SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL
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Globalization, Development and Democracy
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REFLECTIONS ON LAïCITé & THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Talal Asad

Keynote address at the "Beirut Conference on Public Spheres," October 22-24, 2004

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Introductory

The idea of the public sphere rests on a binary scheme: public vs. private. The public sphere is also thought of as part of a tertiary structure, the space of general communication and information that mediates between the overarching state and the many restricted spaces of daily life. Its historical origin is reflected in the growing power and need of the bourgeoisie in early capitalist society. This development has been seen not only as a step in the emergence of a modern public, but as essential to the formation of liberal democracy. Essential to that formation also is the political doctrine of secularism.

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GLOBALIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

José Antonio Ocampo

Paper for the first annual International Forum for Development, October 18-19, 2004

I. Introduction

"We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people," reads the fifth paragraph of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000). Although globalization reflects technological advances and economic forces, it can be molded by society and, particularly, by democratic political institutions. In fact, the form that globalization has been taking has been largely determined by explicit policy decisions.

In this sense, the most disturbing aspect is the uneven and unbalanced character of the current phase of globalization and of the international policy agenda that accompanies it. The latter reproduces the traditional asymmetries in the world economy and creates new ones. There are four issues that dominate the current economic agenda: free trade, intellectual property rights, investment protection, and financial and capital account liberalization. In the latter case, certain additional conditions have been superimposed as a result of recent crises: it should be appropriately sequenced, and priority should be given to long term flows and institutional development. Moreover, in the area of international trade, liberalization is incomplete and asymmetric: various goods of special interest to the developing countries are subject to the highest levels of protection, and in the case of agriculture, to subsidies in the industrialized countries.

On the other hand, major issues have been left out of the international

In modern society there is typically a multiplicity of religious beliefs and identities, and so we are told they can be held together only by a formal separation between religious belonging and political status, and the allocation of religious belief to the private sphere. To be fully part of a participatory democracy citizens holding different religious beliefs (or none) must share something that enables them to have a common political life a public space in which information affecting the entire political community can be exchanged and ideas debated. But reasoned discourse can take place in that space only if religion does not dominate it. According to this conception, the public sphere is ideally a secular space central to a secular state.

In what follows I want to discuss a recent re-statement of secularism (or *laïcité*) in France arising from the so-called Islamic headscarf affair and to look briefly at the role of public opinion in it. But what interests me here is not the degree to which the public sphere enables or obstructs rational debate, or who is excluded, or whether it actually facilitates the active participation of citizens in forming a critical public opinion or obliges them to consume passively distorted opinions prepared by corporations, or how it relates to the problem of democratization. I view the public sphere as a domain in which particular kinds of subjects are formed as morally independent and socially responsible. For even speaking is more than self-expression and communication it is also, famously, making oneself and being made, investing the self with a variety of emotions.

For most of 2003 and much of the following year, French public opinion was exercised by the affair of "the Islamic veil." Should Muslim girls be allowed to wear a covering over their hair when they are in public schools? The dominant view was definitely that they should not. A considerable amount of polemic was published on this topic.[1] This was not the first time that the matter had been publicly discussed, but on this occasion the outcome was a government-appointed body the Stasi commission that was charged with providing an answer to what was seen as a serious social and political problem, namely, the undermining of *laïcité*. The commission consulted a wide range of opinion and submitted a report to the President in which it recommended a law prohibiting the display of religious symbols (crosses, kippas, and headscarves) in public schools.

The headscarf worn by Muslim schoolgirls has become the symbol of many aspects of social and religious life among Muslim immigrants and their offspring to which many people publicly object. Researchers have enquired into the reasons for their lack of

integration into French society,[2] and especially for the drift of many of their youth towards "fundamentalist Islam" (*l'islamisme*), a drift that some of them trace to pervasive racism and to economic disadvantage, but that others see more as a result of manipulations by conservative Middle Eastern countries and by inflammatory Islamist web-sites. Intellectuals have debated whether and if so how it is possible for religious Muslims to be integrated into secular French society. The passions that have led to the new law are remarkable. It is felt by the majority of French intellectuals and politicians of the left as well as of the right that the secular character of the Republic is under threat because of Islam, which they see as being symbolized by the headscarf.

People commonly find the origin of *laïcité* in the constitution of the Third Republic at the end of the nineteenth century. But secularism has many beginnings, and I find it useful to begin the story in early modern times. At the end of the sixteenth-century wars of religion, the states of Western Christendom adopted the *cuius regio eius religio* principle (the religion of the ruler is the religion of his subjects). This agreement is part of the genealogy of secularization in that it attempted to resolve *religious* conflicts by adopting a *political* principle. Contrary to what is popularly believed, it was not the modern world that introduced a separation between the religious and the political. A separation was recognized in medieval Christendom, but there it articulated complementary organizing principles. Now that distinction had become contingent: religion could be absorbed by the political or excluded altogether from it. That this arrangement did not end persecution is not surprising. After all, transcendent power and authority were now given to the state to decide not only on who was deserving of religious tolerance but on what precisely religious tolerance was.

In 1589 the Edict of Nantes gave French Protestants the right to practice their religion in a Catholic realm, at the very time when Spain was on the verge of expelling its Muslim converts. Although the Edict was subsequently revoked, the French Revolution two centuries later denounced all religious intolerance and attacked ecclesiastical power in the name of humanity. The political oratory and pamphleteering of the Revolution created a public space that was national in its focus and ambition. By then, of course, the essence of religion had come to be generally defined as consisting essentially of personal belief so that the Church as a public body appeared simply as a rival for political authority. The result was nearly a century of bitter conflict between the state and its internal competitor for sovereignty, a conflict finally resolved under the Third

Republic that was dedicated to a civilizing mission in the name of the Revolutionary ideals of humanity and progress. When in 1882 the Third Republic made secular schooling compulsory for six- to thirteen-year old children, public education became a means for cultivating future citizens who would take part in the formation of responsible public opinion. It was coincidentally then, under the Third Republic, that a significant extension of France s colonial conquests took place, justified by its *mission civilisatrice,* the complement to its positivist nation-building at home. (Although Algeria had been conquered earlier in the century in 1830, Tunisia was annexed in 1881 and Morocco in 1907, both under the Third Republic as were other places in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and West Africa.) Anti-clerical schooling at home, unequal agreements with the Church, and imperial expansion abroad were the pillars on which *laïcité* was established under the Third Republic.[3]

I want to suggest that the French secular state today abides by the *cuius regio eius religio* principle even though it disclaims any religious allegiance and governs a largely irreligious society.[4] It is not the maintenance or interdiction of a particular religion by the state that is significant in this principle but the installation of a single power drawn from a single source and facing a single political task: the worldly care of its population regardless of its beliefs. Since "religion" draws the attention of subjects to *other-worldly concerns,* political power needs to define its proper place for the worldly well-being of the population in its care. This requires answering the question: What are the signs of religion s presence? *Laïcité* therefore seems to me comparable to other secularisms, such as that of the United States, a society hospitable to religious belief and activism and a Federal government seeking to apply the principle of neutrality towards religious groupings but a government that also finds itself needing to define religion (and therefore its necessary limits) through the courts. In both cases one could say that what properly belongs to the public sphere (a space of continuous debate and diverse interpretability) is absorbed into the state s constitutional domain in which an accumulation of legal judgments seeks to fix meanings.

economic agenda: the mobility of labor, particularly unskilled labor; international norms regarding taxation, especially on capital, which is essential to guarantee an adequate contribution of this highly mobile factor to public sector financing; the formulation of truly international norms on competition and codes of conduct applicable to multinational corporations; the design of effective instruments to ensure an adequate technological transfer to developing countries; and compensatory financing to assure the inclusion of those countries and social groups that tend to fall behind in the process of globalization.

The preceding reflects, in turn, the most important asymmetry: that which exists between the rapid globalization of (some) markets and the relative weakness of the international social agenda, which has its best expression in the declarations and plans of action of the United Nations Conferences and Summits. The social agenda has to cope, in turn, with weak accountability and enforcement mechanisms, the limited supply of Official Development Assistance, and the conditionality that characterizes international financial support.[1]

In broader terms, it is increasingly recognized that globalization has made more evident the need to provide political, social, economic and environmental “global public goods” (Kaul et al., 2002), in view of the fact that, with the growing interdependence of nations, many areas of public interest that were previously national (and, in some cases, local) are becoming spheres of global attention. Nevertheless, there is an undisputable contrast between the recognition of this fact and the weakness of the international structures and the limited resources allocated to provide these global public goods.

This paper provides an analysis of some of the challenges faced in building a more balanced globalization. It is divided into three sections, the first of which is this introduction. The second focuses on economic inequalities and asymmetries, and the international schemes and national policies needed to overcome them. The third deals with the broader relations between globalization and democracy, and between globalization and social equity.

II. World economic inequalities and asymmetries

1. Global inequalities

The extensive literature on economic growth makes clear that the world has experienced a long term divergence in the levels of per capita incomes among countries over the past two centuries. This trend was particularly strong in the XIX century and the first half of the XX century. It slowed down between 1950 and 1973, experienced a

reversal between 1973 and 1980, but has resumed since then. Using levels of per capita income of the 142 countries included in the historical series of Angus Maddison (2003), it is possible to estimate that the average logarithmic deviation of this variable (one of the traditional measures of inequality) increased from 0.54 in 1980 to 0.65 in 2001. Divergence is stronger and more persistent if we focus on the ratio between per capita income of the industrialized countries and the poorest region of the world today, sub-Saharan Africa. This ratio was already high in 1973 and nearly doubled since then (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1
Increasing international inequalities



Source: Author estimates based on Maddison (2003)

The analysis of the same data source brings to light another and equally important phenomenon: the marked and growing dispersion of the rates of growth of the developing countries during the last quarter of the XX century—that is to say, the coexistence of “winners” and “losers” among them. In fact, for the same sample, the standard deviation of the rates of growth per capita of developing countries increased from 1.8 in 1950-73 to around 3.0 since 1973 (Figure 2). Furthermore, this trend is widespread, as it affects all regions, and low-income as well as middle-income countries.

FIGURE 2
Dispersion of growth rates of developing countries



Source: Author estimates based on Maddison (2003).

The divergence in per capita incomes has been accompanied by a fairly broad trend towards increasing inequality within countries. According to Cornia (2004, Part I), 48 out of 73 countries for which information is available experienced a deterioration of income distribution during the last decades of the XX century; these 48 countries contain 87.5% of the population of the sample of 73 countries (Table 1).[2] Furthermore, in four out of five countries that experienced a deterioration of income distribution, the worsening of the Gini coefficient was at least equivalent to three percentage points, a relatively large change. On the contrary, only nine countries, with 2.7% of the population, experienced a clear improvement in income distribution and in the rest income distribution remained essentially stable. According to this study, inequality tended to increase, sometimes markedly, in a large group of industrial countries,[3] in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Latin America. Asian countries, amongst which China stands out, have increasingly shared in this trend. Africa is the only continent without a clear tendency of this sort, as a result of opposite patterns experienced by different countries in the continent.

data and research on topics bearing on electoral reform; and to articulate the major questions and themes that should inform a more ambitious social science research agenda to strengthen the integrity and accessibility of the U.S. electoral process.

Fall Activities

Start-up activities of the Commission began immediately after its formation. The SSRC launched a dedicated web site to serve as an information clearinghouse and disseminator of the Commission's activities (http://elections.ssrc.org) and inaugurated a daily monitoring effort to track data, research, and claims from academic and nonpartisan sources regarding electoral process controversies as they might arise after the election.

In the weeks following the Presidential Election on November 2, Commission members and SSRC staff mobilized to respond to specific questions and controversies arising in the media. Although Election Day 2004 did not witness the same crisis of doubt that plagued Florida in 2000, allegations of serious irregularities in Florida, Ohio, and elsewhere captured the attention of significant numbers of scholars and citizens. Individually and collectively, Commission members helped interpret and assess the significance of these irregularities—in editorials, radio programs, essays, and newspaper interviews. In mid-November, SSRC staff canvassed Commission members to form an interim working group to respond more systematically to some of these controversies. In a written report released on December 21, the group concluded that, although publicly reported claims and arguments concerning alleged irregularities did not present compelling evidence of election fraud, a definitive resolution of some allegations might never be possible because of inadequate data and insufficient transparency of the election process. The group therefore recommended that national standards be adopted to ensure the full and transparent collection of a wide variety of electoral process data, in order to restore the credibilty of the electoral process and facilitate effective resolution of controversies in future elections.

A definitive resolution of some allegations might never be possible because of inadequate data and insufficient transparency of the election process.

The Final Report

As the interim report was being completed, Chair Alexander Keyssar continued to work with individual Commission members on articulating the major social scientific questions and research challenges facing efforts to strengthen the legitimacy and integrity of America's election and voting system. These insights served as the basis for a final report of the Commission, released on March 1. The report, entitled "Challenges Facing the American Electoral System: Research Priorities for the Social Sciences," reviews ten priority electoral process themes that demand a more concerted social science response:

- improving the process of registration and voting;
- nonpartisan election administration;
- subjective voter perceptions regarding the registration and voting process;
- felon disenfranchisement;
- immigrant voting concerns;
- discrimination and the Voting Rights Act;
- voting rights of persons with cognitive impairments;
- factors affecting voter turnout;
- reform of the Electoral College; and partisanship and districting.

After surveying the research challenges that lie within each of these priority areas, the authors conclude the report by calling for the formation of problem-oriented national social scientific working groups to carry out new lines of research. The Commission report also recommends that existing research and data resources be integrated and strengthened to facilitate the work of scholars, and that comparative research drawing on the experiences of different states and nations be mobilized to help inform current reform efforts.

Looking Forward

Although the Commission's immediate mandate has been met with the completion of its final report, the need for a mobilized social scientific research response to America's electoral process challenges is still acute. SSRC staff are currently working with Commission members, other scholars, institutional partners, and funders to begin undertaking several of the research and infrastructure-building priorities outlined in the final report.

The need for a mobilized social scientific research response to America's electorial

process challenges is still acute.

In the immediate future, the SSRC also intends to deepen its role as a catalyst and clearinghouse through the dynamic upgrading of the Commission web site. As of early February, the web site and its searchable databases contained over 60 recent research products, 375 press articles, 400 bibliographic entries, indices for over 90 organizations, and 37 data archives. Future upgrades to the site will include regular scholarly analysis and commentary on current policy debates, postings on conferences and research opportunities, and links to downloadable datasets. In continuing to build the clearinghouse and working to support new problem-oriented research networks, the SSRC's commitment to electoral process work is part of its overall mission to bridge the research needs of public and civil society groups with those of scholars operating across different institutions, disciplines, and levels of analysis.

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PENDLETON HERRING, 1903-2004

Fred I. Greenstein & Austin Ranney

Pendleton Herring, a pioneering student of American politics and influential foundation executive, died at his home in Princeton, New Jersey, on August 17, 2004, at the age of 100. He had two successive careers, first as a leading political scientist, then as head of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), a capacity in which he played a major part in fostering the burgeoning of the social and behavioral sciences in the post-World War II years.

Herring also had a strong commitment to public service. During the war, he worked with the Bureau of the Budget as an advisor on the Records of War Administration and on advisory committees for the army, navy, and air force. He was awarded the Navy Citation and Distinguished Civilian Service Award in 1946. His most important public contribution was as the principal advisor to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal's associate Ferdinand Eberstadt in a study of the feasibility of unifying the armed services. The Eberstadt report was a major determinant of the National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency.[1]

Edward Pendleton Herring was born on October 27, 1903 in Baltimore, Maryland. (He later dropped his first name.) Herring had a formative early political memory of being taken to the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in 1913. He received his A.B. in English in 1925 and Ph.D. in political science in 1928 from the Johns Hopkins University. He embarked on a graduate education with a view to entering the diplomatic corps, an interest sparked by his world travels as a mess boy and cook on merchant ships during college vacations. During his graduate studies, Herring was taught

constitutional law by Frank J. Goodnow, the first president of the American Political Science Association.

When the time came to select a dissertation topic, Herring proposed an interview-based study of the activities of lobbies in the nation's capital. When the earlier Johns Hopkins graduate student Woodrow Wilson had conducted the study published in 1885 as *Congressional Government,* he did not see fit to visit Capitol Hill. Herring's proposal, he recollected in his APSA oral history, prompted a deliberation on the part of the faculty about whether interviewing "came under the rubric of scholarly research." He reports that after being given a go-ahead, "I simply wandered around the congressional corridors as if I were the white rabbit in Alice in Wonderland . . . I remember distinctly knocking on a very large door that was opened by a little man with a florid countenance. He invited me in, and it was only after we had been talking for some time and he had likened lobbyists to coyotes that I realized he was John Nance Garner."[2] Herring's dissertation, which was published in 1929 as *Group Representation Before Congress,* has taken a place alongside Peter Odegard's *Pressure Politics* (1928) and E. E. Schattschneider's *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff* (1935) as the foundation of the study of pressure groups as a field of political science. It also paved the way for field studies of political behavior in Washington and other settings.

Herring was a member of Harvard University's Department of Government from 1928 to 1947, and secretary of Harvard's Graduate School of Public Administration from 1936 to 1947. During his years at Harvard, he published six books, each of which had a significant impact. Following *Group Representation Before Congress,* he published *Public Administration and the Public Interest,* an early analysis of the interactions among government agencies and their clienteles, and *Federal Commissioners: A Study of Their Careers and Qualifications,* an exploration of the backgrounds of the members of federal regulatory commissions. Both appeared in 1938.

Herring's next two works were more general in scope and impact. *Presidential Leadership: The Political Relations of Congress and the Chief Executive* (1940) is a searching analysis of the presidency in action. *The Politics of Democracy: American Political Parties in Action* (1940), remains a principal source of ideas and inspiration for those who hold the view that the United States needs a politics of moderation and consensus rather than one of sharp choice between irreconcilable alternatives and that the pragmatic, decentralized parties of American tradition are more likely to meet that need than

the unified, disciplined British-style parties admired by advocates of "responsible party government." Herring's final book, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy Under Arms* (1941), is an account of the military buildup that was in progress in the period before Pearl Harbor and an early contribution to the study of civil-military relations. It was this work that brought Herring to the attention of Eberstadt.

After the war Herring resigned from Harvard to join the staff of the Carnegie Corporation. In 1948, he became president of the Social Science Research Council, founded in 1923 to promote the organization and funding of social science research. Herring held the SSRC presidency from 1948 to 1968. In those twenty years the Council became the prime organization shaping the nature of research in most of the social sciences. At the beginning of Herring's presidency the annual budget of the SSRC was under $500,000. When he left office it was nearly $2 million.

