From Neil Smith, *The Politics of Space: Jigsaw Geographies After Area Studies*. Forthcoming.

Chapter 2

"ABYSMAL IGNORANCE": THE PRE-LIFE OF AREA STUDIES, 1917 - 1958

It is widely and not unreasonably assumed that area studies emerged in the postwar period, very much as a product of World War II. Certainly, as a distinct academic pursuit, recognizable by its area divisions between African studies, Soviet and East European studies, Asian studies, Middle Eastern studies and so forth, this is demonstrably the case. Area studies coalesced in the wake of World War II and as such it came with a specific historical and geographical imprimatur. Area studies came into being as a child of what might be called the second moment of US global ambition, a triumphalist moment marked by the hubris of Henry Luce's "American Century." Having failed to put Woodrow Wilson's "global Monroe Doctrine" into practice following World War I, and broadly defeated by the ideological isolationism of the following decades, post-World War II internationalists saw the new peace as a second chance at global power. Fuelled by US economic and military power, driven by the remnants of Rooseveltian internationalism and the opportunity afforded by its oversight of postwar reconstruction, and spurred just as much by emerging cold war geopolitical competition, successive postwar administrations leavened 1945 global optimism with cold war pugilism to provoke a more global posture than

the US had yet embraced.[1] Area studies was simultaneously partner and offspring of that nationally based but globally focused project, and compared with prior forms and institutionalizations of area knowledge, its distinctiveness lay in its Americanness.

And yet area studies did not spring *de novo* out of World War II and its aftermath. It had its precursors. The early academic history of the field is well rehearsed in documents from the formative postwar period, many of them published by the New York based Social Science Research Council as it strove to institutionalize area studies research.[2] Several programs in Latin American studies and Oriental studies had already emerged in US universities in the 1930s. The former were significantly stimulated by State Department cultural and economic exchange initiatives related to Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy," whereas the latter represented a more explicit regionalization of endogenous academic specialties long absorbed in classical studies of the Middle East. But its inspirations also came from earlier developments outside academia, and these are less often integrated into written histories of area studies. We begin with that non-academic history in an attempt to answer two questions. First, why did area studies emerge when it did in the United States, considerably later than parallel institutions in Europe? And why, when it did emerge, did it take the form of area studies based primarily inside universities as opposed to the kind of institutional form represented by, for example, the British Royal Geographical Society or

the myriad other scholarly societies – the think tanks of their day – that connected academia with government throughout Europe?

The answer to these questions needs to be sought not just in a narrow intellectual history, important as this thread of investigation is, but in the relationship between area knowledge, power and empire. Three specific projects and organizations played crucial roles in preparing the ground for the institutionalization of area studies, and these are less commonly included in the received histories of the field. We shall examine them briefly before considering the postwar period. These were by no means the only such efforts but they did figure among the most significant. They are the World War I "Inquiry," the Army Specialized Training Program of World War II, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

From the Inquiry to World War II

At the turn of the twentieth century, "the mind's eye of an American swept world affairs with marvellous freedom," suggested Robert Wiebe in his classic history, *The Search for Order*. "The national government treated foreign relations much as it did the rest of its business," leaving the initiative largely to private citizens and the governments of others. "Foreign relations were composed of incidents, not policies," and successive administrations did not plan so much as react. An ideological mucilage of manifest destiny certainly provided a modicum of ideological coherence but in practice their

foreign affairs moved variously from issue to issue. Even as they relished empire with the acquisitive colonial wars of 1898, US administrations barely developed a recognizable foreign policy, and this remained the case into World War I.[3] Thus it was that having used the pretext of German attacks on American owned freighters supplying Britain, France, Russia and their allies to take the US into World War I, Woodrow Wilson also ordered the formation of a highly secret think tank code-named "the Inquiry." Wilson by and large ran his own foreign policy, and his State Department was encrusted with nineteenth century assumption and not a lot more. It had very few trained personnel with an expertise in other parts of the world, and the entirely independent "Inquiry" was conceived in the face of "almost panicky demands in Washington for basic data."[4] Assembled in autumn 1917 and based in uptown Manhattan at the American Geographical Society, where it availed itself of the extensive library, the unique map collection, and the leadership services of the AGS director, Isaiah Bowman, the Inquiry amassed a large group of academic specialists to survey the central issues that would inevitably arise in any postwar peace conference.

The Inquiry was to be the primary information base for conducting what many, expressing the modern Wilsonian optimism of the moment, anticipated would be a "scientific peace." It eventually numbered 126 researchers, predominantly cartographers, historians and geographers, but also including classics scholars, economists, journalists, psychologists, geologists and

lawyers. It was generally organized around regional specialties – Russia and Eastern Europe, Palestine and Mesopotamia, the Balkans, Africa, the Far East, etc. – focusing particularly on various nations or sub-regions of Europe, but it also included several thematic committees including cartography and diplomatic history. Perhaps indicating the presumptions of the Monroe Doctrine and a certain concern that Mexico or Argentina, for example, might "go German" during or after the war, but just as certainly with an eye to postwar commerce, the Inquiry expended an inordinate effort on Latin America despite the region's comparative isolation from the battlefield. By comparison, Asia attracted scant coverage and the colonies of European powers even less. However uneven, the Inquiry's purview was nonetheless global rather than hemispheric, and this itself was a new departure for fledgling US foreign policy.[5]

Almost before it found its feet, the Inquiry's work was translated into a diplomatic posture. It drafted the famous "Fourteen Points" although neither the Inquiry's existence nor its role were yet revealed. In these Fourteen Points, drafted by the Inquiry, Wilson made a powerful moral claim over which directions postwar reconstruction ought to take. Apart from more general diplomatic proclamations, these points covered sovereignty and territorial settlements throughout Europe, from France to Russia, Poland to the Balkans, and gestured toward a new political geography for the lands covered by the collapsing Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. As this

suggests, the focus of the Inquiry's work was very much about territories and boundaries, and in asking the question how postwar boundaries, especially in Europe, ought to be rearranged, they emphasized national identities and characteristics. Considerable effort was devoted to the mapping of national groups identified by language, religion and other factors, and to analyzing cultural and political conflicts along national grounds. There was a certain irony in the fact that this work mobilized an emerging language of ethnicity and ethnic difference. Developed particularly in the post-Civil War period in the US, the language of ethnicity provided a means by which immigrant Americans of European decent could be separated from African Americans, on the one hand, while on the other, the internal national divisions between Irish, Italian, Jewish and other immigrant Americans – all in the process of becoming "white" – could be recognized as inferior to, or at least different from, the Anglo stock that provided the supposed republican norm. In other words, socio-territorial labels projected from Europe onto a cultural assimilationist map of the United States were reflected back as an avowedly scientific apparatus for reworking the cultural, social, economic and political geography of Europe, the continent from which those categorizations were extracted in the first place.

