped it.

Ambassador McHenry: The Group had reservations over your position. To the extent that this authority resembles Turnhalle, it would complicate efforts to reach a solution. But the Group at Capetown was in the impossible position of trying to shape things but being told when we raised questions that the South African Government had not had enough time to develop answers. South Africa had insisted in the agreed points that the central authority would not be Turnhalle by another name. Although Turnhalle representatives were elected, there

---

11 For the Group of Five démarche, see Tab A, Document 50.
12 See Document 52.
is a question over the participation in the election, and whether the electorate really had a choice. The reason we are asking for details is to avoid a stacked deck. The central authority could determine the future form of a government in Namibia. The question of local authorities was raised, and the contact group said that possibly this would be no problem.

Prime Minister Vorster: We envisage one representative participating in the central authority from each tribal group, and not all tribal groups would be included. The UK representative had asked me whether this would not be a reconstitution of Turnhalle. I said, “more or less”. You asked about including businessmen. That was thoroughly discussed.

Vice President Mondale: Our hopes are somewhat smashed. We had thought that questions on the UN and so on related to what form was to be determined for the central authority. Now we learn that the result of these talks will still mean Turnhalle authority, with representation determined by tribe. It is thus possible that a “yes” or “no” proposition will be put to the Namibians regarding their future by a group elected by many, but without full participation or national approval. This solution will not receive international acceptance.

It will be internationally rejected. The United States will oppose it. It will result in the aggravation of what I hoped to have, namely, better relations with South Africa. This is not a threat. But in sorrow, I ask you to reconsider this question. Such a conference which may be held could accept parts of the Turnhalle constitution, which could be accepted internationally through a fully participating election, leading to a constituent assembly, and independence. This would reflect your commitment to fulfill the wishes of the South West African people.

Prime Minister Vorster: As much as the United States, South Africa wishes to get out of South West Africa. The costs of remaining are higher than we currently can afford. If we leave, we will take what we own. This would lead to a standstill. But if we are forced, we will do so. We will take the railroad wagons and rolling stock out. We want our troops and police to leave. They both cost a lot of money. We are only there because governments have asked us to be. If we left, we would have an Angola twice over due to SWAPO and, as in Rhodesia, abductions of our people.\(^{13}\) We have a common purpose. But I would rather leave public life than be responsible for such a development. I am absolutely committed, having promised the people of South West Africa an interim government. If I did not do so, this would totally destroy the credibility of South Africa with South West Africa.

\(^{13}\) Reference is to the continuation of guerrilla warfare in Angola and Rhodesia.
Vice President Mondale: We don’t care about the name of the authority. We do care about the process, and participation in developing the structure. If such is done, we and the international community would support an independent Namibia, and also thereby have improved relations with South Africa. We don’t like communism. What we did in the United States was to deny them their causes. Communists use pockets of violence to exploit a situation and to accelerate hostility and more violence. In Namibia and Rhodesia we have a chance to turn the corner. Turnhalle would contribute only to producing an undesirable environment.

Prime Minister Vorster: That’s where we differ.

Vice President Mondale: Aspects of Turnhalle can be included in the settlement. We want all people to participate in the elections.

Prime Minister Vorster: That’s alright. The machinery of the electoral process could be supervised by the UN.

Vice President Mondale: But we had hoped elections would be to determine the process.

Foreign Minister Botha: That is not ruled out.

Vice President Mondale: I thought you said that elections would be constituted to ratify Turnhalle.

Prime Minister Vorster: South West Africa would prefer the Turnhalle system, and I think it’s best. There would be elections under universal suffrage for a constituent assembly, leading to an independent government.

Vice President Mondale: What is the entity of the interim government?

Prime Minister Vorster: We haven’t clarified it with the Turnhalle. The Foreign Minister has been busy with his own election recently.

Foreign Minister Botha: There have been 31 years of dispute over South West Africa. That’s a long time. We had 5–6 International Court decisions, over 200 General Assembly resolutions and Security Council resolutions. Our real concerns are South West African independence as an entity within a reasonable period, with majority rule and no prejudgment as to its future government. Too much is being made of what the central authority is. You fear that an interim government would give an edge to one side. Turnhalle has been in operation for three years. South Africa could have influenced the details, but they have not yet been worked out. There is nothing sinister here.

Vice President Mondale: The structure must be suitable. The question is who will be the interim government.

Prime Minister Vorster: South West Africa will not control all the ministries.
Vice President Mondale: The interim period will be crucial. If it is only Turnhalle, it will not be accepted. If it is broadly created, it could be. The nature of its functions must be clearly neutral and all Namibia should participate in the process, with UN involvement. Then, we are coming close. The key point is what is the interim government?

Prime Minister Vorster: Would it suit you better if we withdrew tomorrow lock, stock and barrel from South West Africa?

Vice President Mondale: We want a stable situation. We wish full participation in elections, and a constituent assembly. We want your cooperation.

Prime Minister Vorster: There are only two alternatives for South Africa: Either we pull out and stop salaries and payments, telling South West Africa that we’re sorry, but that we have been forced out or, to do what people have asked. Turnhalle is representative, no matter what you think. You should accede to their minimum demands and that government, calling it by whatever name you wish. I will accord local government to the Damaras and Hereros and an interim government will be set up to run daily life. Then elections will be held, with caveats mentioned by the Five, on a territory-wide basis. Independence will come for one territorial entity. These are the only two alternatives. I can’t think of another.

Vice President Mondale: The process needs international acceptability. It is in your best interests, we believe, and in the interest of better relations with the United States, to support a neutral authority, which will lead to elections, a constitution and independence.

Foreign Minister Botha: Your concern is exaggerated. What we envisage is an alternative to the status quo. Currently, there is a white legislature in the South, a colored council advisory body, a Rehoboth authority, and black governments in the north. Certain members of South African ministries now are in South West Africa. They could have manipulated and still can far more than the central authority will be able to. The central authority as we envisaged it will be open, and black dominated, and will achieve the goals we seek.

Vice President Mondale: What would be the powers of the interim government?

Foreign Minister Botha: We have discussed this with the people at Turnhalle. Turnhalle is ready to move ahead on a change in some of the modalities.

Vice President Mondale: We are grateful for the schedule having been changed.

Foreign Minister Botha: The Prime Minister’s own caucus would ask him to leave office if he does not honor his commitment.

Prime Minister Vorster: Over the years, the UN demanded independence for South West Africa as a whole, “come hell or high water”.
If this then is not acceptable, it is not our problem. At least we can wash our hands of it.

Foreign Minister Botha: Independence would be preceded by a fair test.

Vice President Mondale: What if you withdrew now? What would the world say were South Africa to withdraw when Namibia was internally fragmented?

Prime Minister Vorster: That always was the case.

Vice President Mondale: Can we define the interim government which will move the process forward to elections as being fair and independent?

Ambassador McHenry: Whether South Africa considers this a small matter or not, the interim government is seen as an important shaper of the future.

Foreign Minister Botha: The status quo also could shape the future. There is much focus on the interim government and the interim period. We don’t want a system like that in Rhodesia. We are almost in agreement. Since there is only one point of contention, it would be a pity to have this cause us to differ.

Prime Minister Vorster: The interim government isn’t new; it is two years old. No one objected to it before. You must accept the point that we are committed. I cannot stay in public life if I do not honor that commitment.

Vice President Mondale: Opposition to the Turnhalle was set forth when the contact group met.\textsuperscript{14}

Prime Minister Vorster (to Fourie): Has any government gone on record as objecting to Turnhalle?

Mr. Fourie (to Prime Minister Vorster): We have received no note on this.

Vice President Mondale: On April 22, 1975, we sent an Aide Mémoire to you, along with the UK and France.\textsuperscript{15} On October 23, 1975, we, the UK, and France made a démarche concerning this.\textsuperscript{16} Dr. Kissinger also sought an alternative to Turnhalle.

\textsuperscript{14} See Document 54.

\textsuperscript{15} In telegram 82914 to Cape Town, April 11, 1975, the Department transmitted the text of the aide mémoire. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750127–0839)

\textsuperscript{16} In telegram 246397 to Pretoria, October 16, 1975, the Department transmitted the text of the joint démarche. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D750360–0046)

Ambassador McHenry: Our underlying efforts have been for equal participation. Turnhalle has not been a fully participatory organization.

Mr. Fourie: The presentation by the Five was the first time we heard this.

Prime Minister Vorster: The Ford Government had said that SWAPO did not have a full chance to participate. We said we would tell Turnhalle of that view. Dr. Kissinger said that money for a Geneva conference to include Turnhalle and SWAPO would be raised. He drew up the Seven Points, to which we agreed.\footnote{See Tab 2, Document 264.} The program then was put to SWAPO, and SWAPO shot it down.

Mr. Fourie: Dr. Kissinger asked the Prime Minister not to allow Turnhalle to go too fast. The first deadline was extended to November, then later. We said not later than January–February.

Vice President Mondale: Let’s take a short break.

The meeting adjourned, 1630–1700.

Vice President Mondale: Concerning the interim authority, I suggest, as we just discussed privately, that we have the contact group come to Capetown in two weeks to discuss with your government plans for phased withdrawal and other details.

Prime Minister Vorster: We had a gentleman’s agreement that phased withdrawal would be the last item discussed.

Ambassador McHenry: The phrase we agreed to was “South Africa would prepare a plan for phased withdrawal”.

Prime Minister Vorster: That is correct. It was a “plan for withdrawal at the end of the political process.”

Ambassador McHenry: It is somewhat imprecise.

Prime Minister Vorster: I am reading from your document.

Vice President Mondale: That’s the first time we have ever been imprecise.

Ambassador McHenry: We wouldn’t await the end of the process before the withdrawal. We should discuss this.

Prime Minister Vorster: Alright, but this is our stand.

Vice President Mondale: Then the contact group will meet again in Capetown in two weeks, there will be free and fair national elections, leading to a constituent assembly, leading to a constitution and phased withdrawal. This would be internationally acceptable.
Prime Minister Vorster: I suggest we meet 1 June. I can’t make it 31 May.

Vice President Mondale: Let’s say late May, at a date to be immediately determined. It will discuss the nature of the central administrative authority. Would you discuss withdrawal at that time?

Prime Minister Vorster: Yes. I’ll discuss all questions.

Vice President Mondale: OK.

Foreign Minister Botha: The Turnhalle representatives should be present. They would be helpful.

Ambassador McHenry: I can’t speak for the Five, but I think our position is that it would be inappropriate. The UN wouldn’t be there, nor would any group like SWAPO, or the National Front. We have tried to brief all groups. We don’t want to anoint one group. We are prepared to explore the ideas there with you first, then with other parties.

Prime Minister Vorster: I can understand your point of view, but they will be there because we have to refer to them.

Vice President Mondale: That poses real difficulties for us.

Prime Minister Vorster: As we said at coffee, I have my own commitments to honor by 20 June, if we don’t find each other. I am not saying we will.

Vice President Mondale: Having Turnhalle present would be different from the first meeting, and would imply tilting. I understand your position; you understand ours. Both governments should think carefully about this over the next few weeks. I don’t know if we can reach an agreement, but we should make the effort. Maybe now, since elections prevented you from doing so earlier, we can come up with something, reserving the right to pursue our own policies.

Prime Minister Vorster: I’m prepared to meet you there.

Vice President Mondale: Let’s talk about the question of returnees.

Ambassador McHenry: This involves language referring to “all persons”.

Prime Minister Vorster: I accepted that in Capetown. It has been and is our policy. But it does not apply to those floating around. According to our intelligence, a substantial number are being detained in Zambia and elsewhere.

Vice President Mondale: All should be allowed to return.

Prime Minister Vorster: You realize that those have been detained for not agreeing with Nujoma.

Vice President Mondale: Yes.

Prime Minister Vorster: The distinction between detainees and political prisoners was made in Capetown.
Vice President Mondale: They should be released.

Prime Minister Vorster: There is a difference between detainees and common prisoners.

Vice President Mondale: In the United States, we have had success over a period of 200 years and know that the best way to destroy an opponent is not to lock him up, but let him speak. Don’t martyr your militants.

Prime Minister Vorster: They have been guilty of arson, murder and theft; there is a distinction.

Vice President Mondale: There are charges though, that they are incarcerated. You can’t have an electoral campaign and process without the prisoners being freed and returned. The United States is having its own fight with the Soviet Union over political prisoners. Solzhenytsin, Sakharov, Bukovsky, Amalrik, and others were in jail only because the Soviets didn’t want to listen to them. We have honored them, including sending a letter to Sakharov, which made Brezhnev mad, and receiving Bukovsky in the White House. At Belgrade we are making our point over political prisoners. There is difference between a militant and a political dissident. The contact group suggested setting up an international commission of jurists. If the prisoners could be returned to Namibia and cases reviewed by the commission of jurists, that might be an acceptable solution.

Prime Minister Vorster: We can discuss that too. It was discussed with Kissinger; he gave us a list.19 We reviewed it and have made a note. According to the note, a substantial number of those on the list already were released, but their names were still on. A substantial number were never detained whatsoever. Those convicted of crimes we cannot release, but we could if SWAPO states that it seeks peaceful change, will cease its terrorism, and that release of prisoners will not jeopardize either of these objectives. The final decision is up to the South African government. It is sensible that the commission might look into it.

Ambassador McHenry: At Capetown there was some agreement on detainees.

Prime Minister Vorster: Let’s have further discussion.

Ambassador McHenry: Now.

Vice President Mondale: Yes, now. It is an important question. Where the courts have decided a case is criminal, the commission would have jurisdiction to decide on its own.

19 Not found.
Mr. Fourie: The commission would settle electoral disputes and decide who is a political prisoner.

Vice President Mondale: The first part of that was accepted.

Prime Minister Vorster: Let’s discuss this in Capetown. I have to see my colleagues and will try to review the matter as favorably as possible.

Vice President Mondale: Both of us have served in public life; we know of the need for political gestures. We know that there are Namibian prisoners held elsewhere. We object to that and will say so. We suggest that it would be a helpful political gesture for Namibian prisoners whom you hold in South Africa to be returned to Namibia with the assistance of an international commission.

Foreign Minister Botha: We have reliable intelligence that as soon as this becomes known, that is that we will release prisoners without a trial, that there will be hasty military trials held for South West African prisoners detained in other countries, and that they will be executed summarily. We need urgent action to avoid this. Nujoma will not want to have released prisoners who oppose him.

Vice President Mondale: That is an excellent point, and we will act on it.

Prime Minister Vorster: Some may argue that all prisoners should be released on the same day.

Vice President Mondale: Just because other countries don’t release their prisoners at the same time doesn’t justify you not releasing yours. It would be a point of honor for South Africa to do so, and provide an example. It would put you in a good position, and help us enormously.

Foreign Minister Botha: Isn’t that a double standard?

Prime Minister Vorster: We would lose face with the blacks in Ovambo whose relatives are held in Zambia.

Vice President Mondale: Tell them that to do otherwise would build up pressure.

Prime Minister Vorster: I would lose face.

Foreign Minister Botha: If we don’t move quickly, they will shoot them.

Prime Minister Vorster: It would be better were you to say in your approach to the Zambians that we have a guarantee that if you release your political prisoners, South Africa will.

Vice President Mondale: If I may go off the record, I believe that if some of your prisoners were released, they could represent a moderating force on SWAPO.

Prime Minister Vorster: Our intelligence is just the opposite.

Vice President Mondale: Why does Njoma want them in jail then?
Foreign Minister Botha: Your criticism just isn’t fair. Many former SWAPO members are returning to South West Africa voluntarily, and are participating in political life. Karena and Kazunguizi are examples.

Vice President Mondale: We would like South Africa to provide an example on this and consider it seriously.

Prime Minister Vorster: Alright, but others should too.

Vice President Mondale: OK, but I hope this is not a condition.

Prime Minister Vorster: Look into the Zambian and Tanzanian prisoners.

Foreign Minister Botha: Have you seen the Amnesty International Report on SWAPO detainees in Zambia?

Vice President Mondale: We want their release, too. I’d like to discuss South Africa tomorrow and hope that you will study our language on Rhodesia in the meantime. I’m not going to advise, but I want to tell you about us and what is going on in America in order for you to understand us better. Mr. Botha knows much of this already. We have undergone a profound transformation over the past ten years. Those who deal with us must understand this. For 200 years, our record on race was disgraceful. It separated people in politics, schools, business, and systems of justice. Growing up a non-white was a curse. We had slavery. For 100 years, we made a long and tortuous march to justice. We are not perfect, but we are proud of where we are. We are proud of our attitudes toward each other. We have gained increased strength as a nation over the past ten years. When I replaced Hubert Humphrey in the Senate, many senators from the South would argue against blacks, saying they were violent, communists and rip-offs; they saw Martin Luther King as a dishonest hustler. It was a dangerous situation which led to violence. In 1968–69, our cities looked like we were at war. Washington looked like Vietnam—it was sickening. We have eliminated all laws which separate and discriminate. We have insisted on enforcing the constitution in schools and elsewhere. Now we’re doing things together—politics, religion, education. A symbol of that is that we have the first southern President in 130 years. In a town that is 80% black, he led the fight for equality. Martin Luther King’s assistant represents us at the United Nations. The result is more peace and good will and strength in the United States. It is indescribable. We have an economic boom in precisely those places where most discrimination had existed. Atlanta is the heart of that boom. We have no more rhetoric. Blacks want to become middle class and rich, as we all do. Perhaps no one is more middle class than the blacks. In the South, blacks are often elected by whites, as in Andy Young’s case. Tom Bradley was elected in Los Angeles, which is only 10% non-white. We are not only at peace with ourselves, but can challenge others; before, we couldn’t. Now, Brezhnev is angry with us because he can’t
attack us. President Carter wanted me to describe this to you. It was reflected in the prompt repeal of the Byrd Amendment. The change is fundamental and enduring. It is based on religion. Human rights are at the core of our meaning, and those who deal with us must understand this.

Prime Minister Vorster: There really isn’t any time for me to reply. Could we meet tomorrow a bit earlier?

Vice President Mondale: Yes. Let’s meet at 8:00 o’clock, and continue on now. Let’s also agree not to make any statement to the press tonight.

Prime Minister Vorster: Fine. You have said that blacks are not inferior. I too have said that they are not. I have asked, “who am I as a creature of God to say another is inferior?” The basis of our philosophy is not that I am better. But there are certain South African realities you must understand, and certain backgrounds. Let’s look at education. The better an education, the better one’s chance for fulfillment. Before my government came to power, the state had no responsibility for black education—only for the whites and some for Coloreds. It subsidized state and religious organizations. Then, my predecessor, Dr. Verwoerd, took over Bantu education. 7.5 million pounds were set aside for black education. The South Africans who are feted in the United States opposed that then. In 1955, the state accepted full responsibility for black education. In 1955, 731,000 blacks were in primary school; in 1973, 2,166,000 blacks were in primary school; now, 22% of the whole black population is at school—the highest in all of Africa. 3,200,000 blacks are now in schools of all levels. In high school, in 1955, there were 34,000 blacks; in 1973—181,000; now, over 200,000. At universities until 1936, admission was refused to blacks. Thereafter, universities opened but, if a “Vorster” applied he got in; if a “McHenry” applied there was no room left. Black universities were built, with equal facilities and 100% subsidized. Thanks to the current government, thousands of blacks now are at universities. There also are Indian and Colored universities. Of the 32,000 member police force, half are white, half non-white. Until our time, a non-white could not advance beyond the level of sergeant. I know what the world says about me. But when I was Minister of Justice in the 60’s, I asked, why not have non-white officers? I put it through. Previously, black people couldn’t be professors or lecturers. They wouldn’t be there now if it hadn’t been for me. I want you to accept that from me. There is a black Rector at the University of the North. Whites serve under him. If that is not progress,

20 The repeal was approved by Congress on March 15 and signed into law by Carter on March 18.
what is? In sports—when my critics were in, no non-white could compete at home or overseas. Your Ambassador knows the situation now. This government made it possible. Now they do participate. Rugby is a national sport, nearly a religion. Different colored teams now play each other. Mixed teams also play international teams. Even five years ago, this was unheard of. If not for my policy this couldn’t have been possible. You mustn’t equate the American black with the South African black, and I can argue this until the cows come home. Whether you like it or not, due to our history and British efforts to Anglicize us, Afrikaans was not tolerated as a language. The British used to put us in the corner with a dunce cap and insist we write a hundred times on the board. “I must not speak Dutch”. Now, Afrikaner children go to Afrikaans schools; English go to English schools, Xhosas to Xhosa schools, Vendas to Venda schools, Zulus to Zulu schools and Coloreds to Colored schools. No one can change this. No one will dare to. If you say change, I’ll say I can’t. It is ingrained and I won’t. Whilst this is our position, we have created opportunity. We always will have separate townships. No one can change that. In the black townships, only blacks have rights. In our economy, in sports, and in social fields, there has been progress. There is no law against blacks visiting whites. There are certainly laws—we’ll discuss them tomorrow.

Vice President Mondale: I’m afraid I must leave. I have a phone call booked to the President, and I can’t keep the President waiting. If you had a Deputy Prime Minister, he would feel the same way about you.

Prime Minister Vorster: I don’t have one.

Vice President Mondale: I know your problem.

The meeting adjourned at 1800.
277. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies

Washington, May 20, 1977

At the President’s request,² the Executive Branch has undertaken a review of US policy toward Southern Africa. To assist this review, we need a list of agreements, contracts, and formal or informal contacts between the United States and the Republic of South African Governments.

All addressees are requested to compile a list of agreements and contracts which their departments have concluded with the South African Government and its agencies. This compilation should include those agreements and contracts currently in force plus those that have now technically lapsed but whose enforcement entails continuing consequences.

In addition, all addressees are requested to compile a list of formal or informal contacts which employees of their departments or agencies maintain with representatives of the South African Government and its agencies, either here in the United States or abroad. This list should include all contacts, whether initiated by South Africa or by the US agency, which are currently being undertaken, are proposed for the future, or which have recently lapsed but have continuing visible consequences.

The nature of each agreement, contract, and contact should be briefly stated. Addressees should submit reports, including negative reports, to the NSC not later than June 24, 1977.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

---

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 105, 4–5/77. Confidential.
² See Document 259.
278. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, May 20, 1977

SUBJECT
Third Meeting Between Vice President Mondale and Prime Minister Vorster: Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa

PARTICIPANTS

United States
Vice President Walter F. Mondale
Mr. David Aaron, Deputy Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. W. Anthony Lake, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Ambassador Donald McHenry, USUN
Ambassador to South Africa William Bowdler
Mr. A. Denis Clift, Adviser to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Mr. James Johnson, Executive Assistant to the Vice President
Mr. Jay Kenneth Katzen, USUN (Note taker)

South Africa
Prime Minister B.J. Vorster
Foreign Minister Botha
General van den Bergh
South African Ambassador to the United States Sole
Mr. Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Mr. Franklin, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Acting Permanent Representative to the UN Eksteen

The meeting began at 0805.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: What are your thoughts about the language I proposed yesterday concerning Rhodesia?2

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I have studied it, and can accept it. But first, we should add, “Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence.”

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: What about adding, following “independence in 1978” the following; “and peace. We believe that negotiation offers the best hope of reducing violence”.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Those words are neutral. We feel strongly about this and you’re looking to me to sell it to Smith. I need some ammunition to do the shooting.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 69, South Africa: 5/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on May 21 by Katzen. The meeting took place in the Hofburg Conference Room and lasted from 8:05 to 10:30 a.m. Mondale was in Vienna for meetings with leaders of the Austrian Government and Prime Minister Vorster.

2 See Documents 158 and 276.
MR. LAKE: Let me explain why we have proposed our language. We believe that it is through negotiation that peace may be attained and that it is unlikely that violence can be measurably reduced by other means.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We hope for peace.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Those are pious words if there are no steps to implement it.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I agree. But we explained what we mean.
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: On 24 September, Smith did exactly what you asked through Ambassador Bowdler.\(^3\) It was difficult to accept this language.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: None of this is easy.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: If you cannot accept this language my hands are tied and Smith will laugh in my face.
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Smith earlier had insisted that all violence had to stop.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: What about, “. . . independence in 1978 and peace. We agree that the negotiating process offers the best hope for reducing violence, and that efforts should be made to this end.”
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: What about: “Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and we believe that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end.” Does the 1978 date pre-suppose a constitution by then?
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Yes. Let’s adjourn for a couple of minutes.
The meeting adjourned for 15 minutes.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Okay, we can accept that language.
MR. AARON: It would read: “The South African Government agrees to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an Independence Constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978 and peace. Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence, and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end”.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Who are “all”?
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Who are “we”?

---

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The Constitution will describe that.
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTH: We seem to be interfering in that process.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We prefer universal suffrage but we still leave it to the Constitution.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Let’s qualify “all” to say “as defined in the Constitution”.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: If we don’t use “all”, some may feel its replacement is a buzz word for other than universal suffrage. Everything we do is greeted with suspicion.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: My press will ask what I mean by “all”, and I will have to tell them.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: That’s alright, but it is easier for me as is.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Alright, as long as your Ambassador understands.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Our position is that it means universal suffrage, and we presume that the Constitution will say that.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I can’t presume that. The press will play us off against each other.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Not really.
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Let us not prescribe ahead of time what the Constitution will say.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I understand what you’re saying, but “all” to us means universal suffrage.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We each will be giving our own interpretation.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I hope that you will convey to Smith our desire for universal suffrage.
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: One can’t prescribe to Smith.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: That’s the surest way to kill any hope of getting anywhere with him.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I understand your position concerning “all”. It is slightly different from ours but not inconsistent.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Don’t blame me later for saying this publicly.
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I’m a limited man, Mr. Prime Minister. My dad said, “at least tell the truth, even if you’re dumb”. This is a good step we’re taking.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Let us discuss South Africa now. What are you quarreling with me about?
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: In my statement following the meeting, I will discuss this paragraph on Rhodesia, and will refer to the contact group.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: We have language we have prepared.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It reads: “Cognizance was taken of the outcome of the discussions between the South African Government and the Representatives of the five Security Council members (Canada, France, FRG, U.K., U.S.) which had taken place in Capetown last month. It was noted that progress had been made and that further discussions would take place in Capetown at an early date.”

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I understood that we had agreed to meet in South Africa by the end of May, at a date promptly to be determined. That meeting will discuss the nature of the central authority, prisoners, and the withdrawal of instrumentalities. A statement which we would work up could include those elements without going any further.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: This is only to be a general statement. Let’s say that the meeting will discuss “outstanding points”.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: No, let’s specify them.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It is better not to.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I don’t want to injure the negotiating track, but agreement has been reached concerning national elections.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It hasn’t yet. The five governments must come back to us. The five told us they could not finalize this until they received instructions.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is better to spell out what the contact group is going to discuss. Questions will arise and it is better to deal with them.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Mr. McHenry had said in Capetown that this document was a nonpaper. That’s not my phrase, it’s an Americanism.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: The phrase came from Germany. The language on Rhodesia represents progress. On Namibia, let us be neutral on progress. It is helpful that we have agreed to meet. It would be advantageous to describe some of the issues we intend to discuss, but joint language is not really necessary.

---

4 For the text of Mondale’s May 20 news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1977, pp. 661–666.

5 The Five met in Cape Town June 8–10. See Documents 58–60.
FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: If you make a fuss about the admin-
istrative authority, it will make it very difficult domestically for us in
South West Africa and South Africa.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let us set this aside. Major ques-
tions clearly remain.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: But is that true? On the major
issues, we are in accord. South Africa has moved. Look at our record
on U.N. demands.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: This really depends on the defini-
tion of the central administering authority. We would hope that it
would be neutral, non-prejudicial, and perform necessary functions
before the new government comes to power. But we are not convinced
that agreement exists. Rather than trying to resolve that question here,
I suggested yesterday that we agree to have the contact group return
to Capetown. Maybe it can’t solve the problems. I’m hopeful, but not
sure. But we can’t describe the problems that remain as minor.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Let’s add to my statement the
following: “It was noted that whilst certain progress had been made,
further discussion on certain major issues would be continued in South
Africa in the near future”. If you wish, we could add, “hopefully, before
the end of May”.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We’ll draft something while we
turn to other matters. In your letter to President Carter, you expressed
a desire to discuss “Southern Africa”, in an effort to end disputes.6
Since receiving that letter, we have put in a lot of time in order to be
able to reply to you in good faith. This is a difficult and emotional
question. It is our hope that relations between our two countries will
improve. We prefer cooperation to difficulties. This meeting may be
an historic one since the President wanted me, in a spirit not of confron-
tation or threats, but with clarity, to describe how we view the questions
of South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia and, to convey to you that our
policy requires progress as we view it, on all three issues. Progress on
any one would be welcomed and we will acknowledge it. Fundamental
differences of perception remain between us concerning justice and the
requirements for stability. We don’t believe apartheid or separateness
is workable or just. Progressive transformation is necessary. Basic ele-
ments of that transformation are an elimination of discrimination—for
us, this includes separateness. We have had our own history with
“separate but equal” facilities. This was a question of our own history
for 100 years. Also, a political society cannot be a healthy democracy
if there is no full and equal participation in the affairs of its national

---

6 See Document 270.
government. It would be valuable if there could be a prompt initiation of dialogue between the South African Government and the real non-white leaders. I don’t want to list specific legislation, but the repeal of laws such as the Pass Laws\(^7\) will be helpful. Further, the banishment of Winnie Mandela was harmful to the relations existing between us. We believe that the situation in South Africa will lead to increased violence, and greater international pressure. More in sorrow than in anger, our policies will go their separate ways. The choice is yours. We believe change is in your interest, and we pray for it. We understand the complexities. Yesterday, I told you of the fundamental enduring nature of our commitment. I want you to know that United States policy on human rights is permanent. There is nothing more central to our policy. And the history of Africa shows what we are talking about. Minority governments have disappeared, violence has increased, and the Soviets, with their pernicious interests, have been quick to take advantage. Frustrations and injustices are there and will be exploited. But our position, while we regret this communist opportunism, is that it would not be there were the opportunity not being created for it. Our feelings about your situation are founded not on our attitude toward communism but based upon fundamental principles affecting human rights. I want to stress that we seek good relations with you. I speak to you with the authority of the President, and not in a confrontational way. We wanted to convey to you with clarity and in all good will the elements of our foreign policy so that in your policy formulation, you would not have any questions. We will be grateful and commendatory when progress comes. We are hopeful on Rhodesia and Namibia. If progress is made, we will publicly commend it and our relations will improve. But progress also must come in South Africa. I have no road map or check list, but I do have the authority of the President to outline our objectives.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: It is a shame that I have such little time to speak because of your departure. What you have said causes me enormous suffering. Yesterday, I told you of our progress. You mustn’t equate the situation in America to that in South Africa, since they are totally different, as I will try again to tell you. Your black man—Mr. McHenry, for instance—I regard not as a black man but as an American. Your blacks came to the United States as immigrant slaves. I just read *Roots*\(^8\) recently.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is required reading for us now.

---

\(^7\) Pass laws facilitated the implementation of apartheid by regulating the movements of non-whites in South Africa.

\(^8\) Alex Haley’s *Roots: The Saga of an American Family*, a novel based on his family’s history.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: You have divested your blacks of their background.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: And it is shameful.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We don’t interfere in your own society. But it is better to understand the situation by comparing our blacks with your Indians. Neither was ever a slave. We met our blacks 140–150 years after we arrived in South Africa. Some of us settled here, some there. We never took their land. There were fewer than two million blacks when we arrived.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: 300,000.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: We brought peace, and now there are 16 million of them. We don’t comment on your Indians.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Our record on that is shameful.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The Africans don’t regard themselves as members of my nation. Buthelezi has created his Inkarta to speak for the Zulus, not for us. We could have gotten along differently, and it perhaps would have been our aim to do so if Britain had not annexed the black nations during the last century. But now, those in the homelands speak their own language, have their own anthem, fly their own flag. They have self-government, cabinets, ministers, laws, and budgets. They are people apart and live where they originally settled. In 1935, at white expense, 7¼ million morgan of land were given to the Africans, since their population was increasing so. The life of the black in South Africa is more viable than that of 40–50 UN members; their standard of living and literacy are higher. Whether you agree with it or not, this is the situation. We are leading people to independence as the Transkei has become, and on 5 December the Tswanas will become independent too. This is a real and workable policy. There are blacks in our civil service. It is true that black doctors are paid less: it always has been so. But my government has identified this and acknowledged that it is wrong. Equal wages should be paid for equal work. We are trying to close the gaps. I have asked the civil service to list categories to eliminate. We don’t have enough money to do that right now. It is not necessary to talk to us about it: this is the situation. You have called for dialogue. Under my Government, there has been more dialogue in two years between blacks and myself than all my predecessors since 1900. If that’s not progress, what is? We also created adult suffrage. Not only do black South Africans come to our cities but hundreds of thousands of other blacks also come to South Africa. Lesotho took you for a ride at the UNO concerning border posts which weren’t, in fact, closed. Lesotho never was our property. Yet,

---

9 Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Inkarta Freedom Party.
there are 140 thousand people from Lesotho in South Africa since they have no employment at home. There are tens of thousands of Swazis and people from Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique. If we told the 80 thousand workers from Mozambique to leave, 300 million rand would be lost to Mozambique, with whom we don't even have a labor agreement. We cannot depart from our plans for independence of the homelands. And after independence we will continue our monetary aid. If you think we should scrap governments and introduce one-man and one-vote in a central parliament, I tell you it can't be done. South Africa is multinational and not multi-racial. We have 4 million Zulus, and 3 million Xhosas. The Xhosas are as proud of their language as you and I. If we had one central parliament, we would need 10 official languages. We don't want to govern anyone. In the future I see the black people becoming independent, and the remainder of our territory shared by whites, coloreds and Indians. We need a modus vivendi and are working on it, but time doesn't allow an elaboration on this now. Mrs. Mandela is a Xhosa, a subject of Transkei, where she can go tomorrow. A daughter of hers is marrying a son of King Sobhuza of Swaziland. The king is a very virile man: he has over 100 children. Mrs. Mandela can go to attend the wedding and remain in Swaziland or in Transkei. But no one else can prescribe our law and order. All that has happened to her is that she is restricted to an area where she can practice nursing but she can't do what her husband did. Nelson Mandela wrote a thesis on “How to be a Good Communist”. I can send you a copy. General Van den Bergh can tell you more; he's been fighting the question since the early 1960s. We could lock these people up but, for humanitarian reasons, we confine them in order not to inflame the situation. The Pass Laws were conceived by the British and we have continued them for good reason. The same situation exists in our cities as does in Lusaka and Dar-es-Salaam. The people flock to the cities where insufficient facilities exist to accommodate them. If 50 thousand people moved to Capetown, there would be huge problems with health risks and other dangers. Therefore, it is our policy to control influx for jobs. Two years ago I discussed this question with 8 black leaders. They all agreed that it was a problem. You can't allow 40 thousand people into a city if there are only 10 thousand jobs—they understood that. I told them, you devise the rules and regulations to solve my problem. They are still working on it. If a solution is reached which can solve my problem, I'll scrap my program. 2½ percent of our labor force has job restrictions applied. There are certain poorer blacks and whites with limited education, who have asked for our protection against their being swamped with competition, by untrained blacks. There is a Parliamentary Commission now studying whether these restrictions still are necessary. If they recommend I scrap them, I will. We are not as white as we are painted. If only you accept this, progress
can come. In a friendly spirit I dare you to tell me which African country to accept as a model. Then we can discuss the whole question.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We don’t see injustice in relative terms. Injustice in one place doesn’t justify it elsewhere. That is why I wanted to convey to you our principles, not details. A just society means the absence of discrimination, and separation imposed as policy is discrimination. We call for an end to discrimination and for full participation leading to a healthy, just, and secure society. These are our beliefs, our feelings about human rights, and our principles. Each nation works its own will. We wanted you to understand our views.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Before my Government came to power, the Indians had no say. Except for several thousand there were no blacks in the Cape. There were only 44 thousand Cape colored males. Blacks had no vote outside the Cape. Now, there is no man who doesn’t have the vote or who cannot participate. They all are participating. Perhaps this is not as you have in the United States with the Guamese (sic), who are subservient and don’t vote for Congress.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Your story about the King with 100 sons reminds me of the story of a farmer with 15 kids. There was a county fair in town, and his kids wanted desperately to go but he told them that they had no money and couldn’t. The kids said they needed no money. All they wanted to do was to have a look. The father agreed, with the stipulation that since they had no money they could not go to any of the concessions. The father also went to the fair and saw a concession with a prize bull. He had 10 cents in his pocket and was very tempted by the Barker’s encouragement to enter. But the father explained that he had 15 children and no money. The Barker then said he wished he had known, because with the farmer having 15 children he would have liked to have brought out the bull to meet the farmer.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: There are other complications. Buthelezi is a Zulu and Zulus have a king. If we had one central parliament, and the Zulus were included, South Africa would have to become a kingdom.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Let’s get down to the bone of the matter. South Africa has been there for 300 years. How can we accept a solution that means our own destruction? There is no independence in Africa and when I say that, it is not racialism. The question at hand is the survival of my people.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I can’t tell you enough of the joy we feel over our strengthened cultural and economic health. The daughter of our President attends a public school in Washington where she is one of only 4-5 whites.
PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Yes, but they all speak English.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Let me tell you of our program of bilingualism. The transformation which we have undergone has strengthened our cultural identity. The arts have flourished. We have many Poles in America. They are proud and they have protections. With guarantees, all of this can come about. Due process is necessary. My father was a preacher and I am a religious person. But sermons are not particularly helpful. I do speak to you with candor. We are ashamed of the treatment we have accorded to our blacks and Indians. It is an indefensible part of American history. In Minnesota we created Chippewa, Navajo and Apache nations on land carefully selected. The land we gave the Navajos turned out to be sitting on a field of oil. The head of Phillips a couple of years ago was an Indian. There is no part of our history with more despair. It is a curse. But we don’t gloss over it: we are hopeful of change.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: What if you had percentage wise the equivalent of 1 billion Indians? Africa has rejected the Westminster system.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: Our Indians wanted it.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: In such a system, where will we vote?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: In Minnesota, the city with the highest number of urban blacks is Minneapolis. We have no Pass Laws, even though we have fewer jobs than people.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: The Zulus have their own government. Buthelezi is their Prime Minister. He asked South Africa to outlaw opposition parties in Zululand, and still asks that we do so. I have refused. But that’s the way Africa is going. Discrimination will be eradicated in South Africa. But we must agree to differ, since we do not regard separation as discrimination.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: Have you seen this American Indian Review Commission report which calls for the restoration of rights to the Indians?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: That’s a good recommendation. But the Indians have full voting rights and we will continue to work to eliminate discrimination.

FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA: A U.S. Court has levied a 400 thousand dollar fine on an Indian tribe refusing to move.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: But we will be getting a decision to give them half of Maine and a Federal Court decision to give them unlimited hunting and fishing rights in Northern Minnesota.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I’m giving you some books, Mr. McHenry, which I hope will help you to understand the complexity
of our society better and conclude that we’re not as white as you paint us.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I never heard that phrase before. That completes our work. I appreciate your meeting me and I pray for the beginning of improved relations. I hope that a dialogue will intensify. I am hopeful concerning Rhodesia’s path to independence and for the efforts of the contact group. I hope that this clarification has been a good basis for judging where we go from here.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I appreciate it too. Whether or not we agree, the clarification has cleared the air. It is better to meet around the table than to shout. There is nothing better I would like than improved relations with the U.S. but it cannot all come from one side. I don’t say this in a recriminatory sense, but we don’t seem to be getting credit from people where we expect it. We are of the West and I regard you as my leader. I can take kicks in the pants but don’t kick me in the teeth.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: We will commend your progress on Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. Our relations thereby can improve. My prayer is that from this historic meeting progress may result.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: What of the communique following this meeting?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: I plan to give a general description, with specific mention of Rhodesia as we agreed, and answer questions. One of the matters to be dealt with will be the nature of the central authority in Namibia.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: I will tell the press of my commitment on that matter.

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: It is better that we all be honest.

PRIME MINISTER VORSTER: Do you have any thoughts of our meeting again?

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE: No, not at this time.

The meeting adjourned at 1030.
279. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, May 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Pursuant to the request the Department received from the National Security Council,\(^2\) attached is a paper setting forth the position of the Department of State on this matter.

Peter Tarnoff

Attachment

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State\(^3\)

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Background
Sanders Associates, a New Hampshire firm, has a contract for study of the South African requirements for maritime surveillance equipment with the South African Government. The contract was arranged pursuant to a White House determination in December 1975\(^4\) that the U.S. would agree to a request from South Africa for cooperation in ocean surveillance. This agreement was opposed by the Defense Department, the NSC staff and the State Department, but the White House overruled these objections. The White House also authorized the State Department Office of Munitions Control to view sympathetically, but on a case-by-case basis, eventual exports of reasonable amounts and kinds

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 105, 6–7/77. Secret.

\(^2\) See Document 277.

\(^3\) Secret.

of ocean surveillance equipment, which the study might show to be required by the South Africans.

In April, 1977, following a review of the matter, Secretary Vance determined that export of this equipment would be incompatible with the Administration's policy toward South Africa, as well as inconsistent with our long-standing arms embargo.

**Department of State Position**

The Department of State continues to believe that sale of this equipment to South Africa, which is in effect military cooperation with that country, contravenes our present policy towards South Africa, and would expose us to sharp criticism. The following points argue strongly against authorization of the sale:

—Sale of this equipment would make a mockery of what the Vice President said to Prime Minister Vorster about our commitment to a progressive transformation of South African society. To follow that declaration with such a significant break with our arms embargo policy would indicate to the South Africans that we are not serious about our policy and that we have accepted their arguments on the strategic importance of their country to us.

—Military cooperation with the South African Government would undercut the progress we have made in generating better understanding and acceptance of American goals among black African states and other Third World countries.

—United States Government approval for this sale, when it became public knowledge, would have sharp domestic repercussions, generating adverse reactions in the Congress, the press and the public at large, and causing confusion about our intentions in southern Africa.

—The value of any intelligence we might obtain from such an arrangement would be far outweighed by the damage the sale would do to our new approach to South Africa as well as to our relations with black African countries.
280. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 4, 1977

SUBJECT
Cooperation with South Africa in ocean surveillance (S)

(TS) By memorandum, dated 31 December 1975,\(^2\) from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Presidential approval was conveyed that the U.S. accede to the request of the Government of the Union of South Africa for cooperation in ocean surveillance, to the extent of facilitating the review of requests for export of equipment and data necessary to upgrade the South African ocean surveillance system. It is understood from commercial contacts that parallel notification of approval to proceed with providing South Africa a modern ocean surveillance capability was provided to the South African Ambassador in Washington by Secretary Kissinger and/or General Scowcroft and was one of the topics covered in a subsequent Kissinger/Vorster meeting. In return for cooperation in facilitating this commercial sale, the South African government has committed to make the information derived from the ocean surveillance system available on call to the U.S.

(TS) In keeping with the above approval, International Signal and Control Corporation received a munitions control license to conduct a study to fully define the system and has now applied for specific license issuance for hardware items as the first subsegment of the study has been completed and approved. Saunders Associates is a partner with International Signals in this effort. The Barlow-Rand Corporation is the contracting firm for the government of South Africa in acquisition of the system.

(TS) The completed system would provide South Africa with a modern system capable of [3 lines not declassified] coastal and harbor radar and surveillance systems, and interning automated data processing and communications capability to rapidly integrate and interpret the collected data. The study and subsequent provision of equipment do not extend to capabilities which would involve sensitive technology transfers or direct U.S. involvement.

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 10/77. Top Secret; Sensitive.

\(^2\) See footnote 4, Document 279.
(TS) The following factors support a recommendation for granting approval for further licenses:

—The proposed system is entirely passive in nature, and has no potential use in internal government matters.

—When completed the system will provide information on the movements of naval and merchant marine traffic around southern Africa which will not be available from other sources, with no financial expenditure by the U.S. Government.

—As the competition for resources increases over the next decade, the available information is expected to make a very substantial contribution to U.S. economic intelligence. It will also have the potential for contributing to monitoring of USSR arms traffic and naval movements in the region.

—The decision to “buy U.S.” recognized the advanced competence of Saunders and International Signals in manufacturing [less than 1 line not declassified] equipment and developing the management information system to correlate the collected data. Should the licenses be denied, comparable systems of lesser technical capability can be obtained from either the Federal Republic of Germany or France (which had earlier bid on the system), in which event the U.S. would have no call on the data derived.

—At least 36 months will be involved in procurement and installation once the hardware acquisition phase has begun, with a total expenditure certain to be in excess of $60 million. The system would, however, lack value until the systems integration effort had been completed. Substantial political leverage would thus accrue during the acquisition phase as South Africa would strongly desire to complete the system and get a return on its investment.

—Security on the part of all commercial firms involved and the Government of South Africa for the fact of U.S. Government cooperation has been superb and can reasonably be expected to continue.

(TS) I therefore believe that we should proceed with granting licenses for the export of reasonable amounts and kinds of ocean surveillance equipment to South Africa in support of the previously approved cooperation. The appropriate timing of such approval needs to be considered. In my view, we should find an occasion when the U.S. wants to send a signal of reward for a South African action that moves in the direction of our policy for southern Africa.

Harold Brown
281. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, June 24, 1977

SUBJECT

My Meeting with South African Foreign Minister Botha

I met the South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha on Tuesday afternoon, June 21. At Botha’s request we met alone, for one and one-half hours.

Despite the length of the meeting and Botha’s stated desire for privacy, the meeting produced nothing new. On both Namibia and Rhodesia Botha adhered to known positions. In both instances he stressed the need for rapid settlements. Perhaps the most interesting of Botha’s points was his flat assertion that the South African Government would not tell Rhodesia to stop cross border raids when Rhodesia believed them necessary for its own protection. One novel feature of Botha’s presentation was an apocalyptic appraisal of the deteriorating ecological situation in Africa. He sees a process of deterioration in health, environmental and agricultural conditions which parallels what he sees occurring in the political realm.

The following are more specific points on each subject area.

Namibia. Mr. Botha emphasized the need for speed in working out an agreement on Namibia. I cautioned that excessive speed could render the elections meaningless. The Foreign Minister thought that six months would be sufficient time to prepare for an election. Our exchange on this point ended inconclusively.

I told Botha that we found the South African Government’s agreement to appoint a civilian administrator to be a constructive move. I emphasized the need for the appointment of someone with a reputation for impartiality. Botha said they believed that a judge would be the type of person best suited for this role and that they previously had a particular individual in mind. Unfortunately, Botha said, his government had decided upon reflection that the person in question might be tainted in the eyes of some by virtue of his having represented the South African Government at the International Court of Justice proceedings concerning Southwest Africa.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Agency File, Box 17, State: 7–8/77. Secret; Nodis. Carter initialed the memorandum in the upper right-hand corner.

2 Not further identified. Reference is presumably to D.P. deVilliers, a member of the South African bar and leader of the South African legal team at The Hague.
On the subject of a United Nations special representative for Namibia, I sought Botha’s opinion of Mr. Ahtissari, now the UN Commissioner for Namibia.\(^3\) Botha replied that his government had some reservations about Ahtissari but they are not ruling him out. Botha cited as troublesome Ahtissari’s chairmanship of the Namibia Commission. I urged Botha to discuss this question with Secretary General Waldheim.

I next raised the question of the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia. Botha said that the South Africans are willing to withdraw their forces in accordance with a timetable to be set by the new government to be elected. If that government wished South African forces to withdraw immediately (i.e., immediately after the second election), this would be done. In reply to my inquiry about the possibility of progressive withdrawals prior to that time, Botha replied that the first step would be the appointment of an administrator. When I pointed out that this was not meaningful in terms of a military withdrawal, Botha agreed that the matter should be discussed further. He seemed to be willing to go no further than saying that the troops would be withdrawn after the new government was in place.

Several items of a transitional nature were raised by Botha such as how the South Africans would ultimately be indemnified by the future Namibian Government for railroads and other permanent installations. The future of Walvis Bay was discussed but in an inconclusive manner.

Overall, Botha’s position on Namibia was that if the South Africans could get a moderate government in Namibia, they would gladly leave as soon as possible.

Rhodesia. I inquired of Botha what Prime Minister Ian Smith had told him in their recent meeting. Botha replied that after having talked with Smith and his Cabinet for two hours, he is convinced that Smith has made his decision. According to Botha, Smith is prepared to accept black majority rule within the agreed time frame. While some Ministers may feel otherwise, Smith is prepared to follow through.

As on Namibia, Botha felt that a speedy resolution of the Rhodesian situation is essential. He believes that existing divisions among the Rhodesian nationalist parties would be further exacerbated by the passage of time. In this connection Botha noted that Mugabe has already been replaced by Tongagara as the most significant figure among the black Rhodesian military leaders. He added that in his view the seriousness of tribal divisions among the nationalists is not fully appreciated.

\(^3\) Reference is to Martti Ahtisaari, a Finnish diplomat who served as UN Commissioner for Namibia from 1977 until 1981.
by the United States and tribalism is sure to complicate any eventual settlement.

Botha suggested that the U.S. should send someone to talk to Smith. He believes that the universal franchise is not an insurmountable obstacle and that Smith, despite his public position, is prepared to give in on this issue.

I told Botha that the cross border raids from Rhodesia must stop and pointed to South Africa’s potential role in this connection. Botha responded that although the South African Government had told Smith to end the last large raid and will continue to counsel restraint, his government is not prepared to tell Rhodesia that it cannot undertake cross border operations when Rhodesia believes these to be necessary for its own protection.

Botha said that it was apparent from the most recent Rhodesian attack on Mozambique that the Rhodesians could have gone all the way to Maputo had they chosen to do so. There is no guarantee, Botha said, that they will not move again, or that they may choose to carry their attack as far as Maputo. Botha argued that for this reason it is important to get a settlement quickly.

South Africa. The majority of our meeting was devoted to a discussion of South Africa’s internal policies. Botha made an impassioned speech charging that American endorsement of “one man one vote” was a “knife in the back” of the South African Government. I stressed that the U.S. cannot accept a continuation of discrimination by the South African Government or failure on the part of the South African Government to deal in time with full political participation. Needless to say discussion of this subject was wholly without agreement of any kind.

(At one point in our conversation Mr. Botha handed me a letter from Prime Minister Vorster to you concerning Namibia. In reading it I noticed on the second page of the letter an undertaking on Vorster’s part to keep “The United States Representative closely informed.” When I questioned the terminology, expressing doubt that the Prime Minister had meant to say the “United States,” Mr. Botha acknowledged that it should have read “United Nations.” He then took the letter back to be corrected. It has now been sent to you separately).5

---

4 Carter underlined this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin next to it: “Zbig & Cy—What do you think?”
5 Not found.
282. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, June 29, 1977

SUBJECT

Intelligence Relationships with Republic of South Africa [classification not declassified]

1. [classification not declassified] Reference is your memorandum of 20 May 1977\(^2\) to the heads of executive departments and agencies requesting a listing of agreements, contracts, and formal or informal contacts between the United States and the Republic of South Africa governments.

2. [classification not declassified] I have surveyed all elements of the Intelligence Community and have been advised there are no intelligence agreements or contracts and no formal arrangements with the South African government, but that there are a number of continuing informal contacts, [2 lines not declassified].

   a. [classification not declassified; 1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

   b. [classification not declassified] Defense Intelligence Agency: The U.S. Defense Attache Office in South Africa maintains contacts with officials within the South African Government, and the Defense Attaches have continuing contacts with a number of South African military attaches posted in Europe and Africa. The DIA Foreign Liaison Division has official and social contact with the South African Defense Attache in Washington, as also do the Foreign Liaison Divisions of the military departments.

   c. [classification not declassified] Bureau of Intelligence Research, Department of State: Casual and occasional contacts are made between personnel of INR/State and officials of the South African Embassy.

   d. [classification not declassified; 1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]

   e. [classification not declassified] Department of the Army: Brief visits to U.S. military installations and contractors are arranged for officials from South Africa, as indicated by the following list of such visits made during the past year:

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 72, South Africa: US Agency Ties with South Africa [IV], 8/77. Secret.

\(^2\) See Document 277.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South African</th>
<th>Installation Visited</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director, Veterinary Research Institute</td>
<td>Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head, Engineering Geology Section, Soil Engineer Group</td>
<td>USA Engineer Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Ms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 staffers, South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research</td>
<td>USA District Engineer, Los Angeles, and USA Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Ms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head, Safety Testing, National Institute of Virology, Department of Health</td>
<td>USA Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, Ft. Detrick, Md.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultant, Euro Consultancy Services</td>
<td>Food Engineering Laboratory, Natick, Ma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head, Lipid and Applied Chemistry, University of Capetown</td>
<td>USA Natick Research Laboratory, Natick, Ma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative, National Building Research Institute</td>
<td>USA Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Ms., and Construction Engineering Research Laboratory, Ill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. [classification not declassified] The South African Defense Attache actively promotes and participates in liaison contacts with senior intelligence personnel of DIA and the military departments. During the last week of April 1977, he visited Fort Knox, Ky., Fort Sill, Ok., Fort Bliss and Fort Sam Houston, Tx., and Carswell Air Force Base, Tx.

Stansfield Turner
U.S. Agency Ties With South Africa

We have now compiled USG agency responses on their ties with South Africa. Forty-three agencies report no ties to that government; 16 agencies described “light” ties; 10 agencies have “medium” ties; 5 have ties which are “heavy” ; and 5 have “very heavy” ties. See Tab A.

Agencies with “light” ties have no contracts or agreements with the Government of South Africa, but do have generally indirect, informal, random and limited contacts. These may involve the exchange of apparently unclassified data.

Those with “medium” ties either have on-going contacts more frequent or formalized than are “light” contacts, or they have formal agreements which generally involve the exchange of unclassified information by apparently low and middle level South African officials.

Those with “heavy” ties have numerous and on-going agreements and/or contacts with South Africa, which appear generally to involve higher level officials. Those with “very heavy” ties have the most frequent, formal, and apparently high level direct agreements and contacts with the Government of South Africa.

Thus, nearly half of the agencies questioned have ties with South Africa. Of those (36) which do have ties, 22 have no formal agreements. The ties of 14 agencies which do have formal agreements involve economic and commercial issues, transportation, the exchange of information, the administration of justice, the struggle against nuclear proliferation, conduct of diplomatic relations, or military defense.

Implications

There is currently no evidence of a general policy governing USG-South African ties. Any South African influence in the USG would, therefore, appear concentrated among a comparatively few agencies which, however, administer the most significant value-interests of the US. This in turn implies that the regulation of formal contacts would

---

2 See Document 277.
require coordination among only some 14 agencies. Concurrently, these particular ties are also those whose rupture would generally be perceived as sending a strong signal of USG displeasure to South Africa.

But a strong signal might also be sent by a determined effort to eliminate informal ties among 22 agencies, precisely because social contacts are not only the most difficult to regulate but generally perceived as being the most harmless and, therefore, usually the last to be regulated in situations of this kind.

This study does not represent the full scope of relations between the two countries; it reflects only ties between USG agencies and the South African Government and omits USG-personnel communication with non-governmental black and white South African citizens. If substantial, this might comprise a web of communication, in support of or to the detriment of established policy, between elements of the respective peoples.

A common policy trade-off exists with respect to all categories of ties: the desirability of cutting ties versus the benefits from shared or exchanged information. Hence, a further distinction could be drawn between those ties conveying, and those not, such benefits. Finally, another refinement among “medium” to “very heavy” ties would be those whose rupture would involve violating a legal obligation, versus those which could be terminated consistent with existing obligations.

**Tab A**

**Paper Prepared in the National Security Council**

**APPENDIX**

To a very limited extent, the top to bottom listings of agencies within categories B–E reflect relative increasing gradations of intensity. However, distinguishing among the agencies in each category is largely an intuitive process.

A. **Agencies with No Ties**

*Telephone Responses*

- HEW
- Commodity Futures Trading Commission
- Consumer Product Safety Commission
- Environmental Protection Agency

---

3 No classification marking.
Federal Trade Commission
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission
National Academy of Sciences
National Capital Planning Commission
National Endowment for the Humanities
National Labor Relations Board
Panama Canal Company
Water Resources Council
Council of Economic Advisers
Council on Wage and Price Stability
Domestic Council
Office of Drug Abuse Policy
Office of Telecommunications Policy
White House Office (Mr. Thomas J. English)

Written Responses

Securities and Exchange Commission
Comptroller General of the U.S.
Selective Service System
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
National Transportation Safety Board
Postal Rate Commission
Permanent Joint Board on Defense—Canada/U.S.
OMB
National Credit Union Administration
Interstate Commerce Commission
General Services Administration
Federal Power Commission
Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Community Services Administration
The Commission of Fine Arts
National Endowment for the Arts
National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities
American Revolution Bicentennial Administration
American National Red Cross
Administrative Conference of the United States
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Council on International Economic Policy
Farm Credit Administration*
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service*
*These agencies each reported having had one informal contact within the last two years.

B. Agencies with Light Ties
A.I.D.*
U.S. Government Printing Office
Veterans Administration
Federal Communications Commission
U.S. International Trade Commission
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
U.S. Department of Labor
U.S. Civil Service Commission
Federal Maritime Commission
Federal Energy Administration
Office of Science and Technology Policy
Council on Environmental Quality
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Smithsonian Institution
Department of Housing and Urban Development
U.S. Small Business Administration
*AID has no contacts with the Government of South Africa per se. However, it indirectly does extend training grants to black South Africans living in South Africa.

C. Agencies with Medium Ties
Section 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ACTION
National Science Foundation
Department of Agriculture

Section 2
Federal Reserve System
Tennessee Valley Authority
Library of Congress
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Department of Commerce
D. Agencies with Heavy Ties
   Civil Aeronautics Board
   Department of Transportation
   U.S. Information Service
   Export-Import Bank of the United States
   [less than 1 line not declassified]

E. Agencies with Very Heavy Ties
   Department of Justice
   Department of the Treasury
   U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration
   Department of State
   Department of Defense

F. Agencies Which Did Not Receive the Initial Memo
   Administrative Conference of the United States
   American Battle Monuments Commission
   Appalachian Regional Commission
   Commission on Civil Rights
   Community Services Administration
   Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
   Indian Claims Commission
   National Mediation Board
   Railroad Retirement Board
   Renegotiation Board
   United States Soldiers and Airmen’s Home
OVERVIEW

Since January of this year, the new Administration has moved vigorously to establish an effective approach to the deteriorating situation in southern Africa. After a series of policy reviews, including Presidential Review Memorandum No. 4, the President determined that: (a) henceforth the US Government would pursue active efforts to bring about political change in South Africa, as well as Rhodesia and Namibia; (b) we should play a more direct role in supporting efforts by the United Kingdom to reopen negotiations leading to majority rule in Rhodesia; and (c) the US Government also should participate directly in initiatives being organized under the auspices of the United Nations to bring Namibia to independence within the framework of Security Council Resolution 385.

Pursuant to Presidential directives we have taken a series of major initiatives, including the following:

—We have advised the Government of South Africa of our views on the need for progressive transformation of South African society.

—We have pursued, through the 5-power Contact Group (sponsored by the United Nations Security Council), negotiations with South Africa on the future of Namibia.

—We have collaborated with the United Kingdom in launching discussions with all parties directly involved in the Rhodesian question with a view to getting negotiations in train.

We examine in the attached country papers the results of our initiatives to date and suggest some next steps we could take to pursue the goals we have set for ourselves in the region.
Rhodesia

[Omitted here is background information on the Rhodesian settlement negotiations.]

The Settlement Proposal

As developed by the Consultative Group following discussions with the four nationalist groups, the Rhodesian authorities, possible donors to a development fund, and interested private parties, the proposal would include a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe, an arrangement for the transitional period and a Zimbabwe Development Fund. It would be embodied in a White Paper, to be issued by the UK Foreign Office, which is now in its early drafts. The British Government would present the White Paper for parliamentary approval in mid-November. Smith would insist on submitting it to a referendum of Rhodesian voters. It is also still possible, though unlikely, that final approval might be given by the parties at a formal conference.

Following its endorsement by Parliament the agreement would come into effect, presumably some time next spring, on a designated day on which Smith would leave, the British take over, the fighting cease and sanctions disappear. The Caretaker Government’s principal task would be to organize and conduct elections to select the future independent government of Zimbabwe. It is contemplated that it would need from three to six months to complete this task upon the termination of which the country’s independence would be declared. The whole process would be completed during 1978.

The independence constitution would be based on four fundamental principles: democratic elections, universal adult suffrage, a bill of rights which is justiciable and entrenched, and an independent judiciary. It is also contemplated that it would establish a Republic headed by an elected President with executive powers. The President would be elected at the same time as a single-chamber National Assembly by a system which would ensure that he would have the support of the majority of its members. The President would be responsible to the Assembly and would appoint a Vice President and other ministers from among its members. The Assembly would be elected on the basis of single member constituencies. It is proposed that a small number of members (perhaps 20) be specially elected by the Assembly itself from among a list of candidates from the white and black communities proposed by the President.

Transitional arrangements would include a caretaker constitution providing for appointment by the UK of a Commissioner with responsibility solely to HMG and in whom would be vested all legislative and executive powers, although it is not expected that the Commissioner would make extensive use of his legislative power. He would be
charged with day-to-day administration of public business, maintenance of law and order, the administration of an election and, subsequently, independence. All armed forces would be under his command including the Commonwealth force, (renamed) police force, what remains of the present Rhodesian armed forces, and the Nationalist fighting forces.

The *Zimbabwe Development Fund* would be created with a target of about $1.2 billion from donations by donor governments from Europe, America, Asia, and the Middle East. Its purpose would be to contribute to restoring the economy of Zimbabwe to the rapid growth it has engaged in the past. It would concentrate in the fields of rural development, training and education and infrastructure creation, particularly in electrification and transportation. The Fund would provide foreign exchange through program aid which may assist in permitting remittance overseas of pensions and other assets during the early years of independence. It would be administered by the IBRD in consultation with the independent Government of Zimbabwe.

**Outstanding Issues**

The Consultative Group travelled to Lusaka and Rhodesia in early July, then to London to see Foreign Secretary Owen. The nature and extent of the difficulties we face in achieving a negotiated settlement were put into sharp focus by the Consultative Group’s talks with Nkomo and Smith and by the British change of heart regarding a British role in the Commonwealth Force. These difficulties include:

1) Law and Order. Intimidation and violence have characterized past elections in Rhodesia. The present bitter division between ZAPU and ZANU is likely to increase during the transition period. It is generally believed that a fair election could only be assured with an impartial government and armed forces. A Commonwealth force supplemented by the use of the existing police might be able to provide this. However, the UK has now informed us that because of the reluctance by other Commonwealth members to commit forces, the growing prospect that at least some elements of the Patriotic Front would continue the fighting, and the reservations which the British Cabinet has about direct UK military involvement, they do not believe such a force is possible. This means that law and order must either be maintained by the existing Rhodesian armed forces or taken over by the guerrilla fighters. It is as unlikely that either white Rhodesians or the Muzorewa or Sithole factions would accept control by the Patriotic Front’s armed forces as that the Patriotic Front would accept maintenance of law and order in the hands of the present forces. The Rhodesians claim that the present army is a professional force, the impartiality of which is widely accepted. Some elements like the Selous Scouts, the Territorials, and
the all white Light Infantry Brigade might be disbanded. However, we believe that even so, the Patriotic Front would reject such a proposal, and use it to gain sympathy from the Front Line states and others of its African supporters. The entire settlement proposal outlined above therefore is threatened by the impasse over control of law and order during the transition period.

(2) The Zimbabwe Development Fund. Owen wishes to make it clear that continued contribution to the Fund at least by the US and UK would be contingent upon performance by the independent government of Zimbabwe of its side of the settlement agreement, including the various constitutional undertakings on pensions, human rights, etc. We have expressed our reservations to this proposal and compromise language has been agreed to which makes only general reference to the idea. The White paper states that the arrangements it contains “as a whole constitute an essential basis for the establishment and continuing operation of the Fund.” Owen feels strongly that private assertions to Smith that we would use the Fund as a lever to ensure the independent government’s performance of its obligations offers an important reassurance to the whites. He understands the difficulties we would have in getting Congressional support for the Fund if its relationship to the independent government’s observance of its commitments were too explicit.

(3) Patriotic Front Intransigence. As the Patriotic Front, and particularly Nkomo’s ZAPU has gained military strength and recognition from the Front Line, and the OAU, it has increasingly insisted on its claim to be the sole representative of the Zimbabwe people. Nkomo has stated that his struggle is for the assumption of power, not just the attainment of majority rule and independence, and his recent statements indicate that he will be satisfied with nothing less than surrender of power by Smith to the Patriotic Front. Neither Nkomo nor his ZANU partners have at the moment a strong electoral position within Rhodesia, though Nkomo’s organization is good and a well organized campaign might bring him greater support than many observers now believe possible.

It seems unlikely that the frontline Presidents would intervene at this stage to bring a settlement. After more than 12 years of failed efforts by Britain, and more recently the US, to bring Smith to reason, they are skeptical that the current initiative will be any more successful. They are convinced furthermore, that what progress has been made has resulted from their own efforts and those of the Nationalists to bring pressure on Smith through military action. They are particularly conscious of the Angola experience and believe that maintenance of Patriotic Front unity is indispensable to avoiding civil war within an independent Zimbabwe. We believe that they will only be willing to
weigh in to support a settlement when we can bring firm evidence to them that Smith has finally agreed to turn over the government and submit to a free and impartial election on the basis of one man one vote.

It seems likely that Nkomo’s recent statements simply assert a maximum bargaining position. If Smith were to agree to leave office, turning the government over to a genuine impartial British administration supported by an external force, and if both Sithole and Muzorewa agreed to the settlement and to participation in it, and finally, if Nigeria and the Front Line could be brought to support such a settlement as they earlier promised to do, Nkomo would be faced with either participating in it or being frozen out. Under these circumstances it is quite possible that he would go along. This is the strategy which the US–UK initiative had been following.

(4) Smith’s Intransigence. In recent discussions, Smith told the Consultative Group that the package which appeared to be unfolding provided insufficient assurances and confidence building measures for the white population of Rhodesia. They would not accept it and he could not recommend it to them, he said. However, senior officials of the regime seemed to believe that Smith might accept a proposal of this kind. The South Africans have urged us to present our package as soon as possible. It is, therefore, believed that Smith’s position also is designed as a bargaining measure to secure the most favorable position terms.

(5) The Internal Option. If Smith persisted with his intransigence he might attempt to work out a settlement with such leaders as Sithole or Muzorewa. He is certain to try this if he cannot get adequate assurances on the protection of law and order during the transition period. However, he would probably prefer not to have to resort to this solution since he understands that it would not bring international acceptance and, therefore, could not end the war or terminate sanctions. Nevertheless, an agreement with Sithole might bring back many of the ZANU fighters and there is a real question whether Zambia would long support a ZAPU armed struggle against a black African Government. At the present time Smith is waiting to see the details of the US–UK package before deciding whether to attempt an internal settlement. In the meantime, he permitted Sithole to return and will probably do the same for a number of exiled Muzorewa men. At the same time, he continues harassment of the internal ZAPU organization, thus preparing the way for an internal settlement if he should decide to try it.

**ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS**

1. Continuation of the Present Initiative. Most of those with whom the Consultative Group has carried out its discussions have supported both the concept and method of its operation. Smith probably hopes
that it will come up with something he can accept. The South Africans are anxious for its results to be announced. Many of the African nationalists and even the Front Line Presidents have pinned hope on its eventual success. Nkomo would like to use it to gain power. Virtually no one has rejected its efforts. However, the law and order impasse would have to be overcome if the initiative is to succeed. This might be accomplished if other Commonwealth nations could be persuaded to commit forces. The Patriotic Front’s acceptance of its broad outlines might help encourage such commitments but this appears unlikely. The Front may acquiesce but it is unlikely to take any steps which would encourage establishment of an external force. Greater US support (still short of troops) might cause the British to take heart but Owen was pessimistic, and U.S. congressional/public support in turn is dependent upon a substantial collective effort. A UN force is out of the question. We might proceed with the initiative while studying more carefully the exact requirements of an external force, encouraging the British, and talking to Commonwealth countries ourselves in the hope of a breakthrough.

