Understanding Gujarat Violence

By Ashutosh Varshney

At 7:42 A.M. on February 27, 2002, Sabarmati Express pulled into the train station of Godhra, a small town in the Western Indian state of Gujarat, ruled by a Hindu nationalist government since 1995. What exactly happened at the train station and soon thereafter remains trapped in different narratives. Some details can, however, be reconstructed with sufficient assurance.

Sabarmati Express was carrying cadres (karsevaks) of the Hindu right from Ayodhya, where they had gone to express their vigorous support for building a Ram temple at a legally and politically disputed site. At Godhra, apparently, an altercation took place between Hindu activists and some Muslim boys serving tea at the train station. As the train began moving after its scheduled stop at the station, the emergency cord was pulled. As a result, the train stopped in a primarily Muslim neighborhood where, according to credible press reports, it was attacked by a Muslim mob. Two carriages were burned, and the firefighting efforts hampered. The fire killed 58 passengers, including many women and children.

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The Gujarat Pogrom of 2002

By Paul R. Brass

Events labelled “Hindu-Muslim riots” have been recurring features in India for three-quarters of a century or more. In northern and western India, especially, there are numerous cities and towns in which riots have become endemic. In such places, riots have, in effect, become a grisly form of dramatic production in which there are three phases: preparation/rehearsal, activation/enactment, and explanation/interpretation. In these sites of endemic riot production, preparation and rehearsal are continuous activities. Activation or enactment of a large-scale riot takes place under particular circumstances, most notably in a context of intense political mobilization or electoral competition in which riots are precipitated as a device to consolidate the support of ethnic, religious, or other culturally marked groups by emphasizing the need for solidarity in face of the rival communal group. The third phase follows after the violence in a broader struggle to control the explanation or interpretation of the causes of the violence. In this phase, many other elements in society become involved, including journalists, politicians, social scientists, and public opinion generally.

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A retaliatory bloodbath followed in many parts of the state. Hindu mobs torched Muslim homes and businesses, killed Muslim men, women and children, and erased mosques and graves. Instead of isolating those Muslim criminals who attacked the train and punishing them legally, as any law-bound and civilized government would do, the state government allowed revenge killings. Over a thousand lives, possibly many more, were lost over the next few weeks. Over 100,000 Muslims were pushed into the state’s ramshackle refugee camps, where basic amenities were minimal and living conditions abysmal.

Hindu-Muslim riots are not uncommon in India, but Gujarat violence plumbed new depths of horror and brutality and has come to acquire a double meaning. It was a bruising embarrassment for anyone who believes in the pluralistic core of Indian nationhood, a view enshrined in India’s constitution, a view that gives an equal place to all religions in the country, privileging none.

Hindu nationalism, India’s Hindu right, reads Gujarat violence differently. It believes in an India dominated by its majority community, the Hindus. All other religions, it has always argued, must “assimilate” to India’s Hindu core, accepting in effect that the Hindus are the architect of the Indian nation and also its superior citizens. For Hindu nationalist ideologues, the anti-Muslim violence was an ideological victory. In a formal resolution, the RSS, the ideological and organizational centerpiece of Hindu nationalism, said: “Let the minorities understand that their real safety lies in the goodwill of the majority.” Laws alone, the RSS implied, as it always has, cannot protect India’s minorities.

Such views, of course, can be expressed in a democracy that protects free speech. The crux of the matter lies elsewhere. Press reports make it plausible to argue that the anti-Muslim retaliation was significantly abetted, if not demonstrably sponsored, by the elected Hindu nationalist government of the state.

Were Gujarat killings pogroms, not riots? Has independent India had any other pogroms before? And what are the implications of such violence for our understanding of the role of the state in ethnic or communal riots? These are the critical issues raised by Gujarat violence.

Riots or Pogroms?

In one respect, the violence in Gujarat followed a highly predictable pattern. A recent time-series constructed on Hindu-Muslim violence had already identified Gujarat as the worst state, much worse than the states of North India often associated with awful Hindu-Muslim relations in popular perceptions. It had also specified three Gujarat towns—Ahmedabad, Vadodara and Godhra—as the most violence-prone: these three turned out to be the worst sites of violence in March and April 2002. It was also argued that the outbreaks of communal violence tend to be highly locally concentrated: many towns, only a few miles away from the worst cities, have insulated themselves from communal riots, entirely or substantially. In contrast to Ahmedabad, Surat’s old city (not the part where its shantytowns are) was argued to be such an example: yet again in March and April 2002, the violence in Surat was minimal, even as Vadodara and Ahmedabad, neither too far away from Surat, experienced carnage.

Not everything about Gujarat violence was, however, entirely predictable. In one respect, the violence was shockingly different. Unless later research disconfirms the proposition, the existing press reports give us every reason to conclude that the riots in Gujarat were the first full-blooded pogrom in independent India.

According to dictionaries, a pogrom means: “An organized, often officially encouraged massacre or persecution of a minority group, especially one conducted against Jews” (www.dictionary.com) “A mob attack, either approved or condoned by authorities, against the persons and property of a religious, racial, or national minority.” (www.britannica.com)

Reports in almost all major newspapers of India, with the exception of the vernacular press in Gujarat, show that at least in March, if not April, the state not only made no attempt to stop the killings, but also condoned them. That the government “officially encouraged” anti-Muslim violence—something often believed—cannot be conclusively proved on the basis of the evidence provided by newspaper reports, though later research may well prove that. What is unquestionable is that the state condoned revenge killings.

The statements of non-governmental organizations most closely associated with the state government are highly indicative. According to the chief of one such organization, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), a leading Hindu nationalist body, Gujarat was “the first positive response of the Hindus to Muslim fundamentalism in 1,000 years.” The reference here is to the original historical arrival of Muslims from Central Asia and the Middle East to the Indian subcontinent, a time when a long Hindu decline, say the Hindu nationalists, also set in. On this reading, the rise of Muslims in Indian history and the Hindu decline are integrally connected, the former causing the latter, and a revenge for historical wrongs is necessary.

The Hindu right believes that its elected government did exactly what was required: namely, allowing violent Hindu
retaliation against the Muslims, including those who had nothing to do with the mob that originally torched the train. For others, of course, it is not the job of the government, whatever its ideological persuasion, to stoke public anger, or to allow it to express itself violently, regardless of the provocation. No elected government that has taken an oath to protect the lives of its citizens can behave the way criminal gangs do, thirsting for a tit-for-tat. This is why Gujarat killings have been a source of bitter debate and intense agony in India.

It is sometimes suggested that the anti-Sikh violence in Delhi, after the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 30, 1984, was the first pogrom of independent India. This argument is not plausible, for the differences are critical. To illustrate the major differences, one can do no better than cite from a most brilliant column written by a senior Indian journalist, who personally covered the 1984 anti-Sikh riots:

First of all, the ordinary mass of the Hindus in Delhi never got involved in the riots—many of us put on crash helmets, picked up hockey sticks and cricket bats, wickets, anything at night to run vigils in our streets so no “outsiders” could harm our Sikh neighbours. How many such stories have we heard from Gujarat? Second, once the government got its act together (within 72 hours) all rioting stopped, as if someone had blown the whistle and called off a game or a movie show. Third, and this is the most important distinction, there was shame, embarrassment, contrition, even fear on the faces of the top civil servants, police officers, Congressmen. They knew something terrible had happened. Rajiv Gandhi may have made his insensitive “when a tree falls earth shakes...” statement to rationalize the killings, but damage control started immediately.

...[A]s the riots were dying out on November 3 (Mrs. Gandhi had been assassinated on October 30) Delhi’s Lieutenant-Governor, P.G. Gavai, was fired. ... The Station Head Officer (SHO) of Trilokpuri (police station) was removed on November 2. The police commissioner, Subhash Tandon, was replaced on November 12. So were Deputy Commissioner of Police (east), under whose jurisdiction Trilokpuri fell, Additional Police Commissioner (range), and Deputy Commissioner of Police (south). Within a month or so they were all facing departmental inquiries. Contrast this with what happened in Gujarat. Did any policeman get removed or punished for non-performance or complicity? Narendra Modi, on the other hand, moved in...

The larger point should be clear. Because of their intense anti-Muslim ideology and a Hindu conception of the nation, the leading Hindu nationalist organizations, such as the VHP and RSS, have celebrated the anti-Muslim violence as an act of nationalism. In contrast, the Congress party never developed an anti-Sikh ideology. This should explain why the Congress ended up developing an attitude of contrition, but the VHP, deeply intertwined with the state government in Gujarat, found hacking and burning Muslims after the Godhra provocation a celebratory and ideologically correct act. It is the latter which makes Gujarat riots a clear pogrom. There is no contrition yet in the statements of the Gujarat state government, or of leading Hindu nationalist organizations. The anti-Sikh violence of 1984 was significantly different.

In the Gujarat government’s eyes, Muslims are disloyal and deserve to be treated harshly, regardless of whether all Muslims were involved in, or supported, the torching of train at Godhra. No distinction need be made between Muslim criminals and innocent Muslim citizens. And the most powerful civil society organizations—the VHP and RSS—are also of the same view. Instead of civil society resisting the state, or the state resisting marauding civic groups like the VHP, there was a coincidence between the two in March 2002. It is this coincidence that created the ideal conditions for a pogrom.

**Causes of Riots: Towards a Deeper Understanding**

It is often said that if the state were communally neutral, or scrupulous enough to protect the lives of all its citizens, there would be no large-scale communal violence. This argument is true, but only trivially so. Moreover, it does not advance our understanding of peace.

Whenever major communal violence has taken place in independent India, academics, activists, legal experts and journalists have been intensely critical of the state. All scholars as well as judicial inquiry commissions instituted to investigate riots in independent India so far have focused on riots and violent towns, not on towns that did not explode, even while other cities were burning. Bulandshahar, next to Aligarh, and Saharanpur, next to Meerut, have rarely been infected by the communal orgy of their neighboring towns. If the researchers and judges only investigate violence, the failure of state organs in preventing riots is bound to be a foregone conclusion. There is no mystery to be unraveled here.

To understand riots better, we need, first of all, to compare systematically the episodes of mass violence with episodes of
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peace. It is about the only way scholars know of figuring out whether they are right about their understanding. In the absence of such comparisons, we can’t convincingly answer a fundamental question: how do we know we are right?

The logic underlying this proposition is simple, often misunderstood, and worth restating.9 Suppose on the basis of commonalities, we find that inter-ethnic economic rivalry (a), polarized party politics (b), and segregated neighborhoods (c) explain ethnic violence (X). Can we, however, be sure that our judgments are right? What if (a), (b) and (c) also exist in peaceful cases (Y)? In that case, either violence is caused by the intensity of (a), (b) and (c) in (X); or, there is an underlying factor or the context that makes (a), (b) and (c) result in violence in one case but not in the other; or, most intriguingly, there is yet another factor (d), which differentiates peace from violence. It will, however, be a factor that we did not discover precisely because peaceful cases were not studied with the violent ones.

Following this method, it can be demonstrated that dreadful though it is, Hindu-Moslem violence is neither endemic nor widespread in India.10 Rioting is heavily concentrated in a handful of cities and towns. In thousands of villages and towns, Hindus and Muslims manage to live together. There may be tensions and small clashes, but they do not degenerate into riots. Since horrific acts of rioting make news and quiet conduct of everyday life does not, we get a distorted picture of the extent of violence and killings.

The share of villages in communal rioting has been miniscule. Between 1950-95, rural India, where more than two-thirds of Indians live, accounted for a mere 4 per cent of all deaths in Hindu-Muslim riots. Such rioting is primarily an urban phenomenon. Moreover, within urban India itself, eight cities accounted for about 46 per cent of all deaths. These riot-prone cities have less than a fifth of India’s urban population and a mere 6 per cent of the country's total population, urban as well as rural.

What explains these local concentrations of communal violence? Based on a comparison of six Indian cities, three riot-prone and three entirely or mostly peaceful, my book (see endnote 5) argues that the pre-existing local institutions of civic engagement—political parties, business associations, trade unions, professional associations of teachers, students and lawyers; NGOs; reading and film clubs, especially if they are mass-based, as in South India—explain why some towns remain peaceful, while others go up in flames.

Periodically, provocative events do take place. Such events can be likened to “sparks.” Where Hindus and Muslims are integrated in local civic organizations, sparks get extinguished. In towns where Hindus and Muslims are segregated and no common civic sites exist, sparks can easily turn into conflagrations, consuming tens and hundreds of lives. This was as true in March and April of 2002 as it has been for many decades, including during partition, unquestionably the worst period of Hindu-Muslim violence.

Such local concentrations of violence suggest that despite the Hindu nationalist claims about Muslim attacks on Hindu culture in the past, only some Hindus, and only some places, allow such perceived “historical and national wrongs” to undermine the political, economic and social links between communities. Privately, they may well have anti-Muslim feelings, but such feelings are not allowed to turn into violence.

Since independence, only two regions of India—the North and the West—have had repeated rioting and, within these regions, only some cities and towns. Despite having a substantial Muslim population, southern India, with the major exception of the city of Hyderabad, has had remarkably low levels of Hindu-Muslim violence. The same is true of eastern India over the last few decades. Hindu-Muslim divisions, the cornerstone of Hindu nationalism, have not been a central feature of the politics of the South and the East. Scholars have tended to draw too many unacceptable generalizations from the North or the West about the whole country. In most parts of India, the relationships of Hindus and Muslims are so extensive—often in organizations and associations—that the Hindu nationalist dream of a nationwide Hindu-Muslim cleavage, from which they would politically benefit, is most unlikely to become a reality.

What is a Better Bet for Peace: The State or Civil Society?

Given the arguments above, how should we conceptualize the role of the state in moments of communal violence?11 After more than 50 years of experience with state behavior during Hindu-Muslim riots, we should revise our view of what the state does in such moments, why it does so, and how to make the state behave better.

It follows that citizen action has to take two forms: while continuing to pressure the state for its dereliction of constitutional duty, it should focus on building integrated civic structures.
Here are four proposals:

First, on the major fault-lines of a polity, as Hindu-Muslim relations are in India, the state tends to act in a politically strategic, not a legally correct, manner. This is true in much of the world. Consider the Sri Lankan state on Sinhalese-Tamil relations, the Malaysian state on Malay-Chinese relations, and the US on race relations, though the US is beginning to come out of its racial bind. States should not act in this manner, but they do, combining legality, morality and political calculations in an unpredictable way. The state in Gujarat acted in a primarily strategic, not a legally correct, manner.

Secondly, this more realistic understanding of how states function neither means that citizens should cease to criticize and pressure the state when it fails to protect lives in riots, nor that they should stop trying every constitutional means of punishing the state. But, while making every attempt to put pressure on the state, they should not bet on it to rectify its behavior any time soon. If, as a result of such criticism and pressure, the state corrects itself on major fault-lines, it should be viewed as a happy low-odds outcome of citizen activism.

Thirdly, working on, and building, integrated civic networks is a better bet. Towns where Hindus and Muslims continue to be integrated—in businesses, political parties, unions, professional associations of lawyers, teachers, doctors and students, and clubs—are also towns where riots remain either absent or rare. An integrated organizational and civic life makes the state behave much better than intellectual and political exhortations that it do so. This remains one of the more important findings of my study.

Finally, it follows that citizen action has to take two forms: (a) while continuing to pressure the state for its dere- licion of constitutional duty, it should (b) focus on building integrated civic structures. The first has been the primary strategy for citizen action, in India and elsewhere, thus far. Such action is necessary, but not sufficient. Citizen initiatives should follow a two-track strategy, combining (a) and (b). The state, otherwise, will continue to get away with its utter misconduct and gross disrespect for human lives during ethnic riots.

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Endnotes
1 A Muslim mosque once stood at this site; Hindu militants razed it in December 1992.
2 It is believed in some quarters that the abducting of a young woman by Hindu militants traveling in the train triggered the attack on the train. Careful analysis shows that this story is simply wrong. For the most conclusive refutation of the story, see Prem Shankar Jha, “The Mystery Email,” The Indian Express, March 25, 2002.
3 While initial reports indicated the flame came from the outside, forensic evidence indicates strongly that the fire began within. The Gujarat Forensic Science Lab (FSL) found that at least 60 liters of petrol were inside the carriage before the fire was set. Some eyewitnesses reported seeing individuals carrying jerry cans filled with petrol enter the train.
4 This is based on a close reading of the following newspapers: The Times of India; The Indian Express; The Hindu of March 26, 2002. See also the most conclusive refutation of the story, Prem Shankar Jha, “The Mystery Email,” The Indian Express, March 25, 2002.
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At first, multiple narratives vie for primacy in controlling the explanation of violence. On the one hand, the dominant social forces attempt to insert an explanatory narrative into the prevailing discourse of order, while others seek to establish a new consensual hegemony that upsets existing power relations, that is, those which accept the violence as spontaneous, religious, mass-based, unpredictable, and impossible to prevent or control fully. This third phase is also marked by a process of blame displacement in which social scientists themselves become implicated, a process that fails to isolate effectively those most responsible for the production of violence, and instead diffuses blame widely, blurring responsibility, and thereby contributing to the perpetuation of violent productions in future, as well as the order that sustains them.

