Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that document the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. This volume, which documents U.S. policy toward Korea from 1969 until 1972, is part 1 of a larger volume that will include a compilation on U.S. bilateral relations with Japan. Part 2 of this volume, on Japan, was sub-
mitted for declassification review in 2003, and will be published when the review is completed.


During the first Nixon administration, Washington confronted an array of difficult foreign policy questions concerning the Korean peninsula. Between 1969 and 1972, U.S. policymakers responded to North Korean hostility with circumspect countermeasures. At the same time, the United States supported the South Korean economic “miracle,” and offered military assistance to increase the preparedness of the South Korean armed forces. In 1971, Washington withdrew 20,000 American troops from Korea, an expression of the Nixon Doctrine accomplished with limited damage to bilateral goodwill. Concurrently, the U.S. Government sought to moderate Korean President Park Chung Hee’s dictatorial tendencies, encourage democracy, and promote human rights without undermining other foreign policy goals. These issues produced disagreements within the U.S. Government and between officials in Seoul and Washington. South Korean and U.S. officials also struggled to settle textile trade issues, and labored to update their bilateral partnership to fit the changing Cold War landscape. But on the whole, U.S.-Korean relations during these years strengthened the alliance that had begun immediately after World War II.

The preponderance of documents published in this volume concerns security issues. As in earlier years, U.S. policymakers continued to deal with North Korean provocations between 1969 and 1972, the most serious being the North Korean Air Force’s destruction of a U.S. surveillance (EC–121) airplane over the Sea of Japan in April 1969. The documents in this volume show how the Nixon team balanced diverse and sometimes competing inclinations to meet the North Korean challenge. The U.S. military presence in South Korea also surfaced as an important topic. During Nixon’s first term, the United States reduced its forces in Korea from 63,000 to 43,000 American servicemen. At first, President Park aggressively opposed the American drawdown, insisting that the U.S. reduction should be small, and that any military realignment should be accompanied by a sharp rise in U.S. military assistance to the Republic of Korea. Seoul’s objection to the U.S. plan related to its unflattering appraisal of Vietnamization and its fear of North Korean aggression. Although Park failed to prevent the removal of 20,000 U.S. soldiers, he did extract from his U.S. counterpart a massive package of aid to modernize the South Korean military. Other records in this publication relate to the deployment of South Korean combat forces in Vietnam. The Republic of Korea maintained two divisions in South Vietnam; during a 1972 battlefield crisis President Nixon personally called on President Park to employ these troops in
the central highlands. Notwithstanding the overall South Korean commitment to the Vietnam campaign, the Park administration found it politically difficult to maintain its foreign military presence there, particularly in light of Washington’s scaled back commitment to Asia. Beyond issues directly related to South Korean defense, this collection therefore reveals the bilateral dimensions of Korea’s involvement in the Vietnam conflict.

Washington’s work to redefine Cold War international relations, with all its attendant consequences, surfaces here in many forms. For years before 1969, U.S. officials had pressed Seoul to become a more confident international actor. This installment of Foreign Relations depicts U.S. satisfaction when the Republic of Korea increasingly did just that during the early 1970s. The new South Korean attitude grew from both economic prosperity and political stability. Since the mid-1960s, South Korea’s real gross national product, industrial output and general exports had increased dramatically; meanwhile, as Park “slowly achieved dominance of South Korean political life and the acceptance of his countrymen by virtue of solid accomplishment,” his government provided the republic with a prolonged period of political stability (Document 80). This volume demonstrates South Korea’s new confidence. When Tokyo and Pyongyang moved to improve their relationship, for example, Seoul (trusting neither country) unleashed a campaign to foil Japanese-North Korean reconciliation. Park eventually won Nixon’s support on this front, and South Korea and the United States convinced Japan to cool its relationship with North Korea after 1972. Also that year, self-assured South Korean officials made their own contact with the North Korean Government. Although those discussions ultimately yielded few tangible results, the North-South dialogue did promote regional stability; symbolically, the meetings captured Seoul’s willingness to confront the North Korean threat. The remarkable change in attitude notwithstanding, South Korean confidence still had its limits, exposed during Nixon’s remaking of the Chinese-American relationship, when President Park and his advisors feared that the U.S. move might compromise South Korean interests. American diplomats worked to dispossess South Korean officials of these misgivings, albeit with mixed results. In the end, the episode, when combined with the records of bilateral textile trade negotiations, illustrate the continuing limits of South Korean influence.

This volume also deals with South Korean internal political affairs. President Park believed that South Korea faced a serious crisis, in which the country needed his leadership to negotiate a threatening era. The South Korean president insisted that the U.S. departure from Vietnam and the reordering of relations between global powers endangered the Republic of Korea. In 1970 Park and his party amended the Korean Constitution to permit his election to a third term as the
country’s president. The following year, the two titans of late twentieth century South Korean politics, Park Chung Hee and Kim Dae Jung, competed for the presidency. Department of State officials endeavored to demonstrate balance by making themselves available to both candidates and advising Park and Kim on topics related to democratic politics. U.S. diplomatic assessments printed in this volume convey contemporary perspectives on the South Korean political experience. One government analyst described Kim as “a proven vote getter with a persuasive manner and an eloquent, oratorical style” who “likes to be called the ‘Kennedy of Korea’” (Document 83). While Kim’s New Democratic Party was disorganized and “short of money,” Park was superbly organized and brought in two of the most skillful politicians in Korea to bolster his effort, Kim Jong Pil to be his Prime Minister and Lee Hu Rak to be Korean CIA Director. When Park, victorious in the 1971 election, declared martial law in October 1972, the U.S. Government expressed frustration. In a meeting with South Korean Ambassador Kim Dong Jo, Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson declared, “all those in the US Government who had been closely associated with Korea were deeply disappointed. While it was not for the US to tell Korea how to run its affairs, he was apprehensive over the future and sorry for Korea” (Document 163). An airgram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State described a dilemma that troubled many U.S. officials: “our long-term presence here and continuing relationship with the ROK associate us, at least tacitly, with the ROKG. It is clear that no mere wrist slapping will deter Park from his political designs. He and those around him are committed to establishing a severely controlled society. This we can deter only by direct and drastic intervention which would threaten Park’s hold on power, create instability and deepen our involvement in the ROK internally” (Document 170).

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the [Foreign Relations] series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are
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retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines of pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified by footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.
VIII Preface

Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Records and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Nixon White House Tapes

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the PRMPA and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon Estate. In February 1971, President Nixon initiated a voice activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House, and, subsequently, in the President’s Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editor made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts produced here. Readers are advised that the tape recording is the official document; the transcript represents an interpretation of that document. Through the use of digital audio and other advances in technology, the Office of the Historian has been able to enhance the tape recordings and over time produce more accurate transcripts. The result is that some transcripts printed here may differ from transcripts of the same conversations printed in previous Foreign Relations volumes. The most accurate transcripts possible, however, cannot substitute for listening to the recordings. Readers are urged to consult the
recordings themselves for a full appreciation of those aspects of the conversations that cannot be captured in a transcript, such as the speakers’ inflections and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958, as amended, on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2003 and was completed in 2009, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 5 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 17 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume, and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide an accurate and comprehensive account of the Nixon administration’s policy toward Korea from 1969 until 1972.

Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), at College Park, Maryland. The editors wish to express gratitude to the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. Thanks are due to the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who were helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger Papers. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers, including the transcripts of telephone conversations, with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The editors would like to also thank Sandy Meagher for her valuable assistance in expediting the use of files of the Department of Defense.
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Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan collected and selected documentation and edited the volume under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Craig Daigle, Richard Moss, and Scott Wilson transcribed the conversations from the Nixon White House Tapes. Moss and Anand Toprani reviewed the transcripts in consultation with David Nickles. Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan C. Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Kristin Ahlberg and Aaron W. Marrs did the copy and technical editing. Juniee Oneida prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs  
April 2010

Ambassador Edward Brynn  
Acting Historian
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Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s indexed central files for 1969–1972 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Almost all the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of President Nixon and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at Archives II include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress.

Department of State historians also have full access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
XIV Sources

of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants. The Central Intelligence Agency has provided full access to its files.


The Nixon Presidential Materials, presently housed at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, are the single most important source of documentation for those interested in U.S.-Korean relations during the first Nixon administration. The Nixon Presidential Materials staff is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. In the future, Nixon’s papers will be transferred to their permanent home at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California.

Documentation on U.S. policy toward Korea in the Nixon Materials can be found chiefly in the National Security Council (NSC) files, which include Country Files, VIP Visit Files, Backchannel Messages, Subject Files, Agency Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Name Files, Presidential Correspondence, Kissinger’s Office Files, files of NSC staffers, and unfiled material. In particular, the Country Files for Korea (boxes 540–544), the files for the EC–121 shootdown (boxes 434–441), and the VIP visits (box 930) are of particular interest. Information on National Security Study and Decision Memoranda can be found in the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files).

One important resource is the White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary, which lists all those who met with the President at the White House or while he was traveling. The Diary also indicates telephone calls to and from the President and has a daily record of “Presidential Movements.” The NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files) contain documents distributed prior to the meetings of the NSC, Special Review Group, Senior Review Group, Washington Special Actions Group, Defense Program Review Committee, Verification Panel, Vietnam Special Studies Group, and the NSC Intelligence Committee. There is a guide to the H-Files available at the National Archives.

After the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Henry A. Kissinger papers located in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress are second in importance. While the Kissinger Papers contain copies of many of the most important items found in the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the chief advantage of these files is that they are well-organized and contain fewer materials on administrative matters of little value to most researchers. The most useful parts of the Kissinger Papers are the Chronological Files, Memoranda of Conversations, Memoranda for the President, and a collection of documents organized by country under the Geopolitical Files heading. The Kissinger papers also contain records of Kissinger’s telephone conversations (telcons). Copies of the Kissinger telephone conversations are also avail-
able at the National Archives and are open to the public. Another useful item in the Kissinger Papers is a typed version of Kissinger’s daily schedule. This is found under Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule, though the schedule before August 31, 1970, has not been located. Access to these papers currently requires permission from Kissinger.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.

Lot Files.

INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110

National Intelligence Estimates, Special Intelligence Estimates and related documents, 1951–1985, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files

DEF 6 KOR S
POL KOR S–US
POL KOR N–KOR S
POL 7 KOR S
POL 15 KOR S
POL 15–1 KOR S
POL 15–5 KOR S
POL 23–8 KOR S
POL 23–9 KOR S
POL 31–1 KOR N–US
POL 15–1 US/NIXON

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

National Security Council Files

Agency Files
Alexander M. Haig Chronological File
Country Files
Institutional Files (H-Files)
Korea: EC 121
NSC Secretariat
Presidential Correspondence
Presidential/HAK MemCons
Subject Files
Unfiled Material
VIP Visits

White House Central Files

President’s Daily Diary
XVI  Sources

White House Special Files
   President’s Office Files

White House Tapes

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Executive Registry Files
   Job 80–R01234A
   Job 80–R01284A
   Job 80–B01086A

ODDI Registry of National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates
   Job 79–R01021A

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC

Henry A. Kissinger Papers

National Security Council, Washington, DC

Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, including records of the 303 Committee

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 330, Records of the Department of Defense

OSD Files: FRC 72 A 6308
   Records of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 1969

OSD Files: FRC 330–75–0155
   Records of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 1972

OSD Files: FRC 330–76–0197
   Records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1971

Published Sources

Abbreviations and Terms

ADB, Asian Development Bank
ADD, Agency for Defense Development
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AH, Alexander Haig
AHC, Attack Helicopter Command (South Vietnam)
AID, Agency for International Development
AK–47, Soviet-manufactured assault rifle
Amb, Ambassador
AMEMBASSY, American Embassy
AOB, air order of battle
AP, Associated Press
ARYN, Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPAC, Asian and Pacific Council

BOB, Bureau of the Budget

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF, Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Force
CINCPACFLT, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUNC, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC, Command in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific
CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
COMUSJAPAN, Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUSK, Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea
COMUSMACV, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
ConGen, Consulate General
CONUS, Continental United States
CPR, People’s Republic of China
CY, calendar year
CVA, attack aircraft carrier

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DEFCON, defense readiness condition
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
Dis or Diss, dissemination
DMZ, Demilitarized Zone
DOD, Department of Defense
DOD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
DOS, Department of State
DPRK, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DRP, Democratic Republican Party (Republic of Korea)

E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/K, Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
XVIII  Abbreviations and Terms

EAP, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EC–121, unarmed, four-engine propeller-driven reconnaissance aircraft
Exdis, exclusive distribution
Ex-Im, Export-Import Bank

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FMS, Foreign Military Sales
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FRC, Federal Records Center
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

GA, United Nations General Assembly
GNP, gross national product
GOJ, government of Japan
GOK, government of Korea
govt, government
GRC, government of the Republic of China
GVN, government of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
HK, Hong Kong; Henry Kissinger
HQ, headquarters

ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
IG, Interdepartmental Group
info, information
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/REA, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IRBM, intermediate range ballistic missile
ISA, Bureau of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense

J, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum
JHH, John Herbert Holdridge
JSOP, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

KATUS, Korean Augmentation Troop, U.S. Army
KCIA, Korean Central Intelligence Agency (South Korea)
KIST, Korea Institute of Science and Technology
KMAG, Korean Military Advisory Group

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
Limdis, limited distribution

M–1, U.S. military field rifle (World War II and Korean War era)
M–16, U.S. military field rifle
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC, Military Armistice Commission
MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MDL, Military Demarcation Line (Korea)
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MiG, Soviet-built fighter aircraft
MIRV, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
MND, Minister of National Defense; Ministry of National Defense
MOD, Minister of Defense; Ministry of Defense

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP, New Democratic Party (South Korea)
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NK, North Korea
NM, nautical mile
NNSC, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (United Nations)
NOA, new obligational authority
Nodis, no distribution
Noforn, no foreign dissemination
Notal, not all (telegram A, referenced in telegram B, was not sent to all the recipients of telegram B)
NPT, Nonproliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSCIG, National Security Council Interdepartmental Group
NSC–US, National Security Council, Under Secretaries’ Committee
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NVA, North Vietnamese Army
NVN, North Vietnam

O&M, operations and maintenance
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OBE, overtaken by events
ODDL, Office of the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OJCS, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/ISA, Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OUSD, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

P, the President
PACAF, Pacific Air Force (United States)
PACOM, Pacific Command (United States)
PARA, Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation; paragraph
PIO, press information office
PL, Public Law
PM, Prime Minister
POLAD, political advisor
Polcouns, political counselor
PRC, People’s Republic of China
PriMin, Prime Minister
XX  Abbreviations and Terms

QTE, quote
R&D, research and development
RB, Reconnaissance Bureau (North Korea)
RefTel, reference telegram
Rep, representative
RG, record group
RH, Richard Helms
RN, Richard Nixon
RNC, Republican National Committee
ROC, Republic of China
ROK, Republic of Korea (South Korea)
ROKA, Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF, Republic of Korea Air Force
ROKFW, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
ROKG, Republic of Korea Government
ROKMC, Republic of Korea Marine Corps
ROTC, Reserve Officer Training Corps
rpt, repeat
RVN, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)
RVNAF, Republic of Vietnam, armed forces
S, Office of the Secretary of State
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
SecState, Secretary of State
Secto, series indicator for telegrams from the Secretary of State or his party to the Department of State
Secy, Secretary of State
Secy Gen, Secretary General
Septel, separate telegram
SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SRG, Senior Review Group
SVN, South Vietnam
TCC, Troop Contributing Countries
Telcon, telephone conversation
Tosec, series indicator for telegrams to the Secretary of State or his party while away from Washington
TS, top secret
U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
U–S/M, Under Secretaries' memorandum
UN, United Nations
UNC, United Nations Command
UNCURK, United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
Unqte, unquote
US, United States
Abbreviations and Terms  XXI

USA, United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USC, Under Secretaries’ Committee
USFY, United States fiscal year
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USIS, United States Information Service
USN, United States Navy
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations
UW, unconventional warfare

VC, Viet Cong
VN, Vietnam
VP, Vice President

WH, White House
WNRC, Washington National Records Center
WSAG, Washington Special Action Group

Z, Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time)
Persons

Abrams, Creighton W., Jr., General, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Command, Vietnam; Army Chief of Staff from October 12, 1972
Acheson, Dean, former Secretary of State (1949–1953)
Adams, Arthur H., General, USMC, UN Command, Military Armistice Commission
Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States

Beam, Jacob D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union from March 14, 1969
Behr, Robert M., Colonel, member, National Security Council Staff
Bergsten, C. Fred, member, National Security Council Operations Staff (International Economic Affairs) from 1969 until 1971
Brown, Winthrop G., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until April 1972
Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador to Vietnam

Cargo, William I., Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, from August 4, 1969
Chiang Kai-shek, President of the ROC; Chair, ROC National Security Council; Director-General, Kuomintang
Choi Kyu Hah (Ch’oe Kyu-ha), ROK Foreign Minister from 1969 until 1971
Chou En-lai, Premier of the PRC; member, Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party’s Political Bureau
Chung II Kwon (Chong Il-kwon), Prime Minister of the ROK until December 19, 1970
Cline, Ray S., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from October 26, 1969
Connelly, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury from February 1971 until May 1972

Davis, Jeanne W., Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat from 1970 until 1971; Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, from 1971
Dobrynin, Anatoliy Fedorovich, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Dorr, Robert F., Country Officer for Korea, Department of State, 1972

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., member, National Security Council Staff, from 1969 until 1970
Eisenhower, Dwight D., former President of the United States (1953–1961)
Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 10, 1969

Flanigan, Peter, Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy
Froehlke, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration from January 1969 to June 1971; Secretary of the Army from July 1, 1971
Fulbright, J. William, Democratic Senator from Arkansas; Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Grant, Lindsey, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, detailed to the National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia) from February 1969 until August 1970; National War College from August 1970 until June 1971; member of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State, from June 1971 until November 1972
Green, Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 1, 1969
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister
Habib, Philip C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 1969; member, U.S. Delegation to meetings on Vietnam in Paris from May 1968 until October 1971; Ambassador to Korea from September 30, 1971
Hahn Pyong Choon (Ham Pyong-Jun), Special Assistant to the President of Korea for Political Affairs from 1970 until 1972
Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr., Colonel, Brigadier General in November 1969; Major General in March 1972; Senior Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1969 until June 1970; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from June 1970
Haldeman, H.R., Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff from January 20, 1969
Halperin, David, member, National Security Council Staff, 1971
Halperin, Morton H., Assistant for Programs, National Security Council, from 1969 until 1970
Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence
Holdridge, John Herbert, Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until July 1969; member, National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia) from July 1969
Hormats, Robert, member, National Security Council Operations Staff (International Economic Affairs), from 1970 until 1972
Hughes, Thomas L., Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until August 25, 1969
Hyland, William G., member, National Security Council Operations Staff (Europe), from 1970 until 1972
Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State from September 18, 1970, until July 12, 1972; Deputy Secretary of State from July 13, 1972 (the Foreign Affairs Reauthorization Act of 1972 created the position of Deputy Secretary, replacing the Under Secretary post as the second-ranking officer in the Department)
Johnson, Lyndon B., former President of the United States (1963–1969)
Johnson, Nels C., Admiral, USN, Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 19, 1970
Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 7, 1969
Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, until February 24, 1973
Kennedy, David M., Secretary of the Treasury from January 1969 until February 1971; Ambassador at Large for Foreign Economic Development from February 11, 1971, until March 8, 1973; Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from March 17, 1972, until February 1, 1973
Kennedy, Richard T., Colonel, member, National Security Council Staff from 1970 until 1972; Director, National Security Council Planning Group from 1971 until 1972
Kim Dae Jung (Kim Tae-jung), Korean opposition leader and New Democratic Party presidential candidate
Kim Dong Jo (Kim Dong-jo), ROK Ambassador to the United States
Kim Il Sung (Kim Il-sung), Premier (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) of the DPRK until December 28, 1972; President (Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly) of the DPRK from December 28, 1972; and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea
Kim Jong Pil (Kim Chong-p’il), Prime Minister of the ROK from June 3, 1971
Kim Yong Shik (Kim Yong-Sik), ROK Foreign Minister from 1971 until 1972
Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Kosygin, Alexei N., Chairman of the Council of Ministers (Premier) of the Soviet Union
Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense
Lake, W. Anthony, member, National Security Council Staff from 1970 until 1971
Lee Hu Rak (Yi Hu-rak), Secretary-General to the President of Korea; Director Korean Central Intelligence Agency
Leonard, James F., Country Director, Korea, Department of State
Lincoln, George, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
Lynn, Laurence, Director, National Security Council Program Analysis Staff, from 1969 to 1971
Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party
McCain, John S., Jr., Admiral, Commander in Chief, CINCPAC, until September 1, 1972
Meyer, Cord, Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency
Michaelis, John H., General, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea
Mills, Wilbur, Democratic Representative from Arkansas; Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee
Mitchell, John, Attorney General until February 15, 1972
Moore, Thomas H., Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations until July 1, 1970; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 2, 1970
Nakasone Yasuhiro, Director, Japanese Defense Agency
Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of Vietnam
Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States
Nutter, G. Warren, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Osgood, Robert E., Assistant for Programs, National Security Council, from 1969 until 1970; Director, National Security Council Planning Staff, from 1970 until 1971
Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense until December 13, 1971
Paik Too Jin (Paek T u-jin), Prime Minister of the ROK from December 19, 1970, until June 3, 1971
Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui), President of the ROK
Peterson, Peter G., Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, and Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy in 1971 and 1972; Secretary of Commerce from January 27 until December 8, 1972
Picard, B. Donovan, Korea Analyst, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from 1969 until 1972; Country Officer for Korea, Department of State, from 1972
Popple, Paul M., Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from 1971
Porter, William J., Ambassador to the ROK until August 18, 1971
Pranger, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia, 1970; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs, 1971
Pursley, Robert E., Brigadier General, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense
Ranard, Donald L., Country Officer for Korea, Department of State, from July 1970
Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State from January 23, 1969, until June 23, 1970; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from June 1970
Rogers, William P., Secretary of State
XXVI  Persons

Sato Eisaku, Prime Minister of Japan until July 6, 1972
Saunders, Harold H., member, National Security Council Staff, from 1969 until 1971
Schlesinger, James R., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, from January 1969 until August 1971; Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission from August 1971
Schneider, David T., Country Director, India, Ceylon, Nepal, Maldives Islands, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from August 1969
Shakespeare, Frank, Director, U.S. Information Agency, from February 7, 1969
Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor from January 20, 1969, until June 10, 1970; Director, Office of Management and Budget from June 1970 until May 1972; Secretary of the Treasury from May 16, 1972
Smith, K. Wayne, Director, Policy Analysis Branch, National Security Council, from 1971 until 1972
Sneider, Richard L., member, National Security Council Operations Staff (East Asia), from May until September 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan from September 1969 until July 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from August 1972
Spiers, Ronald I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from August 15 until September 18, 1969; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from September 18, 1969
Stans, Maurice H., Secretary of Commerce until January 27, 1972
Steadman, Richard C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 1969
Sullivan, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from April 1969
Symington, Stuart, Democratic Senator from Missouri
Taylor, Rufus L, Vice Admiral, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until February 1, 1969
Trezise, Philip H., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from July 8, 1969, until November 27, 1971
Westmoreland, William C., General, USA, Army Chief of Staff until June 30, 1972
Wheeler, Earle G., General, USA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 2, 1970

Yi Hu-rak, see Lee Hu Rak
Korea


1. Special National Intelligence Estimate

SNIE 14.2–69


CONFRONTATION IN KOREA

Conclusions

A. We have reviewed the evidence on North Korea’s intentions and capabilities vis-à-vis South Korea. We conclude that, under present circumstances, Pyongyang does not intend to invade South Korea; nor do we believe that Pyongyang is deliberately trying to provoke the Republic of Korea (ROK) (and/or the US) into a resumption of major hostilities. We do believe, however, that North Korean Premier Kim Il-song is committed to a strategy of developing a “revolutionary struggle” in the South and this his campaign will continue to include harassment of ROK and US forces in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and armed infiltration of rear areas.

B. In our view, North Korea’s prospects for establishing guerrilla bases in South Korea or developing significant political support among the populace are quite poor, at least over the next two years or so. Communist violence will, however, continue to be a costly distraction for the ROK Government and a potential cause of public dissatisfaction with the Pak administration.

C. In pursuing its campaign of violence, Pyongyang seems willing to live with a situation that presents a continuing danger of retaliatory attack by ROK forces. Kim Il-song is apparently confident that he can

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1 Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret. Submitted by Rufus Taylor, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. In an attached January 27 memorandum to Thomas L. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, John H. Holdridge stated that the SNIE was on the agenda of the January 30 USIB meeting, that its forerunner was dated May 1968, and that the “estimate reaffirms the conclusions of earlier SNIE’s that Pyongyang does not want a war.” The forerunner is SNIE 14.2–68; see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, part 1, Korea, Document 200.
control the situation, stopping short of actions certain to provoke a major reaction. If ROK reactions to North Korean provocations continue to be almost entirely defensive, Pyongyang might be tempted at some point to go well beyond incidents along the DMZ and occasional rear-area operations. We cannot rule out such efforts, but whether they take place would depend on how the North Koreans judged the probable reactions of the ROK and the US.

D. Thus, the danger over the next year or two is not that war will arise from a deliberate decision of one side or the other, but that it might result from miscalculation—for example, in the process of probing for weaknesses and testing ROK and US resolve, North Korea may overplay its hand and lead the South Koreans to retaliate heavily.

E. We believe that, even in these circumstances, North Korea would wish to avoid full-scale war. In a crisis, decisions in Pyongyang—as in Seoul—would be affected, perhaps decisively, by the attitudes of major allies. In our view, given no major change in Soviet or Chinese attitudes, both Moscow and Peking would probably urge North Korea to avoid a full-scale war. Yet despite these considerations, Kim Il-song’s manner of thought and action is such that the North Korean response would be difficult to predict with confidence. A critical element in both North and South Korean thinking during any crisis would be the US posture, or what they believe it to be. But we believe that North Korea would feel that the initiation of major hostilities against the South would bring about US military response, particularly while US ground forces are stationed in South Korea.

F. We cannot say exactly how a Vietnamese settlement would affect Kim’s current course. It would depend primarily on how he interpreted the outcome in terms of US willingness to take a firm stand against further North Korean provocations. Thus, he could become somewhat more aggressive or more cautious. Given his strong public commitment to the promotion of revolution in the South, however, it is unlikely that he will abandon his objectives, even though he may modify his tactics.

[Omitted here is the “Discussion” section of the estimate.]
2. National Security Study Memorandum 27


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of the Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator of the Agency for International Development
The Director of the United States Information Agency

SUBJECT
Interagency Planning-Programming-Budgeting Study for Korea

Senior Interdepartmental Group Memorandum #85, dated September 26, 1968, directed an Interagency Planning-Programming-Budgeting study for Korea. The President has directed the completion of this study as one of the series of studies to be undertaken in accordance with National Security Decision Memorandum No. 4, subject: Program Analyses.

To avoid interrupting the progress of the study, no changes in the organization of the interagency task force and support of the study by the participating agencies should be made at this time. However, the task force should be in close consultation with the NSC staff as the study progresses.

A complete draft of the study report, backup analyses, and program memorandum should be submitted by the Chairman of the Steering Group to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for review in accordance with NSDM 4 by May 1, 1969. The completed study report and program memorandum will be circulated...
for NSC IG/EA comment prior to submission to the NSC Review Group. The Administrator, Agency for International Development and the Director, United States Information Agency should be represented on the Interdepartmental Group for this purpose.

The terms of reference for the study as described in SIG Memorandum #85 shall remain in effect.

Henry A. Kissinger

3. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Call of Ambassador Kim Dong Jo on Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Kim Dong Jo, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea
The Secretary of State
Honorable Chyun Sangjin, Minister of the Korean Embassy
Mr. Choi Kwang Soo, Counselor of the Korean Embassy
James F. Leonard, Country Director for Korea

Military Aid

After some polite preliminaries Ambassador Kim pointed out that, although Korea is carrying the main burden of its own defense, it remains heavily dependent on the United States for the supply of weapons and other equipment. They are grateful for the support provided through MAP but they very much hope that when, as was the case this year, the world-wide MAP appropriation is cut, the Korean portion will not be reduced proportionately.

High-Level Contacts

Ambassador Kim asked whether it was intended to hold a meeting of the troop-contributing countries in Bangkok after the SEATO

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69. Confidential. Drafted by Leonard and approved in S on March 21. The meeting was held at the Department of State. A copy was sent to Richard Sneider at the White House.
meeting. The Secretary said he believed it was, but that scheduling was a bit of a problem and it was not as yet a firm decision.

Ambassador Kim noted that his President had had the highest regard for President Johnson and had attached great importance to keeping in close contact with him through letters and through meetings at Honolulu and elsewhere. President Park would very much hope to continue this custom and maintain the closest of relations with President Nixon and the senior members of the new Administration.

The Secretary responded that he certainly concurred in the desirability of such contacts without being able at this time to offer any views on just how this should be done. He said that President Nixon was simply not at the moment addressing himself to the question of where and when he would travel next, having just returned from Europe. The President very definitely did not want his trip to Europe to appear to indicate any lack of interest on the part of this Administration in other areas.

Ambassador Kim said he appreciated these assurances, since the comments which had come out of the White House in connection with the European trip had spoken of such things as Summit Meetings with the Soviet leaders, and of the importance of the Middle East and Latin America, but had not mentioned the importance of the Far East. The Secretary acknowledged that it was difficult to keep a completely satisfactory balance, since whenever one mentioned one area it created questions as to why some other area was not mentioned, but the Administration was by no means unconcerned about Asia. Ambassador Kim said that, speaking personally rather than as a diplomat, he very much hoped that the new Administration would exert itself to overcome the impression which had been created regarding its supposed focus on Europe. The Asians needed the sort of psychological lift which can be given them by reaffirmation of American interest.

Ambassador Kim noted that high-level visits are one way of expressing this interest. He had called on Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard and invited him to the Defense Ministries’ meeting, which was planned for May in Seoul. He had also called on Secretary of Commerce Stans and reached temporary agreement on a Commerce Ministers’ meeting in Seoul in September. He said that he would urge the United States to consider undertaking with Korea the sort of regular ministerial meetings which we now had with Japan under the leadership of the Secretary of State. His Government would very much welcome a visit to Korea by the Secretary.

Secretary Rogers responded that he would very much like to accept such an invitation. He said he hoped he might be able to go to Korea during the trip which is planned in connection with the Japanese ministerial talks in June. (Note: These talks are now scheduled for July.) The Secretary promised to look at his schedule in this connection.
Protectionism

Ambassador Kim drew attention to the very major problem which protectionist tendencies in the United States would create for Korea. He said that this was nothing less than a matter of life and death for his people. He pointed out that one-third of Korean sales in the United States are now textiles of man-made fibers and that any sort of restrictions on this portion of the market would be a serious threat to the export target of $400 million set by his Government for 1969. The Korean Government has to carry a very heavy military burden and it must have economic prosperity and development if it is to do its share in the military field.

Paris Talks

The Ambassador said that he would like to ask the Secretary for his evaluation of the prospects at the Paris peace talks. Were they bright? The Secretary responded that the objectives for which we are working in Viet-Nam and in Paris are quite clear: the freedom for the South Vietnamese to determine their own future. We do not yet know if the North Vietnamese are sincerely interested in peace on these terms, and he could not at this point characterize the situation in Paris as bright or as anything else. As the Ambassador was undoubtedly aware from the newspapers, we are suggesting mutual troop withdrawals as an area in which progress might be made, but as of this moment he could not see clearly at all whether there would be progress. He said that if the prospects look good we would then of course be consulting promptly with our Korean and other allies.

Policy Declaration

Ambassador Kim asked if it might be possible that the Administration would soon be making a clear statement of its objectives in Asia. Secretary Rogers responded that our objectives in Asia are in large part determined by our treaty obligations there. The Ambassador asked if we did not think it would be desirable to put something on the record about support for those nations which are “bastions of freedom” in the Far East, etc. The Secretary said he did not think it was timely to do so, that the mood of the American public would not be receptive to what might be called hard-line or belligerent statements. There was, he added, no question of our “throwing in the towel” in Asia. We would persist in fulfilling our commitments there, but we do very much seek an honorable end to the fighting.

Regionalism

The Ambassador referred to President Nixon’s views on regional cooperation in Asia and asked whether the Secretary felt that what the President had in mind there was primarily economic and cultural co-
operation or whether Mr. Nixon had been thinking of regional security arrangements. The Secretary answered that he thought it was the former. The United States could not really at this point consider any further security commitments. He did not have to draw the Ambassador’s attention to the climate of opinion on this subject in Congress and in the press. As for arrangements among the nations of the area, that was of course another matter. He did not, however, think that we believed the timing would be appropriate now for new security pacts among the free Asian nations.

The Ambassador said there had been discussion among his colleagues about possibly extending an invitation to the United States to join ASPAC. He wondered what the Secretary’s reaction might to be such a thought. The Secretary said that he did not think it would be wise to consider this possibility. He felt that the congressional reaction to further engagements, even of this sort, would be negative.

The Ambassador thanked the Secretary very much for being so generous with his time and said that, on his imminent return to Korea, he would certainly be arranging for a formal invitation to the Secretary to visit Seoul. He asked if there was anything in particular the Secretary wished conveyed to President Park personally. The Secretary said that he would be grateful if the Ambassador would convey Mr. Nixon’s personal regards and underline the high esteem in which Mr. Nixon holds President Park. He said he would also be grateful if the Ambassador would express to the President and to others the deep appreciation of this Administration and, in fact of all the American people, for the very important contribution which the Koreans are making in Viet-Nam. This was a matter on which he knew Americans felt very strongly. The Ambassador promised to do so and said his farewells.
4. National Security Study Memorandum 34


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Contingency Planning for Korea

The President has directed the preparation of a contingency planning study for Korea. This study should examine possible U.S. actions in light of an outbreak of hostilities due to limited or full scale attacks by North Korea or unilateral South Korean responses to North Korean provocation. As directed in the guidelines for contingency planning, this paper should include a careful orchestration of political and military actions.

The East Asian Interdepartmental Group should perform this study and forward it to the Review Group by April 25, 1969.2

Henry A. Kissinger

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 1–42. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of USIA.

2 An interagency Korean Task Force was established to prepare the study. Headed by Winthrop G. Brown, it included members from the Departments of State and Defense and CIA.

5. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 1, 1969.

Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon of Korea
Lee Hurak, Secretary General of Korea
Ambassador Kim Dong-jo of Korea

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 77, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 30, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. Presumably drafted by Sneider. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held at the White House from 12:24 to 12:41 p.m. and Kissinger was also present. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Chung Il Kwon was in Washington to attend the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who died on March 28.
After discussing General Eisenhower’s deep interest in Korea, Chung passed personal greetings to the President from President Pak. The President expressed admiration for Korea’s economic development and the contribution of its forces in Vietnam.

Korea’s Requirements

In response to the President’s question about the current developments in Korea, Chung launched into an extended discourse on Korea’s needs. He began by describing the militant and threatening attitude of the North Korean regime and their efforts to infiltrate and stir up trouble in South Korea. He explained that Kim Il-sung’s objective was to provoke dissidence in the South and try to set up centers of Communist subversion there similar to those which existed in South Vietnam. All of this, in the Prime Minister’s mind, is a prelude to major aggression of which the North Koreans were quite capable.

Chung said that basically it is important to avoid a repetition of the mistakes made in 1950, when Secretary Acheson excluded Korea from the areas crucial to forward defense in Asia, thereby encouraging Kim Il-sung and the Russians to launch the Korean War. He suggested four major steps:

1. The U.S. should maintain two divisions in Korea and more after the Vietnamese war is over. Some people had interpreted Operation Focus Retina as indicating American intention to withdraw some of its forces from Korea and this was bad. The U.S. military presence was important both militarily and psychologically.

2. There must be balanced military power on the Korean peninsula. This means that the South Korean air force and navy which are half the strength of the North Korean forces should be brought up to even balance with the North.

3. A combined U.S.-Korean mobile combat force should be formed to help fight in Asia. This action would relieve some of the American burden in Asia.

4. The Republic of Korea, if it has enough U.S. support, will be able to handle any guerrilla infiltration from the North to prevent the build-up of a guerrilla base.

In view of Korea’s requirements, Chung hopes that the U.S. will maintain military assistance at least at the current level at $160 million a year, or above.
Okinawa

Chung expressed great concern about Japanese pressure for return of Okinawa. Okinawa is very important to Korean security and the Koreans are not sympathetic with the Japanese desire for reversion. Korea has been providing for Japan’s security while Japan has been growing economically powerful. The Japanese should understand this.

Vietnam

Chung suggested that we should be patient and firm with the Communists and not expect much to develop quickly from the Paris negotiations. He thought we should be prepared to fight for two or three years if necessary in order to avoid another Panmunjom agreement. The surest way to bring the North Vietnamese to a peaceful settlement was to apply the pressure of force. He did have a plan for ending the war quickly. If resumption of bombing in the north is not desired, the port of Haiphong should be blockaded and mined, thus cutting off the preponderance of supplies from the Soviet Union which could not very well be brought overland. The closing of the Haiphong port would hurt the North Vietnamese badly and put pressure on the Russians since the Chinese had cut off rail transportation of arms from the Soviet Union through China. Consideration should also be given to sending forces across the DMZ into North Vietnam. If the Chinese Communists threatened to intervene, the President should write a letter to Mao Tse-tung saying that if they did he would use the nuclear bomb against them. Pressures of this kind, said the Prime Minister, would bring about a settlement very quickly.

The President said we would give very serious consideration to Korean views on its military requirements.

Withdrawal of U.S. Forces

Chung said that it would be political disaster for the Korean Government if the U.S. withdraws its forces and Korea does not do likewise. He stressed the need for close consultation on this question. The President said that we would of course consult closely with Korea on this and other problems of mutual interest.

Just before departing, Chung expressed the hope the President would again visit Korea.2 The President said he hoped to do that some day.

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6. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
Call of the Prime Minister of Korea on the Secretary of State

PARTICIPANTS
His Excellency Chong Il-kwon, Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea
His Excellency Dong Jo Kim, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea
Honorable Lee Hu-rak, Secretary-General to the President of Korea
Mr. Hong Song-chol, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister
Honorable Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Mr. James F. Leonard, Country Director for Korea

The Prime Minister opened the conversation by expressing on behalf of his Government the very great regret which the Korean leaders and the Korean people felt about the passing of General Eisenhower, and he and the Secretary had a brief dialogue about General Eisenhower and his relationship to Korea.

Visit of Secretary of State to Seoul

The Prime Minister said that he hoped very much that the Secretary would be able to come to Seoul in the near future, perhaps either just before or just after his visit to Japan for the ministerial talks with the Japanese. The Secretary said that, as he had told Ambassador Kim, if it was at all possible he would do so.

Security Problems

The Prime Minister said that he would first like to take up with the Secretary matters of common concern in the security field. He said that Kim Il-song had three years ago shifted North Korean policies from peaceful unification to the use of force to achieve unification. Since that time the North Koreans had been despatching guerrillas to stir up trouble in the South. Fortunately the situation in the ROK was entirely different from that in South Viet-Nam. The North Korean tactics are to establish points and eventually areas of guerrilla activity, but the people of the South do not cooperate with them and the armed forces and

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69, Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Leonard and approved in S on April 15. A copy was sent to Sneider at the White House. The meeting was held at the Department of State.
2 See footnote 1, Document 5.
3 See Document 3.
police have been able to mop up these guerrilla bands. Last November the North Koreans had made their largest intrusion since the Korean War by putting ashore more than 110 guerrillas on the East Coast. However, an Army division, working together with Home Guard units, had completely cleaned up this infiltration. Why, then, it may be asked, does Kim Il-song continue in this unsuccessful operation? The Prime Minister suggested that Kim Il-song retains the hope of establishing bases, of damaging South Korean industry, of harassing communications lines, and of compelling the ROKG to thin out its defenses along the front. Then, if they are successful in this, the North Koreans will launch a general attack.

This North Korean strategy shows clearly the importance of maintaining United States forces in Korea. These forces, the Prime Minister said, are the key factor in preventing a war from breaking out there. The principal objective of Kim Il-song is in fact to get United States forces out. The Prime Minister said that, although from a strictly military point of view, he could not argue that certain reductions in the United States forces would have a disastrous impact, he did feel that the psychological consequences of any reduction would be most serious. Moreover, any reduction in forces, however small, would be a great encouragement to the North Koreans.

The Secretary asked how many troops the North Koreans had in their Army. The Prime Minister answered that there were some 420,000 regular troops plus more than a million more in militia-type units. The North Korean air force had some 720 aircraft which was more than twice the ROK air force. The Secretary asked about the size of ROK armed forces and the Prime Minister answered that they were now at the level of about 620,000 men. Although this compared favorably with the 500,000 men in the North Korean armed forces, the North Koreans were exceedingly well equipped and thoroughly trained. The ROK Government, therefore, hoped very much that the United States would continue to maintain its two combat divisions in Korea.

The Secretary asked if this was not just about the same level as the Korean forces in Viet-Nam, and the Prime Minister responded that it was. The Secretary said that the American Government appreciates very much what is being achieved by these forces in Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister referred to the tragic experience of 1950, which he connected directly to former Secretary of State Acheson’s comments regarding Korea. He naturally hoped that there would never be any repetition of this tragedy. The Secretary said he quite understood the Prime Minister’s point.

The Prime Minister said that it was absolutely essential to maintain a favorable balance of power in Korea, one where superiority was clearly on our side, so that the North Koreans would not be tempted to launch any general offensive. For this reason, it was most essential
to pursue the modernization of ROK forces. The M–1 rifle should be rapidly replaced by the M–16. The problem of spare parts and of ammunition should be effectively solved. The Prime Minister drew attention to the importance of the Homeland Guard units (Homeland Reserve Forces). Some two million men had been enrolled in these units since January 1968 and the United States contribution of M–1 rifles had been very much appreciated. More was needed, however. From North Korean films it was possible to conclude that their militia was heavily armed with anti-aircraft artillery, for example, and not merely light personal weapons. He pointed out that it had required substantial forces from three regular divisions to round up the 31 infiltrators who had attempted to assassinate President Park. More recently, some 27,000 men had been put into the field in order to track down the 110 infiltrators on the East Coast. More and better equipment was needed for the forces who would do these jobs. At present, there were only some thirty rounds of ammunition available for each soldier, which was merely enough for training, but not enough for any action. He said he hoped that, as M–1 rifles and carbines became excess to United States needs, they could be provided free of cost for the ROK reserve units, and he hoped that facilities could be provided so that the ROK could itself turn out the ammunition for these weapons.

Okinawa

The Prime Minister said the second point he would raise was the problem of the United States bases in Okinawa. He was sure this would be discussed by the Secretary during his meetings in Japan and by the Japanese Foreign Minister when he came to Washington. He pointed out that Japan’s security problems, both external and internal, would take a very different shape if the ROK did not occupy the position it did.

Japan and the United States had a mutual defense treaty, but the Japanese did not seem to be clear about who was threatening their security. They are trying to bargain with the United States over Okinawa and fail to realize that their treaty with the United States really benefits not the United States but Japan. Okinawa is connected to the main line of resistance against communist aggression, the line which runs from Korea through Okinawa to Taiwan and beyond. It is therefore very important that the United States not give up its nuclear and other rights on its Okinawa bases. The United States must not allow this gap to develop in the defensive line. The Prime Minister said that eventually it might be possible to build up compensating strength, for example, to build up the ROK Navy, but this sort of thing would take a long time.

The Secretary responded that the United States well understands the Korean attitude on the Okinawa problem. The Japanese, of course,
make a plea on this matter which is almost the opposite of the position the Prime Minister had set forth. The United States is nevertheless very conscious of the factors to which the Prime Minister had drawn attention and will have these factors very much in mind during the negotiations with the Japanese.

**Viet-Nam**

The Prime Minister said that the Korean Government clearly understands the United States intention with regard to an eventual withdrawal of forces from Viet-Nam. The United States should recognize, however, that the Korean Government also has a problem in this respect. He said that Ambassador Brown would recall very well the very great difficulties which had been faced at the time of the despatch of Korean troops to Viet-Nam. These problems, which centered in the National Assembly, had eventually been overcome through close cooperation between himself and Ambassador Brown, but the Opposition remains very hostile to the Korean involvement in Viet-Nam, and unless United States moves regarding troop withdrawal are closely coordinated with the Korean Government, there could be bad political consequences in Korea. The Secretary said that he was fully aware of this problem. He thought it very likely that the meeting of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) in Bangkok in May would discuss this matter. He said he thought it had probably always been envisaged that when withdrawal of foreign forces began it would be on some sort of a pro rata basis among the allies.

The Prime Minister said that, with regard to negotiations on Viet-Nam, the only advice his Government had to the United States was to maintain a strong posture. We should occupy the top of the hill and then negotiate. It was important not to be deceived by communist negotiating tactics but to make the necessary extra effort on the ground in Viet-Nam and to be very patient.

The Secretary asked the Prime Minister what sort of reports he had from the Korean commanders in Viet-Nam. The Prime Minister responded that the reports were excellent. He said that morale was high among Korean forces and he felt they were very effective in their pacification operations. He noted smilingly that he thought yellow people could be more effective in this sort of thing than white people.

**Economic Cooperation**

The Prime Minister said that as his final point he would raise the problem of economic cooperation. President Park had set for the Korean people the goal of economic self-sufficiency. This goal was in sight, but the Korean situation might be likened to a period in which a child is just beginning to stand up and walk. It is most essential at this stage to give encouragement and not to disturb the learning process. The
Prime Minister pointed out that this development could also be a great benefit to the United States in providing us with a showcase of the effectiveness of our assistance programs. He pointed out the great problems which were raised for Korea by restrictions on textile imports into the United States.

The Prime Minister noted the hostility with which the Korean people viewed certain activity by the Japanese, who are extremely prosperous, but who seem to be trying to grab for themselves the benefits of—for example—the economic rehabilitation which will be undertaken in Viet-Nam. This sort of thing the Korean people simply do not understand. He therefore would frankly ask from the United States in economic matters, not merely “equal treatment”, but particularly favorable treatment for Korea. If Korean economic growth can be assured for another five years it will be a much more solid situation.

The Secretary responded jokingly that he had been informed Secretary of Commerce Stans would be in Korea in the middle of May and he had complete confidence that Secretary Stans would be able to solve all of the problems that the Prime Minister had raised. The Prime Minister laughed and said this would be very welcome.

The Prime Minister offered a few farewell courtesies and the meeting concluded.
7. Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Washington, April 15, 1969.

Analysis of Courses of Action

1. The following courses of action must be analyzed in the light of the issues involved and our objectives in this incident in order to select that course of action best supporting issues and objectives. With these criteria, possible courses of action are set forth in an order of desirability in the attached spread sheet. This order is based on precedents established in the Pueblo incident, and would have to be adjusted if a more positive approach is desired for this incident.

2. Two fundamental issues are the basics at stake in this incident; the principle of freedom of international air space and the right to gain redress of the wrong against a US aircraft and its crew. These are further influenced by the results to date in the Pueblo incident and current activities in the DMZ, particularly with regard to MDL markers.

3. Our objectives in any action taken as a result of this incident are:

   a. To receive appropriate redress for the illegal destruction of the aircraft and probable death of the crew.
   b. To react to the extent required to prevent further incidents such as the Pueblo seizure, MDL marker repair incidents and this aircraft destruction.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 436, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korean Shootdown of US Reconnaissance Aircraft 4/19/69. Top Secret. Attached as Tab B to an April 15 memorandum from Pursley to Kissinger. Pursley’s memorandum listed four questions that Haig asked the Office of the Secretary of Defense to consider regarding the shootdown of the U.S. aircraft: “1) what options do we have for ‘retaliation’?; 2) what measures can and/or should be taken to prevent the North Koreans from picking up the survivors?; 3) how quickly could we execute an escorted reconnaissance flight like the one that is now missing?; 4) what North Korean assets are available worldwide against which we could take some retaliation?” (Ibid.)

2 At approximately 0447Z on April 14, a North Korean aircraft shot down a U.S. Navy EC–121 of Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One over the Sea of Japan. The North Koreans claimed that the U.S. plane had violated its air space, had attempted to escape, and was then shot down approximately 80 miles at sea.

3 The attached spread sheet with advantages and disadvantages of each course of action is not printed.

4 The USS Pueblo was a U.S. Navy vessel sent on an intelligence mission off the coast of North Korea. On January 23, 1968, North Korean naval vessels and MiG jets attacked it, killing one man and wounding several. The surviving crew were captured and held prisoner for 11 months. Although considered, no military action or reprisals were taken by the United States against North Korea. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, part 1, Korea, Documents 212–331.
c. Within limitations imposed by accomplishment of objectives a and b, above, to prevent escalation of this incident into a larger conflict.

d. To cause minimum disruption on other military operations worldwide.

4. US Forces are in a position at the present time to implement courses of action 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7. Courses of action 4, 5, 8, and 10 would require repositioning of forces and would probably involve withdrawing some naval forces from the SEA area. These latter courses of action would require a period of time for movement of forces and detailed planning. A combination of courses 1, 2, 3, and 7 could be implemented now and would be considered an appropriate initial response.

5 These courses of action were: diplomatic demands for appropriate redress; conducting high altitude/high speed reconnaissance operations over North Korea; conducting escorted reconnaissance flights in same area with same type of reconnaissance aircraft; requesting the Soviets to make representations to the North Koreans; and destroying North Korean aircraft off the coast of North Korea.

6 These courses of action were: a show of force; feints against North Korean air defenses; selective air strikes; and blockade of North Korean ports.

8. Record of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, April 15, 1969, 6:30 p.m.

The President wanted to know what the situation on the Dutch ship and crew was.\(^2\) HAK said they still haven’t located it yet. It has been reported to be in the high seas. The P said he would assume HAK has checked with the lawyers but not the State lawyers. The P said his view would be to pick up the ship. As soon as it has been paid for, is that impossible? HAK said the first reports were that it was. After their discussions, he told them that another look had to be taken. The President

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\(^2\) At 5:40 p.m., Nixon and Kissinger spoke on the telephone about whether any North Korean ships were in the area. According to a transcript of their conversation, Kissinger stated: “We are getting reports on North Korean assets abroad and they’re very discouraging. One Korean ship which is sailing with Dutch registry, and Dutch crew and flag—so it’s almost impossible to seize that.” (Ibid.)
said it was impossible to pick up the Pueblo too but they did. We should pick up the crew and take them back to Holland. When they give us the Pueblo, we’ll give them their ship. He asked what kind of ship it was. HAK said it was one of their largest fishing ships. The President said O.K., “I think we should just pick the darn thing up.” We should check with the Dutch to see where it is and all the circumstances. He said he would be willing to take heavy criticism for this.

HAK said he had already put this on a high priority basis. The President said to find a way that international law can be breached. The U.S. became a great nation by breaking international law. The President said we certainly have concluded that we won’t just sit here and do nothing. HAK agreed. The President said even if the peaceniks on HAK’s staff didn’t agree. HAK said he didn’t have any peaceniks on his staff. The President said he was just kidding. HAK said the State Department had a paper on diplomatic actions. The President said the price is too high to pay not to do anything. He said you recall Nasser’s statement and said “I just think we have to do something here. If we don’t face up to the Dutch, we have to face the Navy action.” HAK said the Navy was coming in with a plan and that we would suffer little or no losses. They would come in low. The President said (someone) is trying to pursue the line that recon planes are fair game. This was not a regular recon plane, was it? HAK said it definitely was not. This plane has been doing the same thing for 15 years without protest. It had been a deliberate plan to get it. They were moving two Mig 21s which would not signal anything in particular to us about their intentions. The President wanted to know what Defense has said. HAK said they have just put out the facts. That the closest point was 15 miles and that it was attacked 100 miles out. The President said Rogers would have to say something tomorrow to the editors he is meeting with and that he probably wouldn’t be able to attend the NSC meeting. HAK said the President wouldn’t be making any decision on this tomorrow anyway. The President said, “no, no, I won’t even discuss it, just listen.”

The President said that ship must not get to North Korea. We’ll just tell the Dutch we’ll buy the darn ship. HAK said he would run it through again.

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3 According to the transcript of their earlier conversation, Kissinger informed Nixon that “there was an intelligence report of [Egyptian President] Nasser’s conversation with [Jordanian King] Hussein to the effect, ‘After all, it isn’t so risky to defy the United States—look at North Korea and the Pueblo.’” (Ibid.)

4 On April 16, Rogers delivered an address entitled “The Complexity of World Affairs” to the American Society of Newspaper Editors which was meeting in Washington. He did not mention the EC–121 shootdown. The text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1969, pp. 387–388.

The President wanted to know if HAK had any lawyers on his staff. HAK said no and that he would have to work through State. The President wanted to know if Justice would do anything. HAK said yes, I’ll try them. The President said, I just happened to have Mitchell here in my office. “I’ll let you talk to him”.

Mitchell wanted to know what the problem was. HAK said he didn’t have the full facts. There is this ship (North Korean) sailing under Dutch crew. The N.K. sent the ship to the Netherlands and when we made some point about picking it up because of the Pueblo, they changed their crew. The President wants to know if it’s illegal to pick up the ship. Mitchell asked if we knew the contractual arrangements between the Dutch and North Korea. HAK said we have very sketchy facts. Mitchell said we should contact the proper Embassy in Holland; they must have the information on the legal arrangements. HAK said he would get all the facts together. The reports have been very bad. Mitchell said do we know where the ship is. HAK said it is reported to be on the high seas but that hasn’t been confirmed as yet.

The President came back on and said we will do all we can do here but he has determined in his own mind that we are going to do something “even if I have to overrule everybody in the State Department.”

HAK said when we move the carrier to another position, we should make it public. If we try to keep it a secret, they will think we are serious, otherwise it might come off as a bluff.

The President wanted to know if HAK had anything good to tell him. HAK said no. The President said he thought HAK’s conversation with Dobrynin was good. HAK said he was concerned; that we should look dangerous. The President said how about doing the Lunch plan and getting caught. They took the ship so we get Cambodia. HAK said the Lunch plan would be used only if they turned us down on the other. The President said he wanted every plane into South Korea. HAK said they were all ready to go but that we should go careful on this.

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6 On April 15, Rogers and Kissinger spoke on the telephone about registering some type of diplomatic protest over the EC–121 shootdown. According to a transcript of their conversation, “R[ogers] said he was going to have Dobrynin in at 12:00. K[issinger] said President does not want any protest to anyone. R said he was not going to protest—he wanted to talk to Dobrynin about helping to save the men.” Kissinger added that he “thinks the President is inclined to play this in low key and to say nothing to anyone until we know where we are headed.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 359, Conversations, Chronological File) No record of Rogers’s conversation with Dobrynin has been found.

7 Kissinger and Dobrynin met on April 14 but did not discuss Korea; see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 36 and 37. No record has been found of a Kissinger–Dobrynin discussion of the EC–121 shootdown.

8 Operation Lunch was one of the operations for the secret bombing of Cambodia.
The President agreed. The President said it should be easy to pick up that ship. Just go out and get it. HAK said Defense and CIA were working on the location.

The President called back to say that HAK should call Lloyds of London; they should know where the ship is. If not, call that man in the Hague\textsuperscript{9} and tell him we have this problem and want to know where the ship is. HAK said he would follow through.

\textsuperscript{9} Not further identified.

Washington, April 15, 1969, 10 p.m.

President said another option had occurred to him with greater symbolic meaning—a Navy blockade of the one port of significance. K said he was sure it could be done. President referred to Cuban blockade\textsuperscript{2} and said question is how long can it be maintained. K said that is the problem. President said he was thinking of the impact. President said people say it does not mean anything, but it means a lot to a lot of people. President said it is good when there is something specific that you want to get done—there is nothing they can do to get the blockade lifted. K said except to pay damages. President said that is what he meant—we want that and the return of the Pueblo. President said it would not take a lot to blockade that place. K said on the other hand there is not much going in or out either so it may be an empty gesture. President said they have to live so there is something going in and out. President referred to three Polish ships which have to come in—they could be kept out. K said they could unload elsewhere and ship down by rail. K said he would have it looked into. President said he wants to get something that has symbolism—that is what we are talking about. President said it could be signal of what we are


\textsuperscript{2} Reference is to the naval quarantine that the Kennedy administration imposed during the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.
going to do down below. President said we could keep it for a few months and then lift it but not say anything. K said if they wanted to play it nastily, we could get hit with it every day—harassing us, etc. K said he would look at it and give the President pros and cons tomorrow.

K said he has some more information on ship—it is in the area of Capetown and supposed to reach Hong Kong on April 23 and go on to Korea. Told President about payment breakdown—20% down payment had been made by Koreans and they owe 80%; loan has been guaranteed by Dutch government. President asked about title. K said we do not think it has passed, it is still a Dutch ship. K said we would have to compensate the Dutch Government 5-1/2 million dollars. President said that is awful small compared to risks taken in other areas. President said there is a lot of symbolism in that.

K said we have assigned State to come up with legal opinion supporting President if he decides to seize ship. President said throw the blockade one at them too. K said o.k.—all of this will be discussed at 3:00 meeting tomorrow. K said the Cuban blockade worked because they thought we were heading for an invasion. President said he knows it is not on all fours at all.

President said he was just looking over military plans. They want to hit two other air fields because they are not so close to the Soviet border. President said there is something to be said about fields not so close to Soviet border. K said he told them to make a plan and give the President all reasons why they are opposed to it and then President can choose—K said we will throw blockade into it too. President said he thought blockade was better than mining.

President said he would like to make meeting in the morning relatively brief. K agreed.

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3 Reference to the tracking of a North Korean ship sailing under Dutch registry, crew, and flag.
4 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon met from 3:20 to 5:22 p.m. with Rogers, Laird, Wheeler, and Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of the meeting has been found.
5 See footnote 2, Document 10.

10. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird

Washington, April 15, 1969.

SUBJECT
Military Operations Against North Korean Targets

Confirming our secure line conversation at 9:55 p.m., April 15, the President has requested the following additional information beyond that contained in the Joint Chiefs of Staff submission entitled, “Air Strikes Against North Korean Targets,” of April 15:

1. A military plan for U.S. retaliation against the departure airfield of the North Korean attack aircraft.
2. A military plan providing for the naval blockade of Wonsan Harbor.
3. A military plan for the mining of Wonsan Harbor.
4. A military plan for a submarine-launched torpedo attack against a North Korean military vessel within or outside North Korean territorial waters.
5. In conjunction with all the military plans listed above, including the initial submission entitled, “Air Strikes Against North Korean Targets,” provide an estimate of loss expectancy of aircraft and/or vessels.
6. List the respective order of battle of U.S. and North Korean forces.
7. Notwithstanding the specific military course of action proposed and in the event North Korea were to respond with air attacks against South Korean bases, what level of reinforcement would be required for U.S. air elements in South Korea to contain the attack and what would be the source and time frame for its completion.
8. In the event North Korea were to respond with air and ground attacks across the DMZ, what level of air and ground reinforcement would be required to contain such attacks.

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2 Laird sent Kissinger the Joint Chiefs’ paper under a memorandum and informed Kissinger that Laird had “discussed our planned approach with the President this evening [at 9:55 on the secure line] and he has approved our moving three carriers north from Vietnam. These will start tonight and are seventy-two hours away.” (Ibid.)
North Korean Shootdown of a U.S. Reconnaissance Flight

The foregoing information should be available for discussion in the meeting with the President at 3:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 16, and be provided in writing by noon tomorrow.

Henry A. Kissinger

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11. Briefing for Director of Central Intelligence Helms for a National Security Council Meeting


The Situation in North Korea

I. The North Korean shootdown of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over international waters has all the earmarks of a deliberate attempt by Pyongyang to revive a high level of tension with the United States.

A. Kim Il-song has always held a militant viewpoint on the question of Communist struggle against the United States. He has long insisted—to the point of strained relations with Moscow and Peking—on the importance of the smaller countries in the world Communist movement.

B. Qualified observers in recent years have perceived in Kim an extreme and growing egotism, expressed in a craving for self-assertion and the limelight, and a proclivity toward wishful thinking.

C. By incidents such as this latest one, Kim effectively upstages Moscow and Peking, and scores points for his personal and nationalist self-assertion. He also makes an effective contrast between North Korean boldness and the caution of Peking and Moscow in challenging the power of the United States. He derives assurance, however, from the fact that North Korea—unlike North Vietnam—has mutual defense treaties with both the USSR and Communist China (signed in July 1961).

D. A major theme of North Korean propaganda, particularly since the Pueblo incident, is that a determined small nation can defeat a “mighty imperialist.”

E. In light of the Pueblo experience, Kim probably saw the April 15 attack as a relatively low-risk opportunity to reopen a propaganda

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campaign against "U.S. aggressive designs," and to further erode the credibility of U.S. activities in the area.

F. The attack also enables the hard line North Korean leadership to focus domestic attention on this challenge to U.S. power rather than on their frustrating inability to launch a so-called "people’s war" in the South, or to keep pace with the economic progress of South Korea.

G. The North Koreans may have felt compelled to make up for the loss of face they suffered in March when they were unable to disrupt or deter the joint U.S.-South Korean "Focus Retina" military exercise.

1. Coincident with this operation, North Korea began a series of unprovoked harassments in the Demilitarized Zone, and also assumed a belligerent posture in blocking routine boundary-marker replacement actions by the United Nations Command forces in the DMZ.

II. Within hours after the destruction of the reconnaissance aircraft, Pyongyang called for a meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom on Friday, April 18.

A. Their aim will be to portray North Korea as the aggrieved party, offer a conference table to reduce the likelihood of U.S. retaliation, and use the meeting as a propaganda forum to expand on their charges of U.S. "aggression."

[3 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]

C. Pyongyang Radio, however, continues to claim that the U.S. plane was destroyed when it entered North Korean air space.

1. The North Koreans have never stated publicly what they conceive their air space to be, and in any event they are probably confident that in the aftermath of the Pueblo incident, a considerable body of world opinion will be receptive to their claim.

North Korean Military Status

III. We have detected only very limited North Korean military reaction since the shootdown.

A. A few of their IL–28 jet light bombers, concentrated in the extreme northwest, may be on strip alert, and there are tentative indications that some air defense units also went on alert shortly after the incident.

B. We have nothing to indicate any change in the status of North Korean ground forces, and there is no indication that North Korean aircraft have reacted to U.S. aircraft engaged in search and rescue operations.

IV. Despite the consistently aggressive attitude of Pyongyang, there have been very few incidents involving U.S. forces that approached or surpassed the gravity of this one.

A. Other than the seizure of the Pueblo, the only such incident was one on April 28, 1965, when North Korean fighters attacked but failed to shoot down a U.S. RB–47 reconnaissance plane at a point about 50 miles off North Korea over the Sea of Japan.
B. There have, of course, been increasingly severe operations against South Korea—for example,—the attempt to assassinate President Pak in an attack directed at the Presidential Palace in Seoul the day before the seizure of the Pueblo;—the protracted incursion by 120 North Korean commandos landed on the East Coast last November;—and the raid by seaborne commandos a month ago on a South Korean police station in an east coast port.

V. The Soviets had some ships in the vicinity of the shootdown which have been engaging in search operations, and at least two TU–16 medium bombers reconnoitered the general area yesterday.

Chronology of North Korean Incidents

16 March 1969 Eight North Korean seaborne commandos attacked a South Korean police station on the east coast, 55 miles south of the Demilitarized Zone.

3 Nov 1968 Some 120 seaborne North Korean commandos infiltrated South Korea’s central east coast in the neighborhood of Ulchin, inflicting considerable civilian and military casualties before being neutralized.

23 Jan 1968 North Korean patrol ships seized the USS Pueblo in international waters off North Korea’s east coast.

22 Jan 1968 A thirty-one man North Korean guerrilla team infiltrated the Demilitarized Zone and attempted to attack the South Korean presidential residence and assassinate President Pak Chong-hui.

28 April 1965 North Korean fighter aircraft attacked, but failed to shoot down, a US RB–47 reconnaissance aircraft at a point some 50 nautical miles from the North Korean coast over the Sea of Japan.

In addition to the above incidents, Pyongyang has sustained a generally high level of tension along the Demilitarized Zone beginning in late 1966. North Korean military personnel have carried out vigorous probing and harassing activity against United Nations Command forces including sabotage of UN military installations, attacks on routine US and South Korean patrols south of the Military Demarcation line, and in late 1967 the derailment of two South Korean trains south of the Demilitarized Zone.

The Military Balance

I. North Korea’s armed forces are capable of defending the country against a South Korean attack, and could go on the offensive with outside logistics support. North Korea uses a very large proportion of its manpower and money to maintain and improve its military, and is
receiving modern military equipment from the USSR. North Korea's military establishment is impressive for so small a country, and the North Korean leadership apparently intends to keep it that way.

A. It is not easy to strike a balance between the military establishments of North and South Korea, especially since the information on North Korea is deficient. The balance of strength probably remains about even, with outside assistance the decisive factor.

B. The North Korean army is smaller than South Korea's—an estimated 350,000 men to nearly 600,000—but it has superior firepower and strong defensive positions along the Demilitarized Zone.

12. Memorandum From the President's Military Adviser (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Shoot-Down Incident

I know you don't need more advice on this subject; however, since today's deliberations may prove critical, I thought I would gratuitously provide some additional thoughts for your consideration and perhaps that of the President.

There is one major difference between this incident and the Pueblo incident of last year which you can weigh carefully, as it has both positive and negative overtones on the domestic scene. In the Pueblo case, the President had some basis for caution in considering any measures in retaliation for the seizure. That basis, of course, was the welfare of the crewmen. In this incident, similar inhibitions are not available in explaining a "no-action" stance. While in the immediate time frame, this may not constitute an excessively troublesome difference, I strongly suspect that when all of the facts are in, and they certainly must be either through the press and our own revelations or perhaps as a result of a Congressional investigation of the incident, then a "do nothing" stance could well build a substantial head of steam.

In the final analysis, however, the decision of the President to respond militarily must be based on his ability and willingness to cope with the worst case response situation. To me, the indicators are simple:

1. All factors considered, a military retaliatory strike of some type is called for.

2. Fundamental to the calculus of retaliation is our ability to contain the worst case retaliation by the enemy. This means that an essential part of today’s program would be a careful analysis of our posture should the North Koreans initiate ground and/or air attacks across the DMZ as a result of our strike. To me, this element is far more significant than is the configuration of the size of our strike force. Consequently, I would recommend that we view this with considerable care at the 3:00 p.m. meeting this afternoon. Wishful thinking or risk-taking will not suffice. We must have the capability to contain attacks with some reasonable assurance of success. More importantly, the enemy must know that we have this capability and the intent to use it. This can only be assured by some level of reinforcement and increased readiness in the theater as well as a demonstrated willingness to provide whatever may be necessary from domestic and worldwide resources. While some consider actions of this type escalatory and threatening, they are rather measures designed to prevent that very thing. I know you have some serious doubts about this, but I could not over-emphasize the difficulties such failures entailed throughout our inching escalation in Vietnam.

3. If the President is unwilling to trigger all of the signalling devices at his command to convey his/U.S. intent to go the limit if required, I would recommend that we not undertake an action such as an overt attack against the North Korean airfield. In this event, I would then recommend that we consider the submarine ambush tactic which I suggested to you yesterday. Such a tactic might take several days or weeks to execute. It would certainly constitute a measure of punitive action which would pose some surprises to the enemy and a great deal of domestic lard for scorched tempers. Next, I fear our only course of action would be a repeat mission with fighter escort.

13. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting


PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Vice President Agnew
William Rogers, Secretary of State
Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense
Gen. George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
Elliot Richardson, Under Secretary of State
Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winthrop Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Col. Alexander Haig, NSC Staff
Richard Sneider, NSC Staff
Brig. General Ralph Douglas Steakley, USAF, Deputy Director (Operations) for
Reconnaissance, Joint Staff

SUBJECT

NSC Meeting on North Korean Downing of U.S. EC–121 Reconnaissance Aircraft

[The following is a transcription of Col. Haig’s notes.]

Helms: No North Korean claim of being in their air space. Only a
limited North Korean military reaction. Possible strip alert, plus air de-
fense alert. No ground alert.

Few incidents surpassed this one, the Pueblo3 excepted. Increased
provocations.

Soviet ships in areas of search—no indication of survivors.4

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 10:13 to 11:07 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The CIA prepared a paper, “Alternative Courses of Action In Response to Korean Attack on US Aircraft,” for discussion at this meeting. The paper “first states assumptions regarding possible survival of the crew and North Korean intentions, and then lists possible objectives of US actions. Alternative military courses of action with associated diplomatic actions are discussed as follows: show of force; single select military combat actions; other military actions.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 9, K–3, Korea, January–December 1969)

2 All brackets are in the original.

3 See footnote 4, Document 7.

4 According to a memorandum for the record of the DCI’s April 16 morning meet-
ing, Helms was briefed that Soviet and U.S. naval vessels in the area of the shutdown were exchanging messages that, combined with U.S. photos of debris, suggested that there were no survivors. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01234A, Morning Meeting Minutes, Box 1, March 1–April 30, 1969)
Wrap-up of North Korean Navy: 10 Komars.

Army comparisons: About even in ground force. With U.S. air support, they have about even capabilities.

The President: 1965 incident. We escorted for six months during daylight, but went to...

Get me the history on incidents in this area, especially since 1953 through 1955 period.

Steakley: Route of mission—ineconsistencies; speeds.

The closest point was 38 nautical miles. Not consistent that it went in.


Fix of shootdown has remained consistent. Soviet track consistent with our track.

Mission flown nine times since November. [Reviewed typical mission.] Soviet tracking normal. Seldom done by North Koreans.

The President:

General Wheeler: Review of military options:

—The drone option.
—Escort reconnaissance flights in the future with combat aircraft.
—Show of air and naval force—48 hours—with coordinated diplomatic efforts. Had no effect after the Pueblo (got mixed up afterwards with the Soviet).

Air strikes against North Korean air defenses. Could cause insecurity. Might cause attack and result in loss.

—We could blockade North Korean ports—within 48 hours. Act of war—little effect. They have no sea-going shipping. We could commandeer some North Korean ships. There is one now at sea with Dutch flag and crew.

—Attempt to destroy a North Korean aircraft off North Korea. Chances slim of getting one. Same little effect.

—Sea to shore bombardment. 48 hours. We would need air cover, however. West coast ports offer little—East coast better. Inchon area is best but it’s in too far.

5 Reference is to the attempted North Korean shootdown in April 1965 of a U.S. RB–47 reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan.
—Attack targets adjacent to the DMZ, with Honest John or conventional artillery. But the Honest John is inaccurate at extreme range. Violation of the Armistice Agreement would trigger retaliation.

—Ground raid across the DMZ. Violation of the Armistice. It could trigger the ROKs to do the same. It would need very heavy fire support—they have some.

—We have the capability of an infinite permutation of air attacks—one, two or many airfields. Air defense targets. We would use Guam, Okinawa, or carriers. The chances of success are excellent. The loss rate would vary with the tactics—2% to 8% losses. Probably between both of these ranges.

This is the menu of military options. Some would have effect; some no effect.

Rogers: Diplomatic options:

The Panmunjom talks are a forum. The North would talk first and would make their claims. They could talk and walk. We would look silly. They have already stated their case. I want to reject.

The UN is a possibility. We would present our case in letter form, but ask for no action. If we do ask, we will get none. Most won’t support us. They will ask why the flight is necessary.

We can use diplomatic contacts with friends and allies.

We could use a combination of all these: diplomatic, UN and Panmunjom. We would be able to help generate domestic support in the event of military action. But all of these are marginal.

Maybe we don’t have to move immediately. Watch for a change.

Don’t fall into trap about where it happened—when we say we should say so but not if...

The President: Don’t say equivocally. They’ll lie.

There is a major difference with the Pueblo. This is a routine mission. That is why there was no air cover. Why did they do this after Pueblo?

Rogers: Unusual tracking. As the General pointed out.

The President: There is no international law as regards air space.

Steakley: It was not unusual, in the sense of its past pattern—only in sense of its scheduled pattern.

The President: Oh, this is normal in the past? His rule to do so?

Steakley: Yes.

Vice President: I see no uncertainty. We know where it was hit and the Soviets picked up here.

Rogers: This is what they will say. I don’t agree.

The Vice President: We always take the other guy’s position.
Laird: This is helpful but they have control of the ——. 6 They can deny.

Wheeler: We have photographed with their okay. It picks up even a wheel.

Laird: Mileage is correct—yesterday—no problem.

Richardson: What will the Soviets say about their own?

Rogers: They can’t lie.

Kissinger: Pyongyang claims we shot first.

Wheeler: I imagine an air-to-air missile. It would probably have to be a missile.

Kissinger: Their statement implies a straight drop on this.

The President: Bill has to go before the editors7 shortly.

Henry, any more?

Kissinger: No. The only thing is that we considered the diplomatic scenario depends on the retaliation decided on. Both must be consistent.

Rogers: Also, we shouldn’t threaten the other side. It ties our hands.

Richardson: Mr. President, provision of Article I of the Treaty.8 The USSR and North Korea are bound.

What is the South Korean reaction?

Wheeler: Bonesteel says they are very concerned. It is typical of their past actions. They are apprehensive we won’t do anything.

Brown: The ROK press reaction says we should retaliate strongly.

The President: They are very jittery.

Laird: The Marker thing hasn’t helped.

Kissinger: With respect to the treaty, North Korea is the only country with defense treaties with USSR and the Chinese.

Also there is an escape clause in Article I.

The President: We will disperse.

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6 Omission is in the original.

7 See footnote 4, Document 8.

Washington, April 17, 1969.

Communist Reactions to Certain US Actions

1. The North Korean attack on the US EC–121 aircraft, like the seizure of the Pueblo, appears to have been a unilateral action taken without advance notice to either Moscow or Peking. This state of affairs will condition Soviet and Chinese Communist attitudes and reactions to US courses of action in this situation as it did in the Pueblo crisis. There is one major difference between these two incidents, however, that complicates the problem of developing effective US responses that would produce the desired impact on North Korea and its Communist neighbors. In contrast to the Pueblo affair, which contained elements susceptible to negotiation, the present situation does not lend itself to bargaining or exchange. Moreover, the possible objectives of US actions, apart from straightforward retaliation, involve the principles of maintaining the right to use international airspace and deterrence against future such hostilities. Neither principle is particularly applicable to the North Korean problem particularly in terms of securing specific responses by Pyongyang.

2. The problem of developing meaningful and effective US courses of action is also complicated by the assumptions and motivations underlying North Korea’s action. The Kim Il-sung regime almost certainly planned this move in advance calculating that the potential advantages in taking this risk far outweighed the dangers of possible US military reprisals. This judgment, and North Korea’s evaluation of future US initiatives, probably are strongly influenced by the Korean’s interpretation of the US response to the seizure of the Pueblo. Kim Il-sung evidently has persuaded himself that the US is overextended in Vietnam and elsewhere and that North Korea therefore can engage in such deliberate acts of defiance with relative impunity. The North Koreans probably

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2 On April 16, Hughes sent Intelligence Note No. 274 on North Korean motives in downing the EC–121 to Rogers. Hughes stated, “It is probably more than coincidence that the downing occurred on Kim II-song’s 57th birthday.” Hughes suggested that “the most likely North Korean motivation, then, is self gratification and increased prestige for Kim II-song at the expense of the United States following a plan based on Pyongyang’s Pueblo experience.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 31–1 KOR N–US)
made the decision to attack the reconnaissance aircraft on the assumption that there would either be no US military response or at the most only a limited one, in the nature of a one-time retaliatory action.

3. We believe that two main factors contributed to North Korea’s complacent appraisal of risks. Kim Il-sung’s style of rule has long been characterized by a willingness to accept risks and by a strong reliance on bluff and intimidation. He has taken pride in his militant “revolutionary” stance and has ridiculed Peking and Moscow for their caution in dealing with US power. A major theme of North Korean propaganda, particularly since the Pueblo incident, is that a determined small nation can defeat a “mighty imperialist.” A more specific motivation for the shootdown probably resides in Kim Il-sung’s desire to offset the failure of his attempts over the past two years to launch a so-called “people’s war” in the South and to undermine and disrupt the South Korean government and economy. Kim, moreover, evidently believes his long-term ambitions regarding South Korea require a high level of tension with the US. Periodic provocations, he hopes, will contribute to the disillusionment of the American public with overseas burdens and bring about a reduction and eventual withdrawal of US forces from South Korea.

4. In view of these North Korean assumptions and ambitions, it is doubtful that any of the US courses of action considered below would have any decisive or lasting effects, either in achieving stated US objectives or in inducing Pyongyang to modify its long-term policies. Embassy Seoul has suggested that if the US response takes the form of a military threat or even a limited strike, “the benefits to North Korea will be manifold.” A very tough populace will be spurred to greater feats of production and sacrifice, and the disputes within the North Korean leadership that have been hinted at in recent pronouncements may be stilled in the face of tangible external pressure. Such gains for the regime, in the Embassy’s judgment, would outweigh the physical losses anticipated from a limited US retaliatory strike.

5. Show of force: The North Koreans probably would view actions such as demonstrative air and naval maneuvers in proximity to North Korea essentially as a repetition of the US response to the Pueblo seizure. They would be inclined to interpret such demonstrations as indicating US unwillingness to resort to any direct application of force that might carry high risks of a resumption of major hostilities. The North Koreans would attempt to extract maximum propaganda advantage from a show of force in the Military Armistice Commission forum and elsewhere. It is unlikely, however, that they would feel compelled to challenge this US air and naval presence by direct air or surface action.

6. Military actions not involving combat probably would not deter the North Koreans from increasing harassment and other forms of
pressure in the Demilitarized Zone area. In fact, they might view an intensification of such pressure as an effective means of stimulating international concern over the danger of major hostilities, thus bringing heavy pressure to bear on the US to withdraw the show of force. We believe that there is little prospect that this course of action would induce the North Koreans to apologize publicly for the shootdown or undertake to avoid such actions in the future.

[Omitted here is discussion of other military options.]

15. Record of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 17, 1969, 8 p.m.

P said another call that might be useful in lining up support would be to Rockefeller. P suggested K give him a call and use his own judgment as to how much you want to disclose. K said he talked to Mel—as result of consultations he finds they are content with what President is doing—there is no pressure to do anything more. President said he (Laird) has been brave soldier—he has taken a lot of heat on these things and you can’t just let State get credit for checking with Congress and being the good guys and Mel the bad guy. That is why President asked him to check with them—he understands them and knows what we are trying to do. President asked whether Laird still thought we had to do this. K said yes. However, K said they were talking on phone that was not secure. Laird still believes it is right thing to do but no longer thinks there is Congressional pressure to do it. K said he thought Rockefeller would support it but he will check with him. P said it was not high priority—give him a call tomorrow.

President said he is still affirmative. He has to be sure we are leading the charge with other people coming along a bit. K said it is about the boldest course President can take. In long run it may turn out not to be so risky. Pres said when you come right down to it here’s the Soviet Union finally flushing Czech Revolution down the drain and no one gives a damn; here we are on isolated basis and we do not do a

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thing with 31 lives missing. Pres said he looked at editorial in Star—he really thinks we should have gotten across the fact there was no question about where plane was. K said he (Pres) could nail that down tomorrow. President agreed. P said they made check and no question whatever and they know it. K said Korean radar showed it was 40 miles off the coast and Russian radar showed 60. They know we are not playing provocation into a crisis. Russians have their hands full in Czech now—they have to be ready for next few days against some riots. K said there will be some reaction in the West. President said he doubted Britain, France and the rest would do anything. K said there might be some bad editorials against them but they will have their hands full for a few weeks.

K said if we do this, we have to be ready to go very, very far in case it leads to ground action. I think we can stop if we are willing to look down and that is a very tough one to bite early in Administration and I owe it to you to say that. K said his judgment is that it will not come to that.

Pres said he trusts Mel is not backing off. K said he is uneasy about it. K said if Pres says he wants to do it, Mel would agree to do and take public responsibility for it. President said Rogers would not. K said he believes to do this will make or break President’s administration—they owe it to Pres and must stand behind him.

President said take the people on the other side—take Kennedy, country will be strongly against him. K said they will say Pres risked another ground war in Asia. K said Pres will have to say we will not tolerate another ground war in Asia—to Dobrynin we will have to say more. When it happens, we might have to go to tactical nuclears and clean it up. All hell will break loose for two months, but at end of road there will be peace in Asia. K said that is something that is easy for him to say.

Pres discussed press stories—they are not praising us, they are trying to get us to do something. They are eroding self-confidence of this country. President said that is another problem that is not answered by option 2. K said he has come to feel that option 2 with Lunch is not feasible. This gives other side incentive not to make public as there is

\[footnote{Presumably a reference to Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts).}

\[footnote{The NSC staff prepared option papers, undated, that provided “themes to be used, as appropriate, in public statements, diplomatic consultations, and domestic consultations.” Option two set forth a threefold U.S. response: “A. We have carefully considered military retaliation but have ruled it out at this time. B. We do intend to continue reconnaissance missions in the area. These flights will have an armed escort as long as we feel this is necessary. C. We have made it unmistakably clear to North Korea that we will not tolerate future provocations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 434, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korea Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/17/69, Vol. II Haig)}\]
nothing they can do about it. Pres said that leaves option 2 without Lunch. K said yes and then do that two weeks after. K said this is low risk course and he would favor if there were no VN war going on and if we had not slipped back so much in last 10 years. Because there is VN and because there is general erosion of moral fiber of country, President said a bold move is indicated. K said in his view we may be forced into an even bolder move a year from now if we do not do this one. President said you mean VN—K said that and anything else that might happen.

P said if question comes up tomorrow, should he indicate that we are going to continue reconnaissance. K said absolutely. Pres said he thought he should say too that we can’t expect Americans to take these activities when they are in open sea and open air unless Government backs them up. K said unless Government protects them. P said he would put in context of looking toward future. Pres said he could use some of option 2 at press conference tomorrow.4 K said he could say he will protect but not how.

K said if Pres uses option 2 he will not lose much, if anything, but general trend is against Pres and this is problem. P will not be significantly worse off. K said his talks with Dobrynin had effect.5 P said with their troubles in Czech they may need us more than we need them. K said he did not think to do nothing is a calamity—Pres said as K points out, to do option 2 is not a calamity. Pres said with option 1 the gains are great and risks very great.6 P said with option 2 there are no gains and no risk except perhaps down the road. K said the risk in option 2 over period of time, which will be cumulative, will be greater than risk in option 1, which will be enormous in brief period. Pres agreed. P said everytime US fails to react, it encourages some pipsqueak to do something.

Pres said not to let Laird move off now—when they meet Saturday morning7 he does not want him wobbling around. K said he would talk to him. Pres asked why no pressure was being put on State by South Koreans. K said he thought our Amb was telling them to keep

4 During his April 18 news conference, the President responded to a question about how the United States would respond to the shootdown by explaining that any U.S. action had to be put in the larger context, “how responding in one area might affect a major interest of the United States in another area—an area like Vietnam, Vietnam being the top priority for us.” He declared that normal reconnaissance flights in the Korean area would continue. See Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1969, p. 381.


6 Option 1 set forth the following U.S. response: “A. The U.S. action in retaliation was an extremely limited and measured one. B. Ours is a single action. C. We are fully ready to defend ourselves, but we trust that there will not be any further military actions.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 434, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korea Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/17/69, Vol. II Haig)

7 April 19.
quiet. P speculated about effect this action would have on averting another Korean confrontation—can’t brush off fact that they say they will take us on. K agreed they might do it. K talked of gain of taking on toughest character in Communist camp and facing him down—this would be enormous. P said we will not take any more heat from moving too much force in—have to be ready to stop them.

P said he would read briefing book now for tomorrow.

16. Memorandum From Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 18, 1969.

SUBJECT
The Korean Decision and Domestic Opinion

A fundamental issue on the Korean decision is the problem of mobilizing sustained public support. There are very few direct clues to American opinion on this issue. Up to the present time, the public demands for retaliation have been limited and less vocal than after the Pueblo seizure. On the other hand, warnings against retaliation have been equally small and come from the expected quarters.

It is my guess that a very large segment of the American people would initially welcome a strong response—as an act of strength and self-respect. The problem will be to prevent this support from seriously eroding over a period of weeks. The action will certainly have its minority of dovish critics from the very beginning. It will raise such issues as—why did we react to this incident and not to the shooting down of other reconnaissance planes? Isn’t there a risk of a two-front war in Asia? Why was Congress ignored? etc. They will be playing to an American people who, however enervated by a decisive action, are also essentially fatigued by the Vietnam war, concerns about the growing racial and city crises, taxes, and other domestic problems turning them inward.

Even if the action brings no response from the North Koreans, these nagging doubts and concerns will remain and serve as a basis for the “never-again” rationalization—although there will be a great

sense of relief and pride in success. It should also be noted that anticipated overseas criticism will play into the doves’ hands.

A crucial question will be the interaction of domestic opinion on the Vietnam war. A strong response in Korea is almost certain to bring the North Vietnamese up short and heighten their concern about the risks of prolonging the Vietnam war. On the other hand, they will be watching even more closely domestic public opinion in the U.S.—which they consider their trump card in outlasting us at the peace negotiations. The initial shock effect on Hanoi could well be lost if there is a serious erosion of domestic support for the Korean action leading to renewed pressures against the Vietnam commitment.

This then is the risk of the Korean action. But, it must be evaluated against the risk of inaction. American opinion is volatile and difficult to judge at this time. I can only guess and that guess is that it will not give sustained support for the Korean action because too many will conclude that U.S. vital national interests were not engaged, as they were in the Cuban missile crisis, sufficiently to justify the risks of renewed hostilities in Korea.

17. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon

Washington, April 18, 1969.

SUBJECT
Alternatives Incident to EC–121 Shootdown

Military Options

If I understand correctly, the alternative military responses being considered against North Korea as retaliation for the EC–121 shootdown have boiled down to airstrikes against two airfields:

- [less than 1 line not declassified]
- [less than 1 line not declassified]

I believe discarding the other military options was appropriate. If a military step is to be taken, an airstrike is the best bet for a number of reasons:

It can be related to the act taken against the U.S., i.e., it comes closest to being an eye-for-an-eye.

It is a one-time operation, i.e., it does not carry the disadvantages of having to be sustained over a period of time, as would mining a harbor or establishing a blockade.

It would be directed against a North Korean military installation, and would not involve, or would minimize, civilian casualties or the impression of a random measure directed against the entire North Korean populace.

It could be launched from U.S. bases, land or sea, thereby avoiding the implication of other nations.

North Korean airfields are more accessible than other potential targets.

If an attack is carried out, I believe the carrier-based attack strike is preferable for a number of reasons. Among those reasons are that:

- B–52 strikes are synonymous—rightly or wrongly—with massive, indiscriminate bombing. At 30 tons of bombs per B–52, there is some justification for the “massive” impression. A strike involving B–52s could well be less acceptable in the eyes of world opinion, and even possibly U.S. public opinion, than one involving smaller ordnance loads and destruction impact.

- If U.S. losses occur in the strike (and I believe there is more chance they may than the JCS papers indicate), the loss of smaller attack aircraft will be more palatable (in terms of lives and dollars) than the loss of B–52s.

- Attack aircraft (such as the A–6) can combine surprise (low-level, night attacks) with accuracy (the A–6 avionics are among the best available).

- Attack aircraft are more maneuverable than bomber aircraft, thereby providing an advantage in minimizing losses.

- A–6 aircraft can be refueled in flight, I have been advised, thereby providing the option of carrying out the strikes within roughly the same time frame as potential B–52 strikes.

Is Military Retaliation Desirable?

Again, if a military option is desired, the carrier-based attack option appears to be the best. I believe, however, it would be better not to use military options now for the following reasons:

- Despite the merits of conducting reconnaissance against North Korea and the clear claim we have to operating on the open seas

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and in the air away from claimed territorial airspace, it is not clear yet that we:

—need the volume of reconnaissance conducted.
—could not have conducted, and cannot conduct in the future, the requisite level of reconnaissance with adequate armed escort.
—therefore, took all the precautionary measures from a command standpoint that should have been taken. The resultant charge could easily arise that:

• we have unnecessarily exposed ship and air crews to risks near North Korea.
• we have not provided adequate protection for the crews.
• we are now taking added risks (to the immediate crews on the airfield strikes and to the U.S. and ROK generally in terms of sustained combat involvement) to retaliate for a situation which evolved from poor planning in the first place, i.e., we are compounding our errors.

• There are alternatives available which would be palatable to the U.S. people, and which demonstrate our resolve, e.g.,

—an explanation of reasons for maintaining recce flights.
—the vow to provide adequate armed escort and a virtual challenge to North Korea to stop us.
—instructions to our military to engage and destroy any North Korean aircraft or vessels approaching our vehicles outside North Korean territorial air space or waters.
—declaring the option of conducting strikes against North Korean bases if the North Koreans persist in interfering with our aircraft or surface vessels.

• I believe the public is supporting and even applauding the Administration’s present reasoned, calm posture. The newspaper, TV, and radio editorials indicate as much. The contacts I have made among the members of Congress, on both sides of the aisle, point to similar acceptance of our current posture. From my sampling, it appears those on the Hill calling for military retaliation are a minority. I believe they will support, on the other hand, a program like that outlined above, which puts our reconnaissance back on station, provides armed escort, and serves notice we will thwart any attempts by North Korea to interfere with such activity. One of the major risks, therefore, in a military strike against North Korea is that of eroding support we need in:

3 On April 18, Kissinger sent Laird a memorandum in which he indicated that “The President has directed that normal EC–121 flights in the Korean area be continued and that until further notice they be provided with armed fighter escort.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80-R01284A, Box 9, K–3, Korea, January–December 1969)
—pursuing our Vietnam policies.
—the ABM debate.
—the increasing dialogue on the so-called “military-industrial complex.”
—resolution of the involvement of the military in foreign policy matters.
—resolution of campus disorders, which stem in part from the ROTC programs.
—trying to stem the tide of general disenchantment with matters of a military nature.

• The immediate implications of a strike against North Korea go even further. It is not clear we have the capability now to handle a major confrontation in Korea, if the North Koreans should react with a major assault of any duration against South Korea. The Joint Staff informs me:

—sufficient ground force stocks exist for about 1 week of hostilities, after which ammunition and equipment would have to be diverted from Southeast Asia.
—sufficient naval and air force stocks are on hand for 30 to 45 days activity, after which diversions from Southeast Asia would have to be made.
—any military involvement in Korea would involve a deferral of the RVNAF modernization program.
—initial combat in Korea would include expenditure controls of combat supplies for U.S. forces.
—the capability to receive and move combat supplies into Korea, at least for 30 days after the initiation of any combat will be extremely limited.
—increased production of major combat items, especially ammunition should be initiated, and budget adjustments made, as soon as possible if military action in Korea is contemplated.

• I believe a tie of this incident to Paris and military activity in Southeast Asia is possible, but it is not clear what the impact of a strike against North Korea would be. The enemy knows full well what kinds of presence we have in SEA, what kinds of pressure we have been maintaining, and what kinds of losses he (the enemy) is taking. I do not believe a failure to act militarily would be interpreted by the North Vietnamese leadership as an act of vacillation or irresolution on our part. A military strike against North Korea carries risks vis à vis our efforts in Paris and SEA, for the following reasons:

—We currently have the initiative in Paris, as being forthcoming, reasoned, and willing to de-escalate. A military venture against North Korea could be touted by the enemy—and the world press—as an example of the aggression and unreasonableness of the U.S. (however false such charges may be). The result could be the loss of some advantages we now have.

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4 Reference is to the Paris Peace Talks to negotiate an end to the fighting in Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese and VC are trying to elicit a U.S. withdrawal. The risks of our involvement in another major conflict could give the NVA/VC encouragement that we would have to withdraw, either sooner or in less effective way, or divert major resources from the Southeast Asia effort.

Our ability to contend the RVNAF is being given more and better equipment is improving, and is taking over more of the fighting, could be jeopardized.

The strikes we are conducting—or planning to conduct—in 3d nations such as Cambodia and Laos would probably meet with general public approval now. Cast against the background of a raid against North Korea, which may touch off expansion of the military conflict there, such strikes in SEA could meet with strong public disapproval—on the grounds they risk still wider U.S. military involvement. Therefore, rather than helping in our Paris and SEA efforts, a North Korean strike could damage such efforts.

I have the feeling a U.S. attack which would be interpreted as mainly for the purpose of punishing the North Koreans, could be akin to incidents which plagued the last two Administrations, i.e., the episode that didn’t have to be, that carried far more risks than the potential pay-off would seem to dictate, and that led to general public disenchantment across a broad range of affairs. If, for example, we take losses during the strike, the question will be raised about losing more life to vindicate original losses. If, for example, we become involved in a more extended fracas at a time when the public is not heavily in favor of things military, the impact against the Administration on a wide front could be damaging to a high degree. If, for example, the Soviets decide not to proceed with strategic talks—as we postponed such talks in the wake of Czechoslovakia—the U.S. public clamor could be likewise damaging.

I wonder if we should take the chance. I believe the carrier-based strike against North Korean airfields is least risky among the military options. But I believe the risks even there outweigh the potential benefits by a substantial margin.
18. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, April 18, 1969, 0300Z.

1940. 1. President Park asked me to call this morning to discuss plane incident and to inquire concerning moves that we intended to make. I informed him that we had been in contact with FonOff on matter of MAC meeting and gave him general outline of our intentions, which was all that was possible because we had not yet received final text of statement Knapp would make. President said he wants to convey to President Nixon his firm belief that this incident will be repeated again as soon as North Koreans have an opportunity. Choice seems to lie between making them understand by a counterblow that they cannot count on continued patience and restraint as they pursue their aggressive policy, or we can give up our right to operate on and over international waters.

2. He said that after Blue House/Pueblo incidents of last year he had strongly urged Vance and me to agree to a strong warning to North Koreans that any additional incident would bring immediate retaliation, but we had refused to go along with that idea and as result US has this new incident to deal with. I commented that there were some additional factors which affect our attitude toward this problem. No one could say in advance what kind of immediate retaliation would be called for and it does not seem at all desirable simply to react without careful thought and consultation. Moreover, everyone knows that we could strike North Koreans and that they do not have the power to strike back at United States. This made it inevitable that their counterblow would probably escalate matters considerably because it would be against Republic of Korea, perhaps cities or major installations. At this point President was silent for awhile. He then said he nevertheless wished to convey to President Nixon his belief that this incident will be followed by others unless some strong reply is made.


2 Major General James Knapp delivered a statement, released concurrently by the Department of Defense, at the 290th meeting of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) at Panmunjom, Korea, on April 17 (April 18, Korean time). Knapp encouraged the North Koreans to acknowledge responsibility for the shootdown and to “take appropriate measures to prevent similar incidents in the future.” The full text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1969, pp. 382–383.

3 Reference is to the attack on the Blue House, the Presidential residence in Seoul, the day before the seizure of the Pueblo. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, part I, Korea, Document 144.
3. President Park is most anxious to know what line President Nixon will take in his press conference. It will help matters here if we could convey whatever you may feel able to provide in that respect prior to press conference. I believe you can rely on him to keep matter strictly confidential until press conference.

Porter

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4 See footnote 4, Document 15.

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19. Record of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, April 18, 1969, 9:15 a.m.

The President said his concern was that we were going to have a great amount of attention today on this particular thing. He didn’t think there was much point in going forward with Option 2. It’s too much of a piddly thing to announce it on Monday. To me, it’s not all that significant. What he had in mind to say was just the facts—that we have run these flights many times, they have been completely unarmed, they have been well outside the territorial limits, he has ordered a continuation of the flights and will take whatever steps are necessary to see that they are protected.

HAK thought it would most certainly be read as an end to it. The President said suppose it is. HAK said maybe some of the President’s supporters would also think this. The reason they are quiet on the Hill is that they don’t want to get ahead of the President. The President said if we crack it on Monday he will still get the supporters to come along. HAK agreed.

The P said he would use the phrase “he would use whatever action is determined to be necessary” and wondered if HAK had any

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2 See footnote 3, Document 15.

3 April 21.
problems with that. HAK said no but in that case he posed two additional questions. If the question is asked whether this same flight has been flown since the incident the answer would be no since they will not fly another pattern of this kind for another two weeks. On the other hand, we do have another plane standing by. The P said whether we do option 2 or not, we would do that. He would keep these flights on the same pattern. The President said he is not trying to provoke so no special missions would be set up. If the question is asked whether that means a flight will be in the area, the answer is that it will be in that area whenever it comes up on its regular schedule or we are resuming scheduled reconnaissance. HAK was worried that the headline would be “President orders armed fighter escorts.”

The President said don’t let the Times editorials bother you. When they push him in one direction, it makes him go all the more in the other. You just don’t appease them.

The President said the Czech thing\(^4\) was important. HAK suggested he play that one low key until we see what we are going to do on the other thing. He added that this is going to make the Soviets look particularly repressive and we would look good because of our restraint.

The President said HAK’s plan for today should be to get the plan ready and recheck with Mel and Helms. HAK said he would have a session with Rogers too.

The President said how about spend 15 minutes with the Statutory members of the NSC (specifically Lincoln) just to get their ideas on this thing.\(^5\) He said he favors option 1 because if they took option 2 they would have to take a very tough line in Vietnam and we don’t have to with option 1. That would mean the risk of Cambodia.

HAK said we have had a cable from the North (South?) Korean President urging strong action. Our ambassador said we can’t.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) Reference to the anti-Soviet “Ice Hockey Riots” of March 28–29, which followed the second victory of the Czechoslovak ice hockey team over the Soviet Union in the world championship. In response to the widespread anti-Soviet disturbances, Soviet Marshal Grecenko visited Czechoslovakia and Gustav Husak replaced Alexander Dubcek as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

\(^5\) No record of a meeting has been found.

\(^6\) Document 18.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Resumption of Regularly Scheduled Reconnaissance Operations in the Pacific Area

The President has directed the immediate resumption of regularly scheduled reconnaissance operations in the Pacific area. This order specifically includes the resumption of scheduled reconnaissance targeted on North Korea. Combat Air Patrol protection for reconnaissance flights within the threat area of North Korean fighter aircraft should be provided. The President desires that responsible departments and agencies take immediate steps to implement this order, including necessary clearances and coordination. No reconnaissance tracks should approach closer than 50 NM to the North Korean coast.

The President has also ordered that the review of worldwide reconnaissance operations being conducted by the 303 Committee following initial review by the Department of Defense adhere to the following priority:

1. U.S. reconnaissance operations targeted on North Korea.
2. U.S. reconnaissance operations conducted in the remainder of the Pacific area.

The President emphasizes that this review of reconnaissance operations should in no way delay the immediate resumption of reconnaissance operations.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 435, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korean Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/18/69–4/28/69, Vol. III Haig, Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2 In an April 30 follow-up memorandum to the same addressees, Kissinger stated that the President had authorized U.S. fighter aircraft, operating as Combat Air Patrol in support of the reconnaissance missions targeting on North Korea, to approach up to 50 nautical miles of the North Korean, Soviet, or Chinese coast. (Ibid.)
21. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 1, 1969.

PRESIDENT

Deputy Prime Minister Choong Hoon Park of Korea
Ambassador Dong Jo Kim of Korea
Yang Yoon Sae, Director, Office of Investment Promotion, Economic Planning Board, Seoul, Korea

The President

Emil Mosbacher Jr., Chief of Protocol
Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Richard L. Sneider, NSC Senior Staff Member

Deputy Prime Minister Park expressed condolences of the Korean Government for the loss of American lives in the EC–121 incident. He gave the President a letter from President Park on the incident and a letter of introduction from President Park.

EC–121 Incident

President Nixon said that he wished to make clear to the North Koreans that they cannot drive us out of the seas, the waters or air space outside the North Korean territorial waters by illegal actions. We need reconnaissance and our aircraft will be protected. We have asserted our determination not to be driven out and what happens in the future is up to the North Koreans.

