

Beyond the Crusades

By Lisa Wedeen

From literary studies to rational choice theory, issues broadly construed as "cultural" have inspired academic debates, fostered interdisciplinary exchanges, and prompted battles over the methods, evidence, and objectives of scholarly research.¹ In political science (the discipline in which I was trained) the concept of culture used to be associated primarily with the literature on political culture that emerged in the context of postwar political sociology, with its concerns for policy initiatives designed to reproduce the conditions of Western democratization abroad (Somers 1995, 114). Derived from Max Weber's ([1905] 1958) classic analysis of the "elective affinity" between the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism in the West, these studies attempted to demonstrate how cultural attitudes and beliefs either constrained or promoted "progress" (Banfield 1958; McClelland 1961, 1963; Pye 1965). Conceived in terms of an alleged set of residual values and norms—what the anthropologist Sherry Ortner (1997, 8-9) has aptly characterized as a "deeply sedimented essence attaching to, or inhering in particular groups"—this notion of culture was prominent in the sociology of Talcott Parsons, (continued on page 2)

Colombia's Conflict and Theories of World Politics

By Ann Mason

Among the multiple critiques of International Relations theory, its limited relevance for understanding the Third World's place in global affairs has gained increasing attention during the past decade.^{1,2} First, the end of the Cold War revealed a more complex world stage with a plurality of actors, problems and interests that had little to do with traditional interstate power relations. September 11 drove home like a sledgehammer the point that the world is about far more than the high politics of Western nations. Today, IR theory's poor ability to describe and explain, much less predict, the behavior of states in the global South is recognized as one of its primary shortcomings. This in part accounts for the tepid reception that this body of theory has received within those countries not counted among the great powers. Both academic and policy-making circles in the developing and post-colonial world are skeptical about a theoretical tradition whose claims to universalism not only ignore them, but that also have acted to reify a global order within which they are destined to draw the short straw.³ (continued on page 7)

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in modernization theory, and in the American cultural anthropology of Franz Boas, Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict, as well as in the behaviorist revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet despite the seemingly dated quality of such formulations, the seductiveness of cultural essentialism persists.² Samuel Huntington's 1993 article "The Clash of Civilizations?" and his subsequent book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996) represent a particularly influential and polemical recent example of this kind of political culturalism: civilizations each have a primordial cultural identity, so that the "major differences in political and economic development among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures." The "fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future," Huntington predicted, and the two civilizations that are of particular importance in this narrative of battles and futures are Islam and the West (Huntington 1993, 22; 1996, 20, 28, 29).

This understanding of culture as a specific group's primordial values or traits is untenable empirically, and yet current scholarly and popular depictions of "Islam" often reproduce such claims and their attendant problems: First, the sedimented essences version of "civilization" or "culture" ignores the specific historical processes and particular power relations that have given rise to the recent phenomenon of radical religious expression. Second, the clash of civilization's story and narratives similar to it ride roughshod over the diversity of views and the experiences of contention among Muslims. Communities of argument arise over what makes a Muslim a Muslim, what Islam means, and what, if any, its political role should be. Third, an essentialist analysis neglects the terrains of solidarity and fluidity that exist between Muslims and non-Muslims, the ways in which political communities of various sorts have depended on the cross-fertilization of ideas and practices. This short essay is devoted to elaborating each of these three points.

Part One: History and Power

First, to take into account historical processes would mean to identify the recent and global dimensions of radical religious expression. "Fundamentalism," as radical religious expression is sometimes termed, is not exclusive to Islam. Nor does it have its roots in age-old traditions. Current Islamicist movements are part of a global phenomenon that originates in the late 1970s, and they share with other contemporary movements two key similarities: a) they resuscitate, invent, or construct an essentialist understanding of political identity based, at least in part, on ascription; b)

although they have important antecedents, they have emerged as a potent contemporary political force at the same time that international market pressures weakened the economic sovereignty of states and undermined their roles as guarantors of citizens' welfare.

The story may by now be a familiar one: in the 1970s, states began withdrawing economically, privatizing property, reducing or eliminating subsidies, deregulating prices, and ceasing to provide services to which people had become accustomed, felt entitled—and needed. As the state has retreated economically in the Middle East, Islamicist movements have tended to fill in the gaps, providing goods and services states do not proffer (Al-Naqeeb 1991; Beinín and Stork 1997; Chaudhry 1997; Henry and Springborg 2001; Medani 1997; Sadowski 1987; Singerman 1996; Vitalis 1997; Wickham 1997, 2002; Yamani 2002). Egypt was one of the first Middle Eastern countries to initiate liberalization measures in 1973. Although such measures could be deemed successful during the oil boom years, they were disastrous in the bust period of the mid-1980s. Liberalization measures introduced Egyptians to a number of imported goods and

luxury items at the same time that oil revenues and privatization policies generated a new, American-oriented "parvenu" class (Sadowski 1987). This new class enjoyed a lifestyle that stimulated widespread resentment among the urban poor and middle classes. Liberalization programs created markets, but they also enhanced perceptions of corruption, widened income disparities, and fostered

considerable economic suffering. Liberalization also removed safety nets that guaranteed people some security. Rising unemployment, decreases in subsidies, housing problems, and population explosions all contributed to the glaring gap between rich and poor. Strikes grew more common in the 1980s, food riots were "a frequent worry" among government officials, and middle and lower class citizens reported economic anxieties (Sadowski 1987, 44).

The undermining of the state as the vehicle of economic development also subverted its role as the carrier of abstract communal solidarities, and it was in this context, often termed "globalization," that politicized religious movements started being mobilized on the basis of a complex blend of ascriptive and behavioral identifications. What is common to most of these movements is that they express anxieties about corroded values and the loss of communal attachments. They register the "moral panic" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, 5) of citizens longing for a state or community capable of protecting and providing for them.

In the Middle Eastern context, Islamicist movements have captured this popular discontent, in part by delivering

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concrete economic benefits to constituents. They have devised disciplined, effective, skillful organizations for channeling resources and providing goods and services. Some offer housing, books, and health care no longer (or never) provided by the state. Islamicist movements also organize affective attachments in the wake of the failure of Arab states to deliver on Arab nationalist promises.

The appeal of Islamicist groups, then, can be historically situated in the changing relations of global capital (and the concomitant shift from nationalist abstractions to religious ones). Invoking a cultural essentialist argument is also, as the political scientist Chalmers Johnson notes, "a way of evading responsibility for the 'blowback' that US imperial projects have generated" (Johnson *The Nation*, October 15, 2001). Possible sources of "blowback" include the widely shared views that the United States serves as a proxy for Israel, is responsible for the decade of sanctions against Iraqis, shores up corrupt dictators, stations troops in Saudi Arabia specifically, and upholds double standards between official commitments to democracy and equality, on the one hand, and actual political activities, on the other. Current global economic arrangements are also implicated in beliefs about US imperial projects; they are understood as bringing wealth to the United States and its perceived institutional surrogates, the IMF and World Bank, while making many parts of the world more miserable and destitute.

The fact that economically incapacitated states in the region encourage expressions of popular discontent in forms that deflect attention away from domestic leaders' incompetence may also explain the elective affinity between state discourses and some aspects of Islamicist movements. The available idioms through which experiences of common belonging to a people become institutionalized in the post-Fordist, post-colonial world are confined to what the state will tolerate and what the Islamicists have won. Thus demonstrations of Muslim piety combine with consensual understandings of anti-American and pro-Palestinian solidarities in officials' speeches and in mass demonstrations. Islamicism has become a coherent anti-imperialist doctrine and a way of re-establishing community. It offers visions of an equitable, just, socially responsible way of life, much as the failed, discredited Arab nationalist regimes of the 1950s and 60s did.

To some extent the success of the Islamicist movements also has to be attributed to the state's elimination of leftist opposition by means of incarceration, torture, and cooptation. In Egypt, for example, the regimes of Nasir and Sadat worked actively to demobilize the working class. Sadat found tactical allies among the Muslim Brotherhood and among the newly growing radical Islamic movements in universities. He released imprisoned Muslim Brothers in 1972-73, and encouraged them to attack leftists, whom he regarded as his major political adversary (Waterbury 1983; Sadowski 1987). In Yemen, unification between North and South was followed by the Northern ruling party's consis-



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tent assault on its Southern Socialist partners. In 1992-93, there were approximately 150-160 assassination attempts against members of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)—most of them carried out by self-identified radical Islamicists who were encouraged financially and politically by the regime.³

Viewing the emergence and appeal of Islamicist movements historically thus compels us to come to terms with the post-Fordist economic world in which the state's economic sovereignty has been undermined globally with consequences for the forms of solidarity and expressions of community currently politicizing citizens in a number of places. A historical account also requires us to recognize the absence of alternative visions of community and authority, as leaders failed to deliver both on their pan-Arab promises and to produce effective state-centered projects for development. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the global decline of Soviet ideology as an alternative paradigm to liberal capitalism, Islamicism provides a critical vision of the world and a sense of hope for some people. Islamicist positions on social justice, based on mechanisms of redistribution such as the Islamic *zakat* taxes, avoid the radical land reform projects of old; they also tend to respect the concept of private property and encourage profit as an appropriate outcome for entrepreneurial activity (Sadowski 1987; Kepel 2002). Islamicists can thus appeal to the middle classes and to the urban poor, even though the credibility of Islamicist solutions to economic problems has been undermined by

the failure of some Islamicist firms to deliver on their financial promises.⁴

Part Two: Contention Among Muslims

Despite the success of Islamicists in providing adversarial idioms and resonant political critiques, the struggle among nominally Muslim citizens and Islamicist adherents is as pronounced as the solidarities an Islamicist adversarial politics has fostered. Being "Muslim" might signify a set of religious beliefs, an ascriptive attachment, a "cultural" identification, a state classification, a set of recognizable activities, or none of the above. There are those who see a separation of mosque and state as fundamental, and those who advocate their conjuncture. There are those who think the *shari'a* should be the source of legislation, those who view it as a source, and those who wish it were irrelevant to contemporary law. There are countries where the *'ulama* or religious elite is independent of the state, places where mosque sermons are controlled by the state, and places where the *'ulama* is coterminous with the state. There are, in short, vigorous communities of argument and plural varieties of social and political practice. This plurality makes any invocation of a single political doctrine of Islam empirically untenable and theoretically meaningless. We have to keep this sense of variety and plurality in mind when thinking about political patterns and the terrains of solidarity that might animate future political life.⁵

Part Three: Terrains of Solidarity

The Modernity of States, The Rule of Law, and Human Rights

Rather than discussing reified categories such as Islam and democracy in general, we should talk, as the theorist Gudrun Krämer encourages us to do, about "Muslims living and theorizing under specific historical circumstances" (Krämer 1997, 72). This may seem obvious, but it is often hard to do, in part because many Muslim authors represent their "views as 'the position of Islam'" (Krämer 1997, 72).

In addition, some Islamicists may end up adopting the strategic option of democracy because leaders calculate that it is in their interest to do so. Such rational calculations explain how the theologically-minded Belgian Catholic movement, for example, despite members' theocratic inclinations and their lack of commitment to democracy, ended up supporting democratic institutions (Kalyvas 1998). In other words, a discussion of ideas, values or shared political commitments may exaggerate the importance of particular ways of thinking while underestimating the salience of common strategic interests and trade-offs—the familiar practices of calculating costs and benefits, which many political leaders who share the same vocation (but perhaps not the same values) *do* when making decisions.



Adrees Latif/Reuters

Keeping these points in mind, let me suggest three shared understandings that might constitute a terrain of solidarity between Islamicists and liberals (I claim membership in neither group): First, conservative *'ulama* and moderate Muslim Brothers (in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen) hold ideas that are fundamentally *modern* (Krämer 1997, 74; see also Chakrabarty 2000).⁶ Implementing the *shari'a*, according to these theorists, means building a state whose common bureaucratic institutions are designed to provide goods and services in return for citizens' allegiance and obedience. Humans, endowed by God with reason, have the ability to interpret correctly the purposes of the *shari'a* and therefore to define the precise contours and functional tasks state institutions will assume. In this light, the adoption of democratic practices or categories may be "acceptable, recommended, or even mandatory," as long as these do not contravene Islamic principles (Krämer 1997, 75).

Second, then, is the admissibility of *democratic norms and procedures* in the process of constructing institutions. A fundamental concern of many contemporary Muslims is the need to check the arbitrary powers of leaders and institute the rule of law, and strict application of the *shari'a* is seen by many as a way of forefending against tyranny while ensuring procedural justice. Whatever problems one might see in this proposition, criticisms of despotism and corruption animate the works of both radical and reform-minded Islamicists (as well as those of secularists). Identifying tyranny as a key spiritual and political problem on the grounds that it treats men as gods when there is only one God provides the justification for rendering dictators and those who work for them apostates.⁷ Although some groups still advocate the restoration of a "caliphate," many groups, including the Muslim Brothers, use the term in ways analogous to a modern president who is entrusted to execute God's law as a fallible human agent and an accountable political representative of the Muslim community. Thus many Muslim authors claim that the ideal Islamic state is a *dawla madaniyya* (a civil state) rather than a theocracy ruled by the *'ulama* or an authoritarian state ruled by the military. In Yemen, moderate Islam-

icists also stress the importance of a *shura* whose actual duties look less like the Prophet Muhammad's version of a consultative body and more like a Western Parliament. (The key figure here is Yasin `Abd al-`Aziz 1999, 63-116.) Many authors in Yemen and elsewhere accept the importance of a separation of powers in which the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary keep each other in check.

Third, moderate, pragmatic Islamicists and many self-identified Muslim authors also express concerns about *protecting human rights* (although there are also lively debates on the extent to which the importation of allegedly Western understandings of human rights contradict the *shari`a* and/or are used opportunistically by Western NGOs, journalists, and governments to justify intervention).⁸ Especially in their role as oppositional political figures, moderate Islamicists have demanded the safeguarding of individual rights and civil liberties from government intrusion, and the human right to live free from repression and torture.

Conclusions:

The vast majority of people in the Middle East probably never ceased to consider themselves Muslim, even at the apogee of secular nationalist movements. But before the 1970s, most Muslims did not seem to identify primarily as Muslims, or rather, that identity did not override other forms of *political* identification. Disillusionment with the performance of states in the 1970s and the creation of parvenu classes that exemplified the ostentatious excesses of the "haves" in contrast to the impoverishment of the "have nots" generated widespread discontent. This discontent was exacerbated with the debt crisis of the 1980s, the decline in the price of oil, and the IMF-imposed restructuring projects that limited state expenditures. At a time when the distributive capabilities of states were undermined and leaders were increasingly perceived to be venal and corrupt, the popularity of Islamicist movements rose considerably. The messages—calls for social equity, political transparency and accountability, and moral piety—were resonant, critical alternatives that gave many a sense of belonging to a common political project with anonymous but like-minded others. It may be difficult to establish a direct causal relationship between economic suffering and political Islamicist movements, but we might acknowledge that fundamentalisms are "intimately connected with material conditions and disaffection" without arguing that such conditions fully explain "the appeal of fundamentalist ideas" (Euben 1999, 89)

To focus on the economic incentives, discursive content, and political-affective impulses that have underpinned Islam-

icist projects is not to suggest that there is a single, unified political doctrine of Islam. Islamicists differ from non-Islamicists and from one another. There are pragmatically minded Muslim Brotherhood adherents and radically minded, militantly inclined Islamicists. There are secularists and pious practitioners. Reifying "Islam" not only denies the empirical world of plurality and diversity, it also proves politically dangerous, by making "Islam" into an object rather than a set of polyvalent activities whose practitioners have divergent visions, fantasies, understandings, and interests.

Moreover, the moderate, pragmatic Islamicists have come to articulate recognizable aspects of a modern state and a democratic politics: government accountability, the rule of law, political participation, the separation of powers, and the protection of human rights. As Gudrun Krämer points out, despite these explicit commitments, Muslim Brothers are not, strictly speaking liberals, if "liberalism" also means "religious indifference" (Krämer 1997, 80). But their moral vocabularies, expressions of entitlement, and political practices share important characteristics with liberal formulations of democratic institution building.

Thinking about shared terrains between Islamicists and non-Islamicists and between Muslims and non-Muslims does not mean riding roughshod over important disagreements, nor does it require "fudging" consensus where consensus does not reside. If democrats are to take their own commitments to democratic political life seriously, then they (we) have to embrace the variety and agonistic, contentious politics that allows for differences to thrive.

Focusing exclusively on Islamicists, moreover, does a disservice to other groups and individuals in the Middle East whose ideals may be less resonant with current public opinions, but whose practices forge the conditions of possibility through which future political life may also get created.

Finally and more generally, by ignoring historical processes and specific relations of political power, the treatment of culture (especially in political science) has downplayed the heterogeneous ways people experience the social order within and among groups, while exaggerating the commonality, constancy, and permanence of intra-group beliefs and values. As a result, cultural essentialist explanations of political outcomes such as ethnic or religious violence tend to naturalize categories of groupness, rather than exploring the conditions under which such experiences of groupness come to seem natural when they do (see Wedeen 2002).

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ceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, December 2002. She is currently working on a book on political identifications in unified Yemen.

Endnotes

¹This essay has benefited from discussions with Nadia Abu El-Haj, Saba Mahmood, Jar Allah `Umar, Moishe Postone, Don Reneau, and Anna Wuerth. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the United Nations, the University of Maine, Bangor, and to Chicago alumnae. This essay is dedicated to the memory of Jar Allah `Umar and to Muhammad Qahtan.

