

FDLR: Past, Present, and Policies

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Executive Summary and Recommendations

The humanitarian situation in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) remains precarious. At the beginning of 2014, 2.7 million people were displaced in the country, the highest number in five years, of whom over 600,000 were newly displaced in 2013.¹ While the defeat of the M23 rebellion² in October 2013 opened new avenues for peace, over 50 different armed groups persist across this region. Arguably the most important of these is the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR). The Rwandan rebels number between 1,500-3,000 troops and regularly carry out rape, extortion and killings against civilians. Perhaps more importantly, they are a major reason for regional instability—they are the main justification for Rwandan interference in eastern Congo and, through their alliances, exacerbate the threat of several Congolese militias.

The Congolese government and the United Nations have announced that the FDLR will be among the next targets for military operations. This paper provides a background on the FDLR and an analysis of past military offensives against the group. The most urgent lesson to draw from this history is to avoid unnecessary military escalation. Offensives in 2009-2012 against the rebels displaced hundreds of thousands, killed thousands, and led to the proliferation of self-defence groups. There is mounting political pressure to attack the FDLR since the defeat of the M23; while targeted operations against its leadership will likely be necessary, peaceful avenues should also be pursued. This includes third countries of exile for FDLR officers not accused of war crimes; sanctions for military officers, businessmen, and officials who collude with the rebels; and renewed efforts to increase defections.

Dismantling the FDLR is one of the most urgent challenges the region faces. The disappearance of the group could dramatically decrease violence against civilians, diminish the threat of Congolese militias with whom the FDLR collaborate, and open space for greater political dialogue in Rwanda.

History of the FDLR

The FDLR was established by former officers and political leaders from the government of the late President Juvénal Habyarimana in the wake of the 1994 genocide. The bulk of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) and the various affiliated militias fled across the border into Zaïre, as the Congo was then called, along with up to a million refugees.³ In Zaïre, the defeated army reassembled and rearmed itself by manipulating humanitarian aid⁴ and

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with the support of the late Zaïrian President Mobutu Sese Seko.⁵ The government in exile rebranded itself in 1995 as a political body advocating for the return of Rwandan refugees – *Rassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et de la Démocratie au Rwanda* (RDR).

The implantation of the former Rwandan state on Zaïrian soil aggravated existing tensions related to citizenship, land tenure and power. These conflicts gave rise to two regional wars.⁶ The First Congo War began in 1996 with a rebellion backed by the new Rwandan government and other countries in the region, leading to the destruction of the refugee camps, the repatriation of about 700,000 Rwandan refugees, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila's ascension to power over the rechristened Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁷ Most RDR leaders fled to other African countries or Europe, while the remaining Rwandan rebels in the Kivus region assumed the name *Peuple en Armes pour la Libération du Rwanda* (PALiR), with its military wing, the *Armée de Libération du Rwanda* (ALiR).⁸

The Second Congo War (1998-2003) erupted when Kabila fell out with his Rwandan and Ugandan allies, who responded by backing several new rebellions.⁹ Kabila's entreaties to the Rwandan rebels formed one of the reasons for the escalation that led to the war.¹⁰ ALiR formed a new wing, ALiR II, based in the western Congo and incorporated into Kabila's army, while ALiR I fought an insurgency in the Kivus.¹¹ These branches merged in 1999 to create the *Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda* (FDLR), which was officially established in Lubumbashi in 2000 and renamed its armed wing *Forces Combattantes Abacungunzi* (FOCA) in 2003.¹² Among the reasons for this name change was the increasingly bad reputation of the group—in 1999 it massacred foreign tourists in the Bwindi national park in Uganda, which led the United States to place the group on a terrorist watch list.

Following Laurent-Désiré Kabila's assassination in 2001, his son Joseph assumed the presidency and struck a more ambiguous stance toward the FDLR/FOCA that oscillated between continued support and hostility. Under diplomatic pressure, he forcefully disarmed a group in Kamina military camp in 2002, an incident that is still perceived by the FDLR as the first of many betrayals by Kabila.¹³ In 2002, the Congolese government outlawed the organization.¹⁴ In exchange for the withdrawal of Rwandan government troops, Kinshasa committed itself to dismantling the FDLR through the Pretoria Agreement signed in July 2002. The dismantling of the group was increasingly seen as a lynchpin to peace in the region—the United States government included Rwanda in the *Rewards for Justice Programme* to capture International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) indictees, which may have helped bring about the arrest of RDR founding member General Bizimungu and FDLR founding member Colonel Renzaho, and in 2001 the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the Congo launched its demobilization programme focused on the FDLR.¹⁵

The FDLR's ability to threaten Rwanda decreased dramatically during this period. Shortly after the genocide, the FDLR (then RDR had probably around 20,000-50,000 combatants), launched raids into western Rwanda that culminated into a full-scale incursion in 1997.¹⁶ The Rwandan government defeated this insurgency by the end of 1998. Since then, the FDLR has not been able to establish a continuous presence on Rwandan territory. The group's last major invasion in 2001, dubbed *Oracle du Seigneur*, may have cost it up to 4,000 men, half of whom were allegedly killed.¹⁷ Likewise, the 2004 operation *La Fronde*, for which the FDLR was able to muster fewer than 100 troops, became an

embarrassing defeat. Operation *Amizero*, planned for 2006, was stillborn, overly ambitious¹⁸ plan, which the Rwandan government uncovered before it was launched.¹⁹

Meanwhile, conflicts within the leadership of the FDLR²⁰ led to several splits. The first occurred in October 2003 due to a schism in the leadership that arose when ALiR I and ALiR II merged following the eviction of the rebels from western Congo by Joseph Kabila. The previous leader, Paul Rwarakabiye, fell out with the head of the western faction, Sylvestre Mudacumura, and accepted an offer from the Rwandan government to return. Shortly thereafter, the political wing—which at the time was largely based in Europe—split as the Vice President Jean-Marie Vianney Higiyo and Treasurer Félicien Kanyamibwa defected to found the *Ralliement pour l'Unité et la Démocratie–Urunana* (RUD-Urunana).²¹ The organisation's military wing followed suit as officers split off from FOCA to create the *Armée Nationale-Imboneza* (AN-Imboneza), the RUD's armed wing. Since the split, the FDLR has tried to reintegrate RUD without success, and several confrontations between the groups were reported in 2008.²²