Park said that the U.S. had done the right thing at this time but there is concern in Korea about future U.S. actions. If the U.S. tolerates continued aggressive action by North Korea morale in South Korea will be reduced.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 78, Memoranda for the President, Beginning April 27, 1969. Secret. The meeting was held at the White House. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held from 11:29 a.m. to 12:26 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) This memorandum is attached to a May 10 memorandum from Jeanne W. Davis to Lawrence Eagleburger indicating that Kissinger approved the memorandum of conversation with the stipulation that it could be distributed within the Department only on a Nodis basis. Deputy Prime Minister Park Choong Hoon also met with Rogers on April 28. (Memorandum of conversation, April 28; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69)

2 In the letter, Park expressed the outrage of the Korean Government and people at the latest North Korean provocations and offered his views as to ways and means to counter them in the future, namely by the strengthening of South Korean and U.S. military forces in Korea. Telegram 2150 from Seoul, April 29, transmitted the text of President Park’s letter to Nixon. (Ibid., Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, President Park Corr., 1969)
President Nixon said we shall have these factors in mind in our decisions on subsequent steps. It is his policy never to threaten but the North Koreans are on notice.

Park suggested three steps to deter the North Koreans. First, we should let the North Koreans know if they repeat the EC–121 shoot-down it will suffer retaliatory action. President Nixon asked Park’s views on Kim Il Sung’s intentions. He said some believe that Kim actually wants a fight at this time. Park said that Kim has built up his forces to war-time level and North Korea is a military camp. South Korea on the other hand is geared to economic development, improvement of its national power and unification by peaceful means. It does not have enough forces to resist the North. The North Koreans may miscalculate therefore and start a conflict in the belief that the U.S. would not fight in Korea due to its involvement in Vietnam.

Park went on to describe the two other necessary deterrence steps. The second action should be to build up U.S. air power in South Korea since there is still too great a disparity in favor of the North Koreans. South Korea hoped that the U.S. would keep at least a task force in the area. Finally, Park said that most important would be to strengthen the ROK forces, particularly its air force. The principal North Korean military margin is in air power; South Korea has good pilots and if it had the equipment, it would have a first-rate air force. The ROK is now preparing a plan to discuss with General Bonesteel for gradual buildup of the South Korean forces. President Nixon suggested that Park discuss this with Secretary of Defense Laird.

Park assured President Nixon that Korea wishes to maintain its traditional friendship with the United States. He described President Park as courageous and restrained. President Nixon said that he appreciated Korean restraint and knew it was difficult for the Koreans. Korea could be assured that the U.S. and Korea would always stand together.

Okinawa

Park then raised several other issues with President Nixon. First, with respect to Okinawa, Korea had no wish to be involved in this question but is concerned since Okinawa protects Korea as well as other countries. Korea therefore wants to be consulted on its disposition. President Nixon said no decision had been made but we will talk to the Koreans.

Trade

Park said that U.S. assistance to Korea is now showing fruits and after 1971 they will not need grant aid. Korea is following a policy of growth, stability and solvency. Korea will need increased trade, however. Its exports have increased from $30 million to $500 million last
year. The most important market for Korea is the United States and its major export is textiles. It is therefore concerned about efforts to control textile imports into the United States. President Nixon said we would certainly have the Korean problems in mind but the textile question is a difficult problem for the United States. Secretary Stans will be talking to the Korean Government on trade problems shortly when he visits East Asia.³

*Private Investment*

Park said that Korea welcomed American private investment. They hope a second mission following George Ball’s mission⁴ will come to Korea to discuss increased investment. He asked the President to encourage this.

*Vietnam Economic Cooperation*

Park thought there was more room for Korean economic cooperation in Vietnam. Korea could assume logistic functions now undertaken by the U.S. and military forces. This would permit us to withdraw some forces from Korea. The President said we would review this question.

*Visits to Korea*

Park said he hoped that the other American cabinet members accompanying Secretary Rogers to Japan would also visit Korea after the July cabinet meeting. The President said that he has told the cabinet members whenever they go to Japan, they should also visit Korea. Park said that the Koreans hope that President Nixon will visit Korea as soon as possible. The President said that sometime during his present term he hopes to visit Korea but he did not think a trip this year would be possible.

In concluding the meeting Park and the President agreed on what they would say to the press.

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⁴ In a memorandum of conversation, March 14, 1967, President Johnson told the Korean Prime Minister that he was sending George Ball, an executive at the Lehman Brothers investment firm, on a mission on March 16 to promote American private investment in South Korea. Ball had served as Under Secretary of State until 1966. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, volume XXIX, part 1, Korea, Document 110.
22. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT: Military Contingency Plans for Strikes on North Korea

In accordance with your request, the Department of Defense has forwarded a series of contingency plans for strikes on North Korean targets (enclosure 1). The plans include concept proposals for the following:

[6 paragraphs (43 lines) not declassified]

The JCS considered striking other remunerative military targets (Tab G) but recommend against such actions.

[2 lines not declassified]

The JCS analysis (Enclosure 1) concludes that:

[4 paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified]

The JCS recommends:

[5 lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]


2 On April 26, Nixon issued NSSM 53, which “directed that a full range of military contingency plans be prepared in the event of future provocations by North Korea.” (Ibid., Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 43–103) On May 1, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Helms, indicating that Nixon had rescinded NSSM 53 since NSSM 34 (Document 4) called for long-range contingency studies. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 6308, Box 1, NSSMs, General Files, 040, NSC, July 1969)

3 All tabs and enclosures are attached but not printed.

23. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


24. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
FY 69 Supplemental Appropriation for Military Assistance to the Republic of Korea

At Tab A is a memo from Secretary Laird in which he outlines the difficulties to be expected in obtaining legislative approval for military assistance to Korea.

Mel points to a lack of support for the action within the Executive Branch which he suggests has been offered to key members of Congress. If that is the case, I would agree that the Korean supplement will be in for some very stormy seas.

As you know, we have included the Korean supplement at Secretary Laird’s specific request. It now appears he is having strong second thoughts about the advisability of proceeding with it.

Action
Proceed with the Korean FY 69 supplemental
Eliminate the Korean supplemental

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2 Dated May 24, attached but not printed.
3 Nixon initialed the approval line under this option and noted: “It’s a question of practical factors—Laird may have to fight more important battles—”
Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park


Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your note of April 8 introducing Deputy Prime Minister Park and for your letter of April 26 which the Deputy Prime Minister delivered to me. I had a most useful and pleasant discussion with him.²

As Ambassador Porter has already told you, I am glad that you consider the actions which I have taken in response to the unprovoked shooting down of the EC–121 over international waters to be wise and appropriate. I am most grateful for the support expressed both in your letter and in the public statements of officials of your government.

I agree with your view that one of North Korea’s motives is to try to drive a wedge between the United States and the Republic of Korea. Thanks to the spirit of the Korean people and the close harmony between our two governments, these efforts have totally failed. I want to assure you of my personal dedication to strengthening the bonds between our two countries.

I am very much aware of the military capabilities of the North Korean regime and the threatening attitude of their leaders. I share your concern about it. I was therefore glad to get your views on ways to meet this continuing threat. I will keep them very much in mind and can assure you that they will receive most serious consideration by my Administration.

As you know, United States tactical air forces in Korea were substantially strengthened after the attempted raid on the Blue House and the Pueblo incident, and other measures have been taken to strengthen our defenses.

I look forward to your visit in August, when it will be possible for us to explore our mutual interests and problems together at length.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence File 1969–1974, Korea, President Park Corr., 1969. No classification marking. On May 21, the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State, John P. Walsh, sent a draft of this letter to Kissinger with the recommendation that he send it to the President. (Ibid.) Nixon signed the letter, and it was transmitted to President Park in telegram 96297 to Seoul, June 13. The original of President Nixon’s letter was forwarded by pouch.

² See Document 21 and footnote 2 thereto. Copies of the two letters are attached to Nixon’s letter.
A. Introduction

This study deals with the most likely contingencies to arise in Korea over the next few years and enumerates a wide range of options available to meet those contingencies. The contingencies are described and illustrated so that most conceivable crisis situations can be included under one or another. That the ROK might launch an all-out military attack against NK was considered as a contingency paralleling that of a NK major attack, but was rejected as highly unlikely.

We have defined specific US objectives under each contingency so that options could be examined against them and structured in some relative order of preference for meeting that contingency. The options are not ranked in strict order of merit or effectiveness, but merely grouped as to whether they seem more or less reasonable choices for achieving US objectives.

B. US Interests in Korea

—The ROK is strategically important to the security of Japan and the East Asia region.
—We are committed by a mutual defense agreement to defend the ROK against external aggression.
—US performance in regard to our commitment to the ROK reflects on other US commitments to allies and the UN.
—The ROK now stands as a successful example of our ability to protect and assist developing nations.

C. Critical Issues

1. [2 lines not declassified]
2. [2 lines not declassified]  
3. Should the US contain any NK attack in the Republic of Korea or counter-attack into North Korea?  
4. What bases in Korea or elsewhere will be available to US forces conducting combat operations in Korea? For US unilateral operations? For UN operations?  
5. What will be the US attitude toward ROK unilateral action against NK? Toward use of ROK forces during a US response to NK hostile acts?  
6. For what courses of action in a contingency can we get US public and Congressional support?  
7. What risk of expanded hostilities are we willing to take?  
8. What is the effect on US interests if US response to NK act is limited to political actions?  

D. Assumptions  
1. There will be no significant changes in the relative military capabilities on the Korean peninsula. The size and location of US forces will remain essentially unchanged.  
2. The US will still be committed militarily in Southeast Asia.  
3. Both the USSR and PRC will wish to avoid direct involvement in Korean hostilities unless they perceive an immediate threat to themselves.  
4. The attitudes, personalities, and machinery of the ROK and NK governments and political systems will not experience significant change.  
5. There will be no significant change in the nature of the UN role in Korea. The present UN Command and Military Armistice structure will continue.

II. Contingencies and Preferred Actions

A. Key Questions  
1. Origin of Crisis:  
--- Are our facts complete? Confirmed?  
--- Does the Mutual Defense Agreement apply?  
--- Is there a question of provocation?  
--- Are there hostages?  
--- Are we on firm legal grounds?  
2. US Military Resources:  
--- What is immediately available?  
--- How soon can additional resources reach Korea?
3. Japan/Okinawa:
—What is the status of our agreements regarding use of bases and how do they apply to the given contingency?
—What are our obligations to the GOJ under the Mutual Security Treaty?
—How does the GOJ view the crisis in Korea?
—To what extent does public opposition in Japan and Okinawa place restraints on our use of bases?

4. Attitudes:
—Congressional?
—Public?
—UN member nations?
—ROK and Japanese, in particular?

5. USSR/PRC Support for NK:
—How have the USSR/PRC reacted?
—What is the likelihood of intervention by one or both? To what extent?

6. NK Military Resources:
—What is NK military capability to react to US courses of action?

B. Broad Objectives
1. General and Long Term:
To protect US interests in Korea there are certain continuing objectives we would seek to achieve through political and, if necessary, military actions. These objectives are:

   (1) Prevent large-scale North-South hostilities.
   (2) Maintain a stable compromise among the great powers with interests in Korea.
   (3) Keep the Republic of Korea out of hostile hands.
   (4) Promote ROK economic development and political stability.

2. Immediate and Short Term:
In addition to the above, responses to crisis situations should be directed at the following objectives:

   (1) To assure that crisis is resolved without advantage to North Korea.
   (2) To deter future provocations, aggressive acts, or threats to stability.
   (3) To maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments.
3. General Considerations:

In developing responses to the various contingencies described in this Study, we will be constrained initially by certain objectives applicable to all crises. These are:

1. Prevent expansion of hostilities.
3. Minimize cost in US lives and resources.
4. Adhere to standards of international law.
5. Assure maximum public and Congressional support for US position and action.

There are factors that under certain contingencies would move us along courses of action that risk contradicting some of our objectives. These factors are: (1) the previous history of NK attacks on US and ROK forces and the consequent implied warning by President Nixon to NK that future attacks will not go unpunished and (2) US and ROK public opinion that would probably demand forceful US action against NK in the event of further serious NK attacks.

Contingency One: Limited Hostile Act by NK against US

Lesser Acts (minor, apparently unauthorized attack; major act of sabotage or terrorism—e.g., kidnapping or assassination of US official; attack within DMZ)

US Objectives for This Contingency

1. Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see p. 62).
3. Deter future NK hostile acts.

Preferred Courses of Action

Political

Military

Probably best suited to most objectives:

—Demand redress (p. 20)  
—Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a)
—Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (p. 26)  
—Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29)
—Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (p. 26)  
—Conduct ground, air, or naval show of force (p. 30)

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2 See Section II, Contingencies and Preferred Actions, B. Broad Objections, above.

3 Pages 20–66 of the study are not printed.
—Declare specified waters and air space adjacent to NK to be “warning areas” (p. 33)

Well suited to some objectives:

—Condemn NK through letter to President of Security Council (p. 25)
—Boycott MAC meetings (p. 20)
—Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang (p. 28)
—Request USSR cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27)

Poorly suited to most objectives:

—Request UN Security Council meeting (p. 24)
—Employ economic sanctions (p. 21)

—Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b)
—Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (p. 28)
—Seize NK assets abroad (p. 31)
—Increase psychological operations against NK (p. 30b)

Contingency Two: Limited Hostile Act by NK against US

Severe Acts (attack on or seizure of US vessel or aircraft in ROK or international waters or airspace; attack on US military, Embassy, or commercial installation in ROK; up to brigade-size attack through DMZ against US units [less than 1 line not declassified])

US Objectives for This Contingency:

1. Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see p. 6)
2. Deter future NK hostile acts and apply appropriate sanctions
3. Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments
Preferred Courses of Action

Political

Probably best suited to most objectives:
— Request UN Security Council meeting (p. 24)
— Request USSR cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27)
— Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang (p. 28)

Well suited to some objectives:
— Demand redress (p. 20)
— Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (p. 26)
— Appeal for military assistance from other countries (p. 25)
— Boycott MAC meeting (p. 20)

Poorly suited to most objectives:
— Employ economic sanctions (p. 21)
— Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (p. 25)
— Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (p. 26)

Military

— Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b)
— Conduct selective air or naval strike (p. 36)
— Launch artillery, missile or mortar attack across MDL (p. 34b)
— Launch ground raid across MDL (p. 35)
— Conduct US or ROK amphibious raid (p. 38)
— Declare specified waters and air space adjacent to NK to be “warning areas” (p. 33)

— Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29)
— Conduct ground, air, or naval show of force (p. 30)
— Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a)
— Interfere with NK communications and navigational systems (p. 28)
— Support ROK covert raid (p. 32)
— Launch US or ROK limited objective, combined-arms attack across MDL (p. 37)
— Increase psychological operations against NK (p. 30b)

— Mine NK waters (p. 33)
— Impose naval quarantine by closing one or more straits in area (p. 34a)
— Return ROK combat units from Vietnam (p. 30b)
— Seize NK assets abroad (p. 31)
Contingency Three: Limited Hostile Act by NK against ROK

Lesser actions (minor, apparently unauthorized attack; major act of sabotage or terrorism; e.g., kidnapping or assassination of high officials; attack within DMZ; raid along ROK coast)

US Objectives for This Contingency
1. Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see Page 6)
2. Prevent uncoordinated ROK retaliation
3. Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments
4. Deter future NK hostile acts

Preferred Courses of Action

**Political**

- Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (Page 26)
- Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (Page 25)
- Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang and Seoul (Page 28)

**Military**

- Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (Page 30a)
- Conduct ground, air or naval show of force (Page 30)
- Reinforce US military forces in ROK (Page 29)
- Declare specified waters and air space adjacent to NK to be “warning areas” (page 33)

**Well suited to some objectives:**

- Demand redress (Page 20)
- Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (Page 26)
- Request USSR cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (Page 27)

- Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (Page 28)
- Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (Page 30b)
- Seize NK assets abroad (Page 31)
- Support ROK covert raid (Page 32)
- Increase psychological operations against NK (Page 30b)
Poorly suited to most objectives:

—Request UN Security Council meeting (Page 24)
—Boycott MAC meeting (Page 20)
—Employ economic sanctions (Page 21)
—Offer more military and economic assistance to ROK (Page 23)
—Launch artillery, missile, or mortar attack across MDL (Page 34b)
—Launch ground raid across MDL (Page 35)
—Conduct US or ROK amphibious raid (Page 38)
—Impose naval quarantine by closing one or more straits in area (Page 34a)

Contingency Four: Limited Hostile act by NK against ROK

Severe Acts (attack on or seizure of third country vessel or aircraft inside ROK territorial limits; mining of ROK waters; attack on or seizure of ROK vessel or aircraft in ROK or international waters or airspace; attack on ROK military or civilian installation, e.g., an Israeli-type attack on ROK airfield; up to brigade-size attack across MDL against ROK military units; assassination of ROK President)

US Objectives for This Contingency:
1. Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see p. 6)
2. Prevent uncoordinated ROK retaliation
3. Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments
4. Deter future NK hostile acts and apply appropriate sanctions
5. Minimize USSR/PRC involvement in hostilities

Preferred Courses of Action

Political    Military

Probably best suited to most objectives:

—Request UN Security Council meeting (p. 24)
—Consult with ROK at Presidential level (p. 24)
—Request USSR cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27)
—Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang and Seoul (p. 28)
—Conduct ground, air, or naval show of force (p. 30)
—Support ROK covert raid (p. 32)
—Launch artillery, missile, or mortar attack across MDL (p. 34b)
—Declare specified waters and air space adjacent to NK to be “warning areas” (p. 34)
Well suited to some objectives:

—Offer more military and economic assistance to ROK (p. 23)
—Conduct US or ROK amphibious raid (p. 38)
—Demand redress (p. 20)
—Conduct selective air or naval strike (p. 36)
—Call MAC meetings to state UNC position (p. 26)
—Boycott MAC meeting (p. 20)
—Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (p. 28)
—Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (p. 26)
—Seize NK assets abroad (p. 31)
—Confirm MAC meetings to state UNC position (p. 26)

Poorly suited to most objectives:

—Employ economic sanctions (p. 21)
—Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (p. 25)
—Mine NK waters (p. 33)
—Impose naval quarantine by closing one or more straits in area (p. 34a)
—Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a)
—Launch ground raid across MDL (p. 35)
—Launch US or ROK limited objective, combined-arms attack across MDL (p. 37)
—Increase psychological operations against NK (p. 30b)

Contingency Five: Limited Hostile act by ROK against NK

(Amphibious raid along NK coast; Special Forces raid on NK installation; limited ground attack across the MDL; air strike against NK installation)
US Objectives for This Contingency

1. Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (see p. 6)
2. Stop ROK provocation
3. Deter NK retaliation
4. Maintain US prestige and the credibility of US commitments

Preferred Courses of Action

**Political**

- Point out to ROK inapplicability of Mutual Defense Agreement (p. 22)
- Consult with ROK at Presidential level (p. 24)
- Request USSR and PRC cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27)
- Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang or Seoul (p. 28)

**Military**

- Threaten to suspend military assistance (p. 39)
- Threaten to deny logistical support to participating ROK forces (p. 39)

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Footnote: Under this contingency we may be presented with a situation initially, or one may develop, which would change relative importance of US objectives, i.e., we may be forced to move from actions containing ROK adventurism to actions required for salvaging ROK interests or integrity. The following actions are suited to this latter purpose:

**Political**

- Consult with ROK at Presidential level (p. 24)
- Request USSR and PRC cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (p. 27)
- Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang or Seoul (p. 28)

**Military**

- Provide logistical support (p. 42)
- Provide air defense south of MDL (p. 42)
- Provide air, naval, and artillery fire support to ROK (p. 43)
- Commit US ground combat forces (p. 43)
- Conduct ground, air or naval show of force (p. 30)
- Increase air and naval reconnaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a)
- Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (p. 28)
- Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29)
- Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b)
North Korean Shootdown of a U.S. Reconnaissance Flight

Well suited to some objectives:
—Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (p. 26)
—Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (p. 25)
—Request UN Security Council meeting (p. 24)
—Threaten withdrawal of economic assistance (p. 21)
—Offer more military and economic assistance (p. 23)
—Recall US Ambassador (p. 22)
—Boycott MAC meeting (p. 20)
—Ask ROKG to replace US front-line units (p. 41)
—Deny air, artillery, or other combat support to participating ROK forces (p. 39)
—Withdraw US advisors from ROK forces (p. 40)
—Increase air and naval re-connaissance with combat escort outside NK territorial limits (p. 30a)
—Interfere with NK communications and navigation systems (p. 2)
—Conduct ground, air, or naval show of force (p. 30)
—Withdraw from combined US–ROK operational planning activities (p. 40)
—Order evacuation of northern nuclear storage sites (p. 41)
—Return ROK combat units from Viet-Nam (p. 30b)

Poorly suited to most objectives:
—Demand redress (of NK) (p. 20)
—Employ economic sanctions (p. 21)
—Appeal for military assistance from other countries (p. 25)
—Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (p. 26)
—Reinforce US military forces in ROK (p. 29)
—Conduct drone or manned reconnaissance over NK (p. 30b)

Contingency Six: Large-Scale Attack by NK against US/ROK Forces
(At least division-size ground attack across the MDL, a large-scale strike in the ROK or a combination of both)

US Objectives for This Contingency:
1. Broad objectives applicable to all contingencies (Page 6)
2. Assure ROK territorial integrity
3. Minimize USSR/PRC involvement in hostilities
**Preferred Courses of Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Military</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probably best suited to most objectives:</td>
<td>— Request UN Security Council meeting (Page 24)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>— Appeal for military assistance from other countries (Page 25)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>— Request USSR and PRC cooperation in preventing expansion of hostilities (Page 27)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>— Request cooperation of other countries, especially Japan and those represented in Pyongyang or Seoul (Page 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well suited to some objectives:</td>
<td>— Execute JCS military plan for neutralization of NK air threat (see Annex E)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>— Execute JCS military plan for the Defense of Korea (see Annex E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorly suited to most objectives:</td>
<td>— Condemn NK through letter to President of UN Security Council (Page 25)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>— Demand redress of NK (Page 20)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>— Boycott MAC meeting (Page 20)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>— Call MAC meeting to state UNC position (Page 26)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>— Request NNSC investigation of NK Armistice violations (Page 26)</td>
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27. Draft Study Prepared by the Interagency Korean Task Force

Washington, undated.

[Omitted here are the Foreword and Table of Contents.]

KOREAN PROGRAM MEMORANDUM (DRAFT)

Chapter One

Force and Program Alternatives

Contents: Decisions, p. 1; The setting for US policy, p. 3; US goals with respect to Korea, p. 4; Alternative program packages, p. 5; Preliminary program evaluation, p. 17; Variants on the program alternatives, p. 23; Observations on implementation, p. 45.

Section 1: Key Decisions

The United States is at a turning point with respect to Korea. A number of major policy decisions are in the offing which could alter fundamentally the US-Korea relationship. These decisions could be made individually, as circumstances demand, with a view toward stabilizing our current policy, which centers on direct employment of US forces. Alternatively, taking cognizance of the growing strength of Korea and other Asian countries, our actions vis-à-vis Korea could indicate a policy of increased Asian self-reliance, at least for lesser-power conflicts. Either way, the high cost implications and the strong interactions between various programs—US deployments, military assistance, economic aid, and other US expenditures—argue for viewing them in the broadest perspective and in relation to each other.

The more immediate actions and decisions concern:

(1) North Korean Infiltration and DMZ Incidents—Should the US endorse and support the Korean plan to meet NK provocative incidents, including arming a two million man militia (costing about $26 million) and developing an integrated counter-infiltration system for the DMZ and coast line (costs ranging from $20 to $158 million)?

(2) US Land Force Deployments and Readiness—Should the US move toward stabilizing current deployments by improving the readiness of our two divisions in Korea, increasing their strength by 8,500 to 13,100 (costing another $140–$220 million annually)?

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1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 72 A 6308, NSSM General File, 040 NSC, July 1969. Secret. This study, which is over 380 pages long, was prepared in response to NSSM 27, Document 2.
US Tactical Air Force Deployments to Korea—Should the US continue to maintain the present temporary air augmentation to Korea—151 aircraft—at an added marginal cost of approximately $20 million annually?

[3 lines not declassified]

Economic Aid to Korea—Should the current US aid phase-out schedule be maintained or interrupted (this schedule entails phase-out of supporting assistance in 1969 and development loans in 1972; PL 480 and technical assistance would continue)? Should the preferential position of Korea with respect to US textile purchases be altered, as has been suggested informally?

In addition to these more immediate decisions, others, larger and more far reaching, also bear consideration in the near future. They concern:

1. ROK Land Force Improvement—Should the US endorse and assist in modernizing the current level of ROK forces (costing up to $950 million in new equipment and entailing about $135 million annually in foreign exchange for operating expenses after 1974)?

2. ROK Air Force Developments—Should the US assist the ROK to develop an air force capable of contending with the North Korean air threat (costing from $375–$875 million for modernization and entailing $74–$176 million annually in foreign exchange for operating costs)?

3. ROK Regional Security Forces—Should the ROK divisions in Vietnam be repatriated in a manner facilitating further use of them in regional contingency roles?

4. ROK Presidential Succession—Should the US attempt to influence the course of the ROK 1971 presidential election?

Section 2: The Setting for US Policy

There are reasons for viewing Korea with optimism. Since 1963, when the Park government was ratified by a close vote, Korea has seen steady improvements in economic performance, military strength, political effectiveness, and international stature. The economy has grown by some ten percent per year, inflation has been controlled, and exports have surged. Improvements in military capabilities have been confirmed by the strong performance of the two ROK divisions in Vietnam; the country’s first expeditionary force provides evidence that ROK forces might well assume a larger defense role at home, at least against North Korean attacks. The growing confidence of the regime was also demonstrated in 1965 by the “normalization” of Korean relations with Japan. ROK contributions to the SVN conflict, combined with Korea’s progress on a broad front, have served to shift Korea’s relationship with the US from dependence toward partnership.

Despite these developments, for some observers Park’s handling of his 1967 re-election suggests that Korea had not matured politically.
Though assured of victory over a weak opposition, the Park regime discredited itself by visible election irregularities. Moreover, with victory in hand, the regime took repressive measures against the opposition leadership. If this tendency continues, the 1971 presidential election may become a major test of the South Korean political system: It could result in a constitutional amendment permitting a third-term bid by President Park, an orderly transfer of power to a successor, or abandonment of the constitutional process.

Another factor of concern is the stance of North Korea. The stated political objective of the North is to reunify the Korean peninsula under a Communist regime. To achieve this objective, North Korean Premier Kim-Il Sung appears committed to a strategy of “revolutionary struggle” in South Korea, and his campaign will probably continue to include harassment of the DMZ area and armed infiltration of rear areas. However, because of the strength of the ROKG, the consensus is that North Korea is unlikely to establish guerrilla bases in South Korea or to develop significant political support among the people. Nevertheless, the self-confidence of the Korean government and the confidence it gains from the people will depend substantially upon success in coping with incursions from the North.

Perhaps the most important element affecting US/Korea programs is the evolving US role in Asia. Neo-isolationist sentiment in the US has given rise to doubts about the long-run US commitment to Asian security. The US response to the EC–121 incident failed to reassure the Koreans on the firmness of future US reactions to North Korean affronts. The impending renegotiation of the US security treaty with Japan and its possible implications for the US military posture in Okinawa add to the uncertainty. Korea may also feel uncomfortable with its dependence upon US decisions in Vietnam for the vindication of its first regional security undertaking. This line of questioning assumes increased importance when it is recognized that the ROKG will remain heavily dependent on the US for the severest contingencies and will probably continue to judge US reliability not only by US actions in Korea but in the rest of Asia as well.

Section 3: US Goals in Korea

The US goals set forth in the original terms of reference for this study taken from the study “US Policy Toward Korea” served as a guide
for the alternative programs. The goals are: (1) To prevent large-scale North-South hostilities; (2) To maintain a stable compromise among the great powers with interests in Korea; (3) To keep South Korea out of hostile hands; (4) To increase ROK ability to defend itself; (5) To promote South Korea’s economic development and political stability; (6) To encourage Japan to make a greater contribution to the security and prosperity of the ROK. The first four, which have direct program implications, can be met without jeopardizing economic development, political stability, or an increased Japanese role in Korea.

There are many ways to meet these goals. In this analysis program alternatives have been developed for US deployments, ROK land and air force improvement, US air forces, ROK naval forces, US/ROK logistic supplies, ROK combat service support, counter-infiltration and economic aid. Two policy perspectives are useful in providing a conceptual framework and giving coherence to program decisions. We have called these alternative program packages “policy continuity” and “accelerated self-reliance.” Both are based on the same evidence, but the emphasis given to certain factors has been changed. Each is a way of viewing the current situation in all its complexity. Each has been presented in its most favorable aspect with a tone of advocacy.

[Omitted here are the remaining sections of Chapter One on “Force and Program Alternatives” and Chapters Two–Five on “Land, Air, Naval Requirements for Korean Defense;” the “Infiltration Problem;” the “ROK Economy;” and “Political Factors.”]

28. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, July 2, 1969, 11:42 a.m.–12:28 p.m.

SUBJECT

Military Contingency Planning for Korea

PARTICIPATION

Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman
State
U. Alexis Johnson

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970, [6 of 6]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. The minutes were forwarded through Haig to Kissinger as an attachment to a memorandum prepared by Behr on July 3.
Summary of Decisions

1. The WSAG will review the NSSM 34 Contingency Study for Korea instead of the NSC Review Group.

2. The NSSM 34 Contingency Study for Korea will be the agenda item for the next WSAG meeting on July 11, 1969.

3. The areas of immediate concern to the WSAG are Korea, Berlin and the Middle East. Following WSAG review of relevant interdepartmental and military contingency plans for these areas, further requirements will be met by task forces functioning as working groups under the WSAG. The existing Berlin and Korean Task Forces will be employed, and action initiated to form a similar element for the Middle East.

4. The contingency of actual Sino-Soviet hostilities will be an additional concern of the WSAG.

Kissinger opened the meeting stating that its purpose was primarily organizational although some time would be devoted to the “Red Books” (covering military plans for Korean contingencies) provided the Committee Members by the Joint Staff. He reviewed the President’s thoughts on the need for updated and effective procedures for contingency planning, having in mind documents which would be useful for incidents similar to the EC–121 “shoot down”. Kissinger said he envisioned the WSAG to have policy responsibility for the content of contingency plans but that the implementation of these plans would

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2 Document 26. NSSM 34 is Document 4.

3 In a May 16 memorandum to Rogers, Laird, and Helms, Kissinger stated that the President had directed that the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Korea “be constituted on a permanent basis in the event of future similar crises worldwide. Henceforth, this committee will be referred to as the Washington Special Actions Group.” Kissinger added that the President envisioned that the WSAG “will confine itself to consideration of policies and plans affecting the crises.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-070, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Mtg. 7/2/69 Contingency Study for Korea (NSSM 34)) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 45.

4 See Document 22 for JCS military contingency planning.
clearly rest with organizations such as those within the State Department that have already been structured to accept these responsibilities. Moreover he wished it to be clearly understood that actual operations during contingencies would not be run from the White House Situation Room. What has to be done now is to develop ways of interfacing military and political considerations and to answer the question “who does what”? He noted that military plans for contingencies are highly sensitive and that, for WSAG actions, only the principals should have access to the documents. They would not be reproduced and would be returned to the Joint Staff after having been worked in the WSAG. Ultimately, what will be required are contingency folders, approved by the WSAG, then kept on file in the White House Situation Room for use in possible emergencies. He then asked the group members for their comments.

Secretary Johnson immediately called to mind the comparison between the Berlin Task Force and the Korean Task Force under Ambassador Brown, which has prepared a plan for Korean contingencies in response to NSSM 34. He commended this plan to Kissinger saying that it covers much of the same ground as the “Red Books” sent to the Group by the Joint Staff. He remarked on the effectiveness of the “Live Oak” plans done by the Berlin Task Force. This is an on-going operation which has produced plans in great detail and with an underlying concept that the planning group would also be deeply involved in the emergency actions incident to Berlin contingencies. He stated that with respect to the Korean Task Force, much valuable work has already been done. What should now be done is to refine the work under the direction of the WSAG serving as a “Watch Dog” committee. Kissinger remarked that the President was not telling the WSAG how to organize, but that he desires the group to provide plans which will give him the same kind of assurance that he had during the EC–121 incident.

Secretary Johnson stated that the Korean Task Force work is now ready to be looked at by the NSC Review Group. Kissinger rejoined that the plan should not be handled by the Review Group but by the WSAG. He did not believe the Review Group could address the problems with the same precision that the President needs for decision making in contingency situations. Admiral Johnson concurred, stating that the military aspects of the contingency plans are highly sensitive and that the security aspects of these plans are of paramount importance. Kissinger added that whether the plan would eventually appear on the NSC Agenda was a decision the President would have to make at a later date.

Turning to Admiral Johnson, Kissinger asked whether the military participated in the Korean contingency plan. Admiral Johnson said that they had but he was not sure to what extent. He thought the document reflected military planning in outline form but not in the detail con-
tained in the “Red Books” before the members. He then reported an exercise internal to the Joint Staff which resulted in a “Crisis Data Book”. This effort visualized hypothetical contingency situations, how they could develop, predicted the reactions of other affected countries, then postulated reasonable US actions and their consequences.

Kissinger returned to the President’s objectives with respect to contingency plans. The President wants, he said, no generalized statements, but instead courses of action which would be useful in specific situations. For example, if he wants three B–52s to strike a designated objective, what else would he have to do. He is interested in knowing the possible reactions of affected people and governments. What exactly is likely to happen in a political/military sense? He wants a check list of what he has to do—not esoteric speculation about events that could lead to a crisis. Additionally, follow-on factors have to be considered such as how to deal with reinforcement levels. Secretary Johnson opined there was a need to amplify the contingency scenarios. Kissinger reflected on his own thought processes during the EC–121 incident and remarked that his initial reactions were probably naive. The main lesson he learned from the incident was that the trick in any action taken would be to preclude a counter blow. He reported some after-thoughts the President had on the EC–121 incident to the effect that if such an occasion arose in the future and a B–52 strike was believed necessary, the price you pay really isn’t much greater for a strike with twenty-five aircraft than with three. The need is to look determined and, if the object is to prevent counter-responses, the action taken should be a powerful blow. If a similar situation were to arise today, he (the President) would probably either do nothing or select an option toward the extreme of the range of possibilities. Admiral Johnson said that he agreed with the President’s ideas as do the Joint Chiefs. For example, if you attack an airfield but don’t take out the enemy’s air order of battle, you are in deep trouble.

Nutter suggested a parallel between the President’s philosophy and Golda Meir’s “A Seven-fold Retaliation” policy. Secretary Johnson said that the military aspects had to be balanced by an understanding of their political implications. For example, when would we expect the Soviet Union to become involved? We had the Pueblo and the EC–121 incidents but the next time it might be the political assassination of a US Ambassador or the President of South Korea, or it might be the destruction of a vital industrial facility such as an oil refinery. Kissinger thought that if any of the contingencies mentioned by Secretary Johnson were to occur today the President would probably take positive action.

Kissinger then turned the attention of the group to the “Red Books” containing representative military contingency plans for Korea. He expressed an opinion that it would be non-productive for the group to review each of the 25 plans in the book. There was basically a great
similarity among the plans, and that probably what should be done would be to group them within categories of response. For instance, [2 lines not declassified].

Admiral Johnson then displayed a graphic prepared by the Joint Staff—a map on which was marked the objectives of the 25 plans contained in the “Red Book”. Secretary Johnson remarked that [4 lines not declassified].

Secretary Johnson then asked how the Group proposed to work the problem at hand? He suggested that the Korean Task Force work be referred to WSAG and not to the Review Group. Additionally, he thought it advisable that members of WSAG look carefully at the Korean Task Force plan in preparation for the next meeting. Kissinger agreed with the two courses of action but suggested that the Joint Staff also work on the “Red Books” to group the contingencies by challenges and responses. He inquired whether the work could be done within a week? Admiral Johnson thought this was possible. Secretary Johnson remarked that the “Red Books” contained no treatment of the political aspects of the various courses of actions suggested in them. Admiral Johnson agreed and said it was not their purpose to address the political issues. All members agreed there was a need for expanded scenarios to include their political ramifications.

Secretary Johnson thought there was an additional requirement to examine the steps, from a political-military standpoint, that could be taken to confine the actions to a low level. Admiral Johnson remarked that a CIA assessment of possible enemy reactions would be needed. Secretary Johnson said he wanted Ambassador Brown in on the act. (It was not clear whether he meant representation on the WSAG or whether he meant in Brown’s capacity as head of the Korean Task Force.) The group agreed that, with the work in front of them, frequent meetings would be required.

Secretary Johnson stated that, of all possible contingencies, Berlin problems had been dealt with more extensively than any of the others. Admiral Johnson remarked that no plan, however detailed, is any good if it is static. All contingency plans must undergo periodic review. Secretary Johnson agreed and recommended a standing Task Force working continuously, but not necessarily on a day-to-day basis, within each of the contingency areas. Meyer asked about the membership of the Korean Task Force? Secretary Johnson then gave a rundown of the task force membership under Ambassador Brown. Kissinger said he has no objection to the task force concept provided they have access to the kind of material necessary to work the problems effectively. Under any circumstances, he considered the WSAG as the proper reviewing authority for the type of planning being considered by the group. Admiral Johnson said it would be possible for the military to provide de-
tailed briefings, giving the necessary background information, but omitting unnecessary operational detail.

Kissinger then inquired about the level of activity of the Berlin Task Force. Secretary Johnson said that its structure and mechanics were still in existence but that its recent activities have been limited. Kissinger stated his belief that, because of the pressure of other duties, the WSAG cannot function as a planning group but only as a reviewing agency.

Secretary Johnson then said the Korean Task Force plan was on its way but he was not really certain of its status within the NSC reporting process.

Kissinger said that for the next meeting the Joint Staff should attempt to group the plans in the “Red Books” and that the WSAG should be prepared to discuss what kinds of provocations would lead to what kinds of responses.

Secretary Johnson then outlined the six general contingency areas set forth in the NSSM 34 study.

Kissinger remarked that, if the work of the Korean Task Force fits the objectives defined by the WSAG, the work should be used and people should not have to do it over again. After the WSAG looks over the Korean Task Force plan, the Korean Task Force could then be used as a Working Group for the WSAG to make whatever revisions will be required. Similarly, when Berlin contingencies are considered in the very near future the Berlin Task Force can assume responsibility for follow-on work. Moreover, because contingency planning is underway for the Middle East there is a need for a similar Task Force to handle those problems. He noted that the military contingency plans which deal with a confrontation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East are somewhat unrelated to politics and seem to be deficient in the logistic arrangements that are called for. Admiral Johnson replied that the military plans for the Middle East are undergoing revision at the present time and that part of the problem in making sense out of logistic requirements is the lack of military bases in the area.

Kissinger then asked whether the next WSAG meeting could be held on the 11th of July. The agenda would be the Korean Task Force plan. Nutter remarked that the members should also consider that plans other than those for the Middle East, Berlin, and Korea would probably be required. Secretary Johnson agreed, but said that further NSC directives were unnecessary because the current general instructions for contingency planning are sufficiently comprehensive. Nutter stated that there are grave problems associated with Berlin planning because of the tripartite and quadripartite character of those plans. There are very difficult security problems and almost insurmountable military problems. Secretary Johnson agreed that the Berlin plans were immensely complicated and represented years of work.
Kissinger recalled his participation in a 1961 Berlin War Game. The results of that game were comforting because they indicated we could not lose. Now the situation is somewhat different. He further questioned what we would do in the event of actual hostilities between the Soviet Union and Communist China. He noted that the President had inquired about this problem earlier in the morning. Early answers to this question are needed.

Kissinger asked Secretary Johnson to see what could be done bureaucratically to set up a Middle East planning element. Secretary Johnson replied that he would look into what has been done in Middle East planning in the recent past and under the former administration. He will report his findings to the Group at their next meeting. All agreed that, subject to the President’s schedule, the next meeting will be held on Friday, July 11th at 1400 hours.

The meeting was adjourned at 12:28 P.M.

5 Kissinger had served as a consultant on security matters to President John Kennedy.

29. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, July 11, 1969, 2:13–2:50 p.m.

SUBJECT
Military Contingency Planning for Korea

PARTICIPATION
Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman
State
U. Alexis Johnson
Winthrop Brown
Defense
G. Warren Nutter

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970, [6 of 6]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. These minutes were forwarded through Haig to Kissinger as an attachment to a July 11 memorandum from Behr. On July 10, Behr submitted three working papers to WSAG members: a summary of U.S. objectives extracted from the NSSM 34 study; a summary of military responses contained in the NSSM 34 study; and an annotated index of Department of Defense military contingency options for Korea. All are ibid.
Summary of Decisions

1. A Working Group under Ambassador Brown, responsive to the WSAG, will produce three sets of contingency plans for Korea. These plans will be structured in the form of sequences of events and will cover low, intermediate and high levels of military involvement.

2. A similar Working Group will be formed for Middle East plans.

3. The WSAG meeting time will be standardized at 2:00 P.M. on Fridays.

The meeting began at 2:13 P.M. Secretary Johnson suggested to the Chairman that he be permitted to report to the Group the results of a “rump meeting” between the two Johnsons which took place on July 10th. Kissinger yielded to Secretary Johnson who then discussed the State–Defense meeting of the previous day. Its purpose was to review the work done by the Joint Staff in grouping the various military plans into categories of response (called for at the last WSAG meeting) and to map a course of action which would distill from the NSSM 34 Study and the DOD plans a paper having greater utility for decision makers. Because much of the work on the probable nature of NK provocation has been done in the NSSM 34 Study, the follow-on effort should concentrate on building scenarios for various levels of military response without too much regard for how the particular contingency would arise. This work could be done by a Working Group under Ambassador Brown, with representation appointed by the WSAG principals.

Kissinger remarked that what the “rump session” had concluded was coincident with his own thoughts. He would not, therefore, have to take the time of the Group by critiquing the NSSM 34 Study (which he regards as an excellent foundation document) in order to express the same conclusions with respect to an approach to the problem of providing the President with useful options in the event of another Korean emergency.

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2 No record of a meeting between U. Alexis Johnson and Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson has been found.
3 See Document 28.
Admiral Johnson clarified what he sees to be the working arrangement—a small ad hoc group responsible to the WSAG as opposed to a NSC/IG effort. All agreed.

Kissinger stated that the Working Group should not concern itself with recommendations about when and why a particular plan should be implemented. All that is called for is a set of options including at the one extreme “surgical strikes”, heavy military involvement at the other extreme, with in-between options such as attack against several airfields. Admiral Johnson noted that diplomatic maneuverings were, of course, related but a thing apart and not germane to the task at hand. Secretary Johnson remarked that the work on the scenarios would be eased by the nature of the problem itself. When a specific course of action is selected for development, that course then logically dictates what must be done to carry it out. He visualized the end-product as a sequence of events similar to that produced during the EC–121 incident.

Kissinger cautioned that a philosophical attachment to one class of response—be it minimum, intermediate, or maximum violence—often tends to cloud contingency plans. What we need are scenarios for the decision-makers. They will have to exercise their responsibility to choose the appropriate level of response from among a group of options.

Returning to the plan of action, Secretary Johnson suggested a “plan a week” approach—for example, the next WSAG meeting should look at the “surgical” strike category, with the other options following at weekly intervals. Kissinger agreed and standardized future meeting times—Fridays at 2:00 P.M. There were no dissents.

Kissinger conjectured that if the President had, today, to select a response to a provocation similar to those of recent history, he would probably pick an intermediate option—say, 8 lines not declassified. Admiral Johnson thought the attacks should be regarded as punitive, and that they would not result in permanent damage.

Kissinger inquired how an attack against 4 lines not declassified. Secretary Johnson inquired about other “nerve-center” targets. Kissinger asked Cord Meyer to identify a number of these targets and to report them to the WSAG by 15 July. Meyer agreed to do so. Nutter brought up a point relating to international law, citing a body of opinion which holds that the target must somehow be related to the “crime”. In other words, if you get hit from an airfield, you have to attack an airfield in response. At this point Secretary Johnson asked what one is really after in striking 9 lines not declassified.

Admiral Johnson raised the question of format, noting that the work his staff had done for him this past week was perhaps too detailed. The consensus of the Group was that the EC–121 sequence of events is a good model.

Admiral Johnson returned to Kissinger’s earlier evaluation of the NSSM 34 Study. He concurred in the evident merit of the work and
hoped that the Korean Task Force would keep it up to date. All agreed that the NSSM 34 Study—and all other IG plans—should be periodically reviewed and made current.

Brown departed at this point after being informed that his WSAG Working Group would include Bill Nelson (CIA), Colonel Boylan (OSD), John Holdridge (NSC), with a Joint Staff member to be reported later.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the Middle East.]

There was no further discussion. The meeting adjourned at 2:50 P.M.

30. National Intelligence Estimate


The Outlook in South Korea

Note

This estimate assesses the outlook in South Korea with particular reference to the 1971 elections, the impact of likely North Korean actions on the ROK, and (at the request of the staff of the National Security Council) the effects of certain possible US courses of action.

Conclusions

A. Well in advance of the 1971 presidential election, political tensions in South Korea are acute and growing. Pak’s political associates are pressing for a third term for him, but he has not yet made his decision. For him to run would require passage of a constitutional amendment and there is strong opposition to such a move even within some circles of the ruling party.

B. Passage of the amendment requires a two-thirds vote of the National Assembly followed by majority approval in a popular referendum. The first step is likely to be the most difficult. Pak’s supporters are conducting an intensive campaign of pressures and inducements to line up the necessary National Assembly votes, but it may prove a

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.
close thing. If the amendment is passed by the Assembly, the government can probably arrange to secure a majority for it in the referendum, though at this stage too it might feel compelled to use heavy manipulation to assure success.

C. The most serious source of trouble for the regime is likely to come from the students—whose potential for disruption has been clearly demonstrated before and who largely oppose amending the Constitution. Student disorders can probably be handled by security forces, but serious and prolonged turmoil might seriously test the latter’s reliability.

D. All things considered, however, Pak probably has at least an even chance of gaining a third term. But events could easily take other turns: if student or other resistance proves strong enough, Pak might decide not to run, especially since he could designate a successor candidate. Whoever runs as the ruling party’s nominee would probably win, though in a completely free election an opposition victory is conceivable. Should it occur, the regime and the army would be tempted to retain control by force; their decision would depend heavily on Pak himself.

E. The contest in South Korea is essentially a struggle over political power rather than over particular domestic or foreign policies. The opposition leaders are as opposed to North Korea’s pretensions as is the administration, and equally aware of the ROK’s essential dependence for security on the US. The main political question is whether South Korea’s fledgling constitutional democracy can undergo something like a free political contest, or whether the government’s desire to keep control, and its fear that political turmoil would benefit North Korea, will lead it to heavy-handed suppression of its opponents.

F. During the coming years of political stress, North Korean military harassments of the ROK are not likely to be abandoned and may even be stepped up. These actions are unlikely to constitute a major threat to the ROK regime, and within limits a fear of the North works for unity in the South. Nonetheless, if Pyongyang is willing to take the risks, it may be able to create divisive strains among South Koreans (and between the ROK and the US) over how to deal with Communist tactics.

G. For the foreseeable future, the ROK will remain, in fact and in attitude, heavily dependent on the US for military support against North Korea. The impact of various possible US decisions concerning the level of such support is assessed in Section III.

[Omitted here is the “Discussion” section of the estimate.]
31. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State

Taipei, August 1, 1969, 1201Z.

Secto 37/2923. Subject: The Secretary’s Meeting with FonMin Choi July 31, 1969.  

1. Summary. FonMin Choi monopolized meeting with Secretary to set forth familiar ROK views on North Korean threat, need for US assistance and restatement of US commitment. The Secretary pointed out that his own visit and presence 55,000 US troops should remove any ROK fears and North Korean illusions.

2. Secretary Rogers paid 40-minute call on FonMin Choi Kyu-hah, accompanied by Ambassadors Porter and Pedersen, Assistant Secretary Green, Messrs. McCloskey, Wilson and Duemling. Also present on Korean side were Vice FonMin Chin Pil-shik, Vice Speaker National Assembly Chang Kyung-sun, General Mun Hyong-tao, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, MFA Director of American and European Affairs Yoon Ha-jong and MFA Director International Relations Bureau Kim In-kwon. FonMin raised following subjects:

3. Park Visit to US. Choi indicated President Park looking forward to conversations with President Nixon in US around August 20. In response to question on venue, Secretary noted San Clemente is out of way and offers very limited accommodations. Mr. Green said President Nixon has some thoughts on venue and programs which he is discussing with Chief of Protocol Mosbacher, who in turn will be in touch with Ambassador Kim immediately after returning to Washington from current trip.

4. Security in Korean Peninsula. Choi reviewed the security situation in Korean Peninsula, specifically referring to recent incidents provoked by North Koreans on island off west coast and DMZ. He noted that while North Korea had once preached reunification by peaceful means, it now advocates “liberating South Korea by force.” Since 1968 infiltration attempts had increased and there have been such incidents as the Blue House raid, Pueblo, the east coast landing in November 1968, shooting down of EC-121, etc. Choi reviewed steps being taken

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2 Rogers met with President Park and senior Korean officials in Seoul, July 31–August 1. He traveled to Taipei and met with President Chiang and senior Chinese Nationalist officials, August 1–3. For a transcript of Rogers’s news conference held after he had reported to Nixon concerning the trip, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1, 1969, pp. 177–178.
to meet North Korean threat, including strengthening of homeland reserve force. He also mentioned joint efforts with US, including jet fighter deliveries and talks on production of M-16’s. He stressed that such preventative measures were essential to forestall all-out aggression from the North Koreans and that President Park planned to make this point to President Nixon. In reply, Secretary indicated we are sympathetic, recognize Korean needs particularly to counter infiltration by sea, and will continue to be as helpful as we can.

5. Economic Assistance. Choi said Korea shoulders a two-fold burden in surviving as a free nation, strengthening its defense capability but also strengthening its economy. Koreans are working hard at economic development, to which aid and PL-480 had made a most effective contribution. He also related economic strength to Korea’s position as bulwark against communism.

6. Korean Issue in UN. Choi indicated this issue would be left to discussions between Ambassador Pedersen and Vice FonMin Choi.

7. Vietnam. Choi indicated that President Park would wish to discuss Vietnam in detail. He only mentioned in passing Korea’s desire to assist its friends and allies.

8. Responding to various points made by Choi, Secretary noted that US is very sympathetic to Korean point of view. Moreover, US Congress takes a very favorable attitude. Therefore, Korea had no grounds for fear that US interest or support is waning. Nevertheless, we must recognize public and Congressional feeling that US is somewhat over-extended abroad to the detriment of domestic needs. This attitude is derived in large part from the Vietnam situation. As a result US may not be able to do everything that Korea would like, but Korea remains at the top of list and Secretary’s visit underscores our support. Secretary added that he would have further chance to discuss these issues with Choi during Park visit and at UNGA.

9. Choi responded with appreciation for Secretary’s reassurances, but said it was essential for USG publicly to express readiness and determination to assist Korea if attacked. The Secretary responded that 55,000 US troops in Korea should leave no doubt as to our commitment and intentions. However, he agreed on usefulness of reiterating commitments from time to time. Meanwhile, it was important for Korea to continue steps being taken to counter infiltration.

10. At end of meeting, Choi handed Secretary two memoranda, one covering threat from North Korea and other setting forth Korean views on 9 subjects—most of which covered in discussion. Choi men-

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3 Not found.
tioned but had no time to discuss problems of North Korean diplo-
matic offensive abroad, Okinawa, regional cooperation, and proposal
for joint US-Korean cabinet meetings. Re Okinawa Green indicated that
both we and Japanese Government appreciate public restraint which
Korean Government has shown on issue.

11. Memoranda given to Secretary have been passed to Embassy
for appropriate action, with copies retained for Department.

Rogers

32. Memorandum for the Record by Robert M. Behr of the
National Security Council Staff


SUBJECT
WSAG “Rump Session”, August 2, 1969

On August 2, 1969, I attended a “rump session” of the WSAG.2
The meeting was called by Under Secretary Johnson for the purpose
of reviewing a WSAG Working Group paper detailing a heavy US mil-
itary response to a major North Korean action against US/ROK forces.3
The group met in Secretary Johnson’s office at 10:00 a.m. and con-
inued in session until 4:00 p.m. Present were Secretary Johnson, Vice Ad-
miral Johnson (OJCS), Ambassador Brown (Chairman, Korean Task
Force), Assistant Secretary Nutter (OSD/ISA) and Mr. Karamessines
(CIA), attending his first WSAG meeting.

Before undertaking a page-by-page discussion of the draft, the
group agreed that additional target options are needed. CIA and the
Joint Staff will develop these options which will include airfields,
power plants and power distribution facilities, and key industrial
plants. Two or three examples within each target category will be se-
lected and arranged in order of military priority.

During the discussion of the draft, at the point in the sequence
of events when a Presidential decision is made, I remarked that I

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institu-
tional Files (H-Files), Box H-070, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Mtg.
2 No minutes of this “rump” WSAG meeting have been found.
3 See footnote 1, Document 29.
considered the paper to be deficient on two counts: (1) the particular
decision is postulated (attack on the North Korean air order of battle)
without a statement of rationale behind the decision and (2) there is
insufficient treatment of the possible risks associated with the US re-
sponse. My suggestion that these deficiencies be remedied was not well
taken. Secretary Johnson stated that these are considerations appro-
priate for the members of the NSC in their development of recom-
endations for the President. I said that if the WSAG principals
thought it unnecessary to set out the pros and cons of the various
options, the NSC staff would have to do so because of the need to
(1) cover as much groundwork as is possible on a pre-crisis basis and
(2) insure to the extent possible, that nothing is overlooked once a cri-
sis develops. Secretary Johnson replied (somewhat irrelevantly I
thought) that the work should be done through “normal staff proce-
dures.” To an extent, my criticisms were later accommodated when the
group agreed (1) to call for a draft point paper in which the President
would set forth the rationale behind his decision and (2) to amplify the
concluding section of the paper by adding a catalog of possible NK,
Soviet and PRC responses, with matching guidance in the form of sug-
gested US “rules of engagement.”

The paper was strengthened in two important areas. First, the lan-
guage was modified throughout to leave no doubt that the response
selected would be a “time-phased” operation—that is, carried out
through a series of strikes over a period of days. Second, US initiatives
in the UN were made more meaningful by broaching the subject of a
US response to a call for cease-fire. (The group agreed that if bilateral
negotiations indicated the Soviets could “deliver” the North Koreans
with a high degree of assurance, the US should respond favorably to
a cease-fire proposal.)

Secretary Johnson had reservations about two aspects of the pa-
per. He was, in the first instance, disturbed by a statement in the in-
 introductory section which states that US military action could be pro-
voked by “firm intelligence indicating a large scale North Korean attack
is imminent.” Although he recognized the legitimacy of a US response
to a North Korean military action, he doubted that we would act on
receipt of intelligence, however unequivocal it might be.

The second area of concern to Secretary Johnson was the business
of command relationships in the area. What he appeared to be seeking
was assurance that we could look to one military commander in the
Western Pacific to assume responsibility for executing a military re-
sponse to a North Korean provocation. Admiral Johnson said that the
problem is very complex, but reported that the JCS have tasked
COMUSJAPAN (who is also CG, Fifth Air Force) to maintain within
his situation room current readiness information on military forces in
the area that could be called upon to respond in time of emergency.
This did not alleviate the Secretary’s concern because he is aware that COMUSJAPAN does not exercise operational control over all of the units that could be involved. His apprehension was obviously generated, at least in part, by the charges made in the recent report of the Pike Committee on the Pueblo and EC–121 incidents.

After completion of the discussion of the Korean paper, Secretary Johnson charged Ambassador Brown with revising the scenario in accordance with the agreements reached at the meeting, setting a deadline of August 8.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Korea.]

RM Behr
Colonel, USAF

33. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, August 8, 1969, 4:55–6:36 p.m.

SUBJECT
Military Contingency Planning for Korea

PARTICIPATION
Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman
State
U. Alexis Johnson
Winthrop Brown
Defense
G. Warren Nutter
CIA
Thomas H. Karamessines
JCS
Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970 [6 of 6]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Situation Room at the White House. Behr forwarded the minutes to Kissinger through Haig on August 11.
Summary of Decisions

1. The heavy response scenario (attack of the North Korean AOB) will be modified in accordance with the instructions given by the WSAG to the Chairman of the Working Group.

2. The “surgical” response scenario will be brought to the same high quality as the heavy response scenario.

3. A third Korean scenario will be prepared after the WSAG determines an appropriate military objective.

4. A Middle East scenario will be accomplished based on Arab attack of Israel, with Soviet military assistance extending beyond the now-existing border between the Arab states and Israel.

5. The next meeting of the WSAG will be in approximately two weeks in San Clemente. The two Korean scenarios and the Middle East scenario will be the agenda items.

The meeting began at 4:55 P.M. Secretary Johnson briefed Kissinger on the WSAG “rump session” held at State on August 2, 1969, during which the principals devoted six hours to a meticulous review of the WSAG Working Group’s draft of a politico-military scenario outlining a heavy US military response to major North Korean provocation. The Working Group had prepared a new draft which was now before the WSAG. In addition, the principals tasked CIA and the Joint Staff with suggesting suitable targets other than elements of the NK AOB. The CIA recommendations (not yet coordinated with the Joint Staff) had been prepared, copies of which Karamessines had passed out prior to Kissinger’s arrival.

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2 See Document 32.

3 On August 9, under a covering memorandum to Kissinger, Behr forwarded two WSAG Working Group papers: “Surgical Strikes” and “Strike Against AOB.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–071, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Meeting 8/8/69 Korea/Middle East)

4 On July 15, Cord Meyer, Acting Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, sent to Kissinger a memorandum listing possible targets in North Korea for a surgical strike. The unsigned CIA memorandum listed five power plants and contained the summary: “the electric power industry of North Korea is unique in that it represents the most critical component of the nation’s economy. The individual generating plants are remote from the population centers and they are vulnerable to attack by limited numbers of aircraft.” (Ibid., Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69)
Turning to revised draft scenario, Secretary Johnson said that he considered it to be in good shape, although another revision would undoubtedly be required. This scenario is the most difficult to handle from a political viewpoint. Moreover, Kissinger should note that it involved more than a single strike. If the intent is to destroy the AOB, not merely to damage its major elements, the job would require effort over a period of time.

Kissinger asked how long this would be.

Admiral Johnson said a total of 1500 sorties would be required to attack 75% of the NK AOB. The success of each sortie would depend upon the delivery aircraft, tactical aircraft having a lower circular error probable (CEP) than B–52’s. The whole effort would take from three to four days.

Kissinger wondered about the probability of success. Nutter thought that a figure of 50% would be about right.

Kissinger suggested that the next Korean scenario should be an adaptation of what has already been done, but with an objective selected from the non-airfield category. He questioned whether the diplomatic effort would fit for either an airfield strike or one against a power plant. He recalled that both had been considered during the EC–121 incident and that some aspects of each seemed to differ at the time. Secretary Johnson thought the work done to date could accommodate virtually any kind of target with only minor modifications to the diplomatic scenario. Kissinger then asked if a different military plan would be needed for each category of target. Admiral Johnson replied to the contrary, saying that all that is needed is to set a military priority for the various targets under consideration. Kissinger pursued his line of thought, seeking assurance that a basic scenario would fit multiple target situations. He wants to avoid a situation where the President would order a response in 48 hours, only to be told it would take from 48 to 72 hours to build a plan. Nutter and Admiral Johnson assured him such would not be the case—for example in a “surgical strike”, only one scenario would be needed regardless of the target. In all cases the timing would be about the same. Kissinger wanted to know if the strike forces would leave stand-by plans covering the targets selected by the WSAG. Admiral Johnson replied affirmatively, the targets will go to the field as soon as the WSAG authorizes release. Kissinger then asked whether we would have options insofar as delivery units are concerned. Admiral Johnson assured him we would. Either tactical air or B–52’s could be used. Secretary Johnson remarked that naval strikes would depend on the location of the carrier task force.

The group directed their attention to the first scenario prepared by the Working Group. Some confusion existed because only Kissinger and Karamessines held the most recent editions of the draft. Colonel
Haig solved the problem by providing a common document for all to use.

Kissinger summarized with a statement of requirements for all scenarios except large-scale attack against the NK AOB: (1) complete preplanning so that only execution delays would be involved; (2) alternative force options with timing for each option. Admiral Johnson noted that the plans would be good only for the present force posture. Kissinger acknowledged this to be true and said that the JCS will be responsible for amending the plans to reflect existing conditions.

Kissinger asked Secretary Johnson what should be done next. Secretary Johnson re-directed the group’s attention to the heavy response scenario, stating that he had no problems with the sequence of events. The concept of the first part of the paper is to mesh the actions of all of the agencies concerned. Early activity will center around the Korean Task Force headed by Ambassador Brown. The WSAG principals will be notified through the procedures internal to their organizations and would await Kissinger’s call. In the way of crisis preparation, each agency would review its procedures and the WSAG principals would insure that the scenario elements relating to their individual agencies would be adequately covered. All agreed that the WSAG papers would be tightly held.

A discussion of the public information aspects ensued. Secretary Johnson said the handling of the PIO releases (both timing and content) would affect the options available. The draft Presidential statement, for example, would set the tone of much that followed. Kissinger cautioned that the scenarios should take into consideration Presidential style. Mr. Nixon would probably not want to make a public statement at the conclusion of an NSC meeting, but would do so close to the time of the US response. All agreed that the President is the key for both decisions and timing and that it is non-productive to try to “blue print” these aspects of the scenario.

At this point (5:31 P.M.) Kissinger was called out of the meeting. In his absence Secretary Johnson asked for opinions on how the problem of subsidiary decisions was handled in the scenario. He called attention to the lack of mention of decisions on “rules of engagement”, saying that enemy reactions would probably be immediate and US forces would have to be prepared beforehand. Kissinger rejoined the group (5:37 P.M.).

Secretary Johnson said we don’t really have a body of supporting decisions. Instead there are two orders of decisions, the first involving such things as rules of engagement and DEFCON levels, the latter being important from a political as well as military standpoint. DEFCON levels represent “signals” of resolve and will be of particular significance to the Soviet Union. More work is required in developing the
catalog of decisions. Kissinger said the President should be told what decisions he has to make long before the particular decision will be translated into action. The WSAG should recommend a schedule of times when the various decisions should be put into effect. In this context, the scenarios should reflect the time necessary to implement each of the corollary decisions contained in the paper.

Kissinger asked about probable losses. Admiral Johnson said he thought the White House had this information. Colonel Behr confirmed this fact. Probable losses will be available to the President for each of the alternative military responses.

Secretary Johnson then brought up the subject of probable enemy responses. He is generally in agreement with the plausibility of those responses identified in the scenario but believes the comments relating to them are somewhat superficial. Kissinger recalled the lesson of the EC–121 incident that was foremost in his mind. The trick in a crisis is not to do a certain thing but to do it in a way that prevents something worse. But you also have to consider what you will do if your act fails to prevent any escalating response. Would you not, for example, in the event of an attack against the NK AOB have to start ground forces moving west? Admiral Johnson replied that we have to be prepared for the worst, but that certain actions meant different things to different people. A general discussion of possible US and enemy responses followed ending with direction to Ambassador Brown to take another hard look at this part of the paper.

Karamessines said that each response was connected with other events. They did not occur in a vacuum. For instance, while the US may move troops, contact with the USSR (diplomatic and by MOLINK) would signify the willingness of the US to observe a “cease-fire” if the Russians thought they could “deliver” the North Koreans. Kissinger agreed, pointing out that in the Cuban crisis the public statements made by President Kennedy had a direct bearing on the behavior of the Soviets.

Kissinger wondered whether a military action should not be done “ferociously” in order to obtain the full deterrent effect. Secretary Johnson said the WSAG needed to make a fundamental decision in order to provide guidance for the Working Group. Do we play it cool or look fierce? Karamessines said there are pros and cons to each approach. If we take a very determined line, the Soviets will probably believe us—the Red Chinese may not. All agreed that in the heavy response scenario an increased SAC readiness posture should be called for as well as such obvious signals as moving air units westward and alerting the 82nd Airborne Division for movement. Kissinger concluded this portion of the discussion by requesting that the Working Group break out the various decisions on a contingent basis—the reparable ones should be grouped apart from the irreparable.
Secretary Johnson flagged an area of disagreement between State and Defense regarding when the US Embassies in London and Tokyo should be notified. State wants them notified at H–2; Defense at H–Hour. After a full exchange of views Admiral Johnson deferred to State on the timing, requiring only that the time of notification be delayed until absolutely the last minute which would still allow the diplomats time to do their job.

Secretary Johnson took exception with the Joint Staff’s optimism regarding NK ability to retaliate by, say, a strike against Seoul. Admiral Johnson explained the concept of operations at length, stressing airborne radar surveillance and air defense capabilities. He agreed, however, that an air attack against Seoul was possible, but it would probably be light.

Returning to the subject of diplomatic conversations, the possibility of leaks, and the possibility of degrading the US effort, Kissinger questioned the value of getting detailed recommendations and opinions from our diplomatic posts. Unless the President has personal knowledge of, and confidence in, a given Ambassador he is unlikely in a crisis to accept advice from anyone who is not a principal. Secretary Johnson agreed and directed Brown to re-work the paper to reflect that judgment.

Kissinger asked what kind of provocation was the basis for scenario being reviewed. All agreed that only a massive NK attack would call for so drastic a response.

Kissinger inquired about the operational aspects. Who is going to run all of this? No one responded.

Kissinger turned to future events. He called for re-work of the heavy response scenario in accordance with the instructions of the group. This should be followed by revamping the “surgical strike” scenario, bringing it to the same high quality as the other paper. He asked about the status of Middle East planning, asking Admiral Johnson if it were not still true that the military have no plans for a US–USSR confrontation in that area. Admiral Johnson said that is so, but work is in progress. Lack of both bases and forces are the main problems. Secretary Johnson reported on the work being done by Rodger Davies’ Working Group. This work is not up to the quality of the Korean plans, but a great deal of time is being devoted to the problem because of the existing critical situation in the Middle East. Kissinger asked if a draft would be available in two weeks. Secretary Johnson said yes; Admiral Johnson said maybe. Kissinger then said he wanted, of the possibilities which had been discussed, a scenario for the Middle East which postulated the Arabs as aggressors and with Soviet military involvement beyond the now-existing border lines. All agreed this was the most difficult scenario and the one which should be developed as a straw-man.
Kissinger concluded the meeting by suggesting, tentatively a WSAWG meeting at San Clemente with attendance broadened to include the Attorney General and possibly the President. The two Korean plans and a rough cut at a Middle East plan would be the agenda items. The meeting adjourned at 6:36 P.M.

34. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

San Clemente, California, August 14, 1969.

August 14, 1969 NSC Meeting on Korea

[Helm]s

Korea

20% GNP to NK conv. forces; perhaps highest percentage in world.

WW II Soviet equipment for ground forces except AK–47 rifle.

Ground forces in defensive positions, about 350,000 (ROK 535,000).

Higher proportion in combat units than ROK. Short of vehicles, ground support equipment, e.g. for sustained offensive.

380 jet fighters (more accurate than 500 figure previously in use)

Need outside log. support

75 MIG–21s

Most are M–17s, 15s

70–80 IL–28 jet light bombers

35 SA–2 missile sites

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–109, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1969. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the following officials attended the meeting, which lasted from 9:39 a.m. until 12:25 p.m.; the President, Agnew, Rogers, Laird, Mitchell, Wheeler, Richardson, Helms, Lincoln, Haig, Lynn, Holdridge, Green, and Morton Halperin. (Ibid., White House Central Files) Haig prepared draft minutes of this NSC meeting, which are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memoranda to the President, Box CI 312, Meetings, National Security Council. Nixon’s notes on this meeting are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 25.

2 According to Haig’s draft minutes, Helms began the meeting by speaking about North Korea’s armed forces and Kim Il Sung and his policies. In response, Kissinger stated, “In April we saw the North Koreans’ irrationality. We also saw it with the Pueblo incident. It seems to go up and then down.”
NK Navy is coastal defensive force
20% of 15–49 able bodied males in armed forces. GNP growth half that of ROK.

NK does not intend to invade ROK, nor are they trying to provoke attack. Need outside support.

Terrorism
1. to get support for Kim-Il Song
2. disrupt, strain South

RN [Richard Nixon]: What is relative role of China, USSR ideologically?
RH [Richard Helms]: Soviet strong.
RN: How do Sovs give arms—cash & carry?
RH: Grants.
RN: Sovs use NK as counterweight to China?
Ans. Yes.
RN: Sovs are restraining?
RH: Definitely.

Discussion on weakness of NK economy, cool-calculating nature of NK.3

Laird: ROK Army capable of defending against attack by NK with U.S. air, sea, logistic support.

Against unlikely CPR/NK attack, ROK could defend until U.S. re-inforces. Imbalance of force capability (i.e. we have air), air control of log. support, [less than 1 line not declassified].

RN: I wonder if we are doing enough with naval forces in EA. I was surprised that NK boats are faster than ROK.

Are our forces adequate to deal with kind of war we may be engaged in—hit run type of thing? Re: hardware, we aren’t ready for this. We could kick hell out of them if they came frontally. But they may not do this.

We should be good in small boat business. What are we doing?
Laird: We have program in FY 70 budget. Not approved by Congress. Could develop in 6–12 months.

RN: Some of the Coast Guard stuff is 20 years old. This is unbelievable.
RN: We should be able to do this at relatively small cost.

3 According to Haig’s draft minutes, Helms stated that Kim Il Sung “is vain but not irrational.” Rogers added that “he is smart as hell.”
Are Russians better at this than we are?
Wheeler: They’ve put more emphasis on it. Up until recently, Sovs had a shallow water Navy. Our Navy is blue water Navy. Don’t think of defending U.S. coasts.

RN: Here we have great big muscular forces. Jerk water countries do it better. U.S. shouldn’t be in such a position.

RN: Likelihood is that having this capability would be very important. Cost needn’t be great. You’re looking into this? (to Wheeler)
Ans. Navy is.
Wheeler:
18 ROK Divs in country: 515,000
150 Aircraft\(^4\)
230 Craft of all kinds.

RN: Are ROK pilots better trained?
Wheeler: NK are well trained. ROK not better. NK has better equipment.\(^5\)

2-1/3 Div in VN
3 Reserve Divs. which we equipped.

In their wish list, they want us to equip an additional 7 Reserve Divisions. They want us to pay for expansion. Price is $3.2 billion.

RN: Bill, weren’t you impressed with SK morale.
Rogers: Yes, they’re strong—1. except in air, and 2. worried about infiltration by water. You couldn’t do anything about it. They recognize that. They ask for so much. They use scare stories to up their requests.\(^6\)

Rogers: Opposition to Park third term among young, intellectuals.\(^7\) This is loyalty to constitution, opposition to military dictatorship.

Wheeler: ROK have extensive counterinfiltration capability [elaborates].\(^8\)
We have 63,000 men in Korea, 2 Divs, one on DMZ. 137 tac aircraft.

Wheeler: ROK Army well trained, moderately well equipped. Can stop a NK attack acting alone with our support. Air Force clearly inferior, vulnerable.

Only 0–5 min warning of NK surprise attack. We are constructing shelters. ROK Navy is coastal patrol force, at a tactical disadvantage. Need additional equipment to have reasonable assurance of intercepting infiltrators. Incidents way down. Reasons:

1. Improvement in ROK (major need is anti-sea infiltration capability. Also, Homeland Defense Reserve Force needs more weapons. Need communications, transportation).
2. Good initial defense against CPR/NK attack.

Laird: $163 mil MAP this year. Has averaged $160 mil per year. Emphasis has shifted from equipment to O&M (1969–$34 mil for equipment). This is self-defeating policy; older the equip, the more maintenance. We must shift emphasis.

They are interested in development of M–16 plant. Colt is giving us trouble on this.

RN: Can’t we use our leverage? The hell with them. If it’s in our interest, let’s move it. [tells Att’y Gen’l to be tough on them]

Laird: Supplemental is heavily oriented toward equipment. [Problem is Colt price is $17 lower than GM per gun.]

Laird: Options are outlined in NSSM 27.

We should move toward improving ROK capability, “Koreanizing.” Must get ROK to resume MAP transfer program ASAP. Whole emphasis of MAP should be changed.

RN: This is no time to make changes.

Over 1970–75, we will be required to examine whether presence of 50–60,000 troops in Korea is good. We shouldn’t sit back, though Congress would support it.

Laird: Their plan costs $3.2 billion, assumes we stay there.

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9 According to Haig’s draft minutes, Wheeler specified, “Infiltration has dropped off. 761 infiltrators in 1968, of whom 542 crossed the DMZ and 219 came in below it. There were only 103 in 1969, of whom 83 crossed the DMZ and 20 came in below.”
10 Brackets are in the original.
11 Brackets are in the original.
12 Document 2.
13 According to Haig’s draft minutes, Nixon ascribed the poor timing for making a change in the number of U.S. troops in South Korea to “Sino-Soviet tension” and “the south Vietnam problem.” He added, “With regard to our 60,000 troops in Korea, Congress would love to see a reduction.”
RN: We have to develop a plan over a five year period to change situation. We can’t do it precipitately now. Not under pressure, but because it is in our interest.

Rogers: “Fourth alternative” Why can’t ROKs in SVN replace our forces in SK? It’s a natural transition.

RN: Also, you can think of keeping our air and naval forces on maximum basis.

Laird: ROK wants to send more forces in SVN. Pay is 10 times as high there.

RN: We always say “not now.” But we must face fact we aren’t going to have 50,000 troops there 5 years from now, while we must maintain substantial presence, particularly air and navy.

Laird: Support in Congress is based on eventual phase-down of U.S. presence.

RN: We have to look at European situation in terms of what we will face politically, e.g. Mansfield.14 We shouldn’t move now, but we must take hard look at troops in Europe too. If we want to reduce, want to make an asset of it, strengthen ourselves in other ways.

RN: With Park, listen now, not make any commitments.

Laird: We spend $1 billion on our forces. Budget is a problem.

Rogers: Park will say 50,000 is magic number. You could make him happy by saying no reductions at this time (before elections). Work on the fast boat thing.15

Laird: MAP cost is small relative to our costs [RN: I realize that]16

RN: What do we have in Taiwan?

Wheeler: No ground forces, just MAAG, air defense.

Laird: Taiwan MAAG too big.

RN: Taiwan threat is different but it’s there.

Rogers: Our Ambassador thinks there is fat in Korea.

Richardson: We are looking at that as part of Personnel Reductions.17

Wheeler: Doesn’t agree with existence of lots of fat.

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14 Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) had introduced an amendment to reduce the number of U.S. troops in Europe.

15 According to Haig’s draft minutes, Rogers stated, “They don’t need more ground forces—only air. Park needs assurance. The fast boat assist would help. Their Foreign Minister wants destroyers and their President wants small boats.”

16 Brackets are in the original.

17 According to Haig’s draft minutes, Richardson noted, “We are looking at a 10% cut of the back-up apparatus.” Assistant Secretary Green added, “There are 260 bases there that can be cut.”
Richardson: 5 issues

1. Infiltration issue
   Three alternatives
2. Force structure—4 postures
3. [less than 1 line not declassified]
4. Economy
5. Regional Cooperation

Force structure

1. Increased readiness (summarizes)
   (RN: Forget posture 1)
2. Present program
   some modernization
   2 U.S. divisions stay
3. ROK self defense
   Complete modernization of 18 divisions
   2 U.S. divisions withdrawn
4. Less modernization, withdrawal of 1 division

Complete withdrawal raises issue of deterrence.

RN: Except that we have a hell of an air force. If I were NK, I wouldn’t want to cross that line. Morale of U.S. troops is outstanding story. We don’t want to screw it away quickly. Bill is right. We want a long term plan. They can’t do it without Sov support. If they do this, that is different kind of war. UN force, need for Sov support is deterrent.

Rogers: Porter thinks our forces on DMZ should be replaced with South Koreans.

Wheeler: I have no strong feelings.
Reason is 99% psychological.

RN: Do it over a period of time, also supplement your air. Should make Koreans happy, sell them some rifles.

Richardson: 4th Alt.
1 division has same value as 2.
Also, we tie our 2 divisions up in Korea. They can’t go anywhere else. [Wheeler affirms this]
Real savings would come only if deactivated.
Even if not, we would gain flexibility.

Wheeler: You would still save significantly if units not deactivated.
Laird: We can save $225 million just bringing them home.

Richardson: Gives figures on total 5-year costs.

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18 In reference to NSSM 27. See Document 2.
19 Brackets are in the original.
Economic assistance issue: should we continue to scale down.
RN: My gut reaction is not to move in that direction. $135 bil per capita income in my briefing paper. Helping them to develop is really worth it. I have no prejudice. Evaluate the alternative. What do they need to take off?
Richardson: Textiles is major export. [1 line not declassified]
HAK: (to Lynn) [Where does that come from?] 20
Richardson: Army Engineering study says it.
HAK: (to Lynn) [Shouldn’t let this get into papers without review] 21
RN: Can we have a real 5 year study on Korea?
Economic side
Military side
After election, cold turkey it. Make it in context of after Vietnam. We should be thinking of it now, be ready with a plan. Otherwise, they will temporize.
Rogers: Should have Ambassador back for next discussion of 5 year plan. 22
RN: Yes, good idea. Pull relevant guy back. Porter is impressive fellow.

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20 Brackets are in the original.
21 Brackets are in the original.
22 According to Haig’s draft minutes, the following additional comments were made: Rogers stated, “We must not take any side on the election issue.” Nixon asked, “Will it affect Park’s visit?” Rogers replied, “No. Say nice things about Korea.”
San Francisco, California, August 21, 1969, 4:15–6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Talks Between President Nixon and President Pak

PARTICIPANTS
President Richard Nixon
President Pak of the Republic of Korea
Mr. Sang Ho Cho (Korean Interpreter)
Mr. Victor Lee (U.S. Interpreter)

President Nixon: Before we go into a detailed discussion today, I would like to explain a few items on my new policy toward Korea. Kim Il-Song’s regime is one of the most aggressive and unreasonable Communist countries in the world. As you recall, the Pueblo incident occurred before I took over the Presidency. During my election campaign, I noted that to give a warning to North Korea once is sufficient. If North Korea provokes another provocative incident, we will react, are prepared to react and will take measures harsher than the enemy provocation. This message was given to the Soviet Ambassador in the U.S.\(^2\) and I believe it was conveyed to North Korea.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1023, Presidential/HAK MemCons, Memcon—The President and President Pak (Korea). Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the St. Francis Hotel. President Park also made a speech to a Korean-American association at the Presidio in San Francisco earlier on August 21, but the primary purpose of his visit was to meet with President Nixon. This memorandum is attached to an undated memorandum from Lake to Kissinger summarizing the meeting and another one on the morning of August 22. Lake stated that President Nixon indicated he would take the following actions: “to inform the Koreans in advance of the time and number of U.S. troop withdrawals from Vietnam, to study sympathetically MAP, military assistance, and other Korean proposals, to plan to encourage more U.S. private investment in Korea, to help the Koreans with surplus agricultural products, to reappraise the Export/Import Bank’s limited capital so as to probably increase it, to talk with General Bonesteel about more fighter planes for Korea, and to visit Korea during his term of office.” (Ibid.)

2 According to telegram 1693 from Moscow, April 22, Ambassador Jacob Beam delivered this message during his initial call on Kosygin on April 22. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL, US–USSR) Beam’s April 22 oral statement and telegram 1693 are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 39 and 40. No written record that this message was given to Dobrynin has been found. On April 17, at 9:25 a.m., Nixon and Kissinger spoke on the telephone about the shootdown. According to a transcript of their conversation, “President and K[issinger] discussed idea of formal protest—decided should not be done with Soviets.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 434, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korea Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/17/69, Vol. II Haig)
Now I would like to elaborate on my new policy toward Asia.\textsuperscript{3} The press overlooked my statement to the effect that the U.S. will fulfill its treaty obligations with the Asian countries concerned. We will honor the U.S.–ROK Defense Treaty. What we must think over is what would be the best way to keep these commitments. We have relaxed our travel restrictions and purchases with regard to Communist China, but we regard Communist China as an aggressive nation. U.S. policy toward Communist China has not changed, and we will not admit the country into the U.N. It is also necessary in this connection to pay attention to the Sino-Soviet conflict. As you know, the Soviet Union has not helped us in solving the issues concerning Communist China, North Korea, the Vietnam War and the Middle East. It is also one of the countries which provide military aid to North Korea.

We cannot cooperate with the Soviet Union without the latter’s reciprocal acts. Under these circumstances, a collective security with the Soviets against Communist China is meaningless. It is first necessary for the Soviets to act with sincerity.

I believe that the non-Communist countries located on the periphery of Communist China must be strengthened since they are threatened by Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. The Soviet Union will also become a greater threat than now if it is left alone.

Now with regard to Vietnam, we are aware of various efforts made by the ROK in South Vietnam. We are withdrawing our troops from SVN when we think that the South Vietnamese have built the ability to replace them. As we informed you in advance, I agreed with President Thieu at Midway to withdraw 25,000 troops. During my recent talks with him, we decided to replace more troops in August, but we have been withholding taking the measure due to the enemy offensive of 2 weeks ago. Probably within about 10 days, President Thieu, General Abrams and other leaders concerned will talk over the subject again. We will inform you in advance the number and time of these troop withdrawals, which will be carried out as long as they do not affect our combat capabilities.

In regard to the Paris talks, I just had a talk with Ambassador Lodge today, who informed me that there has been no progress. As you know, November 1 is the first anniversary of our bombing halt. If I had been the President last November, I would not have halted the bombing. This is just between us; if there is no further progress in the Paris talks, we will re-evaluate the situation about October 15.

\textsuperscript{3} Reference is to the Nixon Doctrine, first enunciated by President Nixon at Guam on July 25. He stated that the United States expected that Asian nations would increasingly be responsible for their own military defense. For text, see \textit{Public Papers: Nixon, 1969}, pp. 554–556. See also \textit{Foreign Relations, 1969–1976}, volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 29.
I believe that your government’s efforts toward military and economic self-reliance are the correct road to take. I hope that other countries in Asia will follow suit. It is necessary for the U.S. to continue to play a great role in Asia. I think that economic and military aid to those countries like the ROK which make self-reliance efforts should be continued. The self-reliance remarks you made this morning (at the Presidio of San Francisco), I think, were good ones for American public opinion to consume. As a private citizen and government official, I travelled a great deal in the Pacific region. I can assure you that we will not retreat from the Pacific area and we will not reduce our commitments, but I think we need intelligent policy, by giving aid to the countries who attempt to help themselves. I have just made a general statement. Do you have any questions on such subjects as military equipment and economic development?

President Pak: I appreciate hearing your firm policy toward the ROK, Asia in general and the Communist Bloc. I would like to make my views clear on these subjects. As you know, Kim Il-Song during the past 10 years or so has almost completed war preparations to unify the country by force. He is looking for an opportunity to invade the South. He has not done so because of the U.S. commitments to the ROK and the presence of American troops in our country. Kim will provoke a war if he believes that this American policy toward the ROK is going to change or has changed. Kim’s objective in making various provocations is to have American troops stationed in the ROK withdraw as they have done in South Vietnam, alienate the ROK from the U.S. and have the U.S. not intervene when anything happens in Korea. The strengthening of ROK defense would check these provocations of Kim and have him give up the idea of invading the South by force. A way to achieve this objective is to strengthen the equipment and combat capability of the ROK forces rather than to strengthen U.S. forces in South Korea, to the extent that the ROK can singlehandedly resist North Korean invasion, since the U.S. has various commitments all over the world.

President Nixon: If the Soviets or the Chinese invade the ROK, it will be a different ball game. Since you were in the military, I would like to elaborate a little on my decision on the establishment of the ABM network.4 According to our intelligence, Communist China will...
have 25 to 50 ICBM’s by 1976 which can hit targets in the U.S. We now have about 1,000 but without the ABM network a nuclear-armed China might be able to use nuclear blackmail against non-nuclear countries in Asia and pose a danger to the U.S. That is why this subject is so important for the defense and security of the Free World.

President Pak: To continue my views, the Korean War, anti-guerrilla operations (in the ROK) and Vietnamese War have been carried well with U.S. aid. Concerning Korea, I do not think you have to worry about the Korean problem if our equipment is further strengthened. I believe that we can meet North Korean threats without increasing the present level of U.S. force in South Korea if (military) equipment is strengthened.

President Nixon: In this connection, we are now studying sympathetically the MAP and other proposals your side has made following Mr. Packard’s recent visit to your country. I am aware of the fact that some of the ROK units are equipped with weapons of World War II.

President Pak: I appreciate your explanation of the so-called Nixon doctrine on Asia.\(^5\) I agree in principle with your new policy, especially on the aspect of having those countries which have relied on the U.S. since the end of World War II try to help themselves. Some Asians, however, are apprehensive because of their misconception and misunderstanding of your policy, believing that the U.S. intends to wash its hands of Asia, leaving Asian problems to the Asians themselves. They will naturally dispel this apprehension when they fully understand your new policy. It will be necessary for us to give guidelines and study methods of gradually decreasing the U.S. burdens so as to have these Asian countries able to defend themselves. In this connection, I would like to have the U.S. guide various countries of Asia so they can share the responsibility and burdens in accordance with their respective ability. At present, some countries are sharing excessive burdens beyond their ability and vice versa. The Republic of Korea and Japan are good examples. Korea is not only divided but also is a developing country. Japan, despite its strong economy, is hardly carrying its share of the burdens in Asia. The Japanese are even trying to refuse to provide military bases to Okinawa when it is returned to Japan, thus hindering the unity of Asia. Several Asian countries as well as the people of South Korea are dissatisfied with such a Japanese posture. I do not have the details on the bilateral negotiations for the return of Okinawa to Japan, but I believe that if the island is to be reverted to Japan,

\(^5\) See footnote 3 above.
the Japanese share of the burdens in Asia must be increased first, before Okinawa is actually returned.

President Nixon: This is a delicate issue because of the constitution of Japan which we helped draft. For a long time I have thought that Japan should play a much more significant role than the present in its defense and collective economic activity. Some progress has been made in the economic aspect. As you are aware, Prime Minister Sato is coming here in November, and we should make every effort to have him survive politically. Free Korea is very important to Free Japan. Japan spends only about one percent of its GNP in its defense, which I believe is too small.

President Pak: The Japanese say that the defense and security of South Korea and Japan are interrelated, but in practice they haven’t done anything.

President Nixon: That is true.

President Pak: They think that they do not have to do anything since they have South Korea in front of them and the U.S. in back of them. They need U.S. advice in this regard. For example, most of the “equipment” carried by North Korean guerrillas who have infiltrated into South Korea such as their radios and shoes are made in Japan. Although we made a protest against this, they continue to sell these items to make a profit. Thus the people of South Korea have no good feelings toward the Japanese. Incidentally, there have been reports to the effect that since American troops have been withdrawing, other allied troops might follow suit. It is my thinking that unless we are requested by South Vietnam or the U.S., we will continue to station our troops in Vietnam.

President Nixon: There has been no progress in the Paris talks, and November 1 is the first anniversary of our bombing halt. What do you think our tactics should be? Do you think we should reopen the bombings?

President Pak: It is up to your decision, but I think it is difficult (to reopen the bombings) because of your domestic public opinion. When I was informed by Ambassador Porter regarding the bombing halt, last November, I told him how we would be taking this action without reciprocal action or commitment on the part of North Vietnam.

President Nixon: In the event that we resume our bombings, what do you think the reactions of Asia would be?

President Pak: Free countries in Asia would welcome it. But it is up to your decision.

President Nixon: What is your view on the Sino-Soviet conflict? How deep do you think it is and how long do you believe it might last?
President Pak: We have analyzed the situation a great deal. There is a 50–50 chance a war might break out between the two countries. Some believe that a war will not be staged since both of them know they both would suffer a great deal of damage and a war might be a prolonged one. On the other hand, some interpret that the longer the present conflict continues, the harder for the Soviets to deal with Communist China. We also have information that the Soviet military takes a hawkish attitude. One thing is certain, though—the present conflict will not be solved in the near future.

President Nixon: I oppose the view that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should cooperate to restrain Communist China. Both the Soviet Union and China are our potential enemy, and this view does not make sense. If the Soviet Union sweeps over China, the former will get stronger, posing a greater threat to Asia.

President Pak: I agree with you.

President Nixon: This explains the reasons why we have eased the travel restrictions and purchases. We are trying to dispel the Soviet idea of opposing China by cooperating with the U.S. But we will continue to support Free China, and our policy toward Communist China remains the same as before.

President Pak: It would be better for us to remove both powers than have one of the powers get stronger than the other.

President Nixon: The economic growth rate in such countries as South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Free China and Thailand has grown higher than other countries of the world, whereas the economic level of China and North Korea has been lowered. Now the danger is in the area of subversion. This is acute in the ROK, for example, because of forces lying beyond the Parallel. Although, as you know, public opinion here demands reduction of troops we have all over the world, I rejected the idea of decreasing the number of our men staying in the ROK. I will make this view clear to the public to warn Kim Il-Song. I had talks with General Bonesteel, and during the last Cabinet [NSC] meeting we received a report that the supply of small ships to the ROK Navy has progressed at a fast tempo. Although our defense budget this year is tight, I think we will be able to meet some of the requests the ROK has made. I do not want to give a wrong notion to Kim Il-Song that the U.S. is lessening its responsibility for the defense of the ROK. Now, I know you have various economic programs under way. This will be known in two to three weeks, but I would like to inform you that today the Export-Import Bank has decided to give

\[\text{\textsuperscript{6}}\text{ See Document 34.}\]
$73 million to the ROK for the construction of one power plant and an atomic power plant. Since I heard that your country wants more private investment unlike some of the Asian countries, I plan to encourage this aspect.

President Pak: As I told you in the car (while proceeding to the St. Francis Hotel from the Presidio of San Francisco), the ROK is indebted to the U.S. for its economic growth. Our “financial independence rate” until a few years ago was about 50 percent. It will be 94.8 percent in the next fiscal year and almost 100 percent in the year after next. We will, however, need surplus agricultural products for the time being. We have encouraged exports to obtain more foreign currency and private investment. The South Korean people have been making efforts to achieve a self-independent economy, and I hope you would consider giving us assistance to achieve this target during the next several years.

President Nixon: I have held the same view since my first visit to your country in 1953. It is difficult with this year’s budget, but the ROK is an exception.

President Pak: The U.S. has been imposing a restriction on its import of textiles, but I hope that you make the ROK an exception in the measure so as to help the country achieve its economic independence.

President Nixon: The matter on the textiles mainly concerns Japan. The ROK has entered the textile market only during the recent years. I hope that a reasonable solution can be found to satisfy both the ROK and Japan. We can discuss the matter in detail tomorrow, but this is not an easy problem to solve. I will try to deal with the ROK problem discreetly.

President Pak: I think I have told all the subjects I had in mind.

President Nixon: On the troop matter, I will inform you tomorrow if our government and President Thieu have decided on it. We are partners in our common struggle. I know that for the ROK population, South Korea has sent more troops in percentage than the U.S. has done. I will inform you of all the measures we plan to take on Vietnam as they occur.

President Pak: I appreciate listening to your views on various subjects. I am encouraged to hear your remarks on the Korean problem.

President Nixon: It is a little noisy outside, but please remember that 98 percent of the American people are Korea’s friends.

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7 On August 22, from 10:12 to 10:48 a.m., Nixon again met with Park at the St. Francis Hotel. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 434, Korea: EC–121 Shootdown, North Korea Reconnaissance Shootdown 4/17/69, Vol. II Haig. The issues covered in their conversation are summarized in Lake’s memorandum to Kissinger; see footnote 1 above. A joint statement was released at San Francisco on August 22; see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 682–683.
36. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, San Clemente, August 25, 1969

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
Admiral Nels Johnson
G. Warren Nutter
John H. Holdridge
Thomas Karamessines

Korean Contingency Plans

1. Ambassador Johnson noted that the plans were virtually completed but that the appendices would need to be broadened to include such items as Task Force officers, the text of the US–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the text of the UN Security Council Resolution, and the “Declaration of the 16.” He pointed out that a particular issue that could not presently be resolved but would be a question later was the degree to which the UN mantle should be wrapped around our actions as opposed to the degree to which we would rely on the Mutual Defense Treaty. The UN mantle would be an advantage but there are those in the UN who would try to tear it off. In these drafts for the President, the UN toga was not wrapped around much, but we might wish to do so later depending on the circumstances.

2. Dr. Kissinger noted that the drafts had been seen by both the President and the Attorney General, and the President had asked him to tell the group of his intense interest in them. The President had also asked that the Attorney General sit in on the WSAG and be kept informed on crisis situations. The other members welcomed the addition of the Attorney General.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–071, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Meeting 8/25/69 Korea Contingency Plans. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Holdridge. The meeting was held at the Western White House. A summary of conclusions of the meeting is ibid.

2 The Mutual Defense Treaty was signed October 1, 1953, and approved by the U.S. Senate on January 26, 1954. (5 UST (Pt. 2) 2368) UN Security Resolution 82, June 25, 1950, led to direct action by the United States and other UN members in response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea. (UN Doc. S/1501) The Declaration of the 16, signed at Washington on July 27, 1953, related to the armistice of the same day; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1953, p. 247. The Armistice Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement on Prisoners of War are ibid., August 3, 1953, pp. 132–140.
3. Dr. Kissinger raised the question of who would monitor the basic scenarios: State, the WSAG, or the President in the White House. He stated that there would be no minute-by-minute watch in the White House, but there would be a small policy group there, including the Attorney General, which would be superimposed. For the rest, flexibility had to be maintained, and he envisaged different groups spending varying amounts of time, with only the Task Force maintaining a 24-hour watch.

4. Dr. Kissinger offered a comment based on the sense of the President’s thinking: The President would be unlikely short of a full-scale North Korean attack to order major military countermeasures. He also would be unlikely [7 lines not declassified] and a list of all that needs to be done politically. The WSAG would have the responsibility for keeping these plans under constant review, taking into consideration such elements as US force reductions in Korea and elsewhere.

5. Dr. Kissinger raised the question of at what point the Mutual Defense Treaty would be invoked. Ambassador Johnson replied to the effect that US forces on the line would be involved from the beginning, and that the constitutional question would exist only in the United States. This issue also related to the UN, e.g. on the merits of a UN resolution versus reliance on the Mutual Defense Treaty to cloak our actions.

6. Dr. Kissinger declared that we had learned from the EC–121 incident that however difficult it might be now to estimate what might happen in a crisis situation, it would not be easier under the pressure of events to deal with such questions as the pros and cons of the UN approach versus the bilateral. He asked if matters of this nature could not be put into the annex to give some hint as to what would best serve US interests at the time. Other questions should also be put in for the President, such as the UN veto, the make up of the Security Council, etc. It would be helpful to say that if the President accepts the plans, these are the decisions he will have to make, and list the criteria; we would also wish to similarly list decisions which would be deferred. Amplification of the annex then would be called for.

7. Also on the basis of the EC–121 incident, Dr. Kissinger wondered whether on alerts it would not be possible to be more specific, i.e., if we were to go after the North Korean air order of battle, we would certainly then want to go on DEFCON. We should recommend what state of alert should be adopted. The President would want guidance which would help him. This could always be modified. Could we not say now that an increase in SAC readiness would be required? It was agreed that such guidance should be included.

8. The discussions turned to how much advance warning of US actions should be given to the Japanese Prime Minister, with Ambassador Johnson recommending two hours from the diplomatic stand-
point, but agreeing that from the security standpoint, thirty minutes would be more satisfactory. It was left that the decision would be made on the basis of who would be in power in Japan at the time.

9. Dr. Kissinger raised the problem of calling for a North Korean ceasefire. This appeared to him to be acceptable if the North Koreans were to undo what they had done. However, we wanted to avoid a situation where we might trade a territorial fait accompli for a single US air strike, with further action precluded by a ceasefire. He recommended that an asterisk be added (page 16) to the effect that we would not stop our activities or call for a ceasefire until the North Koreans undid what they had done. It was generally agreed that the UN Security Council should be called in the event of a North Korean attack.

10. Dr. Kissinger observed that we [2 lines not declassified] as suggested in the annex. This response should at least be listed. We might wish to look at this aspect through a NSSM.

11. To finish up the comments on Korea, it was agreed that the comments already made applied equally well to the other Korean scenario, and that one more revision should wind up the Korean papers. The only remaining question, as Dr. Kissinger saw it, was the availability of strike forces, and he asked that steps be taken to make certain that the needed forces were on hand.

[Omitted here is discussion of China and the Middle East.]

John H. Holdridge
MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT’S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (KISSINGER) TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NSSM 27 STEERING GROUP (BROWN)


SUBJECT
Guidance on NSSM 27

The President has directed the completion of the NSSM 27 evaluation of U.S. policy and program alternatives for Korea. In light of NSDM 4, he expects that this study will:

—present the alternatives considered in the form of five year plans for U.S. policy and programs toward Korea.
—include a description of the key program and budgetary decisions to implement a given plan and their timing over the next five years.

After being briefed on the NSSM 27 summary, the President also decided that:

—U.S. and ROK force structures posed in Alternative 1 of the NSSM 27 summary need not be considered further.
—ROK air and naval forces, particularly fast patrol boats, will be strengthened, if necessary, to meet the threat of North Korean “hit and run” attacks.
—U.S. economic assistance to Korea may be maintained if it will in fact strengthen Korea’s prospects for rapid economic growth.

I understand that IG/EA’s comments on the NSSM 27 summary will be available shortly. When they are submitted, the study should be revised as appropriate in cooperation with my Program Analysis staff. The NSSM 27 summary should be completed by October 15, 1969 in preparation for another National Security Council meeting on Korea.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-041, Review Group Meeting—NSSM 27 Korea 2/6/70. Secret. Copies were sent to Rogers, Laird, Helms, Mayo, Hannah, Shakespeare, and Wheeler.

2 Document 2.


4 Document 27.

5 No record of an additional NSC meeting on Korea in 1969 was found. The next NSC meeting on Korea was held on March 4, 1970 (see Document 55).
38. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, September 17, 1969, 4:45–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Status Review of WSAG Papers

PARTICIPATION
Henry A. Kissinger—Chairman
State
U. Alexis Johnson
William Cargo
Defense
G. Warren Nutter
CIA
Thomas H. Karamessines
JCS
Vice Admiral Nels C. Johnson
NSC Staff
Col Alexander M. Haig
Harold H. Saunders
John H. Holdridge
William G. Hyland
Col. Robert M. Behr

Summary of Decisions

[Omitted here is the summary of decisions unrelated to Korea.]

2. Korea Papers—agreed actions:

   b. Add section for Presidential review, which supports concept of a “quick, ferocious and decisive” response to a major NK provocation.
   c. Subject to additions described above, Korea Papers are considered complete. They will require amendment as necessary and review every three months.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970 [6 of 6]. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Situation Room at the White House. Behr forwarded the minutes through Haig to Kissinger under a September 22 memorandum.
3. General—

As a part of the overall contingency planning process, a check-list item should be an early determination of satellite surveillance requirements along with a set of implementation procedures.

The meeting began at 4:45 P.M. with Secretary Johnson in the chair in the absence of Kissinger who was detained in the President’s office. The acting chairman suggested that the agenda be limited to a wrap-up of the Korean papers and a discussion of the Sino-Soviet paper. The Middle East papers are not yet, he stated, in a form to be addressed by the principals. He called upon Cargo to set the stage for discussions of the Sino-Soviet paper.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Korea.]

Kissinger then turned to the Korea papers, asking if they were ready for WSAG approval. Secretary Johnson replied affirmatively, but subject to the addition of the text, and short discussion, of the Soviet-North Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. Kissinger said he had only one reservation about the Korea scenario, and that had to do with the effectiveness of alerting procedures and DEFCON level as signal of U.S. resolve. He noted two things to be avoided in handling a crisis situation—on the one hand timidity, and on the other hand, those actions signalling prelude to major war. Would not a quick and ferocious response that would clearly be a “one shot” operation be a more suitable course in order to discourage North Korea from further response? He will write up this alternative, giving the President the benefit of both views. After this addition, the Korean scenarios will be considered finished, with the understanding that they will be up-dated as required when military dispositions change. Additionally, they will be reviewed every three months.

No definite date was set for the next WSAG meeting other than that one would be required before Secretary Johnson returns from vacation on October 6, 1969.