When its work and existence was eventually revealed as many of the Inquiry staff prepared to go to Paris for the 1919 peace conference, the organization was widely seen as a repository of "experts" – "fact students,"

according to one Kansas newspaper, "highbrows laden with secrets of foreign lands."[6] The rationale for the Inquiry is clear enough, namely to provide the knowledge for US participation in Paris, but it would be a mistake to exaggerate the instrumentalism of this work. In little more than a year, it produced nearly 2,000 reports and 1,200 maps at a considerable cost of $241,000, and much of this material was shipped to Paris with the US delegations. Yet they fell well short of providing the systematic planning Wilson sought, and when they did offer strategic advice it was as often ignored as followed. The Inquiry's choice of focus was often less than strategic. There was a paucity of US "experts" in area knowledge, and the organization adhered to a self-defeating preoccupation with "security" which restricted Inquiry personnel to a relatively narrow elite group. Accordingly, the topics of Inquiry studies and reports often reflected the expertise of the staff more than any overall plan or judgment about its contribution to US diplomacy.

War, surely enough, has a way of highlighting deficiencies in a people's – perhaps especially a state's – knowledge of the world, sharpening the perceived need for such knowledge, and this was equally the case during World War II.. More than in the earlier conflict, US area knowledge was galvanized in preparation for the war itself. Much like the Inquiry, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) – its deep secrecy betokened by its own anodyne appellation – recruited squads of university academics among others. Some

were sent as spies to "outposts" around the world, but many also remained in the Research and Analysis Branch in Washington D.C. where they collected, organized and conveyed intelligence in support of the war effort. An objectivism born of the new social scientific positivism policed this work. The OSS was a wide-ranging and often discordant group which included dozens of foreign refugees and emigres and not a few socialists and communists committed to the defeat of fascism. An Inquiry writ large, the OSS vied with the military and State Department for authority over intelligence gathering.

Precursor of the CIA, the story of the OSS and its extensive efforts in procuring and producing wartime area knowledge are quite well known,[7] but less remembered today is the work of the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) which also aimed at wartime preparation. Amidst a chaotic array of personnel preparation programs, it was the centerpiece of an effort to produce a more educated officer class, focusing on a layer of recruits who would be dispatched far more widely around the world in this second global conflict. Inaugurated in 1943, the ASTP effectively offered a crash course in university study. 227 institutions across the country eventually opened their doors to an expected 150,000 recruits who would study for 36 weeks before deployment. Its curricula were intense and wide ranging, covering engineering, medicine and the sciences, but they also aspired to provide geographical, historical, political and cultural knowledge of strategic areas in the war. Language training was a major part of this work.

It was widely perceived, according to one retrospective, that an "abysmal ... ignorance of cultures other than Western civilization" gripped the United States on the eve of World War II: a "shroud of ignorance" intoned another survey at the time.[8] The Foreign Area and Language curricula of the ASTP were designed to make up for that ignorance, and amidst the general scramble for new and old curricular material and for trained instructors, the shortage was nowhere more acute than with geography, since at the outset of war several hundreds geographers were immediately seconded to Washington. The difficulties in recruiting faculty created strenuous inter-university competition for faculty, leading to some strange practices: desperate university administrators "persistently scanned the passenger lists of the *Gripsholm* for possible academics returning from Japan and China."[9] Even where it worked, however, the ASTP overall was of dubious assistance to the war effort. Having admitted 219,000 students and graduated 75,000, it was peremptorily terminated after a year when urgent personnel requirements sent officer trainees straight to war.[10] Yet it did play a pivotal role as regards area studies.

In the immediate months and years after World War II, unlike the aftermath of 1919, there were efforts to tackle the lingering "abysmal ignorance" of the world, and what the ASTP started grew into something larger. Guided as much by available expertise as by battlefield location, the ASTP curricula had especially stressed Europe and East Asia, but inadvertently or

otherwise, it helped launch many academic careers in languages and area studies, that stretched well beyond these two regions. Most significantly, it helped alter the institutional landscape for this work, stimulating the evolution of a "center" model in the field of language and area training. The ASTP had perforce combined very intensive language study with the study of the places and cultures attached to these languages, and this wartime amalgam of areal foci seeded the postwar establishment of area studies centers in universities across the country. In this model, expertise, research and teaching on specific areas was gathered from across the disciplines into discrete centers. Languages usually lay at the core of such initiatives, especially after the 1958 National Defense Education Act enshrined support for such centers and programs within its Title VI.[11]

The Council on Foreign Relations

However central, the exigencies of war were not the only stimuli in the coming to life of area studies. After World War I and the Paris peace conference, veterans of the Inquiry exhorted the new Harding administration to break with the nineteenth century seat-of-the-pants foreign policy of the prewar days and to establish a "Division of Intelligence" inside the State Department. Their calls went unheaded, thus preparing the ground for the "abysmal ignorance" diagnosed on the cusp of war two decades later. Nonetheless, not satisfied with official refusals and a rising ideological

isolationism after 1919, these Wilsonian internationalists were determined somehow to institutionalize area knowledge in a way that would eventually influence US foreign policy. In Paris, US delegation advisers had been envious of their British and French counterparts who arrived with the full weight of Foreign Office and Colonial Office intelligence units – and authority – behind them; by contrast US decision-making was far more free-wheeling, and to the chagrin of the scholarly advisers it often made no use whatsoever of their expertise. The US advisers had already resolved with British colleagues to establish a transatlantic international affairs organization after the peace conference, and while this never came to fruition it did spawn separate British and American organizations. On the US side, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) was established in 1921, putting together Inquiry academics and many of the Paris advisers on the one side with a broadly internationalist Wall Street gentleman's dinner club led by erstwhile secretary of war and secretary of state, Elihu Root. Root, it should be noted, had won the 1912 Nobel Peace Prize in recognition, in part, of his authorship of the notorious Platt Amendment which gave the US rights in perpetuity to the Guantánamo enclave in Cuba.[12]

The founding statement of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) expressed its ambition. It comprised "a group of men interested in spreading knowledge of international relations" and ventured to do so by providing "a continuous conference on the international aspects" of American affairs. It

provided a "contact bazaar" for what it called "men of influence" and it sought no less than to guide US foreign policy.[13] This same period spawned a number of other associations variously seeking to fill the vacuum of foreign policy knowledge, including in different ways the Hoover Institution and the Foreign Policy Association, but the Council may have been paramount. The ambition of its founding statement would eventually be realized as the CFR evolved into one of the most powerful non-governmental think tanks in the United States, a foreign policy training ground for numerous presidents and secretaries of state, from Henry Kissinger to Jimmy Carter. But despite its best efforts, the CFR was not always so influential. Based in New York City, its first two decades were spent a long way from the power of Washington.