Under Herring's leadership, the growing resources of the Council were used to pursue two main goals. The first was to improve the quality of social science knowledge by encouraging researchers to acquire more and better data, analyze them by more rigorous quantitative methods, and develop systematic theories with predictive power. The second was to focus and report research in ways that would make it accessible to public policy makers. The Council worked mainly through committees of scholars, chosen and encouraged by Herring and his staff. Among the more noteworthy were the committees on mathematics in social science research, economic stability, and biological bases of social behavior. In Herring's own discipline, the committee on political behavior and its derivative committees on comparative politics and governmental and legal processes played key roles in the "behavioral revolution" that transformed political science beginning in the 1950s.

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Children and Armed Conflict

Working Group Meeting on Data Collection on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children

The Program on Children and Armed Conflict (CAC) convened a meeting of the Working Group for the Data Collection Project, funded by the European Community Humanitarian Organisation (ECHO), from September 7-9, 2004, in New York City. The Working Group is composed of a small number of experts on data collection on CAC that act as advisors to the SSRC. Country coordinators from Angola, Colombia, DR Congo and Sri Lanka—the four countries where the project is being implemented—were present, as well as researchers from the Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science, who worked with the SSRC in the development of the Data Collection Module on Recruitment and Displacement of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict. A representative of UNICEF also contributed to the meeting. The aim was to discuss the progress of work on this project, to have feedback from the efforts undertaken in each country, and to discuss and refine the draft Data Collection Module. This Module, to be used for data gathering at the country level, needed to be adapted to the specific situations in each country while remaining general enough to allow for global comparisons. Overall, the gathering achieved its goal of reviewing work progress, refining the Module and planning the next steps: in-country training seminars for data collection and the fieldwork.

CAC training workshop in Mbandaka, D.R. Congo.
Ezra Simon

In-Country Training Seminars for Data Collection

The Program on Children and Armed Conflict is pleased to report on the completion of the Training Seminars for Data Collection on Recruitment and Displacement of Children affected by Armed Conflict. These seminars were held in Colombia (Medellín), Sri Lanka (Vavuniya), Angola (Huambo), and DR Congo (Mbandaka), and were aimed at strengthening the capacity of the country research teams to carry out field research using appropriate methodologies and tools for data collection on CAC.

CAC training workshop in Huambo, Angola.
Ezra Simon

The training seminars brought SSRC staff Alcinda Honwana and Ezra Simon to the field as co-facilitators with trainers from the Fafo Institute for Applied Social Science. The focus was on the technical aspects of data gathering and analysis as they relate to each local area, as well as current CAC policies and research trends. Fieldwork is currently being conducted by country teams composed of local researchers trained in the latest methodologies and analysis techniques for both qualitative and quantitative research focusing on

displaced families and children caught up in armed conflict. One of the most interesting aspects of the training seminars is that they managed to broaden the research circle beyond the level of the field team. There has been energetic participation on the part of leaders of local research institutions, think tanks, and even those working in transit centers for demobilized children, all of whom are keen to view the information being gathered in light of improved effectiveness in program design.

Workshop on Youth in Organized Violence: Comparing Contexts

The Social Science Research Council, in collaboration with the Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies (ISS), convened from December 9-11, 2004, a workshop on the theme "Youth in Organized Violence: Comparing Contexts." The goal of the meeting, held in Pretoria, South Africa, was to broaden understanding of the links between a vast range of issues regarding youth and organized violence—from participation in war and armed conflicts (including military and para-military groups) to organized forms of urban violence in gangs, protection rackets and street children organized around violent acts. Funded by the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation, it brought together scholars and field workers who carry out research in Australia, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Liberia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, the U.S., and Zimbabwe.

The workshop examined the role that organized forms of violence play in young people's lives; developed new theoretical and analytical insights on the issue of youth in organized violence; and encouraged a comparative analysis of the various forms of organized violence in which young people are engaged, providing perspectives that might not otherwise occur when viewing these in isolation. Drawing directly from their own field research, participants in the workshops provided careful considerations that analyzed the complexity of the relationship between youth and organized violence and the various factors that contribute to their involvement. Participants discussed, for example, how issues such as poverty influence youth's involvement in violence in contexts as far-ranging as the Brazilian *favelas,* to youth gangs in the U.S. and Australia, and child soldiers in Sierra Leone, along with the prevalence of death squads and vigilantism in South Africa. These were compared with situations such as the circumstances of child soldiers in Colombia and Sri Lanka, and protection rackets in Nigeria, as well as transnational issues such as the export of gang culture from Los Angeles to El Salvador.

This project, of which this was the first workshop, focuses on the development of better understandings of the contexts in which youth create, instigate, and are inducted into organized forms of violence, especially the situations that enable these organizations to flourish and evolve. The workshop brought together scholars from various disciplines (anthropology, psychology, criminal justice, sociology, war and conflict studies, political science, economy) conducting studies on youth and organized forms of violence. The idea is to develop discussions and analysis across various contexts in which young people are engaged in organized violence and to develop new insights and knowledge that will help improve the social sciences' understandings of the connections between youth and organized forms of violence. A second workshop is scheduled for 2005.

Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF)

CPPF continues to play an increasing role in providing a systematic channel for informal encounter between scholars, journalists and practitioners, on the one hand, and senior UN staff on the other, in order to strengthen the conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts of the UN system around the world.

On June 24, 2004, the Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum organized a meeting that brought together a number of senior UN staff along with experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) aimed at examining problems in the Congolese transition process. Ongoing instability in eastern Congo and in Kinshasa, as well as recent attacks directed at the UN Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC), had raised concerns about the state of the political transition. Building on previous work by CPPF on the DRC, the meeting analyzed the causes and implications of violence in the east, the politics of power-sharing within the transitional government and between central and regional governments, prospects for elections scheduled in 2005, and unification of the armed forces, and put forward substantive suggestions for renewed UN engagement.

The appointment of a UN Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide represents a milestone for the UN system in creating a mechanism to mobilize international response to avert potential future atrocities. On August 5, 2004, CPPF convened a small number of experts from academia, NGOs and the UN to assist the Special Adviser to brainstorm his initial strategy, methodology, and overall approach with a particular emphasis on practical recommendations.

Although the crisis in Darfur has been widely recognized as amongst the world's worst humanitarian disasters today, this high profile has not been matched by an adequate understanding of the deep and complex roots of the crisis. On September 8, and November 18, 2004, CPPF held a sequence of two linked meetings aimed at deepening the analysis of the underlying dynamics of Darfur's violence. UN staff and specialists on Darfur met under CPPF's aegis in September to discuss the region's society and economy (specifically addressing issues of identity, land, and oil), the dynamics of militia/opposition mobilization, the links to wider Sudanese political processes, and implications for the stability of the region. The November follow-up was expressly devoted to assessing progress made in the Abuja, Nigeria, peace talks on Darfur, and their linkage to the national (north-south) negotiations.

Two further linked meetings were held on October 7, 2004 and December 10, 2004: the first concerning Liberia, the second concerning its neighbor Côte d'Ivoire. The Liberia meeting took stock of progress made thus far in the country's transition back to peace and made recommendations for UN engagement, particularly concerning preparations for planned elections in 2005. The Côte d'Ivoire meeting was held in the immediate aftermath of the resumption of conflict in that country following the apparent collapse of the peace process in November and the escalation in the use of "hate media." Both meetings brought experts from West Africa and elsewhere to New York for intensive and productive off-the-record discussions about underlying dynamics and possible options for UN and international engagement.

Global Security and Cooperation (GSC)

GSC Migration and Security meeting

Reframing the Challenge of Migration and Security

The GSC Program has proceeded with a new project called "Reframing the Challenge of Migration and Security," made possible by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY). This research inquiry, falling under CCNY's Strengthening U.S. Democracy Program, examines the domestic implications of the U.S.-led "war on terror" on civil liberties and seeks to make a significant contribution to the important debate about the proper balance between human rights and the government's security obligations. Our goal is to facilitate a constructive dialogue between representatives of the most affected group—Muslim immigrant communities—and the U.S. homeland security authorities. By "interrogating" the perceptions and assumptions of each of these communities, and by creating an information-rich environment in which they are able to challenge each other, we expect a deeper understanding of both the post-9/11 security imperatives and the social, political and economic disruption that indiscriminate application of those imperatives is creating.

To date, the GSC program has assembled a consultative group of eight leading scholars on the subject, commissioned five substantial background papers, and convened thirteen leaders of the Muslim- and Arab-American communities for a September 2004 meeting with the consultative group and with a representative of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Moderated by Joseph V. Montville, the discussions focused on the effects of the post-9/11 policies and practices of the U.S. government on their communities, as well as their conceptions of homeland security in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and related issues. The participants offered candid thoughts

on the experiences of their individual communities, and voiced the concerns and opinions of those most directly impacted by these new policies.

The program is now preparing for homeland security professionals to relate their perspectives and will plan for a synthesis of the findings in the final phases of the project in spring 2005. For further information about this initiative and to access the commissioned research papers, please visit the project website.

Project on Political Violence—Cuenca Workshop

The GSC Program held the third workshop on its Project on Political Violence in Cuenca, Spain, November 11-14, 2004. The purpose of this workshop was to bring the project participants together in order to discuss the final versions of their field research reports, with particular focus on policy recommendations. The Project on Political Violence, funded by the Norwegian Foreign Office, was launched in 2003 in partnership with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) in order to narrow the gap between policymakers and analysts with regard to appropriate responses to political violence. The SSRC and NUPI have convened an international group of distinguished scholars all of whom have extensive field experience with militant groups and most of whom have policy advisory experience. Discussions at the workshop in Cuenca centered on the analysis and comparison of the different military, political, legal and economic policies that governments have used in dealing with armed militants operating in their territories, and examined, in particular, which combination of policies have been effective, which have been less successful, and the political and social costs of policy failure. For more information click here.

The GSC program regrets to announce the death of Marianne Heiberg, Senior Researcher at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and valuable partner in the GSC's Project on Political Violence, on December 25, 2004. The SSRC extends its sincere condolences to her family and colleagues during this time of grieving.

SSRC-UNU Project on Multilateralism Under Challenge

With generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the GSC Program has taken up a fresh strand of research work on multilateralism as impacted by new realities of power and various contemporary challenges that are currently putting strains on the international system. The program has engaged this topic in two principal sets of activities. The Workshop on the Future of Multilateral Arms Control, held in Paris in June

2003, brought together leading analysts of nuclear arms control, international organization, international relations theory, and regional politics, for two days of discussions on the implications of the events in the Persian Gulf for multilateral arms control accords and institutions apparently paralyzed by a crisis of legitimacy and viability.

In the second phase of our work on multilateralism, the GSC Program has partnered with the United Nations University (UNU) in Tokyo to produce a volume provisionally entitled *Multilateralism Under Challenge? Power, International Order and Structural Change.* Co-sponsored by the UNU, this line of work considers the challenges confronting multilateralism in the context of changing threats or perceptions of international security and evolving norms relating to state sovereignty and human rights. This work is set to analyze the relationship between the distribution of power—in all its dimensions, hard and soft—at the international level and the effectiveness of, and prospects for, multilateralism. We will also consider whether multilateralism can offer a viable basis for international order when power is preeminently concentrated in a unipolar system.

First drafts of papers written by an international group of scholars and practitioners were discussed in an authors' workshop held in Washington, D.C., on November 29-30, 2004. Participants engaged in fervent discussions about the nature and gravity of the current crisis of multilateralism, addressing the topic at hand from multiple perspectives and theoretical positions. The multilateralism volume, co-edited by Ramesh Thakur (UNU), Edward Newman (UNU), and John Tirman (MIT), will be published by the UNU Press in early 2006. Among the contributors are Emanuel Adler (the Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Richard Goldstone (Fordham University School of Law), Robert Keohane (Stanford University), Thomas Weiss (City University of New York), Shashi Tharoor (UN Department of Public Information), and others. It is hoped that the project, which will be publicized widely, will have a major impact upon policy discussions at the national level, throughout the United Nations system, and within academic circles. For more information, please visit the project website.

Project on Globalization and Conflict

The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation has renewed its support of the project on Globalization and Conflict, focused on the analysis of how processes of globalization affect the conditions conducive to instability and armed conflict, or, conversely, enhance stability and

prospects for peace. The funds made available by this grant will be used for future rounds of Collaborative Action Research Grants on Globalization and Conflict, which fund empirical research in “conflict zones” by local scholars. Current sets of commissioned research projects are underway in the Horn of Africa, West Africa, the Andes, and Southeast Asia. The first line of inquiry focused on the relationships between globalization, natural resources, and conflict. A second line of inquiry has taken up issues of globalization, conflict, and state capacities to control violence. A third line of inquiry will focus on the relationship between globalization, violent conflict, and the absence of good prospects for youth education and employment. For more information click here.

Collaborative Action Research Grants on Globalization, State Capacities, and Violent Conflict

The Program on Global Security and Cooperation is pleased to announce the new recipients of the Collaborative Action Research Grants on Globalization, State Capacities, and Violent Conflict. The grants were awarded to four teams of researchers who currently work and/or live in West Africa, Burma/Myanmar, and Laos. The selected projects will receive grants in the amount of $10,000 for four to six months, to explore the relationship that exists between processes of political and economic globalization, violent conflict, and changing patterns in state capacities in the developing world. The names and bios of all the grant recipients, as well as the title of their research proposals can be found on the SSRC website.

HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation

The first meeting of the SSRC’s Steering Committee for the Initiative on HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation was held in November 2004. The committee identified intellectual priorities and major gaps in knowledge relating to the long wave nature of the pandemic and its social-structural impacts, and emphasized the need to increase the centrality of these concerns to mainstream policy and research agendas. Other initiative highlights over recent months include the co-convening of a satellite session on the contribution of social sciences to the pandemic at the 15th International AIDS Conference in Bangkok. The session was convened by the SSRC, UNESCO, UNAIDS, the AIDS Society of Asia and the Pacific, and the Gates Foundation. This led to further collaboration with UNESCO on developing cultural approaches to HIV/AIDS and in working together on an international meeting on HIV/AIDS, women and migration. A recently established partnership with Harvard University has resulted in rapid progress in the areas of HIV/AIDS and democracy,

governance and security. Dr. Alex de Waal has been appointed jointly as a half-time program director at the SSRC (see New Staff) and as a fellow at the Harvard Global Equity Initiative and is coordinating this area of activity for the SSRC.

Emergencies and Humanitarian Action

The Social Science Research Council is sponsoring a monthly seminar series in 2004-05 entitled “The Transformations of Humanitarian Action” as a key component of its broader effort to promote social science work on humanitarian emergencies. The seminars address the dramatic expansion of the size, scope, and scale of humanitarian action in the recent past, and how this has altered the fundamental organization and purpose of humanitarian work. The seminar series offers an opportunity for scholars and practitioners to engage with each other in an open and intimate forum. At the inaugural seminar on October 12, 2004, at the Century Association, Human Rights Watch program director Iain Levine and Council President Craig Calhoun presented short papers on the theme “What is the ‘Field’ of Humanitarianism?” to a group of 16 academics and practitioners. Seminar participants included representatives from Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University, and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), among others. On November 9, 2004, Alex Cooley of Barnard College’s political science department and Larry Minear of Tufts University’s Humanitarianism and War Project presented papers on “The Marketplace of Humanitarian Action” to a group of 21. “Humanitarianism and the Politics of Peace in Darfur” on December 8, 2004, featured presenter Alex de Waal in a roundtable discussion involving 25 scholars and practitioners. De Waal is working jointly with the SSRC and the Global Equity Initiative at Harvard. All seminars are chaired by Craig Calhoun and Michael Barnett, the chair of international affairs at the Hubert Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota.

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Estudios migratorios latinoamericanos, special issue on "Migration, Borders and Diasporas in the Americas," 17, 52, 2003.

The Translocal Flows in the Americas (TLFA) Project at the Social Science Research Council has organized a special issue of *Estudios migratorios latinoamericanos*—a Latin American peer reviewed journal based in Buenos Aires, Argentina that specializes in migration research—featuring seven essays that were presented at its conference on "Migrations, Borders and Diasporas in the Americas," held in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic in June 2003. The issue includes essays by Nicholas De Genova, Kevin A. Yelvington, Sergio Caggiano, Angela C. Stuesse, Patricia Landolt, Elizabeth Oglesby and Daniel Ramirez. Through this publication, which includes an introduction by Alejandro Grimson (IDES/CONICET) and Marcial Godoy-Anativia (SSRC), the SSRC seeks to strengthen and extend the broad dialogue we have established between migration scholars in diverse parts of the Hemisphere, and to disseminate state of the art scholarship in Spanish on questions of migratory flows, borders and diasporas to scholarly communities in Latin America, the Caribbean and the United States.

Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, edited by Alex de Waal. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. 269 pp.



This book examines the social and political



manifestations of Islamism in northeast Africa, including both the Nile Valley and the Horn. Northeast Africa has been a crucible for political Islam, and the site of one of the fiercest struggles between Islamists and their enemies. Though militant Islamists were a powerful force in the 1990s in places such as Sudan, by 2000, Islamism was in retreat, brought down by its own political and ideological limitations. Nonetheless, events since 2001, and the refraction of the U.S. agenda through local political struggles, have given militant Islamism renewed salience, thus enabling this book to mark an important step toward understanding the complex dynamics that enfold the region. SSRC Program Director Alex de Waal is the book's editor.

Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, revised edition, by Alex de Waal. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. 255 pp.



In 2004, Darfur, Sudan was described as the "world's greatest humanitarian crisis." Twenty years previously, Darfur was also the site of a disastrous famine. *Famine that Kills* is a seminal account of that famine, and a social history of the region. In a new preface prepared for this revised edition, SSRC Program Director Alex de Waal analyses the roots of the current conflict in land disputes, social disruption and impoverishment. Despite vast changes in the nature of famines and in the capacity of response, de Waal's original challenge to humanitarian theory and practice, including a focus on the survival strategies of rural people, has never been more relevant. Documenting the resilience of the people who suffered, de Waal explains why many fewer died than had been predicted by outsiders. The book is also a pathbreaking study of the causes of famine deaths, showing how outbreaks of infectious disease killed more people than starvation. Now a classic in the field, *Famine that Kills* provides critical background and lessons of past intervention for a region that finds itself in another moment of humanitarian tragedy.

The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11, edited by John Tirman. New York: The New Press, 2004. 296 pp.