²This introduction is derived from Lisa Wedeen, "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, Vol., 96, No. 4, December 2002. The article deals, in part, with the persistence of the political culture school (see, for example, Putnam, Leonard and Nanetti, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, 1993) and the importation of aspects of cultural essentialism into certain rational choice analyses.

³Interviews with Yemeni Socialist Party leaders, Fall 2001; see also the interview with Tariq al-Fadli in *al-Quds al-`Arabi*, November 10 2001, reprinted in the YSP's weekly *al-Thawri*, January 3, 2002. Al-Fadli was a well-known Yemeni Islamic Jihad movement leader who joined the ruling General People's Congress party in the mid-1990s.

⁴See, for example, Gilles Kepel's description (2002) of the banking crash in Egypt in the late 1980s, pp. 279-281. Thanks are owed to Anna Wuerth for suggesting these passages to me.

⁵Recognizing the fact of diversity does not mean avoiding generalizations, but it may help identify the kinds of generalizations that can plausibly be made.

⁶I am obviously indebted to Gudrun Krämer's essay (1997) for my Part Three. Her work introduced me to the works of `Abd al-Qadir `Awda, *Al-Islam wa-awda'una al-siyasiyya* and *Al-Islam wa-awda'una al-qanuniyya* (Cairo, n.d.); `Ali Jarisha, *I'lan dusturi islami* (al-Mansura, 1985) and *Al-Mashru'yya al-islamiyya al-`ulya*, 2nd ed. (al-Mansura, 1986); Muhammad `Imara, *Al-Dawla al-islamiyya bayna al-`almaniyya wa al-sulta al-diniyya* (Cairo and Beirut 1988); Muhammad Salim al-`Awwa, *Fi al-nizam al-siyasi lil-dawla al-islamiyya*, new ed. (Cairo and Beirut 1989); Fahmi Huwaydi, *Al-Qur'an wa al-sultan: humum islamiyya mu'asira* (Cairo, 1982); and *Al-Islam wa al-dimuqratiyya*. My own research on Yemen has led me to study the writings of Yasin `Abd al-`Aziz, *Aduwa' ala haqiqa al-musawa* (San`a' 1996) and *Al-Hurriya wa al-shura, dirasatani fi al-fiqh al-siyasi* (San`a' 1999). I am also beholden to al-Qardawi's television commentaries on al-Jazeera.

⁷Critiques of dictatorship among Islamicists also use vocabulary that does not carry religious connotations, such as despotism (*istibdad*) and oppression (*zulm*).

⁸The status of women, the rights of gay people and of non-Muslim minorities, and the freedom of academic research remain fraught topics. In Yemen, the right of private individuals to retaliate against a crime or to settle accounts privately (*qisas*) is also a particularly charged issue.

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Colombia's Conflict and Theories of World Politics - Ann Mason

(continued from page 1)

The Andean Region exemplifies this breach between IR theorizing and the multifarious problems besetting peripheral states and societies. Until very recently, the violence and social conflicts found in nearly every corner of the Andes were not even on IR's radar screen. The 40-year plus armed conflict in Colombia, the violent opposition to Hugo Chavez's populism in Venezuela, massive social protests in Bolivia and Peru, and Ecuador's persistent political and social instability were all branded domestic issues, and thus not the purview of systemic IR thinking. Worldwide transformations that have blurred the internal-external dichotomy, however, have prompted recognition of what has long been common knowledge in the region: local conflicts and problems are completely enmeshed with complex global economic, social and political processes. Colombia's conflict is a case in point. Global markets for illicit drugs, links between Colombian armed actors and international criminal organizations, regional externalities of Colombian violence, the burgeoning Colombian transmigrant community on all five continents, the explosion of the global third sector's presence in the country, increasing US military involvement, and growing concerns by the international community about the deteriorating Colombian situation all illustrate the international face of this crisis.

What light might IR theory shed on a conflict that is estimated to result in 3,500 deaths a year, two thirds of which are civilian, that is responsible for 2.7 million displaced people and another 1 million-plus international refugees, whose political economy is such that an average of 7 kidnappings occur daily, and that has the country awash in numbing levels of violence and human rights abuses?⁴ IR theory is in the business of explaining and predicting violent conflict, as well as the behavior of the world's member states in relation to conflict and stability. Although critical and second-order theories of international relations have fundamentally different concerns,⁵ substantive theorizing must address what Michael Mann calls IR's "most important issue of all: the question of war and peace."⁶ Realist and liberal theories, which share a similar ontology, assumptions and premises, purport to do just that.⁷ Still, the classical paradigm in IR is primarily concerned with the international relations of the advanced, industrialized states. But if Kal Holsti's figures are correct, that 97% of the world's armed conflicts between 1945 and 1995 took place in either the traditional or the new Third World, a viable theoretical framework of world politics must be able to integrate the global periphery.⁸

In this short essay I will discuss what contemporary IR scholarship may or may not offer in its treatment of the



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Andean Region, and of the armed conflict in Colombia in particular. My commentary will be limited to three issues familiar to the developing world, as seen through the lens of Colombia's current crisis: the correlation of state weakness with violence and instability, the post-territorial nature of security threats, and the North-South power disparity. I will conclude with some observations on what this might tell us about the adequacy of the theories themselves.

State Weakness

The sovereign state that lies at the heart of the Westphalian model is the building block of mainstream IR theory. Most theorizing about international politics characterizes the state in terms of power, understood as the capability of achieving national interests related to external security and welfare. Realist and liberal perspectives, and some versions of constructivism, are all concerned with explaining conflictual and cooperative relations among territorially distinct political units, even while their causal, or constitutive, arguments are quite different. Although Kenneth Waltz was taken to task for blithely claiming that states under anarchy were always “like units” with similar functions, preferences and behavioral patterns, much of international relations scholarship persists in a top-down, juridical view of statehood largely abstracted from internal features.⁹

But international legal sovereignty may be the most that the advanced industrialized states have in common with states on the global periphery such as Colombia. First of all, Colombia's priority is internal security, not its power position relative to other states. Threats to the state originate within Colombian territory, not in neighboring countries. In spite of some longstanding border tensions and historical rivalries within the Andean Region, Colombia and its neighbors are more concerned with the strength of domestic social movements and armed actors than they are with external challengers or the international balance of power. Indeed, even in the absence of a regional balancer, strong democratic institutions, dense economic and political networks, or multilateral governance structures, inter-state wars in the region during the 20th century have been extremely rare. This no-war zone, or negative peace according to Arie Kacowicz, appears to best be explained by a shared normative commitment to maintaining a society of states and to peaceful conflict resolution, contradicting both material and systemic explanations of interstate behavior.¹⁰ International stability in the Andean Region stands in sharp contrast to persistent domestic strife.

State strength in much of the developing world is not measured in terms of military capability to defend or project itself externally, but rather according to the empirical attrib-

utes of statehood. The institutional provision of security, justice and basic services, territorial consolidation and control over population groups, sufficient coercive power to impose order and to repel domestic challenges to state authority, and some level of agreement on national identity and social purpose are more meaningful indicators of state power. States in the Andean Region, however, all receive low marks for the very features that mainstream IR theory accepts as unproblematic, and immaterial. Colombia is certainly in no immediate danger of collapse. Indeed, the resilience of its democratic institutions in the face of the internal conflict is noteworthy. Nevertheless, most indications point to a state that has become progressively weaker: the basic functions required of states are inadequately and sporadically performed, central government control is non-existent in many jurisdictions, social cohesion is poor, and the fundamental rules of social order and authority are violently contested.¹¹ Most importantly, Colombia fails the basic Weberian test of maintaining its monopoly over the legitimate use of force and providing security for its citizens.

Internal state weakness that ranges from impairment to outright collapse is the common denominator of post-Cold War violence and insecurity.¹² Not surprisingly, it is also the

permissive condition of Colombia's security emergency. Reduced state capacity underlies the more proximate causes of the violent competition with and among contending subnational groups, namely the FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*), the ELN (*Ejército para la Liberación de Colombia*), paramilitary groups, and

narcotrafficking organizations.¹³ Recent efforts by the Alvaro Uribe administration to build up Colombia's military suggest movement toward state strengthening, although effective consolidation must go far beyond this one component of stateness. It remains to be seen whether in the long run Colombia's bloody conflict becomes a force for state creation in a variation on the Tillian theme, or on the contrary, a structure that has ritualized violent discord as a normal part of Colombian social and political life.¹⁴

This erosion in capacity and competence has taken its toll on what is perhaps a state's most valuable asset—legitimacy. The Colombian state's mediocre performance and problem-solving record degrades central authority, reducing public compliance and policy options, and leading to a further deterioration in internal order as extra-legal forms of security and justice emerge as viable alternatives. This dynamic has been exacerbated by new mechanisms of global governance and the proliferation of global actors within domestic jurisdictions that have legitimated non-sovereign loci of authority. What Jessica Matthews describes as a “power shift” away from the state—up, down, and sideways—has resulted in a complex web of cross-cutting and intersecting arenas at

International legal sovereignty may be the most that the advanced industrialized states have in common with states on the global periphery such as Colombia.

the local, regional, state, transnational, and global levels, which reconfigures social power relationships and produces new sites of authority.¹⁵ In the Third World, where it is common for states to contend with both domestic and external polity alternatives, and where the notion of exclusive sovereign authority has always been problematic, domestic constituencies increasingly identify and organize themselves in a multiplicity of ways in a highly fluid, heterogeneous political landscape. In Colombia, communities such as transnational NGO's, church and humanitarian associations, foreign legal regimes, and international organizations, as well as insurgent and paramilitary groups at the local level, are increasingly viewed as legitimate substitutes for the state. While new spheres of authority may eventually promote norm compliance and stimulate reforms in Colombia, so far the strengthening of alternative polities has tended to compromise central authority, further debilitating the state.¹⁶

Global Security Dynamics

At the same time that Colombia's security crisis is in great measure attributable to the empirical weakness of the state, it also highlights another dimension of the emerging global order: the complex interplay between domestic and international security domains. The globalization of security puts into sharp relief the growing discontinuity between fixed, territorial states and the borderless processes that now prevail in world politics. While Realists would point out that current events in North Korea and Iraq are eloquent reminders of the applicability of a traditional national security model in which state-on-state military threats predominate, concerns in Colombia reflect a somewhat different security paradigm.

First of all, insecurity in Colombia is experienced by multiple actors, including the state, the society at large, and particular subnational groups. Security values, in turn, vary according to the referent: national security interests, both military and nonmilitary, exist alongside societal and individual security concerns. Colombian society not only seeks protection against violent attacks, massacres, assassination, torture, kidnapping, displacement, and forced conscription, but also security in the form of institutional guarantees related to democracy, civil liberties and the rule of law, employment and a minimum standard of living, and access to basic services such as education and health care. Many of the internal risks that Colombia confronts are also enmeshed with regional, hemispheric and global security dynamics that are dominated by both state and non-state actors.

While Colombia is typically viewed as being the in eye of the regional storm, the Colombian crisis is itself entangled

with transregional and global security processes, including drug trafficking, the arms trade, criminal and terrorist networks, and US security policies.¹⁷ The remarkable growth in the strength of Colombia's most destabilizing illegal groups during the 1990's, for instance, is directly attributed to their ability to generate revenue from activities related to the global market for illegal drugs.¹⁸ Both the FARC and the paramilitaries capture rents from the cultivation, production and trade of cocaine and heroin. This finances their organizations, keeps them well stocked with arms also traded on regional and worldwide black markets, and sustains a pernicious conflict. These transactions occur within complex transnational criminal associations inside and at the edges of the Andean region, which in turn are involved in global financial, crime, and even terrorist, networks. Seen from this perspective, Colombia's war is not so internal after all: it actively involves dense transborder networks composed of an array of global actors. Such a post-sovereign security setting underscores the necessity for mainstream IR theorizing to go beyond its state-centered vision of world politics and to develop conceptual tools better equipped to deal with global realities.

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Power and Authority on the Periphery

IR theory's notion of formal anarchy coexists uneasily with relations of inequality and domination that pervade world order. While most representatives of states in the South would tell you that the exclusive authority with which the institution of sov-

erignty endows them is not quite equal to that of their more powerful northern associates, neorealism and neoliberalism insist that the evident discrepancies among states are mere power differentials within a decentralized international system that lacks a central political authority. Thus, hegemony and asymmetrical interdependence as such do not contradict the fundamental IR distinction between anarchy and hierarchy.

Some dominant-subordinate structures, such as the US-Colombian relationship, may be about more than material differences, however. The immense disparity in economic, political and military power has permitted Washington to impose its will in Colombia on a wide range of issues similar to a coercive hegemonic project. Nevertheless, Colombian observance of American preferences in its foreign and internal security policy is not exclusively related to overt threats or quid pro quos. Constructivist research suggests that there exist legitimate hierarchical structures in the international system involving states as well as institutions. The rules of what Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim call "informal empire" are such that in some circumstances

inequality can be characterized as a de facto authority relationship.¹⁹ Authority implies that the US exercises a form of social control over Colombia, and that in turn Colombian compliance cannot always be explained by fear of retribution or self-interest, suggesting some acceptance, no matter how rudimentary, of the legitimacy of US power. Ongoing practices that become embedded in institutional structures can create shared behavioral expectations and intersubjective understandings reflected in identities and preferences. Colombia's anti-drug posture, for example, that was in great measure shaped by Washington's militarized war on drugs and aggressive extradition policy, has over time become internalized.²⁰ Colombia has appropriated the prohibitionist discourse of the United States, and become an active agent in reproducing its own identity and interests vis-à-vis the illegality and danger of drugs.²¹

It would be an exaggeration, however, to conclude that Colombia's behavior on its shared agenda with the US is completely consensual: the underlying power configuration is a constant reminder that Washington calls the shots. The US reconstruction of Colombia's internal conflict into part of its war on global terror, with great uncertainty within the country about its implications for a negotiated settlement, is illustrative. US preponderance can also lead to "increased incentives for unilateralism and bilateral diplomacy," at times directly against Colombian interests.²² Recent arm-twisting to grant immunity to American citizens and military personnel in Colombia from prosecution for human rights violations under the International Criminal Court is a case in point. Still, material inequalities can obscure how third-dimensional power also operates in the informal authority relations between the United States and Colombia.

Conclusion

The Colombian situation suggests various themes which theories of world politics would be well advised to take into consideration. IR theory has been largely silent on the issues of state-making and state-breaking that reside at the heart of the Third World security problematic. In neglecting domestic contexts more broadly speaking, this body of theory is inadequate for explaining the relationship between violent "internal" conflicts and global volatility at the start of the 21st century. These theories also have a blind spot when it comes to non-state actors in world politics. In overemphasizing states, realist theories in particular are hard pressed to adequately account for the countless sources of vulnerability of states and societies alike. Security threats, from terrorism to drug trafficking to SARS, defy theoretical assumptions

about great power politics and the state's pride of place in world order. Similarly, non-territorial global processes such as Colombia's security dynamics are not well conceptualized by conventional IR levels of analysis that spatially organize international phenomena according to a hierarchy of locations.²³ Colombia's experience with sovereignty also calls into question the logic of anarchy in realist and liberal IR theorizing. Seen from a peripheral point of view, the notion of formal equality is little more than a rhetorical device that camouflages deep and persistent material and social inequalities in the international system. We thus arrive at the conundrum of a "stable" world order, in IR terms defined by the absence of war among the world's strongest states, wracked by violent conflict and immeasurable human suffering in peripheral regions. Perhaps most importantly, today's global security landscape should prompt us to rethink theories that by and large bracket non-Western domains and suppress their narratives.

The heterogeneity of the IR discipline cautions us against jettisoning the entire canon as flawed when it comes to the Third World, however. Constructivists' incorporation of a social dimension into an analysis of state identities and inter-

ests is a promising research agenda for analyzing non-material aspects of North-South relations. Neoliberal institutionalism has also contributed to our understanding of the role of global institutions and norms in conflict resolution and cooperation in the Third World, and may offer insight into

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seemingly intractable conflicts such as Colombia's. Paradoxically, certain realist precepts also have utility for analyzing the international politics of developing states. The distribution of global economic, political and military power has an enormous impact on center and peripheral states alike. As we have seen, the inequality in US-Colombian relations poses a serious challenge to multilateralism and mechanisms of global governance. Furthermore, in spite of the ongoing reconfiguration of the state in response to global transformations, sovereign statehood has proved to be highly adaptive and resilient, vindicating realism's state-centric assumptions. Colombia's internal weakness, for example, is to be contrasted with the state's increasingly successful political and diplomatic agenda within the international community, even in the face of increasing global constraints. The complexities of Colombian security dynamics, which vividly illustrate a non-realist security landscape, nevertheless require that public policies specify and prioritize threats and responses largely in conventional, military terms. And finally, Colombia's efforts to recuperate state strength, or complete its unfinished state making project, as the case may be, suggest that state power remains pivotal to internal, and thus

global, order.