The Council's first major step was to establish a magazine, *Foreign Affairs*, which included articles about all parts of the world, great and small, insofar as they impinged or might impinge on perceived national interests. Cultures, economies, politics, all were fodder for the Council's worldview. The editors of the journal indubitably "saw themselves as models of impartiality," judges one historian, but "no reader could be fooled into thinking that the journal was anything other than a plea for a ... United States foreign policy, interested in exploiting the world's natural resources ...."[14] If today's *Foreign Affairs* remains recognizable in this description, it is not necessarily easy to discern how innovative this venture was. Even more innovative was the Council's modus operandi. In addition to inviting

dignitaries and "men of influence" to address the membership and discuss the issues of the day in depth, the CFR picked up the Inquiry's innovation, later reworked in Paris, and organized itself around a series of study groups. These were confidential and restricted to members, but they did produce minutes, notes, memos and reports as a record of apparent progress in working out specific issues. Also like the Inquiry, the definition of study groups was divided between thematic topics, such as diplomacy or finance or territorial issues, and individual geographical regions – Russia, the Near East, Latin America, American-Canadian relations, and so forth. Eventually, these study groups also initiated more intensive research projects designed for more popular consumption and a series of such monographs began to flow from the Council in the late 1920s.

If successive Republican administrations turned their backs on intensive diplomatic involvement with Europe after World War I (though not at all with Central America and the Caribbean where military intervention remained routine), the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 did not immediately reverse the resurgent hemispheric focus of US foreign policy, and the Council's hopes of greater access to Washington went largely unfulfilled. Likewise, any expectation that the Roosevelt administration would significantly augment its woeful foreign intelligence capacity was also frustrated, the Japanese invasion of China notwithstanding. Not until war erupted in Europe in 1939 was the glaringly obsolete structurelessness of

intelligence gathering inside the State Department seriously addressed, and the need for an alternative anxiously sought. At first, with financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation, the CFR embarked on a comprehensive program of "War and Peace Studies." A sort of private "Inquiry" of its own day, this program compiled 670 confidential reports and transmitted some seventy of these directly to the State department and White House. Some, such as an early report on Greenland, were highly strategic, while others were more expansive, looking at postwar trade in the Pacific, for example, or a possible regionalization of the world after the war. As the Council personnel keenly grasped in launching this War and Peace Studies project, the war offered a "grand opportunity" for the US to emerge as "the premier power in the world."[15]

Sensing again a glimmer of the ambitious global reach that had animated their origins, the Council now dropped any areal definition of its study groups and with a view to postwar arrangements reorganized its research structure under four thematic headings: political; security and armaments; economy and finance; and territorial. Henceforth, specific geographical places or regions were dealt with either under the appropriate thematic rubric or else in the territorial committee which came to act as a kind of clearing house for the Council in general. Chaired by Isaiah Bowman, the veteran geographer from the Inquiry, this committee covered a host of thematic issues from the effects of air power in war to minerals, refugees and the "colonial question," but it also examined specific regional conflicts. The arm's-length

nature of this work for the State Department lasted until Pearl Harbor whereupon the State Department inducted the entire Council study group structure into its powerful Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. This was an astonishing eventuality: as late as 1942, the country about to become the most powerful in the world was so bereft of area knowledge and related expertise concerning the rest of the world that it had to swallow, virtually whole, a private apparatus – a think tank – devoted to such questions.

There is no straight-line evolution from the "Inquiry" to the Council on Foreign Relations, or for that matter to the ASTP program, except that the form of and need for each indicates the gross inadequacy of expert as well as popular knowledge about the rest of the world. Each of these initiatives is in different ways a formative precursor to the emergence of area studies after 1945, and each also highlights the intricate connections that obtain between area knowledge and state policy. Vital as these were, these organizations and innovations were by no means alone. Also of special importance in the pre-life of area studies were incipient academic programs in area studies together with several philanthropic foundations.

Academic Institutionalization

In 1903, according to past provost of Harvard, Paul Buck, "not a single Harvard thesis dealt with anything beyond the limits of Classical Antiquity,

Western Europe, and the United States."[16] In retrospect, this level of national intellectual insularity – the studied lack of interest in the world beyond its shores (assuming that a national extrapolation is reasonable) – seems literally incredible. Despite all the work of individual orientalists, sanskritists, arabists and classical scholars around the turn of the century, vast stretches of the world still remained uncharted in American university curricula. As late as 1940, no more than 60 PhDs had graduated from US universities with dissertations on the "non-western world," and most of these focused on antiquity.[17]

The rise of academic area studies was integral to the ascendant power of the United States in this period, and As David Nugent has argued in a trenchant analysis of the early origins of area studies, the larger goal was expansive: "greater knowledge about and ultimately control over social conditions, cultural patterns and human subjects located along the contested margins of [the West's] expanding spheres of influence."[18] If the economic depression of the mid 1890s made the question of available international markets a critical concern to American capitalists, the colonial wars and territorial acquisitions of 1898, which simultaneously galvanized and orchestrated broad public flag-waving, highlighted the state of public ignorance about the world. However slowly, academics responded, but entire courses and courses of study concerning the world beyond North America and Europe were still rare prior to World War I. The pretensions of the Monroe

Doctrine focused the corrective lenses first and foremost on Latin America, and several universities, including Yale and Texas, cobbled together small programs on the cusp of WWI. These were largely built on the basis of existing research interests, loosely pooling several scholars into a recognizable regional core. The earliest work in this region often drew on archaeology, ethnology, geology and geography – still only in the process of becoming truly distinct academic pursuits. This was the case at Yale where a small group of younger faculty organized support for several expeditions to the Andes, including Hiram Bingham's 1911 trek to Machu Picchu. East Asia also attracted attention, especially China and Japan, as rising US economic and political ambition prompted the question of a Pacific rather than Atlantic geometry to US expansionism. Indeed there was a widespread sense that if "old" Europe had traditionally held the upper hand over the Atlantic, the new empire represented by the United States commanded proprietary claims over the Pacific which it could cultivate as its own backyard.[19] Slowly universities began to build up their offerings in the languages, history, arts and cultures of the various "civilizations" of the region.