2. A Temporary Slowdown and Withdrawal from Initiative. While all parties are anxious for Owen to return to Africa to present his proposals, Smith and the Patriotic Front have both taken maximum negotiating positions and indicated little flexibility, apparently for tactical purposes. A slowing down of US–UK negotiating activity might cause concern and some loosening up in their respective positions. However, in the interval the war will continue and perhaps intensify, making settlement that much more difficult and Smith may turn to an internal settlement.

3. A Power Sharing Solution Backed by the US and UK. In the face of the present impasse the British are considering returning to a Geneva type formula in which an agreement is reached among nationalist groups on an interim government with our encouragement. Joshua Nkomo would have to be the leader of such a government and it should include Ndabaningi Sithole. Mugabe and his ZANU followers would undoubtedly demur but Sithole might lure many of the latter away. Intelligence reports indicate he has support among ZANU military forces. Such an agreement might be reached by accepting Nkomo’s suggestion of a conference between the Patriotic Front, Smith and the British. We and the South Africans might press Smith to attend on the basis of a promise from Nkomo that the warfare would cease. Nkomo in turn might be brought to agree to such a commitment on the basis of knowledge that he would head the interim government and Smith had agreed to majority rule/one-man one-vote when it took over. An election would be held at the end of the interim period.

Such an agreement would be difficult to achieve. Though Smith has dealt with Nkomo many times in the past and respects him, he
would have difficulty leading the Rhodesian whites to an accommodation with Nkomo and the Patriotic Front. Nkomo would have difficulty from Mugabe and his ZANU element. Sithole and especially Muzorewa would not readily give up their present strong popular position. Nevertheless, such a possibility is being actively considered by the British and may be proposed by Owen when he arrives for talks on the 23rd.

4. A Smith-Backed Internal Solution. If we disengage from the present initiative or if we propose a settlement which makes inadequate provision for maintenance of law and order, Smith will attempt an internal settlement, probably with Sithole. Such settlement would probably succeed in drawing away many of the ZANU military forces but it would be adamantly opposed by Nkomo. Nor is it certain that Muzorewa, who stubbornly maintains his leading popular position, would withdraw. Kaunda would continue to support Nkomo and ZAPU but it is not clear that he would long countenance active military subversion from Zambia into an independent Zimbabwe ruled by black leadership. It is possible that an internal solution that showed promise of holding together for any time might also attract Nkomo into some form of power-sharing solution described above.

Issues to be Decided in Preparation for Owen Visit Here

—Should we advise Owen to go ahead with his plan for a trip to Africa in late July or early August?
—Should he simply present the constitution for an independent Zimbabwe without a proposal for law and order?
—Should we encourage Owen to continue with the present strategy and explore with him ways of resurrecting a Commonwealth Force? Or should we advocate dropping the present effort and exploring other options?
—In developing the various options that should be discussed with Owen, should we focus on the four in this paper?

Namibia

[Omitted here is background information on the Namibian settlement negotiations.]

Negotiating Strategy

Our negotiating strategy on Namibia, as it has evolved based on Resolution 385, has been to tailor the provisions of the Resolution in such a way that they could be acceptable to South Africa while retaining the basic elements in order to make the package acceptable to the UN, the Africans, and SWAPO. After two rounds of talks with the South Africans and subsequent briefings of other concerned parties, significant progress has been made, but a number of important issues remain
unsettled. Additional discussions with the South Africans are still necessary, and we have to weigh the reactions of the other parties.

One aim of the process we have undertaken with the Contact Group has been to create a situation in which the parties most directly involved (i.e. South Africa, SWAPO, other Namibian political groups, and the UN) will negotiate more or less directly. Through the efforts of the Contact Group, we would hope that substantive differences between the sides could be reduced to an extent which would permit either direct talks or indirect negotiations through some informal conference mechanism. The holding of an actual conference is not essential.

In its discussions with the South Africans and in its briefings of others, the Contact Group has attempted to stick to general principles as much as possible and to make it clear that it was neither empowered nor attempting to negotiate.

Current Status and Next Steps

At the current stage in our efforts to reach a settlement of the Namibian problem we are not presented with a situation which necessitates the consideration of a range of options. We are engaged in a process which has shown some significant success and which requires that we follow particular courses of action. Our immediate goal now is to include other concerned parties more directly in the process in which the Contact Group becomes no more of a negotiating entity than it currently is. The following are steps currently under way or now being discussed by the Contact Group:

—Develop plans regarding the procedures and mechanism for the role the United Nations will play in elections and the transition process.

—Drawing on our studies, urge the United Nations Secretary General to develop the details of a potential UN role in Namibia. At some point thereafter, in consultation with him, prepare a Security Council resolution which would confirm the agreement reached with the parties involved, and give him authority to appoint a Special Representative and the necessary support staff.

—Obtain information from the South Africans on the withdrawal of their forces. This is a vital issue which has been emphasized by all parties concerned. We should also discuss with the South Africans the duties and responsibilities of the Administrator-General before they are promulgated.

—Bring the Front Line states and the Nigerians more directly into the process. Consider how we might undertake to promote confidence among them that an acceptable settlement on Namibia can be achieved. We have asked Nyerere and Kaunda to encourage SWAPO to participate in discussions with the Contact Group. The attitude and actions of the Front Line states and Nigeria could be of crucial importance in
overcoming SWAPO suspicions and possible objections to the efforts of the Contact Group.

—Consult SWAPO more fully as the process continues. As long as SWAPO remains on the sidelines its suspicion will continue to grow. The Contact Group has invited Sam Nujoma and other SWAPO representatives to come to New York for discussions on the Western initiative and the direction it is taking. We hope such a meeting can take place sometime during July.

—Give consideration to the possible financial implications of the transition period and after. Costs could be considerable in terms of the requirements for UN involvement in the election process.

Contingencies

The actions proposed above are designed to head off possible problems and maintain momentum as the process unfolds. There are, however, two broad contingencies which must be kept in mind: SWAPO or the South Africans may balk at a critical juncture.

If discussions proceed as successfully as they have so far, there is a good possibility of coming up with proposals that we consider acceptable and reasonable by September. At the current stage of the Contact Group’s efforts, it would appear more likely that SWAPO would put a roadblock in the way of a settlement, and South Africa may be betting on that possibility. While SWAPO has not rejected the Contact Group’s initiative, the SWAPO leadership has been maintaining a hard and uncompromising line. This may be due to a large extent to the exclusion of SWAPO from real participation in the process, but we should also be aware of possible SWAPO intransigence for reasons of its own, including internal political ones.

SWAPO strength for the most part comes from its support from the African states, particularly the Front Line nations and Nigeria. If we believe that a reasonable basis exists for an acceptable settlement, but are faced with SWAPO rejection, we would have to do all we could to convince the key African leaders that a just settlement is achievable with reasonable compromises.

There is also the possibility of renewed South African obstinacy. If South Africa should balk because of what we could also view as unreasonable SWAPO conditions, we would have to work through the Front Line states and the Nigerians in an attempt to elicit the necessary compromise. On the other hand, South Africa for a complex of reasons could refuse to make further concessions which we might feel are not unreasonable. In such a case, we would have to consider what steps we could take and what pressures we could exert to regain South African cooperation.
SOUTH AFRICA

A. The Vienna Talks and the South African Response

In response to the President’s request for a study of measures to promote the progressive transformation of South African society, the Administration determined that an important first step was to inform the SAG leaders in a clear and authoritative manner that our policy toward South Africa had changed, and to insure that other countries and parties in southern Africa were also aware of the change. Accordingly the Vice President met with the South African Prime Minister in Vienna on May 19 and 20 and, in addition to discussing Namibia and Rhodesia, described our new policy to him. The essential message was that the US believed continuation of institutionalized racial discrimination and deprivation of political, economic and social rights for the majority of South Africans was contrary to basic principles adhered to by the American people, would lead to further isolation of South Africa from the international community, and inevitably would result in a racial confrontation with drastic consequences. For reasons of principle as well as self-interest, the US could not continue to have the same kind of relationship with South Africa as long as that country pursued its apartheid policies. We would not tell South Africa how its government should be organized, but we believed that two principles needed to be observed: (a) the elimination of racial discrimination, including separate development, and (b) full political participation by all of the people of South Africa. The Vice President put American policy towards South Africa clearly and incisively on the public record in his press conference following the meeting with Vorster May 20.

One month later, it is difficult to assess the net effect of this change of U.S. policy on various elements of South African society.

Not surprisingly, however, the first reaction of the South African Government (SAG) to the Vice President’s message has been a categorical refusal to make changes as the result of American pressures. Rather, the SAG has engaged in a campaign to depict our policy as designed to “submerge” the white minority. South African Government actions relating to race relations since Vienna have apparently been shaped by immediate internal concerns rather than a response to the American initiative. In public statements, however, South African leaders have diverted attention from the real issues central to the need to move away from the apartheid system, by charging that the U.S. has issued

---

6 See Document 268.
7 See Documents 158, 276, and 278.
8 See footnote 4, Document 278.
a demand for an immediate move to one-man, one-vote which they charge would mean destruction of the white population. There are some indications that such SAG tactics against the new American approach may at least temporarily weaken the position of white liberals advocating political change but who are also concerned about their security under a rapid transition to majority rule. It is too early to judge the depth of this effect.

Reaction in the black community in South Africa is even more difficult to gauge. The principal medium generally thought to represent broad African views, the World newspaper, has welcomed the new policy; Ambassador Young, its most visible proponent in South African eyes, has become something of a hero for many South African blacks. Soweto student leaders promised the Ambassador during his recent visit to South Africa that they would endeavor to keep the June 16 anniversary of the outbreak of last year’s riots a peaceful event. On the other hand, the leaders of the influential Black Peoples Convention refused to see the Ambassador at all.

On a broader scale, the improved credibility of our southern African policies among the leaders of black Africa probably stems in large measure from our willingness to confront South Africa on the question of its own policies.

B. Public Explanation of Policy in the U.S.

In view of the current intensive effort by the South African Government to depict our policy toward South Africa as misguided and inimical to peace and stability in South Africa, as well as to Western interests in general, we believe that the Administration should consider—on an urgent basis—ways to present as effectively as possible our position on the South African question to the American public.

C. Next Steps

Having communicated to the South African Government and the world that we would pursue a policy of active concern with South Africa’s internal racial policies, we must now decide what form of follow up is most likely to help us move toward our objectives.

We had earlier determined that we would base our next steps on the South African response to the Vice President’s message in Vienna. If the South African Government had in any way responded positively, we would have been able to react in a similar fashion. In fact, however, the public response of South African leaders to U.S. policy as set forth by the Vice President has been strongly negative. South African officials, especially Prime Minister Vorster and Foreign Minister Botha, have:

—reassured white South Africans that no basic changes in the government are contemplated and attempted to rally whites by playing on their fears of blacks.
—emphasized to the West South Africa’s perception of the threat of communist control of South Africa’s resources and of the strategic sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope.
—claimed that the government is working toward some change by accelerating the pace of separate development, and by reducing discriminatory practices.
—appealed to the American people to modify US policy along lines more acceptable to South Africa.

Moreover, there has been no private indication of any different approach. In private conversations with American officials, senior South Africans have, in addition to making the foregoing points, suggested:
—that US policymakers continue to misunderstand the situation in South Africa;
—that policy toward South Africa is being made by a group of young liberals who are opposed to the South African Government;
—that Vice President Mondale, in view of his liberal record, is not really a reliable interlocutor;
—and, in any event, that the U.S. Government policy is not truly representative of the beliefs of the American people.

In the face of this response, we have laid out in this paper a range of steps which might be taken to indicate to South Africa that American policy was accurately presented by the Vice President, and that we are serious about carrying it out. In reviewing these steps, we should give careful consideration to several factors, including timing, feasibility, cost to the U.S., problems in implementation, and impact in South Africa and elsewhere, especially Africa and the U.S. itself.

A first consideration is whether sufficient time has elapsed to have allowed the South Africans to reflect fully on the new U.S. policy, and to have considered their response. The sharp negative quality of their initial reaction was perhaps predictable, but argues for some steps in the near future to support our stated policy. On the other hand, in our response to Presidential Review Memorandum 4, we suggested that a six-month period might be allowed before taking measures clearly to demonstrate the seriousness of our purpose regarding South African policies and actions.9

We believe that factors which could affect the timing of future steps require some further study. Our initial review of steps we might take suggests that careful consideration must be given to the implications of each of these steps before we carry any of them out. We need to assess the impact (economic or otherwise) that particular steps could have on South Africa itself. We will also want to examine the financial

9 See Document 264.
cost to the United States which in some cases might be minor, and in other cases may amount to hundreds of millions of dollars. Moreover, a number of these measures can be implemented by the Executive Branch, but others will require new legislation from the Congress, and still others could exact a substantial price in domestic political reaction. Some (UN action, for example) can only be implemented with the cooperation of other countries, especially our allies.

We will want to weigh the impact many of our actions will have on our allies, and consult with them (especially the UK) perhaps even on some steps we could take unilaterally. As discussed below, the impact of some actions in the economic field will be sharply reduced without similar steps by our allies, who are also South Africa’s major economic partners.

We should keep in mind the differences in objectives that would be served by each possible measure we could select. Three distinct political objectives should be considered as part of the evaluation in choosing a particular step:

—effect on public opinion in the United States, South Africa and black Africa, as well as elsewhere;
—disengagement or disinvolvement of American Government and other activities from South Africa;
—impact on South African economic and political life.

A key decision will be selection of the first steps. We might want to choose, initially at least, a small step which would be a modest indication to the South African Government that we are firm in our policy. This would enable them to avoid being put in the position of seeming to yield to public outside pressure should, on reflection, they decide to move in the direction we want. On the other hand, we may want to make our first move a clearly symbolic act which will capture public attention in South Africa, as well as in this country and elsewhere. Or, if our purpose is to show that we mean business, we may wish to take a step with substantial effect on South Africa, such as an effort to limit American trade and investment in that country. It should be noted that measures which appear to be first steps towards more serious actions would probably be more effective than one-time steps.

(Any proposed economic measures would be especially difficult to implement, inasmuch as they would probably encounter opposition from within as well as outside the U.S. Government. Those who are concerned about implementation of such measures should note that they are not likely to be considered until we arrive at a later stage in a situation of SAG failure to move toward positive changes. And they would be considered in the context of our economic, as well as political, circumstances at the time.)

In addition to disassociating ourselves from the South African Government as long as present racial policies are continued, we are
also committed to using our influence in South Africa in a direct way to influence change. We have been increasingly active in this area in recent years, having expanded our cultural exchange program, made low-key efforts to provide training to elements of the black population, and sought to persuade American firms in South Africa to improve their employment practices for blacks. Further activity could include: (a) increased U.S. Government encouragement of U.S. firms to improve their employment practices including dealing with the black labor unions, and (b) discussions with other governments to encourage improved employment practices by all foreign companies and to minimize any competitive disadvantages which U.S. firms might incur acting alone. It seems likely, however, that poorer relations with South Africa will affect the scope of our activities, although we will want to continue and expand them where possible.

Specific Measures

We are presenting measures for consideration on a continuum ranging from measures with relatively little direct impact to those which are much stronger. At the same time, we offer some comments on the impact we believe these measures would have on South Africa, the objective we believe they could serve, and the costs and problems which would be involved in carrying them out.

1. Closure of Missile Tracking Station

The station is a part of the Air Force’s eastern test range. It is maintained in a stand-by mode by a contractor, and has not been in active use for several years. Closing the station would not be a major political signal to either the SAG or its opponents. It would be seen as a gesture of dissociation, however, reducing further our involvement with South Africa.

2. Reduce the Size of the Defense Attache’s Office

At present the Defense Attache Office (DAO) includes an attache from each of three services, two assistant attaches, and seven American enlisted men, as well as three locals. The DAO operation includes an aircraft which is useful both to the Embassy in meeting logistical leads and for various technical assignments. This office maintains a low profile liaison with the South African defense forces. It helps us to keep in touch with developments in those forces and provides some useful intelligence on maritime movements around the Cape.

The Department of Defense believes that control of the strategic position astride the main oil route from the Middle East oil fields to Western Europe and the United States would become vital to the security of the United States in the event of conflict in Europe between NATO countries and members of the Warsaw Pact. Currently, approxi-
mately 80% of the oil destined for Europe traverses the Cape route. The Defense Department states that the active support of the South African Government would be important to defending it from interdiction by hostile forces. The Department of State, however, believes that while it is vital to keep the sea lanes open, it is unlikely that hostile action to close them would occur in the remote area of South African waters. State does not agree, therefore, that South African support would be relevant in this context. Moreover, State doubts that the size or even the existence of the DAO is relevant to this issue. Our Ambassador has recommended that, given the limitations on military cooperation, a DAO of the size that we now have in South Africa is not justified in any event. He recommends that it be reduced.

3. Discourage Cooperation in Sports

Although the U.S. Government has no control over the activities of U.S. sporting organizations, a statement discouraging such activities would have considerable influence on those areas of sporting activity, outside the Olympic movement, where cooperation with South Africa continues. Official American discouragement of future athletic cooperation would have high symbolic value for both black and white South Africans. Such a step would respond to increasing African and UN pressure to isolate South Africa in this field.

This would arouse opposition in the United States, however, among athletes and others who would contend that it runs counter to American efforts to keep politics out of sports and that athletic competition with South Africa is a positive influence for change in racial attitudes and practices.


We may wish to abandon our present policy towards American investment in South Africa by making a public statement discouraging new investment in that country unless the investors are willing to implement strong fair employment practices. Such a position could be taken publicly without concrete steps for enforcement, at least at first. (We would also continue to urge firms already operating in South Africa to adopt such practices.)

A public posture of discouraging investors unwilling to enforce fair employment practices would have substantial, though somewhat limited, impact on opinion in South Africa and elsewhere. Some critics would charge that the US is continuing to support South Africa, while others might call this unjustifiable interference in American business activity. Such a policy would be in keeping, however, with our approach based on moderation and non-violent methods of bringing
about a progressive transformation of South African society. It would be more effective if done in cooperation with our allies.

5. Elimination of Commercial Services

Only one full-time commercial officer is presently assigned to South Africa—in Johannesburg. Two political-economic officers, one in Cape Town and one in Durban, deal on an irregular basis with commercial matters that are not handled by local employees. Five professional local employees are occupied extensively with the provisions of commercial services in Johannesburg and two other local employees, one in Cape Town and one in Durban, are heavily involved in commercial work. These commercial services support activities of American businessmen.

The Department of Commerce strongly opposes elimination of commercial services in South Africa, arguing that Commerce has a legal obligation to provide export marketing assistance to American businessmen. The commercial staff in South Africa, Commerce states, is vital in monitoring enforcement of Rhodesian sanctions, maintaining contacts with South African businessmen, and providing other services.

The Department of State agrees that export marketing assistance is an obligation of the Department of Commerce, although this does not mean that services must be provided in all cases or in every country. Some offices in State believe that the political benefits to be gained by eliminating commercial services in South Africa would be substantial enough to outweigh the economic costs of this measure. This would be a strong signal to South Africa, would have considerable impact on public opinion, and would disengage the US Government from another aspect of present involvement with South Africa.

6. Reduction of Mission Size, Including the Closure of a Consulate

Should a Consulate be closed, the one at Durban (5 Americans, 15 local employees) would be the most likely. Reductions in Embassy staffing might be effected first by relocating the regional IRS office, which covers most of Africa, and the office of the Agricultural Attache.

In enunciating our new policy, we have improved our credibility with many black African leaders. To maintain this new credibility, reducing official relationships would stimulate the least resistance domestically and would be less likely to encounter resistance from our allies than, for example, actions in the economic field. This measure would not have as strong an impact as other steps, but it would—especially if taken in concert with other steps—provide a signal to the South Africans, and to others as well. Reduction of our presence in South Africa will, however, limit our access to and knowledge of some sectors of South African society; closing the Consulate at Durban would reduce to some extent our information on Rhodesian sanctions violations and minerals exports from South Africa.
7. Reduce or Prohibit Export-Import Bank Facilities

Although the Eximbank facilities available for South Africa do not include direct credits to South African purchasers, they do include loan guarantees, insurance, and discount loans up to $2 million.

In the wake of talks in Vienna with Vorster, an early denial of Eximbank facilities to South Africa could, in our judgment, be a powerful political signal that we indeed mean business.

The prohibition of Exim facilities for trade with South Africa is, however, likely to have an adverse impact upon U.S. trade with South Africa and could also affect U.S. investment in South Africa. In 1976 U.S. exports to South Africa totaled $1.25 billion, of which about $200 million was supported by Exim guarantees or insurance. At least some of these sales will be lost to European and Japanese competitors, if Exim facilities are cut off in the likely event that those governments do not take similar steps. Implementation of this option will also damage the Administration’s ability to insulate Exim (as an apolitical institution designed to promote US exports) from the political pressures of Congress.

8. Restrict South African Access to High-Level Technology

The most likely authority for control over the export of US technology to South Africa is the Export Administration Act. It is quite conceivable that this Act could be used to require the issuance of validated licenses (by Commerce) before designated goods and/or technology can be exported to South Africa. Thus, the USG would have a control mechanism for South Africa similar to that used for most communist countries. We could use this authority to limit South African access to advanced technologies in areas such as power production, electronics and other fields. We might also forbid further cooperation between USG agencies and South African entities in technological fields (we are presently undertaking a survey of such cooperation). We might deny visas to students who plan to study advanced scientific and technological subjects under the sponsorship of the South African Government and parastatal corporations.

For South Africa this is an important aspect of our relations, whereas except for a few areas, most notably coal gasification, it offers us limited technological data. There is precedent in our relations with communist countries for many steps in this area. However, with the exception of controls for national security reasons, we have traditionally opposed governmental intervention in the international transfer of technology. It is an ill-defined area and control would be cumbersome. There would be considerable short- and long-term costs in terms of lost revenues and markets. In this area in particular, careful study should be undertaken of the relative merits of measures we might take.
9. Discourage Future U.S. Investment in South Africa (This proposal goes further than step 4—page 10 above.)

Current U.S. policy toward investment in South Africa neither encourages nor discourages U.S. investment in South Africa, but informs potential investors of the social, political and economic conditions in the country. Total book value of U.S. investments in South Africa is about $1.6 billion.

The U.S. Government could actively discourage U.S. investment in South Africa. In the context of the Trading with the Enemy Act we could issue regulations that would prohibit transactions with South Africa. A non-regulatory approach would be more flexible and provide the same impact, e.g., wide dissemination of a new U.S. policy discouraging investment in South Africa.

Concrete action to discourage investment would be an unambiguous signal of a shift in U.S. attitudes toward economic relations with South Africa, and it may be possible to structure in such a way that would not harm existing U.S. investment. Moreover, it would be a valuable political gesture, domestically and internationally.

This would, however, counter our long standing effort not to impose national policies through regulation of foreign subsidiaries. If the measure did not have multilateral support from all the major foreign investors, the effort will not have much economic effect. It would have a negative impact on some segments of U.S. public opinion and Congressional attitudes toward evolving support for our African policies, and might lead to retaliation against U.S. firms already established in South Africa, and could reduce the extent of the positive influence that American firms can exert to improve the economic and social conditions of black South Africans.

The Department of Commerce believes that the impact that our discouragement of investment would have on South Africa would be limited because the SAG has already taken steps to reduce its dependence on foreign capital.

The Department of State agrees that South Africa has taken steps to reduce its need for foreign capital, but believes that it remains important to the South African economy, since the country continues to have trade imbalances as well as extensive plans for infrastructure development which would require outside funds. However, the high political and economic cost of this option would suggest careful study.

10 Reference is to paragraph "4. A Smith-Backed Internal Solution" under the heading "Alternative Directions."
9. **Discourage U.S. Banks from Extending Loans to South Africa**

U.S. banks at the end of 1976 had total claims on South Africa of approximately $2.24 billion, out of a total commercial bank exposure in South Africa of approximately $6.9 billion. Because of the current unsettled situation in South Africa banks are currently shortening the length of loan maturities. Private non-bank capital inflow in 1976 was also much lower than in 1975. U.S. action to discourage further lending activity to South Africa would therefore possibly accelerate an existing trend.

The method chosen to implement this action is important. One option would be to apply to South Africa provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 which would allow Treasury to curtail or eliminate U.S. banking transfers to South Africa. Such a move unilaterally, however, may be affected by pending legislation concerning this Act and the requisite declaration of a national emergency. The net economic effort of such action might well serve to drive South African lending activity to other banks, especially the European banks in the Eurocurrency market. The option would thus impose a high cost to the U.S. with only possibly slight effect on South Africa, given the existing easy access to world capital markets and the very liquid position of banks.

The encouragement of U.S. banks to withhold loans to South Africa which would support apartheid policies or reinforce discriminatory business practices could be accomplished by another procedure, which offers more flexibility. By means of a letter sent to FED member banks by FED Board Chairman Arthur Burns, American banks could be urged to make no further loans to South Africa which were linked to discriminatory practices. This letter could be in addition to, or instead of, public statements by Administration officials. Letters by Chairman Burns have been effective in other instances in the past. Again, however, the effect of such an action would be considerably weakened if undertaken unilaterally. There would be heavy cost to U.S. banks and perhaps some erosion of support for the Administration’s southern African policies. More study needs to be done to assess the viability of this option, and Congressional reaction to it.

---

11 Reference is to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (PL 95–223, 91 Stat. 1626), that gave the President broad authority over financial transactions and property in a foreign country, following a declaration of a national emergency under the Act.
10. **UN Action Under Chapter VI—Non-Mandatory Steps**

The Security Council could take recommendatory action under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The current arms embargo against South Africa is voluntary and is a Chapter VI measure. Possible additional recommendatory action, which has been mentioned in the UN, could include: discouraging new foreign investment in South Africa (proposed by the Swedes at the 31st UNGA). There would be great pressure on all major trading nations, including the U.S., to comply with the resolution.

Action in the UN might persuade South Africa to make changes. Economic measures which had the full support of all Security Council members could be especially effective in making an impact on that country.

Action in this area will encounter opposition from business groups and others, who will argue that we are reducing our potential for constructive influence in South Africa. Our allies may be reluctant to see even voluntary action taken in this field and would probably be even more reluctant to join in any cooperative ventures.

11. **UN Action Against South Africa—Chapter VII—Mandatory Sanctions**

The UN Security Council has on several occasions considered resolutions to apply mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The OAU has consistently recommended sanctions, particularly a mandatory arms embargo or economic sanctions. Several resolutions calling for Chapter VII action against South Africa for its internal policies are still pending in the Security Council from a deferred meeting in March on South Africa. They could be revived at any time and put to a vote at African request. Application of sanctions by the SC would first require a determination that a threat to international peace and security exists. There is a serious question under the UN Charter whether apartheid can be considered a threat to international peace and security, and the Africans recognize that this would be sufficient to justify a veto. The British and French indicated to us earlier this year that they are still opposed to any Chapter VII action on the question of apartheid and would veto.

D. **The Arms Embargo and “Gray Area Sales”**

Whether or not the Administration decides to take any steps to alter the US-South African relationship, a decision should be made

---

12 Chapter VI of the UN Charter requires countries with disputes that could lead to war to first employ peaceful methods, such as but not limited to, negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Should these measures fail, the dispute must be referred to the UN Security Council.
now as to how we observe the arms embargo against South Africa. During the years of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, guidelines that were established and decisions that were taken in certain specific cases constituted a demonstrable relaxation of restraints on “gray area sales” (i.e., sales to the South African military of non-lethal items that presumably would not be used in combat operations). While this was greeted with favor by business firms involved in such sales, the relaxation was denounced by some members of Congress and critics of apartheid.

Background. In 1962, the U.S. instituted unilaterally a partial arms embargo against South Africa. In 1963, UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson announced that the U.S. would halt all sales of military equipment to South Africa, with the exception of deliveries under existing contracts of certain items for South African external defense. The U.S. subsequently voted in favor of UN Security Council resolutions which called on all States voluntarily to terminate the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture of arms and ammunition.

USG guidelines issued in 1964 prohibited all US exports to South Africa, or sales by the Defense Department in or to South Africa, of:

(a) items on the munitions list;
(b) items specially notified by State to Commerce;
(c) arms, ammunition and military vehicles;
(d) equipment and materials for the production and maintenance of arms and munitions; and
(e) other items of significant use in combat or in training for armed police, and paramilitary forces.

Exceptions were made for sales by and for civilian nongovernmental users of various items having both military and non-military utility. We also permitted sale of spare parts for previously supplied equipment pursuant to explicit pre-existing contractual obligations, in particular for the C-130 aircraft South Africa purchased in 1961. (We have on hand an application from Lockheed for sale of additional spares.) Revised guidelines issued in 1968 also exempted US-manufactured components of items produced in third countries, unless either the components or the end items were articles of a weapons nature.

In 1970 the guidelines for the US embargo were relaxed by NSDM 81\(^\text{13}\) with respect to sales of “dual-use” items to the South African military. That NSDM provided that “non-lethal dual-use items which are preponderantly employed for civilian use will be licensed to either civilian or military buyers” and that “non-lethal dual-use items which

are preponderantly used by military forces, but which do not have a clear and direct application to combat or to internal security operations, . . . may be licensed to military buyers upon the recommendation of the Department of Commerce and with the concurrence of the Department of State.” Under these “dual-use” exceptions, licenses have been issued for sales to or for the South African military forces of various items, such as VIP passenger aircraft and computers to be used for personnel and supply control purposes.

**Options.**

We believe the Administration should now decide whether it will permit: (a) the export of U.S. items for sale to or use by the South African police or military forces, and (b) the export of spares and maintenance equipment with respect to items previously licensed for such sale or use.

(a) **New items.**

**Option 1. Generally prohibit all exports for sales to or for use by South African police or military forces.** Under this option, Commerce would require validated licenses for exports of all items for sale to the South African government, or for sale to or use by the South African police or military forces (the export of U.S. components for integration into such items would be included). Exports for sales to the South African government of items whose export is otherwise permitted by the guidelines would be licensed upon receipt of adequate assurances that no use will be made by police or military forces. Exports for sales of any items to or for use by the military or police would generally be denied, although specific exemptions for items of a non-weapons character might be granted on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian or other special reasons (such as disaster situations). All approvals of licenses in these categories would be made on the basis of recommendations by Commerce and concurrence by State.

**Pros:**

—Minimizes the possibility that U.S. items would be used by the South African police or military for purposes related to combat or internal security operations.

—Minimizes reliance on questionable assurances by the South African police or military that “dual-use” items would in fact not be used for combat-related purposes in urgent situations.

—Demonstrates further that the Administration is firmly opposed to apartheid.

**Cons:**

—Requires licensing of exports of many items now being shipped under general license, and will therefore result
in increased administrative burdens on Commerce and State, and increased paperwork for U.S. exporters.
—Will not prevent South Africa from acquiring comparable items from other sources, which may result in a competitive disadvantage to U.S. suppliers. (This effect might be reduced by diplomatic approaches to other supplier countries, although it is not clear whether such approaches would be successful.)

Option 2. Prohibit exports for sale to or use by the South African military or police of specific categories of items. Under this option, Commerce would apply the procedures described in Option 1 to exports for any items in specific categories which appear on lists which State may transmit to Commerce from time to time. In addition to items whose export is presently prohibited, State would initially include those types of “dual-use” items which appear most sensitive or adaptable to use in combat or training activities, such as all types of aircraft and motor vehicles. Other items might be added from time to time as appropriate.

Pros:
—Same as in Option 1, points 2–3.
—Reduces administrative burdens by concentrating on items of specific interest.

Cons:
—Allows sales to or use by the South African military and police forces of many types of U.S. products, which will contribute to the overall operations of these forces and will generally facilitate their combat and counter-insurgency efforts.
—May allow exports of potentially sensitive items before State has had sufficient information or opportunity to put them on the list.
—Will continue to expose the U.S. Government to charges that it generally condones sales of U.S. goods to the South African military and police.

(b) Spares and maintenance equipment for previously-licensed items.

Option 1. Terminate all further exports of spares and maintenance equipment for items whose export would now be prohibited. Under this option, no further licenses would be granted for spares and maintenance equipment for items previously licensed but whose export would no longer be permitted. This would result in no contractual liability for the U.S. Government or the U.S. suppliers of these items, even where suppliers may have pre-existing contractual commitments to supply the items, since such contractual obligations are generally excused where subsequently prohibited by governmental action (although suppliers might
suffer losses to the extent that they cannot find alternative customers for goods already produced).

Pros:  
—Terminates all U.S. exports to support the use of items whose export would be inconsistent with new U.S. policy.
—Precludes any further support of items with clear military applications (such as military cargo aircraft) under contractual arrangements predating the imposition of the embargo.

Cons:  
—Interrupts existing supply arrangements, and may therefore result in loss of profit opportunities of transitional costs for U.S. suppliers.
—May cause some uncertainty among customers for other U.S. products in some cases about the reliability of U.S. firms as a source of supply.

Option 2. Permit exports of normal quantities of spares and maintenance equipment for limited transition period. Under this option, the export of spares and maintenance equipment for items previously licensed, but now prohibited, would continue for a specified transition period of six months. During that period exports of spares and maintenance items would be permitted only to the extent consistent with the normal current maintenance requirements of the systems in question, and purchases for stockpiling in excess of those requirements would not be allowed.

Pros:  
—Eases transition costs and problems for U.S. suppliers, and permits them an opportunity to seek other sales prospects for their products.
—Gives customers of U.S. products fair notice and opportunity to find other sources of supply.

Cons:  
—Continues U.S. sales for support of systems whose export is inconsistent with U.S. policy, although for limited period of time.
—Puts administrative burden on Commerce to determine what quantities constitute normal maintenance requirements of systems in question, and may permit disguised stockpiling purchases for future requirements.
285. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, July 22, 1977, 9:30–11 a.m.

SUBJECT

Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Dr. Robert Bowie
Asst. Sec. Richard Moose
William Parmenter
Amb. Stephen Low
USUN

Defense
Dep. Sec. Charles W. Duncan
Amb. Donald McHenry
Leslie Janka
NSC

JCS
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron
Thomas Thornton
Henry Richardson

Secretary Vance, Chairman, set the agenda to discuss, in order, Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

Rhodesia

There was general sentiment that the United States could not withdraw or slow down from its present initiative toward a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. An outside peacekeeping force was a necessary condition to a negotiated settlement, most probably a Commonwealth rather than a UN force. The US should not take the lead in organizing a peace-keeping force; that would be a new policy. The British should remain in the forefront, and Owen should be urged to return to Africa after the Rhodesian elections. But British objectives are ambiguous. The reciprocity between an acceptable political package and the evolution of a Commonwealth force was noted.

A Commonwealth force also has symbolic value by helping create a situation in which either Nkomo or Smith might feel forced to join, especially Nkomo should Smith resign and arrangements emerge for free elections based on one man, one vote.

The possibility of Smith handing over power to Sithole in an internal solution was discussed; the US could not support such a solution because it would undermine US credibility in southern Africa. Secretary

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 48, South Africa: 7–8/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
Vance noted that no conclusion was reached in the discussion on Rhodesia.

Namibia

Though no major policy decisions stood to be made, major issues included African parties demanding the strongest possible role for the UN; the withdrawal of South African troops, and the importance of that issue to SWAPO’s participation in negotiations and elections. US policy, with the Five Power Contact Group, seeks a situation where neither the UN nor South Africa would actually be totally in control of the interim process but where each can plausibly tell their own constituencies that they are. The delaying tactics of SWAPO, the possibility of disorder in Namibia, and the general distrust by Africans of the South African government were identified. There may be new momentum: the Secretary General will now make his staff available for contingency planning and will appoint Atasharri as the UN Special Representative. Owen should be asked to call Waldheim in this connection.

High level discussions with the Front Line States and Nigeria, perhaps when Ambassador Young is in Lagos in late August, would be timely. The connection between US relations with Angola and progress in the Namibian talks was noted.

South Africa

Secretary Vance asked whether, relative to a list of steps presented in order of severity of action against South Africa, now was the time to take smaller, or more severe, steps against that government. It was decided that now was the time to begin taking smaller steps.

Relative to some proposed small steps, it was decided that a study was needed to recommend desirable ways to accomplish specific reductions of military, diplomatic and commercial personnel in the USG South Africa mission.

On “Gray Area Sales” to South Africa, it was decided that a new directive was needed that there should be prohibited, with respect to new items, all exports for sales to or for use by South African police or military forces.

The issue was discussed of whether, with respect to spares and maintenance equipment for items previously licensed for export to South Africa, all further exports of spares and maintenance equipment for items whose export would now be prohibited would be terminated. It was decided that this issue should be the subject of additional study.

---

2 For a discussion of proposed steps, see Document 284.
It was further decided that pending cases concerning the export of spares and maintenance equipment should be decided on a case-by-case basis for a limited transition period. The above study should be completed by the time of the Lagos Conference on Apartheid August 22-24, and it should look toward the elimination of this category of exports to South Africa, unless that government provided substantial reason otherwise.

It was generally agreed that another meeting would be needed on southern African issues.

Follow-up Actions

1. State is to recommend desirable ways to accomplish specific reductions of military, diplomatic, and commercial personnel in the USG South Africa mission, and the conditions necessary to implement these, by August 22.

2. State is to prepare a Presidential Directive prohibiting, with respect to new items, all exports or sales to or for use by South African police or military forces by August 17.

3. State is to prepare a study on whether, with respect to spares and maintenance equipment for items previously licensed for export to South Africa, all further exports of spares and maintenance items whose export would now be prohibited would be terminated, to be completed August 17.

4. State is to prepare guidelines for cases concerning the export of spares and maintenance equipment to South Africa, in conformity with these PRC conclusions, by August 17.

5. A follow-up PRC on southern Africa should be scheduled for the period between September 26 and October.

---

3 The World Conference for Action Against Apartheid was held in Lagos August 22-26.
4 See Document 319.
5 See Document 170.
6 Not found.
7 Not found.
8 See Document 169.
286. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Operations of
the Central Intelligence Agency (Wells) to the Deputy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Aaron)

Washington, July 27, 1977

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Mate-
rial, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 7–8/77. Secret. 2 pages not
declassified.]

287. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
South Africa¹

Washington, August 10, 1977, 0102Z

188207. Subject: Soviet Demarche on Nuclear Weapons Develop-
ment by SAG.

[1.] Summary. USSR has made demarches to USG, HMG, GOF,
and FRG concerning a nuclear weapon development program by the
SAG. Demarche was followed by article on TASS wire alleging SAG
about to test a nuclear weapon. Ambassador is asked express U.S.
concern at appropriate level of SAG. End summary.

2. Soviet Charge Vasey made oral demarche here on August 6² at
which time he stated that the SAG is completing work on the creation
of a nuclear weapon and that an underground testing facility has
been built in the Kalahari for a weapons test. Soviet Charge expressed
concern at these developments and asked the USG to use its influence
with the SAG to get the SAG to refrain from any test as well as halt its
program to develop a nuclear weapon. Charge referred to forthcoming
TASS statement on subject; statement moved on TASS wire August 8.
We understand that similar demarches were made to HMG, GOF,
and FRG.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770287–0051.
Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by J. Clagett Taylor (AF/S) and Richard L. Williamson
(ACDA/NP/NX); cleared by Dennis Keogh (AF/S), Gary L. Matthews (EUR/SOV),
Gerard G. Oplinger (PM/NPT), Lawrence Scheinman (T/D), John P. Boright (OES/
NET), and Charles Van Doren (ACDA/NTB); approved by Seelye. Sent for information

² For text of the oral démarche, see Document 288.
3. Soviet approach called attention of USG, as a member of the Security Council bearing a responsibility for the maintenance of peace, to the completion of work on a nuclear weapon by SAG and charged that test area in the Kalahari is practically ready for underground experiments. Soviet Government believes possession of nuclear weapon by South Africa would aggravate situation in Africa, increase danger of the use of nuclear weapons, and provide justification for other countries to develop nuclear weapons. Soviets pointed out that if further nuclear non-proliferation occurs, world opinion will question value of NPT. They noted that South Africa’s nuclear capability is due to the help of other (unnamed) states. Soviets stated that this is a matter of extreme importance and urged USG to use channels at its disposal to deter the SAG from developing or testing a nuclear weapon.

4. Ambassador, or in his absence Charge, is requested to express USG concern about the Soviet allegation at appropriate level of SAG, perhaps to Foreign Secretary Brand Fourie. Regardless of accuracy of Soviet charge, we want to be on record as having missed no opportunities to caution SAG on potentially grave consequences of developing nuclear device. Ambassador should draw on following talking points:

—As you know, the Soviets have charged publicly that the SAG is about to test a nuclear device. You should also know that the Soviets have made a more specific charge to us in private, viz that the SAG has developed an underground facility in the Kalahari for the purpose of underground nuclear testing.

—Although we recognize the Soviets will seek any propaganda opportunity to serve their own ends, in light of the specificity of the charge, the fact that it was raised privately with us prior to its public release, and the close coordination of demarches with other Western governments, the US cannot dismiss such an allegation without an explanation from the SAG.

—The administration considers the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be a major risk to international peace and stability and is determined to do everything in its power to prevent a further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. For this reason, the US would consider it a matter of gravest concern if there were any shred of truth to the Soviet allegation.

—We would like your comment on Soviet allegation. If there is any substance to the Soviet allegation, this would be a matter of grave concern to the USG. If there is no substance, it would be in your own interest to make a public statement refuting reports that SAG is developing a nuclear weapon. Announcement of SAG willingness to adhere to NPT would be the best way to allay fears that South Africa is moving toward a nuclear weapons program.
189626. Subject: Soviet Demarche on South African Nuclear Program.

Soviet Charge Vasev on August 6 delivered to White House an oral message from Brezhnev to the President concerning alleged South African plans to develop a nuclear weapon. Text follows:

Begin text.

We would like to draw your attention to a matter which, in our opinion, is of quite considerable importance from the point of view of its consequences to the development of the international situation and deepening of detente. This matter concerns the Soviet Union and United States as permanent members of the Security Council who carry a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security.

According to information received, the Union of South Africa (USA) is completing work on the creation of a nuclear weapon and the carrying out of the first experimental nuclear test. In the desert of Kalahari there has been built a testing area which is practically ready for the carrying out of such experiments underground. These facts, giving witness to the possibility of creating nuclear weapons in the USA, cannot but arouse serious concern. It is clear that if this state, which conducts a policy of apartheid with regard to the African population of its country, and does not observe the decisions of the United Nations, acquired nuclear weapons, then this would sharply aggravate the situation on the African continent and, as a whole, would increase the danger of the use of nuclear weapons.

The emergence of such weapons in the hands of the USA would undoubtedly be used by certain other countries for the justification of creating their own nuclear explosive devices. It is not difficult to see what harm this would cause to the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation and how essentially it would weaken the policy (framework) of nuclear non-proliferation, the strengthening of which the joint efforts of the USSR and the United States have been directed. No one doubts that the USA can create nuclear weapons only thanks to the help of other

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0459. Confidential; Cherokee; Niat Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Matthews (EUR/SOV); cleared by Marshall Shulman (S/MS), William Hyland (NSC), Thomas G. Martin (S/S), and William H. Luers (EUR); approved by Christopher.
states. It is also known that the USA was given access to the latest research in the nuclear field, that it received and continues to receive nuclear equipment and materials. The “London Agreements” demand, as is known, the observance of a number of conditions aimed at the banning of the use of those materials, equipment and technology received for the creation of nuclear explosive devices. World public opinion will rightly ask: Since these agreements have failed to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons in the USA, then what value do they have?

The Soviet Union considers this a matter of extraordinary and urgent importance (in which there should be taken) all efforts for the prevention of the USA conducting nuclear tests and creating its nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union intends in the nearest future to publish an appropriate statement, having in mind to draw the attention of governments and public opinion to the dangerous plans of the USA. As far as the United States is concerned, they, as we understand, have at their disposal the necessary channels and possibilities for the rendering of a direct restricting influence on this state.

Addressing ourselves directly to you, Mr. President, we take into account the great attention which you personally give to the problem of restricting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Between the Soviet Union and the United States cooperation is developing along the line of strengthening the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. These states have taken on themselves certain obligations in the agreement on prevention of nuclear war. Now a situation has arisen when it is urgently necessary, even at once, to undertake energetic efforts toward the goals of preventing the emergence of new nuclear states and barring the proliferation of nuclear danger.

I hope that this appeal of mine meets, Mr. President, with your understanding and that the American side will take correspondingly effective measures. On our part, we would like to find out the view of the United States concerning the questions mentioned above. End quote.

Comment: All references in note to “USA” stand for Union of South Africa and not rpt not United States. Draft reply from President to Brezhnev is now being prepared and we will send final version to you as soon as it is cleared.

Christopher
Washington, August 15, 1977, 2011Z

192990. Subject: Reply to Soviet Demarche on South African Nuclear Program.

1. The Deputy Secretary called in the Soviet Charge, Vasev, August 15 and gave him as a non-paper the text of the President’s reply to Brezhnev’s message on South African nuclear programs delivered by Vasev on August 6. In receiving the reply Vasev commented that it appeared to be very constructive and in the same spirit the Soviet side approached this problem. Text follows for your information.

2. Begin text. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for bringing to my attention information you have that the Republic of South Africa is completing work on a nuclear explosive device and is preparing to test such a device. I am replying in like spirit, out of the deep concern I share with you to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

We are addressing this matter on a serious and urgent basis since we view such a development in the Republic of South Africa or elsewhere with the utmost gravity. The United States has long been concerned over South Africa’s operation of a pilot enrichment facility which is not under the safeguards system of the IAEA, and over the repeated refusal of the South Africans, despite our urgings, to join the NPT.

Upon receipt of your information about the existence of a test site in the Kalahari desert, I directed my experts to investigate the situation, utilizing our national technical and other means. I am also instructing my representative in Pretoria to emphasize to the Government of South Africa in the clearest terms that the testing of a nuclear device would have the gravest consequences. I am pursuing this with the Government of South Africa.

It is my hope and my intention to work closely with you and other concerned countries in the immediate period ahead, so that by our respective efforts we can successfully resolve this serious situation. End text.

Vance

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0457. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Mark J. Garrison (EUR/SOV); cleared by Tarnoff; approved by Christopher.

2 See Document 288.
290. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, August 17, 1977, 1350Z


Quote. Cherokee for the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Possible South African Nuclear Weapons Program. Ref: (A) Pretoria 4021, (B) State 188207, (C) Paris 23625 (Notal).

1. As a result of information passed to US by Soviets (ref B), [10 lines not declassified].

2. Longer-range strategy for preventing South Africa from becoming a nuclear weapons state, as well as follow-on steps we and others might take to achieve that goal, are still under consideration here. However, the situation is sufficiently serious to justify immediate actions to warn the South Africans in unambiguous terms of the grave consequences of a nuclear test or other steps in the direction of acquiring nuclear weapons.

2 [3]. The following talking points should be used by the Ambassador in approach to Botha as soon as possible following rpt following specific separate authorization from Dept:

(A) We have noted your previous assurances that your nuclear program is devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes. However, the possession by South Africa of an unsafeguarded enrichment plant, and your persistent delay in adhering to the NPT, have always been grounds for concern. Now, on the basis of our independent investigation, we have substantial evidence which appears to be contrary to your assurances.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 107, 8/16–20/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Cherokee; Nodis.

2 In telegram 4021 from Pretoria, August 10, the Embassy reported on a conversation with South African Deputy Secretary Van Dalsen regarding the Soviet démarche: “In response to our concerns, Van Dalsen referred first to Defense Minister Botha’s statement to the press last evening: ‘Both the Prime Minister and successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs have already explained extensively and on a number of occasions that nuclear energy in South Africa will be used for peaceful purposes only. I have nothing more to add.’ Van Dalsen said he wondered where the Soviets had gotten the ‘romantic notion’ about a Kalahari test site.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770287–1301)

3 See Document 287.

4 In telegram 23625 from Paris, August 16, the Embassy transmitted Guiringaud’s initial reactions to Vance’s suggestions on approaching the South Africans on the nuclear test issue. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2575)
(B) In light of the grave implications, the President has instructed me to make clear that the detonation of a nuclear device—whether a nuclear weapon or a so-called peaceful nuclear explosive—or any further steps to acquire or develop a demonstrated nuclear explosive capability would have the most serious consequences for all aspects of our relations, and would be considered by us as a serious threat to the peace. Under these circumstances, you should know that we do not believe that South Africa could continue to count on help from the Western powers in any field. You should also be aware of the possibility that the issue may arise in the UN Security Council on short notice with unforeseeable results.

(C) We have this matter under urgent consideration, and will raise with you in the next few days the steps we believe are needed to resolve this issue. However, in the immediate future, we believe it is in your own interest to put these concerns to rest. Assurances, such as those given on August 10 by Van Dalsen, cannot resolve these doubts. Instead, we believe you should find means to prove, in a publicly persuasive way, that you are not developing the Kalahari facility as a nuclear test site, and that your pilot enrichment plant is not and will not be used to produce enriched uranium for any explosive purpose.

4. If asked what the US proposes to do by way of a longer-range resolution, you should indicate only that we would be prepared to consider carefully any suggestions that the SAG may wish to make in the very near future as to how the situation could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

5. Begin FYI: We are consulting in strictest confidence with limited number of allies before deciding on next steps. We would welcome your comments and recommendations both on next steps and longer range strategy. Specifically, we are in touch with French whom we hope will make a parallel demarche. We are repeating to you relevant cable exchange with Embassy Paris.

6. You can expect to receive message authorizing you to proceed on this matter within next twenty-four hours. End FYI.

Vance.

Unquote.

---

5 See footnote 2, above.

6 In telegram 192561 to Paris, August 14, the Department transmitted a letter from Vance to Guiringaud requesting French support for a joint approach to South Africa for an onsite inspection. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–2570)
291. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, August 17, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

4. Israel and South Africa: The Department’s Intelligence Bureau has completed the following analysis on the extent of Israeli-South African cooperation in the field of nuclear weapons development:

“Available information sheds little light on the nature and extent of Israeli involvement in the South African nuclear program, especially in the sensitive enrichment or weapons-related area. Since April, [less than 1 line not declassified] revealed nuclear cooperation between South Africa and Israel, possibly including plans to exchange nuclear-related materials. The nature of the material to be exchanged and the specific recipients could not be determined [less than 1 line not declassified] also revealed exchange visits by nuclear experts, but neither the duration of the visits nor their purpose.

—In April the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) requested a “formal proposal” regarding an “offer” made by the Nuclear Fuel Corporation of South Africa. In the same month, a South African firm was eagerly awaiting “samples” from the Soreg nuclear research center in Israel.

—In early June, a representative of the South African Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) visited Israel for consultations with the IAEC.

—In July, the Israeli Prime Minister’s office made arrangements for CSIR representatives to attend a nuclear-related symposium in Israel.

—[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

—Next week, South African Uranium Company representatives and members of the IAEC are scheduled to meet in Israel.2

These recent contacts between the Israelis and the South Africans presumably follow the arrangement announced during Vorster’s visit to Israel last year, which called for increased cooperation in Science and Technology. In the mid-1960’s, South Africa supplied the Israelis with a small quantity of natural uranium. We have known for some time that Israel and South Africa exchange information on conventional weapons and technology. There has been no hard evidence that they

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 8/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.

2 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin: “Let’s prepare options for future contacts w/Begin re this.”
also cooperate in the area of nuclear weapons development, but this cannot be ruled out.

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]"

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

292. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel

Washington, August 17, 1977, 2043Z

195546. Eyes Only for Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: Israeli-South African Nuclear Cooperation.

1. On August 6, Soviets made oral demarche to U.S. stating that South Africa is completing work on creation of nuclear weapon and that underground testing facility has been built in Kalahari Desert for a weapons test. Similar demarches were made to British, French and Germans. [10 lines not declassified]

2. In passing information on South African nuclear development, Soviets expressed strong concern about possibility of South African nuclear test. We have told Soviets that we have been giving serious attention to South African nuclear activities, that we fully share their concern of preventing a possible nuclear test, and that we have made our deep concerns known to the South African Government. We informed Soviets that we will shortly confer with them.

3. Subsequent to Soviet demarche, TASS released statement linking Israel and NATO with South Africa in manufacture of nuclear arms. Timing of release is undoubtedly related to forthcoming Lagos conference, and press elsewhere has picked up and repeated theme of Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850106–1456. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Arthur A. Houghton (NEA/IAI); cleared by Alfred L. Atherton (NEA), Philip J. Farley (S/AS), Paul H. Kreisberg (S/P), William B. Edmondson (AF), Gerard G. Oplinger (PM), Charles Van Doren (ACDA), Robert Barry (IO/UNP), and Jeffrey R. Siegel (INR/STA); approved by Christopher. Sent for information Immediate to Pretoria.

2 See Document 288.

3 See Document 287. The World Conference for Action Against Apartheid was held in Lagos August 22–26.
4. [5 lines not declassified] (Further information in this connection will be forthcoming through other channels.)\(^4\) [3 lines not declassified]

We expect charges raised by TASS to be subject of considerable hostile attention at Lagos.

5. If Israeli-South African cooperation involves nuclear weapons technology or materiel, it would hold gravest potential consequences for both GOI and USG. Israel would be particularly vulnerable to charge that it had actively aided South African nuclear weapons development in order to obtain additional unsafeguarded natural uranium and in order to test its own weapons capability, thereby raising nuclear spectre both in Middle East and Southern Africa. GOI’s past assertion that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East would, within context of active Israeli-South African nuclear test program, lack meaningful credibility, and incentives for Arabs to develop their own nuclear weapons would become significantly greater.

6. Even without cooperative nuclear arrangement on weapons technology between Israel and South Africa, the mere fact of Israeli-South African contacts in the nuclear field will make it hard for Israel to defend itself against allegations of complicity in a possible South African nuclear weapons program. Israel is particularly vulnerable to such charges, especially in African context, because of its well-known conventional military supply relationship with South Africa. Most immediate problem is how to handle issue at Lagos Conference. Moreover, Lagos may only be the preview for a subsequent UN Security Council debate.

7. You should seek meeting with Evron at earliest opportunity to make following points. You will note that for tactical reasons we have geared this presentation to Lagos Conference. But in course of discussion with Evron; you should make clear that, above and beyond issue of Lagos Conference, should there be any substance to allegations of Israeli-South African collaboration in nuclear weapons field this would be matter of extremely serious concern.

As Israel is aware, Soviets have raised allegations about South African nuclear weapons program. Other countries, NATO and Israel in particular, have been linked in Soviet press with South African nuclear weapons development, and these allegations have been carried in international media. Soviets have also made a more specific charge to us, in private, that the South African Government has developed a facility in the Kalahari Desert for nuclear weapons testing.

---

\(^4\) Not further identified.
We have expressed the gravest concern about this matter to the South African Government and are actively seeking satisfaction that SAG will not test a nuclear device or pursue a nuclear explosives program.5

—Allegations of Israeli-South African nuclear weapons cooperation may be raised at forthcoming Lagos anti-apartheid conference, along with general issue of Israeli-South African cooperation in conventional weapons field. The publicly-announced agreement on scientific cooperation between GOI and SAG reached last year could also fuel suspicions in the current atmosphere created by Soviet public charges.

—We wish to be able to cooperate as closely as possible with the Government of Israel in handling whatever situation may develop in Lagos and subsequently in the UN context. In order to do so, we must be confident that we have received full and complete information from the Government of Israel on the nature of any Israeli/South African cooperation in the nuclear field. We therefore request that the GOI provide us these complete details as urgently as possible. We will of course hold such information closely within USG.

—As GOI can appreciate, subject of possible South African nuclear explosion is of utmost concern to USG and is receiving priority attention at the highest levels.

8. In course of your presentation you should tell Evron that we regard our information [less than 1 line not declassified] very sensitive and request that it be so treated by Israelis.

9. Ambassador Herzog has just informed Jim Leonard that Israel has decided not repeat not to attend the Lagos Conference. We believe this to be a serious tactical error on Israel’s part. Further instructions will follow.

Vance

5 See Document 290.
293. **Interagency Assessment**¹

Washington, August 18, 1977

South Africa: Policy Considerations Regarding a Nuclear Test²

**KEY JUDGMENTS**

1. It is our judgment that the South African government plans to proceed through the various stages of a nuclear weapons program, including the eventual testing of a weapon.

   —We believe that domestic political concerns would argue in favor of testing; and that these concerns weigh more heavily than foreign policy considerations in a decision whether or not to test;
   
   —While we have almost no direct evidence on the attitudes of South Africa’s military leaders toward the advent of a nuclear capability, we think that, on balance, military considerations, too, would argue in favor of testing;
   
   —We do not believe that fear of adverse foreign reaction poses a sufficiently compelling reason for South Africa to avoid a test.

2. Yet we can discern no over-riding pressure on South Africa’s leaders to rush to test a weapon in the immediate future; indeed, we think foreign policy considerations could lead them to adopt a flexible attitude toward its timing;

   —There would be considerable pressure on Vorster within the cabinet to go ahead with a test as scheduled, to project an image of power at home and abroad, and to demonstrate that South Africa is not to be coerced by foreign threats to its security;

   —But Vorster might well be persuaded to delay a test for a short time if there were indications that a major turnaround in U.S. policy toward South Africa was possible, or if he judged that a test could undermine sensitive ongoing negotiations, e.g., on Namibia.

3. While we thus ascribe some flexibility, or “give,” to the South African position regarding the timing of a test, we do not see any circumstances arising which would lead to a termination of their long-standing program to develop a nuclear weapon. We see no credible threat from the West which would be sufficient to deter the South African government from carrying out a test; indeed, threats would, in our judgment, be more likely to harden South African determination.


² This assessment has been coordinated at the working level by representatives of the Intelligence Community. [Footnote is in the original.]
NOTE

This paper examines the political and other non-technical factors bearing of a South African decision to test or not to test a nuclear weapon in the near future. It also addresses specifically the further question, what might induce South Africa to postpone a test?

Because of real current uncertainties regarding the state of South Africa’s test readiness and the availability now of South African-made fissionable material for a test, assumptions on these points have been made to facilitate consideration of political and other aspects. We have assumed that the South Africans, without specific additional foreign assistance or consent, could conduct a nuclear test within a matter of weeks, and that they could continue their nuclear weapons development thereafter without foreign assistance. If South Africa’s test readiness, in fact, depends on receipt of materials from an assisting foreign country, or an acquiescence of that country in a final test decision, another avenue of US counteraction which has not been considered in this paper might become available.

The following assessment is based in part on technical analysis of the program. In the main, however, it reflects the Community’s knowledge of the Afrikaner people and their leaders; their perceptions of themselves and the outside world; and the policy imperatives to which they seem most likely to respond.

DISCUSSION

I. Factors Bearing on the Decision to Test/Not to Test

A. Domestic Politics

1. The ultimate and over-riding concern of the South African government is to ensure the survival of the Afrikaner nation. During its 30-year rule the National Party has accomplished this to the satisfaction of its constituents, primarily by achieving a rapid growth in South African economic and military power, subjugation of the non-white majority, and keeping the levers of political power in Afrikaner hands. Under this system the Afrikaner people (and English-speaking whites as well) not only have survived, but have enjoyed high and rising living standards.

2. In the past couple of years, however, things have not been going nearly so well for the Afrikaners. Their leaders, long prone to see South Africa as fighting a lonely struggle in a hostile and misunderstanding world, have increasingly adopted a siege mentality, driven by such events as:

—the end of Portuguese colonial rule;
—the apparent imminence of majority rule in Rhodesia;
—the growth of world support for the guerrillas operating against South West Africa;
— the collapse of South Africa’s détente policy in southern Africa;
— the broadening condemnation of apartheid by the West;
— the installation of Communist-backed radical regimes in black African states;
— the recent hardening of official U.S. policy toward South Africa.

At home, too, the government has had few, if any, recent successes to demonstrate to its constituents that it is coping effectively with the country’s mounting problems, including:

— continuing serious racial disturbances—the worst in a century;
— a recession that will soon enter its third year;
— the embarrassment of the Angolan intervention;
— sharply rising defense costs;
— growing emigration.

3. Faced with these developments, the testing of a nuclear device would have strong appeal to the Vorster government as a way to restore confidence in the government’s capability to keep the present social system intact without significant change and without major concessions to the black majority.

4. We also note that it is consistent with Vorster’s personality to favor proceeding with nuclear weapons development and to undertake testing. Vorster throughout his career has shown a strong inclination toward actions which project power and toughmindedness and has made no secret of his personal contempt for world opinion directed at influencing his freedom to make South Africa’s decision. This would be an important factor in South African reactions to attempts at forcing Vorster’s government not to test a nuclear device. Additionally, Vorster, who has a great interest in his place in Afrikaner history and who has lamented privately that his achievements in maintaining the status quo are not appreciated, may view development of a South African nuclear capability as a dramatic achievement for which he will be remembered.

B. Military Considerations

5. We are lacking direct evidence on the planned role of nuclear weapons in South African strategy, nor have we direct information on the attitude of South Africa’s military leaders toward the advent of a nuclear capability.

6. Since South Africa, even after a test, would probably still be several years away from a dependable delivery capability, it is our judgment that many in the military would favor going ahead with the testing phase as the next step in the long process of acquiring deliverable nuclear weapons. We further believe that the military would defer to political leaders on the decision whether or not to test, and on the timing of a test. For many South Africans, the rationale for going
ahead in the development of nuclear weapons stems from a fear that ultimately South Africa faces the threat of being invaded by Communist-backed black regimes and perhaps even by Soviet and Cuban forces. Historically, the Afrikaner response to a perceived threat has been to assume the worst and to prepare for it; and we believe that this attitude will be a major factor in Pretoria’s opting to test and continue to develop nuclear weapons.

C. Foreign Policy Considerations

7. We are virtually certain that Vorster is aware that a nuclear test would sooner or later be detected and made known throughout the world. A decision to test must therefore be seen as a conscious decision to defy the world and to increase greatly the risk of bringing on various combinations of censure and sanctions, as well as jeopardizing any sensitive negotiations South Africa might be engaged in at the time.

8. We find this attitude entirely consistent with the defiant, tribally-oriented cast of the Afrikaner world view, which is based on a strong determination to be able to stand alone as a nation and a desire to demonstrate to the outside world that the Afrikaners will not brook outside interference in their affairs. In short, a test would be viewed as projecting an image of Afrikaner power to the world. While some analysts believe that Vorster would feel this drive could be satisfied merely by possessing the capability to test, most think that he would not rest content without the demonstration effect of a test.

9. We note that the approach to the test phase is but one step—albeit a critical one—in South Africa’s long-standing, complex program of weapon development. We therefore see the foreign policy objectives of this program as being more general and long-range. A recognized nuclear weapon capability would, in Vorster’s view:

—break the linkage of the world’s image of South Africa solely as the country of apartheid;
—compel the world to pay attention to South African whites (particularly Afrikaners) as a force which must be taken account of;
—exert pressure on all the parties involved in southern African affairs to give more serious consideration to the interests of South African whites.

10. At the same time we believe that Vorster recognized that international reaction to a test would in all probability weaken the chances for moderate influences to predominate in the Rhodesian and Namibian crises, and perhaps enhance Soviet influence in the area. While this consideration would not be likely to prevent a test, it could lead Vorster to delay a test so long as he still perceived significant advantages to be gained from ongoing negotiations.
D. The Question of Sanctions

11. South Africa’s leaders cannot separate foreign policy concerns from consideration of censure, sanctions, and other punitive measures which other countries might adopt in the wake of—or in anticipation of—a South African nuclear test.

12. We agree that particular sanctions (discussed below) could hurt the South African economy—particularly if they involved participation of all the major industrial countries and a few peripheral ones, e.g., Iran and Israel. It is our judgment, however, that the impact of sanctions, even under the most optimistic assumptions about universality of application, would not be felt for at least a year. It was also pointed out that imposition of financial sanctions might lead South Africa to renounce or cease payments on its outstanding short-term debt to the West, amounting to $3.4 billion.

13. It was noted that South Africa has gone a long way toward achieving its goal of industrial self-sufficiency.

—It has a 2–3 year stockpile of oil;
—It has recently claimed to be 80% self-sufficient in industrial machinery and 66% in transport equipment: its two greatest industrial vulnerabilities in the past.

14. In addition, the Vorster government already has cranked into its plans a judgment about the prospect of sanctions. The 1978 budget, for example, reflects a sharp drop in Western credit and the resulting lack of real economic growth.

15. It is our view—and probably that of the Vorster government—that it would be extremely difficult to get general and effective Western cooperation in economic or financial sanctions, even in the condition of shrill censure of South Africa that would inevitably follow a nuclear test.

16. Based on all the above, it is the consensus that South Africa’s leaders would probably not be deterred from testing a weapon out of concern over the imposition of economic sanctions.

E. The Special Case: South Africa’s Peaceful Nuclear Power

17. A separate but related question is whether South Africa’s leaders would be willing to jeopardize peaceful nuclear development in the interest of testing a weapon. There are two major elements in this development: fuel enrichment, and nuclear power plant construction. South Africa’s dependence in the enrichment case is neither immediate nor great, although the South Africans have been seeking foreign financial and technical aid in its plans to build a much larger plant so as to compete in the world’s market for enriched reactor fuel. In the nuclear power program, however, South Africa is critically dependent on foreign sources of supply, particularly France.
18. The power plant program is an important one, planned to provide eventually on the order of 10% of South Africa’s power needs. These needs could be met from coal-fired plants, but would involve long-distance power transmission and other extra costs.

19. The enrichment program involves South African plans to export by the mid-1980s some $400 million of enriched uranium annually—this would equal four times the value of raw uranium ore exports. While this would be only a small part of total exports (currently running at $8 billion a year), it nonetheless would mean foregoing a sizable piece of foreign exchange earnings.

20. We estimate that sacrificing foreign assistance for these two programs would eliminate nuclear power possibilities for many years and reduce significantly South African participation in the enriched reactor fuel market.

21. Whether this would affect a current decision to test is uncertain. We think it is a better than even chance that the South Africans already have written off U.S. deliveries—which probably are not due until 1980–81—in the light both of the current worsening in their U.S. relations and earlier foot-dragging by the U.S. in delivering components for these two programs.

II. The Timing

22. In spite of our overall judgment that South Africa’s leaders perceive persuasive reasons to continue a nuclear weapon program, including the testing phase and beyond, we do not feel that they are yet under any over-riding pressure to rush to test a weapon in the immediate future. We see this program as having a certain technically-derived calendar or schedule; but this schedule is not unchangeable. There are decision-points along the schedule where Vorster and his inner circle—whom we believe are in close touch with every aspect of the program—have the option of moving ahead, delaying for a short period, or cancelling indefinitely.

23. The relevant question, we believe, is not, “why would they test quickly?”; but rather, under what condition or circumstances would they be induced to delay a test shot?

24. We would stress that Vorster would be under pressure, particularly from the hard-liners within his cabinet, to go ahead with a test on schedule. It is our consensus also that the Afrikaner electorate would not be much impressed by anything short of a test shot; and that the Vorster inner circle would be aware of this need for a demonstration effect. Others, for example his foreign minister, might well argue:

— that there is no urgency to test;
— that a test might not only complicate current negotiations on Namibia, but would make it difficult for those Americans (and Europe-
ans) who are sympathetic to white South Africa’s cause to exert any influence on U.S. and Western policy toward Pretoria.

25. We judge that there is a somewhat better than even chance that South Africa’s leaders would adopt a relatively flexible attitude toward the timing of a test; and that they might be persuaded to delay a scheduled test for a short period if there were indications that a major turnaround in U.S. policy towards South Africa was possible.

26. While we perceive this degree of “give” in the South African position on testing, this give has severe limits.

—We perceive no credible threat which would be sufficient to deter South Africa from carrying out a test; indeed, our reading of the Afrikaner personality suggests that threats would have the opposite effect to that intended;

—We do not foresee any circumstances which would induce South Africa to terminate, or even to postpone for a prolonged or indefinite period, its nuclear weapons program;

—If South Africa were within two to three weeks of a scheduled test, the costs of a prolonged delay and the long lead-time needed before again reaching the test phase would probably be prohibitive.