In India, all this takes place within a discourse of Hindu-Muslim hostility that denies the deliberate and purposive character of the violence by attributing it to the spontaneous reactions of ordinary Hindus and Muslims, locked in a web of mutual antagonisms said to have a long history. In the meantime, in post-Independence India, what are labelled Hindu-Muslim riots have more often than not been turned into pogroms and massacres of Muslims, in which few Hindus are killed. In fact, in sites of endemic rioting, there exist what I have called “institutionalized riot systems” in which the organizations of militant Hindu nationalism are
deeply implicated. Further, in these sites, persons can be identified who play specific roles in the preparation, enactment, and explanation of riots after the fact. Especially important are what I call the “fire tenders,” who keep Hindu-Muslim tensi ons alive through various inflammatory and inciting acts; “conversion specialists” who lead and address mobs of potential rioters and give a signal to indicate if and when violence should commence; criminals and the poorest elements in society, recruited and rewarded for enacting the violence; and politicians and the vernacular media who, during the violence, and in its aftermath, draw attention away from the perpetrators of the violence by attributing it to the actions of an inflamed mass public. When successful, as it most often is, the principal beneficiaries of this process of blame displacement are the government and its political leaders, under whose watch such violence occurs. Here also, in the aftermath, social scientists become involved when they draw attention to the difficulties of “governance” in societies where interethnic and intercommunal animosities are allegedly rampant. They themselves then become implicated in a political discourse that, as Baxi has well put it, concerns itself with “the agonies of governance,” rather than with the “suffering” of the victims of misgovernment, and thereby normalizes the violence against its victims.

In sites of endemic rioting, there exist what I have called “institutionalized riot systems.”

These issues of images, labels, and responsibility emerged starkly once again in the months from February 27 through June 2002 in the western Indian state of Gujarat, where widespread killings, mostly of Muslims, were carried out on a scale, and with a ferocity, reminiscent of the genocidal massacres that occurred during the partition of the Punjab in 1947, and with the apparent involvement—by several eyewitness accounts—of ministers in the government itself, under the leadership of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Chief Minister Narendra Modi. All the elements of riot production and interpretation outlined above appear in the great killings in Gujarat.

All available evidence, which is unusually well documented in the case of Gujarat, indicates beyond a shadow of doubt that the Sangh parivar (the umbrella organization of all militant Hindu organizations) was well-prepared and well-rehearsed to carry out the murderous, brutal, and sadistic attacks on Muslim men, women, and children. Although the precipitating incident that provided the pretext for these actions was unexpected, there was an apparent connection with local politics in the town of Godhra, the site of the incident; a clear connection with the vast movement of militant Hindu political mobilization centered around the demand for the building of a new temple to the god, Ram, in the northern Indian town of Ayodhya; and a post-pogrom intent on the part of the BJP government in Gujarat to take advantage of presumed Hindu political consolidation for electoral purposes, by calling for early state legislative assembly elections.

As in most such situations, the “causes” of the initial acts of violence appeared obscure and indeterminate, yet the process of blame displacement began before any credible facts at all emerged concerning the horrific killing of 58 persons, mostly kar sevaks (militant Hindu volunteers) returning from Ayodhya by train on February 27, burned alive in two bogeys of that train, at the railway station in Godhra. BJP leaders promptly blamed the Inter Services Intelligence unit of Pakistan (generally known as ISI) for the Godhra incidents. In the days following this and other BJP claims and accusations, however, news reports appeared that cast doubt on them and pointed to several other circumstances that opened up other interpretations. These included an allegedly provocative, insulting, and lewd behavior on the part of the kar sevaks in relation to Muslim vendors at the train stations en route to Godhra, and in relation to Muslim passengers, including women. Other circumstances concerned local political rivalries between the Congress and the BJP, between rival factions in the Congress, and between local Muslim organizations. It was also revealed that the town of Godhra, with an approximately 40% Muslim, 60% Hindu population balance, has had a long history of communal riots, of which no less than thirteen were enumerated between 1947 and 1992.

But the Godhra incidents were quickly overshadowed by what followed, namely, a systematic pogrom enacted with precision and extreme brutality by persons and organizations in the institutionalized riot system of the RSS family of organizations, including members of the BJP government, the police, and even members of the elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS). This pogrom began on February 28, a day after the Godhra massacre, under the auspices of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), which called for a state-wide bandh (closing down) to protest the killings in Godhra. The Gujarati pogrom continued until March 3, after which there was a hiatus followed by “a new round of violence” from March 15.

Estimates of the numbers killed range from below a thousand to two thousand. Some thirty cities and towns in the state were reported to be “still under curfew” on March 27.

Official figures provided by the Gujarat government also show the characteristic predominance of Muslim victims in the numbers killed during rioting: more than 5 Muslims to 1 Hindu, inclusive of the Hindus killed on the train at Godhra, but a ratio of 15 to 1 in the rioting that followed after Godhra. The numbers of displaced persons compelled to seek refuge in relief camps also speaks to the enormity of the cataclysm visited upon the Muslims of Gujarat: nearly 150,000 in 104 relief camps by mid-April.

Numerous features of these killings and destruction of
property suggest the validity of the term pogrom and its systematic character. They include the destruction of over 500 mosques and dargahs (shrines). It has also been reported that many, if not most, police either stood aside or coordinated or participated in the violence against Muslims. Moreover, testifying to the high degree of preparation, the marauding mobs of killers carried lists of voters and other documents with them, which made it possible for them to identify the homes of Muslims who were to be killed and whose property was to be destroyed. Also on the riot scenes, according to eyewitnesses, were prominent BJP and VHP leaders, who moved along with the mobs of Hindu rioters. Sometimes they played the role of "conversion specialists," addressing the mobs, after which they discreetly left, whereupon the mobs carried out their murderous attacks. As in Kanpur City in 1992 and in the great Aligarh riots of 1990-91, when attacks were made for the first time on predominantly Muslim mohallas at the outskirts of these cities; so also in Gujarat, "Muslims were attacked even in areas where they constituted the majority." Further, the killings extended to several villages in rural areas of the state. Also, as in Aligarh in 1990-91, several of the vernacular media agencies in Gujarat became, in effect, part of the institutionalized riot system of the Sangh parivar. A leading Gujarati newspaper, Sandesh, featured a front-page headline on February 28, "Avenge Blood with Blood," above a story concerning a statement from the VHP. Sandesh and Gujar Samadhar featured many other false and incendiary stories in the following days, some of which virtually encouraged Hindus in areas where violence had not yet spread, to kill Muslims.

It is important to note further that the Gujarat pogrom transgressed beyond the boundaries of ordinary riots, pogroms, and massacres into the "zone of genocide." In particular, the use of sexual molestation, rape, and murder of women, as well as children, including the reported case of cutting open a pregnant woman's belly and killing the foetus, deserves note.

It is necessary to underline the implication in this pogrom not only of the BJP state government, but also the government of India, led by the BJP, which had the power and ultimate responsibility to stop this flagrant breakdown of law and order.

his government, addressed the country on television on the third day of rioting "to denounce the Gujarat riots," he did not visit Gujarat until thirty-six days after the Godhra massacre and the pogrom that followed it. He was then reported to have remarked "that the carnage had shamed India." Aside from the fact that, in his eyes, it was India's status in the world that was at stake, as much as or more than the plight of the victims of a state-supported pogrom, other features of his visit deserve note. Vajpayee visited Godhra first, thus expressing his solidarity with the Hindus who had been killed, the victims from the Sangh parivar. Also, he took with him on his tour of Gujarat central minister Uma Bharati, member of the VHP, whose speeches during the 1991 elections and prior to the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya in 1992 were considered hostile to Muslims, and who was one of the most active proponents of the construction of a Hindu temple at that site.

On September 24, the "revenge and retaliation" drama was carried further in an act of "retributive terrorism," this time in an assault, by two Muslim terrorists, upon the well-known Akshardham Hindu temple complex in the capital city of Gandhinagar, a mere 100 yards away from the home of Chief Minister Modi, where 37 persons were killed and 81 injured before the two gunmen were shot dead by commandos dispatched by the central government. On this occasion, contrary to their previous response to the Godhra killings and the pogrom that followed, the two most prominent BJP leaders, Prime Minister Vajpayee and Home Minister L. K. Advani, rushed immediately to the scene, where, characteristically, they blamed Pakistan for the attack, although the head of the sect that controls the temple was reported to have urged Vajpayee to "show restraint" and refused "to blame anyone."

The final act in the Gujarat drama is its appropriation for electoral purposes. Hopeful that Hindu sentiment in Gujarat had been consolidated by the Godhra killings and that most Hindus had been pleased by the revenge and retaliation that was taken upon Muslims in the state, the BJP government dissolved the legislative assembly on July 19 and called for elections in October. However, its call was frustrated by the Chief Election Commissioner, who noted that such early elections could not be "free and fair" under the circumstances, namely, the failure of the state government to provide protection to Muslims before the riots and rehabilitation after them, the displacement of large numbers of Muslims from their homes and their inability to return to them, and the obvious likelihood, therefore, that the Muslim population in the state would feel intimidated and might be too fearful to go to the polls. Elections were finally scheduled for December 12. However, the postponement of the
election did not prevent the predominant leadership of the BJP, under chief minister Narendra Modi, from gaining the advantage of a polarized election contest, in which many Hindus appear to have consolidated behind the BJP, in effect registering their approval of the pogrom against the Muslims. The stakes in this contest were seen by all parties involved to have important consequences, not only for Gujarat, but for the future of the BJP-dominated coalition government in New Delhi and its commitment to a militant Hindu nationalism that scapegoats Muslims and thrives on anti-Pakistan rhetoric. A defeat for the BJP in Gujarat would have threatened both; its victory in Gujarat has encouraged militant Hindu hardliners in their political strategies that include violence against Muslims and Christians designed to promote Hindu political consolidation.

What the BJP’s election campaign would be like was demonstrated in mid-July when the annual Hindu Jagannath Rath Yatra (journey by chariot) festival was allowed to proceed through the streets of the old city section of Ahmedabad, including its Muslim quarters, along a 15-kilometer route, in which the procession itself extended for three kilometers. These were followed by two other Hindu religious festivals in other parts of Gujarat, on Janmasthami (Krishna’s birthday), August 31, and the Ganesh festival on September 20 when, in Vadodara city, violence occurred in which four persons were killed as the procession passed through Muslim sections. Such Yatras, though part of traditional Hindu religious processions, here and elsewhere in India, have increasingly been dominated by militant Hindu activists, who use them to intimidate and provoke Muslims in the localities through which they proceed. On October 26, Chief Minister Narendra Modi launched an explicitly political Yatra, dubbed a “Gujarat Gaurav Yatra” (Gujarat pride journey), with each stage of the journey beginning from a Hindu temple. When it reached Godhra, on November 10, the chief minister was reported to have “blamed the Muslims for the violence in Gujarat [sic].” The chief minister has also been reported, in various news media, on several occasions, to have made extremely provocative speeches, insulting Muslims in general, and mocking the plight of those Muslims displaced during the pogrom.

It appears both from reports of the campaigning as well as pre-poll interviews and the election results themselves that the Gujarat killings were used effectively to consolidate Hindu sentiment and voting behind the BJP, a party that was in decline in the state before the pogrom. Press reports have indicated that, despite Election Commission restrictions on direct exploitation of the Godhra and Akshardham killings, the BJP made use of slogans and videos designed to inspire fear and hatred of Muslims among Hindu voters.

The election of December 12 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the BJP. It won 126 seats in the 182-seat Gujarat state assembly. Similar consolidation behind the Congress party was reported among Muslim voters, but it is the Hindu consolidation that matters most in a state where only nine percent of the population is Muslim. Most significant is the reported difference in the BJP’s victory in areas in which violence occurred (52 of 65 seats).

In riot-prone India, whenever new great riots or waves of riots occur, leftist and secular writers, academics among them, commonly say that the latest wave of riots is the worst since the great Partition massacres of 1946-47. In some of the respects noted above, but especially if one takes account of all the features of this fierce outburst, it is fair enough to say as much about Gujarat in the year 2002. Others, however, proclaim a different view, taking comfort from the fact that riots did not spread from Gujarat to other parts of India, as they did in the last great wave of 1992.

But both types of statements, especially the latter, are distractions that divert our gaze from the dynamics of riot production in present-day India. The first type is useful mainly for exposing to full view the dimensions of what actually happened, and noting that yet further social and political boundaries have been transgressed. For Indians, the first image conjures up the retributive genocidal massacres of Partition in the Punjab in 1946-47, seeming to herald yet another monumental catastrophe, which will include the further weakening or disintegration of India or the obliteration of its Muslim population. If the first view maximizes the implications of such events as Gujarat in 2002, the second minimizes them. Both views have the same focus, namely, the future of India, that is, its territorial integrity, societal peace, democratic functioning, pluralism, and its status in a world of nation-states. But what is more important for India’s present and future in all these respects is to escape from the self-perpetuating traps of blame displacement and the complementary traps of maximizing and minimizing the significance of horrific violence. In short, it is necessary to fix responsibility and penetrate the clouds of deception, rhetoric, mystification, obscurity, and indeterminacy to uncover what can be uncovered, knowing full well that the whole truth can never be known, but that the evident actions and inaction of the perpetrators and apologists of violence, of known persons, groups, organizations, political leaders, media, academics seeking causes, and patriots seeking comfort can be identified, so that appropriate action can be taken against the perpetrators and the apologists can be discommoded.
and persons mentioned come primarily from the following sources: Fulmeline, issues from April 13 through November 9, 2002; various Indian newspaper reports from samachar.com for the period February 28 through September 5; and the report of a delegation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)] and the All India Democratic Women’s Association (AIDWA), which visited Gujarat March 10–13, undated, but received via e-mail forwarded to me by Clea Finkle from Subhashini Ali, a member of the team.

The latest confirmation of this assertion arrived after this essay was first written. A Concerned Citizens Tribunal, headed by a highly regarded former Supreme Court justice, Krishna Iyer, whose membership included two retired Bombay High Court judges, other former government officials, and academics, issued a 600-page report in which it was stated that the post-Godhra killings constituted “an organised crime perpetrated by the Chief Minister, N.arendra Modi, and his Government.” The report was also said to have noted that the “post-Godhra violence was pre-planned and executed with ‘military precision’ by the Sangh Parivar with the State’s complicity.” It also affirmed, according to the news report, that “several members of the Modi Cabinet participated in the violence” or instigated the mobs.”

The report “also indicted the BJP-led Government at the Centre for ‘failing in its duties’;” HIndu, November 22, 2002 (online version).

Raz Ahmad has found my term applicable to the Gujrat killings, in “Gujarat Violence: Meaning and Implications,” EPW, May 18, 2002.


Times of India, March 27, 2002.


In this and many other respects, the numbers exceed Kystallnacht—the hallmark pogrom of the twentieth century—when 267 synagogues were destroyed or damaged; see Leonidas E. Hill, “The Pogrom of November 9–10, 1938 in Germany,” in Paul R. Brass (ed.), Riots and Pogroms (N ew York: New York University Press, 1996), p. 104.

Brass, T. H.eft of an Eld, ch.vii and The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence, ch.vi.


Dionne Bunsha, “Peddling Hate,” Frontline, 19:15 (July 20 – August 2, 2002).


NDTV.com, April 4, 2002.


Dionne Bunsha, “The Modi Road Show,” Frontline, 19:21. The RSS family of organisations, however, exercised physical restraint on this occasion, choosing not to respond with further violence against Muslims, which, at this stage, would have been counterproductive, posing the twin dangers of further postponement of the desired election and the imposition of President’s Rule.


See, for example, the post-election comments of BJP leaders reported in the Hindu online edition, December 16, 2002.


For example, Dionne Bunsha reports the use of slogans arousing fear of further attacks from “Muslim terrorists,” such as the following: “You are travelling. You can be attacked.” “You are praying. You could be attacked.” “Saffron Theatrics,” Frontline, 19:25.


For example, Ramanwami R. Jyer, “Death of Indian Pluralism,” EPW, July 20, 2002.

For further analysis of the Gujurat riot and its aftermath, including an interim report from the International Initiative for Justice in Gujurat, please visit our upcoming Contemporary Conflicts website at conconflicts.ssrc.org.