The meeting adjourned at 6:30 P.M.
Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Your Conversation with Ambassador Porter—Talking Points

You are scheduled to see Ambassador Porter at 5:00 p.m. today.²

Suggested Talking Points:

—NSSM 27. The NSC took a preliminary look at NSSM 27 on August 14.³ You hope that it will consider the finished paper in late October. The President’s preliminary reactions are of interest: He wanted the study couched in concrete five-year planning terms. He ruled out the “top option” of increased ROK preparedness plus a major US presence, but at the same time he appeared to accept the possibility that a substantial US presence will be required for the indefinite future. How should our role in Korea look five years hence?

—Supplemental MAP for Korea. The President has shown interest in providing additional MAP to Korea this year. Congressman Broomfield has already submitted an amendment adding $100 million to the Korean MAP package, and we are considering how to handle this.⁴ As Ambassador Porter knows, Defense has twice submitted suggestions in recent months for supplemental MAP aid, once for $108 million and once for $88 million. We have held these up pending the chance to integrate them with the thinking that comes out of NSSM 27. In specific terms, we found a strange sense of unreality and a lack of focus. It was unclear whether the supplemental was intended to meet the North Korean air threat or its infiltration capabilities. Moreover, in the Korean

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² No record of the meeting has been found.

³ See Document 34.

⁴ In a memorandum to Kissinger, also dated September 19, Holdridge recommended supporting Broomfield’s amendment. He noted that it provided the necessary legislation for the $100 million in additional Korean MAP that President Nixon favored and could be tailored to the conclusions reached from NSSM 27 because it was not tied to specific expenditures. He added that the Broomfield amendment funds would be available for use in subsequent years, unlike other MAP proposals for Korea. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. I, to 9–69)
context, we are suspicious of a counter infiltration program which seems to rely on a sophisticated, integrated radar network, and which made no provision at all for high speed patrol craft, which seemed to be the prime necessity. What does Ambassador Porter think of the priorities for MAP at this stage? How much will this cost?

—ROK Self-confidence. Given the economic performance of the ROK, we are mystified by the degree to which it seems to remain mesmerized by the North Koreans. Why don’t the ROKs undertake a more active campaign to seize the propaganda initiative from North Korea? The Communists propose postal exchanges and family reunions. Given the relative economic and political conditions of the two countries, one would think that the ROK could seriously embarrass the North Koreans by promoting their own exchanges. Why is it still so important to the ROK to prevent North Korea diplomatic contact abroad? They are fighting a losing battle, over the long term; would they not be well advised to get off it?

—The Third Term. Are we right in assuming that Park is a shoo-in to get his third term amendment in the referendum next month? How will this affect the Korean political scene? Will the opposition be strengthened or weakened by his decision to press ahead for a third term amendment? Did the short-cutting of parliamentary procedures in the past two months seriously damage the prospects for democracy in Korea?

40. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Textile Negotiations and Korea

Marshall Green has sent you a memorandum (Tab A)\(^2\) requesting that Phil Trezise be authorized to tell certain highly-placed Japanese on a confidential basis that we intend to discuss textiles with the

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\(^2\) Dated October 3, attached but not printed.
Koreans after the Korean Referendum on President Park’s third team. He indicates, correctly, that I have not concurred in this course.

Marshall’s rationale is that (a) the Japanese have been stirred up by a press conference recently given by Secretary of Commerce Stans in which Stans took a very hard line on restricting Japanese textile imports, and (b) the Japanese therefore will want to know from Trezise (who is going to Japan to negotiate liberalization of Japanese imports from the US and not to talk about textiles) whether others are also facing US import restrictions on textiles. The point is put forward that Trezise’s whole mission may be prejudiced if he cannot tell senior Japanese that the ROK, Hong Kong, and the GRC are also involved. I presume that the assumption, although not stated, is that misery loves company and that the Japanese will feel all right about the restrictions on them if they are aware that others are also subject to restrictions.

My problem concerns the President’s decision not to bring up the textile question with the Koreans until after the Referendum, and his assurance to Park in San Francisco\(^3\) that the textile question would be handled “discreetly.” In my judgment, we can have no assurance that the Japanese who would learn about Korean involvement would not leak; on the contrary, I believe that they would have every incentive to leak. They would not be addressing Trezise as individuals but as representatives of an entire industry that is bothered by restrictions, and would certainly wish to pass on whatever Trezise tells them to the manufacturers they represent—who in turn would probably make the information public, even if the people at the top did not. The result would be that Park and the Koreans would learn about the boom being lowered on them before the Referendum, which is precisely what we are trying to avoid. Worse, the Koreans would learn about the matter from the Japanese press, which hardly could be considered discreet handling. We would be likely to end up with two angry Presidents on our hands. I have told all this to Marshall Green, who, as you may recall, was the very one who wanted to delay informing the Koreans until after the Referendum. All this can be avoided if we simply do what the President said.

I do not agree with the argument that Trezise’s whole purpose will be compromised if he cannot discuss textile restrictions. The Japanese are thoroughly aware of the growing resentment in the US of the fact that the Japanese howl about our restrictions and yet are extremely rigid in excluding US-manufactured goods from Japan. They must know that they are going to have to make concessions on their part if they wish to avoid US import quotas being imposed on them. This is the argument which will count, not the knowledge that there are others who will share their bed of pain on textiles.

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\(^3\) See Document 35.
Incidentally, the Referendum is now set for October 27. I think that we ought to be able to hold the line for three more weeks, having done so this long. I checked this out with Bob Hormats in Fred Bergsten’s office, who strongly agrees.

**Recommendation**

That you not concur in Marshall Green’s request.4

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4 Kissinger initialed his approval on October 8.

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**41. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon**


**SUBJECT**

Helicopter Crew Members Held by North Koreans

Secretary of State Rogers has sent a memorandum to you (Tab A)2 noting that the North Korean attitude at the Military Armistice Commission meetings since the helicopter incident3 gives us no room to believe that Pyongyang will accept anything less than past procedures, including an apology, to effect the release of the helicopter crew. On humanitarian grounds, he suggests that the time may now have come to reconsider our current negotiating position,4 and recommends that

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Helicopter Incident. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action.

2 Dated October 2, attached but not printed.

3 A U.S. helicopter on a training mission on August 17 inadvertently flew into North Korean airspace over the DMZ and was shot down. Its three injured crewmen were captured. The North Koreans refused at three public meetings of the Military Armistice Commission and in two private meetings to consider their return until the United States publicly apologized.

4 In telegram 147500 to Seoul, August 31, the Department instructed the UN Command senior member, General Adams, to “express regret and acknowledge unintentional violation of the armistice agreement,” but to “specifically avoid the use of the word ‘apology,’” and “under no circumstances should he admit that the flight over North Korean territory was an intentional violation of North Korean airspace for military or intelligence purposes.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Helicopter Incident)
we follow the precedents in the *Pueblo* and the 1963–64 helicopter cases. He attaches two conditions: we should sign the document of the nature desired by the North Koreans only when assured that signature will secure early release of the crew members; and that we should defer until after the Korean Item debate in the General Assembly signature of any language which goes beyond that suggested in a draft telegram containing instructions to our MAC representative (Tab B).\(^5\)

The instructions to our MAC representative hedges on the matter of calling the incident a “criminal act” by saying only that the DPRK regards this as a criminal act for which the UNC side tenders an apology. This is a slight back away from the previous formulation, and State proposes to stand fast on it, until at least after the UNGA consideration of the Korean Item.

**Recommendation**

I doubt that the North Koreans will yield on their demand for an apology on their terms, and may even balk at State’s reformulation. If we want the men back, we will sooner or later have to go through this drill. I am assured by State that the language as proposed will not cause us any particular problem in the UNGA debates, nor affect the continued UN presence in South Korea. I would favor, therefore going ahead as State requests.\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Attached but not printed.

\(^6\) Nixon initialed his approval on October 8. The President’s approval of the draft instructions was conveyed to the Department of State on October 14; the instructions and the draft were transmitted in telegram 177837 to Seoul, October 21. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Helicopter Incident)
WASHINGTON, OCTOBER 6, 1969.

SUBJECT
Aerial Reconnaissance of North Korea

At the 303 Committee meeting on June 17, 1969, consideration was given to a JCS proposal to fly four to six SR-71 overflights of North Korea monthly subject to 303 Committee approval each month. On June 20th you specifically approved two initial SR-71 overflights of North Korea.

The two initial flights and a third authorized by the 303 Committee in early August produced considerable significant intelligence not before available. There was no known North Korean reaction to these overflights. Approval for additional SR-71 overflights has been withheld by the Committee during the current negotiations with the North Koreans for release of the captured U.S. three-man helicopter crew.

The helicopter crew have now been in North Korean hands for approximately six weeks, and negotiations for their release still seem to be making no progress.

The Department of Defense and CIA would like to resume SR-71 overflights of North Korea on an approximately once a month basis subject to review of intelligence requirements and mission by mission approval of the 303 Committee.

The Department of State believes resumption of these missions may jeopardize negotiations for the release of the three prisoners and recommends a continued indefinite SR-71 stand-down pending their outcome.

Mr. Mitchell and I agree with Messrs. Packard and Helms that the North Koreans will probably release the prisoners only when it suits their purposes to do so and that an SR-71 overflight at this time will have little or no direct impact on their decision.

Recommendation
That you approve resumption of SR-71 overflights of North Korea during the month of October 1969 and approximately once monthly thereafter subject to mission by mission approval of the 303 Committee.2

2 Nixon initialed his approval on October 8.
Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Need for an Examination of Military Procedures in Korea

There have been a number of instances over the years in which US airplanes and helicopters have strayed across the DMZ. Some of them have gone undetected; others have led to politically costly verbal concessions at Panmunjon when we have undertaken to ransom the pilots.

On the ground, the circumstances under which four US soldiers were murdered within the DMZ\(^2\) suggest that operating procedures are too relaxed for such a zone of tension.

Such incidents may lead to further diplomatic humiliation and unnecessary loss of life. They could, conceivably, result in something much more serious. The particular combination \[I line not declassified\], coupled with the evidence of North Korean daring provided by the Blue House raid, suggest one such possibility.

I believe that an effort was made to tighten up the aerial navigation regulations, after the May 1963 helicopter incident, but the steps clearly have not been adequate.

More stringent controls may be necessary, such as

— instituting procedures whereby no soldiers enter the DMZ without adequate cover.
— grounding aircraft with limited navigational equipment in all except contact conditions.
— improving navigational aids and carrying out training flights in areas other than the border (the latest helicopter incident apparently was a training flight).
— monitoring our own flights with radar in the border area.
— prohibiting non-essential flights in the vicinity of the DMZ.

This seems an appropriate subject for a report by DOD to the Under Secretaries' Committee.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger noted on the memorandum: “Al—Should see if this maybe is better to have DOD report to us? What do you think?”

\(^2\) On October 18, four American soldiers were ambushed and killed in the DMZ.
Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Under Secretary Richardson at Tab A.³

³ Kissinger evidently did not sign the memorandum to Richardson, which is attached. An October 29 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger stated that “nothing would be more self-defeating than to ask for an examination of our military procedures in Korea by the Under Secretaries Committee. I believe this would open the door to the extent required for Under Secretary Richardson, with Dave Packard’s acquiescence, to table the Porter proposal that we relocate all US forces in Korea to a position south of the DMZ. This, of course, would be the preliminary to a subsequent proposal for a substantial reduction in our forces there.” Haig instead recommended that Laird be asked to examine the “existing procedures for military operations along the DMZ and keep the problem within Department of Defense channels.” Kissinger wrote “I agree” in the margin of Haig’s memorandum and signed a revised memorandum to Laird, October 29, that requested a Department of Defense report be submitted to the President. (Ibid.)

44. Editorial Note

On November 20, 1969, John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council staff sent a memorandum to Henry Kissinger, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, about the imprisoned helicopter crew in North Korea. Holdridge indicated that “State proposed to authorize the United Nations Commander in Korea to sign the apology proposed by the North Koreans, when he believes this will result in a simultaneous release of the three imprisoned helicopter crew members. The UN Commander is authorized to sign a receipt going no farther than the language of the apology. When the prisoners are released, the UN Command spokesman is authorized to make a low-key statement denying the ‘criminal act’ and setting forth the facts of the case.” Kissinger initialed his approval of an attached Department of State cable to Seoul, which was sent as telegram 19634, November 21. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 540, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Helicopter Incident).

On December 2, North Korea released the U.S. helicopter crew after receiving an official apology. The United Nations Command released a statement at Panmunjom, together with a document signed that day by Major General Arthur H. Adams, Senior Member, United Nations Command Side, MAC, which explained that “to secure release of the three helicopter crew members, General Adams was authorized to sign a statement today that the United Nations Command side had committed a ‘criminal-act’ by ‘infiltrating’ the helicopter ‘deep’ into the territory under the control of North Korea.” The complete texts of both documents are printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 22, 1969, page 583.

45. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


I think the time has come to reduce our Korean presence. We could not do so because of the EC 121 at any earlier date but I do not want us to continue to temporize with this problem. What I have in mind is to maintain the air and sea presence at whatever level is necessary for the kind of retaliatory strike which we have planned. On the other hand, I think it is time to cut the number of Americans there in half and I want to see a plan which will implement this laid before me before the end of the year. It, of course, should be well worked out and sold to the Koreans on a proper basis.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 341, Subject Files, HAK/Presidential Memoranda, 1969–1970. No classification marking. Haig initialed the memorandum and added: “Lynn has action.”

46. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹


SUBJECT

General Wheeler on his Conversation with President Park of Korea

Secretary Laird has sent you (Tab A)² a memorandum in which General Wheeler describes his conversation with President Park during the Korean Armed Forces Day ceremonies on October 2.

² Dated November 10, attached but not printed.
Wheeler reports that Park was relaxed and cordial. He appeared to feel in control of the present situation but concerned at the prospect of a pull-out or substantial reduction in American troops in Korea.

President Park made the following principal points:

— he wants to build up the Home Reserve Forces to help forestall North Korean hit-and-run raids along the coasts.
— he wants to avoid extreme actions and does not intend to “march north.”
— the North Koreans will not attempt all-out war if the South Korean economy prospers and US forces remain, but war is “inevitable” if US forces are withdrawn.
— therefore, the ROK needs to match North Korean armed forces to deter or defeat aggression, and must have an independent defense capability. (Note: this is somewhat contradictory with the previous point and seems to accept that at some future point the ROK will “go it alone.”)3

3 Nixon noted at the end of the memorandum: “I want a plan developed now to bring about the ROK take over—U.S. to provide a trip wire & air & sea support only.”

“December 6, 1969” is stamped next to the note.

47. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Reduction in U.S. Presence in Korea

You requested that a plan for reducing the U.S. presence in Korea by half be presented to you soon.2 I have scheduled an NSC meeting on Korea for January 213 and an overall plan for U.S. policy and programs in Korea will be ready for your consideration then.
Preparation for a Korea Decision

We have had a comprehensive study of U.S. policy toward Korea underway for some time. You reviewed the preliminary results in the NSC meeting on Korea in August.4

I think that this report will provide an excellent framework for you to use in making known your decision on your policy toward Korea and the U.S. presence there for the next five years. It will lay out the principal policy and program alternatives toward Korea in the following areas:

—U.S. force and presence levels in Korea,
—U.S. military and economic assistance packages consistent with each U.S. presence,
—U.S./ROK burden sharing in both military and economic matters.

The scope and thoroughness of this report should enable you to formulate an overall policy toward Korea and to adjust the U.S. programs in Korea accordingly.

This Korea plan is now being revised on the basis of agency comments. It will be ready for your consideration by late December. I have scheduled an NSC meeting on Korea for January 21.

The implementation of your decision to reduce the U.S. presence in Korea will require a sound approach to consultations with the ROK so that we can minimize the likelihood of a confrontation with President Park or a pullout of ROK troops from Vietnam.

Fortunately, State and DOD have already started to work out approaches to these problems without any knowledge of your decision. As a result, the implementation of U.S. presence reduction following the NSC meeting on Korea can probably be carried out smoothly and rapidly.

If you approve, I will proceed with preparation of a Korea plan for an NSC meeting on January 21 and ensure that work on the implementation of your decision is completed shortly afterwards.5

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4 See Document 34.
5 Nixon initialed the “Approve of Korea Schedule” line on December 16.
WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 15, 1969.

SUBJECT: Korean DMZ Incidents

After the downing of a helicopter over North Korea was followed by the ambush of four U.S. soldiers in the DMZ on October 18, the Department of Defense was asked to provide you with a report on the adequacy and suitability of existing procedures for U.S. operations in that area. At Tab A is Mel Laird’s response. His report contains a detailed summary of present precautions taken for air and ground operations in the DMZ. In assessing the incidents, Laird indicates, inter alia, that:

—The cause for disorientation of the helicopter pilot is inexplicable since the weather was clear, the pilot was technically qualified, and existing procedures were followed (item 6 of report).
—Contrary to existing instructions, a machine gun jeep escort was not provided for the ambushed work team (item 11).
—The incidents were the result of personnel error rather than inadequate procedures.

Laird concludes that existing procedures are “adequate and suitable.” Personnel error is, of course, always possible. But as a minimum, all personnel operating in the DMZ should be frequently reminded of the importance of following instructions to the letter and indoctrination qualifications of helicopter pilots must not become perfunctory. I believe that the incidents themselves will tend to ensure stringent adherence to existing procedures in the near future. However, an informal check should be made about six months from now that personnel near the DMZ have not become relaxed about adhering to standing procedures.
1. DOD reports that during Secretary's meeting with Ambassador Kim January 20\(^2\) conversation turned from current MAP prospects to importance of higher levels of MAP and problems of SecDef with respect to both MAP and his defense budget. In course discussion Secretary made series of statements in essence as follows:

A. Pressures for reduction of our forces in Korea are increasing.
B. ROK forces should be modernized before we withdraw any of our forces. Secretary Laird therefore attaches high priority to increased level of MAP for Korea.
C. It is part of the Nixon Doctrine that MAP be increased in some countries to permit reductions of U.S. forces in those countries.

2. Before relating MAP to troop withdrawals Secretary Laird had said that administration proposal of $425 million for world-wide MAP included $164 million for Korea, which he considers absolute minimum. He said this could be reduced to $140 million if the MAP appropriation now being considered by conference committee is not increased above the $350 million in the authorization bill. He favors an additional $50 million MAP for Korea and he favors a MAP supplemental for Korea in FY 70 if appropriation remains at $350 million figure, but these were his, rather than administration's, views. Question of supplemental would depend in part on outcome forthcoming NSC meeting on Korea. (DOD memcon will be forwarded in due course.)

3. On January 21 Ambassador Kim telephoned Assistant Secretary Green regarding Secretary Laird's comments on troop withdrawals and spoke also with Deputy Assistant Secretary Brown. DOD concurs fully with position we are taking with Kim that:

A. Secretary Laird was not saying any USG decisions had been made or that there would be any immediate U.S. troop withdrawals. Rather he was emphasizing the importance of additional MAP for modernization of ROK forces.
B. We do not have any proposal regarding troop withdrawal to make at this time. We always consult with ROKG on matters of that

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Peters (EA/K), approved by Brown and S/S, and in draft by Ware (DOD/ISA). Repeated to CINCPAC.

2 No record of Laird's meeting with Kim has been found.
degree of importance and we would certainly do so before taking any step to reduce U.S. force level.

4. Kim said that there was no misunderstanding, that he had not understood Secretary Laird to be talking about immediate troop withdrawals and that in fact he did not plan to report the discussion to Seoul. He added that he personally is very much opposed to associating MAP increases with U.S. troop reductions.

5. This background furnished in case Kim, contrary to his statement to us, does report to Seoul.3 DOD concurs.

Rogers

3 In telegram 949 from Seoul, January 30, Porter informed Rogers that “I would judge from attitudes being displayed at high levels here that Kim has reported to Seoul.” Porter also suggested that “though ROK’s will claim ‘modernization’ should apply to every aspect of their forces, they have adequate material in many categories. Subject to Gen Michaelis’ views, I would say that where they need modernization is in matter of transport and small arms.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70)

50. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Economic Assistance Program to Korea for FY 1970

State requests your approval of a FY 1970 economic assistance program for Korea of $128 million, comprised of $93 million in PL 480 Title I loans, $20 million in Development Loans, $10 million in Supporting Assistance, and $5 million in Technical Assistance (Tab A).2 It is designed to support Korea’s large defense effort and economic development program. The amounts have now all been appropriated by Congress. All agencies concur.


2 Attached but not printed at Tab A is a December 30, 1969, memorandum from Richardson to Nixon, recommending a $128.2 million FY 1970 economic assistance program for Korea. Richardson noted that the Departments of Treasury and Agriculture concurred.
The Korean GNP has risen at a spectacular rate of 11 percent per annum since 1964. However, growth has been accompanied by rising inflationary pressures, balance of payments problems, and a rapid increase in external debt. The proposed program will be accompanied by self-help conditions, supporting economic stabilization and debt control measures recommended by the World Bank and IMF. It maintains the declining trend in our economic assistance to Korea, as the country moves toward a self-sustaining economic position.

A $39 million credit for Korean purchases of U.S. rice, which (270,000 tons) is part of the proposed PL 480 package, involves a proposed waiver of Korea’s local currency downpayment. Section 103 of PL 480 permits such a waiver where you determine that a downpayment would be inconsistent with the Act, and it was done on a similar deal in 1969.

Agriculture, responding to pressures from California rice growers anxious to dispose of a large surplus, recommends that you authorize the waiver to reduce our terms below those of the Japanese and thus to assure our rice a portion of the Korean market. The remaining portion (230,000 tons) of Korea’s estimated 500,000 ton import requirement will probably be supplied by the Japanese on concessional terms.

Next month the National Security Council is scheduled to consider U.S. long-range posture with respect to Korea, including our level of military presence, military and economic assistance programs, and trade policies. The present proposal pertains only to the rest of FY 1970, and in no way prejudices any future decisions, e.g. an increase in economic assistance as a quid pro quo for possible decreases in U.S. military force levels. Such assistance would be provided out of AID’s and/or Agriculture’s budget for FY 1971 and beyond.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the Korean economic assistance program as proposed by State. Budget (Tab B), Treasury, and Agriculture concur.

2. That you waive the local currency downpayment on the $39 million credit rice sale. Agriculture, Treasury, and Budget concur.4

3 Attached but not printed at Tab B is a January 17 memorandum from Mayo to Nixon, recommending approval of the Department of State’s proposal noting that the “program proposed here does not foreclose a decision to increase economic assistance as a quid pro quo for possible adjustments in U.S. military force levels. Such increase could be provided from AID’s FY 1971 budget and from Agriculture’s FY 1971 budget for PL. 480 concessional sales.”

4 Kissinger initialed approval for Nixon of recommendations 1 and 2 on January 31.
51. Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting

Washington, February 6, 1970, 2:45–3:35 p.m.

SUBJECT
Korea (NSSM 27)

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
William I. Cargo
Winthrop Brown
Donald McHenry
Defense
Richard A. Ware
CIA
Edward Proctor
JCS
LTG F. T. Unger
OEP
Haakon Lindjord
USIA
Frank Shakespeare
BOB
James R. Schlesinger
NSC Staff
John Holdridge
John Court
Jeanne W. Davis

Summary of Decisions

1. The JCS will readdress the question of the number of ROK divisions that would be required to defend against a North Korean attack and against a combined NK/Communist Chinese attack, taking into account possible increased MAP or increased modernization, and provide an analysis of force figures by February 13.2

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. On February 3, Lynn sent Kissinger a memorandum in which he provided a progress report on the NSSM 27 study. (Ibid.) For the preliminary response to NSSM 27, see Document 27.

2 See Document 52.
2. Eliminate Posture 4; add to Posture 2 the concept of the minimum US force that would be required with a modernized ROK force—i.e., the proper mix of US and ROK forces to achieve the objective, assuming minimum US forces.

3. Review the MAP figures and reconsider the cost figures to reflect some flexibility: e.g., totals for the period 1971–75 as opposed to 1970–74; withdrawal by June 1971 rather than June 1972.

4. Hold another RG meeting on February 19 and an NSC meeting on February 25.

(State and JCS representatives circulated proposed amendments to the Issues Paper at the table.)

Mr. Kissinger asked Amb. Brown why they had wished to advance consideration of the Korean item.

Amb. Brown replied there were two reasons: (1) State’s desire to allow maximum time between any decisions which may be made about US force posture in Korea and the Korean elections in 1971, so as to give Park maximum freedom of maneuver; and (2) to ensure that any decisions on US forces in Korea receive thorough consideration and are not taken hastily in view of the severe budgetary pressures on the Defense Department.

Mr. Kissinger asked if all agreed with the statement of the issues, including the comments circulated by State at the table.

Mr. Cargo referred to State comment No. 3 and recommended that Postures 4 and 5 be eliminated from discussion in order to simplify the paper.

Mr. Kissinger asked how these postures came to be included and if anyone was opposed to their elimination.

General Unger noted that the postures were stated in terms of what would be required to resist a North Korean attack or a combined North Korean/Chinese Communist attack, with current equipment or with modernized equipment. The JCS took the position that, assuming continued presence of two US divisions, 19 ROK divisions would be required to resist a combined attack. He agreed that future developments, including increased MAP, could permit a reduction of these figures, but thought that at the present time any reduction below the 19 division

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3 A Review Group meeting was held on February 16 but dealt with France. A special NSC meeting on February 25 dealt exclusively with Israel. According to a February 23 memorandum from Cargo to Colonel Davenport, a “pre-Review Group meeting” was held on February 19 to discuss changes to the NSM 27 study. Cargo included a paragraph to be inserted “to flag the political problems associated with an adjustment of US posture in Korea.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970) The minutes of the February 19 meeting have not been found.

4 The NSC meeting was postponed until March 4; see Document 55.
level would risk defeat. Therefore, the JCS reserved its position on the last paragraph of page 2 of the Issues Paper and suggested a restatement of page 3, paragraph 3, along the lines of the amendment distributed at the table. He expressed grave concern at the sources of the figures used in the paper and said he had asked the Chiefs to readdress the question of the number of ROK divisions that would be required, taking into account possible increased MAP or increased modernization.

Mr. Court pointed out that the Defense Department had cleared the statements in the Issues Paper.

General Unger agreed that there had been a great deal of work on these issues but said the JCS had not really analyzed the meaning and the effect of “modernized” equipment versus present equipment. He cited the statement that 16 to 18 divisions with modernized equipment would equal 23 divisions with current equipment. He cited the statement that during the Korean War 17 US and ROK divisions had defeated one million North Korean/Communist Chinese, but pointed out that half of these 17 were US divisions, and that we had complete air supremacy. He said the whole situation was being readdressed by the Chiefs, noting, for example, that the cost figures on the list of equipment needed for modernization for 18 divisions totalled $800 million.

Mr. Kissinger said the President hates to be hit cold on issues of this kind and he would be reluctant to go into an NSC meeting at which General Wheeler would raise these issues before the President for the first time. He asked Ambassador Brown if he would object if the NSC meeting were postponed to February 25.

Ambassador Brown agreed, but pointed out that he had asked these questions concerning force structures a year ago and thought he had the answers.

General Unger agreed that there had been military participation throughout the drafting of the study, but he had found that many of the statements in the paper were based on figures the source of which he had been unable to determine.

Ambassador Brown agreed it was more important to discuss the issue thoroughly even if it meant a slight delay.

Mr. Kissinger said we should look at the military assumptions again.

Mr. Cargo agreed that this was essential, saying he had assumed that we had Defense agreement on these assumptions.

Mr. Kissinger said he was surprised at the statement that 21 ROK divisions could defend against a North Korean attack and 23 ROK divisions could defend against a combined North Korean/Communist Chinese attack.

He thought it was necessary to get these various assumptions straightened out.
General Unger asked if it had been agreed to drop Postures 4 and 5.
Mr. Kissinger asked if there were a consensus on considering the first three postures.

Mr. Ware suggested that the issue be considered in terms of what would be the minimum US force required combined with an effective ROK force.

General Unger added that the political effect of the various postures should also be considered.

Mr. Cargo thought that Postures 1, 2 and 3 embraced the political/military realm.

Mr. Kissinger asked if the Koreans would be willing to go down to 14 divisions. It was agreed that they would not.

Mr. Kissinger agreed with Mr. Ware’s suggestion that the issue should be considered in terms of what the ROK needed to enable us to get by with a minimum US force there. He thought it should also take into account the corollary MAP programs.

General Unger pointed out that the MAP was based on 1968 figures.

Mr. Kissinger asked that these MAP figures be reviewed. He asked if there was possibly another option: minimum US forces plus adequate ROK force.

Mr. Schlesinger asked if the MAP figures included the possibility of drawing on excess stocks.

Mr. Ware said this was very difficult to do because they do not know more than one quarter ahead what the services will release as excess.

Mr. Schlesinger noted that Congress has authorized only $350 million for MAP next year. He thought going back to Senator Fulbright’s Committee for supplemental MAP funds would be extremely tough since the feeling on military assistance is running very high.

Mr. Ware commented that this was a basic issue—the relationship of MAP to troop withdrawals and defense expenditures. He thought these must be discussed in relation to the FY 1971 supplemental request.

Mr. Kissinger noted that, at the time of the question of the jet aircraft for Nationalist China, the President had indicated he was more interested in the Korean supplemental than in the jets. He thought Senator Fulbright might be more amenable to MAP if it were related to a reduced US military presence abroad.

Mr. Cargo thought that in the costing out of the various postures we would need to relate the DOD figures and the MAP figures.

Mr. Kissinger commented that he thought the study was a very good one but that we must get agreement on the figures.
Mr. Cargo thought that in considering the minimum US force that would be required we must be careful of the political aspect. He thought reduction of the US presence below one division would create political problems we could not support.

Mr. Ware thought these should be considered in relationship to the political/fiscal problems at home, noting that supporting a division overseas was “expensive as hell.”

General Unger asked again which postures were being eliminated.

Mr. Kissinger said Posture 4 can go since it calls for the withdrawal of both US divisions.

General Unger commented that Posture 2 also calls for the withdrawal of both US divisions but includes more modernized ROK divisions.

Mr. Shakespeare thought both 2 and 4 should be eliminated.

Mr. Kissinger asked if it were true that a ROK force of 12 to 14 divisions could repel 25 North Korean divisions.

Mr. Court replied that this was based on total manpower involved since the divisions were not organized in the same manner.

Mr. Kissinger said he had nothing against Posture 5 if it should be found that 14 ROK divisions plus one US division is the right combination in the view of the JCS. He thought Posture 4, which pulls out both US divisions, would present us with enormous political problems.

General Unger replied that Posture 2 also pulls out both divisions.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we should then eliminate both 2 and 4 and reserve a position on 5 depending on the JCS judgment as to what ROK forces would be required with minimum US forces. Or should we eliminate 4 and redefine 2 in terms of minimum US force required.

Mr. Cargo suggested that we leave 1, 3 and 5 as they are; that we drop 4; and that we add to 2 the concept of minimum US force.

Mr. Kissinger agreed we should drop 4.

General Unger noted that Posture 2 equals 18 ROK divisions and no US divisions. He thought that if these 18 divisions were brought up to US standards through modernization, it might be reasonable to leave in Posture 2.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if the President would seriously consider pulling out all US divisions from Korea.

Mr. Kissinger replied that the President would seriously consider Posture 2 if it should be concluded that this represented the proper mix of ROK forces with US forces, along the lines of Mr. Ware’s formulation.

Mr. Shakespeare noted the symbolism of the US military presence in Korea.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that it was inconceivable that the President would decide to withdraw all US forces from Korea. He noted that un-
der Option 2 a 15,000-man US force would remain which could include a brigade.

General Unger agreed there would be a residual force.

Mr. Kissinger suggested that we look at 2 from Mr. Ware’s point of view. Could this residual US force equate to the minimum US force required? Are 18 ROK divisions the right number of divisions?

Mr. Proctor referred to the “substantial safety factor” (page 4, Issues Paper) and asked what was considered a substantial safety factor.

Mr. Schlesinger noted that Table 1 had been figured on five-year totals for 1970–74. If we shifted these to 1971–75 we would get different cost impacts. The cost would also be different if it were based on withdrawal by June 1971 rather than withdrawal by June 1972. He thought the costing did not reflect the full flexibility available to us.

Mr. Kissinger agreed that this was a good point.

Mr. Ware noted that Defense was already on the ’72 budget cycle.

Mr. Schlesinger answered that they would not have to change their ’71 budget in order to withdraw troops from Korea.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if there was a reasonable order of probability that this would happen.

General Unger replied that this was covered in the basic study. He said there [3½ lines not declassified].

Mr. Kissinger asked if it were not easier [1 line not declassified].

General Unger agreed.

Mr. Cargo thought this related also to the question of troop deployment.

Mr. Shakespeare asked if we could then say there was [1 line not declassified].

General Unger thought we could.

Mr. Kissinger commented that in Europe he thought [3 lines not declassified].

Mr. Shakespeare commented he did not think this would be true in Korea.

Mr. Kissinger thought Kim Il-Sung alternated between intransigence and restraint and that he had been more restrained since the EC-121 incident. He considered him tough but not insane.

Ambassador Brown agreed that Kim was practical and tough but he also thought he was insulated from reality.

Mr. Kissinger asked if we could run down the list of issues to see if they were fairly stated.

He asked if all were satisfied with the discussion of our purpose: do we try to contain a North Korean attack only or a joint Chinese-North
Korean attack? He asked if the JCS would analyze the force levels in terms of both possibilities.

General Unger said they would do so, but because of the element of risk in preparing to defend against a North Korean attack only, the JCS thought we should plan force levels to resist a combined attack. He thought it a more realistic approach, noting that they could plan forces which would hold back a combined attack long enough to bring in reinforcements.

Mr. Kissinger identified the next issue as the need for a modernization program and for what purpose. The third issue, the timing of withdrawal, to be based in part on budgetary and in part on political considerations. He asked Ambassador Brown if we could assume that we would either want this withdrawal as early as possible or would want to wait until after the ’71 Korean elections.

Ambassador Brown thought we should make no assumptions on timing until we had consulted with Park and had his reaction.

General Unger thought in the matter of timing we should also consider when the ROK forces would be returning from Vietnam.

Ambassador Brown reiterated that we should take no final decision until we hear from Park.

Mr. Kissinger agreed, but thought we needed a statement of all the considerations bearing on the time of the withdrawal.

Mr. Cargo noted page 11 of the Issues Paper contained some of these considerations as well as some alternatives. Paragraph 8 of the State Department memorandum circulated at the table was an effort to put these considerations in a broader context.

Ambassador Brown thought we would be able to make a better judgment of timing when we had the information from the JCS on the force figures.

Mr. Shakespeare asked how important the ROK divisions in Vietnam are—military or psychologically.

General Unger replied it was important to keep these forces in Vietnam. The timing of their removal was of course related to Vietnamization.

Mr. Shakespeare asked about their usefulness in Vietnam as opposed to the usefulness of their return to Korea.

General Unger replied that the ROK forces would be needed in Vietnam as long as we needed combat forces there.

Mr. Kissinger thought it was not entirely up to the US as to when the Korean forces were brought back from Vietnam. It would be very difficult if we should press the Koreans to bring their forces back from Vietnam, then we should pull our forces out of Korea. He thought the possibility of trading their divisions in Vietnam for our forces in Ko-
rea was the least possible incentive for Korea to leave Vietnam. He also thought this might give an unfortunate impression of general Asian disengagement. He suggested that we look at the negotiating scenario again with this in mind. He asked if the issues on the placement of US forces were fairly stated.

All agreed they were.

Mr. Ware noted that State, in its memorandum of amendment, proposed eliminating all alternatives but No. 3 [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Cargo explained that they did not wish to see the alternatives eliminated but were talking only about the system of numbering the alternatives in the Issues Paper compared with that used in the basic study memo which might be confusing.

General Unger thought in order to give a better balance, we might insert in the penultimate paragraph on page 14 of the Issues Paper the thought that we might want to have [1½ lines not declassified].

Mr. Schlesinger thought we should also take into account the various means of financing modernization. He noted that if we should withdraw a division from Korea, there would be approximately $550 million in stocks available to the ROKs; if Korea withdraws from Vietnam they would bring their equipment back with them; we could also look to excess US equipment in Vietnam as Vietnamization progresses. He thought we should consider all of these funding sources in view of the severe constraints on grant MAP.

Mr. Lindjord referred to the increased flexibility if we should bring some 2 US divisions back from Korea and said this would be true only if we kept the divisions in being and did not disband them.

Ambassador Brown replied that the only point in their withdrawal would be if they were to be disbanded.

Mr. Schlesinger thought they might be retained “in low profile.”

Mr. Lindjord asked if the Japanese would not be concerned if we took US troops out of Korea.

General Unger thought they would.

Mr. Kissinger said we would want to have the JCS analysis of the force figures by February 13. We would plan to have another Review Group meeting on February 19 and an NSC meeting on February 25.

SUBJECT
NSSM–27, US Policy for Korea (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to your request at the Review Group meeting on 6 February 1970, and to the revised Issues Paper, subject as above, which was provided to the Joint Staff by the NSC Staff on 16 February 1970. JCS comments are provided below, along with suggested revisions to the Issues Paper, attached hereto.

2. (S) The NSSM–27 paper raises the issue of the capabilities of the existing forces now in Korea and the appropriate level of US/ROK ground forces required to defend Korea against the potential threat. The JCS do not concur with the judgement in the Korea Study that 12–14 ROK divisions could hold an attack by North Korea. The current JCS objective for an adequate defense of Korea against North Korea, calls for 21 combat-ready divisions (19 ROK, 2 US). At some risk (which is increasing due to growing obsolescence of ROK equipment) the existing ground forces in Korea (17 ROKA, 1 ROKMC, and 2 US) have been able to deter an all-out attack and maintain a relatively stable situation in a tense environment. These forces are considered capable of stemming a North Korean attack and/or fighting a delaying action against a combined NK/CPR attack while awaiting additional support.

3. (S) The premise in NSSM–27 that a reduced number of improved and modernized divisions could equate to a somewhat larger number of unmodernized divisions is to some extent valid. However, it must be recognized that there are definite limits to which equipment improvement can offset reduction in force, particularly in the case of infantry divisions. The type of modernization required (high densities
of air and ground mobility resources, advanced communications equipment) would be prohibitively expensive to acquire and support. Further, the modernization would be limited by time and the technical capabilities of the ROK. Given the special circumstances in Korea (uneasy Armistice, difficult terrain, and proximity of Seoul to front lines), reductions in ROK ground forces below 18 divisions should not be considered, and substantial improvements should be made to existing forces including ROK air and naval forces. The JCS do not consider the NSSM–27 postures provide adequate funds for essential ROK air and naval improvements.

4. (S) The JCS believe that withdrawal, now, of US forces would be untimely. Should such withdrawals be directed, the JCS consider that the minimum posture necessary to maintain existing deterrence and stability in Korea is 1-1/3 US divisions and 18 improved ROK divisions, with improvements to the ROK air and naval forces (as outlined in the JSOP) and continued US tactical air support. (The JCS have forwarded a plan for a reduction to 1-1/3 US divisions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (ISA).) The JCS consider that 1/3 of a US division and 19 modernized ROK divisions would provide this same capability, but believe it would be imprudent to consider this reduction in US forces until the return of ROK forces from Vietnam.

5. (S) The above represents the JCS view of the military considerations concerning US/ROK posture in Korea. However, proposals for withdrawal of US troops must also address other important factors involved, including political, psychological and economic. US forces in Korea are a symbol of the US commitments to the defense of the Republic of Korea, and in fact to all of Northeast Asia. Any significant or rapid reduction in the US presence could cause anxiety to the Koreans and be regarded (by both allies and enemies) as evidence that the United States had lost interest in meeting its defense commitments in Korea. This would be particularly serious if US reductions were not fully offset by the completion of substantial improvements to ROK forces in advance of any US withdrawal.

F.T. Unger
Lieutenant General, USA

SUBJECT
ROK Force Capabilities

The ROK force capabilities remain subject to considerable disagreement for postures which reduce both ROK and U.S. active forces in Korea. The JCS claim, for example, that Posture 3 outlined in the Korea “issues” paper, could neither “stem” a North Korean attack nor “delay” a combined NK/CPR attack.2

This memo summarizes the Korea Study’s assessment of this problem using historical experience, wargame simulation, and force effectiveness comparisons.

The conclusions are that:

—a decision to withdraw a U.S. division and to maintain an 18 or 19 division ROK force structure involves no military risks of any significance.
—we need not “modernize” the entire ROK 18 or 19 division force structure to enable them to defend themselves against the present or likely future North Korea force structure.

Posture 3

The ground forces included in Posture 3 are:

—One U.S. infantry division with about 15,000 U.S. combat personnel and 15,000 support personnel in Korea.
—Sixteen ROK active divisions with modernized combat and support equipment. About 13,200 men per division. Including combat support, these divisions will yield a total combat force of 429,000 men.
—Five ROK ready reserve divisions (3,000 fulltime personnel per division) and seven ROK rear area reserve divisions (1,500 fulltime personnel per division). When activated, which would take 15 days for the ready reserve and 30 days for the rear reserve, those divisions would add 135,000 men to the ROK force structure. In addition, the ROK have a 500,000 man armed militia which they plan to increase to 2,000,000 men in strength.

These forces would be deployed forward, with the U.S. division and 16 active ROK divisions positioned north of Seoul in prepared de-
fensive positions along the invasion routes from North Korea. The re-
serve and rear area divisions would be largely south of Seoul and
could\(^3\) not enter the conflict at its onset.

The threat to South Korea would consist of either:

—Twenty-five North Korean infantry division equivalents (the
North Koreans have only 19 organized infantry divisions) with a
strength of 9,200 men per division. Including combat support, the
North Koreans could field a total combat force of 281,000 men.

—Forty-five NK/CPR division equivalents (including the 25 NK
divisions) for a total combat and combat support force of 666,000 men.

Against North Korea, the attacking force, assuming careful prior
planning and complete surprise, would consist at most of about half the
North Korean force or 12 combat divisions. U.S. field commanders judge
that this force would probably attack along the three principal inva-
sion routes used in 1950 with the bulk of the force (about six divisions)
targeted on Seoul.

**Historical Experience**

Our experience during the Korean War offers a few guides to as-
ssessing these U.S./ROK force capabilities and the force requirements
for deterring a North Korean attack.

In early 1950, the ROK forces consisted of eight light infantry di-
visions (85,000 combat personnel) poorly organized for defense against
a conventional attack from North Korea:

—The ROK forces were outnumbered 1.5 to 1 overall and 2.0 to 1 along
the DMZ.

—The ROK defenses were poorly prepared and about half of the
ROK force was engaged in anti-guerrilla operations south of Seoul.

—The total investment in ROK equipment totaled only $50 mil-
lion. As a result, the North Korean force were stronger numerically
than the ROK in nearly all categories of equipment. ROK logistical sup-
plies were adequate for less than 15 days of combat operations.

With this numerical and qualitative superiority, the North Kore-
ans were able to successfully defeat the ROK forces in 1950.

This force balance changed measurably during the remainder of
the war. During 1951, the NK/CPR Spring offensive and the UN
counter-offensive showed that:

—The NK/CPR forces of over 800,000 men could be held by a UN force
of 535,000 men including about 320,000 ROKs.

—The UN forces successfully counter-attacked with a force of about
550,000 men against a combined NK/CPR force of about 700,000 men.

\(^3\) A handwritten notation changed “would” to “could.”
In both cases, the UN’s combat forces engaged in the conflict were about equal to the enemy’s in spite of the great disparity in the sizes of their overall forces. While the UN consistently supported over half of its forces in combat, the NK/CPR rarely kept more than one-third of its forces engaged because of its inferior logistical support. With equal combat manpower, the UN forces’ superior firepower and combat support gave it a substantial advantage.

Judging from this experience, an ROK force with a comparable logistical and equipment advantage could hold an all-out North Korean attack with forces substantially smaller (10 ROK divisions would suffice) than the attacking force and defeat it with an equal-sized force. With a Posture 3-size force, the ROK could field 430,000 men north of Seoul of whom 215,000 could be engaged and supported in combat. Within a month, the ROKs could further increase this combat force to 275,000 men. The attacking NK force would be about 180,000 during the initial offensive but only 115,000 on a sustained (more than one month) basis.

Therefore, even with a Posture 3 force, the ROKs could maintain a clear superiority over North Korea’s forces. The U.S. forces in Korea and reserve ROK divisions would not be needed; but, if engaged, would further enhance the ROK advantage.

**Wargame Simulation**

To draw the implications of this historical experience modified for current force capabilities, the Army has developed a wargame which simulates conflict in Korea under a variety of conditions. Because the JCS estimate that 21 U.S. or ROK divisions would be required to defend against a NK attack, the wargame was first used to test this estimate. The Army found that an initial attack by 21 of the 25 NK divisions supported at ROK standards could be held north of Seoul for at least 30 days by 20-2/3 ROK divisions and 1-1/3 U.S. divisions if the attack were a complete surprise and ROK forces were not in defensive positions. However, a number of the Army’s assumptions were unrealistically conservative.

—The NK could not attack with 21 of the divisions in their force structure. The NK could support no more than half (12 divisions) of their force in combat. Moreover, because of the North Korean’s need for a reserve against amphibious attack, the intelligence community’s estimate is that a NK attack would consist of only 6–9 divisions.

—The logistical capabilities of the North Koreans are substantially less than the ROK or the U.S. forces. The average ROK combat soldier is backed by twice as much support manpower and would receive four times the logistical support of a NK soldier. The relative advantage of U.S. forces is even greater.

—The ROK forces are now deployed in strong defensive positions along the invasion routes from North Korea. All 18 ROK divisions are now deployed north of Seoul.
Incorporating more realistic assumptions into the Army’s wargame, it becomes apparent that about six ROK divisions could meet an NK attack initially and that as few as 9–12 divisions could hold on a sustained basis. Under Posture 3, the ROK’s 16 active and modernized divisions could more than meet this requirement.

Force Comparisons

To check this analysis, the ROK capabilities were compared in detail with the expected NK and NK/CPR threat to determine if there were structural or equipment deficiencies in the ROK forces that would limit their performance or require modernization.

The force comparisons considered for each type of weapon:

—The aggregate number of weapons by type in each combat force, i.e., the number of rifles held in the ROK and NK force structures.
—The capabilities in combat of each major weapon, i.e., the relative effectiveness of a U.S. M–16 rifle and a NK AK–47 under combat conditions given the maintenance, supply, and doctrine governing use of the weapons.
—The overall combat effectiveness ratio between ROK and NK or NK/CPR weapons systems considering the quantity, quality, and support of each major weapons systems.

From such comparisons, it was obvious that the present ROK force of 18 unmodernized divisions is stronger than the NK force in almost all major weapon categories. Moreover, this ROK superiority would be retained, even without modernization and with a considerably reduced active ROK force, for example, in Posture 3:

—The ROKs have a definite edge in rifles, rockets, recoilless rifles, trucks, and communication equipment over the NK forces.
—The ROKs are about equal in machine guns, mortars, artillery, tanks, and self-propelled assault guns.

Thus, without modernization, the ROK forces are more effectively equipped than the North Koreans. With the modernization envisaged under Postures 2 to 5, the ROK’s relative edge would be greatly increased.

—Replacement of the M–1 rifle with the M–16 would double ROK firepower and further increase their advantage over the North Koreans.
—Provision of more artillery and tanks would give the ROK a definite edge whereas they are now only equal to the North Koreans.
—Better transportation and communications would facilitate ROK redeployment of their forces following a surprise attack. Although the ROKs have 3.5 times as many trucks as the North Koreans, the terrain in Korea makes lateral movement difficult.

4 Kissinger underlined this word.
However, these improvements, while desirable, are not necessary to maintain adequate defenses against North Korea unless extensive Chinese support for the North Korean forces is expected or the Soviets (North Korea’s chief supplier) prove willing to completely modernize the NK forces over the next five years.

**Overall ROK Capabilities**

These three independent analyses tended to corroborate each other in indicating that:

—An ROK force of 12–14 unimproved divisions could probably hold an all-out North Korean attack. With a larger and improved ROK force now envisaged, the ROKs could defeat the North Koreans and at least attempt a march North.

—An ROK force of 16–18 improved divisions could hold a combined NK/CPR attack for at least 30 days north of Seoul.

Based on these estimates, Posture 3 with 16 improved ROK divisions could easily defeat a North Korean surprise attack and at least hold a combined NK/CPR attack in which the Chinese entered within 15 days the largest force they could field and support. Against either threat, there is little or no military need for U.S. ground forces in Korea, with even the current unimproved ROK force structure. If the ROK force were built up to the 19 division modernized level, as the JCS suggest, the ROKs could attack North Korea with complete confidence and expect to hold on even if China entered the conflict. If the U.S. then introduced substantial forces, the ROKs could hope to defeat even a combined NK/CPR force and reunify Korea.

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54. **Memorandum of Conversation**


**PARTICIPANTS**

Dr. Kissinger  
Ambassador William Porter  
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

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Ambassador Porter reported that there had been a session that day at State on the position State would take at the March 4 NSC meeting on Korea, in which the group had recommended that withdrawals be expressed in terms of figures rather than units. This would be more meaningful, as a division under certain circumstances could amount to as few as 12,000 men. The Secretary had not commented on this, but took up the proposal that the first slice should be 20,000 men, with 20,000 more to be withdrawn after the two ROK divisions came back from Vietnam. The thought was to let the generals strip off the figures, but keep as much muscle in Korea as possible. Two-thirds of the division on the line would be taken and sent home, which would give 8 to 10,000 of the 20,000 figure; 10,000 more would be stripped from the rear areas and service troops. The ROKs would be left to handle the increased defense responsibility. State’s position on this, according to Ambassador Porter, was to support 16 modernized ROK divisions, not 18.

Dr. Kissinger observed that the reasoning of the Joint Chiefs eluded him—their position was that 18 ROK divisions could hold a North Korean and Chinese attack, but that 16 divisions plus US forces couldn’t do a thing. To a remark from Ambassador Porter that modernization of the ROK divisions would increase their effective strength a great deal, Dr. Kissinger noted that the Joint Chiefs argue two US and 18 unmodernized ROK divisions or one US and 18 modernized divisions are needed, but that one US division and 16 modernized ROK divisions can’t do the job. This could not be true. Their figures ought to be internally consistent. He had looked through their figures, but could not determine what thought processes had been used to reach their conclusion.

Ambassador Porter recalled that in the last withdrawals which we had made in 1954 and 1955, we had taken out a total of six divisions, two corps headquarters, and non-divisional units. At that time there had been 40,000 men in a division. Now we were talking about a 12,000-man division withdrawal. This was a bare bones cut.

Dr. Kissinger mentioned that when General Bonesteel had spoken to the President—there had been two sessions—the President had been inclined to be helpful, but had been turned off by Bonesteel’s presentation. Ambassador Porter said that Bonesteel’s line with him in Korea was to preserve, and not to tear down; he had replied that he had simply wanted to get the fat out of our commitment.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he understood there was a disagreement between Ambassador Porter and the military on the size of the force which we should retain on the line. Ambassador Porter responded to
the effect that the military wanted sufficient forces to support any one
point such as Panmunjom at any one time. The military wanted a
brigade. He thought, however, that a battalion at Panmunjom would
be sufficient to fulfill our responsibility of guarding the MAC meeting
place. This could come from the 7th Division, which with the addition
of one brigade from the division being sent home could rotate battal-
ions to the DMZ and have enough strength at any one time to back
this battalion up. As for the rest of the line, we could let the ROKs take
over. They already have seven-eighths of it.

Dr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Porter when the scenario should
be started. Ambassador Porter replied that the discussions with the
ROKs should be begun right away before the Presidential election cam-
paign opens, which would be in the Fall after the nominating conven-
tions. He wanted the essentials made known to the ROKs and tied
down so that the issue would not bob up in the election campaign. If
the process starts after the campaign begins, there would be an effort
to hold us off until the elections, which are now scheduled for May
1971, were over. He would like to go back to Seoul on Friday\(^2\) with ap-
proved instructions.

Dr. Kissinger said he doubted the instructions would be approved
so soon and noted that the President usually waits to make a decision
until after the NSC meeting is over. Ambassador Porter remarked that
the sooner we begin, the better. He would like to see General Michaelis
begin listing the matériel we would leave behind for the ROKs, and
then move into discussions of further phases of modernization, so as
to provide time for Washington to consider the extra steps which would
be needed. The first modernization step would be from equipment al-
ready there, and the second might be from what the ROK troops in
Vietnam brought back with them. If President Park were to ask us what
we intended to do, we could say that so much was ready, and continue
to negotiate from there.

Dr. Kissinger said that the decisions might be made in perhaps
two weeks. Ambassador Porter declared that this was acceptable. He
was not thin-skinned, and it wouldn’t bother him if the Koreans
jumped around a bit. Park was rather expecting an early decision, but
could be put off. Dr. Kissinger hoped that the decision might even be
made on March 4. Ambassador Porter said that in any case he felt it
was better to move, and get Park’s comments so we could see what
we could do.

Following a brief exchange on who would be attending the March
4 NSC meeting, Ambassador Porter asked Dr. Kissinger what kind of

\(^2\) March 6.
information he might send in from Korea which would be helpful. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he had been very interested in the materials which Ambassador Porter had been sending back. He didn’t usually comment, but read it all. He cited an account of a Vladivostok radio broadcast on My Lai which Ambassador Porter had forwarded; this had come in very useful in a recent meeting with Dobrynin, who had been amazed that we had picked up Vladivostok radio. Ambassador Porter said that he often saw things which were outside his own bailiwick but which he thought might be interesting, and would send them back in bits and pieces. Dr. Kissinger urged Ambassador Porter to send in anything he considered significant. He trusted Porter’s judgment, and would make an effort to read his reports if the Ambassador was willing to write them down.

Dr. Kissinger asked for Ambassador Porter’s views on Vietnam. Ambassador Porter expressed the opinion that the Communists were preparing for another effort. They would let us pull down our forces, and then have a go. They would have to do this—the leaders up North were finding it hard to envisage peace, and “their lives were at stake”, i.e. they had imposed too many casualties on the North to be able to stop now. There would probably be another effort by the Communists to catch a government unit in an isolated position. The VC characteristically work on some ARVN unit out in front, watching its officers’ movements, picking out its weak points, and working full time to lay out their plans. They badly need a win because of the trouble they are now in, and would try to achieve a psychological victory by catching a battalion and decimating it. They would carefully select units to attack which are in areas from which the US has withdrawn. We would simply have to face this situation.

Continuing, Ambassador Porter commented that Senator Fulbright had wanted him to talk about Vietnam and the Middle East, but that he had refused on the grounds that these questions were outside his area of responsibility. On Korea, Fulbright had inquired into nuclear weapons, and had gone on and on about them. He had told the Senator that he had no instructions to talk about nuclear weapons, to which Fulbright had accused him of “taking the Fifth”. He had responded by expressing the hope that the Senator would not draw this comparison too far. He had thought that the Senator would never let go.

Dr. Kissinger asked if Ambassador Porter would need to be reconfirmed if he were appointed to another post, to which the Ambassador said that he thought this would be no problem. The Senator’s area of concern had really been the ROK, and he, Porter, felt that the hearings had gone quite well. Surprisingly, Senator Symington had wanted to let the ROKs loose against the North.
Turning back to the troop withdrawal issue, Ambassador Porter expressed the belief that we could swing the option which we wanted. The ROKs would go into their usual banging tactics, but could be held. They would want us to modernize their forces first and then withdraw, but we should do both concurrently. He urged that the commanding general in Korea be given the authority to arrange these matters. This would strengthen his hand with respect to CINCPAC, who wanted to run everything himself, and who customarily took the JCS view. However, he had every confidence that Michaelis would be able to strip off the forces properly, and would also go further than the JCS would in this effort.

55. Draft Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting


PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Acting Chairman, Admiral Moorer
Director Helms
Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador Porter
OEP Director Lincoln
Assistant Secretary Green
Laurence Lynn
B/General Alexander M. Haig

The meeting was convened at 9:40 a.m. by the President. He called upon Director Helms for an update on the current intelligence situation.

Helms: During 1969 North Korea has retrenched in its unconventional warfare operations against South Korea. The North Koreans...
have considerable conventional naval and air power which was modernized by Soviet equipment between 1966 and 1968. North Korean ground forces are equipped with what is primarily obsolete Soviet equipment. They total 25 divisions of which 14 are forward along the DMZ. Reportedly this year they have reduced their strength by [to?] 350,000 as compared to South Korean forces of over half a million. The North Koreans are short on transportation but strong in modern air power. One of the most significant factors in the North Korean force posture has been the impact of maintaining this force upon North Korea’s economic development. Between 15 and 20 percent of North Korea’s gross national product is allocated to Defense and over 20 percent of North Korea’s males are in uniform contributing to a severe labor shortage.

Helms estimated that North Korea has no intention of initiating conventional operations against South Korea in the foreseeable future, adding that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese Communists are encouraging such operations. Kim Il Sung’s strategy in the unconventional warfare area commenced in 1964 when he initiated the intensifying UW campaign against the ROK. This campaign was probably initiated to discourage U.S. support for the ROK, especially as a result of U.S. domestic reaction. By 1969, however, Sung was unsuccessful in generating dissonance in South Korea and thus decided on a change in tactics if not strategy. 1969 reflected the lowest incident rate of UW harassments of any period since 1964. While Sung has not renounced violence, he appears to be shifting away from this tactic.

The ROK are now better prepared than in the past to counter North Korean UW initiatives. They have developed a sophisticated counter-infiltration system which includes a national coordinating committee and ancillary operational control centers. The coastal surveillance capabilities have been markedly improved and they have constituted 20 counter infiltration battalions backed up by efficient ROK militia. Perhaps the major factor in the ROK effectiveness has been the dislike of the South Koreans for the Sung regime and the establishment of strong anti subversion laws.

President: The President then asked Dr. Kissinger to review the options available for future U.S. military presence in South Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: Dr. Kissinger pointed out that there had been two concurrent studies on our defense posture in South Korea: one within the interdepartmental framework and the second a systems analysis type study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He emphasized that
while the conclusions were not identical, they were nearly parallel. U.S. military strength in Korea totalled some 64,000. The present combined strength consists of 20-1/3 ROK divisions of which 2-1/3 are in South Vietnam. Thus, the total posture includes 18 ROK active divisions plus 2 U.S. divisions. The combined strength outnumbers the North Koreans almost two to one; although North Korea is much stronger than the ROK in both air and sea power. The ROK supports its combat soldiers at approximately twice the level of the North Koreans. Our studies considered two scenarios: one would provide an analysis of forces required to defend against only a North Korean attack. The second considered the first requirement to meet a combined North Korean/CPR attack. Against the North Korean attack alone the combined U.S.–ROK force levels could withstand such an attack and halt it north of Seoul. Against a combined North Korean/CPR attack the 18 ROK divisions, together with the two U.S. divisions, could sufficiently delay such an attack until additional forces could be deployed.

Dr. Kissinger emphasized that there was some disagreement on how many ROK divisions were actually needed to maintain a sustained defense against an attack emanating from North Korea alone. He pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe 19 ROK divisions were necessary and that others felt a force level somewhat lower would be satisfactory.

Dr. Kissinger emphasized that we look at five force postures:

1. 2 U.S. divisions plus 18 ROK divisions;
2. 2 U.S. brigades plus 18 improved ROK divisions;
3. One U.S. division plus 18 improved ROK divisions;
4. One U.S. division plus 16 improved ROK divisions;
5. A residual U.S. force plus 18 improved ROK divisions.

He pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed with postures 4 and 5 above. Dr. Kissinger also emphasized that the problem is not one of purely military strength but also has definite political overtones. It is likely that the U.S. military could be reduced to 1/3 division plus 19 improved ROK divisions. However, the problem involves the impact on deterrents and what level of U.S. presence is necessary to insure that the North Koreans remain deterred. A second factor is the problem of costs which were summarized on the Table at Tab A.3 Another factor impinging upon costs would be the status of the forces removed from Korea; for example, if we removed 20,000 troops we would realize savings of $20 million. If these troops were held on active duty, on the other hand, our savings would be $450 million if they were deactivated.

Dr. Kissinger also emphasized that for the time being we should attempt to keep ROK forces in Vietnam and that our actions in South

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3 Attached but not printed.
Korea could influence their willingness to do so. An additional problem involves the positioning of our remaining U.S. forces. Presently there is one division on line and one back. The question now is should we pull back from the DMZ to reduce friction or should we draw forces from both the line and the rear. Dr. Kissinger pointed out that most disagreed that we should thin out our forces on the DMZ but keep some combat power south of Panmunjom. State favors a force of only one battalion, while the JCS favors a brigade-sized force. [2 lines not declassified] A final question would involve the magnitude of our counter insurgency programs. The big issue, however, is the degree of U.S. presence involving answers to the following specific questions:

(1) The size of our force;
(2) The degree of modernization of the ROK divisions; and
(3) The timing of U.S. withdrawals.

All agree that we should consult with the South Koreans, especially in view of their presence in South Vietnam. Precise timing, however, involves a decision as to whether or not we should consult before their presidential elections or wait until after the elections.

Admiral Moorer: Admiral Moorer stated that the JCS considers that the minimum U.S. posture should be 1-1/3 U.S. divisions plus 18 improved ROK divisions, plus modernization of ROK air and naval forces and the retention of U.S. air and naval strength in the ROK. He emphasized that the ROK equipment is deteriorating and that North Korean air strength poses a considerable threat.

Secretary Rogers stated that State favors a drawdown of U.S. strength in two phases. The first phase would be an immediate drawdown and the second would be additional reductions after the ROK divisions return from Vietnam. He emphasized that State preferred to see U.S. troops withdrawn by numbers rather than by designated division or TONE unit. State also favors consultations immediately. The size of the reductions should depend on the assistance we can give to the modernization of the ROK and the level that our Congress would support. State believes that we should:

(1) Decide in principle on the reduction;
(2) Start consultations, then make the final decision; and
(3) Initiate Congressional consultations.

Secretary Rogers emphasized that we must keep President Park on board throughout, since this is the first step of the Guam Doctrine and his support will be essential. Since his elections take place in May of 1971, our consultations should start immediately.

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4 Better known as the Nixon Doctrine; see footnote 3, Document 35.
Ambassador Porter affirmed that he could start consultations immediately.

The Vice President pointed out that he had spoken to the ROKs in Manila and that they emphasized emphatically that we should not reduce our presence in South Korea. Indeed, they expressed a willingness to send more ROK troops to South Vietnam if we would not draw down on our strength in the ROK. Finally, they offered free of charge whatever additional facilities the U.S. Government might need in view of phaseouts elsewhere.

Secretary Packard emphasized that the important problem is Congressional willingness to support 18 or 19 improved ROK divisions. He stated that if we draw down now we must have provided for the modernization of the ROK. The Joint Chiefs of Staff want to proceed cautiously. Mr. Packard’s fear is how we can get Congressional support for ROK modernization without withdrawing sizeable U.S. forces, in the order of magnitude of 20,000.

Secretary Rogers affirmed that State also favored 20,000, adding that Congress will move in the face of such a reduction and the savings that would result.

Admiral Moorer stated that the drawdown must be early in the fiscal year if we are to realize any savings.

Dr. Kissinger stated that some of the modernization could be realized from the equipment of U.S. forces being withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The President stated that the key factors are:

1. There must be some withdrawal. We cannot keep 64,000 U.S. troops in Korea forever.
2. We must work out the program carefully and relate it intimately to our April decision on the next withdrawal from Vietnam.
3. We must control the debate on the Hill with respect to our involvement.
4. We must avoid the impression that we are withdrawing from our responsibilities by emphasizing that our drawdown has to be accompanied by ROK modernization. In summary, the President stated that the preferable course is to think in terms of our April Vietnam tranche and the timing and requirement for consultations with President Park and the role of the Congress as well.

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5 As part of a 3-week visit to Asia during December 1969 and January 1970, Agnew represented Nixon at the inauguration ceremonies for President Ferdinand Marcos and Vice President Fernando Lopez, held at Manila on December 30.
The Vice President recalled Lee Kuan Yew’s remarks to the effect that U.S. credibility to execute its commitments is a crucial point. Rhetoric is not enough. We must be positively postured to follow through. He emphasized that the situation in Laos suggested that we should keep strong forces nearby in the Far East, pointing out that Asian leaders are very fearful of U.S. intentions. The President stated that the Vice President’s remarks were very pertinent, and we cannot give the impression that we are leaving the area. Thus we need careful thought on how to do it.

Secretary Rogers added that President Park applauded the Nixon Doctrine but added: “Don’t do it to me.”

Under Secretary of State Richardson stated that we should not think that our forces in Korea are available for deployment elsewhere. The President stated that the best way to accomplish our reduction is to get President Park to ask for it. He inquired of Ambassador Porter whether or not this could be done. Ambassador Porter responded affirmatively, adding that we could probably get Park to do so providing we can give him assurances on modernization.

The President stated we must not weaken our forces there precipitously. It is simply a question of U.S. support of U.S. divisions.

OEP Director Lincoln added that in late 1947 we reduced our strength and the North Koreans attacked. Under Secretary Packard stated that we must have a Congressional commitment.

Dr. Kissinger stated we must decide on the level of our reduction, then the Under Secretaries Committee can prepare a game plan on how to proceed to include instructions to Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis. Secretary Rogers added it should be a tentative decision since consultation may result in problems with President Park or the Congress.

The Vice President cautioned that what we draw down will never go back and the President agreed, adding that we should keep in mind that [less than 1 line not declassified]. The President stated we might consider increments of 10,000 now and 10,000 later, with the support needed under such a procedure. The President stated that this is the first five-year perceptive study. We have had 64,000 troops in Korea since 1953 and someone should have looked at it long before now. We must stop temporizing with these issues and must view the problem from the long range. In essence, what we are looking for is not a way to get out of Korea but a way to be able to stay in by means of a long-range, viable posture. We are faced with increasing emphasis on domestic spending here at home. Thus, we have to find a way to continue playing a role by drawing down our strength somewhat or else the Congress will refuse to support anything.

Secretary Rogers inquired about [3 lines not declassified].

The meeting was adjourned at 11:30 hours.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT
U.S. Programs in Korea

Following NSC review of U.S. policy and programs toward Korea, the President has decided to reduce the U.S. military presence in Korea by 20,000 personnel by the end of FY 71. The President has also directed that the following priority actions be taken to implement his decision.

1. Consultations with President Park. The President directs that consultations be undertaken with President Park to inform him of the President’s intentions and explore with him the timing and conditions of withdrawal. The President wishes the objective of this consultation to be the creation of a situation in which U.S. withdrawals result from President Park’s initiative in view of present ROK strength and the agreed need for future improvements in ROK forces. The Under Secretaries Committee shall submit a plan, based on the conditions outlined below, for consultations with President Park to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs no later than April 1, 1970.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 363, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 1–50. Top Secret; Nodis. Haig initialed the NSDM. Telegram 43580 to Seoul, March 25, transmitted a summary of this NSDM. (Ibid., Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70)

2 Telegram 1550 from Seoul, March 28, provided a summary of the discussion between Park and Porter. According to the telegram, “Park then repeated he would like to know before agreeing to procedures [Porter] had outlined extent of modernization U.S. envisages. To this [Porter] replied I understood his desire for more precise information, but kind of detail he is seeking is not yet available but is being developed.” (Ibid.) In telegram 1634 from Seoul, April 1, Porter reported his conversation with Chung Il Kwon, who “began to probe about figures and magnitudes of program we envisage.” Porter noted that “I took same line as previously, told him all that would be developed in good time if they would come forward with positive response to our proposals.” (Ibid.)
2. **Conditions for Consultation.** The President has decided that consultations with President Park shall be based on the following conditions:

   (a) Subject to approval of the Congress, the U.S. will attempt to provide annual average military assistance to Korea over FY 71–75 at a level of $200 million per year comprised either of grant MAP of $200 million per year or its equivalent in grant MAP at a lower level, such as $160 million per year, supplemented by equipment and other supplies excess to U.S. needs.

   (b) The U.S. will increase its economic assistance to Korea by continuing PL–480, Title I at or above a level of $50 million per year, depending on the availability of surplus commodities, in addition to currently-planned aid, provided that the ROK assumes, to the extent feasible, a larger defense burden through a MAP transfer or military sales program.

   (c) Further withdrawals of substantial numbers of U.S. personnel beyond the 20,000 personnel decided upon are not now planned, though they may be considered when substantial ROK forces return from Vietnam or compensating improvements in ROK forces are well underway.

   Upon completion of initial consultations with President Park, these conditions will be revised as necessary.

3. **Other Preparations for Consultation.** The President has also directed that concurrently with consultations with President Park:

   (a) The Departments of State and Defense will develop a plan for consultation with the Congress on the feasibility of increasing MAP for Korea to the levels noted above.

   (b) The Department of Defense will develop a plan for the withdrawal of military personnel, noted above, and the disposition of remaining forces in such manner as to reduce the U.S. presence in the DMZ to the minimum consistent with our continuing responsibility for the security of the UN area at Panmunjon.

4. **The Korea Program Memorandum.** Following initial consultations with President Park and the Congress, the President has directed the preparation of a five-year Korea Program Memorandum covering U.S. policy and programs for Korea, including:

   (a) **ROK Military Forces**—The President directs that the U.S. support improvements to the ROK forces to the maximum extent possible within the available resources. The objective of these improvements shall be to develop ROK forces capable of deterring or conducting a defense against a conventional or unconventional attack by North Korea. For this purpose, a five-year force structure and resource plan for the development of the ROK armed forces toward this goal shall be prepared by the Department of Defense based on the assistance levels in 2 (a).
(b) U.S. Military Forces—The President directs that the Department of Defense develop a five-year force structure, resource and personnel plan for U.S. forces in or clearly related to Korea. In this plan, the feasibility and timing of further reductions in the U.S. military presence in Korea should be thoroughly evaluated.

(c) Other U.S. Programs—The President directs that the Department of State and other agencies develop five-year resource and personnel plans covering their programs in or related to Korea.

As envisaged in NSDM 4, the Korea Program Memorandum based on these plans will serve to guide agency planning in regard to Korea and be periodically revised as necessary.

5. Organization. The President directs that these plans be prepared under the direction of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee and, upon completion, submitted to the President.

Henry A. Kissinger

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57. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, April 23, 1970, 0800Z.

60605. For Ambassador from Alexis Johnson. Subject: U.S. Troop Reductions.

1. Ambassador Kim came in to see me alone this afternoon to deliver the signed copy and translation of Park’s letter to the President. He also had a long private letter from Park—apparently in Park’s handwriting. Kim was in real anguish and following are the principal points in our hour and a half conversation:

A. Although on the basis of his previous conversation with me, Laird, etc., Kim had been reporting the likelihood of an approach on
our part with respect to troop reductions, Park had chosen to ignore these reports and, based on his conversations during the visit here, had been confident that there would be no such approach at this time. Thus your approach to him came as a “profound shock.”

B. Contrary to the situation with respect to Viet-Nam and NATO, neither Park nor Kim had discerned any pressure from the Congress for reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea. Only Senator Tydings had spoken out on the subject3 and Senator Cooper had told Kim that Tydings was by no means representative of Congressional views.

C. While accepting the principle and logic of the Nixon Doctrine as it applies to Korea, the whole matter was a question of timing. While accepting logic of our position on ability of present ROK Forces, together with remaining American Forces and American Air and Naval reinforcements, to deal with a North Korean attack this logic would not be understood or accepted by Korean people and an announcement of a reduction of forces prior to carrying out a modernization of ROK Forces would have profound political effects in Korea.

D. In general, a repetition of most of the points Park made to you as reported in your 2039.4

2. In response I pointed out political impossibility of obtaining additional MAP funds for modernization ROK forces without some reduction in US forces; the fact that this should in no way be interpreted as a withdrawal from or abandonment of ROK but was simply a re-alignment of some forces to make them more readily available; that remaining US forces and our ability for quick reinforcement would continue to constitute effective deterrent; that we could not defend having ROK as only exemption to application of Nixon Doctrine in Asia; that feared psychological effects on ROK could be reduced or eliminated by presenting this as jointly agreed action based on mutual confidence, ROK successes, etc., etc. Without ever explicitly saying so, I tried and believe I was successful in leaving Kim with impression we

3 U.S. officials were concerned by the South Korean response to a Senate speech on April 9 by Tydings during which the Senator recommended the withdrawal of one U.S. division from Korea. In a memorandum to Kissinger, April 18, Holdridge stated that Ambassador Porter had reported that “Korean leaders were taken aback by Senator Tydings” and that this “may affect the Koreans’ hitherto relatively favorable response to our suggestion that they take the initiative in calling for a reduction in U.S. personnel.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70)

4 Dated April 22. (Ibid.)
would probably go ahead in spite of Park’s opposition and it would be best for them to get on board. However, Kim was not to be shaken and I promised that his views would be brought to the attention of the President.

Rogers

58. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park


Dear President Park:

I have received and studied carefully your letter of April 20 commenting on my proposal, presented through Ambassador Porter, to withdraw 20,000 United States troops from Korea by the end of June 1971. Let me in this response put my proposal in perspective.

In our discussions during your visit to California last August, I explained my policy toward Asia, and I greatly appreciated then as I do now your agreement with its fundamental features. The maintenance of treaty obligations is basic to this policy. Specifically, so far as Korea is concerned, the United States is committed in the case of armed attack against your country to act in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty between our Governments. All the world, and specifically North Korea and Communist China, are aware of this. That commitment was reaffirmed in our meeting.

It is also my policy that as the strengths and capabilities of our Allies increase it is reasonable to expect them to assume more of the responsibility for their own defense and specifically to provide the bulk of the manpower required for that purpose.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970. Top Secret. On April 29, Rogers sent a draft of this letter to Nixon under a covering memorandum with the recommendation that he sign it. Rogers noted that the "Under Secretaries Committee has recommended that, following one or two more talks between Porter and Park, you should brief congressional leaders and ask for their backing. In view of the problems that could arise should Park remain adamant, we believe you should respond to Park first." On May 25, Kissinger forwarded Rogers’s memorandum and draft letter to President Nixon under a covering memorandum with the recommendation that he sign the letter. The Department transmitted the text of Nixon’s letter in telegram 81354 to Seoul, May 27. (All ibid.)

2 See Document 57.

3 See Document 35.
Over the past several years the Republic of Korea under your leadership has made great progress in developing its economic and military strength, progress completely overshadowing that of the North. The contribution made by your military forces in Vietnam attests to this remarkable development. Despite this increased economic and military strength, the number of American troops in the Republic has not declined from the level which prevailed when the Republic was far less able to assume the primary burden for its defense. In fact, the number today is somewhat larger than that prevailing at any time over the past ten years.

I am not proposing a total withdrawal of United States forces such as the one in 1949 to which you referred in your letter. On the contrary, the 20,000 men to be withdrawn constitute less than one-third of our current forces in the Republic of Korea. The forces remaining will provide not only substantial United States military capacity but also clear evidence of a United States commitment. So far as a deterrent is concerned, it will remain clear to North Korea and to Communist China that the United States has not retreated from Korea or the Pacific area.

I recognize that the level of military assistance for Korea provided by the Congress under the last military assistance appropriation has been less than we considered desirable. Part of the reason for the Congressional attitude towards military assistance has undoubtedly been a feeling by the Congress and the public that with the progress made by recipients of such assistance they should assume a greater share of the responsibility for their own defense.

Subject to Congressional approval, I propose to provide substantially higher military assistance over the period 1971–75 for Korean modernization. Moreover, provided your Government assumes a larger defense burden we are also prepared to consider some increased economic assistance. This assistance would be available during the very period which you see as crucial to Korea’s continuing economic progress and protection from the North.

I plan to brief the Congress on my proposal and seek to enlist their support so that the processes of modernization of the Korean armed forces can begin as soon as possible. An initiative from you showing that Korea is ready to assume more of the burden of its own defense will add to Korea’s image and to Congressional and public support for these greater appropriations.

You may be assured, Mr. President, that I would not have made this proposal except after the most careful study of all the factors involved and specifically of those mentioned in your letter. I would not have made it had I believed that it would adversely affect the Republic of Korea which we consider so important to the security of Asia and of the Free World, and in which we have such an immense national investment.
Therefore, Mr. President, I hope that you will be able to agree that my proposal is in the interests of both our countries and that you will find it possible to take the lead in presenting it to your country and to the world as a natural and proud consequence of the remarkable progress achieved by your country.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Nixon

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59. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, May 29, 1970, 1130Z.

2772. For Ambassador Brown. Ref: A. State 081354; B. Seoul 2733; State 082520.1

1. President Park received me at 11:15 hours local today. Conversation lasted one hour and half. We were alone, at my request (except for interpreter).

2. He assented to my offer to read President Nixon’s letter of May 26.2 After reading, Park asked me if it did not say what had been said before. I replied that it was essentially carefully considered reply to points he had raised and in my view we should work together in cooperative and forward-looking fashion. Park said that as far as proposals for strengthening ROK forces is concerned we can start to develop them any time, but he must know amount of program before he can judge whether he can take lead as we desire. Until he knows nature and extent of modernization he cannot agree to any withdrawals.

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2 Dated May 27, it instructed Porter to inform Park about the M–16 and other defense matters. (Ibid.)
3 Dated May 28, in it Porter wrote that he would suggest to Park that the Minister of Defense meet with General Michaelis about the M–16 and related issues. Porter also wrote that he would inform Park that Packard’s letter on the subject was coming. (Ibid.)
4 Dated May 28, it informed Porter that a letter concerning the M–16 from Packard to the Korean Minister of Defense was being pouched. (Ibid.)
5 Document 58.
3. I said we understand his natural desire to know dimensions of what we can do. On the other hand, we are asking him to support our approach to Congress and to his people so that we can get things under way and develop a program. Park replied we must understand his position. If he agreed to take initiative before knowing how much, when, etc., his people would ask him those questions and he could not answer. If he could say only vaguely that there would be adequate program and troops were being withdrawn, Korean people would feel unsafe and his position would be difficult. A year ago, Koreans had submitted program proposal. If that had been accepted it would now be possible to consider whether time frame for withdrawal could be changed from 1975 to earlier date. That program should be reviewed. From his point of view there are too many unknowns. It was not necessary to talk about amount of money involved as equipment is important aspect. He cannot take initiative on present basis. In his letter he had asked reconsideration of withdrawal until 1975, and if Korean program mentioned in his letter of April 1969 to President Nixon could be approved he could then consider changing date when some U.S. troops might depart.

4. I said we were both talking about substantial programs which over five-year period might cost billion dollars or more. He was right to say we should not be talking amounts of money but rather types and amount of material involved. We want to get down to real discussions with his people to determine exactly what is involved. It would first be necessary to brief Congress to get acceptance in principle for modernization program and if Park would assist by taking lead in suggesting some of our troops could leave it would, as letter pointed out, greatly add to Korea’s image before Congress and American people generally.

5. Park said we should sit down with Koreans and develop program before going to Congress. If we would do that it might be possible for troops to leave before 1975 (sic). I replied it seemed necessary to us to get principle accepted first by Congressional leadership rather than go and give them very large program on platter and say that’s it. It was best to leave to us procedures and psychological aspects of handling things in U.S. I continued that in view of his references to fact that his date for departure, 1975, might be subject to change and that troops “might leave” before then, I would like to clarify point. We were asking his support with Korean public and U.S. Congress for idea that some troops might leave in view of fact that substantial modernization program was envisaged. We were not asking permission for troops to

leave, as there was no requirement on us in that sense. We were re-
quired to consult with him and that is what we are doing. Park said
he understood that his agreement, or concurrence, is required before
we can withdraw troops. I replied that obviously we could not and did
not give even government as friendly as that of Korea control over
movement of our troops, and that as there seemed to be some misun-
derstanding on that point it was just as well that it came up now. Con-
sultation is required of us, but that is different matter, I said. (This part
of conversation was, like rest, in even tones.)

6. I continued by saying we were faced with practical problem as
to how to reply if and when congressional leadership inquired as to
President Park’s attitude toward withdrawal of American troops. I sug-
gested that in view of importance of giving Congress right impression,
it would be appropriate for President Park to authorize statement to
be used as necessary along these lines: “When President Park knows
there will be an adequate modernization program and knows its di-
ensions he will be able to reassure his people in those circumstances
that some American troops can be withdrawn.” Some such statement
would be helpful to some degree even though it not as forthcoming as
we would desire. After congressional approval in principle obtained,
we could try to develop in detail substantial program which had been
proposed to him. Park asked whether such statement would be made
publicly or privately. I said that during initial period we would try to
handle it as he desired. He reflected for few moments and said he
didn’t want to authorize anything, but we could use sense of his views
which was along lines of above-quoted suggestion. I said this purely
my own suggestion and I could not say whether it would appear use-
ful in Washington.

7. I said there was another point I wished to go over. Moderniza-
tion program is result of USG desire to reassure ROKG and people of
our continuing concern for their safety, even though we are with-
drawing some troops. Program and withdrawal are therefore related
but are not dependent one on the other. We wish to see program get
underway when and as we withdraw, but each will have its own pace.
Park did not respond to this aspect of things.

8. President then reviewed many of his earlier remarks on subject
of need for American patience. It was true there had been improve-
ment in military field, but that was true of enemy also. In economic
field, work had barely been started and average national income is still
only $200 per year. ROKs are carrying great national defense burden
but by 1975 they hope to assume all of that burden over annual Amer-
ican MAP contribution of $150 million. On point of withdrawal Park
thought that perhaps this does not seem as serious in United States as
it does in Korea. At this critical moment Koreans hope for more U.S.
patience.
9. I commented that these factors had been given our most careful attention as my President’s letter indicated. We are not contemplating anything so drastic that it would undermine confidence of ROK people. We are extremely mindful of proceeding in manner which will make it clear to them that powerful force will remain and that basic commitment is unchanged.

10. President Park then asked if our people could commence talks on modernization program. I replied that I thought Washington would wish to contact congressional leadership first, which would be done very soon. We could and would however make gesture at this time, which was to open talks on M–16 factory. Park said he was informed I was sitting on letter from Mr. Packard and asked why I had not delivered it. I said I did not have letter, but Mr. Packard would send one on subject shortly. Park asked if M–16 would be considered part of modernization program. I replied that inevitably it must be so considered, though it would be handled somewhat differently from other parts of that program. He then inquired whether we would build M–16 factory if he maintained his opposition to troop withdrawals. I replied neither M–16 nor any other project would be made easier, especially with Congress, by his opposition.

11. He then said I had urged this matter be closely held but he was disturbed to hear this morning statements made by high-level American officials to effect American troops would be leaving Korea. What was explanation, he asked. I said I thought our officials, like some of his own, were reacting to pressures from Congress, Assembly and press. Comments on our side were no doubt intended to hold down pressures in U.S., while his Ministers were also commenting in manner calculated to do same thing here. I then read State/DOD response to inquiries on subject as related State 082211.

12. President then asked again when our people could get together to discuss modernization. I replied I thought right after congressional leadership is briefed, but I would seek further comment from Washington. In meantime, there was M–16 and perhaps one or two other matters on which, as part of overall program, discussions could commence.

Porter

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7 Presumably a reference to telegram 82520 to Seoul.
8 Telegram 82211 to Seoul, May 28, provided the suggested responses for Porter.
(National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 541, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. II, 10/69–5/70)
60. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, June 1, 1970, 0310Z.

2788. For Ambassador Brown.

1. I suggest that while we are considering Park’s hard line resistance to our proposals, and his lack of sensitivity to American domestic problems bearing on this matter, we not react hurriedly in sense of further argument with him. I suggest we keep it cool, continue our planning, and give this problem appearance of one wherein we have met our obligation to consult with him. We should continue to tell him that we have carefully considered his views, and he will hear from us as our efforts to build up his forces proceed, and as our plans develop in matter of force reduction.

2. His recalcitrance is true reflection of his present outlook: we must meet his wishes; our problems are not controlling, not even when they involve our men, our money, our markets and our materials. He has quite deliberately pushed campaign to assure his people that we cannot reduce our forces in any degree without his consent; and that we have not notified him of any such intention. He has now gone so far in this process that he may be developing first real threat to his own reelection next year when it becomes clear that his Ministers have been less than frank with Assembly and public. He will sense need, especially if we proceed calmly toward our objective, to repair his fences and reduce his political vulnerability by at least pretending some degree of accord with us. In addition to course suggested in para one above, we should let him know that his people will inevitably acquire correct picture of our obligations, our proposals, and our attachment to their future. It seems clear that we should not leave pace to Park, nor permit him to establish precedent.

3. I think he will sooner or later develop idea of sending mission to Washington to argue matters with us. Possibly he would use both Prime Minister and Defense Minister for that purpose. If they failed to change our position, system here, as you know, would make them responsible for “failure.” I assume you would prefer to discourage thoughts about such a mission when and if they appear.

4. Would appreciate your comments.

Porter

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61. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, June 15, 1970, 1010Z.

3115. For Ambassador Brown. Prime Minister called me today and handed me signed original English translation of letter from President Park to President Nixon dated June 15. Letter reviews history of Korea since 1950, enemy intentions, and repeats much of Park’s comment already transmitted. Letter then continues:

“However, inasmuch as you are proposing to me a partial reduction of the United States forces in Korea in line with your policy of generally reducing United States troops stationed abroad, I think it is in the interests of both of our governments to express clearly and frankly my views and positions and problems related to such reduction.

“The United States forces in Korea serve as a most effective deterrent against the potential aggressors and also as an indispensable element of the defense posture in the case of an armed attack from the north. Any reduction should, therefore, be accompanied by positive measures of strengthening the Republic of Korea forces to offset the effect of such reduction lest it should result in weakening the deterrent or defense capability. It is to be added that major part, if not all, of such measures should be implemented in advance.

“As for the modernization of the Republic of Korea forces as an effective means of strengthening them, it is to be reminded that the ‘Counter Infiltrations/Guerrilla Forces Improvement Requirements’ and the ‘Republic of Korea Forces Development Objectives Plan’ were submitted to your government on January 9 and June 7, 1969, respectively. I have instructed my Minister of National Defense to integrate these two plans into a single five-year (1971–1975) overall modernization plan, which, I understand, is being submitted to your government through the Commander, United States Forces in Korea, as of this date.

“I think that consultations should be made on the requirements as well as the ways and means of implementing this overall and substantial modernization. Consultations should also be made on the problem of regular military assistance and on the question of whether it would be necessary to increase the level of the Republic of Korea forces.

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2 The original letter is ibid., Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970.
3 Neither paper was found.
Furthermore, the ways and means of developing defense industries in Korea should also be explored. It is strongly hoped that firm assurances in advance will be made by your government with regard to these problems.

“As regards the United States forces in Korea, assuming any partial reduction should take place, problems concerning its size and timing as well as the maintenance of the present structure of the United States forces in Korea should be the subjects of consultation. At the same time, consideration should be given to the necessity of strengthening the disposition of naval and air forces of the United States in and around Korea.

“In case of reduction of the United States forces in Korea, there should also be measures of effective diplomatic assurance aimed at forestalling or eliminating its political and psychological adverse effects on the people of the Republic of Korea. Such measures would help to relieve the apprehensions of the Korean people as to their future security and, more importantly, to prevent the danger of irrevocable calamities which might be caused by miscalculation on the part of the potential aggressors, the North Korean and Chinese Communists, as to the capability or determination of our two nations to take common measures to meet their aggression.

“The importance of fulfilling the treaty obligation of your government in the defense of the Republic of Korea is also pointed out in your letter. There should be a reaffirmation of the determination of the United States to take effective and prompt measures, including the dispatch and reinforcement of ground troops, in the case of renewed aggression in the Korean Peninsula. The potential aggressors should be given a clear and stern warning about such determination of the United States.

“The United States has consistently supported the objective of the United Nations in Korea to realize ‘a unified, independent and democratic Korea.’ And, it goes without saying that the mainstay of the United Nations forces, which constitute an indispensable factor for the maintenance of peace in the Korean Peninsula, consists of the United States forces in Korea. Accordingly, it should be reaffirmed that the partial reduction of the United States forces in Korea would in no way affect the role of the United Nations forces in Korea and that until such time as the above-mentioned objective of the United Nations in Korea is accomplished, the United States forces, which form the nucleus of the United Nations forces in Korea, will certainly continue to be stationed in Korea at a level of powerful and substantial strength.

“I consider it of utmost importance for our two governments to take diplomatic steps to arrange for a system of close and full consultations on the implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty between our two countries and related matters.
“Mr. President, if and when we are able to reach a definite mutual accord through diplomatic negotiation and consultations in advance on the military, economic and diplomatic measures referred to above, such safeguards would be instrumental in seeking the understanding of the Korean people, who are so strongly opposed to any reduction of the United States forces in Korea. On my part, it would be impossible to persuade the Korean people to accept the partial withdrawal by the end of June 1971, as mentioned in your letter, because of the unexpected shock it would give to them and the shortness of time involved. Apart from this point, if the above-mentioned accord be firmly reached, my government will then be prepared to have discussions with some flexibility in regard to its basic position, explained in my previous letter dated April 20, 1970, of opposing any reduction of the United States forces in Korea before the end of 1975.”

Copy has also been sent to Korean Ambassador in Washington who should have it in about two days, Prime Minister stated. Complete text by pouch.

Porter

4 Document 58.
5 See Document 57.

62. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, July 2, 1970, 0016Z.

106164. For Ambassador from Brown. Ref: Seoul 3400. 2

1. Appreciate your thoughts contained reftel. We have been considering question of when and how to notify ROKs of withdrawal plan and are inclined to agree with you that on balance it preferable to do so before ministerial meeting. Problem is primarily matter of timing.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70-Dec 70. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Henry Bar-dach and Donald L. Ranard (EA/K); cleared in draft in S/S, by Captain Guthrie (DOD/JCS) and by Colonel Boylan (DOD/ISA); and approved by Ambassador Brown (EA).

2 In telegram 3400 from Seoul, June 30, Porter recommended that the Korean Government be notified of the date of the first withdrawal of U.S. troops before the ROK-U.S. Defense Ministerial meeting scheduled for July 21 in Honolulu. (Ibid.)
Just as soon as response to Park’s June 15 letter goes forward, stage would be set to inform ROKs of plan and timetable. DOD paper detailing plan is now before Under Secretaries Committee and we anticipate it will move forward for presidential approval within next few days.

2. Assuming that withdrawal plan is approved during first part of July, it would then be feasible for you and Michaelis to notify ROKs before Honolulu Conference of our intentions in as much detail as you see fit. We recognize, of course, that this will be bitter pill for ROKs in absence of further specifics from us as concerns modernization assistance we will be able to provide. Nevertheless, believe this step necessary to indicate to ROKs that we mean business, as well as meet June 1971 deadline. When you notify ROKs you will be able to point out again that initiative from them will enhance Congressional support for increased MAP.

3. Would welcome your comments on above scenario.

Johnson

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3 For Park’s letter, see Document 61. For the response, see Document 64.

4 In telegram 3464 from Seoul, July 6, Porter expressed his agreement with this “scenario,” adding that he thought “it is most practical approach to matter.” Porter also suggested that equipment such as M–48 tanks, M–113 AMCs, and U–6 aircraft, which were becoming “excess to EUSA requirements” be offered to “modernize ROK forces.” He requested “authority to inform ROKG simultaneous with notification of withdrawal plan.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)
Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

U.S. Troop Reductions in Korea: Possible Bureaucratic Dispute over Who Instructed Porter to Inform Park of “Deadline” in Effectuating Reductions

At Tab A is a telegram of July 6 from Saigon describing Secretary Rogers’ conversation that day with ROK Foreign Minister Choi, in which the latter called under instructions from President Park to express shock over a telegram presented to him by Ambassador Porter putting forward a “deadline” to effectuate U.S. troop reductions. Since there has been no telegram from State telling Ambassador Porter to pass the word to Park in this way (at least in regular channels), it is conceivable that Secretary Rogers may attribute Porter’s actions to instructions sent him by someone else, e.g. the White House. This could become a troublesome issue, given President Park’s temperament and strong objections to U.S. troop reductions, as is amply brought out in the rest of the telegram.

In piecing together what may have happened, I believe it is highly likely that the prime mover in this series of events was Secretary Rogers himself. At Tab B is a telegram from Saigon describing the Secretary’s previous conversation with Foreign Minister Choi on July 3, in which the Secretary really laid it on the line to Choi to the effect that we had already made a decision to reduce our forces in Korea, that Ambassador Porter was “instructed on the details,” and that it “was necessary to agree immediately on troop reductions.” You will note that this telegram was sent to Seoul for information on July 6 and that its transmission time was 3 hours and 20 minutes earlier than the telegram at Tab A (1300 Z versus 1620 Z.) Thus there was plenty of time for Ambassador Porter, who already was “instructed on the details,” to take this line from the Secretary as his marching orders and go to Park on his own initiative. Everything which the Secretary said on July 3 is consistent with what Park chose to construe as a “deadline” on effectuating U.S. troop reductions. While Ambassador Porter is not normally

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. In the upper right hand corner, Kissinger wrote next to his initials: “Al, see my note on reporting cable.” The memorandum bears Haig’s initials and the word “clipped” in parentheses. Kissinger’s note has not been found.

2 Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
one to jump the gun or to operate without instructions, he may well have felt that he already had these instructions and just needed a go-ahead sign. Certainly the Secretary made it very plain to Choi where we stand.

Instructions to Porter were sent in telegram 107269 to Seoul. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)

64. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park


Dear President Park:

I have received and carefully considered your letter of June 15 in which you comment further on my decision to withdraw 20,000 United States troops from Korea by the end of June 1971.

The United States commitment to the defense of Korea, embodied in the Mutual Defense Treaty between our Governments, was reaffirmed when we met last in California during August 1969. At that time we agreed that the military forces of Korea and those of the United States stationed in Korea must remain strong and alert. Most importantly, we reaffirmed our determination to meet armed attack against Korea in accordance with that Treaty.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea: President Chung Hee Park, 1970. Secret. A typed note indicates the letter was pouches on July 9. On June 19, Rogers sent a draft of this letter to the President with the recommendation that he sign it. Kissinger forwarded a substantially revised draft to the President under a June 28 covering memorandum that summarized Park’s letter of June 15 and suggested modifications and subsequent actions. Kissinger stated that Park would probably modify his position of total opposition if the United States initiated a “major modernization program for ROK forces” before U.S. departure, which “might be as much as $2 billion or more,” and assured the ROK that the United States would “reinforce our units in the event of aggression.” Kissinger noted that Park “is now publicizing the issue in Korea in an attempt to block any withdrawal until after the Presidential election of May 1971.” Kissinger concluded: “I believe that we must not let Park feel that he can interfere with your decision by misuse of publicity on this issue,” and believed that the President sign the letter. On an undated memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, transmitting the June 28 memorandum, Kissinger wrote: “I feel sorry for Park.” (All ibid.)

2 See Document 61.

3 See Document 35.
As I said in my letter of May 26, and as I have also stated publicly, the maintenance of treaty obligations is a fundamental principle of my policy toward Asia. In this you have my assurance in both word and deed. Not only will the forces remaining in Korea provide the powerful and substantial deterrent you seek, but the continued United States presence among them will also serve as the best possible demonstration to both friend and enemy of our commitment to Korea’s defense and security.

I am fully sympathetic, of course, to your position that any reduction of United States forces be accompanied by a strengthening of the Republic of Korea Forces. As you know from my letter, this is basic to my plan. The United States will provide, subject to Congressional approval, a compensatory increase in military assistance for Korea for the purpose of modernizing your military forces. To bring this about I intend to brief leaders of Congress on these plans as soon as possible in order to obtain their support so that modernization can begin.

It is my earnest desire, Mr. President, that we move forward together. I believe the time has now come for our representatives to sit down together and discuss my program and the necessary modernization of your military forces. The Republic of Korea Forces Development Objectives Plan has been very helpful in assisting our planning for Korean modernization requirements, and we shall look forward to receiving your Government’s five year overall modernization plan to which you refer in your letter. Simultaneous with such discussions, I hope you will find it possible to take the initiative in presenting my decision to your countrymen.

With best wishes

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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4 Document 58.

5 The text of Nixon’s letter was transmitted in telegram 107000 to Seoul, July 6, for immediate delivery to President Park. In telegram 3559 from Seoul, July 9, Lathram commented on Korean press reports of Park’s reaction to anticipated U.S. troop cuts. Lathram concluded that “we speculate that ROKG at long last has accepted inevitable but still hopes through negotiation to secure prior modernization commitments and some postponement timing of reductions.” (Both in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)
Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
“Re-aligned Configuration” of Two U.S. Divisions in Korea

Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis have suggested that one way for us to ease President Park’s political problems over U.S. troop reductions would be to retain both U.S. divisions in a “re-aligned” configuration involving the replacement of U.S. brigades being withdrawn by ROK brigades. Divisional command would be retained by the U.S. (See Ambassador Porter’s back-channel message at Tab B.)

You have asked if we could do this.

Theoretically speaking, there would appear to be no reason why the re-alignment suggested by Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis cannot be carried out. There is a long history of Koreans serving with American units under U.S. command, dating all the way back to the Korean war. “KATUSAs” (Korean Army troops assigned to U.S. Army units) still are a feature of our forces in Korea, and the addition of two ROK brigades to a U.S. division to replace two U.S. brigades would not be a vast change from this pattern. If it would meet President Park’s political desiderata of retaining what could be described as two U.S. divisions, we would want to consider carrying this recommendation out.

However, information which has just been provided by Defense on our proposed troop reductions indicates that one entire division is to be withdrawn along with Army and Corps supporting units, leaving one division consisting of eight maneuver battalions. The question here is whether there would be enough of a U.S. framework remaining upon which a mixed U.S.–ROK division under U.S. command could be assembled. It might be possible to apportion the U.S. battalions in such a way as to provide a nucleus for two divisions, with the rest made of ROKs, but I suspect that Defense would balk at having U.S. forces in such a minority position. This would also require around four ROK brigades, not the two which Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis call for in their proposal. Alternatively one mixed division could be assembled, leaving the U.S. division considerably under
strength. Porter and Michaelis are evidently operating on the assumption that two brigades from the U.S. 2nd Division are to be removed, but that one will remain to which two ROK brigades could be added. I recall from earlier discussions with Defense on U.S. force reductions in Korea that Defense was thinking in such terms, but the signals appear to have been switched. Ambassador Porter might be asked if his proposal is fully compatible with the latest Defense planning.

Assuming that this proposal is compatible with Defense planning, another problem is involved: that of retaining U.S. forces along the DMZ. One feature of the present reduction plan is that with the exception of one company rotated to Panmunjom for security duty from the remaining U.S. division, the ROKs would man the entire DMZ. Under Ambassador Porter’s concept, the two ROK brigades in the 2nd Division would assume places on the line, thereby leaving what in name would be a full U.S. division along the DMZ. The advantages of a U.S. pull-back would then no longer obtain, i.e. lowering the chances of a direct U.S.-North Korean confrontation from the very outset of a significant North Korean military move across the DMZ. I believe that Ambassador Porter might be asked for his thoughts on this issue.

Another immediate problem I can foresee is the purely technical one of getting Ambassador Porter’s message into regular instead of back channels. [5 lines not declassified] We could also ask him to address the two problems I mentioned above. I have drafted a message from you to Ambassador Porter to this effect (Tab A).³

Larry Lynn concurs.⁴

Recommendation:

That you clear the message to Ambassador Porter at Tab A.⁵

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³ Attached but not printed.
⁴ Lynn initialed his concurrence.
⁵ Kissinger wrote the following note at the top of the first page: “OK to send backchannel as edited. HK”; another note indicates the message was sent July 13.
66. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, July 13, 1970, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Kissinger
Congressman Cornelius Gallagher
Lindsey Grant, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
Korean Troop Reduction Plans

Congressman Gallagher said that he will leave for Korea on Sunday, and plans to stay there for four or five days. He may stop in Japan on the way home, to see Expo 70. Dr. Kissinger asked whether State had alerted our Embassies; Mr. Gallagher did not think that it had, and Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Grant that this be done (Note: State has been advised). Congressman Gallagher mentioned that he expects to be Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee next year unless Zablocki wants the position again, which he doubts.

