

Conflicts over Globalization

Introduction

During the summer of 2001, before the September 11 attacks, it looked as if struggles over globalization might be the biggest story of the year. Fighting in Genoa at the time of the G-8 summit last July had shown how substantial a mobilization might challenge dominant patterns of neoliberal capitalism. But the integration of markets proceeded apace, as, for example, China's entry into the WTO was finally settled. In response the Council invited several social scientists from different disciplines, countries and orientations to discuss the issues posed by conflicts over globalization. Though not representative of the full diversity of perspectives, the four essays that resulted do show the complexity of the issues.

All were written before September 11. The authors have had the chance to make modest revisions, but these are not essays about changes produced by the September 11 events. They address, rather, changes in the world and struggles to shape or resist them that have been underway for years. How much to understand either terrorism or the war against terrorism as rooted in these struggles over globalization is an open question.

The present symposium presents four different views of what has been at stake in recent conflicts over globalization. The disagreements are as clarifying as the arguments of any one author. And though the forms of conflict may change, neither it nor the issues that provoke it fade overnight. ■



In This Issue Symposium on Globalization

Pierre Bourdieu

Jagdish Bhagwati

Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow

David Graeber

Craig Calhoun
President, Social Science Research Council

Uniting to Better Dominate

By Pierre Bourdieu

Historically, the economic field has constituted itself within the framework of the national state with which it is in part dependent. Indeed, the state contributes in many ways to the unification of economic space (which contributes in return to the emergence of the state). As Polanyi shows in *The Great Transformation*, the emergence of national markets is not the mechanical product of the gradual extension of exchanges, but the effect of a deliberately mercantilist state politics seeking to increase external and internal commerce (particularly in supporting the commercialization of land, money and work). But unification and integration, far from bringing about, as one would have thought, a process of homogenization, are accompanied by a concentration of power, to the point of monopolization, and at the same time, of the dispossession of one part of the population thus integrated. That is to say that integration with the state and the territory it controls is in fact the condition of domination (as is clearly seen in all situations of coloniza-

tion). Indeed, as I was able to observe in Algeria, the unification of the economic field tends, especially through monetary unification and the generalization of monetary exchanges that follow, to throw all social agents into an economic game for which they are not equally prepared and equipped, culturally and economically; it tends at the same time to submit them to standards objectively imposed by the competition of productive forces and the more efficient means of production, as one sees clearly with small rural producers more and more completely torn away from self-sufficiency. In short, *unification profits the dominant*. The difference is constituted in capital simply by the fact of being placed in relationship. (It is thus that, to take a recent example, Roosevelt was forced, in the 30s, to establish common social rules of work such as the minimum wage, a limitation of the hours of work, and so on—to avoid the degradation of wages and conditions of work following the integration into the same national market of unequally developed regions.)

But in addition the process of unification (and concentration) remained circumscribed by national boundaries: they were limited by all the barriers, notably juridical, to the free circulation of goods and persons (customs duty, foreign exchange regulations, etc.). They were limited also by the fact that the production and especially the circulation of goods stayed narrowly tied to geographic places (mostly because of the cost of transportation). These limits, at once technical and legal, to the extension of the economic field tend today to weaken or disappear as a result of different factors: partly purely technical factors, like the development of new means of communication like air transport or the Internet; partly from more properly political, or judicial-political, factors, like liberalization and deregulation. Thus the formation of a *world economic field* finds itself supported, notably in the financial domain (where information technologies tend

to make the variations that separate different national markets disappear).

The Double Sense of "Globalization"

Here it is necessary to return to the word "globalization": we have seen that it could, in a rigorous sense, indicate either the unification of the world economic field or the extension of this field to a global scale. But it can also mean something entirely different, passing surreptitiously from the descriptive sense of the concept that I have just formulated to a normative, or better, performative sense: "globalization" then indicates an economic politics seeking to unify the economic field by means of an whole group of legal-political measures destined to beat down all the limits to this unification, all the obstacles, for the most part linked to the nation-state, to this extension. That defines, quite precisely, a neo-liberal politics inseparable from the true economic propaganda that confers on it a part of its symbolic force in playing with the ambiguity of the notion.

Economic "globalization" is not a mechanical effect of laws of the economy or technology, but the product of a politics put to work by an ensemble of agents and institutions and the result of the application of deliberately created rules to specific ends, to realize trade liberalization, that is to say the elimination of all the national regulations that slow down businesses and their investments. In other words the "world market" is a political creation (as the national market was), the product of a more or less consciously planned politics. And this politics, like at its level that which led to the birth of national markets, has the effect (and perhaps also the *goal*, at least among the most lucid and cynical of neo-liberalism's defenders) of creating the conditions of domination and brutally confronting the agents and the enterprises previously enclosed in national limits to the competition of the most efficient and powerful productive forces and means of

Pierre Bourdieu, among the most distinguished and influential sociologists of the later 20th century, died as this issue was going to press. For an appreciation of his life and work, see "A Word from the President: Remembering Pierre Bourdieu," p.16.

production. Thus, in emerging economies, the disappearance of protections dooms national enterprises to ruin and, for countries like South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia or Brazil, the suppression of all obstacles to foreign investment involves the breaking up (of local enterprises, then purchased, often at ludicrous prices, by multinationals. For these countries, public markets remain one of the only ways local companies are permitted to compete with the great businesses of the North. While they are presented as necessary to the creation of a "global sphere of activity," the World Trade Commission's directives on the politics of competition and of public markets would have the effect of insuring competition "of equal arms" between the great multinationals and the small national producers, leading to the widespread disappearance of the latter. We know that in general formal equality within actual inequality is favorable to the dominant.

The word "globalization" is, we see, a *simultaneously descriptive and prescriptive pseudo-concept* that has taken the place of the word "modernization," long used by American social science as a euphemistic way of imposing a naively ethnocentric evolutionary model that permits the classification of different societies according to their distance from the most economically advanced society, which is to say American socie-

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810 SEVENTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10019 USA

ty, so consecrated for now and as the goal of all human history (this is the case for example when one takes as a criterion of the degree of evolution one of the typical, but apparently neutral and indisputable, characteristics of this society, like the energy consumption per head of the inhabitants, according to the model critiqued by Lévi-Strauss in *Race and History*). This word (and the model that it expresses) embodies the most accomplished form of *the imperialism of the universal*, which consists, for a society, of universalizing its own characteristics by tacitly establishing them in a universal model (as French society long did, as the supposed incarnation of the rights of man or of the heritage of the French Revolution, presented as a model, especially in the Marxist tradition, of all possible revolutions.)

Thus, through this word, the process of unification of the worldwide field of economy and finance, which is to say the universal integration of national economies previously partitioned off from each other and henceforth organized on the model of an economy rooted in the historical particularities of a tradition of a particular society, that of American society, finds itself established simultaneously as inevitable destiny and political project of universal liberation, as the end of a *natural evolution* and as a civic and ethical ideal that, in the name of a postulated link between democracy and the market, promises political emancipation to the people of all lands. The most accomplished form of this utopian capitalism is without doubt the myth of the "shareholder democracy," which is to say of a universe of wage-earners who, paid in stocks, would collectively become "owners of their businesses," achieving the perfectly successful association of capital and work: and the triumphant ethnocentrism of theories of "modernization" reaching sublime heights with the most inspired prophets of the new economic religion which sees in the United States the new homeland of "actually existing socialism" (one sees in passing that the scientific madness that triumphs today in Chicago cedes nothing to the most exalted delirium of "scientific socialism," which developed, in other times and places, with the consequences that we know.)

It would be necessary to stop here in order to demonstrate first that what is proposed and imposed in a universal manner as the standard of all rational economic practice is in reality the universalization of particular characteristics of one economy immersed in a particular history and social structure, that of the United States;¹ and that, at the same time, the United States, by definition the realized form of a political and economic ideal that is, essentially, the product of the idealization of its own economic and social model, notably

characterized by the weakness of the state. But it would also have been necessary to show, secondly, that the United States occupies a dominant position in the world economic field that it owes to an exceptional group of competitive advantages: *financial advantages*, with the exceptional position of the dollar that permits it to drain from the whole world (that is to say strong economies like Japan but also the oligarchies of poor countries or networks of world trade) the capital necessary to finance its enormous deficit and to compensate for a very low rate of saving and investment and which assures them the possibility of putting the monetary policies of its choice to work without worrying about repercussions on other countries, especially the poorest, which are objectively chained to American economic decisions and which have contributed to American gain not only by the minimal costs of their work and their products—especially raw materials—

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but also the advance withholdings that they have submitted to and from which American banks and the stock market have benefited; *economic advantages*, with the force and competitiveness of the capital goods sector and investment, and in particular industrial micro-electronics, or the role of banks in the private financing of innovation; *political and military advantages*, with their diplomatic weightiness which permits them to impose economic and commercial norms favorable to their interests; *cultural and linguistic*

advantages, with the exceptional quality of the private and public systems of scientific research (measurable in the number of Nobel prizes), the power of lawyers and of large law firms, and finally, the universal usage of English which dominates telecommunications and the whole of commercial cultural production; *symbolic advantages*, with the imposition of a lifestyle practically universally recognized, at least among adolescents, especially through the production and diffusion of representations of the world, mostly cinematic, to which an image of modernity is associated. (One sees in passing that the superiority of the American economy—which, moreover, moves further and further from the model of perfect competition it is alleged to be—rests on structural effects and not on the particular efficacy of an economic politics—even without taking into account of the effect of the intensification of work and the extension of working hours joined with very weak wages for the least qualified and also the role of a new techno-scientifically dominated economy.)