Iraq: Political Recognition and Social Action

By Charles Tripp

At the present moment, Iraqi history appears to be bracketed by two momentous, externally generated events. The first, some ninety years ago, occurred when the British Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force landed at al-Faw and began the process which led to the creation of the new state of Iraq. The second event, which may not happen, but which seems increasingly likely to take place in the coming months, would be the US-led invasion and military occupation of the whole of Iraq. In both cases, the course of Iraqi history has been and may be shaped in part by the pursuit of the narrowly defined strategic interests of these powers, but also in part by their understanding of Iraq’s trajectory as a state. This is underpinned by the views held of the Iraqis as social actors, the recognition accorded to various forms of collective identification in Iraq and the weight given to certain narratives in the formation of Iraqi history.

Of course, this is not a disinterested exercise. Decisions taken and policies pursued by Great Britain then and possibly by the US in the near future on the basis of such forms of recognition have important material consequences. Furthermore, they interact with the ways in which Iraqis have seen and continue to see themselves. While the social ontology of Iraq which informs outsiders’ actions in Iraq may be based upon the self-understanding of the outsiders themselves, as well as on analogy and comparative example, it will also be heavily influenced by the self-representation of various groups of Iraqis. These powerful interpretations by Iraqis themselves will be conditioned by dominant narratives in their history which they are seeking to preserve or to challenge, but they will also be affected by strategic calculations about the new order that appears to be unfolding and the opportunities and dangers ahead.

The argument to be developed here is that dominant forms of power, both external and internal to the territories of Iraq, have the capacity, through recognition and all that flows from it, selectively to reinforce existing formations and imaginings. In addition, they are capable of calling into being identities and organisations that might have played a
minor or marginal part under a previous dispensation of power, but which now begin to shape an emerging narrative of Iraqi history, placing them in centre stage. The intention is thus to argue for the contingency of much that has been taken for granted about Iraqi society, not to deny its reality, but rather to deny the impression conveyed—often through collusive discourse—that there is something ineluctable about the categories most often used to think about Iraq as a social and political entity.

Contingency in this sense is not simply arbitrary, but is often linked to a particular notion of instrumentality. Administrative knowledge is, in its intention at least, predictive knowledge. Whether under the British, under Iraqi governments including that of Saddam Hussein, or under a possible future US military occupation, the determination to mobilise, to extract resources from or simply to preserve social order amongst the population assumes a set of beliefs about how people will behave as social actors. At one level, this provides grounds for a debate about whether people act as individuals or as members of larger collectivities. At another level, the question revolves around the nature of those collectivities, how they cohere, move and change. These are the presuppositions upon which are founded government policies intended to encourage some forms of behaviour and suppress others.

When the British occupied Mesopotamia during the First World War and created the new state of Iraq thereafter, they brought with them varying ideas about who the Iraqis were and the potential of different social groupings to lend themselves to the project of state-building which the British government had in mind. Some of these ideas were grounded in comparative imperial experience, often of a contrasting nature. Officials with experience of British India were highly influential, seeing in the landscape of Iraq, whether in the Arab or Kurdish areas, tribes and tribal hierarchies which they assumed would behave much as those they had encountered in the North West Frontier Province of India. They were responsible for introducing the ‘Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulation’ which gave recognised tribal shaikhs the authority to settle all disputes in their ‘tribal areas’, independent of the judicial apparatus of the Iraqi state. However, these officials’ views about the importance of the tribal elements of Iraqi society were challenged or at least modified from two directions.

Those concerned about the connection between state-building, societal development and land holding drew upon British imperial experience in Egypt since 1882 and sought to implement policies which focused on the peasant as a social actor, emphasising his potential for individual development and pursuit of self-interest. These officials questioned the allegedly enduring nature of ‘the tribes’, as well as the administrative utility of using shaikhs as intermediaries. Instead, they looked to the individual peasant proprietor as the best way of furthering economic development and of rooting the new state in a solid social base. For other British officials, nationalism and specifically Arab nationalism was to be the language of engagement with modernity. This led to the cultivation of former Ottoman administrative elites—the ‘effendis’ so despised by the enthusiasts of tribal hierarchy—at the expense of both the religious hierarchies of the Shi’a and of the Kurds’ Sufi tribal leaders. Contradictory as these views were, many were taken up and incorporated into British and subsequently Iraqi state policy, helping to shape government policy and to give social reality to certain kinds of actors associated with the state that was emerging in Iraq.

Precisely because questions of identity and the recognition of particular identities by the state touch on rights, claims and resources, differences about these categories and their appropriateness for the classification of Iraqi society have been a constant theme of Iraqi political debate. Surfacing with particular vehemence at times of perceived change and new possibility—understandably, in view of the historical contingency of the categories themselves—the arguments about the rights and the future role of ethnic groupings, of religious communities, of tribal hierarchies, as well as of functional classes and class fractions have preoccupied Iraqis throughout their history.

Nowhere was this more apparent in public discourse in Iraq than in the years following the 1958 revolution which overthrew the Iraqi monarchy. There were those who saw this as a defining moment which would allow the recognition of new forms and forces of collective action, escaping the social categories associated with the monarchical state. In theory, the vertical bonds which had tied sections of Iraqi society together—the affinities of tribal association, of sectarian alignment and of ethnic identification—would give way to horizontal, functional groupings, bringing to the fore groups and thus collective action based on class identities, on gender solidarities and on common generational aspirations.

The events of 1959 in Kirkuk and Mosul—when ideological and class antagonisms became intertwined with ethnic and sectarian hatreds to produce severe intercommunal violence—showed how difficult it was to separate one form of identification from another in a society where the state had long recognised certain forms of affective identification as the basis of hierarchies of privilege. Furthermore, the actions of the governments of Abd al-Karim Qasim and of the `Arif brothers during the first half of the 1960s showed how persuasive the ethnic, tribal and sectarian categories were in the imagination of those who ran the Iraqi
Despite some attempts at radical programmes of social reform, it was clear that ‘seeing like a state’ in Iraq still involved recognition of collective identities which had more to do with the vertical categories of ethnic, sectarian and tribal ascriptive identity than with horizontal coalitions of like-minded citizens. This, in turn, reinforced a dominant narrative which justified the authoritarian, central state with reference to the claimed ethnic and sectarian fracture lines of Iraqi society.

It was in part disillusionment with what some saw as a stalled modernity in Iraq which led to their qualified support for the Ba’thist coup d’état of 1968 which brought Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and his kinsman Saddam Husain to power. Many Ba’thists, as well as non-Ba’thists, had reservations about the methods used to consolidate power, and about the identity and inclinations of those who had taken over the leadership of the party. However, both within the Ba’th and beyond there were many Iraqis who felt that the new regime would create space for solidarities based on the ‘progressive’ social forces of national self-determination and developing class consciousness. The early recognition by the new regime in Baghdad of the two nationalities—Arab and Kurdish—which co-existed in the Iraqi state, was seen as promising in two ways: it seemed to recognise a single Kurdish nationality which, in theory at least, would iron out the feudal, tribal and sectarian particularities of the actually existing Kurdish populations of Iraq; it also seemed to link Iraq firmly to the movement of Arab national liberation, the various anti-colonial manifestations of which could be seen from Algeria to Palestine and from Libya to Yemen. At the same time, the close relationship of the Ba’thist regime with the Iraqi Communist Party in the National Patriotic Front of the early 1970s suggested that political recognition for workers, peasants, women and students as political actors would be a mark of the new era, realising the disappointed expectations of 1958/9.

These hopes were to be dashed by the late 1970s with great violence both inside and outside the Ba’th party. The purges and persecutions of 1978/9 signalled and paved the way for the emergence of Saddam Husain as supreme leader of the party and of the country. It was to be his vision and his methods which thereafter shaped the narrative of Iraqi politics. In this respect, the state that emerged under Hassan al-Bakr and then under Saddam Husain has displayed a characteristic duality as far as the recognition and use of social categories are concerned. On one level, whilst Arabism and the recognition of the Arab national identity of most of the Iraqis has been a prominent part of the public discourse of the regime two things have become clear: in practice, Iraqi national identity has been promoted more assiduously as a unifying theme for all Iraqis, Arab or otherwise; secondly, adherence to Arab or indeed Iraqi identity has never been regarded by Saddam Husain as a sufficiently reliable indicator of individuals’ political inclination.

For this reason, behind the façade of the public state, there has long existed in Iraq a ‘shadow state’. This is centred on rather different forms of recognition and thrives on the patronage which keeps much of Iraqi society dependent on the particular solidarities at the heart of power. A key part of this solidarity is the recognition by Saddam Husain of the importance of kinship and clan affiliation. In their various forms, whether constituting the immediate family of Saddam Husain and closely affiliated clans, or historically linked sub-groupings within the al-Bu Nasir and in the tribal groupings associated with it, these collectivities have been recognised as more likely than not to incline their members to serve his cause. As the numbers of those who have fallen victim to Saddam Husain’s suspicions will testify, membership does not confer immunity and he himself has never trusted these people unconditionally. Nevertheless, they have enjoyed greater access to the privileges dispensed by the regime than most other social groupings in Iraq, and it is they to whom Saddam Husain has consistently looked for the security of the networks of the ‘shadow state’ throughout the most sensitive—and potentially dangerous—organs of the public state.

It has been pointed out that during the past decade, in particular, Saddam Husain has also sought to extend this kind of recognition to the tribal structures of Iraq more generally. Seeing in them some of the virtues which he claims to see in his own tribal background, he has sought to make of the ‘tribes’ of Iraq a key element in the maintenance of social order and in the elaboration of a narrative of Iraqi history that accords more closely with his own statecraft. Saddam Husain has lavished resources on tribal shaikhs and incorporated them and those they claim to lead into his political order in a bid both to give them a stake in the maintenance of his regime and to assign them a distinctive and privileged role in Iraqi history. Not only has this meant the return of the recognition by the state of the authority of tribal shaikhs to settle disputes; it has also led to some curious transformations in the ways in which many ordinary Iraqis have reacted to these changes.

On the one hand, it is noticeable that many of the shaikhs preside over considerable urban constituencies and are no longer the remote figures of rural authority that they once were. On the other hand, possibly as a result of this process and certainly as a result of the mediating power which the recent recognition has granted to them, significant numbers of urban, often professional Iraqis, sometimes several genera-
tions removed from a collective existence where their tribal identity meant anything, are known to have sworn allegiance to ‘their’ shaikh in order to be (re-)admitted to ‘their’ tribe. Bizarre and pointless as such behaviour would have seemed only twenty years ago, it has been imbued with significance, even if only of a purely instrumental kind, by a state in which such forms of recognition have material results for people’s life-chances.

As far as Saddam Husain is concerned, there is clearly also an instrumentality to this kind of recognition: he wants a certain kind of social order and, from his own experience of this and of the alternatives, tribal structures can be used to perform such a role. They also— together with other forms of vertical division in society— stand in opposition to association based on horizontal solidarities, such as class identity. Precisely because the language of class politics is also a language of categorical entitlement and the assertion of claims based upon the division of labour, it is antagonistic to the principles of patrimonialism upon which much of Saddam Husain’s power is based. The existence of such solidarities is recognised by the public state in Iraq, as the plethora of state sponsored professional, workers and peasant organisations will testify, presenting a familiar corporatist face to the world.

However, in the ‘shadow state’, such association counts for nothing. Here a different scale of values, and the recognition of more particular identities form the basis of the favour, access and conditional privilege which underpin Saddam Husain’s regime. People have responded to this state of affairs pragmatically, as suggested above. Common economic interests and professional solidarities certainly exist, but they are easily subverted by a regime which chooses to recognise tribal, sectarian and ethnic communities as the channels for its patronage and favour. The key question here is the context in which particular forms of identity are being asserted as the bases for collective action. Hitherto, the context created by the regime of power that is the Iraq of Saddam Husain has overwhelmingly favoured those forms of identity which imply a hierarchical relationship between a chosen few communal representatives and a mass of subordinate supplicants.

It is also possible that, given Saddam Husain’s background and his modus operandi closer to the heart of power, a tribal idiomy makes a certain amount of moral, not simply pragmatic sense. Whether he thinks it could exist in this way independent of his own patronage of it, is another matter. In many respects, his other techniques for ensuring non-accountable, vertically structured lines of favour and sanction would suggest that the recognition of tribal identities may be important, but it may only be one among a number of forms of social recognition by which he seeks to maintain his kind of order in Iraq. He thereby helps to sustain a narrative in which once again the fractiousness of Iraqi society appears to demand the ‘leader necessity’ who will exercise strong leadership and prevent social chaos.

In this way, Saddam Husain’s recognition of distinctive Shi’i identities in Iraq through selective patronage of certain Shi’i communal leaders and of personalities and factions within the predominantly Shi’i cities of the south, goes hand in hand with denunciation of Shi’i sectarianism and persecution of distinctively Shi’i organisations, such as al-Da’wa or the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). This is not, of course, the recognition of the Shi’as as a political actor. On the contrary, it corresponds to an understanding of the many trends and currents which have shaped the political loyalties and inclinations of the Shi’as. Where these have lent themselves to incorporation into the networks of the patrimonial, authoritarian state over which he presides, Saddam Husain has been content to coopt elements from among the Shi’as, as he has done with other sections of the Iraqi population. For instance, in his relations with the Christian and Mandaean minorities in Iraq, Saddam Husain has been willing to grant them recognition in return for their assumption of responsibility for their communities— regardless of whether all the members of those communities see their political situations in this way.

One could make a similar argument for the nature of Saddam Husain’s long and troubled relations with the Kurdish populations of Iraq. It was he who advocated recognition of the legitimacy of Kurdish nationalism in the 1970s—and spent the ensuing years trying to ensure that those who spoke in its name would in turn recognise his authority and that of the central government in Iraq. Increasingly disappointed with the attitudes of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and of the Popular Union of Kurdistan (PUK), he turned instead to elements of the Kurdish population who may have felt no less distinctively Kurdish, but who had their own reasons for disputing the leadership claims of the two major parties.

The significance of these patterns of recognition, identification and patronage at this moment of Iraqi political history is twofold. In the first place, it means that many of the individuals and parties operating within the broad field of Iraqi politics (whether this is within the parts of the country controlled by Baghdad, within the Kurdish Autonomous Region, or in the ranks of the exiled opposition movements) are operating within imaginative frameworks which antedate Saddam Husain’s rule, but which may have been recognised and encouraged by him— and incorporated into his regime of power. This element of collusion with a conception of the state which is not far removed from that implemented by Saddam Husain (and by many of his predecessors) has added to the fractious nature of the Iraqi opposition forces in exile.
The notoriously divided and antagonistic relations between the dozens of organisations which have sprung up in the past decade or so to give voice to different visions of Iraq's future are in part the result of the powerless condition of exile.

However, they are also to some degree a response to the different ways of being Shi‘i, Sunni, Arab, Kurdish, Yazidi, Assyrian, Turkmen or indeed Iraqi, once these terms have been given currency and recognition. For example, the proliferation of organisations with various ethnic and sectarian labels in the Kurdish Autonomous Region during the past decade or so has been due to a number of factors. First of all, despite the fact that the region is divided effectively between the KDP and the PUK, there is space both geographically and politically for other forms of association to find expression. This has created a necessary but not a sufficient condition for such parties to emerge. Equally important has been the fact that the dominant narrative in this political world is that of Kurdish nationalism, defined by distinct ideas of Kurdish ethnicity. It is scarcely surprising, in response, that other groups, such as the Turkmen or the Assyrians, seek recognition of their distinctive identities and thus the political claims of their own ethnic grouping. Also important for the emergence of the Islamist groups among the Kurds has been the simultaneous dispute about what it means to be Kurdish and the place of Islam—and of Sufism—within that identification. At the same time, the close interest and intervention in the region by the Turkish and the Iranian governments during this period have helped to bestow a useful form of recognition on some of the Turkmen and the Islamist groups, respectively. Many Iraqis, of course, reject these labels altogether. They claim to speak instead for an idea of citizenship and for a liberal conception of the state. Precisely because this is antagonistic both to the Iraqi state centred on Baghdad and to the proto-state in the Kurdish region, it is a trend that has untested appeal within Iraq. Many Iraqis speak for an idea of citizenship and for a liberal conception of the state. Precisely because this is antagonistic both to the Iraqi state centred on Baghdad and to the proto-state in the Kurdish region, it is a trend that has untested appeal within Iraq.

This feature raises the second significant aspect of this pattern—namely, the imminent threat of the military occupation of Iraq by the United States. This has made many of the groupings which claim to speak for the Iraqis and which oppose Saddam Husain determined to achieve a form of recognition by the United States, even if it makes others uneasy. The coming together in December 2002 in London of the multitude of Iraqi opposition groups highlighted problems in this search for recognition. In the first place, there was general support for the idea of a federal as well as a democratic Iraq, but there were differences about the criteria which would win recognition under a federal system. In some versions, federalism was being advanced as a form of cantonisation, geared to creating a framework of cooperation and minimal trust in a multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian society. In others, it was being championed by those who rejected such labels as a means of simply decentralising the powers of the Iraqi state. Furthermore, the formation at the conference of a 65 person ‘follow-up committee’ which was gradually expanded to unwieldy proportions as other names were added, other political actors recognised, said something about the problems of mutual recognition amongst those who claim to speak for the Iraqis.