Rather than dismissing IR theory outright for its shortcomings in explaining the problems of countries such as Colombia, we may be better advised to look toward peripheral regions for what they can contribute to testing, revising, and advancing our theories of international politics. Perhaps the explosion of war-torn societies in the Third World and the implications this has for world order will inspire critical analysis of where the theories fail and what they have that is germane to analyzing international relations in the South. Just as there is no single theoretical orthodoxy in IR, neither is the Third World a like unit. With any luck, the diversity of these experiences will lead to new theorizing about world politics. ■

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Endnotes

¹I would like to thank Arlene Tickner for her helpful comments on this essay.

²For an introduction to this line of analysis, see Stephanie Neuman, ed., *International Relations Theory and the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

³On how Latin American scholarship has incorporated Anglo-American IR thought, see Arlene Tickner, "Hearing Latin American Voices in International Studies," *International Studies Perspectives*, 4, 4, 2003 (forthcoming).

⁴While the number of conflict related deaths is high, the overall figures on violence in Colombia are nothing short of alarming. In 1999 there were 22,300 violent deaths, representing a homicide rate of 53.66 per 100,000 individuals, according to Alvaro Camacho, "La política colombiana: los recorridos de una reforma," *Análisis Político*, 41, 2000, pp. 99–117. Displaced population figures are as of September 2002, according to the NGO *Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento*. See Boletín Codhes, Bogotá, September 4, 2002. The number of international refugees is taken from the US Embassy in Bogotá website, <http://usembassy.state.gov/bogota/wwwsdh01.shtml>, last updated April 4, 2002, and from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees' website, last updated January 24, 2003, <http://www.acnur.org/>. Colombia has the dubious distinction of having the highest kidnapping rate in the world, with 2,304 cases reported in 2001 according to the NGO *Pais Libre*. See http://www.paislibre.org.co/el_secuestro_colombia.asp#, "Total Secuestros en Colombia 1997–2002," May 14, 2002.

⁵My comments will not engage the multiple Marxist approaches, critical theory, or post-positivist constructivism, but will rather focus largely on first-order problem-solving theories of international relations. For a general overview of the main theoretical traditions in the field, see Stephen Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories," *Foreign Policy*, 110, pp. 29–46.

⁶Michael Mann, "Authoritarianism and Liberal Militarism: A Contribution from Comparative and Historical Sociology," in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 221.

⁷On classical realism, see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948/1973). The standard work on neorealism remains Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979). On neoliberal theory, see Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The promise of institutional theory," *International Security*, 20, pp. 39–51.

⁸Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 210–24.

⁹Waltz, 1979. Both constructivism and liberal theory are important exceptions. See respectively Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

¹⁰Arie Kacowicz, *Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective* (Albany: State University of New York, 1998).

¹¹For an analysis of Colombian state weakness and the "partially failed" thesis, see Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro, "The Coming Anarchy: The Partial Collapse of the State and the Emergence of Aspiring State Makers in Colombia," paper prepared for the workshop "States-Within-States," University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, October 19–20, 2001.

¹²For a sampling of the large literature on state weakness, see Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Lionel Cliffe and Robin Luckham, "Complex political emergencies and the state: failure and the fate of the state," *Third World Quarterly*, 20, 1, 1999, pp. 27–50; Holsti, 1996; Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

¹³A good introduction to Colombia's current political violence and the various actors involved is found in Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 345–370.

¹⁴Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).

¹⁵Jessica Matthews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs*, 76, 1, 1997, pp. 50–66.

¹⁶I have argued this previously in Ann Mason, "Exclusividad, autoridad y Estado," *Análisis Político*, 47, 2002, pp. 55–76.

¹⁷For an elaboration of the transregional security model see Arlene B. Tickner and Ann C. Mason, "Mapping Transregional Security Structures in the Andean Region," *Alternatives*, 28, 3, 2003 (forthcoming).

¹⁸The relationship between rents from illegal drugs and the internal conflict in Colombia is well established in Nizah Richani, *Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002).

¹⁹Alexander Wendt and Daniel Friedheim, "Hierarchy under Anarchy: Informal Empire and the East German State," *International Organization*, 49, 4, 1995, pp. 689–721.

²⁰This process is, nevertheless, highly uneven, and can be mediated by multiple factors. For an analysis of how domestic considerations led Colombia to adopt a confrontational position toward US demands on extradition during the Gaviria administration, see Tatiana Matthiesen, *El Arte Político de Conciliar: El Tema de las Drogas en las Relaciones entre Colombia y Estados Unidos, 1986–1994* (Bogotá: FESCOL-CEREC-Fedesarrollo, 2000).

²¹Curiously, even while various states in the US are considering the decriminalization of drug use for medicinal purposes, Colombia's current proposed political reform includes eliminating the "personal dosis" of illicit substances, which had been legalized by the Constitutional Court in 1994. On the construction of an anti-drug national security identity see David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

²²Robert Keohane, "The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and The Liberalism of Fear," in Craig Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley Timmer, eds., *Understanding September 11* (New York: The New Press, 2002), p. 85.

²³Barry Buzan, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations Reconsidered," in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., *I.R. Theory Today* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

Remembering Robert K. Merton

Craig Calhoun

Robert K. Merton, one of the towering figures on whose shoulders contemporary sociology rests, died Sunday, February 23rd. He was 92.

Merton was born July 4th, 1910, and his extraordinary life story evokes both the universalism of science and an American trajectory appropriate to the holiday birthday. Merton's parents were Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, and the future RKM was born Meyer R. Schkolnick. The family lived above his father's small dairy products shop in South Philadelphia until it burned down, without insurance, and his father became a carpenter's assistant. Merton's family lacked wealth, but he insisted his childhood did not lack opportunity—and cited such institutions as a very decent public high school and the library donated by Andrew Carnegie in which he first read *Tristram Shandy*. Indeed, suggested Merton in 1994, that seemingly deprived South Philadelphia slum provided "a youngster with every sort of capital—social capital, cultural capital, human capital, and, above all, what we may call public capital—that is, with every sort of capital except the personally financial."

Sorokin, founding chair of the Harvard sociology department. He applied to Harvard, even though his teachers told him this was usually beyond the reach of those graduating from Temple. And when he arrived, Sorokin took him on as a research assistant. By Merton's second year they were publishing together.

In addition to Sorokin, Merton apprenticed himself to the historian of science George Sarton—not just for his stay at Harvard but for years of the epistolary exchanges Merton loved. And—serendipity again (perhaps)—Merton decided to sit in on the first theory course offered by the young Talcott Parsons, just back from Europe and working through the ideas that would become *The Structure of Social Action*. The encounter with Parsons did not just inform his knowledge of European theory, but deepened his idea of sociology itself. Still, as he wrote later, "although much impressed by Parsons as a master-builder of sociological theory, I found myself departing from his mode of theorizing (as well as his mode of exposition)." Indeed, Merton was among the clearest and most careful prose stylists in sociology. He edited each essay over and again, and left

He remained intellectually active until the end of his life, a witty and engaged presence at conferences, energetic in using email to stay in touch with an extraordinary range of contacts, and still writing.

The name Robert King Merton evolved out of a teenage career as an amateur magician. Merton took up conjuring partly through taking his sister's boyfriend as a "role model" (to borrow a phrase literally his own). As his own skill improved, he sought a stage name, initially "Merlin." Advised that this was hackneyed, he changed it to Merton. Already devoted to tracing origins, he chose a first name after Robert Houdin, the French magician whose name Harry Houdini (himself originally Erich Weiss) had adapted. And when he won a scholarship to Temple College he was content to let the new name (with its echoes of one of the oldest and greatest colleges at each of Cambridge and Oxford) become permanent.

At Temple—a school founded for "the poor boys and girls of Philadelphia" and not yet fully accredited or matured into a university, he chanced on a wonderful undergraduate teacher. It was serendipity, the mature Merton insisted. The sociologist George E. Simpson took him on as a research assistant in a project on race and the media and introduced him not only to sociology but to Ralph Bunche and Franklin Frazier. Simpson also took Merton to the ASA annual meeting where he met Pitirim

behind added footnotes and revisions both large and small to a host of his writings. It was easy to imagine that he might have been a professional editor had he not been an academic.

Indeed, it is easy to imagine the young Merton turning in any of several directions. His first articles, written as a graduate student and published in 1934–5, addressed "Recent French Sociology," "The Course of Arabian Intellectual Development, 700–1300 A.D.," "Fluctuations in the Rate of Industrial Invention," and "Science and Military Technique." They appeared in journals of sociology, the history of science, economics, and simply science. Ultimately, he wrote his first major study on *Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth Century England* (1938), and in the process helped to invent the sociology of science.

By the time he was 40, Merton was one of America's most influential social scientists and had embarked on a lengthy career at Columbia University. He was a member of the National Academy of Sciences and honored in a host of other ways. Since he had chosen sociology, he could not win a Nobel prize, of course, but his son did.

And at 90, Merton the father would call on his son for help learning enough new mathematics to read exciting work by younger colleagues like Duncan Watts. He remained intellectually active until the end of his life, a witty and engaged presence at conferences, energetic in using email to stay in touch with an extraordinary range of contacts, and still writing.


Merton was perhaps the last of an extraordinary generation of sociologists whose work shaped the basic definition of the discipline in the mid-20th century. Along with Parsons, he helped make Emile Durkheim's notion of functional analysis central to the field—though Merton preferred to speak of "structural-functional analysis" and tried to avoid reduction of an approach to an orthodoxy or "ism." Merton eschewed the building of grand theoretical systems in favor of what he called "middle-range theories" designed to guide empirical inquiry. He made famous the distinction of "manifest" from "latent" functions, denied that social cohesion could be assumed as "normal," and gave analysis of social conflict more attention than did Parsons, though not enough to escape the widespread criticism of functionalism that started in the 1960s.

A crucial argument of Merton's early work was that science is misunderstood as the product of individual geniuses able to break free from conventions and norms. Instead, he stressed the "ethos of science," the normative structure specific to the field that encouraged productivity, critical thinking, and pursuit of continually improved understanding. He was not always happy when students left the Mertonian fold in their efforts to push sociology forward, but he did always recognize that this was how science worked.

Sociology of science remained the field closest to Merton's heart. But his contributions also deeply shaped the later development of such disparate fields of study as bureaucracy, deviance, communications, social psychology, social stratification, and indeed social structure itself. Indeed, his work was pivotal to the emergence of some of these as subfields. In the course of his simultaneously theoretical and empirical analyses, Merton coined such now-common phrases as "self-fulfilling prophecy" and "role model."

Somewhat surprisingly for a theorist, Merton was also one of the pioneers of modern policy research. He studied an integrated housing project, did a case study of the use of social research by the AT&T Corporation, and analyzed medical education. Most famously, working with his Columbia colleague Paul Lazarsfeld and a range of students and colleagues, he carried out studies of propaganda and mass communications during World War Two and wrote the classic, *Mass Persuasion* (1946).

Merton and Lazarsfeld formed an enormously productive partnership, training generations of students and developing a program of theoretically informed but empirically rigorous research. Among their most influen-



tial collaborations was *Continuities in Social Research: Studies in the Scope and Method of The American Soldier* (1950). This project, like several others, linked them to the SSRC. They also played crucial roles in the founding of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences—though not entirely synchronized in that case. Though Lazarsfeld was generally considered the methodologist of the pair, Merton also innovated in research methods, developing (with Marjorie Fiske and Patricia Kendall) the "focused group interview" that gave rise to the now-ubiquitous focus groups of political and market research. As Merton later remarked, focus groups are no replacement for surveys based on representative samples. Still, he said, he wished he could be paid a royalty fee whenever the technique was used.

Merton's writings were not only broad ranging but extraordinarily influential. In addition to the virtues of clarity and sheer intellectual creativity, this was because they were addressed to working sociologists, providing an interpretation of the craft and tools for its improvement.

They were the ideal teaching tools for graduate students. While Merton wrote several important books, the extended essay was his chosen form and his classic book, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (originally published in 1949 and revised and expanded in 1957 and 1968), is a collection of some of his best. He worked hard to give each a precise organization, often offering a classificatory scheme to assist readers in applying his conceptualizations to different empirical phenomena. Frequently, he coined memorable phrases—as in a 1936 article entitled "the Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action."

Indeed, Merton not only coined but loved memorable phrases and the patterns of association and evocation in

er" lacked stature, or because the context wasn't ready, because a crucial connection wasn't made, or because an empirical or practical test wasn't identified. The role of chance connections—serendipity—in scientific breakthroughs became another enduring focus for Merton's boundless curiosity and careful scholarship. Though he recently allowed a manuscript on the topic to go to press, he did not regard it as finished work. One suspects that on this as so many of his themes he had innumerable more index cards squirreled away, footnotes waiting to be added.

Of course, as Merton showed, discoveries once well known could be forgotten, leading to rediscoveries, especially by the young. Some of Merton's own work has itself

Near the end of his life, Merton remarked on the oddity of living long enough to write contributions to the *festschriften* of so many of his students. The explanation was not mere longevity, of course, but the fact that he was extraordinarily influential as a teacher.

which they were passed on. One of his most famous books traces the phrase, "if I have seen farther it is by standing on the shoulders of giants," through centuries of use. The phrase is most commonly associated with Sir Isaac Newton, though with the widespread success of *On the Shoulders of Giants* (1965) Merton must be a very close second. What Merton showed with dazzling erudition and more than a few entertaining digressions was that the aphorism originated with Bernard of Chartres in the 12th century. This corrected not only those who cited merely Newton but those who credited the phrase to ancient authors, including apparently nonexistent ancient authors, perhaps thinking thereby to accord it greater dignity and impress readers with their Latin references (that South Philadelphia high school taught Merton four years of Latin).

Merton's book became famous enough to be known (at least among initiates) by the acronym "OTSOG." This was partly because it was so engagingly written, a scholarly detective story in the form of an epistolary novel, a compilation of associations and sometimes improbably connections that invited the allusion to Tristram Shandy in the subtitle. But it is also a serious inquiry into the phenomena of scholarly reference and citation, the development of reputations, and the place of science amid humane knowledge.

Merton continued to address the relationship between the first appearances of ideas and the occasions when they begin to have more serious influence, noting how many basic scientific advances were anticipated by "prediscoveries" that failed to change the way scientists thought. That in turn opened up the question of why this should be, whether in any specific case it was because the "prediscover-

er" lacked stature, or because the context wasn't ready, because a crucial connection wasn't made, or because an empirical or practical test wasn't identified. The role of chance connections—serendipity—in scientific breakthroughs became another enduring focus for Merton's boundless curiosity and careful scholarship. Though he recently allowed a manuscript on the topic to go to press, he did not regard it as finished work. One suspects that on this as so many of his themes he had innumerable more index cards squirreled away, footnotes waiting to be added.

Near the end of his life, Merton remarked on the oddity of living long enough to write contributions to the *festschriften* of so many of his students. The explanation was not mere longevity, of course, but the fact that he was extraordinarily influential as a teacher. As important as each was as an individual intellectual, both Merton and Lazarsfeld may have been even more important as mentors and animators of an intellectual community at Columbia—and indeed beyond, at the Social Science Research Council, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and the Russell Sage Foundation. Merton was a mentor to such disparate but important sociologists as Peter Blau, James Coleman, Lewis Coser, Rose Coser, Alvin Gouldner, Seymour Martin Lipset, Alice Rossi and Arthur Stinchcombe. He was equally influential in social studies of science, which became increasingly interdisciplinary, with students including Steven and Jonathan Cole, Harriett Zuckerman, and Thomas Gieryn. In the work of all, one can see not only Merton's specific ideas but the distinctive style of combining theory and research characteristic of Columbia sociology during his time there.

Robert Merton is survived by his wife and collaborator Harriett Zuckerman, by three children, nine grandchildren, and nine great-grandchildren—and by thousands of sociologists whose work is shaped every day by his. ■

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Merton Internalized

Alice S. Rossi

Bob Merton was a major intellectual mentor of mine, beginning in the years I spent in graduate training at Columbia, as both a Teaching Assistant and a Research Assistant of his. My years of residence at Columbia were brief—only the 3 years from 1947 through 1950—but their intellectual and professional influence were so great that in memory they seem closer to a decade than to a mere three years. I was also privileged to be a close observer of the interactions between Merton and my second most influential mentor, Paul Lazarsfeld. Any Columbia graduate student exposed to both of these major figures in sociology in those years has internalized important lessons from them: we were left with standards of excellence in our own subsequent careers that are difficult to reach. On the other hand, in retrospect, I think some of their students have achieved a greater integration of intellectual and methodological acuity than either Bob or Paul were able to attain in their own work.

rejection of the idea I shared with them. Only later did I learn that they were laughing in reaction to my suddenly slipping into a New Yorkese accent. Bob Merton laughed heartedly when I told him this story years later.

The most lasting influence of Bob Merton on my subsequent work was a project of ours when I served as his research assistant. He had lectured numerous times about the criteria we should keep in mind when reading a sociological study, or designing one's own. In marked contrast to an older model of sociology that kept to narrow criteria—"only social facts are needed to explain social facts"—Merton proposed four levels of analysis: cultural/historical, social structural, psychological, and physiological. I had numerous discussions with him about applying these levels of assessment to some sociological monographs, which became the subject of our project the following year.

Merton never made any systematic use of this four-

He convinced me for all time that nothing short of five or six drafts of a manuscript is likely to yield a polished product.