The most recent volume in the "After 9/11" series jointly published by the SSRC and The New Press has been released. Edited by former GSC Program Director John Tirman, *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration After 9/11* raises vital questions about government policy and the many dimensions of the migration-security link, including discussions of civil liberties, transnational organizations, refugee populations and politically active diasporas. Contributors include Fiona Adamson, Howard Adelman, Imtiaz Ahmed, Thomas Bierstecker (with Peter Romaniuk), Louise Cainkar, Enseng Ho, and others. Other volumes in the series are *Understanding September 11* (Calhoun, Price, Timmer, eds.), *Critical Views of September 11* (Hershberg, Moore, eds.), and *Bombs and Bandwidth* (Latham, ed.). The fifth volume scheduled for the series is *Lessons of Empire* (edited by Calhoun, Moore and SSRC Board member Fred Cooper).

Iglesia, represión y memoria. El caso chileno, by María Angelica Cruz. Madrid: Siglo XXI Editores, 2004. 171 pp.



The Program on Latin America is pleased to announce the eighth volume resulting from the Council's project on Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru has been published in Spanish by Siglo XXI Editores. *Iglesia, represión y memoria. El caso chileno,* by María Angelica Cruz with a prologue by Paul W. Drake, is a study of the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Chile's evolution from the road toward socialism under Salvador Allende (1970-73), through the dictatorship under Augusto Pinochet (1973-90), to the restored democracy under the Concertacion (1990 to the present). The publication forms part of a multi-volume series consisting of work produced by program fellows and faculty, which has been released simultaneously in Madrid and Buenos Aires and distributed throughout the world. In addition to the eight volumes already published, four additional volumes will be published with Siglo XXI in 2005.

Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, edited by T. J. Pempel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005. 305 pp.



This volume is the result of a seminar series organized by the Abe Fellowship Program of the SSRC with funding provided by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership. The collection is about the people, processes, and institutions behind region-building in East Asia. In it, experts on the area take a broad approach to the dynamics and implications of regionalism. Instead of limiting their focus to security matters, they extend their discussions to topics as diverse as the mercurial nature of Japan's leadership role in the region, Southeast Asian business networks, the war on terrorism in Asia, and the political economy of environmental regionalism. Throughout, they show how nation-states, corporations, and problem-specific coalitions have furthered regional cohesion not only by establishing formal institutions, but also by operating informally, semiformally, or even secretly.

International Migration Review, special issue on "Conceptual and Methodological Developments in the Study of International Migration," edited by Alejandro Portes and Josh DeWind, Vol. 38, Fall 2004.

As a follow-up to the field-survey collection of essays in the *Handbook of International Migration: The American Experience* (Hirschman, Kasinitz, and DeWind, eds., Russell Sage Foundation, 2000), the SSRC International Migration Program organized in collaboration with the Center for Migration and Development at Princeton University a conference that examined research related to recent innovations in this field, both in theory and empirical research, across both sides of the Atlantic. Papers presented at the conference appear in this special issue of the *International Migration Review* and cover research approaches to subject areas such as states and modes of political incorporation, transnational communities and immigrant enterprise, unauthorized immigration and the second generation, and religion and migrant incorporation.

U.S.-South African Research and Training Collaborations, by Beth Elise Whitaker. New York: Social Science Research Council, 2004. 43 pp.

This working paper is the most recent SSRC project related to knowledge production, research networks, and capacity-building in sub-Saharan Africa. The report, conducted and written by Beth Whitaker (University of North Carolina, Charlotte), explores the state of collaboration between U.S. and South African higher education institutions in the post-apartheid era. Political transformations in South Africa catalyzed a flood of student exchange programs, individual research partnerships, and institutional linkages with U.S. universities. In focusing on the broader institutional connections, the study demonstrates some overlaps and some significant gaps, including the paucity of cross-national collaborations on HIV/AIDS and the unevenly distributed participation in these partnerships, with historically disadvantaged universities in both countries having less ability to establish networks internationally for mutual benefit. The study should be an important resource for planning future collaborations and addressing some of the gaps identified in the study.

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The Summer/Fall 2004 issue of the *GSC Quarterly*, an electronic newsletter of the Program on Global Security and Cooperation, was released in early November. The issue features versions of four chapters from former Program Director John Tirman's edited volume *The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11* (The New Press, 2004). This is the fourth book in a series on "After September 11" jointly organized by The New Press and the SSRC. The chapters in the newsletter were written by Imtiaz Ahmed, Louise Cainkar, Gary Gerstle, and John Tirman. The issue can be found on the SSRC website where visitors can also gain access to all archived issues of the newsletter.

The Africa Program of the SSRC is pleased to announce its new online Directory of African Research Networks and Institutions featuring information on 68 organizations, institutions and networks conducting social science research in sub-Saharan Africa. The directory is organized topically and provides brief descriptions of each organization.

Since first forming on October 27, 2004, as an authoritative nonpartisan resource for perspective and analysis of electoral process concerns, the SSRC National Research Commission on Elections and Voting has established a website dedicated to the project at http://elections.ssrc.org . The website now operates as a national academic research repository, featuring a clearinghouse of data links, a press archive, and an organizational directory for

elections and voting work in the United States. The site is updated regularly.

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Alex de Waal has been appointed program director at the SSRC and will be working on projects on HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation and on Humanitarian Emergencies, and through each contributing also to the Africa Program. He will divide his time between the Council and Harvard University's Global Equity Initiative, with which the Council has a joint project on HIV/AIDS and Social Impact. In his twenty-year career, de Waal has studied the social, political and health dimensions of famine, war, genocide and the HIV/AIDS epidemic, especially in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes. He has been at the forefront of mobilizing African and international responses to these problems. Alex's books include: *Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan* (Oxford University Press, 1989, revised edition, 2005), *Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan* (African Rights, 1995), and *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa* (Indiana University Press, 2004). De Waal received his doctorate in social anthropology from Oxford University.

Yasmine Ergas has joined the Council as a senior consultant for program development and external relations. Ms. Ergas was a program director at the SSRC between 1985 and 1991, staffing the Committee on Western Europe and an early initiative on the social consequences of HIV/AIDS.

Clarice Taylor has assumed the position of senior consultant to the Children and Armed Conflict Program. She is assisting with coordination, project implementation and communications. Most recently she was director of communications for the UN-affiliated

World Conference of Religions for Peace.

Ezra Simon has joined the Children and Armed Conflict Program as a program coordinator. Prior to the SSRC, Ezra worked for various relief and development organizations, as well as earlier work at an academic journal, a research institute, and a student exchange organization.

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REFLECTIONS ON LAÏCITÉ & THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Reading signs

Because religion is of such capital importance to the lay Republic, the latter is the final authority that determines whether the meaning of given signs is "religious." One might object that this applies only to the meaning of symbols in public places, but since the *legal* distinction between public and private space is itself a governmental construct, it is always a part of the Republic's reach.

Now, the arguments presented in the media about the Islamic headscarf affair seemed to me not so much about tolerance towards Muslims in a religiously diverse society—not even about the strict separation between religion and the state. They were first and foremost about the structure of political liberties on which *this* state is built, the signs that properly refer to it. The dominant position in the debate assumed that in the event of a conflict between constitutional principles the state's right to defend its personality would trump all other rights. The state's inviolable personality was expressed in and through particular signs, including those properly attached to the abstract individuals whom it represented, and to which they owed unconditional obedience. The headscarf worn by Muslim women was held to be a religious sign conflicting with the secular personality of the French state.

The eventual outcome of such debates about the Islamic headscarf in the media and elsewhere was the government's appointment of a commission of enquiry charged with reporting on the question of secularity in schools. The commission was headed by ex-minister Bernard Stasi, and it heard testimony from a wide array of persons. In December 2003 a report was finally submitted to the president recommending a law that would prohibit the display of any

"conspicuous religious signs" (*des signes ostensibles*) in public schools—including Islamic headscarves, kippas, and crosses worn around the neck. On the other hand, medallions, little crosses, stars of David, hands of Fatima or miniature Qur'ans that the report designates "discreet signs" (*les signes discrets*) are authorized.[5] In making all these stipulations the commission clearly felt the need to appear even-handed (the secular Republic must be neutral in its treatment of various religions). The proposed law was formally passed by the National Assembly in February 2004 by an almost unanimous vote. There were some demonstrations of young Muslims —as there had been earlier when the Stasi commission had formally made its recommendation—but the numbers who openly protested were small. Most French Muslims seemed prepared to follow the new law, many reluctantly.

I begin with something the Stasi report does not engage with: According to the Muslims who are against the ban for reasons of faith, the wearing of the headscarf by women in public is a religious *duty* but carrying "discreet signs" is not. Of course there are many Muslims, men and women, who maintain that the wearing of a headscarf is *not* a duty in Islam, and it is undoubtedly true that even those who wear it may do so for a variety of motives. But I do not offer a normative judgment about Islamic doctrine; I simply note that if the wearer regards the veil as her religious duty, it becomes an integral part of herself. For her it is not *a sign* that can be shed at will but *part of a presence* that indexes an embodied doctrine. For the Stasi commission all the wearables mentioned are signs, and they are regarded as *displaceable signs* as though "meaningful symbol" and the materiality of the object so regarded were identical. So the symbols are taken to have a "religious" meaning by virtue of their synecdochic relation to systems of collective representation—in which, for example,the kippa stands for "Judaism," the cross for "Christianity," the veil for "Islam." What a given sign signifies is therefore a central question. The process of signification is ideally rational and clear, qualities that make it capable of being rationally criticized. It is assumed that a given sign signifies another sign which is clearly identifiable as "religious." What is ignored in this assumption, however, is the entire realm of ongoing discourses that provide authoritative interpretations. The precision and fixity accorded to the relationship of signification is always an arbitrary act and often a spurious one where embodied language is concerned.

Bernard Stasi

Saget / AFP

Assuming for the sake of argument that certain signs are religious, where and how may they be used to make a statement? According to the Stasi report, secularism does not insist on religion being confined to the privacy of conscience, to its being denied public expression. On the contrary, it says that the free expression of religious signs (things, words, sounds) is an integral part of the liberty of the individual. As such it is not only legitimate but essential to the conduct of public debate in a secular democracy—so long as the representatives of the different religious opinions do not attempt to dominate it.[6]

At first sight this liberal formulation leaves something unclear: Does willing consent to a particular religious argument by a majority of those participating in public debate amount to domination? A clear answer to this question is given in the functions of the state, for the latter doesn't only guarantee freedom of expression but also educates everyone into becoming autonomous and so able to judge freely. In this way it "inscribes secularism as a direct descendent of the [Revolutionary] Rights of Man."[7]

The determination of meanings by the commission was not confined to visible signs. It included the deciphering of psychological elements such as desire and will.

Problems of interpretation plagued the new law on the headscarf

from the beginning. For example French Sikhs made a special case to the president for allowing the wearing of the turban for boys in public schools. Their argument was that since it is long hair that is prescribed for males by the Sikh religion and not the wearing of a turban, the latter was a *cultural* and not a *religious* sign, and that therefore the law banning religious signs should not apply to it. In April 2004 the ministry accepted the Sikh argument: the new law did not apply to "traditional costumes which testify to the attachment of those who wear them to a culture or to a customary way of dressing."[8] However, this apparent exception was eventually voted down in August 2004 by the National Assembly, who considered the ban to apply equally to the turban (but not to long hair) for Sikh men as an obvious religious sign. This ambiguity in interpretation was resolved by law.

The determination of meanings by the commission was not confined to visible signs. It included the deciphering of psychological elements such as desire and will. Thus the wearer's *act of displaying the sign* was said to incorporate the actor's *will* to display it—and therefore became part of what the headscarf meant. As one of the commission members later explained, its use of the term "displaying," *manifestant,* was meant to underline the fact that certain acts embodied "the will to make appear," *volonté d'apparaitre.*[9] Consequently, the *Muslim identity* of the headscarf wearer was crucial to the headscarf's meaning because the will to display it was read from that identity. Paradoxically, Republican law realizes its *universal* character through a *particular* (i.e., Muslim) identity in the sense of a particular psychological internality. However, the mere existence of an internal dimension that is held to be accessible from outside opens up the universal prospect of cultivating Republican selves in public schools and pointing them in the right direction.

The commission's concern with the desires of pupils is expressed in a distinction between those who didn't really want to wear the headscarf and those who did. It is not very clear exactly how these "genuine desires" were deciphered, although reference is made to pressure by traditional parents and communities. Referring to the verbal and physical abuse offered young women who go bareheaded in the ghettoes, the report describes the headscarf as "offering them the protection that ought to be guaranteed by the Republic." Does it follow from this that pupils should be subjected to a sartorial rule in public schools? This may seem an odd leap, but if the rule is put in the context of the project of cultivating and governing secular subjects—who are free, equal and tolerant only as *properly-formed Republican citizens*—this exercise of state authority

makes good sense.

However, it is worth remarking that solicitude for the "real" desires of the pupils applied only to girls *who wore the headscarf.* No thought appears to have been given to determining the "real" desires of girls *who did not wear the headscarf.* Was it possible that some of them secretly wanted to wear a headscarf but were ashamed to do so because of what their French peers and people in the streets might think and say? Or could it be that they were hesitant for more complicated reasons? However, in their case surface appearance alone was sufficient for the commission: no-headscarf worn means no-desire to wear it. In this way "desire" is not discovered but semiotically constructed.

This asymmetry in the possible meanings of the headscarf as a sign again makes sense if the commission's concern is seen to be not simply a matter of scrupulousness in interpreting abstract evidence but of promoting a certain kind of behavior—hence the commission's employment of the binary "coerced" or "freely chosen" in defining desire. The point is that in ordinary life the wish to choose one thing rather than another is rooted in dominant conventions, in loyalties and habits one has acquired over time, as well as in the anxieties and pleasures experienced in interaction with lovers and friends, relatives, teachers and other authority figures. But when "desire" is the objective of *discipline,* there are only two options: it must either be encouraged ("natural") or discouraged ("fictitious"). And the commission was certainly engaged in a disciplining project.

So the commission saw itself as being presented with a difficult decision between two forms of individual liberty—that of girls whose desire was to wear the headscarf (a minority) and that of girls who would rather not. It decided to accord freedom of choice to the latter on majoritarian grounds.[10] This democratic decision is not inconsistent with *laicïté* but it does conflict with the idea that religious freedom is an *inalienable right* of every citizen (which is what the Rights of Man articulate). Because if a right is inalienable, it is held by each citizen regardless of what the majority wants and regardless also of whether the representative government decides for commendable reasons to put certain conditions on it.[11]

Let me sum up what I have said so far: I have been suggesting not only that government officials decide what sartorial signs mean, but that they do so by privileged access to the wearer's motive and will—to her subjectivity—and that this is facilitated by resort to a certain kind of semiotics. A governmental commission of inquiry claims to

bring private concerns, commitments and sentiments into the public sphere in order to assess their validity for a secular Republic, but it does much more than that. It *constitutes* meanings by drawing on internal (psychological) or external (social) signs, encourages certain desires and emotions at the expense of others.

The report insists that secularism presupposes the independence of political power as well as of different religious and spiritual choices. The latter have no influence over the state, it says, and the state has none over them.[12] However, what emerges from the report is that the relationship is not symmetrical. The state's neutrality claims to treat all religions equally. But this does not preclude the state's taking decisions, on the basis of public opinion, that affect the exercise of religion although religion may not intervene in matters of state. This asymmetry is a measure of sovereign power.

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Dealing with exceptions

Defenders of *laïcité* (and this includes most assimilated Muslims)[13] argue that the debate over the headscarf is to be understood as a reluctance on the part of the French state to recognize group identity within a Republic that sees itself as a collection of secular citizens with equal rights inhabiting a level public sphere. Of course there are differences in France, they say, and these must be recognized as aspects of people's identities so long as they do not threaten the unity of society. In articulating national unity, state neutrality, and legitimate diversity, secularism creates, over and beyond the traditional attachments of each person, that larger community of affections, that collection of images, values, dreams and wills, which sustain the Republic.[14] But the Republic is essentially built around the abstract principle of equality among all individuals represented through a rational process of signification that is at once semiotic and political.

The question remains as to whether there is any place in *laïcité* for rights attached to religious groups. And the answer is that indeed there is, although such groups are usually thought of as particular exceptions. Perhaps the most striking are state subsidized Christian and Jewish schools ("private establishments under contract to the government") in which it is possible, among other things, to display crosses and kippas, and where religious texts are systematically taught, and where pupils still grow up to become good French citizens. (Indeed, because they are able to be more selective and are often better funded than public schools, religious schools tend to maintain higher educational standards.) Here are some other examples.

Alsace-Moselle is the one region in which the state pays the salaries of priests, pastors, and rabbis, and owns all church property. There are historical reasons for this exception[15] and the Stasi report suggests this exceptional arrangement be retained on the ground that the population of that area is especially attached to them—that is, because *they are part of its regional identity.* Retaining these arrangements does not, so the report insists, conflict with the principle of secular neutrality.[16]

Holubowicz

Another exception is this: although the Republic is secular, the Church of Rome has a very special position in it. The modus vivendi put in place from 1922 to 1924 between France and the Holy See allows the Republic to recognize “diocesan associations” within the framework of the 1905 law.[17] These autonomous associations are territorially defined, and they have complicated financial rights and obligations in relation to the state. Today they are the bodies representing the Catholic Church in official dealings with the Republic.

There are more exceptions that re-enforce the attachment of individuals to religious communities: chaplains in the army, in colleges, schools, prisons, and hospitals are all provided and paid for by the state. Jewish and Muslim funerary rites are permitted in public cemeteries owned and maintained by the state. According to the 1987 law, gifts made to religious associations benefit from tax concessions—like other associations that provide a general public service.

So France is not—and never has been—a society consisting simply of individual citizens with universal rights and duties who can exchange ideas and information in the public sphere and arrive at rational conclusions. French citizens *do* have particular rights by virtue of their belonging to religious groups—and the power to

defend them in public space. Thus early in 1984, when the Mauroy government attempted to introduce limited state intervention in religious schools, massive demonstrations in Paris and Versailles (about a million in the former) led to the government's fall. Although demonstrations are not in the normal sense part of a *debate,* they surely inhabit the public sphere to the extent that they express and defend political positions in public space.

To these religious groupings—all inhabiting the public space between the state and private life—belong many citizens, clerical and lay, and their identities and interests are partly shaped by that belonging. And since they participate with unequal power in the formulation of public policy, the claim of political neutrality of the secular state towards individual religious groups becomes problematic.