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom and France and the White House

Washington, August 18, 1977, 2033Z


Quote. Top Secret Pretoria 4211. Subject: Possible South African Nuclear Weapons Program. Ref: (A) State 194980, (B) State 194976.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 8–10/77. Top Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

2 See Document 290.

3 In telegram 194976 to Pretoria, August 17, the Department responded to Botha’s August 16 inquiry about arrangements for a summit on the Anglo-American package for a Rhodesian settlement: “You may tell Botha that meeting would be held in US, specific time cannot be fixed yet. This will depend on what actions South Africa is prepared to take in both the Rhodesian and nuclear questions. In this sense timing is up to them, as meeting will be the final piece to be fitted in if and when other pieces are all in place.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–1275)
1. Pik Botha initially received me alone at 1430. Before getting into the nuclear question, he reviewed his visit to Salisbury and Cuban activities in Angola. Both these points are covered in separate cables.\footnote[4]{In telegram 4213 from Pretoria, August 18, Bowdler reported on Botha’s recent trip to Salisbury. (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770298–1058) In telegram 4212 from Pretoria, August 18, Bowdler reported on Botha’s concerns over Cuban activities in Angola. (National Archives, RG59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770298–1004)} After I made the points contained reftel (A), which he took down verbatim, and registered his initial reaction, he called in Brand Fourie. Meeting ended at 1600.

2. Botha’s initial reaction was one of outrage. He said he was shocked by the “arrogance of the message.” He denounced the demarche as one more indication of how the Carter administration is trying to strangle South Africa. He asked rhetorically what obligation was there for South Africa to subscribe to NPT; what assistance does the West provide South Africa that would be discontinued; what evidence does the US have to support the allegation that the SAG is on the threshold of exploding a nuclear device; why does the US now provide nuclear fuel to India after it went ahead with what SAG is now being accused of doing? This outburst crested with the statement that he would not call Owen about his forthcoming trip to South Africa; he will have nothing further to do with the Rhodesian problem; we will withstand any sanctions imposed against us. At this juncture he called in Fourie.

3. There followed in a calmer mood a discussion of the allegations that the US was trying to strangle South Africa, in which I carefully reviewed the constructive character of our policy as outlined by VP Mondale at Vienna\footnote[5]{See Documents 276 and 278.} and the Secretary in the July 1 speech.\footnote[6]{Vance delivered a speech entitled “The United States and Africa: Building Positive Relations” to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People on July 1. For text of the speech, see Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, August 8, 1977, pp. 165–170.} I then turned the conversation back to the nuclear question. Botha claimed that he knew nothing about the Kalahari facility or plans to detonate a nuclear device. He affirmed that the SAG nuclear activity was designed only for peaceful purposes. Fourie volunteered he was aware of “a Defense Ministry testing range for missiles or cannons or the like,” without indicating any specific locale. He asked whether this was what we had in mind and what evidence we had to support our concerns. At this point I asked specifically what I might tell my government about the matter of a possible detonation of a nuclear device. Fourie replied—and Botha concurred—as follows: “We deny and object to the allegations contained in your presentation and ask...
for proof of the assertion.” They coupled this with an indication that they wished to speak to the PM and “others” about this question, again emphasizing that the US should furnish what evidence it has.

4. At the conclusion of the discussion of the nuclear matter, I conveyed the message contained in reftel (B). Botha took careful note but gave no reaction.

5. Comment: What Botha authorized me to convey to the Department would appear to constitute a denial that the SAG is preparing to explode a nuclear device. The umbrage displayed at the demarche may be sincere, but we need more evidence. I would have been more reassured, for example, if they had specifically identified the Kalahari site as a conventional weapon testing area. Can we provide the more specific information they requested as a means of obtaining:

(A) Reaffirmation of the denial after they have had a chance to consult the PM and “others;”

(B) Access to the Kalahari site by technically competent people from the IAEA in whom we have confidence (SAG is probably more likely to accept inspection by neutral body than by what they regard as the accuser).

6. I will be sending tomorrow my views on further next steps and longer range strategy.

Bowdler

Unquote.

Vance
295. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in South Africa, France, and the United Kingdom**

Washington, August 19, 1977, 0106Z


1. Report in ref tel B has been reviewed at highest levels. Notwithstanding its preliminary nature and possibility that it may be followed up with more considered SAG response, given its negative thrust and the need for positive U.S. action prior to upcoming Lagos Conference we have decided that further intervention is required now. Therefore, please deliver following message from the Secretary to Foreign Minister Botha.

2. Begin text:

Dear Mr. Minister:

President Carter and I have been closely following the dialogue between our governments concerning allegations of a nuclear weapons program in South Africa. Ambassador Bowdler has already conveyed to you the nature of our concerns.

In your conversation with him, you asked to be provided with the evidence that had led us to express doubts about the purposes of the Kalahari facility. Our experts have concluded, on the basis of experience with analogous installations, that the most likely purpose of a facility—like the one in the Kalahari—is to conduct underground tests of nuclear explosive devices.

The facility that concerns us is located in the southern part of the Kalahari desert, about 100 km south of Botswana and 145 km east of Namibia at approximately 27–45 S, 21–27 E. It consists of:

(A) A drill rig and associated facilities;
(B) A square lattice tower in a cleared area enclosed by a wall, about 1 km from the drill rig;
(C) An area, about 3 km from the square tower, containing a pad; this area is connected to the tower area by power or communications lines;

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083-0351. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Tarnoff.

2 See Document 290.

3 See Document 294.

4 See footnote 3, Document 285.
(D) A secured housing area 15 km from the tower area, containing approximately ten buildings;

(E) A hard-surface airstrip approximately 1,600 meters long and 3 km from the housing area. In addition, the entire area is surrounded by an outer patrol road.

We are prepared to show you photographs from which this data is derived.

I believe the only way to resolve existing doubts is to permit a prompt visit by a small U.S. technical team to inspect the location in the Kalahari desert, which we have identified as a possible nuclear test site. I believe that it is in both of our governments’ interest that this visit take place no later than Sunday, August 21, before the start of the Lagos Conference, where some will seek to exploit politically, to our mutual disadvantage, the uncertainties raised publicly by South Africa’s nuclear activities. Our experts are prepared to leave for South Africa at a very short notice.

I hope that with your government’s cooperation we can quickly put this matter to rest.

Sincerely,

Cyrus Vance. End text.

3. For Paris: Ambassador should convey substance of ref tel B (being repeated septel) to Soutou and provide him a copy of the above text. You should note that we have given careful consideration to Giscard’s concerns that the precedent of demanding an inspection might be cited against us elsewhere. On balance, we have concluded that urgency of the situation demands that we ask for an inspection privately, without public fanfare. You should indicate that we would welcome a parallel approach by the GOF and would also welcome possible French participation if the SAG does invite an inspection team.

4. For London: Ambassador should convey to FCO gist of South African reaction to our demarche (ref tel B), indicate U.S. Ambassador has been instructed to approach SAG with message from Secretary to Foreign Minister, and provide text (2 above). U.K., may find it useful in formulating its own demarche.

Vance
Pretoria, August 19, 1977, 1536Z


1. I delivered the Secretary’s letter to Pik Botha to Brand Fourie at 1400. After reading it he said he thought the location described coincided with the testing site he had mentioned yesterday. To make sure, he placed a phone call. Forty minutes later the person contacted called to confirm that this was a “military testing facility.” I asked Fourie if he could be more specific about the nature of the testing going on at the facility. He thought that missile testing was involved but preferred to consult with military authorities concerned before attempting to characterize the site. 

2. Noting the urgency attached to the sending of a small US technical team, I asked whether I could expect a response within the next twenty-four hours. Fourie replied that with the PM out of town and given the need to consult military authorities because a military installation is involved, he doubted whether a response would be forthcoming until early next week. I pointed out the Secretary’s statement that it is in the interest of both governments that the visit take place no later than Sunday, August 21. He nodded but made no further comment. 

3. Atmosphere today was cordial and relaxed. I asked Fourie whether Botha had called Owen on the Rhodesian question and he said he had. 

4. Department pass London and Paris as appropriate.

Bowdler

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0358. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See Document 295.
3 In telegram 4222 from Pretoria, August 19, the Embassy reported that the French Ambassador had made his démarche to Fourie the day before: “Fourie, he said, had taken line that all of South Africa’s nuclear activity was for peaceful purposes. Fourie also asked for evidence but did not offer denial given me.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0349)
4 See Document 294.
297. **Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts**

Washington, August 20, 1977, 1535Z


1. While we believe it useful for SAG to allow our technical team to inspect Kalahari site by August 21, we do not wish press SAG into intransigent position on this point given difficulty of time factor. We are therefore prepared accept certain assurances from them if made in proper terms. Accordingly, you are instructed to see Fourie urgently and make following points to be conveyed immediately to Botha and Vorster in Cape Town.

   A. In view of both the urgency and importance of this matter and the limited time available to us, we will at this time take South Africa’s word concerning its nuclear program. In that connection, we would appreciate receiving their affirmation, to be made public if necessary, as follows:

   B. First, that South Africa does not have or intend to develop nuclear explosives for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise.

   C. Second, that the Kalahari facility we have described to them is not a testing facility for nuclear explosives.

   D. Third, that there will be no nuclear explosive testing of any kind in South Africa.

   E. The SAG will appreciate that our ability to forestall or moderate expected demands for international action on this matter will depend on the degree to which the SAG can provide such affirmations. Given the problems that are likely to arise, the most effective way of defusing the matter would be for South Africa to declare publicly its intention to adhere to the NPT and place all of its nuclear facilities under full

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 107, 8/16–20/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Bonn, Paris, London, Lagos, and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Edmondson and Habib; approved by Habib. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

2 See Document 295.

3 See Document 296.
international safeguards. We envision problems both at Lagos and in the UN.

2. Should Fourie volunteer SAG willingness to invite on-site inspection, you should note that we have a team ready for a special flight to SA, but add that in view of the urgent international concern we would ask them to provide the affirmations outlined in subparas B, C, and D above.

3. If Fourie says inspection may proceed, notify us by Flash and we will provide necessary data for overflight and landing clearances including names and background of inspection team.

Vance

Unquote.

Christopher

298. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House

Washington, August 20, 1977, 1716Z

199024. For Dr Brzezinski only. Fol rpt Pretoria 4238 sent Action SecState dtd 20 Aug 77.

Quote: Secret Pretoria 4238. Subject: Possible South African Nuclear Weapons Program. Ref: State 198014.²

1. I saw Brand Fourie at 10:00 and made the points contained ref tel.

2. He said he could not get through to Vorster and Botha until after the caucus morning session in Cape Town, but would be sure to do so then. He was not certain how fast he could get me an answer. There are policy questions involved, he noted, and did not know how long it would take the PM to touch the necessary bases. Looking over the three affirmations requested, he expressed a personal opinion that at least some of them could be made without difficulty. He regretted that this matter had come up over a weekend when all the principal policy makers were out of town concentrating on another issue of vital importance to South Africa. He understood the problem we face at Lagos and the UN and wants to be helpful.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 8–10/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 297.
3. Fourie expressed no willingness to invite an on-site inspection of the Kalahari site. During our brief conversation he again noted that this was a secret military installation requiring the approval of military authorities. He expressed the view that “Our military no more wants foreigners prying around their secret installation than yours do.”

4. Speaking of the longer term picture, Fourie expressed concern that US-SA nuclear cooperation had fallen off during the past 3–4 years. If this cooperation had remained high, he observed, the present misunderstanding might not have arisen. Prefacing his next remarks with the observation that he was not suggesting bargaining or horsetrading, he said that it would help a great deal if the US and SA could discuss South Africa’s nuclear fuel requirements and reach some kind of an understanding. As long as you try to cut us off, he added, you must expect that we will search for other ways to satisfy our needs.

5. Fourie and I have coordinated our weekend programs so that we can expedite sending response as soon as received from Cape Town.

6. Dept pass to Bonn, London and Paris as appropriate.

Bowdler

Unquote.

Christopher

299. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, August 20, 1977

South Africa. Ambassador Bowdler called us from Pretoria this afternoon to say that he had just had a cryptic telephone call from Pik Botha’s deputy, Brand Fourie, in which Fourie said, in effect, there was no problem with the three affirmations Bowdler had asked for when they met earlier in the day. He also said that he thought there would be an opportunity to say something public early next week. The affirmations we requested are:

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 8/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote “Warren. J.” in the upper right-hand corner. Vance was in Beijing for meetings with Chairman Hua, Foreign Minister Huang, and senior Chinese officials August 20–26.

2 See Document 297
—That South Africa does not have or intend to develop nuclear explosives for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise.
—That the Kalahari facility we have described to them is not a testing facility for nuclear explosives.
—That there will be no nuclear explosive testing of any kind in South Africa.

In his meeting with Fourie, Bowdler also told him that the most effective way to defuse this matter would be for South Africa to declare publicly its intention to adhere to the NPT and place all of its nuclear facilities under full international safeguards. In the subsequent telephone call, Fourie said he wanted to talk to Bowdler about this point tomorrow.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

3 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this sentence: “good C.”

300. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance and the White House

Washington, August 22, 1977, 1512Z

Tosec 90049/199187. White House Eyes Only for Brzezinski. Foll rpt Tel Aviv 6228 sent Action SecState dtd 22 Aug 77.
Quote: Secret Tel Aviv 6228. Subject: Israeli-South African Nuclear Cooperation. Ref: Tel Aviv 6215.

1. Prime Minister Begin asked Evron to relay to me this morning, August 22, the following response to our urgent query:

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 64, PRC 032, 8/25/77, S. Africa Nuclear Threat. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted and approved by Wisner. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770005–0242)

2 In telegram 6215 from Tel Aviv, August 22, the Embassy reported that the talking points in telegram 195546 to Tel Aviv, August 17, had been delivered to Evron on Sunday morning: “I also made clear that issue went well beyond impending difficulties at Lagos Conference, and that any actual collaboration in nuclear weapons field would pose extremely serious issue for US. Evron promised to obtain response for us on an urgent basis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0076)
2. Quote: The Government of Israel has never had any contacts with the South African Government, nor has there ever been any cooperation with South Africa regarding the development, and/or the production, of nuclear weapons. End quote.

3. Department please repeat this message to the Secretary.

Lewis

Unquote.

Christopher

301. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
South African Nuclear Threat

The South African reply to our initial demarche, was a mixture of outrage, denial, a demand to know on what evidence we base our allegations. A small door was left open in the form of Botha’s promise to speak to Vorster.

At a meeting of the Special Action Group on South Africa this afternoon, the following immediate strategy was decided upon:

—Our primary aim must be to get as much information about what the South Africans are really doing, as soon as possible, and before the Lagos Conference where this will be a key issue.

—This should take the form of a demand for an on-site inspection of the Kalahari site. The inspection would be carried out unilaterally by the U.S., if necessary, but preferably with the French. We will not however wait for the French. It was judged useless to try to get IAEA

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 115, South Africa: Nuclear Issues: 5–8/77. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The SAG meeting on Africa was held August 23. Carter wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Zbig—what we want is: no test—If they have to lie about what their plans were, let them do so—Let them save face. J.C.”

2 See Document 294.

3 Carter wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “no—Assure no test.”

4 Carter wrote “no” in the left-hand margin next to this sentence.
participation. ERDA is putting together a two-man team of experts who will be ready to leave tomorrow.

—Cables are to be sent to the British, French, and West Germans informing them of our current actions and of the possibility that we may want to call an emergency meeting of the London Suppliers Group (to apply nuclear sanctions).

—An effort will be made to engage the Soviets in the context of the Suppliers Group; the exact form of the demarche is not yet clear, but it will most likely be a Vance-Dobrynin meeting tomorrow.

—Ambassador Lewis’ appointment to inform and warn the Israelis was cancelled by Vance because of the settlements issue. Lewis should be told to go ahead as soon as possible. We will have a much worse problem if any Israeli activities are revealed at the test site.

5 The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multinational organization concerned with nuclear weapons proliferation. It is often referred to as the London Suppliers Group after a series of meetings held in London from 1975 to 1978 resulted in agreements on the export of non-weapons specific nuclear technology.

302. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, August 23, 1977, 0308Z

200246. Subject: Dobrynin Informed About South African Assurances.

1. I called in Dobrynin August 22 and gave him the following oral statement regarding the South African nuclear problem:

(Begin text)

Against the background of the exchange of correspondence between President Brezhnev and President Carter, we want your government to know about the results thus far of our discussions with the South African Government on the question of nuclear testing.

It is our firm determination to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives anywhere in the world, and we would view with the gravest

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0450. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Mark J. Garrison (EUR/SOV); cleared in S/S; approved by Christopher.
concern the introduction of nuclear explosives into the already tense situation in Southern Africa.

In this context, we have sought and received firm assurances from the South African Government to the following effect:2

(1) South Africa does not have or intend to develop nuclear explosives for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise;

(2) That there will be no nuclear explosive testing of any kind in South Africa.

While we believe these assurances are important as a first step, longer range measures are also important. We will intensify our efforts to persuade the South African Government to place all its nuclear facilities under full international safeguards and to declare its intention to sign the NPT.

(End text)

2. Dobrynin commented that the assurances were a first step in the right direction.

Christopher

---

2 See Document 299.

---

303. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts1

Washington, August 24, 1977, 1414Z

200985. Lagos for Amb Young, USUN for Amb Leonard, White House only for Dr Brzezinski. Following repeat State 200985 Action Tel Aviv Info Secretary Aug 23.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 108, 8/21–31/77. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to London, Paris, Lagos, Pretoria, USUN, and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Nicholas Veliotes (NEA); cleared by Atherton, Nye, and Kreisberg; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840072–2645)
Quote Secret State Tosec 90097/200985. Subject: Israeli-South African Nuclear Cooperation. Ref: A—State 195546; 2 B—Tel Aviv 6228.3

1. Please seek meeting with Evron at earliest opportunity to thank him for Begin’s message in ref B. Unfortunately, the use of the term “weapons” in Begin’s statement introduces an important ambiguity. Therefore, we would like clarification that GOI assurances include cooperation regarding any nuclear explosives, including peaceful nuclear explosives, and the technology and/or materials that could contribute to such explosives. Furthermore, in addition to any possible direct Israeli Government cooperation, we would like these broader assurances to cover any private Israeli firms.

2. In addition, we would still appreciate full and complete information from GOI on the nature of Israeli/South African cooperation in the nuclear field (para 7, State reftel).

3. FYI. We have approached South Africans and they have given us assurances that they do not intend to develop nuclear explosives, and that Kalahari is not a test facility for nuclear explosions. We are still in process of considering possible next steps and this exchange does not rpt not obviate need for info requested from Israelis. We can expect this issue to be with us for some time, in addition, we are sending you septel certain relevant paragraphs of recent domestic legislation.

4. We have not raised subject with Israeli Embassy and do not plan to.

Christopher

Unquote.

Christopher

---

2 See Document 292.
3 See Document 300.
304. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance and Multiple Diplomatic Posts

Washington, August 24, 1977, 2137Z

Tosec 90129/202215. USUN for Amb Leonard, Lagos for Amb Young, White House Eyes Only for Brzezinski. Fol rpt Tel Aviv 6330 Action SecState 24 Aug 77.


1. I saw Evron August 24, thanked him for Begin’s response, and asked for additional clarification as instructed in ref tel. I gave him exact text of inquiry as stated in para one and two of ref tel. Evron said that of course Begin was leaving tomorrow for Romania and he was not sure he could get a response until after his return. I said I understood, but asked whether he could not at least have some word with Begin today so that the Prime Minister could give the necessary policy direction for the information to be prepared. Evron said he would try to do so.

2. Evron conveyed to me this afternoon the following: Quote: The Prime Minister has asked me to reiterate to you his previous statement that his government has no contact nor has it ever cooperated with the Government of South Africa in developing or producing nuclear weapons. In reply to your inquiry of today, the Prime Minister has instructed me to inform you that his government does not cooperate with South Africa in the production of nuclear explosives of any kind, nor are we aware of any Israeli private firm which is active in this field. End quote.

3. I pointed out to Evron that this statement, while very helpful, did not answer the question again posed in para two of ref tel concerning broader Israeli-South African cooperation in the nuclear field. Evron said that he had given me the total response conveyed to him by the Prime Minister. He suggested that I could of course pursue the matter further with Foreign Minister Dayan in Begin’s absence if I wished.

4. Comment: This has been a cool and careful exchange. I think we have gotten the explicit assurances we are seeking with respect to

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 108, 8/21–31/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to USUN, Lagos, Paris, Bonn, Pretoria, London, and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted and approved by Wisner. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770005-0339)

2 See Document 303.

3 See Document 300.
weapons cooperation and nuclear explosives in general, but it is now clear to me that this is all we will get with regard to the nuclear field unless I take the issue up directly with the Prime Minister. If I am to do so, I think I will need some more talking points which provide a persuasive rationale for our pressing the point. (In this connection, the further information which was promised to be forthcoming through other channels in para four of State 195546 has not yet arrived in Tel Aviv.) I appreciate having the relevant paras of recent legislation contained in State 201049, and can, of course, draw on these if instructed to do so. However, I think we need to have a somewhat franker and less threatening tone to the presentation if one is to be made to Begin, in light of the assurances he has already given us, if we are to elicit more details about the aspects of their collaboration with South Africa which do not touch directly on weapons or explosives. I am quite ready to go back to bat on this again, but let us be sure of what we really need to learn and be careful of the way we argue our requirement.

5. Department please repeat this message to the Secretary.

Unquote

Christopher

---

4 See Document 292.

5 In telegram 201049 to Tel Aviv, August 23, the Department transmitted sections of the Foreign Assistance Act relating to nuclear transfers. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770304–1299)
305. Memorandum From Henry Richardson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)\(^1\)

Washington, August 30, 1977

SUBJECT
South Africa as Possibly Practicing an International Boycott Under US Law

The 1976 Tax Reform Act obliges Treasury to maintain a list, updated quarterly, of all countries which, under a very confused statutory definition, are designated as practicing an international boycott. The consequences of such a designation are, generally, public notification as such, plus administrative measures taken by Treasury against companies doing business in that country to diminish their write-offs for taxes paid to the latter. Treasury has raised the possibility that the statutory definition might fit South Africa’s refusal to put blacks in managerial positions. They have requested our input whether as a matter of policy South Africa ought to be included on such a list; theirs is the final responsibility.

The balance of opinion among lawyers in both Treasury and State is that while South Africa could theoretically and technically fit under the statutory definition, such an application would probably be subsequently overturned in court, because of the relatively clear Congressional intent to apply the Act against Arab countries conducting anti-Israel boycotts. Therefore, they advise against placing South Africa on the list.

The question for us is whether this statute, in its application to South Africa, could be added to the South African “hit list” as yet another option available to the President for action if and when appropriate. I am inclined against this strategy because of the uncertainty of its holding up in court,\(^2\) because other measures spelled out on the hit list are more certain of application, because of the fairly loud splash among US corporate interests that such a designation would make, and because of the relatively harsh signal that would be sent to South Africa at this, an inappropriate, time. Deal concurs in this reasoning.

Therefore, unless you object, I intend to inform Treasury by phone tomorrow (August 31) that it would be preferable were South Africa

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 7–8/77. Confidential. Sent for information. A copy was sent to Tim Deal of the NSC Staff.

\(^2\) Aaron underlined this sentence up to “court,” and wrote in the left-hand margin: “Just as well.”

not placed on the list.\(^3\) I am also requesting a more complete written legal opinion on this matter from State.\(^4\) Since the list is reviewed quarterly, and since the inclusion or exclusion of a particular country is not binding as a precedent from quarter to quarter, there will be opportunity to review this issue if necessary.\(^5\)

\(^3\) Aaron underlined “that it would be preferable were South Africa not placed on the list,” and drew a line connecting the sentence to his note below: “let’s finesse it for a while keep the option open and on our own private ‘hit’ list!!”

\(^4\) Aaron underlined “requesting a more complete written legal opinion on this matter from State,” and drew a line connecting the sentence to his note below: “use this excuse to keep it open.”

\(^5\) Aaron wrote “No” in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.

---

306. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance\(^1\)

Washington, September 6, 1977

SUBJECT

South Africa

The President has approved the following steps to be taken in regard to the South African nuclear situation:

1. A demarche urging the SAG to: (1) make an immediate commitment to the NPT including a formal public statement of intent; and (2) to unilaterally submit the Valindaba enrichment plant to IAEA safeguards as an immediate interim measure. The demarche is to be made by Gerry Smith to Ambassador Sole in Washington.\(^2\) Once the groundwork has been laid, a team of proliferation experts will visit South Africa for detailed discussions and a possible visit to Valindaba.

2. Make clear that we will continue to monitor the Kalahari site and that we will view with the utmost gravity any activity there which appears to be inconsistent with previous assurances.

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 9/77. Secret.

\(^2\) See Document 309.
3. If our conditions are met, the US would agree to supply low-enriched fuel for the two French reactors.

4. For the present, the US will not agree to supply highly-enriched uranium under any conditions. The President wishes to see solid evidence of the SAG’s willingness to cooperate before any commitment is made for further supply of weapons-grade material.

5. Regarding the export of equipment for enrichment plants, the President requests that a paper be prepared explaining what items would be considered “non-sensitive” in this context, and analyzing whether the proposal made in the Department’s Strategy Paper\(^3\) is consistent with the Administration’s overall non-proliferation policy. Pending a further Presidential decision, the US position shall be non-committal if this issue is raised by the SAG.

6. The various approaches to Paris, London, Bonn, Moscow, Ottawa and Tokyo outlined in the Strategy Paper are approved. The President also directs that Lagos be kept informed.

7. If negotiations with the SAG appear promising, immediate consultations with members of Congress are to be undertaken concerning future nuclear cooperation with South Africa.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

\(^3\) Reference is to an undated document entitled “Strategy Paper: Next Steps on South African Nuclear Issue,” in which the Department recommended: “If raised by the SAG, we should remain non-committal on revising our present restrictions on exports of equipment for South Africa’s enrichment plant, consistent with our general policy of not contributing to the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. If pressed, we should indicate our readiness to consider on a case-by-case basis certain non-sensitive transfers.” (Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 64, PRC 032, 8/25/77, S. Africa Nuclear Threat)
307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa and the White House

Washington, September 13, 1977, 0412Z

218572. Subject: South African Nuclear Assurances. Refs: (A) State 215867; (B) Paris 26349; (C) Pretoria 4683.

1. As you know from ref (A) the President has approved further steps to obtain tangible action by the SAG to supplement its verbal assurances of peaceful nuclear intentions. Assistant Secretary Moose will be calling in SAG Ambassador here early this week to receive a démarche from Ambassador Gerard Smith urging South Africa to (1) make an immediate commitment to the NPT including a formal public statement of intent; and (2) unilaterally submit the Valindaba Plant to IAEA safeguards as an interim measure.

2. If our conditions are met, the US would agree to supply LEU for the Koeburg reactors. However, for the present, US will not agree to supply HEU under any conditions. Before any commitment is made for further supply of HEU, the President wishes to see solid evidence of the SAG’s willingness to cooperate.

3. We have informed the French of our approach and asked them to support it, if possible by a parallel démarche indicating the difficulty they would face in supplying the Koeburg reactors if South Africa fails to accept and implement our package. While they will find it difficult to associate themselves directly with the NPT aspect of our démarche, ref (B) indicates they may support the overall approach.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 108, 9/1-4/77. Secret; Sensitive; Niat Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by McCormick (AF/S); cleared by Moose, Petterson, Locke, Kelley (S/AS), Kahan, Nyce, Williamson, and Edmondson; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840070-0329)

2 In telegram 215867 to Paris, September 9, the Department shared the démarche Gerard Smith made to South African Ambassador Sole and instructed the Embassy to seek French support for the U.S. approach and a parallel démarche to the South African Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0887)

3 In telegram 26349 from Paris, September 10, the Embassy informed the Department that Quai Political Director De Laboulaye was briefed on September 9: “De Laboulaye gave no indication of substantive problem with our request for parallel support and said he would try to give us the GOF response on Monday.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840086-2508)

4 In telegram 4683 from Pretoria, September 10, the Embassy expressed concern that the South African Government would not meet U.S. demands without a commitment to supply fuel for the Safari I reactor. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840090-2351)
4. We are also informing London and Bonn and seeking reiteration of their demarches on the NPT and the need for Valindaba safeguards. We plan to inform Moscow of our approach at about the time it is made. We will also keep the Canadians, Japanese and Nigerians informed.

5. Text of current draft of aide-memoire which Ambassador Smith will be presenting in Washington follows. Request your views on whether it would be desirable for you to make a simultaneous approach in Pretoria in the form of a letter to Botha from the Secretary noting our appreciation for the three assurances given by Prime Minister Vorster and mentioning that Ambassador Smith will be talking with Sole regarding our specific concerns.

6. Text: Quote The United States welcomes the three assurances given by the Prime Minister of South Africa on August 24 as an important contribution to reassuring the international community that South Africa is not considering the acquisition or development of nuclear explosives.

7. Quote The United States notes that the Prime Minister further stated on August 24 that he was willing to discuss the accession of South Africa to the Nonproliferation Treaty. In this connection, the United States wishes to cooperate with the Government of South Africa to resolve questions that recently arose over South Africa’s nuclear intentions and to offset world uncertainty on this issue and the effects of Soviet propaganda.

8. Quote To build on the good beginning that South Africa has made, the United States urges the Government of South Africa promptly to make a public statement of its intent to adhere to the Nonproliferation Treaty and take the steps necessary for accession at the earliest opportunity.

9. Quote The United States believes that adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty will serve the interests of South Africa as well as provide vital reassurances to the international community of South Africa’s commitment exclusively to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

10. Quote Notwithstanding that important action, we believe international concern will persist if some international inspection of the Valindaba enrichment plant does not speedily commence. Pending development of safeguard arrangements pursuant to the NPT, the United States urges South Africa promptly to arrange for interim international safeguards at Valindaba. Immediately following a South African request for interim international safeguards, we would be prepared, if desired, to send qualified technical personnel to work with South African and IAEA personnel in devising procedures for effective safeguards, and, if IAEA is not prepared to conduct an inspection of Valindaba at that time, to assist in making other appropriate arrangements for that purpose. The United States understands South Africa’s concern...
for the protection of proprietary information relating to its enrichment process. We are prepared to discuss any realistic arrangement to meet this concern, but are convinced that urgent action is necessary.

11. Quote The United States will continue to review the situation, including the status of the Kalahari site. We are concerned about continuing activities at that site. The United States will view with the utmost gravity any activity which appears to be inconsistent with previous assurances.

12. Quote The United States considers that the steps outlined above are necessary to allay the serious international concern that has arisen over South Africa’s nuclear intentions and would allow the United States to supply low-enriched uranium fuel for the two power reactors under contract from France. End quote.

13. Re points in ref C., we have decided for tactical reasons not to attempt direct response to questions Vorster listed in August 24 speech\(^5\) as we are unable at this time to give SAG satisfaction on any of these except for supply of low-enriched uranium (assuming our conditions are met) and will have to respond negatively if SAG insists on having highly enriched (weapons grade) uranium. See para 2 above.

Vance

---

\(^5\) In telegram 4369 from Pretoria, August 25, the Embassy transmitted the text of Vorster’s August 24 speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770307–0898)
221539. For Dr Brzezinski only. Following repeat Pretoria 4813 Action SecState dtd 9/15/77.

Quote Secret Pretoria 4813. Subject: South African Nuclear Assurances. Ref: (A) State 221176, (B) Pretoria 4736, (C) State 218572.

1. I delivered Secretary’s letter and aide-memoire to Pik Botha at 4 p.m. local time. After learning of subject of my visit, he immediately called in Brand Fourie. The 45 minutes which followed proceeded on two planes: (A) The nuclear issue, and (B) the deteriorating state of US-South African relations.

2. Botha’s attitude toward the aide-memoire was that it was “disappointing” and made him “very unhappy.” He said the PM in his August 24 speech had proposed a discussion of a variety of issues: NPT, safeguards, Safari I, Koeberg and problems relating to IAEA. Now instead of expressing a willingness to enter into discussions as equals, Botha said, you send us an aide-memoire telling us what is good for us, threatening us further on the Kalahari site and ending up by saying that if we do a series of things, this would allow you to supply LEU for Koeberg. This is a super power telling a small power what to do and it is not acceptable to us. We are a sovereign state, richly endowed

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 8–10/77. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Perito. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770005–0688)

2 In telegram 221176 to Pretoria, September 15, the Department instructed the Embassy to “deliver immediately to Botha, or in his absence and at your discretion Fourie,” the aide mémoire and message from Vance to Botha. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 108, 9/15–22/77)

3 In telegram 4736 from Pretoria, September 13, the Embassy provided a draft text for a proposed letter from Vance to Botha: “Dear Pik: President Carter has asked that I convey our appreciation for the assurances given by Prime Minister Vorster regarding South Africa’s peaceful nuclear intentions. That action was an important beginning in reassuring the international community over the aims of South Africa’s programs in the nuclear field. Following up on the Prime Minister’s public statement on August 24, I think that it would be in our mutual interest to work together to deal with the remaining concerns surrounding South Africa’s nuclear plans. With this in mind, I would like you to know that Ambassador Gerard C. Smith will be contacting Ambassador Sole in Washington during the course of this week about consolidating the positive effect of the Prime Minister’s assurances. I trust that Ambassador Smith’s proposals will be given the most serious attention by your government. Sincerely, Cy.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1802) The letter was sent as drafted.

4 See Document 307.

and capable of defending our borders. We determine for ourselves what is good for us. Our PM has made a serious, balanced proposal to sit down and talk about various key aspects of the nuclear issue and you have ignored this in favor of telling us what to do.

3. Both Botha and Fourie spent considerable time attacking our stand on the Kalahari site. Both led off asking why we had thrown in the Kalahari issue. The PM had given all the necessary assurances. South Africa’s word was now being impugned. He objected to overflights with satellites and high altitude aircraft. He did not think this is legal and will eventually want to come back to us on this “unlawful spying activity.” Fourie said that we should know that the drilling at Kalahari will continue. Five holes have so far been sunk and in the months ahead our spy satellite will see them drilling seven more. He suggested we save our money because the pictures would not show anything inconsistent with South Africa’s assurances. Botha added that no nuclear material has been introduced into those holes or come near the site.

4. Regarding our relations, Botha repeated the same themes covered in our first conversation on Kalahari (Pretoria 4211). He regarded the aide-memoire as another effort to beat South Africa into submission. He claimed to have information that we had consulted our Embassies about the impact of cutting off oil to South Africa. Now you try to lay down the line we should follow on our nuclear policy. “If you persist in this course, then I see grave consequences for our relations.”

5. I tried to explain the mutual interest represented by our approach. I again stressed that our representation on Kalahari was not designed to strangle SA (as he claimed) but a move consistent with our world-wide policy to prevent the proliferation of nuclear capacity. I reviewed the advantages for South Africa in signing NPT and agreeing to safeguards. I again went over the importance of working together on Rhodesia and Namibia and taking meaningful action on full participation on the domestic front. He brushed all these arguments aside, repeating the earlier point that we had not addressed ourselves to the PM’s specific proposal for discussions on an equal basis.

6. In conclusion I said I assumed they would want to study the aide-memoire in the light of the Smith-Moose-Sole conversation. Botha observed that Sole is uninstructed and is not familiar with the subject. He stated that I should consider what he had told me as the reply. If there were any further comments they wished to make, they would call me in.

---

6 See Document 294.
7. My reading is that Botha will have little more to say. I do not anticipate a shift to a more forthcoming attitude. Their response to fuel for Koeberg was that if they saw some way of avoiding the 200 million rand penalty clause, they would drop the project right away and have told the French so. Further, they challenged me on why fuel for Safari I was not included. I told them I was uninstructed. I believe the only way we might break out of this impasse is through a meeting between Ambassador Smith and appropriate SAG officials like Dr. Roux and Brand Fourie. Perhaps this can be arranged privately somewhere in Europe for at least an exploratory round of talks even though the prospects are not encouraging.

Bowdler
Unquote.

Vance

309. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, September 15, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

4. South African Nuclear. Gerard Smith presented to South African Ambassador Sole our Aide Memoire which urges (1) South African accession to the Non-proliferation Treaty, (2) prompt international inspection of the Valindaba enrichment plant, and (3) expresses our concern over continuing activities at the Kalahari site. In Pretoria, Ambassador Bowdler presented our Aide Memoire to Foreign Minister Botha.

The South African reply was extremely sharp. Botha said Prime Minister Vorster had proposed serious discussions between equals and, instead of accepting that invitation, the US responded with threats as to Kalahari and conditions on LEU supply. Botha told Bowdler our message was unacceptable, saying the Aide Memoire was another effort

---

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 9/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote “Cy” at the top of the first page.


3 See Document 308.
to beat South Africa into submission. “If you persist in this course, then I see grave consequences for our relations,” Botha said. Bowdler was told the drilling at Kalahari will continue; five holes have been dug and they will drill seven more in the months ahead. No nuclear material has been introduced into the holes or come near the site, Botha said. Botha brushed aside Bowdler’s arguments that our move was consistent with our worldwide non-proliferation policy and that there were advantages to working together on NPT accession and IAEA safeguards. Botha concluded by stating his words to Bowdler constituted South Africa’s reply to our demarche. Bowdler does not anticipate a more forthcoming attitude.

While we cannot underestimate the nature of the initial South African response, we have found such bombast typical of their negotiating tactics. We will prepare for you recommendations on next steps.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

310. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, October 4, 1977, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT
Talks between President Carter and President Samora Machel of Mozambique

PARTICIPANTS FOR THE US:
The President
The Secretary of State
Dr. Brzezinski
Ambassador Andrew Young
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Richard Moose
Ambassador Willard DePree
Jerrold Schecter, NSC Staff
Henry Richardson, NSC Staff (notetaker)

PARTICIPANTS FOR MOZAMBIQUE:
President Machel
Foreign Minister Joachim Chissano
Special Assistant to the President, Sergio Viera
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Jose Carlos Lobo

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 10/1–5/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the President’s suite at the UN Plaza Hotel. Carter was in New York October 4–5 for the 32nd United Nations General Assembly meeting.
The President and Machel exchanged pleasantries during the press opportunity.

_The President:_ I enjoyed your response at the luncheon; it was much better than my speech.

_Machel:_ But your speech was most important. You had to give your speech originally so that I could follow it.

(The Press departed)

_The President:_ You were wise and correct when you said that we are in a position to understand racism, poverty and a host of similar problems. We have made progress in the United States. We cannot live on pride alone, though we are proud of our country. But we still have hunger, many of our people still need medical treatment, we still have needs in the field of education, and too many of our people are still out of work. Although we are the most powerful and wealthy country, we still have improvements to make.

And, it is important to us to improve relations between Mozambique and the United States. I am aware that past administrations may have been somewhat tardy in this respect.

_Machel:_ There was a time when the United States related to the struggle against colonialism, such as ours, somewhat like a fire engine; you came along after the fire had already begun to burn.

_The President:_ I believe that things are different now. Your leadership is well known. I value your opinions, and I hope that you will share them freely, either by direct communication with me, or through Ambassador DePree. We also need your advice in other areas. For example, I know of your interest in the Indian Ocean. We are trying to work with the Soviet Union to turn the area into a demilitarized zone. I would also be glad to share our problems and ideas on the Middle East and on SALT.

_Machel:_ In only a very few words you touched many points. First, let me say that because you created the conditions for our talks today, this is already a good situation. We must speak sincerely to each other in order to feel our problems. When we talk with reserve, ongoing differences cannot be eliminated. Our tradition is to point out the positive, and indicate a way towards a solution of those problems which remain.

During the time of President Johnson, US-Mozambique relations were very bad. The United States at that time ignored the existence of the African Continent. That was a time when the United States turned

---

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter hosted a working luncheon for African Foreign Ministers and Heads of Delegations to the United Nations from 1:17 to 2:11 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)
almost its full attention to the Middle East. It was a time when the United States was very sensitive internationally about Vietnam. It was impossible to discuss anything without confronting those sensitivities. During the time of President Nixon, we were at war. There was a lack of diplomatic and political support for us from the United States. We had no need for material support, and wished only for your diplomatic and political support. There was no basis between us for closer relations. There was no sensitivity on the part of the US government to colonialism. And colonialism produces discrimination, massacres, violations of human rights, and conditions where lives have no value. We were fighting colonialism and we needed the support of all peoples; we needed humanitarian assistance; we needed your declaration that our struggle was just. We got none of this from the US government, only hostility. It was as if we had become a devil for the United States in our relations with that government. So, we became “dead” to US cooperation. We defeated Portuguese colonialism. You know of the involvement of the US government in support of the Portuguese. At the most decisive phase of our struggle, the United States spent $400 million for Portugal to support a colonial war. I cannot hide these frank and honest feelings; the United States played a role in lengthening that war.

After our victory, relations with the United States improved somewhat. Ambassador Easum was in Mozambique in October, 1974, during our transition period. He was expelled for unknown reasons. Upon our independence in 1975, we entered into purely diplomatic relations with the United States. The United States was sure that ours was a minority and temporary government, that we were not stable. Apparently the intelligence available to the United States was faulty on that point, because we have survived. Evidently the computers did not understand us and failed to give the right answer.

The President: The computers did not understand me either. They predicted that I would not win my election (laughter).

Machel: Our government is stable. Our program of nationalizations is well thought out and will be consolidated. We have the people’s support. The poor must defend their power. Perhaps I take too long in making these points, but we must remember the conditions which led us here.

We support the Zimbabwe struggle for independence, and we have willingly made Mozambique a base for that struggle. This does not seem to fit within the framework of US thinking. For the United States,

---

everything violent must be communism and vice versa. There seems to be no understanding of a struggle for independence. Independence is a most precious thing. To be free is the most valuable thing we know. That is why we support armed violence when all other means fail to gain independence. In 1976, the United States made demagogic statements about Southern Africa. Kissinger came to bring peace, but no peace was seen. When the Lusaka declaration was issued, we said “wait.” Kissinger wanted to come to Maputo; we said no, because of his past activities. But we always received President Ford’s envoys; however, not Kissinger.

Kissinger did not find a solution in the Middle East. In Southern Africa, his policy was one of agreeing with South Africa for their assistance in making progress towards a settlement in Zimbabwe and Namibia in return for which the United States would leave them alone about apartheid in their own country. We cannot trade human lives in this respect. We are pleased by the present Anglo-American initiatives in Southern Africa. We have asked ourselves about the conditions under which they could succeed. We appreciate this policy, because it is based on respect for human rights and because it is a positive step for Southern Africa. We believe this policy to be genuine and not a cloak to protect apartheid. Mr. President, Southern Africa is not a problem only for Zimbabwe and Namibia, but it is a problem for all of us. We are the flesh surrounding the wound, and it is very painful. We see discrimination, hangings, and massacres every day in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. This is intolerable to us. We must ask, where lies the responsibility for these conditions? Who has been strengthening Rhodesia for twelve years?

When we speak of the West, we speak of West Germany, France, Great Britain, but chiefly the United States, because those countries find their blessing in the United States to pursue these policies. The United States is deeply involved in economic investment in Southern Africa, which is the highest form of economic support, and leads to killing and humiliation. Not only the political question, but also the economic question must be resolved in Southern Africa. Apartheid must be resolved in order to find solutions in all of Southern Africa.

With the consent of the United States, South Africa has acquired a nuclear capacity. Assistant Secretary Schaufele confirmed such US nuclear assistance, but asserted that no harm was done. The French have practically supplied nuclear weapons to South Africa, and now, too late, oppose them. The West Germans are still supplying South

---

Africa. These bombs can only be aimed against the independent states of Africa, against all who demand equality. In all of this, the US was either involved or has great responsibility. That is a crime, and why we think of North America when we think of imperialism, because North America has always been involved in unjust causes.

The President: You have a very mistaken, distorted viewpoint of our country. We have the same motives as you do. We want nothing in Southern Africa except that Zimbabwe be independent, and be its own country. We want to end the bloodshed. Rhodesia is not attacking us—we could stay aloof from the fighting and the bloodshed and our interests would not suffer. We have nothing to gain by involving ourselves in this struggle for independence. We do it because we care for freedom and we care for independence. The same is true in Namibia where we have taken the lead in the Five Power Contact Group and in the United Nations under Ambassador Young. On South Africa, we do not control our citizens. We have a different society than you do. I understand that you trade with South Africa, which is your choice, and perhaps it is for the economic benefit of your people. It would be easy for the United States to avoid involvement in these very same situations for which you are concerned.

In the last 25 years, the world has changed. Colonialism was formerly an accepted way of doing things. In a sense, Spain and Portugal were our founding fathers; they colonized the land which is now the United States. We do have a concern in the United States about communism. We have elections every four years, which is different from Mozambique. But, just because our countries are different, does not mean that your country is bad. Perhaps, also, it was a mistake on your part to remain under Portuguese rule for so long a time. But this does not mean that you lack courage. To criticize others because of their differences is not productive at this time. I was not involved in the events of which you have spoken. I came from a farm, like you. The computers never thought that I would be President. My concern is for friendship between the United States and Mozambique, and my desire for this friendship is genuine. I am proud of my country; it is a country dedicated to justice and freedom.

Machel: This freedom and desire for friendship was the substance of my first point. I know that you were not involved in the events which I described, but it was necessary that I present a picture of those events.

The President: It was not an accurate picture.

Machel: President Nyerere expressed the feelings of all of us when he spoke of the steps you had taken in such short time in Zimbabwe and Namibia. These were very positive and solid steps. Because of those steps, we are today talking about how the transition period in
Zimbabwe will go, precisely because the United States has taken the lead in the situation. The United States seems more committed to the struggle against colonialism than does the United Kingdom. These positive steps are useful not only relative to Zimbabwe and Namibia, but also to cooperation between the United States and Mozambique. A basis for this cooperation is being laid, and on this basis discussions can be held on commercial and aid cooperation. Two years ago, this was not possible. Your government has brought a new diplomatic and economic perspective. There is now a basis for cooperation to permit and make possible our economic development. Our need of industrial development and agricultural development forms a basis for proceeding. We must also consider the mutuality of benefits in this cooperation, and in this respect there is a range of possibilities.

On the Indian Ocean, our position has been made clear to the United States and the Soviet Union. We are not privy to knowing what happens during the meetings of the two great powers on the subject. For us, we want no military bases established; we want the spirit of detente to be shared; we want the Indian Ocean demilitarized and denuclearized to form a zone of peace. All who pass in peace will be welcome. This is our policy.

Secretary Vance has just been to China. Our position there is that Taiwan is an integral part of China.

As for relations between the United States and Mozambique, now, importantly, a basis for real economic and technical cooperation has been laid. Our experts can take it from here.

The President: Let me return to one point. In the past, our government’s policies have taken into account the division of world power between the United States and the Soviet Union. This has been a recognized pattern of alignment, for not only these two countries but other countries as well. Congress and others among the American people still view Mozambique as aligned with the Soviet Union against the United States. This I know is erroneous, but it is an attitude left over from our past differences. We here represent our governments as they actually are, not as they were. I think that it is possible to overcome the residue from the past, especially if you and I can agree. I hope that you will be patient as we move away from the past. I do not control all of my people. I cannot control Congress, and I need your assistance. A sign from Mozambique of friendship would be very helpful at this time. I pledge to work closely with you to eliminate our differences, and proceed on to fulfill our common purposes. I hope that we will be able to communicate often, either directly or through our embassies.

Machel: I agree.

The President: We have much to learn about Africa. We have given it our attention only recently, and we need your advice and counsel.
I am only concerned that you might misjudge the character of the American people. Times have changed, and we share a common purpose. This purpose can be strengthened by our friendship.

Machel: We admire the American people, and we do not confuse them with the government of the United States. The American people have never been our enemies nor have been the Portuguese people. We were fighting Portuguese colonialism, not the Portuguese people. Many of my colleagues have visited the United States and have been warmly treated. The people of the United States have contributed humanitarian aid, medical assistance, education, and taught school, both blacks and whites, in the war zone. Yesterday, I received presents and checks from friends of Mozambique in America. We are good friends with the American people. Yesterday, also, I received documents and other signs of support. Once again, we see that the American people are contributing money for Zimbabwe and Namibia, and for those persons exiled from South Africa.

The President: I hope that you will accurately recognize that my government truly exemplifies and represents the aspirations and wishes of the American people as your government does for your people. We must put the past behind us in order to work towards the future together.

Machel: I feel the same way; however, I wish to make it clear that we are under no one’s influence. We gave our lives for independence. We are only dependent on our own people. It is true that our system emphasizes socialism, but that is because the people supported us. As you say, there is a commonality in our policy. But it must be made clear that we are no one’s agents.

(The President and President Machel exchanged final pleasantries.)

The discussion closed at 4:05 p.m.
311. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House

Washington, October 13, 1977, 1914Z

246013. Eyes Only for Dr Brzezinski. Fol repeat Pretoria 5452 Action
SecState dtd 13 Oct.

Quote Secret Pretoria 5452. Subj: SAG Response to September 15
Nuclear Demarche.

1. At meeting this afternoon, Brand Fourie handed me two communi-
cations, the texts of which are reproduced below. The first is a short
letter from Pik Botha to the Secretary answering his letter of Sept 15.2
The second is a long communication from PM Vorster to President
Carter responding to our Sept 15 aide memoire3 on nuclear matters,
as well as discussing the Namibian and Rhodesian problems, and US
policy toward South Africa in polemical terms.

2. In septel will be covered observations and comments made by
Fourie on the nuclear question.4 In still separate cables I am reporting
what he had to say on the Kaunda-Smith meeting and recent develop-
ments in Namibia, both subjects which he raised during what turned
out to be a general tour d’horizon.5

3. Text of Botha letter to Secretary:

Begin text: Dear Cyrus,

In your letter of September 15, 1977, you indicated that President
Carter had asked you to convey appreciation for the assurances given
by Prime Minister Vorster regarding South Africa’s peaceful nuclear
intentions. I submitted your letter and the accompanying aide-memoire
to my Prime Minister and I would be grateful if you would be kind
enough to transmit the attached message, containing his reactions, to
President Carter. The message also refers to the questions of Rhodesia
and South West Africa—matters dealt with in an earlier exchange of
letters with the President.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File,
Africa, Box 18, 8–10/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Eyes Only; Nodis. Printed
from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Tarnoff.
(National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

2 See footnote 3, Document 308.

3 See Document 307.

4 Transmitted in telegram 246578 to the White House, October 14. (Carter Library,
National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 8–10/77)

5 In telegram 5459 from Pretoria, October 13, Bowdler reported on the South African
perspective on the Kaunda-Smith meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign
Policy File, D770381–0208) In telegram 5466 from Pretoria, October 14, Bowdler reported
on recent developments in Namibia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy
File, D770377–0073)
I wish to draw your attention particularly to the concluding sentence in paragraph 5 of the message in which it is suggested that an in-depth discussion by our officials on nuclear energy matters could be useful. It has occurred to me that perhaps you may wish to consider asking Ambassador Gerard C Smith to visit us for this purpose.

Yours sincerely

R F Botha

Minister of Foreign Affairs. End text

4. Text of Vorster letter to President:

Begin text: Dear Mr. President,

1. I have received the message conveyed through my Foreign Minister by Secretary of State Vance on the 15th September 1977 regarding South Africa’s nuclear programme.

2. You will recall that pursuant to representations made by the United States Government, we formally advised it in August that South Africa did not have, nor did it intend to develop, a nuclear explosive device for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise; that the so-called Kalahari facility was not a testing ground for nuclear explosions; and that there would not be any nuclear explosive testing of any kind in South Africa.

3. Furthermore, on the 24th August 1977, I reiterated these assurances in a public statement. At the same time I focussed attention on the need for goodwill, trust, cooperation and the necessity of honouring commitments and obligations by all states with an interest in the peaceful development of nuclear energy.

In this connection I drew attention to a series of discriminatory steps against South Africa, e.g.—

(1) Unwillingness on the part of the United States over the last two years to supply South Africa with the contracted fuel elements for the research reactor Safari I, thus seriously affecting our research and development programme;

(2) Ignoring of commitments by the nuclear powers to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as provided for under Article IV(2) of the NPT;

(3) The ousting of South Africa from the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in flagrant violation of the agency’s statute;

Some efforts were made to justify this discriminatory step on the pretext that South Africa had not adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, conveniently forgetting that, for example, no less than 13 of the 34 members of the Board of Governors have either not ratified or
acceded to the NPT—including Egypt, who replaced South Africa on the board.

You will also be aware that in spite of India’s non-adherence to the NPT and her explosion of a nuclear device, she was supplied by the United States with enriched fuel for her Tarapur reactor;

(4) The extreme pressure which is exerted on South Africa to accede to the NPT as against the apparent lack of pressure on non-NPT members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA to adhere to the Treaty;

(5) From the latest U.S. demarche (that of 15 September 1977) it is clear that in spite of a firm contract with ERDA, the United States will not supply low enriched fuel for the two Koeberg power stations unless South Africa accedes to the NPT;

(6) It has not passed unnoticed that South Africa, one of the most important suppliers of uranium, and a potential exporter of enrichment equipment, is excluded from every group formed for considering matters relating to non-proliferation. One cannot escape the feeling that a systematic attempt is being made to exclude South Africa from all deliberations in the atomic energy field. The latest example is the exclusion of South Africa from the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, which evaluation is the subject of consultation with 36 of the Agency’s member states.

4. Nevertheless, in my statement of 24 August 1977, I made it clear that South Africa would be prepared to discuss with the United States the question of our accession to the NPT, but added that discriminatory steps, including those mentioned by me, would actually be raised and would have to be sorted out at the same time. I was sincerely hoping that this would lead to a frank discussion between our governments in an effort to facilitate our accession to the NPT.

5. However, the United States demarche of 15 September seems to imply that we must first adhere to the treaty, and pursuant thereto some, I repeat some of the points raised by me can thereafter be discussed. It therefore appears to us that the United States wishes to concentrate only on the NPT, ignoring the rest. Such an approach would not be practicable.

I note that the United States Government’s anxiety over the Valindaba pilot plant persists. There is nothing sinister about the plant, and we have often stated its purpose, and I personally offered to share with other countries the knowledge and technology acquired.

I honestly believe that if official United States spokesmen were to refrain from questioning South Africa’s good faith, and instead were to agree to an in-depth discussion by our officials on these matters, a major step could be taken towards opening the way for South Africa’s adherence to the NPT.
South West Africa and Rhodesia

6. We recently concluded the latest round of discussions with the Five Western members of the Security Council on the question of South West Africa, and we put forward a set of constructive proposals concerning the attainment of independence for the territory in a peaceful manner. These suggestions, particularly that relating to security and South African forces, of which you will no doubt be apprised by Ambassador McHenry, supplement the following principles to which South Africa has already committed herself in regard to South West Africa:

(A) The granting of independence to South West Africa as soon as possible, in any case before the end of 1978;
(B) Independence to be granted to the territory as a whole;
(C) Elections on the basis of one-man-one-vote country-wide for a constituent assembly;
(D) Removal of discrimination on basis of colour;
(E) The representative of the Secretary-General satisfying himself on the fairness of the elections;
(F) The release of detainees and political prisoners, if any, inside and outside the territory; (i.e. those held by SWAPO and other entities in Tanzania, Zambia, Angola etc. as well as those detained by the South African authorities.)
(G) The return of all South West Africans to participate peacefully in the political process;
(H) The appointment by the Secretary-General of a panel of jurists to decide upon disputes, for example on fairness of electioneering, status of convicted prisoners, etc.

7. Also in the case of Rhodesia, Secretary of State Vance and Ambassador Young would have informed you of the responsible role South Africa has tried to play in order to facilitate a settlement.

We never asked for a quid pro quo for our co-operation and efforts in seeking solutions for the South West African and Rhodesian questions. This did not, however, mean that in spite of our unceasing efforts to play a constructive role—efforts acknowledged by you yourself—South Africa would face increasing hostility from those very countries with whom it is endeavouring to resolve these problems.

8. We cannot escape the impression that the United States as well as certain of the other Western states concerned, while expecting our further active co-operation in the search for peace, nevertheless continue to take steps which we cannot interpret as otherwise than hostile and which endanger our continued co-operation. This was my clear impression in Vienna during the talks with Vice-President Mondale.
and it is regularly being confirmed by reports from Washington, as for example on the extension of the so-called “grey areas” in trade between our two countries, the holding of special hearings and other deliberately discriminatory and even vindictive actions against South Africa. In line with these measures, and encouraged, it seems, by the United States, the member countries of the European economic community are now considering steps to curtail our traditional trading ties with Western Europe.

9. It would seem, therefore, that the United States officially hold the view that stability in Southern Africa and the future of our country is to be sacrificed in the hope of stopping Soviet expansionism. This is a vain hope. On the contrary, by simplistically insisting on majority rule in South Africa, the United States will cut the ground from under moderate black and white leaders and pave the way for confrontation and eventual conflict on a catastrophic scale. You will appreciate that such an approach and the type of action referred to are making it extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible, for my country to continue the constructive role it has accepted. It would therefore be a major contribution to our peace efforts if an assurance could be given that this campaign against us will cease. In conclusion, Mr President, I wish to assure you that I value this further opportunity of sharing my thoughts with you.

Yours sincerely,
J. Vorster. End text

5. Signed copies of originals being transmitted by pouch October 14.
Bowdler
Unquote.

Vance
312. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown

Washington, October 24, 1977

SUBJECT
Cooperation with South Africa in Ocean Surveillance

The President has reviewed the respective positions of the Departments of State and Defense with regard to granting licenses for export of ocean surveillance equipment to South Africa and has disapproved granting further licenses. The President believes that a further expansion of intelligence sharing arrangements with the South African Government at this time is inconsistent with our interests and objectives in southern Africa. The potential value of the information that would be obtained from the surveillance system would be more than outweighed by the certain damage to United States interests that would follow from public knowledge of a new intelligence sharing arrangement with South Africa.

The Government of South Africa should be informed of this decision at an appropriate level and advised that the decision was taken subsequent to the recent repressive measures.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 10/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to Turner.
2 See Document 279.
3 See Document 280.
4 See Document 322.
313. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, October 24, 1977, 8:30–10 a.m.

SUBJECT
South Africa

PARTICIPANTS:
The Vice President
Denis Clift
C. L. Haslam

State:
Secretary Vance
Adm Stansfield Turner
Richard Moose
William Parmenter
Anthony Lake

Ambassador William Bowdler
General George S. Brown

Treasury:
Robert Carswell
Lt. Gen. William Y. Smith
Lyle Widman
David Aaron

Defense:
Secretary Brown
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Deputy Secretary Duncan
Thomas Thornton
David McGiffert
Jessica Tuchman

United States Representative to the United Nations:
Ambassador Andrew Young
Anne Holloway

Ambassador Bowdler reviewed the South Africa situation. The recent political repression is part of the government’s overall strategy relative to plans (centering on recent revisions of the constitution) to bring the Indians and the “coloreds” into the laager. It also may relate to the November 30 election; the US has an interest in maintaining a viable South African political opposition. South Africa probably still wishes to be reasonable on Rhodesia and Namibia. It took such actions to gain time for the policy of separate development and for some yet-to-be-defined policy on urban black South Africans. The Vorster government also may believe that the major trends in the world are politically conservative and wish to buy time until they can gain advantage from them.

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 115, South Africa: 11–12/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

2 A detailed account of Bowdler’s assessment was transmitted in telegram 5664 from Pretoria, October 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850056–1821)
In further discussion, US intelligence cannot now positively say that the Kalahari facility is a test site, but on the other hand, there is no alternative use seen for the facility; South Africa could possibly be ready to explode a nuclear device in a number of weeks. The meeting was generally in favor of the proposed Congressional resolution condemning the South African action. It was agreed that the concept of prohibiting all grey-area sales should be subsumed under a mandatory UN arms embargo, both subject to a six-month moratorium, provided this can be negotiated in the Council. If needed at the end of six months, a Presidential Directive would be considered. On selective reductions in Embassy Pretoria personnel, the discussion focused on the symbolic impact of various specific reductions versus the need for providing information.

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

On economic measures, the discussion focused on denial of Exim Bank insurance and guarantees and the withdrawal of Commercial Credit Corporation facilities; withdrawal of Exim Bank facilities would not necessarily lead to a termination of US bank exposure in South Africa.

Secretary Vance summed up:
— that Ambassador Young and Assistant Secretary Moose would undertake to communicate with the Congressional Black Caucus, and as soon thereafter as possible, communicate their findings to the President;
— that the Committee recommends that the United States support or initiate a resolution on a mandatory arms embargo under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, plus a review of economic relations between member states and South Africa;
— that the United States would take other unilateral steps indicated previously;
— that Ambassador Bowdler would remain in the United States as long as necessary;
— that Ambassador Young would attempt to have the hearings on the concurrent Congressional resolution delayed for a few days;
— that there should be a meeting as soon as feasible between officials of the Department of Commerce and representatives of major American corporations doing business in South Africa to get their views and input on the situation;

3 Reference is presumably to the Collins Resolution (House Concurrent Resolution 383) introduced on October 19, which condemned the South African Government’s “massive violations of the civil liberties of the people of South Africa,” and urged the President to “take the strongest possible diplomatic measures against South Africa.”
—that public statements issued by the United States about the current situation vis-a-vis South Africa should be put in the context of Vice President Mondale's previous statements in Vienna, should not imply the beginning of a series of pressures to turn around South Africa, should express hope for improvement, and should not involve the US Government in a public negotiating round on specific South African measures;

—that these recommendations should go to the President as soon as possible.

314. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Defense Brown

Washington, October 25, 1977

The President has decided the United States should adopt the following position regarding the recent developments in South Africa.

1. The United States is prepared to support or take the initiative with regard to a UN Security Council Resolution which would, under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, require termination of the sale or transfer of military items to South Africa. The Chapter 7 finding should be based on the situation created by the importation of arms into South Africa in view of the recent action of that government. In support of this resolution, the United States would be prepared to terminate the sale of all items destined for use by the South African military or police. This would include all so-called “grey area” items.

2. The United States should be prepared to support a UN Resolution which calls upon all states to review their economic relations with South Africa and to consult regarding their future economic relationship with South Africa.

3. The United States should seek to have such resolutions limited to a six month period renewable upon further action by the Security Council.


UNSC Resolution 418 (1977), adopted unanimously on November 4, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. For text of the resolution, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, pp. 161–162.
4. In connection with these steps, the United States shall recall its Naval Attache from Pretoria and immediately summon home the Commercial Officer for consultations.\(^3\) Ambassador Bowdler should plan to stay in the United States for the next week at the minimum.

5. The United States should immediately undertake a review of its commercial and economic relations with South Africa. In this connection, the Department of Commerce should plan to meet with leading American business organizations active in South Africa to discuss the future economic relationship and the situation in South Africa. This meeting should take place only after NSC approval.

6. [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

7. Congressional leaders should be kept fully informed of the actions we are prepared to take consistent with protecting our negotiating position in the Security Council. In this connection, the Executive Branch should welcome, without specific endorsement, a Congressional resolution which supports our position.

8. Closest consultations should be maintained with our allies, particularly the British.

9. If the question of U.S. nuclear cooperation with South Africa should arise in the course of discussions at the United Nations, Ambassador Young is authorized to inform the delegations privately that the U.S. position is that there will be no consideration of further nuclear fuel supplies until such time as the South African Government has agreed to adhere to adequate full scope international safeguards.

The attitude to be adopted by the United States should reflect the Vice President’s presentation to Prime Minister Vorster in Vienna. We should stress that we are undertaking these actions regretfully, that we had hoped South Africa would begin to embark on a positive course to open a dialogue with all of its citizens and that we had made clear we would welcome such a development. However, we also explained to South Africa that our relationship would suffer without such positive steps, and in the light of recent actions which move South Africa backward in this regard, we are compelled to take action. It is still our hope nonetheless the South African Government will in time reverse its recent actions and general course so as to make it possible for our relationship to improve.

Zbigniew Brzezinski\(^4\)

---

\(^3\) See Document 316.

\(^4\) Aaron signed for Brzezinski above Brzezinski’s typed signature.
315. Memorandum From Christine Dodson of the National Security Council Staff to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff)

Washington, October 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Tasking on South Africa

On the basis of the PRC meeting on South Africa of October 24, and Dr. Brzezinski's subsequent directive, the NSC requests the following:

—That recommendations be submitted to the NSC on the need for a Presidential Directive(s) to implement a UN mandatory arms embargo and which incorporates a prohibition of all gray area sales to South Africa, and a Directive for signature by the President if it is determined that such is needed, (by COB, Friday, November 4);

—That State coordinate with Defense the immediate withdrawal of the naval attaché; that the commercial attaché be immediately recalled for consultations; and that the NSC be kept informed of developments;

—That an interagency study be prepared proposing further staff reductions in embassy Pretoria that could be made, if required, consistent with maintaining necessary informational and analytical capacity (by Wednesday, November 9);

—That a memorandum be prepared recommending action to be taken by the United States to implement Security Council language concerning a review of the economic relations between UN member states and South Africa (by Friday, November 4);

—That a draft letter be prepared to Prime Minister Vorster from the President responding directly to recent events in South Africa (by COB Friday, October 28);

—[1 line not declassified].

Christine Dodson
Staff Secretary


2 See Documents 313 and 314.

3 See Document 316.

4 See Document 319.

5 See Document 317.
316. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, November 2, 1977

SUBJECT
_tasking on South Africa: Withdrawal of Naval Attache and Recall of Commercial Officer_

The State Department has, consistent with the NSC request of October 28, 1977,\(^2\) coordinated with the Department of Defense on the withdrawal of the Naval Attache from Pretoria. Orders for his withdrawal will be cabled to the Embassy immediately after the announcement of this action by Secretary Vance November 2.\(^3\) In consultation with Ambassador Bowdler we have determined that November 24\(^4\) would be an acceptable date for his departure, given consideration for the packing of his household goods and other necessary personal arrangements.

Orders for the recall of the Commercial Officer from Johannesburg will also be sent November 2, after the announcement that he is being recalled for consultations.

Orders are being withheld until after the announcement because it would be inconvenient to transmit them in classified cables. We will, however, inform the Charge by a classified message that announcement of the withdrawal and recall will be made tomorrow.

Peter Tarnoff\(^5\)

---

\(^1\) Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 106, South Africa: 11/1–9/77. Secret.

\(^2\) See Document 315.

\(^3\) Vance announced the withdrawal of the Naval Attaché and the recall of the Commercial Officer in Johannesburg during a November 2 news conference at the Department of State. (Department of State Bulletin, November 21, 1977, p. 716)

\(^4\) In a November 3 memorandum to Brzezinski, Richardson wrote: “After consultation with Bartholomew, I informed State and DOD that November 24 would be somewhat late for the departure of the Naval Attache from Pretoria, and that we would prefer that he depart no later than two weeks after the date of the announcement. This means that he is now scheduled to depart by November 16.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Richardson, Chron File, Box 106, 11/1–9/77)

\(^5\) Frank Wisner signed for Peter Tarnoff about this typed signature.
317. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Vorster

Washington, November 3, 1977

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Because of the gravity of our concern over recent events in your country, we asked Ambassador Bowdler to come to Washington for a close review of our relations. I am taking advantage of his return to Pretoria to send you this letter.

I hoped that Vice President Mondale's meeting with you in Vienna last May would lead toward amelioration of those conditions which prevent better relations between our countries. I did not mean to dictate solutions to southern Africa's problems, but rather to explore how we might cooperate to avoid racial conflict in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

I appreciate your constructive role in the search for fair and workable settlements in Rhodesia and Namibia. While serious obstacles remain, I look forward to our continuing cooperation. But I had hoped, Mr. Prime Minister, that parallel progress might also be made on resolving those issues which hinder development of a viable and just relationship among the people of South Africa.

However, your government's October 19 actions detaining or banning those who work toward black identity and an end to discrimination have shocked the American people. The government and people of the United States hope those actions will be reconsidered and reversed. I therefore urge you to lead your government toward a political and social system in which all your people may take part fully and freely. Such a move would be in keeping with the many values our two peoples hold in common.

Your government's actions of October 19 have understandably produced strong adverse reaction elsewhere in the world, too—and not only in states hostile to South Africa. Those affected include South Africa's most important trading partners, as well as other governments which might prefer closer relations but now find it more and more difficult to justify even the maintenance of normal ties. I am concerned that further actions similar to those of October 19 would only speed this process.

Already these events have produced the kinds of pressure in the United Nations and other international fora which may lead to South

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 48, South Africa: 11–12/77. No classification marking.
Africa’s growing isolation in the world. I am also concerned that the actions of October 19, if not corrected, will increase the danger of serious confrontations between the white and black citizens of your country.