The first and foremost impression any graduate student of sociology at Columbia had of Robert Merton was the brilliance of his lectures. I took copious notes of his lectures, but it was in the quiet of Burgess Library when I added marginal comments on those notes that I was most excited by what he said as distinct from how he said it. In the library it was the exciting content that predominated as opposed to the great flair of his dramatic delivery that was so impressive. As his teaching assistant I wrote out more detailed notes and typed them up for his future use. Since his own notes were so extensive, I questioned why he wanted more notes from me. His answer provided a key to the brilliance of the lectures themselves: as he explained, the act of lecturing often triggered example after example that had not occurred to him while preparing his own notes, and he wanted a record of them. Suddenly I could remember and learn to note in the classroom the occasional pause while he looked off, and then with a rising, exciting voice, out would come a new, brilliant insight that added to the thesis he was proposing. I had a similar experience once in giving a lecture at the University of Chicago some years later, when I paused in the middle of a lecture to pursue a new idea that had hit me, and took off in a peroration sharing my insight with the audience. To my chagrin, the students laughed, which I took to be a

levels approach in his mature work. He was surprised to learn that, in an intellectual autobiographic essay I wrote years later, I attributed to that early project of ours my own growing interest in cross-disciplinary research, and in particular the inclusion of biological factors along with social structural and psychological variables in studies of adult development. With a wry smile, he mused that perhaps he should have followed through on that early project.

Just as influential on my subsequent work has been Merton's standards of excellence in written prose. When we worked together on what became the essay on reference group behavior that we published in 1950, he convinced me for all time that nothing short of five or six drafts of a manuscript is likely to yield a polished product.

I do believe that there was a special magic to having had both Merton and Lazarsfeld as early mentors. Over the course of the past fifty or more years, I continue to sense an *internalized Merton* when it comes to analytic linkages between disparate-seeming phenomena or to clarity and grace of writing style, and an *internalized Lazarsfeld* when it comes to elegance and simplicity of problem formulation and measurement of complex constructs. I would acknowledge that I was most influenced by Bob Merton, and my husband, Peter Rossi, would acknowledge Paul

Lazarsfeld as his most important mentor. We had many occasions on which to learn from each other during the six years we collaborated in a study of the parent-child relationship over the life course, on what became our jointly authored book, *Of Human Bonding* (1990). I think in our collaboration, we fulfilled the expectations our two

mentors held for us by blending the respective skills of these two master craftsmen of their discipline in theory, writing, method, and analysis. ■

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RKM's Lasting Example

Helga Nowotny

A tribute to a great mind—and a great man—can arise from an attempt at synthesis or originate in a specific, local memory. I go with the latter, in the firm belief that a small and personal episode may translate the mind and the person. When I arrived at Columbia University as a foreign graduate student in 1965 (although already with a doctorate from the University of Vienna), obviously I was also

Thus began for me, as undoubtedly for many others, a personal encounter between student and teacher that later developed into a sustained transatlantic friendship. What had impressed me in the first encounter was the insatiable curiosity and the ambition to know which supported and was supported by it. Curiosity led him into many different directions, while being guided by the right kind of ambi-

In today's world which is literally “out of joint,” a broad vision is once more needed for the social sciences. RKM set a lasting example.

attracted to take the courses offered by the great teacher that RKM undoubtedly was. When exam time approached, RKM offered those in his class who wished to take on some additional work to come and see him. We spoke about my background and other topics before he handed me a manuscript of an empirical study into the living and working conditions of German workers in the late 19th century whose author turned out to be no less than Max Weber. The study had never been translated into English. Merton wanted me to summarize, analyze and comment upon it. I was fascinated.

tion: to find the strategic problem site and the strategic problem definition. Together, they would open up new avenues for exploration with enduring impact. In today's world which is literally “out of joint,” a broad vision is once more needed for the social sciences. RKM set a lasting example. It is for us to choose the next generation of problem definitions and strategic research sites. ■

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Merton, Teacher

Thomas F. Gieryn

Robert Merton had magic. He could turn a New York City taxi into a seminar room. To share a ride with Merton was to watch sociological discoveries in the making. He would never allow the cabby simply to drive. Instead, he engaged in conversation that always avoided condescension while managing to extract some aperçu that illustrated perfectly this or that pattern of social life. Merton never missed a pedagogic opportunity, and as his student and assistant during the mid-1970s, I had plenty of them. After he paid the fare and we hit the sidewalk, Merton would get my attention with his eye and smile: "Did you see, Tom...." just in case I had missed the point. I cannot now remember the substantive details of those little lessons, but the bigger lesson is with me still: ordinary social life is patterned, it is describable and interpretable with

good sociological concepts, theories can be confirmed by ordinary folks even on the fly.

We have lost a master teacher, whose lessons go far beyond structural-functional analysis or the normative structure of science or self-fulfilling prophecies or sociological ambivalence or role-sets or.... Merton leaves behind instructions for how (and why) to be a social scientist, not just how to do it. He epitomized the role of the scholar scientist, and by his example gave substance and purpose to the sociological calling. Merton demands so much of us, because he demanded so much of himself—perfection, and nothing less. When galley proofs arrived at Fayerweather 415, Merton would challenge me to find more typos than he could find. Funny, he always won this game (and I rationalized those consistent defeats

by suspecting that Merton counted not just corrected spellings and such but also stylistic rewritings that only he as author could make). He could find a typo in any book within five minutes, except in his own.

Merton in lecture was jazz, but not quite free-form. The lesson? Why, plainly: read everything (of course), and remember it well enough that you never need to fake it.

Merton in lecture was jazz, but not quite free-form. For three decades or more, he asked his assistant to take notes during the graduate course on social structures, and then type up the notes for later reference (and posterity). At the start of each lecture, Merton would go to the extreme upper-left corner of the board (which he could easily reach), and put up an outline that didn't seem to change much from week to week: "1. Unit-act. 2. Actor. 3. Conditions..." (lessons learned from his own teacher, Parsons). I also sensed that the outline did not change much from semester to semester, which made me wonder why it was so vital for me to take notes that surely did not vary much from those taken by decades of predecessors. But of course, that was wrong. The outline may have been a fixture, but the material covered on any day seemed like sheer sociological improvisation. Or so it appeared to the neophyte. Since Merton left little in life to chance, perhaps I confused spontaneity for disciplined imagination (he spent hours in the office before each class, crafting). The lesson here was not about status-sets and role-sets, but about the classroom as an occasion for creative intellectual activity, for working through new ideas that some day might be fit for print. Don't forget that.

The classroom is also a risk, where the lecturer is always vulnerable (even, or maybe especially, for one of Merton's stature). Some of his best riffs were in response to questions that were animated by a student's desire to trip him up or perhaps expose a bit of ignorance (i.e., score a point). I remember one question in particular about Merleau-Ponty (who had little or no relevance to the lecture that day), and as Merton took what seemed to be a very long time to compose a response, I began to sweat empathetically. Not to worry: for at least the next half-hour, Merton served up a primer on Merleau-Ponty and his significance for sociological thought, and I still keep my notes for that lecture just in case one of my own students puts me to the test. The lesson? Why, plainly: read everything (of course), and remember it well enough that you never need to fake it.

By 1975 or so, the seminar on sociology of science became increasingly interesting, as the field began to try on fashions that were not cut from Mertonian cloth. A manuscript arrived one day bearing a strange title, "The Sociology of a Brain Peptide," written by a French scholar

then unknown (but now with a considerable following). Merton asked me to look it over, and I reported back with complete bewilderment. He flipped through it himself, paused here and there, scowled, then tossed it in the trash:

"Pretentious mush." Well, one must read everything—but not all of it will be worth sustained attention. The scholarly life insists upon tough judgments of quality, and not every thought or book meets the very highest standards that Merton set for us. At times, the science seminar came close to humiliation in the name of education. Once, a draft paper of mine, having been bloodied all over by Merton's red pen (it never ran dry, did it?), was made into an object lesson so that my fellow students could avoid its many flaws and infelicities. But it wasn't personal: "elegant variation" and "freight-train adjectives" were such common specimens of bad writing that they could be found in Fowler's *Modern English Usage* (which Merton may have consulted as often as Durkheim). The lesson: your penultimate draft probably isn't there yet.

Even Merton's scholarly writings are didactic, not as textbooks, but because they put on display the recursive processes of reading, thinking, analyzing data and writing. The now-normative style of citations was not well suited to what he wanted to accomplish with the anything-but-lowly footnote. In his book on the role of religion in stimulating seventeenth-century English science (lesson: do not settle for trivial problems, even in a dissertation), Merton uses a footnote to explain how his exploration of the salutary connections between Puritanism and early modern science was inspired by yet another footnote, in Max Weber's magisterial *Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (quoted in the German original). Imagine: two mere footnotes yielding perhaps the most enduring and debated theory in the history of science, eponymized as "the Merton Thesis."

Years later, and not that long ago, Merton did more magic—this time, for my young sons, with sleight of hand. The lesson I saw was not just prestidigitational: things are not what they seem! Social life is not chaotic, classroom teaching is not an interruption of creative thought, old books are not dust-collectors, good writing does not come easily, critical intellectual judgments may not be avoided, a passion for perfection is not perverse. Social scientists in this post-Mertonian world no longer argue over manifest and latent functions, or theories of the middle range. The man's bigger lessons, I hope, we never forget. ■

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Of My Master-at-a-Distance Turned Friend

Piotr Sztompka

Blaise Pascal once wrote that the birth of a great person is a most significant, though totally random event that may occur in the history of a society. One may paraphrase this by saying that to meet a great person is the most fortunate chance that may occur in an individual biography.

My chance came at the beginning of my academic career. After completing a Fulbright scholarship at the University of California, Berkeley, I published my first English-language book in 1974. In *System and Function*, I defended the functionalist approach against the then-current onslaught of radical, leftist criticism. Coming from a young Polish scholar, from behind the Iron Curtain, such ideas caused some heads to turn. One of these was Robert K. Merton's. Some time later, upon returning to Poland, I received a letter relaying his interest in my ideas, as well as his wondrous offer of a series of summer school appointments at Columbia University in order to bring me to New York so that we could discuss my work.

One hot and humid summer day, I appeared at Fayerweather Hall at a small departmental reception and was

personally. He was a true "role model," as he might put it in his theory. I learned from him not only a wealth of ideas, but, most importantly, the manner and style of doing sociology—truly classic, analytical, precise, balanced, avoiding dogmatism and extremes. Short of becoming a latter day Joseph Conrad, I could not even dream of emulating his mastery of the English language, but a souvenir he handed me one day—the *Fowler's Dictionary of Modern English Usage*—bears an encouraging handwritten inscription: "For Piotr, to help him on his way to become a stylist in the English language." I have been trying ever since. I have also attempted to acquire his perspective on moral, political, and human issues which he always generously shared—showing true concern, too, for quite private and personal problems such as living under martial law in 1981, or tending for my nonogenarian mother over the past decade.

My chances to reciprocate have come twice. The first was given me when Anthony Giddens requested that I author an intellectual biography of Merton for the series

I learned from him not only a wealth of ideas, but, most importantly, the manner and style of doing sociology—truly classic, analytical, precise, balanced, avoiding dogmatism and extremes.

introduced to a tall, handsome, slightly gray-haired gentleman in a tweed jacket and an ascot instead of the *de rigueur* tie. He was the center of attention, surrounded by most of the company present, and yet he was at once friendly and open, easygoing and helpful.

Following that first one came numerous subsequent meetings at his Riverside Drive apartment overflowing with books and manuscripts, with all manner of papers on the floor and a gallery of pictures on the walls. The portraits represented the great scholars—of sociology but also of the hard sciences—with whom he collaborated and corresponded.

Shortly thereafter, in typical American fashion, he began to address me on a first name basis, as "Piotr," and requested likewise. My traditional Polish upbringing, however, did not permit me the outrageous familiarity of "Bob" as most of his friends called him. The most I could force myself to utter was "Robert." He graciously accepted my reservations and this remained our own special secret until the end of his days. He always remembered who he was to me: all the correspondence that I received closed with an affectionately signed "Robert."

Over the years, Merton became perhaps the most significant influence on my life—intellectually as well as

entitled "Theoretical traditions in the social sciences." This offer came in the gloomy winter of 1981 when, once more, Polish dreams of freedom and democracy had been dashed by the communist regime's crushing of the "Solidarnosc" movement. The opportunity to escape from the sad realities of the day into the realm of pure ideas was more than welcome. At that time we called such work an "internal exile." The task naturally mandated reading, at last, all that Merton had ever written, as well as everything that had been written about him. A sizable library it was indeed. This was the most instructive course in social theory that I had ever taken. When the book appeared in 1986 Merton was clearly pleased, purchasing thirty copies for his friends. Furthermore, he noticed that the logical connections I had discovered amongst his works unveiled a coherent theoretical system, rather than merely a brilliant mosaic as earlier commentators had tended to view it. "You plainly understand what I have been up to over the years, and in places more profoundly so than I did at the time of writing—and sometimes since," he penned in one of his letters.

The second opportunity came some years later when my master-at-a-distance was receiving his twenty-second in an amazing row of honorary doctoral degrees—this

time from my alma mater, the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. I played the part of the *promotor rite constitutus* and remember how proud I was to read—in Latin at that solemn ceremony in the mediaeval hall of the *Collegium Maius*—an extensive appraisal of his accomplishments. In response, in turn, he munificently referred to Bronislaw Malinowski and Florian Znaniecki among his own masters, as well as to Stanislaw Ossowski, Stefan Nowak and myself as his longtime Polish friends.

He preserved good memories of his visit to my city. Years later he sent me an amusing advertisement for LOT Polish Airlines, clipped from a *New Yorker* magazine: "Fly to Krakow, the city of Paris cafes without the Parisians." On yet another occasion, he forwarded a picture of the monument to the Polish King Ladislaus Jagiello, the founder of my University, raised somewhere in Central Park.

He was famous for his epistolary talents, and I keep and cherish a fat file of correspondence I have received from him over the years. Each letter contains some piece of wisdom phrased in witty and colorful prose and coined in meticulous and pedantic form. The earliest were typed on his IBM Selectric typewriter; the latest—after a period of

struggle against his writing habits—were processed beautifully on an Apple Macintosh. The enthusiasm with which he embraced computer technology at a very late age became obvious when e-mails, with his most recent works as attachments, started flowing into my inbox. The last such correspondence proudly referred to the 2003 Italian edition of his new book, *Travels and Adventures of Serendipity*.

I recall vividly the last occasion when we met. It is the end of the nineties; it is a sunny but chilly New York day in October. We are walking together along Broadway to his favorite lunch place. Merton walks briskly in a light tweed jacket and a small cap, ignoring the wind and cold. Myself, I am freezing in an overcoat. A blue bus stops at a sizable distance from us. "Let's catch it," he says and runs like a youngster, bounding onto the bus steps just in time. He was already in his late eighties.

Nothing but cancer could have defeated his body. Nothing, however, will defeat his heritage of ideas. ■

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Editing with Merton

David L. Sills

It has been my great privilege and good fortune to have known Bob Merton for 52 years:

- As a graduate student (Columbia, sociology).
- As a neighbor (Hastings-on-Hudson, New York).
- As a colleague (Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia).
- As a correspondent (certainly his letters rival those of Charles Darwin!).
- As a co-author (of an article on the Kelvin Dictum among others).
- As a co-editor (of *Social Science Quotations*).
- As a friend (who can put all that that means in parentheses?).

Each of these relationships could be described at article length—one might even say book length—but since the space allotted to me is limited, I will focus here upon only one: our co-editorship of *Social Science Quotations*.¹ My goal is to describe important aspects of the unique Merton work style and erudition by recalling his participation in this joint editorial project.

Getting started

Why I made the wild decision in 1986 to edit a book of social science quotations is a little unclear now, 17 years

later, but a major determinant was probably a co-authored article on the so-called Kelvin Dictum, published two years earlier. The first two sentences of the article, which were undoubtedly written by Bob, are the following:

The power of simple phrases, aphorisms, slogans, dicta—their ability to summarize, epitomize, exemplify, or even create complex programs of research or action—has long been recognized in politics. That they may play a similar role in the social sciences is also coming to be known.²

But another—more remote in time—origin of *Social Science Quotations* is Bob's having published 20 years earlier an entire book on the origin and fate of one famous quotation, Isaac Newton's remark that "If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants."³

With these publications as background, the next event in this saga was a telephone call that I made to Bob announcing my intention to raise funds for preparing a volume of social science quotations and asking him if he would serve as chairman of an editorial advisory board—the highest ranking position I could dream up. He hesitated during this call, as well as during the next few calls. It finally dawned on me that he didn't want a *ceremonial* assignment but a *working* one. Accordingly, I asked him to be co-editor, he shouted his immediate acceptance over the telephone, and four years of hard and exciting work began.

What to name the baby?

Bob and I had often discussed *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations* in our conversations over the years and my files revealed that we soon called our projected volume *Bartlett's II*. But as soon as we settled on its official name—*Social Science Quotations*—"SSQ" became its in-house code name.

The subtitle—*Who Said What, When, and Where*—was created because we decided very early that—in contrast to the practice of the editors of most books of quotations, including *Bartlett's*—we would describe the author of each quotation by nationality, dates, and occupation or profession. The date, source, and page of each quotation would be in the text, while the end-of-the-book Bibliography would give the full documentation. This meticulous documentation cost us a lot of editorial and xeroxing time, but we were never sorry that we did it.