The connection between these emerging academic programs and the ambitions of the country's ruling political and economic classes was rarely instrumental and not even necessarily direct. Whether publicly-funded or private, the colleges and universities generally operated at arm's length from the state and from direct corporate interests, and while this was a matter of

academic pride concerning their intellectual independence it was also – often in the same breath – a source of annoyance, even frustration: how were colleges and universities to find the resources to support such programs. The need to educate a "national leadership" often provided a language that might just as easily have stressed global education as a project of class interest and that simultaneously blurred the class striations of modern academia. The expansion of higher education after WWI was fueled by a burgeoning middle class and a socio-economic restructuring that demanded a growing rank of salaried professional and managerial personnel,[20] but the bureaucratic structure of academia still looked back toward a classical education rather than the demands of modern capitalism. Even before the Depression, the question of university funding for this expansion had become paramount, and the connection between the transmogrifying mission of higher education and various expressions of national interest was of central concern. Across the faculties and disciplines the immediate answer lay with philanthropic foundations which came to play a significant intermediary role, and this was nowhere more true than in the social sciences and in the expanding field of area studies which, as an expression of these shifts at home as much as the interests of US power abroad, were also becoming more dependent on the social sciences.

The major philanthropic foundations, especially Rockefeller, Ford, Mellon, and Carnegie stepped into the infrastructural and financial void.

They saw themselves as in many ways pioneers underwriting the frontiers of this emerging social knowledge – from the physical and medical sciences to the human and behavioral sciences to the investigation of cultures, economies, societies and politics at home and abroad. The overall aim was to produce the knowledge which, when disseminated and applied, would allow for the remaking of the social order in tune with the peregrinations of modern industrial and managerial capitalism. As Nugent has put it, "the great philanthropies undertook 'cultural work' on an enormous scale." Accordingly, the foundations funded new programs in higher education and the reorganization of existing academic work; underwrote research that applied "modern" scientific methods to the subjects of more traditional scholarship; kindled, through a focus on graduate education, the formation of new intellectual elites, both in the US and among scholars selectively brought from abroad; generated international research into the social, physical and cultural landscapes of hitherto poorly charted regions of the world; and underwrote the formation and work of parallel organizations, such as the Social Science Research Council (established in 1923), the Council on Foreign Relations, and many others. All were devoted to the same broad project of a nationally interested global enlightenment.[21]

The breadth of foundation involvement and the interrelatedness of these various involvements – "the often astonishing levels of collaboration between the universities, the foundations, and the intelligence arms of the US

state"[22] – can quickly be illustrated by considering the kinds of investments made by the Rockefeller Foundation in the decade prior to US entry into World War II. Beginning in 1933, the Foundation began awarding a number of academic fellowships for the study of foreign languages. The first grants went for the study of Japanese, followed by grants to Columbia and Harvard Universities, the Institute for Pacific Studies (established in 1925), and later Cornell for the study of Russia and Russian language. Yale and Columbia received awards for Chinese followed by a Princeton fellowship for Turkish. A prewar 1941 grant to the American Council of Learned Societies aimed at instruction in "neglected modern foreign languages" of potential value to the Armed Forces.[23] The latter provided a platform on which the ASTP could build. At the same time, beyond academia, the Rockefeller Foundation had funded an American Geographical Society (AGS) project on modern land and frontier settlement around the world, emphasizing the need to combine land, labor and capital in opportune locations; the foundation also financed the CFR's "War and Peace Studies," provided scholarly fellowships for wartime refugees from Europe, and with a view to US interests after the war spent $85,000 to complete a long-running AGS project to compile a 1:1,000,000 map of "Hispanic America." Throughout the war, the Rockefeller Foundation provided more than a million dollars to finance language and area study at University of California, Harvard, Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, and the Modern Language Association, among numerous others.[24]

"At the end of the 1930's," whatever advances had been made in the establishment of area studies, it was still true that "such programs were few, scattered and small."[25] The war changed all that. Wartime discussions, preparations and programs, including programs devoted to specific areas and languages but also more programmatic departures such as Columbia University's Committee on Area Studies, were the premise on which area studies became institutionalized in postwar higher education. Much of this work was coordinated by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) which struck a Committee of World Regions during the war, reconstructed after the war as a Committee on World Area Research. The SSRC took as it goal nothing less than the building of a "national program of area studies" contributing directly to state policies.[26] The SSRC Committee gave special "consideration to the government's interests in area-trained personnel...." For the universities, they believed, the "principle problem" was how to "serve the government's need for personnel and the requirements for specialized area training programs.... In the judgment of the Committee new data were needed as a basis for a sound national policy."[27]

The ASTP model was the locus around which the more practical issues of area studies were discussed, and quite quickly, a model of organization, which seems quite familiar today but was novel then, came into focus. "All the social sciences, combined with the functional study of languages, were brought together in order to promote a comprehensive understanding of a region,

country, nation or civilization."[28] In the six years from 1946 to 1951, despite budget cuts which afflicted universities nationwide, the number of university centers devoted to specific global areas doubled to twenty nine. Again, the foundations stepped in, investing many millions of dollars. The Rockefeller-financed Russian Institute at Columbia University Center in Russian arguably led the way, established in the same months that Churchill made his famous 1946 iron curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri, and in 1948 Carnegie underwrote the Russian Research Center at Harvard. The Carnegie Corporation was also important in this period, targeting much of its early investment on Asia, from the "Near East," as it was then known, via South and South-east Asia to Japan. Carnegie also provided an unprecedented $800,000 grant to the SSRC for the purpose of graduate fellowship work across the world's regions. By 1954, the State Department could list 62 area studies centers in US universities. That much of this formative investment went to Ivy League universities and the most prestigious public institutions was not coincidental to one of the larger purposes, namely the making of a new US professional and political elite in international affairs.