The spirit in which I have written the foregoing, Mr. Prime Minister, is a constructive one. We do not seek the destruction or punishment of any group in South Africa, but rather we hope for a way to bring all groups into full participation in your rich society. If this can be done, through a dialogue among all South Africans, there is no reason why our countries should drift apart.

Because of the gravity of the issues which face our respective nations in southern Africa, it is particularly important that we continue to be able to communicate with candor and understanding. I feel certain that we can do so.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

---

318. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 9, 1977, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
The President’s Meeting with the Congressional Black Caucus

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Vice President Mondale
Rep. Parren Mitchell
Rep. Walter Fauntroy
Rep. Charles Rangel
Rep. Augustus Hawkins
Rep. Charles Diggs
Rep. John Conyers
Rep. Ed Markey
Rep. Paul Tsongas
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Henry Richardson NSC (Notetaker)
Frank Moore

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 11–12/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
The President opened the meeting by noting that within the past two or three weeks the United States had faced a major diplomatic challenge on South Africa. Recalling that he had previously asked Ambassador Young to talk with Caucus members individually, he felt it was useful for he and the Caucus to have this informal discussion on South Africa. The Vice President had previously met with Vorster, and Dr. Brzezinski has been involved with the on-going policy process, and he wanted the Caucus to learn directly about our policy objectives. The United Nations had voted a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, which we supported as a measured step, and we are heartened by the recent actions of France in delaying delivery of patrol boats bound for South Africa. Opinions of the Caucus meant much to him, both in support and by way of criticism. They are also significant in giving support to Ambassador Young. There is growing pressure on South Africa, much of which stems from the coordinated actions of the five allies who have major investments there. Acting in harmony, they conveyed a strong reminder to South Africa that they must change their policy.

Rep. Mitchell thanked the President for his interest and his statement. The President knows of the Caucus’ interest and awareness on these questions, and this extends beyond the Caucus to other members of Congress, as illustrated by the presence of four Congressmen at this meeting not members of the Caucus, including Congressman Squires and Congressman Bonkers. Not being sure of the agenda of this meeting, he brought a package for the President on South Africa and other issues of concern to the Caucus for the President’s consideration. Congressman Diggs would comment specifically on South Africa.

The President said that he wished the Caucus to be familiar with progress being made in both the Zimbabwe and the Namibian negotiations. On these questions he had no secrets from them. He was also concerned about the continued presence of 20,000 Cubans in Angola,

---

2 Reference is to the October 19 bannings. See footnote 6 below.
3 See Documents 158, 276, and 278.
4 Reference is to UN Security Council Resolution 418. See footnote 2, Document 314.
which is not compatible with peace in that region, and wanted the Caucus’ views on that question. He has mentioned this problem to other African leaders, who thought the Cubans would withdraw. The Cubans are an extension of Soviet policy and are now moving into Ethiopia. It would be good for he and the Caucus to explore privately how this question might be resolved.

Rep. Mitchell said that the Caucus will visit Cuba after December 12 for discussions with Fidel Castro, and this question can be put on the agenda.

The President suggested that it would be useful for Administration officials to discuss Cuba in Angola with the Caucus before their departure.

Dr. Brzezinski noted that the number of Cuban troops in Angola is proportionately greater in comparison with Angolan population than was the US proportionate presence in Vietnam.

Rep. Diggs said that as the only person in the room who has been to Angola since the beginning of the Neto regime, he welcomed discussions on Angola. The Caucus visit to Cuba will be useful in this regard. The Caucus appreciated the Administration’s new Africa policy and particularly the efforts of the President which resulted in the first concrete step against South Africa—the arms embargo. This, however, was only a first step. The importance of the particular meeting was signified by this being the first time that there was discussion on an equal time basis of a foreign policy issue in which Afro-America was concerned, compared with various domestic issues. This signifies a growing black coalition throughout the country which is concerned with US foreign policy towards Africa. Further, the Collins Resolution, recently passed overwhelmingly by the House, shows the broad spectrum of support for Administration policy generally throughout the country.

He wished to make two or three points. The arms embargo has limitations. If it is not based on the principle that South Africa is a

5 In telegram 19138 from Bonn, November 11, 1976, the Embassy transmitted Diggs’s report on his trip to Angola. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760420–0973)

6 The Collins Amendment to House Concurrent Resolution 388, introduced on October 26, passed by a vote of 347 to 54 on October 31. House Concurrent Resolution 388, introduced by Cardiss Collins on October 26, passed by a vote of 347 to 54 on October 31. It denounced South Africa for the September 12 death of Steve Biko while under detention in South Africa and the October 19 bannings of anti-apartheid individuals and groups. Additionally, the resolution “urges the President to take effective measures against the Republic of South Africa in order to register the deep concern of the American people about the continued violation of human rights in that country.” For text of the resolution and the congressional debate, see The Congressional Record, vol. 123, Part 28, October 28, 1977 to November 3, 1977, pp. 35965–35975.
threat to peace and security, and on that basis leads to other actions, its impact will be diminished. It presents questions of implementation. Its provision on a “review” of existing licenses for manufacture of arms presents possible loopholes. The attitudes of Israel and France are uncertain relative to enforcing the embargo. He recalled that another group from the Caucus had met with Secretary Vance to express concern that the President take certain measures against South Africa which can be done by voluntary executive action, without fanfare, as opposed to other measures, such as a cancellation of tax credits under legislation proposed by Congressman Rangel.7

Rep. Diggs stressed that the perception of South Africa by US eyes must be changed. Until we change our attitudes we are not dealing with reality. He specifically cited the perception that increased communication with South Africa will lead to change, while isolating South Africa would lead to a retreat and to retrogression. This perception was critical to the implementing of our diplomatic objectives. Communication with South Africa has not led to change over the years. It must now be concluded that moving incrementally in this direction will not do.

The President responded that there certainly has been a change in their attitude towards us; we are now just behind the Soviet Union on their enemies list (laughter). He believed that South Africa was indeed feeling the pressure and would continue to feel the pressure, but he understood Rep. Diggs’ point.

Rep. Diggs continued that we need a more realistic attitude about US business in South Africa. Some kind of mechanism is needed to bring the realities of such involvement home. There is also needed an Administration initiative that would induce an inquiry into the status of political detainees in South Africa. The United States might establish a special refugee status for South African exiles to enter the United States. In any case, the United States needed to apply a set of gradually escalating economic pressures through mechanisms of cooperation as the basis of the policy.

The President noted that the United States was the current villain in South Africa. He was pleasantly surprised by the wide support for the Collins Resolution in the House, a trend of support of which began with the Byrd amendment. He sensed a growing concern and change in attitude towards South Africa among all American citizens. He wished the Caucus to join with him and other members of the Administration to pressure US business to put constraints on their dealings with the South African government. He noted that earlier, under the

---

7 Minutes of the Caucus meeting with Vance were not found.
private (sic) urging of the Administration, US corporations took major steps locally in South Africa to improve the working conditions of their black South African employees. Such pressure on US businesses could best be applied through non-governmental channels.

For example, the Caucus could work directly on major corporations through compiled lists of boards of directors.

*Rep. Conyers* noted that the policies of many major US corporations are so racist that securing this kind of cooperation would be difficult.

*The President* noted the difficulty, but said that such measures would nevertheless be a good step. There are some good companies in this respect, for example, Xerox, especially those that have black people on their boards of directors and in high management.

*Rep. Mitchell* said that when the Caucus first requested a meeting with the President on an emergency basis, somehow signals were crossed, and this meeting was delayed. He noted that the Administration was engaged in an evolving process of policy making. The Caucus wants to be part of that process. Included in the package which was being left with the President were six proposed bills for the next session of Congress, which represented a tightening of the screws against South Africa, in addition to the Caucus’ 12 point statement.8 The government of South Africa is increasingly arrogant with respect to the violation of rights of black South Africans, the continuation of apartheid and refusal to permit majority rule, and therefore tough legislation was required.

*Rep. Diggs* noted that the European community had promulgated a code of conduct for corporations operating in South Africa, which was more stringent than the Sullivan Declaration.9 The United States might consider joining with the Economic Community and adopt such a code as government (sic) policy, as opposed to the code being binding only on individual corporations.

*The President* said that Dr. Brzezinski could inquire into that question. He understood that the Sullivan statement on company behavior in South Africa was tougher than that particular code.

*Dr. Brzezinski* noted that we are in an unprecedented situation with South Africa by trying to get that country to change its internal social order.

---

8 The package was not attached. The administration’s response to the twelve points is in the Carter Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Countries, Box CO-53, CO 141 Confidential 1/20/77–1/20/81.

Rep. Rangel asked whether that was not our objective in Cuba; and Dr. Brzezinski replied that our objective there was more one of containment than domestic change. Inducing change in South Africa will be a major process because it requires a change in the minds and perceptions of 3 million whites in their relationships with the black majority. The United States in its policy would like to pull some of those whites along with us, as well as black South Africans.

Rep. Conyers asserted that concern for the internal social order of a country was not so unique, especially since World War II. A lack of concern for such questions contributed to the annihilation of Jews in Germany, because the United States arguably exhibited too much sympathy for the problems of the German people in terms of making such needed adjustments. He was glad to see that for the first time, as the Administration has stated it, human rights is the issue.

Rep. Mitchell said that he was concerned about the slow, tedious evolving nature of Administration policy on South Africa. Afro-Americans were getting impatient about this very question, and this impatience led to his being on a picket line in front of the White House a few days ago to protest this slowness.

Rep. Diggs pointed out that the Administration had also another constituency for this policy: Black Africa. South Africa is a litmus test here that reveals our deepest feelings about race and human rights.

The President agreed that this was fundamental. If it were up to him he would have majority rule in South Africa tomorrow. But if we took a strong unilateral stand, he would predict that there would still be no change in South Africa. It is the cumulative (sic) effect and the growing European realization that economics is tied to human rights that will get us to the goal faster and within the framework of international law. There is some parallel in that when we tried certain unilateral measures against Cuba, we probably strengthened that country’s social system.

Congressman Rangel pointed out that the United States was indeed acting unilaterally against Cuba, but when black nations in Africa look to the United States, and there are a growing number of African nations in the United Nations, it is in our interest to lead against South Africans. This produces stronger allies for US policy generally in Africa.

The President indicated that he would soon have to leave for other responsibilities.

Rep. Mitchell said that before the President left he wished to make three requests. First, the Caucus wished a response from both the Administration and the President to their 12 point program against South Africa relative to each point. Secondly, the Caucus wished for some mechanism for them to tie in with the Administration on policy making about South Africa to be established.
The President said that the best way to do this would be through direct liaison by the Caucus with the State Department and with Andy Young’s office. If this is not adequate the Caucus could get back to him directly, and new arrangements can be made.

Rep. Mitchell said that the third point concerned unemployment. He hoped that OMB and Labor could look at how to accelerate and expand existing employment programs to remedy the problem of black unemployment which was literally killing black communities in the country.

Rep. Conyers added that there was a delay in funding existing programs. There were currently shortfalls in Title 6 and in CEDA money.

The President indicated that the latter was contrary to his information from Secretaries Kreps and Marshall. They had indicated that they were ahead of or on schedule on both of those. Our schedule might differ from that of the Congressional Budget Office. He requested the Vice President to check this with Secretaries Kreps and Marshall.

Rep. Mitchell said that he had other points on urban policy but he would cover them in direct correspondence to the President.

Rep. Fauntroy thanked the President for bringing human rights to DC and for the work of his staff, especially Bunny Mitchell, in this regard.

(The President then departed for other responsibilities. The Vice President remained.)

The Vice President said that he wished to elaborate on several points. When we developed our response to South Africa on the death of Steve Biko and other related matters, Andy Young was our principal advisor. His idea was that an ineffective embargo is worse than no embargo at all. In this respect, the recent move by France to block delivery of patrol boats already on order is significant. We know that now when we move, we move in this respect with the international community.

Rep. Rangel asked about the position of the Israelis on the arms embargo.

Dr. Brzezinski answered that they were embarrassed, but that he thought that they would go along with it. They are sensitive to both the moral and political factors in these questions.

The Vice President continued that, secondly, Andy was concerned that there always be another credible step ahead of us; for this reason, our policy was a measured policy. We withdrew Ambassador Bowdler and the Commercial attaché for consultations. And Andy has consulted with each of you on the Hill. On Zimbabwe and Namibia, South Africa has not been totally unhelpful. We seem to be close to the moment of truth in Namibia. South Africa has made some progress on some tough
issues. If these can be resolved, then there is a good chance for an independent democratic Namibia. And the success of such a settlement is important.

Rep. Diggs noted that Ambassador Bowdler has said flatly that South African involvement in Namibia and Zimbabwe is in their own interest (sic), independent of any involvement by the United States. This implies that we need not go slow on one part of our policy towards South Africa to preserve some other part.

The Vice President noted that this Administration’s policy has changed in that respect from the Nixon Administration: There was to be no trade-off between Namibia and Zimbabwe, and apartheid, and he wished to be clear on that. But the progress being made now by the Contact Group on the Namibian question was one element in the total relationship. Also, it was his personal wish to put Vorster in an embarrassed position in the upcoming election by encouraging stronger white opposition than perhaps he expects. The chance of such opposition emerging, however, is remote.

Rep. Mitchell said that the Caucus appreciates the work of Andy Young. But he said that when the President (sic) reviews each of our 12 points, each will seem to be a tightening of the screws against South Africa. On that point, we are not in disagreement.

Rep. Diggs noted that we could not control all events in our relationship with South Africa, and therefore the United States must be ready to respond to events as they occur. For instance, the Swedes will probably introduce a resolution into the General Assembly calling for disinvestment of all companies doing business in South Africa. It is certain to be passed by an overwhelming majority, but how will the United States vote?

(There were final pleasantries. The meeting adjourned at 10:30.)
319. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, November 10, 1977

**SUBJECT**

Reduction of Staff in the USG-South Africa Mission

Attached is the response to paragraph 3 of the NSC’s memorandum of October 28 requesting an interagency study proposing further staff reductions that could be made in the U.S. Government’s Mission in South Africa, if required, consistent with maintaining necessary informational and analytical capacity.\(^2\)

The Department of State has been advised by the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture that those agencies are forwarding to the NSC separate memoranda commenting on the proposals in the attached study. We have also been advised by the Department of Defense that that agency is opposed to any further reductions, following the withdrawal this month of the Naval Attaché in Pretoria, in the size of the Defense Attaché Office in South Africa. However, we understand that the Department of Defense has no objection to the proposed closure of the Eastern Test Range Tracking Station in South Africa, provided permission is forthcoming to transfer the tracking station facility to Botswana.

Peter Tarnoff\(^3\)

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 48, South Africa: 11–12/77. Secret. Tab 2 is attached but not printed.

2 See Document 315.

3 Frank Wisner signed for Tarnoff above this typed signature.
REDUCTION OF STAFF IN THE USG-SOUTH AFRICA MISSION

The objective of any reduction in the USG South Africa Mission should be to convey a clear political signal to the South African Government that the U.S. is prepared to disassociate from that government if it makes no effort to move toward a fundamental transformation of its society. The elimination of key, high-visibility positions which South Africa regards as essential to the maintenance of close US-South African cooperation would most likely provide this clear political signal. In our view, across-the-board reductions of a given percentage are not relevant since they would affect many positions of no importance to the South African Government. Such positions would include secretaries, Marine security guards, a number of officers and technicians providing consular, administrative, and technical services, and low visibility operations with little government-to-government contact. Together these positions account for 60% of authorized official US positions in South Africa.

We believe that most State Department officers, DOD attaches, USIS employees, [less than 1 line not declassified] are regarded by the South African Government as official staff whose presence indicates a desire on the part of the United States to maintain significant relationships with the Republic of South Africa. In addition, the level of our presence, as gauged by the number of consulates general, consulates, USIS libraries, tracking stations, etc., provides a further indication to the South Africans of the significance and depth of our relationship. With respect to both personnel and facilities, net reductions can be made if we wish to convey certain political signals, or changes in status can be effected, such as reducing a consulate general to a consulate and designating the highest-ranking U.S. official in South Africa as charge rather than ambassador. Options for both net reductions and changes in status for both personnel and facilities are examined on an agency-by-agency basis below.

PERSONNEL

State

It is generally true that high-ranking State Department officers are more visible to the South Africans than middle-grade and junior offi-
cers, that their presence is considered important to the South African Government, and that their removal would convey a clear signal with respect to US-South African relations. It is also true that the loss of these positions would have a much more serious impact on mission operations than the reduction of lower-ranking State positions. In light of the above, we strongly recommend the retention of an Ambassador as chief of mission, but suggest consideration of the redesignation of the three consul general positions as consuls.

The Ambassador

The Ambassador clearly could be an important element of a scenario involving a modification of official U.S. presence in South Africa. His withdrawal would leave no doubt with respect to U.S. intentions, and the South African Government could not fail to conclude that the U.S. “means business.” Such a move would also garner substantial political payoff from the South Africa black community and most, if not all, African nations and leaders.

While the advantages are apparent and substantial, the same holds true of the disadvantages. The most serious disadvantage would be a reduction in high-level contact with the South African Government. The Ambassador has been America’s chief spokesman in conveying on a day-to-day basis the U.S. view that South Africa must move rapidly toward a system of full political participation for all racial groups. As U.S. involvement in the initiatives taken since May with respect to Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa itself increases, and as we speak out more frequently on human rights and other domestic developments in South Africa, the Ambassador’s presence becomes even more essential. There is also logic in the argument that it would be unwise to withdraw the Ambassador at the initial stage in a reduction in staff. If his withdrawal at the outset did not achieve our political objectives, then the subsequent withdrawal of other personnel would add little to the exercise. It would be wiser to hold the Ambassador in reserve, as a final, rather than initial, withdrawal. Finally, the extreme complexity and sensitivity of the issues involved in our relationship with South Africa call for handling by an experienced, top quality mission chief.

Consuls General

We recommend the reduction in level of the consulates general in Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg to that of consulate and the redesignation of the positions of consul general as consul. In terms of position and visibility, the consuls general are not as important as the Ambassador, but their redesignation as consuls accompanied by the reduction in level of the consulates general would be taken seriously
by South African officials. Moreover, these moves could give the South Africans the impression that the withdrawal of the Ambassador could follow if satisfactory progress were not achieved. Since the consuls general continue to perform important functions at their posts, it is essential that senior middle-grade officers are assigned as consuls to Cape Town, Durban, and Johannesburg in the future. The advantage of the moves outlined above is that a clear political signal is conveyed at less cost than if senior personnel were removed without replacement. Essential mission functions would not be affected significantly, although certain high-level contacts in South Africa’s major cities might be somewhat more difficult for a while.

**Political and Labor Officers**

We recommend no reduction in positions designated either political or labor in the USG South Africa Mission. The four political officer positions in Pretoria are particularly important for carrying out the Embassy’s political reporting functions, maintaining contacts with the South African Government and key black and white leaders, monitoring internal political and human rights developments, and explaining at the middle levels of the South African Government the details of U.S. policies and concerns. In spite of the importance of these positions, three of the political officer positions in the Embassy are of lesser rank (one lower-level middle-grade officer and two junior officers), and their loss would have a minimum impact on the South African Government. Only the Political Counselor is a senior officer.

The labor/political officer in Johannesburg is the Mission’s chief officer for monitoring developments in the labor movement and in meeting with American corporations in South Africa to discuss the implementation of fair labor practices. We do not believe that the elimination of this position would give a clear signal of our intention to distance ourselves from the South African Government. On the contrary, the South Africans might well conclude from the elimination of this position that we wished to sever our ties with black labor leaders.

The political/economic officer position in Durban is the second-ranking position at this post. There is a clear need for a political officer at this post. Durban provides our main access to black homeland (Transkei, Kwazulu) leaders and our main contact with the Indian community. Durban is also an important center of white political opposition. We see no benefits in terms of political payoff in the elimination of this position.

**Economic/Commercial Officers**

Of the six positions designated either economic/commercial or resources, we believe that the elimination of only one, the commercial
officer position in Johannesburg, would be of real political significance. This is the only position designated exclusively as commercial, and South Africans may well regard this officer’s presence as an indication that the United States will continue to maintain close trade and commercial relations with South Africa. If there is a decision to make further reductions in Mission staffing, we recommend the elimination of this position as it would be in step with current policy not to engage in active, high visibility trade promotion in South Africa. Moreover, current policy is neither to encourage nor discourage U.S. investment in South Africa. There would be some cost to our mission operations by the elimination of this position, especially in regard to end-user checks and licensing checks, both of which are extra work occasioned by our arms embargo. Such work in the commercial field, and supervision of local employees carrying out commercial functions, could be transferred to the political/economic officer, although it would be difficult to continue handling the present volume of trade inquiries from the United States. If the Commercial Officer position is eliminated, consideration should be given by the Department of Commerce to minimizing the flow of trade inquiries to the Consulate General.

We want to stress the need for one political/economic reporting officer in Johannesburg, since the city is South Africa’s largest and its financial and industrial center. The economic contacts of this officer are of considerable value to the Mission. He is the officer best situated for reporting on the role of blacks in the economy. Also he monitors the socio/economic problems of South Africa’s apartheid society. For example, he is a window on Soweto, the sprawling Johannesburg suburb of 1.2 million blacks.

The regional resources officer in Johannesburg is also important in the execution of mission functions in the economic field. This officer is our chief contact with the mining industry. His reports with regard to developments in diamond, gold, uranium, and chromium mining will have continuing importance to the United States. This officer does not have significant contact with the South African Government. Therefore, the elimination of this position would not convey the sort of political signal afforded by some other positions. It would, however, deprive us of essential information relating to South Africa’s vital minerals sectors and for following Rhodesian sanctions enforcement.

The economic/commercial officer position in Cape Town is the second-ranking position at this post. As the center of South Africa’s colored community, Cape Town remains an important political and commercial center. Since the officer now does a substantial amount of political work, action is being considered to redesignate this position as political/economic. This position needs to be retained if essential reporting is not to suffer.
The two economic/commercial officer positions in Pretoria already represent the minimum staff necessary to follow important economic questions in South Africa and discuss major economic issues with the South African Government. The economic/commercial counselor is the supervisor of the total economic/commercial reporting program, e.g., CERP, WTDRs, etc. at all four posts. Furthermore, if the United States begins to give greater consideration to the use of economic leverage in southern Africa, the role of the Embassy’s economic/commercial officers would become even more important in the future. These two officers maintain important contacts in the business and industrial sectors, and report much of value about economic trends, trade patterns, stockpiling efforts, and other matters of special interest regarding South Africa’s economic strengths.

**USIA**

We do not recommend any reduction in current USIS staff in South Africa. The benefits of USIS activities to the United States Government and to the majority population of South Africa are substantial. Through its libraries in Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban and its reading room in Soweto, USIS has developed broad contacts with all racial communities in South Africa. In recent years, USIS has focused most of its extensive cultural programs on the black community in South Africa. In establishing good contacts with black community leaders, USIS has fostered substantial goodwill for the United States. As USIS continues to focus much of its program in South Africa on the black community, we can expect continuing benefits from these efforts in the years to come.

The reduction or elimination of USIS personnel and programs would have little political gain. Since our USIS activities are one of our main ways of reaching the black community in South Africa, the elimination of or a cutback in USIS programs might even be interpreted by the South African Government as a sign that we wish to discontinue or deemphasize such contact. At best, the signal which the South African Government would receive from such a reduction would be mixed. On the basis of the substantial benefits from the USIS program, we believe that there is a strong case for maintaining (or even expanding) the USIS presence in South Africa.

**DOD**

We recommend consideration of a reduction in the Defense Attache Office in Pretoria from four attaches (three following the departure of the Naval Attache later this month) and five enlisted men to one attaché and one enlisted man. Consideration should also be given to closing the Defense Attache Office in Cape Town (one attaché and one enlisted
man). This office may have to close in any case due to the fact that the South African Government is requiring the Assistant Naval Attache to move from Cape Town to Pretoria by the end of 1977. By virtue of our recommendation below to close the Eastern Test Range Tracking Station near Pretoria, there would also be a net reduction of one Air Force enlisted man at the tracking station.

In proposing these cuts, we have attempted to reconcile the legitimate and important liaison and intelligence gathering functions of the DAO with its status as a conspicuous example of a US-South African military relationship. It is in the military area where the US is particularly open to criticism by South Africa’s blacks and other African nations.

The most emphatic signal would be a complete closing of both Defense Attache Offices. This action would provide an unmistakable indication of our overall intentions and our specific interest in discontinuing existing military relationships. The South African Government tends to regard the maintenance of a full range of attache staff as indicative of a desire to stay in touch on military matters. The closing of the attache offices would be in keeping with our arms embargo and restrictions on high-level military contacts. Such a move would also achieve maximum political payoff in the black community and in other African states.

The disadvantages of a complete closure should be examined carefully. First, we would lose important intelligence gathering and intelligence liaison functions. These functions could probably not be assumed by other agencies. Second, we would lose our chief contact with a key element of the South African establishment. This contact could continue to be useful as an avenue for explaining US views and policies. Third, we would lose the DAO’s flight operation, which supports [1 line not declassified] the administrative requirements of eight posts in the region. It has also been of very great value in certain special diplomatic missions.

If an overall reduction in Mission personnel is to be made, and if it is to have some significance, a reduction in the size of the DAO is essential. Of all of the American presence, the South Africans and other African countries regard as most significant the presence of five (soon to be four) U.S. military attaches. Failure to eliminate DAO positions would indicate that we wish to continue to maintain close military relations and would undercut the effect of reductions in other areas. Therefore, we recommend a maximum cut in DAO personnel—four attaches and five enlisted men. With only one attaché in Pretoria and none in Cape Town, the loss in intelligence gathering would be substantial, but with one officer at least the most essential work could be carried out.
**Agriculture**

We recommend the elimination of the agriculture attache position in Pretoria since the retention of this position would be seen as business as usual by South Africa’s white farmers and food processing industry. Although the Embassy’s agriculture section would be left with no U.S. citizen employee, the work of the two local employees in the section could afterwards be supervised by the Economic/Commercial Counselor.

**IRS**

We do not recommend any reduction in the number of IRS personnel assigned to the IRS office in Johannesburg. Since the work of this office is entirely with U.S. citizens and corporations, a reduction in staff would convey no political signal to the South African Government, unless the office were closed entirely. In a situation in which we were sharply reducing staff, however, failure to close this office could send the wrong signal to South Africa.

**FACILITIES**

**State**

We have recommended above the reduction in level of all three consulates general to consulates. In addition, we have considered the possibility of closing one or more consulates general, but have concluded that the overall cost would be greater than the political benefits. Each consulate general continues to play an important role in discharging fundamental mission operations. A facility must be maintained at Cape Town to accommodate and support the Embassy six months each year. Moreover, Cape Town is the center of the country’s colored community of 2.4 million. Johannesburg is probably the most important of the three consular sites. Besides being South Africa’s largest city and its economic and commercial capital, it has the largest number of visiting and resident U.S. citizens. Moreover, it lies at the center of South Africa’s major concentration of urban blacks. Of the various black townships, Soweto is the largest. Politically, Durban plays an important role. It provides our main access to Transkei developments and our contact with the Indian community, which is concentrated in Natal. Durban is also the most important center of white political opposition and is near the home of the nation’s largest black group, the 5 million Zulus. Chief Buthelezi, an important black leader, is based near Durban. It is also the largest port in South Africa. We would not want to lose any of the advantages gained by having active reporting posts in these three cities.
USIA

Consistent with our recommendation regarding USIS personnel and programs in South Africa, we recommend no reduction in USIS libraries and other facilities in South Africa.

DOD

We recommend the closure of the Defense Attache Office in Cape Town and closure of the DOD tracking station. The reduction in personnel proposed above also necessitates the withdrawal of the military support aircraft and the private contract employee who services it.

The DAO in Cape Town contributes to the collection of military intelligence which is useful to the United States. In our view this consideration is outweighed, however, by the need to reduce our military presence in South Africa.

The requirements of the South African Government would make it necessary to locate in Pretoria the remaining attaché and enlisted man after the reductions in DAO personnel discussed above. However, if there are important reasons to keep open the Defense Attache Office in Cape Town, and if the South African Government will permit it, we would not oppose the retention of two DAO enlisted personnel, one of whom could be assigned to Cape Town.

The DOD tracking station has not been used actively since 1973, and a request by the DOD to use the facility later this year and early in 1978 has been turned down by the National Security Council. For all practical purposes, the tracking station is not functional and does not contribute to US space-tracking operations. The gains from a formal closure of the station would be worthwhile because the facility is a visible example of US-South African cooperation in the military-scientific field. In conjunction with the reduction in DAO positions proposed above, the closure of the tracking station could well make a significant impact upon the South African Government.

If we proceed with the reduction of DAO positions to one officer and one enlisted man, it will be impossible to maintain the military support aircraft, since a minimum of two attaches and two enlisted men are needed. This means a loss in both intelligence gathering and administrative support to all southern African posts. Some of the loss in the latter category can be compensated for through greater use of commercial charter flights.

Agriculture

With the exception of the elimination of the agricultural attaché position discussed above, no changes in Department of Agriculture facilities in South Africa are proposed. The attaché office would remain
open and would come under the supervision of the Economic/Commercial Counselor.

IRS

No changes with regard to the IRS office in Johannesburg are proposed. However, in the event of a major reduction of the U.S. presence in South Africa, the IRS office probably should be withdrawn since its continued existence would be regarded as business as usual.

TIMING

The timing of the reductions in personnel discussed above is important. Barring logistical problems, all of the reductions could be made within three months. Some, even most, of the reductions could take place immediately, but at considerable personal hardship to those affected and their families, and with considerable strains both in the logistical support necessary and in the personnel systems of the affected agencies. In any case, we recommend that we proceed immediately to implement moves outlined above with respect to the status of the consulates general and the closure of the tracking station. Moreover, we recommend that these steps as well as whatever decision is reached with regard to staffing reductions be announced publicly in order to make the greatest impact.

320. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter

Washington, November 11, 1977

1. Talks with South Africans on Nuclear Issue: Dick Moose and Joe Nye met informally November 10 with Brand Fourie and Ambassador Sole to review nuclear matters. We told the South Africans that if they adhered to the NPT and agreed to interim safeguards on the Valindaba enrichment plant, we would furnish low enriched uranium for the Koeberg reactors. We stressed our continuing concern about developments at Kalahari and the importance we attach to moving ahead urgently to determine whether we can reach an agreement.

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 11/77. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum.
Fourie and Sole indicated that Vorster’s original assurances stand. Fourie denied that Kalahari was a nuclear test site, declined to say what its purpose is, but suggested that we may soon have access to information which will clarify its actual nature. On fuel for the Safari-I reactor, the South Africans showed some interest in the possibility of converting the facility to use low enriched fuel. The discussion left unclear the extent to which agreement on HEU fuel would be a prerequisite for the SAG taking the steps we have stipulated, but Fourie indicated that if all we could do is supply fuel for the Koeberg reactors, then the prospects for nuclear cooperation are nil. The SAG remains concerned about our insistence on interim safeguards on Valindaba, and more generally about the possibility that regardless of assurances we might give now, US policy might change in the future thus undermining any agreement. We noted that a nuclear relationship with South Africa would entail costs and risks for us as well as for them.

Fourie is interested in having Ambassador Smith come to South Africa for talks in January; we tentatively agreed provided there was a clear, specific and mutually agreed basis for fairly final talks by then. This will require further groundwork including a reply to Vorster’s letter\(^2\) in the near future.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

---

\(^2\) See Document 311.
321. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 11, 1977, 9:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Discussion Between Dr. Brzezinski and Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, South Africa

PARTICIPANTS
FOR NSC
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Henry Richardson (NSC Notetaker)

FOR SOUTH AFRICA
Brand Fourie, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, South Africa
Ambassador Donald Sole, Ambassador to the United States

Dr. Brzezinski: I am interested in your views on the current situation. I have had somewhat of a long interest in your country going back to my childhood interest in the Boer War. And I am conscious of the historical dilemmas now facing South Africa.

Sole: Allen Dulles wrote a brochure on the Boer War at the age of 8 years old; I will send you a copy.

Dr. Brzezinski: The Boer War and the Abyssinian War have stood as two examples of remote wars which captured a wide degree of interest. As I said, I am aware of the totality of the historical legacy and the dilemmas of South Africa. However, some of these legacies are in conflict with world trends. There is the danger that local conflict, such as South Africa illustrates, will quickly attain international significance and involve other parties. They do create a web of concerns that affect the international community.

Fourie: We are concerned with where the US/South African relationship goes from here. It goes without saying that we wish good relations; we want to know whether this is still possible. In South Africa there is a feeling that society is at the crossroads, and that the government must make some firm decisions. Some say that we need to tighten our belts and concentrate on surviving. That is a long road. Can we get out of the current situation that we’re in with our self-respect intact?

One South African dilemma rests on Foreign Minister Botha’s understanding that, in terms of time, Rhodesia and Namibia were seen
as priority items to the United States. The understanding was that if there was reasonable progress on those two, then South Africa would have time to evolve with respect to the apartheid situation. This situation now seems to have changed, and domestic considerations in South Africa are now in the forefront, with the other two issues having slipped backward. Though we are not saying that there is an inter-relationship of substance, the atmosphere created by events in one area does affect the others. This has been complicated by the recent UN action.\(^2\) Prime Minister Vorster has no intention of going back on his assurances concerning Zimbabwe and Namibia, but undoubtedly a shadow has been cast over those two issues. We will still try to carry out our promises on them. The nuclear issue is interlinked, though we do believe it is soluble. One problem does bother us: What is the use of making progress on the nuclear issue or on some other issue, if it is to be overturned in three or six months by UN action or by some unilateral action?

We need a period of some months, *not* (sic) years, to allow things to settle down. Our elections will be over at the end of November, and admittedly during the elections some exasperating things have been said. This is also true for the United States, for example, Ambassador Young's recent statement with respect to the Prime Minister.\(^3\) We need time to put things on ice and allow them to settle.

*Dr. Brzezinski:* You have correctly identified the four issues which face us. There was indeed a pre-disposition by the United States to give each of them different degrees of urgency. Our hope was that by cooperation with the Front Line states, the Nationalists, the British, and yourselves, that we could move ahead quickly on Zimbabwe and Namibia. But we also held that certain issues in South Africa itself must be the subject of a progressive transformation towards participation by all people in the society, because of the national and international consequences that this would have if it did not happen. The nuclear issue surfaced rather suddenly. We thought that it had been contained

\(^2\) UN Security Council Resolution 417 (1977), adopted unanimously on October 31, condemned the South African Government “for its resort to massive violence and repression against the black people, who constitute the great majority of the country, as well as all other opponents of apartheid.” UN Security Council Resolution 418 (1977), adopted unanimously on November 4, imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. For text of these resolutions, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977*, pp. 161–162.

\(^3\) Not further identified. Possibly a reference to remarks made at a meeting of the governing board of the National Council of Churches when Young said: “Lord have mercy for the hell which falls on John Vorster not after death, but in the day-to-day living with fear that has to go with the kind of sinful life that he has adopted as national policy in that government.” (“Young Sees Life ‘Hell’ for Vorster,” *Washington Post*, November 11, 1977, p. A23)
by the three assurances which you gave, but then doubt arose on those. It is important to us that there be certainty on all three of these assurances, and that there be no factual uncertainty as there may be on one of them, as well as no uncertainty of commitment. It is in no one’s interest for this uncertainty to linger.

The death of Steve Biko and the events of October 19 pose an international issue. It provoked a considerable amount of US moral and political opposition to South Africa. This has produced a situation where there is more linkage among all four of these issues, and a compression of the time lag which we had formerly been prepared to entertain. This has occurred in a process that is both national and international over which we have little control. It is simply that the world has changed in such a way that the repressive character of the acts plus some of the statements made in conjunction with them, for example, by the Minister of Justice, has led to their linkage and the compression of the time span with which we have to work.

In this respect, it is difficult to see how the situation can be put on ice, without acts by South Africa not only to undo the events of October 19, but also other positive acts in the context of black-white relations in South Africa. A simple release of people banned and detained at that time is not enough. Some broader response is needed. In this connection, you must realize that the events of yesterday\(^4\) only create a more difficult situation relative to your request to put the matter on ice. Until the events of October 19, although it was difficult, the timing was manageable.

Fourie: I do not have available sufficient facts to know exactly what happened in those arrests yesterday. I think, however, that the involvement of children was not to arrest them but to take care of them in a humane way; this leads me to believe that it was a different situation than what might have been implied in the press, but I do not have sufficient facts to comment fully.

Dr. Brzezinski: I understand, but you should realize that such events have a political effect which only accelerates the various issues which you propose to put on ice. Progress on the issue of domestic apartheid would tend to enhance progress on all outstanding issues.

Fourie: On the nuclear question our assurances will stand. There was never any intention to go back on those assurances (sic). These are not only assurances that we gave; this is our policy. The problem about the Prime Minister’s public statement arose because the questions were

framed by the reporter in terms of whether the United States had “exacted a promise”, and the Prime Minister naturally answered “no”, because all we were doing was stating what our normal policy is. We think that this was only a storm in a teacup. As I mentioned in talks at the State Department, I would hope for Gerard Smith to be able at some time in the future to go to South Africa for a discussion on nuclear issues. I know that it presents political problems in the United States to talk on these matters, but I hope that we can proceed.

On the domestic situation, the accurate picture is that there is a process of South African evolutionary progress and there are certain patterns which can be pointed out. However, there has been somewhat of a set-back in the process because of international pressures. There has now arisen in South Africa an “appeaser syndrome” which has had a retarding effect on proposals for change. But, you should be aware of major indicators of this process, all of which together constitute a trend:

1. We are formulating plans to terminate our job reservation policy, so that job reservation would disappear in 80 percent of the cases.
2. A one-man commission has been established to explore the prospects for equal opportunity for all groups in the country.
3. You have doubtless heard of the revisions in the constitution which the government has proposed, which would give Indians and ‘coloreds’ their own parliaments and make it possible for them to elect the Executive President.
4. A Cabinet commission has been appointed to act “with speed” to give the government recommendations on the position of South African blacks in urban life, and we will soon appoint a new Minister of Bantu Affairs.

Such progress cannot be instantaneous. Our elections are over at the end of November; December is our vacation month; Parliament will reconvene next January.

Dr. Brzezinski: What you say is very sensible, but now there are questions of both timing and scope that have been presented. I can appreciate your dilemmas. But there is now a change in the consciousness of the international community and the consciousness of the people in South Africa in terms of how fast these changes must take place. The kind of channeling of protest and the pace to which you refer may not be possible because of these changed international circumstances. Any attempt to do so may well lead to an even sharper conflict which will lead to consequences for everyone concerned. The only way to prevent this conflict may well be to accelerate the pace of change; although I can see your reasons for maintaining a more leisurely pace,

---

5 See Document 320.
this may be impossible under the circumstances. This means that needed corrective measures must go beyond the points that you’ve raised and anticipate future problems.

Fourie: There is unfortunately here, a case of action and reaction between what we do and the response to it. The independence of the homelands are viewed by some as a deteriorating element, but actually they are an ameliorating element in the situation. We have given Transkei its independence, and will shortly do so for Bophuthatswana and probably two or three more.

Dr. Brzezinski: That is a complicated issue, and I don’t know enough about it to discuss it in detail. But there would seem to be certain glaring inequities, in terms of their resources, compared with those in the rest of the country.

Fourie: The independence of Bophuthatswana is entirely voluntary, and until recently we did not even know if they would accept independence. They will be comparatively well off economically, especially in terms of land. Let me mention Southwest Africa, especially the question of the size of our forces that will remain in that territory. We have tried our best in negotiations with the Five Power Contact Group, but we simply cannot go below 1400 troops remaining in the territory. Unless there is some accommodation on this point relatively soon, we must proceed independently and move towards an election.

In Rhodesia, a failure on the mechanics of the proposal threatens. The majority of the black Rhodesian population favors Sithole and Muzorewa, and are opposed to the outside forces of the liberation army. We cannot influence the black nationalists to accept the proposal. But if they do not accept it, the proposal will fail. Smith will not oppose the proposal. In principle, South Africa believes that the Anglo-American proposal has the ingredients for success, but it is the little things that are preventing it at the moment.

Dr. Brzezinski: Do you mean that the black nationalists are the primary opposition to the proposal, and that Smith will not oppose the Anglo-American plan?

Fourie: Yes. If the election were held now, Muzorewa would win 60–65 percent of the vote. Nkomo cannot win an open election. We have been dealing with this problem since 1974, and originally Kaunda sold us on Nkomo. We thought then that Nkomo was the desirable leader for Rhodesia. Now we have no favorite; we favor free elections.

Dr. Brzezinski: But we have pointed out before the dangers of an internal solution, and we still believe this is the case.

Fourie: We have told Smith to forget about an internal solution. If the Anglo-American proposal fails, it will not be Smith who makes it fail, but the nationalist leaders.

Dr. Brzezinski: Will Kaunda play any role here?
Fourie: Kaunda will deal with anyone. We would expect that the nationalists would make some move to insert the Patriotic Front.

Dr. Brzezinski: It seems to us that Smith’s aims in the situation are to divide the nationalists to stall and to buy time.

Fourie: Smith is no longer trying to stall. He can no longer wreck the Anglo-American proposal. The key to the situation is the support of Muzorewa and Sithole. We know this because we have talked with all of these groups. The Anglo-American proposal is 95 percent agreed; it is only the 5 percent, and this 5 percent concerns who is going to get the lever to rule during the transition period which would lead to power after independence.

The meeting ended at 10:20 AM.

322. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the Chief of the South African Defense Force (Malan)\(^1\)

Washington, November 21, 1977

Dear General Malan:

Nearly two years ago Admiral Holloway Informed General Armstrong of our willingness to consider favorably an application for a study of South Africa’s requirements for an improved naval surveillance capability for your coastal waters and harbors.\(^2\) I understand this study has now been completed.

US authorities have reviewed this program in the light of recent developments in Southern Africa and have concluded that further cooperation would not be appropriate at this time. As a result, we will be unable to approve any new export license applications in this area.

I deeply regret the situation that has forced us to reevaluate this program and hope most sincerely that the impediments to closer cooperation between our two countries can soon be removed and the cordial relationship that has characterized past activities between our two peoples fully restored.

Sincerely,

CW Duncan

---


323. Letter From South African Prime Minister Vorster to President Carter

Pretoria, November 24, 1977

Mr President,

I am glad that you took the opportunity offered by Ambassador Bowdler’s return to South Africa to write to me about relations between our two countries. I believe that these communications between us can serve a useful purpose in removing misconceptions and possibly avoiding the taking of far-reaching decisions based on incomplete facts, leading not only to a deterioration in relations but, even more important, to an increase in the dangers facing Southern Africa—also from outside.

You referred to my meeting with Vice-President Mondale as one which you had hoped would lead towards amelioration of those conditions which prevented better relations between our countries. We must, however, face the fact that our perspectives of those conditions differ.

The United States has repeatedly called for full participation by all the peoples of South Africa in the political process. In my discussions with Vice President Mondale in Vienna during May this year I explained that there is no man who has not got the vote and who cannot participate in Government. Perhaps they cannot participate in the same manner as in the 51 States of the United States, but then one should equate the position of Guamese in the United States to that of Blacks in South Africa. The Guamese are subservient to the authority of the United States but they have no vote in Congress. Furthermore our present election is in part being fought to give more meaningful participation to the Coloureds and Indians.

Over the last six months we have become convinced that your Administration is determined to impose upon South Africa prescriptions for the arrangement of her internal structure which you have found to be most appropriate for the United States. It was Vice-President Mondale who first stressed that good relations between our two countries would in future be contingent upon South Africa moving towards a “one-man-one-vote” situation—a thesis which has subsequently been reiterated by senior officials of the Administration charged with the execution of foreign policy. For example, at the World
Conference on Action Against Apartheid in Lagos, Ambassador Young, on 30th August, said:

“In June of this year our Vice President Walter Mondale, met with Prime Minister Vorster to convey a message from President Carter and the entire United States cabinet. He said that our policy toward South Africa is rooted in a firm commitment to the progressive transformation of South African society, toward majority rule and an end to apartheid. Only as we work toward that end, in as rapid and aggressive a manner as possible, can we hope to save South Africa from the violent and cataclysmic effects of continued apartheid.”

I note from your present letter that you did not mean to dictate solutions to Southern Africa’s problems, but rather to explore how we might co-operate to avoid racial conflict in Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa. Within this framework I wish to stress that the circumstances of demography, development, culture and history of South Africa are vastly different from those in the United States. Black people in America identify themselves within the existing White-ordered society, having no separate national affiliations. In South Africa, despite a modest attenuation of their group consciousness and sentiment in the cities, Black people, as is the case all over Africa, have very clear national affiliations, based on their distinct cultural, historical, geographical and linguistic characteristics.

South Africa’s policy is in fact designed to develop a viable and just relationship between her peoples and to establish a political and social dispensation in which all will play their part fully and freely. I sincerely hope that the United States will some day find it possible to recognise that there may be more than one way of accomplishing this, and to agree that local considerations, experience and history must in the interest of those concerned outweigh theories and principles emanating from abroad.

In the third paragraph of your letter dealing with Rhodesia and South West Africa, you referred to your hope that parallel progress might also be made on resolving those issues which hinder development of a viable and just relationship among the people of South Africa”.

During a recent visit by our Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Washington, he understood in the course of informal discussions at the State Department, that the use of the term “parallel progress” was not intended to connotate that in the view of the United States what now happens in Rhodesia and South West Africa must also take place in South Africa. A confirmation of this understanding would be useful.

---

4 November 10. See Document 320.
In the fourth paragraph of your letter it is stated that the Government and people of the United States hope that the actions taken on October 19 “will be reconsidered and reversed.” I fear that there has been a great deal of misunderstanding about these actions. What was at stake was the maintenance of law and order, to enable the Government to proceed with the progressive institution of evolutionary changes already planned. October 19 should in no sense be seen as constituting a reversal of the policy of evolutionary change in the interest of all the peoples of South Africa. This policy will continue to be pursued, but it is only under conditions of law and order that it can be successfully implemented and indeed accelerated. The actions taken on October 19 can be reversed only to the extent to which the circumstances which gave rise to these actions have been corrected. These circumstances include incitement and plans for intimidation, which in themselves have gathered strength and volume from the criticisms and pressures applied vis-a-vis the South African Government from countries including the United States, which de facto and de jure, exercise no responsibility whatsoever for the maintenance of internal order and which have no intention of assuming such responsibility.

You also urge me to lead my government toward a political and social system in which all our people may take part fully and freely. This, however, is not an objective which, by the exercise of external pressure both publicly and privately, is being urged upon any other state in the international community of nations. It is only South Africa which is being singled out in this respect. It is, on the other hand, the objective of the South African Government to retain and develop within the South African framework the “many values our two peoples hold in common.” But if a policy is followed vis-a-vis South Africa of punitive action and imposition of sanctions, the retention and development of these values, far from being facilitated, are rendered infinitely more difficult, and the objective which is urged on the South African Government becomes impossible of attainment, since confrontation thereby becomes virtually unavoidable and confrontation externally can only stimulate confrontation internally.

Not only from your letters but also because of your general interest in human rights, I take it that you are concerned with the quality of life of all peoples, including those of South Africa. You may rest assured that my Government is continually striving to improve the quality of life of all South Africans. We are, for example, embarking on a new programme of providing better and additional housing, at great expense, for South Africa’s urban Black population. Considerable amounts will be spent improving facilities also in Soweto. It has occurred to me that you may wish to consider urging American firms
operating in the Republic to make a special effort to assist these programmes. Possibly, your Administration may even wish to co-operate in realising these projects.

You also refer to the questions of Rhodesia and South West Africa. In my letter of 12 October 1977 I gave an exposition of where we stand in regard to these matters and what our commitments are. I have no intention of going back on these commitments.

However, as you know, the serious obstacles still to be overcome are basically not matters relating to fundamental constitutional principle, but rather result from the aspirations of certain individuals and groups, with outside backing, to find ways and means of securing governmental power through means other than free elections—free from intimidation. If they were allowed to succeed, the Soviet Union would have penetrated even further into Southern Africa. I cannot become associated with any arrangement that would lead not to majority rule but to such a special type of dictatorship. This would rob the peoples concerned of their inherent right of self-determination.

You indicated, Mr President, that the spirit in which you had written to me was a constructive one and that you did not seek the destruction or punishment of any group in South Africa. I appreciate this, and I wonder whether we should not try to examine and identify areas of agreement and build on these areas of agreement rather than emphasise the extent of our differences.

The creation of a climate of mutual confidence might be the first priority. A pre-requisite to this might be a cooling-off period to enable the highly emotional tensions which have been generated on either side to be relaxed. If this could be done, we might be able to start early in the new year on a course directed towards building on areas of agreement between us. This in my opinion will in turn progressively diminish areas where we differ in our approach as to the manner in which best to resolve the problems of Southern Africa.

Yours sincerely

BJ Vorster

5 See Document 311.
324. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance and Secretary of Commerce Kreps

Washington, November 28, 1977

SUBJECT
Prohibition of Exports to South Africa

Since 1962 the United States has unilaterally maintained an embargo for the export of arms and related material to South Africa, pursuant to export controls administered by the Departments of State and Commerce, and the United Nations Security Council has recently called for such an embargo by all nations.

The President has determined that, in view of the policies and acts of the South African government, the foreign policy interests of the United States require additional restrictions on exports from the United States destined for South Africa. Accordingly, the President hereby directs the Departments of State and Commerce to: a) continue the present embargo on export of arms and related material to South Africa, and b) take the necessary measures under their respective export controls to prohibit all exports from the United States of any commodities and technical data for delivery to or use by military or police forces under the jurisdiction of the Republic of South Africa.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 11–12/77. Confidential.
325. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, December 3, 1977

SUBJECT

Proposed DOE–SASOL Agreement

The President has requested the Department’s recommendations regarding a Department of Energy Proposal to sign an agreement with a South African Government-controlled company to purchase coal liquefaction technology. The attached paper has been prepared in response to the President’s request.

Peter Tarnoff

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Background

The Department of Energy (DOE) has been seeking for the past year Department of State clearance for its proposal to negotiate and sign a contract with a South African Government-controlled company (SASOL) to purchase coal liquefaction technology for an asking price of about $1.1 million.

The contract negotiations and implementation of the contract will require an ongoing DOE–SASOL relationship of about 18 months. While the bulk of the relationship on the US side will actually be handled by a DOE contractor (the Fluor Corporation), there will be one 7–10 day visit by two DOE representatives to South Africa and monitoring and progress meetings every four to six weeks, which could be held in the US or in a third country. At the present time the Fluor

---

2 See Document 268.
3 Confidential.
Corporation is serving as overall contractor for the SASOL II plant, which when completed in 1982 will greatly expand South Africa’s coal liquefaction capacity.

Discussion

The Department of Energy believes that the proposed contract (a) will support the President’s energy program and help to accelerate the reduction of our reliance on imported oil; (b) will provide invaluable data and guidance to the US synthetic fuel program which cannot be obtained by any other means; and (c) could reduce the time for commercialization of DOE’s new coal liquefaction technologies by three to five years.

The Department of State believes that the benefits of the proposed contract to the US energy program must be weighed against the political costs of entering into an agreement with the South African Government at this very sensitive period in our bilateral relations. This contract would result in the creation of a new US Government-South African Government relationship at a time when the Administration is considering the termination of certain other relationships. We believe that this would be the wrong signal to send to the South African Government in the aftermath of the multilateral and individual actions which we have taken recently to express our concern over the October 19 bannings and arrests in South Africa. It is very likely that such a contract would become public knowledge; indeed, the South African Government might well publicize this development to demonstrate the continuing importance of South Africa to the United States. This relationship would be criticized as contrary to our present South African policy and would very likely have an adverse impact upon our relations with some African countries.

Recommendation

The Department of State strongly recommends that for overriding political reasons DOE not negotiate and sign the proposed contract with SASOL at this time. The Department of State proposes to review its recommendation before the end of January 1978 in the light of US-South African relations at that time and forward its views to the President. DOE has agreed to defer any further action with respect to this issue until the end of January 1978.

4 In a December 23 memorandum, Richardson recommended that Brzezinski wait until State completed its review before taking the issue to Carter. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 48, South Africa: 11–12/77)
326. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, December 5, 1977

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Subject File, Box 115, South Africa: 11–12/77. Secret. 1 page not declassified.]

Attachment

[4 pages not declassified]

327. Intelligence Assessment

RP 78–10003 Washington, January 1978

Human Rights: South Africa And the United States
An Intelligence Assessment

[Omitted here is a table of contents]

NOTE

The heart of this paper is a relatively short essay that assesses the human rights situation in South Africa, the prospects for change, and the implications of this situation for the US. The essay attempts to transcend and put into perspective the wealth of detailed information available about South African racial and security legislation and specific instances of human rights abuses. Selections from this detailed information are appended as annexes.²

The paper uses Secretary Vance’s definition of human rights, which divides the concept into three broad categories:

---

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services, Directorate of Intelligence, Job 79T01316A, Intelligence Publication Files (1977–1979), Box 4, Human Rights: South Africa and the U.S. Confidential; [handling restriction not declassified].

² Annexes A–C are attached but not printed.
Individual Rights

—The right to be free from government violation of the integrity of the person.
—Freedom from torture.
—Freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
—Freedom from arbitrary arrest or punishment.
—The right to a fair public trial.
—Freedom from the invasion of one’s home.

Social and Economic Rights

—The right to the fulfillment of such basic human needs as food, shelter, health care, and education.
—Freedom from the diversion of resources to a self-serving elite at the expense of the needy.
—Freedom from government indifference to the plight of the poor.

Political and Civil Rights

—The right to enjoy civil and political liberties.
—Freedom of thought.
—Freedom of religion.
—Freedom of assembly.
—Freedom of speech.
—Freedom of the press.
—Freedom of movement both within and outside one’s country.
—Freedom to take part in government.

I. HUMAN RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Ideology is not the issue in South Africa. It is justice.

Reverend Makhulu, a South African refugee in Botswana at a memorial service for Steve Biko.

Introduction: Jim Crow, South African Style. If one looks at the South African situation from the standpoint of human rights, one is tempted to conclude that human rights is the South African problem. This appears to be a logical assumption if one considers the events that have dramatized the human rights situation in South Africa in recent months.³

³ See Annex A for a chronology of some of the more significant South African human rights developments over the past year. [Footnote is in the original.]
—The death of black consciousness leader Steve Biko while in police custody in September 1977, less than a month after he had been detained in apparently robust good health.

—Revelations about the humiliating conditions under which Biko was held, the likelihood that damage to his brain resulted from police brutality, and indications that South African officials condoned and covered up police excesses.

—The security crackdown on 19 October 1977:

—The detention of over 50 black leaders and other activists, including the editor of the country’s largest black newspaper (The World), Percy Qoboza.

—The banning of 18 black consciousness or other anti-apartheid organizations, including two with which Biko had been prominently associated (the South African Students Association and the Black People’s Convention) and the multiracial Christian Institute.

—The banning of three publications, including The World.

—The banning of seven leading white critics of apartheid, including the head of the Christian Institute, Beyers Naude, and Donald Woods, the editor of an English-language paper and a personal friend of Biko.

Such actions are not unusual in South Africa. They reflect basic white South African attitudes about race and security. The government’s policy of apartheid is essentially an Afrikaner version of white supremacy, a concept which the Afrikaners clearly did not invent and which most English-speaking South African whites have generally shared. What distinguishes apartheid from the more relaxed and pragmatic white supremacy policies of the predominantly English-speaking white South African governments up to 1948 is an attempt to implement a systematic separation of the races. In South Africa, anything that threatens apartheid is considered a threat to national security, and anyone who criticizes apartheid is believed to be a Communist, a fellow traveler, or some other kind of subversive.

The Legal Basis for Repression. These attitudes are embodied in a complex of laws designed both to implement apartheid and to silence its critics. Many of the laws that buttress apartheid were on the books long before the National Party came to power in 1948, but their enforcement has been tightened and their scope enlarged over the past 30 years:

---

4 By apartheid we mean the fundamental South African policy of systematic separation of the races, not simply racial discrimination. Apartheid is sometimes called by other names, e.g., “separate development” or “plural democracy.” [Footnote is in the original.]

5 See Annex B for a list of key South African racial and security laws enacted since 1947 and their major provisions. [Footnote is in the original.]
—**Native Areas** and **Group Areas Laws** prohibit blacks from owning land outside the 13 percent of the country that the government has designated as black homelands.

—**Influx Control Laws** are designed to keep blacks in tribal homelands unless they have jobs.

—**Pass Laws** require each black over 16 to carry a pocket-sized passbook containing basic personal data including tribal affiliation and permits showing where he or she can live or work. Blacks must be able to produce their passbooks on demand or risk fines and imprisonment. (About 300,000 to 400,000 blacks are convicted of Pass Law violations every year.)

—**Job Reservation Laws** reserve jobs above a certain level of skill for whites.

Since 1948 the National Party governments have also added an intricate web of security laws that provide a variety of ways to intimidate critics and to silence those it regards as threats:

—**Petty harassment:** police surveillance, searches without warrant, interrogations.

—**Preventing a person from leaving the country:** refusing an application for a passport or withdrawing the passport of a person who already has one.

—**Banning:** banning orders vary somewhat from person to person, but usually are for five-year periods and commonly include restricting the person’s movements to a given magisterial district, forbidding the person from meeting with more than one person (outside his or her immediate family) at a time, forbidding attendance at any social, public, or political gathering, forbidding visits to educational institutions or factories, forbidding publishing anything or being quoted, and forbidding the practice of certain professions. (About 160 persons are currently banned, about 40 of whom are white.) An organization can also be banned, in effect making it illegal and allowing the state to confiscate its assets.

—**Listing:** former members of a banned organization can be “listed,” which subjects them to certain restrictions or prohibitions that in their totality are almost as inhibiting as a banning order.

—**House Arrest:** confining a person to his or her residence, usually from sunset to sunrise, and requiring the person to report regularly to the local police headquarters. (Such persons would almost always be under banning orders as well.)

—**Banishment:** blacks can be required to live in an area of the country remote from their homes.

—**Detention:** persons can be arrested and incarcerated for up to a year at a time without coming to trial or being charged with the break-
ing of any law. They can be held in solitary confinement and incommunicado, even being denied a lawyer. After the period of their detention expires, they can be immediately re-arrested under the same terms so, conceivably, a person could be detained indefinitely without trial. (Over 700 persons are currently detained under the security laws.)

The fact that such security practices are entirely legal in South Africa is perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the country’s human rights situation. The Afrikaners are people of the Book, so they like to have a quotation from the Old Testament or the law to justify what they do. Their emphasis on legality, however, tends to blind them to criticism and to delude them about the international acceptability of their harsh practices.

The sweeping powers granted by the security laws also create an atmosphere conducive to abuse. Police do not hesitate to use force against unarmed demonstrators. Torture seems to have become a standard operating procedure in the interrogation of detainees. Forty-five security detainees are known to have died while in police custody since 1963 (23 since March 1976), several under highly suspicious circumstances that suggest police brutality as the cause of death. At least some of the reported suicides of detainees could in fact have been prompted by a realization that death would be preferable to further torture.

There are subtle differences in the ways whites and non-whites are treated under the security laws. White political dissenters are more likely to be banned than detained, unless the government believes it can make a criminal case against them. The government is less hesitant about making mass arrests of blacks and other non-whites even if it does not plan to press formal charges. This difference may be less a function of race than of the perception that while white dissenters can be irritants, they do not pose the threat to white supremacy that the black majority does.

The Principal Target. The principal target of the government’s recent security crackdown is the black consciousness movement that has developed in recent years, mainly among the younger generation of urban blacks. Almost all of the organizations banned last October—the principal exception being the Christian Institute—were associated with the black consciousness movement. The movement is not an organization but essentially an attitude characterized by pride in being black. The government evidently holds the movement primarily responsible for creating the unrest that turned to violence in Soweto in June 1976 and views it as the principal internal threat to the South African way of life.

By its recent actions, the government apparently hopes to duplicate the success it had in repressing the black nationalist movement in the
early 1960s. At that time, it rendered politically impotent the leaders of what is now the older generation of black activists. Nelson Mandela, the leader of the African National Congress (ANC), has been imprisoned since 1962—the last 13 years at the South African penal colony on Robben Island. Robert Sobukwe, onetime leader of Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), has been either imprisoned or under house arrest and banishment for the past 17 years.\footnote{See Annex C for brief sketches of Mandela, Sobukwe, and some of the other victims of apartheid. [Footnote is in the original.]} 

\textit{Conclusion}. The only persons in South Africa whose human rights are protected and respected are whites who do not question the fundamental policies of white supremacy and apartheid. Only whites can vote, hold office, or have any meaningful say in the political process. Non-whites are systematically relegated to inferior jobs, inferior education, and inferior housing. Though there are only about 4.3 million whites in South Africa’s population of over 26 million, whites earn roughly two-thirds of the national income and possess an even greater preponderance of wealth and power.

The South African government tries to justify this situation by arguing that South African blacks are better off than the vast majority of blacks in sub-Saharan Africa. This is probably true in terms of quantitative measures of standard of living, education, housing facilities, and medical services. But the price the vast majority of South Africans are paying for this situation is the denial of their basic human rights.

II. PROSPECTS

\begin{quote}
The white man is stronger than you think, and the black man must not push us around.\
\end{quote}

Jimmy Kruger, South African Minister of Justice.

\textit{Forces For Change}. A number of important factors impinging on the South African human rights situation have changed in recent years. Internally, the younger generation of black South African activists bring a different background to their conflict with the white authorities from that of their elders. While the older generation had been educated largely in mission schools and had experienced firsthand the more relaxed white supremacy system before 1948, the younger generation is essentially a product of the apartheid system of “Bantu” education and systematic repression. Their elders have been intimidated by fear of losing their jobs and what little property and status they have managed to acquire, but many young urban blacks are imbued with the
new black consciousness philosophy and are less inhibited by the risks involved in trying to change the system. They also have less to lose.

The collapse of Portuguese authority in southern Africa has introduced a sense of impending change into the thinking of South African whites as well as blacks. The victory of radical, revolutionary movements in Mozambique and Angola accelerated this process. And the continuing pressure for black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia has further heightened Pretoria’s sense of insecurity.

Internationally, the issue of human rights in South Africa is more in the spotlight than ever before. There are several reasons for this:
—The South African government’s recent repressive actions.
—Advances in international telecommunications.
—The new US emphasis on human rights and on Africa.
—The new vitality in United Nations efforts to get South Africa to change its racial policies.

The recent UN decision to impose a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa\(^7\) is likely to be only a first step in a mounting campaign of external pressure for change.

*The Strength of Resistance to Change.* These new factors in the situation have not and will not by themselves compel the South African government to alter its basic policies. Indeed, they may make the Afrikaners even more stubborn in their resistance to change. The Afrikaners have survived many difficult tests in the past because of their resilience and tenacity and perhaps especially because of their belief that God is on their side. These qualities will help to sustain them in their future efforts to withstand what they regard as attacks on themselves and their way of life.

The Afrikaners’ resistance to change is related to their sense of insecurity and their passion for survival as a distinct people. These in turn are rooted as deeply in the sufferings and humiliations inflicted on them by the British in the 19th and early 20th centuries as in any contemporary fears of engulfment by southern Africa’s black majority. This anti-British animus does much to explain the Afrikaners’ resistance to even such modest political reforms as extending the franchise to a relatively small proportion of nonwhites, which many English-speaking South Africans would favor. The Afrikaners fear that the nonwhites would be likely to align politically with English-speaking whites and that, if enough nonwhites had the vote, such a voting alignment would be able to wrest political power from the Afrikaners. Such fears,

---

in addition to a basic conservatism, help to explain the Afrikaner conviction that reform would accelerate rather than avert a revolution.

Continuing Apartheid and Repression. The government will continue to try to implement the logic of apartheid. In theory, this would seem to require separate homelands for each of the different races, but in practice the homelands policy is limited to blacks. Other homelands are likely to follow the example of the Transkei and Bophutatswana in gaining their nominal “independence,” notwithstanding the facts that:

— The homelands have little or no meaning for urban blacks who have weak tribal loyalties at best.
— No other government in the world is likely to recognize them.
— They are not economically viable.
— The different races are actually more economically interdependent now than ever before.

The main significance of this policy in human rights terms is that it is designed to justify the government’s refusal to grant South Africa’s 18.6 million blacks any political rights outside the homelands.

The government will probably move ahead with the creation of separate parliaments for the country’s 750,000 “Asians” (mainly ethnic Indians) and 2.4 million “Coloreds” (people of mixed race, mainly white, black, and Malay). This change would allow these groups a measure of self-government, but the government has no intention of relinquishing the whites’ dominant voice in the nation’s affairs. A related proposal—to create a powerful new office of president with the authority to run the country virtually as a dictator—would reduce the power of even the present all-white parliament.

Another purportedly major change, which the government recently announced with much fanfare—replacing the passbooks now issued by the South African government with identity cards issued by black homelands—would actually result in a further implementation of apartheid. Movement of blacks into “white areas” would continue to be restricted, but the restrictions would be applied by the black homelands rather than by the white South African authorities.

Other changes will undoubtedly be announced, probably accompanied by public relations efforts to make them appear significant. Some petty aspects of racial discrimination may be reduced or even eliminated, but the effect almost certainly will be essentially cosmetic.

So long as the Afrikaners maintain their grip on power, there will be little prospect of any significant departures from the policy of apartheid. There is also little prospect for any significant relaxation of the security laws or their enforcement. The state security apparatus appears strong, vigilant, and pervasive enough to thwart major unrest and to maintain stability over the next few years at least.
The Longer Term. It is doubtful, however, that repression can be effective indefinitely. Repression in the 1950s and 1960s had the effect of turning otherwise moderate dissidents into radicals, and this trend almost certainly will continue at least among a significant minority. The only hope for meaningful peaceful change would appear to be a multiracial dialogue, which some moderate blacks and whites have already proposed. Given the determination of the Afrikaners to resist change and the power of the state security apparatus, however, the chances for peaceful change seem slight.

The longer change is delayed, the greater the likelihood it will be revolutionary and violent when it does come. In the interim, the struggle will probably be drawn out for several years, with growing bitterness and intermittent, probably increasing violence. This prospect will almost certainly keep the South African human rights situation in the international spotlight and increase the external pressures for change.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

The blacks are awakening too fast for the Afrikaners to come to terms with them. The white man is now so desperately afraid of the black giant that you can almost talk of a sick society. Fear is clouding the Afrikaner’s judgment.

F.J. van Wyk, Head of the Institute of Race Relations in Johannesburg.

Overview. The basic elements of the South African human rights situation can be stated fairly simply. The abuse of human rights is essentially a function of apartheid. Unless there is a change away from apartheid, the abuse of human rights will continue indefinitely—regardless of any other changes the South Africans make.

Notwithstanding the simplicity of these generalizations, the South African situation is extremely complex. The complexity does not stem from the fact that the government deprives the vast majority of the people in the country of fundamental human rights. South Africa is not alone in this regard either in Africa or in much of the rest of the world. Nor does the difficulty stem from the fact that the Afrikaners are particularly resistant to change; in that also they are by no means unique. What makes the South African problem especially complex is that it is rooted in racial distinctions that flaunt the sensibilities of most of the world.

The problems which this situation poses for US policy are also complex. On the one hand, there is little room for compromise between apartheid and US human rights policy. On the other hand, Washing-
ton’s human rights policy must be considered in the broader context of the full range of US policy interests and objectives. US pressures for change within South Africa are unlikely to move the Afrikaners to abandon apartheid, but they are likely to make cooperation with Pretoria in other areas more difficult. At the same time, such pressures are likely to improve US standing in black Africa.

South African Reactions to US Policy. The Afrikaners view the new US emphasis on human rights, so far as it applies to them, as an attempt to get them to change their way of life. Prime Minister Vorster and the National Party made US interference in South Africa’s internal affairs the central theme in their recent campaign for re-election. The results clearly demonstrate that the government has the overwhelming support of the country’s white electorate in its resistance to such pressures.

Politically conscious South African blacks (and black Africa generally), on the other hand, have been impressed by recent US human rights policy, at least insofar as it has implied a tougher US stance toward South Africa. They are wary, however, that US rhetoric may not be matched by sustained practical efforts in support of change. Their apprehensions derive from:

—The large US economic stake in South Africa.
—The even larger economic stake of major US allies, particularly the British.
—Past US cooperation and continuing relationships with the Pretoria regime.
—US opposition to recent efforts in the UN to enact tougher sanctions against South Africa.