Quotations by non-social scientists

One important feature of *Social Science Quotations* that Bob insisted on is that it include quotations on society and the social sciences drawn from the writings of other than social scientists—providing only that each quotation contained what might be called a social science proposition. Examples of such authors include poets (Auden on Freud: "To us he is no more a person now but a whole climate of opinion"); novelists (Tolstoy in *Anna Karenina*: "Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way"); dramatists (Shakespeare in *As You Like It*: "All the world's a stage and all the men and women merely players"); philosophers (Wittgenstein's "The world is all that is the case"); political figures (Bismarck's "Politics is the art of the possible"); revolutionaries (Lenin's "Politics begin where the masses are, not where there are thousands, but where there are millions, that is where serious politics begin"); and physicists (Einstein's "The Lord is subtle, but he is not malicious").

A sample RKM memorandum

Preparing this article required my examining my SSQ files, a necessary, sometimes painful, and yet joyous experience. Each letter, each memorandum, and each one of Bob's annotations on my memoranda was a warm bath in nostalgia. On July 26, 1989, for example, Bob sent me one of his many memoranda, which were often keyed to xeroxed copies of quotations. (This 1989 memorandum states that it is being sent from "East Hampton, Shangri-La." Bob presumably had also remembered that when President Roosevelt was asked at a press conference to reveal from where the bombers used during General Doolittle's famous April 1942 air raid of Tokyo were launched, he replied, with his famous grin, "Shangri-La!")

This 1989 memorandum has 27 numbered paragraphs; I

can include only 10 of them here. The quotations underlying his queries are not given, even if they were located (many were not); the point of this display is to illustrate the range of his inquiries. (I will follow his frequent practice of putting personal names in solid capital letters.)

Selections from a 1989 RKM memorandum

1. Who initiated the now-current phrase "rising expectations"? [It turned out to be TOCQUEVILLE.]
2. We should definitely include a quotation from KIERKEGAARD on concepts generally and perhaps the extended quotation on the concept of irony in particular.
3. We must include SIMMEL on the Caesar aphorism.
4. Have we done a search thru ISAIAH BERLIN, another eminently quotable & not merely eminent scholar?
5. We must include the OTTO NEURATH metaphor of rebuilding a ship on the open sea.
6. The CICERO source on the quotation for the comparison group for the survivors of shipwrecks which he attributes to DIAGORAS: I'll want to check this with the DIAGORAS LAERTIUS version which I used in my very first published paper, "Recent French Sociology" (1934).
7. Must include WITTGENSTEIN on *The Golden Bough*.
8. Let's include this AUDEN jingle on MARX.
9. Here's a must from EDWARD GIBBON.
10. "Methodological individualism" is understandably attributed to KARL POPPER, since he elucidated it at great length.

Etcetera, etcetera!

Attached to this 27-paragraph memorandum was a clipping from the *New York Times*, reminding its readers that Karl Marx had once said that "the world will remember my boils." Bob had over-written in red ink this mock-serious comment: "A must of course!"

Echoes of quotations

I suspect it was Bob who invented the concept of quotation echoes: defined as subsequent uses of quotations, either deliberate or unintentional, acknowledged or unacknowledged. Some quotations become cultural heirlooms, passed from generation to generation. Here are some examples of echoes that we largely discovered accidentally in our search for appropriate quotations. We examined many more quotations than we could possibly

use, and if one of us hit upon an echo, it was cause for an immediate phone call.

Quotation: "The historian's one task is to tell the thing as it happened" (Lucian, 2nd century).

Echoes: (1) "This [history] wants only to show what actually happened [*wie es eigentlich gewesen*]" (Leopold von Ranke 1824). (2) "[The historian] may search for, but he cannot find, the 'objective truth' of history, or write it 'as it actually was'" (Charles A. Beard 1935).

Quotation: "Politics is fate" (Napoleon 1808).

Echoes: (1) "One might say here, varying a well-known saying of the great Napoleon: 'Anatomy is destiny'" (Freud 1912). (2) "Am I saying . . . that 'anatomy is destiny'? Yes" (Erik H. Erikson 1968).

Quotation: "One need not be a Caesar truly to understand Caesar" (Georg Simmel 1905).

Echoes: "As is often said, 'one need not be Caesar to understand Caesar'" (Max Weber 1913). (2) "I can under-

reference to him or her) is perhaps the perfect Mertonian concept: it describes a process throughout science that is simultaneously happening to many of his own phrases.

Titles also have echoes. The "theorist" Bob Merton and the "methodologist" Paul Lazarsfeld were colleagues at Columbia for 35 years; this unbroken and fruitful collaboration for such a long time is almost unmatched in the history of science. In 1975, Lazarsfeld published an article titled "Working with Merton." In 1998, Bob published an article that echoed that title: "Working with Lazarsfeld."⁴ I have provided a second echo by naming this article "Editing with Merton."

For the remainder of my life I will miss the joy of seeing and talking to Bob, including our frequent exchanges of discoveries of quotations and their echoes—a practice started in 1986 and continued until his death. My gratitude to him can never be fully expressed. Here I can only echo Hamlet's friend Horatio, who said to his dying friend, "Good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest."⁵ ■

Here I can only echo Hamlet's friend Horatio, who said to his dying friend, "Good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest."

stand the acts and motives of Caesar as well as of the cave-man" (Alfred Schutz 1942).

Quotation: "Politics are a smooth file, which cuts gradually" (Montesquieu 1748).

Echo: "Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards" (Max Weber 1919).

Quotation: "The survival of the fittest ... is that which Mr. Darwin has called 'natural selection'" (Herbert Spencer 1864–1867).

Echoes: (1) "The expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer of the Survival of the Fittest is more accurate" (Darwin [1859] 1869). (2) "The Principle of the Survival of the Fittest could be regarded as one vast generalisation of the Ricardian economics" (Keynes 1926).

Bob himself frequently created in the course of his publishing lifetime many concepts that had a specific reference at the time they were created but are now found as echoes in both social science publications and everyday speech. One finds such phrases as "self-fulfilling prophecy," "role model" and "unintended consequences" used as frequently in op-ed columns in the *New York Times* and on the *Oprah Winfrey Show* as in the halls of academia. In these halls, such Merton concepts as "manifest and latent functions" and "theories of the middle range" still on occasion find their way into discussions of contemporary issues.

"Obliteration [of source] by incorporation" (the process by which the words and ideas of an accomplished scholar are incorporated into the vocabulary of science without

David L. Sills, a sociologist, was an Executive Associate at the Council from 1973 until his retirement in December 1988. Among his other responsibilities during these 16 years, he served as editor of *Items*.

Endnotes

¹*Social Science Quotations: Who Said What, Where, and When*, edited by David L. Sills and Robert K. Merton, has thus far been published in three formats. In 1991, the Macmillan Company and the Free Press published it as Volume 19 of the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, volumes 1–18 of which had been edited by David L. Sills. Also in 1991, the Macmillan Company published it in a paperback edition entitled *The Macmillan Book of Social Science Quotations*. In 2000, Transaction Books published it in a paperback edition.

²The Kelvin Dictum was proclaimed by the British physicist Lord Kelvin in 1883; it has since become a popular motto for those natural and social scientists who believe that quantification is essential in order to establish proof. In Kelvin's words, "when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind." See Robert K. Merton, David L. Sills, and Stephen M. Stigler, "The Kelvin Dictum and Social Science: An Excursion into the History of an Idea," *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences*, Volume 20, October 1984, page 319.

³Robert K. Merton, *On the Shoulders of Giants: A Shandian Postscript*. New York: Free Press, 1965.

⁴Paul F. Lazarsfeld, "Working with Merton," pages 35–66 in Lewis A. Coser, editor, *The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1975; Robert K. Merton, "Working with Lazarsfeld: Notes and Contexts," pages 163–211 in Jacques Lautman et Bernard-Pierre Lécuyer, editors, *Paul Lazarsfeld (1901–1976): La sociologie de Vienne à New York*. Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1998. (Based upon a conference held at the Sorbonne in December 1994, at which papers were presented by Lazarsfeldians from eight countries.)

⁵William Shakespeare (1602) 1940 "The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark." In *The Complete Works of William Shakespeare*. New York: Garden City, Act V, Scene ii, page 778.

Word from the President

The last year has seen a US-led invasion of Iraq, major losses on the stock markets, travel restrictions based on SARS, and a host of other troubles. None of you will be surprised to know that these pose challenges to the SSRC. The challenges include raising funds, carrying on our work in an unsettled global context, and perhaps most centrally developing new programs that address pressing intellectual issues.

The last is the most important. The Council exists to encourage scientific innovation, to help important new lines of work achieve critical mass, to build new networks, and to help social scientists better address vital public issues. This is all the more important when the world is especially unsettled, but also more difficult.

In the midst of these pressures on social science—and demands for strong social science—Robert Merton died. He was a frequent collaborator in Council projects and a long-time friend. We pay tribute to his enormous contributions elsewhere in this issue. But here it is important to note the extent to which he, Paul Lazarsfeld, and their colleagues and students combined applied social science research with fundamental advances in theory and research methods. Their work stands as a powerful example of the extent to which academic research need not be distant from public concerns in order to be intellectually powerful and innovative.

A central commitment of the Council is to the idea that social science can produce necessary knowledge for citizens to understand their societies and policy makers to decide on crucial questions. Equally important, asking how well our existing intellectual frameworks grasp contemporary issues is one of the crucial pressures for improving those frameworks—and thus advancing science. Tackling issues from the social organization and impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic to the nature of contemporary global conflicts and the institutions that might contain them demands fundamental new science and direct engagement with practical issues at the same time—not a model of pure science first and applied science following. At the same time, it demands understanding the implications of different contexts and histories on the ways in which the practical challenges of disease or conflict appear and can be addressed.




At its January meeting, the SSRC Board of Directors made developing better social science on the HIV/AIDS pandemic and its consequences the Council's top new priority. It is worth recalling that the daily deaths from AIDS dwarf those from terrorism, the Iraq war, and SARS combined. Yet most of the time the pandemic is pushed from the front pages of newspapers—and it has not achieved sustained attention at the core of any social science disci-

pline. This is so despite the scale and significance of the social transformations it is engendering: collapse not just of communities and families but potentially of states, some of the largest public health interventions ever, enormous questions about governance, a huge group of orphans and deep questions about inter-

generational relations and cultural transmission. As the pandemic spreads to Russia, India, China and other countries, and beyond initially high risk groups in those countries, new questions arise not just about how to stem its transmission but about how it affects social structure, economic activity, culture, politics, and interpersonal relations. These effects in turn have implications for both the further spread of the disease and for the social order itself at domestic and international levels.

Research on AIDS is just as important for social science as for practical action. To start with, it should be a concern if one of the largest social issues in the world today doesn't figure in the core agendas of the social science disciplines and major interdisciplinary fields. And if this is true of AIDS specifically, it is also true of infectious diseases more generally. In addition, the processes of social change which AIDS causes or with which it is intertwined are among the best available empirical cases for studying fundamental social dynamics from risk behavior to the formation of social networks, the interrelationship of domestic governance to international intervention, gender relations and family structure to demographic imbalances among generations. Sadly, they may also be the best available occasions to study the collapse as well as the coping of social systems—of agricultural productivity, for example, or of ethnic traditions like funerals that have knit groups together for innumerable generations.

An initiative on HIV/AIDS will not simply create a separate, self-contained program of AIDS research within the Council, nor nurture such a field in social science. Rather, it will bring together social scientists to address the basic social dynamics and analytic problems raised by the AIDS pandemic. The experts needed are not just specialists on AIDS, but economists who study the labor force, anthropologists who study cultural reproduction, sociologists who specialize in demographic modeling, political scientists who do research on problems of governance at scales from the local through the national to the global. These specialists and many others are needed to complement the equally vital work of epidemiologists and biomedical researchers,



bringing into the field a crucial but largely missing social organizational perspective. Indeed, it is not too much to say that lives will be lost if AIDS is approached only in biomedical terms without attention to the social factors that shape patterns of infection and access to care, that intertwine AIDS with famine and armed conflict, that facilitate or thwart well-intentioned interventions.

Our initiative starts from recognition of basic changes in the pandemic and responses to it. It is not only large scale, it is long-term—and thus attention is needed to how people and social institutions cope with it or are changed by it. Though the global response is depressingly inadequate, it is still large, involves a range of different actors, and demands study in its own right. The availability of anti-retroviral drugs is not ending the epidemic, but it is changing it and creating new challenges—like determining how these should be distributed (an issue at once in distributive justice and material methods of implementation, in the relationship between public and private actors like health agencies and pharmaceutical companies, and an important test case for regimes of intellectual property rights and their relationship to development of new technologies). It affects issues of security—as for example both conflicts and peacekeeping forces become

other contexts. We don't promise transcendent unity among these groups—getting them simply to talk more to each other has been one of the holy grails pursued by previous Council presidents among many others. But the best way to get the knights to the round table may be not to propose discussion of methodological issues in the abstract, but to set to work on concrete analytic problems with real world implications. If we can make progress on this in the context of HIV/AIDS, it will benefit many different fields of social science.



We are developing new projects on a variety of topics from risk, to how "emergencies" are constructed and handled, to "stubborn inequalities" within as well as across regions of the world. Existing programs are reinventing themselves in new contexts, as for example the Global Security and Cooperation Program takes on questions of weapons of mass destruction and arms control in an era when the old structure of treaties and approaches developed in the Cold War no longer works. Staff from several different Council programs are collaborating in a project on Islam in Europe and America. And a project on reconceptualizing

Not all social science will or should aim to address both pressing public concerns and core intellectual problems at the same time. But projects that do both are basic to the Council's niche in social science.

part of transmission dynamics and also as the disruptions wrought by the disease shape further conflicts—and human security issues like famines. And among the most striking changes in the pandemic is that it is becoming increasingly female. This too raises fundamental questions about social processes as well as about the impact of the disease and action to mitigate its damage.

This new initiative doesn't arise in a vacuum inside the Council. On the contrary, it grows out of our African Regional Program but will also involve other regional programs and comparative research because the pandemic will play out differently in different contexts. The new initiative builds on previous work done in the Human Sexuality Program and on interdisciplinary health sciences. It will include work on issues of conflict and security, migration, economic development, and the role of philanthropic institutions—each of which draws on expertise and networks developed in other programs.

Work on HIV/AIDS may provide us with an occasion to support better connections among researchers with advanced modeling skills, those who deal in large quantitative data sets, those expert on the disease as such, and those with serious knowledge of specific cultural, political, and

public spheres in the Middle East and North Africa initiated a year ago grows simultaneously more interesting, more important, and more difficult.

Here we see something of the challenge of global conflicts and crises. The US invasion of Iraq has been a concern to scholars around the region and around the world, not just because of its potential political consequences, but also because of its impact on scholarship itself. The destruction of the Iraqi national museum and national library—and the failure of the US military to protect them despite ample advance warnings and requests, even from other parts of the US government—give a dramatic example of how the war brought intellectual and cultural as well as material losses. Whatever comes in the war's wake, whether the US occupies Iraq for years or forgets to honor its commitments as in Afghanistan, whether secular democracy or militant Islam is ascendant, the implications for scholarly collaboration and research are substantial and not well-recognized outside of specialist groups. And yet, disruption in scholarship and intellectual exchange is not merely an academic matter. It directly undermines the development of public spheres, both as the underpinnings of democratic governments and as sources of international understanding.

The Council has for nearly a decade been devoted to building international networks of social scientists, creating spaces for nurturing intellectual communication that couldn't happen elsewhere and collaborative research that brings forward not only new knowledge but new intellectual perspectives. This work is deeply challenged, and not only in the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq comes amid a range of new obstacles to international cooperation and communication. In the wake of 9/11, border controls were tightened around the world and especially in the US and Europe—with the result that it is dramatically harder for international scholars to meet. The issue is not just formal regulations—some draconian enough—but informal policies that impose delays of months before visas that should be routine are granted, that create an atmosphere of insecurity and intimidation that makes scholars from many places (or of many skin colors) think twice about travel. Onerous new regulations govern foreign students. These sources of friction add to more public issues in creating anxiety about American hegemony. Scholars who would like to build international connections are also inhibited by popular and governmental reactions to the US and perceptions that seeking better relations among scholars of many countries may be betraying loyalties at home.



One of the demands of the current moment is for strengthening international connections among scholars, building arenas in which intellectual discussion can support democratic public life and collaborative research can explore challenges such as those of HIV/AIDS and the world's many conflicts. It is ironic, thus, that at the very moment when such connections are sorely needed support for them is at a low ebb.

Declines of up to 40% in their portfolios have led many foundations to reduce their budgets. This hurts the Council, along with other grantees, but all-in-all it is gratifying to see how much our work is still valued. At the same time, many foundations have shifted their foci from support for long-term development of academic fields towards more immediate interventions in public affairs, including efforts to reduce inequality and address ecological, humanitarian and other crises. This also has an effect on the Council, not just in net budgetary terms but in terms of which of our intellectual projects meet with more interest from funders.