Two years after RUD's split from the FDLR, commander Sangano Musohoke (alias Soki) defected with a small number of troops, founding the FDLR-Soki based in northern Rutshuru territory of North Kivu.²³ He was killed by the M23 in July 2013 and replaced by Colonel Kasongo Kalamo.²⁴ While this group no longer collaborates with the FDLR, the two have a non-aggression pact.²⁵ The last faction to split from the FDLR was that of Lieutenant-Colonel Gaston Mugasa (alias Mandevu), in 2010.²⁶ Mandevu integrated his 185 combatants into the M23 in 2012 and came to control a small area north of Goma between Nyiragongo and Nyamuligira volcanoes.²⁷ Following the split within the M23 between Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga in April 2013, Colonel Mandevu disappeared. Conflicting sources claim he either surrendered to the FARDC or fled to the Bayinyo Forests on the border of Rwanda, Uganda and DRC.²⁸

The years between 2003 and 2009 were marked by continuous unrest in the Kivus, which played to the FDLR's advantage. In particular, the group's fate was determined by relations between Congo and Rwanda. With the emergence of Laurent Nkunda's *Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple* (CNDP) in 2006, Rwanda's support of a rebellion in the Kivus fostered an alliance of convenience between the government in Kinshasa and the FDLR. This gave the Rwandan rebels an infusion of weapons and heightened their morale. During this period, the FDLR was also a crucial enabler of Congolese armed groups. It had collaborated with various local Mai-Mai militias since the 1998 Rwandan-backed *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD) rebellion; this collaboration continued during the CNDP rebellion. In addition, the FDLR collaborated with some Congolese armed groups involved in various illicit rackets.

The tables were turned, however, in 2009, when the Rwandan and Congolese governments came to an agreement that brought about the arrest of Laurent Nkunda, the integration of the CNDP into the Congolese army, and deployment of Rwandan troops into the Congo in operations against the FDLR. These operations, dubbed *Umoja Wetu* (Our Unity), *Kimia II* (Peace II) and *Amani Leo* (Peace Today), as well as subsequent offensives against the FDLR, brought about the defection of 3,903²⁹ FDLR troops between January 2009 and April 2012, roughly 60 percent of their estimated total strength.³⁰ To add to the rebels' battering, the brutality of this counterinsurgency and the reprisal attacks against civilians by the FDLR led to the creation of the Raia Mutomboki, a local self-defence militia

that ferociously attacked the FDLR and their dependants in both Kivu provinces. The brutality of these operations and their disastrous humanitarian consequences form the stark backdrop to the upcoming operations; this history will be addressed in more detail below.

Pressure on the FDLR was eased somewhat by the end of the Rwanda-Congo entente that began with the M23 rebellion in April 2012. The Congolese army's focus shifted from the FDLR to the M23, and numerous reports surfaced of renewed collaboration between Congolese troops and the Rwandan rebels.

Current Status of the FDLR

There are contrasting estimates of the FDLR's current strength. The UN Group of Experts estimates the group to include around 1,000 combatants in North Kivu and 500 in South Kivu, while the Government of Rwanda cites a total between 4,000-4,200 combatants.³¹ The Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), on the other hand, believes FDLR/FOCA to be 3,000 strong.³² The Enough Project offers a range of 1,500 to 5,000 combatants,³³ while some FDLR/FOCA defectors and UN officials have placed the figure between 700 and 800.³⁴ RUD-Urunana/AN-Imboneza figures are equally diverse, with United Nations and Rwandan officials citing around 300 combatants,³⁵ while the RDRC put their strength at 1,500³⁶ and the Enough Project offers a range of 400-600³⁷. According to sources within the organisation, FDLR-Soki numbers 180-200 combatants,³⁸ while data offered by the Enough Project cites 60-100 troops.³⁹ Field work commissioned by the Affinity Group leads us to be sympathetic with the lower estimates for these groups.

The FDLR/FOCA is still led by General Sylvestre Mudacumura, who has been at the helm of the rebellion since October 2003. The troops are divided into two sectors corresponding to North and South Kivu, which are further divided into sub-sectors and antennas.⁴⁰ Led by Colonel Pacifique Ntawunguka (alias Omega), the Apollo Sector in North Kivu is deployed in Walikale, Lubero and Rutshuru territories, with headquarters in Nganga, Walikale.⁴¹ The Jakarta Sector in South Kivu under Colonel Mugabonake Boniface (alias Hagenimana Josué), has headquarters in Katasomwa, Mwenga territory.⁴² These positions have changed substantially since early 2012, when the twin pressures of Congolese army offensives and Raia Mutomboki attacks prompted the group to move its headquarters from around Kibua, in southwestern Masisi territory—where it had been for over a decade—around forty kilometers northwards to Nganga. Similarly, the group evacuated most of its positions in South Kivu and regrouped its soldiers in the inaccessible Itombwe forest, straddling Mwenga and Uvira territories.⁴³

The FDLR maintains a relatively differentiated structure. The group has special battalions for the protection of its North and South Kivu headquarters, and deploys smaller CRAP (*Commandos de Recherche et d'Action en Profondeur*) companies and platoons, which engages in reconnaissance, assassination of high profile targets, propaganda, and recruitment.⁴⁴ PIPs (*Postes d'Intervention Populaire*) are used to protect FDLR dependants and organise regular mandatory paramilitary training. There is a military training school in North Kivu and a similar camp in South Kivu, which was set up in 2013 due to the difficulty of moving between the two provinces.⁴⁵

Despite its dwindling size, the FDLR is still a serious threat to the local population and regional stability. The group committed at least 282 murders of civilians in 2012,

including some women and children.⁴⁶ Countless other people were injured at the hands of the combatants, and many lost their homes as their villages were burnt to the ground.⁴⁷ In certain locations, the group has assumed the roles of police and taxation authority, arresting and abusing those who fail to comply with its demands.⁴⁸ While the group is not able to seriously threaten the Rwandan government, it is still able to carry out raids into western Rwanda, where most of the country's economic resources are located. Between late 2012 and mid-2013, the FDLR managed to carry out three serious attacks on Rwandan soil.⁴⁹ Ironically, the attacks were only possible due to M23 operations, which left parts of the border exposed.⁵⁰

With respect to Rwanda, the FDLR should be seen in the context of its domestic politics. While it is not a strategic threat, it is seen as the embodiment of the legacy of the genocide in Rwandan press and official government discourse. Given the importance of the genocide in Rwandan memory and society, the FDLR is seen as much more than just a military challenge by many Rwandans. In addition, the strict limits on political freedom in Rwanda, and the silencing of opponents and critics, have led the FDLR to be seen as legitimate by some opponents of the government. The most prominent example of this is the recent alliance announced by former Rwandan Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu and the FDLR.