A good case can be made that the cold war did not begin in 1945 but immediately after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, whereupon US troops were, within months, operating on Soviet soil and the US government refused to recognize the new Soviet government. Be that as it may, the post-WWI phase of the cold war nurtured the pre-existing polyps of area studies into

established academic programs surveying the global scene. The results of the second major conflagration of the twentieth century left US ruling political and corporate classes not only with global ambition – they had long had this – but with a determination and some of the military and economic means to bring that ambition to fruition. Dejected Wilsonians perceived in 1919 that the stakes of national power were global and now finally they and their intellectual and political progeny had the chance to make that happen. Area studies provided a geographical arithmetic for the analyses that this quest inevitably entailed. The Ford Foundation moved forcefully into the field after 1951, providing several million dollars to numerous colleges and universities over the next few years for fellowships, research, and language training in Near and Middle East studies and for programs on Africa.[29]

Without gainsaying the particular motivations, fascinations and intellectual predilections of faculty and students enthused by these new departures, there was little doubt concerning the resolutely practical intent of area studies. Indeed the drive for area studies was consistent with a broader shift in the philosophy of education. In the more traditional humanities model which derived from the post-eighteenth century reworking of classical scholarship, the university organized the broad cultural and scientific education of the participant-citizen and the cultivation of national leaders. The exigencies of war rapidly sharpened a longer term demand for the greater targeting of skills and intellectual specialties,

abilities more amenable to direct application, and this was exemplified by the rise of the social sciences in the early twentieth century. Area studies was one of the key venues where old and new practices were blended and where the enhanced practicality of social and cultural (as well as scientific) knowledge was pioneered; far from denying the individuality of scholarship, the point was to harness that work toward nothing less than the redefinition of the scholar-citizen. Thus one influential postwar survey of the fledgling field, sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution's Ethnogeographic Board, concluded with an appeal that the new area studies work fashion itself according to "consumer demand," and that "areaists" would have to organize the market for their knowledge. "Wartime experience," the 1947 survey concluded, pointed to the necessity of state support and coordination of area studies "lest liaison between the universities, government and other employers of areaists be left to chance and free enterprise":

> What branches of government can support area research? What are the problems of converting the individual scholar into a professional government regional specialist? What qualities does action research demand in a person and how can they best be learned? Besides the government, missionary boards and business enterprises engaged in foreign commerce should be systematically approached to make them aware of the potentialities of a new type of educated person. The demand will increase with the product.[30]

At a time when the idea of a "new socialist man" was villified as a sinister offense against human nature, there is no record that this quintessentially American vision of a new academic man, tailored to the needs of postwar capitalism, drew any such criticism.

Area studies may not have had its beginning in World War II and the immediate cold war years, but its visage as an institutionalized field of study was surely fashioned in that crucible. Attempts to systematize geographical knowledges of the world, in the broadest sense, took root as a normal part of the academic landscape after the 1950s, however awkwardly they jostled alongside the now largely established disciplinary structure. The final stage of institutionalization came as universities and colleges initiated their own area studies programs, for simultaneously intellectual and functional reasons, hoping to attract some of the increased streams of funding. The takeover of area studies by universities which had their own agendas was real enough, but it did not sever the umbilical chord with military necessity. A major impetus came with the 1958 National Defense Education Act which by the early 1960s, under its Title VI, was underwriting 55 new and existing language and area studies centers.

The specific interests of the US government in establishing and supporting postwar area studies programs is not difficult to fathom. Intent this time on following through with its global ambition, both official political parties were committed to a cold war struggle with the USSR which even before the end of the war was taking on intense geopolitical overtones. The binary political geographies of the cold war made such regional knowledge of the globe vital. But geoeconomic competition was as much a driving force as geopolitics. Amidst fears that the 1945 peace and military demobilization

would bring a return of the Depression, many in the corporate class certainbly saw the cold war military buildup as a boon, but they also increasingly looked abroad for new markets. Various European economies lay in ruins, and while there were undoubtedly profits to be made in their reconstruction, other outlets were also sought. Especially with the wave of unfolding decolonization, and the consequent loosening of trade tariffs and regulations, their attention also turned to the traditional backyard of Latin America but even more so to the Middle East, Asia and Africa. Harry Truman's 1949 Point IV program galvanized this perspective, much as the Marshall Plan did for Europe and Japan. The focus was markets more than resources, the question of Middle Eastern oil notwithstanding, and Point IV was devoted to the development and industrialization of "underdeveloped areas," promising the capitalization of "undercapitalized" economies in exchange for access to markets; where markets did not exist, they would be created. All of this required a level of area knowledge about vast regional spaces that still lay largely uncharted in public and even official mental maps of the world, and academia was set to work. If the geoeconomic and geopolitical rationales behind the consequent institutionalization of area studies were often obscured, this only reflected the mixed rationales behind government action itself. With Point IV, observed one of its early architects, "dollars and democratic phraeseology walk hand in hand in the allegedly naive corners of the world."[31] In and of itself, Point IV did not unleash an immediate wave of

capital investment in what was beginning to be called the Third World, although it did help open early channels for such investment, especially in Asia. More importantly, it also lubricate a more expansive vision of the world as Americans took an interest in far flung parts of the world, albeit through the fissured lenses of the cold war.

Of American Exceptionalism and Lost Geographies

The most interesting question as regards the origins of area studies is perhaps not the historical question, why this form of knowledge emerged when it did, but more the geographical question why it emerged in the form it did, and where it did. Other societies and institutions after all have produced organized bodies of knowledge for knowing the world, not least in Europe. Why was area studies such an American phenomenon? Why did the belated recognition of the necessity of a global geographical vista take the form of area studies? These questions point first and foremost to a prior question that requires clarification: what in this entire process makes area studies so distinct?

Strictly speaking, the distinctness of postwar US area studies lay not in its content. In their different ways, European scholarly societies and the broader academic curricular work they helped inspire were doing much the same work in language, history, literary, or anthropological instruction that area studies belatedly took on. The earliest maps for which US area studies programs clamored after 1945 were more than likely to hail from German or

British cartographic houses – XXXXXXX or Bartholomew – and to have been the same maps that guided the naval officers and civilian strategists of both camps in World War II. Still American area studies was not European geography, or European colonial or tropical studies, European philology, or even some amalgam of these. The British Royal Geographical Society or the Societ B Geografica Italiana differed in significant ways from the later programs in area studies: the former existed outside, albeit in close connection with academia (although the RGS, is again since 1995, whatever else it is, the official professional organization for British academic geographers), whereas area studies was an explicitly academic venture; unlike area studies, the European scholarly societies were usually directly embedded in ruling national elites; and the instrumentalist impulse of much area studies was more technocratic than that of European societies and quite differently articulated with state interests.