One of the most unquestionable manifestations of the relations of force that establish themselves at the heart of the world economic field is without doubt the asymmetry and the logic of the double standard (two weights, two measures) which means for example that the dominant ones, and in

particular the United States, can return to protectionism and to subventions that they forbid to developing countries (which are forbidden, for example, to limit the import of a product that would cause grave harm to their industry or to regulate foreign investments). And much good will is necessary in order to believe that solicitude for social rights in the lands of the South (or, for example, the banning of child labor) is exempt from protectionist motives when one knows that it comes from lands that, like the United States, are engaged in enterprises of deregulation, flexibilization, limitations on wages and trade union rights. And the politics of "globalization" is without doubt in itself the best illustration of this asymmetry, since it aims to extend to the whole of the world, but without reciprocity, one way (which is to say in association with isolationism and particularism) the model most favorable to the dominant.

The unification of the world economic field through the imposition of absolute rule of free exchange, of the free circulation of capital and of growth oriented toward export presents the same ambiguity as the integration of the national economic field in earlier times: in giving all appearances of a universalism without limits, of a sort of ecumenism which finds its justifications in the universal diffusion of cheap lifestyles of the "civilization" of McDonald's, of jeans and Coca-Cola, or in the "legal homogenization" often held as an index of "positive globalization," this "project of society" serves the dominant, which is to say the great investors who, while situating themselves below the state, can count on the great states, and in particular the politically and militarily most powerful among them, the United States, and on the great international institutions, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, which they control, in order to assure favorable conditions to the conduct of their economic activities. *The effect of domination connected to integration in inequality* can be well seen in the fate of Canada (which might well have been that of Europe if it had directed itself toward a sort of customs union with the United States): due to the lowering of traditional protections that left it defenseless, notably in cultural matters, this country is in the process of undergoing a veritable economic and cultural integration with American power.

Like the former national states, the dominant economic forces are indeed able to put at their service (international) law and the great international organizations, reduced to acting as their lobbies. These work to equip the economic interests of businesses or of nations with legal justifications (for example in guaranteeing to industrial investors the maximum protection and rights); and they devote a very impor-

tant part of their intellectual energy to undoing national rights, for example the laws and regulations that assure consumer protection. The international authorities, without fulfilling all the functions ordinarily associated with nation-states (like those that touch on social protection), invisibly govern the national governments that, more and more reduced to the management of secondary business, constitute a screen of illusion appropriate for masking the real sites of decision. They symbolically reinforce the semi-mechanical action of economic competition that forces nation-states to play the game of competition on the terrain of taxation (in granting exemptions) or competitive advantages (in offering free infrastructure).

The State of the World Economic Field

The world field presents itself as a group of world sub-fields each of which corresponds to an "industry" understood as a collection of businesses in competition for the production and commercialization of a homogeneous category of products. The structure, almost always oligopolistic, of each one of these sub-fields corresponds to the distribution structure of capital (under its different types) between

different firms capable of acquiring and conserving the status of efficient competitor on the world level, the position of a firm in each country depending on the position of this firm in all the other countries. The world field is strongly polarized. The dominant national economies tend, from the sole fact of their weight in the structure (which function as barriers to entry) to concen-

trate the capital of the companies and to appropriate the profits they produce, thus directing the inherent tendencies of the operation of the field. The position of each firm in the national and international field depends indeed not only on its own advantages, but also on economic political, cultural and linguistic advantages that flow from its national appurtenances. This sort of "national capital" exercises a multiplier effect, positive or negative, on the structural competitiveness of different firms.

Today these different fields are structurally submitted to the world financial field. This field was brutally freed (by measures like, in France, the financial deregulation law of 1985-86) of all the regulations, some nearly two centuries old, which had been reinforced after the great series of bank failures of the 30s. Having thus arrived at almost complete autonomy and integration, it became one site among others for capital development. The money concentrated by the large investors (pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds) became an autonomous force, controlled only

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by bankers who increasingly privilege speculation, financial operations without other than financial goals, to the detriment of productive investment. The international economy of speculation also finds itself liberated from the control of national institutions that, like central banks, regulated financial operations, and long-term interest rates tend no longer to be fixed either by national authorities or by a small number of international operators who control the tendencies of financial markets.

The concentration of finance capital in pension funds and mutual funds which attract and manage collective saving permits the trans-state managers of this saving to impose exigencies of financial profitability on businesses, in the names

international market a means of internalizing transactions, as Williamson says, which is to say organizing them inside unities of production integrating the firms absorbed and so reduced to the status of subsidiary company of a head office; while others seek in subcontracting another way to establish subordinate relations in relative independence.

Thus, the integration of the world financial field tends to weaken all regional and national powers and the formal cosmopolitanism in which it arms itself, in discrediting all other models of development, especially national, there and then condemned as nationalist, leaves citizens impotent in the face of transnational powers of economy and finance. The so-called politics of "structural adjustment" aims to assure the



AP/Wide World Photos

of stockholder interests, which gradually come to direct their strategies. This notably limits their possibilities of diversification and imposes decisions of downsizing, reduction of costs and of manpower, or of merger-acquisitions that place all the risks on wage-earners, sometimes fictitiously associated with profits, at least for the highest place among them, through remuneration in stocks. The increased liberty to engage, and above all, perhaps, to disengage capital, to invest or to disinvest, in the view of obtaining the best financial profit, supports the mobility of capital and the generalized dislocation of business whether industrial or banking. Direct overseas investment permits the exploitation of differences between nations and regions in the matter of capital but also the cost of handwork, and it also allows research for proximity to the most favorable market. As emerging nations transformed autonomous strongholds into provinces subordinated to central power, the "network firms" find in the internal and

integration in the subordination of dominated economies; that by reducing the role of all the mechanisms, called "artificial" and "arbitrary," of political regulation of the economy associated with the social state, the only authority capable of opposing transnational businesses and international financial institutions, to the profit of the so-called free market, through a group of converging measures of deregulation and privatization, such as the abolition of all protection for the domestic market and the lifting of controls imposed on foreign investments (in the name of the Darwinian theory that exposure to competition makes businesses more efficient). By doing this they tend to assure a nearly total freedom to concentrated capital and to clear the path for the great multinational enterprises that more or less directly inspire these politics. (Inversely they contribute to neutralizing the attempts of the so-called emerging nations, that is to say those capable of opposing effective competition, to lean on

the national state with a view to constructing an economic infrastructure and creating a national market, in protecting national production and encouraging the appearance of actual demand linked to peasant and worker access to consumption through increased purchasing power, itself encouraged, for example, by state decisions like agricultural reform or the institution of a progressive tax.

The relations of force of which these politics are a barely euphemistic expression and which tend increasingly to reduce the most deprived nations to an economy resting almost exclusively on intensive or extensive exploitation of natural resources shows itself also in the asymmetry of treatment accorded by the world authorities to different nations, according to the position they occupy in the structure of distribution of capital. The most typical example without doubt is the fact that the International Monetary Fund's demands

that the United States reduce its persistent deficit have long been ignored, whereas the same authority imposed deficit reduction on several already imperiled African economies which has only increased unemployment and misery. And one knows, moreover, that the same states that preach to the world the opening of borders and the dismantling of the state can practice more or less subtle forms of protectionism, through import quotas, voluntary restrictions on exports, imposing standards of quality or security and forced currency revaluations, not to mention certain virtuous exhortations with respect to universal social rights; or to sacrifice to forms of state assistance, through for example what has been called "mixed oligopoly"; founded on interventions of states aiming to assure the sharing of markets by voluntary agreements of trade restriction, or by the fixing of productions quotas to foreign subsidiaries.

This unification, unlike that which formerly operated, in Europe, at the level of the nation-state, makes itself without the state—against Keynes' desire to see the creation of a world central bank producing a neutral reserve currency that could guarantee equal exchanges among all the countries—and at the sole service of interests of the dominant which, unlike the lawyers of the origins of the European state, have not really needed to equip the politics that serve their interests with the appearance of the universal. It is the logic of the field, and the force of concentrated capital itself, which imposes the relations of force favorable to the interests of the

dominant. They have the means to transform these relations of force into rules of the game with a universal appearance through the supposedly neutral interventions of the great international authorities (the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization) that they dominate or under cover of representations of economy and politics they are



Photo by Jonah Hoyle

able to inspire and to impose, which have found their most accomplished for mulation in the project of the Multilateral Investment Agreement. This sort of utopia of a world rid of all state constraints and delivered to the discretion of the investors allows the idea truly "globalized" world which the international preservation of the leaders and the structures of industrial and financial multinationals of all nations aims to impose while leaning on the political, diplomatic and military power of an imperial state gradually reduced to its functions of maintaining interior and exterior order.² It is thus vain to hope that this unification assured by the "harmonizing" of legislation leads by its own logic to a true universalization, assumed by a universal state. But it is not entirely unreasonable to expect that the effects of the politics of a little oligarchy attentive to its own interests in the short term must support the progressive emergence of political forces, also worldwide, capable of gradually imposing the creation of transnational authorities charged with controlling the dominant economic forces and subordinating them to truly universal ends. ■

¹See below "The imposition of the American model and its effects."

²Cf. François Chesnais, *La mondialisation du capital*, Paris: Syros, 1944 and M. Freitag and E. Pineault, eds., *Le Monde enchaîné*, Montréal: Éditions Nota Bene, 1999.