While Washington’s human rights policy has given encouragement to South African blacks, it has increased the sense of isolation and insecurity of white South Africa. Since white South Africans consider themselves part of the “free world,” they find it especially difficult to understand why “the leader of the free world” has taken a leading role in what they view as an international campaign against them. They undoubtedly hope that Washington will back off from its new emphasis on human rights, and they will do what they can to achieve that end.

Rhodesian and Namibian Contingencies. The evolving situation elsewhere in southern Africa may be viewed in Pretoria as an opportunity to ease its predicament. Pretoria knows that the West would like South Africa’s help in facilitating peaceful transitions to black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia. Pretoria would probably be willing to play the delicate game of bartering its influence over negotiated settlements in Namibia and Rhodesia in exchange for a more relaxed US stance toward the South African human rights situation, if the US were willing to play that game.
Pretoria’s opportunities for maneuvering will depend in part on the course of events in Rhodesia and Namibia. “Internal” settlements in either territory which attempt to exclude the more radical “liberation” forces, e.g., the South-West Africa People’s Organization, the Patriotic Front, or their more militant elements, could raise the likelihood of more active Cuban or Soviet involvement in the Namibian and Zimbabwean liberation struggles. If such involvement escalated significantly, Pretoria might expect that US alarm at such a development would lead to greater US willingness to relax its pressures for change within South Africa itself.

**Choices for the US.** The dilemma for US policy in this situation, as in others, is to find a workable mix between principle and practicality, action and inaction. Because of the intractable nature of the South African situation, there is a risk that no matter what steps Washington takes in support of change, none will fully satisfy the demands of politically conscious South African blacks (and their principal allies in black Africa, such as the Nigerians) short of giving the black majority and the other races full and equal political rights. This, of course, would amount to a revolution in the South African context.

The Communist powers have a tactical advantage in this situation in that they advertise themselves as the champions of revolution and have few compunctions about the means by which revolution should be achieved. The advocates of basic change in South Africa, however, would be less likely to accept Communist aid if their cause had the option of viable alternative support. Most tend to be wary of Communist intentions, in no small part because of the poor Communist record with regard to human rights.

So long as the US is prepared to take practical steps in support of change, the new US emphasis on human rights should enable Washington to stake out a viable position between the racist and the Communist extremes. A graduated sequence of deliberate pressure, for example, would have a chance, over time, of convincing the Afrikaner leadership of the need for meaningful change. Failing that, the US would at least put itself in a position to compete with the Communist powers in the longer term contest for influence not only in southern Africa but in Africa generally.

On the other hand, if the US is not prepared to back its human rights principles with serious practical efforts (unilateral, multilateral, or both) for change within South Africa, the US could regain some favor with the Pretoria regime. This would have the near term advantage of facilitating Pretoria’s cooperation in other areas but the disadvantage of identifying the US with racism and the southern African status quo. Given the powerful forces for change already set in train, such a choice would almost irrevocably ensure a long-term diminution of US influence.
328. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, January 13, 1978, 0040Z

9388. For the Ambassador deliver opening of business. Subject: Nuclear Talks. Ref: Pretoria 171.2

1. After this extended silence from the SAG on arrangements for team visit, a discussion with Fourie clearly is called for.3 Continued reticence on the part of the SAG to address the issue would, at some point, bear implications for the likely utility of such an undertaking and of any subsequent political negotiation as the means to achieve our nuclear objectives. Eagerness on our part, on the other hand, could well erode our position at the start of a sensitive exploratory process, and lead the SAG to conclude that it has something to gain by playing “hard-to-get.”

2. You might wish to draw on the following, as appropriate, in indicating to Fourie that we prefer a technical exchange sooner rather than later, and that we view it as a necessary prelude to any negotiations involving Gerard Smith.

—We look upon a private meeting between Gerard Smith and South African officials in Vienna on the margins of the February 21–22 IAEA board meeting as a possible next step after the SAG has received our technical proposals.

—It is becoming unlikely that such a meeting could result in a final settlement, but it could serve as a useful prelude to a meeting held for that purpose if it could build upon the work accomplished by an exchange on the technical elements of our position.

—We would hope, therefore, that the team visit would be viewed as useful by the SAG and that it could be scheduled early enough for the SAG to be able to prepare a response to our technical proposals which could then be made available to Smith in any Vienna discussion.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156-2385. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Allen W. Locke (PM/NPP); cleared by Gerard C. Smith (S/AS), William B. Edmondson (AF), and Lewis R. MacFarlane (AFS); approved by Joseph S. Nye (T/D).

2 In telegram 171 from Pretoria, January 11, the Embassy informed the Department that the Ambassador was scheduled to meet with Fourie on January 13 to discuss the lack of movement on scheduling nuclear talks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780016-0360)

3 In telegram 298 from Pretoria, January 17, the Embassy reported on Bowdler’s January 13 meeting with Fourie. Bowdler noted that Fourie did not commit to sending a high-level delegation to the IAEA board meeting, which would preclude a dialogue with Smith. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150-2294)
Continued slippage of the team visit would diminish the opportunity for a useful exchange with Smith in Vienna, with attendant prejudice for working out a nuclear settlement within an acceptable time frame.

Christopher

329. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of Commerce Kreps

Washington, February 1, 1978

SUBJECT
Regulations on Prohibition of Sales to South African Military and Police

Relative to your recent request\(^2\) to interpret the Presidential directive of November 28, 1977,\(^3\) prohibiting sales to the South African police and military, as incorporating a grace period with respect to those U.S. companies which have contracted to provide repair and maintenance services for previously exported goods, the Department of Commerce regulations implementing this directive may permit servicing under outstanding servicing contracts or other legal commitments for a period of two months, and direct exporters to give notice to their

---


2 In a January 23 memorandum to Brzezinski, Kreps asked for a reexamination of the President’s directive of November 28, 1977, to allow U.S. companies to service goods previously licensed by the Department of Commerce. Kreps wrote: “In the past, when new export controls have been imposed, the Department has permitted the servicing of goods legally sold before the more restrictive controls were put into effect. The only exception is when a total embargo has been imposed. This policy reflects a need to protect the U.S. commercial reputation for reliability in the international community, which was built up in large measure through the sale of sound products backed by rapid servicing, as well as a desire to prevent requiring U.S. companies from having to default on contractual commitments. Even when the 1963 UN sanctions were imposed against South Africa, Adlai Stevenson announced that exceptions would be allowed for servicing previously exported military equipment when such servicing was stipulated in a contract. This exception applied to military equipment as well as to commercial equipment purchased by the military.” (Ibid.)

3 See Document 324.
customers to make alternative arrangements for servicing at the end of that period.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

330. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\(^1\)

Washington, February 11, 1978

SUBJECT

Nuclear Team Visit to South Africa

On September 6, 1977, the President approved the following steps in regard to the South African nuclear situation:\(^2\) (1) to present a demarche urging the South African Government to make an immediate commitment to adhere to the NPT, and to submit the Valindaba enrichment plant to IAEA safeguards as an interim measure; (2) once the groundwork had been laid, to send a team of proliferation experts to South Africa for detailed discussions and a possible visit to Valindaba.

Having presented our demarche on September 15,\(^3\) we are now sending a small team of nuclear experts, led by a political officer from the Department, to engage under Ambassador Bowdler’s guidance in a technical exchange with the South African Government on two issues that must be resolved at the technical level if we are to have negotiations on resolving the nuclear problem. The issues are:

(1) whether, given South Africa’s adherence to the NPT, the US could fuel the Safari reactor with other than highly enriched uranium in addition to fueling the Koeburg power reactors;

(2) whether application of interim safeguards to Valindaba could be consistent with South Africa’s legitimate needs to maintain the commercial secrecy of its enrichment technology.

Briefly, our efforts thus far can be summarized as follows:

\(^2\) See Document 306.
\(^3\) See Documents 307–309.
—In presenting the demarche in September, we indicated that if South Africa took the steps we urged we would be prepared to permit shipment of low enriched uranium fuel for the Koeburg power reactors. The South African side asked what our intentions were with respect to fueling the Safari reactor and we indicated that this question would have to be addressed at a later date.

—On October 13 Prime Minister Vorster responded to our demarche in a letter to President Carter.\(^4\) He reiterated South Africa’s peaceful nuclear intentions, listed a series of grievances regarding US and multilateral discrimination against South Africa on nuclear matters, and asked for high level negotiations that would address this range of issues. Vorster indicated that if the US would agree to such in-depth discussions, “a major step could be taken toward opening the way for South Africa’s adherence to the NPT.”

—In a conversation in Washington on November 10,\(^5\) Brand Fourie (number 2 in the South African Foreign Ministry) said that a decision on NPT adherence would not be a difficult one for the South African Government, but that two issues caused the South African Government concern:

1. If future nuclear cooperation was limited to fueling the Koeburg reactors the prospects for a successful resolution of the overall problems were nil;

2. The US request for interim safeguards on Valindaba had surprised the South African Government, and had raised doubts about US intentions. The South Africans have a strong interest in protecting the commercial secrets in their unique enrichment process.

The technical team will address these issues as follows:

—On Safari, the team will describe efforts the US would be prepared to take to supply lower enriched fuel (37%) for an interim period until technology now under development permits fueling the reactor on low enriched uranium (20%). Consistent with the President’s direction, the team will not indicate US willingness to supply any further amounts of highly enriched, weapons-grade fuel. If the South Africans argue that supply of some HEU for an interim period of time would be necessary to prevent shutdown of the reactor, and if they make uninterrupted operation of the reactor a \textit{sine qua non} for a settlement, the team will urgently report this position to Washington for further consideration.

—On Valindaba, the team will propose a safeguards research and development program that could be put into place at the enrichment

\(^4\) See Document 311.

\(^5\) See Document 320.
plant as a South African-IAEA project with US technical support. A key element of the proposal is protection of South African commercial secrets while establishing effective accounting for materials delivered to and removed from the plant. This program would not constitute safeguards in a formal sense, since the IAEA will not assume safeguards responsibility before it is satisfied that appropriate and effective safeguard techniques are feasible. However, if implemented along the lines of our proposal, it would provide an opportunity to maintain an international presence at Valindaba to insure that we know what is happening there. This would be an interim step leading to application of full IAEA safeguards at Valindaba and at any follow-on commercial enrichment plant. The US contribution to such a program would be relatively small and within existing capabilities of our current research programs and would not require significant expansion of our relationship with the SAG.

An additional issue which the SAG may raise concerns US refusal to supply equipment and technology to be used eventually in South Africa's enrichment program. This point was included in Vorster's letter to the President, and has been raised a number of times by South African officials at lower levels. The team will report any South African views on this subject to Washington for study in the context of the President's April 7 policy statement, which prohibits US exports which would contribute to enrichment capabilities abroad. We have underway, with the Department of Energy, a study of South Africa's needs and previous requests in this area, and we will be prepared to offer recommendations at an appropriate time and in light of the position this issue appears to have in the negotiating process.

A remaining key issue is the suspect nuclear test site in the Kalahari. If we begin to move toward a settlement with South Africa which involves continued US nuclear cooperation, it will be essential that we be in a position to resolve uncertainties in the US and elsewhere with respect to the nature of the site. The team will ensure that the SAG understands the need to clarify the Kalahari situation. This will serve to remove any grounds for South Africa to contend later that we have added a condition to further negotiations. The team will be receptive to any South African overtures in this area, including the possibility of visiting the site. It will not, however, press the SAG for inspection of the site or in any way raise Kalahari as an obstacle to conduct of the technical exchange which is the team's primary purpose.

Peter Tarnoff

---

331. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, February 20, 1978, 1000Z


1. Nuclear team, led by Ambassador Bowdler and accompanied by Econ Couns Tartter, met with Brand Fourie and AEB Chairman Roux February 20. Ambassador introduced team and reviewed context in which team proposals were developed (talking points transmitted septel). Team members then gave overview presentations of new U.S. legislation and its effect on U.S.–SAG nuclear cooperation, Valindaba safeguards R&D proposal, and proposal for fueling Safari with lower enriched fuel.

2. Fourie listened attentively. At outset of his response, he introduced familiar theme that U.S. discriminates against South Africa in nuclear supply policy (he cited case of India as contrast); South Africa appears to meet all legal and technical criteria for receiving fuel, and yet supplies are withheld on political ground. He asked whether this would be the case in the future, noting that assurances of fuel supply was of paramount concern to South Africa.

3. Roux listened intently to team presentations, but gave no substantive response. He is arranging individual follow-up meetings at Valindaba with AEB and DFA personnel for Wednesday.

4. In his introduction, Ambassador said progress would be facilitated if SAG could clear up nature of Kalahari site. Fourie replied that no one present could respond. This was a matter for Defense authorities.

5. Request Department repeat USIAEA Vienna for Ambassador Smith and Embassy Stockholm for Oplinger, NSG delegation.

Bowdler

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 2/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 Telegram 17106 to Cape Town, January 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–1569)

3 See Document 332.
Pretoria, February 21, 1978, 0645Z

951. Department please pass White House. Subject: South African Nuclear Talks: Ambassador’s Talking Points. Ref: Pretoria 0950.2

1. Following is text of talking points presented orally to Fourie and Roux mentioned ref tel.

2. Begin quote:
   Introduction
   —The high level exchange of communications between our two governments since last August has been devoted to a considerable extent to issues relating to nuclear cooperation between our two governments.
   —Your visit to Washington last November,3 Brand (Fourie), led to the idea of a team coming to South Africa in an effort to explore and find a new basis for that cooperation to continue.
   —In this way their presence here would serve to build one of those areas of agreement mentioned by Prime Minister Vorster in one of his communications and in so doing open the way for resolving other differences.
   —In your conversation with Joe Nye last November,4 Brand, you referred to two issues of concern to your government: (1) fuel for Safari I and Koeburg and (2) the nature of interim safeguards at Valindaba.
   —Team is here specifically to present results of our careful consideration of these issues, one of which is a major element of our bilateral nuclear relationship and the other an outgrowth of our request that SAG take concrete actions in furtherance of your earlier assurances.
   —Before turning to the team, would like to make three further general points.

Vorster grievances
   —First, with respect to the PM’s October letter to President Carter,5 we have studied with care all the concerns raised there.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Africa, Box 18, 2/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.

2 See Document 331.

3 See Document 320.

4 See Document 320.

5 See Document 311.
—While the team is not in a position to address in detail all of these concerns at this time, this does not mean that the U.S. would dismiss them or seek to imply that they are of no significance. We are willing to address all of them, but
—Some, as Joe Nye pointed out, are multilateral in nature, and beyond our ability to control.
—Those which we can deal with, clearly, can be dealt with most effectively in the more favorable climate that would be created by the SAG’s taking the actions we have proposed.
—It is our hope that through this team visit, we can develop a clearer picture of a continuing US–SAG nuclear relationship, and so establish a basis for your government’s consideration of NPT adherence and placing interim safeguards on Valindaba which in turn would make it possible to provide fuel for Safari I and Koeburg.

Kalahari
—Another point I believe needs to be referred to is the Kalahari site.
—As Joe Nye noted, progress toward a settlement would be greatly facilitated if you would clear up for us the nature of the site.
—I have to say, in all frankness, that our experts are unable to explain the site as other than a nuclear test site.
—Whatever settlement involving continued nuclear supply we eventually reach, we will have to assure the Congress, the NRC, and the public that we are not contributing to a program that is on the threshold of a nuclear test.
—I understand that your government may be extremely reluctant to divulge detailed information on the site.
—Nonetheless, it would be most useful to the settlement process if this question were clarified during the Washington team’s presence here.

Developments in U.S. nuclear policy
—Finally, I would like to review one or two aspects of our nuclear policy as they affect U.S.-South African relations in particular, and U.S. nuclear cooperation worldwide.
—The U.S. Congress has just passed new legislation, which the President will sign into law very shortly, that revises our nuclear export policy.
—We will be renegotiating our agreements for cooperation to bring them into line with new conditions required by the law. We have about two years to accomplish this.

6 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, H.R. 8638, PL 95–242, signed into law by President Carter on March 10, imposed strict nuclear export controls.
—We can, if you like, offer some preliminary views on how the U.S.-South African agreement would be affected. The team has copies of the law and Mr. Locke would be happy to brief such persons as you designate.

—One provision I should note is the requirement in the law that a recipient have all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in order to qualify for continued receipt of U.S. nuclear materials and technology after the 24-month renegotiation period.

—One other policy consideration I should mention, although it is not a part of the new legislation, is the President’s decision in April that henceforth we will not supply highly enriched uranium unless two conditions apply: that the project for which the HEU is intended is “of exceptional merit”; and that it is not technically feasible to convert the project to use lower enriched material.

Presentation of team

—Now I would like to describe the team and what it has brought in the way of proposals.

—Allan Locke is Deputy Director of the Office of Non-Proliferation Policy in the State Department, and has worked closely with Joe Nye (whom you have met), as well as with Ambassador Gerald Smith and other concerned offices on our current nuclear policy initiatives.

—Joerg Menzel is a safeguards expert with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He is thoroughly conversant with the IAEA’s efforts on enrichment plant safeguards and authored the proposal on Valindaba that we wish to discuss with you.

—Richard Lewis, with the Argonne National Laboratory, is one of our leading technical men in the field of research reactor fuels, most recently regarding development of lower enriched fuels for research reactors. He has looked closely into the Safari situation and would be able to present his findings on how Safari might operate with lower enriched fuels supplied by the U.S., consistent with our overall policy direction.

—We can go through these proposals now in whatever detail you like, or the team members can leave with you preliminary written proposals for your study. We can spend more time discussing any of the points I have raised.

—If you believe that our proposals could contribute to the process of settling our nuclear problem, and merit follow-up discussion at the technical level, I would be glad to place the team at your disposal.

End quote

3. Request Department repeat to USIAEA Vienna for Ambassador Smith and Embassy Stockholm for Oplinger, NSG delegation.

Bowdler
333. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

Washington, March 17, 1978, 0141Z

68704. Subject: Non-Paper to Dobrynin on South African Nuclear Test Site.

1. During March 16 luncheon meeting with Dobrynin the Secretary handed over the following non-paper on the South African nuclear test site: (Begin text)

We have studied carefully your message on the South African nuclear situation. We appreciate this opportunity to continue the constructive exchange which began last August.

We have no information that a new and separate possible test site is under construction or that significant new test-related activity is being undertaken at the site in the Kalahari. We have information that there is continuing activity at the Kalahari site but our experts have not concluded that this present activity represents preparation for conducting a nuclear explosion.

As you are aware the South African Government has stated that it does not intend to produce or test a nuclear explosive. Our information does not lead us to conclude that the South African Government is proceeding to act contrary to those assurances. Nonetheless, we continue to be concerned with the situation and are actively working toward the objective of having all South African nuclear activities brought under full IAEA safeguards.

We have no information on the construction of reactors dedicated to plutonium production in South Africa. The only reactors known to be under construction are the two power reactors at Koeburg. These power reactors will be subject to IAEA safeguards and commitments against the use of any produced material in nuclear explosive devices. The agreement between France (the reactor supplier) and South Africa also prohibits the reprocessing in South Africa of the reactors spent fuel. As for a new facility for the production of enriched uranium, we understand that the South African authorities have reduced the size of the proposed expansion of the existing uranium enrichment facility at Valindaba so as to limit its capacity to fueling South African reactors with low enriched uranium. We would be pleased to receive any addi-

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 111, 3/16–27/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Brown (EUR/SOV); cleared by Garrison and Tarnoff; approved by Shulman. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1246)
tional information you have that the South African Government may be working on a second test range and building a reactor dedicated to plutonium production.

We agree that it is important to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by South Africa and to induce South Africa to adhere to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards. In this connection, we have put to the South African Government a proposal for early establishment of an international presence at the Valindaba enrichment facility to develop a formal safeguards program to be administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. We believe that our willingness to continue some nuclear cooperation under these conditions would be a significant inducement for the South African Government to take the necessary action.

We have noted your reference to the “possibilities” of the UN Security Council. While we do not rule out eventual recourse to the Council, we do not believe that Council action at this time would be helpful in realizing the above objectives. We value the close consultation which the USSR and the United States have maintained on this issue, and we trust that you would consult with us prior to taking any further steps. We intend to continue our consultations with you in the cooperative spirit that has marked them throughout. (End text)

2. Following is text of Soviet message to which our non-paper responded:

(Begin text)

We would like to draw your attention once again to the question on which we already had a frank and useful exchange of opinions last August, namely, to the question of preventing the realization by the authorities of South Africa of their plans to develop nuclear weapons.

We met with satisfaction your communication concerning steps taken by the United States to exert restraining influence on the Government of South Africa. As you have informed us, South African authorities gave assurances to the US Government that South Africa would not conduct any nuclear test explosions. It is also known that South African authorities made public statements to that effect. However, competent Soviet organizations have data that work is continued in South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and prepare test explosions. Equipping is being completed of one test site, and construction of another is under way. Information is also available that an industrial

---

2 See Documents 287–289.
3 See Document 302.
4 See footnote 5, Document 307.
reactor is being built in South Africa for producing weapon-type plutonium and, in addition to a small facility already in operation, a new large factory for the production of enriched uranium is planned. Its construction will enhance to a considerable extent the potential of that country to produce nuclear weapons.

In view of the above, a question arises regarding further actions to prevent conducting nuclear tests and developing nuclear weapons by South Africa.

As we understand, possibilities of the United States to exert direct restraining influence upon that country are far from being exhausted. Naturally, the possibilities of the UN Security Council should also be used in this regard. We, of course, would be prepared to consider also other possible steps which, in the opinion of the US Government, could bar the access of South Africa to nuclear weapons.

It is obvious that this question is a matter of immediate concern to our countries as permanent members of the Security Council which bear special responsibility for maintaining peace and international security.

It is necessary to take all possible measures in order to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by South Africa, to induce it to accede to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to place all its nuclear activities under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will consider any communication with understanding and, on your part, will share with me your thoughts on this question which, as you understand, becomes a matter of urgency.

(End text)

Vance
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, March 20, 1978

SUBJECT
Review of U.S. Economic and Commercial Relations with South Africa

The President decided on October 25\textsuperscript{2} on a number of measures concerning the recent developments in South Africa. Included among these was the decision that the United States “should immediately undertake a review of its commercial and economic relations with South Africa.” Pursuant to this decision the Department of State undertook the preparation of such a review in collaboration with other U.S. Government agencies. Contributions to the review were received from the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Export-Import Bank.

The Review of U.S. Economic and Commercial Relations with South Africa has now been completed and is attached. All contributing agencies are in basic general agreement on the review.

Peter Tarnoff\textsuperscript{3}

Attachment

Review of U.S. Economic and Commercial Relations With South Africa\textsuperscript{4}

Washington, undated

[Omitted here is the title page.]

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 66, PRC 041, 2/11/77, Southern Africa. Confidential.
\textsuperscript{2} See Document 314.
\textsuperscript{3} Wisner signed for Tarnoff above this typed signature.
\textsuperscript{4} Confidential.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Scope

II. Summary

III. Current U.S. Economic and Commercial Policies
   A. Commercial Promotion
   B. Export-Import Bank
   C. Commodity Credit Corporation
   D. Restrictions on Selected U.S. Exports

IV. Trends in Economic/Commercial Activities with South Africa
   A. Trade
   B. Investment
      1. U.S. Investment in South Africa
      2. South African Investment in the U.S.
   C. Finance
      1. Commercial Banking
      2. Export-Import Bank
      3. Commodity Credit Corporation

V. Range of U.S. Policy Options for a Change in Relationships
   A. U.S. Government Support for Voluntary Actions by Private
      U.S. Firms or Banks
      1. Neutral Position Toward U.S. Private Sector Activities
      2. Unilateral Encouragement of Progressive Behavior
      3. More Active Encouragement Through Multilateral Efforts
      4. Additional Unilateral Encouragement of Progressive Be-
         havior Through Forceful U.S.G. Leadership
   B. Other U.S. Measures Which Might Be Taken Under Existing
      Legislation and Their Likely Impact on All Parties
      1. Termination of U.S. Export Promotion Activities
      2. Discourage New Investment and/or Bank Loans
   C. U.S. Measures Which Would Require Legislative or UN Action,
      and Their Likely Impact
      1. Moratorium on New Direct Investment and/or Bank Loans
      2. U.S. Import Restrictions
      3. Denial of Foreign Tax Credits
      4. Freezing of South African Assets
VI. U.S. Vulnerability to Range of South African Economic Measures

A. Trade

1. U.S. Exports
2. U.S. Imports

a. Chromium
b. Manganese
c. Industrial Diamonds
d. Vanadium
e. Platinum Group Metals

VII. Popular Attitudes and Proposed Legislation in the U.S. Congress

VIII. Conclusions

Appendices:

A—Statistical Tables
B—Pending Legislation Related to South Africa
C—Additional Eximbank Options

I. Scope

The President decided on October 25, 1977, on a number of measures to signify our displeasure with the increase in repressive measures in South Africa. At that time it was decided that the United States “should immediately undertake a review of its commercial and economic relations with South Africa.” Pursuant to this decision the Department of State undertook the preparation of such a review in collaboration with other U.S. Government agencies. Contributions to the review were received from the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Export-Import Bank.

The review which follows identifies a number of measures in the economic and commercial field which we could take to achieve one or more of our objectives in South Africa. In the review we have considered the likely impact of such measures on ourselves, South Africa, or third parties. We have not conceived of the review in itself as leading to policy recommendations for future action since such action, if any, will depend on the evolution of our political relations with South Africa.

II. Summary

Over the past twelve years, the United States has neither encouraged nor discouraged U.S. investment in South Africa. Nor has the U.S. taken part in trade promotion events in South Africa involving substantial and readily identifiable government participation and spon-
sorship. The U.S. Export-Import Bank has not granted direct loans to South Africa since 1964, and the U.S. Government restricts the export of selected items to South Africa. Further, the U.S., which voluntarily embargoed arms shipments to South Africa in 1963, fully observes the recent mandatory UN arms embargo against South Africa. On November 28, 1977 the President issued a directive to prohibit future exports of all commodities and technical data destined for sale to or use by the South African police or military.

Despite our self-imposed restrictions (albeit limited in nature) in response to apartheid and specific repressive measures, U.S. trade with South Africa expanded substantially during 1965–76, although less rapidly than trade with the rest of Africa. In 1977, however, because of the economic recession in South Africa, our exports to South Africa declined. United States direct investments in South Africa also grew steadily over the 1965–76 period and contributed to the growth of the South African economy. U.S. banks increased their share of foreign commercial loans to South Africa in the 1970’s and have been an important factor in South Africa’s ability to sustain large balance of payments deficits. There has been a decline, however, in the rate of increase in the book value of U.S. direct investment and bank loans during the last year, brought about by uncertainties concerning South Africa’s political future and by the current recession in South Africa.

Any proposals to change our economic/commercial relationships with South Africa would have to be viewed in light of the following three possible U.S. policy objectives as well as our own economic welfare and that of our principal allies: 1) encouragement of a progressive transformation of South African society; 2) distancing the U.S. from South African human rights abuses through a reduction of U.S. business and official involvement in South Africa; and 3) improvement—or no deterioration—of our political and economic/commercial relations with black Africa. The pursuit of one or both of the first two objectives could, of course, serve to facilitate the goal of improving our relations with black African countries, as well as serve to protect U.S. interests in a future majority-ruled South Africa.

For example, additional measures involving U.S. Government support of enlightened employment practices by U.S. firms would respond to the goal of encouraging progressive transformation of South African society. Measures to further restrict trade or to curtail loans or investment would tend to distance the U.S. from South Africa.

---

6 See Document 324.
There are a number of possible ways in which to change our economic and commercial relations with South Africa. They include a) U.S. Government support of voluntary actions by U.S. firms and banks; b) various measures which the U.S. Government could take under existing legislative authority; c) measures which would necessitate new legislation; d) measures which could be taken pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and e) declaration of a national emergency in order to invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

U.S. measures that could be taken under existing legislation include policies to encourage and reinforce action by private firms and banks, the termination of remaining U.S. export promotion activities, discouragement of new direct investment in or bank loans to South Africa (e.g. by official persuasion), and a variety of possible restrictions on U.S. exports or export financing (i.e. Eximbank guarantees and CCC credits). U.S. measures requiring new legislation or action by the U.N. Security Council include a range of possible U.S. import restrictions against South Africa, a moratorium on new investment in or bank lending for South Africa, denial of foreign tax credits and, in the extreme, freezing South African assets in the United States.

South Africa, in retaliation to our measures or for other reasons, could take various actions including possibly an embargo on U.S. exports, refusal to repay commercial bank and Eximbank guaranteed loans, restriction of the remittance from South Africa of dividends of U.S. firms, or a cut off of sales to the U.S. of strategic minerals. The loss of South African minerals would be costly, particularly with regard to chromium, especially in the unlikely event that South Africa ceased exporting these minerals to other countries at the same time. There are other suppliers of some of these minerals, however, including some black African states. Not all these suppliers could meet the immediate U.S. demand. Because of its dependence on foreign capital, technology and earnings from minerals exports, South Africa would be unlikely to undertake severe economic measures against the U.S. unless we took severe economic measures against it. If the South Africans undertook a major retaliation, the U.S. economy could adjust only after considerable dislocations and adverse effects on some U.S. domestic policy goals.

Severe U.S. restrictions on exports to South Africa and ending of export financing could be costly for the U.S. in economic terms especially if taken unilaterally. Equally, maintenance of the status quo—if the situation in South Africa does not improve—would be costly in terms of our foreign relations with the rest of Africa, and the credibility of our general human rights policy. Limited measures, such as providing tax credits or Eximbank facilities solely to U.S. firms which practice enlightened employment practices, would be less costly in economic
terms, but less helpful in our relations in the rest of Africa. Actions taken multilaterally would put more effective pressure on South Africa with possibly less cost to the U.S.

Increased U.S. Government support of voluntary action against apartheid by U.S. firms and banks is one means of influencing changes in the work place. There are a number of possibilities for U.S. Government measures, including the elaboration of a code of conduct for U.S. multinational firms operating in South Africa. By itself, however, this kind of action would not be enough to contribute significantly to all our policy objectives.

While a growing number of members of the House and Senate favor taking action against South Africa, the majority is silent on U.S. policy regarding South Africa. There are currently six pending bills dealing with South Africa. These include, inter alia, proposals to deny tax credit to U.S. firms operating in South Africa, prohibition of U.S. imports of South African coal and uranium, and prohibition of Eximbank facilities for U.S. exports to South Africa. Legislation which would adversely affect American business in a serious way—in either the investment or trade field—would be unlikely to pass, at least under present circumstances.

The principal conclusions of this study will be found in Part VIII.

[VIII. Conclusions]

1. Evolution of our Economic and Commercial Relationship with South Africa

The movement toward increased restrictions on our economic relationship has been imposed by the U.S. and not South Africa. It has been triggered largely by concern about apartheid in general and by specific harsh measures taken by the South African Government rather than by factors relating to the situation in Namibia and Rhodesia. Our future relationships will hinge on domestic U.S. Executive and Congressional responses to South Africa’s actions in all these areas.

2. Recent Trends

Restrictions have not thus far had a great impact on the trend of our economic relationship. General economic conditions have been the controlling influence, with apprehensions about long-term internal stability a secondary but progressively important factor. Confidence—particularly important for investors—has been shaken by recent events in South Africa.

3. Policy Options

a) Increased voluntary actions by U.S. firms and banks in the field of enlightened employment practices could be one way of combatting
apartheid in the workplace. South Africa’s desire to maintain its link to foreign technology and capital leads us to believe that the South African Government is highly unlikely to oppose efforts to upgrade employment practices. Voluntary measures might be among the easier and least costly of the options for change in the relationship. There is some disagreement, however, as to how much progress has been made thus far under existing guidelines. Black Africans could view increased voluntary measures as inadequate, and they do not fall into the category of measures which would distance us from South Africa.

b) The U.S. could reinforce these voluntary actions through more forceful leadership. This could include updating the 1973–74 guidelines, seeking new ideas from the U.S. business community, highlighting good and bad employment practices, discouraging bank loans to non-subscribing firms, and/or publicly discouraging new investment in South Africa unless the firms are willing and will be permitted to meet more progressive employment standards. U.S. Government support of the firms’ progressive activities would less likely provoke an adverse South African reaction than outright U.S. calls for a reduction of business activity in South Africa, although it would have less impact than U.S. Government direct actions.

c) The unilateral discouragement of new U.S. investment in South Africa would have greater impact if accompanied simultaneously by discouragement of U.S. bank lending to South African borrowers. Although possibly difficult to obtain, multilateral action would have still greater impact in South Africa and reduce the effect of benefiting U.S. banks’ foreign competitors which unilateral action implies. An actual U.S. prohibition or moratorium on investments in or bank loans to South Africa could have a significant psychological and economic impact but might run greater risk of South African retaliation.

d) Legally the U.S. has considerable authority to restrict exports and deny U.S. Government financial support for exports to South Africa. Restrictions on U.S. exports to South Africa would have an adverse impact on certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Their impact on South Africa’s economy would be negligible unless the other main trading partners of South Africa also adopted such a policy. Their psychological-political impact, however, could nonetheless be significant, depending upon the circumstances. Measures worked out in coordination with other countries would have the greatest impact.

e) Barring mandatory action by the UN Security Council or a Presidential declaration of a national emergency, U.S. restrictions on imports from South Africa would require legislation and would have some adverse economic effects for the U.S., particularly because of our large imports of certain strategic materials. These adverse economic effects would be costly, particularly in the case of chrome where the cost of adjustment clearly would be high.
4. U.S. Vulnerability to South African Countermeasures

Should South Africa restrict exports to the U.S. we would face cost and supply problems in terms of strategic materials. As noted above the dislocations would be most difficult in the case of chrome until it becomes available again from Rhodesia. A complete break in our economic relationship with South Africa would hurt U.S firms with large sales and investments in South Africa, as well as Eximbank with substantial exposure there. South African retaliation would obviously be more difficult if our actions were multilateral. For example, South Africa could not hold its exports off the market completely without depressing its economy.

5. Congressional Sentiment

A full consensus has not emerged in support of a fundamental across-the-board change in our economic/commercial relationship with South Africa but pressures for change in the relationship are mounting.

6. Impact on Black African Countries

While certain economic/commercial actions might not have great economic impact on South Africa, they would have the advantage of distancing us from South Africa and its racial policies and thereby reduce pressure on the U.S. from black African countries where we have important interests, and also lend consistency to our overall human rights policy.

[Omitted here are Appendices A–C.]
335. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts

Washington, March 24, 1978, 0202Z


1. Begin summary: Five Power talks in Washington March 16–17 to discuss pros and cons of economic sanctions against South Africa were useful and revealing. All Five agreed it is important not to be caught off guard by initiatives or UN resolutions which might push us into actions against South Africa which we could not or should not support. It was also agreed that none of us was contemplating a complete economic embargo against South Africa but positions beyond that were extremely varied.

2. The French urged the group to establish an overall plan of common objectives and tactics and to agree not to take any unilateral actions. They argued that we must avoid a “sectoral” approach in which action would be taken in separate sectors such as petroleum or nuclear trade and said that any measures taken should not affect past or present trade/investment contracts. When pressed, the French offered to join others in restraining economic activities in only a few select areas (e.g. limiting export credits to five years) which appeared to us would have little real effect on their economic ties with South Africa.

3. U.K. officials noted the overriding importance of Britain’s investment and commercial ties with South Africa, cited the need to have “equality of sacrifice,” and emphasized that Britain could not support any significant interference with trade, reduction of government supported export promotion measures, or curtailment of public supported credit facilities. The British also asked everyone to eschew any unilateral action. German officials saw little they could do, aside from some possible reduction in export credit activities. The Canadians noted credit restriction and other actions taken in December 1977 and urged others to support their lead in phasing out public support of trade with South Africa.

4. On the U.S. side, we expressed agreement with the goal of coordinating our positions regarding prospective economic moves.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780129–0899. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Sent to Bonn, London, Ottawa, and Paris. Sent for information to Pretoria, USUN, Brussels, and Cape Town. Drafted by Francis H. Thomas (AF/EPS); cleared by Carl C. Cundiff (AF/EPS), William F. Eaton (AF/S), Thomas Niles (IO/UNP), Richard D. Kauzlarich (EB/IFD/ODF), and Robert S. Gelbard (EUR/RPE); approved by William Edmondson (AF).
against South Africa, but indicated that the U.S. could not agree to an iron clad “lock step” approach among the Five, especially if this meant that the actions contemplated would be the least common denominator of possible moves. Also, noting that each government’s relations with South Africa had unique features, we suggested that in some cases it might be preferable to handle relations with S.A. in differing ways, although it would be important for us to keep one another fully apprised of planned actions to achieve maximum coordination. Canadians generally agreed with us.

5. We declined the French delegate’s suggestion that the Five Powers agree on the spot to oppose any move in the UN to call for economic sanctions against South Africa on the grounds that the government’s apartheid actions constituted a threat to world peace and security as defined under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. We noted that the meeting had been called for an exchange of views and data, not to reach firm agreements, and that consideration of such policy questions would require careful consideration by member governments. (The UK and Germany seemed prepared to join France in ruling out Chapter VII, whereas we and the Canadians said we could not exclude such action absolutely under all circumstances, even though we would entertain any consideration of Chapter VII most reluctantly.)

6. The French then pressed for another meeting of the Five be held in a few weeks time to consider and decide how member governments would respond to pending UN resolutions. We agreed to communicate with each other later.

7. Welcome reaction by posts to foreign officials’ accounts of what is “thinkable” and what is “not thinkable” in terms of economic policy changes toward S.A.

8. For your information, we are contemplating another meeting possibly in two to three weeks, probably in New York (despite UK objections that NY is glass house where nothing can be kept confidential) to discuss possible Five Power responses to draft UN resolutions on South Africa or Namibia. End summary.

9. State Department officials, joined by observers from the Departments of Commerce and Treasury, met with their counterparts from Canada, France, Germany and the UK on March 16 and 17 to consider pros and cons of possible economic actions against South Africa. Meeting was follow-up to luncheon session in New York on February 13 of the Foreign Ministers of the Western members of the UN Security Council. Participants all agreed it was important member governments not be caught off guard by initiatives or UN resolutions proposed by other parties which might push us into actions against South Africa which we could not or should not support. All agreed none now contemplating complete economic embargo against South Africa. Beyond that, however, there emerged wide variations on positions.
10. Identification of foreign participants and agenda shown in State 064166 and 054137 respectively. Please note need to maintain confidentiality of these meetings and the discussions reported herein.

11. Deputy Assistant Secretary in Africa Bureau, William Edmondson (who chaired meeting), noted decision to arrange meeting of “experts” followed agreement of Foreign Ministers of the Five to arrange exchange of views on economic relations with South Africa and wish to have close coordination on responses to pressure for economic actions. He said U.S. in dealing with South Africa had the following principles in mind:

A. In view of U.S. concern for human rights, we could not regard passively the current situation in S.A.

B. We were seeking a peaceful transition toward full political, social and economic participation in South Africa’s society for all South African people.

C. In absence of improvements on human rights, we believed USG should consider reducing involvement in S.A.

D. As U.S. Vice President stated in Vienna last year, U.S. had no specific blueprint or timetable for change.

E. Although there was growing U.S. public disapproval regarding South Africa’s apartheid policies, there was not full agreement on measures to be employed to register our concern.

F. Actions contemplated had to be meaningful, not just easiest or cheapest.

G. We wished to avoid policies which were merely reactive to specific developments in South Africa and preferred to send a series of carefully calculated signals to the S.A. Government and people over a period of time.

H. The failure of the SAG to introduce remedial measures and our delay in distancing ourselves from the SAG could strain the credibility of our pronouncements of opposition to apartheid; the USG was being challenged by the U.S. Congress, the public and the UN to back up our avowed position.

I. The prospects that we might be forced to react to possibly hasty or harsh resolutions in the UN argued for prompt formulation of policies and careful consideration of the timing of their implementation.

---

2 In telegram 64166 to multiple posts, March 13, the Department transmitted the list of participants. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780112–0188)

3 In telegram 54137 to multiple posts, March 2, the Department transmitted the proposed agenda for the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780096–0785)

4 May 19–20, 1977. See Documents 158, 276, and 278.
12. With regard to issue of trade between the U.S. and South Africa, U.S. spokesman noted following:

A. As expression of disapproval of apartheid, U.S. during past 12 years had limited publicly-financed support of trade promotion to low level trade facilitation. For example, U.S. did not have trade centers or send trade missions;

B. U.S. had voluntarily embargoed arms shipments to S.A. for past 15 years and observes recent UN mandatory arms embargo; in November 1977 U.S. also unilaterally prohibited exports of all commodities and technical data destined to or for use by S.A. police or military;\(^5\)

C. S.A. share of U.S. trade with Africa has fallen from 31.5 percent in 1965 to 12.7 percent in 1976 (with the shift largely attributable to increased purchases of Nigerian oil); U.S. exports to S.A., while declining, amounted to $1.1 billion in 1977 (primarily higher technology goods);

D. S.A. remains very important source of certain minerals and presently provides significant proportion of U.S. needs of chromium, manganese platinum group metals (used in catalytic converters) vanadium and antimony.

13. Theoretically possible policy options considered by U.S. with respect to trade curtailment included:

A. Termination of remaining official trade promotion activities;

B. Prohibition of sales to S.A. agencies associated with apartheid.

C. Prohibition of exports of high technology items.

D. Embargo on shipments of selected goods, e.g., oil although U.S. added this idea not seen as advisable.

14. U.S. noted that impact of possible actions on trade would vary. Termination of trade promotion would have modest psychological impact. Embargo of trade would be effective only if done in multilateral context and could pose problems for people of S.A. and neighboring countries. Embargo on purchases of S.A. minerals could seriously affect U.S. domestic industries and employment.

15. On private investment, U.S. noted current policy, dating back to 1964, was to neither encourage nor discourage investment in S.A. and U.S. has encouraged American firms in S.A. to follow enlightened employment practices. Book value of U.S. investment in S.A. has risen from $490 million in 1966 to $1.7 billion in 1976. This amounted to about 16 percent of total direct foreign investment in S.A. Policy options available on investment could include effort to:

\(^5\) See Document 324.
—Encourage more actively U.S. firms to subscribe to code of conduct;
—Discourage new investment in S.A.;
—Prohibit, by legislation, new investment;
—Deny foreign tax credits (by legislation).

16. Regarding code of conduct, U.S. informally passed copy of U.S. proposal to Canadian, German, and UK delegates (French group was late arriving that day from luncheon). Document suggested that representatives of Five believe common voluntary code of conduct for foreign firms operating in S.A. would be one means to achieve our overall goals; such code should draw on existing multilateral and unilateral codes and guidelines; responsibility for implementation would belong to each participating government (that is, we would avoid issue of mandatory reporting); and proposed that Five have future working level exchanges on feasibility of adopting common code. (Begin FYI: U.S. raised issue of code in meeting only briefly since we concerned Group might focus on code as least common denominator of potential economic actions. End FYI.)

17. On official export credits, we noted that as expression of disapproval of apartheid U.S., since 1964, has prohibited direct ExImBank loans to S.A. (but not prohibited other EXIM Bank facilities). As of November 1977, ExImBank’s exposure in S.A. was just under $203 million (compared with approximately $1.5 billion for France and Germany and $0.7 billion for the UK). In addition, CCC agricultural credits to S.A. in the period 1966 to 1977 was about $88 million, mostly for rice sales. We noted possible policy options which could be considered with regard to curtailment of ExImBank facilities could range from increasing minimum cash down payment to a complete denial of all official credit facilities. A unilateral curtailment of ExImBank cover to S.A. would have only modest effect since S.A. use of European (and Japanese) credits far exceed that of ExImBank. A multilateral denial would cause substantial impact and have the domino effect of reducing willingness of private banks to do business with S.A. because of increased risks.

18. The Canadians said GOC had strong interest in African affairs. Forty percent of Canada’s bilateral aid budget went to black African countries and support for human rights was a central policy of the government. The government they said had embargoed arms to S.A., offered aid to countries surrounding S.A., recognized Angola and Mozambique and was seeking ways to signal to S.A. after the Biko affair that no longer would business as usual be tolerated. The Canadian leader remarked that SAG was unique among human rights transgressors in that “abuses are guaranteed” to the majority of the people in country from “cradle to the grave”.

19. Canadians recalled that in December 1977 the GOC, after a series of Cabinet meetings, announced actions against S.A. principally to:
   A. Phase out gradually government trade promotion in S.A.;
   B. Curtail public export credit (EDC) on government account facilities (the Canadians acknowledged that this facility not used for S.A. and credit was still available under corporate account);
   C. Plan to issue “voluntary” code of conduct for businesses operating in S.A., possibly by April (but GOC could not presently support EC code because of reporting requirements);
   D. Require South Africans visiting Canada after May 10 to obtain non-immigrant visa.

Canada presently was studying additional measures including cut-off of preferential tariffs on S.A. goods and discouragement of investment. The public reaction to current moves, the Canadians said, was split 50/50.

20. Canadians said imports from S.A. were about $150/$160 million annually of which 60 percent sugar. Exports amounted to approximately $95 million annually equivalent to 8000 man years of employment. Canadian investment in S.A. about $100 million, none publicly guaranteed.

21. Canadians said they somewhat discouraged by hesitation some members in meeting to make stronger commitments; believed it not repeat not advisable to view code of conduct as being responsive to initiatives in UN for action (inasmuch as Africans often not keen on private investment under any circumstances); thought it useful to include Scandanavians, Dutch, Japanese and possibly others in any proposed multilateral actions; noted that in Rhodesia and Namibia we openly espoused majority rule as objective and asked if this was objective of members in S.A., and; suggested members could push S.A. to take measure to remove Job Reservation Act and bring about over five year period equalization of wages and equal per capita expenditures on education. Repeatedly GOC members urged others to support Canadian lead in phasing out public support of economic ties with S.A.

22. The French delegation noted that apartheid in South Africa was an international issue and at any time another Soweto-like outburst might occur which could lead to a call for sanctions under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (relating to threats to world peace and security). The Five Western members of the Security Council should be ready to act promptly. In 1963, the French said, their government embargoed certain arms sales to South Africa and delivery on four naval vessels was stopped, although this costly to GOF.

The French asked member governments to consider what policies would effectively pressure S.A. to move away from apartheid. These
meetings, they emphasized, should be confidential to avoid having outsiders sense that we are moving hastily to erase a “bad conscience.”

The French leader said he interpreted the minutes of the meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York on February 13 to call for coordinated action of members and Western solidarity to insure efficacy of actions. He added that while it was useful for participants to review the situation it was more urgent that members agree to make decisions.

23. The French delegation, when pressed, offered to consider joining others in restraining economic activities in a few select areas:
   A. Limit export credits to five years repayment
   B. Deny public guarantees in investment (the French noted their investments were modest and generally not guaranteed.)
   C. Link public export credits to compliance with code of conduct.
   D. Under certain circumstances, might even curtail all public and private guarantees offered against inconvertibility and political risk (this, according to GOF, would cause business with S.A. to be on “cash basis”).

24. French exports to S.A. were about 2.4 billion francs, with imports about same. French direct investment was about 5 percent of total in S.A. The French delegation noted concern about using sectoral approach of attempting to bring pressure by cutting off oil or nuclear power materials; said French credit exposure in nuclear plant in S.A. was major element French interests; asked that efforts to curtail economic activities not affect past or present contracts; urged members to devise global plan; noted Africans expected members to handle the apartheid problem in S.A.; suggested we send signals to S.A. to carry out prescribed actions over reasonable time, failing which members would react. At conclusion of meeting French leader said he was disturbed that there had been no agreement of members at least to stand against introduction of Chapter 7 resolution in UN. He said we need demonstrate to world we are making effort to respond to S.A. problem.

25. The German delegation noted the FRG also wished to preserve peace and security in SA, avoid internal strife, stop outsiders from setting up spheres of influence and avoid an East/West confrontation. The FRG viewed the rights of all South Africans as being of first importance. The FRG thought, however, that it was preferable to play a constructive role in supporting gradual evolution of apartheid and noted that in seeking this goal some economic pressures might be useful. The FRG’s present policy against South Africa was to:
   A. Enforce arms embargo
   B. Avoid promoting economic interests
   C. Begin process of reducing terms export credit guarantee facilities
   D. Use labor/church contacts to induce change
E. Consider offering more scholarships for study by non-whites
F. Support code of conduct for business in S.A. as important element of "constructive dialogue."

The Germans agreed that time was pressing but thought changes evolving among constructive forces in S.A. should be encouraged.

26. Trade by German firms with S.A. reportedly amounted to DM 3.1 billion in 1976 or the equivalent of 60,000 jobs. The German business community and labor leaders, for example, Mr. Loderer of the Metal Workers Union, were against imposition of economic sanctions. German exports to S.A. were about 3.1 billion marks in 1976 or 1.2 percent of total German sales to the world. Imports from S.A. amounted to about one percent of all German purchases, primarily minerals, including about 50 percent of Germany’s requirements of chromium, manganese ore, platinum and uranium oxides. Investments by Germans in S.A. totaled 3.5 billion marks of which DM 621.6 million was direct transfers and the balance reinvestments and revaluation.

27. The German delegation noted that the FRG did not have the instruments to restrict government support for trade although efforts to "harmonize" export credit terms among members and Japan could be contemplated; individual export credits by the FRG already are limited to five years and to ceiling of 50 million DM total per transaction in absence of Cabinet approval; granting of export credit linked to EC-9 code of conduct; S.A. is in position to circumvent financial curbs by tapping the eurodollar market. On overall policy FRG said it is one thing to give a signal to the SAG and it is another thing to succeed in changing the SAG’s policy; human psychology suggests we need use gentle persuasion with the SAG, and; FRG opposes the use of Chapter 7 sanctions against South Africa.

28. British officials noted that unlike the German view, the UK did not perceive since the last election encouraging signs of change in S.A. According to UK, the SAG was preparing for economic sanctions, for example, by building up oil reserves and producing its own arms. The history of South Africans was that when pushed to corner they would fight. The S.A. problem, contrary to some Africans view, was not a leftover colonial problem as in Rhodesia and members should not allow black Africa to press us into accepting unacceptable economic actions against S.A. Members should act in concert, the UK advised, looking at the problem as a whole and agreeing where we would draw the line.

29. UK officials said British direct investment in S.A. was very large, amounting to 50 [percent] of all foreign direct investments there. UK portfolio investment was also substantial. The UK was number three supplier of goods to S.A. and number two buyer from S.A. Presently there were about 800,000 UK subjects living in S.A.
30. British said could not accept UN Chapter VII determination against S.A. since it could then be interpreted as being applicable also to other countries with human rights problems and because it was to be expected that such a determination would lead to a complete economic embargo against S.A. In view of the large British economic presence in S.A., UK officials felt that efforts to enforce a general economic embargo would be tantamount to “self mutilation.” British said domestic industry and EC generally depended heavily on public credit support and drastic actions would lead to S.A. retaliation. UK could not support “interference” with a. trade; b. export promotion measures; or c. public supported credit facilities.

31. What was “thinkable” to UK would be some limitation of government support of long term credit or curtailment of investment insurance linked to public statement that government no longer encouraged investment in S.A. No changes in economic policy could be contemplated except in multilateral context. Most changes would require parliamentary debate and approval. It was important, the British noted, to distinguish between what the members can and cannot do and to have members recognize need for “equality of sacrifice.”

32. U.S. representatives in course of meeting expressed agreement with goal of coordinating positions on proposed actions, noted that U.S. had important special interests in Africa to consider and indicated U.S. could not agree to iron clad “lock step” approach, especially if this meant actions carried out would be least common denominator of possible moves. Also, noting each government had unique forms of relationship with S.A., we suggested it might be preferable to handle relations in different ways although important for us to apprise one another fully to achieve maximum coordination and impact on S.A. Canadians generally supported this line. U.S. also noted issue of “equality of sacrifice” raised by U.K. should not be raised to level of guiding principle; efforts to have S.A. do away with symptoms of apartheid such as Job Reservation Act might not be significant if led to elimination of petty discrimination and left undisturbed basic political discrimination.

33. At conclusion U.S. declined French delegate’s suggestion that members agree on the spot to oppose any move in U.N. to call for economic sanctions against S.A. under Chapter VII of UN Charter. (The U.K. and Germany seemed prepared to join France in ruling out Chapter VII action.) We said we could not exclude such action absolutely under all circumstances even though we would entertain any such move most reluctantly.

34. The French then pressed for another meeting of the Five in about two weeks time. The U.K. delegates said they would need more time inasmuch as some issues had to be considered at Cabinet level. We
agreed to communicate with each other promptly on further meeting including if possible agenda and need to exchange papers beforehand.

35. Action requested: Would welcome reaction Embassies Paris, Bonn, Ottawa and London on policy positions taken and economic relationships described at meeting. For your information we are contemplating another meeting within two to three weeks, probably in New York (despite British problem) with concentration on discussion draft U.N. resolutions which might be tabled and how we should coordinate our positions.

Vance

336. Letter From President Carter to South African Prime Minister Vorster

Washington, March 27, 1978

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

It has been some time since we have exchanged views, and I felt it particularly appropriate at this time to give you my thoughts on two issues of great importance to both our countries: Namibia and Rhodesia.

Within a few days, you will be receiving a revised Namibia proposal that represents almost a year of intensive and sometimes difficult discussions among the five Western members of the Security Council, your Government, and other parties. I am convinced that it can bring about Namibia’s transition to independence in a way that you and the world community will recognize as legitimate and fair. It can also create an overall political atmosphere that would greatly strengthen the hand of those working for peace and moderation in Southern Africa. I ask you to bear this in mind in considering the proposal, and to bear in mind as well that the five Western members of the Security Council are fully committed to its success. I urge your Government to join with us as a demonstration of South Africa’s willingness to work toward shared objectives.

The critical situation in Rhodesia also demands the attention of both our Governments. I believe that the Salisbury agreement is inade-

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, South Africa, Republic of, 3/78–1/80. No classification marking.
2 See footnote 2, Document 85.
quate to the task of bringing about an enduring and peaceful settlement.\(^3\) Without a more comprehensive agreement, the fighting will continue and escalate, offering further opportunity for the external intervention that all of us hope to avoid.

I believe that a peaceful settlement can best be advanced by restoring momentum to the Anglo-American negotiating effort through meetings of all parties. The signers of the Salisbury agreement would be included as well as the Patriotic Front, and a serious effort would be made to narrow their differences. The initial responses to this idea have been regrettably negative. Each of the principal parties appears more interested in preserving its perceived short-term advantage than in coming to grips with the prospects of increasing violence.

I have asked Ambassador Young to urge the leaders of the Front Line states to influence the Patriotic Front to participate in such a meeting. I shall make the same point to General Obasanjo when I visit Lagos. I hope that your Government will make a similar plea for conciliation and cooperation with the authorities in Salisbury.

In your letter of last November,\(^4\) you made clear your opposition to any arrangement, in Rhodesia or Namibia, that would deny the peoples of these territories their inherent right to self-determination. I share your concern on this point, and it is precisely for this reason that we must pursue solutions that show promise of leading to the essential goals of regional stability and self-determination.

I fully appreciate the deep concern with which you and your countrymen view these problems. I want to assure you that we will not falter in our search for solutions that are both peaceful and just.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

---

\(^3\) On March 3, Smith announced an internal settlement, which resulted in a power-sharing agreement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa. See footnote 3, Document 194.

\(^4\) See Document 323.
SUBJECT

Study on Economic Pressures on South Africa

The SCC last October 24 directed, inter alia, that the “United States should immediately undertake a review of its commercial and economic relations with South Africa.” (See para. 5 of Tab B.)\(^1\) The result of this is the long document at Tab A,\(^2\) prepared by the State Department with inputs from other concerned agencies.

This study reflects general agreement among all concerned agencies, probably because it makes no recommendations. It is, indeed, a “review” and a very competent one. It indicates various kinds of actions that we could take, ranging from jawboning through executive orders to new legislation (or binding UN resolutions.) Functionally, the most interesting possibilities explored involve improving employment practices of US firms operating in South Africa; discouragement of investment; curtailment of credits; and termination of all export promotion activities and imposing other barriers to trade. A recurring theme is the need for multilateral support if any sanctions are to be effective.

The study also contains sections on the impact of various actions on US interests (notably loss of South Africa as a source of supply for some important minerals) and on public and congressional opinion (a mixed picture).

I suggest that you look at the table of contents which shows the range of matters discussed, the Summary (Section I) and, if you feel so inclined, the Conclusions (Section VII).

The study appears at an opportune time if, indeed, we are willing to impose economic sanctions in order to press the South Africans on Namibia. It unfortunately does not differentiate according to pressures that would be particularly appropriate to that issue, but that approach could be easily developed if we need to.

---


\(^2\) Not attached, but see Document 314.

\(^3\) Not attached. Reference is possibly to the attachment to Document 334.
A meeting was held in Washington two weeks ago among the US, UK, FRG, France and Canada to discuss economic relations with South Africa. Aside from a determination not to go to a total embargo, there was a wide diversity of opinion among the group as to possible steps. It was pretty clear that the collective action needed to make economic sanctions effective (and shield us from unilateral economic losses) is going to be hard to achieve, except perhaps under strong UN sanctions.

Another recent item of interest in this area is a CIA study that estimates Soviet gains from disruptions in South Africa’s trade. (The two countries have very similar exports.) A ten percent cut in South African trade with world markets would yield $400 million in foreign exchange gains for the Soviets—a 50% cut would yield about $2 billion. The Soviet hard currency deficit in 1977 was $1.5 billion. (Query: If we should have to move to sanctions, how can we prevent the Soviets from taking a windfall?? Calling on them to contribute a portion of their excess profits to some worthy African cause would be a neat propaganda move but would probably result at best in increased Soviet scholarships for African students and sending of snow plows to Namibia.)

What Next?

1. For the time being, I recommend that we put this document on the shelf to be drawn on when the occasion arises. There is no reason to move forward on any of these fronts right now, especially when we may need all the ammunition that we can muster in the next few months.

2. In the interim, however, I propose to ask State to put together some illustrative packages of economic measures that might be used in certain contingencies—e.g. Chapter VII sanctions re Namibia; pressure to get Smith to abandon the internal settlement; low-level and medium level signals of US displeasure about South African failure to improve its domestic practice.

3. Our current posture on investment (based on a 1964 Policy Planning Paper by Red Duggan) is to neither discourage nor encourage. It is inconceivable to me that we should still be neutral on this. If you agree, I will ask State how we should go about shifting our posture to one of discouragement and what that would involve. This would be implemented as part of any other sanctions actions that we might take.

---

4 See Document 335.
5 Not found.
6 Aaron approved the recommendation.
7 Aaron disapproved the proposal.
if there is no decision to apply any sanctions, we should do at least this by about June 30.  

4. As a result of the SCC meeting, it was also directed that Commerce should meet with US corporations doing business in South Africa to solicit their views on our economic relationships and future prospects. This was to be done only after NSC had given its approval. (See para. 5 of Tab B.) The meeting has never taken place; I think we should move ahead with it now, both as a means of ensuring that we have a full picture in hand before we actually do anything and as a low-key signal that we are pursuing the matter. If you approve, I will get State and Commerce moving.  

Attachment B being forwarded separately because it is an XX item.

---

8 Aaron disapproved the proposal.
9 Aaron approved the action.

---

338. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State

Secretary’s Aircraft, April 18, 1978, 0320Z

Secto 4099. Subject: South Africa: Secretary’s Talk With Botha on Nuclear Relations.

1. In brief opportunity to talk privately with South African Foreign Minister Botha and Foreign Affairs Secretary Brand Fourie after dinner April 16, the Secretary raised the issue of South African adherence to the NPT and application of safeguards to Valindaba. Botha said that both these things would be possible but indicated that the SAG’s big problem was what if South Africa did these things and then the UN Security Council applied general, repeat general, sanctions against South Africa.

2. The Secretary noted Botha’s view that NPT adherence and the application of safeguards at Valindaba were possible and said the U.S.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1740. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Pretoria and Cape Town. Vance was en route to London to attend the CENTO Ministerial meeting.
would be prepared to have Amb. Smith come to South Africa for talks on this and the full range of nuclear questions.

3. The Secretary expressed the belief that we could probably find ways to deal with South Africa’s concern about Security Council action in the strictly nuclear area, and with regard to South Africa’s concern about the deterioration of bilateral relations, said that we would welcome talking privately about broader political issues following Ambassador Smith’s visit to South Africa.

Vance

339. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated

Economic Impact on South Africa of a Termination of Eximbank Activities in South Africa

We judge that the direct economic impact upon South Africa of a termination of Eximbank facilities for trade with South Africa would not be significant, aside from limited price increases, provided that South Africa’s other trading partners continued to offer the equivalent of Eximbank facilities to their nationals. The Germans, French, and British all have significantly larger Eximbank type-exposure in South Africa. Eximbank facilities support only a small proportion of U.S. exports to South Africa. For example, in 1977 Eximbank authorizations for South Africa were about $115 million, while U.S. exports to South Africa totalled $1.1 billion. (Comparable figures for 1976 were $1.4 billion in U.S. exports and about $200 million in Eximbank authorizations).

We believe that if Eximbank facilities were terminated U.S. exports to South Africa would decline somewhat, but we cannot quantify this loss. The U.S. share of the South African import market has remained

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 1–5/78. Confidential. Tarnoff sent the paper to Brzezinski under an April 22 covering memorandum, in which he wrote: “Attached is a paper prepared in response to a request from the NSC for an analysis of the economic impact on South Africa and possible responses by that country to a termination of Eximbank facilities for trade with South Africa.” In an April 20 memorandum to Tarnoff, Dodson requested a “brief report on the predicted economic impact on South Africa of termination of EX–IM guarantees and insurance exposure.” (Ibid.)
generally in the 16–18 percent range since 1965. Europe and Japan stand ready to provide virtually all of South Africa’s needed imports.

Private banks would note Eximbank’s termination of business with South Africa. Both they and foreign direct investors might feel less optimistic about South Africa’s balance of payments.

Prohibition of Eximbank activities would be the first significant economic measure which we have taken against South Africa since Eximbank loans to South Africa were prohibited in 1964. Such an action would have a political and psychological effect on South Africa underscoring U.S. concern over the trend of developments there. It would also represent a tangible action taken to distance ourselves from a government which has so far not indicated publicly or privately that it intends to end apartheid or undertake significant movement toward full political participation of all its citizens in the affairs of South Africa. Prohibition by Congressional action might well have a greater political and psychological impact upon the South African Government because of the belief widely held in South African Government circles that Administration policy vis-a-vis South Africa is not supported by the majority of the American people.

We believe that the most likely South African Government response to an Eximbank cut off, whether by Administrative or legislative action, would be increased criticism of the Administration for pursuing a policy of “selective morality” i.e., punishing South Africa while allegedly overlooking serious human rights violations in other countries. The South African Government may consider such an action as a harbinger of more comprehensive economic sanctions in the future and take accelerated measures to reduce South African dependence on imports. If a legislatively imposed prohibition passes Congress before the Namibian and Rhodesian issues are resolved, it could make it more difficult for us to secure the South African Government’s cooperation in achieving satisfactory solutions to the Namibian and Rhodesian problems. We doubt that the cut off of Eximbank facilities would lead South African Government to take serious retaliatory measures such as prohibiting the repatriation of earnings of American firms in South Africa, defaulting on loans (including loans guaranteed by Eximbank) or restricting export to the U.S. of minerals important to the functioning of U.S. industry such as chrome and platinum. Such retaliatory measures would seriously erode investor confidence in South Africa and would complicate even more the government’s efforts to attract foreign investment and to boost exports. However, we cannot entirely rule out South African retaliatory measures since the government for reasons of national pride might decide to take some action against the U.S.
340. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 28, 1978

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Donald B. Sole, South Africa Embassy
Ambassador Gerard Smith
Donald Peterson, African Affairs
Robert Kelley, S/AS, Special Assistant (Notetaker)

SUBJECT
Proposed US-South African Talks on Nuclear Issues

Ambassador Sole came in at his request. He said he wanted to follow up on the discussions in Pretoria on April 16 between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Botha regarding a Smith visit to South Africa. Sole said that he had no instructions and that he had not been briefed on the April 16 conversations other than having been told that the Secretary and Foreign Minister Botha had agreed that the next step would be for discussions to take place on nuclear issues in South Africa with the US side to be led by Ambassador Smith. Sole asked what the timetable for such discussions might be. Smith said that would be for South Africa to say.

Credibility of US Supply Assurances

Sole said that as soon as we have “stability” on Southwest Africa it would be desirable to begin the nuclear discussions. Before turning in detail to the question of timing, Sole made a strong statement on the need for the US to be a reliable fuel supplier. Sole said the credibility of US supply assurances is a major problem for South Africa. The present state of US supply credibility would not satisfy the very large body of opinion in the South African government that doubts any US assurances to supply the Safari and Koeburg reactors would be implemented. Sole referred to the New York Times article reporting the President’s decision to override the NRC and to ship fuel to India’s Tarapur reactor. He asked rhetorically whether there would be any justification for not taking the same action with respect to supply decisions on South Africa. Any agreement concluded between the US

---


2 See Document 338.

and South Africa must carry with it the assurance that it can be implemented at all times, Sole emphasized.

Sole said the United States has spoken of regional fuel centers and one rationale for their establishment is that it would remove decisions as to fuel supply from the hands of individual governments. However, South Africa’s experience is such that it would have no confidence in an African regional center. Sole suggested that if the United States wanted to assure South Africa, it should consider a fuel center located in South Africa. Such a center could have full safeguards and any other precautions that the United States thought advisable. Sole said he thought no other alternative would suffice to assure the South African government.

Smith replied that discussions of regional fuel centers do not anticipate their establishment over the next few months. We must think of something that can be done in the short term rather than concentrate on a regional fuel center. South Africa should be able to take comfort from the fact that the President did override the NRC on the India supply issue, that a fifth commissioner was now on his way to the NRC, and that the new nonproliferation legislation provided for rapid processing of export licenses. Smith pointed out that in administering a worldwide nonproliferation policy the United States had to think carefully about precedents; what we agreed to do with respect to country A has implications for country B.

Smith said that he assumed South Africa understood that the US could not do anything to return South Africa to the Board of the IAEA.

**Technical Team Results**

Turning to the visit of the US technical team to South Africa in January, Smith said we found South Africa’s response that the visit was “interesting and useful” somewhat puzzling. Smith asked if Sole could provide any amplification.

Sole said that, as a result of the technical team’s visit, South Africa now has a much clearer understanding of what the United States wants in the area of safeguards. The Valindaba pilot enrichment plant was designed to enable safeguards to be applied without disclosing the commercial secret of the South African enrichment process. The technical team’s proposals had reassured South African officials that safeguards were feasible without compromising trade secrets. As an aside,
Sole said he can visualize South Africa would have great difficulty adjusting the pilot plant to meet its own needs for enriched uranium.

Scenario and Timing for Nuclear Discussions

Sole said that the key issues are those stated in the Prime Minister’s letter of last fall. Smith said that it was his impression that the Secretary was thinking of a two-stage process: nuclear talks by Smith in South Africa after which we would welcome a discussion of broader issues. Smith asked if that was Sole’s understanding. Sole, as indicated above, replied that he had not been briefed on the Secretary’s conversation with Brand Fourie beyond being told that it was agreed that the next step would be discussions in South Africa with Smith.

On timing, Sole suggested that the latter half of May was desirable from the South African point of view. It is necessary to wait until then because Brand Fourie will be a key participant in the Smith discussions and yet he will be fully occupied with the Southwest African issue until the UN finishes consideration of that question. Sole described his understanding of the UN’s timetable: the General Assembly will consider the Southwest African question until May 3; thereafter the matter will be put to the Security Council for a vote. If the Security Council approves, then the “special concentration” of South African officials on this issue will no longer be necessary. Thus, the nuclear discussions could begin in the latter half of May.

UN Discussion of the Nuclear Issue

Smith asked if Sole believed that the nuclear discussions in South Africa might have some effect on the UN’s consideration of a resolution on nuclear cooperation with South Africa. Sole replied that he doubted that anything could be done to affect such a development. Smith said that then it seemed less urgent to begin the nuclear discussions with South Africa. Mr. Peterson suggested that the discussions might deflect UN consideration of a resolution directed against South Africa. Sole said that the US-South African nuclear issue could not be resolved on the basis of three or four days discussion in South Africa between Smith and South African Ministers.