On Korea, Mr. Gallagher said that he had reliable information that the Koreans were concerned that the Communists will act in concert against South Korea within the next few years, because they fear that by 1975 the Japanese will be rearmed and will make any such action too dangerous. The ROK Government is very worried that the United States is giving the impression of a withdrawal. It would like the U.S. Seventh Division to stay in Korea, if only in cadre status, along with the Second Division. The Koreans understand that this might leave only 42,000 American servicemen in Korea, but they could put up with that if the two division organizations remained. Mr. Gallagher understands that the Koreans would be willing to contribute perhaps another 25,000 troops to Vietnam if the U.S. would agree to keep the two divisions in Korea. Mr. Gallagher thought that President Park is certain to raise this proposal with him next week.

Dr. Kissinger said that we have a paper before us right now as to what troops should be taken out. He had heard through another channel of the proposal related by Mr. Gallagher. It is an interesting one. It shows that the ROKs are displaying a positive attitude. The decision

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Confidential. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. This memorandum is attached to a July 15 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, upon which the latter initialed his approval of the memorandum of conversation on August 13.

2 Gallagher (D-New Jersey) was Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
is a technical one, and we are looking into it; we may be able to accommodate their wishes. If we do, the issue of additional ROK forces to South Vietnam would not arise.

Mr. Gallagher thought the ROKs might still make the offer. Dr. Kissinger said that at this stage we do not believe that we need new foreign troops in Vietnam. Secretary Rogers has brought back an interesting report of the increased confidence in Vietnam. The best threat we can make to persuade Hanoi to negotiate may be that the GVN may be unbeatable alone. A year and a half ago, this idea would have been inconceivable.

Dr. Kissinger said that it was good to know of the approach to Mr. Gallagher, but he did not believe that it would be useful for Mr. Gallagher to explore this exchange proposal in Korea. He would, however, like Mr. Gallagher’s impressions on his return. He suggested that Mr. Gallagher, while in Korea, make clear that 42,000 is “still a big slice.” It is as good as 60,000 in terms of guaranteeing the U.S. reaction if the Communists attack.

Mr. Gallagher said that they didn’t seem worried about the numbers; they were hung up on the question of the divisions. Dr. Kissinger saw no objection in principle to keeping the two divisions, but thought we might substitute Korean troops to fill out the cadre division. This would of course raise problems as to how to control their initiatives. Mr. Gallagher thought that the Koreans want the cadre division but are not particularly interested in fleshing it out with Korean troops.

Dr. Kissinger said that we want to be helpful. The Koreans are good allies; the President had a good meeting last August with President Park. The shock of the proposed reduction is its symbolism, but we will do the best we can.

Dr. Kissinger reiterated that we share interests in common with the ROK. We are not trying to get out. The proposed reduction allows us to stay longer by reducing U.S. domestic pressures against a major continued U.S. presence. He hoped that Mr. Gallagher would relay this idea to the Koreans. Mr. Gallagher said that this was precisely what he wanted to get across to them and he wondered if Dr. Kissinger could provide him with that language in writing. Dr. Kissinger agreed to do so, and asked Mr. Grant to draw up appropriate language (Note: separately transmitted).³

³ On July 13, in a memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge forwarded a brief statement that Kissinger subsequently approved and sent to Gallagher’s office on July 17. The statement reads: “The US Government regards the proposed reduction in its forces in Korea as a means of assuring that it can continue to cooperate over the long term in assuring Korean security, not as a means of withdrawing from its obligations. The indefinite retention in Korea of some 62,000 troops could be regarded as excessive, particularly in view of the absence of active hostilities for over fifteen years. This could in turn lead to domestic criticism of the continuing large-scale American presence.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)
In a digression during the discussion of Korea, Congressman Gallagher mentioned that he was a close friend of President Balaguer of the Dominican Republic. He had helped to assure that Balaguer could remain in the U.S., and had even found some funds to help support him, during a time when President Bosch was putting pressure on us to have Balaguer deported. Mr. Gallagher said that he has helped Balaguer’s government and can perhaps be of help to us if something is needed from Balaguer or if we need an intermediary with personal credit with him.

67. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Department of State

Honolulu, July 23, 1970, 0548Z.

For Assistant Secretary Green from Ambassador Brown.

1. Full account of today’s meeting is being sent through military channels. What follows involves considerable duplication but is sent in an attempt to give you a little flavor of the two sessions.

2. This morning the Koreans indicated that two hundred million dollars of military assistance per year for five years would be required to bring their forces to a state at which genuine modernization could begin. Coastal surveillance was a priority requirement which would involve a squadron of S-2’s. They also asked for substantial US help in establishing defense industries in Korea. They made it clear that bringing defense equipment up to date was not, in their view, modernization.

3. Secretary Packard’s offer to leave behind the equipment of the departing 20 thousand plus adding some substantial items from excess stock, such as 286 M-48 tanks, plus a regular MAP appropriation of 140 million dollars, plus a request for a supplemental appropriation in substantial but unspecified amount was received in silence. Jung’s only

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2 A ROK–U.S. Defense Ministerial meeting was held in Honolulu, July 22–23. Department of Defense telegram 230535Z from Packard to Laird, July 23, is attached but not printed. According to Packard’s telegram, the first day of meetings dealt with differences between ROK and the United States over the possibility of North Korean aggression. The second day dealt with the issues surrounding troop withdrawals and modernization of ROK forces.
comment was that he was sorry to see that the equipment to be left behind included some corps artillery. This indicated to him that we intended to remove I Corps. He later stated that for US to leave behind the equipment of the departing troops would not be of any help because that equipment was already in Korea and therefore leaving it there would not increase Korea’s defense capability.

4. Mr. Packard’s statement that we were prepared to station US aircraft in Korea in replacement of squadrons now scheduled to be withdrawn in September was greeted with the sentence “This is of course gratifying, but I have not yet had an opportunity to tell you of the diplomatic, military and economic assurances which my government will require before it would be in a position to indicate any kind of acquiescence in any reduction of US forces.” Jung then said the ROK’s wanted to know very quickly exactly what items of equipment we would be prepared to provide for modernization, that he had expected our comments on the ROK modernization plan long before this, and that they wanted a firm commitment that 60 percent of the items in the five year modernization program would be delivered in the first two years. He also wanted us to find some way, such as a separate appropriation for Korea, which would insulate the current Korean MAP program from the effect of any cut in MAP appropriations made by the Congress. He said that he had not expected the subject of MAP transfer to be raised and that his government’s position was that we and they were bound by the Brown letter. Any resumption of MAP transfer was unacceptable. The defense burden on the Korean budget was already great, 23 percent. He said they wanted US help in financing defense manufacturing industries and providing raw materials for them. He asked for support of a defense science research institute to be established in the Ministry of Defense which would be the same character and “co-equal” with KIST. He would like to get about the same amount of aid for this new agency as KIST had received. He was gratified to hear that US air units would be stationed in Korea, but wanted firm assurance as to the disposition of US air and naval forces in the area and assurances as to what counter-measures they would be prepared to undertake in the event of North Korean aggression.

5. In the diplomatic field, in order to cushion the shock of reduction and maintain the deterrent, he had expected “faithful fulfillment” of US treaty obligations, the assurance of the redeployment of US forces

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3 Ambassador Brown’s letter of March 4, 1965, set out the U.S. military and economic commitments to be made to South Korea in exchange for the deployment of Korean troops to Vietnam. The letter was handed to the South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs on March 7, and a sanitized version was published in the Korea Times and the Korea Republic on March 8. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXIX, part 1, Korea, Document 76.
to Korea if the treaty had to be invoked, including ground forces. He asked for “stern and forceful warning to North Korea,” and assurance that UN forces would stay in Korea in powerful and substantive strength until unification was accomplished under the UN formula. He requested assurance of close and full consultation on the fulfillment of the defense treaty which would involve, among other things, expansion of the annual Defense Ministers meeting to include Foreign Ministers. He said that any addition to the Korean defense budget, as would be involved in a resumption of MAP transfer, would impair ROK economic progress and should not come until the Korea development program had proceeded much further than it has today.

6. He said that the ROK Government wanted these assurances first before reductions of forces in Korea were discussed and that unless they had received sufficient assurances in the defense, diplomatic and economic fields the ROK Government could not concur in any reductions. He remarked pointedly that a unilateral reduction “would be very inappropriate.”

7. He said all of this with a straight face in spite of the fact that it had been made clear to him in private conversations, prior to the meeting and by Secretary Packard in the morning session that the US decision to withdraw 20 thousand men had been made and was firm.

8. The posture of the Korean delegation today had a strong flavor of an aggrieved party who was being deprived of his rights by a faithless friend.

9. Secretary Packard’s performance at this point was superb. Very quietly but very firmly he reminded the Minister that the US had maintained substantial US forces in Korea for 17 years, that there were no Soviet or Chinese forces in North Korea, and that the US had provided Korea with over 8 billion dollars in aid. He said that to assume that Korea had not made enough progress to justify the marginal decrease in forces which we were proposing was totally unrealistic. For us to specify in advance the form of assistance which we would render if our help were required under the treaty was out of the question. We would live up to our commitment under the treaty. We would provide appropriate help if required by our treaty obligation. But we would not give any more assurances or assume any additional commitments. Mr. Packard noted that at this meeting we had recognized the importance of solid defensive strength for the Korean forces. We had reaffirmed our commitment under the treaty. We had accepted the need to upgrade the Korean force’s equipment. We had moved to assure more effective air support as that required. We had offered to give them equipment from our departing troops which would provide them with a capability equivalent to that of the US forces which were leaving. If this were not attractive to them we could easily take the equipment home or dispose of it elsewhere. We intend to request a supplemental
MAP appropriation. We were prepared to examine the possibility of developing defense industry. We had agreed to provide them with three S–2 planes within the new few weeks.

10. We felt, therefore, that we had fully shown our good faith. There was no possibility that we would make greater commitments or do more than we had already outlined. It would be most unfortunate if there should be a public confrontation between us. He hoped that we could conclude our discussion on a note of progress and a picture of a US sympathetic to ROK requirements.

11. The Minister then said that it was clear that there were wide gaps between us. He was not in a position to say “yes” or “no” to our package proposal. Perhaps we should leave the points which had been made for further discussion between our representatives in Seoul and Washington.

12. Jung is a capable man who feels strongly on this subject. He does so not only in terms of his own special responsibility as Minister of Defense and concern for what might happen to him if he doesn’t bring back a package satisfactory to President Park, but also because of genuine concern that the proposed withdrawal would jeopardize his country’s security.

13. Despite the fact that Secretary Packard, Ambassador Porter, and a number of others have tried to show him how what we have offered could be honestly and effectively presented as a real achievement on his part and a reassurance to his country-men, he refuses to see it this way. I think that he has really persuaded himself that he is right in not doing so. It is perhaps indicative of his mood that he told us at lunch today that he had been reminded by various colleagues in the Korean Assembly before he left for Honolulu of the story of a representative of an ancient Korean king who, having been unable to get an opportunity to speak at an international meeting on a matter of concern to his monarch, had very appropriately committed hari-kari on the spot.

14. Postscript—Agreement on a communiqué which mentions only our agreements and does not specifically refer to reduction of forces has made Jung feel a lot better. In his final comment he expressed the hope that his rather extreme demands should not be taken amiss but should be attributed to concern for his country.
68. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, August 4, 1970, 0450Z.

4044. For Ambassador Brown. Pass DOD and CINCPAC for POLAD.

1. Summary. Park received Michaelis and me at 4:30 pm Monday. Interview lasted two hours. As we gradually increased pressure on him, his position on joint troop planning moved from adamant repetition of his earlier refusals to countenance reduction of U.S. troops or to plan jointly on that subject, to statement that he had instructed his Defense Minister to do no such planning until “a degree of satisfaction” had been achieved in modernization talks now underway. Finally, he appeared to soften latter position somewhat by saying he had not yet received interim report of modernization group and he would reserve his opinion on joint planning on reductions until he had that, after which he would get in touch with us. As result of problems we spread before him he seemed more indecisive, albeit more truculent, as reality of U.S. determination to proceed with or without his cooperation became clearer to him. He reiterated all the “musts” and declared his “displeasure” frequently. At no point did he acknowledge U.S. gestures made at Honolulu. He excluded his Ministers from interview despite Prime Minister’s statement to me that he would be present. He had only two Blue House officials there, including interpreter.

2. I opened by saying we had requested interview for purpose of examining our positions and of ascertaining how we could cooperate during period ahead. I said problems are arising because of lack of joint planning. Further, we hope to keep public contention and difficulty, which would only complicate and endanger favorable consideration of modernization problem by Congress, to minimum. We were also hoping that clarifications we had provided at Honolulu had made it possible to deal with these matters. Modernization talks are under way and we believe they will produce useful picture of what is needed. Is it now possible to move ahead on joint planning on our troop reductions?

3. Park replied that there was no change in their attitude. His views had been made known to United States at Honolulu. Nothing

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2 For a summary of the modernization talks, which began on March 22, see Document 88.
could be done about troop reduction planning before achievement of results at modernization conference and before “assurances” concerning security could be given to Korean people. When those things are achieved joint consultation could begin. He understood U.S. problems, but there are similar or greater difficulties in Korea. He had received letters which indicated Korean people 100 per cent against reduction of U.S. troops. If reduction is to occur there must be “assurances that there will be no outbreak of war in Korea.” Unless there is some agreement of that kind he will not agree to reductions. He understands there are serious and sincere talks about modernization underway and he hopes they will provide conclusion which will enable general public to feel secure. Only then will he take part in reduction talks and only then will matters of size, timing, and actions to be taken after agreement, be discussed. He wanted to make clear at this point that ROKG will not participate in talks on reductions until such assurances are given.

3A. I then said that we regretted that there is no change in their willingness to talk with us and I would describe problems arising in connection with our decision to reduce number of our troops. Our planning, which we had unfortunately been compelled to do alone because ROKG felt it could not participate, provides for reduction of 5,000 spaces by December 1970, of 8,500 more at end of March 1971, and of 4,900 by June 30, 1971. As translation proceeded, Park closed his eyes and jiggled his knee as he does under stress, and ordered coffee.

4. Park repeated that he understood U.S. difficulties including congressional problem, but unless there is mutually acceptable conclusion of modernization talks, ROKG will not participate in talks. “If United States proceeds to reduce he will not object but he will not cooperate.” He continued: “Perhaps it would be said that ROK Govt is uncooperative and intransigent but same holds true for United States because ROKG was not consulted in advance of this decision and must have assurances.”

5. I replied that there was no approved plan on troop reductions when we asked ROKG to plan jointly with us. They felt unable to do that. Therefore we had to move in view of our national sentiment, policy, budgetary and manpower considerations. ROKG may have had good ideas but they would not present them in planning sessions. For example, for lack of joint planning there is real problem about disposition of equipment which may become available soon as result of reductions. What are we to do with it? We cannot let it deteriorate, and it is hard to imagine public reaction here or in U.S. if ROKG refusal to plan with us makes it necessary to send it elsewhere. This very unfortunate. List of equipment is impressive, there are hundreds of tanks for
example, and much other equipment that would be of great value to ROKF.\(^3\)

6. Park, now in more of thinking rather than declarative mood, said list included Corps equipment.

7. I repeated that we had to develop our planning unilaterally because we could get no Korean input. Korean thoughts would have been most useful but they would not participate. General Michaelis could answer his questions on military aspects of problem.

8. Park rather angrily said he had received initial official word of our intentions on March 27 and he regrets reaction of USG to his pleas for few years’ more time. He had time and time again asked for consideration of ROK security problems because next few years critical. But if situation in U.S. makes it difficult for USG to wait, he would not object provided ROK forces are strengthened to extent they are able to deter aggression and assurances about security are forthcoming along with his strengthened forces. He does not know what outcome of modernization talks will be. If they lack sincerity, if Korean requirements encounter U.S. attitude that they cannot be met, then it is his intention to object to troop reductions in Korea. But if U.S. pulls out forces as planned he can do nothing as U.S. forces are under U.S. control.

9. I said all this comes down to question of confidence. We have given every possible assurance at our highest level about our intention to modernize their forces, and we have reiterated our commitment to their security. Legally, it is impossible for us to do more than we have done. From our point of view Korean Govt seems to lack confidence in U.S. intentions and our statements, and we do not understand why.

10. Park then picked up word “impossible” and seemed to be trying to determine whether I said it was impossible for us to accept their demand for additional security assurance. I checked word with him and then said that if ROKG is asking for something more in way of commitment than is in treaty, it is impossible for us to exceed treaty limits. If ROKG is asking for renegotiation of treaty to provide additional assurances it is opinion of our govt that such renegotiation is practically impossible in present circumstances. Park replied that he never made that request, it came from Assembly.

11. Park went on to day that it may be true that there is lack of confidence and trust between our two countries, lack of U.S. confidence in

\(^3\) In telegram 3883 from Seoul, July 27, Porter informed Brown that he intended to urge Park to accept joint planning of U.S. troop reductions. Porter explained that he would use the rationale that without Park’s consent to joint planning, congressional agreement to giving the ROK leftover equipment could not be obtained. (Ibid.)
Korea, and of Korea in U.S. He does not depend so much on Mutual De-
defense Treaty. When Korean war broke out there was no treaty but U.S.
came with valuable and timely assistance. (He became somewhat worked
up at this point.) On problem of confidence in each other he recalled that
during meeting with President Nixon about year ago U.S. President ex-
plained his Doctrine and his intention to reduce forces abroad. After that
explanation, President Nixon assured him Doctrine would not be applied
to Korea but on contrary U.S. forces would be made stronger, and
that this was expressed in effect in joint communiqué. Also at time of
despatching ROK forces to Vietnam, General Beach’s letter declared that
as long as Korean forces in Vietnam there would be no U.S. troop cut
in Korea. At this, I looked at him inquiringly, but he avoided looking
at me. He was excited and after moment’s reflection I decided to leave
obvious challenge for another occasion, as it would not do to correct
him before his Secretary General and his interpreter. He gave me no
opportunity in any case to inject a correction. He went on rapidly, say-
ing that time has come for Korea to develop her economy and her de-
fense self-reliance, and he fully intended that his country would stand
on her own feet but only thing required is our understanding that this
could not be done in day or two.

12. He then declared that less than year after he had received U.S.
assurances about no troop reduction, he was presented with U.S. plan
for withdrawal. Korean people are keenly interested in reduction of
forces and disposal of our equipment and how much will be made
available. They are not sure of our intentions. Will there be more re-
ductions next year?

13. Noting his uncertainty, I suggested that he might consider hav-
ing some officers meet with General Michaelis’s staff and consider var-
ious problems arising from our force reduction and plan orderly
arrangements for equipment, units, etc. which are needed. I added that
we understand he seeking some kind of assurance but nature of what
he is seeking is not clear to us. It appears to lie on diplomatic side, and
we could explore what they have in mind while his people make prac-
tical arrangements with our military officers which would not neces-
sarily imply that he had agreed to our force reductions.

14. Park said ROK Govt would do that when satisfactory conclu-
sion can be drawn from modernization talks. He said he was in posi-
tion of having instructed his Minister of Defense that no planning on
troop reductions could take place until there is “satisfactory degree”
of assurances from modernization talks.

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4 See footnote 7, Document 35.
15. Gen. Michaelis then explained procedures being followed by modernization committee to determine actual equipment and funding requirements, priorities and training lead times.

16. Gen. Michaelis and I pointed out that there is really no time for procedure he suggested (para 14). Problems of reductions and equipment we had mentioned would soon be upon us. What would be effect of shipping out our equipment, we asked again.

17. Park rejoined angrily that we were saying Korean delegates would go into joint troop reduction planning talks to listen only. I said that not case, they should meet with us, exchange ideas about orderly arrangements for units and equipment. We very much regretted absence of ROK ideas.

18. Park said statements of U.S. spokesmen about reduction indicated USG will go ahead. As far as he is concerned, if conclusion satisfactory “to a degree” can be drawn from modernization talks he would not object to discussion of troop reductions and would meet and talk with us.

19. I replied that it should be understood that in suggesting joint planning I did not imply there could be any change in our plan to reduce our force. I had only suggested joint exchange on absorption of equipment and arrangements for replacement units as practical aspect of problem, which Gen. Michaelis best qualified to discuss.

20. Park then asked Gen. Michaelis for details of our plan for reduction and was given outline of approved plan. Park inquired whether it is planned to take whole units or parts of units. Michaelis provided him with chart showing nature and pace of withdrawals.

21. Park then launched into expression of displeasure at U.S. unilateral planning, to which I rejoined again that it was necessary only because ROKs felt they could not join us. Park reiterated his “regret and displeasure” at U.S. action and stated again he would not participate until “satisfactory conclusion” could be drawn from modernization talks. He said that if U.S. troops were being moved elsewhere for emergency purposes then this hasty withdrawal would be understandable but that is not case and it is based only on U.S. domestic political problems, and ROK should be given more time. So far everything is on unilateral basis and U.S. is not respecting or listening to ROK wishes. U.S. troops are merely going home and withdrawal is not for any emergency purpose. What about NATO? Why aren’t troops being withdrawn from there?

22. I took this occasion to read to him Secretary’s remarks to Korean parliamentary delegation. Park said nothing except that North Koreans know all about ROK strength.

23. I then made statement to effect that essence of problem is that we must talk and plan jointly. Regardless of our views as to how each
of us had proceeded, we can only encourage his people and avoid giving comfort to enemy by talking and planning together. He knows our system of govt. We had given him best assurances we can possibly give that we will provide adequate modernization and we had assured him commitment to ROK security remains unchanged. We do not understand why such assurances cannot be taken to ROK public. Our plans involve less than three per cent of main ROK/U.S. force and we have offered generous compensatory arrangements. Also we find it difficult to agree that only one side of problem, modernization, should be discussed. Both modernization and troop reduction planning must go forward together. Unless they do, modernization program may encounter obstacles in Congress. I would leave with him informal paper (ref State 121444 para two)\(^5\) which reflected views we had expressed.

24. Park sat a moment without responding. He then said he had not yet received interim report on modernization. Until he did he would reserve judgment on need to plan jointly with us, and will then get in touch with us. I said I hoped for reasons we had stated that would be soon.

25. I will comment later on long-term meaning for us, as I see it, of Park’s attitude. One interesting thing occurred after interview ended. As we were leaving his office, after making our farewell bows, I turned once again and looked back at him. Park was looking at paper outline which Michaelis left of approved plan for force reduction and for some reason he was smiling. This struck me as odd. There were certainly no smiles during our meeting.

26. Suggestions for near term handling of problem follow for your consideration.\(^6\)

Porter

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\(^6\) In telegram 4095 from Seoul, August 6, Porter added that “I am inclined to believe that it is best to let things simmer for awhile and avoid any reaction which would give Park and advisers reason to believe that their tough stand is paying off.” (Ibid.)
Seoul, August 19, 1970, 0247Z.

KRA 3085. Today in a discussion with MND, Jung once again reaffirmed there could be no discussion of force reduction until a mutually recommended requirements plan for modernization was developed and not until the President had an assured package to “show to his people.”

After a rather lengthy and tense discussion, Jung, stating he was speaking to me as a private individual and not as the MND, said that when the modernization committee has evolved an agreed upon requirements package and after President Nixon submitted an FY 71 supplemental to the Congress, they would discuss the reduction of 20,000 but not the removal of a division, corps headquarters and corps artillery. Asked for an explanation, he said this meant a man for man and unit for unit substitution. Two US divisions and corps structure under US command must remain.

Warm regards.

70. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Military Assistance for Korea

The Under Secretaries’ Committee has looked hard at the necessity for modernizing Korea’s Armed Forces and has concluded that within the limits of the $1.0 billion 5-year program (less the value of excess equipment which might be included) modernization would be limited largely to the ground forces. To provide a reasonable level of modernization for the ROK Air Force and Navy the Under Secretaries’ Committee believes an additional $500 million over the period would be needed.2

The NSDM–48 envisaged upgrading of ROK Air/Ground defense capabilities and improvement in Air Base facilities to permit rapid reintroduction of U.S. air power and reduce vulnerability to attack. However, only $71.8 million of investment in the ROK Air Force over the 5-year period was contemplated, and no investment funds were contemplated for modernizing the ROK Navy.

It is clear that a program of balanced force modernization with the ultimate objective of ROK military self-sufficiency over the next five years will involve a very high price tag. It is equally clear that a program focused primarily towards ROK ground force modernization, while considerably less expensive, will involve a continuing and more immediate requirement to provide U.S. air and naval reinforcements in the event of a North Korean attack.

While it is unlikely that the ROK Government will be able to support a militarily self-sufficient force from its own resources and thus will seek continued substantial military assistance from us for the indefinite future, the cost of increasing ROK naval and air capabilities would be less than that required to provide equivalent U.S. force capabilities in the area.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger signed the original, which was sent to the President on August 22. An attached August 19 memorandum from Haig to Kissinger alerted the latter to the Under Secretaries Committee recommendations.

2 The Under Secretaries Committee’s recommendations were submitted to Nixon in an undated memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson. Johnson’s memorandum and an August 19 memorandum from Haig to Holdridge and Kennedy requesting them to “staff” Johnson’s memorandum are attached but not printed.

3 Document 56.
I believe that a modernization program for the Air Force and Navy is worth our support. This program cannot be achieved within the limits of the existing $1 billion program, and the $1.5 billion figure provides a reasonable add-on. (We may want to take a hard look at the specifics of the increases proposed for the Army, Navy and Air Force, however.)

I recommend therefore that you approve in principle a balanced force modernization program with a level of $1.5 billion for the period FY 71–75 comprising a combination of grant, MAP and excess equipment and supplies. The USC would be directed to develop detailed alternative force modernization programs.4

The USC also has recommended that you seek a FY 71 supplemental MAP appropriation of $150 million to support the Korea program but does not recommend when this request should be made. The Committee notes that additional funds also will be required for both economic and military assistance for Cambodia. Consideration will have to be given as to whether these requests and that for Korea should be combined.

The Committee does recommend, though, that the Vice President announce publicly during his visit to Seoul5 that the U.S. intends to seek a substantial supplemental appropriation for Korea force modernization this year. Ambassador Porter strongly supports this recommendation.

You have indicated that you do not want to request a supplemental before November. If the Vice President announces your intention to request a supplemental, it may tend to force your hand with the Congress and raise the question of the effect of Cambodian operations on our current MAP levels earlier than would otherwise be the case.

I recommend, therefore, that the Vice President be instructed not to announce or inform Korean officials that the U.S. intends to seek a supplemental. You will want the Vice President to make the point in general terms that we support the concept of modernization and will do all that we can subject to approval of the Congress to provide a balanced military assistance program capable of meeting ROK needs. General Michaelis would be informed of the total dimensions of our aid and would work out a one-year illustrative modernization program to show the Koreans and reassure them that their needs will indeed be met.6

4 According to a September 2 backchannel telegram from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, President Nixon “approved a $1.5 billion level for balanced modernization of the ROK military, but adds that the upper limit of the funding authority should be held to $1.25 billion, with the balance of the program’s valuation to be provided from excess/long supply and matériel to be supplied to the ROK at no cost over the five year period.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)

5 See footnote 2, Document 71.

6 According to the September 2 backchannel telegram from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, Porter was informed that “bearing in mind” the Vice-President’s visit, “COMUSK should inform MND he authorized to begin to discuss details force modernization program.”
71. **Backchannel Telegram From the Ambassador to Korea (Porter) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**


692. Following message also sent to President from Vice President via State channels. Please forward if necessary.

1. After six-hour meeting with Park today we came up with following two texts which I agreed to submit for your consideration. First text is my proposal to Koreans for public statement to Park which we would make to help him in dealing with public suspicion about possible further troop withdrawals. Latter proved to be much more abrasive issue than that of joint military planning for our force reduction. I believe he would accept this text if you feel agreeable to approving it:

*Begin text:* “The U.S. Government, through a long-range program of military and economic aid, will assist the Government of the ROK in its commendable effort to modernize and strengthen its defense forces.

“Until the modernization process is completed, the presence of U.S. troops in the ROK will be required. U.S. forces will be withdrawn only as ROK defensive capabilities improve.

“Evaluation of ROK defense capabilities shall be made from time to time by representatives of the United States and the ROK after full consultation. It is understood, however, that in the event those representatives cannot agree, U.S. reserves final control of its armed forces.”

*End text first statement.*

ROKs may desire that final sentence not be published, in which case I recommend we try to accommodate them by confirming text of agreement, including that final sentence, by letter.

2. Following is text of proposal made by President Park which I said I would submit to you for consideration with the foregoing but which I could not in good conscience recommend to you:

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Sent to Lord for Kissinger in San Clemente where it was received at 4:55 a.m. on August 25.

2 Nixon dispatched Agnew to Korea during the last week of August. Kissinger described Agnew’s mission in an August 22 memorandum to him: “Your presence will be a great asset in helping President Park, as well as the Korean people, appreciate the depth of our continued friendship and backing under the Nixon Doctrine. The ‘face’ Park will gain from your visit will make it easier for him to go along with our reductions and support them publicly, which we want him to do.” (Ibid., Box 406, Subject Files, Vice President’s Briefing Book, Republic of Korea, August 1970)
President Park has no objection to U.S. force reduction of 20,000, provided ROK forces equipment is modernized, and national defense capability is increased, and provided there will be no further reduction of the level of remaining U.S. forces until such time as modernization program has been implemented and ROK force strength increased."

End second text.

3. Second text indicates Park’s determination to tie remaining U.S. forces to undetermined level of modernization program which I felt I could not agree to. Am hoping you can give these matters early attention to enable us if possible to reach conclusion before my departure tomorrow at 1300 hours Seoul time.3

3 In telegram 138266 to San Clemente, August 25, U. Alexis Johnson sent a draft reply for Agnew to Rogers and Kissinger which warned that the Koreans could take the view that modernization is a “never-ending process,” and reiterated that the reduction of 20,000 troops was not dependent upon completion of deliveries under the modernization program. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)

72. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon1


[Omitted here is a discussion of U.S. force levels in Europe.]

With respect to Korea, I feel that the stresses and strains surrounding our decision to reduce by 20,000 this fiscal year are such that the traffic would not bear another substantial withdrawal for at least the next year or two. While I agree that we should work toward carrying out some further reduction in our forces in Korea, I am concerned that we do so in a way that does not give the wrong signal either to the other side or to our friends in the area. This will take time and careful handling. My concern in this regard is not only with respect to Korea, but perhaps even more importantly with respect to Japan. You well know what a volatile people the Japanese are. I have already noted con-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 283, Dept of State, 1 Sep–Nov 1970, Vol. IX, Secret. An attached September 29 memorandum from Kennedy to Haig noted that Rogers’s memorandum “was passed directly to the President on Saturday, September 26. It was returned to us from the President without comment.”
cern on the part of some of them that we are perhaps moving too far
and too fast in reducing our presence in the area. While some concern
on the part of the Japanese is healthy, I feel that we should be careful
not to cross over the line that would cause the Japanese to have such
doubts about our deterrent capabilities and intentions with respect to
Japan and the rest of the area [1½ lines not declassified]. Unless we handle
ourselves properly, this could quickly become a very real danger.

I am sending a copy of this to Mel Laird.

William P. Rogers²

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Korea¹

Washington, October 26, 1970, 2224Z.

176021. For the Ambassador from Alexis Johnson. Ref: Seoul 5608.²

1. I saw Ambassador Kim alone this morning and, as indicated in
Reftel and he had indicated to me yesterday, he left with me a piece of
paper entitled “agreed minutes,”³ containing eight points, to be signed
on behalf of both governments. He said that he was giving me this pa-
per for my “reference only”, as it was understood all negotiations on
this subject were centered with you and Seoul.

2. In response to my questions, he said that it was envisaged that
the “agreed minutes” would remain a confidential document between
the two governments and that there would be a separate public state-
ment. He said that he did not feel that the first five points should give
much difficulty, as they primarily repeated what had been said on var-
ious occasions in the past; but he recognized that para six, which stated
that the U.S. “has no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the
wishes of the Korean Government” with respect to consultations on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542,
Johnson and approved by Ranard and Curran (S/S).

² Dated October 26; in it Porter indicated that Choi wanted to hand him a draft of
programs for further discussion of troop reductions and military modernization. (Ibid.)

³ See Document 74.
future troop reductions, created problems, and that para seven, estab-
lishing annual meetings of U.S. and ROK Foreign and Defense Minis-
ters on “implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty”, as well as a
standing “Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Committee” chaired by the
Foreign Minister and including the MOD, with the Ambassador and
CINCUNC on the U.S. side, was something new.

3. After glancing through the paper, I said that without going into
details I could not accept the concept. I pointed out that vis-à-vis the
Congress it would be entirely impossible for us to acknowledge (as we
would have to do) that we had a “secret agreement” with ROKG and
at the same time to allege that “it did not contain anything new” in the
way of a U.S. commitment. With respect to para six, I said that he was
correct; that it was entirely impossible for us to accept veto by the
ROKG over the disposition of our forces. With respect to para 7, I said
that I could not accept the idea of formalized annual meetings involv-
ing both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, but I thought
it would be possible to work out something a little more formalized
with respect to participation of high-level State officials in the annual
Defense Ministers’ meetings. With respect to the “Korea-U.S. Security
Consultative Committee” in Seoul, I thought that this was substantially
the way things now were working.

4. I said that, at the conclusion of the present phase of talks, I en-
visaged that only formal confidential exchange between the two gov-
ernments would be a factual recording of the understandings that had
been reached with respect to what we were going to seek in the way
of modernization and changes in disposition of forces consequent to
our reduction. In reply to Kim’s question, I said that I did not have any
view on whether this should be an exchange between you and the For-
eign Minister or between Michaelis and MOD, but it seemed to me the
latter would be the normal and natural way of doing it. The only other
thing that I envisaged was relatively brief agreed public statement to
be issued by both governments. In response to Kim’s question I said
that I did not envisage this as being a signed “agreement,” but rather
an agreed public statement to be issued by you and the Foreign Min-
ister in Seoul, with our making copies available here; but I did not re-
ject the idea of a simultaneous Foreign Ministry and Department of
State statement. I said that we had been discussing such a statement
with you and I expected that you would shortly have the instructions
to enable you to discuss a text with the ROKG.

5. Kim’s defense of their “agreed minutes” draft was not very spir-
ited, and he obviously anticipated my reaction. I hope what I said to
him will be helpful.

6. Text of “agreed minutes” being sent septel.

Rogers
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, October 26, 1970, 2210Z.

175981. For the Ambassador. Ref: State 176021. 2

1. Following is the text of the “agreed minutes” mentioned in reftel:

Agreed Minutes
Seoul, 1970

Recognizing that it is in their interest to continuously maintain and strengthen the traditional friendship and close ties between them, forged both in war and peace, and to resolve problems of their common concern in the spirit of mutual trust and confidence, and

Realizing that the defense and security of the Republic of Korea is a matter of their common concern and responsibility:

The Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America held sincere consultations on various relevant matters arising out of the question of a partial reduction of the United States forces stationed in Korea, as a result of which they have reached, among others, the following understandings:

1. The United States will continue to fully honour and carry out its obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States and its assurances thus far made through various policy declarations and joint statements in regard to the defense and security of the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea and the United States recognize that the continued presence of substantial United States forces in Korea, which are also the mainstay of the United Nations forces in Korea, is not only a clear evidence of United States commitment to defend the Republic of Korea but also an effective deterrent against the renewal of hostilities in Korea. They agree that Republic of Korea forces and United States forces stationed in Korea must remain strong and alert. The United States reaffirms that it will render forthwith and effectively all possible assistance, including the use of armed forces, to repel armed attacks against the Republic of Korea.


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2 Document 73.
a nuclear power threatens the freedom or security of the Republic of Korea, it will provide a shield against such a threat.

3. The United States will continue to support the principles and objectives of the United Nations in Korea and the efforts of the United Nations to achieve the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea, and reaffirms its adherence to the joint policy declaration which was signed on July 27, 1953 by the sixteen nations which supported the Republic of Korea with troops during the Korean war. The Republic of Korea confirms its policy of cooperation with the United Nations and emphasizes the necessity of continued presence in Korea of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) as well as the United Nations Command (UNC) and its forces for the achievement of the United Nations objectives in Korea. It is also the policy of the Korean Government to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations Command, as set forth in the Agreed Minutes between the Republic of Korea and the United States signed on November 17, 1954 as amended on January 30, 1962.

4. The Republic of Korea will continue its efforts for developing its national economy and strengthening its defense capabilities and will also promote Asian and Pacific regional cooperation in political, economic, social and other fields. The United States will extend to the Republic of Korea additional military and economic assistance at a substantially higher level to modernize and strengthen the Republic of Korea defense forces through a long-range military and economic assistance program, as per Attachment I.

5. The Republic of Korea has no objection to the reduction in the United States troop strength in Korea by (blank), which will be implemented along the lines of understandings reached as a result of consultations between the two governments. It is noted that, upon completion of this reduction, the authorized number of United States military personnel stationed in the Republic of Korea will total (blank). The United States confirms that such reduction does not affect or weaken in any way United States commitments to the defense and security of the Republic of Korea.

6. The United States confirms that, based on present conditions, it does not plan or intend to reduce the number its troops stationed in Korea beyond the figure of (blank) mentioned in the preceding paragraph and that, to ensure the security of Korea, no significant reduction in United States troop strength in Korea will be made without full prior consultation with the Government of the Republic of Korea. Such consultation will be primarily based upon Korea-U.S. evaluations of the nature and degree of the military threat being directed against the Republic of Korea and of Republic of Korea defense capabilities. In this
connection, the United States makes it clear that it has no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Korean Government in the prior consultation referred to above.

7. In order to ensure close consultations on the implementation of the Mutual Defense Treaty and on other defense and security matters of mutual interest and common concern, the two governments agree to hold annual meetings between their respective Foreign and Defense Ministers. It is also agreed to establish as a standing consultative organ, the “Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Committee” to be composed of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defense on the Korean side and the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and the Commander, United States Forces in Korea, and concurrently Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command in Korea, on the American side, which will meet whenever requested by either side. The committee meetings will be presided over by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

8. A joint declaration, as per Attachment II, will be issued in order to warn potential aggressors against miscalculation or misjudgement in connection with the partial reduction of the United States forces stationed in Korea and to reaffirm publicly the readiness and determination of the Republic of Korea of the United States to promptly and effectively counter any threats the potential aggressors might pose.

Attachments: I, II

For the Government of the Republic of Korea: For the Government of the United States of America:

Rogers

3 Not attached.
Seoul, November 3, 1970, 0942Z.


1. Since ROK Assemblyman Kim Dae Jung won the nomination of the New Democratic Party (NDP) for the Presidency, he has been campaigning in manner that is causing considerable uneasiness among Democratic Republican Party (DRP), including latter’s leader, President Park.

2. Kim is attracting very large crowds in major cities, before whom he unhesitatingly discusses number of sensitive issues, domestic and foreign. He is forceful orator, and reports indicate that he can both effectively harangue crowds and deal persuasively with intellectual groups. He is challenging Park by name and issue.

3. He has brought about major outcry in govt circles by advocating elimination of Homeland Reserve (HR). While he did not mention fact specifically, he is of course aware that popular enthusiasm toward service in that body has waned due to favoritism on wide scale which enables sons of officials and others who are well connected to avoid reporting for drill sessions, which, moreover, are considered tedious by men who were drilling in same manner as recruits ten years ago. In coastal areas units put in more than twice as many duty hours as city dwellers, and their dislike for such duty is increased by fact their absence from area and fishing boat frequently brings economic loss for which they are not compensated.

4. Mr. Kim is doing his best also to get govt over barrel on local self-government issue, and he is reviving memories of fact that local elections were once promised by President Park and his party. DRP is in quandary as to how to handle that one because local elections would remove rigid control which party now exercises through system of appointive governors, mayors, county and district chiefs. System has proven highly effective in both rewarding and punishing rural communities on basis their election performances.

5. Kim’s basic theme is simple. He does not deny Park’s achievements, but he declares that change is needed to straighten out political, economic and social inequities which he claims are developing in Korea. In addition to issues cited above, he has declared himself in favor of lowering voting age, raising investment in rural areas by twenty

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Confidential.
per cent, a graduated income-tax scale, for enhancement of women’s status through committee which would be under direct control of President, support for needy students and for eliminating that great bugaboo of Korean families, the college entrance examinations.

6. DRP has moved to curb Kim’s electioneering by having Central Election Management Committee, which it controls, declare that campaigning for presidency must be limited to period of forty days prior to actual election. During meeting with me last week at Kim’s request (memo pouched) I questioned him about effect of CEMC’s ruling. He said that he would ignore it, and he has done so up to now. DRP at this point is baffled, because CEMC ruling does not affect right of political parties to hold rallies. Persons are not supposed to proclaim their candidacy for presidency, but even if Kim observed that rule, no one can possibly misunderstand his words, his purpose, and his demeanor.

7. After my meeting with Kim, Prime Minister brought it up in conversation and asked my impressions of nominee. I said I found Kim interesting person who spoke in measured terms and who seemed to be clear-minded as well as determined. I added that I thought it would be interesting election. He inquired whether in my opinion there would be problem for President Park. I said I did not care to make judgment on that matter. PriMin then said that Mr. Kim was putting out reports to effect I supporting him and that I would help him go to United States. I commented there were two things about such reports, first being that they were without foundation, and secondly that I had heard them from several sources all of which, interestingly enough, were connected with DRP.

8. Minister of Defense then approached me and brought up subject of opposition candidate’s desire to eliminate Homeland Reserve, which Minister said must be maintained at all costs. I said that our opinion of value of Reserve had not changed, thought there were many things about way it was being developed which were having effect on public. Minister then said we would soon see what govt would do to equalize service for all elements of Reserve. I said I had no comment to make on that as it is Mr. Kim and not I who had been bothering him on subject.

9. President is said to have had some highly charged moments as he read Kim’s speeches. Opening para of that part of Kim’s speech to Seoul Correspondents Club on October 30 on “Korean Diplomacy in the 1970’s” reportedly had particularly pronounced effect on Park. At that point the NDP nominee said he believed talks with Kim Il Sung should be preceded by latter’s denunciation of aggression. Kim Dae Jung then continued: “At the same time, I am firmly opposed to creating this atmosphere of tension and horror, as evidenced in the policy of
the present administration of President Park Chung Hee to prolong the life of one’s regime in the name of national security and anti-communism.” It is reliably reported that Park had to be peeled off the ceiling after that one. President has made no campaign move as yet. He is not noted for charisma, and would in any case be inhibited by his sense of personal dignity and local custom from engaging in direct debate with his opponent.

10. Kim is receiving strong support from his two erstwhile rivals for NDP nomination, Kim Young Sam and Lee Chul Sung, who are stumping with him. They are articulate trio, quite possibly better than anything majority party can field. Among many other things DRP is also annoyed because Kim Dae Jung’s given name “Dae Jung” literally means “large crowds” or “masses,” and DRP leaders are complaining that he uses his name much too frequently as he tells crowds that “day of masses has arrived.”

11. We will be exercising care as we observe developments to ensure that neither side uses us for its purposes. It is obvious already that we are witnessing interesting developments which are likely to become even more so if Kim continues to draw crowds. (At Kwangju yesterday two hundred thousand persons came to hear him, and at Pusan several days ago he reportedly had from seventy-five to one hundred thousand.) DRP strategists are in some disarray, and their reported plan to stand on Park’s record may have to be greatly altered to deal with Kim’s promises, as Korean public generally is not overly enthralled by accounts of what party did for them yesterday.

12. We have en route to Dept comprehensive review of these developments and plan to continue frequent and complete coverage.²

Porter

² In telegram 5804 from Seoul, November 4, Porter reported on the Korean Government and DRP reaction to nominee Kim Dae Jung and that Park asked the Prime Minister “to do something” about Kim. (Ibid.)
76. **Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State**

Seoul, November 7, 1970, 0240Z.


1. President received me Friday morning for conversation indicated refelts. This part of my presentation based on desire explain to him status of military talks as we see them at this point and ascertain whether we in agreement in that connection. With congressional consideration of modernization problem ahead, which would no doubt include inquiry into question of U.S. troop reduction, it essential ROK/U.S. appear well aligned in these matters, I said.

2. Speaking first about modernization equipment list, I said committee on that subject had achieved agreement about items to submit to higher authority for examination and approval. This process now under way, and list being examined in Washington. It possible there might be some changes to suggest to ROK for variety of reasons including lack of production, nonavailability of items, etc., but in effect we consider that with submission of list to Washington, work of Seoul Committee chaired by Generals Shim and Smith had been concluded. Park nodded agreement, did not comment.

3. As for arrangements arising from our plans for troop reductions, I understood his people well briefed on our intentions and schedule. One point remaining is U.S. reaction to ROK proposal for retention of I Corps. When Washington reaction to this proposal is received, whether favorable or otherwise, we would consider that troop arrangement discussions were effectively concluded. Park inquired whether I thought reaction to their I Corps proposal would be favorable. I replied I unable to say, that I had recommended favorable considerations as had General Michaelis. Park again nodded, and said “all right.”

4. Continuing, I said this would bring us to dealing with problem of eight-point proposal which ROK Foreign Office had been strongly

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Confidential; Exdis.

2 Dated November 5, it reported the Department’s views on several issues: the need for additional talks with Park on troop reductions; presentation of possible resolution of the salmon fishing problem; and foreknowledge that the military modernization package was before the EA/IG Steering Committee. (Ibid.)

3 Dated November 4, it contained Porter’s request for the Department’s views on his meeting with Park. (Ibid.)
urging that we accept.4 We had made it clear in Washington and Seoul that it was simply not practical to proceed along lines they proposed, and that to attempt to do so could have very unfortunate effect on congressional consideration of programs benefitting ROK, including modernization. We regretted necessity for this stand, but Symington sub-committee hearings had surely made clear to ROKG considerable sensitivity that exists in Congress toward matters connected with our commitments. We urged ROKG to leave well enough alone. First things had to come first, and by that I meant we must be free to approach Congress on modernization and other programs without having to cope with accusation that we were enlarging on our commitments. This was my government’s view, I said, and I personally convinced that ROKG insistence on anything like eight-point “agreed minutes” would have very adverse effect on important ROK interests. I urged him both personally and officially to put these proposals aside and have confidence that we knew best how to advance ROK interests. Without making any other comment, Park said quite simply that he agreed. I said I appreciated his wise decision. I summed up this part of conversation by saying that as I understood it, when our response to ROK proposal about I Corps arrives, we will consider our military arrangements have been concluded. I would then approach the govt with draft statement for their consideration which would say that we had made satisfactory progress in those matters, and which, for purposes of public reassurance, would take note of fact that our commitment remained unchanged. President Park indicated assent to this understanding.

5. Comment: I was surprised to some extent by Park’s acquiescence, though we had feeling here that various factors were working on him, including of course congressional factor, and pressure from opposition which is discussed septel. ROKs had tried to arrange things their way, but were facing need for conclusion for both U.S. and ROK domestic reasons. I consider that this conversation effectively phased out Foreign Minister’s drive for eight-point type of document, and I will check with Secretary General Kim of Blue House to ensure that both FonMin and DefMin are informed along lines cited above. There could be some hang-up on DefMin’s side if we are unable to agree to their proposal about I Corps, but even there Park did not seem inclined to stick to their previous line. Odd thing about that, also, is recently announced appointment of ROK Deputy Commander for I Corps.

6. General Michaels has seen.

7. Other subjects discussed reported septels.

Porter

4 See Document 74.
Washington, November 6, 1970.

SUBJECT
The Korean Presidential Campaign

Although the presidential election in the Republic of Korea (ROK) will not be held until May, 1971, the candidate of the opposition New Democratic Party, Kim Tae-chung, has already emerged as a serious contender in the race against President Park Chung Hee. President Park is seeking a third term, the Constitution having been amended last year to remove the provision which limited the President to two terms in office.

In seeking re-election, Park can point to a solid record of achievement, particularly his role in the ROK’s remarkable economic growth. During his administration the ROK has taken giant strides toward stability, economic viability, and international acceptance. The President also enjoys the political advantages accruing to the strong, authoritarian chief of a state in which democratic institutions are only beginning to develop. He has a large measure of control over the media, a sizeable and active party organization, control of the armed forces as well as of extensive and well-endowed security organs.

Conversely, a long period in power has eroded the elan noted in his regime in earlier years, the corruption which he originally sought to stamp out has reappeared and may even have increased, and there is widespread impatience at the heavy hand of his security organs. Most of the population has benefited from economic growth, but disparities in income are excessive. The campaign to amend the Constitution, during which he made statements à la DeGaulle, offering the electorate a choice between himself and chaos, left a legacy of distrust and disappointment.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Confidential. A November 9 covering note from Houdek to Kissinger reads: “The full State memo is well worth reading. It looks like Park has a real opponent on his hands and is in for a hotly-contested election.” Houdek recommended that “we should closely monitor this election” and obtain from CIA a more complete biography of Kim Dae Jung and an assessment of his election chances. Haig wrote at the bottom of the page: “Yes, and we’re helping defeat Park for a less reliable substitute.” Latimer forwarded a memorandum to R. Jack Smith, November 18, tasking the CIA with the request for a biography of Kim and an analysis of his prospects. (Ibid.) For a summary of the assessment, see Document 83.
Park is now 53 years of age. Kim is 45, and the most vigorous opponent to face the President thus far. Kim is also able and intelligent, an excellent orator, skilled both at haranguing large crowds and establishing easy relationships with small groups of intellectuals. He offers an alternative, in contrast to previous candidates who could only oppose for opposition’s sake.

Since his nomination Kim has toured Korea, expounding his views to large—up to 200,000—crowds in the country’s major cities. He does not deny Park’s achievements, but declares that a change is needed to straighten out the political, economic and social inequities which he claims are developing in Korea. Specifically, he advocates elimination of the favoritism-riddled Homeland Reserve, the restoration of local self-government, the establishment of a graduated income tax, lowering of the voting age, and the raising of investment in rural areas by twenty percent. In foreign affairs, Kim accuses the President of exaggerating the North Korean threat to prolong the life of his own regime, asks for talks on reunification with Kim Il-song (but only after the latter renounces any aggressive intentions), and proposes that Korean security be guaranteed by the U.S., Japan, the Soviet Union and the CPR.

President Park has reportedly asked Prime Minister Chung Il-kwon to “do something” about Kim, and several leaders of the ruling Democratic-Republican Party (DRP) have urged the government to take strong action against Kim on the basis of alleged violations of the anti-communist laws (i.e. Kim’s remarks bearing on Korean security). Reluctant to make Kim a martyr, the ROKG has acted to squelch future publicity about Kim’s speeches, and has mounted a radio and TV campaign against him. The latter included a live TV-radio press conference in which Defense Minister Jung, supported by thirty leading Defense officials including the JCS chairman, denounced Kim’s call for abolition of the Homeland Reserve as “benefiting the enemy.”

If we have any experience with Korean elections, it is that they can be hotly contested, sensitive, and even disruptive to internal stability. As this one begins to take shape, it appears it will not be an exception.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

SUBJECT
Koreans Abandon Efforts to Obtain Diplomatic Assurances Regarding U.S. Troop Reductions

President Park has agreed to a suggestion from Ambassador Porter that the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) set aside its request for new “diplomatic assurances” in regard to further reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. The ROK had earlier submitted an eight point “Agreed Minutes” paper to be issued jointly by both sides when our talks were completed. The most controversial point was a proposed requirement for “full prior consultation” in connection with future reductions, and a statement that we would take no actions contrary to the wishes of the Korean Government. We had informed the ROK both in Seoul and in Washington that their paper was unacceptable and that we could not grant the ROK such veto power over the deployment of our forces. We told them, however, that we would see value for both sides in a statement, either by President Park unilaterally or jointly with Ambassador Porter, that we had reached satisfactory agreement on both the extent and manner of troop reductions and on modernization. In this we would also reaffirm our treaty commitment. President Park has agreed to such a statement.

A draft statement is under discussion with the Department of Defense and we hope to send it to the White House for clearance very shortly.

In making his decision President Park was probably motivated by the need—for both domestic and diplomatic reasons—to show satisfactory results in his negotiations with us. His opponent in next May’s presidential election, Kim Tae-chung, has charged that the President has made a mess of relations with the Americans. Kim has also charged that the President has deliberately fostered an atmosphere of tension and fear, fear of North Korean aggression and fear of abandonment by

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret. A copy was sent to Kissinger. Additional notations on the memorandum read: “Haig: FYI” and “Action: Smith/Holdridge.” Another notation on the memorandum indicates that Haig saw it. In a memorandum to President Nixon, December 8, Kissinger summarized this memorandum for the President. The December 8 memorandum bears Haig’s initials and a notation that Nixon saw it. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 74.
the Americans, in his efforts to prolong the life of his regime. Park is very sensitive to both charges. He has probably realized that there is no chance that we will reconsider our positions and that further adamancy on his part could cost him heavily with both our Congress and the Korean electorate. Whatever the reasons for Park’s apparent acquiescence, the result is entirely favorable.

William P. Rogers

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79. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
U.S./ROK Joint Statement

You will recall that as an aftermath of the Vice President’s visit to Korea\(^2\) the ROK Government tried to obtain a statement from us to the effect that we would provide full prior consultation to the ROKs before undertaking any further troop reductions. In addition, the ROKs wanted the statement to say that we would take no actions contrary to the wishes of the Korean Government. Finally, they wanted a public declaration from us that we would automatically commit our forces to the defense of the ROK in the event of a Communist attack.

We have of course maintained the position that we could not issue any statement containing such sweeping provisions. Ambassador Porter stonewalled the ROKs, and eventually they climbed down and expressed willingness to accept a statement (to be issued jointly) expressing satisfaction with the just-completed talks on modernization of the Korean ROK armed forces and the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea, noting that annual U.S./ROK high-level security consultations would be held to assess the nature of the military threat directed against

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\(^{1}\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum. Another notation indicates that S/S was informed on November 18 at 5:50 p.m.

\(^{2}\) See footnote 2, Document 71.
the ROK, and reaffirming the continuing validity of the U.S./ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. State believes that a public pronouncement of this nature would be useful in reassuring the ROKs on the retention of the U.S. presence in Korea, and President Park has agreed on the issuance of a joint statement along the lines indicated.

At Tab C is the text of the proposed joint statement as originally sent over for clearance by State. We had no problem with the first two paragraphs; however, we felt that the use of the word “commitment” in the third paragraph, while substantively not requiring anything more of the U.S. than the language of the Mutual Defense Treaty requires, might be misconstrued by people such as Senators Fulbright and Symington who are attempting to create the impression that the U.S. is assuming new commitments in East Asia. (The language of the Mutual Defense Treaty simply requires us to consult on what action might be taken to meet an armed attack in accordance with our respective constitutional procedures.) Accordingly, State submitted a re-draft of paragraph 3 which states that U.S. troop reductions do not affect the “determination” of the U.S. to meet armed attack against the ROK in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty (Tab A). This language was drawn almost verbatim from the joint statement by the President and Park Chung Hee of August 22, 1969 (Tab B). It should therefore be acceptable.

Recommendation

That you clear State’s draft of the U.S./ROK joint statement, as amended at Tab A.

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3 Tab C, a draft cable to Seoul, is attached but not printed.
4 Tab A, attached but not printed, is a memorandum from Curran to Davis, November 13.
5 Tab B is attached but not printed. For text of the joint statement, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 682–683.
6 Kissinger initialed the approve option. The statement was transmitted in telegram 189173 to Seoul, November 19, for discussion with the Korean Government. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70)
THE CHANGING SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA

Conclusions

A. South Korea’s position on the Korean peninsula has improved considerably in recent years. It has had a long period of political stability. The economy is booming. Its military strength poses a substantial deterrent to any North Korean invasion. And South Korea’s international position is notably stronger than that of the North. The planned withdrawal of one US Army division from South Korea will not of itself significantly alter this balance.

B. North Korea, probably in part responding to these changes and to the evident failure of its military confrontation tactics, has changed its line of attack. Terrorism and paramilitary action have been de-emphasized. North Korean efforts to build a base for political subversion in South Korea, as well as diplomatic activity abroad, both appear to be increasing. Pyongyang probably hopes by a more “peaceful” approach to weaken support for the vigorously anticommmunist Seoul regime in world (especially American) opinion, and to play on the natural desire of many South Koreans for closer North-South relations.

C. South Korea is likely to respond to Pyongyang’s more flexible tactics by some very tentative approaches of its own toward East Europeans and the USSR. But major direct moves to ease tensions with North Korea still seem far distant in view of Seoul’s enduring hostility to and fear of the Korean communists. For some time, South Korea will be most concerned to maintain firm US security commitments, to retain some US troops on its territory, and to strengthen ties with fellow non-communists in East Asia, especially Japan.

D. Only South Korea itself could give the North a significant opening for its political subversion efforts. Pyongyang will be alert to exploit suspicions or misunderstandings between Seoul and Washington—especially Seoul’s fear that the US might abandon it to its enemies. Perhaps even more important, the strong Park regime has kept Korea’s

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.
old political ills under control but has not really cured them. Economic troubles, Park's increasing authoritarianism, problems in finding a successor to Park, or even an apparently diminished threat from the North which reduced incentives for national unity, all might make the South Korean political situation less stable. In such circumstances, North Korean propaganda and subversion might begin to have more impact than has been the case to date, and the North might be tempted once again to re-intensify paramilitary action and armed subversion against the South.

Discussion

1. During most of the time since World War II, South Korea has constituted a serious problem of one kind or another for US policy. Simple economic viability was long a worry—recovering from the ravages of wars, establishing the basis of a modern industrial society in a traditionally agricultural and resource-poor land, and much of the time fighting the twin handicaps of ruinous inflation and pervasive official corruption. Political life has been no less troubled. The shortcomings of Syngman Rhee's regime during the 1950s led to his overthrow in 1960. Under the brief experiment with free political activity which followed, the perennial factionalism of Korean political life degenerated into mounting public disorder. Major General Park Chung-hee and his military colleagues who seized power in 1961 put a stop to that. But they were slow to win genuine popular support, even after they converted themselves into a civilian government in 1963. And throughout these years, South Korea has lived under the shadow of the hostile North and its powerful Communist backers. In the last few years, however, changes taking place throughout Park's reign have culminated in a quite impressive position of strength.

1. The Balance Sheet

2. President Park, although lacking the more flamboyant qualities of leadership, has slowly achieved dominance of South Korean political life and the acceptance of his countrymen by virtue of solid accomplishment. He has skillfully maneuvered among rival power brokers to give South Korea a prolonged period of political stability—authoritarian, to be sure, but more subtle in application than during much of Korea's modern history. He also has overseen an economic development program, centered on labor-intensive export industries, which has made most South Koreans better off than ever before. Since 1964, South Korea's real gross national product (GNP) has increased at the remarkably high rate of 12 percent a year, while industrial production has grown 19 percent and exports 41 percent annually. The South Korean economic scene has drawn the high, if grudging, praise of one Japanese businessman that "they are where we were 15 years ago."
3. Under Park’s supervision, South Korea has developed one of the most competent and professional civil and military government structures in Asia. Its army, the fourth largest in the world, is reasonably well equipped through US aid programs, and its officer and non-commissioned officer corps has received leadership and combat experience in Vietnam. Moreover the younger officers now coming into leadership positions are better trained, and seem less rent by regional and personal factionalism and more imbued with professionalism, than were their predecessors. The civil bureaucracy also has gained in effectiveness. A large infusion of fresh blood following the military coup of 1961 has installed young men, well qualified by academic training and experience or by military service, in key positions.

4. Progress also has been made toward international acceptance. One of the most difficult problems was resolved on at least a formal level with the 1965 treaty normalizing relations with Japan. Since then, Japanese capital has played a vital role in South Korea’s economic growth. Suspicion and outright dislike of Korea’s sometime conqueror persist, but there nevertheless is a growing recognition within the leadership in both countries of common regional interests. An encouraging feature of the relationship has been quiet cooperation in the exchange of intelligence. Other advances toward international status have been South Korea’s acceptance in regional groupings, such as the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Asian Development Bank. Its participation as an American ally in the Vietnamese war has given it a sense of pride and self-confidence which may prove as important as the more tangible military and economic benefits that participation has brought.

5. These very successes have created potential problems. South Korea has relied heavily on foreign loan capital to finance its economic boom, and in the process has accrued massive foreign debts. In normal circumstances South Korea should be able to handle these debts. But it is highly vulnerable to international economic conditions. A serious world-wide recession, or the loss of US markets, or anything which frightened off foreign investors, could undermine the whole delicate structure of rapidly growing exports to earn the money to repay the loans which make possible in the first place the industrial growth to produce the exports to earn the money.

6. There also are inequities in the distribution of South Korea’s new prosperity. The rural areas lag in educational opportunities, housing, and health and other government services, as well as in actual income levels. Even in the booming cities unskilled wages remain very low, and the pressures of rapid urbanization could aggravate worker resentment at the prosperity of South Korea’s growing middle class. The “revolution of rising expectations” is not yet a serious political problem in South Korea, but the ingredients are there.
7. Finally, South Korea’s political stability rests too much on Park himself, and on a feeling of threat from the North which makes Park’s strong rule seem acceptable. Park’s very success in dominating South Korea’s political life has served to stunt the growth of democratic institutions, or the development of independent political leaders. There is no effective political opposition. The New Democratic Party (NDP), chief candidate for that role, is weak and divided. Park’s own Democratic Republican Party is allowed little role in policy making, and even the implementation of policy is primarily in the hands of military men, with whom Park still identifies far more than with civilian politicians. Corruption still is an integral part of the governmental process, making the possibility of new national scandals ever-present. Park’s heavy-handed rigging of elections he surely would win, even if they were free and fair, serves further to discredit the democratic process. In sum, while Park is careful to preserve the forms of parliamentary process, including a considerable degree of free speech and a relatively independent press, there is little real sharing of power or deep-felt public identification with the regime.

8. Of itself, this may not matter too much. Democracy is a foreign plant in South Korea, with shallow roots in the cultural traditions and emotions of the people. Personal and family ties still rate higher than any concept of impersonal law or broadly based political parties, and Confucian paternalism runs directly contrary to ideas of shared or diffused power. Stability, order, economic progress, and relative freedom from government harassment mean more to all but a very few Koreans than parliamentary processes, and on these counts Park delivers handsomely.

9. But Park (however understandably) has been unwilling to designate an heir apparent, and his skill in playing even his own supporters off against one another has kept any individual or group from emerging as an obvious potential successor. The powerful South Korean Central Intelligence Agency and the Army command are suspicious, even hostile, rivals. Kim Chong-p’il, the guiding political genius of the regime’s early years, is able and aggressive and has something of a personal following. But this alone makes him suspect by many, and he can no longer count on Park’s support for the succession. When Park chose to amend the Constitution last year, to enable himself to run for a third term as President in 1971, he forfeited an early opportunity to oversee the first orderly transfer of power in the Republic’s history. Should that transfer take place when Park is unable to supervise and control it—i.e., after his defeat or death—continued stability probably would depend on whether the change of circumstances threw up another individual who could impose his will on the congenitally feuding Koreans.

10. And Park’s own dominance is based to an unhealthy extent on the widespread sense of threat from the North, which the government
has at least in part purposely exaggerated. If this threat should recede—if national unity no longer seemed quite so crucial—a wide range of destabilizing tendencies could emerge. Relations with North Korea might become a controversial issue. Students—traditionally regarded by themselves and many others as the “conscience of the nation”—might be less willing to tolerate government corruption and limits on political freedoms. Trade unions might be more openly restive about government control. Ambitious individuals in the political parties or the military might hope to use such sentiments to challenge Park’s virtually total command of South Korean politics.

11. Indeed, very tentative signs of such political stirrings already are evident. Kim Tae-chung, the young and aggressive NDP Presidential candidate for the 1971 elections, is mounting a surprisingly vigorous campaign by criticizing Park for—among other things—“creating this atmosphere of tension and horror . . . to prolong the life of [his] regime in the name of national security and anticommunism.” Kim does not now appear to be a serious danger to Park; many among the large crowds who apparently relish hearing him attack the President would not in fact want to substitute his untested abilities for the security Park has demonstrated he can provide. But such criticism could intensify Park’s tendency under stress to withdraw into a distant authoritarianism, at times paralyzed by indecisiveness and at times impulsively over-reacting. If Park should take repressive measures against Kim or other critics which seemed out of proportion to the threat, he could further fuel the incipient discontent with his authoritarianism.

12. On balance, however, we think that South Korea should be able to cope with its problems and maintain a relatively strong position for the next few years at least. South Korea’s strengths are especially impressive when measured against the apparent failings of the North. All our evidence indicates that North Korea’s economy is doing badly compared with the South, and its political and military apparatus has been disrupted by a seemingly endless succession of high level purges.

13. The planned withdrawal of one US division from South Korea—about 20,000 of the presently authorized total of 63,000 men—will not of itself significantly alter the relative military balance between North and South. The South Korean military has shown increasing skill in coping with North Korean guerrilla infiltration efforts. With US air and logistic support, South Korea should be able to successfully defend against an all-out North Korean attack.\footnote{See Annex for a discussion of North and South Korean military capabilities.} In the hypothetical
situation where North Korean troops were joined by Chinese, the South (again with only US air and logistic support) is capable of holding off the combined forces for about a month. In fact, South Korea’s military position vis-à-vis the North should be further strengthened by the $1.5 billion equipment modernization program which the US intends to provide over the next five years.

14. Nor will South Korea’s economy be markedly damaged by the planned US troop withdrawals. US military spending, which includes Vietnam-related items as well as money brought in because of troops actually in South Korea, has contributed on the average only about 15 percent of the real increase in South Korea’s GNP during the 1965–1969 period. This share has been steadily declining with the expansion of South Korea’s economy. The loss of about 20,000 US troops will at most slow down South Korea’s (conservatively) estimated 10 percent annual growth during the next several years to a still highly impressive 9 percent, and will cost Seoul roughly $50 million a year in dollar earnings. This loss is relatively small when compared with South Korea’s export earnings of nearly $1 billion in 1970, and its $400 million annually in foreign capital inflows. It will not have much balance of payments effect so long as exports continue to climb rapidly.

II. The Northern Challenge: A New Direction?

15. The North Koreans seem to have read the balance sheet in much this way, and have revised their tactics against the South accordingly. The immediate cause of this tactical adjustment seems to have been the failure of their experiment with paramilitary tactics and terrorism from 1966 through 1968. Such large scale disasters as the Blue House raid and the mass landings at Ulchin on the east coast, far from encouraging the people of the South to rise in “people’s war”, only stiffened the South’s resistance, while justifying the presence of US troops in the eyes of the world. Since early 1969, the rate of incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has dropped by over 80 percent. Meanwhile, the emphasis of Pyongyang’s efforts has shifted to the infiltration of agents for political subversion—i.e., to recruit agents, organize cells, and to develop the political base for revolution in the South. Kim Il-song has recently signaled the continuation of this policy by warning that the people of the South must take the responsibility for their own revolution; the road ahead, he said, will not be an easy one.

16. While shifting its emphasis from armed to political subversion against the South, North Korea has also resumed its earlier campaign for international status and influence. An extensive effort is under way, particularly in Africa, to open trade and diplomatic ties. Denunciations of the UN’s role in the Korean Question have again become somewhat more ambiguous. Attempts also have been made at least to seem more flexible on relations with the South. North Korea has revived earlier
suggestions ranging from such limited steps as mail exchanges and visits between members of divided families, to a non-aggression pact, mutual troop reductions, and even a confederation of the two Koreas, each keeping its different social and political system. Pyongyang’s constant demands remain the withdrawal of all foreign (i.e., American) troops from the peninsula and the ouster of the Park government by the South Korean people.

17. All in all, North Korea seems to be showing its peaceful face at the moment, both to the South and to international opinion. Kim doubtless hopes to exploit the natural desire of many South Koreans for better relations with the North. These shifts in military and diplomatic activity are reflected in new propaganda emphasis from the North. “Peaceful reunification” is once more the key phrase, with nation-wide elections possible if only (again) the foreign troops would leave. While it is granted that military means may eventually have to be used to achieve reunification, Pyongyang now claims to foresee this as a response it will make only when the South Koreans themselves rise up in revolt against their foreign oppressors and the native puppet government.

18. We have very little evidence as to why this change in tactics has come about, and still less about how long it might obtain. But speculation about the “why” does give some indication of “how long.” For a start, Pyongyang’s openly aggressive tactics were obviously not working. Far from weakening the South Korean regime, the evident threat was serving to solidify support for Park and acceptance of his strong rule. Nor was North Korean brinkmanship generating international pressure on the US to withdraw from Korea. Quite the contrary: it demonstrated the need for continued US military presence in the peninsula, while both Peking and Moscow were clearly reluctant to back up North Korean adventurism. With Pyongyang’s two potential backers feuding between themselves, the North Koreans could not count on receiving the level of support necessary to further pursuit of the high-risk policy.

19. And North Korea had mounting problems at home. We already have mentioned its economic failings, and the purge in late 1968 of key military and intelligence leaders.4 We are not sure whether these men were eliminated because their policies toward the South had failed or whether Kim Il-song got rid of them for quite other reasons (most likely because he feared they were or might become a threat to his total control of the military) and then used them as scapegoats for an unsuccessful policy. Whatever the true reason for the purge, it seems likely

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4 Those purged in 1968 included three of North Korea’s five Army Group Commanders, the Minister of Defense, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the Army’s Reconnaissance Bureau. [Footnote is in the original.]
that a need to regroup and rebuild at home would further diminish Kim’s enthusiasm for an aggressive policy toward the South which was not working anyway.

20. Kim furthermore can reason that his newer “peaceful” approach is having some success. His diplomatic offensive has thus far won recognition from a few more African and Middle Eastern states. More important, the Japanese have been encouraged to hope that North Korea may be ripe for their “bridge building” efforts, and are likely to increase economic and even political contacts. Most of all, Kim’s present course is in keeping with the current fashion of détente. He can hope that in the absence of a clear military threat, international and even South Korean support for Park’s fiercely anticommunist government will weaken. Indeed, he may see the planned reduction of US troop strength in the South as consistent with his present policy, if not an actual consequence of it.

21. What we cannot estimate with much confidence is Kim’s own volatile personality. His desire for the international limelight and his apparent tendency to act hastily and emotionally when he feels his position threatened, together with a real need to buck up the spirits of the North Korean populace and reconcile them to continued economic and political hardships, all may make it difficult for him to hold steady on a “peaceful” course. At any time he thought it opportune, and with very little warning, Kim could revert to a paramilitary approach toward the South. But insofar as evidence and logic are useful guides in such a situation, it seems to us likely that for some time to come North Korea should calculate that it has little to gain from aggressive military tactics on any significant scale against South Korean forces.

22. Pyongyang probably will indulge in military spectaculars from time to time. These might be directed at US targets in and around the peninsula if the opportunity arises—something like the Pueblo or EC–121 incidents—rather than at South Korea itself. Kim would hope to erode American interest in defending South Korea and to shake South Korean confidence in our willingness to react sufficiently vigorously, as well as to demonstrate that his quarrel is not with South Korea as such but with the “foreign oppressors” whose presence prevents better North-South relations. There might also be attempts at political assassination in the South. These probably would be designed to appear to be the work of South Korean “freedom fighters”, rather than North Korean military actions.

III. The Southern Response

23. North Korea’s more flexible tactics present a more complex and possibly confusing challenge to the South. It is a competition South Korea is eminently qualified to win, provided it has confidence in its
considerable strengths vis-à-vis the North. We think it increasingly has. South Korean estimates of the impact of the proposed US troop withdrawals on the actual military balance largely parallel our own. But their frequently expressed concern that North Korea might miscalculate the withdrawals, as a sign of diminished US commitment, reflects their own fears that indeed this may be just the beginning of a general disengagement policy. While gaining in self-confidence, the southerners are not yet convinced of the permanence of their “economic miracle.” Moreover, they still see themselves confronted by an implacably hostile North Korea and surrounded by three neighboring giants—the Soviet Union, China, and Japan—who are unfriendly or at best untrustworthy. And they worry about the Americans who, they feel, once before withdrew troops from Korea too soon.

A. Continuing Reliance on the United States

24. Thus a continuing attempt to elicit further American assurances of military support—in writing if possible—will remain the cornerstone of South Korea’s foreign policy for the foreseeable future. The South Koreans feel strongly that they are and ought to be an exception to the Nixon Doctrine. Seoul will continue seizing any opportunity to press for a bilateral guarantee of “automatic” US response to an attack or, failing that, for a regional security alliance. In the past it has tried such approaches as a “PATO” modeled on NATO (which some South Koreans seem to believe commits the US to automatic response in West Europe’s defense), an ABM system with the US providing the weaponry and the countries within range of Chinese missiles the real estate, a security system among the countries contributing troops to the allied side in Vietnam, or expansion of ASPAC into a military alliance. Most recently, the Nixon–Sato communiqué of November 1969 raised South Korean hopes of a security system with the US, Japan, and Taiwan. The common theme in all these regional efforts—we believe the central South Korean aim—is not so much to improve cooperation with Asian neighbors as to get the US ever more securely bound to South Korea’s defense.

25. The same motive is present in South Korean thinking about Vietnam. [less than 1 line not declassified] reports that some influential South Koreans have tried to think of ways to prolong or expand the war may not at all reflect Park’s official policy. But he almost certainly takes comfort from a situation in which US and South Korean soldiers are allied in common anticommmunist cause, and he has real apprehensions about anything that diminishes this active and lucrative cooperation.

B. East Asian “Anticommunism”

26. So long as they are reasonably confident of the American commitment, the South Koreans are likely to play their strong hand quite skillfully in diplomatic and economic competition with the North. They
have more money for investment and for purchase of raw materials, and South Korean diplomats are not feared as a subversive element in the countries with which both Koreas would like relations. Seoul naturally will give first priority to strengthening ties with fellow non-communists in East Asia. Taiwan, and at least for the present, Thailand, see Asian security problems in much the same light as does South Korea. Some ROK officials have even talked of offering South Korean troops to Thailand, especially if it became necessary to withdraw them from South Vietnam. Such an offer no doubt would be contingent on US bases and personnel remaining in Thailand; Seoul is not interested in taking on purely Asian entanglements.

27. Relations with Japan are likely to grow especially close, if not warm and friendly. Japan’s economic stake in South Korea is high and growing, and with it inevitably comes some political influence. A whole network of political, intelligence, economic, and military exchanges is developing between the two at various levels of government and commercial life which may lead to a sort of big-and-little-brother relationship over the years. The South Koreans find their relationship with Japan galling, but useful, and expect the US to protect them from Japanese economic and potential military aggressiveness. If the US shield were removed, the South Koreans might be confronted with a choice between accepting a Japanese “protectorship” and coming to terms with the North. We think they probably would choose the Japanese alternative; but the process of making a decision would provoke strong emotions and divisions within South Korea.

C. Approaches to the Communist World

28. South Korea also is edging cautiously toward a different relationship with neutralist and even communist states. This is still very much in the talking stage in Seoul, and is in large part a defensive reaction. Seoul clearly is worried about US efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union, even alleging that this restricts the US from moving to check North Korean aggressiveness. Now the West Germans, with whom Seoul has believed it had psychological affinities and similar interests, seem prepared to compromise on their divided-nation problem. At the same time, South Korean officials talk of a need to block North Korean diplomatic efforts throughout the world. Park appears responsive to the argument of some of his advisors that South Korea will be “isolated” in international opinion if it continues to seem so intransigent toward the communist world.

29. But South Korea’s evaluation of its own strengths and needs also appears to be slowly changing. Seoul’s protests about Japan’s economic and other dealings with the North have an increasingly formal sound, as though South Koreans—while still not liking Japanese-North
Korean exchanges—no longer see them as such a serious threat to their
own interests. Superficially at least, Korean developments might follow
the German model (albeit a decade or so behind) of both sides working
for a lessening of tensions and specific improvements in relations while
reunification remains impossible. But so long as Kim Il-song is in power
in the North, and the Korean War generation in the South, a fundamental
hostility to and fear of North Korea will persist. A crucial difference from
the German situation is that the South Koreans have been through a bit-
ter war with the North and still feel physically threatened.

30. The South Korean version of détente is therefore likely to re-
main a matter of very small steps, far behind those of most other non-
communist states. Diplomatic relations may be established with coun-
tries which also recognize Pyongyang. Sporting and cultural
delegations will be exchanged with East European states. And South
Korea’s stringent anticommunist law may be amended to permit trade
with some communist countries.

31. Progress in this direction will be very slow indeed. Seoul will
have trouble finding suitable goods to trade with communist states,
and reconciling the traditional communist preference for barter trade
and long-term deferred payments with its own desire for immediate
foreign exchange profits. It certainly will not want to seem to lessen
whatever obstacles other nations still feel to dealing with North Korea.
Furthermore, it will want to be very careful about undermining the
solid anticommunist front of the South Korean populace.

D. The Korean Question

32. The relationship with North Korea is a more important and
much more difficult problem than approaches to other communist
states. On 15 August—the 25th anniversary of Korea’s liberation from
Japanese rule—Park’s surprise reunification proposal brought at least
some propaganda advantage. He departed from previous official state-
ments dismissing unification as a problem for the distant future. In-
stead, he challenged the North Koreans to help lay the groundwork
by ceasing military provocations and publicly renouncing the force-
ful overthrow of the South Korean Government. The proposal, how-
ever, was hedged about with conditions clearly unacceptable to Py-
ongyang, which promptly denounced it. Thus, its main value probably
lay in its impact on world and domestic opinion, with an eye toward
both the UN vote on the Korean Question and the upcoming Presi-
dential election in South Korea.

33. Park’s formal airing of the subject did have one unavoidable
side-effect—reunification will be discussed with increasing openness in
the South. In an effort to control the pace of the blossoming debate, and
to assert government control over it, spokesmen have described plans to
allow discussion of North-South relations by stages: first among “ex-
erts”, then scholars, then journalists, then students, ending with general public debate in 1972. Such control will not be entirely possible, particularly in the later stages. The government’s own statements and actions will make it more difficult to accuse others of having violated the anti-communist law by merely discussing relations with the North.

34. If North Korean military activity remains at a low level, there is likely to be some increase of public pressure for more initiatives toward the North. Even very modest steps, e.g., family visits or mail exchanges, would imply a tacit recognition of the North quite dramatic in South Korean eyes. But there will be at least as many important South Koreans uneasy about the whole venture as there are pressing for greater flexibility. We expect Seoul’s détente efforts to continue to be a matter of one step back for every two forward. And the issue of US troops on the peninsula will remain of crucial importance to both North and South, effectively limiting progress toward major rapprochement between them for a long time to come.

35. Even Seoul’s desire to make more friends among more kinds of states must be seen in context of the priority it gives to relations with the US. Certainly South Korea would like as many nations as possible in its corner if the US protectorship were ever weakened or removed. But there really is no palatable alternative to that protection. Hence any gestures Seoul makes toward North Korea will be as much an attempt to demonstrate to Washington that it is not the South Koreans who are responsible for continuing tensions on the peninsula, as to prepare for a possible American withdrawal.

IV. Sources of Instability

36. South Koreans suspect that while Washington may still consider their defense a necessary burden, it is one for which American enthusiasm is diminishing. They further worry that the US might want to share its Korean load with—perhaps even turn it over to—Korea’s traditional enemies, the Japanese. Their suspicions about US constancy should ease as Seoul gains confidence in its own strengths vis-à-vis the North. For a very long time to come, however, there will be ample opportunity for misunderstanding. A compromise settlement in South Vietnam, further US troop withdrawals from South Korea or Japan, efforts to improve US-Chinese relations (including what might be seen as US weakness in opposing Peking’s entry into the UN), all would arouse South Korean apprehensions that Washington’s dedication to the anticommunist cause in Asia was weakening.

37. There is very little the South Koreans could do about any of these developments. We cannot rule out a South Korean military provocation in the DMZ, designed to show Washington that American troops still were needed in Korea. Moreover, some in Seoul may genuinely believe that they have much more leverage with Washington than is the case. If
President Park, who has staked everything on the US tie, feels “abandoned” and exposed, it might aggravate his tendency to become more authoritarian in his rule and less accessible to the reasoned advice of subordinates in times of stress. Public pronouncements as to what the US “must” or “must not” do can expose him to embarrassment before his own populace, and exacerbate tensions between the two governments. Any break in harmonious US–ROK relations—e.g., intemperate statements by Park which alienated segments of American public opinion—would aid North Korean efforts to sow distrust and discord.

38. A more serious source of potential instability is the political situation in South Korea itself. Should the sense of threat from the North recede, the main justification for the repression of political life in South Korea would no longer appear acceptable to important elements in the population. We do not know what would happen in such a situation, but it could lead to confusion and struggle and some unraveling of political stability. In such circumstances, North Korean propaganda and subversion might begin to have more impact than has been the case to date, and the North might be tempted once again to intensify paramilitary action and armed subversion against the South.

39. In sum, the dimension of the threat to South Korea is expanding beyond the military confrontation we are used to thinking of, into a more complex political competition at home and abroad. South Korea clearly has the advantage on the international front. But friction between South Korea and the US, or between the South Korean Government and its own people, could give North Korea an opening for more successful political or even paramilitary action in the South than has heretofore been the case.

[Omitted here is the Military Annex.]
U.S. Troop Reductions 213

81. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 2, 1970, 6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Kim Chong Pil, Republic of Korea
Assemblyman Chung Joo Yoon
Henry A. Kissinger
John H. Holdridge

SUBJECT
Kim Chong Pil’s Remarks on US-Korea Relations

Dr. Kissinger warmly welcomed Mr. Kim, recalling their relationship while Mr. Kim was at Harvard. Mr. Kim, Dr. Kissinger noted, had been the only student he had ever had who had been accompanied by a bodyguard. (Assemblyman Chung Joo Yoon interjected to note that he, in fact, had been the one who had accompanied Mr. Kim.) Dr. Kissinger recalled, too, that he and Mr. Kim had been in Saigon at the same time on one occasion. Mr. Kim responded to the effect that he had hoped Dr. Kissinger might have been able to proceed to Seoul from Saigon. Dr. Kissinger expressed in turn the hope that he could go to Seoul in the not too distant future, to which Mr. Kim responded “the sooner the better.”

Mr. Kim stated that he would like to take this opportunity to ask Dr. Kissinger a number of frank questions—questions which were also in President Park Chong Hee’s mind. First, could Dr. Kissinger visualize in the foreseeable future any withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam, and if so, when, in what form, and what size? Dr. Kissinger declared that in principle he could see the possibility of a Korean withdrawal, for example in the case of a peace settlement. He could also imagine that if the South Vietnamese became strong enough to take over, then at some point the ROK troops could be reduced. He had no schedule in mind, except in the event that a peace settlement materialized, and was exercising no pressure. The question of ROK troop withdrawals was one that should be discussed confidentially between the two Governments.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. III, 6/70–Dec 70. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Drafted on December 7. The meeting was held at Kissinger’s office at the White House. This memorandum is attached to a December 9 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger recommending no further distribution “due to the sensitivity of the subject matter.”
Dr. Kissinger asked if he could ask Mr. Kim a question—were the Koreans satisfied with the discussions they were having with our Ambassador in Seoul? Mr. Kim replied that he was personally satisfied over the outcome of the negotiations with the U.S. Ambassador. He had met President Park before his departure, and President Park had not shown any unsatisfactory reactions. However, many Koreans had not had satisfactory feelings about the negotiations. On this, Dr. Kissinger remarked that if Mr. Kim’s President wanted to deal directly with our President on issues of extreme sensitivity such as the troops in Vietnam, President Park could always get in touch with him, Dr. Kissinger, through the Korean Ambassador here or through someone else the Koreans could trust. Mr. Kim promised after his return to tell this to President Park.

Mr. Kim went on to say that to be frank, with respect to the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea President Park had expressed displeasure when this announcement was first made because at the time of the San Francisco conference between the two Presidents there had been no mention of U.S. force reductions. Then, a sudden unilateral announcement concerning reductions had occurred. From the standpoint of the staff who assist President Park in preparing for discussions, there should be as much advance notice as possible so that they would be better able to help him out. Dr. Kissinger replied that what Mr. Kim had said was true; however, at the time the two Presidents had met we had not known of the decision on the U.S. force reduction. It was not that we had tried to keep this matter from President Park. Mr. Kim indicated that President Park now understood the difficult decisions which the U.S. had to make. Of course, President Park had to deal with next year’s election, and the U.S. announcement had initially put the ROK Government in an embarrassing position, though the people now understood.

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Kim how President Park would do next year—Mr. Kim’s party had some experience in managing elections, hadn’t it? Mr. Kim acknowledged that he and his party did have some experience in this field, and might need to try managing the elections again. Dr. Kissinger humorously remarked that Mr. Kim must have learned some of this from Dr. Kissinger’s teachings, although the Koreans had a talent of their own.

Mr. Kim said that in view of changing international trends over the next four or five years, Korea might find itself in a more difficult position in coping with these changes and was looking over its policy decisions. For this reason he wanted to ask Dr. Kissinger’s counsel. Among the changes foreseen by the Koreans were China gaining a position in the UN, a continuation of the Chinese Communist threat, and
a settlement in Vietnam. In its international position Korea had to face such changes. Its international security situation was a big issue, and under the changed circumstances the Koreans might need to explore new policy directions. Dr. Kissinger responded by asking in what way, and towards whom? Mr. Kim then spoke of an increased degree of flexibility on the international scene and an opening of doors, e.g. Chinese admission to the UN and a possible settlement in Vietnam. However, while some doors were opening more widely, the ROK position might become closed in so that it might some day be compelled to act against its will. Accordingly, the ROK had to ride over the changes and the waves on the international scene.

Dr. Kissinger asserted that he understood Mr. Kim’s point. We would try to consult with the Koreans better than had been the case on the troop withdrawal issue. Our President was not known for letting down his friends. Mr. Kim noted on the score of U.S. troop reductions that after 25 years of working together the Korean people might have gotten the feeling of being left in a vacuum. Still, they now understood the idea and accepted it. A more fundamental point, Dr. Kissinger declared, was that the Koreans didn’t want their country to be in an isolated condition with respect to the rest of Asia.

Mr. Kim agreed that the Koreans were concerned about being isolated from Asian society. The Chinese position was one of flexibility, with more and more recognition and the possibility of UN entry; on the other hand, Korea was unable to have such flexibility because of basic positions which it had originally taken. Thus, if the world tide was changing and Korea remained as before, Korea needed to ask how it would be affected. Should it continue to maintain its basic positions? This is what he, Mr. Kim, had in mind in asking for Dr. Kissinger’s views.

Dr. Kissinger agreed that we were, in fact, in a transitional period. We had no illusions about China, which we knew was our enemy. However, we had two enemies, the USSR and China, which happened to be fighting with one another. Speaking quite frankly, we therefore were trying to see if we could use one enemy against the other. While we realized that China was not our friend, the tactical situation required us to see how we might use China in moves vis-à-vis the Soviets. In this, though, it was out of the question that we would sacrifice Korea to China. The Koreans were fortunate in not having the problem of how to deal with two enemy countries. We would not abandon Korea, which should not confuse our tactics with our strategy.

Mr. Kim referred again to the U.S. force reductions in Korea, observing that everyone in Korea understood that this meant a detachment of the U.S. commitment to support Korea and in effect the
reestablishment of an Asian defense system. Dr. Kissinger responded by remarking that we had always thought the ROK would be better off by having its army modernized than by having U.S. forces present in Korea. Mr. Kim’s reply was that Korea had the problem of the North Korean threat, and needed to maintain big forces at all times. As President Park had said in his August 15 speech on reunification, the ROK was watching the negotiations between East and West Germany and might need to face up to the desirability of talking with North Korea. During the next four or five years, Korea would have to deal with problems such as these.

Dr. Kissinger declared that we were friends of the ROK, and would do what we could to support and strengthen it. Dr. Kissinger noted that he had the highest regard for President Park, and had high personal regard for Mr. Kim. Mr. Kim wondered if Dr. Kissinger had any words in mind for President Park, and Dr. Kissinger reiterated that if President Park wanted to be in direct touch with us he should send the Korean Ambassador or someone else whom he could trust to Dr. Kissinger. In this way we could maintain direct contact.

82. Memorandum of Conversation


SUBJECT
The Vice President’s Meeting with Korean Foreign Minister Choe Kyu-ha

PARTICIPANTS
Choe, Kyu-ha, Korean Foreign Minister
Kim, Dong-jo, Ambassador of Korea
The Vice President
Arthur Sohmer, Administrative Assistant to the Vice President
General Dunn, Military Assistant to the Vice President
Kent Crane, Assistant to the Vice President for Foreign Affairs

Foreign Minister Choe opened the meeting by saying he was in the United States for the annual UN debate on Korea. He was pleased to re-
port that our position once again had prevailed,² and he expressed grati-
itude for the cooperation extended to him by the US delegation at the
UN. Choe had seen President Park just before leaving, and the President
wished Vice President Agnew to know that he appreciated the Vice Pres-
ident’s visit to Korea, wished he could have stayed longer and hoped he
would come again.³ The Vice President said he regretted that his visit to
Korea was so short, but was pleased to have had the chance to travel
around the country even briefly. The Vice President had been greatly im-
pressed by the professionalism and high morale exhibited by the ROK
Army unit he had visited. He had also been impressed by the film Pres-
ident Park had shown him on North Korean war preparations and
wished that other Americans might have an opportunity to see such
films, which put communist activities into proper perspective.

The Vice President said he was pleased with the talks on mod-
erization of the ROK Armed Forces. He felt certain that good progress
would be made in these talks, but as he had told President Park, the
US cannot go beyond the provisions of our 1954 treaty. Our treaty with
Korea is worded much the same as all our other treaties, so it would
be inappropriate, and in fact impossible, to try to alter the provisions
of one treaty without creating difficulties with our other treaties. More-
over, Americans consider the wording of our treaties significant and
binding—not only as regards limitations, but also as regards positive
commitments.

Aside from our firm treaty commitments, the Koreans should also
consider the $150 million which the President had earmarked for the
ROK in his supplemental aid request to Congress as further evidence
of our continuing support. Although we will certainly have additional
problems with antiwar elements, the President has made it clear to the
Congressional leadership that he regards all our commitments as be-
ing equally important—those in Europe, the Middle East and the Far
East. Therefore, he regards the supplemental aid request as an indivi-
dible package which cannot be sliced apart by special interest groups.
For example, he has indicated he will not accept an appropriation of
funds for Israel—a course of action which might have a certain politi-
cal attraction in some quarters.

² On October 30, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly defeated a draft
resolution that called for the simultaneous and unconditional admission of the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to take part, without the
right to vote, in future UN discussions relating to Korea. The First Committee did
approve a draft resolution that allowed representatives of both states to participate in
discussion of the Korean question provided that they unequivocally accepted the com-
petence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question within
³ See footnote 2, Document 71.
There was only one outstanding problem in US–ROK relations which deeply concerned the Vice President, because it might be used by the neo-isolationist forces in the Senate to undermine our supplemental aid request for Korea. That problem concerned continuing Korean fishing for Pacific salmon. As the ROK Government has been informed many times before, Pacific salmon are regarded by us as a resource of the US and Canada, maintained and nurtured at great expense to the taxpayers of those two countries. The Vice President was worried because representatives of our fishing industry had approached doves in the Senate concerning Korean actions, and their complaints might affect passage of the supplemental.

Ambassador Kim launched into a long explanation of ROK actions regarding the salmon problem. He noted that Senator Stevens and representatives of State had discussed the problem with the ROK last year and the ROK had agreed not to catch salmon. In accordance with that agreement the ROK had issued no licenses for salmon this year, but some fishermen had nevertheless illegally poached salmon. The ROK had attempted to stop these violators, but Senator Stevens had become very upset and caused State to initially refuse to enter into fishing discussions this year with Korea. However, Ambassador McKernan had recently been in Seoul, and State now seemed to be satisfied with the ROK explanation of the problem.

The Vice President replied that our information was that a considerable amount of fishing is going on despite the ROK efforts to stop it. After so many discussions, even an isolated incident could be used by opponents of US–ROK cooperation. The Vice President hoped that the ROK would again look into this serious problem.

Foreign Minister Choe then addressed himself to several points which had come up in the preceding conversation. He said he would pass on the Vice President’s comments about the film President Park had shown him and would attempt to get a copy of the film for the Vice President’s retention. Regarding modernization of ROK forces, the Foreign Minister was pleased that the House had approved our supplemental request and hoped the Senate would follow suit. The Foreign Minister said he was aware that Vice President Agnew, as President of the Senate, could be of great assistance in this regard. The Vice President interjected that, although one cannot rely on much in Washington, one thing is absolutely certain—the President of the Senate has little influence on the actions of that august body. Choe insisted that the Vice President was being unduly modest. For instance, the Vice President’s trip to Korea had been most helpful, and force modernization talks were now going very well.

Continuing his summation, Choe said that he, too, was astounded that Korean fishing boats were still entering our waters for salmon. He
felt that Ambassador McKernan had highlighted this problem, and Ambassador Porter’s démarche to President Park had also underscored America’s deep concern. The President had promised Ambassador Porter to do everything in his power to prevent the illegal fishing from continuing. Thus the Foreign Minister believed that the fishing problem would be resolved to our satisfaction in the very near future. Meanwhile, the Korean fishing industry was in need of better facilities and the Foreign Minister noted with pleasure that Ambassador McKernan had agreed in principle last year that the US might help out. The Vice President simply noted that we would be glad to discuss such matters, because we wish to be helpful to our good Korean allies in as many ways as possible.

The Vice President asked if there had been any reduction in the number of provocative incidents generated by North Korea. Choe said the North Korean approach had assumed a different character of late. The DMZ was well defended now, so the enemy was coming around by sea in high speed boats, most of which were provided by the Soviets. The problem was therefore more difficult due to the many small islands off the South Korean coast which had to be defended. Still the North Koreans had no chance of seriously disturbing the situation in South Korea, and in fact, there was now some good news for the South Koreans. The Foreign Minister had noted in news reports that a North Korean major had defected yesterday in his Mig–15. This was the first good break for the South Koreans after a long series of unfortunate incidents: the Pueblo capture, the EC–121 shoot down, the hijacking of a commercial airliner (whose crew was still being held) and the kidnapping of the crew of a South Korean loudspeaker boat.

In closing the Foreign Minister said he was very pleased with the sincere spirit of cooperation which he had found among US officials. He doubted that there were any difficulties which our two countries could not jointly handle together. The Vice President heartily agreed. The one thing which the Vice President admired most about the Koreans was their forthright way of discussing problems. We Americans understand and appreciate the direct approach. We believe it is the most efficient and effective way for friends to resolve their differences. At the Vice President’s request the Foreign Minister promised to convey his regards to President Park, and also to indicate the Vice President’s strong interest in the supplemental aid request.

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4 In telegram 198600 to Seoul, December 4, Irwin reported his conversations with Choi, which were basically a reprise of this meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S)
83. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
CIA Memorandum on the South Korean Elections

On November 18 you asked CIA for a memorandum on South Korean opposition candidate Kim Tae-chung’s challenge to President Park in the 1971 elections. The CIA response is attached (Tab A). The main points in response to your request are as follows:

—The biography of Kim Tae-chung is at Tab B. He is an attractive, active, forty-five year old politician, a Roman Catholic, and does not speak English. He is described by U.S. officials who have dealt with him as more forthcoming and direct than most Korean politicians, a proven vote getter with a persuasive manner and an eloquent, oratorical style. Kim likes to be called the “Kennedy of Korea.”

—Despite the widespread favorable reaction to Kim’s opening campaign speeches, his prospects for victory next May appear at this time to be marginal at best. In comparison to President Park’s Democratic-Republican Party, the mostly conservative New Democrats are poorly organized and short of money. Moreover, Kim cannot count on even the unwavering support of all of his own party.

—The issue of U.S. troop reductions in Korea appears likely to have only a marginal impact on the election. President Park had opened himself to the charge that he created undue strains in relations with the Americans by his initial strong stand that any cut-back of U.S. troops in Korea at this time would be tantamount to inviting Pyongyang to resume open hostilities. The emotional impact of this issue has by now largely dissipated, however, and the talks on modernizing South Korean forces have helped to recreate an atmosphere of mutual cooperation.


2 Tab A is Intelligence Memorandum No. 1499/70, December 9, entitled “The 1971 South Korean Presidential Election”; attached but not printed.

3 Attached but not printed. The biography is an annex to Intelligence Memorandum No. 1499/70.
—Kim cannot make too much of an issue of U.S. troop reductions without the risk of offending the nation’s 625,000-man military establishment. For Kim to insist that these reductions endanger the nation’s security would, at the very least, imply criticism of the country’s armed forces, and could expose him to charges of giving aid and comfort to the enemy.4

4 The CIA Intelligence Memorandum stated that the matter of U.S. troop reductions was not likely to be a major issue in the campaign for a variety of reasons, “but mainly because the views of the two parties on national security and foreign policy correspond rather closely.”

84. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research


Republic of Korea: Park Girds for Election Battle

In preparation for what he must now expect to be a rough campaign prior to the presidential election in the spring of 1971, President Park has brought Yi Hu-rak back into his inner circle as head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and appears to be seeking to bring Kim Chong P’il back into active politics on his team. At the same time Park has attempted to improve his administration’s image through new Blue House appointments and by replacing Prime Minister Chong Il-Kwon, whose name was linked with a murder–sex scandal earlier this year.

Yi Hu-rak to CIA. Yi Hu-rak, the highly effective but scandal-ridden and unscrupulous former Blue House Secretary General, will return from an eleven-month sojourn as Ambassador to Japan to replace CIA Director Kim Kye-won, who is in Park’s bad graces. Park expects the CIA to play a key role in his election campaign this year and has been dissatisfied with Kim. The latter was not only unable to arrange the nomination of the opposition candidate Park wanted to run against, but even failed to predict the nominee correctly.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Drafted by Joseph E. Lake (INR/REA) and approved by Evelyn S. Colbert (INR/REA).
Yi is extremely competent and reputedly one of the few persons willing to confront the President with unpalatable truths. Although he was sent to Japan after extensive and well-documented corruption charges made his presence in the Blue House a political liability, Park appears to believe that the benefits of improved CIA operations and better advice during the elections are worth the political price he may have to pay.

Kim Chong-p’il to Party? It is rumored that Kim Chong-p’il was offered the Democratic Republican Party (DRP) vice presidency in order to bring him back to Park’s side for the rough election period ahead. Kim, however, may not accept the appointment since he is reputedly disappointed with the post he has been offered and the appointment given Yi Hu-rak, an old, bitter adversary.

A New Prime Minister. The one major shift in the cabinet was the appointment of Paek Tu-chin as Prime Minister replacing Chong Il-Kwon who reportedly plans to seek a National Assembly seat and has his eye on the speaker’s chair. Paek has been in and out of the government since 1945, serving under Syngman Rhee as Finance Minister and Prime Minister.

It is not clear why Park chose to replace Chong at this time. Chong’s alleged mistress was murdered earlier this year, and Park may have seen him as a liability; however, Paek has been linked with various financial scandals over the years and seems to be little improvement. In any case as a northerner and proportional representation member of the National Assembly, Paek does not have as strong a political base as Chong and will probably be more dependent on Park than Chong.

Blue House Changes. In an effort to add a fresh quality to his administration, Park on December 9 appointed eight new special assistants, over half of whom are under 50 and have no previous governmental experience. The new men are to look at long-range policy interests. Although they will find it difficult to contend with Park’s proclivity to concentrate on programs rather than long-range policies, their impressive credentials and the new office will reflect favorably on Park between now and the 1971 elections.

Outlook a Dirty Campaign. Park obviously expects Yi Hu-rak and the CIA to play a major role in his campaign strategy; however, his efforts to improve his image and strengthen his team are not wholly consistent. If forced to choose, Park would rather have tough in-fighters at his side than look clean and progressive to the voters. Judging from his appointments, Park expects a long and dirty campaign.
Seoul, January 27, 1971, 0927Z.

505. Subj: ROKG Concern about Opposition Nominee’s Trip to U.S.

1. Luncheon with Prime Minister today was almost entirely taken up by his recital of ROKG fears that Kim Tae Chung will see important people in United States. He said that there are many rumors in Seoul that Americans were paying for Kim Tae Chung’s trip and were pledging to support him. He reached peak of this remarkable statement by urging me to issue public statement to effect that U.S. is absolutely neutral in matter of ROK elections “despite rumors that we are supporting opposition.” I tried to deal lightly with his fears but he would not change subject. I urged him to get a briefing on my statement to President Park last November and our comments to Lee Hu-rak to effect that if they had facts to discuss, we would be willing to hear them. As to his request for “statement of neutrality” in response to rumors, I commented that would not be practical measure, because anyone could start new rumors that presumably would require another statement, etc.