A different translation of this essay will appear in *Firing Back: Against the Tyranny of the Market*, to be published later this year by the New Press. This translation is by Elsa Dixer.

Why Globalization is Good

By Jagdish Bhagwati

From the mid-1980s through the early 1990s, the United States scene was racked by a not-so-magnificent—in fact by an obscene—obsession with Japan. Japan was denounced furiously, or feared with what the Russian proverb calls "big eyes," for many sins and with varying passions: by our alarmed policymakers such as President Clinton and his advisors in the first term of office, by our competing lobbies such as Detroit, by our finest policy intellectuals such as James Fallows, by bureaucrats such as Clyde Prestowitz, by distinguished economists such as Laura Tyson and Rudiger Dornbusch and in the reputed media such as *The New York Review of Books* (a "progressive" magazine which nonetheless fell for this national illiberal obsession and whose stable of Japan-obsessed writers included Fallows). The air was thick with charges and suspicions. Skeptics like me were rare, at least on the public scene.

On trade, Japan was widely denounced as a wicked trader, unfairly acting as an exclusionary importer and a predatory exporter. It was feared as if it were a formidable combination of Superman and Lex Luthor: omnipotent and evil. Whatever it did was viewed darkly as through an opaque glass clouded by the desert dust. If the Japanese bowed low, as they do, to greet you, that surely was because that made it easier for them to cut you off at the knees or even higher up! Interestingly, all this has vanished with Japan's decline and today many will accept what I said at the time in a huge outpouring of writings: especially, but not exclusively, that this was a product of a "diminished giant syndrome" reflecting the rise of Japan, and that Britain, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, had gone through its own sad reaction to the rise of Germany and the United States (except that Britain's relative decline was for real, not just a syndrome).¹

Why do I bring this up? It is because I find so many people today equally obsessed by globalization. This includes notable intellectuals like Edward Said and Pierre Bourdieu, the NGOs and the "activists": the charming epithet that suggests, contrary to what Keynes famously said about the influence wielded by departed economists, that people like me and Bourdieu are "passivists" unless we march and preferably perform theatrics in the streets. But then part of the game in public debate, as Orwell reminded us, is to seize the higher ground by appropriating to oneself and one's cause a pleasing and agreeable description, and what is better than to suggest that your opponents are bourgeois Oblomovs?

As with Japan, the obsession takes several forms. The Japan-bashers have their counterpart in those who would throw sand into globalization's fuel tank, not just its gears; some go so far as to take to (minor) violence. Then there are those who simply have globalization continually on their minds: these correspond to the Japan-worriers. Just as econo-

mists like Dornbusch who seemed to argue that if it snowed in Cambridge, it must be a result of Japanese misbehavior, there are many "anti-globalizers" who feel in a grand non sequitur that all ills of the world such as poverty, gender discrimination, democratic deficit, unwelcome cultural change and what not are due to globalization. Then there are those who, just like the Japan critics who wanted only to tame the Japanese monster, wish to "humanize" globalization, giving it a "human face," presuming again that it lacks one to begin with.

This ferment is useful: it gives pro-globalizers like me a different perspective that always enriches. But I believe that its main thrust that globalization is bad is all wrong, at least in the key respects that I consider to be important. But if I maintain that globalization is good, I also believe that it needs appropriate governance: an area where the thoughtful anti-globalizers and I can find common ground if not shared prescriptions. That is what I will argue here, very briefly.

At the outset, however, I must say that by globalization, I mean economic globalization. This embraces, at minimum, trade, direct foreign investment (i.e. multinationals or corporations, in the language of the anti-globalizers, or DFI in the usual acronym), short-term capital flows and the international movement of people. The public debate suffers from what I have called the Fallacy of Aggregation: there are huge differences in the economic and political implications of these phenomena and in the difficulties they raise for their fruitful management. Thus, the East Asian financial and economic crisis illustrates the dangers of gung-ho financial liberalization (brought about by what I have called, with some success, the Wall Street-Treasury complex²) without prudent monitoring and institutional reforms. But its sins should not be visited on freeing which generally does not create such drastic outcomes.

Let me just focus, for the brevity imposed by this symposium, on the question of freer trade (and tangentially the flows of DFI since DFI and trade flows do have a link, but certainly not an indispensable one) as the element of globalization that attracts particular opprobrium and reaction.

Nearly all economists are now agreed that, despite reservations expressed by a few of their number³, the postwar record of freeing trade is one associated with increasing economic prosperity. So the argument that trade increases the size of the economic pie is not at serious issue currently: globalization is therefore considered to be *economically benign*.

But there are many reservations now in the public domain that globalization, while economically benign, is *socially malign*. Bourdieu states rather melodramatically: that the "unification of the world economic field" is "surreptitiously" transliterated into a "normative" "neo-liberal politics" marked by "economic propaganda." The economic part of

that "propaganda" is no propaganda: to call it that is just balderdash even if it comes from an eminent intellectual. But there are serious questions if we ask about social agendas: e.g., gender discrimination, poverty etc.

I would contend that, if we look at these questions in depth and get down from generalities to looking at the matters concretely, the presumption that economic globalization produces social ills is not compelling. Indeed, in many cases, globalization is not part of the problem; it is part of the solution. I have argued this extensively for globalization's effect on poverty in the poor countries, for gender issues, for our workers' real wages and on our labor standards, for child labor, for democratic deficit and much else. The central tendency of what Bourdieu and Said despise and dismiss as "neoliberal" globalization is to help, not harm, the causes they and the socially concerned globalizers espouse!

But if I reject their facile assertions that globalization is socially harmful, we still need to think through the kinds of institutional, domestic and international changes that we need nonetheless as globalization proceeds apace. I would like to state just two types of changes and their rationales.

Even though the central tendency is favorable rather than harmful, there are bound to be exceptions. These downsides cannot be brushed aside; they must be addressed when they are significant. So we need to think of institutional and policy design to deal with them.

Thus, to deal with the greater insecurity that many feel, and some experience (objectively in terms of layoffs and substantial decline in incomes in the jobs next acquired), the freeing of trade is best handled through some form of adjustment assistance. For poor countries that cannot finance it, the World Bank and other financial-aid institutions must be charged with providing this assistance to liberalizing countries.

Take yet another example. Shrimp farming along the coastal areas in India (and some other poor nations) has environmentally damaged surrounding mangroves and the livelihoods of traditional fishermen and farmers. Does one deal with by shutting off exports as some of the anti-globalizers in India want? Surely, given the big contribution that exports make to India's development and hence its ability to pull the poor up into gainful employment (an assertion I make on the basis of empirical developments once the 3.5% rate of growth for nearly a quarter of a century under autarky and dirigisme of the Kafkaesque variety gave way to over 5%

growth rate with India's "neo-liberal" turn to globalization and markets in the 1980s), it is silly to kill shrimp exports. Instead what we want is Superfund or torts type compensation for past damages and a "polluter pay principle" for taxing the pollution visited by the shrimp farmers. In short, we need the institutional changes that give us this mix of correctives to make shrimp farming and exports necessarily welfare-enhancing.

We also need to recognize that even though globalization is beneficial, it does not follow that the greater the speed with which it occurs, the better. In short, as we know from the disaster in Russian economic reforms, Shock (or Sachs)

Therapy set back the cause of "neo-liberal" reform by years, while causing gratuitous unrest and suffering. Similarly, the imprudent haste with which financial liberalization was virtually forced on certain East Asian countries was a cause of the ensuing collapse there that must be recognized as the worst man-made crisis in the world economy since the Great Crash of 1929.

Then again, we also need to remember that the fact that globalization promotes social agendas does not mean that we need to be satisfied with the speed at which it delivers on these agendas. Globalization will generally promote economic prosperity

and reduce child labor. But we need to do more. Here again, suitable policies can be pursued. I would claim that, generally speaking, these supplementary policies lie in the domain of moral persuasion, using today's civil society and media: two powerful tools that must not be underestimated. ■

Jagdish Bhagwati is University Professor, Columbia University, and currently the Andre Meyer Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, working on a book on *Globalization and Appropriate Governance*.

¹Many of my more accessible writings are reprinted in a selection of my public policy essays, *Unsettling Essays on Trade, Immigration and Democracy*, MIT Press: Cambridge, 1998.

²This concept and terminology is now used widely. But product differentiation also is present. Thus Robert Wade calls it the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex; Barry Eichengreen has talked about the Wall Street complex. The idea and terminology was put out by me in *Foreign Affairs* at the very beginning of this crisis; the article, widely translated and reprinted, has been reprinted in my recent selection of public policy essays, *The Wind of the Hundred Days: How Washington Mismanaged Globalization*, MIT Press: Cambridge, 2001.

³The most vocal skeptic is Dani Rodrik of Kennedy School at Harvard University. But a full riposte to his reservations and criticisms has been made by T.N. Srinivasan of Yale and myself; see my website <http://www.columbia.edu/~jb38>.

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After Genoa and New York: The Antiglobal Movement, the Police and Terrorism

By Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow

In the light of the events of September 11 and the US government's subsequent offensive against terrorism, it may be useful to reflect on the strategies used against protest in times of terror, and their effects. We take as our starting point the measures that Italy took to meet the antiglobalization movement in Genoa this past summer. The implications, we will argue, go well beyond Italy to authorities' responses to violence, whatever its source and wherever it is found—including the United States in the months and years to come.