There was also another factor at play. The conference had been convened in part to convince the United States of the capacity of the Iraqi exiled opposition to work together and thus implicitly to cooperate with US plans for state reconstruction in Iraq. This was aimed at deflecting the US administration from recognising the Iraqi military as the only realistic guarantors of social order in Iraq in the aftermath of the collapse of the present regime—a fear kept alive by the remarks made by US officials about the future role of the Iraqi army. As the behaviour of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) delegation indicated, there is also an urgent ambition to be recognised by the US as the chief interlocutor in the future dispensation of power in Iraq. The reaction of other delegates showed how contentious this could be, reviving the sensitive question about the fine line dividing recognition from cooption in a way reminiscent of similar debates concerning relationships with the government of Saddam Husain.

This seems to be a harbinger of the period when the US might become the supreme arbiter in Iraq. The obvious striving by various associations for recognition by the dominant power is and will remain a prominent feature. Under present circumstances, some will seek such recognition through the language and practices of collusion, echoing the preoccupations of influential allies in the US administration in the hope of having the favour of delegated power bestowed upon them. Should the regime of Saddam Husain be overthrown, others will seek recognition by demonstrating their capacity to mobilise significant sections of Iraqi society under their identifying banners. Whether collaborating with or opposing the US occupying power, the claim will be that their social weight demands their recognition.

Whilst this is taking place, with all the unforeseeable turns that fate may bring, the second feature of this process of recognition will no doubt begin to show itself. Just as with the British occupying power some eighty five years ago, the possibility of acting within Iraq may bring out very different
views in the US administration about the potential of Iraqi society. Considerable differences will probably develop regarding the way to proceed and the appropriate Iraqi actors through which divergent plans for the Iraqi state can best be implemented. On one level, this may revolve around perceptions within the US administration about the reliability, venality and authority of the leaders of particular groupings. Such doubts and differences clearly already exist regarding the leaders of the INC, the Kurdish parties and others.

On another level, however—and this goes to the heart of the argument being presented here—there will be profound differences within the US administration about the nature of existing Iraqi society, about its potential and about the trajectories open to it if certain kinds of change are encouraged. To a large degree, these will hinge on the recognition bestowed upon different Iraqi social actors as legitimate and effective collaborators in the project of state reconstruction. The outlines of at least three of these positions are already discernible. Should the US invade and occupy Iraq, others will no doubt emerge, but these three will undoubtedly remain in some form. The first of these could be called the ‘narrative of the Necessary Leader’—a view of Iraq which largely subscribes to the authoritarian vision of Saddam Hussein and his predecessors, in which the many divisions of Iraqi society are taken to be so deep and antagonistic that preventing a slide into chaos becomes the priority. Under this heading, recognition is accorded to those who can exercise effective command over the security and administrative apparatus of the state, even if this means implicit recognition of a ‘shadow state’ to get things done.

Another view apparent in Washington and likely to be influential, places more reliance on the communal leaders of Iraqi society and could be called the ‘Lebanese solution’. Here, recognition would be given to those who can plausibly claim authority over various sections of Iraqi society, corresponding to the primordial view of ethnicity, sect and tribe which has been so much in evidence in public debates about Iraq. It would be a recipe for the ‘communalisation’ of the Iraqis and would revolve around trying to work out a framework whereby these supposed ‘communities’ could cooperate in the state project. A third view, which could be called the ‘Liberal future’ would bestow recognition on those Iraqis who claim to champion individual rights, the breaking of state monopolies in the economy and the representation of people as individual citizens, not as members of prescribed communities. This is a well articulated aspiration of a significant number of Iraqi intellectuals in exile and clearly appeals to the liberal imagination in the US. However, it is far more radical in its implications for the refounding of Iraqi political society and will have to contend with entrenched internal opposition, and with opposing visions which might cause less immediate disruption. It would also be faced with some of the internal contradictions of the liberal individualist view of the world in which, for instance, the emergence of a distinctively Islamist politics may cause problems.

Of course, none of these problems is insuperable. The question of which version of an Iraqi reality will be brought into being by external intervention and recognition will depend upon a variety of unforeseen factors, including the stamina and resources which the US and its allies might bring to the task. Short-term commitment and criteria of success which simply require the removal of Saddam Hussein from power will clearly favour the first option, leaving unrecognised and unacknowledged the many voices of Iraq that exist beyond the monotone of its central state apparatus. A longer-term commitment, if it is sought, will raise more interesting questions about the balance of communal recognition versus individual recognition as the basis for the polity. Here the possibility of a radically new departure for Iraq does exist. These differences are already visible in the ways in which various branches of the US administration talk about and act towards Iraq. They will become even sharper should the US find itself in the position of administering Iraq itself. It is then that there will come to the fore questions of which social formations become recognised by the US and identified as significant political actors in the shaping of the country’s future. The question of political recognition of their social reality will thus become crucial for the Iraqis—a matter of opportunity and disappointment for some, but for others a matter of life and death. - January 2003

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Endnotes

1 ‘Nowhere is this better captured than in the works of the Iraqi social historian ‘Ali al-Wardi, especially in Parts 5 and 6 of his six-volume work Lamahat Ijtima‘iya min Ta‘rikh al-Iraq al-Hadith [Social aspects of the modern history of Iraq] (Baghdad: Matba‘a al-Adib al-Baghdadiyya, 1969-78).


5 Qasim (1958-1963) relied increasingly on his limited circle of kinsmen and had effectively undermined the secular, ideological, coalition-based parties of the National Democrats and the Iraqi Communists, whilst granting recognition to parties based on Islamic and on Kurdish identities. The ‘Arif brothers (1963-1968)
Globalization or Denationalization?

By Saskia Sassen

Saskia Sassen, Chair of the SSRC Committee on Information Technology and International Cooperation, gave the following keynote address to the concluding conference of the Council’s International Predissertation Research Fellowship Program.

It is an honor and a pleasure to have the opportunity to discuss the theoretical and methodological difficulties of studying and interpreting a variety of dynamics usually grouped under the term globalization.

What is it we are seeking to name with the term globalization? At the heart of whatever shape the answer might take lies the formation of global institutions and processes, such as the World Trade Organization, global financial markets, the new cosmopolitanism, the War Crimes Tribunals: these operate at a scale we usually associate with the term globalization. But there is a second set of processes that does not necessarily scale at the global level as such. These are processes that take place deep inside territories and institutional domains that have largely been constructed in national terms in much, though by no means all, of the world. What makes these processes part of globalization even though localized in national, indeed sub-national settings, is that they involve transboundary networks and new types of transboundary formations that connect multiple local or “national” processes and actors. Examples are cross-border networks of activists involved in specific localized struggles with an explicit or implicit global agenda; particular aspects of the work of states, e.g., certain monetary and fiscal policies, which are critical to the constitution of global markets and cross-border flows of capital and are getting implemented in a growing number of countries; the use of international human rights instruments in national courts; non-cosmopolitan forms of global politics and imaginaries that remain deeply attached or focused on localized issues and struggles, yet are part of global lateral networks containing multiple other such localized efforts.

We are, then, not only dealing with the now widely recognized fact of multiple globalizations (e.g., Appadurai 1996; Eichengreen 2002; Aman 1998), only some of which are constitutive of the neoliberal corporate economic globalization that has received most of the attention. We are also dealing with the question of the various scales at which global processes get constituted, ranging from supranational and global, to sub-national. Recognizing that the global does not scale only at the global level introduces interesting analytic challenges and opportunities for social scientists. It signals that we can use some of our old tools and data sets but through new conceptual architectures.

Here I want to focus particularly on the second type of dynamic. This one has received less attention from the mainstream scholarship on globalization and is far less likely to be conceptualized or recognized as part of globalization, yet has the potential to offer a far more fruitful angle on certain kinds of questions about globalization.

1. The Sub-national: A Site for Globalization?

A focus on such nationally based processes and dynamics requires methodologies and theorizations that engage not only the global scale but also the sub-national scale as components of global processes. Working with sub-national scales makes it possible to use long-standing research techniques, from quantitative to qualitative, in the study of global processes. It also gives us a bridge for using the wealth of data produced in area studies. In both cases it is crucial to situate these in conceptual architectures that are not quite those held by the researchers who generated these research techniques and data sets. Their efforts mostly had little to do with...
globalization as we use this term today. One task this entails is the decoding of what is still represented or experienced as "national" when it may in fact have shifted away from what had historically been considered national.

Studying the global, then, entails not only studying that which is explicitly global in scale, but also the multiplication of cross-border interconnections among locally scaled events and conditions. Further, it entails recognizing that many of the globally scaled dynamics, such as the global capital market, are actually partly embedded in the national and move between global scales, such as electronic financial markets, and locally embedded conditions, such as the concentrations of variously place-bound resources that constitute a financial center.

Let me focus on two instances that serve to illustrate some of the conceptual, methodological and empirical issues in this type of study. One of these instances concerns the role of place in many of the circuits constitutive of economic globalization. Unbundling globalization in terms of multiple specialized cross-border circuits, rather than simply representing it in terms of master categories such as global markets, allows us to introduce places and their distinct locations on particular types of specialized circuits. Global cities, for example, are places where multiple of these global circuits intersect and thereby make these cities strategic and deeply reshape them.

A second of these instances, partly connected to the first, is the role of the new interactive technologies in repositioning the local, thereby inviting us to a critical examination of our understanding of the local. Through these new technologies, a financial services firm housed in one or another city becomes a microenvironment with continuous global span. But it is not only these types of firms that do so: also a resource-poor organization or household can become a microenvironment with global span. These microenvironments can be oriented to other such microenvironments located far away, thereby destabilizing both the notion of context often imbricated in that of the local, and the notion that physical proximity is one of the attributes or markers of the local. Further, through these interactive technologies, especially as implemented in the Internet, we can see the possibility of a new type of politics of places located on global networks. This is a form of global politics that runs not through global institutions, but through local ones.

The next two sections briefly elaborate on each of these instances.

II. Place in a Global and Digital Economy

One of the organizing themes in much of my work on globalization is that place is central to the multiple circuits through which economic globalization is constituted. One strategic type of place for these developments, and the one focused on here, is the city, which is now often defined as an urban region. Other such strategic places are export processing zones, "silicon valleys," off-shore banking centers, and major internationalized and export-oriented industrial districts.

Including these kinds of strategic places in the analysis of economic globalization is not without conceptual consequences. Economic globalization has mostly been conceptualized in terms of the national-global duality where the latter gains at the expense of the former. And it has largely been conceptualized in terms of the internationalization of capital, and then only the upper circuits of capital. Introducing places in an analysis of economic globalization allows us to reconceptualize the latter partly in terms of spatially specific, concrete economic complexes and processes. A focus on such places deconstructs the nation-state into a variety of sub-national components, some profoundly articulated with the global economy and others not. It also signals the declining significance of the national economy as a unitary category—always more an aspiration than a full reality.

Why does it matter to recover place in analyses of the global economy, particularly places as constituted in major cities? Because it allows us to see the multiplicity of economies and work cultures in which the global information economy is embedded. It also allows us to recover the concrete, localized processes through which globalization exists and to argue that many of the ethnic economies and low-wage labor markets in large cities are as much a part of globalization as is international finance. Finally, focusing on cities allows us to specify a geography of strategic places at the global scale, places bound to each other by the dynamics of globalization. I refer to this as a new geography of centrality, and one of the questions it engenders is whether this new transnational geography also is a space for the formation of new types of transnational political, social, cultural, subjective dynamics. Insofar as my economic analysis of the global city recovers the broad array of jobs and work cultures that are part of the global economy, though typically not marked as such, it allows me to examine the possibility of these new dynamics.

a) The material practices of globalization.

I think of the mainstream account of economic globalization as a narrative of eviction. Key concepts in that account—globalization, information economy, and telematics—all suggest that place no longer matters and that the only type of worker that matters is the highly educated professional. It is an account that privileges the capability for global transmission over the material infrastructure that makes such transmission possible; information outputs over the workers producing those outputs, from specialists to secretaries; and the new transnational corporate culture over the multiplicity of work cultures, including immigrant cultures, within which many of the “other” jobs of the global information economy take place. In brief, the dominant narrative concerns itself with the upper circuits of capital;
and particularly with the hypermobility of capital rather than with that which is place-bound.

Massive trends towards the spatial dispersal of economic activities at the metropolitan, national and global level are indeed evident, but they represent only half of what is happening. Alongside the well-documented spatial dispersal of economic activities, we see new forms of territorial centralization of top-level management and control operations. National and global markets as well as globally integrated operations require central places where the work of globalization gets done. Further, information industries require a vast physical infrastructure containing strategic nodes with hyperconcentrations of facilities. Finally, even the most advanced information industries have a work process— that is, a complex of workers, machines and buildings that are more place-bound than the imagery of information outputs suggests.

Centralized control and management over a geographically dispersed array of economic operations does not come about inevitably as part of a "world-system." It requires the production of a vast range of highly specialized services, telecommunications infrastructure, and industrial services. These are crucial for the valorization of what are today leading components of capital. An emphasis on place and production does not confine the analysis to the power of large corporations over governments and economies. It also focuses on the range of activities and organizational arrangements necessary for the implementation and maintenance of a global network of factories, service operations and markets; these are all processes only partly encompassed, if at all, by a focus on the power of transnational corporations. Thereby we recover the infrastructure of activities, firms and jobs—including jobs and firms we never think of as being part of globalized sectors—that is necessary to run the advanced corporate economy. These are all part of the practice of global control: the work of producing and reproducing the organization and management of a global production system and a global marketplace for finance, both under conditions of economic concentration.

Global cities are centers for the servicing and financing of international trade, investment, and headquarters operations—wherever these might be located. That is to say, the multiplicity of specialized activities present in global cities are crucial in the valorization, indeed overvalorization of leading sectors of capital today. And in this sense they are strategic production sites for today's leading economic sectors. This function is reflected in the ascendance of these activities in their economies. Elsewhere I have posted that what is specific about the shift to services is not merely the growth in service jobs, but, most importantly, the growing service intensity in the organization of advanced economies: firms in all industries, from mining to wholesale, buy more accounting, legal, advertising, insurance, financial, and economic forecasting services today than they did twenty years ago. Whether at the global or regional level, cities are adequate and often the best production sites for such specialized services. The rapid growth and disproportionate concentration of such services in cities signals that the latter have re-emerged as significant production sites after losing this role in the period when mass manufacturing was the dominant sector of the economy.

The extremely high numbers of these types of firms in the downtown districts of cities are the spatial expression of this logic. The widely accepted notion that agglomeration has become obsolete when telecommunication advances should allow for maximum dispersal is only partly correct. It is, I argue, precisely because of the territorial dispersal facilitated by telecommunication advances that the importance and share of central corporate functions have expanded immensely. For specific reasons I cannot dwell on here this expansion of central functions has largely, though not exclusively, materialized in the form of expanded territorial agglomerations of specialized services. This is not a mere continuation of old patterns of agglomeration, but rather, one could posit, a new logic for agglomeration. Information technologies are yet another factor contributing to the new logic for agglomeration. These technologies make possible the geographic dispersal and simultaneous integration of many activities.

But the distinct conditions under which such facilities are available have promoted centralization of the most advanced users in the most advanced telecommunications centers (Castells 1996; Graham and Aurigi 1997).

A focus on the work behind command functions, on the actual production process in the finance and services complex, and on global marketplaces has the effect of incorporating the material facilities underlying globalization and the whole infrastructure of jobs typically not marked as belonging to the corporate sector of the economy. This gives us an economic configuration very different from that suggested by the concept of information economy. We recover the material conditions, production sites, and place-boundness that are also part of globalization and the information economy.

An unexpectedly broad range of types of firms, types of workers, types of work cultures, and types of residential milieux, turn out to be part of globalization processes though they are neither recognized, represented, or valorized as such. In this regard, this new type of urban economy is highly problematic. This is perhaps particularly evident in global cities and their regional counterparts.
The city has indeed emerged as a site for new claims: by global capital which uses the city as an “organizational commodity,” but also by disadvantaged sectors of the urban population, frequently as internationalized a presence in large cities as capital.

a whole series of new dynamics of inequality. The new growth sectors—specialized services and finance—contain capabilities for profit making vastly superior to those of more traditional economic sectors. The latter are essential to the operation of the urban economy and the daily needs of residents, but their survival is threatened in a situation where finance and specialized services can earn super-profits.

b) New geographies of centrality and of marginality.