2. We would make appropriate appointments for Mr. Kim as we do for other ROK Assemblymen who visit U.S. He said we should guarantee that Kim did not see “important people,” that Kim is only ordinary Assemblyman. I inquired why ROKG feels so intensely worried about Kim’s trip. Was it because govt feared that Kim would receive great publicity here? Only time Paek Tu Chin laughed during interview was at that point. He said “That will never happen.”

3. Contacts between American and ROK officials here, in which latter have raised their worries about American support for Kim Tae Chung, indicate that concerted effort is under way to put us in defensive frame of mind.

Porter

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential; Limdis.
2 See Document 75.
3 As reported in a memorandum of conversation, December 28, 1970, Korean Ambassador Kim Dong Jo pursued the same subject with Under Secretary Johnson. Ambassador Kim stated that if Kim Dae Jung was to call on the President, Vice President, or the Secretary of State, “it would be very embarrassing for the Korean Government. Other legislators in Korea have not been granted audiences at such official levels in the U.S.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S)
Seoul, February 2, 1971, 0815Z.

633. For Ambassador Brown. Ref State 10811.2

1. As you know, Michaelis’ orders are to commence withdrawal of U.S. Second Division troops from DMZ beginning from Feb 8 and their replacement by ROK First Division elements.

2. Korean Govt has continued its delaying tactics in its dealing with General Michaelis in effort ensure publication of joint statements and signature of military documents before troops move, it being their intention to present matter as ROK success in holding U.S. troops in position until modernization program satisfactory to ROK was achieved. We have given them no encouragement or reason to believe that joint release and other matters would be approved by 8th of February.

3. COMUSK has remained in close contact with MND in endeavor to induce latter’s cooperation, but MND phoned him at midnight yesterday to say Cabinet’s position remained unchanged, i.e., that ROKG will not cooperate in redeployment problem unless all papers including joint statement are agreed. Earlier in evening, MND delivered to COMUSK text of message he had sent to ROKA Chief of Staff (Suh) which said: “If and when pending problems are resolved smoothly, it is anticipated that General Michaelis, CINCUNC, will get audience with the President for consultations and issue his operational order for relief of Second U.S. Division on that date of audience. It is presumed that starting date of relief would be around 8th of February 1971.

“Inform limited number of related (sic) ROK commanders in confidence on this matter.” This document was dated 1900 hours February 1, 1971. On receipt of document COMUSK phoned MND and stated this order to Suh was not satisfactory and that starting date of relief would not be “around” 8th of February 1971; “it will commence on 8th of February.”

4. President Park has also not acceded to my request for meeting on these subjects. However, during call with DCM on Secretary General of Presidency (Kim) this morning, I used MND message to

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2 Dated January 21, it transmitted Rogers’s instructions to Porter and Michaelis to begin withdrawal from the DMZ without a joint statement with the Korean Government on troop redeployment or ROK agreement to modernization. Rogers also instructed Porter to meet with Park to explain U.S. reasoning and to inform him that a joint statement would be issued at a time suitable to both governments. (Ibid.)
General Suh (above) to say again that in matter of redeployment of troops on 8th, there is no question of “if and when pending problems are resolved,” that we have apprised ROKG fully on question of troop deployment and have jointly developed with them plans for relief of American Second Division by ROK First Division. This evoked statement by Secretary General to effect that ROKG position is that documents, including joint statement, must be agreed before troops are moved. I said we had heard their views many times and, as they knew, we could not agree with them that our control over movement of our troops should be subordinated to ROKG satisfaction on matter involving different program, i.e., modernization.3 I went back through history of our position in this respect since start of our negotiations on March 27, 1970. I did not refer to Park’s lack of response to Michaelis’ and my requests to be received, but said I wanted to make it absolutely clear to SecGen that General Michaelis would proceed along lines with which ROKG completely familiar and that we do not accept ROK view that troop redeployment depends on negotiation of various papers. Secretary General said he hoped that Washington acceptance of Foreign Ministry counterdraft would come in time to eliminate problem, meaning before Feb 8, which confirmed belief mentioned para two above concerning manner in which they intend to present subject to ROK public. I replied that if it happens that all papers they are interested in are agreed by Feb 8, it would neither hasten nor delay redeployment, but it would be in ROK interest to exercise great care to avoid giving impression to U.S. public and Congress that ROKG had successfully refused to cooperate on matter of our troop redeployments until they were satisfied in matter of modernization. SecGen listened carefully but did not respond to this.

5. I said that if there is no joint statement prior to Feb 8, and if as result ROKs make no comment on U.S. withdrawal from DMZ, my govt might feel it desirable to notify American public of commencement of withdrawal, as matter would have historic significance for American people whose sons had stood guard on that line for twenty years.

6. I recommend that you consider whether statement along lines para five would be useful from our viewpoint. In addition to historic aspect, it seems to me redeployment should be cited as major U.S. move to lessen tension in Korean Peninsula. If ROKs do not cooperate, I do not believe they should be permitted to obscure our move for their own

3 Telegram 18966 to Seoul, February 4, instructed that President Park be informed that “USG has concluded that ROK five year force structure and modernization plan, as developed by joint military committees in Seoul, would provide an acceptable framework for the modernization of Korean military.” (Ibid.)
election or other reasons. If you agree, please inform whether you will produce draft or whether you wish us to submit ideas.  

Porter

4 Telegram 18181 to Seoul, February 3, concurred fully with the Ambassador’s actions and stated the view that it was “important you continue to drive point home that U.S. troop redeployment and DMZ withdrawal decisions are firm, and that implementation is not repeat not contingent upon agreement of joint statement.” (Ibid.)

87. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, February 3, 1971, 0125Z.

1. Kim Tae-chung and party met with Green for second discussion following courtesy call on Secretary (reftel). Meeting came at request of Kim for follow-on discussion to earlier one with Green on January 30, and lasted about hour and quarter.
2. Kim opened discussion on foreign affairs with brief comment regarding his plan for a four-power security pact, which he reported he had discussed with Reischauer last weekend. He reported Reischauer skeptical regarding willingness of China to become involved, but Kim commented that notwithstanding he believed pact a reasonable “political goal”. Green responded that China’s course of action would probably depend at least in part on North Korean reactions. Kim took no initiative to expand topic further.
3. Turning to question of China’s entrance to UN, Kim raised variety of questions regarding U.S. position, probability of entrance, likely

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Ranard, cleared in S/S–O, and approved by Green.
2 Dated February 1, it reported on a meeting between Rogers and Kim Dae Jung. According to the telegram, Kim presented a summary of his domestic and foreign platform proposals. Rogers assured him that the United States “favors free, fair and impartial elections and intends to follow a policy of non-intervention.” Kim asked what the U.S. role would be if he were elected and there was a coup. Rogers replied that it would be inappropriate for him to comment on the question “inasmuch as it highly speculative.” (Ibid.)
3 Telegram 16424 to Seoul, January 29, reported Kim Dae Jung’s first meeting with Green and Brown. Kim stated that based on Park’s broken pledge of not running for a third term and his recent appointment to government positions of Lee Hu Rak and Paik Tu Chin, who were known as rough political in-fighters, “the signs are clear government is gearing up for a rigged election.” (Ibid.)
conducted in UN, impact on Taiwan, etc. Green made clear we support GRC and will oppose any move to unseat her from UN but that at the same time we are seeking better relationship with Peking. We have not yet established position as to ChiRep tactics this year and are re-examining question and will be consulting with friends. During discussion this topic Kim raised question of universality. He said that NDP would find universality impossible to accept “because it would perpetuate the division of Korea.” Kim implied, however, he has not reached final judgment but is rather “polishing up his thought”. Prospect of universality, he said, is a painful problem and experience for ROK.

4. On two separate occasions Kim veered away from foreign affairs focus to refer to DRP-inspired rumors of military opposition to his candidacy and possibility of military coup. As in meeting with Secretary, Kim’s question was pointed: “What would U.S. do?” Green declined direct response, indicating, however, that USG deeply interested in government that represents the will of the people.

5. Comment: Prior to initial meeting with Green, Kim requested opportunity to have few minutes alone with Green and Brown with no Koreans except interpreter present. While private meeting did not transpire, it would appear that what Kim had in mind was question of U.S. role in event of coup.

Rogers

88. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Agreement with the ROKG on U.S. Troop Withdrawal and Korean Military Modernization

The discussions begun on March 22, 1970, by Ambassador Porter with President Park on U.S. troop reduction and Korean military modernization will reach their public successful completion at 10 p.m.

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Friday night\(^2\) when an agreed Joint Statement will be given to the press (Tab A).\(^3\)

President Park is expected on Monday to issue a unilateral statement on redeployments and U.S. troop reductions. Our Embassy at Seoul will be provided with a copy one day before.

The joint statement is basically the text offered President Park by the Vice President,\(^4\) with embellishments added by the ROKs which do not change the substance. Its main points are as follows:

—The ROKG and the USG have completed talks regarding modernization of the Korean Armed Forces and reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea.

—The USG agrees to assist in the long-range modernization of the ROK defense forces.

—Consultations have been concluded on the reduction of U.S. troops in Korea by 20,000. This reduction does not affect the U.S. determination to meet an armed attack against the ROK under the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954.

—Overall military capabilities to defend the ROK against a military threat will be the subject of annual security consultative meetings between high-level officials of the two governments.

Comment. You may recall that the ROKG was holding out for a commitment that any future U.S. troop withdrawal would be subject to its veto. This Joint Statement puts on record that they did not get what they wanted.

We will, however, have to wait until Monday to see how Park handles this. Ambassador Porter believes he will take it like a man.\(^5\)

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\(^2\) February 5.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed. The joint statement was given to the press on Saturday, February 6. The full text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 1, 1971, p. 263.

\(^4\) See Document 71.

\(^5\) In telegram 727 from Seoul, February 8, Porter noted that President Park "unwittingly helped U.S. achieve our aims by adopting an absolutely intransigent attitude of refusal to cooperate in troop redeployments unless we agreed to exchange documents, and by placing responsibility for reaching agreement on his Ministers. Caught between their President’s requirement that his Ministers achieve 'papers' prior to our Feb. 8 date for commencement of redeployments and our intention to proceed then whether or not papers were agreed, the Ministers' demands steadily eroded in favor of accepting almost anything; they were appalled by obvious consequences of a confrontation." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971)

89. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
ROK Troop Withdrawals from Vietnam

Attached is a cable from Seoul informing us that the ROKs plan to reduce their troop strength by one combat division beginning in October 1971, to be completed by the “first half of 1972.”2 In passing this information to us, Korean Foreign Minister Choi said his Government wishes to enter consultations with us and would appreciate our comments.

State and Defense will probably bring this up at today’s SRG meeting,3 and cite the cable as evidence of a need for guidance to be sent out to our TCC Missions prior to the April 23 TCC meeting in Washington. Since they both favor a phased ROK withdrawal from Vietnam beginning after the October elections and continuing through 1972, they may use this reported Korean plan as a lever to gain your endorsement.4

However, the ROK plan could be more of a trial balloon than a formal and fixed position. The ROKs may hope to smoke us out on our own willingness to continue supporting the ROK contingent in Vietnam. There is a distinct hint here that their withdrawal rate may be

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2 Telegram 1994 from Seoul, April 13; attached but not printed.
3 The Senior Review Group met from 3:09 to 4 p.m. to discuss enemy capabilities concerning Vietnam in 1971 and 1972. Kissinger made the following remark about Korea: “We also need some projection of TCC participation independent of fiscal restraints. It isn’t self-evident why the ROK forces have to come out next year and why their removal wouldn’t put a strain on the South Vietnamese. I am not trying to pre-judge the conclusion. I just want to make sure that we look into these questions.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–053, SRG Meeting—Vietnam Assessment 4/13/71)
4 Telegram 2175 from Seoul, April 20, reported that Foreign Minister Choi informed Porter that the ROK had notified the Vietnamese Government of its intentions to “withdraw some troops later this year” and that the “Vietnamese do not seem to understand.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan 31–Dec 1971)
subject to our own reaction to their proposal. I believe that it might be possible to have them withhold action pending a further assessment of the military situation in South Vietnam for the remainder of 1971. In any event, we would probably not wish the ROKs to begin their withdrawals until a decent period of time after the GVN elections.

90. Report by John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff


Report on Visit to Korea and Japan, March 2–5, 1971

Following are the highlights of my visit to Korea and Japan during the period March 2–5, 1971:

Further Withdrawals of U.S. Forces from Korea

Both Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis (represented by USAF Lt. Gen. Smith at the briefings provided) spoke out strongly against further U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea for the next two years. According to Ambassador Porter, it might be possible to start discussing further withdrawals in FY 73 and to carry them out in FY 74; General Smith argued for discussions in FY 74 and withdrawals in FY 75. The basis for objections against withdrawals now was the adverse political repercussions on the ROKs. In addition, General Smith felt that the modernization program had to begin to show results before our next moves if the ROKs were to accept those moves at all. Both the Ambassador and General Smith believed that we have something of a moral obligation not to carry out any further force reductions for a period of time sufficient to let things settle down politically in Korea, and to allow the ROKs to adjust to the concept that ground forces in Korea would for the most part be theirs. Interestingly, the Ambassador and the military joined in suggesting that we might ultimately be able to support our commitment in Korea through air and naval forces, with only enough U.S. ground forces on hand to [1 line not declassified].

ROK Attitudes on U.S. Withdrawals

General Yoon, a senior Blue House adviser, made a special point of emphasizing the adverse political repercussions which would occur in Korea if we did not allow our force levels to stabilize for a reasonable period of time. President Park’s political position now would be very seriously affected if there were any further drawdowns, and there might also be some increase in the North Korean threat. General Yoon said that the ROKs were perfectly willing to assume the burden of their own defense, but that modernization of the ROK forces was a prerequisite and that U.S. reductions in advance of the ROK modernization would tempt the North Koreans to attack at a time when the military balance would appear most favorable. Interestingly, General Yoon appeared to think that a two-year period of maintaining U.S. present force levels would be acceptable to the ROKs. General Yoon also referred to the standard ROK line on U.S. withdrawals: a premature withdrawal would shake the confidence of the Korean people and adversely affect the rapid ROK rate of economic growth.

Withdrawal of ROK Forces from Vietnam

In my conversations with Embassy officers and our military representatives in Seoul, I was able to get the word across that there was no compelling interest in the White House in getting the ROK troops out of Vietnam. According to the Ambassador, President Park felt that for political reasons he had to follow the example of the other TCCs in carrying out withdrawals from Vietnam, but would probably stop with the removal of the ROK marine brigade and leave the remaining two divisions indefinitely in Vietnam. To carry out further withdrawals would mean that the provisions of the Brown Letter on U.S. payment of MAP transfer costs would no longer apply, and that the ROK would be obliged to take over all of these costs forthwith. (They are evidently willing to take over the transfer costs gradually, however; see below.) General Smith indicated that there is no pressure from our military in Korea for the return of the ROK troops in Vietnam. They are assuming that this is entirely a ROK matter and not one of ours. As to the ROK troops in Vietnam, Lt. Gen. Knowles said to me during the flight to Seoul that he would recommend getting the two ROK divisions out of the coastal areas of Vietnam and putting them into areas where they would be more useful. I assume from this that the JCS is not pushing for a ROK withdrawal. However, I understand that Secretary Laird wants to cut back on the funds now being provided to support the ROK troops.

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The MAP Transfer Costs

General Smith stated that an agreement had been reached with the ROK military for the Koreans to take over the MAP transfer costs as follows: $20 million in FY 72, $40 million in FY 73, and $50 million in FYs 74, 75, and 76, or a total of $210 million. In return, PL 480 to the value of about $120 million would be provided. Ambassador Porter was unaware of any agreement covering a five-year period, but had heard of the ROK willingness to spend $20 million in FY 72. This matter needs more elaboration. (Note: an agreement on the first year has been concluded.)

The ROK Modernization Package

Our military in Seoul had just finished preparing a suggested ROK modernization package, which was being forwarded to Washington via CINCPAC. The representative from State who accompanied me (Leslie Brown of the Bureau of Political Military Affairs) had evidently received an advance copy of this package and raised questions concerning each of the recommendations for the ROK services. On the Army package, Brown questioned the provision of self-propelled artillery on the grounds that the ROKs would have difficulty maintaining this equipment and because the large O & M costs which would be required. The KMAG Chief, General Pezdirtz, explained that the U.S. Army does not now operate artillery which is non-self-propelled, and thus the ROKs would be receiving what our forces would be leaving behind. In addition, he argued strongly for building up a more mobile ROK posture by developing lateral roads south of the DMZ, leaving only a constabulary-type screening force along the line, and drawing back the main ROK forces to central positions farther back from the line from which mobile forces could move quickly to areas of North Korean attack. In this way it would be possible to reduce the ROK forces by at least 100,000 men, thereby offsetting the O & M costs.

On the Air Force package, General Smith defended strongly the number of F–5E aircraft suggested for the ROK. His argument was that with 77 F–5E’s (a type of aircraft capable of reaching Pyongyang from South Korea), plus 18 ROK F–4s already on hand, plus 54 US F–4s which will now be stationed permanently in South Korea, there will be 149 high-performance aircraft in the South; this would roughly balance off against 108 MIG 21s and 70 IL 28s in the North—the only aircraft in the North Korean inventory capable of striking deep into South Korea. In addition, 245 hardened shelters now exist in the South for both U.S. and ROK aircraft. The equation is that the North Koreans, to strike successfully (with a 75% chance of success) against the South, would need three and a half aircraft per hardened shelter in order to guarantee enough destruction of the US/ROK inventory to preclude retaliation, but the North Koreans simply do not possess this number of aircraft. (All hardened shelters would have to be attacked since the
North Koreans would not know which ones were occupied.) Clearly, enough U.S. and ROK aircraft would survive an attack to be able to retaliate against Pyongyang. In these terms, the air strength available in the South would constitute an effective deterrent. General Smith’s presentation impressed me as making a great deal of sense.

On the Navy side, the plan is to provide the ROKs with a substantial number of fast patrol boats to cover the coastlines in the east, west and south. These patrol craft would work together with three destroyers to be provided which would be stationed off each of the three coasts as radar picket vessels, and which could remain at sea for long periods of time. The destroyers would be armed with Sea Sparrow missiles in addition to guns, so that they could defend themselves against air or sea attack if necessary. There was a difference of opinion within 8th Army headquarters over the destroyers—General Smith thought that the Sea Sparrow missile was a bad idea, since the ROK could shoot it at anything they saw on their radar screens, and might raise problems for us in this respect. There is also a question about the cost of the destroyers: $26 million each seemed rather high, and would represent a substantial percentage of the total MAP package. Alternatives might well be considered.

Defensibility of South Korea

At one stage in the briefings given by 8th Army, a briefer said flatly that the ROK armed forces as they presently stand could “defeat” a North Korean attack. This rather surprised General Knowles, who put forward the JCS view that the ROK forces would only be capable of “holding” a North Korean attack for a period long enough for the U.S. to come to the rescue. The 8th Army people were firm on the ability of the ROKs to inflict a defeat.

Operation “Freedom Vault”

The para drop, which was the central point of my visit to South Korea, took place on March 4, a day late. Bad weather forced a postponement. The drop itself, however, came off very well, with 11 C-141s dropping about 700 members of the 82nd Airborne Division—a “brigade minus” as the briefers on the site euphemistically put it. There were also some 300 ROK paratroopers dropped. Quite an array of dignitaries from Seoul came down for the affair, including President Park, members of the ROK National Assembly, and quite a galaxy of generals—there were 21 of ours on hand.

Despite the good show which the paratroopers and U.S. and ROK Air Force put on, the one thousand or so troopers seemed rather lost in the vast expanse of territory before us. I don’t believe that this point was lost on the witnesses, the Koreans in particular. The press coverage of the operation was very good in general, but there was a constant note running through it to the effect that this show was all very well, but
could also mean that the U.S. might be planning on further troop withdrawals in favor of flying in airborne or other units from the continental U.S. in case of dire need. The corollary was: would these U.S. troops be sufficient? Throughout, the ROKs appeared to have almost a phobia about U.S. troop withdrawals and being left alone to face the music.

**President Park’s Situation and Electoral Prospects**

At the reception at the Osan Air Force Base Officer’s Mess following the para drop, Ambassador Porter commented to me that President Park looked very bad. He seemed pale and drained and not in good condition physically. He made no effort to move over to speak to Ambassador Porter, although one of his aides made a point of taking me over to introduce me to the President as an “observer from the White House.” There clearly seemed to be something of a strain in Park’s relation with the Ambassador, although I do not believe this was a serious one.

What was probably uppermost in Park’s mind was the upcoming election campaign. Although it had not formally begun, Kim Tai Chung, the opposition candidate, was already very active and grabbing headlines on issues which were putting Park on the spot. For example, Kim was promising more attention to the economic development of the two Cholla provinces (economically backward part of the ROK) than Park had been giving; Kim had also been speaking in terms of trying to open up some contacts with North Korea, thus preempting this issue from under Park’s nose. It appeared that Kim was a more charismatic type before the Korean people than Park, who was finding himself at a disadvantage in competing. The betting was that Park would still come out on top, but by a much closer margin than had been anticipated. Park had hoped for a bigger margin than last time, when he won by only one million votes, but it seemed unlikely that he was going to get anywhere near that much. This in itself would be a loss of face for Park.

In an attempt to put the heat on Kim, Park’s people were already beginning to resort to various forms of skullduggery. Kim’s nephew had been harassed by the Seoul police on very dubious charges, and there was some effort to go after Kim as well on charges of having violated the electoral law by opening the campaigning ahead of time. Ploys like this didn’t seem likely to gain much public sympathy.

**Popular Attitudes on Reunification**

According to our military in Seoul, the younger generation of Koreans coming along had been thoroughly brainwashed about the iniquities of North Korea, and wanted no part of reunification (except, of course, on Park Chong Hoa’s terms). This is simply not so, according to a member of Park’s personal staff, Dr. Hahn, who is a graduate of Harvard and Yale law schools. Dr. Hahn said that the theme of reunification is an extremely popular one among the student generation, and
that Park is in fact missing the point by not devoting more attention to this issue. According to Dr. Hahn, the younger generation is quite romantic about the theme of “one Korea,” does not recall to any great extent the circumstances of the Korean war, and is willing to have re-unification even under North Korean control if this will bring about a new national unity. The line seems to be that, “yes, we may suffer hardships as a result, but this will only last for three generations or so.” Dr. Hahn said that he was doing what he could to get President Park to say something about reunification. However, as noted, Kim Tae Chung had already taken up a position on this issue which had outflanked Park, who was finding it impossible as a result to adopt a stand until after the elections.

**The Role of Japan**

There seemed to be the continuing deep-seated expansion of Japan in the mind of the ROKs. Japanese capital was being welcomed up to a point, but the Koreans were reluctant to let the Japanese get in too deeply for fear the Korean economy might end up under Japanese majority control. This was another reason why the continued U.S. presence in Korea was desired—so long as we are there in force, we tend to offset the growth of Japanese influence to a level which becomes unacceptable.

**Chirep and Universality**

The ROKs were well briefed on the issues which are confronting the GRC and ourselves in connection with Chirep. General Yoon, mentioned above, laid it on very heavy in telling me that universality would cause the ROKs real trouble. Ever since the Korean War, they have clung to the UN umbrella for their actions in the Korean War, and would find it extremely hard to accept the legitimization of North Korea—declared an aggressor by the UN—in the UN General Assembly. In addition, the Park Administration would see in universality an added problem in dealing with North Korea on the question of reunification. I was told in so many words that any U.S. support for the unification principle in advance of the Korean elections would be extremely hard for President Park to take. Not everyone agreed with this hard-and-fast line (Dr. Hahn did not), but the majority opinion, especially that within the military, followed it.

**Ambassador Park and the U.S. Embassy in Seoul**

Everything that I saw about Ambassador Porter convinced me that he is an extremely good representative. He knew all of the Korean leaders intimately, including their foibles and strong points, and was able to sort out the Korean political scene in a way which made a great deal of sense. He runs a taut ship in his Embassy, and is on the best of terms with the military. He is also an ambassador who keeps firmly in mind
his mission of representing the President of the U.S. to the president
and people of the country to which he is assigned, rather than the re-
verse. I have no doubt that this has caused some strain with his rela-
tions with Park, but there are times when firmness is called for. As the
Ambassador said, “You gotta be able to listen to ‘em cry.” I am sure
that the Koreans regard him basically as being sympathetic, and that
they respect him for doing his job.

[Omitted here is the report of Holdridge’s visit to Japan.]

91. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of the
Treasury Connally, the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Johnson), and Others

Washington, April 17, 1971.

Connally: I obviously don’t have the information, but I might, par-
enthetically, ask: what do we get for the one and a half billion that
we’ve committed to, in terms of military preparedness of, of Korea?
What if Korea—

[unclear exchange]

Connally: Every time I ask, every time we start talking about eco-
nomic matters, everybody wants to keep the trade off in the economic
field. When we talk about military matters, they’ve got nothing to give
us in the military field. What do we get for it?

Johnson: Two—two things. We got, we got modernization of their
forces—

Connally: What does that—?

Johnson: —which they needed, which they needed, and which was
justified on its own merits. It was needed on its own merits. And sec-
ondly, we got the reduction of our, our—

Nixon: Reduction of our forces.

Johnson: —our forces; the 20,000 forces that we drew out of there.

Nixon: Well, but—

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Cab-
inet Room, Presidential Recordings, Conversation 53–2. No classification marking. Ac-
cording to the President’s Daily Diary, the conversation was held in the Cabinet Room
between 9:34 and 10:45 a.m. Also attending were Kissinger, Stans, David Kennedy, Pe-
terson, Shultz, and Flanigan. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The editors transcribed
the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
Connally: Look, I understand, but we will have to have Korea's consent to reduce our forces, you know.

[unclear exchange]

Connally: Now, if it’s in our interest, that’s fine. But we don’t have to have their unilateral consent.

Johnson: No, no—

Nixon: I—I think, I think John has got a point here. Let me say, Alex, that I do not go as far as some, and that I know, I know the diplomats have to take a different view, and you must argue it, always. But, believe me that it doesn’t—when it comes to linking, I’ll obey the linking. Military linkage, economic linkage, I’m for it, if it serves our overall interests. That’s really what it’s about—

Connally: That’s all I’m saying, Mr. President.

Nixon: Don’t compartmentalize it too much.

Johnson: [unclear]

Nixon: I think it’s very important, very important to try to get—if you can work it out on an economic basis, fine. But the, the [unclear] a little bit of linkage—what’s that?

Connally: May I suggest, Mr. President, that we ask Pete—that you ask Pete to do one other thing if it appears worth [doing]. Let’s see what [unclear] might lead to withdrawal. We approach this again from the standpoint of, “What can we give ‘em? What more can we give ‘em?” Let’s see what they already have that we can withdraw. Hong Kong? What, what can Hong Kong do for us, except send us textiles? Now, how important is this if we just maintain a, a great relationship with Hong Kong. Taiwan, they live at our sufferance, to be cold about it. Now, they’re our friends, and we want to support ‘em, but what can they do? Why do we argue with them if we can withdraw if they don’t go along with it? Korea’s the same way.

Nixon: They live at our sufferance.

Connally: Sure, they live at our sufferance. And all I’m saying is—I don’t want to be completely bull-faced, just about 90 percent—but let’s see what they’ve already got that we can take away from them if they don’t want to go. Just don’t get [unclear] and stand back, give ‘em something else.

Johnson: My point, Mr. President, is not that I oppose the linkage, as such, but I, I would be hopeful that we each accomplish this within the economic framework.

Connally: Good.

Kennedy: Alex, could I, could I respond to that?

Johnson: Sure.

Kennedy: I—I don’t think, I don’t think any of us would argue that if you could do it with as little as possible—
Kennedy: —we should do it. Johnson: Sure.

Kennedy: But, I, I do want to remind you of this chart. We are talking about 34 percent of their exports. We probably are talking about a society that is counting on this growth as part of their national, you know, forward planning. We’re talking about 45 percent growth, and we’re gonna try to talk them into accepting under—between 5 and 10 on a third of their exports. And I—my only view is that it’s gonna take [unclear].

Nixon: Five and ten, you mean—?

Kennedy: To meet the industry requirements. I mean, we’re gonna have to go from 45 down to 5. Is this right, Maury?

Stans: Yes, yes—

Kennedy: Somewhere between 5 and 10 [unclear]—

Stans: Five in some categories, ten on others—

Kennedy: And, so, all I’m trying to suggest is we’ve got quite a job to get—

Nixon: Now, now let’s [unclear]—I don’t—I want to be sure I understand what that is. You say that their growth is 45 now?

Kennedy: I’m saying that—

Nixon: Textiles are their exports. I understand this.

Kennedy: Yeah. Thirty-four percent of their exports are textiles—

Nixon: Right, exports—

Kennedy: They have been growing at 45 percent compounded. Commerce prepared these forms. We had six people working—

Nixon: Yeah. Sure, sure.

Kennedy: —and the industry position, now, is somewhere between 5 and 10 percent. And I simply—

Nixon: This is our industry, now?

[unclear exchange]

Kennedy: I mean, in order to make a deal that is, that is—

Stans: My point being—

Kennedy: —specific guidelines.

Stans: —in case you’re not aware of it, in our discussions with ’em last year, they proposed a—an agreement on a 43 percent increase per year. Subsequently, they’ve gotten it to 30 percent, but that’s as low as they’ve ever gone, so—

Nixon: You mean the other countries?

Kennedy: Korea.

Nixon: Korea.

Stans: Korea.
Kennedy: Well, Koreans are tough partners.
Nixon: They all are.
Stans: Could I—?
Nixon: Koreans are tough.
Stans: Could I raise a point on the economic “carrots,” as you called ’em? I would agree with Alex that if we could it would be great, but I’m not sure that these economic carrots are good enough, or that there aren’t some considerable risks in some of those that are on the charts. For example, to increase the allowances of cotton goods, and to put textiles under general preferences, these are things that could not be secret from the rest of the world. And if we put textiles under general preferences for Korea and Taiwan, I think we’d have trouble with South America and in Africa and in all the other countries that would want textiles under general preferences. So, we open up a can of worms there that could cause us a lot of trouble.

92. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, April 19, 1971, 0930Z.

2141. For Ambassador Brown. Subj: Alleged Threats Against Kim Tae-Chung.

1. Last Friday Kim Tae Chung sent word that he would like to see me rather urgently that evening noting he would be absent in Choolad-Do campaigning all this week. I sent word back that I was sure he would understand why my meeting with him at this time might be misunderstood and that if he had any special message he could have some of his close advisers meet with PolCouns.

2. Dr. Chong Il-Hyong had quiet lunch with PolCouns at latter’s residence today. He said he and Kim Tae-Chung have received several threatening telephone calls and letters, which they believe are govt-directed, that they have reason to believe there is ROK-CIA scheme to assassinate Kim as public sentiment continues to swing in direction Kim victory, and that Kim had hoped might be possible for me to find a way to discourage government from carrying out any such attempt.

PolCouns replied in relaxed way that calls and letters could of course be from cranks or attempt to intimidate, and Chong agreed. At other times during conversation Chong spoke of NDP concern with possible massive rigging (but had nothing impressive when pressed for details as to how government would carry out rigging), spoke of possibility of palace coup, and even of possibility DRP would create confusion at selected key polling places to invalidate balloting in those places. Chong did not convey impression that he or Kim Tae-Chung was overwhelmed by threats, but I thought I should let you know of this development. I do not plan any further reply.

3. In quiet way which conveyed impression he was genuinely persuaded, Chong also said NDP elated with way campaign is going, that conservatively at present time Kim expected win by half million votes in honest election and that further swings to Kim in coming final days of campaign should substantially increase that margin. As NDP manager for presidential campaign he is highly partisan, but as you know Chong is quiet and serious man.

Porter

93. Editorial Note

On April 27, 1971, Korean President Park Chung Hee of the Democratic Republic Party was re-elected for a third term. He defeated Kim Dae Jung of the opposition New Democratic Party. Park polled 6,342,828 votes over Kim’s 5,395,000 but obtained fewer votes in Seoul than Kim. The DRP failed to reclaim its two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, which was necessary for the ruling party to amend the Constitution in order to provide a fourth term for Park.

In a May 28 memorandum to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, Executive Secretary of the Department of State Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. stated that the Korean elections “are being interpreted hopefully in terms of political stability, which would have been endangered had the minority NDP been trampled by government apparatus and power.” Eliot added that “our first reaction to these elections is one of considerable satisfaction with the vitality of the two party system in Korea.” He continued: “A strong and forceful president who has moved Korea ahead has been returned to office; and a vigorous opposition will sit in the Assembly with enough clout to make certain there is no sliding back to repressive rule.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971)
94. Memorandum From Ernest Johnston of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)  


SUBJECT
Korean Textile Negotiations

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum which Peter Peterson has sent to the President seeking authorization for use of economic carrots in order to get Korean agreement to voluntary textile restraints.  

This is the memorandum which I mentioned in my memorandum to you of June 15, 1971 (Tab B). John Holdridge and I worked closely with Peterson’s staff on its preparation.

The President on April 16 had approved in principle a list of economic and military carrots for the Korean textile negotiations. You had stressed that if military carrots were to be included, you would wish to be consulted further. The Peterson memorandum does not propose military carrots, though Peterson expresses the opinion that they may have to come subsequently if the economic package is insufficient. Our probable need for military carrots if we negotiate with the Koreans on their Vietnam troop levels would make the inclusion of military carrots in a textile deal doubly difficult.

The Peterson memorandum includes two principal inducements for a Korean textile settlement. They are:

—That we continue our AID development lending beyond 1972 at approximately the current level of $20 to $25 million a year, giving a total over five years of $100 million.
—That we increase annual PL 480 sales above the current $100 million level by about $40 million and reduce the amount available for U.S. uses so that over the next five years the increase would amount to $250 million.

This total package of about $350 million would compensate the Koreans about equal to a conservative estimate of the amount which they would lose in potential sales by concluding a five-year textile restraint agreement with the United States.
Almost all observers agree that the ROKFV are not now being used to greatest advantage. Decisions on what to do about this situation, however, will involve a wider span of consequences than is immediately apparent. There is of course the series of effects these decisions will have on the situation in the Republic of Viet-Nam. But, there is also a direct connection between what we do about the ROKFV and what the President may want to do in the future about further withdrawals of US forces from the Republic of Korea, as well as about overall US strategy for Asia. Decisions to follow certain lines of action in our support of the ROKFV could foreclose, at least in part, future options elsewhere which are now available to us.

We know that President Thieu reacted initially to news in April of Korean troop withdrawal planning by saying that he wanted Korean troops to stay in South Viet-Nam through CY 1972. Since then, we have not discussed this subject with him. We know, on the other hand, that the Government of the Republic of Korea (ROKG) began troop withdrawal planning some months ago. However, since the Conference of the Troop-Contributing Countries (TCC) in Washington on April 23, the Koreans have been careful to make no further announcement of their plans beyond saying that the details on units and timing will result from GVN/ROKG consultations. Furthermore, they have told us they do not expect these consultations to begin in earnest until after the South Vietnamese elections in October.

In the context of South Viet-Nam, the ROKFV issue rests on five years of experience in observing ROKFV performance and providing US support for the Koreans in Viet-Nam. Initially very effective in combat, ROK forces have remained generally in the coastal areas to the point where, in some cases, RF and PF forces are now between them and the enemy. They have appeared reluctant to undertake offensive operations and have been useful for guarding only a small sector of the populated area. In fairness, it should be pointed out that this...
cautious approach may have resulted from a reported ROKG directive to the Korean field commander to minimize casualties.

There is another less direct but equally significant impact of the ROKFV on our interests in Viet-Nam. The Korean presence there has been characterized thus far by a continual and well-organized pattern of irregular practices. Investigations of these practices have revealed that substantial amounts of US funds and property have been diverted from their intended purposes by the ROKFV. Although dollar losses cannot be stated in precise amounts, the lower limits, as defined by investigations, are in themselves significant, according to Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams. The results of US attempts to curtail the irregular practices of the ROKFV to date have been marginal. With the continuing withdrawal of US forces, our capability to improve these results will deteriorate substantially.

Essentially, there are four alternatives open to us:

— Alternative 1: Move the ROKFV out of Vietnam on a schedule roughly in parallel with our own troop redeployments. For example, this could begin with the Marine brigade after the October elections, to be followed by one division between January and June, 1972, and the remaining division between July, 1972 and January, 1973. Redeployment under this alternative would be sufficiently measured in pace that the void to be filled in MR–2 should not prove unmanageable in light of anticipated improvement in RVNAF capabilities. Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams report that continued South Vietnamese progress probably will allow the GVN to assume current ROKFV responsibilities by late CY 1972 without unacceptable detriment to other ongoing programs. US costs under this option ultimately should be significantly lower than the basic direct costs to the US ($243.9 million) now estimated for the ROKFV for FY 1972. MACV favors this alternative. On June 1, Secretary Laird reaffirmed his support for the MACV’s position.

— Alternative 2: Keep the ROKFV in Vietnam through CY 1972 and gradually return them to Korea throughout CY 1973. Under this alternative, the ROKFV would continue to receive substantial foreign exchange earnings. The ROKFV would continue physically to occupy areas in MR–1 and MR–2 which would be denied to the enemy. The net effect on the RVNAF, however, would be essentially negative: not only is current ROKFV combat effectiveness low, but the ROKFV does not put Korean combat units under the operational control of the RVNAF; moreover, RF/PF development is stunted while Korean units remain behind the cutting edge of the pacification program as it moves inland.

Delivering ROKFV withdrawal behind our own could affect Vietnamization adversely. As US units depart, there will be a reduction in the support now provided the ROKFV under working arrangements between US and Korean field units. This is likely to result in diminished
ROKFV effectiveness even within their present areas of operation. If we shifted US planning to allow for continuing to support the ROKFV without slowing US redeployments, this accommodation would be at the expense of other critically important spaces in a small US force. If we were able to make special arrangements to shift our support responsibilities all or in part to the RVNAF, it is questionable whether the Koreans would be willing to go along on that basis. It is equally questionable as to whether or not the RVNAF in the near term could assume the responsibility, especially in MR–2.

Notwithstanding all of the foregoing negative factors, it is important to stress that the ROKFV could represent a significant residual force in CY 1972. Bearing in mind the US withdrawals which will have taken place and the continuing enemy threat in MR–2, the two Korean divisions might make a major contribution to the security of the area if faced with large scale NVA infiltration—a contingency we may have to face.

Basic direct costs to the US are estimated at $243.9 million for FY 1972. Ambassadors Bunker and Porter, as well as General Abrams, report that if we ask the Koreans to assume a more active combat role in South Vietnam, we can expect them to demand a high price. Mission Saigon estimates, for example, that the additional costs of moving one of the two divisions now in MR–2 up to join the Marine brigade in MR–1 would be from $80. to $100. million if we are to accede to all requests for additional equipment we believe the ROKG would make. There is considerable doubt that the military worth of the ROKFV justifies even the FY 1972 estimated costs, much less any additional outlays. Ambassador Porter predicts the ROKG asking price could also include requests for (a) suspending further MAP transfer after the first $20. million this year, (b) no further US troop withdrawals from Korea for the next few years, and (c) perhaps a US commitment regarding US financing of a “ROK contribution” to the post-hostilities rehabilitation effort in Vietnam. He and other US officials believe, however, that hard bargaining might result in substantial reduction of these demands because the ROKFV provide the ROKG with foreign exchange earnings they greatly desire. In any event, we must take into account the $2.5 billion limitation on US support of Free World forces in SVN as currently proposed by the Administration.

Alternative 3: Move back to Korea a force roughly the same in personnel strength as a division (the Marine brigade plus support troops), beginning after the October elections, and keep about two division equivalents in Vietnam through CY 1972, gradually withdrawing them throughout CY 1973. The arguments applicable to Alternative 2 are generally valid for Alternative 3. US logistic support would be simplified in one respect by the elimination of Marine-type requirements in MR–1.
—Alternative 4: Establish a ROK Mobile Task Force, (8–12,000 men) redeploying the balance of the ROKFV beginning after elections in October 1971. While this alternative would provide for a Korean combat force in Vietnam probably through CY 1972, it has major disadvantages. The ROKFV have no demonstrated capability, either operationally or logistically, to conduct significant mobile task force operations. The Koreans’ refusal thus far to put their combat units under the operational control of any other national commanders—even those of the US—makes such a concept operationally questionable. Logistic support of a mobile task force is beyond the capability of the ROKFV without outside assistance. Unless the concepts and priorities of our Vietnamization program are significantly changed, this assistance would have to come from the US. A bare minimum of 5,300 US combat support and logistics personnel would have to be earmarked for ROKFV support if the TF concept were implemented. This force level requirement could be accommodated if a decision were made to have at least 100,000 US troops in SVN as of July, 1972. However, if the US presence were significantly smaller but with RVNAF priorities unchanged, maintaining ROKFV logistic support would require heavy civilian contract support at unknown costs. Other support requirements, also, would be difficult for us to meet. The helicopter support we now give the entire ROKFV, for example, would be roughly one-half of the estimated support (6 helicopter companies and about 1,600 US personnel) to implement a mobile task force concept. The US would either have to provide these aircraft and their backup or keep sufficient US aviation units in SVN to fly for the ROKFV. Finally, a mobile task force, even if it were envisioned as operating only to relieve ARVN units for combat (a technique more consistent with Vietnamization than direct employment in combat operations), would operate under more arduous conditions than the ROKFV do now. There would be increased personnel costs for the ROKG, with likely resultant demands for additional benefits and support from the US—all costs, and all accompanied by the ever present threat of immediate withdrawal from SVN.

When we consider the ROKFV issue in the context of Korea, the traces of a larger picture emerge.

—Based on the President’s approval of a modernization program for the ROK armed forces costing $1.5 billion over a five-year period, US and ROKG officials began discussions which resulted in formulation of a force structure and an equipment list. This joint USG–ROKG understanding served as a basis for a detailed Five-Year Modernization Program now under consideration in the Under Secretaries Modernization Committee. When this Program as now envisioned is completed, the ROK armed forces will be strong enough to cope with the North Korean threat with only US air, naval and logistic support. It is expected that, by mid-June, this Program will be forwarded to the President for
approval. The ROKG, of course, is anxious for the USG to approve the detailed Program so their planning can proceed.

—The currently agreed ceiling on ROK forces supported by MAP is 600,000. General Michaelis has encouraged the ROKG to consider reductions in the overall size of the ROK armed forces as the Modernization Program progresses. We doubt that there will be any action taken by the ROKG on this matter until ROK forces in SVN return to Korea.

—In October, 1970, the President directed that there would be no further US withdrawals from Korea beyond the 20,000 spaces already approved. The 20,000-space reduction will be completed by June 30, 1971. Defense and State generally agree that US ground forces in Korea could be further reduced by the end of FY 1973. Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis have indicated that it would be desirable to notify the ROKG one year in advance of further US withdrawals from Korea. We have no reason to challenge that view. Accordingly, if such a reduction is to take place in early FY 1973, notification to the ROKG should be made not later than this summer.

—Defense and State planning on these and other issues of force requirements and forward deployments in Asia has been in the context of NSSM–69, “US Strategy and Forces in Asia,” now being completed and tentatively scheduled for DPRV action late in July.

Clearly, the disposition of the ROKFV has significant implications for US planning on future reductions in the level of US forces in Korea, and for our support of Korean armed forces within Korea—all within the larger context of US strategy and forces for Asia. If we press the Koreans strongly to remain in strength in Vietnam, they will be in a strong position to insist that we maintain current US force levels in Korea.

Therefore, we are convinced that forthcoming NSC discussions on the response to NSSM–69, “US Strategy and Forces for Asia,” while they need not precede decisions made on the ROK forces in Vietnam, must not be predetermined by those decisions, either. Similarly, US decisions in the Vietnam context must not imply a related commitment on our part to maintain unchanged the US presence in Korea.

The first of these decisions is a choice among the four alternatives just described:

1. Redeploy ROKFV roughly in parallel with US redeployments.
2. Keep ROKFV in SVN through CY 1972; gradually return them to Korea during CY 1973.


No matter which of the above alternatives is selected, we should take the position that the USG will negotiate with the ROKG and the GVN on the basis that there will be no increase in the costs of US support arrangements for the ROKFV beyond those estimated for FY 1972; further, that we insist that, whatever ROKFV forces remain in Vietnam for whatever period, we get enhanced military returns for our financial contribution; and, lastly, that we stipulate in these negotiations that funding arrangements now in effect will continue only to 1 January 1973, with the question of follow-on US support arrangements thereafter requiring examination at a later date.

Furthermore, at about the same time we negotiate the issues concerning the ROKFV, we should inform the Korean Government that we are planning to reduce our ground force space authorization in Korea further during FY 1973. A recommendation on the size and nature of these reductions will be submitted to the President at a later date.

96. National Security Decision Memorandum 113


MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT
Republic of Korea Forces in South Vietnam

Having reviewed the alternatives for ROK force presence in Vietnam in the June 17, 1971 paper forwarded by the Secretary of State, the President has decided:

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 97–144. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.
2 Document 95.
—The U.S. will support the continued presence of two ROK divisions in South Vietnam through CY 1972. The U.S. will plan to consider its position on the question of ROK force presence beyond CY 1972 with a review of the military situation after the 1971–72 dry season in South Vietnam.
—Negotiations will be undertaken with the Vietnamese and Koreans on the basis that there should be no increase in costs of U.S. support arrangements above those estimated for FY 1972.
—The negotiations should stress the requirement for improved ROK performance in the combat role in South Vietnam.
—The negotiations will not link possible U.S. redeployments from Korea with the continued presence of ROK forces in Vietnam. No decisions have been made on U.S. redeployments from Korea beyond the 20,000 space reduction to be completed by June 30, 1971.

Negotiations implementing this decision should stress the U.S. role as being in support of the GVN request for a continued ROK force presence in South Vietnam.

The Secretary of State should report to the President as appropriate on the progress of the negotiations implementing these decisions. The negotiations should be completed as soon as possible and no later than September 1, 1971.

Henry A. Kissinger

97. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Republic of Korea (ROK) Forces in South Vietnam

I am concerned about the potential ramifications of National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 113, dated June 23, 1971. The NSDM, as you may recall, calls for the United States to negotiate the continued presence through CY 1972 of the ROK divisions in South Vietnam. In my judgment, such actions represent a significant risk of decreasing the prospect for withstanding the internal and external

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 113. Top Secret; Sensitive.
2 Document 96.
threats to Republic of Vietnam (RVN) security in 1972. Based especially on General Abrams’ judgments, I believe more effective military use can be made of the resources which would otherwise be diverted to the ROK units.

I, and the entire command chain within the Department of Defense, share your concerns about the RVN security outlook in the foreseeable future, i.e., through at least CY 1972. We are taking every possible step to insure that no major security problems develop. With declining US resources available for application in RVN, we must insure, I believe, that all resources are used to their best advantage. Optimum effectiveness of RVNAF and third nation forces is paramount.

General Abrams reported to me last January in blunt and emphatic terms that the ROKs “were not pulling their weight.” Ambassador Bunker concurred in that view. Both Abrams and Bunker have consistently repeated that view since last January—and, if anything, have reinforced their conviction. The benefits derived from the ROKs’ presence in RVN may be positive, but are almost assuredly small. On the dollar side, the ROK contingent of nearly 48,000 men is currently costing between $250–$300 million. That now represents a relative claim on resources of substantial proportions. The incremental contribution of the ROKs with those resources is almost certainly well below the incremental contribution which could be made with such resources if the funds—or any significant portion of the funds—were devoted to other forces, especially the RVNAF.

Occasionally, the options involving retaining or redeploying at least some of the ROK forces have been characterized in terms of “something being better than nothing.” That characterization is, I believe, misleading. The options are not something or nothing. The options in using our declining resources and search for optimum effectiveness are “a small something” versus “a bigger something.” The ROKs currently and prospectively represent a small something. The same resources diverted to the RVNAF would in Abrams’ judgment represent a bigger something. I support the MACV viewpoint.

We might, of course, try to negotiate improved ROK performance. We have been given clear signals by the ROKs that any increased ROK effectiveness will carry with it an even higher price tag than that now being paid. Such an option appears to me to have (a) little chance of success and (b) an impact in consuming MACV’s increasing valuable time.

On 23 June, the same date as the NSDM, we received informal word from Saigon, as you know, that the Koreans planned to start redeploying their troops in December 1971. They would ostensibly withdraw about 17,000 men by July 1972. Four points, inter alia, are noteworthy:

- The proposed ROK redeployment schedule is clearly not tied to that of the US from RVN, nor, in any apparent way, to that of the US from Korea.
During the early part of 1972, when a major DRV push may be expected in RVN, the ROKs would still have the equivalent of 1½–2 divisions in RVN. Even by 1 July 1972, the remaining ROK force would be on the order of 30,000 men—more than sixty percent of its current force level.

The proposed ROK redeployment should free some resources which could be diverted to the RVNAF.

The negotiations for the ROK redeployment are presumably going to be carried out between the ROKs and the GVN, a situation which for apparent reasons, is preferable to that of having the US intervene as middle-man.

In my judgment, given the circumstances outlined above, it would be best now to take the following steps:

- Allow the ROKs and the GVN to continue negotiations for initiating ROK redeployments in December 1971.
- Indicate to the ROKs and the GVN our concurrence in the size and rate of the proposed initial ROK redeployment schedule.
- Inform both the ROKs and the GVN that we would wish to reassess further ROK redeployments after we see how the military situation develops in early-to-mid 1972.
- Solicit specific suggestions from MACV on how the resources freed as a result of the proposed ROK redeployment will be used to increase the overall security situation in RVN.

I recommend the steps outlined be initiated immediately.

Mel Laird
ROK Troops in Vietnam and Force Modernization

on a five-year force structure and modernization plan for the Korean armed forces.

Recommendations

The Committee has reviewed the enclosed plan (Tab A) and recommends:

— that you approve this plan as setting the major objectives for our military assistance program in FY 71–75, subject to annual review to evaluate program changes, cost factors, resource availabilities, and the evolving situation on the Korean peninsula.

— that you authorize a military assistance and sales program totaling $1.5 billion in FY 71–75, comprised of a combination of grant military assistance (MAP), excess defense articles, and other U.S. military equipment transferred to the Republic of Korea at no cost; and including a maximum of $1.25 billion in new obligational authority (NOA), this amount to be reduced to the maximum extent practicable through foreign military credit and cash sales, provision of excess defense articles and other “no cost” U.S. equipment transfers.

— that you authorize Vice President Agnew during his visit to Seoul June 30–July 3 to convey to President Park your approval of the objectives plan, subject to annual review as stated above.

Discussion

On February 10 we and the Koreans jointly announced the satisfactory completion of talks on the modernization of the Korean armed forces and the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. Our troops have since been replaced on the DMZ by Korean forces. At the end of this month our force level in Korea will have been reduced by 20,000 men.

At the time of our joint statement we told the Koreans that the modernization plan provided an acceptable framework but that the specifics of the plan required further study in Washington. We now request authorization to inform the Korean Government that this plan has your approval and that we are prepared to move forward with its implementation.

As you recall, the Vice President was directly involved in the negotiations concerning our troop reduction and modernization plan during his earlier visit to Seoul. We still have difficult bridges to cross with

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3 Attached but not printed. On May 20, Winthrop Brown sent Irwin a draft of the NSDM 48 Steering Group Report. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 197, Korea, 000.1–292)

4 Neither the approve nor disapprove option was initialed. The full text of Agnew’s public statements made in Seoul during a round-the-world trip undertaken at Nixon’s request is printed in Department of State Bulletin, August 30, 1971, p. 229.

5 See Document 88.
the Koreans in regard to our future force levels, and we would profit from the good will created if the Vice President could personally convey your decision.

John N. Irwin II

99. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of Defense Laird


SUBJECT

NSDM 113

I have carefully considered your June 26, 1971, memorandum on Republic of Korea (ROK) forces in South Vietnam. My decision reported in NSDM 113 that the U.S. will support the continued presence of two ROK divisions through CY 1972 is reaffirmed. This decision should be conveyed to the South Vietnamese and Republic of Korea governments.

I agree that it would be timely and appropriate to consider the issue of further ROK redeployments after the 1971–72 dry season in South Vietnam, and I would welcome your suggestions and those from MACV on how additional resources might be used to improve the security situation in South Vietnam.

Richard Nixon

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 113. Top Secret; Sensitive. Attached to a July 6 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon in which Kissinger analyzed Laird’s views and concluded that “while the Secretary’s reasoning is troublesome,” his specific recommendations were generally consistent with NSDM 113. Kissinger recommended that Nixon send the memorandum to Laird. NSDM 113 is Document 96.

2 Document 97.
100. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park


Dear Mr. President:

I have just completed a very fruitful round of discussions with Ambassador-at-Large David M. Kennedy regarding the current textile negotiations in the Far East which he is conducting as my personal envoy. As a result, I would like to personally reaffirm to you the very great importance which I attach to settling the textile issue. I must, as well, reluctantly express my regret upon learning that progress toward reaching accord with the Republic of Korea has been delayed.

Because I realize that the decision which you must make involves far-reaching political considerations, I would like to emphasize that the United States has attempted to fully incorporate these considerations in its proposals and, therefore, to maintain the special relationship—a relationship whose benefits flow in both directions—which we enjoy with the Republic of Korea. Since I understand that the supplemental economic assistance we propose to offer fully cushions the impact of the U.S. textile proposal on your third Five Year Plan, I feel confident that we may now rapidly move to agreement.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence File 1969–1974, Korea, President Chung Hee Park, 1971. No classification marking. Nixon signed a similar letter to Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato after receiving both letters from Ambassador Kennedy during a meeting at the Western White House in San Clemente on July 16, 10:08–10:40 a.m. Kennedy also gave Nixon a memorandum describing the course of the textile negotiations in the Far East. He noted that the negotiations were at a “make or break point” and “the key is Japan.” (Ibid.) According to the President’s Daily Diary, Nixon also met with Kissinger, Haig, and Peterson from 10:08 to 10:35 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No record of the meeting has been found. On July 15, Richard Kennedy and Ernest Johnston prepared talking points for Kissinger to send to Nixon in anticipation of the July 16 meeting. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence File 1969–1974, Korea, President Chung Hee Park, 1971)
101. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Trip to Republic of Korea

General. I visited the Republic of Korea (ROK) on July 11–14. During that period, I visited US and ROK units; made a special trip to the DMZ; had lengthy—and I believe, productive—private discussions with top US and ROK officials; and participated in the annual US–ROK Security Consultation Meeting.

In this report, I shall describe each of the activities briefly, provide my main impressions, and conclude with some generalizations and recommendations.

Activities

A. Visits with US and ROK Units

I visited Camp Casey, headquarters of the US 2nd Infantry Division; Camp St. Barbara, now utilized by ROK Army artillery units; and Suwon Air Base, home of the 10th ROKAF Tactical Fighter Wing. I found the US and ROK ground units in excellent condition, with modern equipment, up-to-date training, and high morale. The ROK artillery unit I visited had assumed a major artillery supporting role from US units only six months ago. Both ROK and US officers were high in praise of the rate and skill with which the ROKs had assumed their new tasks, even though it had meant transitioning to different and more modern equipment. The consensus was that the ROKs were as effective as, if not more effective than, the US units they replaced. The US officials considered this transition illustrative of the overall possibilities for the ROKs’ assumption of additional ground combat missions.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 227, Agency Files, Dept of Defense, 16 May–31 Jul 71, Vol. XII. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger forwarded Laird’s memorandum to Nixon under a July 22 memorandum. A notation on Kissinger’s memorandum indicates the President saw it. Kissinger summarized Laird’s conclusions and recommendations as follows: “The ROK is a staunch and dedicated ally, and we should continue to cultivate that relationship with it in the spirit of harmony and candor. The present composite ROK/US military capability constitutes an adequate deterrent.” He continued: “Starting in FY 73, we should plan to reduce U.S. ground force strength in Korea by at least 14,000 additional men. We should maintain a tactical air presence in Korea for the indefinite future.”

2 For Laird’s conversation with Nixon on July 22 about his trip to Korea, see Document 102.
The ROK Air Force unit I visited was equipped with modern F–4 and F–5A fighters, obsolescent F–86s, and a mixture of relatively modern support aircraft. The base, typical of the ROKAF structure, was equipped with sufficient hardened shelters for each of its front-line tactical fighters. As with the ROK ground units, the skill, training, and esprit of the ROKAF officers and men were obviously of the highest order. Also, as with the ground units, the leadership provided throughout the ROK defense structure was superior. It was apparent that the ROK modernization program, in general, is proceeding soundly and expeditiously.

The single most glaring deficiency is in equipment used by the ROK Air Force. Some of the aircraft, especially the F–86s, are old and could not be expected to match the equipment now in the North Korean inventory. The modernization program for the ROKAF recognizes the need for better aircraft and includes systematic acquisition of more advanced fighters. I have accelerated the delivery of the ten F–5As in the FY 71 MAP program. Those aircraft would have been delivered in March 1972. Under a revised delivery schedule, I specified that they be delivered not later than August/September 1971.

I did not have the opportunity to visit ROK naval units. US and ROK officials assured me that the component is also progressing well under the modernization program. Their chief request is for so-called “Fast Boats,” which would be used to counter sea-borne infiltration. “Fast Boats” are included in the modernization plan, though the rate of delivery is somewhat slower than the ROKs like. In the meantime, US officials contend the ROKs have developed an effective intelligence, air, and sea tactical component which is doing a creditable job in countering North Korean attempts at Seaborne infiltration.

B. Visit to the DMZ.

Even a brief visit to the DMZ is enough (a) to confirm the presence of a persistent enemy, (b) to indicate the intensity with which the ROKs feel the presence of the North Korean threat, and (c) to illustrate the dedication and effectiveness with which the ROKs treat that threat. From an observation post on the DMZ, east of Kaesong, I saw a wide expanse of the ROK fence line, a ROK unit on patrol, and at least three North Korean observation posts and firing positions. It is sobering to see the situations which we call on brave men to handle and to witness those dedicated men at their tasks.

C. Private Discussions With US and ROK Officials

In addition to meeting with Ambassador Porter, General Michaelis, and other top officials of the US country team, I talked at some length with President Pak and Minister of Defense Jung. In addition, I made courtesy calls on Prime Minister Kim and the ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs (also a Kim). I shall outline briefly the gist of those discussions.
(1) *US Country Team.* Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis obviously maintain close and effective surveillance of, and working relationships with, the ROK leadership. Our country team anticipated virtually every issue which the ROKs raised. Our top officials provided, before my private meetings with the ROKs and before the formal Consultation Meeting, incisive and useful analyses of the situation and problems facing us in the Korean peninsula. I shall outline those issues through the remainder of this report.

(2) *President Pak.* The Republic of Korea President started our discussion by inquiring of your health and asking me to relay to you his best wishes. He expressed his gratitude for the historical friendship displayed by the United States, the harmonious relationship between the two nations, the extent of the sacrifices made by the United States in behalf of his nation, and the important contributions being made by the US in the on-going ROK Modernization program.

The key points President Pak made to me were as follows:

— The current ROK stability and development successes are direct functions of the aid and assistance offered by the US since World War II.

— The ROKs are trying to develop self-reliance, and thereby relieve the burden on the US. The ROKs have no intent of asking US troops to stay in the Republic of Korea indefinitely. He hoped the US would retain its capability in South Korea until the ROKs did attain self-sufficiency.

— The ROKs would keep about 600,000 men in their active forces (about their current level) in the Republic of Korea for the indefinite future. [As ROK troops are withdrawn from the Republic of Vietnam, that means some unit deactivations. Minister Jung later told me the plan was to deactivate one division plus a Marine brigade in the latter part of 1972 to keep at the 600,000 level.]^{3}

— There is justification for the view that North Korea would not invade the South unless help were provided by the Soviet Union and/or Red China. Pak thought such help was not likely now. Nevertheless, the sizeable North Korean forces now in existence and the irrationality of Kim Il Sung constitute a real and substantial threat. The theme of Kim Il Sung’s impetuosity and fanaticism as the key element in the threat was persistent throughout all ROK discussions.

— If any indications were given of ROK military or political weakness, Kim Il Sung would try to exploit the situation.

— The Republic of Korea will remove, as we already knew, 1 brigade (10,000 men) from South Vietnam between December 1971 and

^{3} All brackets are in the original.
June 1972. Though President Pak and the ROK officials were emphatic, and even sensitive, about the autonomy of their decisions concerning ROK forces in Southeast Asia, it seemed clear their RVN troop levels would be adjusted downward as US forces were withdrawn from SEA.

The points I tried to impress on President Pak were as follows:

—The ROKs can make additional major constructive steps toward self-reliance in weapons production. The M–16 rifle and ammunition plants are only examples of what can be done. [President Pak agreed.]

—The rate and composition of the ROK modernization program will bear close scrutiny. I noted you were pressing Congress for virtually all program elements the ROKs deemed desirable. Yet, I cautioned that (a) Congress is a co-equal branch of government in the US; (b) Congressional approval is not assured; and (c) the attempt by the ROKs to put most of the spending in the early years (front-loading) might be more than the ROK armed forces or the ROK economy could digest.

—You had asked for sufficient funds and manpower in FY 72 to hold US forces in South Korea at about their current levels. Again, positive Congressional concurrence was not assured. Already, I told Pak, the Armed Services’ Committee conference had specified a 50,000-man reduction for US ground forces. If approved by the Congress, we would have to allocate that reduction in the least harmful way possible.

—The US programs in the Republic of Vietnam are going well. The single most critical area now for the RVN is that of will and desire and the determination to get the job done. Neither the US nor any other nation can supply those ingredients for the South Vietnamese. I expressed the hope that President Pak would apply sound logic in considering any future withdrawal of ROK forces, i.e., linking ROK troop presence to the capability of the RVNAF to perform the tasks now being done by the ROKs. I cautioned President Pak about linking ROK presence in South Vietnam to that of the US or any other third nation. I observed that if the US had followed such a pattern in his nation (Republic of Korea), the US would long ago have withdrawn from Pak’s country. I suggested that Pak should gauge ROK troop pressure in RVN against mutual ROK/RVN interests.

(3) Minister of Defense Jung. Minister of Defense Jung presented 14 points to me. For the most part, they involved details in the Modernization program. The thesis of Jung’s comments was to ask for more US assistance at a more rapid rate. He did cover a few items involving the principles of US/ROK security relationships. In addition to responding to Jung’s points, I raised four basic points, all of principle.

Jung’s fourteen points were as follows:

—Outlook for US Military Assistance to ROK in FY 72. Jung asked for clarification on our FY 72 intentions. I gave him our proposed program...
in some detail, indicating the total would be nearly $440 million (excluding $15 million FMS credits), as follows:

- Grant MAP $240 M
- Excess Defense Articles 100 M
- Equipment of withdrawing US forces 100 M
- $400 M

—*Fast Boats/Killer Boats*. Jung wanted as much help in this area of interdicting seaborne infiltration as possible. I told him we had a destroyer in the FY 72 program, that we were accelerating funding on the Fast Boat program, and that we would see what other help might be possible.

—*F–4s–F–5s*. Jung expressed hope for 6 more F–4s; the earliest delivery of any nation on the forthcoming international Fighter (F–5E); and any other help possible in the tactical fighter area. I told him we would look at the F–4 proposition, had already included funding in the FY 72 MAP program for at least two of the early F–5Es, and would accelerate delivery to August/September 1971 on 10 F–5As. The ROKs were especially pleased with the latter action.

—*Automated Air Defense System*. Jung requested the US provide an automated or semi-automated Air Defense System. I told him we would look into the proposition. I frankly have no idea of the relative merits or costs of such a system at the present time.

—*ROK Forces in South Vietnam*. Jung told me again of the ROK plans to withdraw 10,000 men between December 1971 and June 1972. Without specifying any dates, he said that by the time the US forces in RVN were at the 40,000/80,000 level, the ROKs would reduce to about 5,000 men (from the current level of about 47,000).

—*ROK Equipment from RVN*. Not surprisingly, Jung asked that the ROK units leaving South Vietnam be allowed to take back to Korea their equipment, without such actions being counted against MAP. I told Jung it might be possible to allow such actions without counting against MAP, but that it would have to count against the overall $1.5 billion Modernization program.

—*Defense Industries*. The ROKs want added FMS credits to buy machinery for the M–16 ammunition plant. Also, the ROKs are eager to start an Agency for Defense Development (ADD) with a view toward doing more in-country R&D. I said we would look at both proposals.

—*US Forces in Korea and the UN Command Structure*. The ROKs, again not surprisingly, want assurances of no imminent US troop reductions in Korea and for retention of the current command structure. I gave no assurances on troop levels, but said the US would adhere to its position for the foreseeable future in support of the UN command structure.
Retention of Old Equipment being Supplanted by New Equipment under the Modernization Program. The ROKs want to keep the old equipment, like M-47 tanks, which is being replaced by new equipment, like M-48 tanks. I explained, supporting General Michaelis’ views, that such actions posed for the ROKs a formidable and unsupportable maintenance task. I agreed, however, we would look at ROK proposals on a selective basis.

SR-71 Flights. Jung asked that SR-71 flights be resumed to provide intelligence information to the ROKs. I indicated we would continue, as we were now doing, to provide the best feasible intelligence information to the ROKs on North Korean activities. That may or may not include resumption of SR-71 flights.

US Policy in the Event of North Korean Attempts to Invade South Korea. Jung asked for an explanation of US policy. I assured him the US would comply with the existing treaty, but that that treaty required Congressional approval before US units could be overtly committed. I cautioned ROK officials against assuming that our treaty involved any so-called “automatic” provisions like that of NATO.

Relations Involving Japan. Jung asked for clarification on US policy towards Japan and toward ROK relationships with Japan. I told him the US was not now concerned as much with resurgent Japanese militarism as with Japan’s failure to modernize its limited conventional forces. I explained further that we encouraged regional cooperation, particularly among air and naval forces, by the ROKs and Japan. Jung said he wanted to develop stronger regional ties to include joint air and sea exercises and officer exchange programs. He said he hoped to meet with the new Japanese Director of the Defense Agency, Masuhara, at an early date.

ROK Force Size. Jung simply reaffirmed the ROK policy that the active regular ROK forces would be kept at a level of 600,000 men. He reviewed again the intention in mid-to-late 1972 of deactivating one Army division, plus a Marine brigade.

I raised four basic points with Minister Jung. They were:

The Threat. I asked Jung how he privately viewed the security threat to South Korea. He gave a fairly conventional response, except that he indicated he felt the North Koreans could and would impose on South Korea only in case political or defense targets of opportunity arose. With President Pak in place for the next four years, Jung felt there would be no political targets of opportunity. With the current and prospective ROK military forces, he thought an effective military deterrent would be provided. While Jung did not state the logical conclusion, the result of his observations would be that except for occasional North Korean attempts at infiltration or harassment, the
prospective situation between North and South Korea is one of regulated, if uneasy, stability.

—Relaxation of Tensions or Negotiations. I asked Jung what he thought of prospects for relaxing tensions and even possibly negotiations, between North and South Korea. He thought the chances slight in the near term but that “step-by-step” measures might be possible by 1975–76.

—ROK Force Planning. I observed to Jung that the ROKs seemed to approach their force planning unrealistically. I asked him if they were doing any planning under the assumption of existing and/or programmed ROK and US resources. It is obvious the ROKs are not. Their planning implicitly assumes an open-ended arrangement in which the US will provide added funds where certain deficits and burdens will arise.

—ROK Forces in RVN. My questions on this item pre-empted a point Jung had intended to raise with me. The resultant discussion was as outlined earlier in this memorandum.

(4) Prime Minister Kim. Perhaps more directly than any other ROK official, Prime Minister Kim delineated ROK policy linking national security goals to economic goals. Kim’s exposition was roughly as follows:

—In view of the North Korean threat, the Republic of Korea needs to maintain a force at least equal to the currently-in-place capability and effectiveness.

—ROK forces must be sized to stay within the capability of the ROK economy.

—Therefore, South Korea must move towards an “elite” force—implicitly smaller in total size than the current force.

—To stay within the limits of the ROK economy, the US would have to supply the hardware necessary for ROK modernization in the “elite” force. The US might even have to supply some of the operations and maintenance funds.

The one additional interesting comment made by Kim was an assertion that, under President Pak, the South Koreans would not “provoke” North Korea. This was apparently to assure the US the ROKs would not use the Modernization program to develop an offensive capability. In subsequent discussions, it became clear the ROK Modernization plan was, per se, a provocation (albeit unavoidable) to the North Koreans.

D. US/ROK Security Consultation Meeting. Many of the points discussed in the formal Consultation Meeting were repetitions of items covered in private discussions. Among the key issues which were not covered in other conversations were the following:

(1) ROK economic goals (presumably growth, stability, and foreign trade) would take precedence over national security goals in areas where the goals conflicted.
(2) It would be explicit ROK policy that defense outlays would not exceed 5 percent of the ROK gross national product. (Recent outlays have been slightly less than 5 percent.) Added O&M outlays under proposed ROK policies would call for either (a) expenditures slightly greater than 5 percent of GNP or (b) added US assistance above that currently planned in the O&M area. It is clear the ROKs will press for the latter.

(3) The inability of the ROK government to sort out priorities consistent with its interpretation of the North Korean threat became apparent. The ROKs want a large, modern force as rapidly as possible; yet, they have not faced the realization that the US cannot serve indefinitely as a grant aid provider to the extent the ROKs desire. The ROKs give lip-service to reorganizing the serious problems associated with maintaining a large modern defense force. Yet, they are seeking to accumulate additional and even counterproductive maintenance burdens before they have sorted out their current allocations. Of the $1.5 billion Modernization program, some 60 percent is intended for investment in new hardware. Forty percent is intended for O&M. It is not clear that such O&M burdens are justified militarily, consistent with US capabilities to provide help, or consistent with ROK economic goals.

In addition to surfacing the issues outlined above, the Consultation Meeting addressed (a) a more detailed delineation of the North Korean threat; (b) the composition and phasing of the ROK Modernization program; and (c) the ROK Homeland Defense Reserve Force.

Main Impressions

The general tenor of the various discussions and activities in the Republic of Korea was that of congeniality, harmony and candor. The tensions and rancor that had typified some previous high level ROK/US meetings were absent. I was pleased to note that, in Ambassador Porter’s judgment, the Nixon Doctrine was given renewed meaning. I hope—and, indeed, I believe—we were able to impress upon the ROK leadership our intention to move ahead in the 1970’s under your basic tenets of strength, partnership, and a willingness to negotiate.

In a more specific way, I came away from Korea with the following impressions:

—There is a sufficient military deterrent in the Republic of Korea at the present time. Moreover, ROK military strength is growing. The Modernization program is going well. The deterrent to North Korea will be more than sufficient in the foreseeable future.

—In many important ways the ROKs display the will, desire, and determination to preserve their basic freedoms. This is especially evident at the level of the individual ROK units.
In other ways, the ROKs show evidence of ambivalence and contradictions in their attitude towards national security. This is especially evident in the highest councils of their government and in their security planning. On the one hand, they espouse conviction that the North Korean threat is large and imminent. On the other hand, the ROKs have blatantly put an arbitrary ceiling on the extent to which they will commit ROK resources to their own defense (5 percent of GNP). The ROKs are clearly counting, both explicitly and implicitly, on the United States to provide many of the fundamental resources, especially hardware and operations and maintenance funds (but not to exclude US manpower), requisite to preservation of an adequate deterrent.

The contradictions and inconsistencies in ROK defense planning are evident in a number of ways:

—The existing North Korean threat is typified on the one hand as large and imminent and on the other hand as quiescent as long as the ROKs display political and military stability. The ROKs contend that despite existing and prospective political and military stability, the threat is still high.

—If the threat is as immediate and intense as the ROKs frequently indicate, they could surely sacrifice more in their behalf.

—The provision by the US of manpower, equipment, and O&M funds creates for the US the same kinds of economic problems the ROKs want to avoid (inflation, restricted growth, and balance of payments disequilibrium). The ROKs are asking us to assume such economic risks and burdens to meet their security threat.

—The US has spent well above 5 percent of its GNP for security since 1950—much of it in the early years of that period directly in the ROKs behalf. It is not unreasonable, despite the ROK low level of income, to ask the ROKs to assume more of their own security burden.

—The ROKs place great credence on the autonomy and independence of their decisions in redeploying their forces from South Vietnam. Yet, they are clearly planning to link such deployments to the US redeployment schedule.

—The ROKs contend they want to give economic stability a high—if not highest—priority. Yet, they are seeking to “front-load,” i.e., accelerate, the 5-year Modernization program into the early years such as FY 72 and FY 73. Such acceleration, without substantial additional US assistance, would clearly impact adversely on the ROK economy.

—The basic ROK approach is not unlike that of Samuel Gompers’ labor movement in the late 1800’s. They simply want “more,” no matter what the category and no matter how inconsistent the context.

The ROKs admit to many, if not most, of the basic contradictions and inconsistencies in current ROK defense planning. That gives hope for instilling realism into the future ROK national security programs.
Additional hope can be garnered from the effectiveness and candor of the current US country team. Rarely have I seen such an outstanding group, both from the standpoint of representing basic US interests and from the standpoint of helping the host nation. I would hope that prospective changes in the US country team leadership would not change that healthy situation.

The ROKs appear sincere in their assertion they play no overt political or military threat to the North Koreans. There is hope, although dim at present, for more fundamental diplomatic resolution of the problems confronting the Korean peninsula.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

1. We have in the Republic of Korea a staunch and dedicated ally. We should continue to cultivate that relationship in the spirit of harmony and candor.

2. The composite ROK/US military capability in Korea at the present time constitutes an adequate deterrent. That deterrent will be maintained as we modernize the ROK armed forces. We should, therefore, continue the Modernization program basically on its current schedule.

3. US troop levels can be reduced further. Starting in FY 73, as the ROK Modernization program shows results, the US should plan to reduce its ground forces by at least 14,000 additional men.

4. The single largest drawback in the current and near-term ROK force structure is in tactical air. The US should maintain a tactical air presence in South Korea for the indefinite future. In addition, the US should retain the capability to maintain a sea presence, part of which would be carrier forces and its ancillary tactical air, in waters close to South Korea.

5. It is important that intelligence covering the North Korean threat be timely and accurate. We should maintain US intelligence functions in and over the Korean peninsula for the indefinite future and seek to increase the effectiveness of the US/ROK intelligence functions.

6. ROK defense planning includes a number of basic and troublesome inconsistencies. We should continue to move the ROKs towards resolution and elimination of these inconsistencies.

Mel Laird
102. Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Defense Laird, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


[Omitted here is discussion of Japan.]

Nixon: I think the whole Embassy has to be just shaken right down to its roots.\(^2\)

Laird: Well, I think that the—you’ve got to—it, it’s—you’ve got to go down to the, into the Embassy itself. I think—

[unclear exchange]

Laird: Going there, it isn’t the Ambassador. The Ambassador seemed to have more guts. But jeez, then he’d always—they’d always hound him away. He’d kind of back away there, but he, he always—he had the right idea to start with—

[unclear exchange]

Laird: He had to back away from it, finally. So, I do think that a change there [unclear]. It’s just the opposite, of course, in Korea, where you go in to Korea, and you have a strong Ambassador, and you have a strong military leader there in Michaelis, who’s—Mike Michaelis is good man; he’s a strong man. It’s probably the best country team that we have any place in the world, I think.

Kissinger: Really?

Laird: In Korea.

Nixon: Good.

Laird: They’re strong, and they’re good, and they put the United States’ interests first. And, the, the atmosphere in Korea—

Nixon: You know, one thing that makes the difference, though, is the, is the balls of the Ambassador. Ball—Porter is basically an upbeat, optimistic kind of a guy. You know? And he’s a—he’s a leader-type. Right, Henry?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Nixon: And I think he—and that affects the whole group. You know, if your group—if, if your top guy is not really a ballsy leader-type, the whole group [unclear]. Right?

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 543–6. No classification marking. According to the Nixon Tape Log, Haldeman was also present. (Ibid.) The transcript is part of a larger conversation, 5:35–6:20 p.m. The editors transcribed the portions of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

\(^2\) Nixon is referring to the Embassy in Japan.
Laird: Well, that, that, that, that certainly is true, and, and that—
[unclear exchange]
Laird: Really a great team there, and [unclear]—
Nixon: I’m glad to hear that.
Laird: —but they, they’ve done a good job. And now that the modernization program is going forward, there’s really—the Koreans do not have any questions about our intent to carry through on our defense commitment there.
Nixon: Yeah.
[4 minutes 47 seconds not declassified]
Laird: I was really very, very impressed with the way that program is, is moving. I have visited there with the Korean forces; went out and spent time with them; visited all the American units and went out and spent time with them and talked with the enlisted men and their officers there. And there’s no drug problem in Korea. There’s no drug problem in Japan, thank—
Nixon: Hmm.
Laird: —thank goodness.
Nixon: Plenty of sex there?
Laird: There’s plenty of sex, yeah.
[unclear exchange]
Laird: There’s a lot of trial marriages that take place—
Nixon: Yes. That’s right.
Kissinger: Trial marriages?
Laird: Trial marriages.
Kissinger: That’s a pretty good system.
Laird: [laughs]
Nixon: Well, of course, they’ve got—they, they have to have very good protection against abortion and everything, you know, right?
Kissinger: In Japan, or in Korea?
Laird: Well, in both countries.
Nixon: Abortion is—in Japan—is, of course—
Laird: In both countries, they—so there is no—that, that particular morale problem there isn’t as, as serious as, as it is in other places. And the drug problem is handled by the governments; they’re tougher than hell out there, I’ll tell you that. Those two governments are, are very, very tough when it comes to that. They just don’t monkey around with it.
Nixon: Hmm?
Laird: With the drug problem.
Nixon: [unclear]
Laird: I, I was, though, very—I hadn’t been in the—in Korea since 1955, and to go up there, on the DMZ, one becomes quite aware of the
conflict that could take place, and the fact that, that the North Vi-
namese [Korean] Air Force is just three minutes away from Seoul. It’s
a, it’s a—you get a little different feel for it.

[1 minute 41 seconds not declassified]

Nixon: Would you say that the morale’s okay?
Laird: Morale’s fine there.
Nixon: It’s interesting.
Laird: Right.
Nixon: It shows you kids will still go places and do things—
Kissinger: Hmm.
Laird: Right. Well, the morale in Japan is fine, too. I mean that’s—
as far as our forces are concerned, there’s—there’s no problem there. I
don’t really have a lot more to say [unclear]. And I think it’s good to
get out there and talk to our commanders and talk to the people—
Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

103. Memorandum From Vice President Agnew to President
Nixon

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
My Diplomatic Mission: June 26–July 28, 1971

I found all the leaders whom I visited frankly appreciative of your
personal gesture in sending me as your representative to meet with
them. My presence and discussions served as welcome reassurance to
these nations which have in the past without exception looked to the
United States for understanding or assistance—particularly timely re-
assurance at a period of rapid change in the international arena.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 951, VIP
Visits, Vice President’s Trip, June–July 1971 [1 of 2], Secret; Sensitive. The memorandum
was forwarded to the President under an August 19 covering memorandum from
Kissinger. Agnew conferred with foreign leaders in 10 nations during a round-the-world
trip undertaken at Nixon’s request.
Everywhere I visited, I found that American prestige and confidence in United States policies remain high. All to whom I talked expressed concern and/or bewilderment at the unauthorized publication by our media of confidential government documents. However, this episode has not dimmed their confidence that your leadership will continue to guide the American people toward policies and actions that are wise and in the best interests not only of the United States but of the world. A corollary of this confidence was an evident widespread understanding of what you are attempting to accomplish through the “Nixon doctrine.” This policy has brought to other governments a new awareness of their own responsibilities, while at the same time clearly, they hope for a reasonable level of American support for their own efforts. Except with Prime Minister Lee in Singapore, Vietnam did not figure significantly in my conversations, most leaders appearing to approve strongly the current course of American policy there and to be reasonably confident that it will succeed. Two major international problems were of active concern, however, in many areas: the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and the current East Pakistan problem.

Korea

President Park is understandably more confident after his recent election victory and he deeply appreciated your gesture in sending a strong delegation to his inaugural.

Park and the Korean people seem to have adjusted quite positively to the hard fact of your decision last year to reduce American troop strength in Korea and have found new confidence in their own abilities. The several dialogues being carried on by Secretary Rogers, Secretary Laird, and our very competent Ambassador in Seoul concerning modernization of the Korean armed forces and arrangements for reduction of Korean troop strength in Vietnam have also strengthened the current sense of cooperation and understanding between our countries.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Korea.]

2 Reference is to the publication in The New York Times of the Pentagon Papers.
Seoul, August 31, 1971, 0909Z.

5309. Subj: Korean CIA Director’s Views on Red Cross Talks. Summary: ROK CIA Director says Red Cross talks designed (a) to show South Korean people ROKG ready to deal with humanitarian aspects of divided country; (b) demonstrate that South can now deal from position of strength; (c) open North to realities of situation in the South. His attitude reflected confidence, desire for Korea to play more active, positive role in Asian affairs.

1. ROK CIA Director Lee Hu Rak asked me at lunch if the reaction of the US Government towards the Red Cross talks at Panmunjom was favorable. I said that he had undoubtedly seen press reports of the Department’s spokesman’s comments welcoming the talks. I added that the Korean initiative was probably also seen as evidence of ROK maturity and self-confidence.

2. This observation produced a long and animated exposition of his strategy in getting the talks started now. The first and most obvious aspect, he said, was to respond to growing public pressure for some kind of contact with the North. The Korean people felt that their government had been an obstacle to the establishment of contacts. It was necessary to demonstrate that this was not so and to relieve the pressure by carefully controlled and regulated interchanges. He saw no prospect, however, that the talks would lead to unification. The ideological differences, he was convinced, were too strong to be overcome.

3. The second and less obvious aspect of his strategy was related, he said, to my comment on self-confidence. During his time as Ambassador to Japan and in his first months in office as CIA Director he

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR N–KOR S. Confidential.
2 In telegram 4729 from Seoul, August 7, Porter reported that Lee Hu Rak had informed him on August 6 that the President of the Korean Red Cross would hold a press conference on August 12 and announce a South Korean initiative for talks with North Korea on the subject of divided families. Porter reported that he had agreed that this initiative would have a good effect both at home and abroad but asked how they intended to get around ROK anti-Communist laws. Porter added that he found it interesting that only the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Justice had been sketchily informed and that he had assured Lee that his information would also be closely held by the U.S. Government. (Ibid.)
said he had made a thorough study of North Korea and had reached the conclusion that in every significant field of comparison the South had passed the North and with each successive year would be building up an irreversible lead. A physical and psychological barrier was in the past necessary, but this was no longer the case. The balance had been tipped. The South, he said, has nothing to fear from peaceful competition, and contacts with the North will have two beneficial effects. They will show our own people that we can deal successfully with the North and secondly it will give us a chance to open the closed minds of our northern compatriots. The North Koreans are the victims of their own propaganda about the South, he continued. They think we are on the verge of economic and political collapse. The agents that we pick up are full of the most preposterous ideas about conditions in the South. Contacts and a flow of information northward will gradually undermine these illusions and bring pressure on the regime.

4. Comment: Lee’s comments during the two-hour conversation reflected confidence, self-assurance, and initiative. The needless opening formality of the question on the USG reaction to the talks was the only traditional instinctive clutch for the reassuring apron strings. The Nixon Doctrine, our troop reductions, the public response to Kim Tae Jung’s campaign, the announcement of the President’s Peking visit, have all been elements of a broad front pushing politically sensitive and responsive men like Lee and Kim Jong Pil to recognize the changing face of Asia. Lee was saying, almost in so many words, that Korea in the past was compelled by its poverty and backwardness to accept the role of pawn and victim; that Korea today need not do so, and that it can play an active, positive, and to some degree an independent role.
105. Memorandum From K. Wayne Smith and John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) ¹

Washington, September 1, 1971.

SUBJECT
ROK Forces in South Vietnam

As directed in NSDM 113 (at Tab C), ² Secretary Rogers has reported (memorandum at Tab B) ³ to the President on the status of negotiations on ROK forces in South Vietnam.

The Secretary reports that 10,000 ROK forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam beginning around December 1, 1971, and terminating six months later.

This redeployment will leave two ROK divisions in South Vietnam in mid-1972. NSDM 113 stipulated that the U.S. would support the continued presence of two ROK divisions through CY 1972.

While the Secretary is technically correct in concluding that, “So far the decisions they [the ROK’s] ⁴ have reached are not in conflict with the U.S. position” he does not point out that several signals point to future ROK withdrawals in CY 1972 that may not be consistent with NSDM 113. Ambassador Porter has reported from Seoul (cable at Tab D) ⁵ that: (a) there is pressure from several quarters within the ROK government for further redeployments, (b) further ROK redeployments will be gauged in part on U.S. plans, and (c) additional decisions on ROK redeployments may follow the October Presidential elections in South Vietnam.

In other words if events are allowed to take their own course, there is a good chance that the ROKs will announce further redeployments in CY 1972 after President Nixon announces our redeployment plans for 1972.

Two Choices—In the face of these circumstances there are two ways the U.S. could proceed:

—Follow the course implicit in the State Department’s response to NSDM 113 which is to let the GVN and ROKs determine the level of

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² Printed as Document 96.
³ A memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, August 11, attached but not printed.
⁴ Brackets are in the original.
⁵ Telegram 4703 from Seoul, August 6, attached but not printed.
ROK presence without any U.S. intervention whatsoever. Thus far we have conveyed neither to the GVN nor ROK governments our preference that two ROK divisions should remain in South Vietnam through CY 1972. If we continue this policy, there is a good chance events will foreclose the option we prefer because the Koreans will probably announce further withdrawals when we do.

—Inform the GVN and Koreans of the terms of NSDM 113, i.e. we want two divisions to stay through CY 1972 and we are willing to continue our support at past levels accordingly.6

Proposed Memorandum to Secretary Rogers—At Tab A is a memorandum for Secretary Rogers instructing him to make known to the GVN and South Korean governments our position that two ROK divisions should remain in South Vietnam through CY 1972.7 You recall that President Nixon’s memorandum (also at Tab C) to Secretary Laird (responding to Laird’s reclama)8 directed that the GVN and ROK governments be informed of the NSDM 113 decision. Therefore the President has already made the decision you are asking Secretary Rogers to implement, although Secretary Rogers may not have been informed of the decision.

On a subsidiary issue, NSDM 113 directs that the issue of U.S. force presence in Korea and ROK presence in South Vietnam should not be linked. Now that the President has decided to keep a U.S. division in South Korea through FY 1973, our leverage in support of a continued ROK presence should be increased. However, such an explosive bargaining chip need not be played now if ever.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum for Secretary Rogers at Tab A. This memorandum instructs him, at an appropriate time before a further announcement is made on U.S. redeployments, to inform the South Vietnamese and Republic of Korea governments of our preferences with regard to ROK troop redeployments.

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6 In the margin, Kissinger wrote: “Didn’t I say that to them.”
7 Attached but not printed is the signed September 23 memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers.
8 Nixon’s memorandum is printed as Document 99. Laird’s reclama is Document 97.
106. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 1, 1971, 9:30–11 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Pyong-choon Hahm, Special Assistant to the President of Korea for Political Affairs
Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John A. Froebe, Jr., NSC Staff Member

General Haig, noting that Mr. Hahm had relatively recently assumed his new position, asked him for his early impressions of his job. Hahm said that one of the first problems that he had come up against was China’s move to get back onto the international scene. As regards the internal Chinese politics of the move, the PLA as well as the civil bureaucracy was supporting this new direction in foreign policy. As to China’s willingness to engage in a dialogue with the U.S., Mr. Hahm thought a major motivation was the Soviet question.

Need for Continued U.S. Military Presence in South Korea

Addressing himself to the substance of the U.S.–PRC dialogue, Mr. Hahm said that he thought that the Chinese would find it easier to tolerate a U.S. rather than a Japanese military presence in Asia because the U.S. has no territorial ambitions. In fact, it could be said the Chinese even need the U.S. in Asia as a hedge against Japan. As regards the Korean peninsula, the Chinese in all probability do not want a U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea—the U.S. presence is in Peking’s eyes probably an essential guarantee against Japan hegemony over South Korea.

As to South Korean views on this question, Mr. Hahm said the top priority for the ROK Government is to prevent another war on the Korean peninsula. If it believed it necessary to attain this object, the ROK Government would probably be willing to recognize Pyongyang. However, in making such a move, Seoul would want to extract the maximum possible concessions from North Korea.

Most importantly, since President Park’s statement of August 15 last year, Seoul has pursued a line of trying to induce Pyongyang to recognize and deal with it rather than attempting to overthrow the ROK Government through subversion and to use force to unify Korea. Mr. Hahm recognized that such a shift would pose considerable diffi-

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971. Secret. The meeting was held at the White House.
cultures for Pyongyang, given its hard public stance on this question. Secondly, Seoul would want North Korea to sit in the U.N. along with South Korea, but on the condition that Pyongyang recognize the competence of the U.N. to deal with the Korean question—although Mr. Hahm said that his government might be willing to modify this condition to insist only on North Korea’s acceptance of the principles of the U.N. Charter.

Returning to the question of a U.S.–China dialogue, Mr. Hahm said that Chou En-lai is probably uneasy over the prospect of too rapid an increase of Japanese influence in Asia. In the light of this, Chou probably would like to have President Nixon’s assurance that the U.S. has moved from confrontation to negotiation, for under confrontation Japanese influence can increase more easily. Chou may also want to ask the U.S. to redefine its relationship with Japan. He thus is seeking U.S. agreement to a new political framework for Asia.

Turning to the geo-political importance of the Korean peninsula, Mr. Hahm characterized the peninsula as “a bone stuck in the throat of all three powers” [Japan, China, and the Soviet Union]. If the Japanese get a foothold on the peninsula, this will be regarded by Peking as a threat. Expressing his own view, Mr. Hahm said that a rivalry between the three powers on the peninsula is intrinsically unstabilizing. Historically, the effect of a Japanese presence on the peninsula and the ensuing three power rivalry was seen in the failure of Teddy Roosevelt’s solution—allowing a Japanese foothold on the peninsula, which only opened the way for a later Japanese move into Manchuria. Mr. Hahm noted in passing that Japan has always justified its military expansion in terms of Japan’s vital need to secure overseas sources of raw materials and markets.

Mr. Hahm said that Chou En-lai is much concerned over the possibility of the Korean peninsula being pushed into the Japanese orbit. United States involvement in South Korea is acceptable to Chou—the Chinese will always choose U.S. militarism over Japanese militarism. The U.S. could make its military presence more tolerable to Peking if it (U.S.) would redefine its role in South Korea as that of a referee between the three powers. At present Chou is scared to death that the U.S. will completely withdraw its military presence from South Korea, leaving a vacuum that will suck Japan in.

Mr. Hahm said that he found the State Department taking the position that an increasing Japanese influence in South Korea growing out of its expanding investment there is harmless. The Chinese, however, see a vital qualitative difference between U.S. and Japanese investment. The Chinese believe, on the basis of historical experience,
that a resurgence of Japanese militarism will follow almost inevitably from Japanese overseas economic expansion. The present situation gives support for such fears: U.S. markets are being closed to Japan and Western Europe is beginning to show fears that the Japanese will turn to their markets as a substitute. In terms of Japanese overseas economic needs, there is a point beyond which the Japanese will not be able to tolerate this denial of markets. We thus cannot draw too fine a line between Japanese economic and military ambitions. Mr. Hahm also noted that even though it is true that there is no evidence of resurgent Japanese militarism now, the Japanese national character is capable of changing overnight. Mr. Hahm reiterated that the Chinese can live with U.S. military involvement in South Korea, but would find a Japanese presence intolerable.

Even Japan would find the disappearance of the U.S. military presence in South Korea to its disadvantage, Mr. Hahm said. Japan would fear that in the absence of the U.S. military presence there the Chinese and the Russians would take advantage of their geo-political advantage and move down the Korean peninsula. Mr. Hahm explained that with Japan suffering the disadvantage of being separated from the peninsula by a sizable stretch of water, it must establish a presence on the Korean peninsula in order to offset the threat posed by China and the Soviet Union which can move into the peninsula over a continuous land bridge. The Japanese thus would like to see the U.S. stay in South Korea as a shield against China and the Soviet Union. Japan has told the South Korean Government that any further reduction of U.S. military presence in South Korea would leave Japan exposed.

At the same time it is essential that Korea not align itself with any of the three powers in order to maintain stability in the area, Mr. Hahm contended, but in the present context the maintenance of the non-aligned stance depends on the U.S. presence.

Mr. Hahm commented that it would take only one big depression or recession for Japan to go militaristic. He expressed the hope that Japan would be successful in finding a solution to its economic problems without going to extremes but said the Korean attitude was one of caution and skepticism.

**Current Misunderstanding of the Nixon Doctrine and U.S. China Policy**

General Haig said he found a great deal of truth in Mr. Hahm’s exposition of the problem. However, he thought that it contained some underlying assumptions that fail to take into account President Nixon’s policies. Specifically, General Haig thought Mr. Hahm misunderstood the Nixon Doctrine and the relationship of President Nixon’s China initiative to it.

As regards the Nixon Doctrine, General Haig stressed the President was not looking for a formula to disengage but rather a way to
stay engaged in a manner that took account of changes in the international scene and in the U.S. He noted that almost any U.S. president would have been faced with the same problem. General Haig underlined the fact that the U.S. is a Pacific power and that the President’s own record clearly reflects this concern. He admitted that there are forces in the U.S. pulling for U.S. disengagement abroad, but said emphatically that this was not the policy of this administration. The U.S. definitely wants to avoid situations that would leave power vacuums. Another basic principle in this regard is that U.S. commitments proceed from U.S. interests, not vice versa. Given the continuing existence of these interests, U.S. commitments will continue to stand firm.

Recent Contacts Between North and South Korea

But, General Haig wanted to know, what was Mr. Hahm’s view of Seoul’s recently initialed contacts with Pyongyang? Mr. Hahm said that his government hoped that Pyongyang would tone down its rhetoric against the South Korean Government. Mr. Hahm noted that in this regard South Korea may now be receiving some indirect assistance from Peking. Tad Szulc of the *New York Times* had mentioned to him the previous evening that he had heard recently that Chou had gone to Pyongyang between July 11–15. This could be interpreted, Mr. Hahm said, as an indication that Peking was pressing Pyongyang to make its own actions more consistent with Peking’s changing attitudes toward the U.S.

General Haig wondered what might come out of the contacts between North and South Korean Red Cross representatives. Mr. Hahm, explaining the rationale of Seoul’s initiative, said that President Park recognized that his de facto recognition of North Korea implicit in certain of his actions and statements in the past year was unpopular in South Korea: it perpetuated the division between North and South rather than reunifying them. Therefore, President Park was approaching Pyongyang on the question of divided families.

South Korean Troop Withdrawal from Vietnam

General Haig asked Mr. Hahm his views on the Vietnam situation. Mr. Hahm said that his government had misjudged the Vietnamese. South Korea had assumed the South Vietnamese would fight the threat of a Communist take over as fiercely as they had in the early 1950s. President Park is now disenchanted with his country’s involvement in Vietnam. Korea became involved in large part to satisfy its obligation to the U.S. Now, however, South Korea finds itself on the receiving end of much criticism from abroad—its troops’ behavior in South Vietnam has given rise to an international image of Korea as bloodthirsty. Mr. Hahm said that he himself had been advising President Park to get out of Vietnam.

General Haig responded that we must confront the fact that we are involved in Vietnam. What we do therefore must be done responsibly
and be done in the full light of the realities of the security situation in Vietnam. He thought that Korea should not take over seriously criticism of what it was doing in Vietnam. Much more important, he said, was that we leave Vietnam in a way that South Vietnamese forces will be able to defend the country. This meant that South Korea should plan on leaving its forces there for at least the coming year. Withdrawing precipitously would raise the same danger of instability in Indochina that Mr. Hahm wanted so much to avoid in the Korean peninsula.

Mr. Hahm objected that South Korea has a serious problem domestically as well—it must not be the last to leave Vietnam, or even worse, it must not be kicked out of South Vietnam. Also, if North Vietnam pulls another Tet offensive because U.S. troops have been down to such a low level, the remaining South Korean forces could be left in an impossible position. General Haig said that he does not believe that Hanoi retains the capability to stage another Tet offensive. He thought the greater danger would be instability in Indochina resulting from a vacuum created by too rapid a troop withdrawal. He said that South Korea need not fear a complete U.S. withdrawal that would leave it holding the bag. The U.S. will not withdraw before the other side satisfies certain conditions. On the other hand, General Haig said, he thought that if South Korea precipitously pulls its forces out, thereby undercutting the Nixon Doctrine’s reliance on Asian nations’ defending themselves, this action would bring even greater criticism on South Korea.

Mr. Hahm pointed out that the signals South Korea had been getting from the State Department and the Government of Vietnam were almost tantamount to an invitation for the Koreans to withdraw. President Thieu didn’t even bother to send President Park a letter when Korea informed South Vietnam of its plans to make its first withdrawals. From all of this, Seoul has gotten the feeling that the U.S. attitude was one of “if Korea wants to get out, then let it go.” General Haig responded that he did not believe that President Thieu wants South Korea to leave, and again said that he did not think South Korea should attach undue importance to the foreign criticism which Mr. Hahm had mentioned.

Mr. Hahm said that he had received the impression during his last visit to the U.S. that the South Korean military presence was not needed. General Haig responded that he firmly believed that Korean troops are needed and said that he was very much concerned over the potential results of an early withdrawal of South Korean troops, particularly the impact on the Nixon Doctrine. General Haig commented that we have all come too far and have invested too much in Indochina to give up the ghost now. Mr. Hahm returned to his dismay over the U.S. reaction to Seoul’s notification on its plans to withdraw the first increment of troops. General Haig countered that this was not the reaction of President Nixon, who accorded the highest priority to the realities of the security situation. Mr. Hahm noted in passing that the withdrawal target for South Korean
troops which he had had in mind was next May. General Haig said that he thought that it would be well if he discussed this matter further with John Holdridge when he saw him later today.

The meeting ended after a further exchange of pleasantries.

107. National Security Decision Memorandum 129


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT
ROK Force Structure and Modernization Program

The President has approved in principle the five-year Korea Modernization Program prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee.\(^2\) As recommended by the Under Secretaries Committee, the President authorizes:

1. A military assistance and sales program totaling $1.5 billion in FY 71–75 comprised of a combination of grant military assistance (MAP), excess defense articles, and other U.S. military equipment transferred to the ROK at no cost.
2. A maximum of $1.25 billion in new obligational authority (NOA), this amount to be reduced to the maximum extent possible through foreign military credit and cash sales, provision of excess defense articles, and other “no cost” U.S. equipment transfers.
3. The annual review of the plans reflecting program changes, new cost factors, resource availabilities, and the situation as it evolves on the Korean peninsula.
4. Program additions or changes shall be considered as offsets to the assistance levels contained within these ceilings unless specifically considered and approved by the President.

Further, the President directs that as set forth in NSDM 48,\(^3\) a five-year Korea memorandum should be developed covering all U.S.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 97–144. Top Secret. Copies were sent to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\(^2\) See Document 98.

\(^3\) Document 56.
activities and programs related to Korea over the next five years and posing, where appropriate, alternative U.S. presence and assistance options. Among other problems, this memorandum should examine:

—The North Korean tactical air threat and the alternative ROK and U.S. forces required to cope with it.
—The alternative means of financing further improvements in the ROK air force within the existing modernization program outlined above.

Henry A. Kissinger

108. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 13, 1971.

SUBJECT

Contacts Between North and South Korea Augur Well for Improved Political Climate on Peninsula

At Tab A is a State memorandum to you describing the agreement of North and South Korean Red Cross representatives to meet at Panmunjon for talks on the question of divided families.² The agreement was endorsed by the governments in both Seoul and Pyongyang, and represents the first contacts between North and South since the end of the Korean War (with one minor exception in 1963).

The agreement was reached against a backdrop of the following recent developments:

—Recent indications of Peking’s interest in a Seoul–Pyongyang rapprochement and movement toward reunification. Most important in this regard was Chou En-lai’s statement on this question during his August 5 interview with James Reston.
—Recent official public expressions in both North and South Korea of interest in moving toward reunification.