The End of a Truce

In spring 1977, a young Italian activist, Giorgia Masi, was shot by the police during a demonstration in Rome. Masi was the last in a chain of about 120 Italians shot—or, as in one infamous case, "suicided"—from the window of a police station, during or after protests. Last July 19, Carlo Giuliani was killed by a young *carabiniere* doing his military service and run over by a police jeep during the violent protests against the G-8 meetings.

In the almost 25 years between Masi's and Giuliani's killings the interactions between Italian demonstrators and the police were—if not appeased—at least civilized. Yet in Genoa, not only did the police shoot a demonstrator; hundreds of peaceful protesters were *caricati con caroselli* (the infamous Italian police practice of aiming police vans directly at demonstrators), beaten up, strip-searched, forced to sing fascist and anti-Semitic songs and denied access to an attorney or, in the case of foreigners, to their consulates. Many returned to their homes in Italy or elsewhere in Europe and the US with broken bones and cracked heads. Some were well-known pacifists, others journalists; but most of them were very young, and their detailed accounts of police brutality shocked public and foreign opinion. Government and parliamentary inquiries were immediately begun, and Italy's new right-wing government was sent reeling by complaints from both Italian citizen groups and allies protesting the treatment of their citizens.

In the light of those events and the growing protests in the US and abroad against the American attack on the Taliban regime, it may be useful to ask, "What explained the breakdown of the police/protester truce in Italy and what can we learn from it in the United States?" Was the violent encounter the fault of the relatively small "black bloc" of anarchists and troublemakers who descended on Genoa, or was it the result of a shift in police tactics? And what does the future portend for an international system that is already seeing a "social movement spillover" from the antiglobalization movement of the late 1990s to an international peace movement today?

De-escalation and Re-escalation in Protest Policing

The Genoa protests were part of a general increase in international activism both in Western Europe and elsewhere. It could be argued that this rise of activism was the cause of the violent police response; but that would imply that it was an *absence* of activism that explains the 25-year truce between Italian protesters and the police. But that was not the case; Italy's terrorist-led "years of lead" continued well into the 1980s, when most of the Red Brigades and other fringe groups were finally defeated.¹ Rather, the long truce between protesters and the police was the result of a deliberate strategy—learned from American and other models—of what we call "contained protest policing." As practiced routinely in Washington, Paris and Berlin, the strategy rested on three main rules for police behavior²:

- Negotiate the marching routes, tactics and objects of protest with protest leaders, allowing them the occasional symbolic victory of breaking the rules—especially when violence-bent minorities join their demonstrations;
- Establish and maintain continual contact with the peaceful protesters all through their demonstrations, constructing a single command center which controls the actions of police units in the field;
- Keep troublemakers far away from peaceful demonstrators, never attack the latter when the former get violent and never break off contact with demonstration leaders even when violent incidents have occurred.

Every one of these rules of procedure was broken by the Italian police in Genoa.

- First, they failed to maintain contact with the protest leaders. Even the mayor of Genoa—attempting to negotiate with the demonstrators—complained that he could not make contact with the police authority in charge of protest control

• Second, their forces were divided among state police (who depend on the Interior Ministry, the *carabinieri* (who are part of the army), the Finance Guards (who answer to the Finance Ministry), prison guards (who work for the Ministry of Justice) and most bizarre of all, special units trained to deal with the mafia! While the best-trained units defended the "red zone" inside the G-8 perimeter, ill-trained and uncoordinated police units from outside were left to roam the city to keep the demonstrators away from the delegates. Even the Interior Ministry now admits that there was no clear chain of command or coordination among the various forces in the field. Moreover, about half of the police deployed in the Mobile Squads were untrained draftees.

- Most important, the police failed to separate the violent fringe of "black bloc" anarchists from the mass of peaceful

protesters. Worse, when these militants threw rocks at them, overturned cars and broke store windows, the police turned their guns, water-cannon (filled with chemicals), tear gas, batons and jeeps not only on them but on the mass of peaceful protesters.

The unprovoked police attack on a planning center and dormitory for the peaceful Genoa Social Forum was the culmination of this perverse strategy. Their faces covered in masks, the police erupted into the Armando Diaz school, swinging their truncheons left and right before transporting whoever they could catch to a police barracks. Members of Parliament and journalists who entered the school after the police raid testified to the bloodshed and disruption they found there. Many of the about 253 people arrested during the two days of marches—some because they were wearing "suspicious" black clothes and/or were foreigners—told the magistrates that they had been beaten, made to stand spread-eagled for hours and kept incommunicado for up to three days. When the 93 "dangerous anarchists" arrested at the Diaz school were finally hauled before the magistrates to be booked, all but one was immediately freed on the grounds of improper arrest.

The Reasons of Misrule

What explains this descent from a police practice that had maintained calm and killed no demonstrators from 1977 to the police riot of Genoa? Three main reasons come to mind:

- First, as there had been during the protests against the World Trade Organization in Seattle, Washington, in 1999, there was undoubtedly a radical fringe in Genoa bent on destruction and radicalization. But against 20,000 police, there were no more than 400 to 700 of these "black bloc" members. The survey of 800 Genoa demonstrators that one of us directed shows that 90% of those interviewed claimed never to have used violent tactics; 41% condemned any form of violence and 52% would employ violence only in defense against the police. In any case, if the violent fringe was the problem, why did the police so often aim their attacks at the mass of peaceful demonstrators?

- Second, the Italian police might have decided that the mistake of the Seattle police had been to go too easy on the protesters at the start; from the first day of the Genoa summit, they went on the offensive. But if the past two decades of "contained police practice" have taught us anything, it is that a strategy of aggressive confrontation not only produces conflict with the most radical groups but risks pushing the mass of peaceful protesters into their hands. This is exactly what happened in Genoa.

- Finally, the Italy of 2001 is not the Italy of 1977 or even

that of 2000. A right-wing government, elected on a "law-and-order" platform, governs shakily. Its prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi—himself at odds with the law—holds together a rag-tag coalition of economic conservatives, Northern League separatists and "reformed" post-fascists. It would not be the first time that a government lacking in legitimacy or internal cohesion tried to strengthen itself by creating or inflating a Threat to the Republic. It is no accident that the post-fascist Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, Gianfranco Fini, was in Genoa police headquarters with MPs of his *Alleanza Nazionale* during the protests and quickly congratulated the police on their behavior.

Friends of Italy are concerned that the election of Italy's first right-wing government since the fall of Mussolini coincides with the retreat of the country's police from a model of neutral protest policing to one resembling the "King's police." Used for centuries against political and

social opponents, the King's police "made" elections, relied on massive military attacks on demonstrators and saw the opposition as a crowd to be feared rather than as citizens to be protected in the performance of their democratic rights.³ A conservative government wielding a version of "the King's police" against transnational protestors is the major explanation for the police riot of Genoa.

Lessons for Anti-Terrorism

In the wake of the events in Genoa, many Italians bought into the government's call for law and order, even as its police broke the law and created disorder. But others remember another period in Italian history: 1921-22, when the police looked the other way as Mussolini's thugs attacked trade unions and cooperatives, submitting Italy to over 20 years of fascism. Supporters of democracy who worry about the excesses of determined protesters should recall that democracy itself is often the victim of overzealous and uncontrolled protest policing.

If there were circumstances peculiar to Berlusconi's Italy that explain the brutal shift from contained protest policing to the "King's police," Genoa was no isolated incident. In Seattle, the police were unprepared to manage their relations with protestors; in Davos, Prague and Nice, the freedom to demonstrate was abridged by governments that blocked demonstrators at the frontier; even in peaceful Sweden, the Göteborg summit in June 2001 triggered a mechanism of military escalation. This was the model that the Italian police deliberately tried to emulate. Thus, even before September 11, we detect an international trend away from the practices of pacific protest policing.

How tense police and frightened government officials

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respond to peaceful protests as they face terrorist threats may become an issue in the United States today. Even as the government was urging its citizens not to attack Muslim minorities as vengeance for the attacks on the World Trade

fight terrorism have the judgment and discrimination to understand the difference between transnational dissent and foreign enemies?

There is another danger as well: both the American expe-



Photo by Jonah Hoyle

Center and the Pentagon, it was engaged in a sweep of arrests and sequestrations that came close to the practice of racial targeting. The powers given authorities by the new antiterrorism law are balanced by few guarantees that they will not be used against domestic dissenters. And as in Genoa, police practice often goes beyond the letter of the law; in late October, amid tension at the nation's airports, a Green party leader in Maine was reportedly surrounded and manhandled by police.⁴

Protesters making unpopular claims have always faced hostile police and potentially repressive governments. But there is a new factor today. Although there was common framing of opposition to the Vietnam war in many countries during the 1960s, there was little real coordination among the various peace movements, and their members seldom crossed borders to support one another's demonstrations. That was before the antiglobalization movements of the 1990s created an international network of organizations and militants who have developed a broad repertoire of protest against common targets. If, as seems likely, these protesters now turn their energies against the American-led war in central Asia, we are bound to see more foreign participation in protests on American soil. Will a government geared up to

rience of the 1960s and the Italian one of the 1970s show that the criminalization of social movements contributes to radicalization and polarization. The perfervid patriotism set off by the events of September 11 may set that process of polarization in motion.⁵ Unless we are vigilant, America may be in for a new wave of repression in the name of democracy. ■

Donatella della Porta directs the political science department at the University of Florence and is the author of *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State* (Cambridge, 1998) and co-editor (with Herbert Reiter) of *Policing Protest* (Minnesota, 1998). Sidney Tarrow teaches social movements at Cornell and is the author of *Power in Movement* (Cambridge, 1998) and co-author (with Doug McAdam and Charles Tilly) of *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge, 2001).