The global economy in good part materializes in a worldwide grid of strategic places, uppermost among which are major international business and financial centers. We can think of this global grid as constituting a new economic geography of centrality, one that cuts across national boundaries and across the old North-South divide. It signals the emergence of a parallel political geography, a transnational space for the formation of new claims by global capital.

This new economic geography of centrality partly reproduces existing inequalities but is also the outcome of a dynamic specific to current forms of economic growth. It assumes many forms and operates in many terrains, from the distribution of telecommunications facilities to the structure of the economy and of employment. Global cities are sites for immense concentrations of economic power and command centers in a global economy, while cities that were once major manufacturing centers have suffered inordinate declines.

The most powerful of these new geographies of centrality at the inter-urban level binds the major international financial and business centers: New York, London, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt, Zurich, Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Sydney, and Hong Kong, among others. But in the 1990s this geography came to include cities such as Sao Paulo, Bombay, Bangkok, Taipei, Shanghai and Mexico City. The intensity of transactions among these cities, particularly through the financial markets, transactions in services, and investment has increased sharply, and so have the orders of magnitude. At the same time, there has been a sharpening inequality in the concentration of strategic resources and activities between each of these cities and others in the same country.

The pronounced orientation to the world markets evident in such cities raises questions about the articulation with their nation-states, their regions, and the larger economic and social structure in such cities. Cities are typically deeply embedded in the economies of their region, indeed often reflecting the characteristics of the latter. But cities that are strategic sites in the global economy tend, in part, to disconnect from their region. This conflicts with a key proposition in traditional scholarship about urban systems, namely, that these systems promote the territorial integration of regional and national economies. Alongside these new global and regional hierarchies of cities is a vast territory that we need to specify or re-specify theoretically and empirically.

Beginning in the 1980s and continuing today we also see a new geography of centrality and marginality inside global cities. The downtowns of cities and metropolitan business centers receive massive investments in real estate and telecommunications, while low-income city areas are starved for resources. Highly educated workers see their incomes rise to unusually high levels while low- or medium-skilled workers see theirs sink. Financial services produce super-profits while industrial services barely survive. These trends are evident, with different levels of intensity, in a growing number of major cities in the developed world and increasingly in some of the developing countries that have been integrated into the global economic system.

III.A Politics of Places on Cross-border Circuits

I have been particularly interested in the possibility of a new politics of traditionally disadvantaged actors operating in this new transnational economic geography. This is a politics that lies at the intersection of two processes or conditions. One of these is the economic participation by disadvantaged workers in the global economy—specifically those who hold the other jobs in the global economy—from factory workers in export processing zones to janitors on Wall Street. The second is the possibility of new types of politics among the disadvantaged arising out of this participation.

The centrality of place in a context of global processes engenders a transnational economic and political opening for the formation of new claims and, hence, for the constitution of entitlements. This is the case most notably for rights to place, and, at the limit, in the constitution of “citizenship.” The city has indeed emerged as a site for new claims by global capital which uses the city as an “organizational commodity,” but also by disadvantaged sectors of the urban population, frequently as internationalized a presence in large cities as capital. The de-nationalizing of urban space and the formation of new claims centered in urban actors and involving contestation, raise the question: “Whose city is it?”

I see this as a type of political opening that contains unifying capacities across national boundaries and sharpening conflicts within such boundaries. Global capital and the new immigrant workforce are two major instances of transnationalized actors that have unifying properties internally and find themselves in contestation with each other.
inside global cities. Global cities are the sites for the overvalorization of corporate capital and the devalorization of disadvantaged workers. The leading sectors of corporate capital are now global in their organization and operations. And many disadvantaged workers in global cities are from groups that have not fully identified with the national—women, immigrants, and people of color. Both find in the global city a strategic site for their economic and political operations.

The possibility of cross-border politics among disadvantaged groups is facilitated by the Internet, and an emergent sense of globality. What I want to emphasize here is that local initiatives can become part of a global network of activism without losing the focus on specific local struggles (e.g., Cleaver 1998; Espinoza 1999; Ronfeldt et al. 1998; Mele 1999). The Internet enables a new type of cross-border political activism, one centered in multiple localities yet intensely connected digitally. It is the speed and interconnectedness of the Internet that matter here. Activists can develop networks for circulating not only information (about environmental, housing, political issues, etc.) but also political work and strategies, including on-line actions. There are many examples of such new cross-border political work. For instance, SPARC, started by and centered on women, began as an effort to organize slum dwellers in Bombay to demand housing. SPARC now has a network of such groups throughout Asia, as well as some cities in Latin America and Africa. This has not stopped their focus on local conditions and their struggles with local governments, but it has given them the clout of being a global network. It represents one of the key forms of critical politics that the Internet can make possible: a politics of the local with a big difference—these are localities that are connected with one another across a region, a country or the world. The fact that the network is global does not mean that everything has to happen at the global level.

This is not the cosmopolitan route to the global. This is about the global as a multiplication of the local. These are types of sociability and struggle deeply embedded in peoples' actions and activities. They are also forms of institution-building work that can originate from localities and networks of localities with limited resources and from informal political actors. We see here the potential transformation of women confined to domestic roles into key actors in global networks without having to give up their work and their roles in their communities. From being experienced as purely domestic, these “domestic” settings are transformed into microenvironments located on global circuits. The individuals or groups involved do not have to become cosmopolitan in this process; they may well remain domestic or local in their orientation, engaged with their households and local community struggles. And yet they may experience themselves as participants in emergent forms of globality, or, more concretely, in specific global social circuits. A community of practice can emerge that creates multiple lateral, horizontal communications, collaborations, solidarities, supports. This can enable local political or non-political actors to enter into cross-border politics.

Large cities, and in some ways cyberspace, are far more concrete spaces for social struggles than the national political system. They can accommodate non-formal political actors who can be part of the political scene much more easily than they can in national institutional channels. Nationally, politics needs to run through existing formal systems: whether the electoral political system or the judiciary (taking state agencies to court). Non-formal political actors are rendered invisible in the space of national politics. Cities and cyberspace can accommodate a broad range of social struggles and facilitate the emergence of new types of political subjects because they do not have to go through the formal political system. Individuals and groups that have historically been excluded from formal political systems and whose struggles can be partly enacted outside those systems can find in global cities and in cyberspace an enabling environment both for their emergence as non-formal political actors and for their struggles.3

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Endnotes

1. Even if, to a large extent, the national economy was a unitary category constructed primarily in political discourse and policy, it has become even less of a fact in the last fifteen years.

2. These new inequalities in profit-making capacities of economic sectors, earnings capacities of households and prices in upscale and downscale markets have contributed to the formation of informal economies in major cities of highly developed countries. These informal economies negotiate between these new economic trends and regulatory frameworks that were engendered in response to older economic conditions.


References Cited


The International Migration Fellowship Program: Seven Years

By Cynthia Chang and Josh DeWind

Earlier this year, the International Migration Program made its final fellowship awards, concluding seven years of competitions supported by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. By sponsoring predoctoral and postdoctoral research since 1996, the International Migration Program has sought to recruit young scholars based in universities across the United States into the field of international migration studies by supporting their empirical research, linking them with senior scholars in the field, and publishing their empirical and theoretical findings. Participants in these efforts are now beginning to emerge as leading scholars in the field.

Fellows were selected in highly competitive processes by multidisciplinary committees of senior migration scholars. By serving on the selection committee, senior scholars became acquainted with research being conducted by the newest generation of scholars in the field. In deciding which projects to fund, senior scholars discussed disciplinary and interdisciplinary methodologies. Selection meetings were forums for provocative discussions about disciplinary and interdisciplinary methodologies and the composition of the field.

A total of 947 qualified applications were received for predoctoral and postdoctoral research and 108 fellowships were awarded—a highly competitive ratio of one award for every nine proposals. The fellowships were awarded primarily on the basis that the proposed research would contribute to new insights and theoretical understandings of the origins, processes, and outcomes of immigration to the United States.

Evolving Profile

The wide variety of institutional affiliations, disciplinary backgrounds, and social backgrounds of the awardees reflect the diversity of the larger applicant pool and the field of immigration studies as a whole. Applicants and fellows hailed from a number of different locations, with applications received from approximately 200 universities and institutions across the United States, and fellowships awarded to scholars at 52. The institutions with the greatest number of awards were Columbia University, University of California, Berkeley, University of California, Los Angeles, University of Michigan, New York University, and Harvard University, with 24% of all applications coming from these six universities.

Table 1: Disciplines of Fellows

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Number of Fellows</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sociology</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthropology</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20
The fellowship program reflects the multidisciplinary nature of the field, evident in Table 1. Like the applicants and the field more generally, awardees were largely concentrated within the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, political science, and history with a scattered distribution in other disciplines such as economics, education, ethnic studies, geography, psychology, and urban planning. Particular emphasis was placed on soliciting applications from underrepresented social science disciplines.

The field of immigration studies continues to evolve as a result of the changing backgrounds and perspectives of immigration scholars. In Immigration Research for a New Century (eds., Nancy Foner, Rubén G. Rumbaut, and Steven J. Gold, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000), Rubén Rumbaut notes the ways in which the changing social backgrounds of immigration scholars have transformed immigration research in the United States through the years. In terms of gender composition, Rumbaut’s study reports a reversal in the proportion of male and female researchers over time with women making up 62% of the youngest cohort of scholars. In seven years of awarding fellowships, 67% of applicants and 70% of fellows of the International Migration Program were women.

Rumbaut also points out the growing number of immigration scholars who are ethnic “insiders.” An ethnic insider is someone who studies immigrants of his/her own cultural or national origin. According to Rumbaut’s survey of immigration scholars, more than a third of the total sample (37%) was classified as insiders. Fellows of the International Migration Program reflect the wider sample of Rumbaut’s study. Rumbaut explains increases in the proportion of ethnic insiders among immigration scholars by citing changes in the ethnicity or national origin of groups that are the focus of research attention today as well as high numbers of foreign-born scholars. Among our fellows, 66% were US-born. Of the 34% of fellows who were foreign-born or immigrants themselves, 54% were naturalized citizens, 32% were foreign students, and 14% were permanent US residents.

In the International Migration Fellowship Program, the majority of both applicants and fellows were of minority backgrounds, defined as being of African, Asian, Latino, Native American, Pacific Island, or mixed ancestry. From minority groups, the largest number of applications were submitted by researchers of Asian and then of Latino and African ancestry. Researchers of European ancestry comprised 45% of the applicant pool but only 41% of the fellows. In contrast to applicants of European and Asian backgrounds, those of Latino and African origins were disproportionately successful in obtaining fellowships.
Minority Summer Dissertation Workshop

To take advantage of the disproportionate minority interest in immigration and thereby promote the careers of minority scholars in the social sciences, the Council’s International Migration Program established the Minority Summer Dissertation Workshop (MSDW). Members of the program committee were concerned that students of minority backgrounds generally feel isolated within higher education not only with regard to their social backgrounds but also, at times, with regard to their academic interests and career development. Thus, the minority workshop was designed specifically to address these needs and interests, attract social science graduate students of minority backgrounds to participate in the field, and facilitate their potential contributions by bringing them into the national network of peers and senior immigration scholars. In seminars led by some of the foremost scholars in the field, the students were presented with a wide range of interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological approaches to immigration research and focused intensively on developing their own dissertation research and funding proposals. The workshop also helped students create a network of peers with whom they might collaborate throughout their careers.

From 1996-2002, a total of 87 applicants were selected to participate in the Minority Summer Dissertation Workshop. Compared to applicants for predoctoral fellowships as a whole, participants in the minority workshop who subsequently applied for predoctoral research fellowships had a higher success rate. One out of every four minority workshop participants who applied for predoctoral fellowships received awards while only one out of every nine applicants for predoctoral fellowships as a whole were successful. These numbers appear to confirm that the minority workshop functioned to prepare graduate students to succeed in the field. As compared with predoctoral and postdoctoral fellows, a higher percentage of minority workshop applicants and participants were women (76% of applicants, 78% of participants). Among applicants and chosen participants, the ethnic group with the greatest numbers of both was Latinos, followed by those of Asian, African, and mixed ancestry. Indicating that the minority workshop helped to recruit immigrant students into the field of migration studies, the proportion of immigrants participating in the minority workshop was higher than that among the predoctoral and postdoctoral fellows (49% and 34% respectively).

Research

A large number of the funded research projects adopted comparative approaches. Some researchers compared the experiences of different immigrant groups in similar contexts or members of the same group in different contexts. Other fellows conducted historically comparative research. Still others compared the experiences of immigrants with those of native-born Americans or examined relationships between the two. Many fellows also centered their research within an international framework either comparing national experiences or examining transnational aspects of migration networks.

In terms of research topics, funded projects have covered a wide range of issues within the broad domains of economics, politics, and society and culture. In the field of economics,
fellows have investigated such issues as economic incorporation, labor market segmentation and recruitment, employment concentration, occupational mobility, entrepreneurship, productivity, consumption, and development. Within the category of politics, fellows have examined political membership and participation, immigrant and native-born conflicts and alliances, civil disturbances, transnational political activism and civic engagement, international relations, and immigrant legislation. Within the category of society and culture, fellows have explored immigrant acculturation and identity as related to issues of class, race, pan-ethnicity, and consumption behavior; psychological coping strategies; sexuality, gender, family, and kinship; shifts in language usage; group networks, relations, boundaries, and communities; transnational, diasporic, and circular patterns of migration and networks.

The immigrant groups studied vary with regard to their national origin and their location of settlement within the United States. In terms of immigrant national origins, research projects have focused on certain immigrant groups from Africa (Cape Verdeans, Kenyans, Nigerians, and Nigerian refugees), Asia (Chinese, Chinese-Thais, Filipinos, Indians, Japanese, Peruvians, Koreans, Samoans, Taiwanese, Tibetans, and Vietnamese), the Caribbean (Barbadians, Dominicans, Guadeloupeans, Haitians, Puerto Ricans, Trinidadians, and West Indians), Europe (Italians and Ukrainians), and South America (Colombians, Cubans, Hispanics, Mexicans). Through the years the fellowships have been offered, the immigrant group of greatest focus has been that of Latin American origin with considerable attention given to immigrants from Mexico, followed by groups of Asian, African, and European origin.

In terms of area settlement of immigrants, the bulk of the research focused on two US states with the largest numbers and concentration of immigrants—New York and California. The urban centers most commonly investigated were New York City and Los Angeles but also included Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Miami, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. Projects also focused on broader national and transnational contexts, comparing immigrant experiences in the United States with those in such countries as Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, India, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines.

Conferences of fellows were held to facilitate exchange between junior and senior scholars in the field and to assess the collective contributions of the fellows’ research toward new understandings in migration studies. The research findings of fellows from 1996-2000 were first reported at the following three conferences: “Transformations Immigration and Immigration Research in the United States” (June, 1997), “American Identities/Transnational Lives” (January, 2001), and “Immigration, Religion, and Civic Life” (March, 2002). A conference of the final two cohorts of fellows will be held in January 2004.

An Interdisciplinary Network

Through its fellowship program, Minority Summer Dissertation Workshop, conferences of fellows, and subsequent publications, the International Migration Program has fostered an interdisciplinary network that is expected to become the foundation on which the next generation of scholars will continue to build the field of migration studies in the United States.

Although the program has made its final fellowship awards, its work will continue along a number of fronts. Planning and administration of the fellowship program continues through 2004, as the final two cohorts of fellows progress in their studies. A summer institute is planned for 2003 that will bring together junior and senior scholars in international migration and refugee studies to discuss new research that can help to shape doctoral dissertations and postdoctoral research projects. Five SSRC working groups are engaged in research projects on Transnational Migration, on Transnational Religion and Migration, on Gender and Migration, on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity, and on Forced Migration and Human Rights. In addition, Council staff working on migration-related topics have collaborated with International Migration staff to form a “cluster” to coordinate and foster new efforts, some of which have a domestic focus and others of which are more internationalized in approach. These include projects, at various stages of development, on Transnational Politics and Immigrant Citizenship; Islam and Muslims in the United States and Europe; Intra-regional Migration within Latin America; Translocal Flows: Migrations and Urban Spaces in the Americas; and Ethnic Networks and Business Formation. Additionally, an interdisciplinary working group is preparing a volume for The New Press examining the implications of post-9/11 “homeland security” in the United States and its focus on threats perceived to be posed by international migrants, particularly Muslims and Arabs.

In each of these projects, we hope to continue the Council’s role of catalyzing and sustaining an interdisciplinary network that nurtures the very best of scholarship on the pressing issues of international migration.

Cynthia Chang is program assistant for the International Migration Program. Josh DeWitt is the program’s director. DeWitt is editor, with Charles Hirschman and Philip Kasinitz, of The Handbook of International Migration: the American Experience (R. usel Sage Foundation, 1999), which won the Thomas & Znaniecki Award from the American Sociological Association Section on International Migration, 2000.