In fact, there is a lot of social science research that bears directly on key public issues and there could well be more and better. There is also real danger that in the effort to solve the world's problems by next week, many funders (and policy-makers, activists and others) will choose strategies that fail (and whose failure could have been predicted or avoided), will fail to anticipate unfortunate consequences, and will fail even to document their work in ways that provide a basis for its continued evaluation and future study—and thus for effective learning from current experi-

ence in planning for future interventions. We don't have a realistic option of simply complaining that funders are often short-sighted and hoping they come around to valuing social science for its own intrinsic loveliness. We do have a chance to demonstrate that social science can provide the best way to understand the consequences and effectiveness of various kinds of interventions into public issues. And we have the chance both to help social science play a more effective role in public affairs and organize projects that can bring real advances on core intellectual themes of social science. These two goals need not be opposed as “applied” to “pure” science, policy research to basic research. The oppositions are misleading and potentially pernicious. Research of fundamental intellectual importance can nonetheless address real world issues. And research on key pressing practical issues can inform scholarly debates and public discussion, not only the internal deliberations and actions of policy-makers.

Not all social science will or should aim to address both pressing public concerns and core intellectual problems at the same time. But projects that do both are basic to the Council's niche in social science. They may be crucial to the future of social science. And, as the example of Robert Merton suggests, they have been fundamental to intellectual achievements of the past. ■

Craig Calhoun

MELLON GRANT MATCHES ENDOWMENT GIFTS FROM INDIVIDUALS

The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation has awarded the SSRC a one million dollar grant that will be used to match individual contributions to the Council's endowment for innovation and new initiatives. With this match individuals are able to double the value of their gift to support the Council's efforts to address pressing public concerns and core intellectual problems in the social sciences.

For additional information, please contact: John Meyers, Director of Development, meyers@ssrc.org 212-377-2700, x535.

Scholarship and Practice in the Transitions to a Knowledge Society

By Ernest J. Wilson III

“**I**nformation Society," "Information Revolution," "Knowledge Society," "Third Wave," "Informatization" and "Network Society" are terms used by a widening circle of intellectuals around the world to capture changes in the relationships between new information and communications technologies and the societies in which they emerge. The terms now appear with greater frequency in the titles of social science books and articles and as the topics of panels at professional meetings. Research findings consistently demonstrate a trend toward greater knowledge-intensiveness in all societies around the world, although at very different rates and starting from different bases (Rodriguez and Wilson 2000) (Wilson and Wong 2003). Yet, the secular trends are clear—everywhere, physical labor is replaced more and more by knowledge, and knowledge-related services account for growing shares of employment and Gross Domestic Product. If there is not yet full agreement on the single most appropriate term to describe these societal changes, there is widespread agreement on the broad global trends.¹

Still, sociologists, political scientists, economists, anthropologists and others struggle to apply these broad macro-notions in their own empirical research, linking aggregate, society-wide trends to organizational or individual outcomes. Equally problematic is linking these broad macro-shifts with the pragmatic concerns of practitioners in public, private or civil society sectors. In this essay I offer a way to frame these diverse and often contradictory interactions, concentrating especially on the micro-motives and behaviors of multiple individuals across four main knowledge-producing and consuming sectors central to the transition toward more knowledge-intensive societies. I point to a four-sided social formation—a Quad—that has emerged at the heart of the still-inchoate knowledge society.

The Quad

The Quad, whether in Beijing, Bangalore or Cambridge, is a network of sustained interactions among variously competing and cooperating elites. It is built on mutual self-interest and on trust, which are at the heart of the social architecture undergirding the technological architecture. These elites in government, private firms, non-governmental organizations and research bodies together form the core intellectual driving force and the principal political coalition for a distributed, transparent and non-hierarchical technological architecture of information and communications.

In order to achieve a new technological architecture, information champions who constitute the Quad press for a new social architecture to launch and sustain it. Though operating within the confines of the information and communications technology (ICT) sector, the Quad leaders

often support broad institutional reform that can reduce monopoly, state controls, and hierarchy more broadly across society.

The Quad is at the heart of the transition toward knowledge-intensive societies in two ways. In temporal terms, Quad members are the first dozen or so individuals in a country who champion the bottom up, anti-monopoly vision of the distributed network of the Internet that provides the underlying infrastructure for the knowledge-intensive society. They are the "first movers," literally present at the creation, who design and build the first ICT networks (Rogers 1995). Second, they are central in social and political terms, forming the kernel of what later may become a pro-reform coalition and constituency against the entrenched "information conservatives" who seek to maintain state-owned highly centralized telecoms and broadcast monopolies. These information champions play David to the state's Goliath.

While the Quad is central temporally and socio-politically, by itself the term cannot convey the richness and range of "the knowledge society." A more sophisticated conception requires greater attention to the *structural features* of the transition, and to the fundamental role played by broad, newly emerging *societal networks*. Thus, the knowledge-intensive society consists of the three complementary features of structure, society-wide networks, and micro-motives and micro-behaviors organized into Quads.² Because scholars have addressed the structural and network elements of the knowledge society more extensively, I will only briefly discuss their relevance to transitions to knowledge-intensive societies and will concentrate instead on the micro-motives and micro-behaviors of the Quad.

Structure. It is logical and empirically accurate to assume that the US or Sweden, which are among the most knowledge-based societies in the world, will have more in common than the ubiquity of cell phones—they exhibit certain commonalities in their underlying economic, social and cultural structures which indicate the character of knowledge societies. The economic structure of an ideal typical, fully realized knowledge society will have a large information sector (measured through contribution to GDP or employment shares), a robust but modest-sized manufacturing sector, and a small agricultural sector. They will possess social and demographic structures to match—professional classes composed of many service and knowledge workers like scientists and engineers. A knowledge society structured around these production and demographic conditions will also have post-industrial cultural values that sustain modern forms of knowledge production, distribution and use.

Networks. All the leading "knowledge society" theorists point to the quantitative and qualitative importance of social networks. Some, like Castells, or Arquilla and Ronfeldt, and to some extent Daniel Bell (who helped spark these debates in the mid 1970s with the publication of his *The Coming of Post Industrial Society*), see these widely distributed, interconnected and non-hierarchical patterns as the single most important component of the new society. Manuel Castells states quite explicitly that:

"[a]s an historical trend, dominant functions and processes in the information age are increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of our societies, and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processes of production, experience, power and culture. While the networking form of social organization has existed in other times and spaces, the new information technology paradigm provides the material basis for its pervasive expansion throughout the entire social structure...." (Castells 1998, 469).

Parallel work in other fields affirms the critical importance of networks as a major component of the knowledge society. This includes Wayne Baker's research on new business networks that link private sector leaders across sectors and firms (1994); networks in warfare (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1999); in sustaining social capital (Portes 1998); in facilitating organizational communications (Monge and Contractor 2001); and more generally as an essential element and metaphor of modern society (Barabasi 2002).

Micro-Level Interactions—the Quad. As essential as structure and networks are for understanding the new societies, they tend to obscure a critical third factor: the absolute centrality of individual action and agency in the diffusion of technologies and their impacts—or not—on the society in which they are embedded. This is by far one of the most fascinating if underestimated elements of the information revolution.

Understanding the initial individual innovators, the early adopters, the impatient policy entrepreneurs and the itchy intellectual leaders who first launched the information revolution in their countries is absolutely essential for explicating the subsequent path of the information revolution in any country. After all, one cannot have a revolution without revolutionaries. Understanding this element of the transformations requires the scholar to move beyond the aggregate and structural, to carefully study the *micro-motives* and *micro-behaviors* of the individual women and men who make the revolution. Indeed, viewing the new digital "technologies" through the eyes of these individuals leads one to re-interpret "ICT" anew as bundles of scarce resources over which individuals and small groups compete, conflict, and occasionally cooperate in order to pursue their own narrow, and occasionally collective, good. We thereby gain a powerful conceptual lever to explicate the pulls and tugs of competing social and political forces that ultimately shape technological diffusion.

Redefined in this way, one can tell a story of the "information champions" from China to Brazil, to Ghana and even in Silicon Valley, as they have created alliances with other like-minded individuals to pursue common ends. (Indeed, Silicon Valley provides a classical case of quad behaviors [Saxenian 1994].) Given the rapid pace of change of highly networked technologies; because new ICT resources are so unfamiliar; because they require substantial and continuous inputs from different sources to work effectively, including a reliable regulatory and legal framework—the champions in one sector are forced to reach out to other enthusiasts in other sectors to achieve their own narrow purposes as well as collective ones.

In the three countries I have studied in the greatest depth, the champions in China, Brazil and Ghana developed a value system built on bottom-up localism, openness and distributed power. Very quickly these enthusiasts, beginning everywhere in the research community, discovered they were vigorously and consistently opposed by entrenched elites who preferred simply to extend the top down, monopolistic, concentrated rules they had always known and benefited from and who tried at every turn to beat back the champions of the liberal project. The information revolutionaries needed allies if they were to supplant information conservatives and survive their counterattacks. The successful champions have employed sophisticated techniques of strategic restructuring to alter bureaucratic and market rules, regulations and incentives to decisively shift subsequent choices and behaviors toward their preferred, more liberal, ICT outcomes.

For all these reasons—tactical, strategic, technological, political—successful information champions have tended to form multi-sided inter-elite linkages to pursue their common ends. These are Quads. They regroup individuals in public agencies, private firms, research units and occasionally from non-governmental organizations. Over time, the Quads in some countries have become the kernel of a pro-diffusion political coalition that pushes the adoption and spread of ICT. In successful Quads, the links among the four nodes thicken and multiply. But at the beginning Quads are fragile, with no guarantees they will grow into vibrant, balanced, multi-directional and benign formations hospitable to ICT diffusion. In many poor countries like Ethiopia the powerful monopolists triumph and ICT diffusion is stunted. But once launched, the more robust the Quad, the better the ICT system will perform. Quads are essential for the emergence of a more information—and knowledge—rich society, and must be central to explaining it.

This multi-part conception of structure, networks and Quads does not make the teleological assumption that every country inevitably will become a knowledge society; after all, most countries in the world have not even become industrial societies. Instead, it emphasizes *possible multiple transitions toward* more knowledge-intensive societies, societies that to differing degrees will demonstrate the three components I describe. Some countries, like the US or Sweden, have gone

the farthest in transitioning towards "knowledge societies" based on the criteria cited above. Yet even the poorest countries are becoming more knowledge-intensive.

The Quad concept makes several unique contributions to explaining the knowledge society. Because many other models tend to concentrate on macro-level and aggregate phenomena, they underestimate individual level dynamics that are so crucial in the early stages of social transition when structures are apt to change. When models do introduce individual level analysis they often rely on flawed a-political and technocratic assumptions about the causes of societal dynamics. They assume all the relevant ICT parties share normative, material and political assumptions and work in harmony to advance the cause of ICT. By contrast, the Quad puts individual agency at the center of its explanations, assuming that transitions are driven by the self-interested actions of women and men who are as likely to disagree as to agree, thereby avoiding the techno-determinism of other formulations, and prompting the search for conflict as well as cooperation in ICT diffusion. The Quad assumes the play of interests in the efforts to use, control and own ICT resources. Indeed, an additional benefit of starting with a Quad perspective is that it leads one to interpret "information technology" not as a disembodied, autonomous thing, but as a scarce, desirable resource that individuals and groups seek to employ for their own advantage. Information conservatives do battle with information liberals to control the new resources. And in the process of creating conditions where these technologies can be employed, they engage in "structuration" (Giddens 1979) or what I prefer to call "strategic restructuring" through which they alter institutions, behaviors and eventually, over time, alter structures as well.

The Quad concept draws on certain other scholarly resources. This strategic restructuring component, like rational choice models, can be integrated well with macro and meso-level analytic models. Also, scholarly work on the Quad can draw from a rich theoretical literature on small group behavior from sociology, communications, economics, political science and anthropology. Some of this writing speaks to other forms of micro-network linkages (notably "iron triangles," "policy monopolies," "social webs," etc. [Baumgartner et al. 2000; and Berry 1989]). In terms of empirical research, there are fascinating cross-national and cross-community variations in Quad structure and dynamics that offer a rich source of comparative analysis and theorizing.

Finally, and somewhat unanticipated, when this model is presented to ICT practitioners, they have interpreted the

construct as intuitively correct and directly relevant to their own professional experiences. Indeed, for many, the Quad became a way to frame and interpret their own practice, and improve their own performance by pursuing ties with other Quad nodes more strategically.

Linking Knowledge and Practice in a Knowledge Society

As I conducted this research among ICT experts in Brazil, China and Ghana I regularly gave presentations and seminars to local scholars and practitioners. I was surprised how much the Quad concept elicited very positive and high-energy responses from both groups, including information champions in business, civil society and government. Once back in the US I wondered whether one could extend and deepen our understanding of the phenomenon through more deliberate, sustained and structured exchanges among Quad members.

These questions were relevant to my efforts to build links between researchers and practitioners for the Social Science Research Council's broader effort in this area, the Information Technology and International Cooperation Program. To this end the SSRC organized³ two large meetings, in Washington and Budapest, with individuals representing each of the Quad nodes, and from countries as varied as Brazil, Canada, China, Hungary, India, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, South Africa, Tunisia and the United States; NGOs like the Associa-

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tion for Progressive Communications and the Center for Democratic Technology; private companies like Fujitsu and PCCW in China; and bodies like the World Bank and the International Telecommunications Union. There were exciting wide-ranging discussions covering not only the creation, distribution and use of new, "necessary" knowledge in the transition to more knowledge-intensive societies, but also difficult governance relationships among Quad members under very different circumstances—local, national, regional, functional and global.

These many-sided, often heated conversations yielded findings that are directly relevant, I believe, to the design and conduct of research projects by scholars. There were insights about our work as individual scholars, and also about the broader research agendas that we debate and set, explicitly or de facto. Some insights are also potentially helpful to practitioners. (One initial lesson is that scholars cannot predict *a priori* the puzzles practitioners find most compelling; to find out, they actually need to talk to them.)

At these two meetings, private, public and NGO participants identified several key issues where they thought social

science would be useful—through better explanations of context, cause and effect, identification of best practices, and in calibrating their own "freedom of action" in a greatly constrained, quickly changing environment.


Context: Practitioners wanted to know what aspects of ICT and the information revolution are most important for the things they really care about in their work. They did not want more "facts" from scholars; they felt they are already drowning in facts; instead they wanted context and meaning. Participants sought out "the political hidden in the technical"; they wanted to discuss the distributional impacts (political as well as economic and social) of a particular arrangement of technology, and were impatient when researchers couldn't or wouldn't point them out.

Cause and effect: NGO participants were especially curious about the actual causal relationships between ICT and societal transformations. One admitted that though his job was to push the point that ICT and democracy are inextricably linked he would like to understand better the nuances and complexities of the relationship. Others asked how ICT innovation relates to social welfare, to economic growth, to power.

Best practices: Virtually everyone from every node in the Quad decried the absence of an accessible body of recorded "best practices" in their fields. They asked how other organizations *similarly situated* have addressed similar ICT challenges. Curiously, neither practitioners, applied researchers nor university-based scholars believe they have done an adequate job in this area.

Relevant Scholarly Findings: Traditional scholarly publications do not much address their practical concerns. Practitioners wondered if there are other forms of scholarship that would be more accessible. They wondered if web-based "policy briefs," which condense academic material and focus on actionable concerns, could meet such a need?⁴ What other products might bridge the divide between academics, policy makers and practitioners?

Freedom: The bottom line for most was "How much choice do I really have in this new digital world?" Many especially from poor countries questioned whether all their options are already determined by technology. They were deeply concerned with how much leeway they actually have to design systems of access or production that can meet their local needs. Others wondered about the extent to which international rules and treaties really shape daily domestic decisions for a government official, a private entrepreneur or a civil society leader.



THE QUAD

The Relevance For The Social Science Agenda

Social context, cause and effect, and determining the conditions under which human intention succeeds or fails ("best practices") are also classical scholarly concerns. "Freedom of action" is a meta-theme that runs throughout many of my field interviews and in the SSRC discussions, yet it remains strangely understudied by commentators. Translated into academic language, this is the age-old concern with the inevitable tensions between structure and agency. Through what mechanisms, for example, do structures constrain the construction of Quads by individuals? How do individual agents strategically restructure inherited elements of industrial society to construct the new elements of knowledge-intensive societies?

Clearly both structure and agency (and networks) constrain and enable, empower and disempower, but they do so selectively. It is not yet clear which individuals or groups are empowered relative to others during the transitions. The normative expectation is that the knowledge revolution will raise the poor and disenfranchised relative to the wealthy and well-positioned, achieved through the restructuring prompted by the diffusion of these new distributed technologies. But how much autonomy do the digital have-nots really enjoy relative to the new middle class information champions seeking liberal ICT diffusion, or to the monopolists seeking top down limited and controlled diffusion? These are partly empirical questions, of course, but whether in Accra or Beijing, they are better understood in the context of a more sophisticated, engaged and theoretical reconceptualization of the knowledge society.

Finally, it is certainly the case that most scholars by selection, training and taste do not work full time at the intersection of scholarship and practice. However, some do. For a minority of engaged scholars, their concern with "useful" or "necessary" knowledge partly shapes their research and writing agendas. Closer work through Quad relationships is one way to appeal to the interests of such engaged scholars, as well as a means to engage thoughtful practitioners in civil society, the private sector and government. In the final analysis, sophisticated and mutually respectful Quad relationships may help social science contribute usefully to individuals and communities struggling here at the front end of what may prove to be substantial and disruptive transitions on the road to knowledge-intensive societies.