What made area studies distinct was not its content but its form of organization and the methods of knowledge production. Three specific differences stand out. First, in the US the always contentious folding of disciplinary perspectives into singular area projects differs considerably from the European experience. In the latter, the divisions between disciplines emerged historically alongside or even after the identification of recognized geographical specialties. David Livingstone was not first a geographer who then went off to explore Africa, bible in hand, but a

missionary with a deep-seated involvement in Africa for whom geography, ethnology, zoology and geology were – however still indistinct one from the other – indispensable for his nineteenth century civilizational adventure. Area studies in the US, by contrast, came almost a century later after much disciplinary division of academic labour, and this consequently established a permanent tension with the pre-existing if young disciplines. The interdisciplinarity that was explicitly sought and became such a hallmark of postwar US academia after the 1960s was already integral to most regional or geographical research and teaching elsewhere in the world largely because the breakdown into disciplines came after rather than before a regionalization of knowledge production.

Second, coming later as it did, the stronger incipient positivism of area studies in the US, its powerful humanities content notwithstanding, tagged this new academic venture as far more instrumentalist than its European counterparts. The point here is not that global knowledge in Europe was *not* instrumental for corporate and state power – clearly it was – but rather that the fact-gathering (in the broadest sense) mission of much US area studies was more readily tailored to – and by – easy bureaucratic uptake. Naval commanders and Foreign ministers strode the halls of the independently funded RGS at the height of empire, whereas their counterparts were hardly likely to occupy chairs of postwar area studies programs in US universities. And yet the mid-twentieth century system of competitive federal and foundation grants

to US universities engendered an entrepreneurialism that was quite efficient at funneling academic results to governmental departments and corporate boardrooms. Third, and related, area studies in the universities differed significantly in a methodological sense from the pursuit of parallel kinds of knowledge in the European context. This was explicit in the early institutionalization of area studies after WWII, when report after report emphasized that the success of area studies depended on, as one survey put it, "integrating content and method."[32] "Integration" was the operative language describing fledgling area studies programs, centers and institutes – the integration not only of different disciplinary perspectives, personnel and methods, but in a more positive vein, the creation of integrated academic homes devoted to specific regions. "Integration" in Europe, was, in a sense, pre-existing, without the contrivance of spatially divided area specialties that had to be integrated across gulfs of pre-existing disciplinary division.

This should not be taken as some kind of nostalgic paen to a putatively more organic or superior intellectualism of the European academy.[33] Disciplinary division was real enough in these contexts but it did not contradict an area division of knowledge production quite as explicitly as in the US. Even less is it evidence of a US exceptionalism in the sense that that country somehow came to occupy a privileged or even unique position. Rather, the argument speaks to different histories, geographies and experiences of empire, and the knowledges generated in support of empire.

European imperialism after the eighteenth century was largely territorially based and organized, the early colonial and even post-colonial United States being a case in point. In political geographical terms if not culturally, the US is actually one of the oldest nation-states, declaring its juridical existence nearly a century before Italy or Germany, for example, yet in territorial terms it is one of the youngest, integrating new states as late as 1959. Put bluntly, with modern European imperialism the accumulation of capital was intertwined with the accumulation of territory, whereas for a US imperialism that began seriously to look beyond the shores of continental North America and the Caribbean only at the end of the nineteenth century, the strategy was quite different. Effectively blockaded out of major colonial possession, the 1898 island conquests of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines notwithstanding, the US ruling class found itself forced to find alternative strategies of economic expansion.[34] An alternative mode of empire required a different spatial knowledge of the world.

The singularity of area studies in the US, then, lies partly in the historical lateness of its emergence, but also in the geographical specificity of US global ambition. From Woodrow Wilson to Franklin Roosevelt to the globalist ambition following the 1980s, American empire has been pursued as a primarily economic rather than territorial/colonial project. Vis-a-vis the European empires it has involved a quite different articulation between political, economic and territorial expansion – a geoeconomic calculus

explicitly fashioned as an alternative to the territorial logics of nineteenth century European colonialism. The United States could afford a moral anti-colonialism less because of political solidarity with the colonized but because the colonial system stood in the way of its global economic expansion.

This in turn demanded a differently inflected knowledge of the world. The largely disciplinary organicism of European "area knowledge" may reflect its formation amidst a prior historical moment in academia but it just as surely expressed the need for a more granular knowledge of place insofar as place was to be taken, occupied, controlled and exploited. By contrast, a US imperial power that ruled primarily through the market could afford to take the world more as a received surface which yielded up markets and resources – physical and human. Where markets were not forthcoming they could be implanted, à la Truman's Point IV program. The world map as organized by area studies certainly involved overlaps but its main outlines made a fairly neat division between Africa, Latin America, Asia, the Middle East and so forth, an organizational chart that replicates a certain Cartesian instrumentalism of economic empire. Even today the State Department, amidst its other layers of organization, divides itself between "desks" that largely mirror this kind of continental and subcontinental parceling of the world.

Even though the point of area studies was to divide the world in order to conquer it intellectually – to create a manageable mosaic through which to catalogue and understand the particularities of place – the effect of this

organizational grid was paradoxically to diminish the importance of geography. The identity of place as emerging from specific places themselves was foreclosed in favor of cartographic abstractions that lumped places into strategic geopolitical or geocultural units based on continental and national lines of separation. Before the requisite area studies specialists were called on to refill the world map with appropriate content, the earth was in a sense flattened. Area studies scholars of course constantly butted up against this primordial imposition but its power can hardly be gainsaid. Thomas Friedman's best-selling utopic projection of global power, *The World is Flat*, therefore represents not a new idea about the twenty-first century, as its deliberately pretentious subtitle would seem to claim, but a quite old aspiration of US power that connects Woodrow Wilson's dream of a global Monroe Doctrine to the Clinton-Bush era of globalization.[35] The rebordering of the United States since 2001 notwithstanding, all eagerly anticipated a world beyond the geographic borders and obstacles that interrupt the free planetary flow of US capital, culture, and political influence. In such a world, what is the utility of engrained geographical knowledge? The oft repeated geographical ignorance of Americans is first and foremost the quite rational expression of a specific imperial intent.

There is another element, therefore, to the question, "why area studies?" This is a question concerning a certain lack in the United States, a question of what has been missing. To put it most bluntly, US academia and

public political discourse was increasingly characterized during the middle decades of the twentieth century by what can be called a "lost geography." On the one hand, the kind of geographical knowledge produced under the auspices of European imperial ambition were not a mainstay of American scholarship, but on the other, even had such a powerful geographical scholarship existed in 1939 or 1945, it would still have been insufficient. There are several aspects to this argument, all involving some contextual history of geography as a discipline.