Endnotes

1 The National Survey of Immigration Scholars (NASIS) conducted by Rumbaut in 1998 was mailed to a list of 1,189 immigration scholars with a total of 753 completed surveys returned, a return rate of 63.3%. Specifically, 282 surveys were returned out of 411 sent to members of the Immigration History Society (69%), 235 of the 285 members of the American Sociological Association’s Section on International Migration (61%), 77 of the 120 members of the American Anthropological Association’s Committee on Refugee Issues (64%), 139 of the 253 SSRC fellowship applicants not otherwise included in other professional organizations (55%), and 20 members of the Ethnicity Nationalism, and Migration Section of the International Studies Association.
International Migration Fellows’ Research

The most important means by which the contribution of the fellows’ research to the field of migration studies will become known is through publications of research reports in volumes edited by the organizers of our fellows conferences. These volumes have been edited to highlight particular themes and the interpretations that fellows have brought to the field through their research. Following publication of some papers in a special issue of the American Behavioral Scientist, the first volume of fellows’ papers was published as Immigration Research for a New Century (eds., Nancy Foner, Rubén G. Rumbaut, and Steven J. Gold, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000). Another volume of fellows’ papers addressing immigrant identity will be published by Routledge in the coming year, and two more volumes are now in preparation.

In the following brief essays we have asked some of the conference organizers-editors to summarize what they see to be the central themes and major insights of the fellows’ research as they are being presented in the volumes of edited research reports. While such summaries cannot reflect the full diversity of topics, research methods, and analytic insights that have resulted, they capture some of the more significant aspects of the fellows’ research and their contributions to the field of international migration studies.

Immigration Research for a New Century

by Nancy Foner

Nancy Foner, Rubén G. Rumbaut, and Steven J. Gold, eds. (Russell Sage Foundation, 2000).

The seventeen essays by SSRC predoctoral and postdoctoral fellows that were included in the volume show the diversity of a field in process of transformation and highlight a number of important new developments taking place in immigration research. The younger researchers have been intensely influenced by recent changes in American society, international migration, and intellectual life. They tend to be less immersed than senior scholars in the academic approaches of earlier periods and, as Rubén Rumbaut’s contribution to the volume makes clear, compared with the recent past, they include an unprecedented number of foreign-born and women scholars.

Many of the populations that concern the new scholars are, of course, recent immigrant groups, many of which were barely present in the United States before the 1970s. The fellows are also analyzing the recent groups through new theoretical lenses and analytic perspectives. A major concern of many fellows is the nature, extent, and impact, of transnational linkages and relations—a topic that has become of great interest, across the social science disciplines, in the last few years. A number of papers in the volume illustrate the permeability of national borders and the benefits that individuals, corporations, social movements, and organizations often receive by accessing extranational resources. Others conclude that social, legal, and economic factors continue to make transnational existence a difficult one. Although ties to multiple nations offer new options, several of the fellows show that such ties may also complicate matters of national membership, for migrants and nation-states alike.

Another concern of the fellows is the dynamics of racial/ethnic classification and incorporation. Essays discuss how notions of race affected treatment by immigration officials at ports of entry earlier in the century, or the role of literacy and English competence in the classification of Italian immigrants a century ago. In the current period, essays explore the extent to which various minority groups have been incorporated into the American majority-rule political system, and the way immigrants of Asian and Latin American origins fit into racially segregated neighborhoods.

One of the burgeoning areas of social science research since the 1970s has concerned women, gender, and families, and recent scholars have devoted considerable attention to gender and family issues among migrants. As Rumbaut notes, the concern with women, gender, and families mirrors the increasing representation of women among migration scholars.

Among the chapters concerned with gender issues, there is an exploration of the experience and societal impact of migrant women in view of the demand for gendered workers like nurses and domestics. Essays by two anthropologists describe the way in which the social, economic, and legal influence of American gender norms transforms the interactions of men and women in the country of settlement and extends to the country of origin as well.

A final topic that animates many of the fellows’ projects is interest in economic incorporation. In recent years, scholars have developed more complex and contextualized understandings of economic incorporation, noting the importance of collective resources, labor markets shaped by class, ethnicity, gender, and legal status, and the influence of the United States on countries of emigration. A number of chapters show the dynamic processes involved in the establishment of niches for foreign-born engineers and scientists, nurses, private household workers, farmworkers, and small shopkeepers. One chapter considers the ways that immigrant and ethnic groups compete over the market for goods and services in urban ghettos; another seeks to explain why immigrants become heavily enmeshed in private household work in some cities but not in others.

The chapters by the fellows, with their different disciplinary styles, theoretical concerns and research methods, stand in market contrast to what an earlier era of immigration studies produced. With their emphasis on questions of membership and transnational ties, racial/ethnic identity and classification, gender, and economic incorporation, they offer an augur of what a new generation of immigration researchers, now coming of intellectual age, is helping to create.

Nancy Foner is Lillie and Nathan Ackerman visiting Professor of Equality and Justice in America at Baruch College, City University of New York.
Immigrant Identity in the United States
by Donna Gabaccia

Donna R. Gabaccia and Colin Wayne Leach, eds. (Routledge, forthcoming).

From its inception, the SSRC’s Program on International Migration has viewed the training, support, and socialization of young scholars as the key to building an interdisciplinary field.

Immigrant Identity in the United States collects essays by young historians, sociologists, a political scientist, and an economist. Contributors were supported by the Program’s predoctoral and postdoctoral fellowships, and several also attended the Program’s Minority Summer Dissertation Workshops. All had participated in SSRC fellows conferences. If the purpose of the 2001 fellows conference in La Jolla was to encourage networking, then it was a success: one ongoing conference discussion (on immigrant women employed in traditionally female fields) resulted in a panel at the Social Science History Association.

That conference, however, also revealed a generation gap in migration studies. Compared to senior scholars, fellows were considerably more fascinated with identity—both individual and collective. By publishing this new work on identity, we hoped to highlight what a new generation of social scientists were contributing to a topic that had more often been the subject of scholarship in cultural studies and more often the object of post-modernist scrutiny than of theorizing or quantitative analysis in sociology, political science, or economics.

All the contributors to Immigrant Identity in the United States viewed everyday practices and social interactions as the most important sites for the creation of identity. Their work reminds us of the very different social interactions that shape how youthful and adult immigrants begin to define “who they are in the United States.” One set of essays focuses on educational institutions (from the public schools of the Napa Valley in the 1870s to Columbia University and Hunter College today), adoption agencies, urban playgrounds, and the cultural symbols of immigrant youth. A second set of essays explores the very important world of work for adult immigrants through analysis of the long-term consequences of the bracero program, the functions of contemporary employment agencies, and workplaces as diverse as California kitchens and the high-tech offices along Rte 128 or in Silicon Valley.

After a decade of “culture wars,” the benefits of bringing cultural identity closer to the center of social analysis of migration seem clear. Our contributors described social interactions, conducted surveys, interviewed immigrants, engaged in participant observation and dug through governmental archives while also analyzing texts and paying careful attention to the construction of racial and ethnic categories through discourse. Surprisingly few of our contributors were attracted to millenarian predictions that contemporary glob-
ship roles, and fight lynching and restrictions on immigration. In contemporary circumstances, essays show non-Christian as well as Christian religions enabling immigrants to retain and transmit ethnic and transnational identities. At the same time we are reminded that immigrants’ religious activities may qualify them as “faith-based communities” for federal grants and services. The larger legal context and differential access to citizenship strongly shape religious institution building in some cases.

The various religions are, we see, operating very differently in their new contexts, sometimes helping to change and incorporate immigrants and sometimes working to preserve ethnic identities. Some religious communities are preparing their members to be full participants in American pluralism, while others socialize their members into cultures of resistance based on ethnic identity politics, illegality and poverty, or, perhaps, on religious beliefs and practices that do not fit “normative” American religious beliefs and practices. Spatial patterns already set in American urban localities, rural churches, and house and apartment designs help determine how immigrants adapt their religious practices. From chapters on Korean Christians and Hindus located in New York City to the Mexican Catholics and Protestants in suburban Georgia to the Vodou, Catholic and Protestant Haitians in South Florida, we see religious, ethnic, and civic identities changed by migration but still at least partially shaped by attachments to the former homelands.

Some of the groups studied are also significant transnationally, perhaps because the homeland remains the more meaningful or accessible civic arena for them. Here, transnational sacred geographies and institutional networks (or the lack of them) play important roles. One chapter shows how Okinawan Buddhist and kami (Japanese spirit worship) priestesses have not migrated, so their followers must do without key formal rituals in America and may acquire Christian or other religious affiliations new to them. Another chapter shows how a male leader of a Buddhist, Taoist, and Chinese popular religion temple in New York’s Chinatown ministers to a small, largely illegal immigrant group in the city but to a large and increasingly wealthy group back in the migrants’ home village in southeastern China. Another chapter describes Buddhist, Christian, and Confucian (ancestor veneration) beliefs and practices followed by Cambodian refugees in Long Beach and Seattle. These combinations, and the attempts to establish monks and monastic centers, are related to the Cambodians’ status as refugees and their efforts to ground themselves in the US economy, but they are also rooted in a syncretistic religious heritage from Cambodia.

Recognizing the failure of the “secularization paradigm” that informed recent decades of social science research and enabled scholars of migration to overlook religion in their inquiries, this volume shows the ways in which religious beliefs and practices can be central to immigrants. It shows religion as a major force shaping and changing constructions of personal and community identity among immigrants and a major force for incorporation into or resistance to civic life in America. It also questions “western” definitions of religion by highlighting religions new to the US and new ways of combining religious beliefs and practices in both private and public arenas.

Karen Isaksen Leonard is professor of anthropology at the University of California, Irvine.

Research Problems in the Study of International Migration
by Louis DeSipio

Volume to be edited by Louis DeSipio, Manuel Garcia y Griego, and Sherrie Kossoudji.

This volume will focus on methodological approaches to the study of international migration. It will include chapters authored by between 15 and 20 of the SSR C International Migration Project predoctoral and postdoctoral fellows. They will use their research projects as foundations to discuss the methodologies they used in their migration research project, their perceptions of what they gained and lost through this methodological approach, and how they were able to use methodologies not dominant in their discipline of training.

The overall objective of the volume will be to present a systematic discussion of methodologies used in international migration scholarship that should serve as a resource for scholars (at whatever stage in their careers) newly entering the field. It is our expectation that by grounding methodological discussions in real-world research experiences, the fellows’ chapters will be more accessible than volumes that focus exclusively on methods. We anticipate that international migration scholars using this volume to guide their research designs will be able to design better projects that blend methodological approaches not traditionally found in international migration scholarship.

The fellows’ papers will be organized around three themes:

- analyzing migrant politics at home and abroad;
- connections between migration and the economy; and
- constructing and comparing social groups.

These three themes are driven, in part, by the research topics selected by the fellows but also reflect broad substantive fields of inquiry that appeared at the fellows’ conferences. We will solicit a senior immigration scholar to author an introductory chapter for each of these three sections. We anticipate that these senior scholars will use the fellows’ papers as a point of departure for a broader discussion of the methods that have been used to study each of these three fields of inquiry.

The exact content and form of the methodological
discussion and balance between the methodological discussion with the substantive findings of the research will vary, but we anticipate authors to focus on one of the following major sets of issues:

- The interplay between methods and the research question. How did the research question chosen influence the methodology employed, or vice versa? What methods not employed could have been used and what resources would have been needed? Had other methods or resources been available, how might the research question be restated? How much time was spent learning new methods (especially those not traditional to the fellow’s discipline) and how did this affect the research questions addressed?

- What was given up as a result of method choice? If there is a distinctive method employed, what was achieved that could not have been achieved otherwise? What were the advantages and disadvantages of the methods employed over the ones discarded?

- (If applicable:) How does the project reconcile the interdisciplinary nature of the research question with the methods employed?

Although it is not possible to discuss each fellow’s contribution here, two perhaps can give an indication of the potential richness of this volume. Emmanuel Eugene of Florida International University studied political connections between Haitian émigrés and Haitians in Haiti. He used an innovative technology—textual analysis of Haitian and Haitian émigré radio broadcasts—as a research tool to evaluate how Haitians and Haitian émigrés are seeking to define Haitian identity and its boundaries. Although not a new question in immigration scholarship, radio broadcasts and applied content-analysis methodologies are uncommon in migration scholarship. K. Bruce Newbold of McMaster University followed a long tradition in migration scholarship by tapping several cross-sectional data sets. His use of these data, however, was innovative, most notably in linking concurrent census files and in identifying refugees within these data. Where Eugene created a new source from which analytical techniques could be borrowed, Newbold got more from what we already have.

The volume will be edited by Manuel García-Griego (University of Texas, Arlington), Sherrie Kossooudji (University of Michigan), and Louis DeSipio (University of California, Irvine). The editors will contribute a chapter to the volume assessing how the questions asked by the fellows and the methods applied to answer these questions reflect or are a point of departure from immigration scholarship over the past century.

Louis DeSipio is associate professor of political science and director of Chicano/Latino studies at the University of California, Irvine.

For a complete listing of the Research Fellows of the International Migration Program, 1996-2002, please go to ssrc.org/fellowships/intmigration/.
Abe Fellowship Colloquium

On November 12, 2002 the SSRC Tokyo office hosted an Abe Fellowship colloquium. Abe Fellow Sawako Shirahase spoke on "Working Mothers and Childcare Support in Japan: A Comparison with the United States." Her presentation was a preliminary report on research conducted in the United States. Worried about declining fertility rates, the Japanese government adopted a series of policy measures in the 1990s to support childcare and enable mothers to continue working. Dr. Shirahase found, however, that many Japanese married women still quit their jobs because of childbearing. Whereas only 28.5 percent of Japanese women with children under three years of age are employed, in the United States, where public support for childcare is minimal, a much higher percentage stay in the labor market and continue their careers. Shirahase explored this difference in her talk, citing the data she has collected.

SSRC Reception: The Africa Program and the Art of Yegizaw Michael

On September 23, 2002 approximately 100 guests joined the Council for an evening reception highlighting "The SSRC and Africa" and featuring the artwork of Yegizaw Michael, award winning Eritrean artist. Guests came from NGOs, foundations, the UN and academia. They heard about SSRC work in Africa, which includes programs on youth and globalization and on higher education, and important components of programs on children and armed conflict, forced migration and human rights, HIV/AIDS and social transformation, and global security and cooperation.

In featuring the artwork of Yegizaw, the Council sought to bring attention to a talented artist with a strong commitment to social and political reconciliation. Yegizaw uses art to combat the anger and anomie accompanying both armed conflict and the scourge of HIV/AIDS. Yeggy (as his friends call him) has seen a lot of both as an Eritrean raised in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Eritrea and Ethiopia have a history of several decades of war and both have high rates of HIV infection.

Reflecting back on the death of friends and his own imprisonment in Ethiopia, Yeggy says, "My whole world is to bring peace to society—from the grass roots level to the top—by using artists, whether it is music or painting, poetry or writing—anything to use for a healing process. I hope that people see through my work the hope, the sadness, the struggle of survival and, at the same time, peaceful settlement. If people don't have a settled mentality, then there is no meaning to life."

Using vibrant colors and symbolism that reflect grounding in East African culture, Yegizaw’s art nonetheless projects a pan-African, even cosmopolitan vision. As an artist and a community organizer, he has worked tirelessly to bridge difference while also encouraging it. "Unity in Diversity," a phrase frequently heard among his fellow Eritreans, is Yeggy's motto.

In addition to his own artwork, Yegizaw is busy with a number of community efforts in the Seattle area to achieve healing through the arts and he continues efforts to mitigate and prevent HIV/AIDS in Africa and elsewhere. For more information about the artist and his work, please go to yeggystudio.com. For more information about the Council’s projects in Africa, go to src.org/programs/africa/.

African Youth in a Global Age

The Africa Regional Advisory Panel organized the first training workshop of the 2002 cohort of fellows for the program "Understanding Exclusion, Creating Value: African Youth in a Global Age" on October 21-26, 2002, in Dakar, Senegal. The workshop was held at the Hotel-Jardin Savana in Dakar, and included the 17 fellows as well as resource persons from institutions in Africa and the United States.

On the 21st and 22nd, the fellows attended and participated in the CODESRIA (Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa) Children and Youth Institute. The institute provided a good platform for the fellows to network with the CODESRIA laureates, and to take part in the discourse on current youth issues around Africa.