The FDLR derives much of its funding from the taxation of mines, trade routes, and markets. Given the shift in the economy of the Kivus in recent years, a large source of income comes from gold mines—including areas around Kasugho, Mangurudjipa, and Mukungwe, although it also derives substantial profits from illegal timber, charcoal, and cannabis rackets. Nonetheless, its supply of weapons and ammunitions is limited, as it depends on the piecemeal purchases from corrupt FARDC officers and raids against their enemies.⁵¹ Communications equipment is also grossly insufficient.⁵²

The relationship between the FDLR and the Congolese army has oscillated between deep collaboration and overt hostility. Whenever the Congolese government has felt under attack by forces allied to Rwanda, it has reached out to the FDLR for help. This historical, cooperation between the Congolese national army and the FDLR was partially reignited in 2012 as the M23 rebellion escalated. The groups regularly met and exchanged operational information; the FARDC supplied the FDLR with ammunition and instructions to employ against M23 combatants.⁵³ Between August and October, local FARDC commanders coordinated ambushes and attacks against M23 with FDLR.⁵⁴ This collaboration diminished by November, when the FARDC defeated M23 and resumed attacks against FDLR at several locations in South Kivu.⁵⁵

Likewise, the FDLR can no longer rely on its membership abroad. By 2004, diaspora opponents of the Rwandan government had already begun withdrawing their support from the movement due to mismanagement of funds, failure to implement the 2005 Rome Communiqué (an agreement for the group's disarmament, conditional on an inter-Rwandan dialogue and thus never implemented),⁵⁶ as well as mounting media coverage of crimes committed by the group in eastern DRC.⁵⁷ This leadership in exile crumbled with the arrests of President Ignace Murwanashyaka and Vice-President Straton Musoni in Germany in 2009; Executive Secretary Callixte Mbarushimana in France in 2010 (released by the ICC a year later due to insufficient evidence against him)⁵⁸; and diaspora network leaders Bernard Twagiramungu, Felicien Barabwiriza and Jean Bosco Uwihanganye in

Germany in 2013.⁵⁹ After the arrest of Murwanashyaka and Musoni, the top political leadership of the FDLR was taken over by the military in the eastern Congo. In recent months, however, the organization has been bolstered by a series of alliances with the opposition parties PS-Imberakuri and the Rwandan Dream Initiative of former Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu.

Due to a myriad of arrests, assassinations, defections and dwindling access to supplies, FLDR/FOCA were in a state of crisis by early 2012. While the M23 rebellion offered a brief respite, attacks by the Raïa Mutomboki since the second half of 2011 and, beginning in 2014, by the Congolese army and MONUSCO—the UN peacekeeping mission—have made life increasingly difficult for the rebellion. The following is an account of assassinations, defections, and disappearance of high-ranking FDLR members in recent years:⁶⁰

NAME	RANK	OCCURRENCE/ LOCATION	DATE
Major Jean de Dieu Habimana (alias Aborogaste Carlos)	Assistant to Operations Officer of South Kivu Sector	Assassinated on General Mudacumura's Orders	Late 2009
Lieutenant Colonel Jean Marie Vianney Ntahombukiye (alias Milano Igiraneza)	Chief of Planning of South Kivu Sector	Assassinated by FARDC Soldiers/near Kashele, Mwenga	10 April 2010
Lieutenant Colonel Elie Mutarambirwa (alias Safari)	Former Someka Battalion Commander	Defected	2010
Lieutenant Colonel Evariste Kanzeguhera (alias Sadiki Soleil)	FDLR Montana Battalion Commander	Assassinated by <i>Nduma Defence of Congo</i> (NDC), with RDF support/in Misao, Walikale	20 Nov 2011
Capt. Nduwamungu Jean Marie	Concorde Battalion	Defected	26 Nov 2011
Lt. Nassoro	FDLR MONUSCO liaison	Assassinated by <i>Forces pour la Défense du Congo</i> (FDC)/near Kimua, Walikale	27 Nov 2011
Lt. Gabi	Reserve Brigade	Assassinated by <i>Forces pour la Défense du Congo</i> (FDC)/near Kimua, Walikale	27 Nov 2011
Capt. Joseph Tuziyaremye (alias Gedeon)	FOCA HQ 00	Defected	Nov 2011
Capt. Theonest Ndayambaje (alias Jagwar)	Bahamas Battalion	Defected	Nov 2011
Lieutenant Colonel Faruha Honor Sindyamahuri	Commander of Someka Battalion	Assassinated by his bodyguards/Rutshuru	6 Dec 2011
Chief of Staff Brigadier General Leodomir Mugaragu + 5 Senior Officers		Assassinated by <i>Forces pour la Défense du Congo</i> (FDC)/near Kimua, Walikale	Late Dec 2011