² Tab A, a memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, August 20, is attached but not printed.
—Increasing confidence in South Korea resulting from the successful conduct of this summer’s national elections [and from South Korea’s economic progress and continued U.S. backing implicit in our support for the ROK military modernization program].³

Since the State memorandum was drafted, three preliminary meetings have been held between the Red Cross representatives on the question of divided families. The next meeting, scheduled for September 20, is likely to involve a more substantive discussion of the problem.

One of South Korean President Park’s political advisers, Mr. Pyong-choon Hahm, told General Haig and me September 14 that Park was moved to take what he described as this “humanitarian” initiative to offset the domestic unpopularity of his de facto recognition of North Korea implicit in certain actions and statements he has made over the past year. The unpopularity, Hahm explained, resulted because Park’s recognition of the North perpetuated the division of Korea.

³ Brackets are in the original.

109. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, September 23, 1971, 0005Z.

174893. Subject: Kim Yong-sik in Washington.

1. In almost hour long meeting with Secretary, attended also by Asst Sec Green and Korean Ambassador Kim Dong Jo, FonMin Kim Yong-sik concentrated on President’s trip to China. FonMin’s representations followed closely script of Park Chung Hee letter² he carried, and touched base with its essential arguments in almost exact order: ROKG welcomed President’s visit to China and hopes it will ease tensions; pleased that trip will not be at expense of old friends; ROK concerned, however, about speculations that Chou En-lai will raise question of Korea; and ROKG request that there be no discussions nor decisions taken concerning Korea without consultation with ROK. As in letter, Kim

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Ranard on September 21, cleared by Green and Johnson (S/S), and approved by Eliot.

² On September 21, Eliot forwarded President Park’s September 16 letter to Kissinger. (Ibid.)
claimed that China is encouraging North Korea; instead China should convince North Korea not to take a belligerent attitude toward the ROK. As arguments that North Korea and China as well have not changed their attitudes towards ROK, Kim pointed to stepped up infiltration since beginning of NK/ROK talks, including in particular incident of last weekend, as well as September 6 Chicom/NK agreement on military assistance. Kim wound up representation with plea that U.S. presence in Korea is a strong deterrent against war and must be maintained.

2. In response, Secretary thanked FonMin for ROK statesmanlike reactions to forthcoming China visit, which most helpful. Confirming that President’s trip will not be at expense of friends, Secretary went on to explain genesis of visit as attempt to improve relations with PRC through face-to-face talks. No agreements have been reached, nor were there any preconditions. Secretary said we would not make any decisions on Korea without consultation with the ROK; moreover, if there is to be any change in our policy toward Korea we will discuss first with ROK. We are hopeful, however, visit will help in reducing tensions which in turn will benefit our friends as well. We are not euphoric, said Secretary, and realize there remain many problems; nevertheless, we believe some progress being made. We expect our friends to understand the rationale for this visit and to trust our judgment. Specifically, so far as ROK concerned, our alliance will continue. We are not thinking of any further reduction of troops in FY 72.

3. Other topics touched on by FonMin included Korean question in UN, North/South talks, and ROK force levels and plans for Viet-Nam. During brief exchange of views on Korean question in UN, Secretary assured Kim we doing all possible to achieve postponement. In discussion of North/South talks, Kim provided no new insights. Secretary, however, found opportunity to encourage continuation of talks as step in direction of easing tension and benefiting ROK image. Concerning ROK troop levels in Viet-Nam, Kim reiterated ROK decision to remove 10,000 between December and mid-1972. Beyond this, he said, ROK has not made any further decisions, although thinking of taking out remainder of troops by end of 1972. Koreans do not wish to be last foreign troops remaining in Viet-Nam and Kim asked that ROKG be kept advised concerning future U.S. force levels. Secretary indicated there no plans for precipitous troop disengagement from Viet-Nam, that further withdrawals will be consistent with those previously arranged, and that we will consult with ROKG regarding future plans.

4. After luncheon on eighth floor in his honor, Kim returned for follow-up discussion with Green, which reported separately by memcon.3

Rogers

3 Not found.
110. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 28, 1971, 5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Kim Yong-sik, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea
Kim Dong Jo, Korean Ambassador to the U.S.
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT
Foreign Minister Kim’s Remarks on the Korean Question in the UN, the President’s China Initiative, and Textiles

After expressing appreciation to Dr. Kissinger for Dr. Kissinger’s taking the time to see him, Foreign Minister Kim remarked that he had come to the United States to observe the debate on the Korean question in the United Nations. This question, which had come up every year since the Korean War, involved three items: the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, the dissolution of UNCURK (the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea), and the solution of the Korean question by the Korean peoples themselves without outside interference. (Note: This resolution has been traditionally put forward by the Communists in the United Nations.) This year, the United Kingdom had put forward a resolution calling for the deferral of discussions on the Korean question until the next session of the UN. This resolution had been successful, the vote having been 68 to 20, which was a “happy outcome.” Dr. Kissinger expressed interest in Foreign Minister Kim’s remarks, and observed that he hoped we would do as well on the Chirep question.

Foreign Minister Kim went on to say that the ROK was working together with other Asian countries to bring about cooperation on matters of regional concern. For example, it had originated the ASPAC concept, and in fact there had been an ASPAC conference going on in Manila involving nine Asian powers when the announcement was made of Dr. Kissinger’s trip to Peking. This had been on the last day of the conference in Manila. At that time, Foreign Minister Kim said, he had made a statement welcoming the President’s forthcoming trip to Peking and expressing the hope that as a result tension might be eased. This was the ROK view.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971. Secret. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office. On October 1, Holdridge forwarded the memorandum to Kissinger, who initialed his approval.
Continuing, Foreign Minister Kim stated that after he had returned to Seoul, Assemblymen had asked him for an elaboration of his views, and had raised the question of whether Korean interests might be adversely affected by this change in the relationship between Communist China and Washington, the capital of the free world. He had then repeated what he had said in Manila about welcoming the President’s visit and hoping that tension would be eased. However, in his mind he had this thing—hostilities between North and South Korea had been suspended for 17 years, and the ROK hadn’t done anything against the North; there had been no invasion by the ROKs of the North. On the other hand, the North had done many things, for example the Pueblo incident and the Blue House raid, and had received some support for these efforts from the Soviets and the Chinese. Foreign Minister Kim cited an incident which had occurred the day he left Seoul in which four infiltrators had been sent against Kimpo Airport. This had been the first such incident since the Korean War. At the same time, North Korea was receiving large amounts of grant military assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese Communists, which was alarming.

So what he wanted to ask Dr. Kissinger, Foreign Minister Kim declared, was whether there was still a strong U.S. determination to defend the ROK. He indicated concern over the possibility that the Communists might increase pressure against the ROK, which was working hard to take care of its growing population but still had to pay attention to North Korea’s attitude and the actions of North Korean infiltrators. The ROK had kept more than 300,000 boys in the trenches for 17 years, and wanted a release of tension. This could be obtained if North Korea was not supported by China and the Soviets.

Foreign Minister Kim said that a second point which he wanted to bring up was the Mutual Defense Treaty which the ROK had entered into with John Foster Dulles. The Treaty should be maintained under any circumstances, and with assurance of this the ROK could continue its efforts to provide for the welfare of its people. But Chou En-lai had spoken to Western reporters about the U.S. getting out of Korea and the abrogation of the US–ROK Mutual Defense Treaty.

In response, Dr. Kissinger said that he wanted to make this general observation: Chou En-lai could say anything he wanted to and express his hopes as to what might happen in Korea, but we had no obligation to carry these hopes out. We had no intention of giving up the Mutual Defense Treaty, and no intention of negotiating about Korea with Chou En-lai. Chou could state his position if he wanted to, but Korea would not be the subject of negotiations between the Chinese and ourselves. We didn’t want such a situation, and there was also the question of what the quid pro quo would be. Why should we barter about our friends with someone who was still our enemy? We were not going to gain the so-called good will of China by bargaining about
our friends. We couldn’t keep Chou En-lai from saying that he wanted withdrawal of U.S. troops, but that was his problem, not ours. Chou En-lai knew that our defense commitment remained in full force.

Foreign Minister Kim said that he was glad to hear these words from Dr. Kissinger. Had Dr. Kissinger made this position clear to Chou En-lai? Dr. Kissinger replied that he had had no occasion to do so. The subject had not come up, but he had made clear to Chou that all our commitments would be maintained. He had not, however, wanted to encourage the Chinese to think that they could discuss matters such as U.S. relations with the ROK with him. Did the Foreign Minister see what he meant? Foreign Minister Kim asserted that he did, of course, see. Dr. Kissinger expressed the opinion that Chou En-lai may have had problems with the North Koreans, and so might have been obliged to say things for the record which would please the Prime Minister of North Korea.

Dr. Kissinger observed that as far as South Korea was concerned, we were going ahead with our modernization program for the ROK forces, and had no plans to make cuts in our own forces through FY 73. This would get us into the middle of 1973, and into the next administration. Dr. Kissinger explained that he didn’t mean to imply there would be reductions in the U.S. forces after July 1973; this was a matter which simply had not been considered at the present time. But from now to July 1973 we had every intention of keeping our forces in Korea. He could speak with complete authority until then, and with good authority thereafter. Basically, there was nothing which Foreign Minister Kim needed to be worried about.

Foreign Minister Kim thanked Dr. Kissinger for these assurances. he knew that Dr. Kissinger had been in Peking, and could speak with authority. But where Japan was in a relatively good position with respect to China, Korea was still a developing country with a long way to go before it attained a strong economy. He tended to agree with Japanese leaders with whom he had talked that China was not in good condition, and its industry was not so big, but China was a “big kingdom” and abrasive in its relations with other countries. However, he was convinced that if “we” (i.e., the U.S. and the ROK) showed determination, we could enjoy a peaceful situation. Dr. Kissinger emphasized that we, too, wanted a more peaceful situation, but we were not going to bargain about our allies.

Foreign Minister Kim then referred to the textile issue as something else which he wanted to bring up. One-quarter of the total ROK budget was spent on defense, and Korea’s financial situation was very different from that of Japan. Korea depended extremely heavily on exports for its income, but now had heard from Secretary Stans that if by October 1 no agreement had been reached with the U.S. on Korean textile exports, then the U.S. would take unilateral action on October 15.
to set quotas. The Koreans wanted to continue the talks with the U.S. and get agreement, but Mr. Stans’ attitude was very negative.

Dr. Kissinger commented that the textile question was one which made people mad. It was very complex, and he did his best to stay out of it. However, the trouble was that the President was under enormous political pressure on the textile issue, and if he didn’t produce something, people—particularly those on the Hill—would say “how can you spend all that money for Korean defense?” This was irrational, since it was in our own interests to build up the ROK defenses, but Foreign Minister Kim should know what the situation was. Our biggest problem on textiles was with Japan, but we were trying to work out an agreement. He would see what could be done, though, about Korea.

Foreign Minister Kim noted that developing countries had a great many problems. Things were easier for Japan (even for Foreign Minister Fukuda), since Japan was a developed country. He expressed the hope that a conclusion could be reached in the textile issue through talks, and not just by means of a unilateral U.S. announcement. Dr. Kissinger remarked he had to say that if no agreement was reached, then there would be unilateral action. This was a fact of life. Foreign Minister Kim responded to the effect that the ROK Minister of Commerce had to report to the Cabinet on his conversations with Ambassador Kennedy, and a little time would be needed to find a solution. The Government would need to find a way to bring the businessmen along. He asked Dr. Kissinger if it would be possible to get this additional time. Dr. Kissinger said he would see if it might be possible to get an extension and a resumption of negotiations. Ambassador Kennedy had delivered a sort of ultimatum in mentioning unilateral measures as of October 15. It had been our understanding last August that Ambassador Kennedy would go back in September, but he suddenly said there would be no more negotiations and that the Koreans had either to accept or not accept our position.2

Ambassador Kim Dong Jo remarked that the Koreans had spoken to Ambassador Kennedy about giving them more time, and he had said he would try to do so. Ambassador Kim and Foreign Minister Kim jointly explained to Dr. Kissinger that Ambassador Kennedy had offered a 7% annual growth rate for Korean textile exports to the U.S. if the Koreans accepted the U.S. position by October 1; otherwise the annual growth rate would be limited to 3%. However, much of what would have been included within the 7% growth rate had already been shipped to the U.S. market, and if the Koreans had to stay within the 3% limit they would have nothing to ship at all. In response to a question from Dr. Kissinger, they clarified the fact that acceptance of the U.S. position would give them a bigger rate of increase.

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2 See footnote 3, Document 112.
Dr. Kissinger stated that he had stayed out of the textile issue and had turned it over to Mr. Peterson. He felt that it was punishment enough for him to have to deal with the North Vietnamese. Foreign Minister Kim reiterated his belief that it would be best to find a solution through talks, and Dr. Kissinger responded that he would do what he could.

In conclusion, Foreign Minister Kim asked Dr. Kissinger when the President was going to Peking. He wanted to know this because Korea was very near to China. Dr. Kissinger replied that no date had been set as yet. Foreign Minister Kim again referred to Seoul not being very far from Peking (probably indicating an interest in the President visiting Seoul as well).

As Foreign Minister Kim and Ambassador Kim left Dr. Kissinger’s office, Ambassador Kim remarked in passing that a former student of Dr. Kissinger’s—Kim Chong-pil—was now in an influential position in Korea, having become Prime Minister, and might want to visit Washington in this capacity. Dr. Kissinger said that if he did so he would be welcome.

111. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
Joint Communiqué from Stans’ Meeting with the Korean Security of Commerce

Secretary Stans has sent you a copy of the joint communiqué (Tab A)² from his meeting with Nak Sun Lee, Korea’s Minister of Commerce and Industry. The meetings took place in Washington on September 27–28.

The salient points are:

—Stans emphasized the objectives of the President’s new economic policy and Lee reviewed the impressive development achievements under Korea’s last development plan and outlined goals envisaged in its next plan.

—Lee noted that the U.S. ten percent surcharge on imports might adversely affect Korea’s exports to the U.S. and urged that it be


² Attached but not printed. Stans sent Kissinger the joint communiqué under a September 29 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)
removed as soon as possible. Stans reaffirmed that the surcharge was a temporary measure.

—Lee emphasized the desire of Korea to encourage more U.S. equity investment, particularly in joint ventures with Korean partners. Stans indicated that U.S. firms will continue to be interested in Korea as long as the investment climate remains favorable.

—Lee requested increased support for U.S. exports to Korea by the Ex–Im Bank. Stans took note of the request.

The discussions were frank and cordial. Stans will go to Seoul to meet with Lee next year.

112. Letter From Korean Prime Minister Kim to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Seoul, October 6, 1971.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It was a great pleasure to renew our acquaintance during my visit to Washington last November. The discussion I had with you then was extremely informative and enlightening.² I regret that since that time I have not been able to maintain regular contact with you due to the heavy burdens and extreme pressures connected with the presidential and general elections in Korea the following spring, and my subsequent appointment to my present post as prime minister.

However, I have been kept informed of your continuing support and cooperation on behalf of Korea, for which we are most grateful, through our Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik, with whom you had meetings recently, and otherwise.

In awareness of your basically sympathetic and understanding attitude, I venture to call to your attention by means of this private communication a matter which, as you are well aware, is of vital and urgent concern to my government and my country. I refer, of course, to the crucial stage of negotiations in regard to textile import agreement between our two countries, deadline for which is impending: October 15.

You are no doubt familiar with the two years of negotiations over the question of proposed U.S. import restrictions on textile products originating in several East Asian countries including Ko-

² The two met on December 2; see Document 81.
rea. You probably know, furthermore, that in the course of these bi-
lateral contacts the Republic of Korea has evinced an understanding
and empathy over the difficult circumstances in which the United
States found herself, and has endeavored to arrive at a mutually ac-
ceptable arrangement in a spirit of good will and cooperation.

It has been sometime since the U.S. terminated grant-type aid to Ko-
rea, compelling our nation to rely increasingly upon her own devices to
sustain economic growth and, at the same time, carry the heavy burden
of national defense in an area of Asia which is still far from peaceful.

In the face of many difficulties and uncertainties, Korea and her
people, under the outstanding leadership of President Park, have con-
tinued to exert their utmost efforts to attain the goal of complete
economic self-sufficiency and self-supporting defense capability by
1976, the last year of our current third five-year economic development
program—a goal which is obviously in the American best interests as
well as our own.

One of the devices employed to fill the gap caused by the termina-
tion of U.S. grant aid has been the intensive program of inducing foreign
capital, including a significant proportion of commercial credits. These,
however, entail in the long run a heavy repayment burden, possibly fur-
ther aggravating the country’s delicate balance-of-payments situation.
There are thus limits to the effectiveness of this approach.

Another, more basic, approach is promotion of exports, which in-
volves the issue at hand. It is true that Korea during the past several
years has achieved a remarkable increase in her export volume—a cir-
cumstance that has been considered both phenomenal and remarkably
encouraging by many outside observers. Still, the total has barely
reached the sum of one billion dollars, and must continue to increase
in order to provide a foundation for the goals of independence and
self-sufficiency aforementioned.

In Korea’s present circumstances the promotion of exports, par-
ticularly the crucial area of textiles, which make up approximately 38
per cent of the total annual export value, is a matter of life and death
to the Korean economy.

The American position in the present negotiations—position that
has been maintained in good faith and no doubt accurately—is that the

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3 On April 13, 1970, Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means Wilbur
Mills (D–Arkansas) submitted a bill to Congress to institute quotas on cotton, wool, and
synthetic textiles. During the remainder of 1970, Nixon administration officials urged the
Korean Government to work out a voluntary agreement to protect its position. The House
of Representatives passed the Mills bill in September 1970. Because the Senate did not
pass it before adjourning on December 28, the bill failed to become law. The United States
and Korea reached a cotton textile bilateral agreement in late 1970, and it was extended
for 6 months on January 1, 1971. Korea filled its quotas in a number of categories early,
and such goods, including some types of fabric and print cloth, gloves, tablecloths, and
napkins, were embargoed. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume
U.S. must impose effective import restraints or else face problems of unemployment and business recession.

To Korea—which is only one among many, and not the largest, of the textile exporters to the U.S.—the proposed export restraints, if applied in their full rigor, may well spell economic disruption and collapse, with all the grievous attendant consequences for the security of Korea, and the stability of this portion of Asia.

Since I fully realize that the issue is also a grave one for the troubled U.S. textile industry, I had instructed Minister Lee of Commerce and Industry, who recently visited the United States on this matter, not to insist arbitrarily on our own position, but to take the American dilemma into full account. As a matter of fact, we have always tried wholeheartedly to understand the U.S. position throughout the entire course of these long negotiations, asking in return only that your representatives in turn also take into consideration our own unique and crucial situation.

We now propose to accept an annual increase rate of 8 per cent—far below the earlier goal and the realistic potential—as our minimum line, the level offered by Ambassador Kennedy to President Park. Our only request is that the base year and starting date be deferred, based on actual performance during the calendar year 1971, and put into effect from the start of the calendar year 1972.

This does not seem to be too unreasonable a request in view of Korea’s late start as an exporting nation; its delicate position, both economically and in terms of international politics; and its crucial role in the military-political balance in Asia. What we ask, we cannot help but feel, is in the mutual self-interest of both countries in long run, and far outweighs any momentary difficulties in making the necessary adjustments and concessions.

Formal presentation of our proposition will be made by the Korean Ambassador in Washington to Ambassador Kennedy. In the meantime, your careful consideration and judicious support is solicited in fully representing our views to His Excellency President Nixon and other officials directly concerned, before bilateral agreement is concluded between our two countries prior to October 15.3

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3 On October 12, Holdridge and Hormats sent Kissinger a draft reply under a covering memorandum indicating that they had learned that Korea was “likely to reach an agreement based substantially on the U.S. proposal.” They advised Kissinger to “indicate that there is no further give in the U.S. position” and to not let “the Koreans perceive any equivocation on our part.” Kissinger rejected the draft, wrote on the memorandum that “Kim is a long-standing acquaintance,” returned it to them, and asked them to write a letter “on general relations.” On November 12, Holdridge and Hormats forwarded a revised draft to Kissinger which he approved and sent to Kim on November 15 with the following statement concerning the textile issue: “I have been pleased that our negotiators were able to reach agreement on the long-standing textile problem. It unfortunately had been a troubling factor in our relations with East Asia.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971)
I thank you for your attention to this matter from a reasonable, impartial, and long-range viewpoint, and for your due action. If this is the case, I think that in future we shall have cause to thank each other, and to congratulate each other, on a potentially dangerous and deleterious situation bypassed and avoided.

With highest esteem and warmest personal regard, I remain,

Sincerely yours,

Kim jong Pil

113. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

REAN–60

Republic of Korea: Park Clamps Down on Opposition Elements

South Korean President Park Chung Hee, in deciding to use the military in severe disciplinary measures against student demonstrations, may have been seeking to remind all elements of society of Presidential authority and to underline the strict limits within which dissent and criticism will be permitted. Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil, cast as the government party’s “progressive” since the presidential elections, has avoided association with the unpopular measures inasmuch as he was in Iran when troops occupied Seoul campuses.

Strong Action Against Demonstrators. In the first five months following the April presidential elections, the ROKG was unusually conciliatory in dealing with demonstrations by various groups over social and economic issues. But by mid-October the government apparently decided that strong action was required against intensifying student demonstrations in which President Park himself, as well as other government and army leaders, were being attacked by name. On October 15, troops occupied Seoul campuses, and on the same day, the well-known deputy managing editor of Korea’s largest newspaper was arrested on charges of reporting military actions at Korea University in exaggerated terms.

Broad Purposes Involved. The government was concerned that if the students were unchecked other dissatisfied elements would be encouraged to mount further demonstrations. It also wanted to avoid any appearance

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 KOR S. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by B. Donovan Picard (INR/REA) and approved by INR/REA Director Paul M. Popple.
of weakness as preparatory talks with the North Korean Red Cross delegation got underway. More importantly, however, action against the students also seems to have been meant as a warning to other elements of the political establishment and the press that President Park is still in control and that criticism and obstruction of the government will continue to be strictly limited. Park probably felt such a gesture useful in view of divisions within his own party which, in early October, had resulted in expulsion of several key members and dismissal of the Home Minister. In addition to government party factionalism, Park was faced with a strong opposition party whose attacks on government policy were gaining wide publicity and which had so far blocked National Assembly approval of the budget. The party’s relatively mild public objection to Park’s measures against the students and the equally mild press reaction seem to indicate that his warning has had the desired effect, at least for the moment.

Prime Minister’s Image Unaffected? Fortunately out of the country at the time (to attend Iran’s anniversary festivities), Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil has not been linked to the crackdown measures. Consequently, his popularity with the students and his image as the progressive within the government party (carefully cultivated during the presidential election campaign) will probably not suffer from the government’s measures.

2 Telegram 5561 from Athens, October 17, reported Vice President Agnew’s conversation with Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil in Persepolis, Iran on October 15. Kim reported a “disruption of important proportions in some universities,” and Agnew expressed “complete confidence in President Park’s ability to handle the situation.” Kim said that he had asked for more time “to try for conciliation” but that the “President moved swiftly as soon as the Prime Minister had left the country for Iran.” (Ibid., POL KOR S-US)

114. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, November 3, 1971, 0728Z.

6717. Subj: ROK Forces in Viet-Nam. Ref: State 198964.2

1. Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs (Yun Sok-Hon) spoke to me of ROK plans regarding ROK forces in Viet-Nam. He said official an-
announcement of withdrawal of Korean Marine brigade and supporting elements totaling 10,000 men would be made on November 6. This action was known publicly but now being officially confirmed. Schedule called for 7,000 of this number to be withdrawn between December 1 and April 30, 1972 and remaining 3,000 by end of June, 1972.

2. Yun said announcement would contain the statement that “further withdrawals will be carried out upon consultation with GVN and other Allies.” Yun said such consultations would begin with GVN immediately following November 6. They would be conducted principally through military channels in Saigon. He said I was undoubtedly aware that GVN had requested two division forces to remain in Vietnam through 1972. However, ROK plans are to withdraw from Vietnam remainder of ROK forces by end of 1972.

3. I replied I was aware of GVN request and understood the matter had also been discussed in Washington between ROK Embassy and Department. We know GVN considers it very important for two divisions to remain through 1972. We believe there is strong military justification for their retention. As ROK had been informed, US was prepared to maintain present financial support arrangements and hoped ROKG would agree to GVN request. I spoke to him of significance of divisions in the area in which they operated and of importance of maintaining military strength and support of GVN at this time.

4. I asked him if what he described as government plan with respect to these two divisions was already a firm decision. He said it was not but this was direction in which their thinking had gone. I told him it was much too soon to make such a drastic decision. At this time we believed that two divisions should remain until end of 1972 in continued support of our past efforts to defend South Vietnamese until they are able to defend themselves. We also suggest waiting until end of '71-'72 dry season at which time we could review the position with regard to ROK forces to be present beyond calendar year 1972.

5. Yun said there were two factors that were influencing ROK thinking. First, as far as international situation was concerned, with entrance of Red China and consequent situation at UN continued Korean

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3 In telegram 6580 from Seoul, October 28, the new American Ambassador, Philip C. Habib, reported that Defense Minister Yu had “made opening skirmish on what I think ROKG plans as tough bargaining session to get further concessions from U.S. in return for leaving two divisions in Vietnam until the end of CY 72.” Habib reported that Yu said the withdrawal schedule of ROKVN forces was currently under discussion with the GVN. Habib responded that the Vietnamese Ambassador “had told us ROK had agreed to keep two divisions until end of 72. Oh no, said Yu, this decision has not rpt not been reached. ROKG has received such request from GVN and it is under study.” (Ibid.)
combat responsibilities in South Viet-Nam will do ROK great harm. They were concerned about their position in UN on matters directly affecting their future. By next summer there would be no combat troops in Viet-Nam except Korean. Keeping two combat divisions there would be hard to defend in international circles.

6. Secondly, they are concerned about the security situation on Korean Peninsula. North Korean buildup in preparation for war goes on together with a general trend of US disengagement from Asia. This worried them greatly as they will not be in any position to defend themselves alone for some years. I replied it certainly was much too soon for us to estimate total effect on Korea of Peking’s entry into UN. We should consult between our two governments before coming to any immediate conclusions with regard to the consequences. Presence of ROK forces in Viet-Nam would not necessarily work contrary to our mutual interest in UN. Moreover I cautioned him not to anticipate US future plans in Viet-Nam. We would continue to do what was necessary to support South Vietnamese self-determination and we hoped ROK would also. Together we had done much in South Viet-Nam and this was not the time to allow past sacrifices to be lost when perseverance would bring what we sought. GVN was most anxious to retain ROK contribution and we hoped ROKG would be responsive to this end.

7. As far as ROK future security was concerned, I reminded him of continuing US support both on ground and through modernization ROK forces. He had spoken of US disengagement from Asia and fears this had generated among Koreans. I pointed out to him that Nixon Doctrine was not disengagement from Asia but rather continued US support for free Asian nations and that it called for each of these nations to do what they could in common defense. Nixon Doctrine was not disengagement but rather an expression of strong continued US participation in Pacific and Asian affairs consistent with current circumstances both in US and Asia.

8. Yun said Senate action on aid bill coming on heels of situation in UN had aroused great concern in Korea and this was related to their current planning. He said that they were concerned that aid program would end and Korea would be without necessary support. I replied that administration was working urgently on this and Senate action was not final. I did not believe Korea would be cut off nor did I think he should.

9. I closed by repeating the belief that retention of ROK forces in South Viet-Nam through ’72 was necessary. I requested ROKG not move too suddenly with decisions or announcements of further withdrawals. He said that they had no intention of making known their plans at this time. I reminded him I had already seen articles in newspapers, sourced to officials, that his government was planning withdrawals in ’72 and mentioning GVN request for their retention. It struck
me this kind of loose talk was not helpful. He agreed but did not leave me with any assurance it would cease. 4

Habib

4 In telegram 6917 from Seoul, November 13, Habib reported a conversation with Foreign Minister Kim concerning the Korean Government's reconsideration of plans to withdraw two divisions from Vietnam. Habib stated that he expected the Koreans to seek additional consultations. He concluded, "it occurs to us that we may get a decision to postpone their decision. That is they will wish to review the subject again in mid-1972, with no final agreement on withdrawal dates at this time." (Ibid.)

115. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park


Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your recent letter in which you comment on the problems of East Asia and their effect on the Korean peninsula.2 I have read your letter very carefully and have also carefully reviewed the presentation of these views which your Foreign Minister provided to Secretary Rogers and to Dr. Kissinger when he met with them at the end of September.3

At the very outset, I should like you to know how much I appreciate the generous and helpful support you and your Government have given to our efforts to lessen tensions in Asia. It is my earnest hope that my forthcoming visit to the People's Republic of China will contribute to the development of a stable and peaceful situation in East

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, President Chung Hee Park, 1971. Secret. Copies were sent to Holdridge, Rosemary Woods, and the Department of State. A notation on the letter reads: “Dispatched via SS, Rept # 2843, @ 1830 29 Nov.” On November 24, Holdridge sent a draft of this letter to Kissinger with the recommendation that he sign the attached covering memorandum and send both it and the draft letter to the President. On November 26, Kissinger sent the letter to Nixon with the recommendation that he sign it. All attached but not printed.

2 Park's September 16 letter to Nixon was hand-delivered to Rogers on September 21. Attached but not printed. In his covering memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger noted that Park broached his concerns in his September 16 letter that the two governments "have a thorough exchange of views in advance" of Nixon's trip to China, that the U.S. "expedite modernization of the Korean armed forces," and that the U.S. "not accept Peking's call for the removal of foreign troops from the Korean Peninsula.”

3 See Documents 109 and 110.
Asia and in the Pacific area. By opening a dialogue between ourselves and the Chinese leadership, this journey can lead to better understanding on both sides of the deep and complex differences between ourselves and the People’s Republic. Gradually and over a longer period, such discussions can result in a reduction of tensions in Asia, which would benefit all nations in that area.

You can be sure, Mr. President, that in taking steps toward the goal of a peaceful Asia, the United States will not overlook the interest of its allies and friends nor seek any accommodations at their expense. My talks in Peking will not deal with issues primarily involving third countries, but rather will be concerned with bilateral issues between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Should issues affecting Korea be raised by the People’s Republic of China, I will of course affirm our strong ties with the Republic of Korea. And, as we assured Foreign Minister Kim during his visit, the United States will continue to consult closely with your Government on issues which affect the security of the Korean peninsula.

The Republic of Korea has taken its own initiative to reduce tensions by proposing and carrying on talks with the Red Cross societies of the Republic and of North Korea. While I note that the purpose of these talks is to ease the painful separation that has afflicted so many Korean families for so many years, I am encouraged that your Government believes these talks may also lead in due course to the development of further communication and exchange with the north. This is a hopeful sign. I recognize, of course, that the capacity for aggression on the part of the north remains considerable. Nevertheless, the strength of the Korean armed forces and the confidence and dedication of your nation provide a firm and growing deterrent to the kind of aggression from the north to which you refer in your letter.

As I said on assuming office, and have frequently repeated since, the United States has no intention of disengaging from Asia. We intend to honor all of our treaty commitments. None of these obligations is more important to peace and stability in Asia than our Mutual Defense Treaty with your country. The modernization of Korea’s military forces which is currently being implemented is clear evidence of United States concern for the defense of Korea. Your own willingness to provide an increasing portion of Korea’s defense requirements is equally clear evidence of the maturity of the Korean economy and of the national pride and self-reliance that has won such great respect for the Republic of Korea in America and around the world.

As regards the withdrawal of additional United States troops now stationed in the Republic of Korea, it is our policy under the Nixon Doctrine not to reduce our forces overseas more rapidly than would be consistent with the increasing capabilities of the host country. As we have previously stated, the United States does not now have plans for the withdrawal of additional troops stationed in your country. You can
be sure that, before deciding on additional force reductions in the Republic of Korea, we will consult fully with you and will undertake with you a joint assessment of any threat to your country’s security.

The events which are now taking place in East Asia may well have a profound effect on the nations of the Pacific for the remainder of this century. I look to your continued support, Mr. President, to help ensure that these events will move us all in the direction of a stable and enduring international order. May I assure you of my highest personal regards and warm good wishes.4

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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4 Nixon’s letter to Park was transmitted in telegram 219526 to Seoul, December 6. The telegram advised Habib that “there is no possibility for Park–Nixon meeting prior to President’s visit to China. We would like therefore to utilize letter to assuage Park’s sensibilities. Accordingly, you should seek appointment with Park to deliver letter and explain President greatly regrets meeting not possible.” Habib was then advised: “We are aware of ROKG need for some public demonstration of our concern for protection of Korea’s interests, as well as Park’s problem of ‘face.’ Accordingly, in delivering letter to President Park you may say that we will understand if he desires to let press know that he has received personal letter of assurance from President stating that no agreements will be made in Peking regarding Korea.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 542, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. IV, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1971) Habib delivered the letter on December 13; see Document 119.

116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, December 2, 1971, 2300Z.

218011. For Ambassador. Subject: ROK Emphasis on North Korean Threat.

1. We are increasingly concerned by ROKG public campaign and statements emphasizing the North Korean military threat and the weaknesses of ROK defenses. Most recent example is MND Yu Chae-hung’s November 30 statement that “increasingly belligerent” North Korea has adopted “swift 20-day war” strategy, and that there is “increasing
danger of re-invasion by North Korea”. Statements of this sort are inevitably coupled with assertion that there is no fundamental difference between ROKG and USG perception of North Korean threat.

2. We note that you and General Michaelis have already called ROKG hand on so-called North Korean winter offensive, but that ROK efforts appear to be intensifying. Without denigrating unpredictability of Pyongyang’s leadership, we believe time has now come for you to point out to high ROKG officials that Department and Washington are mystified over ROK claims and intentions. If ROK has evidence we do not possess we would appreciate learning of same. We have no knowledge of any immediate plans or preparations by North Korea for any unusual military operations except exercises. Accordingly, if ROK persists in present efforts, we will have no choice other than to make clear publicly we do not share ROKG estimate. Obviously, we far prefer to avoid public quarrel with ROK over this issue, but ROK must understand that stakes involved are too high to be subordinated to internal political maneuvering.

3. In explaining our concern to ROK, you may say that we find ROK campaign out of step with efforts to relax tensions in Asia, and a possible invitation to Pyongyang for adventurism or miscalculation. These unrealistic intelligence assessments (e.g., Yu’s reference to ninety NK supersonic twin-jet bombers) are harmful to encouragement of business investment in Korea. If continued, we expect ROK estimates will soon draw congressional and editorial attention with resultant impact harmful to ROK military modernization support. ROK can appreciate we are having difficulties enough with Congress on economic and military assistance appropriation bill.

4. We are puzzled by ROKG maneuvering and beginning to wonder whether this is cover for some sinister move they may have in mind, e.g., move against National Assembly or curtailment of political parties or press. We wonder, for example, if ROK is casting a wistful eye toward recent events in Bangkok. If so, Koreans should understand, and you should be prepared to tell them that any such move would have gravest consequences. Would appreciate any further light you can throw on situation.2

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2 Habib replied in telegram 7312 from Seoul, December 3, that “senior ROK officials know that we do not agree with their public position on North Korean threat” and that “If asked, we may have to state publicly that we do not agree. They are, we believe, prepared to accept this public difference.” “In their opinion they are the final authority on the state of their national security.” Habib added, on counterpoint, that “President Park’s projected statement and planned legislation may have what we might regard as sinister implications, but as now outlined, would not necessarily go beyond acceptable limits.” Finally, Habib warned that “I think it would be a mistake, however, to talk of ‘grave consequences’ (para 4 ref tel) until we have decided specifically on what we would do. We should also have a clearer idea of what the ROK intends to do before making what they would consider a threat.” (Ibid.)
Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, December 2, 1971, 0952Z.

7289. 1. CIA Director Yi Hu Rak told me that President Park is planning to make a statement sometime during week of December 5 in which he would declare an emergency situation. He added hastily that this would not be an emergency declaration in a legal sense as provided for in the Constitution. There would be nothing legally binding about the emergency statement. Rather it was intended to be an exhortative declaration to “awaken” the people and make them realize there were things that needed to be done to assure the security of Korea.

2. In the course of the statement, President Park would set forth six points as goals or demands upon government and people. Yi could only recall four of them such as: (a) Strengthen security; (b) Each individual is called upon to fulfill his part in the security plan whether Homeland Reserve drills, military training or reserve training; (c) The press should refrain from printing provocative or irresponsible articles; (d) The people should be infused with a new appreciation of the security situation rather than be lulled into a feeling of peace-mindedness and security.

3. I asked Yi if there would be any movement of troops in this scheme. He said there would not be any military movements involved in the declaration although there were plans for improving the defense of Seoul which would go ahead. I asked if it was not likely there would be a strong adverse public reaction to emergency controls when public not convinced of necessity. He repeated again that the declaration was not legally binding therefore none of the automatic restrictive measures that would come into play in the event of a formal declaration of emergency would apply. President Park was concerned over the degree of apathy of the general public and he wished to bring home the need for full alertness in the face of the continuing North Korean threat.

4. I asked Yi if any measures involving the National Assembly were included. He said none whatsoever. I then asked him if he thought

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.

2 As reported in telegram 7318 from Seoul, December 4, Habib was informed by the Prime Minister’s Special Assistant Han Sang-Kuk on December 3 of President Park’s intention to declare a “semi-emergency” on December 5 “to alert the people to the dangers to national security.” (Ibid., POL KOR N–KOR S) Telegram 7389 from Seoul, December 7, reported on the December 6 declaration of national emergency by President Park, who exhorted “all people to knuckle down and prepare for worst in name of patriotism and national security.” (Ibid., POL 15–1 KOR S)
that this move on top of previous public discussion of the danger of North
Korean attack and the budgetary increase for defense just passed would
together appear as provocations to the North and lead to escalatory re-
actions on the part of Pyongyang. He replied they had taken this possi-
bility into account and the wording of the President’s statement would
be carefully designed to counter any such belief. Also they would be mak-
ing clear their purpose was defensive and had no aggressive intention.

5. I asked him if there was any change in the estimate he had pre-
viously given me that there were no indications the North Koreans
planned to attack in the near future. He said that he had not changed
his estimate and did not believe there was any such intention at pres-
ent time. He came to this conclusion on the basis of all information
available to him including attitude of North Koreans at Panmunjom
Red Cross talks.

6. He then said he wished to inform me on highly confidential ba-
sis of preliminary secret contact with North Koreans. This was not at
high level and on North Korean side involved Kim Tok-Hyon (listed
in our files as Deputy Chairman of NK delegation). He said he pre-
ferred not to give me name of South Korean involved. These secret con-
tacts were arranged quietly as occasion permitted at Panmunjom in
course of informal exchanges. He was hopeful when time came to use
this channel for more serious discussion it could be managed easily with
participants at higher level. (We then talked a bit about my experience
in secret talks at Paris Viet-Nam meetings and he expressed interest in
discussing negotiating tactics and techniques on another occasion.)

7. Yi said the Panmunjom talks provided an insight into North
Korean political thinking and he was using them in this way. In the
long run talks had to move in direction of more significant political
questions beyond that envisaged under Red Cross cover. Government
on each side was controlling talks and would use them for whatever
purposes it had in mind.

8. Yi said he would like to pose hypothetical proposition. If secret
talks were to materialize at higher level it might be possible to make
progress on certain political matters. Let us assume at some time in fu-
ture agreement was reached in which each side declared it had no in-
tention to take any measure against other; arrangements were made for
some communication between people in North and South; agreement
was reached for mutual reduction in military forces; agreement was
reached that each side would respect other as an entity with implication
that reunification was an ultimate but not immediate goal; and each side
would accept great power guarantee of agreement reached between
them; would U.S. look with favor upon such agreement?

9. I replied I normally did not respond to hypothetical questions. How-
ever, if North and South Korea were to negotiate mutually ac-
ceptable agreement involving issues of sort he had mentioned to me, I believed U.S. would generally welcome such development. This was an initial reaction which of course I would hope to discuss with him in more detail some other time in the course of examining possible elements of such an agreement one by one.

10. Yi said we could talk about these matters again but he just wanted to assure himself that they would not be working contrary to U.S. views if they were to seek basis of accommodation with North. I told him that on contrary we would favor their making such efforts.

11. Comment: Yi’s account of Park’s proposed declaration [1 line not declassified] did not divulge all details. We will reserve full comment until we can examine nature of actual statement to be made and background information that will become available. However, at this point we conclude there is general movement toward increasing government controls in Korea. Park seems determined to pursue this course gradually but persistently. In ROKG view these moves are necessitated by entire complex of events which could include Park’s future political plans, concern over general course of events in Asia, desire to be in strong position vis-à-vis the North in anticipation of coming negotiations and international competition, and their general expectation of sooner or later having to depend on their own resources for security.

Habib

118. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research¹


Republic of Korea: Park Increases His Power to Counter “Emergency Situation”

For the third time in three months, President Park Chung Hee has tightened his controls over South Korea, this time citing an “emergency situation” requiring extraordinary measures in the interest of national security. Although there is little prospect that Park will willingly

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR. Confidential; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Picard and approved by Popple.
reverse the movement toward greater presidential control, he will be sensitive to both domestic and foreign reactions.

Park Tightens Controls Again. Deploving the fact that partisan politicians and “self-styled intellectuals” were “bewildering” the population “in the name of freedom of expression,” Park announced on December 6 that the government would shift priorities from developing the economy to improving defense capabilities, would limit press and public discussion of security issues, and, if necessary, would curtail civil liberties.2 Although the North Korean threat was cited in the emergency declaration and is an ever-present concern of the South Korean leadership, Park’s move is related much more directly to the internal situation, where he sees stability threatened by a combination of factors including the problem of the presidential succession; the loss of cohesion as the nation’s fear of North Korean hostility and hence its strong anti-communist ideology diminishes; declining US support; and potential economic problems.

The announcement was Park’s third effort in the past three months to tighten his control. In October when National Assembly members from the ruling party joined with the opposition to censure the Home Minister, Park had several of them arrested, beaten by the ROK CIA, and then expelled from the party. In November, in response to student demonstrations, university campuses in Seoul were occupied by the military, students were arrested throughout the country, and a senior editor of the nation’s major newspaper was arrested for “exaggerated reporting” of the campus crackdown.

The warnings implied in these actions have now been made more explicit by the emergency announcement itself and by proposed legislation penalizing discussions or publication of “military information,” broadly defined, and increasing military authority to requisition private property. Reports that CIA Chief Yi Hu Rak is the principal architect of the December 6 measures and that the army is to be strengthened suggest that the President has decided to rely on the Army and CIA while sharply reigning in most other elements of the society.

Internal Weaknesses Real. While Park’s evident interest in strengthening his control may well stem in part from his own ambitions and his possible desire to succeed himself in power once more, his concern with internal instability is a genuine one. Though in theory a parliamentary democracy, the political system has always revolved around an authoritarian President—first Syngman Rhee and now Park—and his network of personal followers. The military establishment—Park’s principal source of strength—is the only other cohesive institution in

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2 See footnote 2, Document 117.
the society; the National Assembly, the bureaucracy, the political parties, and the commercial-industrial establishment, although slowly developing, are still weak, while the press and academic establishments have little real power or public support. Thus the presidency has had great importance as a means of holding the nation together and giving it direction, and Park, like his predecessor, has tended to feel that it would be extremely dangerous to permit the position to pass to other hands. However, the elections this spring indicated strong public opposition to the prospect that Park might indefinitely occupy the presidency; and he may well fear that the struggle over the presidential prize, which is already under way, will inevitably create great instability. Some of his closest advisers (probably including the powerful CIA chief) encourage such fears, as their own power derives from their personal relationship to Park.

External Changes Likely To Weaken Internal Cohesion. US troop withdrawals, past and prospective, compounded now by congressional hesitation over military aid appropriations, have been the most unsettling aspect of the changing external situation. A changing economic relationship with the US is also registering its effect through the surcharge, restrictions on textile imports, and declining Vietnam procurement, thus adding to factors threatening the economic success that Park regards as his major accomplishment.

In addition, the easing of great-power tensions and the softening of cold-war rhetoric with its clear distinctions between “communist” and “free” worlds threaten to weaken the ideological glue that has long served as a partial substitute for cohesive social institutions. Moreover, the prospect of widening contacts with North Korea raises questions about the extent of the threat from across the DMZ that has long served to justify strict government control and national sacrifice. Although Park himself has publicly welcomed the improvement in US–PRC relations and has tried to adapt to it with a more flexible foreign policy, he is not confident he can maintain discipline without an appeal to the threat from the North. North Korea’s prompt reply that it “can not and will not attack” is likely to help confirm the ROK’s fear that Pyongyang, with its more highly regimented society, believes that relaxation of tensions will make the South an easier prey.

How Far Will Park Go? It is too soon to predict how far Park will go in suppressing opposition, though rumors in Seoul claim the President has been favorably impressed by governmental reorganizations in Cambodia and Thailand. So far he seems to be planning each move carefully, apparently aware of the danger that some government action could provide a cause around which diverse opposition elements—the press, students, academic leaders, the opposition party, the dissidents within his own party—could unite and rally popular support. In the past he has
been sensitive to history—the way in which escalating repression and resistance capped by the death of a student protestor sparked the massive popular demonstrations that precipitated Rhee’s fall.

Park will also be sensitive to US reactions, as well as the broader effects of Korea’s international image, but at present there seems little prospect that he will willingly reverse the movement toward greater presidential control.

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, December 13, 1971, 1016Z.

7507. Ref: State 219526.2

1. I called on President Park afternoon December 13 to deliver President Nixon’s letter (reftel). The letter was made available for translation just before I called so that he had sole knowledge of its contents.

2. Park opened conversation (which lasted one hour and ten minutes) by saying he appreciated reading the letter in which President Nixon showed such a keen understanding of the Korean situation and the security problem in the area. Without further ado Park launched into a fairly lengthy statement regarding the recent declaration of emergency in Korea. He said the Foreign Minister had explained to foreign representatives the scope and contents of the proclamation, but the President wanted to place particular emphasis on U.S. understanding of the matter because of our common concerns. He had decided the declaration of emergency was necessary after careful study of the situation in and around the Korean Peninsula. Some Korean and foreign observers seemed to doubt the situation on the Korean Peninsula had become so serious. This is understandable given the general trend in the international community toward peace and détente—particularly when relations between the U.S. and Red China are thawing. But when the big powers make an effort to ease tensions then perhaps some of the weak nations become prey to unexpected incidents. For example, as the U.S. and Red China moved toward each other the Republic of

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Secret; Priority; Nodis.
2 See footnote 4, Document 115.
China suffered from these moves. The Republic of Korea was concerned that it too could become a victim like the Republic of China.

3. Korea recognizes we were seeking to ease tensions in this part of the world and favors such moves, but in their view, peace and reduction of tension in this part of the world required deterrents to any possible aggression. Korea looked upon the U.S. treaty commitment as serving as a mighty deterrent to war. Without it there would have already been a war. It is fortunate that President Nixon has a deep interest in Korea and they appreciate his reaffirmation of U.S. treaty obligations on a number of occasions. Although this treaty serves as a deterrent to war, it is not 100 percent sure. Park said he believes the Korean nation as a whole must have the self-determination and will to defend itself and improve its defense capabilities. This self-reliance together with the Mutual Defense Treaty will make for a more firm deterrent. It would not be right for Korea to depend solely on the U.S. commitment. He felt the need to tell his own people that they must be ready to defend their country and be resolute to this end.

4. Since Red China’s admission to the UN, Park continued, his government has been studying and evaluating the situation prevailing on the Peninsula in regard to its national security. They expected the Republic of China to speak on behalf of the North Koreans in the UN but the fact they had completely supported North Korean policies produced some concern because this meant they favored reunification of the Peninsula by force. This was a danger to Korean security because it must be assumed that statements made by the Chinese Communists were not simply rhetoric but intended to support North Korea fully. Thus the Korean Government had to come up with the necessary measures to cope with the situation.

5. I said I would report President Park’s views but had some questions and observations. We had been watching the security situation carefully and as the President must be aware we had no evidence a North Korean attack was imminent. If he had any information to indicate this assessment was in error we would appreciate a chance to discuss the facts. The sudden declaration of emergency had attracted attention of the Congress, press and the business community. The estimate that an attack was imminent had aroused concern. This was not surprising given the fact that generally speaking Korea was looked upon as a country which was stable and making rapid progress. Now suddenly the news contained expressions of immediate alarm and this aroused concern. We had already been queried by a number of American firms and others interested in Korea as to the situation.

6. I told Park we had recently reexamined and improved our intelligence about North Korea’s current preparations. On the basis of the latest information we could still see no indications an attack was
imminent. The U.S. Command was in the process of exchanging information and analysis with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of Defense. The results of this latest assessment will be available to President Park and I recommend it for his consideration.

7. Park replied that he realized there is a continuing joint assessment on the military situation. He will be interested in the latest one. Further, he also understands there are no indications of an imminent attack on the ROK. However, he said, we must always be aware of the Communist capacity to commit aggression at any time. There may be no indications today but Kim Il Song has the capacity to attack and can pick the time to do so.

8. I asked if he considered the possibility that the declaration of emergency and the precautionary steps taken by his military forces might appear provocative to the North Koreans and contrary to the trend exhibited in the opening of Red Cross talks and the general interest in negotiations in the area. Park did not reply directly but said the North Koreans were accusing him of being a puppet regime engaged in war preparations on U.S. instruction. This kind of propaganda was not new but at a time when North Korea was trying to make out that it was willing to talk peace they continued to send their agents across the DMZ. The ROK is a peaceful country but it is wary of North Korea. Kim Il Song knows this. The Korean declaration of emergency had two principal purposes: (a) To warn Kim Il Song that even though there are moves for lowering tension such as Red Cross talks he should not think the ROK is unwary. The Korean people know that Kim Il Song has a sword hiding behind his smile; (b) To warn the Korean public who had fallen into a degree of apathy by believing the international situation is such that war is not possible and peace is in the offing. Park wants his people to realize there is a threat and the North Korean danger still exists. People needed to be warned and shaken from their own apathy.

9. I reverted to something Park had said earlier about small countries being prey to the larger ones and reminded him of the assurances given in the letter from President Nixon that the U.S. would not seek accommodations at the expense of its allies and friends. I reminded him also of the President’s statement that if issues affecting Korea were raised by the Chinese in Peking the President intended to affirm our strong ties with the Republic of Korea.

10. At this point I said we were aware of President Park’s interest in a summit meeting. President Nixon greatly regrets that such a meeting with President Park is not possible. The President, however, in his letter sought to respond to all the points previously raised by President Park. We will understand if President Park desires to let his public and the press know he has received a personal letter of assur-
ances from President Nixon stating that no agreements will be made in Peking regarding Korea. Of course, in accordance with the need for maintenance of confidential and privileged communications between the Presidents we would not wish to see the contents of the letter made public beyond the above statement.

11. Park did not comment on my statement rejecting a summit meeting. (I did not expect him to as it is quite in his nature not to appeal for such a meeting, rather leaving it to his subordinates. The Foreign Minister has been after me on this and I am sure we will hear more on the subject.)

12. Park said he agreed it was important to maintain the confidentiality of communication between President Nixon and himself and he would do so. He would not plan to use the assurances given in the letter at this time but will do so at an appropriate time. For example, under questioning in the National Assembly the Foreign Minister could refer to the assurances in the manner we had suggested. Or alternatively if some high official were being questioned by the press it would be very natural to speak of the message received from the President and the assurances contained therein. He would hope to do this in a natural manner rather than arouse too much concern.

13. In closing Park referred again to his comments about the emergency declaraton (he appeared anxious to reassure us of his intentions but he also was making it clear that he believed he had good reason to pursue them). Park said he does not expect complete understanding in the U.S. for his actions. There are even people in Korea who do not understand the true picture. Nevertheless he felt it was necessary to warn his people. It was better to do that than to worry about the apprehension of others. As President he was responsible to take all measures to protect the security of his country. If Canada was in the hands of an aggressive Communist determined to crush the U.S. he was sure that the President of the U.S. would do no less. I replied we understood his concern for the security of his nation and we had demonstrated our commitment to that security for many years. I was sure that between us we could see to it North Korean aggression did not materialize again just as we had seen to it ever since the Korean war.

14. We agreed that in response to press queries about my call on him today we would merely say I had delivered a personal message from President Nixon and we had had a general conversation covering matters of interest.

Habib
Washington, December 14, 1971, 1446Z.

224446. For Ambassador. Ref: Seoul 7507; Seoul 7508. 3

1. Ambassador Kim Dong Jo came in for brief meeting afternoon December 13 with Under Secretary Johnson at latter’s request. After allowing Kim to read copy of Nixon–Park letter, Under Secretary explained Ambassador Habib had already delivered letter to President Park same day, and had informed him that summit meeting at this time was not feasible.

2. Referring also to Kim Yong Sik’s discussion with Habib, Johnson regretted possibility of misunderstanding by Kim Dong Jo about subsequent meeting, but made clear we are unable at present time to commit ourselves to a summit meeting with Korea at any date. We intend to keep request in mind; for the present President Nixon’s letter, however, says about as much as could possibly be said in terms of assurances to Korea. Kim offered only a token remonstration and subsequently indicated he fully understood U.S. position.

3. Under Secretary also raised subject of North Korean threat and emergency declaration. Saying he felt Kim already knew his views, Johnson believed it important to repeat that, while Korean internal affairs are ROKG business, repercussions of emergency declaration could shake confidence of Americans in Korea. Noting we have had inquiries from business, public and the Hill, Under Secretary hoped President Park was not moving in the direction of curtailing National Assembly. Korea has many friends in our Congress, including Speaker Albert, said Johnson, and Korea knows how important to her welfare is support from our Congress. Kim Dong Jo was curious as to whether Habib had been persuaded by President Park’s explanation. From nature of questions Habib had raised, Under Secretary thought not.

Irwin

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Ranard on December 13, cleared by Brown and Miller (S/S), and approved by Irwin.

2 Document 119.

3 In telegram 7508 from Seoul, December 13, the Embassy reported confusion in the Korean Government caused by an erroneous report from Ambassador Kim Dong Jo in Washington as to the possibility of a Nixon–Park summit meeting in between Nixon’s Beijing and Moscow summits. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S)
121. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, December 22, 1971, 0902Z.

7701. Summary: According to Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil emergency declaration and extraordinary powers sought by President Park are direct outcome of desire to prepare nation for the uncertainties of the general international situation over the next few years. In particular Park is determined to increase ROK self-reliance and ability to deal on its own with North Korea over the longer run. The government intends to secure passage of law granting extraordinary powers over any opposition in the National Assembly even if it requires exceptional measures. End summary.

1. I had a two-hour conversation with Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil December 22 almost exclusively devoted to the current situation centered about President Park’s emergency declaration and request for extraordinary powers. Kim led into the discussion by saying he had come to the “personal” conclusion that Park had not embarked upon his present course by reason of any “hidden motives” involving either the establishment of a generalissimo-type government or perpetuation of himself as president for life. Kim believed Park was sincerely concerned about the course of events in the world as they affected Korea and by immediate situation facing his nation. Park was concerned his people and his country were not prepared to meet the tests to which they will be put over the period of the next few years which he conceives as the most dangerous time.

2. Kim said the Korean people were not pragmatic but acted in accordance with their conceptual understanding. For twenty-five years they had placed their reliance upon big power protection, namely, the United States. This had served them well and they had prospered. However, the world was changing and big power interests were such that smaller nations were now uncertain. Although still dependent for ultimate deterrent upon their friends and allies they needed to develop a greater degree of self-reliance. A big power had not been able to prevent the Republic of China from losing its seat in the United Nations. The big powers could not prevent local wars from developing. In the event of such local wars countries involved needed to depend upon their own resources to a greater extent than before. If a country were not sufficiently prepared, it could find itself at a disadvantage.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC for POLAD.
3. In the past, Korea had looked to the United Nations for its protection. At one stage the United Nations had responded and saved them. But Korea could no longer look to the United Nations which would probably be unable to act in a new emergency. As for the United States upon which their life had depended for so long and still depended, Park felt that they could no longer be assured of an American military presence. They knew there would be no further withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea in 1972. Beyond that, however, they could not be sure of what would happen.

4. President Park believed ROK needed to be prepared for any contingency. If it turned out that they had been overly cautious then it would have cost them some resources that might better be used elsewhere and that they would have paid some price in internal restrictions. But this was better than the price that would be paid if they had not been sufficiently prepared.

5. Kim said North Korea was at a peak in terms of its strength and preparations for war. It was not known when these preparations would be used but ROK had to be alert to the danger. It was better to be prepared for the worst than to run the risks involved in assuming no immediate threat. Kim ended his explanation by saying that for all these reasons President Park was determined to get the legislation he was seeking giving him a wide range of emergency powers.

6. I asked Kim to what limits Park was moving. How did he intend to apply the emergency powers he was seeking? How far would he go in terms of individual restrictions or the use of the wide powers of control over the society? To what extent would apply the economic powers on wages and prices that he was asking? How did he intend to deal with the National Assembly in this situation? Why were these extraordinary powers necessary when by and large the government already had sufficient authority to do what was necessary? Kim replied that only Park Chung Hee knew how far he would go. In effect the President would go as far as he felt was necessary to enable the country to meet possible challenges. Kim did not know the precise answers to the questions I had asked with regard to the use of the powers being sought. The general rule was that the powers would be applied only if they were needed and President Park would make that determination.

7. I told Kim I assumed Park did not operate on his own without advice and opinion of others. What advice and opinions was he being given as to limits to which he should go and the consequences of surpassing these limits? Kim replied there were a few people counseling moderation but Park had made it clear that he was determined to have the authority and then use it if it becomes necessary. The desire for the authority was on a contingency basis and no one could deny the contingency. The President believed his present authority was geared to
deal with extraordinary situations after they arise, but was not sufficient to prevent them from happening.

8. I asked why emergency declaration was now being supplemented by request for extraordinary powers. Kim said Park had told him at time of emergency declaration that it would be wise to allow some time to pass to see how public would react. Instead, Park now wanted to push ahead with new law. Kim did not know the reason, but believed Park was strongly influenced by events in East Pakistan where neither big powers nor UN were able to prevail. Instead, the country that was better prepared won out. He was not going to see ROK in that position. I replied that ROK was not in that position, and that it seemed they were discounting U.S. presence and treaty with U.S. much too readily. Kim replied they knew their dependence on U.S. was great and they believed greatest deterrent to North Korean attack was U.S. presence. For this reason they wished U.S. division to remain in Korea for indefinite period. But meanwhile they needed to do all necessary to prepare themselves for any contingency.

9. I told Kim I wanted to make sure he understood some of the reactions that could be expected abroad and particularly in the United States. Certainly people would find it difficult to understand the reasons for these latest actions which would appear retrogressive. Korea had an extraordinarily good reputation abroad as a progressive nation. There would be concern expressed at the course of events. I recounted for him what we had already seen on this in the press, in the Congress and among business firms interested in Korea. It was inevitable that the concern expressed after the declaration of emergency would now be increased in the face of the new legislation and the circumstances surrounding its passage. I told him that any action contemplated which would seriously affect the National Assembly would arouse immediate and fundamental concern.

10. He said the government majority expected to secure passage of the bill in this session. At this very moment the rostrum of the Assembly was being occupied by a group of opposition Assemblymen. He did not believe all members of the opposition were so adamantly opposed to the bill but one faction led by Kim Tae Chung appeared determined to disrupt the Assembly and prevent passage of the bill. It might become necessary for the government to take abnormal measures to pass the bill. I remarked that I hoped this wasn’t a warning of a meeting at 2:30 in the morning. He caught the implication and replied that he hoped they would not do anything more extra-legal than the sort of thing done in the Japanese Diet to pass the Okinawa Reversion bill.

11. He then went on to express concern as to extent President Park would go if the opposition persisted in interfering in the passage of the bill through the methods it was currently applying. I told him again in quite positive terms that action against the National Assembly would
be detrimental and would not be understood. He replied that in general he believed Korean people would understand measures taken within the Assembly in such circumstances. The public was not that concerned over what they saw as political in-fighting. The public would be more concerned if the government were to misuse its authority in the administration of the country.

12. I asked him what the general public reaction would be toward the President’s request for extraordinary powers. He said he believed the public would accept the wisdom of these things provided they were assured of one thing—that Park was not taking these measures for any hidden motive connected with his perpetuation in power. I asked how the public could receive that assurance. He said only Park’s actions would be the test and the people would know.

13. I asked if he did not foresee the possibility the North Koreans would view the recent spate of actions in the South as provocative and, in turn, escalate their own actions to a point where tensions would be increased substantially with all the dangers that would imply. He said the North Koreans were already at a maximum state of readiness and all they would do would be to redeploy some of their forces in a more aggressive stance. On the other hand South Korea had absolutely no intention of provoking an attack on the North at any time. If anyone were to even make such a suggestion he would resist to the utmost.

14. Kim said he would be busy trying to persuade opposition to be reasonable in the Assembly in order to permit government to be reasonable in its actions in return. However, President Park was absolutely determined to get the authority he believed necessary to carry out his responsibilities. The use of emergency powers was normal in extraordinary circumstances, and Korea was in such a position.
7707. Subj: Emergency Presidential Powers: Preliminary Comments. Ref: Seoul 7661. Summary: In the face of President Park’s determination to have emergency powers we see policy alternatives of either direct confrontation or continuing pressure to prevent abuse. We favor latter course.

1. All the available evidence confirms Prime Minister’s statement to me (see Seoul 7701) that President Park is determined to have the powers set forth in new proposed law and will use any measures necessary to obtain them. Only local element which we can expect to oppose the President publicly at this time is NDP which is not capable of obstructing bill’s passage by extra-parliamentary procedures in face of President’s determination and does not have the votes to prevent passage on Assembly floor.

2. Why does President Park feel the need to push through a law giving him extraordinary emergency powers and must he have this enacted by the Assembly by December 29? We believe Park was motivated by the same considerations which prompted the December 6 declaration of emergency (see Seoul 7527). He has been disturbed by situation in UN which led to expulsion ROC, by U.S. Senate action on aid, by U.S. drawdown of forces in Korea, by indications United Nations would be unable to act in Korea (reinforced by Pakistan case) and by his belief internal attitudes in Korea too permissive. He feels that small powers like Korea must be prepared to look after themselves if at the time of crisis their interests and the interests of the great powers do not happen to coincide. He appears also to feel a need for a legal framework below the level of martial law through which he could exercise “legitimately” the powers which he already has.

3. What role should the U.S. play? One course of action would be to intervene positively and attempt to persuade Park to withdraw the proposed legislation. This would require a direct confrontation with

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.
2 Not found.
3 Document 121.
4 Dated December 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S)
5 Reference is to UN efforts to end the Indo-Pakistan war.
the President himself. Both he and the Prime Minister know from my conversations with them that there are aspects of the emergency decree and the related actions following it which create problems for the U.S. They know that significant elements in the government, press and Congress regard the steps as politically retrogressive, and that the business community is concerned. I have been as frank and direct as I can be in stating and re-stating these reactions, and we must assume they have been weighed in the President’s decision and that he has decided to proceed nonetheless. To stop him in his tracks, I would need much more. Not a mere warning of the possibility of declining American support, (which he already expects) but a flat statement of some specific, unavoidable consequence or series of consequences would be required, plus the determination to put them into effect if he persisted.

4. An alternative course would be to continue what we are now doing: responding to requests for our views coming to us from figures in government, the legislature and the community in general; being sure that the Korean Government has a complete feedback on reaction from the U.S.; refraining from direct intervention and allowing the counter forces in Korean society to develop, to resist and correct possible government excesses.

5. We are inclined towards the second alternative. President Park knows he cannot take us for granted, and we can hope to moderate his actions although not altering his basic conception. He is perceptive enough to see that we can accelerate the American disengagement that he fears, and we can play on that fear. We would let Park and key officials know that while we will not interfere in ROK domestic affairs, he is making continued support of ROK by U.S. administration difficult. He should therefore understand if he uses powers granted to him under other than clearest evidence of serious emergency, no assurance can be given that U.S. people, Congress, and administration will continue to provide him with moral and material support they have given in the past.6

Habib

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6 In telegram 230831 to Seoul, December 24, the Department noted, “Park may see the world and problems facing Korea as you noted, place U.S. support in jeopardy if he is viewed as an autocrat who is throttling Korean democratic life for his own ends.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S)
123. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 1, 1972.

SUBJECT
The Situation in Korea

PARTICIPANTS
Koreans
Kim Tae-chung, National Assemblyman
Om Yong-dal, New Democratic Party
Dr. Yu Ki-hong, Kim’s associate in Washington

United States
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Winthrop G. Brown, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs
Donald L. Ranard, Director for Korean Affairs
Robert F. Dorr, Country Officer for Korea

Accompanied by former ROK diplomat Om and by Dr. Yu, his associate in Washington, Kim called on Assistant Secretary Green February 1 and expressed apprehension over the ROK state of national emergency.

Kim questioned the motives of President Park in declaring the emergency and suggested that Park is harming US–ROK relations. Kim also pointed out that North Korean Premier Kim Il-song has seized the initiative in his propaganda campaign against the ROK and questioned ROK sincerity in Red Cross meetings at Panmunjom.

During his call, Kim did most of the talking and concentrated on the following points:

(a) North Korean Threat: Kim noted the contradiction between the public statements of the ROKG and of the U.S. State Department. As member of National Assembly’s Defense Committee, he had been thoroughly briefed and did not believe there is a danger of imminent North Korean attack. He also doubted that President Park believes an attack is imminent.

(b) ROK “Emergency”: Kim believes Park is using North Korean threat as a pretext for actions motivated by both internal and international developments. On the international side, admission of the PRC to the United Nations was one of the many factors that had motivated...
Park. But Park’s main motive was internal: 5.4 million people had voted for Kim, thus showing desire for a leader other than Park. After the April 1971 presidential election, Koreans had wanted democratic processes to continue, but Park had not been responsive to the wishes of the electorate and had acted harshly, for example, in the case of student dissenters. Kim said the ROK President should not excite and “stir up people” with talk of the North Korean threat, nor should he muzzle dissent.

(c) Red Cross Talks: Mr. Green was particularly interested in Kim’s views on the Red Cross talks. Kim said he had urged in the National Assembly and in his presidential campaign that there be dialogue and postal exchanges between North and South Korea. He could not understand why the ROKG was now pursuing a “difficult” matter (divided families) while taking no steps to solve an “easy” problem (i.e., postal exchanges). Kim said the Red Cross talks will not succeed if the ROKG continues to publicize the North Korean threat. Kim feels Park has a “changed attitude” since the election and now does not wish the Red Cross talks to make progress. While North Korea’s Kim Il-song will have to abandon his intention of exploiting the Red Cross for political reasons, it will also be necessary for the ROKG to confine its role to the humanitarian purpose of the talks.

(d) Kim Il-song Peace Pact Proposal: Referring to Kim Il-song’s January 11 interview with the Yomiuri, Mr. Kim believed it indicated that the North Korean Premier was prepared to meet with Park and the DRP, and that withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea is not a condition for the peace pact which Kim proposed. Subsequently, however, Kim Tae-chung said he thought that Kim Il-song was trying for a more flexible image and that Park was the more militaristic of the two. He acknowledged that Kim’s statements were propaganda, but that he should not be allowed to get away with it.

Mr. Green told Kim that North Korea seems to be intent on improving its propaganda image and its diplomatic position in the world. The North Koreans have become well known for events such as the 1950 invasion, the Blue House Raid, the Pueblo seizure, the EC–121 incident, and the insurgency in Ceylon. They now seem anxious to project a different and more reasonable image. With respect to the ROK emergency, Mr. Green said we of course are very interested in follow-
ing this matter but it is essentially a domestic development within the
ROKG. On the Red Cross talks, the USG naturally welcomes dialogue
of this type and feels that it is always useful to talk with adversaries,
even when views on important issues are widely divergent. It was in
this same spirit of tough-minded dialogue that the U.S. had sought to
open communications with China.

124. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National
Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Haig)


SUBJECT

ROK Forces in South Vietnam

The ROK Foreign Minister presented Ambassador Habib with an
aide mémoire concerning the retention of ROK forces in South Viet-
nam and also discussed the issue on February 4 (Tab A). Essentially,
he made the following points:

—The two ROK divisions will remain in South Vietnam until May
1972. At that time, they will begin to withdraw unless the ROK receives
from the U.S. adequate assurances of logistical support and equipment.

—The ROK Defense Minister will go to South Vietnam on Febru-
ary 8 to prepare contingency plans for the withdrawal of the two di-
visions. Presumably he will also discuss the ROK requirements for the
retention of the two divisions with General Abrams, who is already
confering with the ROK’s about the types of equipment needed.

Ambassador Habib concludes that we must soon decide just how
far we are prepared to go to meet ROK requests for military support.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543,
for information. Haig wrote the following note for Holdridge on the bottom and top of
the page: "2/8/72—John, Let’s consider in coord. w/Abrams, Defense. ¬ State what
must be done to keep this mission intact including if necessary a Presidential msg to
Park—this is urgent. Please call me. AH”.

2 Attached but not printed. The text of the Foreign Minister’s aide-mémoire was
also transmitted in telegram 695 from Seoul, February 4.
Comment

At the Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group meeting on February 4, Ambassador Sullivan announced that you had asked him to effect the necessary coordination on retaining the ROK divisions. As soon as General Abrams reports on the specifics of the ROK request, Sullivan will coordinate and forward a report on them.

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125. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Recommendation That You See Korean Ambassador Kim Before Peking Trip

You found it necessary to postpone Ambassador Kim Dong-jo’s call on you scheduled for noon last Thursday, and have not been able to schedule a new time. He has been trying to see you since early December to press President Park’s request for a summit meeting with the President, and his Government’s related anxieties over our handling of the Korean question.

Park’s nervousness over the Peking trip is well known to you. Growing out of his concerns for Korea’s fate in the changing Northeast Asian context was (1) Park’s imposition of a limited emergency in South Korea to tighten political control, and (2) his insistence on a summit meeting with the President. Apparently to try to force our hand on a summit meeting, Park has invoked his prime leverage—a threat to pull his two divisions out of Vietnam after next May.1 (You have our recommendation that the President agree to a brief, informal meeting in San Clemente between the Peking and Moscow trips.) Two weeks ago North Korea further exacerbated Park’s suspicions of us with their ploy suggesting that they negotiate with us directly and privately the...
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.\textsuperscript{3} Our drastic reduction of FY 72 military assistance, word of which he will get in the near future, will push his anxieties up a few notches more.

Ambassador Kim admittedly is not the most effective foreign envoy in town, and Park probably depends more on Ambassador Habib to get his messages through. Nevertheless, I think we should avoid adding to Park’s suspicions at this juncture by, as he would take it, holding his Ambassador at an arm’s length. Seconding Marshall Green’s strong recommendation to you yesterday, I think it is highly important for you to try to see Kim at least briefly before we leave for Peking next Thursday.

**Recommendation**

That you authorize me to arrange with Coleman Hicks a brief call for Ambassador Kim before next Thursday.\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{3} Telegrams 799 and 812 from Seoul, February 9 and 10, reported the North Korean requests for private talks. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2)

\textsuperscript{4} Kissinger initialed his approval and wrote the following note at the bottom of the page: “He is a pain in the neck. HK”. A notation in an unknown hand at the top of the first page reads: “Set for 5:50 p.m. 16 Feb 72.” According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he and Holdridge met with Kim from 5:52 to 6:01 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule) No record of the meeting has been found.

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126. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers\textsuperscript{1}**


**SUBJECT**

ROK Forces in South Vietnam

The ROK aide mémoire of February 4 on the subject of ROK forces in South Vietnam\textsuperscript{2} raises issues which may eventually require the President’s decision. Since the ROK has indicated that it plans to begin

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 75 0155, Korea, 000.1 1972. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Laird and Helms.

\textsuperscript{2} See Document 124.
withdrawing its two remaining divisions in May 1972 unless it receives adequate assurances of logistical support and equipment, the President considers it essential that a review of ROK requirements and issues for U.S. decision be undertaken promptly.

The President therefore has requested that the NSC Undersecretaries Committee prepare for his consideration a report on the status of ROK/GVN/U.S. negotiations concerning the continued presence of ROK forces in South Vietnam. The report should include an evaluation of the importance of ROK forces to GVN military posture and to the success of the Vietnamization program, the military justification for and assessment of the costs to the U.S. of the ROK support and equipment requests, and alternate courses of action available to the U.S. with a view to maximizing ROK presence in South Vietnam.

The report should be submitted no later than March 3, 1972, for the President’s consideration. In the interim the President has directed that no steps should be taken vis-à-vis the ROK which could adversely affect its willingness to retain two full divisions in South Vietnam through at least CY 1972.3

Henry A. Kissinger

3 On February 23, Froeb sent Haig a memorandum, concurred in by Kennedy and Negroponte and initialed by Kissinger, on the status of the Under Secretaries Committee report. Froeb explained that the USC would explore an alternative of “linking, though not necessarily explicitly, the two Korean divisions’ continued presence in Vietnam with our one division’s continued presence in South Korea.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2)

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, March 2, 1972, 0743Z.

1224. Subj: Post China Trip—Meeting of Assistant Secretary with ROK FonMin. Summary: In three hour meeting March 1 FonMin and Assistant Secretary Green reviewed at length visit to China, commu-
niqué, and effect of these not only on Korea but on general situation in East Asia including Japan, Taiwan, Viet-Nam, and USSR.

1. In opening general remarks Asst Secy described the visit to China with presentation essentially same as that made to FonMin Fukuda reported from Tokyo.

2. A. Korea. Predictably, FonMin was mainly concerned with the visit and the communiqué in relation to Korea. He wanted to know at what level subject had been discussed, whether China or U.S. introduced subject, with what intensity Chinese pursued their points on Korea, whether reasons were given by Chinese for supporting North Korea’s Eight Points on Reunification, and whether Chinese had mentioned four-point peace pact proposal of Kim Il Sung Yomiuri interview.

B. Asst Secy Green and Holdridge replied in general terms explaining that each side expressed its points of view as the talks proceeded, China having first introduced its point of view on Korea. They noted that discussion on Korea was relatively brief, was, as other subjects taken up, in broad generalities and essentially along lines set forth in the communiqué. Brief discussions had not given any new insights on Korean question. Green said he thought PRC felt compelled to touch upon Korea and North Viet-Nam in conventional terms but not beyond conventional terms because of ties with North Korea and North Viet-Nam, and as a means of preventing USSR exploitation of Chinese failure to show support for its friends. Four-point peace pact proposal set forth in Yomiuri interview was not mentioned in China.

3. Korea and U.S. Forces. A. FonMin said ROKG attaches significance to Chinese failure specifically to demand withdrawal of U.S. from Korea in communiqué while calling for abolition of UNCURK. He asked whether Chinese expressed objection to presence of our forces here, at one point indicating belief that Chinese perhaps had no objection to that presence.

B. Green said this was interesting point but felt it should not be over-emphasized without further analysis. Holdridge noted that in another section of communiqué Chinese declared as a general principle that “all foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own country.”

C. Green said that one of most important long-range effects of visit to China will be that Chinese now have opportunity to develop better

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3 For the North Korea’s Eight Points, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1971–1972, p. 25040. For the Yomiuri interview, see Document 123.
understanding of U.S. purposes and policies in Asia. As Chinese cope with their difficulties with USSR, they can through dialogue with U.S. come to understand that U.S. policy in Asia is not antagonistic to PRC. This affords opportunity for example for Chinese to understand better U.S. policy with respect to ROK, and that helps ROK.

4. Chinese View of Korea. A. FonMin inquired how much emphasis Chinese put on reunification and whether they seemed to consider ROK hostile. Did Asst Secy believe that Chinese would support an NK adventure against South, or would they check North Korea?

B. Green and Holdridge replied that as previously indicated discussion was brief, general, and about as set forth in communiqué. Asst Secy said that without having gained any special or new impressions on these matters during week in China, he had personally felt for some time that North Korea was more adventurous than Chinese and that latter, having a strong memory of heavy losses and bitter experience in Korean war, wanted no repetition of conflict in Korea.

5. Taiwan. A. FonMin said that in communiqué U.S. described Taiwan as part of China. Green and Holdridge corrected this pointing to very careful language with which U.S. acknowledges and does not challenge that both Taipei and Peking consider Taiwan part of China. This did not mean that we accepted Taiwan as part of China, but rather that we wished to avoid involving ourselves in the legal technicalities. FonMin said that Koreans nevertheless understand that U.S. has changed its policy vis-à-vis Taiwan.

B. Asst Secy and Holdridge emphasized that U.S. has not changed its policy. Green went on to express view that Chinese displayed some tolerance in the position taken in the communiqué on Taiwan avoiding, for example, any attack on the U.S./GRC mutual defense treaty.

[Omitted here is discussion of Japan, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.]

Habib
128. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Republic of Korea Forces in South Viet-Nam

This memorandum is in response to your request as transmitted in Mr. Kissinger’s memorandum of February 16, 1972, for a review of negotiations on the retention of ROK forces in Viet-Nam and the courses of action open to us to maximize the ROK presence. A detailed study is attached as an appendix.

The ROKG has asked for military and political assurances regarding its forces in Viet-Nam if it is to keep two divisions there through CY 1972.

We think we can provide acceptable military assurances, although not in the exact terms requested, based on current support levels until U.S. forces reach the 30,000 man level. After that the U.S. capability will begin to decrease. At the 15,000 man level it will not be possible to support ROK forces unless additional U.S. personnel are retained in Viet-Nam specifically for that purpose (our best estimate is 1,735 men).

Following is an analysis of the ROKG security requests:

1. Retain two U.S. brigades in Viet-Nam while ROK forces are there. This will be difficult to meet under the 69,000 man U.S. force level programmed for May 1. It might be possible to retain one U.S. brigade at the 35,000 man level but not at any lower level.


3. Helicopters. The issue is AHCs. We currently provide two companies and could provide a third after May 1. The ROKG has asked for four but the current level of activity of its forces does not justify this.

4. Logistic support from U.S. sources. Current plans are for a combined U.S., RVNAF, contractor support program which we think the ROKG will accept.

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2 Document 126.
3 An undated appendix entitled “Republic of Korea Forces in South Viet-Nam” is attached but not printed.
5. **Relocation of ROK bases and support facilities.** It can be done. Since we do not know what the ROKG has in mind, it is not possible to set a price tag but it would be costly.

6. **Emergency airlift of ROK forces to Korea if the security situation warrants.** Planning is no problem but the assets cannot be committed at this time.

We believe the ROKG will compromise on its requests for assurances. Its principal concern is U.S. assurance of support at home and we have had hints President Park wants something along these lines. There are two alternatives:

1. **Negotiate for the two divisions with one of the following proposals:**
   a. A brief meeting between you and Park, and an assurance we will do everything possible to retain the U.S. Second Division in Korea through FY 1974 (OSD does not believe we should make a commitment on U.S. force levels at this time).
   
   b. Inform Park we will do everything possible to make up the FY 1972 modernization shortfall and that cash and credit sales which go to meet agreed objectives of the program would not result in a proportional diminution of the total $1.5 billion modernization package. While this inducement would be less attractive to Park than the first, the five-year (FY 71–75) military modernization program is a priority ROKG security objective. The Congressional cutback in MAP appropriations this year caused a 40% reduction in planned funding for this important program. Should Congress fail to provide the MAP levels required for ROK military modernization, Korea’s progress toward defense self-sufficiency would be retarded. It might then be necessary to extend this program beyond FY 75.

2. **Negotiate for less than a two division force.** This might be satisfactory if the ROKG price is too high or if an assessment of the military situation warrants.

A third alternative outside the scope of this paper is not to oppose the commencement of ROKG troop withdrawals on June 1 as currently planned.

*John N. Irwin II*
129. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, March 27, 1972.

SUBJECT
Republic of Korea Forces in South Vietnam (ROKFV)

I have reviewed the paper that the Under Secretaries Committee has sent to the President concerning the ROKFV and believe the appendix to the summary memorandum presents a balanced view of the problem. The Department of Defense participated fully in its preparation. The summary memorandum is a State Department product. Although I support the paper in general, I continue to doubt the efficacy of the ROKFV as I made clear last June when we were considering this question (NSDM–113).

In any consideration involving the retention of significant ROK military forces in Vietnam, I believe the following points to be of major importance:

—The GVN and ROK should be the prime members in resolving the question. The US role should be secondary, in support of the GVN’s needs. Such an approach was implicit in NSDM–113, but I sense that we are moving away from it.

—We should be careful not to link possible US redeployments from Korea with retention of the ROKFV. NSDM–113 prohibited tying together these two separate issues. If the US should make a commitment in these talks to retain the Second Infantry Division beyond FY 73, as State recommends, we will have established such a link. I oppose this commitment since it reduces the flexibility of our forces by precluding the deployment of that division to meet other contingencies. The reduction of our forces, which this Administration has so ably accomplished, has made flexible deployments essential to our national security.

—A viable alternative to committing the US to retain current US troop levels in Korea is to reassure the ROK on their force modernization program. This could be done effectively by seeking a supplemental appropriation to restore the funds cut by the Congress from this program. Along the same vein, the ROK would welcome and we

2 See Document 128.
3 See Documents 96 and 97.
recommend a change to our cash and credit sales guidelines so that Foreign Military Sales credit purchases which go to meet agreed objectives and move the ROKG toward self-sufficiency would not be deducted from the overall $1.5 billion package.

Melvin R. Laird

130. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Direct Contacts Between North Korean and South Korean Representatives

CIA Director Helms informed you in early March that ROK CIA Director Yi Hu-rak had received North Korean feelers for direct contacts between North and South Korean representatives, and was proposing to follow through. He planned to send a ROK newspaperman to P’yongyang for this purpose. (See memorandum at Tab B.)

Mr. Helms has now sent you another memorandum on this subject (Tab A) indicating that Yi Hu-rak is indeed moving ahead. However, Yi has decided to send one of his own CIA men to P’yongyang (via P’annunjon) instead of the newspaperman. Yi’s man was to proceed to North Korea on March 28 with the ROK Red Cross representatives who were traveling to North Korea for talks with their counterparts, but would remain behind when the others came back. Chargé Underhill and the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Command were informed, and the latter made the necessary arrangements.

It appears that the initiator of these feelers on the North Korean side is the younger brother of Kim Il-song, Kim Yong-chu. If the initial contact between North and South Korean representatives proves successful, including a return visit of a North Korean to Seoul, Yi Hu-rak will attempt to meet with Kim Yong-chu personally in P’yongyang. He

2 Tab B, Helms’s memorandum to Kissinger, March 6, is attached but not printed.
3 Tab A, Helms’s memorandum to Kissinger, March 28, is attached but not printed.
has discussed this possibility with President Pak, who has not taken a position yet. However, Yi is confident that Pak would accept his recommendation that he visit P’yongyang. No other senior ROK officials are aware of these developments.

As Yi sees the situation, the contacts will probably not lead to early reunification, but rather to the prevention of war and accidents. Yi will emphasize trade and exchanges rather than political discussions. Nevertheless, he regards these contacts as an historical moment.

[less than 1 line not declassified] Yi Hu-rak has made a number of requests:

—That the U.S. and Japan not open too many doors to North Korea until after Yi’s meeting with Kim Yong-chu. This would assist the ROK in this venture. [1½ lines not declassified]

—That the visit of American newsmen to North Korea be delayed if possible until after the Yi/Kim Yong-chu meeting, presumably for the same reason.

—The U.S. officials in Washington and ROK and elsewhere continue to point out to ROK officials that the North Koreans seem to be making peaceful advances, and to urge ROK representatives to respond in kind. This would create a responsive atmosphere inside the ROK Government which would contribute to ROK support and understanding once these secret initiatives become known. Yi anticipates some initial criticism.

[less than 1 line not declassified] will provide minutes of the exchanges which are taking place. Secretary Rogers as well as yourself will be informed.

Comment: This is a rather remarkable development, given the atmosphere of suspicion which President Pak has been maintaining toward North Korea. It definitely appears to be a reaction to the President’s China initiative; indeed the North Korean feelers are probably also related. We will keep a close watch on the requests made by Yi Hu-rak to assure that no abrupt moves are made on the U.S. part which might inhibit the North Korean-South Korean contacts. State, of course, needs no urging to support the desirability of such contacts.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Korean Forces in South Vietnam

NSDM 113 of June 23, 1971, promulgated your decision that the U.S. would support the presence of two ROK divisions in South Vietnam through CY 1972 and would review the question of their retention beyond 1972 after the current dry season. In an aide mémoire of February 4, 1972, the ROKs stated that they would begin to withdraw their two divisions from SVN in May 1972 unless they receive adequate U.S. assurances of support in six specified areas. In a March 15 conversation with General Michaelis, the ROK Minister of National Defense pressed for the U.S. assurances sought in their February 4 note but dropped the two requirements which were proving most difficult for us (retention of two U.S. infantry brigades in SVN and provision of increased helicopter support).

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee has sent you a memorandum (at Tab B) incorporating an interagency study of how we might react to the ROK request. The study’s comments upon the four remaining ROK desiderata are:

—Adequate air support will not be a problem.
—Logistic support. Our capability to provide logistic support from U.S. facilities will diminish once our force level drops below 30,000 until at 15,000 no U.S. support could be provided without a special U.S. personnel increment of about 1,700 men for this purpose. Currently about 5,000 U.S. personnel provide logistics and aviation support for the ROKs. However, CINCPAC and MACV have developed an alternative plan involving a combination of RVNAF, contractor, and offshore support for the ROKs which would reduce the requirement for U.S. personnel to 1,733. Informally both the RVNAF and ROKFV have agreed to this arrangement.
—Provision of materials to support construction for redisposition of ROKFV. No details have been specified. Previous experience indicates this could be quite costly. Although there are no plans at present...
for redispersion of ROK forces within South Vietnam and such redispersion appears unlikely.

—Plans for emergency airlift of the ROKFV to Korea. Planning would be no problem, but we would not wish to commit our airlift to this role regardless of conditions and other priorities.

The Under Secretaries Committee memorandum suggests two alternatives for retaining the two ROK divisions:

1. A brief meeting between you and Park in which you could assure him we will do everything possible to retain the U.S. Second Division in Korea through FY 1974. However, Secretary Laird does not believe we should make that commitment at this time (Tab C), and I agree. Also, another summit meeting before your Moscow trip is impractical, and in any event such a meeting would result in requests for similar visits by other Asian leaders.

2. Inform Park we will do everything we can to make up the FY 1972 modernization shortfall and that cash and credit sales toward the objectives of the program will not be counted against the $1.5 billion total. (Secretary Laird believes that the primary ROK concern is the modernization program.)

The February 4 ROK aide mémoire did not raise these subjects, and I do not believe that we should, at least in this context.

A significant factor not mentioned in the study is that the ROKs derive substantial foreign exchange benefits from their forces in SVN; approximately $190 million in FY 1970 and $120 million in 1971. At the present the ROKG is facing severe financial problems and is quite aware of the monetary advantages of retaining its forces in SVN. I agree with the study that the ROKs are concerned with their worldwide image and with the security of their forces in SVN, but I also believe they actually prefer to have their troops stay, if their security concerns can be met.

Defense has informally expressed a strong belief that the GVN and ROKG should negotiate the matter between themselves, and to some extent this is appropriate. On the other hand, we are also directly involved and must participate.

I believe that we should negotiate with the ROKs for the retention of the two Korean divisions in South Vietnam through the end of the 1972–73 dry season on the basis of their remaining specific requests for support of their forces in South Vietnam, namely:

—a reassurance of adequate air support within overall priorities as in the past;

5 Attached; printed as Document 129.
—the alternative logistics support system developed by CINCPAC/COMUSMACV;

—provision of construction materials within the capability of our diminishing force and with the understanding that no major projects will be undertaken in view of the fact that ROK forces will eventually be withdrawn from SVN in any event; and

—plans for an evacuation airlift for the ROKFV with the proviso that should an emergency arise we and the ROKG will consult regarding priorities for airlift assets.

In addition, we should, in the course of these negotiations, assure the Koreans that there is no danger of our withdrawing all our troops from South Vietnam before they do.

The NSDM at Tab A\(^6\) incorporates the above recommendations.

**Recommendation**

That you approve the NSDM at Tab A.\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Attached; printed as Document 132.

\(^7\) Nixon initialed his approval.

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132. National Security Decision Memorandum 161\(^1\)

Washington, April 5, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

Republic of Korea Forces in South Vietnam

The President has reviewed the alternatives for retaining the two Republic of Korea divisions in South Vietnam as presented in the March 21, 1972, study forwarded by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee.\(^2\)

The President has decided that in order to facilitate the retention of the two Korean divisions in South Vietnam through the end of CY–1972

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Decision Memoranda, Nos. 145–264. Top Secret; Nodis. A copy was sent to Helms.

\(^2\) See Document 128.
we should make the following response to the remaining ROK requests for assurances of support for their forces in South Vietnam:

—Adequate air support will be provided within overall priorities as in the past;
—The U.S. is prepared to implement the alternative logistics support system developed by CINCPAC/COMUSMACV;
—The U.S. is prepared to consider providing construction materials for redisposition of the ROKFV within the capability of our diminishing forces and with the understanding that any plans for new construction will take into account the fact that ROK forces will eventually be withdrawn from SVN in any event; and
—The U.S. is prepared to draw up joint U.S.–ROK contingency plans for an evacuation airlift for the ROKFV with the proviso that should an emergency arise the two governments will consult regarding priorities for airlift assets and implementation details.

Our discussions with the ROK should not link the presence of U.S. forces in Korea to the retention of ROK forces in Vietnam. We should however assure the ROK that U.S. forces will not be totally withdrawn from South Vietnam sooner than the total withdrawal of all ROK forces. Finally, should the foregoing assurances prove acceptable to the ROK, we should inform the ROK that we are prepared to again review the question of continued ROK presence in South Vietnam beyond the presently envisaged time frame in early November 1972 in conjunction with the GVN.3

In keeping with the provisions of NSDM 113,4 the Under Secretaries Committee is requested to undertake a review of the question of continued ROK presence in South Vietnam beyond CY–1972 after the current Indochina dry season. This review should be submitted to the President not later than September 29, 1972.

Henry A. Kissinger

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3 Telegram 64395 to Seoul and Saigon, April 14, transmitted the President’s decision. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972)

4 Document 96.
Washington, April 6, 1972.

TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
U.S. Policy Concerning the Korean Peninsula

The President has directed a review of our policies toward the Korean Peninsula. The study should identify U.S. interests and objectives (both near and long-term) toward the Peninsula, potential issues in our relations with South Korea and North Korea, and the options open to the United States in respect to those issues over the next three to five years.

The study should examine:
—The present and prospective military, economic, and political balance between North Korea and South Korea (taking into account the study completed in response to NSSM 69).2
—The interests, objectives, and roles of the PRC, USSR, and Japan, and those of other Asian states such as the ROC, in respect to the Peninsula.
—The impact of improved U.S.–PRC relations on South Korea and North Korea, and how improved U.S.–PRC relations may affect the interests and roles of other major powers in their relations with South Korea and North Korea.
—The ways and extent to which U.S.–Japan relations are or may be affected by the U.S. posture toward the Peninsula.

The study should include consideration of the following issues:

—Korean reunification and political accommodation between South Korea and North Korea (including consideration of the general forms that reunification and political accommodation might take, their effects on stability in the Peninsula, the possible timing of moves toward reunification and political accommodation, and the relationship between moves toward reunification and those toward political accommodation).³

—Continued U.N. presence in Korea.

—Korean participation in the United States.

—U.S. military presence in South Korea (taking into account the study completed in response to NSSM 69).

—U.S. assistance for South Korean forces (continuation of the U.S. assistance in the modernization of ROK forces as approved in NSDM 129 should be assumed).⁴

—The nature and extent of U.S. trade with and economic assistance to South Korea.

—The nature and extent of any U.S. contacts with North Korea.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia and submitted not later than May 10, 1972 for consideration by the Senior Review Group.⁵

Henry A. Kissinger

³ See Document 130. In an April 3 memorandum, Helms transmitted the report of Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs Richard B. Peters that two ROK officials had on separate occasions mentioned to him recent “political contacts” between ROK and North Korean officials. (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry (DCI), Job 80-B01086A, Box 12 of 16, Korea)

⁴ Document 107. In an April 24 memorandum to Kissinger, Odeen reported that Laird recommended changes to NSDM 129. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2) No record of discussion of those changes to NSDM 129 has been found.

⁵ See Documents 152 and 153. In a June 21 memorandum to Elliot, Haig noted his understanding that the NSCIG-East Asia “study is progressing well on the full range of issues concerning our relationships in Korea and should be completed within the near future for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.” He added that the “President has asked, however, that those portions of the study concerning the Korea question in the U.N. and the United Nations Command be completed and forwarded” because it was “a matter of urgency.” Haig specified a June 30 deadline for that part of the study. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2) See Document 148.
134. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 14, 1972, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Dr. Pyung Chong Hahm, International Affairs Advisor to President Pak Chong-hui
Mr. Sang Ock Lee, Counselor, Embassy of Korea
Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

SUBJECT
Dr. Hahm’s Remarks on U.S.-Korean Relations

Dr. Hahm began by referring to the question of the two ROK divisions in Vietnam. Although President Pak had accepted the need for keeping these divisions in Vietnam until at least the end of 1972 and perhaps into 1973, “some of his advisors” were concerned over the problem that this might create for the ROK in the UN next fall. Possibly the PRC might be more inclined because of the presence of these divisions in Vietnam to raise the Korean item in the UN General Assembly. In addition, there seemed to be criticism on the part of the American public and press with respect to the fact that the two divisions are staying on.

Dr. Hahm wondered, wouldn’t it be possible, therefore, to make a token withdrawal of Korean forces from Vietnam starting this summer? Only enough troops would be withdrawn to suggest that the process had begun and certainly not enough to affect the military situation. What did Mr. Holdridge think of this?

Mr. Holdridge first ascertained that Dr. Hahm was, in fact, one of the advisors to President Pak who had raised this issue. He went on to state that he was in no position to do anything other than to pass along Dr. Hahm’s remarks; however, it looked very much as if the Communist attacks in Vietnam might continue through the summer, and it would create an extremely unfortunate impression if the ROK began even a token withdrawal at this time. In addition, the two ROK divisions were playing a very important part in establishing the military balance in Vietnam, and it was imperative that they be kept on. In the
present situation, for example, one of the ROK divisions was helping
to open Route 19 and was performing a very important function. It was
precisely for this reason that we had asked the ROK Government to
keep the divisions on.

Mr. Holdridge remarked that, as far as the attitude of the Ameri-
can people and press was concerned, he personally was not aware of
any particular American criticism over the presence of the ROK troops.
Even papers such as the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* had
not brought up this matter for months. It was possible that there would
be those among American academic circles who would be critical, but
certainly this would not reflect the attitude of the American people as
a whole. The average American, if he knew about the ROK participa-
tion in Vietnam at all, would probably say that this was a good thing.

Mr. Holdridge doubted that the question of the ROK troops in Viet-
nam would affect one way or another the PRC attitude on the Korean
item in the UN General Assembly. The Chinese would in all probabil-
ity make their decision as to what position they would take on the ba-
sis of a long-range calculation of their national interest, to which the
issue of the ROK troops was peripheral.

Dr. Hahm mentioned that there seemed to be criticism of the ROK
from some American groups, particularly academics, over what ap-
peared to be lack of ROK responsiveness to North Korean peace over-
tures. The problem for the ROK, Dr. Hahm explained, was that it would
be very difficult for President Pak to say anything which suggested ac-
ceptance of two Koreas. The 1948 Korean Constitution, in fact, was
drawn up in such a way as to conceive of only one Korea, and Korean
nationalistic sentiment on this point was very strong. Inherent in North
Korea’s approach, though, was a definite two Koreas implication—the
North, for example, called for a peace treaty between the North and
the South which could only be negotiated between two sovereign pow-
ers. Americans didn’t seem to understand this situation, or the diffi-
cult position into which President Pak was put by their criticism.

Dr. Hahm stated that there was nevertheless one condition under
which two Koreas would be acceptable: if North Korea offered to re-
nounce the use of force against the ROK. Under such circumstances, a
two Koreas situation condition could be justified as an *interim* step
pending final reunification at some point later on.

In connection with the two Koreas question, Dr. Hahm said that
the UN presence in Korea had been helpful for a long time in main-
taining the one Korea concept. Since 1948, the UNCURK (United Na-
tions Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) had
personified this concept. Under present circumstances, though, condi-
tions were no longer the same. (*Note:* He did not elaborate, but ap-
peared to be indicating some degree of willingness to consider some
revision in the UN role.)
Mr. Holdridge emphasized that if there was any criticism about President Pak’s position, it was not from the Administration. We understood President Pak’s sensitivities and certainly would not do anything to interfere with his judgement as to what course his country should take. The U.S.–PRC Joint Communiqué had in fact made it very plain that we would not get out in front of the ROK, but rather would support South Korean initiatives directed toward a relaxation of tension in the Korean peninsula.

Dr. Hahm reported that a number of American journalists had apparently received invitations to visit Pyongyang for the 60th birthday of Kim Il-sung. Included among these had been Harrison Salisbury and Selig Harrison.3 Both had said that they were going, but now the invitations had apparently been withdrawn as a result of the stepped-up fighting in Vietnam. North Korea evidently felt it undesirable to have Americans present in Pyongyang at this particular time. But a number of Americans were still interested in going, e.g., the Dean of the Emory Law School and an American-Korean professor at Bridgeport University. Dr. Hahm added that he had heard there was also some possibility of North Koreans coming to the U.S. in the guise of members of the UN PRC delegation.

Mr. Holdridge commented that he had not known of the travel of Harrison Salisbury or Selig Harrison to North Korea. The fact of the matter was that we would find it very difficult to prevent such travel, and the publicity if we tried to do so would be very adverse. We would not encourage travel of Americans to North Korea, though. As for the North Koreans coming to the U.S. as members of the Chinese delegation, this did not appear very likely since the Chinese to date had been very scrupulous in their relations with us. It would be far more likely for the Chinese to propose that North Koreans come via a UN invitation for them to attend the UNGA session which would contain no conditions. Such would almost surely be the case if the Chinese brought up the Korean issue next fall.

Dr. Hahm said that there was still a possibility for contacts between the North Koreans and private Americans, at least. Under these circumstances, the U.S. should do what it could to help the ROK make contacts with both the PRC and the USSR. This would be most desirable prior to the visit of Americans to North Korea in any significant numbers. Speaking frankly, the ROK had already asked France to act as an intermediary between it and both the PRC and the USSR, and the French had agreed on the proviso that this be kept strictly confidential. But perhaps the U.S. might also be able to render assistance in some way.

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3 Harrison Salisbury was a New York Times reporter. Selig Harrison was the Northeast Asia Bureau Chief of The Washington Post.
Mr. Holdridge said that he did not offhand know how the U.S. might be helpful, but if the ROK came to us with any suggestions, we would certainly want to give these due consideration.

Dr. Hahm said that the various points he had raised in the conversation indicated a need for closer contacts between the U.S. and the ROK to make sure that each side knew what the other was thinking and to avoid misunderstandings. By way of further elaboration, he mentioned that as a result of the President’s July 15, 1971 announcement of his intended China visit, followed by the textile issue, and then by the cut in U.S. military assistance to Korea, President Pak had begun to worry about the state of basic U.S.–ROK relations. Marshall Green’s visit had reassured him greatly, but more continuous high-level contact would still be desirable. In the impending visit of Kim Yong-shik Mr. Kim would of course be seeing certain higher level U.S. officials, but what was really needed was a brief meeting between President Nixon and President Pak. This need not be long—perhaps only 45 minutes—but the contact itself would be the important thing. Mr. Holdridge did not comment.

Dr. Hahm concluded the conversation by expressing the hope that Americans would continue to invest in Korean economic development. This was desirable both in terms of assisting in the expansion of the ROK economy and to prevent Japanese investments from dominating the economic scene. The Japanese were becoming increasingly hard to deal with, e.g., when the Koreans raised objections to Japanese terms for investment, the Japanese would cite Chou En-lai’s “4 points” and threaten to pull out entirely in favor of dealing with the PRC instead. Mr. Holdridge agreed with the desirability of continued American investment in Korea.
135. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, April 26, 1972, 10:03–10:58 a.m.