Next Steps

Next steps flow logically from this argument about the importance of Quads for the transition to more knowledge-intensive societies. First, foundations, think tanks, universities and research bodies need to create more regular opportunities for members of the Quad, especially scholars and practitioners, to engage in serious discussions with one another, in order to explore when and how their ideas about the transition will necessarily be both contrasting and complementary. Second, within the academy there should be more deliberate, structured, sustained and interdisciplinary scholarly dialogue on the multiple meanings of the knowledge society. Third, one way to structure and inform the first two is through more theoretically driven, conceptually clear, comparative and empirically-based research on the emergence of the Quad as a unique social formation driving the transitions toward more knowledge-intensive societies.

For social scientists, puzzles about transitions toward a knowledge society should be deeply and doubly compelling, professionally and personally. On the one hand transitions and transformation have always been matters of reflection and investigation for the social science disciplines (in the lineage of Marx, Durkheim and Weber). At the same time, "knowledge creation and dissemination" is what we do and in many ways defines who we are as individuals. After all is said and done knowledge is the purpose and the subject of our professional lives. ■

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Endnotes

¹I use the conventional tri-partite distinctions among data, information and knowledge, in which data are isolated facts, information amounts to facts linked to some particular issue or interest, and knowledge is information that is deeply explicated and contextualized relative to conditions already known and understood. By extension the term "knowledge society" is distinct from "information society"; the former suggests greater

interactive complexity and richer value added than the term "information" society. I present an ideal-typical description of "knowledge society" below.

²My formulation draws from several sources, most notably, four years of field research with extensive interviews across multiple sectors that I conducted in Brazil, China, Ghana, India, Malaysia, South Africa and other countries (to be published as *The Information Revolution in Developing Countries*, MIT Press, Fall, 2003). It also draws on my extensive work on information society issues with the World Bank, Economic Commission for Africa, Global Business Dialogue, the Markle Foundation and developing country governments.

³The following were full partners in this initiative: William Drake, Visiting Senior Fellow, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland; Laura Forlano, project manager, and Robert Latham, program director, Information Technology and International Cooperation Program, SSRC; and Saskia Sassen, professor of sociology, University of Chicago and chair, Information Technology and International Cooperation Committee, SSRC.

⁴One such attempt to make policy briefs available to practitioners and the general public may be found at <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/itic/>. See page 39 of this issue for greater detail about the Information Technology and International Cooperation Program website.

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See page 39 of this issue for a snapshot of the website for the Program on Information Technology and International Cooperation.

Abe Fellowship Program

The Abe Fellowship Program held its annual Fellows' Retreat January 23–26, in Galveston, TX. The event, which included 14 fellows from the 1999, 2000 and 2001 cohorts, began with a dinner reception and keynote address by Arthur Helton, the director for Peace and Conflict Studies and Senior Fellow for Refugee Studies and Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. Mr. Helton's presentation on "The Price of Indifference: Recent Issues in Refugee Policy and Humanitarian Action" addressed the state of refugees as a global issue.

In addition to sessions in which small interdisciplinary groups of fellows offered each other critical feedback on their research and exchanged advice on problems they are facing in the conduct of their research, the 2003 retreat also included a plenary discussion followed by small group discussions of Alex Kerr's controversial book *Dogs and Demons: Tales from the Dark Side of Japan*, an analysis of troubling aspects of Japanese society.

Reggie Life's documentary film entitled *After America...After Japan* was also screened during the retreat. The screening was followed by a plenary discussion of the difficulties of repatriation to one's home country after a stay abroad along with issues of cultural identity and the effects of internationalism on individuals and societies.

The final plenary session, entitled "Discussion of Pros and Cons of Interdisciplinary Training and Research," sparked a lively discussion on the need to bridge the divisions between disciplines and overcome obstacles presented by the present infrastructure of academic institutions.

Reconciliation Between Japan and Asia

The Abe Fellowship Program held a public symposium and private workshop on January 30–February 1 at George Washington University, Washington, DC. The events were co-sponsored with the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) and GWU. Entitled "Reconciliation Between Japan and Asia: What is America's Role?" the symposium featured presentations by six speakers, including two Abe Fellows, on themes ranging from history writing and claims for redress, to reconciliation with China. The two-day

workshop was the first stage of a project on "Memory, Reconciliation, and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Implications for Japan-US Relations." Convened by Mike Mochizuki, George Washington University, and Charles Burgess, *San Francisco Chronicle*, the workshop was attended by scholars and practitioners from China, Germany, Japan, and the United States. Many controversial issues were discussed, such as war guilt, compensation, and how a nation honors its war dead. Differences of opinion and emphasis were aired.

Subsequently, Yoshihisa Komori, a journalist for the conservative *Sankei Shimbun* who participated in the events, wrote several articles that falsely portrayed the proceedings and writings of the participants as "anti-Japan." In March, the project was criticized in Japan's House of Councillors and three scholars were ridiculed as "anti-Japan." These attacks have raised basic questions about public funding and academic freedom in US-Japan intellectual exchange activities. While controversial, this workshop underlined one of

the original goals of the CGP-SSRC Seminar Series: to promote the honest exchange of opinions in order to engage and solve difficult issues. Both organizations remain committed to that objective.



Japanese Pop Culture on Chinese Campuses

The SSRC Tokyo office hosted an Abe Fellowship Program colloquium on March 20 on "Aspirations for a Middle-Class Lifestyle: Japanese Pop Culture on

Chinese Campuses." The presenters were fellow Yoshiko Nakano, the University of Hong Kong, and Wu Yongmei, Beijing Foreign Studies University. The commentator was Hirakawa Suehiro, University of Tokyo. Noting the increasing popularity since 1995 of Japanese television series showing the lifestyles of Tokyo singles, Nakano and Wu traced the diffusion of pirated versions to university campuses as students were gaining greater freedom to choose careers and more control over their futures. The speakers contended that Japanese TV series portraying relatively affluent, independent lifestyles have shaped elite Chinese aspirations.

Consumer Culture and its Discontents

The Abe Fellowship Program held a workshop on "Consumer Culture and its Discontents," April 9–11, in conjunction with the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partner-

ship under the CGP-SSRC Seminar Series. The meeting brought together 11 participants, including four Abe Fellows, from Japan, the UK, and the US. Sheldon Garon, Princeton University, and Patricia Maclachlan, University of Texas, were co-conveners. The major themes of the project include: critiques of consumption; consumption vs. savings; gender issues; relations between consumers, producers, and the State; consumer nationalism; and consumer identity and citizenship. The geographical spread—from Europe and North America, to Japan, South Korea, China, and Southeast Asia—ensures broad comparability. Equally diverse are the national models. While the US government exhorts citizens to use their plastic to gird the economy, despite high levels of consumer debt, for example, Singapore enforces a compulsory savings program that functions as a self-financed social security and mortgage fund. A second workshop, scheduled for January 2004 in Tokyo, Japan, will lead to an edited volume. The site, Arden Homestead in Harriman, New York, is pleasant and convenient. One caveat: the presence of deer ticks gives special meaning to a walk in the woods.

Africa Program

The Africa Program has commenced the third year of its African Youth in A Global Age fellowship program. The announcement for this year's competition, "Youth, HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation," has been widely distributed to African universities, research networks and institutes; youth NGOs and NGOs in general both in Africa and worldwide; African Studies departments at institutions worldwide; foundation offices in Africa and the US; and to scholars focusing on youth issues.

This year's fellowship is being organized jointly with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), and South Africa's National Research Foundation (NRF). Funding has been provided by the Education for Democracy and Development Initiative (EDDI) of the US Agency for International Development, CODESRIA, the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), and the NRF. Selections will be made in June.

Report on training and research collaboration

The Africa Program has recently posted to the web an important study on training and research collaborations between US and South African institutions. The Africa Program commissioned the study, with funding from the National Science Foundation, in an effort to gain a better understanding of existing gaps in US-South African collaborations and to contribute to the development of priorities for future collaborative activities. The study is based on content analysis of an existing database on US-South Africa higher education partnerships and additional primary research. The study was conducted by Dr. Beth Whitaker, currently an assistant professor of political science at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte. It may be found at ssrc.org/programs/africa/publications/finalreport.pdf

Economy and Society

Program in Applied Economics

The Program in Applied Economics (PAE) has recently announced a new funding opportunity for graduate students working in the area of Economic Development and Risk. The program is offering summer field research grants of up to \$5,000 in support of work that examines risk in the context of economic development, including questions of the nature of uncertainty, vulnerability, and risk-mitigating behavior within emerging economies and poverty enclaves. The new grants are part of the PAE's new focus on Risk and Uncertainty, which was launched with the program's 2002 Summer Workshop. Further information about the program's new direction and the summer research grants can be found at www.ssrc.org/pae.

Financing Technological Innovations

The program on Financing Technological Innovations held an "authors meeting" March 21-22, 2003, to discuss plans for an edited volume examining the historically diverse modes of finance enjoyed by technology inventors and entrepreneurs. Questions of key early sources of investment in technological innovation ran through much of the meeting, particularly in the context of late-19th and early-20th century economic development in the US. Other presentations addressed finance trends in the relatively new industries of biotechnology and computing, as well as the role of government in spurring technological change. These and other themes of the conference were informed by a diverse group of nearly 30 scholars and practitioners, whose disciplinary backgrounds included history, economics and sociology. The meeting was held at the Beckman Conference Center, on the campus of the University of California at Irvine.

Program on Global Security and Cooperation (GSC)

The Roundtable Series on War & Terrorism, an initiative of GSC Program Directors John Tirman and Itty Abraham, has resumed after the winter holidays with an interesting line-up of speakers. On January 28, Leon Sigal, director of the SSRC's Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project, discussed the effects of the "axis of evil" speech on relations with North Korea, the Bush administration's handling of the North Korean crisis, and alternative policy options. Mai Yamani of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, gave a talk entitled "War, Politics, and Reform in Saudi Arabia" on February 20. Kevin Clements, Secretary-General of International Alert, London, briefed the Washington audience on March 7 in a session called "The War on Terror, the War on Iraq: The Quest for Justice and Peace." He set the current Iraqi crisis in a broader context of contemporary international relations, pointing out its damaging impact on transatlantic relations, the EU integration project, democracy, and civil liberties. This session was co-sponsored by the SSRC and the Alliance for

International Conflict Resolution. The most recent roundtable convened on April 7 with a presentation by Prof. Dogu Ergil of Ankara University who offered a Turkish perspective on the effects of war in Iraq. The Series seeks to bring new voices to Washington, usually from regions involved in or affected by the "war on terrorism."

On February 4, the GSC Program, in partnership with Women Waging Peace, co-sponsored a lunch presentation by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Senior Consultant for Reconciliation at South Africa's Institute for Justice and Reconciliation and associate professor of psychology at the University of Cape Town. Ms. Gobodo-Madikizela served on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and developed the TRC's first outreach program, giving victims of human rights violations a chance to speak publicly about their abuses. Her talk highlighted the complex issues surrounding apology and forgiveness after mass atrocities.

Information Technology and International Cooperation Program (ITIC)

Intellectual Property in the Digital Era

The Information Technology and International Cooperation Program hosted a seminar on "Ownership, Stewardship and Property in a Digital Age" on January 22, 2003. The seminar, the first in a series of two, is part of Dr. Steve Weber's project on Open Source and the Political Economy of Cooperation in the Information Revolution. This research project is one of five supported by the Ford Foundation-funded Information Technology and Social Transformations initiative. Weber's goal is to broaden what has been a fairly limited and technical discussion about property and community in the digital era. He, and his collaborator Shari Cohen, are doing this by bringing together people who are participating in the debate over intellectual property in the digital era with experts from a variety of communities who also confront issues of community ownership, intellectual property, and stewardship. There were 20 participants including a rabbi, an historian of indigenous religion, an anthropologist, a lawyer and an art expert.

Information Technology and Social Transformations

Dr. Catherine Mann hosted a meeting titled "Diffusion and Effective Use of Information Technology: A Latin-Asian Dialogue on Initial Conditions and Policy Challenges" on February 3-4, 2003 at the Institute for International Economics. Dr. Mann is leading a research project of the same name that is part of the Ford Foundation-funded program on Information Technology and Social Transformations at the SSRC. The purpose of the meeting was to introduce research team members who will be collaborating on four joint papers in the coming months, and to get their initial observations on the topic. The themes for the joint papers are: the financial system as user and promoter of information technology; education and skill building to use technology effectively with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises; government

and fiscal systems and their use of information technology; and innovation and entrepreneurship in the new economy.

Albanian Research Team

On January 31, 2003, Robert Latham (program director, Information Technology and International Cooperation) hosted a distinguished group of Albanian research institute leaders for a general briefing on the Council's work. Organized by the US Department of State, the International Visitor Program sponsors meetings between US researchers and their foreign counterparts in an effort to share knowledge on how to "better approach and influence policy- and decision-makers in the process of shaping economic development." Representing Albania's Think Tank Administration were Ermelinda Meksi, chair of the Albanian Institute for Public Policies (and member of the Albanian parliament), Auron Pasha, director of the Institute for Research and Development Alternatives, Andia Shtepani of the Albanian Center for International Trade and Engjell Skreli, director of the above mentioned Albanian Institute for Public Policies.



The group discussed the nature and role of research institutions such as the SSRC in the US. The delegation was particularly interested in the relationship between research and policymaking, funding structures, and strategies for reaching wider public audiences.

International Dissertation Field Research Fellowships (IDRF)

23 fellows from the 2001 IDRF cohort convened in mild and sunny New Orleans from March 6-11 for the tenth fellow's workshop. The workshop is a requirement of the IDRF fellowship, and gives fellows the rare opportunity to present their work to a diverse group of peers, as well as offering them a chance to establish an intellectual network that is both cross-disciplinary and cross-regional. In addition, the workshop is a forum for fellows to receive constructive feedback on their research from facilitators and other participants, and to converse about writing-up strategies and academic life after the dissertation.

On the opening day, the fellows, who came from all parts of the world, met in interdisciplinary groups organized by common themes in order to prepare panel presentations. They then spent a challenging and rewarding three days discussing their disparate projects with the larger group, making attempts to bridge the disjunctures between their

respective methodologies in order to see the broader implications and themes of their work. Anne Blackburn (Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University) and Harry West (Anthropology Department, New School) acted as facilitators, and, together with IDRF staff, chaired the panel presentations.

2003-2004 fellowship cycle

The selection committee of the International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship program convened for its seventh annual meeting and awarded 50 provisional grants to applicants from the 2003-2004 fellowship cycle. The fourteen-member committee, comprised of scholars from a diversity of fields in the social sciences and humanities, reviewed 103 proposals during its two and a half day session on April 10-12 at SSRC offices in New York. The proposals were selected as finalists by the IDRF's network of over 140 screeners from an initial pool of 824 applications.



The new cohort of IDRF fellows represents 29 universities and 15 disciplines or fields of study: history, anthropology, sociology, geography, ethnomusicology, archaeology, Middle Eastern studies, political science, art history, architecture, East Asian studies, economics, environmental studies, literature, philosophy, public policy, and religion. The cohort will be doing research in all areas of the world. A notable increase for the 2003 cohort are the 7 fellows who will be doing cross-regional fieldwork, a large jump from last year's 4. The meeting concluded with a reception and dinner at French-Moroccan restaurant Marseille, where retiring members of the selection committee were toasted and thanked for their years of service. For a list of the new cohort please go to ssrc.org/programs/idrf.

Islam and Muslims in the United States and Europe

With funding from the Russell Sage Foundation, the SSRC organized a planning meeting entitled "Islam and Muslims in the United States and Europe: Processes of Mutual Accommodation," which was held on April 10-12, 2003. Twenty scholars from Europe and the US convened to complete their assessment of extant scholarship, on-going research, and

prospects of fostering and guiding future collaborative research that will seek to understand the lives of Muslims in the West. Review papers, commissioned by the Russell Sage Foundation to assess the current scholarly literature, helped the group assess what social science theory and research in the United States and Europe contribute toward understanding the themes of the workshop.

Building on the first planning meeting that took place in May 2002, participants examined how the religious practices, identities, and institutions of Muslims are related to American and European societies through processes of mutual accommodation. Three central themes were the relation of religion and culture in the migratory experience, the impact of Islamic beliefs and practices on Muslim social identities and group relations, and the impact of group differences on residential patterns, labor market participation, income, political participation, education, and similar topics. Papers covering each of these themes in both the United States and Europe were submitted and discussed.

The organizers will explore with the Russell Sage Foundation the potential for organizing a longer-term working group on similar topics and for publishing the two review essays and thematic papers that were prepared for the meeting.

Japan Program

From January 8-12, 2003, the Japan Program convened its eighth annual Japan Studies Dissertation Workshop at the Asilomar conference center in Monterey, California. Funded by the Japan Foundation, the conference brought together an interdisciplinary group of PhD candidates in US universities who are carrying out research related to Japan. Twelve students from seven different disciplinary backgrounds made presentations and received feedback concerning their research from fellow participants, as well as four faculty mentors. Over the course of the workshop, the group exchanged ideas on methodologies and research design based on individual projects and on the relevant readings sent before the workshop. In addition, an open forum session for all participants and faculty addressed practical concerns such as disser-



tation writing and publishing, career planning, and teaching. The workshop concluded with a discussion of crosscutting themes and emergent issues based on the essays prepared by participants prior to the workshop, readings, and on discussions of the first three days.