Nineteenth century American geography, allowing for its comparative indistinctness from related disciplines, was a powerful intellectual and practical force. It was certainly a tool of empire, except that the nineteenth century imperial expansion of the US was largely internal to its national development. Geography helped explain the physical world of the European frontier in North America; with ethnology it explored the human world encountered there; and in the conquered and cultivated lands behind the frontier it offered knowledge for land settlement, resource extraction, transport planning, agricultural development, urban growth. Yet two things happened that marginalized geography as an academic discipline by the middle decades of the twentieth century. First, the project of empire moved on from a domestic to an international affair, and the economic as opposed to territorial architecture of this project evaded geography. Second, the discipline itself bears considerable responsibility. In the process of

separating itself from geology as a distinct science, American geography clung to its physical, geomorphological roots as a seeming guarantor of scientific authority, and by the years prior to World War I when it took up questions of social geography it generally proposed explanations rooted in physical, climatic and environmental causation. The era following the most intense industrial and urban development the country had yet seen was an unpropitious moment for environmental determinism.

Paradoxically, the rise of geopolitics in Germany in the 1920s compounded American geography's isolation. With its sights increasingly set on questions of cultural and political geography, a new generation sought to distance itself from environmental determinism, but the rise of geopolitics emphatically kept a particularly ugly determinist model of geography in the public mind. With fingers singed from their dabble with environmental determinism, geographers responded not by tackling the theoretical crudity of German geopolitics but with a defensive rejection of theory *and* politics tout court. Instead they regrouped defensively around a nineteenth century Kantianism. On the cusp of World War II, a great intellectual "retreat," as one senior geographer described it, was on. As a later commentator lamented, geography by mid century had become "middle west, middle class and middle brow."[36]

The lost geography of the twentieth century was a symptom of disciplinary timidity and just as much it was a product of the incapacity of

the discipline to respond – critically or instrumentally – to the changed architecture of empire posed by US ascendancy. The lost geography was itself an expression of this particular empire. The transformation of empire did not necessarily spell the end of geography as a university pursuit, but it did create the simultaneous necessity and opportunity for restructuring what counted as geographical knowledge – an opportunity the discipline shied away from. Only in the most facile terms – those of geopolitics – did a geographical sensibility about political power prevail in the first decades after 1945. Whereas US ambition in the beginning of the twentieth century was aptly expressed in terms of empire, as in Brooks Adams' influential 1902 book, *The New Empire*, four years later with Henry Luce's announcement of the "American Century," the future had become a project of temporal rather than spatial ambition.[37] This was not accidental. A spatial identification of power, unlike a temporal vision, makes the target visible. One can fight an empire, but how does one fight a century?

Geographers contributed significantly to the origins and institutionalization of area studies, as a perusal of contributors to the SSRC and other surveys of the 1940s suggests, although the Association of American Geographers, the professional society for US geographers, was not even represented among the membership of the pivotal Social Science Research Council. They contributed centrally too during the war, not least to the ASTP, but even as the conception of area evolved into a more regional

conceptualization, less rigidly tied to continental divisions of the world, the work of geography remained highly descriptive and was often taught by non-geographers. In his 1946 retrospective the Smithsonian anthropologist William Nelson Fenton suggests that already, the material taught in this program emphasized not the geographer's ability to combine multiple perspectives into an integrated portrait of place, but rather "simple descriptive geography." Area studies, he concludes, effectively took over the geographer's object of study: "It is important to remember that we are now talking about Area Study when we mean the geographer's Regional Study.... Army area training programs did not summon real anthropology and real geography."[38] Geographers themselves, it has to be stressed, were often complicit in this anemia of wartime geography. Latin America excepted, as Matt Farish points out US geographers themselves entered World War II with quite weak knowledge about the "Third World," especially Asia and Africa, a "scholarly lag" which had "devastating results."[39]

That Harvard University closed its geography program in the same year that it opened its Russian Research Center is therefore more than symbolic; it is symptomatic. As the discipline was out-competed in the education market of the postwar world, its role in area studies also became more and more marginal. So much so that later surveys of the field, at least in the US, largely erase the role of geographers in the early history of area studies; the loss of geography was compounded by a loss of memory concerning whatever

historical role geography and geographers played. The geopolitical climate of the cold war, helped draw the geopolitical map of the academy with its own nations and continents of knowledge. In all of this, the map of the outside world was effectively given, the earth flattened into a jigsaw puzzle of competing interests that was recognizable in the energetic shuffle between many area studies programs and their appropriate "desks" at the State Department.

Conclusion

The "abysmal ignorance" that area studies set out to combat was itself as much a product of empire as the solution it called up. What the empire taketh away, the empire findeth means to reinvent. The contradictoriness of this went deeper than the decline of geography, revealing a certain collusion of class prejudice and nationalism. This abysmal ignorance of the world occurred despite the fact that the United States had experienced unprecedented immigration from Europe and Asia lasting well into the 1920s. The country arguably harbored an unequaled reservoir of area knowledge of the world, not to mention an extraordinary pool of global language ability. However, the political and cultural emphasis on ethnic assimilation rendered the ruling class quite literally blind to the country's extraordinary global resources: for they resided not in Ivy League colleges but as denizens of inner city neighborhoods. Immigrants were habitually lauded as the backbone of the

country while simultaneously feared as threats to national loyalty, and so Japanese Americans, instead of being enlisted to the war effort, were incarcerated in concentration camps by President Roosevelt.

At an individual level, the ASTP could be more pragmatic. One veteran of the ASTP Area and language program as well as the OSS, now a retired political science professor with extensive knowledge of the Middle East, took the course in colloquial Moroccan Arabic at the University of Pennsylvania. With instructors difficult to come by, the ASTP in this case resorted to using "informants" gleaned from the local economy. A number of Moroccans who happened to be working in Philadelphia at the time were duly identified, including a cook and his wife as well one or two Moroccans working in a traveling circus.[40]

Notes

1. Henry Luce, "The American Century," *Life* 17 February 1941. See also Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II*. Oxford: Oxford University press, 1967; Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.*

2. See for example Robert B. Hall, *Area Studies: With Special Reference to Their Implications for Research in the Social Sciences*. New York: SSRC, 1948; Julian H. Steward, *Area Research. Theory and Practice*. New York: SSRC, 1950; Wendell C. Bennett, *Area Studies in American Universities*. New York: SSRC, 1951. See also David Szanton, "The Origin, Nature and Challenges of Area Studies in the United States," in David Szanton, ed. *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, 1-33.