Capt. Akizimana Benjamin	Sosuki Fourth Battalion	Defected	Jan 2012
Major Kizingkiko Ildephonse (alias Nkiko)	Company commander of the protection force for the FDLR Reserve Brigade at Shario	Defected	Jan 2012
Lt. Nayahoyo Enock (alias Kayira)	Deputy of the military prosecutor for the Second Battalion at Nyabaleke	Defected	Jan 2012
Maj. Asante Joseph Emmanuel	Commander of the FDLR Reserve Brigade at Mashaki	Defected	Jan 2012
Lt. Hakizimana Cyprien	Zodiak Battalion	Defected	Jan 2012
Captain Samson Businge	Liaison Antenna Officer	Assassinated by his bodyguards/Uvira	Jan 2012
Brigadier Gen. Leodomir Mugaragu	FOCA Chief of Staff	Assassinated by <i>Forces pour la Défense du Congo</i> (FDC), with RDF support	11 Jan 2012
Capt. Gahamanyi	Second Battalion in South Kivu	Defected	Feb 2012
Major Thomas Yoyo	Liaison Antenna Officer	Assassinated by his bodyguards/Rutshuru	Feb 2012
Capt. Businge Samson	Director FDLR Antenna	Killed in South Kivu	22 Feb 2012
Captain Theophile	S3 of Military Police Battalion	Assassinated	Late Feb 2012
Capt. Gahamanyi	the Second Battalion in South Kivu	Defected	Feb 2012
Capt. Gahamanyi Félicien	Sosuki Battalion	Defected	March 2012
Major Ryangarirora Emmanuel	Reserve Brigade	Defected	March 2012
Lieutenant Aloys Bizimana (alias Idrissa Bashaka)	2nd Battalion Commander in South Kivu	Defected/near Bunyakiri	10 March 2012
Lieutenant Colonel Etienne Mbarushimana	Only Senior Officer to return to Rwanda Since M23 Rebellion Outbreak	Defected	24 May 2012
Lieutenant Colonel Tharcisse Uwimana (alias Sharaf)		Defected to Zambia	June 2012
General Stanislas Nzeyimana, (alias Izabayo Bigaruka)		Disappeared in Tanzania	Feb 2013
Ferdinand Nsengiyumva, (alias Bemba Bahizi)	In Charge of South Kivu Operations	Arrested by FARDC	Sep 2013
Colonel Hamada Habimana	South Kivu Sector Commander	Defected to join family in Kenya	Nov 2013
Mazuru	FDLR Liaison Officer in Ruzizi Plains	Assassinated by <i>Forces nationales de libération</i> (FNL)	

In 2013, former combatants told the UN Group of Experts that living conditions were abysmal, morale amongst the rank and file was extremely low, and resentment was high against commanders who owned fields while foot-soldiers themselves were instructed to loot to survive.⁶¹ The movement is thus rife with internal divisions, and the hierarchy is no longer capable of coordinating or controlling the organisation's operations.⁶² Even though hardliners like Mudacumura want to continue the armed struggle against Rwanda, younger moderates would prefer to give up the fight.⁶³ At the end of December 2013, the FDLR released a declaration communicating their readiness to disarm and demobilise as well as their refusal to engage in military operations against the FARDC or the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB).⁶⁴ Signed by General Major Victor Byiringiro, the document echoed previous statements and insisted upon an inter-Rwandan dialogue. Interviews with FDLR/FOCA combatants, however, revealed that the group's leadership is aware of the reality that Rwanda will never accept negotiations with any manifestation of the former government.⁶⁵

The FDLR have complex relations with civilians in the areas they control, both the Rwandan refugees and the Congolese population. According to the UNHCR, there are still 141,190 Rwandan refugees in the DRC, only 6,220 of whom are assisted by the organisation.⁶⁶ There are no camps for these refugees, and many live under the influence of the FDLR.⁶⁷ Membership in the FDLR is obligatory for refugees, and young men automatically become soldiers at the age of 13 years.⁶⁸ The group retains stringent control over these refugees, requiring travel permits, punishing efforts to repatriate, and doing their best to prevent outside communication, from radio use to telephones.⁶⁹ In exchange, the FDLR promise the refugees protection against their enemies. Furthermore, the necessities of 20 years of survival have embedded the FDLR in the socio-economic fabric of eastern Congo. The FDLR has put down deep roots in local communities, especially in the areas with large Congolese Hutu populations, such as Masisi and Rutshuru. The FDLR/FOCA collaborate with the Congolese armed groups Nyatura and *Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain* (APCLS), as well as the Burundian *Forces Nationales de Liberation* (FNL). They barter supplies with these groups, assist in military operations, and provide training to each other.⁷⁰

The FDLR's main efforts have become economic, with many analysts describing the group as a criminal, mafia-like network. Small units are detached by commanders to raise funds, either through taxation or by engaging in petty trade themselves – this is often referred to as “*logistique non-conventionnelle*” by the group. The FDLR are involved in almost every part of the rural economy, setting up roadblocks along supply routes, and focusing particular efforts on taxing and extorting miners and traders.⁷¹ For example, in 2012, FDLR collected taxes from miners working in Mukungwe and Rukatu mines, in Mwenga territory, collecting roughly 2,000 USD per month.⁷² The group also profits from gold mining in Lubero and Walikale territories,⁷³ collaborating with Mai-Mai leaders like Sikuli Lafontaine and Hilaire Kombi in these enterprises.⁷⁴ The group is involved in the production and taxation of cannabis, the logging of timber, poaching, and the illegal production of charcoal in Virunga National Park.⁷⁵

These economic activities have embedded the group further into the fabric of society. In relatively stable rural areas, FDLR have raised domestic animals like cattle, goats, pigs and chickens, and cultivated food crops on a large scale – from potatoes and manioc to beans and vegetables. Local Congolese communities benefit from this production, which has

resulted in reduced food prices in some areas.⁷⁶ FDLR dependents also work for locals, providing cheap labor.⁷⁷ Given their relative affluence in rural areas, and their access to means of violence, the FDLR have become money lenders, often lending large sums to local traders. This is one of the reasons for attacks against civilians when the FDLR are chased out of certain areas by the Congolese army, and some local militiamen have cited these debts as reasons for joining Raïa Mutomboki.⁷⁸ FDLR have also invested in urban areas where they put up capital for stores, pharmacies and restaurants.⁷⁹ Such activities are only possible through collaboration with local authorities and business owners;⁸⁰ in Uvira, between August and September 2013, for example, FDLR representatives met with local leaders and militia leaders to negotiate the economic activities in which the FDLR could engage.⁸¹ While FDLR's economic activities and local alliances cannot be generalized – they are much more developed in North Kivu than in South Kivu – combatants within the movement have often intermarried into Congolese society.⁸² These unions have bound families and communities, and produced children who no longer speak Kinyarwanda.⁸³ These networks – social, economic and military – have been forged over the last two decades, rooting the FDLR in Congolese society, and making it ever more difficult to weed out its members regardless of how fractured and feeble the movement itself has become.