Structure of the Talks

Smith asked how the talks might be structured. Repeating that he had no instructions and that he could only say how he would set them up, Sole said that there might be an initial meeting between Smith and Foreign Minister Botha and Minister of Mines Fanny Botha. This would

---

5 See Document 311.
be followed by more detailed discussions with Brand Fourie and Roux and several of their assistants.

Sole stressed that it would be very important for Smith to establish his personal credibility in the first meeting with the two Ministers. He pointed out that Smith was coming to them new and the question of Smith’s personal credibility would be vital. It is these two Ministers who will decide the question in South Africa, Sole said. The Ministers will not go into the details of any discussion or agreement because they do not have the requisite expertise but they will be the decision-makers. Sole said that the talks should be planned so that Smith would have one or more opportunities to meet informally with the two Ministers. In view of the above, Sole believed that a week should be allowed for the talks.

Press Notice

Smith asked whether the talks could be held in privacy. Smith said it was his view that more useful work could be accomplished if the talks could be carried out without notice to the press.

Sole said that it can’t be expected that the negotiators will be left alone by the press. It just will not work to attempt to conceal the talks from the press and to try to do so would create more problems than are desirable. Sole suggested that the parties should agree on a statement to the press that this is the beginning of an endeavor to move progressively towards a renewal of the traditional nuclear cooperation that has marked US-South Africa relations and that these talks will be delicate and thus the press should not expect that there will be much in the way of briefings or other information. Mr. Peterson pointed out that Namibian negotiations did not escape the glare of publicity and that the South African press is very assiduous.

Kalahari

Smith said that to secure Congressional approval of any agreement with South Africa on nuclear questions there must be some clarification of the Kalahari site. Sole responded that the “tower has been moved” and that he understands US intelligence people are revising their initial assessments. Smith said that South Africa should be aware that we will be asking for further clarification on Kalahari. Sole said “why would we move the tower?” apparently implying that this was an effort on the part of South Africa to remove any question that the site

6 An unknown hand underlined this sentence and placed a question mark in the right-hand margin.

7 An unknown hand underlined “he understands US intelligence people are revising their initial assessments” and wrote in the margin: “? Is this a ‘guess’ or a ‘leak’?”
was not designed for peaceful purposes. Smith responded by asking why the tower was there in the first place. On this point, Sole said “I am not authorized to say but we have told you that the site though not nuclear had a military purpose.”8 Smith urged South Africa to clear up this puzzle and Sole responded saying he appreciated this point.

South African Invitation

Sole concluded the meeting by pointing out again that he had come not pursuant to any instructions, but that he simply wanted to be informed as to our thoughts on timing for a Smith visit. He had given Smith his view as to how the talks might be set up and that much depended upon the availability of Brand Fourie since he is key for both nuclear and Southwest African issues. Smith said that in view of the fact that Brand Fourie’s availability was a critical factor, Smith would await an invitation from South Africa specifying the time which would be most convenient for it. Sole said he was very pleased to hear this.

8 An unknown hand underlined “had a military purpose.”

341. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, May 24, 1978

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Francois de Laboulaye, French Embassy
Ambassador Gerard Smith
Philip J. Farley

SUBJECT

Jacomet Visit to South Africa

de Laboulaye came in to give an account of Andre Jacomet’s recent visit to South Africa. Brand Fourie and Dr. Roux were the principals on the South African side.

Jacomet said that from the French point of view there was no reason why South Africa should not find it in its interest to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to accept full-scope safeguards. Brand Fourie replied that in principle South Africa was prepared to adhere to the NPT, but could only do so if discrimination against South Africa were to cease. This would be the area to be explored during Ambassador Smith’s visit to South Africa at the end of June.2 As a counterpart to signature of the NPT, South Africa envisaged not only commitments regarding nuclear cooperation but also assistance in maintaining South Africa’s international position.

Brand Fourie then enumerated six areas in which it would seek U.S. nuclear assurances.

1. Highly enriched uranium was required for continued operation of the Safari research reactor. HEU of 93% enrichment was needed promptly, with a guarantee that supplies would continue until studies had been completed and showed that it would be feasible to operate the reactor effectively with fuel of lower enrichment.

2. LEU fuel for the Koeburg reactors was needed, with a guarantee of long-term supply.

3. There was a question requiring clarification regarding reprocessing and reutilization of spent fuel from Safari. Spent fuel had been returned to the U.S. some 18 months ago. South Africa wished it to be reprocessed and refabricated, or reimbursement to be made.

4. Assurances were desired that the application of controls by the IAEA to the Valindaba enrichment facility would not prejudice industrial secrets.

5. South Africa expected the U.S. to use its influence in order to recover the South African seat on the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

6. South Africa would expect the U.S. to change its policy to permit export of non-essential components for construction of the planned South African large-scale enrichment plant.

Brand Fourie continued that, while these nuclear commitments were important, their value as counterparts for South African adherence to the NPT was diminished because either they had already been promised, were a matter of fulfilling an existing treaty, or might be nullified by subsequent United Nations action. Therefore, South Africa expected from the three Western permanent members of the UN Security Council that, if South Africa signs the NPT, these powers would oppose in the UN the further escalation of pressures and threats against South Africa. Smith noted that this formula was open-ended, not related

---

2 See Documents 343–345.
to nuclear matters, and thus probably went farther than the U.S. would be prepared to go.

de Laboulaye continued that Brand Fourie had asked Jacomet whether the French would be in a position to supply fuel for the Koeburg reactors if the U.S. did not. Jacomet replied that the French could not consider such a substitution commitment without U.S. knowledge of it. They could however explore the possibility of some mutually reinforcing trilateral French-US-South African fuel supply arrangement.

Jacomet took note of the South African position, observing that his mission was limited to nuclear problems and that the scope of what South Africa was seeking might be too much to load onto the nuclear equation. Brand Fourie characterized what he had said as the South African final position. He suggested that French-South African talks might resume after the Smith visit and that it might then be examined whether it would be useful to organize a trilateral conversation with the U.S.

Jacomet had commented in his report that there was evidence of much South African bitterness toward the U.S. The South Africans appeared to have lost confidence in U.S. reliability, and feared that concessions on their part would lead to new demands on the part of the U.S. This lay behind their desire to bring France and the UK, the other Western members of the Security Council, into the picture. They assessed the NPT as very important to the U.S., and the Koeburg reactors to France, and thus saw possibilities for a trilateral understanding.

Smith stated his appreciation for this full account of Jacomet’s talks, which would be very useful to him in preparing for his own visit.
342. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance

Washington, June 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Nuclear Discussions with South Africa

The following positions are approved for the forthcoming talks with the Government of South Africa on nuclear issues.

1. The basic US conditions for future supply, namely: (a) NPT adherence including a formal public statement of intent; and (2) submission of the Valindaba enrichment plant to IAEA safeguards as an immediate interim measure, remain unchanged.

2. If these conditions are met the US is prepared to agree to supply low-enriched fuel for the French reactors at Koeberg.

3. Also if our conditions are met, and if SAG explicitly agrees to convert the Safari research reactor to operate on lower enriched fuels as soon as such fuel becomes available, the US will urge NRC approval for limited shipments of HEU fuel for Safari on the following basis:
   - until the reactor can be fueled with uranium of lesser enrichment (18–24 months);
   - timing and quantity of shipments limited to avoid accumulation of more than 15 klograms of unirradiated HEU in South Africa;
   - spent fuel returned to the US after cooling (as provided by existing contracts); and
   - establishment of additional measures (e.g., supervised loading and unloading of the reactor) to further minimize the risk of diversion.

4. Concerning the compatibility of safeguards with the protection of South Africa’s enrichment process, the US is still awaiting a response to the points made by our technical team on an earlier visit. We continue to desire to protect SAG’s commercial secrets but cannot accept this as a reason for exempting any nuclear facility from appropriate international safeguards.

5. Regarding the export of “non-sensitive” equipment for South Africa’s enrichment plant, emphasis should be placed on determining precisely what is of interest to the SAG. The US side should explain in detail our policy on sensitive nuclear exports and on national enrichment facilities in general, and may indicate US willingness to supply certain “non-sensitive” equipment. As an example of the type of export

---

that might be agreed to, the US side is authorized to cite in general
terms, measuring and analytical equipment that would support an
enrichment plant safeguards research and development program.

6. No explicit commitments should be made with regard to most
favored nation or least favored nation treatment.

7. If the SAG raises the question of US commitments to oppose
any future trade embargo (including those from which nuclear supplies
were exempted), the US side is authorized to make clear that the US
will not commit itself to oppose any future embargo or make any other
broad political commitment. The US does not intend, however, to take
away with one hand what it has given with the other, and is therefore
prepared to explore ways in which the continuity of future nuclear
supply to South Africa could be ensured if the above conditions are
met.  

Zbigniew Brzezinski

2 In a June 21 memorandum to Vance, Brzezinski wrote: “As per call from Ambassa-
dor Smith, in addition to generally exploring ways to ensure the continuity of future
nuclear supply, the US side is authorized to specifically advise the South Africans that
we would not allow the escalation of pressures in the Security Council against South
Africa on specifically nuclear questions if they agree to our conditions. If the South
Africans raise broader political linkages, the US side should indicate that it is not prepared
to discuss those matters in this forum.” (Ibid.)

343. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the
Department of State

Pretoria, June 28, 1978, 1630Z


1. Summary. This message reports on the first two meetings
between US and South African officials on nuclear issues in Pretoria,
Monday, June 26 and Tuesday, June 27. The US side consisted of
Ambassador Gerard Smith, Ambassador William Edmondson, Charles
Van Doren (ACDA), Allen Locke (PM), Michael Guhin (OES) and Rob-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2338.
Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
Brand Fourie of DFA, Roux of AEB and Auret of DFA comprised the South Africa side. At the end of the second meeting, the two sides agreed to draft a joint minute describing areas of agreement for discussion on Wednesday, June 28.\(^2\) Fourie said he believed there was nothing in the U.S. presentation that would make an agreement impossible; Roux said he saw a real chance for an agreement.

End summary.

2. Highlights of first day. Brand Fourie welcomed U.S. delegation, saying South Africa was in favor of non-proliferation and looked forward to the talks. He suggested most useful way to proceed was for Smith to first give a “birds eye” view of the situation as seen by the U.S. Smith delivered opening statement, making following points:

(a) U.S. delegation had no brief to go beyond nuclear subjects;
(b) U.S. delegation visit directly resulted from Vance-Botha meeting in April where Botha said that NPT accession and immediate safeguards at Valindaba were “possible”\(^3\),
(c) the essential objective was to avoid “linkage” of the nuclear issue to any broader political question;
(d) the talks should be more than mere explorations because there was now a unique opportunity to resolve the nuclear issue which may not come again, and it should be capitalized on now. Smith stressed that any agreement reached would be ad referendum.

3. In discussion following Smith statement, Smith advised Fourie and Roux of approved U.S. positions, provided South Africa adhered to the NPT, including a formal public statement of intent, and accepted immediate, interim safeguards at the Valindaba enrichment plant.

4. Fourie and Roux made the following points during the discussions:

A. They had argued to their Ministers that there were real benefits to NPT membership under Article IV and thus the U.S. policy that it would not export sensitive equipment to a South African national enrichment plant was a disappointment.

B. The U.S. position on supply of the Safari reactor was most welcome because a number of research reactor experiments had suffered under the intermittent operation caused by lack of fuel. South Africa agreed with the US position that it was bad to have so much HEU in use around the world. Safari could probably now run on 40 percent enriched fuel if available but it would take some time to develop

\(^2\) In telegram 3662 from Pretoria, June 29, the Embassy transmitted text of the Joint Minute. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2348) Telegram 3652 from Pretoria, June 29, summarized the June 28 discussion. See footnote 2, Document 348.

\(^3\) See Document 338.
fuel enriched to a lower level that would meet Safari’s operating requirements.

C. On Koeburg, South Africa was concerned that if it now signed the NPT, some years down the road the US might decide not to continue supply. Smith pointed out that these were always unknown risks in the future, but our position on any proposed UN nuclear embargo resolution and a possible procedure for “simultaneous closing” of a US–SAG package arrangement should go far to resolve concerns.

D. On Valindaba safeguards, Prime Minister Vorster was personally concerned that although an agreed safeguards regime might initially protect proprietary information, pressures would build which would lead to demands to get at the “heart” of the plant, thus revealing design secrets. The US side reviewed the technical proposal made during the February technical exchange and indicated the belief that mutually acceptable safeguards were possible.

E. Roux questioned whether the US had done all it could to return South Africa to the IAEA Board. Smith detailed US actions at the June Board, including pre-vote lobbying, the US statement (which Smith in part read aloud), and the US call for a vote. Smith said there was no more the US could realistically do in the future.

F. Roux complained strenuously that South Africa’s request for reimbursement for Safari spent fuel returned to the US had been ignored. Smith undertook to get prompt action.

5. The first session closed with Brand Fourie’s statement that he and Roux were encouraged by the US positions and, after briefing their Ministers, would provide the US side at the second day’s meeting with an initial SAG reaction.

6. Highlights of second day session:

Fourie opened by commenting as follows on the US positions presented by Smith on the first day: Safari supply: he and Roux were pessimistic that the negotiations and procedures required for a package arrangement could be concluded in time for South Africa to avoid a shut-down of the reactor for lack of HEU.

---

4 In telegram 140152 to Vienna, June 2, the Department transmitted the text of the statement. Additionally, the Department instructed: “Delegation should call for vote on this issue, voting for South Africa and against any other African state for designation to African seat. Delegation should seek maximum support for this position, especially from delegations taking this position at June 1977 Board. If, however, delegation’s head count reveals serious defection from last year’s votes for designation of South Africa, and Mission believes calling for vote in these circumstances would be counter-productive, delegation should seek additional instructions.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780231–1003)
Koeburg supply: The US position on action in the UN appeared to resolve this, but Botha wished to discuss “guarantees” at a later meeting. US export of enrichment technology: Fourie and Roux repeated their disappointment that the US view of Article IV (N.P.T.) precluded South Africa from gaining access to equipment for its enrichment plant. Roux said SAG had decided to expand the present plant rather than build a new “large-scale” one because it could not get the equipment it needed.

Valindaba safeguards: SAG desired from the US practical details on how safeguards could be installed, but realized this could not be pursued in these talks. Roux was encouraged by the US view that interim safeguards might be sufficient.

Renegotiation of agreement for cooperation: Fourie and Roux were inclined to start renegotiation of the present agreement, in parallel with using the present agreement for near term exports in order to get the maximum congressional approval possible.

Discussion with French: Fourie said trilateral talks might be useful at some stage (he said SAG had talked to the French and intended to have future discussions with them).

IAEA: Fourie said he was disappointed at the US assessment that it was not realistic to expect SAG could return to the board, but accepted this “as a fact”.

NPT: Fourie concluded by stating that there was nothing in the US proposals that “would make it impossible for South Africa to join the NPT.”

7. In response, Smith said Fourie was perhaps too pessimistic on Safari supply. It was up to South Africa how fast a package could be completed. Formal public declaration of intent to accept the U.S. proposal should allow HEU to go forward. Smith handed over a non-paper listing the conditions that the US would require. Fourie replied that any such SAG declaration of intent would be conditional on the US making good on its supply commitments.

8. The US side (Van Doren) read to Fourie (but did not hand over) a paper describing how a simultaneous closing could be achieved. Fourie said that Congress could later ban nuclear trade with the SAG. This would end SAG’s obligations to the US. The US side pointed out that such a law would be subject to Presidential veto, which could only be overturned by a 2/3 vote of both Houses. Fourie recognized that a congressional ban could not be guaranteed against, but noted that if it did occur the SAG would not only terminate its bilateral nuclear obligations with the US but could also withdraw from the NPT.

9. Smith reiterated the US position that the SAG could not expect Article IV of the NPT to allow South Africa access to sensitive enrich-
ment equipment. In response to a question Smith handed over a non-
paper (septel) showing the US nonproliferation law did not preclude
nuclear cooperation if a country built an enrichment plant.\footnote{Not found.} Fourie
commented that he and Roux may have “made a tactical mistake” in
saying to their Ministers that Article IV would bring SAG tangible
benefits, but he would see if he could repair the damage.

10. Fourie said that he would have to obtain his government’s
authority to accept the package proposed by the US, but that in his
view the two sides ought to take up the question of a schedule for
reaching agreement. He said that the following topics could be listed
as agreed in principle in a joint minute or “heads of agreement”, which
Smith proposed: Safari and Koeburg supply, reprocessing of Safari
spent fuel, SAG position in the IAEA, and Valindaba safeguards. Fourie
said he would have to go to his Ministers on the Article IV issue. Roux
added that he and Fourie saw a real chance for an agreement but that
they would have to write a memorandum to their Ministers, answering
their questions and seeking their reactions to the US proposals. Fourie
said he thought the SAG could give the US a paper in “about a month”
with its position. He saw two positive items in the US presentation (1)
the “simultaneous closing” procedure and (2) the possibility of supply
of HEU in time to avoid a shutdown of Safari and one negative (the
US position on Article IV of the NPT).

11. In response, Smith emphasized that SAG should not delay
much further and expect the possibility of a final resolution to remain.
Fourie indicated that he would have to have some time to get his
government’s position in line but agreed to Smith’s proposal that each
side draft a joint minute for discussion on the third day.

Edmondson
Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)

Washington, July 7, 1978

SUBJECT
Report on Nuclear Talks in South Africa

Our discussions in South Africa were encouraging. As reflected in the attached Joint Minute, which conforms to our instructions, the South Africans appear receptive to a package deal including the following elements:

1. South African adherence to the NPT;
2. Prompt start of a safeguards development project at their pilot enrichment plant at Valindaba to provide interim safeguards at that facility;
3. A “simultaneous closing” procedure to ensure that both sides fulfill their package obligations. South Africa would promptly renegotiate its agreement for cooperation with the U.S. to meet the standards under our legislation for new agreements; the revised agreement would become effective upon completion both of successful Congressional review and of NPT adherence by South Africa; and
4. Cooperation with us to reduce the enrichment of the fuel for the Safari research reactor (which now uses HEU).

If they agree to the foregoing (the South African cabinet is expected to consider the package in August), our part of the package would include the following assurances:

1. We would recommend NRC approval of limited quantities of HEU fuel for their research reactor pending availability of lower enriched fuel. We would do so only after establishing that the export meets all statutory requirements and that the safeguards project at Valindaba has commenced, but before completion of SAG accession to the NPT. Such HEU shipments would be under tight monitoring arrangements and would not permit an accumulation of more than 15 kgs of HEU in South Africa.
2. We would be prepared to authorize export of the LEU we have contracted to enrich for the Koeburg power reactors in the context of the renegotiated agreement and actual accession to the NPT.
3. If this package is concluded, we will not permit its frustration by UN Security Council action on specifically nuclear matters.


Attached but not printed. See also footnote 2, Document 343.

See Document 342.
The South Africans accepted the limitation of our discussions to nuclear matters, but noted that they planned to discuss at an appropriate level the broader question of the consequence of a UN economic boycott.

The South Africans were disappointed that we would not be able to provide equipment for the expansion of their enrichment facility, but appeared to accept this as a practical reality.

We made clear to the South Africans that our new legislation made continued supply dependent on our being able to establish that they had conducted no nuclear explosions, had not violated safeguards or guarantees to us, and were not using nuclear materials in connection with a weapons development program.\(^4\) In the latter connection, we sought and received some modest additional information [2 lines not declassified].

We stressed the urgency of reaching agreement which might well not be possible much longer. The South Africans agreed to seek a Government decision within the next two months.

Next Steps. The South African cabinet is expected to consider the package the first half of August. We believe that a favorable decision will be recommended by the delegation with which we met, which included the Permanent Foreign Secretary and the President of the Atomic Energy Board.

In the meantime, we will prepare for an interim safeguards presence at Valindaba and continue our efforts to clarify [less than 1 line not declassified] questions that have been raised.

We will advise key Congressmen confidentially and generally of our progress on this case, and are advising the French, the British, the Germans (and in less detail) the Nigerians and the Soviets.

I am also sending this report to Secretary Vance.

\(^4\) See footnote 6, Document 332.
345. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner

Washington, July 11, 1978

SUBJECT
South Africa Nuclear Issue

While in South Africa for talks on the nuclear issue, I raised with South African officials our concerns regarding the Kalahari test site and a highly secure research facility adjacent to the Pelindaba nuclear research center. A member of my team and I were briefed on those facilities by South African officials and I had two follow-up conversations with Chairman Roux of the Atomic Energy Board.

I enclose the following for your information:

1. The explanation by a General Lemmer (Assistant Chief of Staff (Army) for Logistics) that the Kalahari site is for classified military activities of a non-nuclear nature.

2. A description of the nuclear research conducted at the isolated facility near Pelindaba.

3. Comments by Roux concerning his unwillingness to permit a member of my team access to the isolated facility, and Roux’s observation that he had never been directed by his authorities to develop nuclear weapons.

The South Africans are acutely sensitive to the appearance in the press of any information they provide us in confidence [less than 1 line not declassified]. Thus, I propose that distribution of the enclosed materials be appropriately limited, commensurate with the need for the experts to make use of them.

Gerard Smith

---

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation

Pretoria, June 29, 1978

Ambassador Smith and Locke met with Major General Lemmer, Chief of Logistics for the South African Armed Forces, Brigadier Swart, Armed Forces Counter-Intelligence, and Col. von Bencker, Army Ordnance (Research and Development), on June 29, 1978.

Smith explained the purpose of our request for whatever information they could provide on the Kalahari site: we were in South Africa to seek an accommodation on nuclear matters that would serve both our countries’ interests; there was a need, for our part, to be in a position to assure the Congress of the U.S. that there was no reason to believe that any accommodation would not be in the interest of the U.S.; our intelligence people were concerned about the Kalahari site, whose features were most explainable in terms of nuclear explosives testing.

General Lemmer said that he, personally, had arranged purchase of 4 farms north of Uppington in 1973–74 for use as a military training area for the Uppington battalion. There were also other activities there in the fields of testing, much of which he was not at liberty to discuss in any detail. He and Brigadier Swart, in the course of conversation, referred to the following activities: testing of military vehicles in desert environment; destruction of obsolete or redundant ammunition, including tank rounds; rocket, projectile, and missile flight testing. There has been no nuclear testing at the site. There could well have been instrumentation at the site, in connection with other testing, and there were occasions requiring elevated towers for taking photos.

Locke asked whether they might be in a position to confirm that there were activities requiring the use of drill holes. Lemmer declined to do so. Swart alluded to there being a water problem at the site, and suggested that there were activities requiring a water supply; but, he concluded, that was all he could say about holes in the ground. Later in the conversation, Ambassador Smith queried as to the possibility of storage of spent nuclear fuel; Lemmer and Swart tended to confirm that there is storage of something at the site, but not of spent fuel. Lemmer elaborated on the logic that any defense force would normally store things underground.

---

In further discussion of the nuclear testing thesis, the Colonel noted that there is a farm house within 4 kilometers of the site, and 10 farming communities within a ten kilometer range, adducing this as evidence that the site was not suitable for nuclear testing.

Lemmer pressed hard to see our photographs (he had been told that they were from satellites). He wanted to be satisfied: (a) that he had been providing information about the site that concerned us, and not some other; and (b) that there was not the chance that the photos had been fabricated. He argued with some vehemence, further, that we were asking for a one-way exchange of information and that, in the context we described of a frank and confidential exchange, we should be prepared to give them pictures. Ambassador Smith undertook to see whether provision of a picture could be possible, although he had no authority to make such an offer at this time.

Lemmer argued that merely being shown pictures would not be adequate for his purpose, which was to be able to compare our photography against the actual site. He indicated a possible willingness to accept a photograph on a short-term loan rather than for permanent retention; he, moreover, would undertake to have the photograph annotated with South African explanations of features portrayed before returning the picture to us.

Attachment

Memorandum of Conversation

Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center, June 27, 1978, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
SAG Explanation of Special Research Facility at Pelindaba

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. J.W. de Villiers, Vice President of the Atomic Energy Board
Allen W. Locke, Deputy Director, Office of Non-Proliferation Policy, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs

Locke met with de Villiers pursuant to AEB President Roux’s offer to Ambassador Smith to engage in further and more expert exchange on the nature of a heavily secured research facility at Pelindaba. De Villiers appeared completely open in his presentation, to the extent of reviewing his personal position on past and present disputes within

---

3 Secret. Drafted by Locke.
the AEB on the nature of the Board’s reactor development program
(which occasioned his resignation for a period of time in the early
1970s).

De Villiers referred to the site as a “fast neutron facility”. It is
located in isolation for two reasons: the need for a sound geological
footing, and because contemplated activities would require either con-
crete shielding or ample vacant surroundings. The extraordinary sec-
urity measure of a double fence is the result of the facility’s being located
outside the fenced and patrolled Pelindaba facility, and further because
the facility (located in a hollow) is out-of-site of the main campus.

The facility is intended to support fact reactor studies—to prove
empirically various computer codes developed at Pelindaba. It contains
a pulse neutron source earlier acquired from the US; this accelerator
is in process of being rebuilt. The idea is to pulse small assemblies of
natural uranium, in order to measure the neutron flux and the rate of
decay of the neutron flux.

De Villiers described his plan to establish a fast critical assembly
at the site, to be patterned after such a facility at Argonne (where he
studied). For this purpose, enriched uranium (on the order of 20%)
would be required from the US; in the absence of reason to believe
such material would be forthcoming (referring to the Safari problem),
de Villiers noted that the fast critical assembly was (or is) under design
with only a hope that enriched uranium could be obtained from the
US. The idea is from a similar facility at Brookhaven.

Now in the facility is a “low mass facility”, with a channel extending
from the site to contain instrumentation lines. At the site are a theoreti-
cal group doing fast reactor theoretical work, and a group of physicists
doing pulse neutron work. There are also a “design office” and
workshops.

De Villiers reviewed past approaches AEB has taken on developing
new-generation reactors. His current preference is to work on a near-
breeder, fueled with thorium and denatured uranium, paralleling the
US Shippingport facility. In response to a question referring to South
Africa’s major uranium holdings seemingly eliminating the need for
recourse to thorium, de Villiers argued that South Africa’s proven
reserves of uranium amount only to about 307,000 tonnes at the 30
dollar price level, and only another 100,000 tonnes or less at the 40
dollar level. He opined this would not prove adequate to sustain a
once-through light water fuel cycle indefinitely, and that since South
Africa did not intend to reprocess and recycle light water fuel, some-
thing else was necessary. There was no discussion of South Africa’s
thorium reserves.

In de Villier’s view, South Africa has potential for becoming a
supplier of research reactors—not in Africa, he recognized, but in other
parts of the developing world (Middle East, Latin America).
The discussion ended with de Villier’s expression of hope that US-South African nuclear cooperation can be restored. South Africa is increasingly isolated from scientific colleagues in other countries; nuclear material and other supplies are impossible to obtain. De Villiers has lost some 20 scientific-level personnel in the past year, for lack of interesting work to encourage their staying with the AEB. Of the 1860 personnel at Pelindaba, only 160-odd are scientists.

Attachment

Memorandum for the File

Washington, July 6, 1978

The day after Smith and Locke received explanations of the secure site near Pelindaba from Roux and de Villiers, Smith asked if Locke could “look around” this site. Roux said he would look into the matter and about four hours later said on the telephone that he was sorry Smith had not believed him when he assured Smith that the secure site did not involve any nuclear weapons related activities. He regretted that the requested invitation could not be issued. He said his people were “busy there with a few new developments” and if they were to say you can’t see this or that, the Americans would get the wrong impression. Later, he attributed the lack of an invitation to “South African pride.”

The night before my departure he asked to speak to me privately at his house. He opened a long monologue by saying how much he regretted that I was leaving South Africa with “mixed feelings.” I said he was an acute observer. He then spoke at length about South African feelings of ostracism, lack of appreciation for racial progress made, falsity of East German propaganda, and said there was no nuclear weapons program in South Africa. He had never had any direction from his authorities to develop weapons.

I surmised that some in the South African Government wanted a weapons program. He assented by saying, “They call me their hope.” He spoke of their experimental work going on at the site south of Pelindaba which involved sodium and heavy water presumably for thermal reactor design work. I said that surely he didn’t believe the United States could learn anything from South African reactor research and development. He said he would never go to the United States and

---

4 Secret.
ask, “What’s in that building.” He referred to United States arrogance. It was at this point that he said that the refusal to invite Locke into the site was based on “South African pride.”

I speculated as to the possibility of some sort of an exchange to permit South African visitation of a reactor development site in the United States in return for our visiting this site.

The next day he called to say that he had a report from de Villiers of his full explanation to Locke of the work at the site in question and in light of that completely frank report he just could not understand my continuing concern about the site. I pointed out the importance of eliminating any doubts in the minds of Washington estimators of the South African program.

Gerard Smith

346. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, July 20, 1978, 2102Z

183943. Subject: Follow-up to Smith Talks.

1. Technical experts have reviewed information on, Kalahari provided Smith and Locke June 29 by General Lemmer. They conclude (a) US technical evidence contains no clear indications that types of activities described by Lemmer have taken place at Kalahari site, (b) visible features at site do not appear to fit Lemmer’s story and remain most explainable in terms of nuclear explosives testing, (c) it is not even clear that site described by Lemmer is the same as that to which US side has referred.

2. Under the circumstances, and in light of Lemmer’s request for our evidence and his offer to “annotate” the imagery, we feel it is appropriate to go back for further clarifications of Kalahari. Although we will not be able to give photographs to the SAG, as Lemmer asked,

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 112, 7/15–31/78. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Lock; cleared by MacFarlane, Bowdler, Despres (CIA), Van Doren, Guhin, and Richard Castrodale (S/S); approved by Ambassador Smith. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–1993)

2 See Document 345.
we can show photos to SAG officials, afford them the opportunity to study these photos in presence of US rep, and leave with them for their reference and annotation a sketch based on the photos. FYI. We hope this gesture of reviewing evidence with the SAG will demonstrate our good faith and seriousness of purpose in seeking resolution of the Kalahari question, and encourage the SAG to provide enough specific information about the site to permit adequate clarification. End FYI.

3. We believe further US–SAG contacts on this question are appropriate even before the SAG reaches decisions on the nuclear settlement proposed in the June talks. While resolution of the Kalahari question (one way or another) is important to us to establish whether future US–SAG nuclear cooperation is appropriate and in our interests, we believe the SAG should see it as in its own interests to dispel doubts concerning its nuclear intentions, independently of progress toward resuming US–SAG nuclear cooperation.

4. You are authorized to take up this matter with Fourie along the lines of the preceding paragraphs, and seek assistance in arranging further discussions with General Lemmer or other appropriate authorities. We envisage further discussions with military on Kalahari running as follows:

A. In a first meeting with military authorities, we would present maps which identify the location of the site in Kalahari, to ensure that we and the South Africans are referring to the same site. (FYI, coordinates of site were passed to SAG last year). We would then introduce photographic evidence, reviewing features we see which have led our experts to the nuclear test thesis. We would then hand over the map and one or more sketches based on the photographs, so that the South Africans can satisfy themselves that the pictures they have seen represent the location to which we have referred in the maps, and do in fact depict features which have been or are present at the Kalahari site. We would ask that the SAG perform its examination expeditiously, and then return a copy of the sketch or sketches with as much annotation or explanation as it can supply, taking into account the need to accommodate its desire for secrecy with our mutual interest in putting the Kalahari issue to rest. We could assure the SAG that any information it provided would be held in the strictest confidence and made available only to the absolute minimum number of individuals in the USG.

5. We would hope that the SAG could return with annotations a copy of the sketch at a second meeting within a week, and that the meeting could be used to review and clarify on the spot as need be the information provided on Kalahari by the SAG.

6. In view of the seriousness and the sensitivity of this proposed exchange and its underlying purpose, we believe your personal
involvement in such discussions might be appropriate; we would appreciate your views on this and any other aspects of the proposal. We can pouch the maps, photographs and sketches for your use, together with additional descriptive material on the features of the site and the analysis and intelligence conclusions drawn by Washington. In addition, or alternatively, we can make available on short notice appropriate expertise from Washington to participate in the meetings, with or without you as you deem appropriate. Such an expert could hand carry the necessary materials, and thus permit the contemplated exchange independent of the classified pouch schedule.

Christopher

---

347. Telegram From the Embassy in South Africa to the Department of State

Pretoria, August 9, 1978, 1755Z

4593. Subject: Kalahari Follow-up. Ref: (A) State 183948 [183943], (B) State 199458, (C) State 198528.

1. Had friendly but inconclusive session with Fourie this morning at which I outlined ref (A) proposal for discussions to clarify and resolve Kalahari questions. I explained that we had greatly appreciated General Lemmer’s willingness to discuss the matter and, in view of his offer to “annotate” the imagery, thought the proposed procedure would be the best way to clear up questions still remaining on the basis of technical evidence and visible features which could be explained by our experts only in terms of nuclear explosives testing.

2. Fourie listened carefully but took no notes. He responded that he was not informed of the substance of Lemmer’s presentation to Smith and Locke and did not know how our request for further discussion would be received, as the Kalahari site was exclusively a defense

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–2389. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See Document 346.
3 Not found.
4 In telegram 198528 to Pretoria, August 7, the Department transmitted the proposed text of the draft contract agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780322–1110)
5 See Document 345.
matter. He said he would pass our proposal on to them and let me know. However, he expressed the view that the request might only “annoy” the SAG (i.e. Cabinet), as it was not clear why we continued to bring the Kalahari up when it was obvious that we would not provide any nuclear fuel to Koeberg in any case without SAG adherence to the NPT. He saw the Kalahari as a side issue if everything else depended upon SAG acceptance of the NPT and full safeguards. Further, he thought President Carter had accepted Prime Minister Vorster’s assurances, yet it seemed we wanted to challenge those assurances.

3. I recalled Ambassador Smith’s discussion of this point and said that we were not in fact asking something that was in any way new but were simply following up on the same matter we had raised at that time, pursuing General Lemmer’s suggestion that he could be more helpful if he could see and annotate the materials we were basing our analysis upon. Without getting into the question of assurances, I said we would almost certainly be asked by Congress and the NRC to signify our confidence that the SAG would abide by the NPT and safeguards before entering into the settlement procedure discussed during Smith’s visit. I said we could do this much easier if we could dispel any doubts our own experts held about the Kalahari question.

4. Fourie said he could not see what good it would do for South Africa if the SAG satisfied the US on the Kalahari, even if they invited us to inspect the site, as it was still only the NPT that counted when it came to achieving an ultimate agreement and providing Koeberg fuel. He said it was Koeberg fuel that they were most interested in as the Safari I reactor could be closed down. (However, I doubt whether AEB President Roux would agree with such a comment.) Fourie said some Cabinet members argued that the US would always find some last minute excuse not to go ahead with an agreement and would see our Kalahari interest in this light, particularly since SAG adherence to the NPT should solve any USG doubts. Some would ask what the US really wanted.

5. I said I appreciated the internal political problem, but pointed out that we had problems he needed to understand too, including an important international dimension. I said some people felt we would be out on a limb with any kind of nuclear agreement with South Africa since there would inevitably be fears and suspicions whether real or stimulated about SA nuclear intentions. Dispelling questions about the Kalahari site would make it possible for us to move forward with confidence with the kind of settlement procedure Ambassador Smith had proposed to them.

6 See Document 311.
6. Fourie said he was a bit concerned that it had not yet been possible for Foreign Minister Botha to discuss the settlement procedure with Minister of Mines S.P. Botha and Prime Minister Vorster. Botha had just left on another trip and there would be further unintentional delay. I said that Ambassador Smith had received Botha’s message through Ambassador Sole (ref B) and understood the problem. Then I asked about Sole’s comment to Herb Kaiser relating the matter to the Walvis Bay and Namibian issues and asked if this reflected SAG views. Fourie asked me to repeat what Sole said, then categorically rejected it as being Sole’s own thinking. He did not sound too pleased.

7. Comment: I suspect that Fourie’s reaction to the idea of further discussions on the Kalahari reflects the kind of questions the Prime Minister himself might ask and may have been intended to register SAG sensitivity on this point. Nonetheless I believe he will report the idea objectively and we may still get a go-ahead. I offered to explain the discussion process we had in mind to anyone else he thought appropriate and will leave it at that until I hear from him.

8. I left with Fourie the draft contract agreement for DOE purchase of recovered fuel from Safari I (ref C) which he promised to forward to AEB.

Edmondson
Pretoria, September 23, 1978, 1117Z

Ref: (A) Pretoria 3652, (B) Pretoria 3662, (C) Pretoria 3783.

There follows below the text of an undated paper entitled “US/South African relations in the field of nuclear energy” handed to me by Secretary of the SAG Department of Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie on September 22, 1978. I had asked him a few days earlier about the status of the SAG reply to our talks of last June, and he said that he and Atomic Energy Board President “Ampie” Roux had prepared a draft which received ministerial approval with some amendments which were then being incorporated. He said the paper which follows thus represented government policy although it had not been shown to the Ministers again. He seemed momentarily uncertain whether to give me the paper at this stage—probably because of the fact the paper had not been reviewed again by Ministers and that there will be a new Prime Minister and possibly a shift of other Ministers before the end of next week—but expressed concern that we might misinterpret further delay. Since it is a basically favorable but still-qualified reply requiring additional clarifications and assurances, there is obviously still room for change by the new Cabinet. I will submit additional comment separately.
2. Begin text (confidential)

1. The South African Government has now had the opportunity to take note of the discussions which took place on June 26–28 between representatives of the United States of America, headed by Ambassador Gerard Smith, and representatives of the Republic of South Africa, headed by Foreign Secretary Dr B.G. Fourie and including Dr A.J.A. Roux, President of the Atomic Energy Board. In taking note of these discussions, the South African Government has had the advantage of being guided by the “Joint Minute” which was prepared by the two delegations.

2. The South African Government associates itself with the aim of finding ways and means to assure the renewal and continuation of cooperation between the two governments in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Furthermore, the South African Government has taken note of the view expressed by the US delegation that such cooperation, from the point of view of the Government of the United States, cannot be achieved without South Africa’s accession to the NPT.

3. In this context the South African Government must reemphasize the fact that it has always actively supported the principle of non-proliferation and has over many years made its contribution towards the promotion of this principle in a positive way. In these circumstances, and provided agreement can be reached on the matters raised in this document, South Africa is willing to consider accession to the NPT on the assumption that the United States is prepared to give an undertaking ensuring the supply of nuclear fuel to South Africa as provided for in the existing US/South African agreement for cooperation concerning the civil uses of atomic energy and the contract between the South African Electricity Supply Commission and the then ERDA. The South African Government feels that such an act would re-establish the mutual confidence which has existed for so many years in the nuclear field and which is an essential basis for future cooperation. This confidence was severely damaged by the unilateral action taken against South Africa without any prior warning by the US Government in recent years.

In regard to the supply of HEU for research reactors the South African Government fully shares the concern of the Government of the United States over continuing its supply to so many countries throughout the world and is prepared to cooperate with the United States to develop fuel for HEU reactors based on uranium enriched to no more than 20 percent. However, it feels that until this objective is achieved the United States should adhere to the inter-governmental agreement between the two countries and supply fuel for the Safari reactor as in the past, so as to enable South Africa to carry out its normal programme for which the Safari reactor was purchased from the United States.
4. Furthermore, the South African Government must emphasize the fact that decisions in which it has had no say and which negated the validity of Article IV of the NPT, have had the effect of penalising South Africa, with its ability to produce enriched uranium on the basis of a process developed by itself, more than any other country in the free world. The question which therefore arises is whether the United States Government would be prepared to reconsider its attitude and thus to recognise the achievements of the South African Government and to consider assisting it in achieving its rightful objectives.

5. The United States Government is aware of the fact that the South African Government has always been concerned about protecting the sensitive enrichment technology on which the Valindaba plant is based. This protection is essential to South Africa’s national interests. Secondly, and of equally great importance, the spread of knowledge of uranium enrichment technology, through a safeguards system administered by the IAEA, could so easily completely jeopardize the objective of non-proliferation. However, in spite of this important consideration, the South African Government has taken serious note of the possibility discussed by representatives of the two countries at their recent meeting in Pretoria, of a safeguards system which would be based upon “periphery approach”. It is prepared to give further consideration to this approach provided it can be satisfied that the implementation of the safeguards system decided upon will not defeat the objective of non-proliferation. This aspect should be considered and dealt with as soon as agreement on the salient features of the re-establishment of the technical cooperation between our two countries in the nuclear field is in sight. In the meantime the South African Government would be grateful if, in an effort to clarify the situation further, the United States authorities could enlighten it on the technical details of the safeguards which the United States envisages for the plant which it proposes to place under safeguards.

6. During the Pretoria discussions between representatives of the two countries in February\(^6\) and again from 26 to 28 June 1978, the South African delegation was briefly informed of the salient features of the United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.\(^7\) A study of the legislation which has since been undertaken has revealed that there are several material aspects on which South Africa still has no clarity. The South African Government would, in particular, wish to be sure that there is no doubt about the interpretation of the legislation and its implications. Accordingly, with a view to promoting progress

---

\(^6\) See Documents 331 and 332.

\(^7\) See footnote 6, Document 332.
towards the target referred to in paragraph 5 above, the South African Government would be happy to send a specialist delegation to Washington to obtain absolute clarity on the United States legislation, as early as possible.

7. Furthermore, the South African delegation has been authorised by the government to proceed with the negotiations on peaceful nuclear cooperation between the two countries, within the framework and spirit set out above and in the “Joint Minute” prepared following the June discussions.8

8. In conclusion the South African Government must re-emphasise the importance it attaches to the consideration of the consequences of a UN economic boycott should it be instituted, as indicated in the “Joint Minute”, it is the intention of the South African Government to raise this issue with the United States Government at an early stage.

End text.

Edmondson

8 See footnote 2, Document 343, and footnote 2, Document 344.

349. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting1

Washington, October 6, 1978, 8:15–9 a.m.

SUBJECT
Africa

PARTICIPANTS
The President
The Vice President
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher

JCS
CIA
Admiral Stansfield Turner

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting: #14 Held 10/16/78, 6–9/78, 10/78. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Cabinet Room.
Dr. Brzezinski: This is the first NSC meeting on Africa since March 3, 1977; it gives us an opportunity to review our approach and test its validity. We will open with a CIA briefing.

Admiral Turner: (Gave general intelligence briefing on southern Africa and Angola.)

Secretary Vance: Namibia is our principal problem in addition of course to Rhodesia, and it is essential for us to go to Pretoria next week to get the South Africans to rethink their position. I spoke to a South African journalist yesterday who recommends that the Contact Group concentrate on setting a fixed date for the election, perhaps late April. This might move the South Africans who are afraid the UN will put off elections indefinitely since SWAPO does not want them. Waldheim’s statement on troops helped and he says he would go along with our scenario. In fact we will probably be unsuccessful and have to go on to sanctions. I believe the other Contact Group members are with us but we have not chosen the sanctions.

The President: What about the issue of force size?

Secretary Vance: Waldheim has scaled things down and it is not a major point now. The South Africans are satisfied with the police arrangements. The issue is whether the new government is prepared to be flexible or whether they have drawn the line.

Dr. Brzezinski: I agree fully with that in the short run but there is a larger issue: This administration has been activist, morally motivated,
and urged moderation. The President’s prestige is involved. I do not believe we will be successful because the Soviets and Cubans offer military radical solutions. There are two courses of action open to us. First, if the Soviet and Cuban problem is a long term threat we should make it a major issue in our relations with them. We must demonstrate to the Africans that military solutions are not viable. Second, if we cannot do this we should slowly and subtly lower our level of involvement. We would maintain our moral position but admit that there is little we can do. We are not able to succeed unless we face up to the Soviet and Cuban problem. The African moderates in time might also realize the harm that the Cuban presence brings about.

Secretary Vance: I believe that there is a third way and that is bringing about peaceful solutions. We should continue along that route. The next step is sanctions directed to the Namibia problem.

The President: We will be moving into the UN and not having us and the British up front.

Secretary Vance: We never were in the forefront in Namibia. If we make progress there it will help us in Rhodesia. It would be dangerous to decide now that we are going to confront the Soviets in southern Africa. Andy Young and I discussed two kinds of sanctions: A cut-off of all air transportation to South Africa and a suspension of credits. Both of these would be for three months.

Ambassador Young: We have already thwarted the Soviet and Cuban advance, as can be seen in the Angolan reconciliation with Zaire. The Soviets want to stir things up but we need stability because of our long range economic interests. The pragmatism of Angola and Mozambique reflects their need for development. Like Sadat, they want the fighting to stop and they know the Soviets cannot help. Namibia is the key; a limited success there will undercut the military option. In the long run the military option leads to situations like Uganda. The present black political leadership in southern Africa is moderate and pragmatic. The military leaders may be different. My greatest fear is that the western-educated leaders will be killed off, leaving people like Amin and Mengistu in charge who are ideologically dependent on the Soviets. On sanctions, the three month period banning air travel is fortunate. Congress will be out of session and it will cover the Christmas season when many South Africans go abroad. It will show the South Africans what it is like to retreat into the laager. They are not a hopeless case; P.W. Botha was elected by a small group of people. Pik Botha’s public following is much larger. Knowing about possible sanctions builds up

---

6 In July, the Governments of Angola and Zaire announced their intention to establish diplomatic relations.
a counter pressure on the South African Government to offset the pressure from the Right Wing.

_The President_: How will the other four countries react to air travel suspension?

_Secretary Vance_: They will agree. On Rhodesia we should have one more try at the Anglo-American Plan and then turn it over to the UN.

_Dr. Brzezinski_: That will be another way of lowering our involvement.

_Vice President_: A Namibian solution on the basis of Resolution 338 would be a major accomplishment. We nearly made it. Former Ambassador Bowdler told me he was skeptical whether it would make sense for P.W. Botha to come to the United States in return for accepting Resolution 338. Couldn’t we explore with Pik Botha if this would be possible? The South Africans are western-oriented and are hurt by their isolation. They would pay a price to be readmitted to the West—perhaps Namibia. If we threaten them with sanctions publicly it will just become a test of their manhood.

_Secretary Vance_: It is an idea worth considering.

_Ambassador Young_: Every time we think of this kind of thing they do something outrageous that makes a visit impossible. We have a lot to talk about with them.

_Secretary Vance_: [less than 1 line not declassified] We do have positive cards to play.

_Ambassador Young_: SWAPO recognizes that Namibia will have to have economic ties to South Africa just as Mozambique does. South African economic influence is strong throughout the region.

_Secretary Blumenthal_: If suspending credits is a possible sanction we should bear in mind that money is the most fungible commodity. Suspending credits would be only symbolic in the short run and South Africa can take countermeasures against our investments there and outstanding bank loans. The sanctions would have to be universal to be effective and this sort of thing has not worked in the past. The embargo on air service sounds like a much better idea. Also we could suspend Exim credits but this would be very small.

_Secretary Vance_: Credit sanctions would be most effective if the UK and France joined in.

_Secretary Brown_: We have not even been able to get our allies to cut off credits to the Cubans who are acting badly in Africa.

---

7 Adopted in 1949, the resolution addressed specific questions concerning the international status of Southwest Africa and South Africa’s responsibilities. For text of UNSC Resolution 338, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–1949*, p. 875.
Secretary Vance: This however is very limited and designed for psychological effect. Even so we must look at it very carefully.

Dr. Brzezinski: We must also consider the impression here. We would be setting up an air blockade while Soviets and Cubans fly troops to Africa; we would be suspending credits while our allies give credits to Cuba. We should put pressure on them.

The President: These are my inclinations but they shouldn’t be taken as final decisions:

1. It would be unwise to espouse sanctions publicly before Cy’s trip. Botha would stand firm against public pressure.

2. Vance could go with a proposal with a firm date for elections (although I thought they would be required before April); a provision for not more than 3,500 troops and 1,500 other personnel. This is what Waldheim told me and I think SWAPO would accept it.

3. I will send a letter to Botha offering a private meeting. It will let him know exactly what we want him to do about Smith and Namibia. I am prepared to meet with Botha here.

4. We need a long range projection of South Africa’s relations with the world; Andy should help out on this. They and many Americans have a vision of disaster in the future. We are on shaky ground pressing South Africa too far. Machel would prefer to work harmoniously with South Africa rather than see the region erupt into war.

5. In Rhodesia we will tell all parties concerned that we will make one more attempt and then put the Anglo-American Plan in the hands of the United Nations. Nobody there wants war and Smith may want to get out from under the situation.

6. We will need a substantial public relations effort directed against Smith’s activities in the US, describing what the Anglo-American Plan is and what we are doing.

7. Early next week we will meet again to see how we want to proceed with Botha. Vance should set the scene with Botha pointing out that our intentions towards South Africa are not hostile.

I think a lot of the black nations in Africa would like to see peace; if we can ever get a process started on apartheid the West and the private sector will also support progress.

Secretary Vance: That sounds fine in general outline. The Africans have reacted moderately on the subject of Namibia and our granting of the visa to Smith. They realize that we are trying to do our best.

---

8 See Documents 93, 95, and 96.
9 See Document 94.
Dr. Brzezinski: If they think that we may back off if they do not support us, then they may be more inclined to back us now.

Secretary Brown: Would we go ahead with the All-Parties Conference if Nkomo or Mugabe didn’t come?

The President: Nkomo is more important.

Secretary Vance: The Front Line States question whether there is enough common ground to hold a conference. If they think there is they will put pressure on Nkomo and Mugabe.

Dr. Brzezinski: I will prepare minutes of what has just been outlined. If anybody has questions or reservations they should submit a memorandum to me today.

Vice President: We should set up a Crisis Management Operation to deal with the Smith visit.

The President: Jody Powell should be involved and Warren Christopher should lead the team.

Secretary Vance: Andy has already been in touch with some of the media.

The President: We need to brief the press broadly. I talked to Tom Brokaw and David Hartman last night. They thought we made the right decision on the visa but we must be prepared to meet the issue head on.

Secretary Vance: Sithole may be an even more articulate spokesman than Smith.

The President: If Botha just tells us to go to hell then we will go ahead with the sanctions. I would like to see Smith give Rhodesia back to the British even if they don’t want it.

Secretary Vance: I will take that possibility up with Smith. The Front Line States will support almost anything once Smith is out.
350. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa**¹

Washington, December 30, 1978, 0126Z

327068. For the Ambassador. Subject: Further Nuclear Talks. Ref: Pretoria 7631.²

1. It has now been six months since the Smith talks. While the SAG has come back to us in the meantime for clarifications, which we have supplied, it has avoided giving us a definite response to our proposals for a nuclear settlement.

2. [4 lines not declassified] instituting a safeguards regime with a possible stockpile of HEU of unknown size would present clear political and technical difficulties.

3. In these circumstances, we think it important to determine whether the SAG is serious in entertaining our proposals, or whether it is simply stretching out the negotiations for other purposes. Delay also reduces the credibility of our effort to resolve the uncertainties of SA’s nuclear intentions through negotiation and cooperation.

4. In light of the above, we are contemplating asking the Secretary to approve an early approach to the SAG. The purpose of an approach would be to determine to what extent the SAG is willing to cooperate on the nuclear issue and, hopefully, to obtain a clearer indication of its specific intention to adhere to the NPT and accept safeguards at Valindaba.

5. If the SAG’s response to this approach indicated that our non-proliferation objectives are attainable, we would consider as a second step what steps we might appropriately take to accelerate the settlement process.

6. The approach we contemplate would be along the following lines:

—You will recall that in June both sides stressed the urgency of resolving the nuclear issues set forth in the Joint Minute³ and expressed

---

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 12/15–31/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the White House.

² In telegram 7631 from Pretoria, December 29, Edmondson noted: “With the Namibian question very much up in the air in the next few weeks, I do not believe this is a good time to encourage SAG to begin further talks on the nuclear issue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780538–0524)

³ See Document 344.
the hope that the necessary decisions could be taken within two months of that time.

—The communication we received in September was inconclusive, did not lead to the implementation foreseen in the Joint Minute, and in fact raised issues we thought had been clarified earlier.4

—Moreover, since September we have provided a team of your legal experts detailed briefings and documentation on all aspects of the Non-Proliferation Act, ancillary procedures, and administrative regulations. We have also supplied a draft text of a revised nuclear cooperation agreement. We have indicated our willingness to discuss further the technical aspects of an interim safeguards development program at Valindaba.

—My government is most concerned that our extensive exchanges over the past year have not brought us to a nuclear agreement.

—Continuing delay compounds uncertainties regarding operation of the Valindaba plant. Our concerns will be shared by others familiar with Dr. Roux’s recent statement in the US press that Valindaba is capable of producing highly enriched uranium. (FYI: Reference is to Washington Post article,5 pouch you earlier.)

—There is serious question under these circumstances as to whether a nuclear settlement reached only after substantial further delay would be in the interests of the US or would resolve continuing international concern regarding South Africa’s nuclear intentions.

—in view of the above and since, as Ambassador Smith pointed out in the June discussions, time is of the essence in our nuclear proposals, we need very soon (FYI: we would have in mind a couple of weeks) your government’s decision on whether to enter the nuclear settlement set forth in the Joint Minute.

7. RefTel reached us as we were preparing the above proposal. In light of your concern regarding timing of further nuclear talks, but also taking into account our concerns enumerated above, we would very much like to have soonest your considered judgment as to whether

---

4 See Document 348.
or not we should go ahead with an approach to the SAG along the lines described in para 6.6

Newsom

6 In telegram 7665 from Pretoria, December 30, Edmonson counseled a delay until at least February. He held: "More fundamentally, even taking into account our nuclear concerns, I believe it would be wisest to make our approach after we have a better idea as to whether we have indeed been successful in getting the SAG to move ahead with the implementation of UNSC Resolution 435 on Namibia. If we are having difficulty on Namibia, it may be difficult to get the SAG to focus on nuclear matters rationally and it will be much harder for us to be forthcoming on matters necessary to get a nuclear agreement. If Namibian matters appear to be hanging in the balance, it might be best not to press them on the nuclear issue. On the other hand, if Namibia is going badly and we are concerned at the passage of time, we might decide to take a much harder stand on the nuclear issue, clearly indicating that we cannot hold our offer open if they have not committed themselves to accept it in time for approval by the present session of Parliament (which ends in June)." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2128)

351. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, January 23, 1979, 2128Z

18587. Capetown for Embassy. Subject: Further U.S.-South African Nuclear Talks. Refs: (A) 78 State 327068 (B) 78 Pretoria 7665 (C) State 4052.

1. Secret (Entire text)

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0513. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Cape Town. Drafted by Allen W. Locke (PM/NPP); cleared by Gerard Smith (S/AS), Thomas R. Pickering (OES), Richard M. Moose (AF), Jerome Kahan (FM), Robert L. Gallucci (INR/STA), Charles N. Van Doren (ACDA/NP), William Salmon (T), and Gerald Helman (IO); approved by Vance.

2 See Document 350.

3 See footnote 6, Document 350.

4 In telegram 4052 to Pretoria and the White House, January 6, the Department instructed the Embassy to postpone approaching the South African Government about nuclear talks until mid-January. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850011–0521)
2. Unless you perceive compelling reasons to the contrary, you should take appropriate opportunity in week of January 22 to seek from Brand Fourie or Pik Botha a decision from the SAG on whether to enter the nuclear settlement set forth during the June 1978 Smith talks.  

3. Suggested points to be made in your approach, revised from ref. A to incorporate your suggestions ref. B, follow:

—You will recall that in June both sides stressed the urgency of resolving the nuclear issues set forth in the Joint Minute and expressed the hope that the necessary decisions could be taken within two months of that time.

—The communication we received in September was inconclusive, did not lead to the implementation foreseen in the Joint Minute, and in fact raised issues we thought had been clarified earlier.

—Moreover, since September we have provided a team of your legal experts detailed briefings and documentation on all aspects of the Non-Proliferation Act, ancillary procedures, and administrative regulations. We have also supplied a draft text of a revised nuclear cooperation agreement. We have indicated our willingness to discuss further the technical aspects of an interim safeguards development program at Valindaba.

—My government is most concerned that our extensive exchanges over the past year have not brought about a nuclear agreement.

—We question whether substantial further delay would be in the interests of the U.S. or South Africa, and believe it could only aggravate international concern regarding South Africa’s nuclear intentions.

—In view of the above and since, as Ambassador Smith pointed out in the June discussions, time is of the essence in our nuclear proposals, we need very soon (FYI: we would have in mind a couple of weeks) your government’s decision on whether to enter the nuclear arrangements set forth in the Joint Minute.

4. FYI: On a contingency basis, we will be considering additional steps on our part which may prove necessary in light of the SAG’s response to the above approach. They will be refinements on and alternatives to the thinking we have already spelled out in the paper “Tactical Options on Valindaba Safeguards.” We will wish to draw heavily on your views and recommendations as we proceed.

Vance

---

5 See Documents 343–345.
6 See Document 348.
Cape Town, January 24, 1979, 1648Z

98. Subject: (U) U.S.-South African Nuclear Relations. Ref: State 018587.  

1. (S-Entire text)

2. Although he had some difficulty squeezing me into his schedule, I called on Fourie today and made the approach requested ref tel, using all of the talking points suggested. I had barely opened the subject with the introductory point when he interrupted with a comment that he had been thinking about the matter and wondering whether there was not something further they should be doing. He then listened to the rest of my presentation.

3. Fourie looked puzzled and said I “frightened” him when I said I thought the Department was probably thinking in terms of “a couple of weeks” in saying that we need to have the SAG decision “very soon”. He reminded me that he is going out of the country on a special mission tomorrow and will not be back until the weekend. He said that Dr. Roux was going to be in Cape Town on February 6, at which time he and Roux would be seeing the two Ministers concerned on another matter and could bring up the subject, but he really did not see how they could get a government decision in such a short time. He would nevertheless report my approach.

4. Fourie recalled that the SAG legal team had gone to Washington but he seemed not to have talked to them after their return, wondering at one point whether they had not come back after he began his holiday leave in December. In any event, he said he had the impression that the SAG was still awaiting some indication from us as to how the USG proposes to handle the question of peripheral safeguards on the U.S. plant that is to be safeguarded. He apologised and said perhaps we had already provided that information and he had not seen it yet. I said I was not aware what stage we were at in the exchange of technical information on that topic but did not believe this was something that had to precede the further discussions which we were willing to have on the technical aspects of a safeguards development program at Valin-daba. He said he would check the point but understood that agreement on such a program was one of the U.S. prerequisites for a settlement.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2048. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
2 See Document 351.
on the lines of the Joint Minute.\textsuperscript{3} I said I would also check the point with Washington.

5. In concluding, I noted that South Africa was in the process of changing Prime Ministers when Fourie handed me their inconclusive response of September 22\textsuperscript{4} and that we had appreciated their difficulty in giving us a definitive response at that time. By now, however, following the legal talks in Washington, we assumed the new Prime Minister would have been briefed on the subject and that a decision to move forward should be possible. Fourie smiled and reminded me that a lot of time and effort had gone into other important matters, not the least of which had been the Namibia problem and the politically difficult information scandal. I said I understood but thought that the passage of further time without some real progress on this issue would make things more difficult; I suspected that people in Washington must feel the time had come to “fish or cut bait”. Fourie said he would pursue the matter as soon as he could.

\textit{Edmondson}

\textsuperscript{3} See footnote 2, Document 343.
\textsuperscript{4} See Document 348.

353. \textbf{Telegram From the Department of State to the White House and the Consulate in Cape Town}\textsuperscript{1}

\textit{Washington, January 30, 1979, 0138Z}

24514. Subject: US-South African Nuclear Relations. Ref: Cape Town 98.\textsuperscript{2}

1. (S-Entire text)

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 1/25-31/79. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Priority to Cape Town. Drafted by Lock; cleared by Keeley, Ambassador Smith, Van Doren, Kahan (PM), Guhin (OES/NET), and MacFarlane (AF/S); approved by Pickering. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142-2045)
\textsuperscript{2} See Document 352.
2. You did an excellent job in reaching Fourie so quickly and in striking the right note in your discussion with him. Your summation of the feeling in Washington, that the time has come to fish or cut bait, was right on the mark. The SAG should understand that we expect it to take a political decision now on the settlement package, which would include agreement to conduct a safeguards development program at Valindaba. We would not see any purpose to further technical exchanges on the specific elements of that program until the political decision is taken. In the event of a positive decision by the SAG, of course, we would be fully prepared to work with it to develop a mutually acceptable safeguards development program that would lead to effective safeguards while protecting South Africa’s proprietary enrichment technology.

3. To elaborate on this point, we note Fourie’s understanding that agreement on a safeguards development program at Valindaba is a prerequisite for a settlement on the lines of the Joint Minute. Clearly, a safeguards development program is an integral part of the settlement described in the Joint Minute, and thus agreement to begin such a program is a prerequisite for the settlement. We would not accept, however, that detailed agreement on how to conduct the safeguards program is a prerequisite for entering the settlement. Indeed, as Fourie and Roux should be aware from previous discussion on this subject, detailed elaboration of the safeguards development program is technically infeasible until the SAG provides basic safeguards-related operating data on Valindaba. We presume the SAG would not be prepared to provide such data, an act it repeatedly has characterized as politically sensitive, until it has decided to enter the settlement set forth in the Joint Minute.

4. We assume Fourie will get back to you after checking on the status of the dialogue on safeguards (para 4 ref tel). Although as indicated above we intend to avoid more technical talks until we have obtained the SAG’s political decision, it is our understanding that the ball is in fact in their court on this one. In our exchanges with the SAG leading to the November visit of legal experts to Washington, we indicated we would be prepared to discuss with SAG experts all the issues raised in the September 22 response, including our approach to safeguarding the US enrichment plant. The SAG did not accept that offer, on the ground that the team it proposed to send did not include appropriate expertise. The SAG has not since, until your conversation with Fourie, expressed interest in holding such discussions. We remain

---

3 See footnote 2, Document 343.
4 See Document 348.
prepared to discuss with the SAG at an appropriate time how we are approaching the question of peripheral safeguards on the US plant. However, in view of the limited relevance of safeguards as designed specifically for the US plant to those which must be designed specifically for the Valindaba plant (beyond the common element of a peripheral approach), we believe it would make more sense, once there is a political basis, to move directly to discussion of Valindaba safeguards. In the course of this discussion we could describe as necessary for illustrative purposes how we propose to safeguard the US plant.

Vance

354. Summary of Conclusions of a Policy Review Committee Meeting

Washington, April 5, 1979, 1:45–3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Rhodesia and Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS
State:
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Assistant Secretary Richard Moose, African Affairs
Mr. Anthony Lake, Director of Policy Planning

USUN:
Ambassador Donald McHenry

CIA:
Admiral Stansfield Turner
Mr. Frank Carlucci
Mr. William Parmenter

JCS:
Lt General William Smith

Defense:
Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
Dr. Owen Roberts

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Funk, Chron File, Box 121, 4/1-18/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
This meeting considered three principle problems:

—The Namibian situation, with emphasis on the present difficulties concerning monitoring arrangements for SWAPO forces, and the necessity of getting a favorable response from the South Africans on the proposals growing out of the Proximity Talks in New York in late March.²

—The question of the desirability of extending diplomatic recognition to Angola.

—The Rhodesian problem, which is being forced to a critical stage by virtue of the internal elections in the latter half of April, and which not only presents us with seemingly intractable difficulties in trying to move the various parties toward a peaceful solution, but also raises serious domestic political considerations concerning the lifting of sanctions under the terms of the Case-Javits Amendment.³ (S)

On Namibia, it was agreed that a short rather personal letter from the President to Prime Minister Botha⁴ would be helpful in encouraging the South African Government to respond in a positive way to the proposals growing out of the Proximity Talks. These proposals were designed to deal with the two principal problems being raised by SAG at the present time: The monitoring of SWAPO forces in Angola, and the establishment of one or two centers in Namibia to gather together and monitor SWAPO forces now in Namibia. (S)

It was recognized that SAG may well fail to accept these proposals entirely, but that a reasonably positive response was necessary to keep settlement hopes alive, and that another Presidential letter could well be crucial in obtaining that positive response. It was noted that a negative response would almost certainly trigger serious moves in the UN Security Council toward sanctions, and that such moves would present us with serious political and economic problems. (S)

On Angola, the Committee was divided on the question of the desirability of extending recognition, and agreed to so report to the President. (S)

² See Documents 111–117.
³ See footnote 3, Document 223.
⁴ See Document 120.
In favor of recognition, it was argued that: (1) Angola had been cooperative with us in dealing with SWAPO on the Namibian problem, and could be important in the future; (2) recognition would give us influence and leverage useful in reducing Cuban influence and presence; and (3) we had important and potentially growing commercial interests in Angola. (S)

It was also argued that recognition would help maintain and build upon our general credibility with Black Africa. (S)

The other view was that while it was desirable to carry on a dialogue with the Angolans about steps leading to a normalization of relations, we should not give recognition without some quid pro quo concerning the massive Cuban military presence and its threat of further intervention in both Namibia and Rhodesia. (S)

It was further argued that an immediate recognition would not only fail to guarantee any basis for Cuban withdrawal nor any Angolan movement toward genuine non-alignment, but would weaken our position in Southern Africa, and that therefore we should use the possibility of recognition as a tool to bring about a reduction in Soviet and Cuban presence and influence. (S)

With respect to domestic politics, two views were also expressed: (1) that recognition was now supportable on the Hill; and (2) that immediate recognition without quid pro quo would be perceived on the Hill as weakness and a vacillating change of long-standing policy. (S)

On Rhodesia policy, the meeting considered two basic options for present action: (1) that we stay with our long-standing and recently restated policy of urging acceptance of a political process leading ultimately to UN-supervised elections; 5 (2) that, in light of the high probability that Congress will attempt to lift sanctions, and may succeed, 6 we should work out a new strategy, which would utilize this factor to pressure the internal government and the Patriotic Front to begin serious negotiations on a political settlement. (S)

It was also suggested that following the elections, there may well be an attempt to split the Front to bring either Nkomo or Mugabe into the internal government, and that if this begins to happen we should be prepared to support such a move. (S)

Serious questions regarding this later “split-front” policy were raised, but the meeting showed a great deal of interest in working out the details of basic Option Two, i.e., using sanctions as a tool to gain

---

5 For text of Vance’s March 17 statement, see Department of State, Bulletin, June 1979, p. 22.

6 Reference is to the Helms Amendment, introduced in June 1978, in an attempt to remove sanctions that had been reinstated in March 1977. See footnote 2, Document 210.
movement toward negotiations. Such an option would require a well-planned and carefully scripted series of approaches to our Congressional leadership, the Front Line States, the Republic of South Africa, the Patriotic Front, and the Internal Government, beginning in April and continuing through May. (S)

The meeting agreed that this Option Two had somewhat limited chances of substantive success, but could have the effect of being a positive factor with respect to domestic political considerations. (S)

It was further agreed that the details of Option Two should be worked out on an urgent basis for careful consideration at a follow-up meeting to be scheduled for the immediate future. (S)

To recapitulate:

—On Namibia, it was agreed to send another short personal Presidential letter to Botha urging acceptance of the proposals regarding SWAPO monitoring growing out of the recent New York Proximity Talks.

—On Angola, there was a division of opinion on the question of extending recognition.

—On Rhodesia, there was careful consideration of a proposal to alter our present strategy to include using the sanctions question to pressure the parties to negotiate, and it was agreed to work out further details for an urgent follow-on meeting. (S)

355. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, April 6, 1979, 2333Z

85899. Cape Town for Embassy, hold for Ambassador’s arrival.

Subject: Nuclear Issue.

1. (S) you should take early opportunity with Brand Fourie to probe current SAG intentions toward a nuclear settlement, drawing on following talking points which may be left with Fourie as a note verbale:

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 116, 4/1–13/79. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Locke. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
—As we indicated on January 24, we need to decide whether we are going to move forward on the proposals Gerry Smith discussed with you last June.

—We are confident that with a favorable decision by you now on the Joint Minute the procedures we must go through to meet our part of the bargain—congressional review and licensing of the fuel shipments by the NRC—will pose no obstacle to continuing nuclear fuel supply to South Africa.