3. Robert H. Wiebe, *The Search for Order 1877 - 1920*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1967, 224-5. President McKinley apparently greeted news of George Dewey's 1898 rout of the Spanish navy from Manilla Bay with jubilation quickly followed by puzzlement and the demand for a map: he "could not have told where those darned islands were within two thousands miles," he later admitted. See Walter F. LaFeber, *The New Empire*. Ithaca: American Historical Association and Cornell University Press, 1963, 361.

4. Wiebe, *Search for Order*, 254.

5. Smith, *American Empire*, 113-138; Lawrence E. Gelfand, *The Inquiry: American Prepoarations for peace, 1917-1919*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.

6. "Fact Students' Join Wilson's Peace Party; Highbrows Laden with Secrets of Foreign Lands," *Kansas City Star* 6 December 1918.

7. See Richard Harris Smith, *OSS. The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981; Barry M. Katz, *Foreign Intelligence. Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services 1942-1945*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989; Bruce Cumings, "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 6-26.

8. Joseph Axelrod and Donald N. Bigelow, *Resources for Language and Area Studies: A Report on an Inventory of the Language and Area Centers Supported by the National Defense Education Act of 1958*. Washington DC: American Council on Education, 1962, 6; Hall, *Area Studies*, 23.

9. William Nelson Fenton, *Area Studies in American Universities*. Washington DC: American Council on Education, 1947, 11.

10. Louis E. Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes. The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II*. Jefferson NC, MacFarland, 1988, 266.

11. Axelrod and Bigelow, *Resources for Language and Area Studies*, op. cit., 6-8; Robert John Mattew, *Language and Area Studies in the Armed Forces*. Washington DC: American Council on Education, 1947; Frederick B. Agard, Robert J. Clements, William S. Hendrix, Elton Hocking, Stephen L. Pitcher, Albert van Eerden, Henry Grattan Doyle, "A Survey of Language Classes in the Army Specialized Training Program," *The Modern Language Journal* 29.2, 1945, 155-160.

12. The Platt Amendment, foisted on Cuba after 1901, provided a Congressional claim for continued US imperial presence on the island and its ownership of Guantánamo Bay as a US naval base. For a critical history of the Council on Foreign Relations, see Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, *Imperial Brain Trust*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977; see also Robert D. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984; and my account through the lens of geographer Isaiah Bowman's career, in "Revolutionarily yours," in *American Empire*, op.cit., 181-207.

13. *Handbook of the Council on Foreign Relations*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1920; *By-Laws with List of Officers and Members*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1922.

14. Schulzinger, *The Wise Men*, .op. cit., 11.

15. CFR, "Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace," Territorial Series, memoranda of discussions, T-A1, 16 February 1940, 1.

16. Paul Buck, *Libraries and Universities*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1964, 150.

17. Tom Bender, cited in David Szanton, ed., *The Politics of Knowledge. Area Studies and the Disciplines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004, 6.

18. David Nugent, "Geographies of Knowledge: The Social Sciences and US Imperial Expansion, WWI-WWII," in Neil Smith, ed., *Creative Destruction*

19. See for example Brooks Adams, *The New Empire*. New York: Macmillan, 1902.

20. Wiebe, *In Search of Order*, op. cit.

21. Nugent, "Geographies of Knowledge," op. cit.

22. Cummings, "Boundary Displacement," op. cit., 6.

23. Axelrod and Bigelow, *Resources for Language and Area Studies*, op. cit., 6.

24. Axelrod and Bigelow, *Resources for Language and Area Studies*, 8-9; on the ACLS research see Smith, *American Empire*, chapters 4, 8.

25. Chauncey Harris, "Area Studies and Library Resources," in Tsuen-Hsuin Tsien and Howard W. Winger, eds., *Area Studies and the Library*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, 5.

26. Robert B. Hall, *Area Studies: With Special Reference to Their Implications for Research in the Social Sciences*. New York: SSRC, 1948, 82.

27. Wendell C. Bennett, *Area Studies in American Universities*. New York: SSRC, 1951, v. On the SSRC, see also Julian H. Steward, *Area Research. Theory and Practice*. New York: SSRC, 1950; Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies," in Noam Chomsky et. al., *The Cold War and the University*. New York: New Press, 1997, 195-231.

28. Axelrod and Bigelow, 8-9.

29. Ibid., 10.

30. Fenton, *Area Studies in American Universities*, 89. On the broader role of the wartime Ethnogeographic Board see Matthew Farish, "Archiving Areas: The Ethnogeographic Board and the Second World War," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95, 2005, 663-79.

31. Isaiah Bowman to H.J. Fleure, 12 December 1949, Bowman Papers, Series 58, Ferdinand Hamburger Jr. Archives, Johns Hopkins University; see also Smith, *American Empire*, 444-451.

32. Fenton, *Area Studies in American Universities*. Washington DC: American Council on Education, 1947, 22.

33. The following paragraphs in this section draw on several discussions in my *American Empire*.

34. This is a considerable generalization to which there are certainly exceptions. The earlier American empires of Spain and Portugal were territorial but not entirely as state projects; mid nineteenth century British imperialism witnessed a spurt of what has been called "free trade imperialism" (John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," *The Economic History Review*, VI, no. 1, 1953); and territorial aggrandizement was integral to US imperial ambition after 1898 and in the earliest years of the

twentieth century.

35. Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat. A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.

36. Thomas F. Glick, "In Search of Geography," *Isis* 74(271), 92-97. The central document in geography's retreat is Richard Hartshorne, *The Nature of Geography*. Lancaster Pa: Association of American Geographers, 1939. Hartshorne, it is worth noting, was coordinator of the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS during World War II. For the lament about this "great retreat," see the AAG Presidential Address of Carl Sauer, "Foreword to Historical Geography," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 31, 1941, 1: 24.

37. Brooks Adams, *The New Empire*, fn. 19; Henry Luce, "The American Century," fn. 19.

38. William Nelson Fenton, "Integration of Geography and Anthropology in Army Area Study Curricula," *Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors* 32, 1946, 700, 706. [696-706].

39. Farish, "Archiving Areas," 671. See Edward A. Ackerman, "Geographic Training, Wartime Research, and Professional Objectives," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 35, 1945, 121-45. And see further the comments by Katz, *Foreign Intelligence*, 15-16, 20.

40. Personal correspondence, Professor Benjamin Rivlin, April 12 2007.