Since the Stasi commission was aware of exceptions to the general rule of *laïcité*, it explained them by distinguishing between the founding principle of secularism (that the lay Republic respect all beliefs) and the numerous legal obligations that issue from this principle but that also sometimes appear to contradict it. The report points out that the legal regime overseeing the public sphere is not at all a monolithic whole: It is at once dispersed in numerous legal sources and diversified in the different forms it takes throughout mainland France and in its overseas territories.[18] The scattered sources and diverse forms of French secularism mean that the Republic has constantly to deal with exceptions. I want to suggest that *that* very exercise of power to identify and deal with the exception is what subsumes the diversity within a unity, and confirms Republican sovereignty—in the sense of sovereignty Schmitt has made us aware of. The banning of the veil can therefore be seen as an exercise in sovereign power, an attempt to dominate the entirety of public space.

I want to stress that my purpose is not to blame the French for being inadequately secular or insufficiently tolerant towards Muslims. I should certainly not be taken to be arguing for the veil as a right to cultural difference or as a right to practice one's faith. My concern is to try and identify some of the questions excluded and contradictions reconciled by *laïcité*, and to locate some of the collective subjects in the public sphere where secular opinion is formed. I have been implying that no actually-existing secularism should be denied its claim to secularity just because it doesn't correspond to some utopian model. Varieties of remembered religious history, of perceived political threat and opportunity, define the sensibilities

underpinning secular citizenship and national belonging in a modern state. The sensibilities are not always secure, they are rarely free of contradictions, and they are sometimes fragile. But they make for qualitatively different forms of secularism. What is at stake here, I think, is not the toleration of differences but sovereignty that defines and justifies exceptions, and the public spaces in which it does this.

It is wrong, in my view, to see secularism primarily as the modern formula for toleration. There are intolerant secular societies and tolerant religious ones. Besides, the idea of tolerating differences—itself a complicated idea—pre-dates the modern political doctrine of toleration. “Tolerance,” especially in modern societies, is popularly confused with *indifference* towards others partly because “toleration” requires the state to regard all religions within its domain indifferently—that is, equally.

Secularism has to do with structures of freedom within the differentiated modern nation state. It has to do with conceptualizing and dealing with sufferings that appear to negate or discourage those freedoms—and therefore it has to do with agency directed at eliminating those sufferings as obstacles. In that sense secular agency is confronted with having to change a particular distribution of pain, both in public and in private. And while in that capacity it tries to curb the inhuman excesses of “religion,” it allows other cruelties that can be justified by a secular calculus of social utility and a secular dream of happiness. It replaces patterns of pre-modern pain and punishment with those that are peculiarly its own.

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Passionate subjects

A basic assumption underlying the Stasi report is that signification is a rational process which offers a translucent window onto reality. But the idea of translucence is continually undermined by passionate constructions that blur the line between subject and object.

In an important book entitled *La nouvelle islamophobie,* Vincent Geisser documents the growing tide of hostility towards Muslims and Arabs in France today and recounts the many public statements and actions that have sought to connect this population with concerns about national security. According to Geisser and others, dislike of Muslims and Islam has roots in a bitter colonial history—especially its troubled relations with Algeria—which is kept alive by a million colonial settlers who returned to France after its independence. This public attitude is now reinforced by a new concern about international terrorism. Yet in the nineteenth century a long line of French writers and travelers (including Nerval, Lamartine, Flaubert) depicted Arabs and Muslims sympathetically—reflecting as they did so, nostalgia for a world being ravaged by modernity. The passions involved then and now should not, therefore, be seen as a simple product of enmity. The sensibilities they express are (as in the colonial past) sometimes fragile and contradictory. But even when they are not unfriendly, they usually respond to the emotional demands of particular Frenchmen and Frenchwomen rather than to those of their Muslim fellow-citizens.

In a book that appeared a year earlier,[19] Daniel Lindenberg (professor of political science at the University of Paris VIII) maintains that this wave of Islamophobia is part of a wider reactionary movement that has acquired new force and includes

hostility to mass culture, human rights, and antiracism. Popular writers like Michel Houellebecq and Oriana Fallacci (an Italian journalist but widely read in France) attack Muslims and Arabs in language very reminiscent of Louis-Ferdinand Céline's anti-semitic obsessions in *Bagatelles pour un massacre.* On the other hand respectable Catholic intellectuals such as Alain Besançon and Pierre Manent too are able to get a sympathetic audience for their anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant sentiment.[20]

One aspect of this sentiment is evident in the way public talk about attitudes towards Muslims has become entangled with public concern over anti-semitism. In spite of the long history of anti-semitism in modern France (a history not entirely closed) animosity towards Muslims is now more pervasive than towards any other religious or ethnic group.[21] Put another way: Anyone who wants to be taken seriously in public life cannot afford to be known as an anti-semite—even the National Front now attempts to avoid appearing anti-semitic in public—but the same cannot be said of people hostile to Islam.[22] (Even the common claim that political criticism of the state of Israel is often a mask for anti-semitism acknowledges in effect that that prejudice needs to be hidden when expressed publicly.[23]) In contrast, there are many prominent intellectuals in France who publicly express opinions Muslims find offensive, and yet these intellectuals remain highly respected.[24] Acts and statements offensive to Jews, on the other hand, issue largely from sections of the population that are already far from respectable: extreme right-wing elements (neo-Nazis) or Muslim youth in the "sensitive" *banlieus.* (It need hardly be stressed that the neo-Nazis are no friends to Muslims either.) Sometimes the anti-Jewish acts of young Muslims are explained in the media as a consequence of their identification with Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation or of the social exclusion and economic disadvantage suffered by young Muslims in contemporary France, but invariably such explanations are denounced by many in the media as tantamount to "excusing criminal violence," and blame is placed instead on Muslim clerics whose views on the subject are held to constitute hateful indoctrination.[25]

The complicated emotional relationship of many French Jews with the Israeli state is too sensitive a subject for most non-Jewish public commentators to deal with publicly. A thoughtful piece entitled "The Jews of France, Zionists without Zionism"[26] has been written recently by Esther Benbassa (professor of the history of modern Judaism at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes) which underlines the tension between the passionate attachment of French Jews to

the state of Israel and the ideological claim by the latter that all Jews belong in Israel, in "their own state."[27] What is missing in this account is a discussion of the implications this tension has for the relations of French Jews with French Muslims, for both of whom political identity is at once local and transnational. This omission does not merely concern the sources of friction between Jews and Muslims in France however; it concerns the problematic character of the idea—on which *laïcité* is premised—that secular citizens are committed to an exclusive culture and a single nation state to which there corresponds a public sphere. The fact that citizens inhabit several public spheres that overlap and extend laterally and do *not* coincide with national boundaries produces difficulties for the modern secular state.

The fact that citizens inhabit several public spheres that overlap and extend laterally and do *not* coincide with national boundaries produces difficulties for the modern secular state.

However anti-semitism may be defined and explained, it is taken more seriously by French politicians,[28] public intellectuals, and activists than parallel expressions of prejudice against Muslims.[29] This asymmetry is due to a general recognition that anti-semitism has been the cause of far greater cruelty in modern Europe than anything perpetrated by anti-Arab racism or by anti-Islamic phobias. That judgment is correct, of course. The systematic attempt to eliminate Jews (and gypsies and homosexuals) in the modern nation state is without parallel. Of course there was French cruelty perpetrated in Algeria, stretching from the destroyed villages, orchards, wells and fields during its nineteenth-century conquest (the modern strategy of total war was invented by French generals in their conquest of Algeria) to the torture chambers in the Battle of Algiers (modern techniques of counter-insurgency were developed by the French there and then passed on to Latin America and the U. S.). But then all that cruelty was outside France and perpetrated against non-Europeans.

Be that as it may, the shame-faced awareness on the part of many French that they themselves participated in the historic cruelty against the Jews during World War II encourages not only their calling publicly for exceptional vigilance against anti-semitism but

also their denouncing with exceptional fervor any incident that might be called anti-semitic. These are indications of a hope that a nation's virtue once lost can be reclaimed, that the moral damage done to itself can finally be repaired. At any rate, the attempt by many intellectuals and much of the media to shift the entire question of "anti-semitism" to "the social danger of Islamism" in France has the comforting effect of diverting attention away from the historical prejudice against Jews in the Republic and away from the more general problem of unity in a modern secular state.

In an interesting book on the symbolic role of the Holocaust in France, Joan Wolf has shown how the meaning of that event for Jews has been appropriated by diverse groups for their own discursive purposes. "After the 1990 desecration of a Jewish cemetery at Carpentras," she writes, "the nation denounced the 'fascist' Le Pen in a narrative that was tantamount to a repudiation of Vichy and an identification with its Jewish victims, and the Holocaust came to stand for the suffering and innocence of the French people at the hands of the evil and guilty Vichy regime."[30] Wolf is right to point to the gap between the Jewish experience of trauma and the French political rhetoric of victimhood under the Vichy regime. But also worth noting is the symbolic dependence of a morally restored France on a *public* recognition of Jewish suffering. This linkage carries its own emotional charge, one that substitutes "Islamic fundamentalism" for Vichy's ideological anti-semitism, and thereby promotes a public distrust of French Muslims whose access to the media is accordingly affected.

Guilt, contempt, resentment, virtuous outrage, slyness, pride, comfort, all intersect in complicated ways in the secular Republic's public sphere and inform attitudes towards its religiously or ethnically stigmatized citizens.

This web of emotions indicates how fraught the very idea of neutrality is in the domain of public opinion. Guilt, contempt, resentment, virtuous outrage, slyness, pride, comfort, all intersect in complicated ways in the secular Republic's public sphere and inform attitudes towards its religiously or ethnically stigmatized citizens. *Laïcité* is not blind to religiously identified groups in public. It is suspicious of some (Muslims) because of what it imagines they may do, and it is ashamed when confronting others (Jews) because of

what they have suffered at the hands of Frenchmen. The desire to keep some groups under surveillance and to be seen making amends to others—and thus of coming honorably to terms with one's own past, of re-affirming France—are both integral to the French public sphere.

Of course there is criminal activity among young Muslims who live in the "sensitive" *banlieus,* and patriarchal attitudes characterize most Muslim immigrants. But neither crime nor patriarchy is foreign to French society. Interpreters of *laïcité* who object to French Muslims on these grounds do not ask themselves what makes transgression of the law and patriarchal relations *defining* features of a specific "culture." It is true that the Iranian Revolution of 1979, as well as the increasing prominence of Islamic militancy in many parts of the Muslim world, have angered many secularists in France. But it is unclear just how these things have come to be construed as a threat to the foundational values of the secular Republic.

I want to end with some comments on a television program broadcast a month before the National Assembly passed the law banning the veil. In January 2004, France 2's *Cent minutes pour convaincre,* took up the theme of "The Republic, religion, and secularism." Many public personalities—including Bernard Stasi himself—were present, and most of the discussion (and all the documentary clips shown) revolved around the theme of Muslim patriarchy—including such customs as arranged marriages, virginity certificates, etc.—of which the Islamic veil was a symbol.[31] It was not how young women wearing the headscarf *lived* that mattered but what "the veil" *signified*.

But in the verbal attack on Muslim patriarchal customs important questions about the character of Republican secularism escaped attention. How can one reconcile the *liberty* to express individual religious belief with the duty to obey the law of the Republic? In what way is the principle of abstract *equality* applicable to subjects embedded in overlapping communities? What does *fraternity* mean among citizens and towards immigrants (for example Maghrebin working-class immigrants as opposed to middle-class immigrants from Britain)? The dominant assumption seemed to be that thanks to the Republic's Revolutionary origin the political form of secular society was already in place and that what was called for was its recognition as a particular set of signs and its defense against other signs.

In spite of the fact that several well-known reasons could be

adduced for re-thinking *laïcité,* they were not taken up. What are these reasons? First, there is the large inflow of formerly colonized Muslims many of whom are not French nationals even though they live, work and pay taxes in France. Many state positions (surgeons, for example) are legally closed to foreigners but they are employed unofficially, paid much less and have no job security. *Everyone who lives in France is not equal before the law.* Second, elements of national autonomy are being ceded to the European Union, undermined by the exigencies of a global economy, and information concerning taxation, subsidies, and fiscal policies generally are virtually inaccessible to ordinary citizens. Third, the recent migration of peoples (including large numbers of Jews and then of Muslims from North Africa) and the circulation of electronic images make for the direction of fears, longings, resentments towards peoples and places beyond the neat boundaries of the sovereign Republic—and even of the European Union. All these processes decrease the individual's command of the knowledge needed to assess her own moral and political actions, making the very idea of the citizen as morally and politically sovereign a problematic one and the Republic's project of creating secular subjects through national education extremely uncertain at best.

The TV show didn't regard any of this to be relevant to its conversation. It was a popular replay of the semi-governmental Stasi commission of inquiry. The public intellectuals appeared to regard themselves as presenting public opinion to the Republic that was about to debate a law fundamental to the defense of *laïcité.* In doing so, they were restoring an eighteenth-century French conception of the public sphere as an institution of governance—as a space of *publicity* that connected a well-governed people to its just legislator in a hierarchical manner.

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Conclusion

Today secularism is invoked to prevent two very different kinds of transgression: the perversion of politics by religious forces on the one hand, and the state's restriction of religious freedom on the other. But this becomes especially difficult in secular France because there "religion" continues to infect "politics"—at one level as the pre-condition for a civilized public sphere (the "Judeo-Christian values" informing secular France) and at another as parody (the "sacred" character of the Republic). The idea that religion is a system of symbols, that these symbols can be authoritatively read by public experts publicly, becomes especially attractive in the first concern, because in order to protect politics from perversion by religion, in order to determine its acceptable forms within the Republic, authority must identify "religion" and police it. This is compatible with encouraging subjects to make and recognize themselves through appropriate signs as proper secular citizens.

So how do public spaces—saturated as they are with fears and ambitions, with memories and hopes—articulate ways of being *worldly* and *unworldly?* Given the fluid, unbounded, *lateral* character of so many social interactions, to what extent should we think of the public sphere as *networks* of emotional connections rather than as *spaces* of political debate within a *hierarchical* structure? The answers to both questions presupposes, I think, that "the public sphere" in secular societies (whether in Europe or in the Middle East) is more than a space of communication and debate, that it is inhabited by embodied subjects for whom politics and "religion" cannot always be easily separated. Perhaps that is why the liberal state finds itself having to try and impose on its citizens the disciplines and limitations that it calls secularism.

Endnotes

1 A useful overview of the controversy is John Bowen's "Muslims and Citizens, France's headscarf controversy," *Boston Review,* February/March, 2004.

2 It is estimated that more than half the inhabitants of French prisons are young Muslims of North African origin. (See *Jerusalem Report,* 6 May 2002.)

3 See François Furet's masterly narrative, *Revolutionary France,* 1770-1880 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995 [1988]). Surprisingly, this account has nothing to say of France's colonial conquests—as if these could only be peripheral to the formation of the Republic. Algeria is barely mentioned—and then only in passing as the place to which convicted deportees were sent. But Algeria was by then an integral part of France, the object of various laws—including the Crémieux Decree of 1870, by which the Jewish minority was accorded full citizenship (and elevated to the rank of French colons) while the Muslim majority was denied it. The bond with Algeria, at once *département* and colony, had fateful consequences for the Republic. Interestingly, with the coming of the Third Republic, France also sought to define itself as "a Muslim power." Patriotic orientalists like Massignon, who survived the Great War, thus became applied Islamologists in the service of France, enthusiasts for the project of emancipating Muslims within the framework of the French empire. It was the Republic that would decide who was worthy of being emancipated, and how, by bringing to bear its own passion for laïcité and its benevolent power. (See Henri Laurens, "Les Arabes et nous," *Le Nouvel Observateur,* 19-26 August 2004.)

4 Davie cites a poll conducted in 1990 in West European countries on religious beliefs, according to which 57 per cent of the French population believes in God (only Sweden has a lower score) and 50 per cent believes in the soul (only Denmark has a lower score). By all other criteria France emerges as the most "irreligious." Grace Davie, *Religion in Modern Europe; A memory mutates* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 10).

5 *Rapport au President de la République: Commission de réflection sur l'application du principe de laïcité dans la République,* Remis le 11 decembre 2003, (http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr). The report has also been published in book form as *Laïcité et République, Commission présidée* par *BERNARD STASI* (Paris : La Documentation Française, 2004). My references are to the latter.

6 *Laïcité et République,* p. 31.

7 *Laïcité et République,* p. 32.

8 See Luc Bronner, "François Fillon propose son 'mode d'emploi' de la loi sur le voile, *Le Monde,* 12 April 2004.

9 Ghislaine Hudson in an interview with a group of young people published as "Laïcité: une loi nécessaire ou dangereuse?" *Le Monde, 11* December 2003.

10 "After we heard the evidence, we concluded that we faced a difficult choice with respect to young Muslim girls wearing the headscarf in state schools. Either we left the situation as it was, and thus supported a situation that denied freedom of choice to those—the very large majority—who do not want to wear the headscarf; or we endorsed a law that removed freedom of choice from those who do want to wear it. We decided to give freedom of choice to the former during the time they were in school, while the latter retain all their freedom for their life outside school." Patrick Weil, "A nation in diversity: France, Muslims and the headscarf." www.opendemocracy.com, 25/3/2004.

11 The report cites various international court judgments in support of its argument that the right to religious expression is subject to certain conditions (*Laïcité et République,* pp. 47-50). My point here is simply that a right cannot be inalienable if it is always subject to the superior power of the state's legal institutions to define and limit.

12 *Laïcité et République,* p.30.

13 According to Bruno Etienne most French Muslims are in favor of integration and consumerism. He claims that in Marseilles (where there is a large concentration of Muslims) only 17 percent practice their religion. See the interview in *Le Monde,* 12 April 2004: "Entretien avec Bruno Etienne; islamologue et professeur à l'IEP d'Aix-en-Province."

14 *Laïcité et République,* p. 41.

15 Alsace-Moselle was re-incorporated into France after the First World War, and therefore after the 1905 law whose article 2 reads: "La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subvention aucun culte."

16 *Laïcité et République,* p.113.

17 Nicolas Senèze, "La régime particulier de l'Eglise catholique," *La Croix,* 6 November 2003.

18 *Laïcité et République,* p. 45.