Endnotes

¹Cfr. S. Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, and D. della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

²The German police used the concept of "de-escalation"; the Italian police that of "preventive controls." On the shift in police strategies of protest control, see D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., *Protest Policing*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

³On the Italian police, see D. della Porta and H. Reiter, *L'ordine pubblico in Italia, 1945-2001*. Rome: Laterza.

⁴See <http://www.indymedia.org:8081> for the Green Party's version of these events.

⁵On polarization, see Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, New York: Cambridge, 2001, ch. 10.

The Globalization Movement: Some Points of Clarification

By David Graeber

A great deal of nonsense has been written about the so-called antiglobalization movement—particularly the more radical, direct action end of it—and very little has been written by anyone who has spent any time inside it. As Pierre Bourdieu recently noted, the neglect of the movement by North American academics is nothing short of scandalous. Academics who for years have published essays that sound like position papers for large social movements that do not in fact exist seem seized with confusion or worse, highminded contempt, now that real ones are everywhere emerging. As an active participant in the movement as well as an anthropologist, I want to provide some broad background for those intellectuals who might be interested in taking up some of their historical responsibilities. This essay is meant to clear away a few misconceptions.

The phrase "antiglobalization" movement was coined by the corporate media, and people inside the movement, especially in the non-NGO, direct action camp, have never felt comfortable with it. Essentially, this is a movement against neoliberalism, and for creating new forms of global democracy. Unfortunately, that statement is almost meaningless in the US, since the media insist on framing such issues only in propagandistic terms ("free trade," "free market") and the term neoliberalism is not in general use. As a result, in meetings one often hears people using the expressions "globalization movement" and "antiglobalization movement" interchangeably.

In fact, if one takes globalization to mean the effacement of borders and the free movement of people, possessions and ideas, then it's pretty clear that not only is the movement a product of globalization, but that most of the groups involved in it—particularly the most radical ones—are in fact far more supportive of globalization in general than supporters of the International Monetary Fund or World Trade Organization. The real origins of the movement, for example, lie in an international network called People's Global Action (PGA). PGA emerged from a 1998 Zapatista *encuentro* in Barcelona, and its founding members include not only anarchist groups in Spain, Britain and Germany, but a Gandhian socialist peasant league in India, the Argentinian teachers' union, indigenous groups such as the Maori of New Zealand and Kuna of Ecuador, the Brazilian landless peasants' movement and a network made up of communities founded by escaped slaves in South and Central America. North America was for a long time one of the few areas that was hardly represented (except for the Canadian Postal Workers Union, which acted as PGA's main communications hub until it was largely replaced by the internet). It was PGA that put out the first calls for days of action such as J18 and N30—the latter, the original call for direct action against the 1999 WTO meetings in Seattle.

Internationalism is also reflected in the movement's demands. Here one need look only at the three great planks of the platform of the Italian group Ya Basta! (appropriated, without acknowledgment, by Michael Hardt and Tony Negri in their book *Empire*): a universally guaranteed "basic income," a principle of global citizenship that would guarantee free movement of people across borders, and a principle of free access to new technology—which in practice would mean extreme limits on patent rights (themselves a very insidious form of protectionism). More and more, protesters have been trying to draw attention to the fact that the neoliberal vision of "globalization" is pretty much limited to the free flow of commodities, and actually increases barriers against the flow of people, information and ideas. As we often point out, the size of the US border guard has in fact almost tripled since signing of NAFTA. This is not really surprising, since if it were not possible to effectively imprison the majority of people in the world in impoverished enclaves where even existing social guarantees could be gradually removed, there would be no incentive for companies like Nike or The Gap to move production there to begin with. The protests in Genoa, for example, were kicked off by a 50,000-strong march calling for free immigration in and out of Europe—a fact that went completely unreported by the international press, which the next day headlined claims by George Bush and Tony Blair that protesters were calling for a "fortress Europe."

In striking contrast with past forms of internationalism, however, this movement has not simply advocated exporting Western organizational models to the rest of the world; if anything, the flow has been the other way around. Most of the movement's techniques (consensus process, spokescouncils, even mass nonviolent civil disobedience itself) were first developed in the global South. In the long run, this may well prove the most radical thing about it.

Ever since Seattle, the international media have endlessly decried the supposed violence of direct action. The US media invoke this term most insistently, despite the fact that after two years of increasingly militant protests in the US, it is still impossible to come up with a single example of someone physically injured by a protester. I would say that what really disturbs the powers-that-be is that they do not know how to deal with an overtly revolutionary movement that refuses to fall into familiar patterns of armed resistance.

Here there is often a very conscious effort to destroy existing paradigms. Where once it seemed that the only alternatives to marching along with signs were either Gandhian non-violent civil disobedience or outright insurrection, groups like the Direct Action Network, Reclaim the Streets, Black Blocs or Ya Basta! have all, in their own ways, been trying to map out a completely new territory in between. They're attempting to invent what many call a

"new language" of protest combining elements of what might otherwise be considered street theater, festival and what can only be called nonviolent warfare (nonviolent in the sense adopted by, say, Black Bloc anarchists, of eschewing any direct physical harm to human beings). Ya Basta! for example is famous for its *tuti bianci* or white overalls: elaborate forms of padding, ranging from foam armor to inner tubes to rubber-ducky flotation devices, helmets and their signature chemical-proof white jumpsuits. As this nonviolent army pushes its way through police barricades while protecting each other against injury or arrest, the ridiculous gear seems to reduce human beings to cartoon characters—misshapen, ungainly but almost impossible to damage. (The effect is only increased when lines of costumed figures attack police with balloons and water pistols or feather dusters.) Even the most militant—say, eco-saboteurs like the Earth Liberation Front—scrupulously avoid anything that would cause harm to human beings (or for that matter, animals). It's this scrambling of conventional categories that so throws off the forces of order and makes them desperate to bring things back to familiar territory (simple violence): even to the point, as in Genoa, of encouraging fascist hooligans to run riot as an excuse to use overwhelming force.

Actually, the Zapatistas, who inspired so much of the movement, could themselves be considered a precedent here as well. They are about the least violent "army" one can imagine (it is something of an open secret that, for the last five years at least, they have not even been carrying real guns). These new tactics are perfectly in accord with the general anarchistic inspiration of the movement, which is less about seizing state power than about exposing, delegitimizing and dismantling mechanisms of rule while winning ever-larger spaces of autonomy from it. The critical thing, though, is that all this is only possible in a general atmosphere of peace. In fact, it seems to me that these are the ultimate stakes of struggle at the moment: a moment that may well determine the overall direction of the 21st century.

It is hard to remember now that (as Eric Hobsbawm

reminds us) during the late-19th century, anarchism was the core of the revolutionary left —this was a time when most Marxist parties were rapidly becoming reformist social democrats. This situation only really changed with World War I, and of course the Russian revolution. It was the success of the latter, we are usually told, that led to the decline of anarchism and catapulted Communism everywhere to the fore. But it seems to me one could look at this another way. In the late-19th century people honestly believed that war had been made obsolete between industrialized powers; colonial adventures were a constant, but a war between

France and England on French or English soil seemed as unthinkable as it would today. By 1900, even the use of passports was considered an antiquated barbarism.

The 20th century (which appears to have begun in 1914 and ended sometime around 1989 or '91) was by contrast the most violent in human history. It was a century almost entirely preoccupied with either waging world wars or preparing for them. Hardly surprising, then, as the ultimate measure of political effectiveness became the ability to create and maintain huge mechanized killing machines, that anarchism quickly came to seem irrelevant. This is, after all, the one thing that anarchists can never, by definition, be very good at. Neither is it surprising that Marxism (whose parties were already organized on a command structure, and for whom the organization of huge mechanized killing machines often

proved the only thing they were particularly good at) seemed eminently practical and realistic in comparison. And could it really be a coincidence that the moment the cold war ended and war between industrialized powers once again seemed unimaginable, anarchism popped right back to where it had been at the end of the 19th century, as an international movement at the very center of the revolutionary left?

If so, it becomes more clear what the ultimate stakes of the current "anti-terrorist" mobilization are. In the short run, things look very frightening for a movement that governments were desperately calling terrorist even before September 11. There is little doubt that a lot of good people are about to suffer terrible repression. But in the long run, a



AP/Wide World Photos

return to 20th-century levels of violence is simply impossible. The spread of nuclear weapons alone will ensure that larger and larger portions of the globe are simply off-limits to conventional warfare. And if war is the health of the state, the prospects for anarchist-style organizing can only be improving.

I can't remember how many articles I've read in the left press asserting that the globalization movement, while tactically brilliant, has no central theme or coherent ideology. These complaints seem to be the left-wing equivalent of the incessant claims in the corporate media that this is a movement made up of dumb kids touting a bundle of completely unrelated causes. Even worse are the claims—which one sees surprisingly frequently in the work of academic social theorists who should know better, like Hardt and Negri, or Slavoj Žižek—that the movement is plagued by a generic opposition, rooted in bourgeois individualism, to all forms of structure or organization. It's distressing that, two years after Seattle, I should even have to write this, but someone obviously should: in North America especially, this is a movement about reinventing democracy. It is not opposed to organization; it is about creating new forms of organization. It is not lacking in ideology; those new forms of organization are its ideology. It is a movement about creating and enacting horizontal networks instead of top-down (especially, state-like, corporate or party) structures, networks based on principles of decentralized, nonhierarchical consensus democracy.