To open the workshop, Dr. Adebayo Oluwole, executive secretary for CODESRIA, gave a keynote address on the "Challenges of Social Science Research in Africa." The remainder of the workshop was dedicated to refining the research designs of fellows’ projects and discussions of conceptual and methodological issues related to youth research. Presentations by each fellow were followed by intense and engaged discussions with resource persons and other fellows. Breakout sessions organized around themes were organized for small groups. Immediately following the workshop, fellows will begin their field research. They will reconvene in June 2003 to present their research findings.
**HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation**

In November 2002, the SSRC convened an international meeting on HIV/AIDS and social transformation. Leading academics and practitioners from around the world discussed the impact of the pandemic on the functioning and well-being of households and communities. The need for social science research on the structural implications of HIV/AIDS for national and international peace and security, for systems of governance, for business and industry and for social and religious institutions was identified. Stephen Lewis, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa, addressed the meeting on the intensely political challenges posed by the pandemic and the related gaps in knowledge concerning the disease’s disproportionate impact on women, the 14 million orphans left in its deadly wake, and the threats posed to international security. This meeting was the beginning of a series of consultations that will shape the SSRC’s response to the pandemic and the development of a major initiative on HIV/AIDS and social transformation.

**The Arts Program**

The 2002-2003 cohort of Arts Dissertation Fellows met for an engaging workshop on October 17th-20th, 2002, at the Harrison Conference Center in Glen Cove, New York. The fifteen 2002 fellows were joined by three fellows from the previous year as well as members of the Arts Committee. The first full day of the workshop was devoted to presentation and discussion of the fellows’ dissertation topics and identifying common threads and themes. The second day was spent examining issues relating to methodology, theory and interdisciplinarity, and professional development.

In a subsequent meeting, held in New York on November 16th-17th, 2002, the committee itself spent some time reviewing the outcomes of the Fellowship Workshop and discussing groundwork—in terms of thematic foci and possible participants—for a projected series of working conferences during 2003. Led by a sub-set of committee members and involving other scholars and practitioners who can offer expertise and fresh perspectives, each working conference will be focused on a central theme at the boundary of the arts and social science. The themes that emerged from the November meeting are: “The Work Itself: Social Science in the Understanding of Works of Art”; “Making the Case for the Impact of Art on People’s Lives”; and “Art, Conflict and Reconciliation.”

**Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF)**

Democracy and Security in the Andes

On October 21-22, 2002, the project “Democracy and Security in the Andes: Towards a Regional Agenda” held its second meeting at the SSRC. This project developed out of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum’s partnership with the Centro Andino de Estudios Internacionales (CAEI) of the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar (UASB), in Quito. CPPF and CAEI function as co-secretariat of the project. The project’s third meeting is planned for the beginning of 2003 and will be hosted by CAEI in Quito.

Central Asia

On December 3-4, 2002, The Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, in cooperation with the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, held a meeting in Berlin on “Central Asia in the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities for Enhancing Peace and Security.” The meeting brought together approximately forty participants in their personal capacity, including: directors of the Institutes of Strategic Studies of Central Asian states, representatives for Central Asian foreign ministries, experts from the UN, the OSCE, the European Commission, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank, as well as a select group of independent scholars and experts. The next meeting in this series is expected to take place at the end of March.

Nepal

On December 12, 2002, CPPF co-organized an informal brainstorming session on Nepal with the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR). The event was hosted by the Asia Society in New York and aimed to provide input into the strategic planning of the international community’s response to the current situation in Nepal.
Education Research Program

A planning meeting for a new initiative on social science research and transitions to college and career was held on September 23, 2002 at the SSRC New York office. The project will examine current research on "transitions" across fields, and will form an interdisciplinary committee of scholars to plan a research agenda and organize field-building activities. In the first planning phase, the committee will be charged with preparing assessments of the state of social science knowledge about American adolescents, particularly those in disadvantaged populations, and their transition to higher education and degree completion.

Ethnography in Transnational Settings

On December 16-17, 2002, a planning meeting was held to discuss the possibility of establishing a multi-disciplinary project on "Ethnography in Transnational Settings." The group of scholars, specializing in anthropology, sociology and history but also in political science, religious studies and marketing studies (among others), discussed changes within and the differences between disciplines regarding ethnographic research and the challenges of practicing ethnography in a transnationalizing and globalizing world. Possibilities of linking the work of this group with the SSRC project on "Transnational Religion and Migration" was also discussed at length, as well as linkages to IDR F methodology workshops. The participants recommended a multi-pronged approach for supporting ethnographic approaches and practices in the social sciences including the possibility of establishing a working group as well as a multi-disciplinary fellowship competition for doctoral students.

Global Governance of Electronic Networks

The Program on Information Technology and International Cooperation held a workshop on "Global Governance of Electronic Networks" in Budapest, Hungary, November 15-17, 2002. The workshop was the second in a series of meetings bringing together policy practitioners and scholars to examine the complex relationships among the information revolution, scholarship and policy practice. The objective of the series is to generate policy-relevant knowledge informed by sustained dialogue between practitioners and social scientists. The workshop was attended by 35 participants from Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa and North America. During the first half of the workshop, discussion topics included multilateral and regional policymaking, private sector self-governance, developing country and civil society participation, and reform with respect to information technology governance. During the second half, authors of forthcoming chapters for a book on this topic presented their work on telecommunications and Internet policy, intellectual property policy, encryption, privacy, cyber-crime, and culture and content issues. The workshop was organized in partnership with the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland.

Program on Global Security and Cooperation (GSC)

Beyond Borders: (Il)licit Flows of People, Objects and Ideas

The Program on Global Security and Cooperation held a workshop in Vancouver, Canada, August 30-September 2, 2002. The fourth in a series, the workshop was part of an ongoing project entitled "Beyond Borders: (Il)licit Flows of People, Objects and Ideas." The project seeks to establish a systematic, comparative understanding of transnational flows that escape the control, or lie beyond the purview, of states. Workshop participants came from Europe, Asia, Latin America, Canada and the U.S. Papers presented included studies of "blood diamonds" in Sierra Leone and Liberia, a comparison of Ecuadorian migration to Europe and the U.S., an ethnography of coca use in northern Argentina, an examination of the spread of subversive sexualities in Southeast Asia, and theoretical reflections on illicitness. The workshop will lead to an edited volume based on revised workshop papers.

Launching the 2002 Grants for Research Collaboration in Conflict Zones

From September 8-13, 2002, the GSC Program hosted representatives of the teams receiving the 2002 Grants for Research Collaboration in Conflict Zones. The eight participants, formally beginning their tenures, hail from Russia, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Colombia and India. In a series of formal presentations, the grantees discussed their individual research projects and received feedback from SSRC staff. On September 12, the SSRC Washington office hosted the sixth luncheon seminar in the War on Terrorism Roundtable series. The event featured the eight GSC research grantees from conflict zones who provided perspectives on the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The grantees discussed how the "war on terrorism" has affected politics, governance, human rights, and peace in their countries and regions. During their week-long stay in Washington, the grantees also had a rare opportunity to network with local scholars and activists with similar professional interests through a series of one-on-one meetings at the U.S. Institute for Peace, the Brookings Institute, the World Bank, USAID and other institutions.

International Law and International Relations Series

On November 14-15, the Program on Global Security and Cooperation held the second workshop in the SSRC-C-GSC Series on International Law and International Relations. Held in Washington, D.C., it brought together a diverse range of scholars, policymakers and practitioners to discuss the "war on terrorism." The "war on terrorism" has redefined U.S. foreign policy, as well as relations between Europe, the United States, and much of the rest of the world. Virtually every aspect of this "war" has significant legal dimensions, just as it does for international relations. The workshop examined these issues as problems of international law and international relations, attempting to parse the interaction between law
and global politics. The different panels addressed issues such as the evolution of both national and international legal frameworks regarding terrorism; terrorist networks and how they are financed; the relationship between migration and terrorism; and the "Bush Doctrine" and the legality/legitimacy of preemptive use of force.

GSC Program Fellows' Conference
In early October, the GSC Program convened the second annual Fellows' Conference in Moscow, Russia. The conference brought together the 2002 cohort of 15 GSC Dissertation and Professional Fellows, 6 GSC Committee members, and SSR C President Craig Calhoun. The group included participants from the Americas, Africa, Europe, Asia and Australia. The primary purpose of the Fellows' Conference was to promote vigorous discussions between the Committee and the Fellows about their individual research projects. It was held in Moscow in order to survey the many global issues in which the "new" Russia is a central player and to build useful and lasting relationships with the scholarly and practitioner community there. The agenda included visits to the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), the human rights NGO Memorial, the Gorbachev Foundation and the Institute for the US and Canadian Studies (ISKRAN). The participants heard lectures and presentations on cross-institutional learning between NGOs and the Academy, on ethnic conflict in Russia, on dealing with a difficult past, on corruption and governance, on the impact of globalization on Russia, and on the "war on terrorism." The highlight of the conference was a private dinner with the former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his long-time advisor Pavel Palazchenko on the closing night of the meeting.

Inter-ethnic Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Europe
The GSC Program, in partnership with the Ethnobarometer Program of the Italian Social Science Council, has chosen the first cohort of young East European and American scholars to participate in a new SSR C-CSS exchange program managed by the Social Science Research Council. Eight twelve-week research fellowships have been awarded for research on issues of inter-ethnic relations and ethnic conflict in Southeast Europe. The fellows will be hosted by appropriate institutions starting in February and March 2003. They will conduct research on diverse issues ranging from the EU's conflict prevention efforts in the Balkans, through policing and education reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to ethnic identity construction by the mass media in the case of Roma. The fellowships are intended to promote collaboration and cross-cultural understanding through work with others at the fellows' host institutions, with Ethnobarometer and the SSR C.

Health and the Social Sciences
The Working Group on Integrative Doctoral Programs in Health and the Social Sciences held its second meeting at the SSR C's New York office on October 25-26, 2002. The group held discussions that were framed, in part, by several themes that emerged from both the group's initial meeting and subsequent reflections provided by a yet-wider group of scholars (themes such as "the role of role models," "funding as fundamental," "the power of peer networks"). Beyond that, a good deal of attention was devoted to a range of issues relating to the kinds of products the group will be working toward during its second year. These issues can be seen as emerging from one seemingly simple question: What kinds of products are central to facilitating future integrative training in the social and biomedical sciences?

IDRF (International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship) Program
The IDRF Program hosted its ninth fellows' workshop in Austin, Texas from October 3-8, 2002. The workshop is a requirement of the IDRF fellowship, and aims to create an intellectual cohort of fellows that is both cross-disciplinary and cross-regional. Along with providing a forum for fellows to discuss their dissertation research in its varying stages, it also affords them an opportunity to exchange ideas with facilitators and peers regarding the more general aspects of theory, research methodology, write-up and fieldwork experience.

The 19 fellows who participated in the 5-day workshop were grant recipients from the 2001 cohort who have
recently returned from their field research and are at the beginning stages of dissertation writing. The fellows come from various disciplines, regions and institutions. They presented their work on panels, which were grouped around common themes across disciplines and regions.

2003 IDRF competition
The International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship Program received 823 completed applications for its 2003 competition. 488 women and 335 men from 110 universities submitted proposals to compete for the 50 IDRF fellowships that are awarded each year. The 2003 applicants represent over 30 departments in the social sciences and the humanities, from African American Studies to Women's Studies, and propose to conduct field research in countries ranging from Argentina to Zimbabwe. The proposals are now being reviewed by 158 screeners at universities across the country.

Inter-Asian Connections
On December 3-4, 2002, the Middle East and North Africa Program together with the Southeast Asia Program and the South Asia Program held a joint planning meeting titled "Inter-Asian Connections." The session brought together scholars representing different viewpoints, disciplines, and regional/sub-regional specializations to engage "the idea of Asia." The group considered how to reframe social science and humanistic knowledge about Asia, from West to East, through a discussion of connections, continuums and comparisons. The inclusion/exclusion of certain peoples, area and geographical zones in the notion of "Asia" was noted. In addition, re-envisioning Asia through new forms of visual and aural cultures was discussed as well as possibilities of developing sources, materials, publications and archives that would allow a new generation of scholars to recast their research in ways that are cognizant of the fluidity and contingency of geography. One theme, which centers on the construction and conceptualization of archives as residues of "connective events," seemed an especially productive route of inquiry. A follow-up meeting is in the planning stages.

Program on Latin America and the Caribbean
ACLS/SSRC Working Group on Cuba
On October 3, 2002 the ACLS/SSRC Working Group on Cuba held its annual meeting in Havana. The working group includes four North American scholars, three Cubans and one Mexican. Committee members reviewed the past year of activities, awarded funds to eleven grant proposals aimed primarily at facilitating collaborative scholarship between Cuba and the United States, and discussed the newly established Hemingway Collection Preservation Project (see below).

Program on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Surveying Middle East Studies: Towards a Global Perspective
In connection with a MENA program initiative, the SSRC convened a panel at the First World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies, which was held in Mainz, Germany September 9 - 13, 2002. The panel was titled "Surveying Middle East Studies: Towards a Global Perspective." It assembled members of survey teams from France, Japan, North Ameri-
ca and Russia. Each team presented research results focusing on the history of Middle East Studies and current changes and trends in the field within each country/region. A one-day meeting was organized for the survey teams to discuss the progress of their research and the organization of country reports for future publication.

Reconceptualizing Public Spheres in the Middle East & North Africa
Representatives from each of the 2001-2002 SSRC/Ford International Collaborative Research Grants (ICRG) Awardee Projects were gathered for a panel at the Congress entitled "Reconceptualizing Public Spheres in the Middle East & North Africa." Presentations focused on the larger theme of public spheres in the region as well as the challenges of undertaking collaborative work. Awardees also attended a closed meeting with SSRC staff to present the progress of their projects, discuss future plans and receive feedback from the group as a whole.

The Production of Knowledge on the MENA Region in North America
A breakfast meeting at the Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association of North America (MESA) held in Washington, DC from November 23-26, 2002, assembled a number of directors of centers and departments of Middle Eastern Studies, as well as other interested individuals, to discuss the initiation of a seminar series on the production of knowledge on the MENA region in North America. Participants expressed interest and committed to attending a planning meeting for the seminar series, tentatively scheduled for early February 2003.

Surveying Middle East Studies, Phase II
The Annual MESA meeting also provided an opportunity to announce the second phase of the MENA Program initiative—surveying the state of Middle East Studies. In collaboration with MESA, the MENA program has been conducting a survey of Middle East Studies in North America with a focus on teaching, training, and the production of a new generation of scholars. The survey is being distributed for a second time this fall/winter to assess the changes and challenges centers and departments of Middle East Studies have experienced since September 11. The North American survey is part of the larger international survey referred to above; possible expansions are being planned in the UK, Eastern Europe and Scandinavia.

The Field of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies
The MENA program and the SSRC Eurasia program also collaborated at the Annual MESA meeting in organizing a "thematic conversation" on Central Asia and the Caucasus for the second consecutive year. The conversation was centered around five presenters, most of whom have collaborated with the Council in the past (whether as committee members or fellowship recipients). The discussion contributed to a better understanding of the field of Central Asian and Caucasian Studies as well as to suggestions for improving the state of the field. Obstacles such as language requirements and primary source work, the influence of colonial histories, and the lack of a centralized forum for scholars of Central Eurasia were addressed. A call was raised for more training in social science skills for regional studies experts and visa versa, and the need to open a dialogue between academics and NGO representatives. The MENA and Eurasia programs plan to continue the "conversation" electronically through postings on the SSRC web site.

Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector
Comparative Transformations of Welfare States and Implications for the Nonprofit Sector
On October 11-12, the Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector held a research planning meeting on comparative transformations of welfare states and implications for the nonprofit sector. Co-hosted with the European Science Foundation, the meeting was held in Florence, Italy, and brought together a small group of leading scholars to explore possibilities for developing a research network that will advance the state of comparative nonprofit sector research, and focus new analytic and theoretical attention on processes of change within and across nonprofit sectors. Participants agreed on the need for a new, updated account of the welfare state, its current challenges, and its long-term trends that will be relevant to policy debates and useful to policy-makers across Europe and North America. There was also general consensus that each welfare state has been and will continue to be shaped by the pattern of its "third sector" and that far too little is known about these recent nonprofit sector transformations. The meeting made progress in generating a set of research questions relevant to proposed changes in policies that govern the legal status, operations, and funding of nonprofit, nongovernmental, "third sector" organizations across Europe and North America.

Third Annual Dissertation Workshop
The Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector held its third annual dissertation workshop in Montreal, Canada, on November 12-13, 2002. Co-hosted with the Aspen Institute and the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy, the workshop was organized around a series of presentations and discussions of dissertation projects, providing a useful opportunity for fellows to discuss their research with faculty and peers. Dissertation research of the fellows included nonprofit and private sector approaches to marine conservation and community involvement in coastal Tanzania, public and private collaboration in plant biotechnology, the role of emotion in motivating the production of collective goods, and the impact of nongovernmental organizations and state-civil society relations on national development. Following the workshop, fellows and faculty took part in the annual
ARNOVA conference, which brings together scholars and practitioners from around the world to present and discuss papers on nonprofit studies, voluntary action, and philanthropy.