For their part, RUD-Urunana/AN-Imboneza combatants are deployed in northern Rutshuru and south-eastern Lubero territories, with an additional battalion in Mukwamimbi, Walikale Territory.⁸⁴ General Jean-Damascène Ndirabaje (alias Musare) is the overall military commander.⁸⁵ FDLR-Soki occupies a very small area in Virunga National Park, west of Buramba, in Rutshuru territory.⁸⁶ Both groups have very limited operational abilities. The FDLR-Soki have become a threat for Virunga National Park guards, and the RUD often collaborate with local Mai-Mai militia, but neither group has much influence outside of their narrow areas of deployment.

Past Military Operations against the FDLR

Since the defeat of the M23, both the UN peacekeeping mission and the Congolese army have stated they would soon launch operations against the FDLR. For many diplomats, the crux of a regional strategy includes ending Rwandan support to Congolese groups while simultaneously addressing Kigali's security concerns. Any new effort, however, must take into consideration both the successes of past operations, as well as the disastrous impact they have had on civilians. During the last major offensive against the FDLR in 2009, for every FDLR combatant demobilized, at least one civilian was deliberately killed, seven women raped, eight homes destroyed, and over 900 people forced to flee.⁸⁷

Since the FARDC launched its first campaign against the FDLR in 2004, each successive campaign has been militarily more effective. At the same time, however, the FDLR has learned to adapt by retreating into nearly impenetrable terrain while launching horrific reprisal attacks against the civilian population. The 2004 operations were marred by allegations of collaboration between FARDC and FDLR; instead of attacking, some units engaged in joint tax collection with the FDLR at roadblocks.⁸⁸ When the FARDC did engage the group militarily over the following two years, the FDLR responded with reprisals against Congolese civilians.⁸⁹ On 9 July 2005, Rwandan rebels attacked the remote village of Mamba, killing 50 villagers, many of them burnt alive in their homes. According to one eyewitness, they jeered, "Where are your blue helmets now?" as they attacked.⁹⁰ Similarly, when mixed FARDC-CNDP brigades – the result of a temporary peace process – launched

an offensive in 2007, FDLR troops retaliated against local communities and “melted into the forests,”⁹¹ while Nkunda’s soldiers kidnapped and killed civilians accused of collaborating with the FDLR (predominantly Rwandophones of Hutu ethnicity).⁹²

The most renowned operations against the group were *Umoja Wetu*, *Kimia II* and *Amani Leo*, conducted January-February 2009, March-December 2009, and January 2010-2012, respectively.⁹³ *Umoja Wetu* was undertaken by a coalition of Rwandan and Congolese forces in southern North Kivu.⁹⁴ The FDLR responded by recruiting multi-ethnic forces from various other armed groups⁹⁵ into its battalions and scattering into small bands of six to eight combatants.⁹⁶ These tactics, as well as the alliances that made them possible, have continued. At the same time, FDLR and RUD troops engaged in reprisal attacks. On 17 April 2009, they burned 255 homes in Luofu and killed seven inhabitants.⁹⁷ FDLR and RUD forces were allegedly instructed to engage in brutal retribution against civilians.⁹⁸ Preceding the attacks, the groups sent letters to targeted populations in an attempt to force their cooperation and coerce the international community to stop the operations for humanitarian reasons.⁹⁹

Kimia II, undertaken by Congolese forces and supported by MONUC, as the peacekeeping mission was called between 1999 and 2010, was militarily even more successful. The FDLR were dislodged from their military and political headquarters in Masisi, strongholds in Lubero, as well as trading, taxation and mining areas.¹⁰⁰ The leadership of both RUD and FDLR were forced into sparsely populated, remote areas of Masisi, Walikale and Lubero.¹⁰¹ These operations, together with MONUC media campaigns in these areas, provoked the defection of nearly 1,500 combatants, 2,000 dependents and 13,000 refugees in 2009.¹⁰² At the same time, the situation enabled five key officers and forty soldiers to covertly organise their defection from RUD, resulting in almost complete dismantling of the group.¹⁰³

The humanitarian costs of these victories, however, were devastating. Reprisal attacks became ever more brutal, particularly in instances where the FDLR lost crucial business partners and protection rackets.¹⁰⁴ FARDC elements also committed massacres and gross human rights violations against civilian populations, especially Congolese Hutu and Rwandan refugee communities, leading MONUC¹⁰⁵ to suspend logistical support to one of the army units. One and a quarter million people were displaced in the Kivus at the end of 2009.¹⁰⁶ As a result, various human rights organisations and even UN agencies called for an immediate suspension of military operations and withdrawal of the new mission MONUSCO’s support for the FARDC.¹⁰⁷ MONUSCO has tried to address these challenges, developing a conditionality policy that prevents support to abusive FARDC commanders, and developing a UN-wide strategy concerning the protection of civilians.¹⁰⁸ Nonetheless, it has remained challenging to isolate the actions of individual commanders from their hierarchies, and deep tensions emerged between the FARDC and MONUSCO as a result of this conditionality.

Lessons garnered through the experience of *Kimia II* were applied to *Amani Leo*, during which military operations focused on clearing strategic areas where FDLR troops attempted to regroup, holding areas from which they had been dislodged, and assisting Congolese authorities in establishing state presence in these locations.¹⁰⁹ However, a campaign of terror and vicious reprisals continued.¹¹⁰

Despite these deep flaws, this series of operations decimated the rebels. The size of

the FDLR decreased from over 6,500 to about 1,800, while that of RUD went from 400 to fewer than 100.¹¹¹ Throughout these operations, demobilization rates increased three-fold and 5,000 members were repatriated.¹¹² Furthermore, the operations prevented large-scale recruitment, the group's internal cohesion fractured, and morale faltered.¹¹³

While operations against the FDLR ground to a halt in mid-2011, several other developments kept the pressure on the group. The Raïa Mutomboki, a network of local defense groups mobilised specifically to counter the security threat posed by the FDLR, began military operations against the group.¹¹⁴ Emerging in the remote jungles of Shabunda and Walikale but later also in Walungu, Kalehe, and Masisi, the Raïa Mutomboki deliberately targeted the families and dependents of FDLR combatants.¹¹⁵ At the same time, Rwandan authorities organized assassinations of senior FDLR leaders, using two companies of Special Forces that Kinshasa had allowed to be based clandestinely in Rutshuru territory.¹¹⁶ This surge in assassinations and attacks led to a haemorrhaging of top officers. Following FDLR Chief of Staff General Mugaragu's assassination in January 2012, for example, approximately 200 combatants defected, along with their dependents and other refugees.¹¹⁷ Over the following two months, five captains, two majors, two lieutenants and a lieutenant colonel also defected.¹¹⁸

Since operations against M23 were concluded, the FIB/FARDC are now planning operations against the FDLR. The initial offensive began at the end of November 2013, on the Kelmbe-Kitchanga axis, and was met without much resistance.¹¹⁹

Possible Policies to address the FDLR

There is no silver bullet for dealing with the FDLR. The organization has deep roots in local society, and has a hard core of determined and experienced officers. Nonetheless, the group has been badly battered by defections and assassinations and now stands on the verge of collapse.