Over the past 10 years in particular, activists in North America have been putting enormous creative energy into reinventing their groups' own internal processes to create a viable model of what functioning direct democracy could look like, drawing particularly, as I've noted, on examples from outside the Western tradition. The result is a rich and growing panoply of organizational forms and instruments—affinity groups, spokescouncils, facilitation tools, break-outs, fishbowls, blocking concerns, vibes-watchers and so on—all aimed at creating forms of democratic process that allow initiatives to rise from below and attain maximum effective solidarity without stifling dissenting voices, creating leadership positions or compelling people to do anything to which they have not freely consented. It is very much a work in progress, and creating a culture of democracy among people who have little experience of such things is necessarily a painful and uneven business, but—as almost any police chief who has faced protestors on the streets can attest—direct

democracy of this sort can be remarkably effective.

Here I want to stress the relation of theory and practice this organizational model entails. Perhaps the best way to start thinking about groups like the Direct Action Network (which I've been working with for the past two years) is to see it as the diametrical opposite of the kind of sectarian Marxist group that has so long characterized the revolutionary left. Where the latter puts its emphasis on achieving a complete and correct theoretical analysis, demands ideological uniformity and juxtaposes a vision of an egalitarian future with extremely authoritarian forms of organization in the present, DAN openly seeks diversity: its motto might as well be, "if you are willing to act like an anarchist in the present, your long-term vision is pretty much your own business." Its ideology, then, is immanent in the antiauthoritarian principles that underlie its practice,

and one of its more explicit principles is that things should stay that way.

There is indeed something very new here, and something potentially extremely important. Consensus process—in which one of the basic rules is that one always treats others' arguments as fundamentally reasonable and principled, whatever one thinks about the person making it—in particular creates an extremely different style of debate and argument

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than the sort encouraged by majority voting, one in which the incentives are all towards compromise and creative synthesis rather than polarization, reduction and treating minor points of difference like philosophical ruptures. I need hardly point out how much our accustomed modes of academic discourse resemble the latter—or even more, perhaps, the kind of sectarian reasoning that leads to endless splits and fragmentation, which the "new new left" (as it is sometimes called) has so far managed almost completely to avoid. It seems to me that in many ways the activists are way ahead of the theorists here, and that the most challenging problem for us will be to create forms of intellectual practice more in tune with newly emerging forms of democratic practice, rather than with the tiresome sectarian logic those groups have finally managed to set aside. ■

David Graeber is an assistant professor of anthropology at Yale University and is currently working with the Direct Action Network, People's Global Action and Ya Basta!

Social Science Research Council Opens Washington Office

On January 23, 2002, guests from foundations, NGOs, universities, the media, public agencies and think tanks gathered to celebrate the official opening of the Social Science Research Council's Washington, DC, office. Council president Craig Calhoun spoke on the importance of joining social science not only to public policy but to public debate.

The office helps the Council to engage a new audience of policy professionals, academics and officials from around the world, as well as the interested public, and to make connections with other research institutions in the capital. Washington is the right location to extend the Council's work on rethinking international studies, a subject whose importance has become increasingly apparent in recent months. A series of conferences and seminars is already in the works. A workshop on global governance and small arms was held on February 6-7, and several seminars on the repercussions of the September 11 attacks are planned for March.

Several SSRC programs have moved to the office in Jewett House, 2040 S Street NW. One is the Program on Global



Security and Cooperation (GSC), which promotes the production, integration and dissemination of the new knowledge needed to understand and meet the security challenges of the 21st century. The program offers fellowships and grants for international and cross-institutional training and research that will facilitate understanding of the causes of and lessons from international conflict and insecurity. To develop dialogue that will lead to a global security studies field, the program convenes fellows' conferences, mounts networking activities and provides platforms for joint work that bring together scholars and practitioners working on a diverse array of security issues. It organizes policy and media workshops, translates and publishes the research and analysis produced in

the program and connects scholars to other academic, practitioner and public audiences. The new location will make it possible for the program to bring fellows, committee members and others to Washington to present their insights to audiences rarely provided with either depth or the "long view."

GSC is jointly headed by John Tirman, the author or editor of six books on international security issues, including *Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade* (1997) and the recipient of the UN Association's Human Rights Award; and Itty Abraham, a political scientist who wrote *The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State* (1998). In addition to his work on the global security and cooperation, Abraham also directs the Council's South Asia program as well as a project on global crime. Tirman and Abraham are joined by program coordinators Veronica Raffo and Petra Ticha and program assistants Margaret Schuppert, Munmeeth Soni and Karim Youssef.

In the future other Council programs, including those that focus on such relevant subjects as health care and education research, may also make their way to Washington. The office will also be used by many SSRC programs as a meeting site (there is a pleasant conference facility in Jewett House) as well as for staging events. Having a base in Washington will make it easier for Council staff to make contacts for current and future work. The Council's office includes two suites, including a fully-equipped space for the use of visiting Council staff, committee members and people attending Council meetings in the area.

The Council has intermittently maintained a Washington presence since the 1930s, when its committees on Social Security and Public Administration (which contributed importantly to the development of the Social Security program) were based there; that location became a general Council office during World War II, and it administered fellowship and grant programs until 1957. There was another Washington office from 1967-71, and the Council's Center for the Coordination of Research on Social Indicators operated in Washington from 1972-83.

SSRC Washington Office
2040 S Street NW
Washington, DC 20009
202.332.5572

A Word From the *President*

Remembering Pierre Bourdieu

Pierre Bourdieu died as this issue went to press. He was the most distinguished European sociologist since Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, and made major contributions to a range of other fields. No one would describe Bourdieu's writings as easily accessible, yet few social scientists in our era have had broader influence. Indeed, Bourdieu exemplified intellectual commitments at the heart of the mission of the SSRC: collaboration across disciplinary lines, internationalism and bringing social science to bear on public issues. He approached these as we also hope to do in a spirit of scientific rigor, with insistence on both quality and creativity.

After Bourdieu died on January 23, *Le Monde* delayed publication by several hours so the front page could carry the announcement. It was the lead story on TV news, and ran with expressions of grief and loss from France's president, prime minister, trade union leaders and a host of other dignitaries and scholars. These continued to flow for weeks, though after a few days they were complemented by attacks from old enemies and pretentious would-be heirs. The media low point came when a *Nouvelle Observateur* journalist refused admission to the hospital nonetheless published a first-person account of the supposed deathbed scene.

In all of this we see something of the French intellectual field that Bourdieu himself famously analyzed. We see the intellectual as celebrity, the desire of politicians to appear as men of ideas and the debasement of intellectual life that journalism can effect even while it ostensibly exalts it. We see also the workings of a scientific field in which scholars struggle for distinction—some by associating themselves with a great man and others by claiming to be important enough that their differences from him actually matter. But not least we see a reflection, however distorted, of an extraordinary intellectual career and the intellectual resources that made it possible.

Born in 1930, Bourdieu was the son of a peasant farmer turned postman in a remote village in the Pyrénées Atlantiques. He was at the top of his class at the Lycée de Pau, the Lycée Louis-le-Grand à Paris and eventually the École Normale Supérieure, breeding ground of France's intellectual elite. Never allowed the unselfconscious belonging of those with wealth and cultivated accents, he also never confused success with proof of meritocracy. He knew it had been a struggle. His very bodily sense of insertion into an intensely competitive social world was one of the inspirations for his enormously fruitful resuscitation of the Aristotelian idea of *habitus*. His awareness of what his classmates and teachers did not see because it felt natural to them informed his accounts of *doxa* and misrecognition and his grasp of the need to struggle with everyday consciousness in order to "win" social facts. Indeed, Bourdieu's estrangement

from the institutions within which he excelled propelled his critical analyses of French academic life, and indeed of the state and capitalism more generally.

Bourdieu's sense of distance from the dominant culture of the École Normale was shared with his contemporaries Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Though the specifics varied, a certain horror at the social environment of the École informed each in a struggle to see what conventional consciousness obscured. Indeed, as Bourdieu often reminded listeners, Foucault attempted suicide as a student. Bourdieu's response, however, was to embrace science, and in opposition to the elitist world of philosophy, specifically social science.

This commitment was crystallized by national service in Algeria during that French colony's horrific struggle for independence. Scarred but also toughened, Bourdieu stayed on as a teacher and became a self-taught ethnographer, proving himself an extraordinarily keen observer of the interpenetration of large-scale social change and the struggles and solidarities of daily life. He conducted research in the Kabyle region and with Berber-speaking labor migrants, addressing themes from the introduction of money into marriage negotiations to cosmology and the agricultural calendar. His first three books, *Sociologie d'Algérie* (1958), *Travail et travailleurs en Algérie* (1963, with Alain Darbel), *Le Déracinement* (1964, with Abdelmalek Sayad) were signal empirical contributions to the study of Algeria, colonialism, economic change and the crisis of traditional agriculture. Working with Darbel and Sayad (an exceptional scholar who remained a close friend until his own death in 1998) helped to inaugurate a pattern of collaboration that characterized Bourdieu's entire career. In a branch of science that has been slow to institutionalize collaboration (compared, for example, to the biomedical sciences), and in a French intellectual field heavily focused on the ideal of the heroic individual genius, Bourdieu developed long-term relationships and a support system for shared intellectual labor. He founded the journal *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* and later the European review of books, *Liber*, as well as two research centers. The combination of feudalism and pursuit of celebrity that characterize French academia were in tension with this, of course, even while they helped Bourdieu procure resources. In order to achieve personal autonomy, several of Bourdieu's students and collaborators felt it necessary to go through painful rebellions. A few could not restrain themselves from expressing emotions from their old quasi-Oedipal struggles in newspaper commentary after Bourdieu's death.