19 Daniel Lindenberg, *Le rappel à l'ordre: enquête sur les nouveaux réactionnaires* (Paris: Seuil, 2002).

20 "Many journalists and intellectuals consider the distinction between religion and politics in this case to be specious, giving one to understand that Islam (and

Muslims) ought to be subjected to surveillance. The Catholics like Alain Besançon and Pierre Manent who have long been hostile to “dialog” with the Prophet’s Faithful, find in this an excellent occasion for settling accounts with what they consider to be the errors and strayings of the post-Conciliar Church, and thus approach the sections most hostile to modernity . . . The new fact is that these thinkers are now followed not only by other, publicly Catholic individuals, but also by unbelievers unhappy with the idea—even before the World Trade Center attack—that Catholicism should be the only religion which it was allowed to attack openly.” *Le rappel à l’ordre,* p.38.

21 Some young men interviewed in Angouleme angrily claimed that “having a political lobby that represents the interests of a particular community is perfectly acceptable for some; for others, the very idea of a community is forbidden.” It is the journalists—so they insisted—who on the one hand repeatedly describe a youth in trouble as “North African” or “Arab” and on the other hand express outrage at the identification of an intellectual as a Jew. (The reference here is to the great scandal caused by Tariq Ramadan, a well-known Swiss professor and activist, when he identified certain French public intellectuals sympathetic to the government of Israel as Jews.) See Phillippe Bernard, “On nous qualifie sans cesse d’«Arabes» et on prétend nous empêcher de nous situer par rapport à l’Islam,” *Le Monde,* 5 July 2004. In France, unlike the United States, the mere suggestion that Jews “have a political lobby” is heard with alarm by liberals because it is typically part of right-wing rhetoric.

22 Complaints about increasing anti-semitism in France relate largely to such things as desecration of Jewish graves, synagogues, and other property, and to insults to Jewish children in school playgrounds and in the streets. Although they are highly offensive and disturbing, it is necessary to bear in mind that such acts can be perpetrated by a handful of hoodlums. There is still, to my knowledge, no comprehensive study of anti-semitism as *institutional discrimination*—i.e., as the systematic prejudice promoting social, economic and political inequalities—for which there is ample evidence relating to people of African and Arab origin. On the other hand the integration of Jews into French society appears to be well advanced. France has had six Jewish prime ministers since the Second World War—a record unmatched by any other liberal democracy. One wonders whether a prime minister of West African or Arab origin is even conceivable in this laic Republic that claims to recognize no differences of color, religion or ethnic origin among its citizens.

23 See the excellent article by Dominique Vidal, “Les pompiers pyromanes de l’antisémitisme,” *Le Monde Diplomatique,* May 2004, which recounts the mounting accusations of anti-semitism against anyone publicly critical of Sharon’s policies towards the Palestinians, and which argues for a joint campaign against anti-semitism and Islamophobia. There is now a strong move to accord anti-semitism special treatment, distinct from other forms of racism. See, for example, Ludovic Tomas, “Mobilisation: À Paris, ils ont marché contre l’antisémitisme,” *L’Humanité,*

17 May 2004.

24 Take for example, “Je hais l’islam, entre autres . . . ” by the psychoanalyst and author Patrick Declerck on the Analyses et Débats page of *Le Monde,* 12 August 2004. The article explodes with rage against “Islam” (all religions are collective neuroses as Freud said but Islam is the worst). It considers itself to be presenting a daring and original view (one should reclaim the right to hate, to identify the enemy publicly and to express one’s hatred of him) but in fact it is neither. Hatred of Islam (Muslims) is common—and is more commonly expressed in acts than in words. Of course, Declerck’s piece does not reflect the viewpoint of *Le Monde.* I would not argue that it should not have been published. My point is simply that an argumentative article with the title “I hate Judaism” would be inconceivable today in any respectable daily.

25 See, for example, Jean Daniel, “Anti-sémitisme: la vérité en face,” *Le Nouvel Observateur,* 15-21 July 2004.

26 Esther Benbassa, “Juifs de France, des sionistes sans sionisme,” *Le Monde,* 31 August 2004.

27 Israel’s liberal democracy is unique in many ways. For example: As the political representative of the Jewish nation, it is not the state of all its citizens (there is a Palestinian minority in Israel), but it is the state of a large population of non-citizens who are also non-residents (Jews in other countries). It is also both a secular state and one that is deeply rooted in religious imagery, sentiment, and politics.

28 Muslims complain of bias on the part of the state in its response to incidents of racism. Thus when a Jewish school was destroyed by arson, they say, government ministers were quick to denounce anti-semitism even though police investigations had not yet arrived at a definite conclusion about the crime. When two mosques were fire-bombed governmental statements came only after much prodding. (“Les responsables musulmans déplorent le temps de réaction des politiques après l’incendie de deux lieux de culte,” *Le Monde,* March 8, 2004.) In fact throughout France far more mosques have been deliberately set on fire or vandalised than synagogues, and yet—so Muslims say—it is only the latter that are as a rule afforded police protection. (See “France: Land of phobias,” *Middle East International,* 19 March 2004.) The Interior Ministry compiles statistics on anti-semitic incidents but other hostile public acts are never systematically counted by reference to the victim’s ethnicity or religion.

29 At the end of June 2004 a large number of graves of colonial Muslim soldiers in a military cemetery in Alsace were vandalized by neo-Nazis. Headstones were damaged and daubed with swastikas. Reaction on the part of the government and major parties was swift and unequivocal. The President, the Prime Minister and Interior Minister condemned the acts strongly. But it is not entirely clear what motivated them on this occasion since there had been a stream of similar acts

against Muslims in France—and even in Alsace itself—as well as several cases of the desecration of Jewish cemeteries. Was it the perception that these acts "are an insult to the memory of soldiers who gave their lives for our fatherland," (Jacques Chirac)? Was it that "respect for the dead, whoever they may be, whatever their religion, is a respect that is required of us all," (Jean-Pierre Raffarin)? (See "Profanation de 50 tombes musulmanes en Alsace," *Le Monde,* 24 June 2004, italics added.) Whatever the motives, the outrage expressed in such cases by representatives of a rigorously secular state is interesting. Positivism notwithstanding, the dead are not just the dead; the status of "war dead" is the most perfect form of political equality the Republic can offer.

30 *Harnessing the Holocaust: The Politics of Memory in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 23).

31 In the first book-length study on the headscarf among women in France, two sociologists identify three classes of women who wear "the veil"—older immigrant women, adolescents, and youth between sixteen and twenty-five. These latter, they write, "claim the veil sometimes with their parents' agreement, sometimes against it." Such young offspring of immigrants are the most integrated into French culture and often speak excellent French. The authors go on to state that "One can understand this phenomenon only in the context of a French society undergoing a profound crisis in its values and institutions." F.Gaspard and F.Khosrokhavar, *Le foulard et la République* (Paris : La Découverte, 1995, pp. 45-6).

This essay is the opening keynote address for the "Beirut Conference on Public Spheres," held in October 2004. The event was organized by the SSRC Program on the Middle East and North Africa, in collaboration with the Center for Behavioral Research at the American University in Beirut, Lebanon, and with support from the Ford Foundation. The three day event brought together over 100 researchers, academics, students, and practitioners from around the globe to share insights on the concept of public spheres in comparative perspective. In the following *Items and Issues* some of this work will be featured.

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GLOBALIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

The reasons for the worsening income distribution within countries continue to be a subject of heated debate. The combination of the adverse distributive effects of market reforms (or, at least, of some of them) and the simultaneous weakening of the institutions of social protection, including the growing difficulties experienced by governments in providing effective social protection in a globalized world economy, offers the best explanation (Cornia, 2004). The increasing differentials in labor income according to skill levels provide a complementary explanation, perhaps the one that enjoys greater consensus among analysts. A third force, which has been subject to less attention, is the increasing asymmetry between the international mobility of some factors of production (capital and highly skilled labor) and the restrictions on the mobility of other factors (unskilled labor), which generate forces that distribute income to the disadvantage of the latter.

Since the 1980s, these two forces—the divergence in per capita income levels among countries and the growing inequality in income distribution within countries—have been counterbalanced by the rapid economic growth of China, and, to a lesser degree, India, the two most populous poor countries of the world. The trend in the distribution of income among the world's citizens thus depends on the statistical methodologies used to aggregate individual country distributions to estimate a world income distribution.[4] Accordingly, different studies have reached different conclusions about the nature of that trend over the last decades of the twentieth century.[5]

Nonetheless, four conclusions can be drawn from this literature. The first and most important is that world inequality is appalling and remains at or very close to its historical peak. The second is that if

there has been deterioration in the world distribution of income, it has been slower than that which characterized the XIX century and the first half of the XX century, during which the gap between per capita income of developed countries and developing countries increased markedly (see, in particular, Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002). The third is that any estimated improvement in world income distribution is exclusively due to the rapid growth of China and, to a lesser extent, India.[6] Indeed, according to Berry and Serieux (2002), if we exclude the effect of the rapid growth of these two countries, there was a sharp increase in world inequality, due to the joint effect of increased intra-country inequalities and the adverse distributive effect of faster population growth in poorer countries. Finally, independently of the trend in the overall indicator of world income distribution, the richest 10% of the world population has increased its share in world income. Berry and Serieux (2002), who estimate that world income distribution improved in 1980-2000, also calculate that the share of the richest decile in world income increased from 46.6 to 49.3% during the same period.[7]

Taken as a whole, these studies also indicate that there was a major redistribution of world income over the last two decades of the twentieth century: China and India, where a large proportion of poor people live, as well as the relatively rich households of industrial countries have gained in world income distribution, while the poor from sub-Saharan Africa and most poor and middle-income recipients from the less successful middle-income countries and transition economies have clearly lost. Furthermore, given the critical importance of China and India in global estimates, it is important to emphasize that their rapid economic growth can hardly be understood as the result of the ability of the globalization process to redistribute world income more equitably. These two experiences, as well as those of other Asian NICs, certainly reflect the fact that world trade has opened opportunities to developing countries, particularly to exporters of manufactures and services. However, these successful stories of integration into the global economy have been matched by several failures.

Any estimated improvement in world income distribution is exclusively due to the rapid growth of China and, to a lesser extent, India.

In summary, existing studies underscore the widespread increase of inequality within countries that characterizes the current global order,

as well as the fact that the opportunities that it provides to different countries are distributed very unevenly. Thus, “virtuous” and “vicious” circles have been put in place in the world over the past decades, resulting in some (certainly major) “winners” but also in a large (even larger) set of “losers.” Several factors may be at work here, particularly agglomeration forces[8] and the differential effects of major international shocks on more vulnerable economies. Three shocks are particularly relevant in this regard: the debt crisis of the 1980s, the strong downward trend of commodity prices since then,[9] and the global financial repercussions of the 1997 Asian crisis.

2. Economic asymmetries in the global order

The growing disparities in the levels of development among countries indicate that, although domestic economic, social and institutional factors are obviously important, economic opportunities are significantly affected by the position that countries occupy within the global hierarchy. This implies that rising up on this international ladder is a difficult task. The fundamental international asymmetries largely explain why the global economy is essentially not a “level playing field.”

These asymmetries are of three kinds (Ocampo and Martin, 2003). The first is associated with the greater macroeconomic vulnerability of developing countries to external shocks, which has tended to increase with the tighter integration of the world economy. The nature of this vulnerability has been changing, nevertheless, in the last decades. Thus, although the transmission of external shocks through trade remains important, financial shocks have come to play a more prominent role, revisiting patterns which have been observed in the past in many developing countries, especially during the boom and financial collapse of the 1920s and 1930s.

In this sense, macroeconomic asymmetries are associated with the fact that international currencies are the currencies of the industrial countries[10] and with the asymmetric features of capital flows and their relation to macroeconomic policy in the industrial and developing world. Capital flows are pro-cyclical in most OECD and developing countries, but the volatility experienced by the latter is more marked. Even more importantly, whereas macroeconomic policy in developed countries tends to be counter-cyclical and independent of the capital account cycle, in developing countries pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies tend to reinforce the capital account cycle.[11] These patterns indicate that industrial countries have more room for maneuver to adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies (particularly in the United States, which issues the major

international currency). In contrast, developing countries generally lack that room for maneuver because they are subject to highly volatile financial flows, because pro-cyclical macroeconomic policies tend to amplify rather than smooth out the capital account cycle, and market players expect and evaluate authorities on their ability to adopt a pro-cyclical stance.

The second asymmetry is derived from the high concentration of technical progress in the developed countries. The diffusion of technical progress from the source countries to the rest of the world remains “relatively slow and uneven” according to Prebisch’s (1950) classical predicament. This reflects the prohibitive costs of entry into more dynamic technological activities, including the obstacles that developing countries face in technologically mature sectors, where opportunities for them may be largely confined to attracting multinationals that control the technology and global production and distribution networks. In its turn, technology transfer is subject to the payment of innovation rents, which have been rising due to the generalization and strengthening of intellectual property rights. The combined effect of these factors explains why, at the global level, the productive structure has exhibited a high and persistent concentration of technical progress in the industrialized countries, which thus maintain their dominant position in the most dynamic sectors of international trade and their hegemony in the establishment of large transnational enterprises.

The third asymmetry is associated with the contrast between the high mobility of capital and the restrictions on the international movement of labor, particularly of unskilled labor.[12] This asymmetry is a characteristic of the present phase of globalization, since it was not manifested in the XIX and early XX centuries (a period characterized by large mobility of both capital and labor) nor in the first twenty five years following the Second World War (a period in which both factors exhibited very little mobility). As has been pointed out by Rodrik (1997), these asymmetries in the international mobility of the factors of production generate biases in the distribution of income in favor of the more mobile factors (capital and skilled labor) and against the less mobile factors (less skilled labor) and, in turn, affect relations between developed and developing countries in as much as the latter have a relative abundance of less skilled labor.

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GLOBALIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

3. Global asymmetries and international economic structures

Since the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),[13] the need to correct the asymmetries that characterize and continue to characterize the international economic system has been explicitly recognized. The commitments concerning the flow of Official Development Assistance and "special and differential treatment" for developing countries in trade issues were some of the partial, although relatively frustrating results of this effort to build a "new international economic order." This vision has been radically eroded in the last decades and has been substituted by an alternative paradigm according to which the basic objective of the international economic system should be to ensure a uniform set of rules—a "level playing field"—leading to the efficient functioning of free market forces.

It is important to underline that, contrary to this trend, in the area of sustainable development new principles were agreed to at the outset of the 1990s, notably principle 7 of the Declaration of the Conference on the Environment and Development that took place in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (commonly known as the Earth Summit), relative to "common but differentiated responsibilities" of developed and developing countries.

In the new vision of the international economic system that emphasizes the need for a "level playing field," the essential gains for the developing countries lie in the eventual dismantling of protectionism of "sensitive" sectors in industrialized countries, in the guarantees that export sectors derive from an international trading system with clear and stable rules, and in the design of preventive macroeconomic policies which serve as "self-protection" against

international financial volatility. The correction of the international asymmetries is only confined to the recognition of international responsibility towards least developed countries, replicating at an international level the vision of social policy as a strategy that focuses State activities on the poorest segments of the population.

'Leveling the playing field' implies restrictions on the developing countries that the industrial countries themselves never faced in previous periods of their history.

Even though all these actions are desirable, would they be sufficient in themselves to generate a greater convergence in levels of development? In light of the previous considerations, the answer is probably negative. The application of the same measures in very different situations can even aggravate existing inequalities. Moreover, “leveling the playing field” implies restrictions on the developing countries that the industrial countries themselves never faced in previous periods of their history: standards of intellectual property protection which are those of countries that generate technology rather than those which were adopted by countries that copied technology, and limitations on policy options for promoting new productive sectors for either the domestic or the external markets (Chang, 2002). Thus, the concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities” of the Rio Declaration and the already classic principle of “special and differential treatment” incorporated in the agenda of international trade negotiations are more appropriate guidelines for building a more equitable global order than the “leveling of the playing field,” the norm that has guided efforts to reform the international economic system in recent decades.

These considerations lay down the essential elements that should guide international economic reform vis-à-vis the developing countries (Ocampo and Martin, 2003). The first of these asymmetries suggests that the essential function of the international financial institutions, from the perspective of the developing countries, is to compensate for the pro-cyclical impact of financial markets, smoothing financial boom and bust at its source through adequate regulation, and providing a larger degree of freedom for countries to adopt counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. This implies, in turn, adequate surveillance during boom periods, to avoid accumulating excessive macroeconomic and financial risks, and adequate financing during crises to smooth the required adjustment in the face

of “sudden stops” of external financing. An additional function, which is equally essential, is to act as a countervailing force to the concentration of credit in private capital markets, making resources available to countries and economic agents that have limited access to credit in international capital markets.

With respect to the second asymmetry, the multilateral trade system must facilitate the smooth transfer to developing countries of the production of primary commodities, technologically mature manufacturing activities and standardized services. It should, therefore, avoid erecting obstacles to such transfers through protection or subsidies. Moreover, this system must also accelerate developing countries’ access to technology and ensure their increasing participation in the generation of technology and in the production of goods and services with high technological content.

In light of the problems that developing countries face in ensuring a dynamic transformation of their productive structures, a “special and differential treatment” is required, particularly in two critical areas: (i) regimes for intellectual property protection that avoid creating excessive costs for developing countries and limiting the modalities through which the transfer can be made and which provide instead clear incentives for the transfer of technology towards them; and (ii) instruments to promote new exports (“infant export industries”), which foster diversification and increase their value added. All this requires, obviously, a search for the appropriate instruments in order to avoid a sterile competition among countries to attract footloose industries.

Institutional development, the creation of mechanisms of social cohesion, and the accumulation of human capital and technological capacities are essentially *endogenous* processes

Lastly, to overcome the third asymmetry, labor migration must be fully included in the international agenda through a globally agreed upon framework for migration policies and strict protection of human and labor rights of migrants, complemented with regional and bilateral frameworks and negotiations. Moreover, such agreements must envisage complementary mechanisms to facilitate migration, such as the recognition of educational, professional and labor

credentials, the transferability of social security benefits, and a low cost for transferring remittances.

A “development friendly” international system should start by overcoming the basic asymmetries of the global system, but cannot ignore the fact that the responsibility for development resides in the first instance with the countries themselves. This has been reiterated in numerous international declarations, particularly in the United Nations Conference on Financing for Development (United Nations, 2002). This principle also responds to an old postulate of development literature: that institutional development, the creation of mechanisms of social cohesion, and the accumulation of human capital and technological capacities (“knowledge capital”) are essentially *endogenous* processes. To use a term coined by Latin American structuralism, in all these cases development can only come “from within” (Sunkel, 1993). There are no universal models and there is, therefore, vast scope for institutional learning and diversity and, as we will see below, for the exercise of democracy.