SUBJECT

Vietnam

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
State
U. Alexis Johnson
William Sullivan

DOD
Kenneth Rush
G. Warren Nutter
Rear Adm. William Flanagan

JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

CIA
Richard Helms
George Carver
William Newton (stayed only for Mr. Helms’ briefing)

NSC Staff
Major Gen. Alexander M. Haig
Richard T. Kennedy
John Negroponte
Mark Wandler

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

—State and Defense will draft a letter from the President to President Park of Korea, urging more ROK activity in MR 2.2
—Admiral Moorer will check on the report that North Vietnamese troops machine-gunned refugees south of the Dak To area.
—We will reassess our PR position tomorrow, in the light of the President’s speech tonight.
—The State, Defense and CIA papers on a cease-fire will be discussed at Friday’s meeting.

Gen. Haig; Henry is doing some speech writing, so he asked me to start the meeting for him. He should be down here fairly soon. (to Mr. Helms) Dick, can we have your briefing?

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSG Minutes, Originals, 1969–1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.

2 Telegram 73671 to Seoul, April 28, transmitted Nixon’s message to Park. Nixon requested that “in this critical and perhaps decisive phase, if your two divisions were to expand their current area of operations it would provide a significant additional contribution.” He continued: “If you agree that this suggestion has merit, I would ask that your field commander in South Vietnam consult with General Vien and General Abrams at the earliest possible moment to explore ways in which your forces may be deployed in the most effective manner with a view to ensuring that Hanoi’s offensive is decisively thrown back.” (Ibid., Box 757, Presidential Correspondence File 1969–1974, Korea, President Chung Hee Park, 1972)
Mr. Helms: [Reads his briefing]³

Mr. Johnson: What’s happening to the ARVN forces around Kontum?

Adm. Moorer: Three Ranger battalions are being airlifted out of Ben Het, and the ARVN forces are concentrating at FSB Metro.

Mr. Johnson: Is the 22nd Division getting back together?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. About 1,500 men from the division will be reformed, and the remaining elements of the division are continuing their movement to Vo Dinh. The 47th Regiment is being reorganized south of Pleiku, and it will probably move up. This is rugged country, from the air support point of view. In this connection, I want to mention that the ROKs have gained the high ground at the An Khe pass. They report killing 238 of the enemy. We have a message in from General Michaelis [U.S. Commander in Korea],⁴ saying that the Koreans want to make sure we have an evacuation plan prepared, in case their positions are overrun by the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Johnson: That’s not new. They asked us some time ago to prepare this evacuation plan.

Adm. Moorer: This message came in before the recent action at the An Khe pass, too. The Koreans have made a big contribution to the effort to open up Highway 19.

Mr. Johnson: Is the Highway open now?

Adm. Moorer: No. But it will be open fairly soon. At the same time, the Koreans are nervous about their positions. And that’s why they want the evacuation plan to be ready.

Mr. Sullivan: If I recall correctly, the evacuation plan was a basic part of the bargain we made with them to retain the two divisions in Vietnam. We agreed to draw up the plan.

Mr. Negroponte: Yes, but it was to be used when there was an emergency in Korea, not in Vietnam.

Mr. Sullivan: You mean it is a plan to return them to Korea, if they are needed there?

Mr. Negroponte: Yes.

Gen. Haig: As long as this question has come up, let me discuss something that Henry was certainly going to talk about. When the President sees the Korean Foreign Minister this morning, he will ask the Foreign Minister to inform Park of our hope that the Korean forces become more
actively engaged in II Corps. Since the President is going to do this, isn’t it a good idea for the President to send a message today to Park? The message could inform Park of the augmentation measures we have taken and of our determination to do what is necessary in Vietnam. The message would also ask Park to coordinate with the JGS and Abrams, with a view towards taking decisive action in this critical situation.

Adm. Moorer: We should mention the latest action at the An Khe pass, too.

Gen. Haig: We know that Abe [Abrams] doesn’t like to use the ROKs. We are past the point, though, where we can ignore them. The Koreans must get out of their enclaves and take over some of the activity in their portion of II Corps.

Mr. Rush: They’ve been guilty of some atrocities, you know. That’s one reason Abe doesn’t want to use them.

Gen. Haig: I understand that. We don’t want to push Abe into a situation he won’t be able to handle. Still, we should get some action out of the ROKs.

Adm. Moorer: I can’t understand why Abrams doesn’t want to use them to help open up Highway 19. They can work on opening the road, especially in the area north of the road. In other words, they just have to expand their area of operations a little more.

We originally had the 173rd Airborne Brigade in the area north of Kontum. When the brigade was pulled out, part of the 22nd ARVN Division went in there. Then the old 3rd NVA Division—which we estimate to be the worst of the NVA units—moved down there. The enemy has been roughing up the countryside and blocking Highway 1. Now it would be good if the Koreans could just work their area, without really going very far.

Mr. Johnson: (to Gen. Haig) You think we should just make a general exhortation to Park in the letter from the President?

Gen. Haig: Yes.

Mr. Sullivan: We should recognize that a letter from the President to Park will undoubtedly result in a Korean request for something which will cost money. Do we want to get into that kind of a situation?

Mr. Rush: What would the Koreans ask for?

Mr. Johnson: We’re negotiating with them now in several areas.

Mr. Sullivan: They’ve already said they need $18 million just to move out of the enclaves.

Mr. Rush: We don’t want them to move to another area. We just want them to make their area safe.
Gen. Haig: Let’s get a draft today of a joint State/DOD message. We don’t want a bill of particulars, just a general plea to get the job done.

Mr. Rush: We can start out by congratulating them on the job at the An Khe pass.

Mr. Johnson: Obviously.

Adm. Moorer: We should tell them it would be very helpful if they could work on the reopening of Highway 19 and in the area north of Qui Nhon.

Mr. Johnson: (to Adm. Moorer) We’ll get to work on the message. I assume you will get something out to Abrams.

Adm. Moorer: Yes, but I need to see the message to Park first.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Korea.]

136. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)

Washington, April 26, 1972.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Foreign Minister Kim Yong Sik of South Korea on April 26, 1972 at 11:45 a.m. in the Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS
President Nixon
Foreign Minister Kim Yong Sik
Major General A.M. Haig, Jr.
Korean Ambassador Dong Jo Kim

Foreign Minister Kim began the meeting by expressing his deep appreciation to the President for his willingness to meet with him at this very busy time. The Foreign Minister extended President Park’s warm best wishes and specifically wished him well in his upcoming visit to the Soviet Union. The Foreign Minister also expressed

appreciation for the support given to the Government of Korea in the
communiqué which resulted from the President’s trip to Peking.\(^2\)

President Nixon responded that he always welcomed the oppor-
tunity to meet with strong and long standing friends. President Park
could be assured that the United States would stand firmly behind its
commitments to Korea. President Nixon had insisted on this not only
in conjunction with drafting the Shanghai communiqué; but also, and
perhaps even more importantly, in the oral exchanges between himself
and the Chinese leaders. The President also emphasized that President
Park could be assured that similar support would be expressed in
Moscow although he did not foresee that the Korean question would
arise except in the most general way.

Foreign Minister Kim commented that he had had a most suc-
cessful meeting with Secretary Rogers the day before,\(^3\) and that the
Republic of Korea was intensely interested in the successful comple-
tion of the modernization of their armed forces. He noted that the
first year of the modernization program had been most successful but
that some difficulties were now developing due to Congressional at-
titudes and that our two Governments were discussing this on a reg-
ular basis.

President Nixon asserted that it was his personal intention to see
that United States commitments toward the modernization of the
armed forces of the Republic of Korea would be met. However, at this
time, there were many difficulties with respect to Congressional atti-
tudes on the whole subject of military aid and foreign assistance. Nev-
evertheless, Korea had many friends within the United States legislature
and momentary difficulties should not be overplayed. In any event, as
the President of the United States, he intended to do everything pos-
sible to insure that American commitments for the modernization of
the Korean armed forces were met.

Foreign Minister Kim then stated that as a result of the stepped-
up fighting in South Vietnam, his government had expressed concern
about the security of their 50,000-man contingent. He noted that ear-
lier his government had considered a more expedited withdrawal of
their forces, but that as a result of an urgent request from their South
Vietnamese friends they had limited this withdrawal to one marine

\(^2\) The text of the “Joint Statement Following Discussions With Leaders of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China,” commonly known as the Shanghai Communiqué, is printed in

\(^3\) A memorandum of conversation between Rogers and Kim on April 26 is in the
National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S.
brigade of roughly 10,000 men. Now that the fighting was stepped up there was concern about the security of the remaining forces. There was special concern because the Korean Government believed that it was essential that Korean forces have the same level of support which they were accustomed to receiving when United States force levels in Vietnam were higher. Now, as U.S. forces were withdrawn, the provision of helicopters and similar support was in jeopardy. Consequently, they were conducting intense discussions with General Abrams to insure adequate support was provided.

President Nixon replied that the United States recognized that the enemy’s flagrant violation of the DMZ and their massive conventional invasion of South Vietnam represented the ultimate challenge to all of the non-Communist nations in Asia. If the North Vietnamese, with their sophisticated weaponry provided by the Soviet Union and China, were to succeed, then certainly the threat would be greatly increased for the Republic of Korea itself. More importantly, Moscow would be encouraged to continue this kind of proxy aggression. Therefore, it was incumbent upon all to take the battle to the enemy in South Vietnam and to achieve an important victory as a result of the recent enemy action. The United States for its part had more than doubled its air activity in the theater and intended to apply air power relentlessly to destroy as many of the enemy as possible. He noted that the Korean forces had now moved out on some of South Vietnam’s highways and were intensifying their operation. This was a period when all free nations involved in the conflict must move aggressively to defeat the North Vietnamese invasion. He personally was dedicated to doing all that was necessary.

Foreign Minister Kim observed that Korea, of course, was always subject to criticism, especially since U.S. forces were withdrawing and Korean forces remained. President Nixon stated that he would insure maximum U.S. support was garnered for Korea’s participation in the defense of South Vietnam. In the United Nations, Ambassador Bush would do everything possible to register U.S. support for Korea’s help to South Vietnam. In the Congress, Korea has many friends and we would influence them also to maintain support for Korea.

Foreign Minister Kim then commented that the Republic of Korea had been in touch through the Red Cross on the humanitarian problem existing between North and South Korea. They had consciously adopted a program which would deal first through the Red Cross on the humanitarian issues and then if the talks were successful shift to more sensitive political issues. President Nixon noted that this was a matter for the Republic of Korea. The United States, of course, welcomed any progress that might be made between North and South Korea, but it was not an issue that the United States would attempt to
manipulate as a third party. We welcomed improving relations if this was possible but we expected the Government of South Korea to be the ultimate judge of the degree to which the dialogue should be carried on.

Foreign Minister Kim then expressed the wish of President Park that President Nixon would have an opportunity to visit Korea soon. President Nixon answered that he intended to make such a visit because he had many Korean friends and he had long been close to many of Korea’s American friends here in the United States. Nevertheless, because this was an election year, it would be impossible for him to undertake any more foreign travel after the visits associated with the Soviet Summit were concluded. Nevertheless, he would hold a subsequent visit to Korea high on his agenda. Foreign Minister Kim said that he would convey this message to President Park and wished to emphasize again as President Park had done in his letter to the President, that the Republic of Korea was fully behind and supported the President’s visit to the Soviet Union and wished President Nixon every success in this endeavor.

The Foreign Minister commented that his discussion with Secretary Rogers had been fruitful and that he had enjoyed a game of golf the previous Sunday at Burning Tree Country Club. President Nixon asked about President Park’s golf game and Ambassador Dong Jo Kim noted that President Park is an excellent golfer. President Nixon presented to the Foreign Minister a dozen golf balls with the Presidential seal and asked the Foreign Minister to again express his full support to President Park, as well as his regrets that an election year would preclude a visit to Korea in the short term.

The Meeting adjourned at 12:03 p.m.
137. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, May 1, 1972, 0852Z.

2476. Subj: President Nixon’s Message to President Park. Ref: State 73671, Seoul 2475.3

1. Presidential Advisor Hahm Pyong Choon over lunch today commented at length on President’s message after observing that he had come to lunch direct from Blue House meeting at which subject was discussed by govt leaders.

2. In recent months Hahm has increasingly come under criticism as an apologist for Park administration policies and we treat his comments on current affairs with some reserve. It is likely, however, that in the meeting he attended there was some sentiment along the lines of main points he was making.

3. Hahm said good effect of President Nixon’s meeting with Fon-Min Kim4 has been dissipated with belief that President saw Kim only to set up Korean Govt for this request and because US is in trouble militarily in VN. Worse yet, US had undermined FonMin by sending the message separately after latter’s departure from Washington instead of asking him to carry the message.

4. In the course of the discussion, Hahm acknowledged that he is counseling withdrawal of ROK troops as originally scheduled. He asked why should ROK troops remain in VN and how could President justify to Korean people expansion of area of operations at time when President Nixon has just announced withdrawal of another 20,000 US troops. In making these points Hahm also alluded to absence of ROK/US summit meeting, failure of US over extended period to respond to ROK request regarding support of ROKVN should it postpone withdrawal, and failure of US reply when it came to respond to all Korean points.

Underhill

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2 See footnote 2, Document 135.
3 Telegram 2475 from Seoul, May 1, reported the delivery of President Nixon’s message to President Park. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972)
4 See Document 136.
138. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
South Korean CIA Director’s Further Comments on His Visit to North Korea May 2–5 for High Level Discussions

South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak on April 25 gave [less than 1 line not declassified] the following additional particulars on his planned visit to Pyongyang May 2–5 for political discussions:

—Yi believes the time is propitious for the meeting: U.S. forces and UNCURK (U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea) are still in South Korea, the U.N. declaration on Korea remains in force, and President Park’s domestic political position is strong enough to support such an initiative.

—Yi believes his discussions could be kept confidential or could result in a joint communiqué outlining specific areas of agreement. Yi favors the latter, because it would detract from the current North Korean diplomatic offensive and would forestall the development of an adverse political reaction in South Korea. Yi doubts, however, that his own government would go along with the idea of a communiqué.

—[1 paragraph (4½ lines) not declassified]

—Yi said President Park asked whether the President is aware of the exchanges with the North and his impending visit. [less than 1 line not declassified] assumed the President knew.

—Yi said he thought his Government would welcome strong U.S. Government support should his visit become known publicly, either through a communiqué or through leaks. U.S. support would help counter domestic criticism in South Korea, as well as improve Seoul’s position in dealing with Pyongyang.


2 Lee Hu Rak’s comments were reported by Helms in an attached memorandum to Kissinger, April 28.

3 Yi probably was referring to the U.N. General Assembly’s resolutions of 1948 which recognized the Government of the Republic of Korea as the sole legal government in Korea. [Footnote is in the original.]
Chargé Underhill reported that South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-sik told him May 1 of the Yi mission.\(^4\) [Yi had told us earlier that Foreign Minister Kim was not to be cut in on the plans for his Pyongyang visit until Kim’s return from the U.S.\(^5\)] Kim said that his Government would want to consult immediately with us in the event that North Korea detained Yi. Kim also pictured Yi’s mission as intelligence-oriented, and stressed its non-political nature. [It was not clear whether Kim is only partially informed, or knows better but is taking this line for face-saving reasons.\(^6\)] When asked for his opinion, Underhill said the ROK initiative was bold and courageous, and if made known publicly later should improve Seoul’s position in its diplomatic competition with Pyongyang, most immediately as regards the U.N. consideration of the Korean question next fall.

\(^4\) Underhill’s report is in attached telegram 2468 from Seoul, May 1.
\(^5\) Brackets are in the original.
\(^6\) Brackets are in the original.

139. National Intelligence Estimate\(^1\)

NIE 42/14.2–72


THE TWO KOREAS

Conclusions

A. All four of the major powers concerned—the US, the USSR, Japan, and most recently China—have tacitly accepted the existence of “two Koreas”; in effect abandoning the idea of reunification, but they differ in their perceptions of the problem and hence on modalities. The Soviets appear to have concluded that, in the absence of any real hope for peaceful unification, the best course in Korea is a negotiated

\(^1\) Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ODNI Registry of NIEs and SNIEs, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the NSA, and the Atomic Energy Commission participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the FBI and the Department of Treasury who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. Another copy of this NIE is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates, Part 3.
accommodation between North and South, but the USSR must move cautiously to avoid antagonizing Pyongyang. The Japanese seem quite ready to accept some form of gradual reconciliation of the two Koreas, provided it is orchestrated in a way that does not disrupt Tokyo’s overall efforts to achieve a modus vivendi with Peking. China, concerned to prevent the growth of Soviet influence in North Korea, is greatly interested in achieving some kind of explicit agreement, but must not get out ahead of Pyongyang, which still wants to unify Korea under its control. Thus, any negotiated arrangement formalizing the peninsula’s division is difficult to foresee.

B. Pyongyang and Seoul, in a prudent effort to prepare for whatever new international alignments emerge in East Asia, are presently talking to one another at several levels. Open negotiations in the Red Cross talks were initiated in the latter part of 1971, ostensibly to open the way for reuniting the many Korean families separated since 1945. There are also covert discussions, but these are mainly exploratory and meaningful progress toward a political settlement would seem to be some time away.

C. The rival Koreans are approaching one another with differing motivations and different scenarios in mind. The North has been more inclined toward expansion of the current Red Cross discussions,² hopeful that its new conciliatory tactics will complicate South Korea’s foreign relations and ultimately lead to dissension in the South which Pyongyang can exploit. This has been coupled with an imaginative diplomatic drive abroad seeking certain other intermediate objectives: the withdrawal of US troops from the South; limitation of Japanese influence there; and recognition of North Korea’s legitimacy by the international community. The South, on the other hand, is worried about the domestic effects of any amelioration in North-South relations and concerned as well over the possibility of a complete US military withdrawal. The Republic of Korea is acting cautiously. It wants to move only at a very deliberate pace and to keep the public talks limited.

D. The prospect is for the Red Cross talks to be prolonged. Although there is nervousness on both sides, domestic and international opinion, pressures from their allies, and the momentum generated by the talks themselves may lead to agreements on divided families, cultural exchanges, and even trade. Progress on these issues, in turn, could help reduce fears and suspicions on both sides and tone down the propaganda content of the negotiating atmosphere.

E. One issue likely to arise soon is the future UN position on Korea. Pyongyang wants an unconditional invitation to this fall’s UN As-

² See Documents 130 and 136.
sembly debates and an end to the present UN involvement in Korea. Seoul is strongly opposed to inviting the North Koreans and wishes to postpone debate at least for another year.

F. If the North-South negotiations break down, or if political upsets occur in either Korea to arrest trends toward political accommodation, the rivals could return to the pre-1971 situation of political confrontation. This might bring about something of an upsurge in armed incidents along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). At worst, Pyongyang might return to harsh tactics pursued in 1966–1969.

G. Another Korean War is not on the horizon, but incidents along the tense, heavily defended DMZ will occur and could at some point escalate to open hostilities. Northern responses in such circumstances would depend heavily on Pyongyang’s perception of both its own allies’ support and the US military commitment to the South. Ultimately, therefore, the question of war or peace in Korea would come to rest, as before, on the decisions of the US, the USSR, and China. If these powers continue to limit military supplies and generally to exert a restraining influence over their clients, war will continue to be unlikely.

[Omitted here is the “Discussion” section of the estimate.]

140. Memorandum From John A. Froeba, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Results of South Korean CIA Director’s Visit to North Korea May 2–5

South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak briefed Ambassador Habib May 10 on his visit to Pyongyang May 2–5. Yi said he first had two meetings and a dinner with Vice Premier Kim Yong-chu, who is also Premier Kim Il-song’s younger brother. Following these, late on May 4 and again the next day he met with Kim Il-song for a total of more than four hours. Overall, Yi thought his trip had been successful as a mutual exploration of basic political differences, but said that no important

conclusions were reached and no problems were settled. Ambassador Habib assured Yi of U.S. sympathy and support for these efforts.

Kim Il-song impressed Yi as highly intelligent and far superior to any of the other North Korean officials he met. Yi found Kim to be quick in understanding and logical in his thought processes. Kim’s knowledge of South Korea internally, as well as of the outside world, according to Yi’s description, was badly deficient. Physically, Kim appeared vigorous and in good health.

The major points that emerged from these sessions, according to Yi Hu-rak, were:

— **South Korean Threat.** Kim Il-song was concerned that President Park, aided and abetted by the U.S., might attack North Korea. (Yi thought this was the key point that came out of his discussions in Pyongyang.) Kim emphasized several times that North Korea would not “repeat the Korean War,” and that the ROK leadership could thus feel reassured. Kim reiterated this assurance in a message to President Park, stating that “I have no intention whatever of making war.”

— **Korean Reunification.** The North Korean representatives were not interested in a two Koreas solution. They rejected the German solution as inappropriate for North and South Korea, which they held should not seek co-existence but rather eventual reunification. Yi said he believes, however, that reunification is a long way off, and that the two Koreas need to deal with immediate practical problems.

— **Reduction of Tensions on the Peninsula.** Yi gained the impression that the North Koreans genuinely wanted a reduction of tensions on the Peninsula, and Yi believes that progress on this is possible. He sees the North Korean leadership now concerned with the “social construction of North Korea.” Kim Il-song proposed a purely Korean joint committee to coordinate on relations between North and South and solve problems that arise, although Yi took Kim’s idea as extemporaneous and not a formal, thought-out proposal.

— **Current North-South Red Cross Talks.** Kim Il-song said in effect that his government had been delaying in the Red Cross talks, but that, in light of his discussions with Yi, North Korea was now ready to push forward. Yi noted that plenary sessions of the talks would probably take place in June.

— **U.S. and Japanese Roles in Korea.** Kim Il-song asked why Seoul was trying to prevent the further withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, to which Yi said he replied that North Korea had caused U.S. forces to come in in the first place and that North Korea could contribute to U.S. troop withdrawal by showing that it would not resort to war. On Japan, Yi said he responded to Kim Il-song’s concern over the possible Japanese reoccupation of Korea by saying that South Korea is clever enough to preserve equality in its relationship with Japan.
Yi said the North Koreans hold to the belief that Seoul is essentially a puppet of Japan and the U.S. Yi stated that there was no mention of the PRC or the Soviet Union during his discussions in Pyongyang.

_North Korean Assassination Attempt Against Park in 1968._ When the question came up in another context, Kim Il-song ascribed the North Korean assassination attempt against President Park in 1968 to “leftist adventurists,” expressed his extreme regret that it had happened, and said it did not represent his intention and that those responsible had been purged. [Kim’s admission of the fact of the assassination attempt—Pyongyang has consistently denied it—and his disassociating himself from it now are quite significant, and add to the credibility of his interest in détente with the Park Government. (It is doubtful historically that he did not approve the 1968 attempt.) There not unexpectedly still is contention within the North Korean Government over the use of armed force.]²

_Pueblo Incident._ Kim Il-song raised the _Pueblo_ Incident, saying that when the _Enterprise_ entered the Sea of Japan, the North Korean leadership thought war was imminent and asked why the U.S. had not opened hostilities. Yi replied that the U.S. move was to deter North Korea, adding that the U.S. never initiated hostilities. (Kim also said that North Korea’s capture of the _Pueblo_ was happenstance and was not planned, and that North Korea was not aware the ship was on an intelligence mission.)

_Seoul–Pyongyang Hot Line._ Kim Il-song agreed that a Seoul–Pyongyang hot line that had been set up for Yi’s visit should continue operational to help prevent or resolve incidents.

_Continuing Contacts._ Kim Il-song agreed that the secret high level exchanges should continue, and suggested that Seoul invite Second Vice Premier for Foreign Affairs Pak Song-ch’ol. No time was set.

_Comment:_ Allowing for Yi Huk’s personal stake in the success of these exchanges, the credibility he attaches to Kim Il-song’s professed interest in a reduction of tensions is significant. A North Korean need for détente can quite plausibly be argued in terms of reduced reliability of PRC international support, of the desirability of shifting resources from defense to economic development (with about 15% of its GNP devoted to defense, North Korea’s security burden is one of the world’s heaviest), and of satisfying accumulating demands for consumer goods. In addition, neither side probably wants to be blamed for breaking the contacts off, faced as they are with the Korean question in the U.N. General Assembly next fall.

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² Brackets are in the original.

141. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, May 19, 1972, 0300Z.

2869. Subj: Korea and Vietnam.

1. Since my return to Seoul a few weeks ago I have detected a submerged but real feeling of concern among Koreans that they are being neglected by the United States. Most specifically, they exhibit a degree of unhappiness over events in Vietnam in which they see themselves being swept along by currents concerning which they have no knowledge, and over which they have no control.

2. Some of this they accept as inherent in their minority position as a remaining partner in Vietnam. Nevertheless, they believe that as our last ally with troops fighting in Vietnam we should share with them, to some degree at least, our plans and strategy. We have had some second echelon levels in the government express disappointment that we have not recognized, either in our public statements or in our private efforts, the contribution of the Korean forces and the risks and dangers they also run if there were to be a North Vietnamese breakthrough.

3. These feelings have been behind Korean refusal to agree to an expansion of their area of operation in Vietnam and also explain Korean reluctance to commit themselves unequivocally to maintaining their forces in Vietnam through the end of 1972. We have been able fortunately to take advantage of the timely presence of Ambassador Brown to counter the indications that some elements in the Korean Government were proposing early withdrawal of Korea’s divisions in Vietnam. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister showed clear understanding of the desirability of maintaining those forces through 1972 but, nevertheless, set forth their expectations of greater support from the United States in return. The commitment is however not iron-clad, and we should not assume that under all circumstances they will retain their forces there.

4. Generally speaking, we are seeing a rising trend of Korean concern that the U.S. takes them for granted and that we also are less than prepared to share in advance those discussions of strategy and actions which we are pursuing in regard to matters directly affecting Korea’s forces and Korea’s future, both military and political.

5. I believe that we are jeopardizing unnecessarily our objectives both here and in Vietnam if we do not share with Korea, to the extent

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR S–US. Secret; Nodis.
we can, our plans and intentions regarding those matters that affect
them directly. The Korean leadership has an unblemished record in
protecting our confidences. I see no reason why we cannot discuss
frankly and fully with President Park the course of secret negotiations
with the North Vietnamese, our plans for military action and military
presence in Vietnam in the near future and to keep him reasonably well
informed of our dealings with the Soviet Union and the People’s Re-
public of China. If we do so, I am convinced we will find him under-
standing and cooperative. If we do not, we are courting unpleasant
surprises.

Habib

142. Letter From President Nixon to Korean President Park


Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letter of March 23 in which you expressed
your views on the security of Korea. Assistant Secretary Green also has
informed me of his frank and useful discussions with you in Seoul. I
am glad that we are continuing to have a close and candid exchange
of thoughts on matters which are so important to our mutual desire
for peace and progress in Asia.

We believe that our quest for a dialogue with the Chinese and Russ-
ian leaders will contribute to these goals, and your support of that quest
is something I deeply appreciate. We recognize that there are wide dif-
f erences between their views and ours, but we feel that conversations
about these differences can have highly worthwhile consequences for

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presi-
text of President Nixon’s letter was transmitted in telegram 97271 to Seoul, June 2, with
a request that a copy be delivered to President Park as soon as possible. (Ibid., RG 59,
Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 US/NIXON)

2 President Park’s March 23 letter was delivered to Rogers by Ambassador Kim on
April 6. The letter asked for assurances concerning the upcoming Moscow summit and
requested restoration of the cuts in FY 1972 grant military assistance to Korea. The orig-
inal letter, forwarded to Nixon by Kissinger under an undated covering memorandum,
is attached but not printed.

3 See Document 127.
all of us. I am happy to report that this was the case in the People’s Republic of China, and I hope it will be the case in the Soviet Union as well.

I can assure you, Mr. President, that the United States will continue to place high importance on the interests of its friends and allies. My talks in Moscow, like those in Peking, will concern primarily bilateral issues. We will take no action at the expense of our friends nor enter into any agreement which would compromise their future. Should the Soviet Union raise any issues affecting Korean security, you can be sure that I shall once again affirm our strong ties with the Republic of Korea. I will also make known our intention to maintain and further develop our close bonds, and to adhere to our defense commitment to your country.

In the past we have known the unpredictability of the North Korean leadership, and we are very much aware that military forces arrayed in North Korea continue to pose a threat to your nation and your people. We share your concern that the North not make the mistake of increasing tensions. I must add, however, that we have no information now which indicates that North Korea plans to initiate hostilities in the near future. Nevertheless, we must not relax our guard.

At the same time, we have noted your efforts to talk with the North about matters such as divided families. As was stated in the Joint Communiqué between the United States and the People’s Republic of China of February 28, 1972,4 “The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication on the Korean Peninsula.” Of immediate importance in this general connection, my Government will look forward to cooperating closely with yours in dealing with the Korean question in the United Nations General Assembly next fall.

While we search for peace, Mr. President, we intend to remain strong. As you know, we plan no changes in the level of our forces stationed in the Republic of Korea through the end of Fiscal Year 1973. We have also outlined for you our planned force disposition in Asia. Before undertaking any further reduction of United States forces in Korea, we will consult fully with you and make a joint assessment of any threat to your country’s security.

The five-year program for modernizing your military forces continues to be of great importance to us. We are happy that we have been able to provide support for this program during its first two years—

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4 See footnote 2, Document 127.
some $440 million in grant funds, and approximately $16 million worth of excess defense articles and the equipment of the division which we withdrew from Korea in Fiscal Year 1971. I recognize Korea’s impressive efforts to become self-sufficient in defense, and regret the reductions caused by the Congressional action in military assistance for Fiscal Year 1972.

Spokesmen for my Administration, in their appearances before our Congress, have emphasized the significance of military assistance to our allies, and in particular the importance of the Korean military modernization program. Korea is well and favorably known to the leaders of our Congress, and I believe, therefore, that our assistance programs will move forward at an adequate level in the coming years.

Concerning the ten percent deposit requirement under Section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, my Administration has no alternative but to comply with the provisions of the law. However, as you are probably aware, this requirement applies only to deliveries of military assistance made beginning February 7, 1972. Further, my Administration does not favor this requirement, and we have called for its repeal in Fiscal Year 1973.

As a Pacific nation, the United States has a special regard for its Asian allies. We have said on several occasions over the years that we intend to honor our obligations to Korea, and we believe our intentions are understood by friend and foe alike. We share your view concerning the necessity for frequent and close discussions between our Governments, and I am pleased that our representatives will again be meeting to discuss these matters at the annual Republic of Korea–United States Security Consultative Conference in Colorado Springs.

Thank you very much for your good wishes. As you know, I place the highest value on our friendship. You have my warmest good wishes as you lead your country forward in these critical times.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

143. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting

Washington, June 1, 1972, 10:07–11:15 a.m.

SUBJECT
Vietnam

PARTICIPATION
Chairman—Maj. Gen. Alexander M. Haig
State
John N. Irwin
William Sullivan
DOD
Kenneth Rush
G. Warren Nutter
Major Gen. David Ott
JCS
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
Capt. Kinnaird McKee
CIA
George Carver
William Newton
NSC Staff
Richard T. Kennedy
John H. Holdridge
James T. Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—The State Department will prepare a draft telegram to Korea asking President Park to authorize the Korean forces in Vietnam to engage in a temporary exercise outside their area of operations to open the Kontum Pass. Gen. Haig will seek the President’s approval of the proposed telegram.

—The Chinese ships off-loading onto lighters at an island near Vinh will be kept under surveillance but not interfered with at this time.

—Ambassador Ingersoll should be informed that we will move some B–52s to Japan if Typhoon Lola strikes Guam. In addition, the Vietnam Working Group should review our arrangements with the Japanese for prior consultation on aircraft movements.

—The Thai Government should be informed that we wish to augment our tanker fleet in Thailand for about six months.

—The psywar proposal to preempt Radio Hanoi will be presented to the President in conceptual form, including a warning on the likelihood of criticism, for his decision.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Korea.]
Gen. Haig: Anything else, Admiral?
Adm. Moorer: The North Vietnamese have completely moved the 320th Division from around Kontum City to the Kontum Pass. Gen. Abrams would like to get the Koreans to help open the Kontum Pass. They did a good job clearing the An Khe Pass and he wants to use them the same way on the Kontum Pass. The problem is that it would require a decision by the Korean President. The ROK forces need Presidential approval to move out of their base area.

Mr. Sullivan: Can we lift them up there?

Adm. Moorer: Oh, sure. No problem on that.

Gen. Haig: I think we should draft a message to Korea asking the Korean President to authorize his forces to make a temporary movement to open up the pass, and assuring him that we will provide the necessary airlift.

Mr. Sullivan: Would they return to their base camp after the pass is opened?

Adm. Moorer: Sure. It would be a one-shot deal. We’re still waiting for the South Vietnamese to move up from Pleiku to open the pass. They may do so yet, but Abrams says this is one exercise the Koreans could undertake. If the SVN forces don’t do it within the next day or two, we should give the Koreans the initiative.

Mr. Sullivan: This is on Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum?

Adm. Moorer: That’s right. We can move the Koreans to Pleiku and then on to the pass. They don’t have enough North Vietnamese in their base area to keep busy.

Mr. Sullivan: We can draft a message to Korea.

Gen. Haig: I’ll get it to the President when he returns and see if he wants to go that strong in a message to Park.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Korea.]
Dear Mr. President:

The North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam has bogged down badly and is well behind schedule. Our South Vietnamese allies have stiffened their defenses on all three fronts and have taken a heavy toll of the enemy.

However, General Abrams informs me that the South Vietnamese lack mobile reserves for some of their immediate problems, especially in the Second Military Region. One of the most pressing problems with which they are unable to cope is the task of reopening Kontum Pass on Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum.

General Abrams feels this is a mission which could be effectively performed by a combination of Korean and United States forces, operating against a limited objective for a limited period of time. Once the pass is opened, he believes our two forces could retire, and the terrain could be held secure by the South Vietnamese forces now available to the Second Military Region. He also assures me that the requisite Korean forces could be temporarily spared from the area where they normally operate.

Under this concept, the United States would be prepared to contribute the airlift, the helicopter units, the air support, and other associated support elements. The Korean contribution would consist of combat elements temporarily withdrawn from their current area of operations.

I would very much like to have our two countries cooperate in this particular effort to assist our South Vietnamese allies. I feel that a successful mission of this type would have psychological as well as military benefits which could instill a helpful momentum into the defense of Kontum.

If you share my view, I would greatly appreciate your authorizing the Commander of the Korean Forces in Vietnam to work out the details

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, President Park (1972). Secret. Holdridge sent a draft of the letter to Kissinger on June 2, noting that such a message had been proposed at the June 1 WSAG meeting (see Document 143) and that minor changes had been made to a Department of State draft, and recommending that he send it to the President. Kissinger sent it to the President under cover of a memorandum of June 3 with the recommendation that he sign it. Kissinger approved for the President. The text of Nixon’s letter was transmitted in telegram 98489 to Seoul, June 3. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 757, Presidential Correspondence 1969–1974, Korea, President Park (1972))
of the mission with General Abrams. If your reply is favorable to such a combined mission, I will then instruct General Abrams to provide the United States elements essential to the proposed operation.²

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

² Park’s reply was transmitted in telegram 3425 from Seoul, June 13. Park stated that he believed that “the operation of recapturing Kontum Pass would be one of the most difficult missions of the Korean forces in Vietnam, involving many casualties on our part.” However, he added, “in consideration of Your Excellency’s special request, I have decided to offer assistance of the Korean forces in the Kontum Pass operation. Korean combat elements will be dispatched to participate in the joint ROK-US operation in the Kontum Pass area, and upon completion of their mission they will return to their current area of operations.” (Ibid.)

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, June 10, 1972, 1119Z.

Subj: Meeting With President Park Chung Hee.
1. I called on President Park for an hour’s talk June 10. This was our first meeting since my return to Seoul. After assessing my health and his for a few minutes (he is now recovered from effects of a fall and looks well) the discussion developed as follows.

2. I thanked him on behalf of President Nixon for the decision to keep Korean troops in Vietnam until the end of 1972. I noted that military situation seemed better there although enemy was persistent and we could expect some difficult periods ahead. I emphasized President Nixon’s determination as shown by recent US actions taken in air and on sea in Vietnam and spoke briefly of necessity to assure achievement of our objectives in Vietnam which are related to general credibility of our commitments elsewhere. Park nodded vigorous agreement and was pleased to receive President Nixon’s recognition of ROK decision on troops.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR S–US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
3. I then spoke of widespread interest in contacts between North and South Korea. This was general as far as Red Cross talks were concerned, but also applied to those who were aware of the secret talks. I noted the general admiration in the US for the initiatives taken by ROK and the skillful manner in which discussions had been pursued, and thanked him for instructing his subordinates to keep us fully informed. I asked him for his assessment of the contacts with North Koreans, what he considered to be North Korean objectives, how he saw the talks evolving, and what time-frame did he foresee as ruling in pursuit of his own purposes.

4. Park asked if I had been briefed on the latest meeting. I replied that CIA Director Yi Hu-rak had been out of town the past few days but I expected to meet him early next week. He said Yi was away resting but he would ask him to give me the details. Meanwhile his Secretary General Kim Chong-Yom would give me a quick run-down when he had finished our meeting. (See below)

5. Park said he would have another talk with me about this question at a later date. He was pursuing the matter of contact with the North carefully and with an eye to what was practical. At this point he wished to see some progress on the issues involved in the Red Cross talks, such as the beginning of plenary meetings, the movement of people back and forth, and the opening of communication. He believes in making some progress on the smaller, easier issues and working toward the solution of more difficult issues. Unfortunately the North Koreans have tried to move immediately to generalized political discussion of the major issues and wanted such things as early summit meetings between himself and Kim Il-sung. This was impractical and the Communist proposals seemed to be directed more to impressing third parties with North Korean desire for solutions rather than to achieving practical results.

6. Park thought that talks would take time to get anywhere. He considered it possible that North Koreans would back away when it came to some practical results, such as mutual visits, communication between people on both sides of DMZ, and other realistic actions. The Red Cross talks were a good test of North Korean readiness to move ahead and only time would tell how far this could go. He, like all Koreans, was suspicious of the North Koreans on the basis of the past record and he would move to test their sincerity.

7. He then discussed situation in North Korea briefly mentioning recent articles in Japanese press, and the series by Salisbury and Lee in The New York Times. (He was critical of biased nature Japanese
reporting but thought *Times* articles were quite good.) He noted evidence of garrison state mentality, personality cult and tightness of controls. The nature of life in the North made him wonder if Kim II-sung really was prepared to expose his people to outside influence. He agreed that it will be very interesting to see the effect of the first non-official contacts, if and when the Red Cross talks open the way.

8. We parted, agreeing to meet again for further discussion, and I went off with Kim Chong-yom.

9. Kim said President Park had asked him to give me a summary of last meeting with North Koreans pending Yi Hu-rak’s fuller report. North Korean Vice Premier Pak Sang-chol had come down to Seoul on May 29th, met three times with Yi Hu-rak, and then for two hours with President Park on May 31. Pak Sang-chol had proposed establishment of a North-South coordinating committee, a meeting between President Park and Kim II-sung, and public disclosure of the secret meetings held in Pyongyang and Seoul.

10. President Park had agreed to the formation of a “so-called” coordinating committee, charging Yi Hu-rak to remain in contact with Kim Yong-chu (younger brother of Kim II-sung) for this purpose. I asked how formal was the arrangement and what were the terms of reference. Kim Chong-yom replied that the arrangement was not formal, and that the terms of references were vague. As of now they viewed the arrangement as a channel for communication which could permit discussion of such things as ways to facilitate the Red Cross talks, or clearing up misunderstandings that could arise over incidents along the DMZ.

11. Public disclosure of secret meetings had been turned down by President Park as had the idea of a meeting with Kim II-sung at this time. Park had spoken of distrust of Northern intentions on part of Southerners and desire not to cause uneasiness or unwarranted expectations on Park of people who have reason to fear North Korea which had once launched invasion and carried out terrorist actions. Contacts should therefore be implemented on a gradual basis, with such actions as family visits, communication between North and South, and cultural exchanges. Park had also told Pak Sang-chol that now was not the time for a summit meeting which needed a great deal more preparation if it was to be useful.

12. Kim Chong-yom then said that President Park is ready to move ahead with political talks if North Korean sincerity is demonstrated by step-by-step progress, particularly in Red Cross talks. Park is concerned that North Korea is more interested in “dividing South Korea’s national consensus” and creating confusion in the South than it is in solving differences. He was also concerned that North is trying to mislead the American public through a false peace offensive, thus promoting de-
mand for early withdrawal of US forces from Korea and an end to the military modernization program.

13. I asked when next political meeting was scheduled. Kim said North Koreans proposed that Yi Hu-rak go to Pyongyang for a meeting in June. No response was made then, but President Park did not plan to send Yi at this time. Generally speaking the ROKG was not interested at this moment in political meetings at a senior level in Pyongyang and Seoul. If they become desirable, it may be preferable to have them in a third country. As for the coordinating committee, it could communicate at a lower level. The ROK strategy at this point is to see what progress can be made at the Red Cross talks, keep all channels open, but remain cautious.

Habib

146. Memorandum from John A. Froebe, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
State Analysis of Recent Political Probings Between North and South Korea

At Tab A is a State memorandum to you setting out their analysis of South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak’s early May discussions in Pyongyang with Kim Il-song and others.² State’s principal conclusions are:

—As we have long assumed, Kim Il-song is indeed of the Stalinist mold. [But this should not be construed to mean that factionalism is not a problem for him. He told Yi Hu-rak that “extreme leftists” were responsible for the North Korean assassination attempt against President Park in early 1968. While this may be a self-serving comment,
we have had evidence of factional conflict in North Korea over the years.\(^3\)

—Contrary to previous notions that Kim has a capacity for irrational behavior, Yi concluded that Kim is decidedly in touch with reality, is perceptive, and is aware of the weaknesses of the sycophants who surround him. [Incidentally, as you may have noted, Harrison Salisbury and John Lee of the New York Times came away from their recent visit to Pyongyang impressed by the oppressive atmosphere resulting from the extreme lengths to which the adulation of Kim Il-song has been pushed. This is the same impression gained by Yi Hu-rak.]

—Kim is intent on persuading the South Korean leadership that he has given up military force as a means of reunifying the Peninsula.

—Vice Premier Kim Yong-chu (Kim Il-song’s younger brother), who has risen rapidly in recent years to his present sixth notch in the hierarchy, is not the near certain successor to Kim Il-song that some analysts have thought him to be.

—State concludes that it is a healthy development that Yi Hu-rak recognizes that the North Korean leadership does not have the high degree of strength and vigor that the South Korean leadership previously has attributed to it. This should contribute to a greater degree of self-confidence among ROK leaders.

State suggests that it is time to take another look at North Korean intentions. I am somewhat skeptical that another analysis of available evidence at this time would measurably clarify Pyongyang’s current intentions.

The evident questions, it seems to me, are what Kim Il-song hopes to gain from his switch in tactics that began late last summer; to what extent he feels constrained by Peking’s altered approach—and by Soviet policy as well; and to what extent Peking and Moscow are willing to use what influence they have in Pyongyang to restrain Kim should this be necessary. Tentative answers to these questions should become more evident as a result of North Korea’s political discussions with the South, from Pyongyang’s approach to the Korean question in next fall’s U.N. General Assembly, from the conduct of their current diplomatic campaign to improve the DPRK’s international position, and from the level at which they keep their continuing harassment of the South through infiltration and subversion.

Related to this, I find State a bit overly hopeful as to Kim’s current purposes, and a bit too insensitive as regards the risks of exploring the possibilities of expanded U.S. contacts with Pyongyang. These risks include loosening the political and social cohesion of South Korea, increasing friction between ourselves, Seoul, and Tokyo, and possibly leading Pyongyang to miscalculate our intentions toward the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

\(^3\) All brackets are in the original.
147. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of
State

Seoul, June 13, 1972, 0939Z.


1. On 13 June 1972, I had an hour and forty-five minute talk with
ROK CIA Director Yi Hu-rak about the recent visit to Seoul (29 May–1
June) of the North Korean delegation headed by Vice Premier Pak
Song-ch’ol. Yi Hu-Rak’s assistant, Kim
Sang-in, were also present.

2. Yi Hu-rak began our discussion with an apology for his delay in
getting together with me, stating he had taken a rest in the countryside
beginning almost immediately after the North Korean delegation’s de-
parture from Seoul. Yi said he had returned to Seoul only on 12 June and
had not yet briefed other ROK officials on developments connected with
North Korean delegation’s visit. Yi then gave me two file folders, one of
which contained what he described as a complete record of the minutes
of the North Korean delegation’s visits with President Park Chung Hee
and himself. The second folder contained accompanying memoranda and
reports on the delegation’s visit. We are translating and expediting the
transmission of these documents to the Department. From an initial
inspection of these records, we note that the North Korean delegation
was composed of five representatives: Vice Premier Pak Song-Ch’ol; Kim
Tok-Hyon, Chief, Organization and Guidance Department, Korean Lenor
[Labor?] Party; Yi Chang-Sik, Vice-Chief of the Organization and Guid-
ance Department; Kim Chae-Song, aide to Pak Song-Ch’ol; and Kim
Ch’ol-Su, who was the accompanying physician.

3. Yi Hu-Rak said he thought that the most important result of the
visit was the achievement of an “agreed coordinating committee,”
which Yi did not want to describe otherwise as formal or informal or
as official or unofficial. Pak Song-Ch’ol had brought with him from Py-
ongyang an official proposal that a coordinating committee be estab-
lished. Yi pointed out that this proposal had resulted from his own ini-
tiative in suggesting a means of coordinating North-South relations
during his earlier visit to Pyongyang. In addition to the coordinating
committee, Pak Song-ch’ol had suggested during his discussions with
Yi Hu-Rak that several other committees be established. According to
the proposal the coordinating committee would deal with political and
unification matters and there could be additional committees for mil-
itary, economic, and other subjects. Yi counter-proposed leaving aside

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543,
2 Document 145.
additional committees until the need for them seemed more apparent. He suggested to Pak Song-Ch’ol that agreement be reached on a comprehensive frame of reference for the coordinating committee along the lines of improving relations between North and South Korea and resolving problems between them. Pak Song-Ch’ol accepted Yi’s definition of the functions of the coordinating committee. The composition and work of the committee had not yet been determined but meanwhile Yi and Kim Yong-Chu had an established channel for communication.

4. Pak Song-Ch’ol proposed the issuance of a joint communiqué on the fact of these visits and discussions, but President Park had rejected this proposal. According to Yi Hu-Rak, the most important problem now facing the ROKG with respect these developments is when, where, and how to make a public announcement about them. Both President Park and Yi Hu-Rak feel the need to proceed cautiously and think that this is not yet the right time to bring out the fact and content of these exchanges. One of their principal concerns is that the U.S., Japan, and other third countries might conclude too quickly that tensions on the Korean Peninsula were being effectively resolved. Another main consideration is the continuing need to prepare the ROK population properly in terms of national morale and unity.

5. At this point, I expressed the view that it would be advantageous for the ROK to make the fact of these developments public as soon as feasible. I told him that, during my discussion with President Park on June 10, I had mentioned there was already widespread talk in the diplomatic community here about secret official visits back and forth between Pyongyang and Seoul. I mentioned to Yi Hu-Rak that information had already leaked out within the ROK about his own visit to Pyongyang and I reminded him that, almost inevitably, there would be a major leak sooner or later. I reassured him that the U.S. Government would avoid giving any impression of reducing our presence or commitments here at this time. I expressed the opinion that the ROK population would welcome positively these initiatives and that President Park and Yi Hu-Rak would receive overwhelming support from the ROK public in contrast to the situation that existed even a year or two ago. Yi Hu-Rak answered that he thought “99 pct” of the ROK population would welcome these developments but public disclosure of the recent secret meetings had to be timed with great care.³

³ In telegram 3769 from Seoul, June 29, Habib reported that Lee Hu Rak informed him that day that President Park had decided to “make public the North-South secret meetings involving Yi in Pyongyang” and Pak Song-Ch’ol’s visit to Seoul. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972) Telegram 3770 from Seoul, June 29, provided the unofficial translation of the proposed South-North joint communiqué, which was almost identical to the final version. (Ibid.) In telegram 3809 from Seoul, July 1, Habib informed the Department of his receipt of the joint communiqué from Foreign Minister Kim, who said that it would be released on July 4. (Ibid.) See Document 151.
6. During his talks with Yi Hu-Rak, Pak Song-Ch’ol invited Yi to visit Pyongyang in June and said he would send him an official invitation after his return to Pyongyang. Yi thanked him for the informal invitation but did not advise Pak Song-Ch’ol whether he would accept. Both President Pak and Yi feel that it would tend to downgrade the value of these meetings for Yi to make an early return visit to Pyongyang. Personally, Yi is not inclined to further meetings with Pak Song-Ch’ol, who, he feels, lacks the personal qualities and sufficient authority to make such meetings very productive. His own thinking is that the next step will wait on an official invitation to Pyongyang, which has not yet arrived but which he expects will be forthcoming. After a suitable interval, assuming that an invitation is received, Yi’s view is to counter-propose a meeting in a third country with Kim Yong-Chu (Premier Kim Il-Song’s younger brother) to take place possibly in July or August. He thought that Paris or Geneva might provide a suitable meeting place. After their meeting, Yi and Kim Yong-Chu could issue a joint communiqué or separate identical statements announcing the establishment of the coordinating committee. The text of the communiqué or separate statements would have been prepared in advance at the working level and agreed on before proceeding to whichever third country was selected for the meeting. The text would be limited in content and would be shaped along the lines that the North Korean and South Korean representatives were working to reduce tensions on the Peninsula and that they would exercise influence toward persuading their respective governments to move toward policies and programs promoting this objective. Yi said he had made no reference to a third country meeting in his discussions with Pak Song-Ch’ol.

7. I asked Yi Hu-Rak whether any progress had been made during these discussions on expediting the Red Cross talks. Yi answered that he agreed with my impression that North Korea may be engaged in a certain amount of foot dragging. He thought that the North Koreans had not yet completed physical and other preparations for the plenary sessions and he could not predict when the first plenary session would be held. He expects that the preliminary meeting on 16 June will result in an agreed agenda. There would then be another preliminary meeting after which it should be possible to predict a date for the plenaries to begin. I said I thought it important to maintain the momentum of the Red Cross talks and mentioned that President Park had referred during our discussion to the usefulness of these talks in testing North Korean intentions. Yi did not expect that momentum in the Red Cross talks would be lost.

8. After the North Korean delegation’s departure for Pyongyang, Yi made a complete report on their visit to President Park. Both President Park and Yi concluded that the visit had been a very successful one from the ROK point of view. They believed that agreement on a
coordinating committee was a useful accomplishment. Park thought that it was good that the North Korean representatives had been able to see Seoul and its environs for themselves. Yi said the North Koreans were “amazed” and impressed with Seoul and with what they had seen during their visit to the ROK. They seemed impressed with the meticulous preparations which the South Koreans had made for their visit and for the future reception of their Red Cross delegation. Yi thought they were impressed also with the nature and freedom of relationships between President Park and Yi Hu-Rak in the give and take of discussions and courtesies. He said the North Korean representatives conducted themselves like “robots” and were unwilling to hazard anything that looked like personal or independent thinking. He commented that Pak Song-Ch’ol, during his meetings with Yi Hu-Rak and even with President Park, confined himself to reading a prepared text from a notebook he carried in his pocket. His conclusion was that Kim Il-Song is the only North Korean leader who can talk freely and Pak Song-Ch’ol had even less authority than Kim Yong-Chu.

9. During this discussion, Yi said that the “hot line” telephone between him and Kim Yong-Chu has been used only twice by the North Koreans. About 15 December, Pyongyang had called to report that ROK troops at the DMZ had fired more than 500 rounds of machine gun ammunition and the North Korean troops intended to retaliate. Yi asked for delay and was able to report back to Pyongyang that the troops had been firing only at phosphorescent lights coming from dead tree trunks, lights which the troops had thought were carried by hostile soldiers. Pyongyang accepted this explanation and avoided retaliation. On the second occasion, Pyongyang had called to explain that North Korean troops had fired several machine gun rounds at three or four ROK soldiers who had wandered north of the demarcation line.

10. Yi seemed pleased with all developments to date and with his personal role in them. He gave the impression that future developments in private negotiations depend to a considerable degree on the next step he is waiting for, namely the receipt of an official invitation to visit Pyongyang.
Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Miller) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Korean Question at the 27th UN General Assembly

Your memorandum of June 21 requested that those portions of the study being prepared in response to NSSM 154 respecting the Korean question in the UN be submitted by June 30. A memorandum is attached examining the questions to be debated in the UN and setting forth options available to the United States Government.

The possibility of a debate on Korea in the United Nations this fall comes at a time when the United States has begun to make major adjustments in the terms of its relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. In choosing among the options available decisions should take into account the following issues:

—How valuable is the United Nations presence in Korea to the U.S.?
—How valuable is the United Nations presence to the Republic of Korea?
—Is now the appropriate time to consider changes in the United States position?


In the past the umbrella of the United Nations presence has been of assistance to the United States in carrying out its policies in Korea with the approval of the international community. Specifically: The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) has provided an agreed U.S.–ROK approach to the question of Korean unification which has the endorsement of the UN. However, it has long since completed its contribution to the rehabilitation of Korea and has never been able to carry out its mandate on

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Korea Overflow, Vol. V–A, Jan–Dec 1972. Secret. In an undated memorandum to Haig, Richard Kennedy forwarded this memorandum with the note: “This was the special study that HAK asked for. We are staffing it and preparing for a potential meeting but thought that HAK might want to have it in the meantime.” (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 5, Document 133.

3 Attached but not printed.
unification since it has never been accepted by the other side. Its presence is symbolic and as North-South bilateral contacts grow even this value diminishes.

The United Nations Command has provided a means acceptable to the ROK for U.S. operational control of the ROK armed forces; has been the guarantor for the UN side of the Armistice Agreement terminating the Korean conflict; and has provided the only useable channel of communication between the U.S. and North Korea. The question of its present usefulness is more complex but the presence and treaty basis of U.S. forces in Korea is independent of the Command. However, the ability to use Japanese bases in defense of Korea is related to UNC arrangements. Dismantling the Command would require a review of the value of these arrangements, revision of the present bases of U.S. operational control of ROK forces and adjustments to preserve the validity of the Armistice Agreement.

Basically, the UN apparatus in Korea is an increasing anachronism and a problem for the United States, particularly in the United Nations. Time can only erode support for the present arrangements devised during the cold war confrontation; increasingly the various states are indifferent to the issue or convinced the UN apparatus is inappropriate to the current international situation. It will thus require increasing U.S. expenditure of time and effort to maintain these arrangements with less and less probability of success.

Value of the United Nations Presence to the ROK.

The UN presence gives the ROK a special status with respect to North Korea and supports its claim to international protection. The UN presence is part of the history of UN involvement in Korea since its liberation from Japanese colonial rule, and supports in ROK eyes the legitimacy of its government which was established under UN aegis. Actually, the legitimacy of the ROKG does not depend in any way on a preferred situation in the UN which, in any event can be maintained only by increasing effort on our part.

UNCURK is seen as a symbol of international interest in unification of Korea on terms favorable to the ROK. The United Nations Command is intimately linked by the ROKG with continued U.S. military support and a token, however fragile, of UN concern for its security.

Removal of the UN presence would be considered a psychological defeat and internally could cause dissension and unrest if it called into question U.S. support or impaired the international status of the ROK.

Is It Time to Dismantle the UN Apparatus?

The Secretary of State has told the ROK Foreign Minister that we are prepared to work with the ROKG for postponement of the Korean debate this year, and the President has assured President Park that we
would cooperate with the ROKG in dealing with the UN question. To undertake major changes in the UN presence this year, except in the face of pressure not evident at this time, would dismay the Korean government. It has entered into what for it is a danger-fraught dialogue with North Korea. Not only are the development and outcome of this dialogue impossible to forecast, but the ROKG is fearful that confrontation in the peninsula will precipitate a massive recession of U.S. support and international interest, leaving it ultimately in an inferior position with respect to North Korea. The ROKG believes it has a right to our support, particularly this year when, at the President’s request, it has reluctantly and at some cost agreed to retain the two ROK infantry divisions in Vietnam for the remainder of this year. The ROK total ground force in Vietnam will be slightly larger than our own by September 1, and the combat portion of that force will be considerably larger.

Recommendations:

1. For the reasons cited we believe this year the U.S. should continue to work with the ROKG for postponement of the Korean debate.

2. In doing so, we should seek ROK agreement to examine with us all aspects of the UN presence prior to the 28th General Assembly in 1973.

3. If postponement proves not feasible we will face the traditional debate. It is not necessary to make a final decision on the various elements of the debate at this point but we think our planning and discussion with the ROKG should be along the following lines:

   a. Invitation Question. The traditional conditional invitation is unlikely to be successful and we should be prepared to make the changes necessary to obtain UN endorsement accepting the possibility that this may mean North Korean participation in the debate.

   b. UNCURK. The ROKG may insist that we hold the present line on UNCURK and it is possible that we could do so for this year. We should however recognize the vulnerability of UNCURK and develop contingency plans for seeking the suspension of UNCURK activity on the most favorable terms possible.

   c. Question of Foreign Troops. We should meet this issue head on and make no concession that might affect the UNC which is the creation of the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. This is an issue we will have to face subsequently.

   d. Korean War Aggressor Resolutions. We should also meet this issue head on on the grounds that the UN is not in the business of rewriting history.

   e. Two Koreas in the United Nations. Neither side appears particularly interested in this approach. Obviously we cannot accept entry of North Korea until both Koreas are prepared to apply for membership.

R.T. Curran

4 Curran signed for Miller over his typed signature.
Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
State’s Analysis of North Korean Premier Kim Il-song’s Proposals of June 21

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from State analyzing Kim Il-song’s proposals he made in an interview June 21 with Selig Harrison of the Washington Post. Kim laid out a four-phase troop reduction for the Korean Peninsula, expressed an interest in a summit with South Korean President Park, and reiterated his standard positions on dismantling the U.N. presence in South Korea and on the usefulness of increased people-to-people contacts between North Korea and the U.S.

State suggests that Kim’s immediate objective in broaching the proposals in this forum was to pressure Seoul to agree to make public the secret North-South political contacts that have been under way since late March. [Whether because of this pressure from Kim or for other reasons, Seoul decided last week to agree to a joint communiqué with the North announcing the existence of the talks, and this is to be made public July 4.]

State analyzes Kim’s four-phase troop reduction plan as follows: (The four phases are demilitarization of the DMZ, reduction of North and South Korean forces by 150,000–200,000 each, conclusion of a North-South peace pact, and last, the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the reduction of the armed forces on both sides to 100,000.) What is new in Kim’s proposed demilitarization of the DMZ is not the idea itself—this has previously been proposed by our senior U.N. negotiator in the Military Armistice Commission and by South Korea—but the modality: Kim’s proposal that it be negotiated between Seoul and Pyongyang directly. This, of course, would undercut the U.N. role in Korea, a prime first objective of North Korea [and one that it is pursuing as regards next fall’s U.N. General Assembly session, which it would like to see abolish UNCURK and nullify the 1950 aggressor resolutions].


2 Dated June 26, attached but not printed.

3 All brackets are in the original. See footnote 3, Document 147.
As regards Kim’s second phase, State comments that the proposal for an interim reduction is new; Kim in the second point of his Eight Point Program for Korean Reunification (broached in April 1971) called for the reduction of armed forces North and South to 100,000 or less. The proposed interim reduction would leave South Korea with an advantage of 150,000–200,000 more troops over the North (the present strengths are 612,000 for South Korea and 383,000 for North Korea). [Seoul’s apparent military advantage would be offset at least in part by what is regarded as the generally superior North Korean reserve force system, numbering between 900,000 and a million. In addition, it assumes that Kim would agree to effective verification of force reductions, and that Kim believes agreement on such an interim reduction could really be achieved.]

As State suggests, Kim no doubt intended the surface political appeal of his proposals to cause the South problems.

—It will stimulate contention internally in South Korea, particularly with the secret North-South political contacts soon to be out in the open. Kim probably believes that his tight political control in the North gives him a basic advantage over his rival, beset with political and social tensions always simmering just beneath the surface and much more vulnerable to foreign criticism of authoritarian political methods.

—Kim probably hopes his proposals, like his insistence on immediate high-level discussion of the basic political issues dividing North and South in order to move toward détente, will cause problems for Park Chung-hee with the U.S. and Japan. (Korean Ambassador Kim Dong-jo on June 30 protested Secretary Rogers’ use of the term “DPRK” to Under Secretary Johnson. Seoul was also disturbed that we had not consulted with it before taking this step, as they noted Secretary Rogers on March 7 had said we would when he stated that the U.S. was interested in improving relations with North Korea.)

—Kim probably hopes that, in the current atmosphere of détente, such proposals will improve North Korea’s international image and put South Korea on the defensive, particularly as regards the upcoming U.N. General Assembly debate.
Seoul, July 7, 1972, 0630Z.

3946. Department pass to Secretary. Subj: Assistant Secretary Green’s Conversation with President Park Chung Hee, July 6, 1972.

1. Summary: Park made following major points in commenting on South-North communiqué: South had sought contact at high level to forestall reckless act by Kim Il Sung. ROK is still suspicious, but wants to make sincere test of North’s intentions. Continued U.S. support of ROK position of strength is essential. Reunification will take much time, but opening dialogue reduces chances of war. North wants to plunge into hot political issues. South wants gradual approach beginning with exchanges. North is already demanding U.S.–UN withdrawal, and will press this line. Green said communiqué welcomed, U.S. would continue to do what it could to help the ROK negotiate from strength. Park expressed hope ROK’s friends not get ahead in dealing with North. ROK would hope to delay world acceptance of two Koreas. End summary.

2. Assistant Secretary Green, accompanied by Ambassador Habib called on President Park for one hour twenty minute discussion. Foreign Minister Kim and Presidential Secretary General Kim Chu Yom also were present.

3. President Park inquired after the health of President Nixon. Mr. Green replied that the President was in very good health and had asked Mr. Green to convey his warmest personal regards to President Park as had Secretary Rogers. Park said President Nixon must be tired after his strenuous efforts during the recent trips to Peking and Moscow. Green replied the President is in excellent health and is the kind of man who is reinvigorated by such travels given his deep interest in international affairs.

4. Green said he had discussed with the Foreign Minister in some detail recent international developments including President Nixon’s Moscow trip, SEATO and ANZUS meetings and recent developments in Asia. Among the latter were, of course, the latest developments in

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR N–KOR S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Taipei, Tokyo, Hong Kong, USUN, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Green visited the ROK July 5–6 as part of a trip to Southeast Asia taken at Nixon’s request in order to gauge reaction to the joint North-South Korean communiqué announced on July 4 concerning opening dialogue between the two countries.

2 Telegram 7140 from Tokyo, July 6, contains a report of Green’s conversation with Kim Yong Shik on July 5. (Ibid.)

Korea concerned [contained] in the joint South-North communiqué. This was a development the United States welcomed and for which we commended ROK initiative and courage.

5. The President said he was sure the Ambassador had briefed Green on the details of the actual discussions with the North so he would not go into these details. The ROK had been concerned over the possibility of a reckless act by Kim Il Sung. Therefore last year they had started trying to solve this problem and had proposed the opening of a dialogue at any meeting place. The North Koreans accepted the proposal and proposed Pyongyang where the initial meeting had been held. Park said he wished to stress that in order to achieve their objectives in this dialogue with the North and to obtain fruitful results, he believes it is imperative to have the strong support of the United States Government.

6. Park said he did not consider North Korean acceptance of the proposal for a dialogue an act of sincerity or sign of good intentions by Kim Il Sung. He anticipated there could even be unfavorable things arising during the course of the negotiations, knowing the nature and past record of the North Korean Communists. Agreement in principle in itself does not give the South Koreans reason to trust the North Koreans. On the other hand they are not appearing totally distrustful. They are willing to test North Korean sincerity and good intentions which must be proven by actions in the future. He noted that toward the end of the joint communiqué the observation of the aforementioned principles are pledged before the Korean people by both North and South. It is to be hoped that Kim Il Sung—as reckless as he is—will observe what he agreed upon but the ROK will wait to test his credibility and hope that there will be no unacceptable recklessness.

7. The reunification of a divided country requires considerable time with perseverance and patience. It is a difficult problem in view of the fact that North and South Korea are at two extremes of ideology and institutions. Neither side will accept the other’s institutions or ideology. They will have to be compromised, and he does not perceive how this would come about at the present time. The important thing was to open a dialogue and to avoid recurrence of war in order to reach the ultimate [goal?] of reunification. There were intermediate steps beginning with an exchange of people, goods and culture so as to improve understanding and eliminate misunderstandings. He does not at present expect the political talks to go into hot discussion on reunification. There will be much time and much to do before that. The North Koreans on the contrary want to get into the hot issues now. Park had explained to Park Sang Chol of North Korea that it is not time to go into the difficult political problems. The North Korean approach is far ahead of political realities. For example they proposed summit talks right away, which is impractical. If the atmosphere matures then, of
course, political talks will be possible but this is not the case. There is no mutual confidence after a separation of twenty years. Direct confrontation on political issues now would only lead to charges and counter-charges. No fruitful results would follow and the meetings would end. So it would be better to eliminate the causes of separation and approach the easy problems before the difficult problems. Park Sang Chol said he would report these views to Kim Il Sung.

8. Park said that upon announcement of the joint communiqué the general public reaction was to welcome the move. They were simply glad a dialogue had been opened between the North and South. More thoughtful people who understood the problems expressed their welcome but at the same time showed some concern because they know the nature of Communism. In the joint communiqué North Korea has affirmed it would not use force to achieve unification. Park was pleased he had finally gotten North Korea to accept this principle. So long as the dialogue continued he did not expect Kim Il Sung would seek to use force. But he does expect the North Koreans to seek something else. The intention of Kim Il Sung is to realize his long-term demand that U.S. forces should withdraw from Korea. This is already demonstrated by the fact Park Sang Chol had stated in a press interview that with the agreement in the joint communiqué there was no need for foreign forces to remain in Korea and that UNCURK should be dissolved. These sorts of demands could be expected continuously in the future.

9. Another intention of Kim Il Sung is to use the communiqué to try and influence U.S. public opinion to call for an end of U.S. military aid to South Korea. It was encouraging to learn that the State Department’s spokesman had made it known that U.S. military assistance will be continued and U.S. forces will not be reduced as a result of the latest development. Park said he believes that if uncertainty arises over future U.S. support the South-North talks would either reach deadlock or break off. The South is trying to test the sincerity of the North. To do so it needs continuing U.S. support because without such aid it would not be possible to negotiate from a position of strength with Kim Il Sung. This is needed in order to gain fruitful results.

10. Green said he appreciated President Park’s lucid, articulate and convincing statement of motivation and prospects. He knew President Park as practical, realistic and tough-minded. He was particularly struck by the comment concerning inhibitions imposed upon the North Koreans. It would become more difficult for them to take provocative actions now that world attention was focussed on them and this was important. He also appreciated the truth of what the President was saying about North Korean objectives. Their objectives were obviously not friendly. As the President said, we distrust them but not to the point where we can’t have a dialogue and a step-by-step approach for a reduction of tensions and a long-run goal of reunification.
We also appreciate the necessity of negotiating from a position of strength as well as the importance of solidarity at home and with friends abroad. The joint communiqué had been welcomed by Korea's friends. The move into South-North talks and an expanding dialogue has our full support. The United States would do that which is within its capabilities to enable Korea to negotiate from strength. This would not be the kind of strength that would threaten the North but it was the kind that would produce honest negotiations. As with our own negotiations with the Soviet Union we did not believe in unilateral reductions or actions. We believe in reciprocity, so we fully understand the point President Park was making.3

11. Park said that the North Koreans had already started propaganda demands for immediate U.S. withdrawal and cut in the level of military forces in Korea. To people outside of Korea who did not understand the situation these proposals might sound good. Some might even feel that North Korea was being more positive and South Korea was being quite passive in the steps toward peace. But people who understood the situation knew better. Park hoped that he would have the full cooperation of the United States and other friends, as well as neighboring Japan. He hopes no one will suggest anything in advance of South Korean proposals. They have a program in mind but they did not wish others to jump ahead in advance of their own views.

12. Green said that we would take this into account. We recognize what has been done is on Korean initiative. We were informed and we welcomed it. We will not get into the business of interpreting what will happen. We hope there will be progress. We recognize the point the President was stressing and we want to remain in close touch on these and all developments. With regard to any such matter as withdrawal or anything that has to do with North Korea—these are subjects for consultation, as Secretary Rogers made clear in his statement of May 7. We appreciate that aside from the question of the reduction of U.S. military presence in Korea we appreciate the great importance of carrying through on the ROK forces modernization program.

13. Park said that they would stay in close touch with the U.S. through Ambassador Habib. They don't consider this an interference

3 Green also provided these assurances to Lee Hu Rak on July 6. According to telegram 3939 from Seoul, July 7, Green told Lee that the South Koreans could "count on the moral and material support of the U.S. Government and people" in their South-North initiatives. Lee said the South thought "it might be better at first to exchange people, material, and communications" than to work on the terms of achieving reunification. Green agreed with this and added "that to the extent exchanges can be achieved it will make it more difficult for North Koreans to create incidents." He commented, "There is no question the South will gain from such exchanges and one can hope North Korean views will be moderated as they are exposed to the outside world rather than remain a closed garrison state." (Ibid.)
of external powers but as assistance, and beneficial to their cause and therefore by definition it could not be interference. Green said that he did not see any reason to interpret the call for independent Korean efforts for reunification as denying U.S. assistance. We do not impose or interfere in other people’s affairs. We have close relations with Korea as we do with many countries in the world.

14. Park said the opening of the dialogue with North Korea is only a beginning. He hopes to improve understanding through various actions which would create an atmosphere of mutual confidence. This would be the first half of an effort for Korean reunification. After that would come the political talks. What happens then will be dictated by internal developments and the course of events which are hard to predict.

15. Meanwhile as he had suggested, our friends should refrain from suggesting things that are in advance of their own proposals. Speaking frankly, he said, the reference made by Secretary Rogers to the “DPRK” of course had no significance of recognition or other political implications. But once the statement had been made the public wondered if the United States was beginning to recognize North Korea. This demonstrated Korean sensitivity to remarks by high-ranking U.S. officials. If someone outside of the government, in the press or in the world of sports, were to make such a statement there would be no significance attached. It is different when a ranking figure is involved. It makes the North Koreans happy and the South Koreans unhappy and he hopes that there is no reason to make North Koreans happy. He asked that we refrain from high official recognition of North Korea.

16. Green said that Park was aware that there was no implication of recognition or normalization of our relations with North Korea in the terms used. We have tended to use terms which countries used to describe themselves as a matter of civility. There was no other implication to be drawn.

17. Park said he had one further point to make before breaking up. Some scholars and others were claiming that in the long-run South-North talks would lead to dual representation in the UN: recognition of two Koreas. This may come sooner or later regardless of other desires but he was hoping to delay that time in order to improve Korea’s position in the world as in the case of East and West Germany. He believes that even some officials in the United States speak in these terms. While it is a practical reality and may come about, it would be better if it were delayed until the ROK is in the best possible position. He knows we cannot control the press or criticisms of those who wish to speculate but again he hopes that in matters like this government officials will refrain from getting out ahead of the ROKG.

18. Green asked what would be the most effective way of meeting the question as to whether the present course of events will eventually
result in two Koreas. Park said he wanted discussion between the North and South to begin. He does not want to increase the problem at the UN but rather wished to postpone the debate there. As for two Koreas he hoped the U.S. Government would recognize the ROK is the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula and that it will not recognize any other [garble—lawful?] government. After all, the Soviet Union refused to recognize the ROK while characterizing the government in North Korea as the only legitimate government. The U.S. Government might say that when agreement is reached between North and South Korea on dual representation only then would the U.S. be able to support such a concept. At present the U.S. should recognize the ROK as the only lawful government. Green said that he did not see that this would create any issue. The U.S. recognizes the Government of the Republic of Korea alone on the Korean peninsula. As for the postponement of debate on the Korean question at the UN this year, Green read to the President a statement he had made in a press interview a week ago which expressed U.S. support for postponement and noting that with good progress in the bilateral talks between North and South there will be ample grounds to request postponement. This opinion would be reinforced by the latest developments.

19. Green expressed his appreciation for the clear views that had been expressed by President Park which would be most useful to our President and government.

Habib
151. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Preliminary Evaluation of North and South Korea’s Joint Communiqué of July 4

The agreement between North and South Korea embodied in their Joint Communiqué of July 4 represents the first major results of the contacts between the two begun last August. As such, the agreement signifies the interest on both sides in continuing and expanding the contacts, and probably will act as something of an additional deterrent against a return to militancy by North Korea. As you will recall, these contacts were stimulated primarily by your China initiative. They first took the form of discussions between their Red Cross representatives concerning the problem of divided families, and since late March have included secret higher-level, official discussions of political issues.

The following are the highlights that emerge from our preliminary analysis of the Communiqué:

—The document is largely confined to an enunciation of broad principles, which is useful as a demonstration of the two sides’ ability to agree on at least some general language. Wide disagreement in its application to specifics will of course remain, with both sides trying to exploit its propaganda value.

—The Communiqué’s content shows that the South successfully resisted the North’s attempts to move immediately to discussion of basic political issues. (President Park has insisted that measured progress must first be shown on the smaller, easier issues.) In addition, Seoul parried Pyongyang’s pressures for an early summit meeting between Park and Kim Il-song.

—As Kim Il-song has no doubt intended in pursuit of one of his principal objectives, the surfacing of the secret talks and the agreement will at least temporarily exacerbate dissension within South Korea.

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2 See footnote 3, Document 147 and Document 150.
• Opposition political leaders already are vociferously objecting that they were not consulted in advance.
• The Park Government must assure conservative elements, particularly in the military, that it is proceeding with due caution and is not being taken in by a tactical shift from the North.
• The Government must tamp down any false expectations of prospects for early or rapid movement toward reunification.
• Park will have to deal with pressures at home and from abroad for a relaxation of his authoritarian political controls. Kim Il-song has always been confident that his tight control in the North will give him a decided advantage on this score.

—The disclosure of the talks may also result in a considerably less militant international image for North Korea. While South Korea will probably also be seen internationally as coming more in line with the “mood of détente,” the North probably has farther to go on this score. Somewhat paradoxically, Pyongyang’s joining Seoul in these talks may thus, viewed relatively, accrue more to its advantage than to Seoul’s. This same objective undoubtedly motivates Kim’s efforts to have the Korean question debated in next fall’s U.N. General Assembly. In the U.N. case, Kim is interested not only in depriving the South of its preferred international status conferred by the complex of U.N. resolutions on Korea, but also is removing the U.N. cloak from our military presence in South Korea.

—As regards the Communiqué’s substantive specifics:

• Pyongyang will undoubtedly use the first of the three principles governing reunification (that reunification is to be achieved through Korean efforts and without “external imposition or interference”) to support its call for the end of the U.N. role in South Korea and for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Seoul has already denied that the phrase has any such meaning.
• The two sides agreed to facilitate “various exchanges in many fields,” and to seek the “early success” of the Red Cross talks on divided families.
• The two sides agreed to establish a Seoul–Pyongyang hot line and a Coordinating Committee chaired by the two principals in the secret political talks. (The Committee’s responsibilities are not defined in the Communiqué, but Seoul has told us it would be used to keep the contacts moving ahead.)

Reaction from Abroad

The PRC and Soviets have reported the Communiqué and the talks factually. The only Asian reaction so far has been first from Japan, where opposition parties have called for Japan to expand ties with North Korea (which has been counter-balanced by the Foreign Office’s call for caution). Taipei’s reaction was expectedly negative, while Saigon urged Hanoi to follow Pyongyang’s example.
ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

The Policy Problem

We now face a situation on the Korean question before the General Assembly which has been somewhat altered from that which existed a month ago when State submitted the NSSM 154 response covering this aspect of our Korean policy. The change revolves around currently shifting positions among U.N. members as to what the role of the U.N. on the Korean question should be in light of the July 4 Joint Communiqué between South and North Korea, and the opposition’s shifting tactics designed to take advantage of this situation.

Most evident, so far, the opposition came forward July 18 to table an explanatory memorandum inserting a new item on the UNGA provisional agenda entitled “Creation of Favorable Conditions to Accelerate the Independent and Peaceful Reunification of Korea.” It included no resolution, which they will presumably submit later. In essence, the memorandum states that, since the July 4 Joint Communiqué has called for the reunification of Korea—an objective which it notes the UNGA has reaffirmed many times over—“by peaceful means and without foreign intervention,” the UNGA should therefore reconsider the “terms of reference and the activities” of the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the U.N. Command in Korea (UNC). Although the other side has not yet made it clear, this agenda item presumably would replace the two agenda items on Korea which they inscribed last year and which are still on the General Assembly’s provisional agenda.

The intent of the opposition in offering this memorandum would seem to be to play on the sentiment among a large portion of UNGA members

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-064, SRG Meeting Korea/UN 8/9/72. Secret. Holdridge included the paper as part of a package of talking points submitted under cover of an August 7 memorandum for Kissinger’s use at the August 9 SRG meeting. (Ibid.)

2 In his August 7 covering memorandum, Holdridge explained that “the State paper was submitted on July 3, and was written with the assumption that postponement would be our primary strategy. Since that date the analysis has, in no small degree, been overtaken by events, primarily the effort of a group of ‘unaligned’ states led by Algeria and Yugoslavia—but directly encouraged by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—to build support for an active debate of the Korean issue in this fall’s General Assembly.” NSSM 154 is Document 133.

3 See Document 151.
that the U.N. role in Korea as defined in the early 1950's, and as most
evident in the present mandates of UNCURK and the UNC, is a Cold
War relic that in light of the July 4 Joint Communiqué is now more
than ever badly in need of overhaul. The July 18 memorandum sig-
nificantly does not specify what role the opposition envisages for these
two bodies. This purposeful omission may reflect PRC and DPRK sen-
sitivity to U.N. members reluctance to make the drastic changes in the
U.N. role that they intend.

Our own position. We now have inscribed on the UNGA provisional
agenda, as a result of its being carried over from last year's session, an
item on Korea to the effect that:

—The UNGA should reaffirm that the U.N. objective regarding the
Korean Peninsula is to bring about its peaceful reunification through
free elections.
—UNCURK should continue to pursue this objective and report
regularly to the UNGA on its progress.

This is essentially the position that the UNGA has reaffirmed on
UNCURK since that body was established in 1950. This aside, our cur-
rent position is of course to support postponement of General Assem-
bly debate on the question for this year.

[Early responses to our initial démarches made this past week in a
wide range of capitals seeking support for postponement has revealed
more support for our current position than was previously anticipated.
The majority of these states have justified their intended support in terms
of avoiding a great power confrontation and avoiding complicating the
promising dialogue now underway between the two Koreas. We would,
however, emphasize the early and partial nature of these returns.

At the same time, State estimates that we presently appear to have
the edge in the General Assembly’s General Committee, which must
pass on our postponement proposal and the resolutions before they go
to the Plenary. State believes that on postponement, the General Com-
mittee at present comes down with 11 for, 6 opposed, 7 uncertain, and
the Polish President of the Committee (who votes only in case of a tie).
We have additional indications, however, that a General Committee
decision to recommend postponement is likely to be challenged by Py-
ongyang’s supporters in the Plenary.]4

The State Memorandum

A. General

The State memorandum stresses the prospects for a continuing de-
cline in support for our past position on the Korean question in the

4 All brackets are in the original.
U.N., and argues that we should therefore move to realign the U.N. role on Korea while we still have sufficient influence to obtain changes acceptable to us. State ascribes this prospective decline to such factors as:

—The existence of direct negotiations between North and South Korea.
—North Korea’s show of flexibility on U.S. troop withdrawal and a peace settlement.
—PRC entry into the U.N.
—The influx of new U.N. members having little direct interest in the Korean problem.
—A growing impatience among most U.N. members with what they regard as the U.N.’s “cold war” position on the Korean question and their desire to move the U.N. to a non-partisan position on such problems.

[There is some reason for skepticism over State’s belief that we are in a “now or never” situation as regards our influence on a realignment of the U.N. role next year. It is likely to decline somewhat, but not necessarily to a critical extent. The most important factor here will probably be the progress made by the two Koreas in their reunification talks, and our relationship to that effort.]

B. Policy Options

Given our strong adherence to postponement, the central problem is to analyze what our alternative strategy should be if postponement fails. More specifically, what alternative position should we put forward on the procedural and substantive questions in the debate in order to defeat the opposition resolution’s call for disbanding the UNC, for withdrawal of foreign troops after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two Koreas, and for no military intervention by U.N. members in Korea? We presumably would move against the opposition resolution by countering with our own positions packaged in one comprehensive resolution.

In our analysis of the options laid out by the State paper, we omit consideration of the section on the pros and cons of postponement inasmuch as postponement is now our preferred approach. [For your reference, State suggests the possibility of shifting from support of postponement to support of debate in order to realign the U.N. presence in Korea while we still have sufficient influence in the UNGA to do so in an acceptable manner.] The State paper’s discussion of options on the procedural question of inviting the two Koreas to participate in the debate is still largely valid, however. Its discussion of options on the substantive questions in the debate (UNCURK, the UNC, and troop withdrawal) also appear still largely valid as regards the definition of the options, but the evaluation of the options is now somewhat outdated.

Before addressing the options, however, the following is a brief description of the procedural framework of the UNGA consideration of the Korean question, given its importance to the outcome.
The resolutions will first be taken up shortly after the new Assembly convenes September 19 by the Assembly's General Committee. This 25-member body, acting as a steering group, screens all items on the provisional agenda and prepares recommendations for the Plenary session regarding whether items should be retained, eliminated, or postponed, and whether the items should be assigned to one of the Assembly's seven main committees for preliminary debate or should go to the Plenary directly. If the General Committee and the Plenary do not agree to postpone consideration of the Korean question again, they would normally agree to refer the question first to the First Committee, which deals with political questions.

The First Committee would not take the question up until about six weeks after the General Committee and Plenary's action, since the opening statements by the foreign ministers and other business of the Plenary is transacted before the Main Committees meet. The First Committee would normally first take up the question of whether to invite both Koreas to its debate on the question as an observer, as is customary when the parties involved are not members of the U.N. In the past, the central issue in the invitation question has been whether both Koreas must first accept the competence of the U.N. to deal with the Korean question. The South has been willing to do so, given the support and advantaged position the U.N. action has conferred on Seoul. The North has refused to accept U.N. competence, reflecting its opposition to the diplomatic advantage given Seoul by the UNGA's 1948 recognition of South Korea as the "only lawful government" on the Korean Peninsula, the U.N.'s 1950 condemnation of North Korean aggression, and the U.N.'s creation of the U.N. Command in Korea.

A few weeks after disposing of the invitation question, the First Committee would debate and vote on the resolutions, and report its results to the Plenary Session. Since the Main Committees are committees of the whole, their findings are seldom overturned in the Plenary, and Plenary consideration of them is relatively brief.

As an alternative to First Committee consideration of the Korean question, the General Committee could recommend that it be referred directly to the Plenary. If accepted by the Plenary, this approach would have the effect of avoiding the nettlesome invitation question as non-member states by custom do not participate in Plenary debates of the GA. While precedent weighs against circumventing prior consideration by a Main Committee, this approach should not be ruled out of our tactical planning.

The Options

1. The Procedural Question: Invitation to the Two Koreas to Participate in the First Committee Debate

The question is not whether to invite both to the debate—both sides have agreed this is desirable—but whether both Koreas must first acknowledge unequivocally the competence of the U.N. to consider the Korean problem. The DPRK's supporters have regularly fought the inclusion of this stipulation by tabling an unconditional invitation resolution. The U.S.-sponsored conditional resolution has thus far always succeeded, although support for the Soviet-sponsored unconditional resolution has increased gradually over the years. (As some indication
of the relative strength of the invitation resolutions, in 1970, the last time a vote was taken, the U.S. resolution passed by 63–31–25, while the Soviet resolution failed by 40–54–25.)

Option 1: Conditional resolution. Invite representatives of both Koreas to take part, without vote, in the discussions in the First Committee, on the condition that the DPRK first unequivocally accept the competence and authority of the U.N. to take action on the Korean question. (Text at Annex C–2 in the State memorandum.)

Principal advantages. Would continue South Korea’s favored position in the U.N., and would be seen by Seoul as increasing somewhat their leverage in their dialogue with Pyongyang.

Principal disadvantages. Would not be acceptable to North Korea, and would probably result in the adoption of the unconditional resolution. (State bases its estimate on the unconditional resolution’s probable success on the following: the unconditional resolution lost by only 14 votes in 1970, the last time it was voted on. The PRC’s active support plus the votes of the eight U.N. members that have recognized the DPRK since then would probably secure its passage.)

Option 2: Cosmetic alteration of the conditional resolution to eliminate reference to the fact that the DPRK refuses to acknowledge U.N. competence on the Korean question. (Text as proposed by New Zealand last year is at Annex C–3 in the State memorandum.)

Principal advantages. Would be acceptable to Seoul, and would support its present position in the U.N. and in its dialogue with the North.

Principal disadvantages. Same as those under Option 1, but in addition would be perceived by some U.N. members as a tacit admission that we feared we would likely lose if we stuck to the traditional conditional resolution, and that we were unable to find a really effective response to the new situation.

Option 3: Modification of the conditional resolution as it applies to North Korea to invite it on the condition that it agree to be guided by the U.N. Charter in seeking a solution to the Korea problem (rather than explicitly affirm U.N. competence on the question). In addition, the modified resolution would explicitly invite North Korea, rather than merely express U.N. willingness to invite it once North Korea accepted U.N. competence.5 (Like the cosmetic alteration, the modified resolution would also omit mention of North Korea’s past refusal to accept U.N. competence.) (Proposed text at Annex C–4 of the State memorandum.)

Principal advantages. Would probably gain the acceptance of most of our previous co-sponsors, a majority of U.N. members, and even

5 The phrases “explicitly invite” and “willingness to invite” are underscored twice in the original.
possibly the Soviet Union, the PRC, and the DPRK. [The last three would probably as a matter of principle be able to accept the substance of such a modified conditional invitation, if they believed it were politically advisable for them to do so. The DPRK has publicly subscribed to the principles of the U.N. Charter.] Might reluctantly be accepted by the ROK, if it became convinced that neither the conditional resolution nor cosmetic alteration of it would pass.

Principal disadvantages. Would reduce the ROK’s advantage enjoyed under the present U.N. position. Could result in a weakening of our position as a result of the DPRK’s participation in the debate.

[North Korea’s not having to accept U.N. competence would apparently not result in any derogation of formal U.N. authority over the Korean question should North Korea, after participating in the debate, refuse to abide by resolutions the General Assembly might pass: as a legal principle, General Assembly resolutions are not binding on the parties to a dispute.]

[Another consequence of Option 3, as with any option that resulted in Pyongyang’s participation in the debate, is that it would help the DPRK reduce its relative diplomatic isolation and its international image of militance.]

Option 4: The unconditional resolution (in 1970 sponsored by the Soviet Union and other Communist members along with about 15 Middle East and African states), which invites representatives of both Koreas, without conditions, to participate in the First Committee debate but without a vote.

Principal advantages. Would be welcomed by the PRC, Soviet Union, and the DPRK, and would avoid a contentious debate in the First Committee on this issue.

Principal disadvantages. Would be widely interpreted as a setback for the U.S., and would adversely affect our position on the substantive questions in the Korean debate. Would be taken by the ROK as a defeat, for which they would blame us; ROK might refuse to attend the First Committee debate.

Option 5: Try to avoid the invitational question either by seeking the PRC and Soviet Union’s agreement to forego the debate or proposing that the Korean question be debated in the Plenary rather than the First Committee. (Non-member nations traditionally have not been invited to participate in debate in the Plenary.)

Principal advantages. Would avoid the invitation question and the possibility of having the unconditional question succeed.

Principal disadvantages. The other side would probably interpret our move as indicating decided weakness in support for our position, and so might stimulate them to press harder for the unconditional resolution.

[Another consequence of this option would be that it would avoid having the DPRK participate in the debate, which would be an
advantage in the ROK’s eyes and in our relations with Seoul, but a dis-
advantage in not exposing the DPRK to the realities of the international
scene at the U.N.

2. Substantive questions in the debate: UNCURK, the UNC and troop
withdrawal, U.N. aggressor resolutions, and of both Koreas in the U.N.

A. UNCURK. The UNCURK question is particularly difficult to
deal with at this point because of the ambiguity of the opposition’s po-
sition on it. Various versions of their draft resolution have used the
terms “stop” or “cease” all UNCURK activities, while the DPRK gov-
ernment statement of July 31 seemed to go farther in calling only for
the “suspension” of UNCURK activities.6 As noted previously, this
would seem to be a moderation of past years’ resolutions calling for
the dissolution of the body itself, noting that UNCURK was obstruct-
ing the reunification of the Peninsula. With the announcement of the
July 4 Communiqué, the DPRK and the PRC have begun arguing that
the Communiqué’s prohibition on outside interference in Korean re-
unification makes UNCURK an anachronism, although there are indi-
cations that Pyongyang wants to stop short of ruling out any U.N. role
in the problem, apparently believing that the U.N. offers a hedge
against a great power deal on the question.

UNCURK was set up by a UNGA resolution of October 7, 1950,
as the third successive organization commissioned by the General As-
sembly to represent the U.N. “in bringing about the establishment of
a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea.” Since
then UNCURK has functioned principally to observe elections in the
South, and to report on other matters related to reunification, includ-
ing North Korea’s 1968 infiltration efforts and attempted assassination
of President Park. It has submitted annual reports to the UNGA, which
have of course been one of the foci of the annual consideration of the
Korean question. (A more detailed chronology of UNCURK’s history
and the early development of the U.N. role in Korea is at Annex B of
the State memorandum.)

In consequence, UNCURK has become a substantial component
of the U.N. presence in Korea. Together with the more important com-
ponent of this presence, the UNC, UNCURK is supportive of the United
Nations aspect of the U.S. troop presence in Korea and of the ROK’s
advantaged diplomatic position. UNCURK also probably constitutes,
in a minor way, a deterrent to renewed North Korean militance on the
Peninsula.

Option 1: Reaffirm the U.N. objectives on the reunification of Korea
through free elections and renew UNCURK’s mandate. (Text of the resolu-

tion adopted in 1970 is at Annex C–7 of the State paper.) This has been the U.S. position since 1950, and the UNGA has approved this position every year that the question has been considered up through 1970. In 1970 the voting margin on this resolution in the First Committee was 69–30–23, and in the Plenary was 67–28–22. (The Soviet-sponsored resolution to dissolve UNCURK lost by 32–64–26.)

Principal advantages. Would maintain the existing U.S. and ROK position on the question of U.N. presence in Korea, and would not add to frictions in our relations with Seoul.

Principal disadvantages. Would be vulnerable to major diplomatic pressure from the PRC, Soviet Union, and DPRK, and would require a major effort on our part to support. [Given the opposition’s call for only “the cessation” or “suspension” of UNCURK’s activities and its packaging this with support for the South-North dialogue, and given the two Koreas’ commitment to negotiate reunification between themselves, it might be difficult for us to muster support again for UNCURK’s role of the past two decades. However, continuation of UNCURK might carry some appeal as a “don’t rock the boat” means of encouraging South-North contacts and talks.]

Option 2: Modify UNCURK’s role and composition. Propose that UNCURK’s mandate be modified to have it facilitate the South-North dialogue and whatever exchanges may develop, omitting reference to Peninsula-wide free elections. Make its composition more representative of the UNGA (its members now include Australia, Thailand, the Philippines, Turkey, the Netherlands and Pakistan, the latter having recently become an inactive member).

Principal advantages. Would preserve an UNCURK role that would be reasonably supportive of U.S. objectives and of the ROK diplomatic position [and also presumably of the basic U.N. involvement on the Korean question]. Could be portrayed as showing U.S. and ROK flexibility.

Principal disadvantages. Would be welcomed by neither the ROK nor the DPRK, and both would refuse to cooperate with it. [The ROK is in fact fearful that an UNCURK reconstituted in role and membership could be inimical to its interests, and at the working level has indicated strongly that it would sooner have no UNCURK than a reconstituted one. As regards the DPRK, we agree that it would oppose almost any modification of UNCURK that we could agree to and would obstruct its operations, leaving a reconstituted UNCURK probably not much more effective in supporting the South-North dialogue than it is at present.] Would be seen by many U.N. members as still unsatisfactory to North Korea and as a sign of weakness in the U.S. position, thus possibly resulting in reduced support for our position. [State has overdone this point.] Would be difficult to reconstitute UNCURK’s membership, since countries not already friendly to the ROK would probably be unwilling to serve in the face of North Korea’s opposition.
Option 3: Suspend UNCURK’s operations. (Draft text at Annex C–8 in State memorandum.)

Principal advantages. Would in effect remove the outmoded UNCURK role and presence from South Korea. [State’s implication that any UNCURK role would be outmoded is indicative of State’s basic position. We would agree, however, that although an UNCURK role modified to support the South-North discussions would not be outmoded, it would probably be largely ineffective because of the almost certain North Korean obstruction and hence counter-productive to the South-North talks.] Would probably gain the support of a majority of UNGA members, and would be more nearly acceptable to the DPRK, the PRC, and Soviet Union. [In fact, the DPRK now seems to have incorporated this option into its position.]

Principal disadvantages. Would be difficult for the ROK to accept, and would reduce its present diplomatic advantage. [Might probably result in a DPRK demand next year that UNCURK be dissolved, arguing that South-North discussions had proceeded successfully in UNCURK’s absence.]

Option 4: Terminate UNCURK. The termination of UNCURK, like its suspension in Option 3, would be with approval for its past activities—in contrast to the old Soviet-sponsored resolution dissolving UNCURK which charges UNCURK with not only having failed to promote reunification, but also having obstructed it. (A draft text is at Annex C–8 of the State memorandum.)

Principal advantages. In addition to the advantages of Option 3, would probably receive wide support in the UNGA, would be seen as a significant U.S. gesture to the PRC and Soviet Union, and would be more acceptable to the ROK than Options 2 or 3. [If the opposition’s position is merely to cease or suspend UNCURK’s activities, we obviously would not want to go even farther and terminate its existence.]

Principal disadvantages. The ROK would strongly oppose, UNCURK’s termination would undercut the UNC’s rationale by implying the U.N. has no function in Korea, and would reduce the ROK’s present diplomatic advantage. Might stimulate criticism of the U.S. as having abandoned a long-held position as a result of pressure from Peking and Moscow.

Option 5: Dissolve UNCURK. We would acquiesce in the Soviet-sponsored resolution as a gesture toward Peking and Moscow, although we would be strongly criticized at home and abroad for bowing to pressures from the other side and for abandoning an ally. [This option has been rendered untenable by the opposition’s draft resolution.]

B. The UNC and troop withdrawal. The UNC has been of importance to us not only as the most effective component of the U.N. presence in
South Korea and for the international support it lends our troop presence in South Korea—although it is not of course vital to our force presence there. It also provides a mechanism acceptable to the ROK for U.S. operational control of South Korea’s armed forces, has been the guarantor for the U.N. side of the Armistice Agreement terminating the Korean conflict, and through the Military Armistice Commission has provided the only channel of communication between ourselves and Pyongyang. Alteration of the UNC could also undercut the U.S. Status of Forces Agreement with Japan, which provides part of the legal support for our use of Japanese bases to fulfill our defense commitment to South Korea.

State’s two options deal with alternative methods of defeating the old Soviet-sponsored resolution, which called for the withdrawal from South Korea of foreign forces there under the U.N. flag within six months of the adoption of the resolution.

Option 1: Oppose disbanding the UNC and the call for troop withdrawal, arguing that (a) our traditional position, as expressed in the UNCURK resolution, states that we have already withdrawn the greater part of our forces from South Korea and will withdraw the remainder “whenever such action is requested by the ROK or whenever the conditions for a lasting settlement formulated by the UNGA have been fulfilled”; (b) the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is a bilateral question between the U.S. and the ROK [this would seem to undercut rather than support our argument]; and (c) the status of the UNC should be left to the U.N. Security Council, which created it. [Because the opposition’s draft resolution adds the third element of calling on U.N. members not to intervene militarily in Korea, we should reply that this would bar the possibility of any future peacekeeping activity, a fundamental responsibility of the U.N.]

Principal advantages. Would support our objectives of maintaining the U.N. presence as supportive of our troop presence and would reassure the ROK.

Principal disadvantages. Would probably be more difficult to garner the support of many non-Communist members, since the other side’s resolution has moved much closer to ours and since their proposal is now packaged with their proposals on UNCURK and South-North dialogue.

Option 2: Oppose disbanding the UNC and the call for troop withdrawal, but agree to restudy the question of UNC arrangements with the Security Council and others concerned.

Principal advantages. Being a demonstration of U.S. flexibility, should increase support for our opposition to the other side’s proposal. Would not seriously damage our defense commitment to the ROK.
Principal disadvantages. Would stimulate the ROK’s anxieties, and would raise the difficult questions involved in altering military command relationships between our own and ROK forces.

(A third option not discussed in the State paper would be to include the language of our traditional UNCURK resolution on the question of troop withdrawal in our own resolution on the Korean question, possibly supplemented by a unilateral U.S. statement on troop withdrawal from Korea similar to the Shanghai Communiqué formulation. We would argue that this formulation is more appropriate than that of the opposition, since troop withdrawal should be linked to a genuine reduction in basic tensions, not just the conclusion of a formal treaty—although we would admit that such a treaty would presumably contribute to a reduction of tension.

The advantage would be that we should through this tactic be able to steal some of the opposition’s thunder by giving new prominence to and making more explicit our commitment to ultimate force withdrawal. At the same time, this should not unsettle the ROK, since we essentially would not be going beyond a position we have already affirmed.)

C. U.N. Aggressor Resolutions. The PRC might, although it is less than likely that it will, propose that the UNGA resolutions of 1951 be rescinded.

State defines two options: (1) That we acquiesce in the repeal of these resolutions. This would avoid a confrontation with the PRC, but would sacrifice principle, set a bad precedent in the U.N., stimulate criticism that the U.N. was re-writing history, and cause frictions with the ROK. (2) That we oppose the repeal of these resolutions, arguing that the 1953 Korean Armistice leaves the resolutions without practical effect, and that the strategic embargo embodied in the second of the two resolutions no longer exists and is no longer applied under the authority of this resolution. The advantage of this option would be that it avoids bad precedents, while allowing a face-saving way out for both the PRC and ourselves. On the other hand, it would provoke a confrontation with Peking.

D. U.N. Membership for Both Koreas. State takes the position in its paper, and we agree, that this is not a practical problem this year, since neither Korea wants, at least at this point, to confer this degree of formality on the de facto two Koreas that U.N. membership would clearly imply.

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7 See footnote 2, Document 127.
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:
—We should try to postpone for another year the UN debate on the Korean question. However, if we don’t succeed, we should try to defer the debate until after the election. In the meantime, we should try to get better estimates of the way other governments will vote on this issue, and we should not talk to the ROKs about contingency plans.
—Option 3—a modification of a conditional invitation to the two Koreas—would probably be acceptable to all sides. We should give more consideration to this option.²
—State should prepare a more detailed analysis of the issues with regard to UNCURK and the UN Command for consideration by the SRG at the end of September.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we should have a review of the Korean issue today because it could come up a little later in two ways. The first issue is a procedural one—whether an attempt will be made to put the Korean item on the agenda of the General Assembly and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1972–1973. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.
² Reference is to the options summarized in Document 152.
whether we should try to defer the debate? Second, if we don’t succeed, if we lose the General Assembly vote, what general stance do we take on the other matters: the type of invitation to the two Koreas, UNCURK and the UN Command?

The two issues are distinct, but related. If we win on the first one, the procedural issue, the second one becomes less urgent.

(to Mr. Johnson) Alex, do you or Sam (DePalma) want to discuss these issues in more detail?

Mr. Johnson: I’ll let Sam do that. I just want to say, though, that I think at this moment the postponement approach looks reasonably doable.