—However, in the continuing absence of a response, there is a tendency to conclude that the SAG has no serious interest in the kind of settlement discussed last June.

—Moreover, people in Washington are concerned that the continuing operation of Valindaba, which we have to assume can produce bomb-grade material, is beginning to make it difficult to maintain support for continued nuclear cooperation.

—We appreciate your concern that safeguards not prejudice your enrichment technology proprietary rights and your desire for a full technical preview of this safeguards problem.

—We think that your decision to accept the safeguards development program envisaged in the Joint Minute will not prejudge technical review of the safeguards issue.

—The important thing to do in the time we have left is to set the political framework in which we can begin that review and get fuel delivered to Safari.

—We hope you will give this matter serious consideration and give us a response soon.

—If, however, there are specific reasons why your government is unable to give us a response at this time, it would be in your interest to set forth these reasons so that they can be taken into account when judgements are made in Washington on the status and prospects for continuation of the nuclear discussions.

2. (U) Septel will address points raised by SAG in previous exchanges on nuclear issue.

Vance

---

2 See Document 352.
3 See Documents 343–345.
4 See footnote 2, Document 343.
5 Not found.
Cape Town, April 12, 1979, 2010Z

880. From Embassy Cape Town. Subject: SAG PNG’s DATT. Ref: Cape Town 878.  
1. S-Entire text  
2. See reftel 878 for summary  
3. Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha called me in at 6:45 this evening, April 12, and reading from prepared notes, said that he had been instructed to inform me that the SAG has established that our DATT aircraft has been used for a conscious program of espionage. He said that they are in possession of photographs taken by a camera installed underneath the seat of the co-pilot which show that the aircraft has been used in a systematic program of photographing large areas of South Africa, including some very sensitive installations. The persons involved in the latest activity which had come to SAG notice were Colonel A. Crews, Major B. McConnell, and H.E. Wyatt.  
4. The Minister said that it had also come to SAG notice that members of my mission were involved in other improper activities. These concerned attempts to manipulate members of the South African Defence Forces, through improper conduct to make sensitive information available to members of the Mission. The most shocking, blatant violation of national sovereignty, he said, was that involving the photographs and the aircraft.  
5. Botha said that the South African Prime Minister would be making a statement on the matter this evening covering the aircraft and photographing but not the other activities. He then said that he wanted me to arrange for the departure of the three individuals concerned within 24 hours.  
6. Botha stated that the privilege of maintaining an aircraft in South Africa is being withdrawn, along with certain other privileges and facilities (he may have meant overflight rights, but did not say so). He said the aircraft is to be removed from the country "at the earliest opportunity after our technicians have assured that on its outgo-

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790177–0408. Secret; Niac Immediate.  
2 In telegram 878 from Cape Town, April 12, Edmondson provided a brief summary of the meeting with Botha. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790169–0061)
ing flight it will not commit further violations of South African sovereignty.”

7. Botha said that the SAG has copies of the photographs taken from the plane and that the SAG had taken photos of the camera mechanism and the way it operated. He stated such photo activity was a violation of the agreement on the use of this aircraft.

8. Botha then referred to other improper activities which the SAG does not intend to divulge to the public and said these included: using pornographic literature in an effort to obtain classified information; seeking classified information from SADF personnel; making unauthorized visits to an air force base (unspecified); questioning members of the SADF about “Defense Force matters;” and stationing or landing the aircraft on SADF bases without appropriate authority.

9. At the end of his presentation, Botha asked if I was aware of these matters. I responded that I was aware of no “improper activities” on the part of my staff, but was greatly concerned at these very serious charges which would inevitably have an extremely adverse impact on our relations. I recognized the right of the SAG to declare anyone it wished persona non grata. I hoped he had very good evidence of his charges. I said that 24 hours was in any case very short notice. He said, “all right, 48 hours.” I said even that was too short, in United States we would give people at least a week. He said, “all right, make it a week.” I then said I found it also strange and of great concern that he was bringing this matter up just as South Africa begins its Easter weekend, and that the Prime Minister had chosen on such short notice to make it public. This was especially damaging in terms of our relationship, and I requested that the Prime Minister not make a public statement until I had had an opportunity to inform my government and obtain its instructions. He said he would pass on my request. When I asked if he had anything to give me in writing, he said he would try to give me something either this evening or in the morning. I repeated my request that the Prime Minister should refrain from making a public announcement on this until I could report to my government. Once again he said that he would report my request to the Prime Minister.

10. Preliminary comment: Since the SAG has long believed that the DAO Beech 200 and its predecessor C–47 were equipped with photographic equipment, it appears probable that action to PNG the Attaches was pre-planned. It is unlikely military intelligence or the Dept of National Security would have acted on their own to force entry

---

3 In telegram 879 from Cape Town, April 12, the Embassy transmitted the text of Prime Minister Botha’s statement made on SABCTV at 8 p.m. on April 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790169-0161)
into the aircraft and lift the film without authorization from a very high level. The compilation of other allegations also suggests a protracted effort to build a case against the Attachés, and the decision to go public with only pro forma warning indicates an ulterior political motive. It seems highly probable that this incident was staged as part of the SAG’s campaign to discredit the integrity of the US in dealing with the SAG and thus to justify South Africa’s expected refusal to proceed with implementation of the UN plan for Namibia. It will also fan strong anti-US sentiment within South Africa, distract domestic attention from the information scandal and set the stage for a xenophobic general election campaign perhaps shortly after this session of Parliament adjourns in June.

Edmondson

357. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Christopher to President Carter

Washington, April 13, 1979

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

South Africa. David Newsom summoned the South African Charge today and gave him the message that the South African defense and air attaches in Washington must leave the country within a week, the same period allowed our personnel there. We announced this decision at the noon press briefing today, avoiding any characterization of the action. The South African diplomat interpreted the decision as retaliatory and later telephoned to say Pik Botha had instructed him to protest in the strongest terms.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

---


2 Carter wrote “good” in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
358. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to Secretary of Defense Brown and Director of Central Intelligence Turner

Washington, April 18, 1979

SUBJECT

South Africa Spy Incident

Because of the political consequences of the seizure by South Africa of the camera and film from the Defense attache [less than 1 line not declassified] the Department of Defense [less than 1 line not declassified] should prepare a report for the NSC providing in detail the circumstances leading up to the expulsion of our attaches. This report [2 lines not declassified] lapses in procedure or normal practice for this activity that may have contributed to the incident and corrective actions taken. The report should be available by April 25.

David Aaron


359. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)

Washington, May 18, 1979

[Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 1–12/79. Secret. Copies were sent to Muskie, Brown, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 3 pages not declassified.]
360. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Duncan) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, June 18, 1979

Dear Dave:

(S) The Director of DIA is allowing resumption of photographic missions using the attache aircraft effective 1 July 1979. New procedures will require coordination [less than 1 line not declassified] and approval by the COM or their representatives for each mission. In addition pertinent DIA regulations have been amended to more clearly define security procedures for transfer and storage of aerial cameras, film, and associated equipment.

(S) These procedures should provide adequate safeguards against a repeat of the South Africa incident.

Sincerely,

Charles

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 1–12/79. Secret. A copy was sent to Turner.
361. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, September 22, 1979, 4:40–5:35 p.m.

SUBJECT
[less than 1 line not declassified]

PARTICIPANTS

Department of State
David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
William G. Bowdler, Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research
Allen W. Locke, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Policy and Operations (PM)

Department of Defense
James Siena, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Affairs, ISA

Central Intelligence Agency
Bruce Clarke, Director of National Foreign Assessment Center
[name not declassified], Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee

Department of Energy
Harry Bergold, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs

National Security Council
Henry Owen, Chairman
William E. Odom
Jerry Schecter
Gerald Funk

Henry Owen convened the meeting and asked for an intelligence briefing followed by a discussion of the implications.
[4 paragraphs (21 lines) not declassified]

Henry Owen summed up the evidence as follows:
—Strong positive evidence.
—No negative evidence.
—A period of uncertainty during the next week until we corroborate [less than 1 line not declassified].

In the discussion of policy implications, the emerging key action question became whether or not the United States should make public the information we now have. All agreed that the U.S. must be the first to announce it, if it is valid. [2 lines not declassified] it was the judgment that:

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 72, South Atlantic Nuclear Event: 9/79–6/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes are not attached and were not found.
—Our posture in the UN will be important, and the Soviet and African radicals will try to exploit the situation.

—Our bilateral options, beyond a demarche, may have to include commercial sanctions. The U.S. public posture will be terribly important for our African policy.

—African countries won’t blame the U.S., but rather South Africa.

—Of the Big Five countries, the most serious implications will be for Great Britain, somewhat less for Germany and France. State did not believe a public announcement of the evidence would hurt the conference underway in London on Rhodesia.

—U.S.-Soviet relations are not greatly affected, but we will have differences in how we deal with Southern Africa.

Henry Owen directed that another mini-SCC meeting be held at 11:00 a.m. Sunday in the Situation Room.² He made the following taskings for that meeting:

a. CIA is to bring all new information and to provide a draft public announcement. [2 lines not declassified]

b. State is to contact our Embassy in South Africa, seeking any evidence which might corroborate [less than 1 line not declassified]. State will produce a U.S. policy options paper in draft by tomorrow.

c. Defense is to verify all U.S. strategic force locations so that we can be certain that no U.S. weapons accidentally exploded in the region. Defense will also check Soviet force locations for the same purpose.

d. All agency representatives should consult with their principles before the 11 o’clock meeting tomorrow for their views and clearances on a position on publicly announcing the evidence we now have.

² See Document 362.
Summar of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting

Washington, September 23, 1979, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

Possible Nuclear Detonation in South Africa

Participants

Department of State
- David Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
- Gerard C. Smith, Ambassador-at-Large
- William G. Bowdler, Director, Bureau of Intelligence & Research
- Allen W. Locke, Deputy to Ambassador-at-Large
- Richard Moore, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs

Department of Defense
- Robert Murray, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Middle East and North African Affairs

Central Intelligence Agency
- Bruce Clarke, Director of National Foreign Assessment Center
- [name not declassified] Chairman, Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
- John Despres, NIO/NP

Department of Energy
- Harry Bergold, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs

National Security Council
- Henry Owen, Chairman
- William E. Odom
- Jerry Schecter
- Gerald Funk
- Robert Rosenberg

1. Limited satellite detection information suggests that a nuclear explosion (1–3KT) probably occurred early Saturday morning in the southern Atlantic, southern Indian Ocean, southern Africa, or Antarctica. Air debris collection now underway may give us greater assurance in the next few days as to whether this happened. It may take at least several weeks to find out the exact location of the explosion and its probable author. South Africa is the most likely candidate. At the moment, there is considerable uncertainty on both these points; we do not yet know whether it will be feasible to resolve this uncertainty.

2. Until we have greater assurance as to what happened, we should not take the initiative in releasing our information but should be pre-
pared, if asked, to say that we have some information indicating that a low yield nuclear explosion may have occurred in this general area and are continuing to assess whether such an event has taken place.

3. We will share the facts described in paragraph 1 with the UK.

4. Stan Turner will share this information with the chairmen and, if he believes necessary, with the ranking minority members of the Senate and House Select Committees, which have a good record of security and whose leaders would expect this sharing.2

5. Every effort will be made to restrict circulation of this information and these decisions within the U.S. Government.

6. The State Department is refining its paper regarding the policy options among which the U.S. would have to choose in the event evidence confirms that a South African nuclear weapons detonation has occurred. This paper was discussed by the PRC and will be considered further.

2 Carter wrote at the bottom of the page: “Share what information we have—in strictest confidence—with British and top 2 leaders in each select committee. Do not let any allegation leak to public until we are sure of facts. Do not let copies of papers be made or distributed except strict ‘need to know.’ Keep me informed. J. Carter.”

363. Memorandum From Jerry Oplinger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, October 11, 1979

SUBJECT

V–B–B Luncheon—South Atlantic Nuclear Event (S)

At a meeting of the Mini-SCC group today, [5 lines not declassified]. Outside technical experts have [less than 1 line not declassified] concluded that it was a [less than 1 line not declassified] atmospheric nuclear explosion. [3 lines not declassified]

Another meeting will be held in approximately one week to review any further information which may be obtained. It was decided that in the meantime no approach should be made to the Soviets or to South Africa, and that no public statement should be made, unless there is a leak. A contingency statement has been prepared in the event that a leak occurs. The question of approaching the USSR, the SAG, or making a public statement will be reviewed again at the next meeting. State has been asked to prepare a paper on what actions the United States might take if we should conclude, with or without further evidence, that there was a South African test, and whether those actions should be part of a more general policy to be applied in the event of nuclear testing by other non-nuclear weapons states. (S)

[less than 1 line not declassified] addressing in concrete system-by-system terms what improvements are needed [1 line not declassified] in future situations of this kind. (S)

In summary, we are continuing to defer recommendations about specific actions so long as there is a significant possibility of [less than 1 line not declassified] recognizing that the risks of a leak will continue to grow. (S)

---

364. Memorandum From Jerry Oplinger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, October 23, 1979

SUBJECT

South Atlantic Nuclear Event (S)

Another mini-SCC was held today, chaired by Henry Owen, to assess the current situation and to consider a strategy paper prepared by State. [1 line not declassified] There is a continuing possibility of receiving confirmation from other sources, but there was a consensus that we should not hold up policy decisions any further awaiting new information. (S)

---

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Box 54, Proliferation: South Atlantic Event 10/1–25/79. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “ZB Has Seen.”
Dick Garwin, who participated in the technical panel has suggested that another panel examine systematically the possibility that other natural phenomenon could have produced the. The purpose would be to calculate more accurately the probability that we are wrong. Frank Press has been asked to manage this effort, and we hope to have the results in a week or so. (S)

There was a preliminary discussion of policy alternatives, but it was decided that this should be held until we have the results of the panel’s assessment. (S)

---

Brzezinski wrote “ok” in the right-hand margin.

365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in South Africa

Washington, October 26, 1979, 1545Z

279478. For Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: South Africa Nuclear Program. Ref: State 278942.

1. Secret-Entire text.

2. In light of the development reftel, we have reviewed the situation and believe that we should move immediately to discuss this matter at the highest level of the South African Government, the discussion should take place between you and the Prime Minister privately.

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 118, 10/21–31/79. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Pickering (OES); cleared by Moose, and Gerard Smith; approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175–2286)

2 In telegram 278942 to all diplomatic posts, October 26, the Department noted: “US news sources reported evening October 25 that US has evidence of low-yield test over a month ago of nuclear device in region that points to South Africa. Press sources indicate no confirming information has been obtained. US Government officials have called evidence ambiguous.” The telegram also transmitted the text of the October 25 Department statement on the matter, which reads: “The U.S. Government has an indication suggesting the possibility that a low-yield nuclear explosion occurred on September 22 in an area of the Indian Ocean and South Atlantic including portions of the Antarctic continent and the southern part of Africa. No corroborating evidence has been received to date. We are continuing to assess whether such an event took place.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790490-0457)
Following that discussion we will have to determine not only how we should proceed with the nuclear dialogue, but also with respect to expected actions in New York.

3. You should therefore seek earliest appointment with the Prime Minister and draw on the following points:

—A) I have been instructed by my government to see you privately to discuss the nuclear question.

—B) I want you to have a copy of the statement which the US Government has made concerning signals recorded on September 22. Since that time we have subjected this data to an intensive technical review and this review supports the conclusion that a nuclear explosion probably did occur.

—C) You will notice that our public statement on the subject has indicated clearly that ambiguities exist with respect to this signal and that we have carefully avoided pinpointing any country as being potentially responsible for the event if it did occur.

—D) The international community will certainly view this development with great concern, and in the absence of a commitment by South Africa to adhere to the NPT safeguards on all its nuclear activities, the pressure for drastic steps will grow and may become overwhelming.

—E) My government would like to have your comments on this latest development and a reaffirmation on the nuclear policy position taken by the former government and reiterated by the former Prime Minister in his October 1977 letter to President Carter. We would like to have your confirmation of our understanding that “South Africa has not developed, nor does it intend to develop, a nuclear explosive device for any purpose, peaceful or otherwise, and that South Africa would not undertake any nuclear explosive testing of any kind.” (You should hand the Prime Minister a piece of paper with the above statement of our current understanding of South African policy written on it.)

4. You will understand the desirability of an early meeting with Botha and the importance of a clear reply including continued confirmation of what South African policy actually is in this regard.

5. We note that you will be seeing Pik today and considered the possibility of your taking this matter up with him. While it is probably inevitable that the subject will come up during the meeting with Pik, we believe it best for you to deal directly and personally with the Prime Minister on instructions in paras 3 and 4.

Vance

---

3 See Document 311.
9782. Subject: (C) Suspected Nuclear Event: Talk With South African Foreign Minister. Ref: (A) State 278942, (B) Harrop-Edmondson telecons of October 25/26.

1. C-Entire text.

2. Summary: I saw Foreign Minister Pik Botha with four of his assistants early October 26, gave him the USG statement about the suspected nuclear event of Sept 22, explained some of the background, including the apparent desire of the source of the leaked story to discredit the SALT-Treaty detection system, and suggested that the SAG consider reaffirming the assurances about nuclear matters that the SAG gave us in 1977. Pik was friendly and attentive but inclined to blame us for the anti-South African emphasis of the story as well as to repeat his press line that the U.S. only gave an impression of weakness by appearing so nervous about the matter. He did not respond to the idea of reaffirming the 1977 assurances (nor did he personally deny the possibility of any SAG testing), but was inclined either to ridicule the report or blame it on some other country or cause. He did instruct one of his people to pass on my request for any information the SAG might have that would help us identify and assess the event. I emphasized our careful handling of the initial indications and left him in no doubt about the seriousness with which we regarded such matters. End summary.

3. Per Harrop-Edmondson telecon Oct 26, I called on SAG Foreign Minister Pik Botha at 0900 October 26 to discuss news stories mentioned ref (A) and to suggest that a reaffirmation of assurances that former Prime Minister Vorster gave President Carter on nuclear testing in August [October] 1977 might be helpful both to SAG and others at this time. Botha received me in the company of four DFA assistants. Since the news story, implying that USG had suggested that South Africa may have tested a nuclear device, had already been on local SABC broadcast along with comment by Pik Botha denying any knowledge...
of any test and complaining that Americans should be sure of their facts before making any statements, I began by saying that the USG had made no accusations. Pik said he knew this; then read with interest the U.S. statement as contained in para 3 ref (A), and listened carefully as I drew on the rest of guidance to explain that the evidence remained ambiguous and that we had not been able to corroborate its nature or origin, or confirm definitely that a nuclear event took place.

4. I said that indications placed the time of the event shortly before 0100 GMT on Saturday, September 22, and when Pik expressed confusion about the timing of GMT, I explained that it would have been between two or three hours after Friday midnight on the night of September 21/22. I defined the area as one apparently centered fairly well south in the South Atlantic encompassing most of the South Atlantic, a portion of Antarctica, the southern part of Africa, including South Africa, and the southwestern portion of the Indian Ocean. When Pik suggested that maybe it was near Australia or New Zealand, I said I understood that was too far east; when he suggested it might be Chile, I said that appeared too far west. Later, when he suggested that maybe the Russians should be blamed, I said we were not “blaming” anyone and that I thought it would be unwise to do so.

5. When I said indications were inconclusive but consistent with a low-yield nuclear explosion in the surface or near-surface atmosphere, he asked what was meant by “low-yield,” and I said that I understood this term could mean something anywhere in the range from 1 or 1.5 to 3 or even 4 kilotons, but that these were scientific details I was neither informed nor knowledgeable about. (He asked what a kiloton was in terms of comparison with Hiroshima, but I deferred to the experts.)

6. I mentioned that the leak about these indications was regrettable but appeared to be intended to create pressure against the SALT agreement by implying a problem with detection systems (despite the fact that SALT detection systems were apparently quite separate and different from what was involved in this instance). I added that the media seemed to be playing up the South African angle because South Africa was the only country with any nuclear-enrichment capability in the area involved. Pik took small comfort in this and began to complain about the U.S. pointing a finger at South Africa, to which I responded by again emphasizing (a) that we had made no accusations, and (b) that our statement made very clear that we had received no corroboration of the suspected event.

7. Again noting the media attention to South Africa, I said that since there was a new, year-old administration in South Africa, I would suggest that it would be useful (to them, to us, and to others perhaps) if Prime Minister P.W. Botha could consider restating or reaffirming
the nuclear assurances that the previous Prime Minister (Vorster) gave to President Carter in August [October] 1977. Pik made no direct reply to this except to note that the Prime Minister was in Cape Town for a quiet weekend. Pik said he had spoken to P.W. on the phone, but implied that he (Pik) was leaving for someplace himself very soon and would not see or talk to P.W. again until sometime later.

8. I reinforced my point a bit by recalling that on Sept 27 I had asked Foreign Affairs Secretary Brand Fourie about Prime Minister Botha’s statement to the Cape National Party Congress, on September 25, that South Africa had weapons to fight terrorism and that if anyone thought of trying something else, they might find that South Africa had weapons that are not known about. Pik immediately interjected that the Prime Minister was referring to conventional weapons. I replied that, yes, this is what Brand told me but in view of media speculation at the time that P.W. was possibly hinting at nuclear weapons (speculation which was not specifically scotched subsequently), this seemed to me all the more reason one might see value in reaffirming the 1977 assurances.

9. Pik then asked if the U.S. did not run the risk of appearing weak by being so nervous over such a matter; the U.S. should not panic so easily. I rather firmly reminded him that the USG had not originated this story; it was a leak being given understandably dramatic coverage by a free press. I said that he should know that despite the South African angle of the story, we had apparently learned from a reliable journalist, who obviously could not identify the source, that the leak came from someone who wanted to discredit the SALT Treaty detection systems. Moreover, I said, the USG had dealt responsibly with the indications we had at the time of the event, withholding any public statement and continuing the careful process of reviewing and assessing all available evidence before making any judgment. I assured him, however, that we regarded any possible nuclear event with utmost seriousness since these were matters of worldwide concern.

10. Pik asked why we had not told the SAG of the suspected event when we first received indications of it. I said that as far as I knew, we had not consulted with any other government except our very closest ally (Britain) simply because we had not had sufficiently conclusive indications to do so. I assumed this was a matter of judgment in a highly technical field on which I had no competence to comment. I said we were continuing to seek information about the suspected September 22 event and would be most grateful if SAG could offer anything at all that they thought could be helpful to us. Pik instructed Ray Killen to check with the Atomic Energy Board and the Department of Defense to see if they might have anything to offer.

11. Pik wondered if the Soviets were aware of the suspected event, since they were the first to call attention to the Kalahari “boreholes”
about which concern was expressed in 1977. I said I did not know. He
then asked if the Russians could have set off a device or if our sensors
could have picked up some natural phenomenon. I said other country
activity might theoretically be possible; one might speculate about a
number of possibilities; I did not know if the sensors could be affected
by natural phenomena, but understood that they were not known
ever to have been inaccurate. (Botha commented that U.S. military
personnel, presumably in Washington, had admitted that natural phe-
omena could not be excluded even though the indications would
more probably stem from a nuclear event.)

12. Pik asked toward the end if the USG thought the Russians
would ever change or give up their goal of (world) domination. I said
he probably did not have time for a full philosophical reply to his
question, but regardless of current and near-term Soviet aims, I had
great confidence in the strength and advantages of the West, particu-
larly the U.S.; I felt we were strong politically and ideologically as well
as economically and militarily. We do not underestimate the threat or
reality of Soviet power, but the Communist world has many weak-
nesses compared with the West and is no longer completely monolithic.
Our respect for human rights and recognition of the force of national-
ism, specifically African nationalism, gives us an advantage, provided
we also recognize and deal with the problems that attract some individ-
uals to the empty but power-backed ideology of Marxism.

13. Comment: As I rose to leave, I repeated that an official SAG
reaffirmation of the 1977 assurances would be a useful step which they
should consider. Botha did not pick up on this, and I note from the
afternoon papers that he told a TV interviewer soon after I left that
America “should accept, calmly and courageously, their role as an anti-
Marxist state and not get scared so easily.” Although AEB Chairman
de Villiers categorically denied to the press that South Africa might
have conducted a nuclear test, Pik Botha has still not issued a specific
denial. Rather, he appears to have chosen to ridicule the possible event
(“maybe they saw the rebirth of Venus”) and thus avoid destroying
the hint that the SAG might indeed have a nuclear explosive capability
about which the U.S. is nervous. In these circumstances, it may be
expecting a great deal to ask the SAG to volunteer any reaffirmation
of the assurances given us by Vorster in 1977.

14. Correction: Insert “South Africa time” following word “mid-
night” in 5th line of para 4.

Edmondson
367. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Austria

Washington, November 24, 1979, 1630Z

305302. USIAEA. Subject: IAEA General Conference: South African Issues. Ref: (A) Vienna 11272; (B) Vienna 12303.

1. C-Entire text

2. Summary. Dept agrees that exclusion or expulsion of South Africa from IAEA would work against non-proliferation interests. USDel should work for conference acceptance of South African credentials and should oppose any conference action to suspend or expel South Africa from Agency membership if debate should take this turn. USDel should take lead on this issue to demonstrate seriousness of our position and should advise Dept by immediate cable if approaches in capitals are indicated. End summary.

3. We understand from IO/SCT-Mission telecon November 20, that Australia is now likely to step aside for Malaysia in SEAP slate for General Committee. In absence some countervailing development, this would result in a General Committee make-up which will tip the vote 7 to 8 in the Committee against acceptance of South African credentials.

4. We understand Australian inclination to defer to another member of SEAP region since Australia occupied a Vice Presidency (and hence membership on the General Committee) at general conference last year. Inasmuch, however, as this will upset the balance on SA credentials issue and in view of the expressed hope by the Indians (ref (A) para 12) to achieve last year’s results, we wonder if the possibility might exist that New Zealand might be acceptable substitute for SEAP

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790542-0448. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by John P. Trevithick (IO/SCT); cleared by Marion V. Creekmore (IO), Barbara J. Schrage (OES/NTS), Alan W. Locke (S/AS), Lewis R. Macfarlane (AF/S), and Linda Gallini (ACDA/NP); approved by Charles W. Maynes (IO). Sent for information to New Delhi.

2 In telegram 11272 from Vienna, October 19, the Mission provided a preliminary review of the agenda for the IAEA General Conference, including the issue of South Africa’s credentials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790483-0269)

3 In telegram 12303 from Vienna, November 15, the Mission informed the Department that “there is real possibility that a serious challenge to South Africa will arise at General Conference. However, there is as yet no concrete indication of this amongst Vienna Missions and it is not clear whether challenge would be focused on South Africa’s credentials for General Conference or on expelling it from the IAEA (even though there is no provision for expulsion in statute). Mission believes US non-proliferation interests argue for moderate US effort to preserve South Africa’s position.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790525-0850)
slot. If Mission believes this is possible, Mission may explore with Australian and Indian Missions. Is there any possibility that Indians, in view their desire to contain this issue in New Delhi, might be willing to intercede with both New Zealand and Malaysia?

5. Dept agrees fully with Mission view that exclusion or expulsion action against South Africa in IAEA could be seriously counterproductive to non-proliferation objectives. Mission should consult with WEOG Missions in Vienna (and Del should continue consultations with same Dels after arrival in New Delhi) to consolidate as much support as possible for favorable credentials results and opposition to South African suspension or expulsion. While we recognize chances are poorer if the issue goes to a vote in plenary, it is nevertheless very important that we achieve as large a show of opposition as possible. Del, as desirable, should make points below in its consultations with WEO’s and other delegations as the question arises.

6. On the credentials issue, the USDel should emphasize the technical character of the examination of member states credentials in exercise of which the application of political criteria is irrelevant. Our abhorrence of South African policy of apartheid is amply on record throughout UN system and elsewhere. Nevertheless, we believe the strength and integrity of UN system demands adherence to constitutional and procedural requirements, recognizing that the system itself provides ample opportunity for recording diverse political views. Introduction of divisive political issues into technical agencies like IAEA can only hinder them in meeting their vital international responsibilities. IAEA statute (Article XIX) provides only for suspension (by two-thirds vote) of the privileges of Agency membership and only for narrowly defined reasons (which do not apply in this case). The statute provides no basis whatever for expulsion which would involve a clear violation of the statute and would set a particularly unfortunate precedent in the IAEA, given its critical non-proliferation safeguards role. Expulsion moves in other fora have demonstrated value of secret ballot in lessening political pressures on members if issue comes to a vote. Moreover, in light of two-thirds vote required under IAEA statute for suspension of a member we believe this majority called for in more drastic issue of possible expulsion should also be two-thirds.

7. On the relevance of the nuclear event in the southern hemisphere to this question, Del should point out that this issue remains under investigation in the UN itself by the Secretary General. Until that investigation is complete, the IAEA should not take any action which would

---

4 In telegram 22229 from New Delhi, December 5, the delegation informed the Department that South Africa’s credentials were rejected on December 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790571–0312)
prejudge the outcome and place the Agency in the untenable position of acting in the absence of any facts.

8. Mission (and subsequently delegation) should keep Dept closely advised on its consultations on this issue by immediate telegram. Contingency statements will be provided septel.5

Vance

5 In telegram 308417 to New Delhi and Vienna, November 30, the Department transmitted the contingency statement. The statement reads: “My delegation opposes any effort to expel South Africa from the IAEA on the grounds that to do so would violate the Agency’s statute. There is no provision for expulsion of a member state in the statute, and furthermore, we do not believe that there are any grounds for the suspension of South Africa by the general conference under Article XIXB of the statute. Moreover, my government considers such action against South Africa to be detrimental to our mutual non-proliferation objectives and our common efforts to gain broader acceptance, including that of South Africa, of IAEA safeguards.

“Indications of a possible nuclear event in the southern hemisphere provides no basis for action against South Africa or any state since, to date, there is no conclusive evidence that a nuclear explosion took place—much less that any particular nation or party can be held accountable. The United States is continuing to investigate all available information on this matter and has expressed its willingness to cooperate with the inquiry requested of the UN SYG by the General Assembly.

“Finally, my government is on record in the IAEA and in many other fora within the UN system and elsewhere as being totally opposed to South Africa’s racial policies. However, the repugnance with which the world community views apartheid is irrelevant to South Africa’s continued participation in IAEA. We believe that the strength and integrity of the UN system demands adherence to constitutional and procedural requirements, recognizing that the system itself provides ample opportunity for recording diverse political views. My government is opposed on principle to the exclusion on political grounds of any member from an international organization. Introduction of divisive political issue into technical agencies like IAEA can only hinder them in meeting their vital international responsibilities. This is nowhere more true than in IAEA with its critical safeguards role.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790550-0505)
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter

Washington, January 9, 1980

SUBJECT
Possible Nuclear Explosion in the South Atlantic (U)

A mini-SCC meeting chaired by Henry Owen today reviewed the conclusions of a panel of outside scientific experts concerning [less than 1 line not declassified] the South Atlantic on September 22. The panel concluded that:

—There is no evidence to date which would clearly corroborate a nuclear explosion;

—The September 22 signal closely resembles those obtained from known nuclear explosions, but reveals a discrepancy “sufficient to raise some doubt;”

—All other possible causes were ruled out except one: the possibility that sunlight reflected from a small meteoroid or space debris [less than 1 line not declassified] could have closely duplicated a nuclear signal;

—The probability of a meteoroid with just the right properties to produce such reflections is of course low; but so is the probability that a nuclear explosion would fail to produce any corroborative data. Yet one of these improbable events appears to have occurred;

—Thus, the panel could not determine whether the signal was generated by a nuclear explosion. (S)

In the light of these findings, the mini-SCC reached the following conclusions: (U)

Following notification to key Members of Congress and our Allies tomorrow, we should inform the South Africans of the outcome of our analysis, and urge them to resume promptly negotiation of the proposals we made earlier (resumption of US fuel supply in return for South African adherence to the NPT and acceptance of interim safeguards on their enrichment plant). A public statement summarizing the panel’s conclusions would then be issued; a contingency statement is being prepared in the event of an early leak. (S)

The panel’s conclusions may have important implications concerning the adequacy of our detection systems to adequately monitor the

---


2 See Document 361.
Limited Test Ban Treaty in areas remote from the Soviet Union, and
to support our non-proliferation policy. Recommendations on this
aspect of the matter will be forwarded to you separately. (S)
The panel’s report is at Tab A. (U)

Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Office of Science and Technology Policy

Washington, January 7, 1980

POSSIBLE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION PANEL

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Despite extensive analysis of all data available, the Panel cannot
determine whether or not the light signal that was recorded by one
VELA satellite (No. 6911) over the South Atlantic on September 22,
1979 was generated by a nuclear explosion. (S)

2. The light signal does have the general character of signals gener-
ated by nuclear explosions. It resembles a nuclear explosion signal
more than any one previously recorded except, of course, for those
known to have been from nuclear explosions. However, a detailed
comparison of the September 22 signal with those observed from other
nuclear explosions reveals a discrepancy, sufficient to raise some doubt
about whether the signal was of nuclear origin. (S)

3. Also, as of this date, there is no evidence which would clearly
corroborate the occurrence of a nuclear explosion on September 22. All
previously recorded signals which had the character of those from
nuclear explosions were confirmed by other evidence to have been
from nuclear explosions. Ionospheric observations made by the Arecibo
radar in Puerto Rico, which is currently unique in its sensitivity, pro-
vided the only suggestive additional evidence for a nuclear event. But
ionospheric signals are not generally well understood. Also, there were
ambiguities in interpretation of the signal. As a result the Arecibo data
were not persuasive as corroborative evidence for a nuclear event. (S)

4. In over ten years of operation, the recording devices of different
bhangmeters on VELA satellites have been “triggered” about 400,000
times—mostly by signals attributed to lightning (which triggers both
bhangmeters on a satellite) and to nuclear particles (which trigger only

---

3 Not found.
4 Secret.
one of the bhangmeters onboard a satellite). In addition, every known atmospheric nuclear explosion occurring in the time the VELA satellite system has been in operation has been recorded by at least one bhangmeter in one of the VELA satellites. Also included in the set of bhangmeter recordings are a group of signals which were tentatively attributed to sunlight reflection from a meteoroid passing in the field of view of one of the VELA satellites. (S)

5. The Panel has reviewed a number of known alternative natural sources which might have caused the September 22 signal and has ruled them out with one exception, and that is reflection of sunlight from a small meteoroid (or a small piece of satellite debris) passing near the satellite sensors that detected the event. The Panel also ruled out the possibility of a technical malfunction of the satellite being the source of the signal. (S)

6. Computer models have confirmed that the September 22 signal could have been generated by a small meteoroid with specified properties passing near the satellite sensors. The necessary shape, size, and velocity of the meteoroid—characterized as a “fractured ball-bearing”—that could cause this signal are reasonable. Small meteoroids of this size are numerous as evidenced by the findings of the Pioneer 10 probe. (S)

7. It should be recognized that the \textit{a priori} probability of the occurrence of a nuclear explosion with no corroborative data such as nuclear debris is small, as is the probability of the first signal from a meteoroid or other physical phenomenon with just the right properties after ten years of observation. Therefore, we are unable to assign relative probabilities to whether the signal was generated by a nuclear explosion or natural phenomenon. (S)

8. Further analysis will be useful in improving our understanding of the September 22 signal. To this end, we recommend (1) continuing the search for corroborative data, (2) a comprehensive statistical analysis by an outside group of the signal characteristics from nuclear and non-nuclear signals discussed above to improve our understanding of their physical origin and enable us to evaluate the likelihood that a member of this class could cause a “false alarm,” and (3) a thorough review of meteoroid data to examine the possibility that a meteoroid or piece of space debris could cause such a signal, including the permissible ranges of values of its physical parameters and the probability of appearance of such an object in the vicinity of the VELA satellite. (S)

9. From our study of the September 22 signal, we conclude that in the absence of corroborative data, signals from current bhangmeters on a single satellite now in orbit cannot for a single event provide definitive evidence of the occurrence of a nuclear explosion. (S)
369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, January 10, 1980, 2307Z


1. Following is report of Ambassador Gerard Smith’s January 8 conversation with Ambassador Sole for your information.

2. Begin text: I told him that I expected the press report would be in soon. I thought it would find there wasn’t sufficient evidence to conclude that a nuclear event had occurred. I personally would like to see us now resume the effort to reach something like the agreement foreshadowed in the Joint Minute reached in 1978 in Pretoria. I said that it would be helpful if the South African authorities could make an unequivocal denial of responsibility for the September event. Sole said that their Finance Minister had made a flat denial when he was in Washington. He said he would look into the question of a further statement but that nothing would be possible until after the results of the press report were available. He added that if the South Africans had tested, it would have been underground since they are bound by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the fulfillment of which they consider a matter of great importance.

3. He did not seem interested in pursuing the lead about further negotiations. He mentioned South African concern as to the reliability of US assurances of supply, an idea he believed he had put to Dick Moose about the possibility of stockpiling US enriched uranium in South Africa so that the South Africans could have assurance of its availability. I had not heard of that idea, but would look into it.

4. On Koeburg, Sole said if necessary the reactors would be put in mothballs.

5. After the IAEA credentials matter at New Delhi, SAG is considering whether to leave the Agency. I expressed understanding at SAG chagrin and hoped they wouldn’t depart. End text.

6. Department expects to provide you instructions for next steps on this subject very shortly.

Vance

---

1 Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 120, 1/10–14/80. Secret; Sensitive; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information to Pretoria and the White House. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted and approved by Gerard Smith; cleared by Macfarlane (AF/S). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058–0003)

2 See footnote 2, Document 344.
Washington, January 12, 1980, 2211Z


1. (Secret-Entire text)

2. A team of US scientific experts under the guidance of Dr. Frank Press, the President’s Science Adviser, has completed its review of all available data on the September 22 suspected nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic. We expect soon to issue a public statement on the panel’s conclusions. In advance of public release, we wish to inform the SAG and other interested governments with whom we have discussed this matter (FYI: UK, France, FRG, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), drawing on the guidance in para 3, below. We are also briefing interested members of Congress, and will provide the statement to UNSYG Waldheim, in fulfillment of our commitment to assist him in his study of the September 22 event. In the event of press leaks in advance of formal release, we intend to use the first and second paragraphs of the statement on a contingency basis.

3. Text of guidance:

—The panel of scientific experts convened by the White House has conducted a thorough review of available evidence concerning the nature and probable source of the light signal recorded by a United States Vela satellite over the South Atlantic on September 22, 1979.

—The panel was unable to determine whether the light signal recorded by the satellite was generated by a nuclear explosion or some other phenomenon.

—The panel reviewed a number of alternative natural phenomena which might have caused the signal and, with one exception, ruled them out. This exception is the possible reflection of sunlight from a small meteoroid or a piece of space debris passing near the satellite.
—The panel also found that, as of the date of its report, there was no additional evidence which could corroborate whether a nuclear explosion or some other phenomenon occurred.

—Because of large uncertainties, the panel was unable to assign relative probabilities to these alternative sources.

—The panel ruled out the possibility that the signal could have been caused by a satellite malfunction.

—The panel identified a few technical areas for follow-on investigations, which will be undertaken. It is not expected that this work will result in any alterations to the basic conclusions. (End text of guidance)

4. Under these circumstances we have decided to make another attempt to reach a nuclear settlement with South Africa. At the same time, mindful of increasing pressure in the UN for nuclear sanctions against South Africa, we cannot put off the question of sanctions indefinitely. Our judgment of the SAG’s willingness to move promptly toward a satisfactory nuclear settlement will be a major factor in our continuing review of the sanctions issue.

5. In contemplating reaching a nuclear settlement with the SAG, its position on the September 22 event is of obvious interest. You will have seen a report of Gerard Smith’s January 8 conversation with Sole,3 including what the latter had to say on the possibility of an authoritative SAG denial of involvement in the September 22 event. We think that, on the heels of the press panel report, an unequivocal statement by the SAG on the September 22 event would further clear the air. In the absence of such a statement by the SAG, we are nonetheless prepared to move ahead on a settlement on the understanding that the Vorster assurances of August 19774 remain South Africa’s nuclear policy, and that the SAG is prepared to reconfirm those assurances.

6. You should take earliest opportunity to brief Fourie or other appropriate level on panel’s conclusions, drawing on points in para 3. You should also draw orally on the substance of paras 2, 4, and 5, and deliver the letter and annex contained in para 7, below. We propose Fourie channel largely because letter is intended to respond to his communication to you of last October 12,5 but we will defer to your judgment as to whether these messages would be more effective if addressed to either the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister. As to timing, you should provide the SAG with the para 3 briefing as soon as possible, against the likelihood that the story will quickly leak and

3 See Document 369.
5 In telegram 9380 from Pretoria, October 15, 1979, the Embassy transmitted Fourie’s letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840175-2277)
appear in the press before the SAG has heard from us. On the other points and the letter, we defer to you as to best timing; however, as you will note, letter underlines importance of ascertaining the SAG’s seriousness on the question of our general nuclear dialogue and is intended to put the ball back in South Africa’s court. We judge that this needs to be done as expeditiously as possible.

7. Text of letter follows:

I am writing to address the issue of nuclear cooperation between our countries. I think it is important that we not lose sight of the concerns and reasons which, for the past two years, have led our governments to consult on this issue.

Before addressing those broader concerns, I wish to make clear the position the US Government is taking on the suspected nuclear event of September 22, 1979. The US has conducted a high-level and intensive scientific analysis of all the data available to us, including the report you made available to us. The experts were unable to conclude whether or not a nuclear explosion occurred.

I wish also to express my government’s strong displeasure and regret at the decision of the IAEA General Conference to reject the credentials of the South African delegation. We opposed that action and made our views clear to the General Conference. In this regard, we are convinced that acceptance of full-scope safeguards and adherence to the NPT by the SAG would be seen as a major positive step by the other members of the IAEA.

At this point, we should focus our attention on the broader nuclear issue. I would like to address myself to your letter of October 12, 1979, in which you raised some specific questions about how the United States envisages the further step-by-step negotiation of our nuclear concerns. Our response to these questions is contained in an annex to this letter.

Important as the points raised in your letter are, they do not in our view go to the heart of the matter. The fact is that after more than two years of discussion, there has been no discernible progress toward agreement. The proposals contained in the 1978 Joint Minute were specifically intended to provide a basis for progress. We urge that South Africa proceed toward agreement on the basis of the Joint Minute. We remain convinced that the simultaneous actions envisaged in that document, and elucidated in the annex to this letter, afford adequate assurance to each party.

The nuclear issue is certain again to come before the Security Council for action. As I noted on September 24, the absence of significant progress toward a nuclear settlement is eroding the basis on which the US has been able to oppose any form of sanctions against South Africa in the area of nuclear supply. That statement is equally true today.
We are prepared to work with you toward an equitable agreement on nuclear matters. In our view, it is essential that our efforts rapidly show results.

Because of the importance and urgency of this matter, I request that this message be passed to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister at the earliest opportunity. End text of letter.

Begin text of annex:

1. The US Executive Branch will recommend that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission license the export of HEU fuel for the Safari reactor in accordance with the terms of the Joint Minute; pending the availability of lower enriched fuel for Safari, providing that South Africa agrees and announces its intention to:
   A) Accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and negotiate a fullscope safeguards agreement as provided therein, after taking the steps specified below to assure continued US nuclear fuel supply;
   B) Undertake immediately to commence a safeguards development project at Valindaba as discussed in the Joint Minute; and
   C) Enter into technical cooperation with the US toward achieving reduction of the enrichment level for Safari fuel to 20 percent enriched uranium.

2. Therefore, as a next step, the US proposes that South Africa confirm its intention to make this announcement at the same time that the Executive Branch makes the appropriate recommendation to the NRC. Once the SAG confirms this intention, the US proposes that relevant agencies of the two sides conclude a contract for supply of Safari fuel. In this connection it should be noted that the existing agreement for cooperation authorizes such supply but does not contain the contractual basis for such supply. The announcement by the South African Government, and our simultaneous recommendation to the nuclear regulatory commission, however, could precede conclusion of the supply contract.

3. With respect to supply of Koeberg fuel, the US reiterates its willingness to renegotiate the US-South Africa agreement for cooperation to meet criteria for new or amended agreements specified in the non-proliferation act. Upon completion of this renegotiation, which can be done on a priority basis, the US will submit the agreement to the Congress for review. In order to provide for a simultaneous settlement the renegotiated agreement would come into effect when the US congressional review is successfully completed and, by explicit provision, when South Africa deposits an instrument of accession to the NPT. End text of annex.

8. We consider it unlikely that the SAG will definitely reject the Joint Minute at this time. It may, however, inform us that because of
recent developments the joint settlement is “dead” for the time being. In this case, you should note our strong regret and underline that the need for urgent action derives in large measure from the nature and disposition of the product of the Valindaba enrichment plant. Concern over the continued unsafeguarded operation of the plant, as well as the presumed accumulation of weapons-usable material, make it difficult to maintain interest in nuclear cooperation or to resist pressure for UN sanctions. You should urge the SAG to find some way of easing these concerns.

Vance

371. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State

Cape Town, January 25, 1980, 1248Z

154. From Embassy Cape Town. Subject: (S) US-South African Nuclear Dialogue. Ref: (A) State 9602 (B) Cape Town 0065.1

1. S-Entire text.

2. I delivered text of letter and annex in para 7 ref tel A to SAG Secretary for Foreign Affairs Brand Fourie on January 24, reviewing for him again the USG conclusions on the September 22 event in the South Atlantic, as provided to one of his officers earlier on January 14 (ref B), and noting that we were prepared to resume our efforts to achieve a nuclear settlement on the assumption that South Africa’s nuclear policy remained as stated in former Prime Minister Vorster’s 1977 assurances to President Carter.2 Noting the role of Congress in the steps outlined in my letter, I added that if we come to an agreement in principle, we may need to be in a position to say to the Congress that those assurances are still in effect.

---

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0017. Secret; Nodis.
2 See Document 370.
3 In telegram 65 from Cape Town, January 15, the Embassy reported that the South African Government was informed of the imminent release of the press statement on the findings of the panel investigating the South Atlantic event. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0013)
4 See Document 311.
3. After reading the annex carefully, Fourie asked if he was correct in assuming that the steps outlined in the annex all constituted part of a package and that the obligation to fulfill the intention (to accede to the NPT), the announcement of which would be among the required steps listed in para 2 of the annex, could be made contingent by South Africa upon the successful review and simultaneous coming into effect of the agreement mentioned in para 3 of the annex. I said that this was my understanding. He said that was how he thought he remembered the Joint Minute, that is, that the SAG would not be obligated to carry out a stated intention to accede to the NPT until the simultaneous coming into effect of the overall agreement on fuel for Koeberg, which could actually follow the supply of HEU for Safari (once the SAG intentions were announced).

4. In discussing our mutual comprehension of the process, the following informal listing of steps was distilled to simplify what would be involved. (The parenthetical notes are my own and were not discussed with Fourie.)

A. Step one would be SAG confirmation to the USG that it was in agreement with the procedure proposed and that it would, at the same time that the US Executive Branch recommends that the NRC license the export of HEU fuel for Safari (as specified in the Joint Minute), announce its intention to take steps (A), (B) and (C) of paragraph 1 of the annex. (Note: The assumption here is that a recommendation of a licence to NRC will effectively guarantee its issuance, since Safari is already under safeguard.)

B. Step two, presumably, would be agreement on the timing of subsequent steps, including negotiation and conclusion of a contract for the supply of Safari fuel, and on whether the SAG announcement and USG recommendation would come before the Safari fuel contract was concluded or afterward.

C. Step three: begin contract negotiations. (Also, presumably begin safeguard development program and cooperation on reduction of Safari fuel enrichment levels.)

D. Step four: either during step three negotiations, or after the contract is concluded, but in either case at a simultaneous time to be established in advance, the USG delivers a recommendation to the NRC that the NRC license the agreed amount of HEU fuel for Safari and the SAG releases the announcement described and agreed upon in step one. (Note: presumably, HEU for Safari could be supplied as soon as the necessary contract is concluded, even if subsequent steps are still in process.)

E. Step five: the USG and SAG begin priority renegotiation of US-SA agreement (permitting supply of fuel to Koeberg) to meet the criteria of the US Non-Proliferation Act.
F. Step six: USG submits renegotiated agreement to Congress for review.

G. Step seven: by express provision in the renegotiated agreement, upon successful completion of congressional review, the agreement is approved to come into effect upon deposit by South Africa of an instrument of accession to the NPT.

H. Step eight: South Africa deposits instrument of accession and the renegotiated US–SA cooperation agreement comes into effect automatically.

5. Fourie asked about the question of peripheral safeguards which the SAG raised before. I responded that this would have to be explored as part of the safeguards development program in step (B) of the annex, adding that I thought we had answered their questions on this subject as completely as possible in the absence of such a development program having actually begun.

6. Fourie said that he would have to study the Joint Minute and the file of our previous exchanges and consult with the experts before he could comment further. He added that AEB President, Dr. Wynand de Villiers, and possibly UCOR Chairman, Dr. Ampie Roux, would be coming to Cape Town on Wednesday, January 30, and that he would discuss it with them then. I reminded Fourie of my request that our letter be brought to the attention of the Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, which he acknowledged by saying that Ministers usually wouldn’t even look at the subject without some form of explanatory exposition by the experts. I said I understood this but felt that it was important that they know of the US approach, given the growing pressures in the UN and the urgency of achieving some significant progress toward a nuclear settlement.

7. Comment: Fourie gave every appearance of regarding our approach with serious interest, although he commented that the “South Atlantic event” had created a rather poor atmosphere. His main concern seemed to be whether we had answered the earlier SAG questions (which he could not remember in detail, even though I tried to get him to concentrate on the importance of getting the agreement process started rather than on the technical aspects. Regarding para 8 of ref A, I doubt very much that the SAG would say that joint settlement prospects are “dead” at any time, unless the USG itself were to take some action (e.g. conditional support for sanctions) that SAG regarded as an ultimatum or too openly coercive in nature. Thus, the most likely SAG response other than agreement (for which the chances seem slim) would be to request further information on technical aspects of the proposed agreement or for assurances on the commercial secrecy of their enrichment process. Unfortunately, there is no assurance that their reply will
be very prompt as attention is currently focussed on the opening of Parliament\(^5\) (February 2).

Edmondson

---

\(^5\) In telegram 671 from Cape Town, March 20, the Embassy reported that Ambassador Edmondson had asked Fourie for a reply on March 18. Fourie said that the matter had been discussed by the Cabinet, but he “needed a couple hours to prepare himself to deal with this complex subject.” Due to their conflicting travel schedules, Edmondson suggested Fourie meet with Minister-Counselor Howard K. Walker, who was fully briefed on the subject. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 1/80–1/81)

---

372. Telegram From the Consulate in Cape Town to the Department of State\(^1\)

Cape Town, March 27, 1980, 1130Z

725. From Embassy Cape Town. From DCM. Subject: US-South Africa Nuclear Relations. Ref: (A) State 076829,\(^2\) (B) Cape Town 0671,\(^3\) (C) Cape Town 0154.\(^4\)

1. S-Entire text

2. DCM on March 27 met with Fourie at latter’s request to follow up Ambassador Edmondson’s enquiry of March 18 about SAG reaction to scenario for achieving a nuclear agreement that was set out in Edmondson’s letter to Fourie of January 24 (refs B and C). DCM gave Fourie typed copy of informal listing of steps as amended ref A.

---

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058–0050. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

\(^2\) In telegram 76829 to Cape Town, March 22, the Department notified Edmondson that he should continue to be the point of contact with Fourie. Additionally, the Department wrote: “Also, with respect to subpara C of that listing, to avoid any possible ambiguity or disconnect with our annex to letter, we suggest that the following sentence be added after the second sentence: ‘But in any event these steps would be taken no later than immediately upon SAG announcement in step 4.’” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 70, South Africa: 1/80–1/81)

\(^3\) See footnote 5, Document 371.

\(^4\) See Document 371.
3. Fourie began by referring to his letter of 12 October 1979 (79 Pretoria 9380)\(^5\) in which he explained that SAG assumed progress could be achieved in steps as long as no steps were irrevocable until corresponding steps were taken by the U.S. He also quoted from that part of the letter which states: “The Republic of South Africa is not in principle opposed to accession to the NPT, provided of course its basic requirements could be met.” He said that our request in the proposed scenario that SAG “agrees and announces its intention to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and negotiate a full-scope safeguards agreement as proposed therein” (State 09602)\(^6\) is stronger than he had phrased it in his October 1979 letter. Nonetheless, pursuant to Edmondson’s letter of January 24, he is authorized to tell us that the SAG could accept the following language: “The SAG intends to accede to the NPT provided its basic requirements can be met.”

4. Fourie then listed what he said were two principal matters to be addressed before proceeding further. The first concerns the note at the end of the 1978 Joint Minute (78 Pretoria 3662),\(^7\) which states: “The South African representatives also wished to discuss the consequences of U.N. economic boycott, should it be instituted. The U.S. representatives stated that their brief was limited to nuclear matters. The South African representatives thereupon indicated that this issue would be raised with the United States Government at the appropriate level.” Fourie said that the SAG believes the time has now come to discuss this issue “at the appropriate level.” They want to do this before proceeding to the next points.

5. DCM asked Fourie if their concern was UN action linked to nuclear issues. (Note: Foreign Minister Botha reportedly was somewhat vague on this point in his meeting with French Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet in February—Cape Town 589.)\(^8\) Fourie replied no, their concern was broader than that. Their view is that a total economic boycott would adversely affect all activities in South Africa, including nuclear ones. Their nuclear program depended not just on the availability of nuclear fuel, but on a wide range of other supplies and services

\(^5\) See footnote 5, Document 370.
\(^6\) See Document 370.
\(^7\) See footnote 2, Document 343.
\(^8\) In telegram 589 from Cape Town, March 12, the Embassy reported on the February 20 conversation between Botha and Francois-Poncet. Regarding UN action linked to nuclear issues, the Embassy wrote: “The SAG is ready to sign the NPT subject to receiving certain assurances. When asked what assurances were wanted, Botha replied that the SAG wanted assurances from the US that no compulsory economic sanctions would be applied against South Africa if there was a draft resolution in the UN Security Council to break all economic and nuclear relations with South Africa.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870058-0031)
that would be hurt by a general economic boycott. Thus, SAG believes assurances given in Joint Minute about USG not permitting international action which would prevent implementation of an overall nuclear settlement applies to UN general economic boycott. Moreover, Fourie added, the SAG views our nuclear discussions in the wider context of “easing our bilateral relations and the international situation involving South Africa,” and an economic boycott would not do that. DCM said that SAG would want an authoritative USG response on this issue, but that we both knew that our bilateral relations and the international situation involving South Africa concerned other important issues in addition to nuclear one. Fourie nodded.

6. The other principal matter that Fourie said should be discussed before proceeding further concerns agreement on what would constitute safeguards, as mentioned in step A of the Annex to Edmondson’s letter of January 24 and to step B regarding a safeguards development project at Valindaba. SAG is concerned about maintaining the secrecy of its process in negotiating and carrying out a safeguards agreement. It is encouraged by what was stated in the Joint Minute about a periphery approach, and believes there needs to be more detailed discussion of this matter to be clear we agree on what constitutes periphery safeguards.

7. Fourie said he had no other items to raise concerning the proposed scenario. Item C in the Annex regarding technical cooperation toward achieving reduction in enrichment level for Safari was agreeable; South Africa was already doing that on its own and would welcome technical assistance. SAG did have some questions about certain matters—e.g., the timing of the congressional review process for the supply of fuel to Koeberg, the irreversibility of a favorable congressional determination, and the need to negotiate a contract for supply of Safari fuel when an agreement to supply already exists. The SAG wonders if this latter item is not a new element not included in the Joint Minute. Fourie wondered how long the process would take.

8. Comment: SAG now has brought front and center the linkage of nuclear matters to the issue of general economic sanctions that Pik Botha raised only weakly with Ambassador Smith in 1978 (78 Pretoria 3611) but to which he has reportedly been giving greater emphasis.

---

9 See Document 370.
10 In telegram 3611 from Pretoria, June 27, 1978, the Embassy reported on Smith’s discussion with Botha: “Botha made weak plea for broader assurance against UN action than I was instructed to give (and of which I advised him verbatim). Botha did not give impression such broader assurance will be made a condition of a nuclear settlement but this cannot yet be ruled out. He expressed disappointment and subject was quickly changed.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150-2336)
in Europe recently (Cape Town 589). Ambassador Edmondson, who returns to Cape Town on April 3, will want to comment on how seriously SAG is prepared to go for such big stakes at the risk of ending our nuclear dialogue and all that could mean for UN action against nuclear cooperation with South Africa. SAG’s attitude seems derived in part from assessment that with recent favorable impression in Western countries of direction of change in Southern Africa and with other domestic and foreign preoccupations in Washington, the risk is worth exploring. It is worth keeping in mind that SAG’s typical diplomatic strategy is to delay and divert decisions it does not wish to make, but not to close doors.

Edmondson

11 See footnote 8 above.

373. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Cape Town

Washington, April 10, 1980, 1945Z

94302. Cape Town for Embassy. Subject: Pik Botha’s March 31 Letter to Secretary Vance. Ref: Cape Town 806.

1. Following is Pik Botha’s letter to Secretary Vance. Apologize for foul-up in not getting it to you before now.

2. Begin text:

        Quote Dear Cy,

        Ambassador McHenry is reported to have stated in Cairo recently that relations between South Africa and the United States have deteriorated considerably, and he suggested that this deterioration might continue or even accelerate.

        1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800180–0291. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Paul J. Hare (AF/S).

        2 In telegram 806 from Cape Town, April 8, the Embassy requested a copy of the text of Botha’s March 10 letter. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800176–0713)

        3 McHenry made the remarks on February 14 during a talk and question and answer session with journalists at the American Center in Cairo. In telegram 3591 from Cairo, February 17, the Embassy transmitted the text of his remarks. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800103–0663)
Since I believe that in these critical times for the West you share my view that it is in the interest of neither of our countries that erosion in the relationship continue, I have so far refrained from commenting in public on Ambassador McHenry’s statement.

I am convinced that this deterioration is not of South Africa’s making and while I do not wish to go into the history of our relations, I think it is my duty to draw your attention to two matters which are currently affecting them adversely.

The first is the recent report of the State Department to Congress on human rights. This report was in the past limited to countries receiving aid from the United States. Presumably it was argued that the American taxpayer and Congress had the right to know what was happening in the countries receiving assistance from the United States. South Africa is not a recipient of American aid, but is now also included in this report.

We, and I presume for that matter a host of other countries, can see no justification for extending the reporting to countries such as South Africa which owe the United States nothing. The report as recently presented has aroused strong reaction amongst the members of the South African Government and will unquestionably have a deleterious impact on our bilateral relations. Furthermore, the section on South Africa contains distorted assertions and tendentious conclusions. No objective attempt is being made to see the South African situation in perspective.

It is not difficult for us to agree on the principle that human rights should be upheld. However, the degree to which human rights are enjoyed or denied in the countries of the world is determined by historical, political, cultural, economic and other variable factors. As a result, the state of human rights differs considerably from country to country with some countries having advanced quite far on some fronts and, at the other end of the scale, some governments still denying their people the most fundamental rights.

South Africa’s record compares not unfavourably with the record of the majority. In any event, we resent, in principle, constant official American commentary on our domestic affairs. I am sure that South Africa is not alone among the countries addressed in your report who resent the implication that the United States claims for itself the right to be the repository and arbiter of moral righteousness.

In addition to Mr. McHenry’s statement, and the above mentioned report, the deterioration in our relations is accelerated by the apparent efforts of the United States Embassy officials in South Africa to use the presence of American companies as a pretext for interfering in South Africa’s domestic labour affairs.
If you agree that good relations between our two countries are desirable, as I believe them to be, then these, what to South Africans seem to be deliberate efforts at introducing adverse elements into our relationship, must be discontinued.

Yours sincerely,
Signed R.F. Botha

Unquote.

End of text.

Vance

374. Memorandum From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter

Washington, July 17, 1980

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

3. South African Demarche: David Newsom called in South African Ambassador Sole this afternoon to express our deep concern over the South African Government’s drift toward greater political repression in recent months. Newsom specifically highlighted the recent banning of Fanyana Mazibuko, a prominent moderate black leader, as the latest

1 Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 40, State Department Evening Reports, 7/80. Secret. Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the first page: “Ed.”

2 In telegram 4845 from Pretoria, July 14, the Embassy reported on the 3-year banning of Mazibuko on July 11. Additionally, the Embassy noted: “The Mazibuko ban is only the latest incident in what has been a three-month security crackdown throughout the Republic. The best current estimates are that over 300 people remain in detention on various security laws. (See Pretoria 4527 [Telegram 4527 from Pretoria, July 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800316–0953]). This figure does not include the 126 men detained last week in East London under the terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act over what was basically a labor dispute. Moreover, since May 23, three major South African civil rights figures—Curtis Nkondo (May 23—Pretoria 3592 [Telegram 3592 from Pretoria, May 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800259–0960]), Helen Joseph (June—Pretoria 4446 [Telegram 4446 from Pretoria, June 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800309–0662]), and now Mazibuko—have been banned. Consequently, we believe it would be appropriate for Assistant Secretary Moose to call in Ambassador Sole to discuss the current situation in South Africa and register our protest over continued detentions without trial and the banning of prominent moderates. Our concern could also be noted at that time about the 66 Section 10 detainees engaged in a hunger strike (Cape Town 154 [Telegram number is incorrect. See telegram 1554 from Cape Town, July 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800336–1035]) and the renewed ban on political gatherings.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800338–0031)
incident in a wave of security crackdowns which include a pervasive ban on peaceful assembly, widespread detentions without trial or charge, and bannings of moderate leaders of all racial groups.

Ambassador Sole expressed his total confidence in Prime Minister Botha’s continuing commitment to the “adapt or die” sentiments expressed last year which suggested some reform was imminent. However, Sole stressed that stability and public order remain paramount, particularly in the face of deliberate attempts to create internal unrest, e.g. through the school boycott.³

[Omitted here is material unrelated to South Africa.]

³ Colored students in the Western Cape started a boycott on April 14 that lasted until July. For details of the boycott, see Keeling’s Contemporary Archives, 1980, p. 30513.

375. Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, July 17, 1980, 2211Z

188581. Subject: Newsom—Sole Demarche. Ref: A) Pretoria 4845;² B) Cape Town [omission in original] C) Johannesburg 1556.³

1. (C–Entire text).

2. There follows talking points prepared for Newsom-Sole meeting (septel)⁴ which addressees may draw from in discussion with SAG officials:

— I want to register with you the concern of the USG over the South African Government’s drift toward greater political repression.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800344–0559. Confidential; Immediate. Sent to Pretoria and the Consulates in Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Durban. Drafted by William E. Lucas (AF/S) and approved by Peter J. DeVos (AF/S). Sent for information Priority to London and USUN.

² See footnote 2, Document 374.

³ In telegram 1556 from Johannesburg, July 15, the Consulate provided more details on Mazibuko’s banning. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D80039–1086)

⁴ In telegram 188637 to Dakar, July 17, the Department reported on the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800344–0720)
Specifically, I want to mention the banning order issued to Fanyana Mazibuko by South African Security Police. Mr. Mazibuko is a prominent, moderate black leader and spokesman, well-known to our diplomats and numerous American visitors. He has been a devoted advocate of improved black education and training and has featured prominently in the nascent black/white dialog in South Africa.

Unfortunately, the case of Fanyana Mazibuko is only the latest in numerous detentions without charge or trial and bannings of leading, moderate political figures we have witnessed in the last three months.

We judge detention without charge or trial to be a major irritant in racial relations in South Africa, one which encourages a growing disrespect for the law. Detentions under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act and Section 10 of the General Laws Amendment Act are particularly objectionable because they provide for indefinite detention without charge and can involve the punitive use of solitary confinement.

Removing moderate, credible, effective leaders from the scene can only be counterproductive in the process of peaceful change.

We have previously raised with you our concern over the ban on political gatherings and the effects of closing off channels for peaceful dissent.

We view the rejection of the major reform initiative, the President’s Council, to have happened primarily because it excludes blacks and because its introduction was accompanied by a general political crackdown.

The effectiveness of future reforms will depend upon their acceptance by a majority of all racial groups. We fear that a continuation of recent trends in South Africa would seriously damage any prospects of that support. Furthermore, it would place further strain on our bilateral relations.

Talking points on Miami unrest, if raised:

—By commenting on disquieting trends in South Africa, we do not mean to imply that all of our own racial problems are solved.

—Recent events in Miami make us no less anxious to convey to your government our concern that recent trends toward increased political

---

repression are seriously jeopardizing the chances for peaceful political change in South Africa.