Some of the postmortem attacks reflected the *ressentiment* of the lesser for the greater that Nietzsche appropriated the French word to designate. In Bourdieu's case this was compounded by the extraordinary amount of intellectual terrain he covered and thus of space he occupied and shadow he

cast. Perhaps most of all, though, there was anger over the extent to which Bourdieu challenged the very system in which he prospered and his unwillingness to turn his own success into an endorsement of that system and thus of all those honored by it. On the contrary, Bourdieu was relentlessly critical of the consecration function performed by educational institutions. Knowing the antagonism this would arouse, he called the first chapter in *Homo Academicus* (1984) "A 'Book for Burning'?"

Bourdieu's studies of universities and intellectual production were partly an extension of his inquiries into education and social inequality (including *The Inheritors* in 1964, *Reproduction in Education, Culture and Society* in 1970 and *The State Nobility* in 1989). Equally, though, they were central to his pursuit of a reflexive grounding for social science. One could not understand the stances intellectuals took without understanding both the positions they held within their microcosm or the place of that intellectual field in the web of symbolic and material exchanges involving holders of different kinds of power and resources. This was no simple determinism, but a demand that social scientists pay attention to the conditions of their own work—starting with the very unequal social distribution of leisure to devote to intellectual projects—and objectify their own efforts to produce objective knowledge of the social world. He challenged, in other words, the common tendency to propound objective explanations of the lives of others while claiming the right of subjective interpretation for one's own.

Struggling to grasp the subjective and objective together was a leitmotif of Bourdieu's work. He railed against false antinomies and the kinds of oppositions that serve less to advance knowledge than to advance careers of those who write endless theses arguing one side or the other. The point was not simply to choose Weber over Marx or Lévi-Strauss over Sartre but to escape from imposed categories. "Objective analysis," he wrote in *Homo Academicus*, "obliges us to realize that the two approaches, structuralist and constructivist ... are two complementary stages of the same procedure." Bourdieu applied the lesson equally in studies of museums and artistic fields and of science itself. He offered no simple "solution" to the riddle of structure and agency. He insisted, rather, that the interaction be worked out in analysis of concrete empirical cases. Only in this way could social scientists do the necessary, if hard, labor of "conquering and constructing social facts"—that is, of distinguishing what was really going on from the received understandings of previous academic knowledge, culture in general and everyday preconceptions.

In a review of Bourdieu's great study of the origin of the modern literary field, *The Rules of Art* (1992), Harrison White suggested that masquerading behind the appearance



Pierre Bourdieu, 1930-2002

of a Parisian intellectual, Bourdieu was in fact a hard empirical scientist. Indeed, Bourdieu had little patience for the rejection of science recently fashionable among self-declared critical thinkers. He thought the "French theory" that claimed indebtedness to Derrida and Foucault (though it seldom reached their standards) had "much to answer for." While he shared the view that simple empiricism was liable to reproduce ideologically conventional results, he argued that the necessary response was not to abandon empirical research but to carry out a struggle over the classifications by which knowledge was produced—including by state actors whose classifications pigeon-holed human beings for purposes of their own even as they provided social scientists with apparently neutral data.

Accordingly, Bourdieu wrote few purely theoretical treatises. He devoted himself, rather, to substantive analyses (and occasionally to sharp polemics). Only relatively late, in *Pascalian Meditations* (1997), did he offer a general discussion of his approach to social knowledge; why it must be related to the conditions of intellectual work, the dispositions of agents and particular locations in collective and individual histories; and why this reflexivity did not mandate relativism.

Bourdieu's most famous "theoretical" studies are actually analyses deeply rooted in his field data from Algeria. *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (1972) and later *The Logic of Practice* (1980) are among the most influential works to try to overcome the simple opposition between subjective and objective, agency and structure. They join with Foucault's work of the same period in moving beyond structuralism's avoidance of embodied subjectivity and with Derrida's effort to recover epistemology by breaking with the notion that it must be grounded in the Cartesian perspective of the individual knowing subject. But they also lay the basis for an empirical science that would address the practices of knowledge at the same time as it produced knowledge of social practice.

Bourdieu approached social science itself as a practical activity; it was no accident that he titled his book of epistemological and methodological preliminaries *The Craft of Sociology* (1968, with Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude Passeron). The craft worker is always a lover of knowledge, the craft itself being precisely a store of knowledge, and yet craft knowledge is never fully discursive; masters teach their skills, but know-how can never be reduced to instructions and never escapes its situated and embodied character. "The rules of art," for example, is (like *habitus*) a phrase that signifies practical knowledge, like the knowledge of cooking embodied in a grandmother's hands-on guidance rather than a cookbook. Art could never be reduced to following rules and yet to say it is without strategy or intention or not based on knowledge would be to misunderstand it utterly. Neither is science simply the value-free expression of truth. It is a project, but one organized—ideally—in a social field that rewards the production of truth—including new truths and new approaches to understanding—and not merely performance according to the rules. It is a project that depends crucially on reason—as an institutionally embedded practice—and therefore refuses equally the rationalistic reduction of reason to rules, simple determinism's unreasoned acceptance of the status quo, and the expressive appeal to insight supposedly transcending history and not corrigible by reason.

It was as a scientist that Bourdieu in the last years of his life turned to analyze some of the impacts of neoliberal globalization. He was concerned above all that the social institutions that supported reason—by providing cultural producers with some autonomy—were under attack. Reduction to the market threatened to undermine science; reduction to the logic of television entertainment threatened to undermine

public discourse. The problem was not internationalization as such—Bourdieu himself called forcefully for a new internationalism and saw science as an international endeavor. The problem was the presentation of a particular model of globalization as a force of necessity to which there was no alternative but adaptation. He usually called this the American model, annoying Americans who wished to distance themselves from government and corporate policies. Whatever the label, he meant the view that institutions developed out of more than a century of struggle should be scrapped if they couldn't meet a test of market viability. Many of these, including universities, were state institutions. They were far from perfect—as his own work showed—but collective struggles had grudgingly and partially opened them to workers, women and others. These were social achievements, and to sacrifice them was to step backwards whether it was masked by a deterministic analysis of the market or a simple assertion of self-interest by the wealthy and powerful. In his own life, Bourdieu recognized, it was not merely talent and effort that propelled his extraordinary ascent from rural Béarn to the Collège de France, but also state funding.

Bourdieu's polemical writings brought him a wide readership in and beyond the universities but also considerable derision from some academics. The sociologist who had refused the French notion of the philosopher as "omnicompotent intellectual" and criticized Sartre seemed to be taking on a Sartrean mantle. Indeed,

Bourdieu became remarkably famous, especially after the movie about him, "Sociology Is a Martial Art," was a surprise commercial success in 2000-2001. Theater groups staged performances based on his ethnographic exploration of social suffering, *The Weight of the World* (written with 22 collaborators). Women approached him on the street and told him—to his evident embarrassment—that their lives were changed by his book *Masculine Domination* (which is a surprisingly abstract text for that, and not even one of his best books—though after Bourdieu had left, one of these women told me how "hot" it had made her just to be next to him). As his theory predicted, the media made him all the more a celebrity when he attacked the celebrity-making machine in *On Television* (1996).

Nonetheless, Bourdieu's public interventions were firmly rooted in his sociological analyses. It was precisely his theory of social fields—honed in studies of the religious field, the legal field and the field of cultural production—that informed his defense of the autonomy (always only relative)

Bourdieu's polemical writings brought him a wide readership in and beyond the universities . . . As his theory predicted, the media made him all the more a celebrity when he attacked the celebrity-making machine.

of the scientific field from the market. His theory of the multiple forms of capital—cultural and social as well as economic—suggested that these were indirectly convertible, but if they were reduced to simple equivalence, cultural and social capital lost their specificity and efficacy. His early studies in Algeria showed the corrosive impact of unbridled extension of market forces.

In his struggles "against the tyranny of the market" as in his earlier more academic work, Bourdieu worked tirelessly for the international solidarity of scholars. He edited a book series that played a major role in making international social science—from Erving Goffman to Joseph Schumpeter—available in French translation. *Liber* and *Actes* were published in a dozen languages. He joined forces with Gunter Grass, Eric Hobsbawm, Toni Morrison and Edward Said, not just to support particular public causes but to help develop a new "Internationale" of intellectuals, partially institutionalized in the World Parliament of Writers.

Bourdieu is best known in the United States for his book *Distinction* (1979), an analysis of how culture figures in social inequality and the pursuit of distinction figures in social practice. In his death, it is at once fitting and ironic that Bourdieu was accorded great distinction and that struggle should ensue among those seeking to enhance their own distinction by positioning themselves in relation to Bourdieu. But it is worth recalling that *Distinction* was also a response to Kant's third critique. As Durkheim had sought to challenge individualistic explanation of social facts in *Suicide*, so Bourdieu sought in *Distinction* to demonstrate the social organization of judgment and taste.