Mr. DePalma: I don’t think it’s worth it to describe the issues in long detail, so I will keep my remarks brief. I must also warn you that it is too soon to be confident about our estimates. Right now, we seem to be in good shape in the General Committee. At least we’re in better shape than we were last year, when we were able to defer the debate. In the end, we think the Committee vote will be thirteen for deferment, seven against and four abstentions, provided the present vote trend holds. Our estimate for the General Assembly vote is less solid, but we think there will be a fifteen or twenty vote margin in favor of deferment.

Mr. Kissinger: I’m trying to understand how this issue will unfold procedurally. Let’s say the General Committee votes for deferment. The issue then goes to the General Assembly. Is that right?

Mr. DePalma: Yes. And an appeal against the General Committee’s recommendation will probably be made in the Assembly.

Mr. Kissinger: When would that happen?

Mr. DePalma: Fairly soon—probably one or two days—after the General Committee votes on the question.

Mr. Kissinger: And if an appeal were made in the Assembly, there would be a debate on the procedural issue of the types of invitations to be issued? Is that right?

Mr. DePalma: There would be general debate on the substantive issues, too.

Mr. Kissinger: Would it be an acrimonious debate?

Mr. DePalma: I don’t think so. My guess is that everybody would try to take reasonable and moderate positions. I don’t think the debate would heat up very much. We would say, given the evolving situation of the talks, we should leave both Koreas alone and let them try to work out their differences themselves. I think the other side would tend to be compelled to follow the same strategy, too.

Mr. Kissinger: You don’t think, then, that there would be a high-powered debate?
Mr. DePalma: No, I don’t.

Mr. Johnson: If the North and South are talking at that time, there probably wouldn’t be a high-powered debate in the Assembly.

Mr. DePalma: I should point out one other thing, though. We’ve never had a situation before where the Chinese and the Soviets are out trying to do something together. We know the Chinese position, but the Soviets have not shown their hand yet, although they have talked about supporting the Chinese. We should take into account the fact that they may work in concert on this issue.

Also, as Alex just said, we will be in a better position if the talks are going again.

Mr. Johnson: They started again today.

Mr. DePalma: Good. If they are suspended when the Assembly considers the matter, the North could say the talks won’t resume again until the Assembly takes affirmative action from the North’s point of view.

Since both sides have not yet hit most governments at high levels on this entire question, we don’t know for sure how the governments will vote. Nor do we know how the governments will react in the face of strong pressures from one side or the other. Therefore, there is some uneasiness about our estimates, which are based on low-level contacts.

If we decide not to do any arm-twisting for votes, the final outcome may depend to some degree on how hard the other side fights. I think the Chinese will fight hard, but it won’t be an all-out effort.

As I say, there is some uneasiness with our estimates. Still, I think we ought to be able to get the deferment.

Mr. Kissinger: If we win in the General Committee but lose in the General Assembly, will the issue then be referred to the First Committee?

Mr. DePalma: Yes, unless the Committee recommends it be referred directly to the Plenary—and the Plenary accepts this recommendation.

Mr. Kissinger: If that were done, it would avoid the invitation question, right?

Mr. DePalma: Yes. And I think we should give some consideration to this approach.

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming the issue is referred to the First Committee, when would the Committee take it up? About six weeks after the General Committee and Plenary’s action?

Mr. DePalma: Yes, although it could be taken up four weeks after the General Committee’s action.

Mr. Kissinger: That would be at the end of the election campaign.

Mr. DePalma: I would say on the eve of the election.

Mr. Johnson: Could we stretch it out so that the First Committee doesn’t take it up until after the election?
Mr. DePalma: Yes, I think that would be fairly easy to do.

Mr. Kissinger: Even if it came up before the election, I think our domestic opponents would be hurt more by an adverse outcome than we would be. Nevertheless, it’s not good to have another UN uproar.

Mr. Johnson: Can we try to stretch the procedure out so that the First Committee doesn’t take up the question until after the election?

Mr. DePalma: Yes. Even the other side is not interested in forcing this issue to come up on the eve of the election. If that were the case, they know we would be forced into taking a stiffer position.

Mr. Kissinger: Okay. Our objective should be to put the debate off until after the election if we lose in the General Committee or in the General Assembly. That will also enable us to be more flexible on the concrete issues, and it will give us more time to consider our positions on those issues.

Mr. Helms: When does the General Assembly convene?

Mr. Kissinger: On the 16th, I think.

Mr. DePalma: No. It convenes on the 19th. Our position looks fairly good, but it is not solid, and we shouldn’t assume that it is solid.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand. You’re saying things look quite good right now. However, we haven’t yet seen the impact of a concerted Chinese and Soviet campaign. And we haven’t obtained the high-level views of most governments. That’s all we can say at the moment.

If the Assembly convenes on the 19th, when will the General Committee be seized with the question?

Mr. DePalma: The 19th is a Tuesday. I think the issue should be brought up at the end of that week—or possibly on the following Monday.

Mr. Kissinger: Then it won’t be stretching things too far to go until November.

Mr. DePalma: No. We have a reasonable chance of doing that.

Mr. Kissinger: While this group is here, we might say a few words about the substantive issues, but we will consider them in more detail later on. We won’t have to take positions on these substantive issues until we know the outcome of the debate.

Mr. Johnson: I agree. And I don’t think we should talk about contingency plans before the debate because it will make the ROKs nervous.

Mr. DePalma: Is that a blanket instruction, or can we talk to the ROKs and two or three others?
Mr. Johnson: Unless there is an overriding necessity to talk about contingency plans, I think we would be better off not to do so.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree with Alex. Also, if we lose, the Koreans could then say that we meant to lose all along.

Mr. Johnson: That’s right.

Mr. DePalma: But our figures are very queasy.

Mr. Kissinger: Once the ROKs know there will be a debate, there will be no way for them to avoid giving us their positions. In the meantime, we can have preliminary talks within the government here. (to Mr. DePalma) When will the invitation question come up?

Mr. DePalma: That depends on the First Committee’s order of business.

Mr. Kissinger: Could it be within the first four to six weeks?

Mr. DePalma: If the invitation question is the first item on the agenda, it will probably come up within five or six weeks.

Mr. Kissinger: If the General Committee or General Assembly votes against us, we won’t have to decide right away about the invitation question.

Mr. DePalma: The problem is that if the vote goes against us, the other side could call for an urgent meeting of the First Committee. But even if that were done, it would still take a couple of weeks.

Mr. Kissinger: And we would insist on following the normal time schedule.

Mr. DePalma: Yes, although there is always the possibility that the other side may get the bit in its teeth and try to capitalize on the situation.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t think the Chinese and the Soviets are that eager to humiliate us.

Mr. Johnson: Neither do I. This issue is not all that important, anyway.

Mr. Kissinger: First, we should try to defer the debate. If we lose, though, we should try to put it off until after the election. Let’s talk briefly about the substantive issues. The first one is the invitation question. The State paper gives several options, the first of which is the conditional resolution, the one we have always succeeded with in the past.

Mr. Johnson: I don’t think we can get any more mileage out of it.

Mr. Kissinger: Option 2 is a slight alteration of Option 1, eliminating reference to the fact that the DPRK refuses to acknowledge UN

3 See Document 152 and footnote 2 thereto.
competence on the Korean question. The text is at Annex C–3 of the pa-
er. By the way, whoever wrote the paper did a good job. Although this
resolution—which was proposed by New Zealand last year—doesn’t
mention the condition, it has it. If Option 1 won’t go, Option 2 won’t go.

Option 3 is another modification. The two Koreas would not
have to accept UN jurisdiction, but only accept the principles of the
UN Charter.

Mr. Johnson: That’s right.

Mr. DePalma: I think Option 3 would probably work. Whenever
the North Koreans turned down the resolutions in the past, they al-
ways said they accepted the UN Charter principles.

Mr. Kissinger: Everyone will get a crack at these options later on.
Right now, though, I’m just trying to get the sentiment of the people
around this table. Is anyone violently uncomfortable with this approach?
(No objections were raised)

Mr. Kissinger: Let me leave out the word “violently.” Is anyone
uncomfortable with this approach?
(Again, no objections were raised)

Mr. Kissinger: Okay, let’s tentatively think about it. The second
substantive issue is UNCURK, and the third is the UN Command
and troop withdrawal. (to Mr. Johnson) Alex, where do we stand on
UNCURK and what are our choices?

Mr. Johnson: UNCURK really has no value to us or to the ROKs.

Mr. Kissinger: You will be interested to know that the first time I
met Chou, he went on and on about UNCURK.

Mr. Helms: It’s not exactly a household word.

Mr. Johnson: Although it is of no real value any more, the ROKs
will be sorry to see it go. As a first fallback position, we could insist
that the North and South continue to talk, and we would not even men-
tion UNCURK.

Mr. Kissinger: We couldn’t get away with that.

Mr. Johnson: You’re probably right. As a second fallback position,
then, we could ask UNCURK to review itself and to report back to the
UN next year. That would at least give us another year.

Mr. Kissinger: You mean we should ask the UN to ask UNCURK
to review itself?

Mr. Johnson: Yes, and to report back to the Assembly next year. A
third fallback position would be to terminate UNCURK. And still an-
other variant position would be to use a study committee to review
the importance of UNCURK and to make recommendations to the Gen-
eral Assembly next year. This is only an important issue because the
ROKs feel UNCURK strengthens their hand in talking with Pyongyang.
We don’t want to appear to be abandoning the ROKs on this.
Mr. Kissinger: The choices you’ve presented are really modalities for abandoning UNCURK.

Mr. Johnson: That’s right. It would be done slowly, but not over a prolonged period of time. And we would give UNCURK a decent burial.

Mr. Kissinger: I heard that the Chinese were going to propose suspending UNCURK’s activities. Is that true?

Mr. Holdridge: That was a CAS report. It said the Chinese may use the word “suspend” instead of “terminate” in their resolution.

Mr. DePalma: They would be smart to do so. In any case, UNCURK wouldn’t be able to be revived.

Mr. Ranard: Whatever word they use, it would stop all of UNCURK’s activities.

Mr. DePalma: That’s right. The Chinese would be better off using the word “suspend,” but I don’t know if they are that smart. Incidentally, the ghost of UNCURK is fast fading, as it is. The Chileans are out. And even though the Pakistanis are still in, they are feeling the heat from the Chinese. UNCURK may be visibly disintegrating before our eyes.

Mr. Kissinger: Who is in it?

Mr. Ranard: There used to be seven countries, but now there are only six: Australia, Thailand, Turkey, the Philippines, the Netherlands and Pakistan. Chile used to be the seventh country.

Mr. DePalma: If Pakistan withdraws from UNCURK, it will provide further evidence of a crumbling situation.

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Ranard) Don, do you want to add anything?

Mr. Ranard: If we are able to defer the UNCURK issue this year, it might give the ROKs the initiative to do something about UNCURK themselves. They know the UNCURK issue is a sticky wicket, and they know this is probably the last time we will be able to defer the issue.

Mr. Kissinger: What will the ROK position be if the UN disbands UNCURK? Will the ROKs be demoralized?

Mr. Ranard: Yes. Since 1947, UNCURK has been the symbol of the legitimacy of their government and the affirmation of the UN role in Korea. If it is abandoned now, the ROKs will be demoralized. In addition, there will probably be some internal political problems, especially between the head of the CIA and the Prime Minister, who are rivals.

Mr. Johnson: But it would not destroy the ROK government.

Mr. Ranard: No, it wouldn’t.
Mr. Kissinger: You say the ROKs could get rid of UNCURK themselves during the coming year. But wouldn’t that have the same impact as the UN suspending UNCURK’s activities?

Mr. Johnson: No, because the ROKs would be taking the action, not the UN. Don’t forget, either, that UNCOK—UNCURK’s predecessor—was an important factor in getting UN support for our actions in Korea in 1950. Their witness about the attack from the North—aside from the Soviet absence—enabled the UN to support our actions. The ROKs remember that, and they feel UNCURK gives them some security.

Mr. Solomon: One report we’ve seen says the North wants a voice in the UN in order to have some protection from a “great power” deal on the Peninsula.

Mr. Ranard: That report, I think, is just a sophisticated argument to get the issue to the UN.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we lose on the UNCURK issue?

Mr. DePalma: If we lose on deferring the debate, we can also lose on UNCURK.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the UN Command issue?

Mr. Johnson: That comes under the Security Council, not the General Assembly.

Mr. Kissinger: In other words, we have a veto on that issue.

Mr. Johnson: Yes. If the General Assembly passes a resolution about the UN Command, the resolution will have no legal effect. We could ignore it if we want to.

Mr. Kissinger: How could the Security Council take action on the UN Command?

Mr. Johnson: It would have to pass a resolution.

Mr. Kissinger: Which we could veto.

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Mr. Ranard: There are less than two hundred foreign troops in the UN Command, aside from our own forces. Would we use the veto when it might have an effect on foreign troop participation in the Command?

Mr. Kissinger: The UN Command is significant because it legitimizes our operations. We don’t need the two hundred foreign troops in the Command.

Mr. Doolin: It also helps preserve the U.S. Status of Forces Agreement.

Mr. DePalma: Can we get the Thai to stick with us? They have one plane in Korea.

Mr. Kissinger: Do we really care about the Thai in Korea?
Mr. Johnson: When I first went out to Thailand, one of my main jobs was to try to persuade the Thai to keep their plane in Korea. Here it is 1972, and we’re still talking about the same plane.

Mr. Kissinger: Is it our desire to keep foreign troops in Korea? I suppose the answer is “yes” as long as there is a UN Command. However, if we lose the Thai plane and the other foreign forces, do we want to make some changes in the command? As long as the UN Command can’t be disbanded by the General Assembly, our position is not bad. Whatever changes the other side wants to make we will control. Is that correct?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the relationship of the U.S. Status of Forces Agreement in Japan with the UN Command in Korea? What changes would we have to make in the Status of Forces Agreement in Japan if we give up the UN Command?

Mr. Johnson: The Status of Forces Agreement with Japan permits the stationing of non-American troops in Japan for the defense of Korea. This has nothing to do with the U.S. forces stationed in Japan, which would not be affected by a disbanding of the UN Command. On the other hand, the relationship of our forces in Korea with the Koreans would be affected by a change in the command.

Mr. Kissinger: If the UN Command were disbanded, it would have no effect on our forces in Japan?

Mr. Johnson: That’s right. Our forces in Japan are covered by the Security Agreement with the Japanese.

Mr. Doolin: But the Security Agreement with the Japanese also allows us to use our forces there in the defense of Korea.

Mr. Kissinger: If we took a softer position on UNCURK in the General Assembly, we would not prejudice the survival of the UN Command.

Mr. Johnson: No, we wouldn’t.

Mr. Kissinger: Could we get an analysis by the end of September of these issues, when we will look at them again in more detail?

Mr. DePalma: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the possibility of the PRC trying to get the General Assembly to repeal the aggressor resolutions of 1951? Could that be done?

Mr. DePalma: I doubt they could get up a head of steam for that. Everyone would be in a bind. They have alluded to it, to be sure, but they’ve never brought it up.

Mr. Ranard: When the Chinese first came to the UN, they said they had three objectives with regard to Korea: 1) to support Kim Il Sung and his eight-point reunification plan; 2) to abolish UNCURK; and
3) to repeal the aggressor resolutions. They have worked on the first two, but they have never done anything about the third.4

Mr. Doolin: Don’t forget that Ch’en Yi also said in 1965 that a condition for membership in the UN was getting rid of the aggressor resolutions.

Mr. Johnson: You’re right. I had forgotten about that.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s all I have.

Mr. Cohen: My papers make reference to NSSM 154,5 but I don’t have it. Has NSSM 154 been prepared?

Mr. Kissinger: The State paper we’ve been talking about today is part of NSSM 154.

Mr. Ranard: Yes, that’s right.

Mr. Cohen: For Treasury and the balance of payments problem, our substantive commitments to Korea are more important than the options on UN debates. It would be helpful for us to have the whole NSSM study.

Mr. Kissinger: You will get it.

Mr. Kennedy: The complete study should be ready very soon.

Mr. Cohen: Good. It would be helpful if we could see it.

Mr. Kissinger: You are part of the SRG, and you will get a copy of the study as soon as it is ready.

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5 Document 133.

SUBJECT
South Korean Concern About Japan's Contacts with Pyongyang, and Desire to Have the Issue Raised at the Honolulu Summit

In a recent conversation with Ambassador Habib to brief him on the progress of the North-South talks, ROK CIA Director Yi Hu-rak also expressed the view that “Japan is moving too quickly in expanding its relations with North Korea and is proceeding at a tempo disadvantageous to preservation of stability in the area.”

Yi then requested that President Nixon raise the ROK concern with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka at the Honolulu summit. Presumably the ROKs would like us to add our weight to the view that Japan should move cautiously in its contacts with Pyongyang, perhaps coordinating its actions with the ROK, or at least keeping them fully informed of their anticipated moves.

We are not sure whether Yi is exaggerating for effect, or whether he has a different understanding of the pace at which Japan plans to expand its relations with North Korea. The Tanaka Government has made quite clear in the past month that it intends to proceed fairly slowly and cautiously in developing relations with Pyongyang. While, for example, it plans to expand cultural, academic, sports, and technical exchanges with the DPRK, it will not allow political exchanges. And even as regards technical exchanges, it will not admit North Korean technicians in connection with projects that might involve Japanese Exim Bank financing. The prospects for any rapid expansion of trade

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2 Telegram 4639 from Seoul, August 9, reported that Lee Hu Rak informed Ambassador Habib on August 9 that agreement had been reached for ROK and North Korean representatives to talk at a first plenary Red Cross meeting to be held in Pyongyang on August 30 and a second plenary meeting to be held in Seoul on September 13. Habib also reported Lee’s assertion that Japan was moving too quickly in expanding its relations with North Korea. “Yi said that he had a favor to ask.” “He hoped that that this problem could be touched on in meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Tanaka. I assured Yi that I would convey his concern. At same time, I pointed out that ROK has excellent channels of influence to Japanese and should make maximum effort of its own.” (Ibid.)
are small, constrained by the North Korean inability to finance it at this point. Equally important, the Tanaka Government has made clear it does not intend any substantial departures in its bilateral relations with Seoul.

You may wish to consider this ROK request in planning for the Honolulu meetings.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka met for wide-ranging summit talks on September 1 in the Kuilima Hotel in Hawaii. Nixon explained that the U.S. position “is to welcome the ROK talks with North Korea, but it would be premature for us to talk to North Korea.” He added that “the security of the ROK is essential to the maintenance of the security of Japan.” Tanaka responded that “this reflected a correct understanding of both Koreas.” He seconded Nixon’s belief that the development of talks between North and South Korea would not “reduce tensions as much as anticipated.” Tanaka seemingly acquiesced to a role of following South Korea’s lead when he stated, “Japan also is watching developments carefully in terms of working out its own contacts with North Korea gradually, in humanitarian and academic exchanges.” (Memorandum of conversation, September 1; ibid., Box 926, VIP Visits, Tanaka Visit (Hawaii), August 31–September 1, 1972 [1 of 4])

155. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Retention of ROK Forces in South Vietnam

Our Embassies in Seoul and Saigon have replied to cables requesting their views on the desirability and feasibility of retention of ROK forces in South Vietnam beyond CY ’72. Our memorandum to you of August 22 (Tab A)\(^2\) summarized the outgoing cables and noted that NSDM 161 of April 5, 1972\(^3\) requested the Under Secretaries Com-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Odeen and Kennedy. Froebe also initialed the memorandum. Haig, who initialed the memorandum, crossed out his own name on the address line and wrote in “HAK.”

\(^2\) Attached but not printed.

\(^3\) Document 132.
mittee to review the question of continued ROK presence in South Vietnam and submit a report to the President not later than September 29, 1972. The cables, summarized below, will be included in this review and will be discussed at a meeting—which we shall attend—at the State Department on September 6. Ambassador Habib, who is in Washington for two days of consultations, will chair the meeting.

Ambassador Bunker and General Weyand have reported (Tab B) that the retention of one ROK Division in MR–2 appears a necessity through CY ’73 and possibly even FY ’74. They claim that ARVN will not be able to develop the divisional size force necessary to replace the ROK troops in MR–2 and that despite its new battalion upgrade program, the Regional Forces are not expected to assume the security mission in this area during CY ’73. The GVN recently has expressed its desire to the Korean government that it agree to schedule one ROK Division beginning withdrawal in July 1973 and a second Division for withdrawal beginning in January 1974. (The Korean government replied on September 4 that its remaining forces will begin withdrawal in January 1973.)

Concerning logistical support, Bunker and Weyand note that transfer of additional logistical responsibilities to RVNAF would neither be desirable for the Vietnamese nor acceptable to the Koreans. They conclude, however, that expanding current ROK support capability to the point of relative self-sufficiency would be both feasible and probably acceptable to the Koreans. The Embassy–MACV message does not provide estimates on the extent of the expansion which the ROKs would consider acceptable for self-sufficiency.

Ambassador Habib in Seoul has cabled (Tab C) that we must be prepared to pay a high price if we wish at least some ROK army units to remain in South Vietnam beyond their publicly announced withdrawal date of June 1973. Habib noted that a U.S.–GVN request to retain ROK forces in Vietnam through CY ’73 will face strong resistance from both opposition and ruling parties. Many Koreans reportedly find it difficult to justify ROK troop levels higher than the U.S., which would not necessarily be the case if the ROKs keep one Division and we don’t go below the currently planned 27,000 figure until there is a settlement. They also resent inadequate levels of consultation on our negotiations and view continued troop presence as a major handicap to broader contacts with non-aligned countries and “non-hostile” Communist nations.

4 Telegram 12754 from Saigon, August 30, attached but not printed.
5 Telegram 4980 from Seoul, August 26, attached but not printed.
Ambassador Habib nevertheless believes that we might prevail on President Park if President Nixon made a direct approach for retention of Korean troops in Vietnam. Our approach probably would have to include the following specific inducements: unequivocal U.S. assurances of logistic support; retention of all U.S. titled equipment in ROK hands; equipment to activate two army assault helicopter companies and for each division, one tank company; continuation of net additional cost payments at current rates and agreement to ROK requests for severance payments and retirement fund contributions. Ambassador Habib also warned that we need to obtain Korean agreement within the next month or so to keep open the option of continued ROK troop presence in South Vietnam.

Subsequent to Ambassador Habib’s cable, the Korean Foreign Minister delivered to our Chargé a copy of an aide-mémoire reminding the GVN that the local ROK commander has now been instructed to prepare for a withdrawal beginning in January 1973. The Minister stated that it would be “impossible” for Korean troops to remain through 1973 but noted that, in his personal opinion, some delay within the one year schedule could be made “if the U.S. were in a difficult military situation at that time.”

The Korean Desk officer at the State Department has advised us that Ambassador Habib’s estimate of Korean demands probably are excessive; he believes that the Koreans may settle for less. We are inclined to agree and view the Korean aide-mémoire to the GVN as a bargaining tactic to strengthen their position in our forthcoming consultations on further ROK withdrawals.

This judgement appears corroborated by a recent [less than 1 line not declassified] report [1 line not declassified] that the Foreign Ministry is the only element of the Korean government that desires a complete ROK force withdrawal. The Economic Ministry, the President and the military reportedly have ambivalent feelings on withdrawal with the Army favoring continued commitment. The impression of flexibility is further indicated by the [less than 1 line not declassified] prediction that the Koreans would bargain over terms for a continued ROK presence at the U.S.-Korean discussions scheduled for late November. The Koreans reportedly will use their plans to withdraw the Capital Division in early CY ’73 as a ploy to obtain firm U.S. commitments either for continued U.S. direct combat and service support or for the addition of new tank and helicopter units to their remaining troops.

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6 Telegram 5165 from Seoul, September 4, reported that Foreign Minister Kim Yong Shik had given an aide-mémoire to the Vietnamese and also provided a copy to Habib. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 KOR)

SUBJECT
Meeting with Phil Habib

I spoke to Phil Habib at his request this morning. He pointed out that the recent request by the GVN to the ROK to maintain their forces in GVN through CY 1973 has seriously jeopardized chances of maintaining ROK force levels in Vietnam. Phil says that he believes that with the right kind of nursing he could manage to get Park to get one Division through 1973 and into 1974 but he is sure that Park will insist on drawing down at least one. The same old problems exist with regard to this however, i.e., the need for U.S. support, helicopters, tanks, etc. Phil said that our failure to talk to Park about Vietnam has been the most serious shortcoming with our relations with Korea. He feels that we are going to sell Thieu out and that he will be left holding the bag on troops in Vietnam. I told Phil to tell Park that he had talked to you and to reassure him that we had not come this far to sell out now, to make sure that negotiations are underway and that we are coordinating carefully with Thieu and to also underline the President’s determination and resolve to include a determination to bring the war to a conclusion either through negotiations or otherwise in the most strenuous way, especially after the election.

With respect to Korean troop levels, we will have the bureaucracy’s recommendations in about a week. I think our best bet is to play for time so that we have the troop levels high if we are forced to enter into a stepped up military phase after the elections. This kind of thing I think Park will understand and support if we consult with him at the time. There will, of course, be the usual payola.2

Phil said that Park has been invited to speak before the Asia Society in early December and that he can greatly improve what is becoming a critical situation in Korea if he could tell Park that the President

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972, Part 2. Secret; Eyes Only. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was sent for action.

2 On November 1, Nixon signed Presidential Determination 73–5 approving “the furnishing of sophisticated weapons systems in FY 1973 to the Republic of Korea.” For text, see Department of State Bulletin, December 18, 1972, p. 702.
will see him in December in conjunction with the speech in New York. I believe that we should do this and I recommend that you approve my having a memorandum prepared for the President which would commit him to a brief, unofficial meeting, perhaps even a breakfast or lunch, in early December.

Approve  Disapprove
Approve breakfast  lunch
Confine to recommendation for office call

3 Kissinger initialed his approval. No memorandum has been found.
4 Kissinger initialed his approval. Park did not visit the United States nor meet with Nixon in December 1972.

157. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Republic of Korea Troops in Viet-Nam

REFERENCE
NSDM 161 of April 5, 1972

NSDM 161 requested the Under Secretaries Committee to review the question of a continued Republic of Korea (ROK) military presence in South Viet-Nam beyond CY 1972 and to submit this review not later than September 29, 1972. A detailed review is attached as an Appendix.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-232, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 161. Top Secret; Nodis. Transmitted to Kissinger by Acting Staff Director of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee Seymour Weiss. On August 30, in a memorandum to members of the NSC, Acting Staff Director of the Committee John K. Wilhelm informed them that the Committee was undertaking the review of continued ROK presence in South Vietnam according to the President’s instructions in NSDM 161. (Ibid.)

2 Attached; printed as Document 132.

3 Attached but not printed.
There are two ROK infantry divisions in Viet-Nam. The Government of Viet-Nam has asked the Republic of Korea Government to maintain two full divisions until June 1973, and not to begin the withdrawal of the second of the two until the beginning of CY 1974. The ROKG has replied that it intends to begin withdrawing its forces “from the beginning of 1973” and it is our understanding that the withdrawal is to be completed by June 30, 1973. The ROKG has told us privately that there is some room for negotiation on the timetable if this would accommodate the United States, but it wanted the GVN to understand that ROK forces could not stay until the end of CY 1973. Although the ROKG insists on negotiations with the US on any retention of its forces in Viet-Nam, it is to our interest to keep intact the bilateral ROK commitment to Viet-Nam and to maintain the position that the US is in a supporting role to any ROKG/GVN negotiations.

We believe the ROKG is firm in wanting to withdraw at least one division in CY 1973 and at the outside might be willing to retain some smaller force until early CY 1974. Within these limits are four principal alternatives for a ROK troop presence:

3. Redeploy one ROK division at the beginning of CY 1973, retain the second through the 1973 dry season (September). (Although the point would not be a part of the discussions, there is implicit in this alternative the option to review during the 1973 dry season the continued presence of one ROK division through CY 1973 and possibly into CY 1974.)

The Korean troops in Viet-Nam are performing a useful role and the GVN cannot assume responsibility for their areas of operation before the end of CY 1973. At the same time, the ROKG finds little reason to retain two full divisions in Viet-Nam in view of the departure of most US ground forces and of what it sees as growing domestic and international liabilities. The critical period from a security point of view appears to be their presence through the dry season (September) of CY 1973. Events cannot be forecast beyond that period, but even the GVN is not planning at this point for any ROK troop presence beyond the first part of CY 1974. Presently, there is no firm requirement for both ROK divisions to remain through entire CY 1973 and the problem is to phase the withdrawals to ensure the presence of one division through as much of CY 1973 as possible.

Consideration has been given to the continued support of ROK forces. While the RVNAF currently provides the bulk of logistic support, they are and will be unable to provide helicopter support and only
minimal close air support. Moreover, within the periods envisaged, the ROK forces will be unable to develop self-sufficiency in these areas. The only alternative is continued US helicopter and close air support. The retention of US personnel spaces for the support of ROK forces in Vietnam has been weighed against the impact on the security of remaining US forces, Vietnamization, the advisory effort, the command and control of the air war, and support of the RVNAF. If an appropriate level of US support is to be provided to ROK forces, it will be necessary to retain additional US personnel specifically for this purpose when the US force level goes below 25,000. (The details of US personnel support requirements for ROK forces are contained in Tab B to the Appendix.)

This review of ROK forces in Viet-Nam is based on the assumption that we will not achieve a negotiated peace prior to the end of the dry season 1973. If negotiations succeed, the alternatives discussed in this paper will no longer be applicable. If peace or a cease-fire along the lines of your May 8, 1972 proposal is established, the ROK forces in Viet-Nam should be withdrawn along with the US forces in four months. The other side will demand it, and it is doubtful that the ROKG could be induced to keep troops in Viet-Nam once we have withdrawn all US forces.

Alternative 3, retention of one division through the critical 1973 dry season period would substantially meet GVN security requirements and probably would provide some ROK military presence through most of the remainder of CY 1973. It would be consistent with ROK aims of completing the redeployment of its forces by the end of CY 1973.

We recommend this alternative together with the following:

1. That Ambassador Bunker be authorized to consult with the GVN, seek its concurrence with our preferred alternative 3 and request that the GVN initially present this joint US–GVN proposal to the ROKG.
2. That Ambassador Habib be authorized to assure the ROKG that the United States will continue to provide comparable levels of air, helicopter, and logistic support to ROK forces during that period; that the US force levels in Viet-Nam will take into consideration these support requirements (i.e., 1,762 US personnel to support a two division ROK force and 1,041 US personnel to support a one division ROK force); that the provisions of the Brown Memorandum of March 1966 as amended will continue to apply; and that the United States is prepared to consider the transfer of title to a considerable portion of the US equipment presently furnished to ROK forces in Viet-Nam. If the question is raised by the ROK, Ambassador Habib may add that the US would, of course, expect ROK forces in Viet-Nam to be withdrawn along with US forces if a settlement or cease-fire is negotiated along the levels of President Nixon’s May 8, 1972 proposal.

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3 See footnote 3, Document 67.
3. That the United States be prepared (but only if necessary to secure retention of ROK forces in Viet-Nam) to offer equipment for one company of tanks to provide additional security to the remaining division.

Discussions with President Park would be facilitated if Ambassador Habib were authorized to state that you were looking forward to an early meeting with him to review Asian security problems.

U. Alexis Johnson

Johnson signed for Irwin over Irwin's typed signature.

158. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) to Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, October 6, 1972.

A Status Report on Contacts Between North and South Korea

It has been just slightly more than a year since the Government of the Republic of Korea had its Red Cross Society call publicly for talks with its Northern counterpart on divided families. This relatively brief period has seen considerable progress. Presently there are active North-South contacts at two levels—the public Red Cross discussions and secret meetings at Panmunjom between trusted representatives of ROK CIA Director Yi Hu Rak and North Korean Party Organization Director Kim Yong Ju, younger brother of Kim Il Sung. The Panmunjom talks follow the July fourth agreement to establish a coordinating committee to work toward reunification. The Yi–Kim channel has been used to resolve impasses in the public Red Cross discussions. Developments in the public Red Cross forum affect very basically the positions of each side in the more political and official private talks.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR N-KOR S. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Picard and concurred in by Kriebel.

2 See Document 151.
Red Cross Meetings

The first two plenary sessions of the Red Cross talks just completed in Pyongyang and Seoul indicate that there is little chance for rapid progress toward reuniting divided families. But the travel of the two delegations to their rivals' capitals was a momentous first step for each toward understanding the society of the other. Both seemed to have been impressed and surprised at the experience. The Southern delegates were surprised by the totality of discipline and control by the Northern leadership over its people. The ROK government was immensely pleased and probably somewhat surprised at the spontaneously hostile reaction of its own press and public to the Northerners' propaganda-loaded speeches. The North was taken aback by the vehement Southern reaction to these speeches, although undoubtedly believing the whole thing had been staged by the Seoul government. The sessions were more ceremonial than substantive, with no agreement reached beyond the time and place for two more sessions—October 24 in Pyongyang and November 27 in Seoul.

Both Northern and Southern leaders seem to feel the ROK benefited most from the first round. Pyongyang feels the South broke its agreement that neither side would criticize the other, by allowing vociferous press criticism of the Northern speeches and has responded by publishing scathing accounts by North Korean journalists who visited Seoul, describing their experience of ROK society as revolting and disgusting. In addition, Pyongyang was clearly stung by its decisive defeat in the UN, made particularly galling by ROK use of the North-South talks to win support for its postponement position. Pyongyang has responded by leveling the sharpest propaganda attacks since the July fourth agreement at the South Korean leadership, accusing President Park by name of perfidy and bad faith. The attacks have stopped short of threatening to end the talks, however. Apparently Kim Il Sung sees this verbal offensive as a means of focusing blame for his UN defeat and embarrassment of his delegation in Seoul on Southern treachery. Moreover, the attacks probably please the hawks in his inner circle while reminding the Northern population that despite the talks there is still an unscrupulous enemy to the south. Additionally Kim certainly views the attacks as a means of pressuring the South to concede to Northern demands for politicization of the talks.

Secret Talks

Discussions in the private channel have aimed at establishing the coordinating committee called for in the July fourth agreement to oversee development of North-South relations at all levels. These talks have been stalled for several weeks over the question of the Committee’s membership. The North demands cabinet level membership to include Foreign and Defense Ministers. The South wants lower level members.
The latest secret meeting on September 29 saw no movement from these respective positions but witnessed an exchange of charges of violation of the July fourth agreement’s prohibition of public name calling.

Prospects

Yi Hu Rak told Ambassador Habib contacts are at a “delicate stage” with the Northern attacks possibly a prelude to Pyongyang’s breaking off the talks. We believe an actual break is unlikely. Though neither side seems ready to move rapidly at this point, neither will want the blame for ending contacts. Both seem to see the present moment as a time for assessment of gains and losses in this new form of competition. Both probably also feel a need to devote some attention to internal dissension generated within the respective leadership groups over strategies for handling future developments.

159. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Republic of Korea Troops in Vietnam (ROKFV)

I have received the paper that the Under Secretaries Committee has sent to the President recommending the retention of one Korean Division in Vietnam through the 1973 dry season. I believe that the paper presents a balanced consideration of the question. The Department of Defense participated fully in its preparation and I support its recommendation.

I would, however, like to make two points which I believe important to any consideration of retention of ROK forces in Vietnam.

—The United States must be particularly careful not to disturb the primary commitment between the ROK and the GVN. The US role

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-224, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 113. Top Secret.

2 Document 157.
should be no more than secondary, facilitating the fulfillment of South Vietnam’s military requirement. The paper makes this point and I wish to emphasize its importance. In the proposed instruction to the field, however, the paper refers to a “joint US-GVN proposal” (p. 4). It would be more appropriate to refer to it as “a GVN proposal endorsed by the United States.”

—We must also be careful not to link the presence of US forces in Korea with Korean forces in Vietnam. Both NSDM 113 and NSDM 161 prohibited tying those two separate issues together. To tie down further an American division in Korea would reduce the flexibility of our forces at a time when force reductions have made flexibility essential to our national security.

Melvin R. Laird

3 Document 96.
4 Document 132.

160. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, October 16, 1972, 1349Z.

5969. Dept pass SecDef immediate: pass CINCPAC priority. Subject: ROKG Declaration of Martial Law and Plans for Fundamental Government Reform. Summary: Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil informed me October 16 of details involving the declaration of martial law throughout ROK at 1900 hours on October 17. At the same time fundamental changes involving constitutional amendments and national referendum will be announced. Proposal involves indirect election of President in December by an electoral group and later reconstitutions of the National Assembly, which is being dissolved as of October 17. The Prime Minister said the government was taking these actions in order to maintain firm and stable situation in Korea. End summary.

1. I was called to the office of Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil at 1800 hours on October 16. He said that he had asked to see me be-

cause he had some surprising news. Korea is in a difficult situation and in order to cope with its problems it cannot act only in an idealistic way alone. Therefore the ROKG has reached the conclusion that it should perform a constitutional reformation. More than ever the ROK is confronted with difficult circumstances and internal and external challenges. In order to cope with them they have reached certain conclusions. They should not hesitate to adopt whatever measures are necessary to maintain a firm and stable situation. If this means resorting to emergency measures they should not hesitate. They should adapt themselves to cold reality and, as necessary, supplement discrepancies in the existing constitution and correct unreasonable aspects of their system. Thus if this required extreme measures they should proceed.

2. Kim went on to say that in the course of reaching this decision ROKG had given long deliberation as to whether such a decision would affect the U.S. elections. But their own analyses had concluded that President Nixon would be overwhelmingly elected and that their actions would have no effect on U.S. elections. They also believe that these reforms should be taken immediately and completed within this year. He was informing me twenty-four hours in advance as they believed it to be a courtesy to inform us before the action was announced. He hoped for U.S. understanding and asked that the information he was about to divulge be kept secret until made public by his government.

3. Effective 1900 hours October 17 the following actions would be taken: (a) The National Assembly will be dissolved. (b) All political activities will be suspended. (c) Martial law will be declared throughout the land. At the same time a special proclamation would be published by the President in which the reasons behind these actions will be explained as well as the actions to follow. He then handed me a copy of the Presidential proclamation in English. Also adopted were an English translation of the formal proclamation of the martial law and the first proclamation of the martial law commander. Each of these being transmitted in septels.2

4. Prime Minister Kim said that within ten days, i.e. October 27, a constitutional amendment will be announced and offered in a national referendum on or about November 17. Provided the national referendum is approved, one month later, on or about December 17, a presidential election will be held. This election will be conducted by an electoral group, which will be known as a National Conference for Unification. In other words there would first be an election for electors

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2 Not further identified.
and they in turn will elect the President. Therefore the presidential election will be completed before Christmas and the constitutional functions normalized before the end of the year, that is to say an amended constitution will be in place. Under this amended constitution a new National Assembly will be elected within six months from the date the national referendum is held and the amendments approved.

5. Martial law will be lifted following the national referendum (assuming approval). Under martial law normal governmental functions will continue except that political assembly and political activity will be prohibited. All colleges and universities will be closed. Prior censorship will be imposed on all public media. Curfew hours will not change.

6. The Prime Minister said that martial law is being proclaimed in order to prevent the disorder and chaos that may arise as a result of the measures that are planned. The constitutional amendments to be presented are still under study but certain general ideas are being followed. In their view the essence of an open society is to have elections but an electoral system is a vulnerable point particularly in a country like Korea where repeated elections increase the vulnerability of the society. To remedy this, it is agreed that the tenure of the President and the National Assembly should be extended. Therefore they will be elected for a period of six years and for no more than two terms. In the past presidential elections have resulted in a great deal of waste, disorder and confusion, the Prime Minister said. So they have reached the conclusion that it is better to have indirect elections in place of direct elections.

7. The indirect elections would be conducted through an electoral group with one elector to come from each myon, dong and eup. This would mean about 3,500 electors. This figure is not firm. They consider the ideal number to be somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 persons. At this point I asked if electors would be chosen regardless of population. The Prime Minister replied that this matter was still under study. It was generally favored to do it by administrative unit but some thought was being given to taking population into consideration.

8. The National Conference for Unification (the electoral group) will have three functions: (a) The election of the President. (b) Deliberate and decide the method for reunification of Korea. When it does so it will be presided over by the President. (c) To confirm appointed members of the National Assembly who will be nominated by the President.

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3 The state of martial law was lifted on December 13, although the ban on political parties continued.

4 District, neighborhood, and town.
9. The new National Assembly will consist of members from each of the present constituencies plus one third to be nominated by the President. This one third replaces the present proportional representation in the Assembly. By this process, the Prime Minister went on, the President will be provided with a stable majority in the National Assembly. In the past, to obtain a stable majority in the National Assembly, the government has had to resort to various undesirable methods. Now, whoever is elected President will have a stable majority. This will eliminate the irregularities that have so often taken place in order to get a majority in the Assembly, he added.

10. The President will also have the power to dissolve the National Assembly. The National Assembly will have the right to vote non-confidence in the Cabinet. The Assembly sessions will be limited to not more than 150 days a year. A regular session of three months and not more than two extraordinary sessions of thirty days each. However, the President can call a special session whenever he pleases, as necessary. Moreover, provisions would be made for “important issues” to be referred to a national referendum instead of as present permitting only constitutional changes to be referred to national referendum.

11. The Prime Minister said that the above were the major [garble] involved. He repeated that further study was still under way particularly on such things as the relationship between the legislative and executive bodies. He said the primary purpose of this reformation was to reorganize the government in order to enable it to carry out “future changes” with “versatility”. During the period before a new National Assembly takes office, necessary legislative action will be taken by the Cabinet.

12. As far as martial law is concerned, he went on, the martial law commander would be the chief of staff of the army. Martial law troops would be under the Capital Security Command. They will remain in their present locations on an alert status.

13. The Prime Minister said thus within the next two months the government would perform the necessary reformation and normalcy would be restored except for the new National Assembly. More thorough studies are still in process as to details on these actions and he will keep me informed as necessary. The Prime Minister ended by saying he looks to us for our understanding. Through this reform his government hopes to cope with the rapidly changing situation around them and to cope with the dialogue with the North. Finally he said that the meetings with the North will go on as scheduled. He asked me if I had any questions. I replied it appeared that the Prime Minister was informing me of the government’s decision and not asking me for our reaction or opinion. He nodded. I said I had a few questions to ask.
14. When he spoke of maintaining a stable situation, did this mean that he thought they did not have a stable situation at present? He replied a stable situation existed but there is always the danger it will be undermined and the government wishes to be prepared for such a chance for some time to come. I asked where the danger he spoke of comes from? He said internally and externally. Internally through the weakness of the present electoral system as he had pointed out above. Externally, through developments surrounding them, such as dealings between big powers which affect them and over which they have no control. And also in order to cope with the North.

15. I noted his statement that political activity would be prohibited after martial law, does this mean there would be no political activities permitted prior to referendum? He said that was correct and that as soon as the constitutional amendment is approved then political activities will be allowed in time for the National Assembly elections. I asked if political activity would be permitted for the elections of the National Conference for Unification. He said political activity by political parties would not be permitted. At this point, without reference to anything else, the Prime Minister said if the national referendum is rejected by the public it will be taken as a sign that the people did not want the government to continue the dialogue with the North and “measures will be taken”. Thus martial law would continue.

16. I said then there would be no political discussion of the referendum permitted. Not by political parties he replied. However, the amendment will be explained to the people who will then be permitted to decide yes or no. They felt the people had enough knowledge, so the government will explain it as it is and let the people decide. I asked if anyone would be able to campaign or explain a position contrary to the amendment, in other words would anyone else be allowed to solicit no votes. He said this would not be possible. Neither the opposition party nor the government party would be able to conduct political activity. Only facts will be given to the people and they can then decide.

17. I asked how presidential candidates would be presented to the National Conference for Unification. He said this had not been decided finally. Whether the conference will choose the President on its own or let the people present themselves as candidates to the electoral body was still under study. I asked him what he expected the reaction in the country would be. He said the immediate reaction would be “shock.” There might be some disturbances but he is certain the situation will return to normal and the referendum conducted in good order.

18. I asked him what he thought international reaction would be. He said he expected there would be a lot of adverse comment but as
the reform would be completed within the year and normalcy restored, the situation would then be better understood. These measures were designed to assure the Koreans a strong and effective system for their own survival. International understanding would be enhanced as the Korean people showed their understanding and cooperated with the government.

19. I asked if this action was taken within or outside the present constitution. He said they intended to amend certain parts of the constitution but leave the rest unchanged. I noted the present constitution does not provide for the process he had outlined. He said this was true and certain measures would have to be taken outside the constitution. I told him this was a very fundamental step and I was not going to give him an off-hand reaction. I would inform Washington immediately. His government had obviously decided to go ahead with these actions. If Washington had any opinion or reaction insofar as these actions affected us, I would be in touch with him. Nevertheless he could expect there will be considerable public comment and the actions taken certainly would have an effect on what people think and do in regard to Korea. I said these were very serious steps being taken by his government and just as he had expressed to me the opinion they would be received with some shock internally, I expected they would also be something of a shock internationally. He replied they expected this but hoped people would understand.

20. He said he would be available to me at any time if I had any further questions. (Country Team comments will follow in septel.)

Habib

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5 Not further identified.
161. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, October 17, 1972, 0026Z.

188775. Subject: Secretary’s Conversation with Ambassador Kim on Martial Law. Following is uncleared memcon FYI subject to revision upon review:

1. Secretary called in Ambassador Kim Dong Jo at 1730 October 16 regarding ROKG decision to declare martial law. Green and Ranard present.

2. Secretary asked Ambassador Kim to inform his government that we cannot accept the reasons given for the decision to declare martial law and in particular cannot understand the attack on U.S. policy in Asia contained in the proposed presidential proclamation. Secretary read from text of proclamation and commented it called into question the wisdom and morality of U.S. policy and suggested that U.S. actions would adversely affect ROK security. He said such statements were not acceptable and added that President Nixon would react unfavorably to the language and that the proclamation could cause serious problems between the two countries. We would be obliged to denounce any such statements publicly.

3. Green said that ROK rationale for declaring martial law was erroneous and that its attack on U.S. policy would create dismay in U.S., Asia and elsewhere. It would be interpreted as an attack on U.S. policy by an old and trusted friend. Referring to recent UN vote on Korean question, Green stated ROK action could only embarrass all those countries who had worked to postpone debate on very grounds that inscription would create internal problems for ROKG.

4. Ambassador Kim asked if offensive passages in proclamation were removed would it be possible for U.S. to make positive public statement respecting martial law declaration which was essentially internal ROK matter.

5. Secretary responded that the rationale given by the ROKG was only one aspect of the problem; also important was the substance of the proposed constitutional changes. Green added that, for example, there will be difficulties with Congress which has made possible the

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implementation of the ROK modernization plan and the continued U.S. troop presence.

6. Ambassador Kim was clearly unaware of proposed actions. He said he was uninstructed in this matter but would report the Secretary’s views at the highest levels of his government. He asked that Ambassador Habib be requested to make representations to the ROKG.\(^2\)

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\(^2\) In telegram 188717 to Seoul, October 16, Rogers informed Habib of his forthcoming meeting with Kim. Rogers also instructed Habib to meet with Park and inform him that “while we will seek to avoid public comment on wisdom of Park’s actions, we will be unable to avoid dissociating ourselves from these actions or from commenting on proclamation statement re President Nixon actions.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 KOR S) According to telegram 5976 from Seoul, October 17, Habib was unable to see Park and instead presented the U.S. views to Kim Jong Pil. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 1972)

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162. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon\(^1\)

Washington, October 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

South Korean President to Announce Imposition of Martial Law October 17

South Korean Prime Minister Kim Chong-pil informed Ambassador Habib the evening of October 16 that on October 17 at 7:00 p.m. (6:00 a.m. the same day Washington time) \textit{martial law would be imposed throughout the country}.\(^2\) In addition,

—The National Assembly (the legislature) will be dissolved.
—All political activity will be suspended, all colleges and universities will be closed, and prior censorship will be imposed on all media.
—The Presidential proclamation (of which Ambassador Habib was given a draft) will justify his actions partly in terms of international

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\(^2\) See Document 160.
instability brought on, in part, by your China initiative, and Japan’s recent normalization of relations with the PRC.

On October 27, President Park will proclaim amendments to the Constitution, which will be submitted to a popular referendum on about November 17, after which—assuming approval—martial law will be lifted. The Government will present the case for the amendments to the people, and no public expression of contrary views will be permitted. If the amendments are rejected, the Government will interpret this as disapproval of its dialogue with North Korea. The amendments will provide:

—A new Presidential election on about December 17, to be conducted through an “electoral college” which will be indirectly elected—and hence easier to control—in contrast to the present direct election for President. [Park was elected to a third four-year term in April 1971.] 3

—A new National Assembly election within roughly the next half year. [The present National Assembly was elected in May 1971 for a four-year term.] The new Assembly will have one-third of its members nominated by the President to provide a “stable majority” in the legislature. Both the National Assembly and the President will be elected for six-year terms, with a maximum of two terms permitted. Political activity will be allowed after the referendum, but political parties will not be allowed to campaign. Prime Minister Kim acknowledged that the amending process will be carried on outside the processes provided under the present Constitution.

In the meantime, talks with North Korea will proceed.

Comment:

—We have had no warning of this move, although we have long known that Park was considering whether he should retain power beyond 1975. He now stands to stay on for at least 12 more years.

—Park’s action is unnecessary in terms of domestic political stability. However, we would not succeed in trying to turn it back, according to Embassy Seoul.

—Park’s move is not simply an attempt to perpetuate himself in power beyond 1975—though this is probably a major reason. Park has probably also convinced himself that he needs greater control at home in order to cope with unforeseen contingencies that will be produced by the new, more fluid international context in which South Korea is now operating.

3 All brackets are in the original.
—Park has, at least in the short term, sacrificed a part of the political advantage he recently gained over the North—with no immediately apparent compensating gain for himself.

—Park, in his timing of his action, may want to avoid an appearance of an act of desperation that it might have if he waited until closer to 1975. In this respect, his action parallels that of Philippine President Marcos, but in other respects diverges from that of Marcos—Park has much less in his domestic situation to justify his action.

State is calling in the Korean Ambassador here this afternoon to express our concern, particularly over references in the proclamation such as the alleged unsettling effect of your China initiative as justifying Park’s action; this may cause these offensive clauses to be removed. Publicly, we plan to be neutral, while disassociating ourselves from Park’s action.

—Rogers met with Kim on October 16; see Document 161.

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea

Washington, October 18, 1972, 1436Z.

189689. Subject: ROK Ambassador’s Call on Under Secretary Johnson.

1. Upon instructions Ambassador Kim Dong Jo requested an appointment October 16 with Under Secretary Johnson for the morning of October 17. Subsequently the Secretary called Ambassador Kim to the Department at 5:30 p.m. October 16 but Kim still made his presentation to Under Secretary Johnson on October 17 at 8:45 a.m. Assistant Secretary Green was present.

2. Ambassador Kim said he had talked to CIA Director Yi Hu Rak twice the previous evening to convey the concern of President Nixon as expressed by the Secretary and had requested that the offensive portions of the proclamation be removed. He noted that the proclamation
had been modified. During the course of the conversation he made the following points:

A. References to the “great powers” in the proclamation were not directed at the U.S., but were a warning to the Korean people to remind them that their historic experience had been one of having been sacrificed to the interests of the great powers.

B. The measures taken by the Korean Government were intended to further the process of peaceful unification.

C. While martial law would be difficult for the US to accept there was to be a national referendum. The intention of the Korean Government was not to establish a dictatorship but to provide for more efficient government. The basic posture of the Korean Government was democratic and the US should judge Korea by the results of the national referendum.

D. He assured the Under Secretary that analogies with 1961 were not appropriate, that the period of martial law was definitely limited to the time required to implement the constitutional amendment.

3. Kim repeated the request he had made to the Secretary the previous day that he hoped the US would not in its public statements say anything which would disturb US-Korean relations.

4. Kim’s composure slipped only once when, in response to questioning about the future of representative government in Korea, he said that he was not a politician, that he was conveying the instructions of his government, and that he had done his best to ameliorate the government’s decision.

5. Under Secretary Johnson made a strong “more in sorrow than in anger” representation to Kim. He said the proclamation, even with the changes, remained unsatisfactory and that he could only interpret it—and the President would so interpret it—as a direct criticism of US policy in Asia. He said he was shocked by the ROKG decision and that he and all those in the US Government who had been closely associated with Korea were deeply disappointed. While it was not for the US to tell Korea how to run its affairs, he was apprehensive over the fu-

3 In telegram 5988 from Seoul, October 17, Habib reported that the Prime Minister’s private secretary had delivered a revised version of the presidential declaration. Habib also reported that, upon questioning Han Sang-Kuk, he had found that Prime Minister Kim was opposed to the martial law declaration and that he had considered resigning over the issues involved. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15 KOR S) In a memorandum to Kissinger, dated October 30, Helms reported similar information that Kim Jong Pil “had urged President Pak Chong-hui not to declare martial law until after the U.S. elections.” According to Kim the “primary reason” for President Park’s drive to complete his plan before the end of the year was his belief that “the U.S. is ‘selling out’ the Thieu government.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry DCI Files, Job 80–B01086A, Subject Files, Box 12 of 16, Korea)
ture and sorry for Korea. He noted that questions would be asked about what practical difference there now was between the governments in the South and the North. He added that Korea had been an example of representative government in Asia. The steps the government took in implementing its decisions would be important. He hoped the ROKG would reexamine its present plans. He reminded Kim that President Rhee had tightened controls on the Korean people until there had been an explosion and he was fearful that history was repeating itself.

6. Johnson warned that it would be impossible for the USG to keep silent in response to press questions and that, while we did not wish to complicate matters for the Korean Government, we could not associate ourselves with the decision or give any indication that we approved it or considered it justified. He reiterated to Kim that we could not understand how the Korean Government could base its drastic internal actions on a presentation of external events that was not justified and was counter to the position the Korean Government itself had taken.

7. Assistant Secretary Green noted that there would be no political opposition permitted [prior] to the referendum. He underlined the views of the [Under] Secretary and made these additional points.

A. The Korean success story had projected to the US public a favorable picture of US Asian policy which was helpful in countering neo-isolationist trends in the US. The ROKG action now cast doubt on this policy.

B. The supplemental military assistance bill in 1970 for Korea had had no opposition in the Congress, in part because of Korea’s favorable image. Now Congressional support would be more difficult to obtain.

C. His primary concern was reaction in Korea. Colleges were to be closed. Korea possessed a sophisticated intellectual element and, while the government might have no internal problems in the beginning, we were apprehensive about the reaction over the longer term.

D. The implementation of the government’s decision would be watched by the press here and they would watch in particular for arrests of political leaders or other evidence of repression. He noted that during the days of the military government the Cabinet had been jailed and he hoped there would be none of this kind of activity. We were not reassured by the Ambassador’s statement to the contrary, nor by the information we had received from our Ambassador in Seoul.

E. Green reminded Kim that he had called on President Park and the Prime Minister twice since March and that he had had no impression of their undue concern over developments in East Asia, and reiterated that only recently the Foreign Minister had unequivocally stated the government’s support for US Government policy.

8. Under Secretary Johnson referred to that portion of the President’s proclamation which stated that the referendum would be a vote
of confidence in the government’s approach to North Korea. According to the statement, if the referendum were rejected, he would take a new approach to reunification. Johnson said he was confused as to what that meant. He thought it sounded ominously like Rhee’s statements about a march North, but he could not believe this was so. Ambassador Kim said he was unable to clarify the statement.4

4 In telegram 6115 from Seoul, October 23, Habib summarized a conversation with Kim Jong Pil: “Prime Minister confirmed to Ambassador constitutional changes he had earlier described. Referendum would be conducted without political debate, and held probably on Nov. 21 despite presence of North Korean Red Cross delegation. Ambassador restated our dissociation with move and our belief it was unnecessary.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 543, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. V, 1 Jan–31 Dec 72)
belief that he is the only man who can lead South Korea in meeting the
twin challenges of reunification talks with the North and of big power
détente.

Habib lays out three U.S. policy options:

—Persuade Park to abandon this course and return to the old con-
stitution. This is impractical, he says, since it would require drastic U.S.
sanctions in order to succeed, and might result in either destroying
Park or making him impossible to work with.

—Persuade Park to soften the more repressive aspects of his new
system, while accepting its basic structure. Habib is also inclined
against this, both because the time remaining before October 27 is in-
sufficient and because in so doing we would share the responsibility
for it.

—Disassociate ourselves from Park’s new system. Habib prefers
this, and would do so by a public announcement commenting on Park’s
new constitution when he makes it public. We would not involve our-
selves in any of the reorganization, except to protest any flagrant per-
sonal repression. Implicit in this course, Habib notes, is our recogni-
tion that we can no longer try to determine the course of South Korea’s
internal political development. It would also involve an acceleration of
our disengagement from South Korea.

Our own initial comment on Ambassador Habib’s recommenda-
tions is to question the extent of disassociation which he advocates.
Given our strong strategic interests in the Korean Peninsula, we con-
tinue to have a derivative interest in a minimum cohesion within South
Korea. While we regret the character of Park’s reorganization and be-
lieve it unnecessary, his new system is not inevitably de-stabilizing.
Our inclination therefore is to focus on how he administers it to see
that he does not in the longer term defeat his own objective of increased
internal cohesion, and in the process encourage the North to renew its
militancy toward the South.

This basic policy question should be thoroughly explored in NSSM
154, which we are now asking for an update on.³

³ NSSM 154 is Document 133. The SRG considered the Department of State re-
sponse on August 9; see Documents 152 and 153. An update was received on April 3,
Seoul, November 18, 1972, 1022Z.

6684. Subj: Martial Law and Government Changes—The ROK on The Eve of Nov 21 Referendum. Summary: There is no doubt that constitutional changes will be approved in the Nov 21 referendum. The government is engaged in a massive campaign to present and gild its case. Extensive support for President Park and the constitutional changes is expected from rural areas and other quarters but there is also substantial opposition both to the changes and to President Park’s retention of power. Under conditions of martial law we have no reliable measure of the extent of approval or disapproval. The government has displayed its readiness to use repressive measures and the outlines of the more authoritarian state which is in prospect are already clear. Whether the government will become more repressive depends mainly upon the extent of dissent or active opposition. The government appears confident that it will survive the successive tests of its public acceptability as it moves through each step of the government changes to come in the next three months. End summary.

1. In the final days before the Nov 21 referendum there is no doubt in the mind of any observer that the constitutional changes will be approved. Most Koreans accept moreover that the government would be willing to alter the returns if necessary to assure that result.

2. In the last days before the vote, meanwhile, the government is engaging in an all-out campaign on behalf of the changes, setting aside any pretense of confining discussion to “explanations” or of observing its own ban on public argument for or against the changes. The campaign involves massive use of the media to present and gild the government’s case, employment of “enlightenment teams” throughout the country, endorsements and appeals on behalf of the changes by leading figures in all fields of endeavor, and mandatory letter writing by government officials to friends and relatives.

3. Under conditions of martial law, press control, and an evident reluctance of many Koreans to discuss the question, it is not possible to know the true extent of public approval or opposition. President Park probably continues to have heavy and largely unquestioning support in rural areas where roughly half of the electorate resides. Others,

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 KOR S. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.
including some intellectuals, share the President’s view regarding the imperfections of political parties and the National Assembly, and use this to rationalize that there is something good in changes which are in any event inevitable.

4. It is clear, however, that there is substantial opposition both to the constitutional changes and to President Park’s retention of power. A growing number of Koreans are privately expressing reservations or outright opposition. These include not only intellectuals, members of the press, some members and followers of the opposition NDP party, and Christian groups, but also some establishment figures. One possibility which we frequently hear voiced is that opposition to the constitutional changes will find its expression mainly in refusal to vote in the referendum.

5. The loss of democratic processes may also give whatever opposition exists a quality of desperation which it did not have as long as it had recourse to constitutional democratic processes. It is not possible to know at this stage, however, whether opposition will persist, intensify, grow, or find more active expression in the period to come. The government has in the past shown a sophistication in its overwhelming display of force at the outset of such crises which it then tapers off as acceptance of the government’s position spreads. The Park administration undoubtedly intends to combine this tactic with massive use of the totally controlled media having as objective to persuade, pacify, or neutralize opposition.

6. There is little doubt, however, that the government will employ repressive measures if active opposition develops. The extent to which it does so will depend in part upon the extent to which people accept the changes without significant dissent or protest. The government’s readiness to use its powers, and the outlines of an even more authoritarian state than we have seen in the past, are already clear enough. We have evidence that at least six or seven members of the opposition NDP party were detained and beaten by ROK–CIA just after Oct 17, some apparently for past rather than current opposition to President Park. The government has similarly struck some high school students in connection with incipient protests at three or four high school campuses as previously reported. Despite reports that house arrests of opposition NDP leaders had ended, we have reports that Yu Chi San and Kim Hong Kil remain under effective arrest in their own homes. Courts-martial continue to mete out severe sentences of up to three years imprisonment for public criticism of President Park or the constitutional changes, even in neighborhood gossip sessions. Newspapers and other media, meanwhile, have acquired a dull quality, serving as much as vehicles for government propaganda as distributors of news. There is no doubt of the government’s intention to stifle any meaningful dissent or opposition and to use any means necessary to that end.
7. Although daily life throughout Korea goes on largely as before, there is a discernible measure of increased tautness among the people with whom the Embassy is in contact. This does not approach a condition of general tension but rather reflects a realization that the rules of public expression on political subjects are changing and that people must be careful of what they say and do.

8. In this environment, we have thus far continued to say when asked that the U.S. will not interfere in Korea’s internal affairs emphasizing at the same time that we are not associated with the changes. Privately, we have in selected cases clarified that the changes are not being well received in the U.S. and that this could have an adverse effect on U.S. public and Congressional attitudes toward Korea. To the frequent query of ROK officials as to what the ROKG can do to gain U.S. approval, we have replied that given the substance approval cannot be expected, but that there are things it should do (i.e., avoid repression) to avoid making the reaction worse.

9. As the Park administration moves through successive steps in making the changes which are coming—the referendum, the Unification Council and presidential elections, the lifting of martial law, the National Assembly elections, and the reopening of the universities—it will be subjected at each stage to a new test of its public acceptability. Although there may well be strains, the government appears confident that with a skillful employment of its vast powers it will survive these tests.

Habib

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166. **Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State**

Seoul, November 18, 1972, 1052Z.

6685. Subj: Martial Law and Government Changes—Discussion With Chong Il Kwon. Summary: Over Lunch Nov. 18, Chong Il Kwon told me of the President’s decision that day that universities will reopen from Dec 1 to 20 then go into the usual winter recess until March. Armored vehicles and troops will be removed from the streets of Seoul late Nov 18, but martial law will not be lifted until after the presidential election. Chong disclosed a number of other major aspects of the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 KOR S. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo.
changes to come. I used the occasion to emphasize to Chong in strong
terms my concern over the government’s resort to brutality in a num-
ber of recent cases and the certainty that its continuation would alien-
ate the U.S. He said it would stop. I advised Chong that a ROK mis-
SION to the U.S. to present the ROKG’s case for government changes
could be counterproductive. End summary.

1. Former Prime Minister Chong Il Kwon had a number of inter-
esting things to say when he came to lunch at my request on Nov 18.
It is now clear that Chong is one of a five or six member inner coun-
cil consulting regularly with the President on governmental changes.
He said at the outset that he had a long drinking session with the Pres-
ident two nights ago and that the President is appreciative that the Em-
bassy here and the USG in Washington have exercised restraint in pub-
lic comments about martial law and the constitutional changes. Chong
seemed to be saying at the same time that Park remains concerned
about USG reactions to these changes. (We have heard the same thing
from other sources.) Main points of interest in the conversation were:

A. The President and a small group of advisers made a decision on
the morning of Nov 18 to reopen all universities Dec 1. University pres-
idents will be informed immediately and public announcement is [gar-
ble]. The intention would be that students return mainly for final exam-
inations. Universities would then close at the normal school year-end
about Dec 20 and as usual remain in winter recess until March. Military
units will be stationed near the universities, perhaps out of public view,
but will not be placed on the campuses. Chong said this is extremely sen-
sitive and asked us to hold it closely. Comment: This seems to represent a
conclusion by President Park that student opposition to government
changes, if any, can be handled, or that if there is to be a confrontation
with the students he will have it and get it over now rather than later.

B. During the late night of Nov 18, armored vehicles and all troops
will be withdrawn from public places in Seoul. Military units will, how-
ever, remain out of sight in an alert status at strategic points through-
out the city. He said martial law would not be lifted before the presi-
dential election.

C. The latest dates for next steps, which Chong said are firm, are
Dec 15 for Unification Council elections, Dec 27 for inauguration. Two
methods of electing the president are being considered. Under one
scheme, a candidate would be nominated if proposed by 50 or more
members of the Unification Council and the Council would choose in
secret ballot from among candidates so nominated. Under the other
scheme, no nominations would be made and instead each Council
member would simply write the name of a person he would like to
have as President on his ballot; the person getting a majority vote
would be elected.
D. It is almost certain that National Assembly elections will be held in February in order to complete government changes as rapidly as possible. It is now expected that the National Assembly will consist of about 210 members. Chong expects that 50 to 70 of these will be opposition representatives elected mainly from the cities. He candidly acknowledged that the one-third selected by the President would be entirely pro government people who could be counted upon to vote with the government.

E. Cabinet changes after the presidential election will not, in Chong’s view, be extensive and will not affect the Prime Minister. President Park is keeping his own counsel, but Chong thought changes would affect only the economic ministries and perhaps defense. He thought retired General Sun Son Chul a likely candidate for Defense Minister, but said there are also others. Ambassador to Tokyo Yi Ho, former Justice Minister, is a strong candidate to replace the present chief justice.

2. I used the occasion of this luncheon to let Chong know that I am aware of the disturbing number of cases in which the government has employed brutality against prominent persons who have opposed the government. Chong acknowledged that six former Assemblymen of the NDP have been beaten up, Kim Han Su having been treated worse than others. Kim Tae Chung’s secretary had also been badly mauled. In the process, Chong said the secretary had finally disclosed the secret sources of Kim Tae Chung’s funds. These were said by Chong to be Korean companies who were threatened by Kim Tae Chung with anti-company speeches on the National Assembly floor if they failed to pay. I reminded Chong that I had told the Prime Minister and him, among others, from the beginning that use of brutality is never justified. I urged him to make clear to the President that news of the government’s use of these methods is bound to get out and that, as the Greek experience had shown, nothing would be more likely to alienate the American people. Chong predictably said he agreed and that he personally had opposed this sort of thing. He said it would stop. I am reasonably sure he will carry my message to the President.

3. Chong said that the government is considering sending a team of former National Assemblymen to the U.S. “to explain” the steps that the ROK is taking, not in Washington but in outlying areas around the U.S. I replied that at this juncture Washington is more important than the outlying areas but that in both the ROK will find the government changes not well received. The mission therefore would not have good prospects for success. He nodded to indicate that this also was his view.

4. I asked Chong about reports the government was thinking of limiting the number of newspapers to four in Seoul and one in each province. He said there was no such plan.
6745. Subj: Assessment of Referendum. 

**Summary:** President Park and his advisors undoubtedly expect that the lop-sided referendum vote will be understood as evidence that the South Korean people almost unanimously support the President and his goals. We see it rather as an exercise in conformity reflecting acceptance of the inevitable. The numerical accuracy of the results is difficult to assess and appears less important than the way that they were achieved.

2. We see the referendum results as more an exercise in conformity than a reflection of national sentiment for or against the constitutional change. The pressures for conformity on the voters were both official and social. No dissenting voices were permitted. The imposition of martial law and the energetic enlightenment campaign left no doubt that the government valued each man’s vote. This worked to produce a high turn-out, since the voting polls would show whether a man voted or not. The intimate and hierarchical relationship of Korean villagers meant that once a consensus was determined there was social pressure for individuals to concur. Because this “tribal” element is much weaker in the cities, the large pro-amendment vote in Seoul and Pusan is less likely to be accepted by Koreans as completely valid than results elsewhere.

2. Whether or not the ballot boxes were stuffed is, as usual, difficult to surmise and impossible to know. The absence of critical observers would seem to make it more likely. On the other hand, the reputation of “Korean democracy” and President’s mandate would be seriously tarnished if evidence of vote counting irregularities were to come to light. On balance, there seems no reason to question that an overwhelming majority of the voters have for a variety of reasons accepted the government’s new direction.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–5 KOR S. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Tokyo and CINCPAC.

2 In telegram 6777 from Seoul, November 24, Habib reported his conversation with Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil. Kim said that the referendum was overwhelmingly successful (it passed with 92 percent of the vote) because “people generally recognized that President Park’s leadership had been successful and they saw no viable alternative for the future.” He said that the President would be “exercising his vastly increased powers with restraint” and that there would be a major Cabinet reshuffle after the inauguration on December 27. (Ibid., POL 15 KOR S)
3. Apart from extending the President’s tenure indefinitely the government’s massive drive to achieve the largest possible favorable vote in the recently completed referendum can be seen as a harbinger of things to come as the government moves in the direction of the national solidarity and discipline for which President Park is appealing. It has among other things shown that factional strife and dissent, identified with the old system, will be tolerated within much narrower bounds if at all. The goal of a “total consensus” (ch’ongui) was among those proclaimed in the “voter enlightenment” campaign we have just been through.

4. President Park now appears to have set aside any desire or need to prove that he is more popular than any available alternative ruler. In its place, his retention of power is now based on (a) the fact that he is firmly and permanently established in office and (b) the promises he made that he would unify the country and promote prosperity. It is now understood that President Park can be removed from office only by death or a military coup. In the long run this may give his regime additional strength or expose it to weakness, depending on his ability to show progress toward the presidential goals, on the manner in which he exercises the vast powers he now has, and the extent to which the people approve or tolerate government under the new constitution. In the short run, his position appears secure.

Habib

168. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State

Seoul, November 24, 1972, 0905Z.

6782. Subj: Prime Minister’s Views on South-North Dialogue. Summary: Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil said government intends to move cautiously in South-North dialogue. Despite public emphasis on reunification, government recognizes difficulty of reaching accommodation with North. Kim was quite critical of what he considered to be Yi Hu Rak’s undue haste in dealing with Pyongyang. End summary.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL KOR N–KOR S. Secret; Nodis.
1. During a lengthy conversation with Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil covering a number of subjects, we discussed in some detail his views on the South-North dialogue. The Prime Minister said he was concerned that the government’s emphasis on reunification during the campaign for the referendum on the constitution had been carried too far. He foresaw great difficulties in dealing with North Korea. The differences between Seoul and Pyongyang were very great and would only be overcome with much time and great patience. President Park had come to this conclusion also and had expressed some reservations at the pace of developments in the dialogue.

2. Kim did not conceal his criticisms of Yi Hu Rak’s efforts. He said it appeared that because Yi Hu Rak was conducting negotiations his personal prestige was involved with showing progress at every stage. This had led him to conduct the negotiations with undue haste and without proper attention to matters which should have been approached with greater prudence. For example, at an early stage, Yi wished to have the coordinating committee include Cabinet members. This would have immediately moved the dialogue to a government-to-government level prematurely. The Prime Minister had objected and the President agreed this was not desirable. The Prime Minister said no one was quite sure of what Yi Hu Rak had committed himself to in discussions with the North Koreans. At one point it looked as if he was pushing for an early summit meeting, but the President would not go along. This was always a possibility but on the basis of his understanding of the President’s position there would be no meeting between Park and Kim Il Sung in the foreseeable future.

3. I asked Kim what progress he thought might be possible in the talks over the next year. He said that the talks would not be broken off and that the meetings of the delegations, both within the coordinating committee and the Red Cross frameworks, would in itself constitute progress. There might be some exchange of visits by particular groups in the cultural and sports fields, but that was not sure and it was even less probable that economic exchanges would be conducted within the next year.

4. Kim said he has discussed with President Park the possibility of reducing the level of leadership at the coordinating committee and of having someone other than Yi Hu Rak lead the South Korean delegation, just as Kim Yong Chu was replaced by an acting chairman of the North Korean delegation. I asked whether this would not be resented by the North Koreans and viewed as a downgrading of the significance of the meetings. Whereas they claim Kim Yong Chu was sick, no such claim could be made for Yi Hu Rak. He did not reply directly, but said it might be desirable to vary the leadership. In any event, he said, President Park has not yet made up his mind on this point.
5. **Comment**: The rivalry between Prime Minister Kim and Yi Hu Rak, of which we are aware, emerges quite clearly in this conversation. Comparing the Prime Minister’s remarks with those of Yi’s, as reported in Seoul’s 6729, points up the different manner in which each of them presents their thoughts to us. Even where elements are overlapping in the two conversations they illustrate the differing points of view. There is no doubt that the Prime Minister as well as a number of other influential figures are convinced that Yi Hu Rak is dealing in a manner and at a pace which they find imprudent. The President’s views lie somewhere between and it is our impression that he is currently applying some brakes on Yi Hu Rak’s desire to push ahead rapidly.

Habib

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2 In telegram 6729 from Seoul, November 22, Habib reported his meeting with Lee Hu Rak on November 20. Lee’s impression was that Kim Il Sung “was basically seeking a period of peaceful coexistence, a situation of no war.” Habib said that it seemed to him “that the ROKG had not yet succeeded in coordinating its South/North dialogue with its general foreign policy. Examples were its UN policy, the subject of South Korean and North Korean representation internationally, and the ROK position on Japan’s approach to North Korea. Lee admitted that coordination would have to take place.” When Lee implied that the ROK Government wanted to avoid discussion of the UN question with the North, Habib “expressed doubt that this would be possible as North Korea wants to get the UN out of South Korea.” (Ibid.)

169. **Telegraph From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea**

Washington, November 25, 1972, 0120Z.

214182. Ref: State 211818. Subj: Assistant Secretary Green Conversation with ROK Opposition Leader Kim Tae Chung.

1. **Summary.** Kim said even though he saw little hope of peaceful transfer of power in Korea, he intended to return there and do what he could to further the cause of democracy regardless of personal con-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 KOR S. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Kriebel and approved by Green and in S/S. Repeated to Tokyo.

2 In telegram 211818 to Seoul, November 21, the Department reported that Kim had previously met with Ranard on November 20. In this meeting, Ranard observed that “ROK Embassy here has shown great interest in Kim’s movement and appointments, and apparently is moving to block appointments Kim hopes to be able to make.” Nevertheless, Ranard set up Kim’s appointment with Green for November 21. (Ibid.)
sequences. Speaking with restraint, Kim said that Park had capitalized on a US tendency to accept accomplished facts and that, despite its unhappiness with events in Korea, USG did not seem to want to complicate situation for ROK in its dealings with the North. Kim thought the Nixon Doctrine implied less US forces and influence in Asia, implying that there was therefore all the less hope for freedom in that part of the world. Green responded that Kim had many in this country and abroad who sympathized with his cause and believed he had a responsible role to play in Korean affairs, though cautioning that violence was not to anyone’s advantage. Green expressed personal view that the trend of history was on the side of forces which recognized the free spirit of man and he was hopeful that there would be a return to normal political activity in the ROK. He emphasized USG desire to maintain good relations with ROKG and that we would not intervene in Korea’s internal affairs. He added that the Nixon Doctrine in no way implied US withdrawal from the Western Pacific. US is a Pacific power with deep interests in Asia and in the Asian people. End summary.

2. Kim Tae Chung met with Assistant Secretary Green November 21. EA/K Director Ranard present. Accompanying Kim were Lee Sangho (Kim’s brother-in-law) and Yu Ki-young.

3. Conversation was lengthy and cordial. Kim began by apologizing that as an opposition leader he had been unable to prevent the arbitrary changes in the Korean Government. In response to questions, he said he would probably go to Japan in early December and return to Korea at the end of December or early January according to the situation. He thought there would be some personal danger and, in response to Green’s concern for his safety, Kim said he hoped there was nothing to fear but the situation under Park could not be predicted.

4. Kim said the great defect of Korean democracy was that it had not been deeply rooted through the efforts of the Korean people. He returned several times to the theme that Koreans must fight for democracy themselves and that he wanted to be in Korea during this politically difficult period. He had concluded that it was now almost impossible to accomplish a peaceful transfer of power in Korea and that the choice was between unconditional acceptance of the government or its violent overthrow. Several times he asked in rhetorical fashion if there were any other way. Kim said that whatever style Park affected and whatever terminology he used, there was no democracy if there was no freedom of expression or criticism.

5. Kim said he understood the limitations on the US and Japanese Governments in influencing Park but that unfortunately democratic forces in Korea were oppressed by arms and money supplied by these two governments, both of which were the friends of the Korean people. Kim said US and Japanese journalists had told him that while the
US was not happy with events in Korea, it would generally be willing to accept what was an accomplished fact primarily because it did not want to weaken the ROK in its confrontation with the North. He thought Park had deliberately capitalized on this tendency. Kim concluded that there was a tendency toward dictatorship in Asia. He said his understanding of the Nixon Doctrine was that it implied less US forces and influence in Asia and he wondered what the future of US policy in Asia was to be.

6. Throughout conversation Kim responded warmly and with appreciation to Green’s remarks of personal esteem and sympathy.

7. On this last point Green responded that the Nixon Doctrine does not mean the withdrawal of the US from the Western Pacific but takes the position that other countries should be more responsible for their own affairs. The Nixon Doctrine did not imply US withdrawal, retreat or isolation. On the question of dictatorship, Green thought authoritarian trends in Asia were not permanent and that people like Kim were on the side of history.

8. Green said he was pleased to see Kim both because of his position as a distinguished leader of the opposition and because he considers him a friend.

9. Commenting on Kim’s remarks about the lack of democratic roots in Korea Green said he recognized the validity of these remarks. He added that the US was not interested in seeing American style democracy in Korea as is sometimes alleged but it does believe the essence of democracy relates to the fundamental nature of man: that he is a free spirit and wishes to participate in the formulation of his own destiny. He thought that countries seeking progress also sought stability and that most had no democratic tradition to guide them. Nonetheless, the trend was towards self-expression and authoritarianism could not last long where people could think for themselves. Those peoples who strive for institutions of this sort will find sympathy among the American people. In the case of Korea, the search for democratic institutions had been uneven but there was no doubt that it would be successful or that Mr. Kim would have a constructive role to play.

10. Green emphasized that the US wished to maintain close relations with the ROKG and to give the government our support. He noted particularly the past close relations between the US Congress and the ROK National Assembly and thought the Congress would follow events in Korea closely. He hoped martial law would soon give way to normalcy and that there would be a return to normal political activity. He emphasized that the US would not take actions which could harm the Korean people; that as Kim knew we thought the extraordinary measures taken by Park were unnecessary but we did not intend to inter-
vene in Korea’s affairs nor create difficulties for the ROKG. He did not think that violent reaction would be to anyone’s advantage and reiterated that in the long run governments must tolerate criticism and opposition. He thought the international community could play some role in encouraging this process in the ROK. For our part we would as appropriate counsel moderation on the part of the ROKG.

11. Ranard suggested Kim make his presence known to the American Embassy in Tokyo after his arrival and said the US Embassy in Seoul would be interested in maintaining contact with him to the extent Mr. Kim thought prudent in terms of his personal safety. Mr. Kim understood that his conversation with Assistant Secretary Green was privileged and that it was not to be discussed with the press.  

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3 Printed from an unsigned copy.

170. Airgram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State


SUBJECT
U.S. Policy in Korea—Country Team Message

Summary

This is a three part paper containing the Country Team assessment of the Korean situation, recommended objectives and supporting

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 544, Country Files, Far East, Korea, Vol. VI, Jan 73–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis.Drafted by Habib and by D. O’Donohue (POL); cleared in POL, USIS, SAA, COMM, and by Underhill, COMUSK, and Adler; and approved by Habib. Richard Kennedy forwarded the airgram to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, January 16, 1973, which reads: “Much to our amazement, Habib has drafted a proposed policy paper which, among other things, proposes that we be planning a reduction of US forces in FY 1974 and an internal study looking to their total withdrawal in the FY 75–76 period.” He continued: “We think this should be turned off firmly now before it leaks out (which it most certainly will—given the wishful thinking on the part of some elements in State). Otherwise, we are headed for a disaster in our relations with the ROK at this critical juncture.” Kissinger initialed his approval of Kennedy’s proposed message to Habib that countered the Ambassador’s suggestions. (Ibid.)
policies in a PARA context and conclusions, alternatives and tactics. In the light of developments during 1972, the Country Team recommends review and modification of U.S. objectives and policies in Korea.

I. Assessment of Situation and Implications of Policy

1. In 1972, events have set in motion changes which profoundly affect the Korean peninsula. The July 4 Communiqué between the North and South and President Park’s “October Revitalization” program have changed completely the context of the South-North relationship and the structure of government in the Republic of Korea. Coupled with the developing new relationships between Korea’s great power neighbors and the U.S., these changes affect not only Korea but the U.S. role and policies here.

A. South-North Relations.

1. The ROKG and the DPRK have moved rapidly in establishing a substantive dialogue and the intergovernmental mechanisms for continued coordination and future joint actions (e.g., exchanges, economic relations, political discussions). The July 4 Communiqué provided a framework within which future negotiations between the two sides will be conducted.

2. While major substantive matters are being approached cautiously, the process now in motion is not expected to cease and we expect more measured, but still visible movement towards broader dialogue and greater contacts between the South and the North. For the foreseeable future, it is our assessment that neither side has as its target organic unification but rather a level of accommodation that does not threaten absolute control over their respective areas. Each will seek to further its own short term objectives while biding time on the larger issue of reunification.

3. As this process continues, it inevitably affects U.S. policy for Korea. It affects assessments of the security threat and our policies regarding the Korean question at the UN and the problem of international recognition of the DPRK. At the same time we must avoid actions which would threaten progress in the South-North dialogue or give the impression that we are precipitately abandoning the ROK. In sum, our policy and programs need to be modified to reflect the new situation in Korea.

B. The Threat of War.

1. As a result of the South-North meetings and the international environment in which they have occurred, the danger of major hostilities is less now than at any time since the 1953 Armistice. There have been no reported incidents along the DMZ in a year. Militant threats and bitter exchanges between the two sides have receded. In their bi-
lateral contacts, including the hotline, the ROKG and DPRK have reduced the importance of the Military Armistice Commission.

2. Nevertheless, formidable military forces face each other. In ground forces, the ROK has an advantage, and the navies are at a stand-off. However, the North maintains an advantage in air power if the U.S. air forces available are not taken into account. This latter imbalance is not serious in the current situation and the present and projected deterrent power in total forces available to the ROK is sufficient for its needs. If the modernization plan for ROK forces is essentially achieved in terms of equipment, we have no doubt that the bilateral military stand-off can be maintained.

C. The ROK Domestic Scene.

1. Domestically, President Park has abandoned a political course which has served him and his nation well and which we have encouraged in Korea for 25 years. With the “October Revitalization” he has deliberately embarked on a program of highly personal, authoritarian rule. There is now established a governmental structure based essentially on tight executive control. We have commented on Park’s reasons in other messages. They involve a complex of factors including primarily his ambition to remain in power and his long-standing unhappiness with the constraints and political frustrations inherent under the former constitution. Park is also convinced that in a changing international environment, and in dealing with North Korea, his country’s national interest demands his strong, unchallenged leadership.

2. We cannot now predict the future train of events. Stability in the near future rests on Park’s ability, for the present unquestioned, to maintain control through the traditional instruments of a dictatorship—the bureaucracy, the police agencies and the Army. The “October Revitalization” will go far beyond the political institutions in establishing firm, positive government control over South Korean society. Measures now under consideration would affect education, labor, the press and economic life. The government speaks of exercising authority with restraint, but there is little question that control will be firm and dissent forbidden. However, disquiet exists, particularly among the educated and students.

3. These changes will cause problems for us and may well affect certain of our programs. Considering our substantial military presence and long-term support for Korea, the USG will be faced with the continuing question of what our policy stance should be towards unpalatable domestic actions of the Park Government.

4. The ROKG hopes that we can be induced to appear to positively support its domestic political plans. At a minimum it expects that we will do or say nothing to jar its control of the situation and that key elements of U.S. policy (MAP, AID, PL 480, U.S. forces) will not
be seriously affected in the short term. We should not support or approve Park's repressive domestic political actions or be associated with them publicly or privately. Indeed, we believe they were unnecessary and in the long run unwise. However, our long-term presence here and continuing relationship with the ROK associate us, at least tacitly, with the ROKG. It is clear that no mere wrist slapping will deter Park from his political designs. He and those around him are committed to establishing a severely controlled society. This we can deter only by direct and drastic intervention which would threaten Park's hold on power, create instability and deepen our involvement in the ROK internally.

D. The International Situation.

1. The South-North dialogue and President Park's "October Re-vitalization" should be viewed in the context of the international scene. Korea is no longer the frontier for East-West confrontation and the interests of the four great powers in Northeast Asia transcend Korea. The evolving web of contact between the great powers has lessened greatly the possibility of a conflagration in Korea involving, or directly supported by, the USSR and PRC.

2. The Koreans have recognized this. On both sides of the DMZ, they have made their own hard-headed appraisal of the situation. The ROKG expresses concern that it can no longer rely completely on the U.S. commitment despite our frequent reaffirmations. It is deeply conscious of the increasingly dominant economic role being played by Japan, and asserts a desire for a continuing U.S. economic presence as a counterweight. Koreans also fear that Korea's future may be caught up and decided in some great power permutations over which they have no control.

3. In this situation, President Park is determined to move toward a policy of greater "self-reliance," diplomatically, economically and militarily. Concern over the great powers, including the U.S., is a clear theme in Park's justification for his domestic political actions as well as the South-North dialogue. However, Park's view of self-reliance, paradoxically, includes a desire and an expressed need for the U.S. presence and assistance to continue—at least in the short run. His concern that we will reduce our aid program, withdraw our troops sooner than he would like, and his doubt over the firmness of our treaty commitment, come to the surface from time to time. Generally speaking, he wishes to hold on to these elements of strength for as long as he can, expecting they will diminish as time goes on.

II. Recommended PARA Objectives and Supporting Policies and Programs

Based on the assessment contained in Part I, there follow the Country Team recommended PARA objectives and summary recommendations regarding supporting policies and programs:
A. Recommended Objectives:

1. Deter hostilities on the Korean peninsula.
2. Maintain a stable compromise of interests bearing upon Korea among major powers in Northeast Asia. For Japan, in particular, this would mean continued availabilities to the U.S. of bases to support our security commitment and a major economic role in Korea.
4. Increase ROK self-reliance and reduce ROK dependence on U.S. military support for its own defense.
5. Avoid U.S. actions with regard to North Korea which interfere with the development of South-North accommodation.
6. Support the continued presence of a government in the ROK whose foreign policies and outlooks are favorable to the U.S.
7. Maintain our long-term interest in the growth of political maturity in the ROK and of institutions responsive to the needs of the Korean people.
8. Increase U.S. exports to Korea and expand private investment in support of U.S. balance of payments while maintaining our interest in sound economic growth in the ROK.
10. Maintain access to such military bases in Korea as needed.

B. Supporting Policies and Programs:

1. Domestic.
   a. Recognize that the Park Government is embarked on an independent course based on a domestic foundation of highly personal, authoritarian rule.
   b. Maintain normal, friendly governmental relations with the Park Government but seek to avoid associating ourselves with Park’s domestic authoritarian political plans and actions.
   c. Maintain normal contacts with elements of Korean society outside the Korean Government, to include any responsible political opposition that may exist.
   d. Continue our public and private support for the ROKG in the South-North dialogue.

2. International.
   a. While not rejecting postponement as a tactic, accept the extension of unconditional invitations to both sides to participate in discussion of the Korean question at the UN. Leave the question of membership for
either one or two Koreas to be decided by the ROKG and DPRK themselves. In this regard the manner in which resolutions by the opposing sides would be dealt with at the UNGA require special consideration.

b. Accept the early end of UNCURK in an appropriate and dignified fashion.

c. Quietly work to move the question of Korean unification out of the UN context leaving it as an issue for the two Korean regimes to settle—not as an international responsibility.

d. Accept that the problem of third country diplomatic relations with the ROKG and the DPRK is a matter for the individual governments to decide. We should no longer feel required to expend major diplomatic capital trying to block diplomatic recognition of the North by other governments.

e. Begin to review our policy with regard to North Korea while avoiding any actions which could complicate the development of South-North relations. At this time we should approach any bilateral dealings with the North most cautiously and only after full consultation with the ROKG.


b. Begin reducing ground combat forces in the ROK in FY 74. Inform the ROKG of the size of the reduction in the spring of 1973 and after the National Assembly elections.

c. Study internally the possibility of complete withdrawal of ground combat forces from the ROK in the FY 75–76 period. At the same time, recognize that South-North developments or other events will affect timing.

d. Continue to transfer the cost of the ROK military defense to the Koreans themselves:

i. Proceed to reduce MAP “Operations and Maintenance” costs through FY 75 as proposed in Seoul 6679 and examine the need for any residual O&M thereafter.

ii. Attempt to substantially meet the MOD Plan “investment” objectives with FY 75 as the target terminal year. This would involve significant increases in “I” levels above those currently projected. Then consider seriously phasing out all grant assistance in the FY 76–77 period.

e. Review the utility of the UNC in the current Korean situation, particularly as it relates to operational control, the armistice and likely UN developments. We should also begin to talk to the ROKG about possible ways of transferring the UNC armistice responsibilities to the ROKG since the two Korean regimes are already in de facto fashion dealing directly on the maintenance of the peace.
4. Economic.

a. Continue our PL 480 program at levels appropriate to Korea’s needs and in support of U.S. objectives including trade development.

b. Continue our vigorous, expanded support for U.S. commercial interests. This requires a more active campaign to interest U.S. exporters in the Korean market, improving EX–IM and other credit and guarantee facilities for trade, and when necessary, the use of official “leverage” to the advantage of U.S. commercial interests.

c. Continue the phasedown of AID technical assistance programs. The ROK is a successful AID “graduate” country. In its present stage of economic growth, the ROK does not need the kinds of technical assistance we provided in the past.

d. Terminate U.S. development loans by the end of FY 75 consistent with our understandings under the Textile Quota Agreement.

5. Other Programs.

a. USIS

Continue the U.S. informational and cultural program in support of U.S. objectives as set forth above.

b. Peace Corps

Review ongoing Peace Corps activities in the light of likely ROKG restructuring of social institutions. Do not increase the program above present levels and assure continuation of a low profile, non-political stance on the part of Peace Corps volunteers in a new, restrictive political environment. Recognize that the Peace Corps program is marginally useful to Korean development but in selected areas its contribution has been valuable and appreciated. It also provides a good environment for American youth for service and self-development.

III. Conclusions, Alternatives and Tactics

A. Early Action:

In major program terms, the recommended policies and program changes listed in Part II would involve early decisions on the following matters. These decisions should be made soon and would be communicated to the Koreans in the first half of 1973.

a. Modification of our UN policy concerning Korea.
b. Level of U.S. ground forces in Korea in FY 1974.
c. Increase of MAP “I” to allow substantial fulfillment of MOD Plan “I” objectives by the end of FY 75.
d. Approval of the MAP “O” cost transfer schedule previously recommended.
B. The Longer Term:

1. Other recommended actions will be considered in more detail in future messages if the general policy direction as envisaged is approved. This involves such things as the future of the United Nations Command, U.S. policy regarding North Korea, U.S. force levels and MAP programs beyond FY 1974, and economic and commercial programs. Some of the simpler recommended actions can be accomplished within existing policy guidelines.

2. It should be noted that, if our recommendations are accepted, there still will be a major U.S. presence in Korea in the foreseeable future. Our PL 480 program would continue; MAP levels would be high through FY 75 and would substantially meet the joint U.S./ROK modernization goals; over 30,000 U.S. military personnel, including the air component, would still be in ROK at the end of FY 74. Most importantly, the basic U.S. security commitment in the Mutual Defense Treaty would remain. Given our current assessment of the security situation, the strength of the ROK forces, and the ability of the Korean economy to bear increased defense costs, we believe it entirely feasible that a carefully calculated phasedown in our present high level of military support can begin in FY 73–74.

3. Our recommendations are in great measure a recognition of trends and decisions already clearly in train. Our recommended course of action would only begin, not complete, the process of establishing a new U.S. relationship to Korea. Our recommendations are sufficiently considered and flexible to avoid a major increase in tensions and to avoid compromise of other important U.S. objectives in Korea and in Northeast Asia. For instance, they should not unduly upset valid Japanese concerns about the security of the area. Nor should they jeopardize the further development of the dialogue between South and North Korea.

C. The Alternatives:

1. The most obvious alternative to our recommendations is to maintain our programs, support and commitments at present levels and let events determine our policy. There are disadvantages in this. They are:

a. The likelihood that events in Korea, the UN and internationally will continue to outpace our expectations. Instead of adopting a prudent course reflecting our assessment of the situation, we would be faced with a series of discrete decisions made on an ad hoc basis, which we suspect would be more, not less, unpalatable to the ROK and more destabilizing in their impact.

b. A lessened justification for our present high levels of support in terms of the security threat. We would, therefore, be mis-using resources and our programs should be brought into closer alignment with desirable U.S. objectives.
c. The clear danger that maintenance of the status quo in policy terms would not only be inappropriate but also unresponsive to our interests as the situation in Korea and Northeast Asia changes.

2. Another alternative would be a policy of active intervention to force the Park Government to back down from its authoritarian political plans and to reinstitute representative government. As we have noted earlier, we can only deter Park by drastic intervention which would create major internal instability and involve us deeply in Korean domestic affairs. This alternative was rejected by the Embassy and the Department at the time martial law was declared and the new Constitution announced. There are those in Korea, and elsewhere, who will be disappointed if the U.S. does not use what leverage it has to try to force the ROKG to reinstitute democracy in Korea. However, it remains our view that the costs of trying to coerce Park to retreat are too great in terms of our objectives and our interests here and, in any event, might fail.

3. Internationally and at the UN, we could also stand pat on our past positions trying to preserve the special status of the ROK. However, the South-North dialogue and other developments, including the imminent international acceptance of two Germanies, make it unlikely that we can successfully accomplish this. Similarly UNCURK, which is of marginal utility, appears to be nearing the end of its road with even the Australians considering how to end the Commission. Because of these considerations, we believe that our past UN policy will not long stand up and that 1973 should be used as a transition year to a policy more in keeping with the realities of the situation.

D. Tactics and ROK Reaction:

1. We would expect a strongly negative reaction by the ROKG to any apparent diminution of our support. The ROKG wishes to preserve as long as possible the benefits of their relationship with the U.S., whatever the actual requirements of the situation are.

2. For obvious tactical reasons, the ROKG would insist that there be no reduction of U.S. troop levels through at least FY 1975, that the MOD plan be fulfilled completely and that UN strategy be unchanged. They might accuse us of weakening our basic commitment at a time when they need it to deal with the North. They might also interpret any U.S. actions as manifestations of U.S. political displeasure with President Park’s domestic policies.

3. At the same time, the Koreans are tough and cynical realists. They have already made their own appraisal of the situation and are anticipating changes in their relationship with the U.S. Prime Minister Kim’s public statements predicting U.S. troop withdrawals by 1975 reflect a private conviction that a fundamental change in ROK/US relationship
is inevitable, and eventually desirable, as soon as the ROK can manage it. The ROKG will not be surprised by the fact we would consider scaling down our material support. However, they want to delay our actions as long as possible.

4. Tactically, we would not present as a package our proposals regarding UN policy, U.S. force levels and MAP. Rather we envisage the following scenario in 1973:

a. February–March: Inform ROKG of our firm decision on transfer of more “O and M” costs. At the same time assure them in concrete terms of USG determination to seek sufficient “I” to assure substantial completion of MOD plan objectives by FY 75.

b. March–April: Inform ROKG of our view that our UN strategy and policies must be modified in the light of developments in peninsula and internationally. Give them our views on policy changes and the future of UNCURK.

c. May–June: Inform the ROKG of a scheduled reduction of U.S. ground forces in FY 74.

5. In our approaches we would assure the ROK of our continued commitment to ROK security, pointing to remaining U.S. forces and our commitment to MOD plan “I” levels. At the same time we would also frankly point out that our MAP and U.S. force levels are not immutable. They are based on ongoing assessments of the threat and on the ability of ROK to bear the costs of its defense. We would tell the ROKG that modernization of the ROK armed forces and the impressive growth of the Korean economy mean that U.S. military resource allocations will continue to change, while our basic treaty commitment remains firm.

E. Conclusion:

In conclusion, we believe that the changed international environment, the South-North developments and President Park’s “October Revitalization” force a review and modification of our objectives in Korea and our supporting policies. The year 1972 has been a watershed year for Korea, and U.S. policies should reflect a new reality and a changing U.S. role. Therefore, we request early consideration of the recommended policies and programs and the proposed tactics.
7216. Subj: ROK Forces in Viet-Nam.

1. ROK Minister of Defense Yu Chae Hung spoke to me about withdrawal of ROK forces from Viet-Nam regardless of outcome of present negotiating efforts. He said his government had withheld its decision on such withdrawal because question would become academic if present negotiations succeeded and ROK forces withdrew under the terms of the agreement.

2. Yu said his government wished to begin withdrawing troops on January 2 and complete all withdrawals by June 30. Vietnamese Government had requested withdrawal to begin in mid '73 with one division to be withdrawn by the end of the year and the second division to be withdrawn in 1974. ROKG had not yet replied formally to this request but was not likely to agree. Nevertheless ROKG did not want to “add to President Thieu’s troubles” at this time. Therefore they were quietly going ahead with their plans to begin withdrawal in January but not calling attention to their total withdrawal plan.

3. Minister Yu said preparing a unit for withdrawal required ten days time for turning its area over to the Vietnamese and assembling for lift. The first units were originally scheduled to begin withdrawal the first week in January and then continue at regular intervals. In the current circumstances they were prepared to postpone the beginning of the withdrawal cycle until the end of January. Even with this postponement they were still planning to get all their forces out by June 30, although there was always the possibility that President Park might reconsider on the basis of President Thieu’s request and make some adjustment in the withdrawal rate. In Yu’s opinion this would be only a modest adjustment and not likely to go anywhere near meeting Thieu’s wishes.

4. Yu asked if I had any news that could affect these withdrawal plans. I said that negotiations were obviously at a crucial point and I thought his government should await the outcome of the current round of meetings in Paris before making any decision. President Park would be kept informed on the course of negotiations. As he knew, under the terms of the agreement withdrawal would begin immediately and

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 KOR S. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon, CINCPAC for POLAD, and Secretary Laird.
would be completed within sixty days. If agreement were not reached soon it seemed prudent for ROKG to be prepared to postpone beginning regular withdrawal cycle until end of January. In any event we might just sit tight for the time being and see what emerges from the negotiations.

Habib

172. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

Congratulatory Message to President Park Chung Hee

Under the recently approved revisions to the Korean constitution, an indirect method of election of the President by a National Council for Reunification has been established. This election will take place on December 23, and it may be taken for granted that President Park Chung Hee will be reelected. His inauguration will take place December 27.

Since October 17, when President Park and his advisors began an extensive series of changes to the Korean government, mainly accomplished under martial law and government pressure, they have attempted to demonstrate to their public that the United States supports their actions. We, however, have taken the position that we were not consulted, and are not associated with these changes. Publicly our position is that the constitutional amendments were an internal matter on which we declined to comment.

Given the above circumstances, a congratulatory message from the President poses certain problems. The Korean Government will make every effort to publicize this message as White House approval of

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S. Confidential. Drafted by Ranard on December 21 and cleared by Green and Sneider.
Park’s election. Notwithstanding, considering our interests in Korea, a cordial but diplomatically correct message is warranted.²

I recommend that the enclosed congratulatory message be sent by the President just as soon as the results have been officially announced.³

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

² The draft message is attached. The substantive portion of the congratulatory note reads as follows: “Dear Mr. President: Allow me to express the congratulations of the American Government and people on your election once more to the leadership of your country. I look forward to the continuation of the cooperative and friendly relations that have marked the close association of the past between our two countries, and to working with you toward the goal of peace in Asia.”

³ Telegram 231688 to Seoul, December 24, transmitted the congratulatory note to the Embassy. According to an attached handwritten note, December 23, the note was approved by Holdridge at the White House by telephone. In attached telegram 7399 from Seoul, December 26, the Embassy reported delivery of the note to the Korean Blue House, which released it on the evening of December 26 along with others including messages from the Governments of Japan and the Philippines. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 KOR S)
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