Engaging the FDLR

The group's brutal history shows us that military operations will come at a huge human cost. Peaceful options should therefore be considered. We understand the widespread demand by Congolese elites that the Rwandan government be asked to open negotiations with Hutu representatives. After all, the Congolese have been placed under relentless pressure to negotiate with repeated rebellions of among others, Rwanda-linked rebellions such as the M23. Nonetheless, demanding that the Rwanda Government open negotiations with the FDLR could provide legitimacy to the group, allow them to play for time, and would be unlikely to produce results. Instead, a third party should assess the potential benefits of technical talks with the FDLR to promote refugee return, third-party resettlement, and the repatriation of senior commanders.

Third Country Resettlement

While the Nairobi Communiqué of 2007 proposed the resettling of FDLR troops and their families in the Congo,¹²⁰ this option has never been executed – there is too much distrust on the part of the FDLR, and local Congolese leaders are not willing to host the rebels. However, FDLR officers have suggested that the option to leave the Congo to become a

civilian in a third country would appeal to many and could increase defections dramatically. “Currently, we have the option of fighting and returning to what many think would be certain arrest in Rwanda,” one officer said.¹²¹ Third country resettlement should be considered, and the United Nations and African Union officials should broach the matter with other governments. In order to be eligible, the FDLR officers would have to be vetted for serious crimes committed in Rwanda or the Congo, and their resettlement would not preclude prosecutions against them in the future. This option would be tantamount to encouraging defections, and MONUSCO or another third party would have to enhance outreach efforts toward FDLR officers.

Enhancing Demobilisation Efforts

The United Nations DDRRR program should be maintained and reinforced. Outreach and sensitisation campaigns could be strengthened through collaboration with grassroots organisations and local churches.¹²² Many FDLR members and their dependents lack accurate information about Rwanda. Combatants are told by their commanders that interviews of demobilised colleagues, now serving in senior positions in the RDF, and reports offered through MONUSCO sensitisation campaigns are inaccurate, and that all repatriates are imprisoned or killed.¹²³ A continuous effort is needed to counteract this propaganda, and would be more successful if accurate information concerning demobilization and return was provided through a variety of sources. In preparation and throughout military operations, demobilization antennas should be placed in key locations and supplied with sufficient amounts of water, food, and security. Lack of these supplies led 93 former combatants to leave a DDRRR location in late 2013, which undermined the process.¹²⁴ Likewise, deserters must be assured protection and assistance in their efforts to access demobilization points.

Credible guarantees would have to be secured from the Rwandan government to ensure that demobilised combatants are not redeployed to the DRC against their will, or reintegrated into another militia.¹²⁵ For example, throughout 2013 FDLR ex-combatants were forcefully recruited into the M23 from Mutobo Demobilisation Centre in Rwanda.¹²⁶ Continued funding to the Rwandan demobilization program should be made contingent on better oversight and follow-up of ex-combatants stationed there.

A core of people who will not return to Rwanda is bound to exist – not because they committed genocide and should face justice, but because they have effectively become locally rooted. Some were Rwandan children who grew up in the DRC, while others were born there.¹²⁷ Some Rwandan combatants married Congolese women and have children who do not speak Kinyarwanda. For this small group, alternative solutions could be envisaged which would allow them to demobilise and legally resettle in the DRC on a case-by-case basis. This group would be made of up rank-and-file soldiers and junior officers; senior officers could be resettled in a third country or return to Rwanda.

Justice for FDLR Crimes

The vast majority of the FDLR is not implicated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, with some estimates citing that only 10 per cent of the top-most leadership would be guilty of genocide.¹²⁸ However, this does not mean that many of these troops would not be guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the DRC, for which they would also have to be prosecuted. Currently, however, there are no credible extant justice mechanisms

in eastern DRC, and local courts are understaffed and lack resources.¹²⁹ This makes it all the more important that specialized chambers be set up within the Congolese justice system to deal with crimes committed by the FDLR, as well as by any other armed group. Legislation to this extent is currently being considered in parliament.

Tackling FDLR's Socio-Economic Ties

The FDLR survives thanks to its roots in Congolese socioeconomic networks. Severing these bonds would alienate the group and curtail its access to resources. This concerns first and foremost relationships between FARDC elements and the FDLR. These ties undermine the army's neutrality, reinforce its abusive behaviour, and diminish the efficacy of its military operations.¹³⁰ To sever these ties, the Congolese government will have to impose effective sanctions on members of the FDLR's support networks, FARDC officers as well as business and political elites. Army officers or units found to be associated with the FDLR would have to be prosecuted and punished, or redeployed to another part of the country, depending on the degree of their collaboration. A first step could be the creation of a special military commission to investigate and punish collusion with armed groups, including the FDLR, supported by MONUSCO and donors. Simultaneously, a parliamentary commission of inquiry could also scrutinize these support networks, which would contribute to improving civilian oversight over the security forces, which is currently lacking.

The UN Group of Experts is currently the only body that systematically monitors and charts the support networks and supply chains of armed groups.¹³¹ Material and diplomatic support from donors for local NGOs and researchers involved in investigating the FDLR – as well as other armed groups – and a forum through which they could collaborate, would improve our understandings of these complex systems.

Military Options

In the end, some military operations are likely inevitable. The FIB has a clear mandate for these operations.¹³² Any campaign must, however, understand the differences between the FDLR and the M23. The FDLR is not likely to stand and fight for territory. Instead, its troops will seek refuge in dense forests and difficult terrain, and will use attacks against civilians as leverage against its opponents. Counterinsurgency in this context must target the organization's nerve centres and build in precautions for protecting civilians. Such operations would stand in stark contrast to previous efforts by the FARDC and MONUSCO, which have been risk-averse and aimed at controlling territory, not eliminating specific commanders.