However, the previous analysis implies that such a development-friendly international system must provide enough room for the adoption of the development strategies that developing countries consider adequate to their economic circumstances—“policy space,” to use the terminology of UNCTAD XI, that took place in June 2004 in São Paulo. Such policy space is particularly critical in the design of policies and strategies in three areas: (i) macroeconomic policies that reduce external vulnerability and facilitate productive investment; (ii) active productive development strategies aimed at developing system-wide competitiveness; and (iii) ambitious social policies designed to increase equity and guarantee social inclusion.[14]

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GLOBALIZATION, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY

III. A more balanced globalization

1. The long road to better global governance

As the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004) has indicated, the road to a balanced globalization inevitably lies in better global governance. However, this road is long and rocky since the asymmetries that characterize the present globalization and the resulting distributive tensions reflect the intrinsic characteristics of politics and the political economy of the world today.

In fact, the imbalance of the current globalization agenda reflects the greater influence exerted thereon by the more powerful states and the large multinational firms. It is also the result of the disorganization of other actors, particularly developing countries, in international debates. This behavior is linked not only to the weakening of historical mechanisms of collective action of the developing countries (such as the Group of 77),[15] but also to the "policy competition" that globalization itself has created: the incentive for each country to show its attractiveness to investors in an era of capital mobility and greater susceptibility to relocation of production.

This situation is also affected by an element of politics and political economy: the resistance of the majority of countries to giving up their economic sovereignty to international organizations. Under the strong market forces that characterize globalization and weaken nation-states, as well as the unilateral liberalization processes simultaneously undertaken by countries, regulations of markets have thus weakened worldwide. Many analysts see this as progress, but it is also a source of serious distortion and risk. In addition, although open regionalism is one of the traits of the current globalization

process and has led to integration efforts in many regions of the developing world (such as in Latin America, Southeast Asia and, more recently, Africa), these efforts have not resulted so far in strong coalitions among developing countries. In fact, the European Union aside (and, in this case, only in a limited way), countries are not ready to give up their sovereignty even to regional organizations.

These characteristics of politics and political economy have had important consequences for international reform. The most obvious is that efforts towards substantial reform are weak. Furthermore, they have prevented a more balanced negotiation process, thus undermining or even ignoring the interests of some actors. Hence, the asymmetries in global power relations and the high cost of establishing international coalitions to compensate for them have taken on greater importance.

The absence of a strong drive towards institution building at the international level implies that the institutions thus far created at the national level will not exist at the global level or will only have limited functions. Given the likelihood of incomplete international arrangements, developing countries should continue to claim autonomy in areas of critical importance, particularly in the definition of strategies of economic and social development and, as we have seen, adequate "policy space" to implement them. Moreover, as we see below, national autonomy in this area is the only system coherent with the promotion of democracy at the global level.

A final implication of the aforementioned analysis is that no international architecture is neutral in terms of the balance of power in international relations. In this regard, an international system that depends exclusively on a few global institutions will be less balanced than a system that relies also on regional institutions. The positions of countries lacking power at the international level will improve if they actively participate in such regional schemes. In fact, these schemes offer levels of autonomy and mutual assistance that countries would otherwise not be able to obtain in isolation. Therefore, the international order should offer ample room for the functioning of strong regional institutions respectful of a global order based on clear rules in other words, a system of "open regionalism." In fact, building a strong network of regional institutions could be the best way to gradually build a better international order.

2. Globalization and Democracy

Despite the strength of the asymmetries that characterize the world economic system and the distributive tensions that it generates, the

current phase of globalization is a multidimensional phenomenon that has also included the gradual spread of common ethical principles and international social objectives. These principles have been sanctioned in international declarations and agreements on human rights, and in the declarations and plans of action of the United Nations Conferences and Summits, including in particular the Millennium Declaration (United Nations, 2000) and the Millennium Development Goals that have derived from it. These principles and international goals represent, in a deep sense, the "social dimensions of globalization." These processes are also rooted in the long history of struggle by international civil society for human rights, social equity, gender equality, protection of the environment and, more recently, globalization of solidarity and the "right to be different" (cultural diversity).

Despite the strength of the asymmetries that characterize the world economic system, the current phase of globalization has also included the gradual spread of common ethical principles and international social objectives.

This "globalization of values" (ECLAC, 2000; Ocampo and Martin, 2003) has been instrumental in spreading democratic principles and a broad vision of citizenship, based on the spread of both civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights i.e., on a "rights-based" approach to the design of political, as well as economic and social institutions. However, the simultaneity of this process with the liberalization of market forces has generated tensions without creating mechanisms to attenuate them. The main reason for this is that the process of globalization, while supporting the recent spread of democracy and the establishment of international social objectives, has also eroded the capacity for action by nation-states. It has kept the complex task of sustaining social cohesion in the hands of nation-states, but has constrained at the same time their room for maneuver. Moreover, the necessary space required by democracy to engender diversity has been reduced as a result of the homogeneity of norms and the strong weight of conditionality in international financial assistance.

In this sense, the absence of a true internationalization of politics is the major paradox of the current globalization process. In other

words, the simultaneous growth of democratic forces and distributive tensions has not been accompanied by the strengthening of the political institutions that would reduce the tension between them. Although there are incipient instances of global citizenship that take place in the form of struggles by international civil society, their capacity to affect the course of globalization still depends on their influence on national political processes.

This has deep implications for the international order. In the first place, it implies that it is necessary to create democratic spaces of a global character. However, this process will be necessarily slow and incomplete. Therefore, as long as the nation-state remains the main space for the expression of political citizenry, the promotion of democracy as a universal value will only make sense if national processes of representation and participation are allowed to determine economic and social development strategies and to mediate the tensions created by globalization. This coincides with the idea that institutional development, social cohesion and the accumulation of human capital and technological capacity ("knowledge capital") are essentially endogenous processes (see section II.3).

The support for these endogenous processes, the respect for diversity and the formulation of norms that would facilitate it are essential for a development-friendly international democratic order. This means, therefore, that the international order should be strongly respectful of diversity, obviously within the limits of interdependence. It also implies that an essential function of international organizations is to support national strategies that contribute to reducing, through political citizenry, the strong tensions that exist today between the principle of equality and the functioning of globalized markets.

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3. International social goals and Official Development Assistance
Within a rights-based approach, the construction of a global social agenda should recognize that all members of society are citizens and, as such, are bearers of economic, social and cultural rights. The international declaration and covenants of human rights, as well as international agreements adopted at United Nations Conferences and Summits, should thus be considered an initial definition of the concept of global citizenship.

However, in this respect, there has not been a full transition from domestic to international responsibilities. In fact, respect for human rights and the responsibility of achieving social objectives still remains at the national level. Moreover, the execution of these obligations and commitments still lies with the nation-state and does not explicitly include other social agents. Lastly, as of now, there are no clear mechanisms for guaranteeing that these rights and international commitments are respected by nation-states.

One essential activity in this field is the production, dissemination and analysis of information on the situation of economic, social and cultural rights, and on the provision of “public goods” and “goods of social value,”[16] as well as on the fulfillment of objectives agreed upon at world conferences and summits. These periodic evaluations should be discussed at representative national forums, with active participation by parliaments and civil society. A process of this type would contribute to creating a culture of responsibility for meeting international objectives and commitments, and to adjusting domestic public policies accordingly. It would thus help building strong political accountability for international commitments.

The political visibility and the mechanism designed to evaluate progress towards the Millennium Development Goals represent major progress in this regard. It would be important to build on this experience and create new and broader mechanisms to promote accountability that would eventually lead to an integrated evaluation covering the declaration and covenants of human rights and other internationally agreed social rights (e.g., the principles and fundamental rights to employment, agreed upon at the International Labor Organization, and the rights of children, women and ethnic groups) and the closely related commitments reached at global Conferences and Summits of the United Nations.

In some cases, this political accountability can gradually make room for the possibility of citizens being able to judicially demand the fulfillment of their economic, social and cultural rights and of other international social commitments in competent national and international courts. The European Union has been the only region in the world where this process has been initiated. In all cases, the obligations of States must correspond to the degree of development of countries and, in particular, with their ability to reach goals that can indeed benefit all citizens. This avoids both voluntarism, whose more ambitious social goals may exceed the means of achieving them and generate frustration, as well as populism, whose efforts to satisfy popular demands beyond fiscal means can generate adverse macroeconomic effects.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that the responsibility for the comprehensive enforcement or implementation of human rights and social goals goes beyond the aegis of the State. For this reason, the international community has moved towards various innovative initiatives, including the concept of corporate social responsibility. One concrete example of such initiatives is the Global Compact of the United Nations, through which the private firms that participate in the program commit themselves to voluntarily promote human rights in their areas of activity, to respect basic labor rights, to protect the environment and, more recently, to combat corruption.[17] This process has been accompanied by private initiatives, both in the corporate sector and in social movements of diverse origins.[18] These principles and commitments of corporate social responsibility have begun to be pursued on a regular basis by different institutions. It is worth noting, however, that there is still a great deal of controversy between those who argue for compulsory corporate responsibility schemes (mainly non-governmental organizations) and those (private firms) that prefer voluntary standards that will be gradually extended through emulation.

On the other hand, the existence of significant global inequalities and asymmetries means that economic globalization will succeed in achieving convergence in the levels of development between countries only if accompanied by resource flows explicitly aimed at that objective. The European Union, through its policy of "social cohesion," has undoubtedly provided the institutional mechanisms through which this principle has been applied most clearly. It is indicative of the underlying political philosophy of these arrangements that the deepening of economic integration in the last decade of the twentieth century was accompanied by the strengthening of its cohesion policy (Marín, 1999). There is, however, no similar experience outside the European context. For this reason, as some analysts have argued, it would be desirable to extend this experience to other regional arrangements.[19]

At the global level, the critical instrument for the achievement of social goals has been and will continue to be Official Development Assistance (ODA). Such assistance should be provided in accordance with the international commitments agreed to at the United Nations (to allocate ODA equivalent to 0.7 per cent of the Gross National Income of developed countries) and with the basic criteria agreed to by the international community in the 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development: to give priority to the fight against poverty and to the ownership of socio-economic development policies by the countries that adopt them (United Nations, 2002).

Endnotes

1 As pointed out in section III below (see also footnote 16), the concept of "global public goods" may be understood as encompassing "goods of social value" that have been determined by international conferences and summits.

2 See, in particular, Table 2.8 of Cornia's book. The data on population come from the United Nations and refer to the year 2000. The percentages were estimated in relation to the population of the 73 countries reported in that table, where 78.5 per cent of the world's population is concentrated.

3 The trend in income inequality in OECD countries also comes clearly from the analysis of pay inequality in Galbraith and Kum (2004), who do not find, however, such a clear trend of pay inequality in developing countries, except in the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. It can be argued, however, that the methodology and data (industrial statistics) used by these authors is more applicable to industrialized than to developing countries.

4 There are two issues that are critical in this regard: (i) the use of market prices

vs. purchasing power estimates of national income (as well as the specific PPP estimate used), and (ii) whether the information provided by household surveys is exclusively used or, alternatively, it is combined with that provided by the national accounts on national income and consumption.

5 Among the studies which claim that there was a deterioration in world income distribution in recent decades, we could include Dikhanov and Ward (2001) for the period 1970-1999, Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) for 1970-1992 using the Theil inequality index (the other two indexes used by these authors show no clear trend during that period) and Milanovic (2002) for 1988-1993. See also the comments on Galbraith and Kum (2004) in footnote 3. The opposite conclusion is reached by Berry and Serieux (2002 and 2004), Bhalla (2002), Sala-i-Martin (2002) and Sutcliffe (2004). The last study provides a very useful comparison of different estimates of world inequality.

6 This conclusion comes strikingly in the different calculations of Berry and Serieux (2004).

7 This is also the conclusion of the estimates of Bourguignon and Morrison for 1980-1992, which indicate that the share of the richest decile in world income increased from 51.6 to 53.4%.

8 This process was emphasized in the past by the literature on regional economics and, more recently, by that on economic geography (see, for example, Krugman, 1995).

9 See Ocampo and Parra (2003). This trend has been recently but only partially counterbalanced by the effects on world commodity markets of the rapid growth of China.

10 This phenomenon has come to be called the “original sin.” See an analysis of this issue and a contrast with competing concepts in Eichengreen et al. (2003).

11 See Kamisky et al. (2004), who call this feature of developing countries the “when-it-rains-it-pours syndrome.”

12 See an extensive analysis of this issue in United Nations (2004).

13 See, for example, the first report of the Secretary-General of UNCTAD (Prebisch, 1964).

14 For a more extended analysis of the issues raised in this section, see Ocampo (2002) and Ocampo and Martin (2003), chapter 5.

15 A recent development has been, however, the rise of new groupings of developing countries that cross regions, and have had an important influence on

trade negotiations (e.g., the G-20 led by Brazil, and the coalition of ACP countries and LDCs).

16 The concept of “goods of social value” captures what in the literature on welfare economics have been called “merit goods.” Thus, “public goods” focus on the interdependence of consumers and other economic agents (in the case of pure public goods, on the fact that consumption is collective), whereas “goods of social value” emphasize the decision of society to provide certain goods to all citizens, and is thus akin to the concept of economic and social rights. Although the differentiation between these concepts makes sense in the context of welfare economics, the common use of the term “public goods” in social and political analysis usually encompasses both. Thus, as pointed out in footnote 1, the concept of “global public goods” should be understood as including international social objectives, in particular the Millennium Development Goals.

17 See www.unglobalcompact.org.

18 Among relevant initiatives, there are directives for multinational enterprises prepared by the OECD in 2001; the Dow Jones Sustainability Index; the international code on environmental management (ISO14001); and the Corporate Responsibility Index promoted by the British organization “Business and the Community” and associated with the British stock-exchange index (FTSE).

19 See, for example, Bustillo and Ocampo (2004) in relation to the application of this framework to a possible Free Trade Area of the Americas.

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This essay is one of a a series of papers and presentations delivered during the first annual International Forum for Development (IFD) and being assembled in a Council-published volume early in 2005. The IFD was held in October 2004 and convened by the SSRC with support from the Ford Foundation. It sought to provide a space for open exchange of ideas among a variety of intellectuals and advocates committed to placing concerns of equity and social justice at the forefront of the development agenda. The IFD brought together more than 50 people from around the world, and included a full day of sessions sponsored jointly with the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly.

José Antonio Ocampo is Under-Secretary General of the United Nations for Economic and Social Affairs. His most recent book, written with Juan Martin, is *Globalization and Development: A Latin American and Caribbean Perspective,* Stanford University Press, 2003. Ocampo has taken part in the efforts of the IFD as a member of its Special Advisory Committee.

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Table 1
Changes in income inequality within countries, 1960s to the 1990s

	Developed countries	Developing countries	Transition economies	Total
A. Number of countries				
Rising inequality	12	16	20	48
Constant	4	10	2	16
Falling inequality	2	7	0	9
Total	18	33	22	73
B. Percent of population a/				
Rising inequality	13.3	66.7	7.5	87.5
Constant	2.3	7.3	0.3	9.8
Falling inequality	1.8	0.9	0.0	2.7
Total	17.4	74.8	7.7	100.0

a/ Percent of 73 countries population, that represent 78.5% of world population.
Source: Based on Cornia (2004), Table 2.8 and population data from the United Nations.

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PENDLETON HERRING, 1903-2004

Herring succeeded in attracting the country's leading social scientists to serve on the SSRC's committees and board of directors and participate in its conferences. Included were R. A. Gordon, Lawrence R. Klein, Simon Kuznets, and James Tobin in economics; Philip Curtin, Louis Gottschalk, Roy F. Nichols, and Edwin Reischauer in history; Willard Hurst, Edward H. Levi, and Leon Lipson in law; Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A. Dahl, V. O. Key, Jr., and David B. Truman in political science; Angus Campbell, Lee J. Cronbach, Leon Festinger, Gardner Lindzey, and Herbert A. Simon in psychology; James S. Coleman, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and Robert K. Merton in sociology; and Otis Dudley Duncan and Frederick Mosteller in statistics.

Herring retired from the SSRC in 1968. He had become president of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation in 1962, a position he continued to hold for almost thirty years. During that period, he was instrumental in persuading the Johnson Administration and Congress to establish the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. as a living memorial to the nation's 28th president. Under Herring's aegis, the foundation supported the publication of the 69-volume *Papers of Woodrow Wilson,* a project to which Herring was an intellectual mentor.

Herring was an active member of the American Political Science Association. He was president of the Association at the peak of the depredations of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy. Herring's 1953 presidential address was a closely reasoned analysis of the importance of the systematic study of government for "helping our democracy to know itself better." Without ever mentioning Senator McCarthy by name, Herring warned against those "who seek to

further their own interests through exploitation of public concern with the Communist contagion."[3] Herring received several APSA awards. In 1979 he received the Charles E. Merriam Award for his contributions to public service. In 1987, he received the James Madison Award in recognition of his scholarship. In 1998, he was in the group of initial recipients of the Frank J. Goodnow Award for contributions to the profession. During its 2003 centennial celebration, the Association recognized Herring's own approaching centenary at a dinner in his honor. Rising to the occasion, he walked to the microphone and crisply enumerated the ways the APSA had advanced his professional life.

There is probably no other figure of his generation who had as varied and great an impact on social science as Pendleton Herring. The postwar political science literature on pressure groups, political parties, and administrative behavior took his prewar books as points of departure, and postwar research across the spectrum of the social sciences owes much to his efforts as president of the SSRC.

It remains to remark on Herring the man. He was a courtly and cultivated presence and a delightful human being. He was unostentatiously erudite and as steeped in the humanities as the social sciences. He carried out his many avocations at a higher level than might have been thought possible for an amateur. Herring took up painting in the 1950's, producing vividly colorful canvases in an impressionist mode, many of them of flowers. (He was an avid gardener.) He turned to poetry in the 1980's and 1990's, privately publishing a collection of sonnets (*Caged Thoughts*) and a pensive series of reflections on the perspective on life of "an old man in his eighth and ninth decades" (*Ventures into Verse*). A scholar to the end, Herring introduced the second collection by noting that he had employed such forms as the haiku, rondeau, and sestina, appending a glossary explaining the verse forms he had used. He remarked on his continuing relish for life in a poem occasioned by his 88th birthday, noting that he had become "too old to dance a jig, but not to hum a tune."