Working Group on Law and Culture

The Working Group on Law and Culture held a meeting at the Russell Sage Foundation, March 13th and 14th. The working group is chaired by Professors Richard Shweder (University of Chicago), Hazel Markus (Stanford University), and Martha Minow (Harvard University), and directed by Kevin Moore. Building on the activities of the RSF/SSRC Working Group on Ethnic Customs, Assimilation, and American Law, a goal of the project is to examine the shape multiculturalism can and should take in a liberal democratic society, paying particular attention to the legal and ethical contexts for diversity. To meet this goal, an interdisciplinary group of scholars, including lawyers, anthropologists, and psychologists were brought together to present findings from recent research and to discuss new research projects to be undertaken over the next three years of the working group. While there were a variety of cases and issues discussed over the two-day meeting, it was decided that the focus of the next meeting will be on a set of common questions relating to gender, parent-child relationships, and transnational and immigrant incorporation.

Program on Latin America and the Caribbean

To publicize and honor the authors of various Latin America-related SSRC publications the Program hosted a small reception on March 27 for the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) 24th International Congress in Dallas, Texas. The Program also organized four panels at the Congress, among them "The Crisis of State and Society Relations in the Andes," "Confronting the Past: The Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission," "Revisiting Fifty Years of Development Studies in Cuba: The Enduring Legacy of Carlos Rafael Rodríguez," and "Luchas por la memoria (The Struggle for Memory)." An SSRC-organized panel on "Comparing Economic Reforms in Latin America and China: The Perspective of Chinese Scholars" was to have been the first participation of Chinese Latin Americanists at a LASA Congress, but was cancelled when, due to the current political climate, participants were unable to obtain visas to enter the United States. Funding was provided for that panel by the Ford Institute for International Education. For further information on these panels please visit: www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica/LASA2003.page

Working Group on Cuba

On February 14-15, the ACLS/SSRC Working Group on Cuba's Standing Committee on Libraries and Archives held its second annual meeting in Havana. The committee



includes preservation specialists from the US, France, Mexico and Venezuela, as well as from three primary preservation institutions in Cuba (José Martí National Library, National Archives of Cuba, Institute of Literature and Linguistics). Committee members reviewed progress made on the four projects funded in 2002, which included the preservation of 19th-century Cuban press; a workshop on map conservation; a workshop on International Standard Archival Description (ISAD(G)); and the preservation of the Sociedad Económica de los Amigos del País collection. The committee also considered proposals for projects to be completed during 2003 and approved funding for: an advanced workshop on map conservation; the conservation of the Institute of History's photograph collection; the conservation of the Institute of History's map collection; a workshop on digital preservation; a workshop on documentary assessment; and a workshop on preventive conservation. The projects aim to promote enduring institutional collaboration, with a view toward long-term impact on the library and archives systems of Cuba. Funding for this initiative comes from the Ford Foundation.

Translocal Flows

A selection committee for the Translocal Flows: Migrations and Urban Spaces in the Americas project, staffed by the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean, convened at the Council's New York office on March 1st to select participants for the project's upcoming workshops. Of the over 450 electronic applications received, the committee selected 16 proposals to be developed for presentation at the "Cities, Inequality and Subjectivity in the Americas" conference in Guadalajara, May 14-16, and 17 proposals for the "Migrations, Borders and Diasporas in the Americas" conference in Santo Domingo, June 26-28. Participant abstracts are posted on the project's website: <http://translocal-flows.ssrc.org/>.

Program on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

On February 8, the Middle East and North Africa Program held its second meeting on "The Production of Knowledge on the Middle East in North America." This initiative was conceived in conjunction with the on-going Global Survey of Research and Training in Middle East Studies. The February 8 meeting brought together fourteen prominent scholars, based at US institutions, many of whom are directors of National Resource Centers for Middle East Studies. Lisa Anderson, member of the SSRC board, also attended. The full day meeting, which was held at the SSRC offices, was structured around two main questions: What historiographical and documentary research is essential to further understanding the production of past and present academic knowledge on the Middle East? And, how would a series of inter-university seminars address different aspects of the production of Middle East knowledge and its pedagogy? The morning session on research was chaired by Robert Vitalis, from the University of Pennsylvania, and discussed the possibility of launching several projects, archival and otherwise. The afternoon session on a new seminar series was chaired by NYU's Timothy Mitchell, and will likely spawn at least four different seminar series: on the historiography of ME Studies, on cyber-Islam, on economic history, and on the nexus of academia/media/policy. A time schedule was established and the group agreed to reconvene at MESA in November 2003 to discuss progress made and to ensure continuing coordination. SSRC staff included Seteney Shami, Steve Heydemann, Mary Ann Riad and Aziz Isham.

Islamic Knowledge and Authority

The Program on the Middle East and North Africa held two consecutive planning meetings on the project "The Global Production of Islamic Knowledge and Authority": February 23 in New York, and March 4-5 in Cairo, Egypt.

On February 23, the MENA program hosted Souleymane Bachir Diagne (philosophy, Northwestern University), Bernard Haykel (Middle East studies, NYU), Ousmane Kane (international affairs, Columbia) and Greg Starrett (anthropology, UNC) in a preparatory meeting. As a result of the meeting, a short report was prepared outlining some key themes, questions, and ways to approach this topic. Themes include: Geographies of Islam (past and present); the Transnational Circulation and Dissemination of Knowledge; the Role of States; Being Muslim: Issues of Performance, Identity and the Redefinition of Roles and Statuses; and Authority and its Manifestations. SSRC staff for the event included Seteney Shami, Josh DeWind and Aziz Isham.

The Cairo meeting included MENA Regional Advisory Panel members Mona Abaza (American University of Cairo), Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb (Kuwait University), Dwight Reynolds (UCSB) and Tsugitaka Sato (University of Tokyo) as well as Asef Bayat (American University of Cairo), Martin



van Bruinessen (Leiden University), Alisher Ilkhamov (Open Society Institute, Tashkent), and Abdulkader Tayob (International Institute for the Study of Islam). The meeting further developed the themes proposed by the first meeting, discussed the possible geographical scope of the project and proposed that a more precise title would be "Changing Authority in Islam" —under this rubric several project activities were agreed upon. Dr. Sato has also proposed a follow up meeting in Tokyo. SSRC staff for the event included Seteney Shami, Josh DeWind, Alcinda Honwana, and Aziz Isham.

Reconceptualizing Public Spheres in Middle East & North Africa

From March 5-9, 2003 the Program on the Middle East and North Africa held a workshop in Cairo, Egypt for semifinalists of the International Collaborative Research Grants (ICRG) Competition. Following preliminary selection, a representative from each of the ten semifinalist teams joined resource persons and SSRC staff to discuss the theme of the competition ("Reconceptualizing Public Spheres in Middle East & North Africa"), explore issues of collaboration and gain valuable feedback on their preliminary proposals. Resource persons included: Josh DeWind (SSRC), Ann Lesch (Villanova University), Cynthia Nelson (American University in Cairo), Sumathi Ramaswamy (University of Michigan), Shanaz Rouse (Sarah Lawrence College) and Judith Tucker (Georgetown University). The workshop created a collegial atmosphere in which participants shared knowledge, provided critical comments on proposals and received detailed information on the final application process. The workshop also provided the opportunity to develop relationships and build networks with scholars working on similar research issues. One highlight of the event was a public lecture presented by Sumathi Ramaswamy entitled "Seeing the Nation: Visual Patriotism and Piety in Modern India." The event was co-sponsored by the Institute for Gender and Women's Studies at the American University in Cairo and was followed by a reception hosted by the SSRC.

Sexuality Research Fellowship Program (SRFP)

On March 6–8, the SRFP Selection Committee convened at the SSRC to select the 8th cohort of dissertation and postdoc fellows of the Sexuality Research Fellowship Program. The 2003 competition drew the largest pool of applicants in program history: 106 applications in total, 75 for dissertation and 31 for postdoctoral support, from a range of fields and disciplines including: sociology, anthropology, psychology, political science, history, demography, education, linguistics, English, public health, journalism, religion, public policy, social work, sexology, and various interdisciplinary programs such as American, cultural, labor, ethnic, performance, media, and women's studies. Out of this highly competitive pool, eleven dissertation fellowships for one-year of support and six postdoctoral fellowships were awarded—one for two years and five for one year of support. A descriptive announcement of 2003 SRFP Fellowship awardees will soon be posted on the SRFP website (ssrc.org/fellowships/sexuality). Staff for the SRFP program are Diane di Mauro and Lissa Gundlach.

South Asia Program

The South Asia Program organized a research conference and fellows workshop jointly titled "Resources: Conceptions and Contestations" for the first cohort of South Asian postdoctoral fellows. The event, held in Kathmandu, Nepal, January 3–11, brought together 35 scholars from Asia, North America and Europe. The purpose was to expose fellows, who are university and college teachers, to contemporary debates on "resources" before they embarked upon their research.

Dr. Dipak Gyawali, recently appointed Minister for Water Resources, Nepal, and former chair of the South Asia Regional Advisory Panel, delivered the keynote address and discussed the vision behind the fellowship program.

This annual event was organized into three distinct but interlinking programs. The first program, January 3–6, combined round table discussions between fellows and conference participants in the morning with public lectures in the evenings. Public lectures were intended to attract the larger community of students, scholars and donors in Nepal, and elicited participation from senior journalists and news agencies. Lectures ranged from an economist's concerns about women's access to forest produce in South Asia to a geographer's analysis of the violence that accompanies the extraction of oil in Nigeria.

The lectures were followed by a two-day conference attended by distinguished and senior scholars in the field. The conference was divided into themes dominating discourse on resources today, namely "construction," "rights," "conflict" and "institutions." Based on their area of expertise, participants were asked to present an original paper on one of these themes. Discussions generated interesting theoretical insights on resources, and also underlined the complexities involved in conflicts over resources. There

was noticeable attention paid in a number of papers to the problem of territoriality; the conference also proved to be an encounter between the followers of Mary Douglas and post-structuralists. These sessions were especially exciting for the fellows, many of whom were being exposed to new areas of contestation and scholarship.

The event closed with the fellows' workshop, January 9–11, attended by a number of the conference participants. In light of the previous days' experiences, fellows were asked to discuss the meaning of "resources" as conceptualized by their project, and how this concept may have changed. Fellows were also encouraged to expand their terms of reference and think outside their discipline. The selection committee, who led these proceedings, made significant contributions by way of suggesting alternative sources of references and consenting to review research output upon completion. Other attractions were visits to Tribhuvan University, documentary screenings, a lecture on the Maoist insurgency, and a cultural evening of Nepali and Tibetan folk dances.

Vietnam Program

From March 5–8, 2003, the Vietnam Program (Mary McDonnell and Van Tran) worked with the faculty and project management board on program contents for the year-long interdisciplinary social science research training project in Hanoi. The project is cosponsored with the National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities in Vietnam. During Program 1 of the training and research program, 40 young and mid-career researchers and lecturers from all regions of Vietnam will gain conceptual knowledge in research problem formulation and research design, practice quantitative and qualitative research techniques and data analysis, and draft research proposals. During Program 2, participants will be organized into research groups for fieldwork on topics relating to poverty, family, or migration.

From March 10–14, 2003, the Vietnam Program and chair of the international team of advisors, Professor Hy Van Luong, advised researchers at the Institute of Social Sciences in Ho Chi Minh City (ISSHO) on their draft conference papers and worked with the steering committee to organize the project-concluding conference on poverty and socio-economic mobility in the context of rapid urbanization. The conference is expected to take place in early 2004.





Jennifer F. Klot has recently been appointed Senior Adviser for two new SSRC initiatives on HIV/AIDS, and on Gender and Security. Prior to coming to the Council, she served as a Senior Adviser at the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) on Governance, Peace and Security. There, she supported global program implementation and provided advice to country offices relating to policy, program, advocacy and institutional strengthening. In this capacity, she advised the Arusha peace process and the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, helping to broker women's participation in these processes and ensure attention to gender issues. During her tenure at the UN, Ms. Klot additionally worked to introduce gender issues to the UN's peace and security agenda. Between 1994–2000, she served as a policy advisor on peace and security at the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and directed the General Assembly-mandated UN study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, chaired by Graça Machel.

Prior to joining the United Nations, Ms. Klot served as the acting executive director for the Fund for Education in South Africa and as the regional representative for the southern Africa office of *Ashoka: Innovators for the Public*, an international fellowship program for public entrepreneurs. She also directed a project to disseminate, research and document indigenous music of southern Africa for performance and educational purposes, and recorded and toured internationally with the *African Jazz Pioneers*, a South African jazz ensemble.

Ms. Klot has been a visiting scholar at the University of the Witwatersrand in South Africa and received a Master's of Regional Planning from Cornell University and a Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and Economics from Rutgers University.



Stephen Jackson, an Irish national, joined the Council in March 2003 as Associate Director of the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum, with particular responsibility for programming related to African conflicts. Before coming to SSRC, Dr. Jackson spent equal periods of his career working in academic centres focused on international humanitarian action and as a relief worker in some of the more violent complex political emergencies of the 1990s. Between 1998 and 2002, he was the founding Director of the International Famine Centre at the National University of Ireland, Cork, a centre established to focus disparate efforts within the University in a cross-disciplinary approach to the political dimensions of global hunger. The Centre undertook applied research, advocacy campaigning, training and consultancy, particularly concerning the dilemmas of humanitarian assistance in conflict zones. Dr. Jackson has written widely on this area and undertaken consultancies for a variety of multilateral and non-governmental actors.

He began his career working as a political lobbyist in London between 1988 and 1991. As a relief worker, he worked for Catholic Relief Services in Somalia in 1992, during the extensive famine brought on by the Civil War. Subsequently, he was engaged in active relief work in Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, before moving, as Country Representative for Trócaire, to Angola where he lived between 1995 and 1996, fostering civil society development and grassroots political mobilisation strategies.

Between 1997 and 2002, Dr. Jackson conducted anthropological fieldwork in the war-torn eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, leading to a PhD in Cultural Anthropology from Princeton University. His dissertation was entitled "War Making: Uncertainty, Improvisation and Involution in the Kivu Provinces, DR Congo, 1997–2002." Jackson also holds an MPA from Princeton, and a BA (Mod.) in Mathematical Sciences from Trinity College, Dublin.


His present research interests include the political economy of war, global/local conflict linkages, principles and practice in humanitarian affairs, the political manipulation of ethnic identity, politico-ethnic violence, the postcolonial state, and regional conflict formations.

Publications

HANDBOOK OF SEXUALITY RESEARCH TRAINING INITIATIVES, edited by Diane di Mauro, Gilbert Herdt, and Richard Parker. New York: Social Science Research Council, 2003. 182 pp.

This handbook, organized by the SSRC Sexuality Research Fellowship Program, provides an overview of around-the-globe training models and initiatives for sexuality researchers, highlighting the challenge of collaborative, interdisciplinary work. It includes a variety of formalized opportunities that provide training, both general and specialized in focus, including graduate training, summer institutes, training grants, institutional consortiums and programs targeting community-based organizations. Reflecting "state-of-the-art" efforts across different countries and diverse contexts, these contributions emphasize design, paradigmatic/theoretical frameworks, implementation and potential contribution to policy formation for scholars and practitioners in Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, India, the Netherlands and the United States. Three key objectives in producing/distributing the handbook are to support:

- the establishment of a strong research base to advance sexual knowledge, taking into account social and cultural change and the need for extensive dissemination efforts to policymakers, practitioners, educators and the general public;
- the integration of multi-/interdisciplinary approaches to the field in theory and methodology, including biological, sociocultural and psychological approaches that promote a new standard of collaborative work; and
- a greater visibility and acknowledgement of the contributions of professionals in the field in order to encourage greater academic respectability and a more effective integration of research with public policy.




Earlier in 2003, the Ford Foundation provided support to the SSRC for the publication and extensive distribution of this publication worldwide.

EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN INTERDISCIPLINARY INNOVATION, edited by Frank Kessel, Patricia Rosenfield, and Norman Anderson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 430 pp.

Growing out of the work of the SSRC Working Group on Bio-Behavioral-Social Perspectives on Health, this volume explores the nexus between the health and social sciences. It is now widely recognized that research on human health requires more than a focus on human biology and disease entities. Lifestyles, attitudes, stress, education, income—all are understood to contribute to the spread of disease, the effectiveness of curative therapies, and the prevention of illness, as well as to good health and an enhanced sense of well-being. Yet even with such developments, there is still considerable debate about how best to conduct research and shape policies that integrate concepts and methods drawn from the full range of the health, social, and behavioral sciences. Moreover, scholars and researchers who wish to engage in such interdisciplinary inquiry have no texts that serve as substantive and practical guides to the most effective avenues.

This volume fills that gap in the literature by presenting a series of case studies that provide a variety of illustrative models of how best to undertake interdisciplinary research on health. It will serve to guide not only those in the scientific research community, but also decision makers in academic settings, foundations, and government agencies who seek to develop and promote interdisciplinary programs dedicated to improving human health and well-being.



The program on Information Technology and International Cooperation has recently redesigned its web pages on the SSRC site. Primary emphasis is given to presenting the articles, research notes, policy briefs and in-depth research projects that are produced under the program's auspices. The website contains details about program workshops and institutes, a substantial list of links to organizations directly related to the ITIC program and its efforts, and information on projects such as IT and Social Transformations, Transnational Civil Society Organizations and Information Technology, IT Governance and Civil Society, and Governing Global Electronic Networks.

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