2. Memcon and press statement follow in septels.\(^6\)

Muskie

\(^6\) In telegram 188637 to Dakar and all African diplomatic posts, July 17, the Department summarized the Newsom-Sole meeting and provided the following press statement, which was released after the meeting: “Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David D. Newsom met with the South African Ambassador, Donald B. Sole, this afternoon to express the deep concern of the United States Government over recent trends in South Africa. Mr. Newsom stressed particularly events of recent months including a pervasive ban on peaceful assembly, widespread detentions without charge or trial, and bannings of moderate leaders of all racial groups including, most recently, Fanyana Mazibuko a prominent figure in black education in South Africa.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800344-0720)
Index

References are to document numbers

Aaron, David:
Angola:
  Cuban military presence, 11
  UNITA insurgency, 22, 24, 42
  U.S. relations with, 27, 29, 33, 231, 372
Namibia, 372

Rhodesia:
  April 1979 elections, 220, 223, 226, 231, 372
  Internal Settlement, 194, 201
  Lancaster House Conference, 252
  Lowenstein proposal, 222, 224
  Owen-Vance peace plan, 158, 159, 163, 169, 175, 209
  Raids on Zambia (Nov. 1979), 246
Sanctions, 170, 226, 231, 372

South Africa:
  Documents not declassified, 286, 358
  Sanctions proposals, 170
  U.S. actions against, 305, 313, 337
  U.S. policy toward, 265, 267, 276, 278, 349, 357, 359

Abubakar, Yaya, 200
Adamu, Gen. Martin, 171

Afghanistan, Soviet invasion of, 42

AFL-CIO, 40

Ahtisaari, Martti, 90, 99, 107, 111, 128

Akadiri, J.A. Oladel, 171, 200

Alexander, Michael, 252

Anderson, David, 86, 90

Angola (see also Frontline States)
  Cuban military presence:
    Brzezinski memorandum, 14
    Richardson memorandum, 2
    Thornton memorandum, 22
  U.S.-Angolan discussions, 36
  U.S.-Angolan relations and:
    Brzezinski memorandum, 39
    Moose mission discussions, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32
    Neto communications, 26
    Vance/McHenry memorandum, 38, 41
  U.S. covert action proposals, 37

Angola (see also Frontline States)—Continued
  Cuban military presence—Continued
    U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171, 200
  U.S. propaganda:
    Brzezinski memorandum, 4, 9, 10
    CIA memorandum, 12, 18
    Gregg memorandum, 37
    Reinhardt memorandum, 6, 17
    Special Activities Working Group discussions, 11
    Tarnoff memorandum, 8
    Turner memorandum, 7, 16
    U.S.-Tanzanian discussions, 68
    U.S.–UNITA communications, 13, 40
    Vance memorandum, 15

  Humanitarian relief for, 1
  Namibia and, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 76
  Soviet military support, 2, 12, 15
  UNITA insurgency:
    Brzezinski memorandum, 3
    CIA memorandum, 5
    Reconciliation strategies, 15, 28, 29, 30, 31, 40
  U.S. military support:
    Brzezinski memorandum, 20
    CIA memorandum, 19, 21
    Clark Amendment and, 24
  SCC Horn Working Group discussions, 23
  Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 42
  Special Coordination Committee discussions, 24
  Thornton memorandum, 22, 27
  U.S. recognition proposals, 14, 15
  U.S.–UNITA communications, 13, 35, 40
  U.S. relations with:
    Aaron memorandum, 231
    Brzezinski memorandum, 14, 25, 39
    Funk memorandum, 33
    Moose mission, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32

1121
Angola (see also Frontline States)—Continued
U.S. relations with—Continued
Neto communications, 26
Policy Review Committee discussions, 230, 372
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and, 42
Thornton memoranda, 27
Vance/McHenry memoranda, 38, 41
Young memoranda, 34
Zairean relations with, 30, 40, 41, 200
Apartheid, U.S. opposition to. See South Africa, U.S. actions against; South Africa, U.S. policy toward
Armstrong, Robert, 252
Arzika, M., 171
Atherton, Alfred L. “Roy,” 292

Bailey, Larry, 318
Barlow, Peter, 238
Barry, Charles, 292
Bartholomew, Reginald, 188
Becker, John, 178
Begin, Menachem, 300
Bennet, Douglas J., Jr., 210, 227, 230
Berggold, Harry E., Jr., 360, 361
Bergsten, C. Fred, 169
Biko, Steve, 318, 321, 327
Billington, Glen, 212
Bin Musa, Haruna, 171, 200
Blacken, John D., 99
Blackwill, Robert D., 42, 252
Bloomfield, Lincoln P., 127
Blumenthal, W. Michael, 230, 231, 267, 268, 349
Bomani, Paul, 68, 164
Bongo, El Hadj Omar, 74
Bongo, Martin, 74
Borg, C. Arthur, 268
Boright, John P., 287
Botha, P.W., 215, 355, 365
Botha, R.F. (Pik):
    Carter correspondence, 94, 102, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124
    Lowenstein meetings, 222
Namibia, 121
    Carter correspondence, 94, 102, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124
    Remarks on McHenry, 123
Seven Point Proposal, 45, 46
Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, 43, 44, 47, 48, 52

Botha, R.F. (Pik)—Continued
Namibia, 121—Continued
UN Security Council Resolution 435, 98
Edmondson discussions, 105
U.S.-South African communications
Carter talks, 101
Vance correspondence, 97, 106, 107, 108, 109, 118, 311
Vance talks, 95, 96, 100, 281
Western Contact Group-South African communications, 104
Western Contact Group diplomacy:
    Carter talks, 101
    Démarche, 49, 50
    Proximity talks (1978), 79
    Proximity talks (1979), 109, 110, 114, 118
    Secretary General’s report (Aug. 1978), 91, 93
    Settlement Proposal, 85, 88, 90
    South Africa talks first session, 52, 53, 54, 55
    South Africa talks second session, 58, 59, 60
    South Africa talks third session, 73
    Vance correspondence, 118, 311
    Vance talks, 95, 96, 100, 281
Political situation, 220
Rhodesia:
    Internal settlement proposals/ negotiations, 131, 260
    Owen-Vance peace plan, 158, 160, 165, 281, 311
    Smith-Vorster meeting (Feb. 1977), 140
    U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 208, 219
    U.S.-South African communications, 261
    Vance meetings, 140, 141
South African aggression against Angola, 118
South African human rights overviews, 373
South African nuclear capabilities:
    Bowdler discussions, 294, 308, 309
    Edmondson discussions, 365
    François-Poncet discussions, 371
    Gerard C. Smith discussions, 371

References are to document numbers
Botha, R.F. (Pik)—Continued
South African nuclear capabilities—Continued
Vance communications, 295, 296, 311, 338
Vance memoranda, 290
U.S. actions against South Africa, 356
U.S. policy toward South Africa, 262, 273, 276, 278, 281, 355
Carter discussions, 269
Young visit proposals, 275
Botswana (see also Frontline States; Khama, Seretse), 48
Bowdler, William G.:
Namibia:
Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, 43, 47
Western Contact Group diplomacy:
Démarche, 49, 50
Draft assessment, 76
Settlement Proposal, 75
South Africa talks first session, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59
South Africa talks second session, 58, 59, 60
Rhodesia, 156, 158, 178, 203
South Africa:
Nuclear capabilities:
Botha discussions, 294, 308, 309
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 311
Christopher memoranda, 297, 328, 346
Fourie discussions, 298, 299, 328
Possible detonation, 360, 361
U.S.-South African talks (June 1978), 345
U.S. technical team visit, 331, 332
Vance-Botha communications, 295, 296, 311
U.S. actions against, 313
U.S. policy toward, 272, 273, 276, 278
Young visit proposals, 275
Boyd, Lord (Andrew Lennox-Boyd), 235
Brement, Marshall, 42
Brewster, Kingman, Jr., 163, 211, 235, 238, 252
Bridges, Peter S., 46, 107
Brown, Emerson, 11, 12
Brown, Frederick, 131
Brown, Gen. George S., 259, 267, 313
Brown, Harold:
Rhodesia, 201, 247, 251, 255
South Africa:
Documents not declassified, 358
U.S. actions against, 280, 312, 313
U.S. policy toward, 259, 267, 284, 349
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.:
Angola:
Cuban military presence:
Richardson memorandum, 2
U.S.-Angolan discussions, 36
U.S.-Angolan relations and, 39
U.S. covert action proposals, 37
U.S. propaganda, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17
UNITA insurgency, 3
Reconciliation strategies, 28, 29
Richardson memorandum, 2
Turner memorandum, 5
U.S. military support, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27
U.S. recognition proposals, 14
U.S.-UNITA communications, 35
U.S. relations with, 14, 25, 39
Funk memorandum, 33
Moose mission, 28, 29
Policy Review Committee discussions, 372
Thornton memorandum, 27
Vance/McHenry memorandum, 38, 41
Namibia:
Carter-Waldheim discussions, 127
Tarnoff memorandum, 230
UN Security Council Resolution 435, 101
U.S.-OAU discussions, 74
Western Contact Group diplomacy, 68, 77, 92, 95, 372
Rhodesia:
April 1979 elections, 220, 231, 372
Cease-fire airlift, 247, 251, 255
Chimoio raid (1977), 177
Descriptive terms, 240
Interagency Group report, 149
Internal Settlement, 188, 193, 194, 201
Internal settlement proposals/ negotiations, 137
Lancaster House Conference, 252

References are to document numbers
Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.—Continued
Rhodesia—Continued
Muzorewa government status, 236
Owen-Vance peace plan:
  Carter-Nyerere discussions, 164
  Carter-Owen discussions, 163
  Malta talks, 183
  Policy Review Committee discussions, 169, 175
  U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171, 200
  U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
  Vance-Nkomo discussions, 151
  Vance/Owen-Botha talks, 165
  Vance status reports, 174
  Sanctions, 157, 217, 230, 237, 249, 250, 372
  U.S.-British all-party meeting proposals, 193, 200, 217
U.S.-South African communications, 261
Zambia strike threat (1977), 154, 155
South Africa:
  Documents not declassified, 326
  Nuclear capabilities, 294, 301, 306, 342
  Bowdler-Fourie discussions, 298
  Carter-Vorster correspondence, 311
  Christopher memoranda, 297
  Fourie discussions, 321
  Possible detonation, 362, 367
  U.S.-Israeli communications, 300, 303, 304
  U.S.-South African talks (June 1978), 344
  U.S. technical team visit, 330
  Sanctions proposals, 314
  U.S. actions against, 314, 324
  Agency contacts review, 277, 282, 283, 334
  Carter-Congressional Black Caucus meeting, 318
  Department of State papers, 339
  Kreps memoranda, 329
  Policy Review Committee discussions, 313
  Tarnoff memorandum, 279, 316, 319, 325
  Thornton memorandum, 337

References are to document numbers
Carter, Jimmy (see also Carter-Vorster correspondence)—Continued

Angola—Continued
U.S. relations with, 14, 25, 28, 34, 38, 41
Kaunda correspondence, 133, 155, 180, 199

Namibia:
Neither correspondence, 94, 102, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124
National Assembly formation (May 1979), 126
National Security Council discussions, 267, 349
Pre-Implementation Conference, 129
Secretary General’s report (Feb. 1979), 125
Speech (Feb. 2, 1977), 44
UN Security Council Resolution 435, 101, 107
U.S.–OAU discussions, 74
Walidheim discussions, 127
Western Contact Group diplomacy:
Botha talks, 101
Christopher memoranda, 67, 72, 73, 88
Kaunda correspondence, 87
Secretary General’s report (Aug. 1978), 93, 94
Settlement Proposal, 89, 336
SWAPO New York talks, 67
U.S.-Tanzanian discussions, 68
Vance memorandum, 61, 65, 75, 128
Vorster correspondence, 56, 66, 89, 311, 336
Walidheim consultations, 63, 65
Walidheim correspondence, 72
Nyerere correspondence, 182, 198
Rhodesia:
April 1979 elections, 227
Callaghan correspondence, 232, 233
McGovern/Hayakawa resolution, 223, 225, 229
U.S. policy, 226, 231
Vance memoranda, 223, 228, 229
Byrd Amendment, 131, 140, 243
Chimoio raid (1977), 177
Descriptive terms, 240
Interagency Group report, 149
Internal Settlement, 189, 192, 194

Carter, Jimmy (see also Carter-Vorster correspondence)—Continued

Rhodesia—Continued
Internal settlement proposals/negotiations, 131, 141, 143
Kaunda correspondence, 180, 199
Lancaster House Conference, 248, 252
Muzorewa government status, 236, 239, 242
National Security Council discussions, 267
Owen-Vance peace plan:
Christopher memoranda, 146
Kaunda correspondence, 180, 199
Nyerere correspondence, 182
Nyerere discussions, 164
Owen Africa trip, 148
Owen discussions, 163
U.S. military aid for Commonwealth force, 161
U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171, 200
U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
Vance/Botha talks, 165
Vance-Owen discussions, 150
Vance status reports, 162, 167, 174
Vorster correspondence, 56, 311
Sanctions:
Brzezinski memoranda, 237, 249, 250
CIA analysis, 144
Defense Authorization Bill, 243
OAU resolution (1979), 242
Presidential Determination, 245
U.S.-British discussions, 248
Vance memoranda, 223, 226, 229, 244
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 198, 199, 200, 215, 218
U.S.-British communications, 132, 134, 142
U.S.-OAU discussions, 74
U.S.-Zambian communications, 133
Vance memoranda, 139
Vorster correspondence, 56, 311, 336
Zambia strike threat (1977), 155, 156

South Africa:
Nuclear capabilities:
Bowdler-Botha discussions, 309

References are to document numbers
Carter, Jimmy (see also Carter-Vorster correspondence)—Continued
South Africa—Continued
Nuclear capabilities—Continued
Bowdler-Fourie discussions, 299
Brzezinski memoranda, 301
Moose-Sole discussions, 320
Possible detonation, 361, 367
Vance memoranda, 291
Vorster correspondence, 311
U.S. actions against, 271, 283, 318, 356
U.S. corporate policies, 266, 267
U.S. policy toward:
Botha discussions, 269
Mondale-Vorster talks, 274
Muskie memoranda, 374
National Security Council discussions, 267, 349
Presidential Directives, 268
Presidential Review Memoranda, 259
U.S.-South African communications, 262
Vance-Young paper, 271
Vorster correspondence, 270, 317, 323
Thatcher correspondence, 256, 257
U.S. relations with Mozambique, 310
U.S.-Zimbabwean relations, 253, 256, 257, 258
Zaire crisis, 1
Carter-Vorster correspondence:
Namibia, 56, 66, 89, 336
Rhodesia, 56, 311, 336
South African nuclear capabilities, 311
U.S. policy toward South Africa, 270, 317, 323
Carver, Michael (Baron), 172, 173, 203, 204, 206, 214
Castro, Fidel (see also Angola, Cuban military presence), 12
Castrodale, Richard, 197, 346
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see also Turner, Adm. Stansfield)
Angola, 5, 12, 18, 19, 21
Namibia, 121
Rhodesia, 137, 144, 158, 168, 224
Chand, Prem, 128, 172, 206
Chidzero, Bernard, 258
Chikwanda, A.B., 209, 241
Chissano, Joachim, 204, 310
Chitunda, Jeremias, 13
Chona, Mark C., 155, 209, 213, 222
Christopher, Warren M.:
Namibia:
Carter-Waldheim discussions, 127
Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, 48
UN Security Council Resolution 435, 107, 108
Western Contact Group diplomacy, 67, 68, 72, 73, 76, 88
Rhodesia:
Owen-Vance peace plan, 146
Carter-Nyerere discussions, 164
Salisbury Group talks, 216
U.S. military aid for
Commonwealth force, 161
U.S.-South African communications, 152
Vance/Owen-Botha talks, 165
Vance-Owen discussions, 181, 214
Sanctions, 244, 248
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 215, 216, 218
Vance-Richard meetings, 138
Zambia strike threat (1977), 154, 155
South Africa:
Nuclear capabilities, 297, 346
Bowdler-Fourie discussions, 298, 299, 328
Soviet démarche, 287, 288, 289, 292
U.S.-Israeli communications, 300, 303
U.S.-Soviet communications, 302
Vance memorandum, 307, 364
U.S. actions against, 356
U.S. policy toward, 272, 349
Young visit proposals, 275
U.S.-Zimbabwean relations, 258
Church, Frank, 249
Clark, Bruce, 246
Clark, Dick, 24, 188
Clark amendment (1976), 24, 31, 37
Clarke, Bruce C., 360, 361
Clift, A. Denis, 158, 159, 265, 276, 278, 313
Clingerman, John R., 154
Cohen, David, 169
Collins, Cardiss, 225, 249
Collins Resolution, 318

References are to document numbers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commonwealth of Nations, 136, 236, 238, 241</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress, Acts of (see also Byrd Amendment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helms Amendment, 210, 212, 243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes-Ryan Amendment (1974), 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunney-Javits amendment (1976), 7, 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress, U.S. (see also Congress, Acts of)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola, 16, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1979 elections, 223, 227, 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Settlement, 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowenstein proposal, 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions, 235, 243, 244, 248, 249, 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-British communications, 160, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional Black Caucus, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conyers, John, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks, Stoney, 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper, Frank, 252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper, Richard N., 209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creekmore, Marion V., 366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crosland, Anthony, 135, 142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba (see also Cuban military presence in Angola; Rhodesia, Soviet/Cuban role)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for Patriotic Front, 160, 163, 194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cundiff, Carl C., 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutler, Walter L., 30, 31, 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutter, W. Bowman, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davidow, Jeffrey, 45, 138, 184, 195, 196, 212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day, Derek, 235, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal, Timothy E., 305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Borchgrave, Arnaud, 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Laboulaye, François, 307, 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dellums, Ronald, 225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dent, John H., 140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DePree, Willard, 310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despres, John, 346, 361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeVilliers, D.P., 281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Villiers, Fleur, 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Villiers, J.W., 345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeVos, Peter J., 375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diggs, Charles, 249, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobrynin, Anatoly F., 302, 333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents not declassified, 263, 286, 326, 358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dodson, Christine, 10, 27, 284, 315, 339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donahue, Arnold, 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dos Santos, José Eduardo, 38, 40, 41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubleday, Thomas, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downey, Thomas J., 222, 225, 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff, Antony:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1979 elections, 220, 221, 226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muzorewa government status, 235, 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 218, 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vance-Richard meetings, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young London visit (Feb. 1977), 135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duncan, Charles W., Jr.:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola, 372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia, 372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia, 169, 188, 201, 230, 231, 372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa, 265, 267, 268, 313, 322, 359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyke, Jim, 318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easum, Donald, 171, 200, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eaton, William F., 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmondson, William B., 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia, 105, 106, 107, 110, 122, 123, 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesia:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1979 elections, 220, 221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimoio raid (1977), 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Settlement, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owen-Vance peace plan, 184, 202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vance-Richard meetings, 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia strike threat (1977), 155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Power sanctions talks, 335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear capabilities, 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botha discussions, 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowdler-Fourie discussions, 328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher memoranda, 297, 346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourie discussions, 347, 352, 370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourie paper, 348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsom memorandum, 350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet démarche, 292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-South African talks (June 1978), 343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vance memorandum, 307, 353, 354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References are to document numbers
Edmondson, William B. —Continued
South Africa —Continued
U.S. air reconnaissance, 355
Eizenstadt, Stuart L., 267, 318
Eksteen, Adriaan, 91, 97, 107, 158, 276, 278
Energy, U.S. Department of, 325
Eteki, William, 74, 138
Evron, Ephraim, 300, 304
Falalu, S.O., 200
Farah, Abdulrahim Abby, 62
Farley, Philip J., 292, 341
Fauntroy, Walter, 318
Federal Republic of Germany (see also Namibia, Western Contact Group diplomacy), 92, 335
Fenwick, Millicent, 249
Ferguson, Ewen, 145, 150, 159, 160, 163, 194, 197
Ferreira, Armenio, 36
Figueroa, Reinaldo, 81
Fourie, Brand: Namibia:
Carter-Botha correspondence, 123
Western Contact Group diplomacy:
Christopher memoranda, 76
Démarche, 49
Proximity talks (1979), 118
Secretary General’s report (Aug. 1978), 91, 92, 93
Settlement Proposal, 85
South Africa New York talks, 82
South Africa talks first session, 52, 53, 54, 55
South Africa talks second session, 59, 60
Rhodesia:
April 1979 elections, 220, 221, 226
Internal settlement proposals/ negotiations, 260
Owen-Vance peace plan, 153, 158
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 208, 219
Zambia strike threat (1977), 155
South African nuclear capabilities, 371
Bowdler-Botha discussions, 294, 308
Bowdler discussions, 298, 299, 328
Brzezinski discussions, 321
Fourie, Brand —Continued
South African nuclear capabilities —Continued
Edmondson discussions, 347, 352, 370
Fourie paper, 348
Jacomet discussions, 341
Moose-Sole discussions, 320
U.S.-South African talks (June 1978), 343
U.S. technical team visit, 331, 332
Vance-Botha communications, 296, 311, 338
U.S. policy toward South Africa, 273, 276, 278, 321
France (see also Namibia, Western Contact Group diplomacy)
Angola, 5, 15
South Africa, 290, 296, 307, 335, 341, 371
François-Poncet, Jean, 371
Frontline States (see also Kaunda, Kenneth; Khama, Seretse; Machel, Samora; Nyerere, Julius)
Luanda summit (1978), 87
Namibia:
Seven Point Proposal, 45, 46
Western Contact Group diplomacy, 68, 75, 81, 115, 116, 117
Rhodesia:
CIA information cables, 137
Hughes Mission, 219
Internal Settlement, 190, 191
Internal settlement proposals/ negotiations, 143
Muzorewa government status, 235, 241
Owen-Vance peace plan:
Carter-Nyerere discussions, 164
CIA Intelligence Memoraanda, 168
Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 203, 204, 205, 209
Malta talks, 184, 185
Owen Africa trip, 148
U.S.-British communications, 159, 173, 187
Vance-Muzorewa discussions, 166
Vance status reports, 174
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 197
U.S.-British communications, 135, 159, 160, 163

References are to document numbers
Frontline States (see also Kaunda, Kenneth; Khama, Seretse; Machel, Samora; Nyerere, Julius)—Continued
Rhodesia—Continued
U.S.-Zambian communications, 133
Vance status reports, 162, 167
U.S.-Angolan relations and, 34, 41
U.S. relations with, 34
Funk, Jerry:
   Angola, 33, 35, 36, 40, 42, 372
   Namibia, 372
   Rhodesia, 221, 224, 230, 234, 246, 372
   South Africa, 360, 361
Funk, William, 11
Gallini, Linda, 366
Gallucci, Robert L., 351
Garba, Joseph, 86, 171, 200, 204
Garrison, Mark J., 289, 302, 333
Garwin, Dick, 363
Gause, George, 32
Gaylard, Jack, 171, 172, 211, 216
Gelbard, Robert S., 335
Geldenhuys, Gen. Jannie, 121
Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 92
Gilmour, Ian, Rhodesia, 235, 241
Goldsmith, Sydney, 44, 187
Graham, John:
   Rhodesia:
      Internal Settlement, 194, 203
   Owen-Vance peace plan, 150, 152, 160, 172, 205
   U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 197, 211
Gray, Bill, 249
Gregg, Donald, 37
Grennan, Denis, 150
Griffen, James, 372
Griffith, William, 42
Guhin, Michael, 343, 346, 353
Guiringaud, Louis de, 290
Gurirab, Tsudao, 86, 117
Habib, Philip C., 44, 138, 145, 147, 297
Hansell, Herbert J., 212
Hare, Paul J., 108, 246, 258, 373
Harlech, David, 236, 238
Harmon, John, 11
Harrop, William C., 201, 212, 222
Hart, Roger L., 184
Hartman, Arthur A., 45, 295
Haslam, C.L., 313
Hattfield, Mark O., 222
Hawkins, Augustus, 318
Hawkins, Harold, 138, 153, 154, 156, 178
Hayakawa, Samuel I., 223, 225, 229
Helman, Gerald B., 44, 86, 107, 195, 197, 351
Helms, Jesse A., 222, 248, 249, 250
Helms Amendment, 210, 212, 243
Henderson, Nicholas “Nicko,” 252
Henze, Paul B., 10, 11, 18, 23, 201
Holloway, Anne, 86, 169, 179, 188, 222, 313
Hornblow, Michael, 265, 267
Hoskinson, Samuel M., 11
Houghton, Arthur A., 197, 213, 292
Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 5, 15
Hufbauer, Gary, 372
Hughes, Cledwyn, 218, 219, 232
Hughes-Ryan Amendment (1974), 21
Hull, Richard, 235
Hyland, William G., 288
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 366
Israeli-South African nuclear cooperation, 291, 292, 300, 303, 304
Ivy Coast, 5, 15
Jackson, Richard, 107, 222, 234
Jacomet, Andre, 341
Jamieson, Donald, 80, 86, 92, 112, 114, 115, 116
Janka, Leslie A., 265
Javits, Jacob K., 249
Jay, Peter, 163, 194, 216, 235
Jayne, Edward Randy, 11, 24
Johnson, James, 158, 276, 278
Jolosaö, Olujimi, 171
Jonathan, Leabua, 138
Jones, Gen. David C., 201, 231, 349
Jordan, Hamilton, 349
Jorge, Paulo, 26, 30, 31, 32, 86
Kahan, Jerome H., 307, 351, 353
Kamanga, R.C., 209
Katjavivi, Peter, 44, 47
Katz, Julius L., 140
Katzen, Jay, 50, 158, 159, 276, 278
Kaunda, Kenneth:
   Angola, 5
   Carter correspondence, 133, 155, 180, 199

References are to document numbers
Kaunda, Kenneth—Continued
Hughes Mission, 219
Namibia, 76, 87
Rhodesia:
Callaghan discussions, 214
Carter correspondence, 133, 180, 199
Lowenstein meetings, 222
Owen-Vance peace plan, 168, 171, 175, 209
Raids on Zambia (Nov. 1979), 246
Richard discussions, 135
Strike threat (1977), 154, 155
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 199, 215
U.S. role, 139
Vance-Botha discussions, 141
Kauzlarich, Richard D., 335
Keeley, Robert V., 106, 107, 118, 218, 222, 258, 353
Kelley, Robert, 307, 340, 343
Keogh, Dennis W., 135, 176, 187, 191, 197, 287
Kerina, Mburumba, 58
Karma, Seretse, 76, 141, 168, 219
Kissinger, Henry A., 52, 159, 160, 260
Knoche, Enno Henry, 137, 265
Kombila, Rene, 74
Komer, Robert W., 246
Konie, Gwendoline, 81
Koornhof, Piet, 123
Krebs, John H., 292
Kreps, Juanita M., 324, 329
Laingen, Lowell B., 184, 185, 186
Lake, W. Anthony:
Angola, 372
Namibia, 109, 372
Rhodesia:
April 1979 elections, 372
Internal Settlement, 188, 195
Lowenstein proposal, 222
Muzorewa government status, 235, 238
Owen-Vance peace plan, 158, 159, 169, 175, 200, 202, 216
Raids on Zambia (Nov. 1979), 246
Sanctions, 230, 234, 248, 372
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 197, 200, 216
Zambia strike threat (1977), 154, 155, 156
South Africa, 276, 278, 313
Lamb, Denis, 8
Lancaster House Conference, 243, 244, 246, 248, 252
Lanpher, Edward, 318
Laver, Patrick, 145, 150, 159
Leonard, James:
Namibia, 99, 100
Western Contact Group diplomacy, 69, 70, 71, 78, 84, 91
South Africa, 304
LeSotho, 138
Lewis, Richard, 332
Lima, Olga, 81, 204
Lobo, Jose Carlos, 81, 310
Locke, Allen W.:
South African nuclear capabilities:
Christopher memoranda, 328
International Atomic Energy Agency membership, 366
Possible detonation, 360, 361, 369
U.S.-South African talks (June 1978), 343, 345
U.S. technical team visit, 332
Vance memoranda, 307, 351, 354
Low, Stephen:
Rhodesia:
April 1979 elections, 228
Internal Settlement, 203
Owen-Vance peace plan, 152, 160, 172, 202, 209, 216
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 211, 214, 216, 218, 219
Zambia strike threat (1977), 155
Lowenstein, Allard, 222, 224
Lucas, William E., 375
Luce, Richard, 235, 236
Luers, William H., 288
MacFarlane, Lewis R., 328, 346, 353, 366, 368, 369
Machel, Samora (see also Frontline States)
Rhodesia, 137, 141, 148, 167, 168, 177, 219
U.S. relations with Mozambique, 310
Madzimbamuto, Daniel, 151
Mafara, Stephen, 216
Maguire, Andrew, 225
Malan, Gen. Magnus, 93, 322
Malecela, John, 68, 164
Malson, Bob, 318
Mandela, Winnie, 278
Mansfield, Philip, 145, 150, 159
Marcuss, Stanley J., 169
References are to document numbers
Markey, Ed, 318
Martin, Louis, 258
Martin, Thomas G., 183, 195, 288
Mashingaidze, Elleck K., 258
Matthews, Gary L., 287, 288
Maynes, Charles W.:
- Namibia, 97, 106, 108, 109, 118, 127
- Rhodesia, 138, 214
- South Africa, 366
Mazibuko, Fanyana, 374, 375
McAfee, William, 11
McCloskey, Paul N., Jr., 222
McCormick, Keith, 307
McGiffert, David E., 24, 201, 313
McGovern, George, 33, 223, 225, 229
McHenry, Donald F.:
- Angola, 25, 38, 41, 372
- Botha remarks on, 123
Namibia:
- UN Security Council Resolution 435, 98
- U.S.-Angolan discussions, 32
Western Contact Group diplomacy:
- Draft assessment, 76
- Frontline States meetings, 111, 117
- Proximity talks (1979), 113, 114, 117, 372
- Secretary General’s report (Aug. 1978), 91, 92
- Settlement Proposal, 86
- South Africa talks, 52, 58
- SWAPO New York talks, 69, 71, 84
- U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171
- U.S.-Tanzanian discussions, 68
- Waldheim consultations, 57
Rhodesia:
- April 1979 elections, 231, 372
- Owen-Vance peace plan, 159, 166, 171, 200, 209
- Sanctions, 230, 250, 372
- U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 200
- South Africa, 265, 276, 278
- U.S.-Zimbabwean relations, 258
Mdee, Samy, 68, 164, 205
Menzel, Joerg, 332
Miller, George, 225
Mitchell, Bunny, 318
Mitchell, George H., 107
Mitchell, Parren, 318
Mkapa, Benjamin:
- Namibia, 68, 81, 86
Mkapa, Benjamin—Continued
- Rhodesia, 164, 202, 204, 205
- Mobutu Sese Seko, 26, 27, 33
- Moffett, Anthony Toby, 225
- Mogwe, Archibald, 81, 111, 116, 117, 204
Mondale, Walter:
- Namibia, 50, 59, 68, 127, 274, 276
- Rhodesia:
- April 1979 elections, U.S. policy, 231
- Lancaster House Conference, 252
- Owen-Vance peace plan:
  - Carter-Nyerere discussions, 164
  - Owen discussions, 159
- U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171
- U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
- Vorster talks, 56, 158, 274, 276, 278
South Africa:
- U.S. actions against, 313, 318
- U.S. policy toward:
  - Carter-Botha discussions, 269
  - Department of State paper, 284
  - National Security Council discussions, 267, 349
  - Policy Review Committee discussions, 265
  - Presidential Directives, 268
  - Presidential Review Memoranda, 259
- Vance-Young paper, 271
- Vorster talks, 56, 272, 273, 274, 276, 278, 284, 294
Montiero, Jaime, 86
Moore, Frank, 249, 318
Moose, George, 197, 215, 216, 218, 220, 221, 234
Moose, Richard M., Jr.:
- Angola:
  - Cuban military presence, 6, 8
  - UNITA insurgency, 15, 24
  - U.S. relations with, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 372
Namibia:
- UN Security Council Resolution 435, 97
- U.S.-OAU discussions, 74
- Western Contact Group diplomacy, 68, 76, 78, 91, 109, 372
Rhodesia:
- April 1979 elections, 220, 221, 223, 226, 372

References are to document numbers
Moose, Richard M., Jr.—Continued
Rhodesia—Continued
Chimoio raid (1977), 176, 177
Internal Settlement, 188, 190, 191, 194, 195
Muzorewa government status, 235, 238, 239
Owen-Vance peace plan:
Carter-Nyerere discussions, 164
Malta talks, 183, 184
Policy Review Committee
discussions, 169, 175
Salisbury Group talks, 216
U.S.-British communications,
173, 181, 187, 190
U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171, 200
U.S.-Zambian communications,
209
Vance-Patriotic Front
discussions, 196
Raidson Zambia (Nov. 1979), 246
Sanctions, 230, 249, 372
U.S.-British all-parties meeting
proposals, 197, 200, 214, 216
South Africa:
Nuclear capabilities:
Bowdler-Botha discussions, 294
Christopher memoranda, 297
Possible detonation, 361
Sole discussions, 320
Vance-Botha communications,
295
Vance memoranda, 307, 351, 364
U.S. actions against, 313, 318
U.S. relations with Mozambique, 310
U.S.-Zambian relations, 258
Moreton, John, 138, 163
Morse, David, 33
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 240
Mozambique (see also Frontline States;
Machel, Samora)
Rhodesian Chimoio raid (1977), 175, 176, 177
U.S. relations with, 310
Mugabe, Robert (see also Patriotic Front)
Hughes Mission, 219
Internal Settlement, 191, 195, 196
Internal settlement proposals/
negotiations, 137
Owen-Vance peace plan and:
Christopher memoranda, 146
CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 168
Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 204
Mugabe, Robert (see also Patriotic
Front)—Continued
Owen-Vance peace plan
and—Continued
Malta talks, 196
Moose talks, 173
Owen Africa trip, 148
Pretoria talks, 206
U.S.-British discussions, 145, 160
Vance discussions, 196
U.S.-Zambian relations, 256, 258
Mulaisho, D.C., 209
Mulder, Cornelius (Connie), 34
Murray, Robert, 361
Muskie, Edmund S., 129, 358, 374, 375
Mutasa, Joyce, 195
Mutukwa, Kasuka, 213
Mutusswa, Solomon (Rex Nhongo), 200
Muzorewa, Abel (see also Rhodesia,
Salisbury Group), 135
April 1979 elections, 220, 228, 229
Government status, 234, 235, 236, 238,
239, 241, 242
Hughes Mission, 219
Internal Settlement, 195
Internal settlement proposals/
negotiations, 137, 174
Lowenstein meetings, 222
Owen-Vance peace plan, 145, 146,
162, 166, 168, 172
Sanctions, 212, 234
U.S.-British all-parties meeting
proposals, 207, 212
Vance-Botha discussions, 141
Young-Ramphal discussions, 136
Mwale, Siteke, 81, 154, 162, 204, 209
Mwanakatwe, J. M., 209
Nach, James, 97, 177
Namibia:
Carter-Botha correspondence, 94, 102,
119, 120, 122, 123, 124
Carter-Waldheim discussions, 127
CIA information cables, 121
Department of State paper, 284
Elections (1978), 101
National Assembly formation (May
1979), 126
National Security Council
discussions, 267
National Security Council study, 264
Policy Review Committee
discussions, 230, 265, 285, 372

References are to document numbers
Index 1133

Namibia—Continued

Pre-Implementation Conference, 129, 130
Presidential Review Memoranda, 259
Secretary General’s report (Aug. 1978), 91, 92, 93, 94, 95
Secretary General’s report (Feb. 1979), 103, 112, 124, 125
Settlement Proposal:
Ahitsaari appointment, 90
Carter-Kaunda correspondence, 87
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 89, 336
Christopher memoranda, 88
U.S.-South African communications, 85
Vance memoranda, 75
Vance-SWAPO discussions, 86
Vance-Waldheim discussions, 90
Seven Point Proposal:
Ahitsaari appointment, 90
Carter-Kaunda correspondence, 87
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 89, 336
Christopher memoranda, 88
U.S.-South African communications, 85
Vance memoranda, 75
Vance-SWAPO discussions, 86
Vance-Waldheim discussions, 90
Turnhalle Constitutional Conference:
Bowdler memoranda, 43, 47
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 56
Christopher memoranda, 48
U.S.-South African communications, 56, 269
Vance memoranda, 44, 46
Vance-Owen discussions, 145
Western Contact Group démarche
Northwest African discussions, 58
Western Contact Group discussions, 58
UN negotiations, 34
UN Security Council Resolution 338, 349
UN Security Council Resolution 439, 97
U.S.-Angolan discussions, 30, 31, 32, 36
U.S.-British discussions, 160
U.S.-Mozambique discussions, 310
U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 200
U.S.-OAU discussions, 74
U.S.-South African communications, 260
U.S.-UNITA communications, 40
U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
Western Contact Group diplomacy
(see also Settlement Proposal above)
Administrator General appointment and, 64
Carter-Kaunda correspondence, 87
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 89, 336
Carter-Waldheim correspondence, 72
Christopher memoranda, 67, 68, 72, 73, 76, 88
Démarche, 49, 50, 272, 273
Draft assessment, 76
Frontline States meetings, 81, 111, 116, 117
National Security Council discussions, 349
Proximity talks (1978), 77, 79, 80
Proximity talks (1979), 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 372
South Africa New York talks, 82
South Africa talks first session, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59
South Africa talks second session, 58, 59, 60
South Africa talks third session, 73
SWAPO New York talks, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 75, 84
U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171
U.S.-South African communications:
Carter-Botha talks, 101
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 56, 66, 89, 311, 336
Edmondson-Botha discussions, 105
Mondale-Vorster talks, 274, 276
Newsom-Sole meetings, 123
Vance-Botha correspondence, 97, 106, 107, 108, 109, 118, 311
Vance-Botha talks, 95, 96, 100, 281
U.S.-Tanzanian discussions, 68
Vance memoranda, 61, 65, 75, 128
Vance-Nujoma meeting, 83
Waldheim consultations, 55, 57, 62, 63, 65
Working paper, 51
Namibia National Front (NNF), 110, 112
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).
See Angola, UNITA insurgency.
N’dong, Laon, 81

References are to document numbers
Nelson, Harvey, 153, 155, 156
Neto, Agostinho:
  Cuban support for, 2
  Death of, 37, 38
Namibia, 127
Political situation, 3
Rhodesia, 150, 168
U.S.-Angolan relations, 14, 25, 26, 27
Newson, David D.:
  Namibia, 106, 118, 123
  Rhodesia, 214, 222
  South Africa, 350, 356, 360, 361, 374, 375
Newton, Alan, 361
Ngonda, Putheho M., 209
Nigeria:
  Angola, 171, 200
  Namibia, 46, 86, 111, 116, 171
  Rhodesia, 171, 175, 184, 219
  Zaire crisis, 2
Niles, Thomas M., 86, 97, 106, 107, 108, 118, 335
Nkomo, Joshua (see also Patriotic Front)
  Hughes Mission, 219
Internal Settlement, 190, 191, 195, 196, 201, 216
Internal settlement proposals/ negotiations, 137, 174
Lowenstein meetings, 222
Owen-Vance peace plan and:
  Carter-Nyerere discussions, 164
  Christopher memoranda, 146
  CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 168
  Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 204
  Malta talks, 196
  Moose talks, 173
  Owen Africa trip, 148
  Pretoria talks, 206
  Vance discussions, 151, 196
  Vance-Owen discussions, 145, 150
  Vance status reports, 162
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 301
Nujoma, Sam, 47
Western Contact Group diplomacy:
  Draft assessment, 76
  Proximity talks (1978), 80
  Proximity talks (1979), 111
  Settlement Proposal, 86, 90
  South Africa talks, 55
  SWAPO New York talks, 69, 70, 84
  Vance meeting, 83
  Waldheim consultations, 57
Nyakyi, Anthony, 68, 164
Nye, Joseph S., 307, 320, 328, 332
Nyerere, Julius (see also Frontline States), 68
  Carter correspondence, 182, 198
  Namibia, 76
Rhodesia:
  Internal settlement proposals/ negotiations, 143
  Muzorewa government status, 236
  Owen-Vance peace plan:
    Carter correspondence, 182
    Carter discussions, 164
    Christopher memoranda, 146
    CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 168
    Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 205
    Owen Africa trip, 148.
    U.S.-British discussions, 163
    Vance discussions, 166, 202
    U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 198, 215, 219
    U.S.-British communications, 135
    U.S. role, 139
    U.S.-South African communications, 141
Obasanjo, Lt. Gen. Olusegun:
  Namibia, 46, 86
  Rhodesia, 171, 200, 219
  Odom, Brig. Gen. William, 360, 361
  O’Leary, John, 169
O’Linn, Brian, 113
Oplinger, Gerard G., 287, 292, 362
Organization of African Unity (OAU):
  Namibia, 74, 88
  National Security Council study, 264
  Rhodesia, 74, 138, 164, 242
Owen, David A.L.:
  Namibia:
    Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, 145
  Western Contact Group diplomacy, 92, 110, 115
    Frontline States meetings, 111, 116, 117
    Proximity talks (1979), 112, 114, 117
    Sithole discussions, 189
    Vance correspondence, 190, 191
Rhodesia:
  Internal Settlement, 189, 190, 194, 197, 207
  Owen-Vance peace plan:
    Africa trip, 148, 269, 272, 273
    Carter discussions, 163

References are to document numbers
Index 1135

Owen, David A.L.—Continued
Rhodesia—Continued
Owen-Vance peace plan—Continued
Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 203, 204, 205
Malta talks, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187
Mondale discussions, 159
Moose talks, 173
Pretoria Patriotic Front talks, 206
U.S. military aid for Commonwealth force, 161
Vance correspondence, 147, 187, 190, 191
Vance discussions, 145, 150, 160, 179, 181, 214
Vance/Owen-Botha talks, 165
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 194, 197, 203, 207, 208, 214
Owen, Henry D., 252, 258, 360, 361, 367
Palliser, Michael, 145, 150, 159, 235, 252
Parminter, William:
Angola, 372
Namibia, 372
Rhodesia, 175, 188, 230, 246, 372
South Africa, 265, 267, 313
Pastor, Robert A., 27
Patriotic Front (see also Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua)
April 1979 elections, 229
Hughes Mission, 219
Internal Settlement and, 188, 190, 196
Internal settlement proposals/ negotiations, 137, 141, 143
Lancaster House Conference, 243, 244, 246, 248, 252
Muzorewa government and, 235, 241
OAU recognition, 74, 138, 164
OAU resolution (1979), 242
Owen-Vance peace plan and:
Carter-Nyerere correspondence, 182
CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 168
Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 203, 204, 209
Malta talks, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 196
Pretoria talks, 206
U.S.-British communications, 150, 159, 160, 163
U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 200

Patriotic Front (see also Mugabe, Robert; Nkomo, Joshua)—Continued
Owen-Vance peace plan and—Continued
U.S.-South African communications, 153
Vance discussions, 196, 202
Vance status reports, 162, 167, 174
Soviet/Cuban support for, 160, 163, 194
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 196, 197, 198
U.S.-British communications, 135
Vance-Muzorewa discussions, 195
Young-Ramphal discussions, 136
Pell, Claiborne, 249
Perito, Robert M., 275, 308
Perry, Rhodesia, 235
Peterson, Donald K.:
Namibia, 76, 86
Rhodesia, 147, 195, 213, 215
South Africa, 307, 340
Pickering, Thomas R., 351, 353, 364
Pinson, Valerie, 318
Policy Review Committee (PRC):
Angola, 230, 372
Namibia, 290, 265, 285, 372
Rhodesia, 169, 175, 188, 230, 246, 285, 372
South Africa, 265, 285, 313
Pompa, Leonard, 177
Porrino, Frank, 11
Portugal, 13
Potts, James, 201
Presidential Determinations, No. 80–6, “Maintenance of Sanctions Against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,” 245
Presidential Directives, NSC–5, “Southern Africa,” 144, 268
Press, Frank, 258, 363, 368
Price, Melvin, 243
Punabantu, M.J., 209
Qoboza, Percy, 327
Ramphal, Sridath “Sonny,” 136
Ramphul, Radha Krishna, 81
Ramsbotham, Peter, 132, 138
Rangel, Charles, 318
Reddy, Leo, 90
Reid, Martin, 150, 159, 221

References are to document numbers
Reinhardt, John E., 4, 6, 11, 17, 240
Rentschler, James M.T., 42
Renwick, Robin, 238
Reyniers, Thomas R., 97, 108
Rhodesia (see also U.S.-Zimbabwean relations)
Anglo-American Plan. See Owen-Vance peace plan below.
April 1979 elections:
Bennet memoranda, 227
Carter-Callaghan correspondence, 232, 233
Lowenstein proposal, 222
McGovern/Hayakawa resolution, 223, 225, 229
Policy Review Committee discussions, 372
U.S. policy, 226, 230, 231
U.S.-South African communications, 220, 221, 226
Vance memoranda, 223, 226, 228, 229
Cease-fire airlift, 247, 251, 255
Chimoio raid (1977), 175, 176, 177
Chimoio raid on Mozambique (1977), 175, 176, 177
Constitution (Jan. 1979), 220, 225
Descriptive terms, 240
Interagency Group report, 149
Internal Settlement:
Brzezinski memoranda, 193
Helms Amendment, 210, 212
Nkomo-Smith discussions, 216
Owen-Sithole discussions, 189
Owen-Vance peace plan comparison, 192
Policy Review Committee discussions, 188
Salisbury Group talks, 207, 216
Special Coordination Committee discussions, 201
U.S.-British communications, 190, 191, 194, 197
U.S. public opinion, 209
U.S.-South African communications, 208, 336
Vance-Muzorewa discussions, 195
Vance-Patriotic Front discussions, 196
Internal settlement proposals/negotiations:
CIA information cables, 137
Department of State paper, 284
Malta talks, 186
Rhodesia (see also U.S.-Zimbabwean relations)—Continued
Internal settlement proposals/negotiations—Continued
Policy Review Committee discussions, 175, 285
Smith statement (Jan. 1977), 131, 133, 260
Smith-Vorster meeting (Feb. 1977), 137, 138, 140
U.S.-British discussions, 163
U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171
U.S.-South African communications, 141, 143, 260
Vance-Sithole discussions, 175
Vance status reports, 174
Lancaster House Conference, 243, 244, 246, 248, 252
Lowenstein proposal, 222, 224
Missionary massacre (June 23, 1978), 212
Muzorewa government status:
Carter-Muzorewa meeting, 239
OAU resolution (1979), 242
U.S.-British communications, 235, 236, 238
Vance-Muzorewa correspondence, 234
Vance-Muzorewa meetings, 241
National Security Council study, 264
Owen-Vance peace plan:
British white paper, 182
Carter-Kaunda correspondence, 180, 199
Carter-Nyerere correspondence, 182
Carter-Nyerere discussions, 164
Carver-Chand talks, 172, 214
Christopher memoranda, 146, 214
CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 168
Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 202, 203, 204, 205, 209
Department of State paper, 284
Internal Settlement comparison, 192
Malta talks, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 196
Owen Africa trip, 148, 269, 272, 273
Policy Review Committee discussions, 169, 175
Pretoria Patriotic Front talks, 206
Salisbury Group talks, 216
Smith-Kaunda discussions, 171

References are to document numbers
Rhodesia (see also U.S.-Zimbabwean relations)—Continued
Owen-Vance peace plan—Continued
Smith press conference (Nov. 24, 1977), 182
Smith press conference (Sept. 2, 1977), 171
U.S.-British communications:
Carter-Owen discussions, 163
Mondale-Owen discussions, 159
Moose talks, 173
Vance-Owen correspondence, 147, 187, 190, 191
Vance-Owen discussions, 145, 150, 160, 179, 181, 214
U.S. military aid for
Commonwealth force, 161
U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171, 200
U.S.-OAU discussions, 74
U.S.-South African communications, 153
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 56, 311
Chimoio raid (1977), 178
Christopher memoranda, 152
Mondale-Vorster talks, 56, 158, 274, 276, 278
Vance-Botha communications, 251, 311
U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
Vance-Muzorewa discussions, 166
Vance-Nkomo discussions, 151
Vance-Nyerere discussions, 166, 202
Vance/Owen-Botha talks, 165
Vance-Patriotic Front discussions, 196
Vance status reports, 162, 167, 174
Political situation, 158
Presidential Review Memoranda, 259
Raids on Zambia (Nov. 1979), 246
Salisbury Group (see also April 1979 elections above), 203, 206, 207, 214, 219, 222
Salisbury talks. See Internal settlement proposals/negotiations above.
Sanctions (see also Byrd Amendment)
Aaron memoranda, 170, 231
British violation of, 214
Brzezinski memoranda, 217, 237, 249, 250
CIA analysis, 144
Defense Authorization Bill, 243

Rhodesia (see also U.S.-Zimbabwean relations)—Continued
Sanctions (see also Byrd Amendment)—Continued
Helms Amendment, 210, 212, 243
Interagency Group report, 149
Low memoranda, 219
OAU resolution (1979), 242
Policy Review Committee discussions, 169, 175, 230, 372
Presidential Determination, 245
Schaufele memoranda, 157
U.S.-British discussions, 235, 248, 252
U.S.-South African communications, 208
Vance memoranda, 139, 223, 226, 229, 244
Vance-Muzorewa communications, 212, 234
Soviet/Cuban role:
Owen-Vance peace plan on, 145
Policy Review Committee discussions, 246
Salisbury Group talks, 207, 216
U.S.-British communications, 160, 163, 190, 194, 203, 214
U.S.-South African communications, 208, 220, 221, 269
U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
UN Security Council Resolution 408, 157
UN Security Council Resolution 423, 193, 194, 197, 199
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals (see also Lancaster House Conference above)
Brzezinski memoranda, 193, 217
Carter/Callaghan-Kaunda correspondence, 215
Carter/Callaghan-Nyerere correspondence, 215
Carter-Kaunda correspondence, 199
Carter-Owen discussions, 194
Hughes Mission, 218, 219
Low-Smith discussions, 211
Salisbury Group talks, 207, 216
U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 200
U.S.-South African communications, 208
U.S.-Zambian communications, 213
Vance-Carrington discussions, 235

References are to document numbers
Rhodesia (see also U.S.-Zimbabwe relations)—Continued
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals (see also Lancaster House Conference above)—Continued
Vance-Muzorewa discussions, 195, 212
Vance-Owen discussions, 197, 203, 214
Vance-Patriotic Front discussions, 196
U.S.-British communications:
Carter-Thatcher meetings, 252
Vance memoranda, 142
Vance-Owen meetings, 145
Vance-Ramsbotham discussions, 132
Vance-Richard meetings, 138
Young London visit (Feb. 1977), 134, 135, 136
U.S.-Mozambique discussions, 310
U.S.-South African communications, 46, 140, 141, 261
U.S. strategy, 139, 264, 267
U.S.-Tanzanian discussions, 68
U.S.-Zambian communications, 133, 209
Zambia strike threat (1977), 154, 155, 156
Ribicoff, Abraham A., 160
Richard, Ivor, 135, 138, 159, 214, 260
Richardson, Henry J.:
Angola, 2, 11, 14
Namibia, 68, 74
Rhodesia, 163, 164, 171, 175, 200
South Africa, 305, 313, 316, 321, 325
U.S. relations with Mozambique, 310
Roberto, Holden, 40
Roberts, Gwen, 230
Roberts, Owen, 372
Robinson, John, 197
Rodrigues, M.A.D., 81
Rohan, Albert, 127
Rosenberg, Robert, 361
Rowlands, Ted, 145, 150, 214
Rustin, Bayard, 235
Rweyemamu, Justinian, 68, 164
Salam, Salim Ahmed, 81, 204
Salmon, William, 351
Sanu, E.O., Rhodesia, 200
Saunders, Harold H., 11, 137

Savimbi, Jonas (see also Angola, UNITA insurgency), 5, 35, 40
Schaufele, William E., Jr.:
Namibia, 44, 45, 46, 48
Rhodesia, 138, 141, 145, 147, 154, 155, 157, 260
South Africa, 262, 265, 269
Schechter, Jerrold, 127, 310, 360, 361
Scheinman, Lawrence, 287
Schmidt, Michael, 107
Schmiel, Eugene D., 234
Schrage, Barbara J., 366
Scott, David, 260
Seelye, Talcott, 141, 152, 275, 287
Seitz, Raymond G.H., 135, 141, 145, 150, 151, 159, 235
Senghor, Léopold Sédar, 5
Shankle, Arthur, 48
Shearer, Jeremy, 260, 269
Shenstone, Michael, 53
Shipanga, Andreas, 113
Shulman, Marshall D., 288, 333
Sick, Capt. Gary, 24
Siegel, Jeffrey R., 292
Siena, James, 360
Siithole, Ndabaningi (see also Rhodesia, Salisbury Group)
Hughes Mission, 219
Internal Settlement, 189
Internal settlement proposals/negotiations, 137, 138, 174, 175
Muzorewa government status, 241
Owen-Vance peace plan, 162, 168, 172
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 207, 216
Slocombe, Walter, 11, 188
Smith, Bill, 318
Smith, David, 203
Smith, Gerard C.:
South African nuclear capabilities:
Botha discussions, 371
Bowdler-Botha discussions, 308, 309
Bowdler-Fourie discussions, 328
Brzezinski memoranda, 342
Christopher memoranda, 346
Possible detonation, 361
Sole discussions, 340, 368
U.S.-French discussions, 341
U.S.-South African talks (June 1978), 343, 344, 345, 348
Vance memoranda, 307, 351, 353, 364

References are to document numbers
Index 1139

Smith, Ian (see also Rhodesia; Rhodesia, Salisbury Group)
April 1979 elections, 220, 221
Congressional outreach to, 34
Internal Settlement, 216
Internal settlement proposals/negotiations:
CIA information cables, 137
Statement (Jan. 1977), 131, 133, 260
U.S.-South African communications, 141
Vorster meeting (Feb. 1977), 137, 138, 140
Lowenstein meetings, 222, 224
Muzorewa government role, 235, 238, 241
Owen-Vance peace plan, 145, 150
Carver-Chand talks, 172
CIA Intelligence Memoranda, 168
Kaunda discussions, 171
Owen Africa trip, 148
Press conference (Nov. 24, 1977), 182
Press conference (Sept. 2, 1977), 171
U.S.-British discussions, 181
Vance status reports, 162, 167, 174
Political situation, 158, 168
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 197, 207, 211, 216
Zambia strike threat (1977), 154, 155, 156
Smith, Lt. Gen. William Y.:
Angola, 24, 372
Namibia, 372
Rhodesia, 169, 175, 188, 230, 372
South Africa, 267, 313
Snell, John, 216
Solarz, Stephen J., 188, 235, 249
Sole, Donald B.:
Namibia, 107, 108, 123
Rhodesia, 158
South African increased political repression, 374, 375
South African nuclear capabilities, 309, 320, 340, 368
U.S. policy toward South Africa, 276, 278, 321
Solomon, Anthony M., 265
South Africa (see also Namibia)
Aggression against Angola, 15, 31, 32, 34, 115, 118
Crossroads statement, 123
Documents not declassified, 263, 286, 326, 358

South Africa (see also Namibia)—Continued
Five Power sanctions talks, 335
Human rights overviews, 327, 373
Increased political repression:
Intelligence Assessments, 327
Muskie memoranda, 374
National Security Council study, 264
Newson-Sole meetings, 375
Policy Review Committee discussions, 313
UN Security Council Resolution 417, 321
Nuclear capabilities:
Botha/Francois-Poncet discussions, 371
Bowdler-Botha discussions, 294, 308, 309
Bowdler-Fourie discussions, 298, 299, 328
Brzezinski-Fourie discussions, 321
Brzezinski memoranda, 301, 306, 342
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 311
Christopher memoranda, 297, 328, 346
Edmondson-Botha discussions, 365
Edmondson-Fourie discussions, 347, 352, 370
Fourie discussions, 371
Fourie paper, 348
Gerard C. Smith-Botha discussions, 371
Gerard C. Smith-Sole discussions, 340, 368
Interagency Assessment, 293
International Atomic Energy Agency membership, 366
Moose-Sole discussions, 320
Newsom memoranda, 350
Policy Review Committee discussions, 313
Possible detonation, 360, 361, 362, 363, 367, 369
Soviet démarche, 287, 288, 289, 292
U.S.-French discussions, 341
U.S.-Israeli communications, 300, 303, 304
U.S.-Mozambique discussions, 310
U.S.-South African talks (June 1978), 340, 342, 343, 344, 345, 348

References are to document numbers
South Africa (see also Namibia)—Continued
Nuclear capabilities—Continued
U.S.-Soviet communications, 302, 333
U.S. technical team visit, 330, 331, 332
Vance-Botha communications, 295, 296, 311, 338
Vance memoranda, 290, 291, 307, 351, 353, 354, 364
Political situation, 34, 215
Rhodesia (see also U.S.-South African communications under Rhodesia)
Owen-Vance peace plan, 148, 165, 167, 168, 179, 269, 272
Sanctions, 144, 171
Smith-Vorster meeting (Feb. 1977), 137, 138, 140
Zambia strike threat (1977), 155
Sanctions proposals (see also U.S. actions against below), 138
Aaron memoranda, 170
Brzezinski memoranda, 314
Department of State paper, 284
Dodson memoranda, 315
Policy Review Committee discussions, 265
U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
Vance-Owen discussions, 145, 179
Soweto uprising (June 16–24, 1976), 74
UN Security Council Resolution 417, 321
UN Security Council Resolution 418, 321
U.S. actions against:
Agency contacts review, 277, 282, 283, 312, 334
Brzezinski memoranda, 314, 324, 329
Carter-Congressional Black Caucus meeting, 318
Christopher memoranda, 356
Collins Resolution, 318
Department of State papers, 284, 339
International boycott list proposal, 305
Kreps memoranda, 329
National Security Council study, 264
Policy Review Committee discussions, 285, 313

South Africa (see also Namibia)—Continued
U.S. actions against—Continued
Tarnoff memoranda, 279, 316, 319, 325
Thornton memoranda, 337
Vance memoranda, 280
Vance-Young paper, 271
U.S. corporate policies, 266, 267, 318, 335
U.S. investments, 264, 284, 337
U.S. policy toward (see also U.S. actions against below)
Air reconnaissance, 230, 355, 357, 359
Brzezinski-Fourie discussions, 321
Carter-Botha discussions, 269
Carter UN speech (Mar. 17, 1977), 271
Department of State paper, 284
Intelligence Assessments, 327
National Security Council discussions, 267, 349
National Security Council study, 264
Policy Review Committee discussions, 265, 313
Presidential Directives, 268
Presidential Review Memoranda, 259
U.S.-British discussions, 142, 150
U.S.-Mozambique discussions, 310
U.S. public explanations, 284
U.S.-South African communications:
Carter-Vorster correspondence, 270, 317, 323
Mondale-Vorster talks, 56, 272, 273, 274, 276, 278, 284, 294
Schaufele-Botha discussions, 262
Vance-Botha discussions, 281
U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
Vance NAACP speech (July 1, 1977), 294
Vance-Young paper, 271
Young National Council of Churches remarks (1977), 321
Young visit proposals, 275
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 42
Soviet Union (see also Rhodesia, Soviet/Cuban role)
Military support for Angola, 2, 12, 15
Rhodesia, 160, 163

References are to document numbers
Index 1141

Soviet Union (see also Rhodesia, Soviet/Cuban role)—Continued
South African nuclear capabilities, 287, 288, 289, 292, 302, 333
Support for Patriotic Front, 160, 163, 194
Soweto uprising (June 16–24, 1976), 74
Spain, James, 68, 164, 202, 205
Special Action Group on South Africa, 301
Special Activities Working Group (SAWG), 11
Special Coordination Committee (SCC) (see also Special Activities Working Group)
Angola, 18, 24, 201
Rhodesia, 201
South African nuclear capabilities, 360, 362, 363, 367
Spiegel, Marianne, 13, 177, 222
Spliers, Ronald L., 135, 136, 145, 159
Spliwotes, Nick, 246
Squire, Bill, 216
Squire, Clifford W., 138
Stark, Pete, 225
Stennis, John C., 243
Stevens, Theodore F. (Ted), 249
Steyn, Marthinus, 64
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 89
Streator, Edward J., Jr., 173, 295
Sullivan, Leon, 266, 267
Sullivan Principles, 266, 267
SWAPO. See Namibia; Nujoma, Sam
Swing, William, 13
Tanzania (see also Frontline States; Nyerere, Julius), 68
Tarnoff, Peter R.: 
Angola, 8
Namibia, 44, 77, 118, 230
Rhodesia: 
Cease-fire airlift, 255
Interagency Group report, 149
Internal settlement proposals/negotiations, 260
Owen-Vance peace plan, 160, 165
Sanctions, 248
U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 217
U.S.-South African communications, 141
South Africa: 
Nuclear capabilities, 289, 295, 311, 330, 333
Tarnoff, Peter R.—Continued
South Africa—Continued
Sanctions proposals, 315
U.S. actions against, 279, 316, 319, 325, 334, 339
Taylor, J. Clagett, 287
Teft, John F., 76
Thatcher, Margaret H., 236, 241, 250, 252, 256, 257
Thomas, Francis H., 335
Thomas, Rear Adm. Gerald E., 169
Thornton, Thomas P.: 
Angola, 22, 27
Rhodesia, 169, 188, 194, 201, 202, 209, 222
South Africa, 269, 313, 337, 349
Thyden, James E., 177, 196, 215, 218, 307
Tighe, Eugene F., 358
Tlou, Thomas, 81
Tongarara, Josiah Magama, 200
Towsey, Kenneth, 212, 216
Trattner, John H., 108
Trevithick, John P., 366
Tsongas, Paul, 33, 222, 225, 318
Tuchman, Jessica, 265, 267, 313
Tunney-Javits amendment (1976), 7, 21
Turner, Adm. Stansfield: 
Angola: 
Cuban military presence, 4, 6, 7, 16
UNITA insurgency, 3, 5, 19, 21, 24
U.S. relations with, 372
Namibia, 372
Rhodesia: 
April 1979 elections, 231, 372
Internal Settlement, 188, 201
Owen-Vance peace plan, 169, 175
Sanctions, 144, 230, 372
South Africa: 
Documents not declassified, 326, 358
Nuclear capabilities, 345
U.S. actions against, 282, 312, 313
U.S. policy toward, 259, 267, 268, 284, 349, 357, 359
Twaddell, William, 138, 145, 260
United Kingdom. See Namibia, Western Contact Group diplomacy; Rhodesia; U.S.-British headings under other subject
United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 34

References are to document numbers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| UN Security Council Resolution 338, 349 | Vance, Cyrus—Continued
| UN Security Council Resolution 385, 49, 50, 55, 274 | Namibia—Continued
| UN Security Council Resolution 409, 157 | U.S.–OAU discussions, 74
| UN Security Council Resolution 417, 321 | Western Contact Group diplomacy, 61, 65, 75, 128
| UN Security Council Resolution 423, 193, 194, 197 | Botha correspondence, 97, 106, 107, 108, 109, 118, 311
| UN Security Council Resolution 447 | Botha talks, 95, 96, 100, 281
| Urquhart, Brian, 128 | Frontline States meetings, 111, 116, 117
| U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 10 | Nujoma meeting, 83
| U.S.-Zimbabwean relations, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258 | Proximity talks (1978), 79, 80
| Valadez, Juan, 36 | Proximity talks (1979), 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 372
| Valerga, Stanislaus R. P., 107 | Secretary General’s report (Aug. 1978), 93, 95
| Vance, Cyrus: | Settlement Proposal, 85, 86, 89
| Angola: | SWAPO New York talks, 71
| Cuban military presence, 4, 6, 15 | Waldheim consultations, 63
| Humanitarian relief for, 1 | Rhodesia:
| South African aggression against, 15, 118 | April 1979 elections, 223, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 372
| UNITA insurgency, 14, 15, 22, 24 | Botha meetings, 140, 141
| U.S. relations with: | Byrd Amendment, 131, 140, 260
| Brzezinski memoranda, 14, 25, 39 | Cease-fire airlift, 247, 251, 255
| Moose mission, 28, 29 | Chimoio raid (1977), 176, 177
| Policy Review Committee | Descriptive terms, 240
| discussions, 372 | Internal Settlement:
| Vance/McHenry memoranda, 38, 41 | Muzorewa discussions, 195
| Young memoranda, 34 | Owen correspondence, 190, 191
| Namibia: | Owen discussions, 197
| Carter-Botha correspondence, 119 | Owen-Sithole discussions, 189
| National Assembly formation (May 1979), 126 | Owen-Vance peace plan
| National Security Council | comparison, 192
| discussions, 267, 349 | Patriotic Front discussions, 196
| Secretary General’s report (Feb. 1979), 125 | Policy Review Committee discussions, 188
| Settlement Proposal, 75, 86, 90 | Salisbury Group talks, 207
| Seven Point Proposal, 46 | Special Coordination Committee discussions, 201
| Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, 43, 44, 46, 145 | U.S.-British discussions, 194
| UN Security Council Resolution 435: | Carter-Owen discussions, 194
| Western Contact Group-South African communications, 104 | Internal settlement proposals/ negotiations, 131, 133, 141, 143, 174, 175, 260
| References are to document numbers | Lancaster House Conference, 248, 252
| | Muzorewa government status, 234, 235, 236, 239, 241, 242
| | Owen-Vance peace plan:
| | Botha communications, 281, 311
Index 1143

Vance, Cyrus—Continued
Rhodesia—Continued
Owen-Vance peace plan—Continued
  Carter-Owen discussions, 163
  Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 202, 203, 204, 205
  Malta talks, 183, 184, 187, 196
  Muzorewa discussions, 166
  Nkomo discussions, 151
  Nyerere discussions, 166, 202
  Owen Africa trip, 148
  Owen correspondence, 147, 187, 190, 191
  Owen discussions, 145, 150, 160, 179
  Patriotic Front discussions, 196
  Policy Review Committee discussions, 169, 175
  Pretoria Patriotic Front talks, 206
  Salisbury Group talks, 216
  Status reports, 162, 167, 174
  U.S. military aid for Commonwealth force, 161
  U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171, 200
  U.S.-Zambian communications, 209
  Vance/Owen-Botha talks, 165
Sanctions, 139, 223, 229, 244
  Brzezinski memoranda, 217
  Muzorewa communications, 212, 234
  OAU resolution (1979), 242
  Policy Review Committee discussions, 230, 372
  U.S.-British discussions, 248
  U.S. policy, 226
  U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals:
    Brzezinski memoranda, 217
    Carrington discussions, 235
    Muzorewa discussions, 195, 212
    Owen discussions, 197, 203, 214
    Patriotic Front discussions, 196
    Salisbury Group talks, 207, 216
    U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 200
    U.S.-South African communications, 208
    U.S.-Zambian communications, 213
  U.S.-British communications, 132, 134, 138, 142
  U.S. strategy, 139, 267

Vance, Cyrus—Continued
Rhodesia—Continued
  U.S.-Zambian communications, 133
South Africa:
  Human rights overviews, 373
  Nuclear capabilities, 290, 291, 292, 307, 351, 353, 354, 364
  Botha communications, 295, 296, 311, 338
  Bowdler-Botha discussions, 294, 308, 309
  Brzezinski memoranda, 306, 342
  Gerard C. Smith-Sole discussions, 368
  International Atomic Energy Agency membership, 366
  Moose-Sole discussions, 320
  Possible detonation, 369
  Soviet démarche, 289
  U.S.-Israeli communications, 300, 304
  U.S.-South African talks (June 1978), 344
  U.S.-Soviet communications, 333
  U.S. actions against, 271, 316, 324
  Policy Review Committee discussions, 313
  U.S. ocean surveillance cooperation, 280, 312
  U.S. corporate policies, Sullivan Principles, 266
  U.S. policy toward:
    Carter-Botha discussions, 269
    Department of State paper, 284
    NAACP speech (July 1, 1977), 294
    National Security Council discussions, 267
    Policy Review Committee discussions, 265
    Presidential Directives, 268
    Presidential Review Memoranda, 259
    U.S.-South African communications, 262, 281
    U.S.-British communications, 145
    U.S. relations with Mozambique, 310
    U.S.-Zimbabwean relations, 253, 254, 256
  Zaire crisis, 1
  Van Doren, Charles, 287, 292, 343, 346, 351, 353
  Van Heerden, Neil, 85, 91, 110

References are to document numbers
### Index

Van Well, Günther, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117
Vasev, Vladillen, 287, 288, 289
Vest, George S., 235, 252
Viall, John, 91
Vieira, Sergio, 81, 204, 310
Voice of America (VOA), 6, 8, 10, 17
Vorster, B.J. (*see also* Carter-Vorster correspondence)

**Namibia:**
- Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, 47, 52
- Western Contact Group diplomacy:
  - Carter correspondence, 56, 66, 89, 311, 336
  - Christopher memoranda, 67
  - Démarche, 49, 50, 273
  - Mondale talks, 274, 276
- Secretary General’s report (Aug. 1978), 92, 93
- Settlement Proposal, 89, 336
- South Africa talks first session, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59
- South Africa talks second session, 58, 60
- South Africa talks third session, 73
- Resignation of, 34, 215

**Rhodesia:**
- Internal Settlement, 336
- Owen-Vance peace plan:
  - Carter correspondence, 56, 311
  - Mondale talks, 56, 158, 274, 276, 278
- Owen Africa trip, 148, 273
- Smith meeting (Feb. 1977), 137, 138, 140
- Vance-Botha discussions, 141
- South African nuclear capabilities, 311
- U.S. policy toward South Africa:
  - Carter correspondence, 270, 317, 323
  - Mondale talks, 56, 272, 273, 274, 276, 278, 284, 294

Walden, George, 252
Waldheim, Kurt:
- Carter discussions, 127
- Secretary General’s report (Feb. 1979), 103, 112
- Settlement Proposal, 90

### References are to document numbers

References are to document numbers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>1145</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Young, Andrew J.**—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Namibia—Continued</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Contact Group diplomacy—Continued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlement Proposal, 75, 78, 85, 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa New York talks, 82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO New York talks, 67, 69, 70, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldheim consultations, 57, 62, 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working paper, 51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rhodesia:**

- April 1979 elections, 226
- Byrd Amendment, 135, 136
- Internal Settlement, 188
- London visit (Feb. 1977), 134, 135, 136
- Lowenstein proposal, 222
- Missionary massacre (June 23, 1978), 212
- Owen-Vance peace plan:
  - Carter-Nyerere discussions, 164
  - Carter-Owen discussions, 163
  - Dar es Salaam talks (1978), 203
  - Malta talks, 183, 184, 185, 186
  - Moose talks, 173
  - Policy Review Committee discussions, 169, 175
  - Pretoria Patriotic Front talks, 206
  - Salisbury Group talks, 216
  - U.S.-Nigerian discussions, 171, 200
  - Vance-Nyerere discussions, 202
  - Sanctions, 226

**South Africa:**

- U.S.-British all-parties meeting proposals, 200, 207, 208, 214, 216, 218
- National Council of Churches remarks (1977), 321
- Nuclear capabilities, 297, 304
- U.S. actions against, 313, 318
- U.S. policy toward, 259, 267, 268, 284, 349
- Visit proposals, 275
- U.S. relations with Mozambique, 310

**Zablocki, Clement J.**, 249

**Zaire:**

- Angola, UNITA insurgency and, 5
- Angolan refugees in, Vance memoranda, 1
- Angolan relations with, 30, 40, 41, 200
- Shaba invasions, 1, 13

**Zambia (see also Frontline States; Kaunda, Kenneth)**

- Angola, 2, 5
- Namibia, 76
- Rhodesian negotiations, 133, 209, 213
- Rhodesian raids on (Nov. 1979), 246
- Rhodesian strike threat (1977), 154, 155, 156
- ZANU. *See* Mugabe, Robert; Patriotic Front.
- ZAPU. *See* Nkomo, Joshua; Patriotic Front.
- Zimbabwe (see also Rhodesia)
  - U.S. relations with, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258

**References are to document numbers**