**Sexuality Research Programs**

**7th Annual Fellows' Conference**

On Oct. 23-26, 2002, the Sexuality Research Fellowship Program held its 7th annual fellows'conference in San Francisco, California, co-hosted by the Institute on Sexuality, Inequality and Health and the Program in Human Sexuality Studies of San Francisco State University. In attendance were 19 post-doctorate and dissertation fellows, a number of former fellows from 1996-2001, research associates/advisers, invited guest participants and SSR C staff members. The conference included small and large group discussions, one-on-one "dance card" conversations, and guest presentations on such topics as research methodology, ethical, cultural, and political issues in sexuality research, and research dissemination and outreach. Highlight presentations provided by guest speakers included: Gayle Rubin (2000 SR FP postdoc fellow) on "perversity to diversity: sexology and social science 1880-1980"; David Valentine (1996 SR FP dissertation fellow) on the institutional concerns of conducting sexuality research; and Steven Russell (director of the 4-H Center for Youth Development and ADD Health Adolescent study researcher) on "adolescent sexual orientation, risk and resilience: evidence for ADD Health."

On Friday, October 25, attendees were treated to two interesting panel presentations of ongoing research initiatives of SFSU faculty working in the sexuality field, and focused specifically on such topics as sexual orientation and ethnicity, historical images of Asian sexuality in 1800s San Francisco, the politics of sexuality education; and sexuality and disability.

In the afternoon, conference attendees visited the new Cesar Chavez Center for Community Research in the Mission district. They then toured the new National Sexuality Resource Center (N SR C), followed by a wine and cheese reception. On Saturday, the conference concluded with a fascinating morning tour of the archive and library collection of the GLBT Historical Society, an afternoon panel discussion, and in the evening, a formal dinner hosted by the SSR C-SR FP. The 2002 SR FP Fellows Conference provided a wonderfully diverse forum for continuing scholarship in this area, and an important opportunity for networking, exchanging research ideas and interests, and professional linking across a wide range of disciplines in the field.

**Sexuality and Reproductive Health for Vietnam Fellows' Conference**

From September 28–October 1, 2002, the SSRC Sexuality and Reproductive Health Fellowship Program for Vietnam held the first Fellows'Conference for the program in Hanoi, Vietnam. Co-hosted by the Center for Continuing Education with Vietnam (CEEVN) and the National AIDS Standing Bureau of Vietnam (NASB), the conference was the culmination of the fellows' study abroad and the completion of their MPH degrees specializing in reproductive health and sexuality. The conference provided an opportunity for the SRH Fellows to discuss research issues regarding their work as well as their fellowship experience studying abroad. They provided brief presentations of their thesis research, current agency/institutional work in Vietnam, and their future research interests in the field. Thesis presentations included: health-seeking behaviors among women with reproductive tract infection in Chilinh, Vietnam; HIV risk among injecting drug users in Vietnam; and gender dynamics and birth control in rural Vietnam.

**South Asia Program**

South Asia Regional Fellowship Program

Thirteen awards were announced in the first round of the South Asia Regional Fellowship Program (2002-2003) on the theme of "Resources and Society." From a total applicant pool of 58 eligible scholars, the selection committee awarded fellowships to five from India, three from Pakistan, two each from Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and one from Nepal. While 11 junior fellows were chosen from a pool of 38 applicants, 2 scholars were awarded senior fellowships from the 20 who applied. The representation of aspirants and awardees from non-urban universities and rural institutes was significant.

Fellowships were awarded to several projects that propose to influence policymaking on key social issues in the region. For instance, in Pakistan, a study seeks to evaluate madrasas (religious schools) as a social resource, while another will
evaluate the linkages between inter-agency collaborations in enhancing primary healthcare services in the country. Investigations on environmental questions include a study on the impact of shrimp farming on coastal land allocations in Sri Lanka while another looks at the gendered pattern of work for women fisherfolk around the Chilka Lake in Orissa. Some fellows are using the fellowship to complete pending studies, like a book on the history of the conservation movement in India by a senior scholar. Explorations of new areas include a study that explores teledrama as a vital resource in the peace process in Sri Lanka, while another explores into the problems and prospects of religious NGOs in Bangladesh gaining trust and access to financial resources.

In January 2003, fellows attended a workshop and conference held in Kathmandu. This was the first event of its kind in the region—a combination of public lectures, a conference that exposed the fellows to new theoretical approaches and a workshop where fellows made presentations to an international group of scholars.

**Bangladesh Fellowship Program**

On December 16-18, 2002, the Bangladesh Fellowship Program celebrated its grand finale with a workshop held at the BRAC Centre in Rajendrapur, Bangladesh. Members of the selection committee were joined by recent fellows (1998-2002) and past fellows (1991-1995) for a series of dissertation presentations and roundtable discussions. The first day of the workshop was devoted to dissertation presentations by fellows who are currently in the writing and research stages. Each presentation was followed by a discussion on theory, methodology, and fieldwork. The discussions also fostered cross-disciplinary exchanges and encouraged suggestions by senior fellows and peers. The workshop included a discussion led by the selection committee members and past fellows on the progress and future needs for the advancement of Bangladesh studies. Most prominent among the issues raised were the need for institutional and research capacity building, and funding for social science and humanities research in Bangladesh universities.

**South Asia Regional Advisory Panel**

On December 19-21, 2002 the South Asia Regional Advisory Panel met in Dhaka, Bangladesh to examine and discuss ongoing and potential initiatives. One of the main highlights of the meeting was the introduction of four new RAP members: Sajeda Amin, Saba Khattak, Neloufer de Mel and Imtiaz Ahmed. Professor Partha Chatterjee gave an update on the launch and reception of the SSRC report on “Social Science Research Capacity in South Asia.” Future initiatives include sponsoring seminars throughout the region with our partner institutes and other research organizations to discuss the issues brought forth in the country and regional reports. The project on a handbook on social science terms in Sinhala and Tamil, led by Dr. Uyangoda, will have its first planning meeting in May 2003. The committee decided on themes and chairs for the next four years of the South Asia Regional Fellowship Program. The theme for the 2003 fellowship year will be “Migration” chaired by Willem van Schendel. Future initiatives considered include examining vernacular media in the region, organizing a South Asia social science conference, and collaborating with the Middle East and North Africa program on the “Inter-Asia Connections” project.

**Junior Researchers/Southeast Asia**

The Southeast Asia Program held a planning workshop to discuss an intended fieldwork/retooling project for junior researchers in Singapore on November 30 and December 1, 2002. The workshop brought together a select group of thirteen Southeast Asian scholars to generate intergenerational and interdisciplinary discussions on epistemological and methodological questions surrounding knowledge production on the region and their relation to a future generation of researchers, with the aims of better defining the intellectual vision and structure of the intended project. Planning for the project continues.

**Vietnam Program**

The Social Consequences of Economic Transition in Southern Vietnam

On October 7-8, 2002, the Vietnam Program (represented by Van Tran) and chair of the international team of advisors, Dr. Hy Van Luong, conducted a workshop with our local partner, the Institute of Social Sciences in Ho Chi Minh City (ISSHO) on our joint research, training, institution building and network creating project examining the social consequences of economic transition in southern Vietnam through longitudinal research into issues related to poverty, migration, and urbanization. An international conference is planned for the end of June 2003 to share the results of the project to a larger national and international community.

**Training Program with National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities (Hanoi)**

On September 24, 2002, the Vietnam Program participated in the closing ceremony awarding certificates to the first 40 participants in the joint SSRCS and National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities (Hanoi) interdisciplinary social science research training program. During the eight-month program, participants acquired new knowledge and skills in such areas as research problem formulation, research design, qualitative and quantitative data collection, data analysis, interpreting data, ethical concerns for researchers, and proposal writing. From mid-October to mid-December, ten of the graduates carried out fieldwork to collect data and write up their findings for the research projects they developed during the program, under the supervision of international and local professors.

Siglo XIX has recently released the fourth volume in its series on memories of repression. The series is a result of a project on Collective Memory carried out under the auspices of the SSRC Program on Latin America. Under the direction of Elizabeth Jelin and Carlos Iván Degregori, and with core funding from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the project supported research, training, and network building in the field of collective memory in the Southern Cone and Peru.

Los Archivos de la Represión addresses social struggles over accessibility, ownership, and preservation of both state and non-government institutional archives in post-authoritarian societies. It approaches conflicts over documentation of repression as a space within which broader social and political debates over collective and individual memories of violence take place in contemporary Latin America. In addressing these themes, the essays contained in this book raise provocative questions about truth, justice, silence, and memory in archival research.

Elizabeth Jelin is a sociologist and researcher at the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) and a research director at Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social (IDES) in Argentina. She is on the Board of Directors of the SSRC. Ludmila da Silva Catela is a researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades at the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC) and is a professor of anthropology in the graduate program at UNC.


The volume explores relationships between energy market restructuring and environmental protection, using a comparative perspective to identify good models from both industrialized and developing countries. The volume’s central question is whether environmental protection, a public good, can be "designed in" to more competitive energy markets. The major focus of the 11 essays is electric power, but comparisons are drawn to other energy industries that have undergone restructuring in order to promote greater competition and reduced government direction. The volume analyzes transformations in the roles of industry, consumers, and government as energy is increasingly traded and dealt with as a commodity. The authors, both Japanese and American, highlight new challenges for governance that stem from the need to protect the environment, to ensure security of supply, to deploy new technology options, and to expand options for consumer choice. Assessing impacts of restructuring on the environment, the book draws on practical and ongoing experiences in industrial and developing countries. It also identifies policy options at both the national and international levels for enhancing environmental protection as an objective of energy market reform.

Martha Harris is a former Abe Fellow and works at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

This special issue of Qualitative Sociology is based on a conference held at the UCLA LeRoy Neiman Center in spring 2001 and co-sponsored by the SSRC. It features the work of several scholars who are involved with the Council’s Program on the Arts, including David Halle, the issue editor. In his introduction, Halle suggests that a major feature of the conference was a questioning of the widespread, too-easy assumption—exemplified by Gramsci’s concept of “cultural hegemony” and the overall orientation of Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School—that culture is above all, a matter of power and domination. Rather, in his view, “the domain of culture is centrally involved with meaning, and meaning is very hard to control.” In “Studying the New Media,” Howard Becker makes the related argument that the preponderance of systematic studies undermines the image of ordinary people being duped by mass culture. And in “Digitization, the Internet, and the Arts” (written with Laura Robinson), Halle himself examines some of the quasi-anarchistic developments associated with eBay, Napster, SAG, and e-Books, and the only moderately successful efforts of the corporate power structure to reassert control. Finally, in “A Social Science of the Arts,” Lynn S. Liben (former Chair of the Arts Committee) and Lisa E. Szechter provide a valuable account of the organizational and substantive genesis of the SSRC’s Arts Program (along with an “Illustrative Investigation of Photography”).

David Halle is professor of sociology and director of the LeRoy Neiman Center for the Study of American Society and Culture at UCLA.


Why do some peace agreements successfully end civil wars while others fail? What strategies are most effective in ensuring that warring parties comply with their treaty commitments? Of the various tasks involved in implementing peace agreements, which are the most important? These and related questions are the subject of Ending Civil Wars.

Based on a study of every intrastate war settlement between 1980 and 1998 in which international actors played a key role, Ending Civil Wars is the most comprehensive, systematic study to date of the implementation of peace agreements—of what happens after the treaties are signed. Covering both broad strategies and specific tasks and presenting a wealth of rich case material, the authors of the 22 essays in this volume find that failure most often is related not only to the inherent difficulty of a particular case, but also to the major powers’ perception that they have no vital security interest in ending a civil war. To strengthen the policy relevance of the research, practitioners and policymakers participated in every stage of the project.

Stephen John Stedman is senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. Donald Rothchild is professor of political science at the University of California, Davis. Elizabeth M. Cousens is director of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum at the Social Science Research Council.
Publications

- Frank Baldwin’s review of The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea’s Tiananmen (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000) appeared in the most recent issue (vol.4, no.1) of The Review of Korean Studies. The issue focuses on alternative views and neglected aspects of “Korean” identities. Baldwin is a program director for the SSRC Abe Fellowship Program and its Tokyo representative.

- The latest issue (vol. 3, no. 1) of the journal Identity, Culture and Politics, published jointly by the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Colombo, and CODESRIA, Dakar, has an article by Itty Abraham entitled “War and Territory in South Asia.” Abraham is director of the SSRC South Asia Program and co-directs the Council’s Program on Global Security and Cooperation.

- Steven Heydemann has recently published two articles on democracy and democratization in the Middle East. In “Middle East Studies After 9/11: Defending the Discipline” (Journal of Democracy, July 2002), Heydemann responds to critiques of Middle East studies by reviewing a number of research programs that have been effective in accounting for political and economic trends in the region, including the reversal of political openings of the early 1990s. In “La question de la démocratie dans les travaux sur le monde arabe” (Critique Internationale, October 2002), Heydemann assesses shifts in the conceptualization of democracy within research on the Middle East. Heydemann is program director of the Council’s Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector.

- Leon Sigal, director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project based at SSRC, has published a number of articles recently on the subject of nuclear diplomacy with North Korea. These have appeared in the Boston Globe, the Los Angeles Times, the International Herald Tribune, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Arms Control Today. Sigal’s articles are posted on the SSRC website at ssrc.org/publications/.

- After 9/11: Solutions for a Saner World, edited by Don Hazen et al., and published recently by the Independent Media Institute, featured an article by John Tirman entitled, “Unintended Consequences,” which explored how US policy in the Persian Gulf over the last 50 years has been beset by a cascade of mistakes leading to a multiple crises. The volume includes essays by Edward Said, Richard Falk, and Arundhati Roy. Tirman is program director for the Program on Global Security & Cooperation.

- “Why Argentina Crashed, and is Still Crashing” is the title of an essay by Eric Hershberg in the NACLA Report on the Americas (vol.36, no.1). The essay argues that, while US and IMF demands played a large role in sparking the Argentine crisis, domestic politics also played a part, and until recently there was no shortage of support within Argentina for many misguided policies. Hershberg is program director of the Council’s Program on Latin America and the Caribbean.


- Craig Calhoun has written on “The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers: Toward a Critique of Actually Existing Cosmopolitanism,” in a recent issue of the South Atlantic Quarterly. The piece has been reprinted in Debating Cosmopolitics, edited by Daniele Archibugi (London: Verso, 2002), and in Oneiving Cosmopolitanism, edited by Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). Calhoun is president of the SSRC.

- The Social Sciences in Transition: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe was recently published by the SSRC as volume 7 in its Working Paper Series. It is written by Elzbieta Matynia, director of the Transregional Center for Democratic Studies at New School University. The volume captures the fluidity of the period since the breakdown of the Soviet Union and offers an account of the societal and academic transformations taking place in the region.
The South Asia Program is pleased to announce the creation of the South Asia Research Network for Social Sciences and Humanities (SARN). This is a new website dedicated to social science and humanities research in South Asia and can be accessed at sarn.ssrc.org. SARN is a research network linking scholars, researchers, teachers, students and practitioners whose primary area of interest is South Asia and South Asian Studies. SARN provides information on research centers, archives and libraries located throughout the region, and includes updated listings on fellowship and employment opportunities, journals, online publications, and workshops and conferences pertinent to South Asia. In addition, we will soon provide content pages for journals published in South Asia. For more information, please visit sarn.ssrc.org.

Not long after the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, the Council launched a website of commissioned essays dealing with the causes, consequences and interpretations of the tragic events. Response to the site was favorable—over a million essays were downloaded in 2002—reminding us that there is strong demand, even in these information-rich days, for careful, reliable and scholarly analysis of contemporary issues. With the launching of the SSRC website Contemporary Conflicts, we are extending coverage to other conflicts in the world besides those directly related to the events of September 11—reaffirming that these, too, merit serious scholarly attention. Coverage will continue on 9/11-related conflict as well, as it continues to embroil people around the world. While the range of topics will expand over time, we will initially carry a number of essays on the Gujarat riot and "communal" violence in India, on conflict in the Middle East and in the Andean Region, and on "Imagining Iraq." The site may be accessed by going to conconflicts.ssrc.org.

In late December, the Translocal Flows in the Americas Project launched its website, along with calls for papers for two upcoming conferences. The website is in Portuguese, Spanish and English and has online application capabilities and an electronic registry where interested users can sign-up to receive information. The website has been a key tool for informing the public of our activities, and has enabled us to streamline the processing of applications and expand our networks of scholars in the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean. The Translocal Flows Project is an initiative of the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean designed to promote research and to strengthen mechanisms for transnational intellectual dialogue about contemporary social processes and cultural practices in the Americas. The site may be accessed by going to translocal-flows.ssrc.org.
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