Military operations will depend on accurate intelligence. Information should be effectively shared between MONUSCO, DRC, and Rwanda, whose cooperation is key. The government of Rwanda has demonstrated that it has extensive information about the group's structure and deployments, and could help provide intelligence through ICGLR mechanisms or directly to the Congolese government, but also on the actual number of hard core genocidaires.

Whatever military strategies are adopted, they must be carried out with utmost care for the safety and security of the local population. Unlike previous operations, they must be prepared to address IDP flows and to protect civilians against reprisal attacks.

Repatriating Rwandan refugees

Thousands of Rwandan refugees are still on Congolese soil, and many of them are held hostage by the FDLR. There have been few efforts to provide humanitarian relief and safety in recent years. Steps should be taken to encourage the Congolese government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to accept the principle of establishing refugee camps on Congolese soil. There are currently UNHCR transit sites in select locations, but these are often far from where the refugees are located, are not well protected, and are not well advertised. Given the controversial history of Rwandan refugee camps in the eastern Congo (especially between 1994-1996), the United Nations would have to take strong measures to prevent any militarization of these camps, guard against FDLR control over camps, and ensure that these are located at safe distance from the Rwandan border. Doing so could clarify the number, and status of Rwandan refugees, and would be an opportunity for them to break ties with the FDLR.

Process

The past year has seen an increase in diplomacy on the Great Lakes region, due to the M23 rebellion and the signature of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) in February 2013. This has prompted the nomination of new envoys, including from the African Union and the United Nations, and increased the involvement by regional bodies such as the International Community for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

At a recent summit in Luanda, the ICGLR chairmanship was passed to the Angolan government, which has made the FDLR a priority of regional diplomacy. This is a welcome development, and the ICGLR should be the focal point for developing a coherent plan on dealing with the FDLR, including some the options presented above. It should also define an end-state for the FDLR, or a tacit agreement on what would mark the end of the rebellion. At the same time, as the ending of M23 rebellion showed, much of the diplomatic heavy lifting will have to happen outside of official mechanisms, especially since the ICGLR mirrors some of the deep rifts within the region.

Conclusion

After years of bad news from Central Africa, the region is on the verge of a breakthrough. After the defeat of the M23, the dismantling of the FDLR—or at least their reduction to scattered groups of bandits—is within reach. This could entail a historic de-escalation of tensions between Rwanda and the Congo, and could dramatically reduce the conflict in the eastern Congo. Diplomats and leaders from the region must seize this opportunity.

The greatest challenge will be calibrating peaceful and military options. Past offensives against the FDLR have caused humanitarian disasters; renewed operations must take this into account, and diplomats should privilege peaceful avenues. This includes allowing FDLR commanders not accused of war crimes to find exile in countries outside of Rwanda, bolstering demobilization efforts, and sanctioning individuals—especially Congolese officials—guilty of colluding with the FDLR.

Dismantling the FDLR would not only be a victory for the local population. It would pave the way for a broader stabilization of the Kivus, where many groups collaborate with

the FDLR, and it could foster space for a much-needed political opening in Rwanda. The obstacles, however, are formidable.

¹ Internal Displaced Monitoring Centre, "Multiple crises hamper prospects for durable solutions," 14 January, 2014, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/africa/democratic-republic-of-the-congo/2014/multiple-crises-hamper-prospects-for-durable-solutions/>.

² Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith Verweijen, *Between Integration and Disintegration: The Erratic Trajectory of the Congolese Army*, DRC Affinity Group (New York: SSR: Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, 2013); Mariano Andrade, "Congo M23 Rebels Defeated on Battlefield: Envoys," *Agence France-Presse*, October 28, 2013, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/congo-m23-rebels-defeated-battlefield-envoys>.

³ Raymond Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, trans. Guillaume Lacaille, October 1, 2012, 9.

⁴ Lynne Duke, *Mandela, Mobutu, and Me: A Newswoman's African Journey* (New York: Doubleday, 2003), 132–133; Thomas Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality* (London: Zed Books, 2007), 155.

⁵ Turner, *The Congo Wars*, 124; *Stoking the Fires: Military Assistance and Arms Trafficking in Burundi*, Human Rights Watch Arms Project (New York: Human Rights Watch (HRW), December 1997), 87.

⁶ Rebecca Feeley and Colin Thomas-Jensen, *Past Due: Remove the FDLR from Eastern Congo*, Strategy Paper (Washington DC: Enough Project, June 2008), 2, <http://www.enoughproject.org>.

⁷ Turner, *The Congo Wars*, 77; Feeley and Thomas-Jensen, *Past Due*, 4; Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 10.

⁸ Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 11.

⁹ Feeley and Thomas-Jensen, *Past Due*, 4.

¹⁰ Idean Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 152.

¹¹ Jason Stearns, *From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of An Armed Movement in Eastern Congo*, Usalama Project (Nairobi/London: Rift Valley Institute, 2012), 18; Jason Stearns et al, *Raia Mutomboki: The Flawed Peace Process in the DRC and the Birth of an Armed Franchise*, Usalama Project (Nairobi/London: Rift Valley Institute, 2013), 13; Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 31, 45.

¹² Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 14.

¹³ The current FDLR commander Sylvestre Mudacumura was in the Kamina military camp when the FDLR were attacked by the Congolese army and fled the camp.

¹⁴ Feeley and Thomas-Jensen, *Past Due*, 5.

¹⁵ Gaaki Kigambo, "Unease in Kigali Over Kikwete's Call for Talks with FDLR," *The East African*, June 8, 2013.

¹⁶ The figure of 22,000 comes from internal documents recovered from RDR leaders, see Fiona Terry, *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 159. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees security evaluation in 1997 estimated the ex-FAR between 30,000-40,000 and the various militia at 10,000-15,000 in *Refugee Camp Security in the Great Lakes Region* (Geneva: UNHCR, 1997). The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda put the total number of militias, government officials and soldiers at 30,000 in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience* (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), p. 58.

¹⁷ Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders*, 3.

¹⁸ FDLR had hoped to recruit from primary and secondary schools; promote political propaganda; identity markets for the purchase of arms; establish training facilities for combatants; and identify military targets.

¹⁹ Hans Romkema, *Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Washington DC: Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program, The World Bank, 2007), 34.