Herring's first wife, Katharine Channing, died in 1969. He married Virginia Stamen Wood, in 1971, who survives him along with his two sons H. James Herring of Princeton, N.J. and Thomas S. Herring of Wareham, MA., five grandchildren, and nine great-grandchildren.

Endnotes

1 For an account of Herring's efforts see Jeffrey M. Dorwart, *Eberstadt and Forrestal: A National Security Partnership, 1909-1949* (College Station: Texas

A&M University Press, 1991), pp. 95-96. “Herring’s most significant contribution to the ideas and forms of national security that emerged from the Eberstadt Unification Report of 1945,” Dorwart comments, “lay in the corporatist scheme that he developed in his 1941 book, *The Impact of War: Our American Democracy under Arms,* widely regarded as the single most important synthesis of civil-military relations written before World War II.”

2 Michael A. Baer, Malcolm E. Jewell, and Lee Sigelman, eds., *Political Science in America: Oral Histories of a Discipline* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1991), 24.

3 Pendleton Herring, “On the Study of Government,” *American Political Science Review* 47 (1953).

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Risk and Development Field Research Grants

Recipients from both the 2003 and 2004 cohorts of the SSRC's Risk and Development Field Research Grant gathered in early December 2004 in Santa Cruz, California to present findings from their fieldwork and receive feedback from their peers and leading scholars in the field. Faculty in attendance were Michael Carter, Director of the BASIS Collaborative Research Support Program at the University of Wisconsin; Stefan Dercon, professor of development economics at the University of Oxford; and Andrew Foster, chair of the department of economics at Brown University. Student presentations included work on social networks and credit provision in Ghana; capital flight in Southeast Asia; financial liberalization and manufacturing in Turkey; sharecropping in Madagascar; land-titling in Indonesia; and remittances and credit provision in Mexico; among numerous others.

Nearly 50 PhD candidates and postdoctoral researchers applied for this year's Risk and Development Field Research Grant. With funds provided by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Program awarded $5,000 to graduate students and $15,000 to postdoctoral applicants, and supported field research into questions of the nature of uncertainty, vulnerability, and risk-mitigating behavior in the context of emerging economies and poverty enclaves. This year, seventeen graduate students and four postdoctoral applicants received funding to pursue fieldwork in developing countries.

This conference marked the conclusion of the Program in Applied

Economics, which has been supporting graduate work in economics since 1997. Over the years, the PAE has funded more than 300 students and researchers through fellowships, workshops, and most recently, the Field Research Grant.

International Forum for Development

The first annual International Forum for Development was convened in New York City on October 18 and 19, 2004, by the SSRC, which has been serving as Secretariat to the Forum for the past year. The Forum brought together academics, intellectuals, political leaders, journalists, business leaders, NGOs and organized labor movements in an effort to identify the ways in which the forces of globalization can be harnessed to promote greater social equity and to work to find viable alternatives to trade liberalization strategies. This year, the Forum focused on failures of the current development orthodoxy, with specific attention to two themes: the failure of economic growth to translate into decent employment in much of the developing world, and the implications of the trade policy decisions of the global North on developing countries. In attendance were Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate; Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; José Antonio Ocampo, Under-Secretary General of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs; Joanna Kerr, Director of the Association for Women's Rights in Development; and Martin Khor, founder of the Third World Network; among others. The event was led by IFD co-chairs Professor Deepak Nayyar, vice chancellor of the University of Delhi and SSRC board member, and Dr. Ha-Joon Chang, professor at the University of Cambridge, together with the other members of the IFD steering committee, including the SSRC's Eric Hershberg.

Panelists presented and discussed alternative policy frameworks areas such as industrial policy, employment creation, trade negotiations, central bank policies, and financial liberalization. Additionally, the Forum convened with the Second Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, with the cooperation of the Financing for Development Office of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, to discuss policy alternatives with delegates and nongovernmental organizations from around the world.

The Council is currently preparing an edited volume of work presented at and relating to the first annual IFD. It will include papers by SP Shukla, former Indian ambassador to GATT; Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for Economic Policy Research; Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights; and

José Antonio Ocampo, UN Under-Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs, among others. Ocampo's paper is featured in this Items and Issues on page 11. Mirroring the Forum, the publication will address issues of growth and employment, international trade policy, rights and development, and gender and employment, together with select regional perspectives presented during the IFD. Publication is expected in early 2005

For more information, including the Forum agenda, participants and participating NGOS, and commissioned and related papers, go to http://www.ssrc.org/programs/ifd.

Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector

The Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector is concluding its work with a capstone conference that will combine discussions of philanthropy and the nonprofit sector with a final fellows' conference that will bring together most fellows of the PPNPS program from the past five years. The capstone conference, which will take place in Florence in March 2005, will focus on two parallel themes. The first concerns the impact of the philanthropic sector across borders, "Philanthropic Projections of Power: Sending Institutional Logics Abroad." Philanthropic organizations (foundations, nongovernmental organizations, religious charities) reflect the institutional logics of the societies from which they originate. Such logics shape both the donor organization's explicit programmatic goals and the tacit understandings that define the methods through which it seeks to advance those goals. Discussions and presentations will explore a number of examples of this phenomenon. The second theme focuses on developments within the U.S.: "Politics and Partnerships: Associations and Nonprofit Organizations in American Governance." The distinctive place of associations in American politics has long been recognized, captured in de Tocqueville's analysis of private organizations as sites of political socialization and civic engagement. Yet this argument typically portrays private organizations as alternatives to, or bulwarks against, the expansion of state power. Consequently, analysts have not grappled as directly with the central place of associations and nonprofit organizations in the development of American political institutions. Discussions and presentations will address this role of civil society. We expect that two scholarly volumes will result from these efforts, which will bring to a close the activities of this program that was funded primarily by Atlantic Philanthropies.

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Capacity Building and Fellowships

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Abe Fellowship Program

Fellowship Orientation Sessions

The Abe Fellowship Program held orientation sessions at the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership in Tokyo on July 30, 2004, and at the University of Kyoto on August 3. Despite the record-breaking heat wave, a total of 23 potential applicants attended. Program staff demonstrated the new online application system. In the Tokyo session, Yoshie Kawade, a 2001 Abe fellow emphasized the importance of coherent methodology and internal consistency in the application materials. In the Kyoto session, Ken Ariga distributed his successful 2002 proposal and shared his experience as a current Fellow with the participants. Lively Q&A sessions ensued at both venues.

Play Ball!/“Purei boru”

The Abe Fellowship Program hosted a brown-bag lunch on July 16, 2004, at the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP). Abe fellow Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu, department of history, Michigan State University, spoke on “Trans-Pacific Field of Dreams: Baseball and Modernity in U.S.-Japan Relations.” Although many American and Japanese baseball fans think of the exploits of Ichiro Suzuki (Seattle Mariners) and Hideki Matsui (New York Yankees) as individual accomplishments, Suzuki said diffusion of America’s national pastime in Japan became possible through the manifold forces of globalization that began to shape bilateral ties in the late 19th century. More than a story of an American cultural form being

transmitted across the Pacific, the spread of baseball highlights an intersection of modern technology, the movement of ideas and aspirations, institution-building, and human networks. For a full version of Shimizu's remarks, see the current issue of *Diplomatic History* (November 2004).

Abe Fellow Kiyoteru Tsutsui.

Global Human Rights and Ethnic Social Movements: International Trends and Ethnic Minorities in Japan

Recent case studies showing the impact of the expansion of human rights ideas and instruments on local politics across the globe were discussed at the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership on November 10, 2004, when the Abe Program held a colloquium on "Global Human Rights and Ethnic Social Movements: International Trends and Ethnic Minorities in Japan." The speaker was Abe Fellow Kiyoteru Tsutsui, sociology department, State University of New York at Stony Brook. The discussants were Yuji Iwasawa, University of Tokyo, and Mikiko Otani, an attorney with Otani Law Office.

Tsutsui presented cross-national quantitative data analyses and qualitative case studies on ethnic minority groups in Japan—Ainu, Koreans, and Burakumin (descendants of outcasts). According to Tsutsui, the global diffusion of human rights norms, intensification of international activist networks, and the growth of international instruments have empowered ethnic minorities and facilitated their political mobilization. The reporting provisions of international conventions, for example, required the Japanese government to address human rights issues, which the three groups capitalized on.

The Determinants of Fertility Decline in Japan: Husbands, Work Place, Government, and Society

The population decrease brought on by rapid fertility decline and the inverted-pyramid shape of the population distribution has caused many social and economic problems. Both were the subjects of a colloquium on December 17, 2004, at the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership hosted by the Abe Fellowship Program. Yamaguch Kazuo of the University of Chicago addressed those in attendance. The discussants included Noriko Tsuya, Keio University; Hisakazu Kato, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research; and Sawako Shirahase, University of Tsukuba. Demographers attribute the fertility decline to women's remaining single and delayed marriage, Yamaguchi said, an explanation also proffered for the Republic of Korea and Southern Europe, which show a similar pattern. In these countries, including Japan, husbands accept a smaller share of housework and child-rearing responsibilities, workplaces are less "family friendly," and women face greater difficulties returning to the workforce after childbirth than in the United States and Western Europe. Fertility decline is related to this social environment. Using a panel survey of consumers from the Institute for Research on Household Economics, Yamaguchi showed how the situation in the household and the workplace affects the attitudes of married women toward child bearing and subsequent fertility behavior.

Eurasia Title VIII Fellowship Program (see below)

International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship (IDRF) Program

Workshop in Nashville

The International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship Program hosted its 13th workshop September 30-October 5, 2004, in Nashville, Tennessee. 22 IDRF fellows in a wide variety of disciplines gathered to share and discuss their recent field research. David Beriss (anthropology, University of New Orleans) and Lynn Thomas (history, University of Washington) facilitated the workshop. The researchers presented their projects in thematic panels, and the result was a series of thought-provoking and engaging group discussions. The participants jumped at the chance to reflect on their projects in an interdisciplinary setting, while at the same time gaining valuable conference-presentation skills. Nashville proved to be an interesting and fun host city, and participants and IDRF staff alike enjoyed a lively mix of evening activities that involved bluegrass and country music, as well as real Southern-style dinners.

2005 Fellowship Competition

At its deadline on November 8, 2004, the IDRF Program received 1,126 applications, which represents an astounding 23% increase from last year and far outpaces the previous record for submissions. Program Director Ron Kassimir and Program Officer Nicole Stahlmann, with some extra help from colleagues from both inside and outside the SSRC, have reviewed the majority of the proposals. The remaining eligible 830 applications have each been assigned to three outside reviewers who are familiar with the applicant's discipline, region and/or research topic. This year, 146 screeners have been recruited who are volunteering their expertise and time to the program.

The online application system, streamlined and improved since its inauguration last year, allowed applicants to submit necessary biographical and academic information via an online interface. The intensive preparations paid off as the reconfigured system was able to handle the unexpected increase in applicants. Other SSRC fellowships followed IDRF's lead in going online in the past year, under the aegis of the newly consolidated Fellowships Office of the SSRC.

The SSRC Mellon Mays Annual Conference

In 1988 the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation established the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship program (MMUF) to increase the number of African American, Hispanic American and Native American faculty in U.S. higher education. Seven years later, the SSRC became one of five institutional partners in this effort,

administering a predoctoral research grant designed to defray the cost of graduate school and to increase completion rates. An annual summer conference is held on the campus of one of the U.S. colleges and universities hosting a MMUF program. Washington University in St. Louis hosted this year's conference, which took place June 9-13, 2004.

The ambitious three-day conference provided opportunities for exchanges among fellows and senior scholars, making available information designed to ensure success in graduate school and for networking with peers and established members of the academy. Activities during the conference included fellows' presentations, workshops, panels, talking circles, and plenaries that featured senior scholars. In all cases, fellows were moderators, rapporteurs, conveners, discussants and respondents to scholarly presentations both by their peers and by senior scholars.

Each year members of the planning committee devote a significant amount of thought to developing a conference theme. And each year the theme captures a way of addressing issues of concern to the fellows in the program, the communities they represent, and the impact of those issues on the community of scholars to which they belong and to the academy. The theme of this year's conference —"Speaking Up and Reaching Out: Empowering Voices"—provided the title for a conference plenary in which Professors Troy Duster and George Sanchez served as the keynote speakers.

Sexuality Research Fellowship Program

Fellows Conference

On October 13-16, 2004, the Sexuality Research Fellowship Program held its 9th annual fellows conference in Bloomington, Indiana, co-hosted by the Kinsey Institute for Research in Sex, Gender, and Reproduction. In attendance were 16 post-doctorate and dissertation fellows, a number of former fellows from 1996-2003, invited guest participants and SSRC staff. Ford Foundation program officer Barbara Klugman was also in attendance.

Fellows and guests were welcomed to the Kinsey Institute with a wine and cheese reception on Wednesday evening, formally beginning the next day with a panel discussion entitled "How to Cast a Wider Net." Addressing the topic of outreach and research dissemination, the panel consisted of presentations by former fellows Red Tremmel (dissertation, 2002), Mary Gray (dissertation, 2003), and 2004 postdoctoral fellow Margot Canaday (also dissertation,

2002). After lunch, Christina Hanhardt, 2004 dissertation fellow, introduced the theme for the conference—"Academic Allies"—in her presentation, "A Paradigm for Collaboration with Community Based Organizations." The afternoon concluded with a tour of the Kinsey Institute's library archives and collections with head librarian Liana Zhou, and Catherine Johnson Roehr, curator of arts and artifacts. In the evening, the conference participants and invited guests attended a special preview of the film "Kinsey," the Fox-Searchlight Productions biopic detailing the life and work of sex researcher Alfred Kinsey.

On Friday morning, October 15th, the conference attendees were treated to a panel presentation provided by researchers from the Kinsey Institute. Featuring Julia Heiman, Institute director, Stephanie Sanders, PhD, Erick Janssen, PhD, (former SRFP fellow Advisor), Nikky Prause (2002 SRFP dissertation fellow), and Deborah Herbernick, the morning panel provided an overview of current research initiatives at the Institute, focusing on the utilization of laboratory and field methodologies to address topics of sexual arousal, mood, risk-taking, and condom use. Erick Janssen also discussed the recent controversy he experienced as a "red-listed" NICHD sexuality researcher earlier this year.

Continuing to build on the theme of "Academic Allies," the afternoon program consisted of a guest presentation by Lorna Littner, senior trainer for the Children's Aid Society's Adolescent Sexuality Training Center. Her talk, "The Pedagogy of Values Clarification," provided an outline of the framework and practice of values clarification in diverse programmatic and educational settings. On Friday evening, the SRFP hosted its annual fellows' dinner at Michael's Uptown Café, where fellows, Kinsey staff, and guests enjoyed a celebratory event together.

Saturday the 16th concluded the conference with a series of one-on-one, small group and large-group discussion sessions, where fellows and guests engaged in informational exchange and collegial support. The SRFP Fellows Conference provided a wonderfully diverse forum for continuing scholarship in this area, and an important opportunity for networking, exchanging research ideas and interests, and professional linking across a wide range of disciplines in the field.

2005-2006 Competition Fellowships on Sexuality and Policy

The 2005-2006 competition is the Sexuality Research Fellowship Program's 10th and final year of providing fellowship support. Providing postdoctoral fellowships to outstanding scholars and other

professionals working in a variety of settings, the SRFP will support research on sexuality and policy, focusing on policy analysis, policy development and/or implementation relevant to local, state, or national concerns. No dissertation fellowships will be awarded. The 2005-2006 competition will target more advanced sexuality scholars and practitioners as demonstrated by academic/administrative position, publication record and research experience. Applicants are expected from a distinguished group of researchers, advocates, scholars, and other professionals, with proposals originating from a wide range of disciplines and backgrounds. The SRFP Selection Committee will meet in early March to determine the final selection of postdoctoral fellows for the Sexuality Research Fellowship Program on Sexuality and Policy.

South Asia Regional Fellowship Program (See below)

Vietnam

Building a Socialist Rule of Law State for Vietnam

From September 9-21, 2004, the Vietnam Program organized an academic program for a high-ranking research delegation visiting the United States as part of a five-year national research project on "Building a Socialist Rule of Law State for Vietnam." The eight-member delegation was chaired by the former president of the Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences and included law professors, social science researchers, a member of the Vietnamese National Assembly, and the vice-minister of Home Affairs. The Vietnamese government's initiative examines the rule of law in a number of civil and common law countries, including England, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States.

During their stay in New York and Washington, DC, the delegation explored different organizational and operational structures and models in the U.S. within their socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts in order to assess whether they could be adapted for Vietnam. The open dialogues with social scientists, judges, lawyers, and government officials at the local, state, and federal levels provided theoretical and practical perspectives on the rule of law, problem-solving courts and the judicial system, congressional law making and agency rulemaking, separation of powers and the relationship among the three branches, and how governmental authority is exercised and constrained. The role that different research centers, private organizations, and citizens play in influencing how policies and laws are made and enforced and in monitoring government was of special interest to the delegation. The visit also enabled the delegation to observe their first criminal jury

trial and see the proceedings in the U.S. Senate Chamber.

SSRC Executive Director Mary McDonnell congratulates a participant in the Vietnam training project.

Interdisciplinary Social Science Research Training Project

From October 18 to 19, 2004, the SSRC Vietnam Program and the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences held a workshop and certificate award ceremony to conclude the third year of our joint interdisciplinary social science research training project in Hanoi. Twenty participants presented scientific reports based on fieldwork conducted during the second half of the ten-month research training program. Participants designed their own research projects, developed quantitative and qualitative instruments, collected field data and analyzed them using SPSS and N-Vivo. Topics included migration, poverty, education, and health issues (including HIV/AIDS and reproductive health). Starting in February 2005, the Vietnam Program will be operating the fourth academic year of the program. It is designed to increase the number of Vietnamese researchers with advanced and integrated skills in social sciences in order to develop capacities for applying interdisciplinary social science research to the concrete issues of rapid socio-cultural and economic change in Vietnam. One hundred and twenty social scientists and professionals have graduated from the program with increased understanding of research conceptualization and design, proposal writing, research methods, and how to combine quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

On October 15, the Vietnam Program also worked with the Southern Institute of Social Sciences in Ho Chi Minh City on plans to widely disseminate the research findings of the joint longitudinal study on urban socio-economic mobility and differentiation in the context of a

rapid growth, urbanization, and in-migration. A project website and policy briefs are being developed.