²⁰ Colonel Mudacumura overturned the decision of FDLR's European leadership and revoked Higiro and Kanyamibwa's promotion, but disagreements dated back to the days of ALiR's separation and Kabila's favouritism of the western branch.

²¹ Feeley and Thomas-Jensen, *Past Due*, 11.

- ²² Roger Kibasomba and Thadee Barega Lombe, “Obstacles to Post-Election Peace in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo: Actors, Interests and Strategies,” in *Understanding Obstacles to Peace: Actors, Interests, and Strategies in Africa’s Great Lakes Region*, ed. Mwesiga Baregu (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2011), 144.
- ²³ UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 29 November 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council* (New York: United Nations, December 2, 2011), para. 135. UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)* (New York: United Nations, December 12, 2013), para. 114, <http://africanarguments.org/category/the-central-africa-forum/>.
- ²⁴ Radio Okapi, “Nord-Kivu: au moins 7 groupes armés toujours actifs à Rutshuru,” *ReliefWeb*, November 11, 2013, <http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/nord-kivu-au-moins-7-groupes-arm-s-toujours-actifs-rutshuru>; AfroAmerica Network, “FDLR Splinter Group Commander Killed by Rwandan Defense Forces Special Forces,” *AfroAmerica Network: Resources, Information, News, Views and Social Networking*, July 10, 2013.
- ²⁵ Demobilised FDLR-Soki Lieutenant, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC, December 23, 2013; FDLR-Soki Captain 1, Semi-structured Telephone Interview, December 23, 2013; FDLR-Soki Captain 2, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC, December 26, 2013; FDLR-Soki Combatant 1, Semi-structured Interviews, Goma, DRC, December 22, 2013; FDLR-Soki Combatant 2, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC, December 24, 2013.
- ²⁶ UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 21 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council* (New York: United Nations, June 21, 2012), para. 100; “Who Fights for Whom?,” *Africa Confidential* 53, no. 12 (June 8, 2012); “Briefing: Armed Groups in Eastern DRC,” UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *IRIN: Humanitarian News and Analysis*, October 31, 2013, <http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=99037>.
- ²⁷ Enough Project Organisation, “Armed Groups Table: The Networks of Eastern Congo’s Two Most Powerful Armed Actors,” *Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, August 2, 2013, <http://enoughproject.org>.
- ²⁸ Consensus exists as to the demobilisation of the vast majority of his combatants, and the integration of the remainder into Nyatura (Congolese Hutu armed group) in the hopes of becoming part of the Congolese national army. Demobilised FDLR-Mandevu Combatant 1, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC, December 23, 2013; Demobilised FDLR-Mandevu Combatant 2, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC, December 24, 2013; FDLR-Mandevu Combatant, Semi-structured Telephone Interviews, December 23, 2013.
- ²⁹ The figure does not take into account those who did not go through the formal demobilization process, those who stayed in the DRC, those who fled to other African countries, nor those who joined other armed groups.
- ³⁰ UN Staff 5, “FDLR and DDRRR,” January 27, 2014; UN Security Council, *Thirtieth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (New York: United Nations, December 4, 2009), para. 7; UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 21 June 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, para. 79; UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 29 November 2011 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, para. 71.
- ³¹ UN Security Council, *Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)* (New York: United Nations, July 19, 2013), para. 90, 97, 103.
- ³² RDRC Senior Staff, “FDLR/FOCA and RUD/URUNANA,” December 30, 2013.
- ³³ Enough Project Organisation, “Infographic.”
- ³⁴ Demobilised FDLR/FOCA Colonel, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC, December 27, 2013; FDLR/FOCA Colonel, Semi-structured Telephone Interviews, December 23, 2013; UN Representative, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC, December 23, 2013.
- ³⁵ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 111.
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- ⁴⁰ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 101; RDRC Senior Staff, “FDLR/FOCA and RUD/URUNANA”; UN Staff 2, “SOSUKI 12/2013,” December 20, 2013, 2.
- ⁴¹ Christoph Vogel, “The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” *Christoph Vogel*, October 2013, <http://christophvogel.net/mapping/>; UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 101; RDRC Senior Staff, “FDLR/FOCA and RUD/URUNANA.”
- ⁴² Vogel, “The Landscape of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”; UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 101, 103.
- ⁴³ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 105.
- ⁴⁴ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 102; Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 39.
- ⁴⁵ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 101; UN Security Council, *Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 98.
- ⁴⁶ UN Security Council, *Letter Dated 12 November 2012 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo Addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, para. 150.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁸ UN Staff 1, “North Kivu and FDLR,” December 28, 2013.
- ⁴⁹ UN Security Council, *Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 101.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 102, 105.
- ⁵¹ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 92; Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 43.
- ⁵² Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 43.
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- ⁵⁴ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 98.
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- ⁵⁶ Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 20; Feeley and Thomas-Jensen, *Past Due*, 7.
- ⁵⁷ Debelle, *Diagnostic Study of the Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda: Contextual Description of the Historical, Political and Military Dimensions of the FDLR*, 31.
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Dated 12 November 2012 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo Addressed to the Chair of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) Concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (New York: United Nations, November 15, 2012), para. 97, 99; UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 89, 100; UN Security Council, *Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 99.

⁶¹ UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 92.

⁶² UN Security Council, *Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 99.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ Victor Byiringiro, “Déclaration Des Forces Démocratiques de Libération Du Rwanda” (General Major, President of the FDLR, December 30, 2013).

⁶⁵ Demobilised FDLR/FOCA Colonel, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC; FDLR/FOCA Colonel, Semi-structured Telephone Interviews; FDLR/FOCA Spokesperson, Semi-structured Telephone Interviews, December 23, 2013.

⁶⁶ “2014 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” *UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency*, January 27, 2014, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c366&submit=GO>.

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⁶⁸ UN Security Council, *Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 145; Demobilised FDLR/FOCA Colonel, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC; FDLR/FOCA Colonel, Semi-structured Telephone Interviews.

⁶⁹ Romkema, *Opportunities and Constraints*, 40; Demobilised FDLR/FOCA Colonel, Semi-structured Interview, Goma, DRC.

⁷⁰ UN Security Council, *Midterm Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 114; UN Security Council, *Final Report of the Group of Experts on the DRC Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 2078 (2012)*, para. 99.

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