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Africa

African Youth in a Global Age

The Africa Program, in partnership with the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) and the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa, recently held the concluding workshop of the African Youth in a Global Age program. This year's program, now in its third year, was organized around the theme of "Youth, HIV/AIDS and Social Transformation." The Center for the Study of AIDS, University of Pretoria, South Africa, hosted the workshop from June 10-13, 2004. The event was attended by 12 program fellows who, with program support, conducted research on the impact of the pandemic on young people around the continent and how African youth were responding to the many challenges of HIV/AIDS. Fellows' research was conducted in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Zambia, Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria and the Gambia. Also attending were CODESRIA representatives, University of Pretoria and University of Venda colleagues, and SSRC staff.

Citizenship Crisis in Africa: Politics of Belonging, Exclusion and the Nation-State

On November 11, 2004, the Africa Program sponsored a panel entitled "Citizenship Crisis in Africa: Politics of Belonging, Exclusion and the Nation-State" at the 2004 African Studies Association (ASA) annual meeting in New Orleans. The panel highlighted an important area of work that the program and members of its regional advisory

panel intend to develop. The co-chairs for the panel were Peter Geschiere of the University of Amsterdam and Catherine Boone of the University of Texas. Papers presented included “Citizenship and Belonging in Africa (and Elsewhere): Toward a Research Agenda” by Geschiere, “‘Sons of the Soil:’ The Language and Politics of Autochthony in Eastern D.R. Congo” by the SSRC’s Stephen Jackson, “The Baka and the Anti-state-between Autochthony and Citizenship” by Alec Leonhardt of Tulane University and “Against Local Will: Elected Councils and Village Chiefs Defend Outsider Interests in Senegal’s Forests” by Jesse Ribot of the World Resources Institute. Catherine Boone served as discussant for the panel.

Collaborative Research Network on Youth and Globalization

On September 11, 2004, the SSRC gathered seven social scientists from a range of disciplines for a planning meeting on youth and transnational activism. The group explored the key conceptual and empirical questions related to youth, transnationalism, and activism and discussed developing a relevant research agenda on the topic. Part of the larger SSRC Collaborative Research Network on Youth and Globalization, the meeting served as a catalyst for potential projects in this area of focus.

Eurasia

Islam in Central Asia

In June 2004, the Eurasia Program completed its first year of a three-year, U.S. State Department funded project in Kyrgyzstan on comparative religions. SSRC staff Seteney Shami and Anthony Koliha traveled to Kyrgyzstan in May 2004 to conduct selection interviews with Kyrgyz faculty from the Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan and to participate in a conference on “Islam in Central Asia” held at Osh State University. Both Dr. Shami and Koliha presented papers at the conference. Four faculty members from the Islamic University were selected to participate in exchange programs at Indiana University and Harvard University during the 2004-2005 academic year. The project will eventually conclude with a conference on Islam and comparative religion to be held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2006.

Eurasia Title VIII Fellowship Program

In June 2004, the Eurasia Program announced the recipients of its Title VIII fellowship competition. There were four fellowship

categories: Predissertation Training, Dissertation Write-up, Postdoctoral Research, and Teaching Fellowships. Twenty individual fellowships were awarded in 2004 (nine predissertation, seven write-up, and two each of postdoctoral research and teaching fellowships). Examples of the work being done by recipients include studying federalism's role in political stability in Kazakhstan, the developing tourism sector in Central Asia, the role of women's policy agencies in Central Asia, the creation of property rights in Russia and Ukraine, and a number of transnational concerns such as globalization, the transnational effects of wars, and environmental issues.

Individual fellowship application numbers for the 2005 competition have increased to over a hundred (up from 88 in 2004), with the downward trend in dissertation write-up applicants experiencing a significant reversal. Additionally, summer language institute grants for instruction in the languages of the former Soviet Union remained a bulwark of the fellowship program (with 15 language programs receiving awards), and the SSRC's role in Eurasia field building activities saw a renewal of support for the annual dissertation development workshop and additional funds for the newly introduced training seminar for policy research, which will better network academics with experts in the non-profit and governmental spheres. Past workshops on Central Asia and the Caucasus were successfully shepherded into two projects, an Educational Partnerships Program on Islam and Comparative Religions in Kyrgyzstan (see above) and a series of on-line teaching supplements on the histories of Central Asia. The current theme of governance and governing in Eurasia will hopefully prove as fruitful in the years to come.

Latin America and the Caribbean

Paradoxical Inequalities in Latin America

A July 6, 2004, planning meeting in Bogotá brought together representatives of institutions participating in a multi-year, collaborative project analyzing diverse facets of inequality in Latin America, with an emphasis on the processes through which these are reproduced over time. The project is called Paradoxical Inequalities in Latin America. Funded by Princeton University's Institute for Regional and International Studies (PIIRS), the meeting resulted in decisions on a provisional timetable for a series of workshops at Princeton during the coming year, and the agenda for two SSRC-sponsored cross-regional seminars that will complement these workshops.

2004 Latin American Studies Association Congress

The Program on Latin America organized and sponsored three panels at the 2004 Latin American Studies Association Congress, held from October 7-9, 2004, in Las Vegas, Nevada. Two of these sessions resulted from the SSRC Translocal Flows in the Americas meetings convened in 2003. (See page 37.) The first panel, "Desplazamientos migratorios y subjetividades diaspóricas: Política, ciudadanías e identidad," focused on transnational migration and diasporic subjectivities in the Americas. Focusing on both South-North and South-South migrations, participants discussed the reconfiguration of identities and communities in post-migratory contexts and the processes of incorporation and/or exclusion of migrants and their descendants in both sending and receiving countries. Chaired by Angela Stuesse (University of Texas, Austin), with Alejandro Grimson (Universidad de Buenos Aires) serving as discussant, it included presentations by Hugo Benavides (Fordham University), Ulla Berg (New York University), Liliana Rivera Sánchez (CIESAS-Ciudad de Mexico) and Sergio Caggiano (Universidad Nacional de la Plata/IDES), as well as Ms. Stuesse.

The second panel resulting from Translocal Flows in the Americas activities was entitled "Ciudades Translocales: espacio, flujo y desigualdad." Focusing on Lima, Peru, Santiago, Chile, Buenos Aires, Argentina and San Juan, Puerto Rico, the presentations discussed socio-spatial segregation, formal and informal suburbanization, growing heterogeneity, and the expanding role of the media and consumption in the construction of urban experience. Participants also examined the ways in which these processes are giving rise to new modes of inequality and unleashing new struggles over political and cultural citizenship. Chaired by Silvia Alvarez-Curbelo (Universidad de Puerto Rico), the session consisted of presentations by Marcial Godoy-Anativia (SSRC), Javier Avila (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos) and Alejandro Grimson and Ms. Alvarez-Curbelo.

A third panel entitled "Inequalities in Latin America" was chaired by Eric Hershberg, with Marcial Godoy-Anativia as discussant, and included presentations of papers by Annabella España Najera and Mariana Sousa, (University of Notre Dame), Paul Gootenberg (SUNY Stony Brook) and Luis Reygadas (Univ Metropolitana/ Iztapalapa), as well as a co-authored paper by Hershberg and Jeremy Adelman (Princeton University). The very well-attended session shed light on the nature of inequalities and their reproduction in Latin America, offered clues as to the unique and generalized factors that emerge as crucial through analysis of Latin American

inequalities and suggested areas of inquiry or strategic questions that merit sustained research and debate.

Translocal Flows in the Americas Project

From October 20-27, 2004, participants from past Translocal Flows in the Americas conferences, several other scholars new to the project, and SSRC staff convened in Bellagio, Italy, at the Rockefeller Foundation's Villa Serbelloni. The group met as part of a collaborative writing endeavor, collectively developing ideas and working on writing projects. Specific themes of these projects include Peruvian migration, colonial circuits in Caribbean migration, hierarchies and inequalities in cross-border flows between the U.S. and Mexico and the Dominican Republic and Haiti, narratives of fear and the political instrumentalities of insecurity in Mexico and Latin America, and remittances and other socio-cultural flows between Mexico and the U.S. Funds awarded by the Rockefeller Foundation made possible the travel of scholars from the south, who would otherwise not have been able to attend the workshop. Participants were Ulla Berg (NYU), Javier Avila (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos), Kristen Hill-Maher (San Diego State University), Sobeida De Jesús Cedano (FLACSO-Dominican Republic), Rossana Reguillo (ITESO-Guadalajara), Jose Antonio Baz, Sergio Gonzalez Rodriguez, Daniel Ramirez (University of Arizona), Liliana Rivera Sánchez (CIESAS-Ciudad de Mexico) and Patricia Fortuny (CIESAS-Merida).

Middle East and North Africa

The Beirut Conference on Public Spheres

The Program on the Middle East and North Africa, in collaboration with the Center for Behavioral Research at the American University in Beirut, held a 3-day conference entitled, "The Beirut Conference on Public Spheres," which took place between the 22nd and 24th of October 2004. Set in the beautiful city of Beirut, the conference brought together over 100 researchers, academics, students, and experts from around the globe to share their expertise and insights on the concept of "public spheres" in comparative perspective. The conference particularly highlighted the work of two cycles of SSRC/ Ford International Collaborative Research Grant awardees, and provided a forum for a number of these participants to showcase the work they've done over the past two-three years. In a series of 16 panels and five roundtable sessions, a number of lively presentations provoked numerous discussions and debates about the concept of the public sphere, and its contemporary relevance during this fraught historical moment. Presentations included topics such as the public sphere in zones of conflict, whether a public

sphere can exist in non-democratic societies, new media and the public sphere, torture and resistance in the public sphere, as well as many other relevant issues. In the front of this issue, you will find the opening keynote address by Talal Asad. Look for more material from the conference in the next *Items and Issues*.

South Asia

The South Asia program held its third South Asia Regional Fellowship Program (SARFP) fellows' workshop in Raichak, West Bengal, India from December 13-15, 2004. This year's workshop offered an opportunity for fellowship awardees to meet each other, discuss their work in small group sessions and present their projects to the whole group. The activities of the workshop were guided by Lawrence Cohen, Malathi de Alwis, Sanjay Srivastava, M.S.S. Pandian and Willem van Schendel, who served as "resource people." Small group discussions, each involving two resource persons and four fellows, focused on proposal themes and research methodology. This year's SARFP fellows are all engaged in projects that address the topic of "Boundaries of Bodies, States and Societies," which seeks to understand and link conceptions of the body and other corporeal territorialities as these might be understood at different levels of the state and society. More information about this year's fellows and theme can be found online at http://sarn.ssrc.org/sarfp/.

The SARFP fellows' workshop was followed by a meeting of the South Asia Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) in Kolkata, India on December 21-22, 2004. The Regional Advisory Panel meets annually to guide the intellectual direction of the South Asia program for the upcoming year. This year's discussion centered on the SARFP fellowship program and this year's upcoming round of competition. The theme for the next fellowship cycle will be "The Long 1950's." This year's theme seeks to examine the "originary" moments of post-colonial South Asia, or in other words, the starting point for the making of post-colonial South Asia, a moment when a radically new set of political, economic and socio-cultural transformations and institutions were being set in place. By extension, this year's theme also seeks to inaugurate a new dialogue between modern historians and the rest of the social sciences. Applications for the 2006 fellowship competition are available on February 10, 2005.

Words in Motion

The project on Words in Motion organized by the SSRC Regional Programs held its capstone conference in Fez, Morocco on June 2-5, 2004. Preparatory small workshops had been held over the past three years in New York, Canberra and Florence. The project explores the transnational movement of terms connected to governance and society, with a focus on how particular words become embedded in language usage, social practice, and institutions to create debates, change social realities and reproduce relations of power. The participants presented papers on the following words: commission (Turkey); conspiracy (Philippines); community (Thailand); good governance (Thailand); indigenous (Indonesia); injury (China); minority (Egypt); race (Europe); responsibility (Japan); secularism (Morocco); security (the U.S. and Brazil); sublime (Japan); tradition (Egypt and Indonesia) and terrorism (Bengal).

The conference hotel, a refurbished mansion in the old city of Fez, provided a superb setting for the discussions. The conference coincided with the Fes Festival of Sacred Music and participants attended one of the colloquiums sponsored by the festival on Cultures of Peace in the Middle East. In addition, a joint lunch and afternoon seminar was co-organized by the SSRC and Fes Festival in which short presentations were given by the president and director of the festival, and Itty Abraham, Seteney Shami and Carol Gluck on “the meanings and practices of dialogue.” Participants attended several festival performances including Sufi ceremonies which lasted from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m.

A volume to be edited by Carol Gluck (Columbia University) and Anna Tsing (University of California, Santa Cruz) will be produced from the conference.

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Migration

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Muslims and Political Life

As part of the Council's efforts to bridge the gap between academic scholarship and the media, the International Migration Program sponsored a panel entitled "Muslims and Political Life" at this year's Religion Newswriters Association (RNA) conference in Washington, DC, September 10-12, 2004.

Each year the RNA hosts a number of expert panels to inform religion reporters in the secular media, and the conference provides an excellent forum for introducing journalists to relevant social science research. Rather than trying to convince reporters of the newsworthy findings in our research and publications, our strategy has been to highlight issues and raise questions that can shape subsequent reporting. The panel, which was chaired by former *New York Times* religion writer, Gustav Niebuhr, explored three topics: the diversity of Muslim communities (Karen Leonard, University of California, Irvine), Muslim civic and political participation (Muqtedar Khan, Adrian College), and changing attitudes towards Arab and Muslim Americans since 9/11 (Amaney Jamal, Princeton University). The presentations prompted questions that reflected the journalists' regional and denominational concerns with the issues raised. There was a similar interest in the selection of recent publications addressing a variety of religion and migration topics, many of them the work of SSRC fellows, which we displayed at a resource table. This is the third year that the International Migration Program has participated in this conference and we are planning to do so again in the coming year.

Institute for Journalists on Islam and Muslims in America

To provide journalists with background knowledge to report on Islam and Muslims in the United States, three SSRC programs collaborated to organize a week-long institute, which was held in New York, September 27-October 1, 2004, with funding from the *New York Times* Foundation and, facilitated by SSRC Board member Orville Schell, the Western Knight Center for Specialized Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley's School of Journalism. Nineteen journalists from print, radio, and television media met with leading scholars, representatives of Muslim organizations, and experienced journalists to explore a range of topics including American Muslims' national, socio-cultural, and religious diversity; Islamic institutions and their ties to immigrant Muslims' homelands; the role of Muslim women in political, business and community life; and civil liberty and political challenges facing Muslims in the post-9/11 context of the war on terrorism.

Transnational Religion, Migration, and Diversity Working Group

Following two earlier meetings, which focused on analytical concepts and a national case study, this working group met in Malaysia, December 1-4, 2004 to consider the regional relationships between transnational migration, religion, and diversity within SE Asia as a whole. The participants considered both the substantive relationships and the methodological implications of focusing on a region of countries linked historically (during pre-national, national, and "post-national" periods) by various flows of people and faiths. The working group will have one more meeting to experiment further with its framing such transnational issues before determining how to design a long-term, comparative research program on the same topics.

Knowledge Institutions and Innovation

Transitions to College: From Theory to Practice

The Transitions project is busy finalizing its products and reports. In July 2004, the committee and practitioners' advisory group met with ten young-in-career scholars who authored discipline-based literature reviews of the extant work on transitions to college. The senior scholars helped refine their essays and reference lists, and participated in a symposium with the young authors about future research directions on the subject of transition to college. The literature review essays for each of the ten fields are being considered for publication by several academic research review

journals. These essays will also be released via the project website along with their associated reference lists, which will be uploaded to the website in early 2005. (Go to http://edtransitions.ssrc.org.)

In October, the two participant groups met again in New York. Basing their deliberations on identified gaps in existing work and discussions of the past year on shifting research paradigms, the group pinned down its lists of priority research agenda items. The research priority lists are currently in final draft form and will be released as narrative reports in separate versions suited for academic and practitioner audiences, with a projected release date of spring 2005.

Media, Democracy and the Public Sphere

Culture, Creativity and Information Technology

Intellectual Property, Markets, and Cultural Flows

The SSRC, in collaboration with the Central European University (CEU), the Annenberg School of Communications (University of Pennsylvania), New York University, and Cardozo Law School held an 11-day summer seminar entitled “Intellectual Property in Comparative Perspective: The Cultural Implications of Technological Change,” Aug.1-Aug.11, 2004, at the CEU in Budapest. The goal was to build stronger cross-disciplinary and transnational expertise on intellectual property (IP) issues, especially in relation to cultural production and technological change. The seminar brought together some 40 participants from 11 countries. The event was part of the SSRC’s Intellectual Property, Markets, and Cultural Flows project. More information can be found on the seminar website: http://ip-at-ceu.ssrc.org.

Digital Cultural Institutions

The DCIP brought its fellowship year to a close with an October 2004 conference on “Digital Cultural Institutions and the Future of Access: Social, Legal, and Technical Challenges.” The conference sought to push forward a dialogue between different disciplinary engagements with digital culture, from law, to library science, to science studies, anthropology, and media policy. The DCIP supports research on institutions involved in aggregating digital cultural resources and developing models of access to them. It promotes the integration of knowledge on a range of providers and mediators of digital cultural goods and services—from digital libraries and online museums to commercial online vendors of music and books, search engines and portals, open and collaborative knowledge archives,

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SSRC NATIONAL RESEARCH COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND VOTING

Jason McNichol

In the early fall of 2004, the SSRC was approached by several senior social scientists and seasoned election observers who expressed surprise at the absence of a national resource for nonpartisan scholarship on electoral process controversies in the U. S. Because many of the underlying weaknesses in the country's election administration system had not been sufficiently addressed in the wake of the 2000 presidential election (despite the work of a bipartisan commission and new legislation), concerned citizens worried that a close 2004 contest could result in widespread debates over the credibility of results in key states and districts. Many election specialists also believed that several other longstanding problems with the current election oversight system demanded a collaborative social scientific response that was largely missing from public discourse. For their part, nonpartisan observer groups and some public servants expressed alarm that the primary data and insights needed to evaluate the integrity of the electoral system—ranging from voter registration trends to the distribution of different types of voting machines across precincts—were of uneven quality and only sporadically accessible to individual researchers.

In response the SSRC launched the National Research Commission on Elections and Voting. Composed of nineteen of the nation's leading scholars on electoral process issues and chaired by Alexander Keyssar of Harvard University, the diverse group of political scientists, historians, sociologists, and legal experts was tasked with three complementary objectives: to inform public discussions over electoral process controversies that might emerge following the November 2 Presidential Election; to build a foundation for a national social science clearinghouse and public repository of

and file-sharing networks, among others.