Bourdieu was accorded the honor of burial in Père Lachaise Cemetery. This famed site in the northeastern corner of Paris is the resting place of a remarkable range of French and international public figures from the Abbé Sieyès to Gertrude Stein. Among its oldest tombs are those of the famed medieval lovers Abelard and Héloïse. Bourdieu is buried between Saint-Simon and Brillat-Savarin, a founder of social science and a founder of gastronomy. Père Lachaise also holds the remains of Bourdieu's great forebears Auguste Comte and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—the latter an under-recognized influence—and of the great historians Jules Michelet and Fernand Braudel. As Bourdieu was engaged with literature and the arts throughout his life, one is pleased to see that the graves of Balzac, Bizet, Chopin, Delacroix, Max Ernst, Modigliani, Molière, Seurat, Oscar Wilde and

Richard Wright are nearby (and one is glad to see Frenchness and internationalism intertwined). Greatness of more "middlebrow" sorts is celebrated as well, with Edith Piaf, Stéphane Grapelli and of course Jim Morrison. Maria Callas was buried in Père Lachaise but after trouble with grave-robbers her body was cremated and her ashes scattered over the Aegean (and but for the cancer that took him, Bourdieu would have delivered the keynote to an SSRC conference on opera in Florence this May).

On February 3, more than 2000 people gathered at the Théâtre Nationale de la Colline in Paris to honor the life and work of Pierre Bourdieu. Speakers came from as far as Japan. They included professors, trade union leaders, artists and political activists. As I said then, it was a privilege to know Pierre Bourdieu, and an honor to speak in homage to

him. I also noted, however, that Bourdieu didn't concern himself much with ceremonies. He had a passion to know and understand, not to receive tributes and honors. Indeed, this is a source of some of the resentment toward him. He gained huge recognition without the formal recognitions so important to others. His very transcendence insulted them. In this regard, academics too often participate in a kind of mutual reassurance scheme. Cite me and I'll cite you; praise me and I'll praise you. Be clever and facile but don't be too

demanding because most of your colleagues want new understanding less than they want the reassurance that they already know everything worth knowing.

Bourdieu never confused social facts with the preferences of colleagues or the public. He knew the political importance of science, but also that this importance would be vitiated by reducing science to politics. In *Pantagruel*, Rabelais famously said, "Science without conscience is nothing but the ruin of the soul." It is a better line in French, where "conscience" also means consciousness. It is not the sort of line Bourdieu would quote, though, because public appeals to conscience are too commonly justifications for a jargon of authenticity rather than the application of reason. But Bourdieu demonstrated that conscience is not simply an interior state of individuals. It is a social achievement, in both its senses. As such, it is always at risk. Pierre was a scholar and researcher of great rigor and also a man and a citizen with a conscience attuned to inequality and domination. Would there were more. ■

Craig Calhoun

After September 11: Perspectives from the Social Sciences

Every day since last October 30, an average of 450 people (and occasionally as many as 2000) have downloaded an essay from the Council's website, "After September 11: Perspectives from the Social Sciences." These essays, by social scientists from around the world, attempt to bring theoretical and empirical knowledge to bear on the events of September 11.

The project, spearheaded by Council president Craig Calhoun and implemented by a staff team including Paul Price, Eric Hershberg, Beverlee Bruce and Ashley Timmer, provides a resource for teachers, journalists and others who want a guide to academic knowledge about those events. More than 50 scholars initially responded to the Council's invitation to write at length about these topics. The project, as Mr. Calhoun put it, offered them "the luxury of stating the intellectual underpinnings" of the opinions they might otherwise express in TV sound bites or brief newspaper op-eds.

"After September 11" is part of the Council's effort to bring useful social knowledge to public attention. Links to the site appear on the websites of several disciplinary associations and the Scout Report, an online publication that highlights quality websites for researchers. The *Chronicle of Higher Education* published a brief description in its issue of December 21, 2001.

The essays are grouped around such themes as globalization, fundamentalism(s), terrorism and democratic values, competing narratives, new war?, new world order?, building peace and recovery. Several of the articles have been translated into Spanish and appear on the Cholonautas website, which is dedicated to the development of social science in Peru. There is also a link to a collection of articles by Latin American social scientists, which offer distinctive perspectives on the events and explore what they mean for Latin America and for Latin American social science.

Contributors to the site include Janet Abu-Lughod, Said Arjomand, Seyla Benhabib, Rajeev Bhargava, Jose Joaquin Brunner, Richard Bulliet, Bruce Cumings, James Der Derian, Barry Eichengreen, Amitai Etzioni, John A. Hall, David Held, Mary Kaldor, Riva Kastoryanou, Michael Klare, Robert Keohane, Timur Kuran, Manmood Mandani, Tariq Modood, Michael Howard Ross, Olivier Roy, Barnett Rubin, Luis Rubio, Saskia Sassen, Nazif Shahrani, Neil Smith, Steve Smith, Marita Sturken, Charles Tilly, Wang Gungwu, Immanuel Wallerstein, Susan Woodward and Aristide Zolberg—among many others. The essays can be found at <http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/>.

An online study guide was added recently to help teachers. It contains a concordance linking the essays to requirements for social studies courses, sample lesson plans, links to other sites providing additional lesson plan ideas, overviews of each of the subjects covered on the site, synopses of select-



ed essays suitable for use in college and advanced high school classrooms and discussion questions aimed at facilitating classroom discussions of the larger issues. The guide was prepared with assistance from Michigan State University and support from the Spencer Foundation.

The New Press, a not-for-profit publishing house operated editorially in the public interest, has agreed to publish, in collaboration with the Council, a series of edited collections of scholarly articles addressing the events of September 11 and a range of issues that they have raised or made newly pressing for social science.

The first book, *Understanding September 11*, is edited by Craig Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley Timmer. Its chapters will examine the events of September 11, their precursors and what comes after, in light of different concerns and intellectual approaches: from international relations to democratic theory, asymmetric warfare to the clash of civilizations, analyses of Islam to analyses of global inequality. They will also address some of the direct implications of post-September 11 for issues like the vulnerability of global finance markets, immigration policy and relations between the US and the Islamic world.

The second, *Terrorism and the Future of the International Order: Global Perspectives on September 11 and its Aftermath*, is edited by Eric Hershberg and Kevin Moore. Essays written from various regional perspectives will offer insight into the varying perceptions of the September 11 attacks and the US response, as well as the implications of recent events for different parts of the world. They will address the debate surrounding Islam; terrorism and counter-terrorism; security regimes and the global order; the economic dimensions of recent events; and the regional political aftershocks of September 11.

Later books in the series will address such topics as global perspectives on the United States, the rebuilding of New York City, information technology and international security, new challenges to global security and the emergence of Islamic identities in the United States and Europe and the war on terrorism. More information on these volumes will appear in *Items & Issues*. ■

Exerpts from "After September 11: Perspectives from the Social Sciences"

"Neo-Fundamentalism"

Olivier Roy, Research Director, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris

In fact, this new brand of supranational neo-fundamentalism is more a product of contemporary globalization than of the Islamic past. Using two international languages (English and Arabic), traveling easily by air, studying, training and working in many different countries, communicating through the Internet and cellular phones, they think of themselves as "Muslims" and not as citizens of a specific country. They are often uprooted, more or less voluntarily (many are Palestinian refugees from 1948, and not from Gaza or the West Bank; bin Laden was stripped of his Saudi citizenship; many others belong to migrant families who move from one country to the next to find jobs or education). It is probably a paradox of globalization to gear together modern supranational networks and traditional, even archaic, infrastate forms of relationships (tribalism, for instance, or religious schools' networks). Even the very sectarian form of their religious beliefs and attitudes make the neo-fundamentalists look like other sects spreading all over the planet.

"US Foreign Economic Policy After September 11"

Barry Eichengreen, Professor of Economics and Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

... These historical observations caution against exaggerated hopes that foreign aid conditioned on a laundry list of reforms and policies can play a major role in getting a postwar Afghanistan back onto its economic feet. They suggest relatively pessimistic conclusions about whether providing sustained US aid, as opposed to dropping dehydrated meals from the skies and hiring US construction companies to rebuild bridges and airstrips, will do much to alleviate the problems of countries where contract enforcement and investor protections are unreliable, and where political checks and balances are too weak to prevent foreign aid from being funneled into the pockets of the elites. We have no choice but to try, but realism and the historical record suggest not expecting too much of foreign aid to countries that have not yet succeeded in putting the relevant political and economic infrastructure in place.

"Beyond Militarism, Arms Races and Arms Control"

Mary Kaldor, Professor and Director of the Programme on Global Civil Society, London School of Economics

A typical new phenomenon is armed networks of non-state and state actors. They include: paramilitary groups organized around a charismatic leader, warlords who control particular areas, terrorist cells, fanatic volunteers like the Mujahadeen, organized criminal groups, units of regular forces or other security services, as well as mercenaries and private military companies... The new wars are very difficult to contain and very difficult to end. They spread through refugees and displaced persons, through criminal networks, and through the extremist viruses they nurture. We can observe growing clusters of warfare in Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia or the Caucasus. The wars represent a defeat for democratic politics, and each bout of warfare strengthens those networks with a vested political and economic interest in continued violence. ... The wars speed up the process of state unraveling; they destroy what remains of productive activities, they undermine legitimacy, and they foster criminality. The areas where conflicts have lasted longest have generated cultures of violence, as in the jihad culture taught in religious schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan or among the Tamils of Sri Lanka, where young children are taught to be martyrs and where killing is understood as an offering to God.... A humanitarian approach, of course, has to be part of a wider political approach. In wars, in which no military victory is possible, political approaches are key. An alternative political narrative, based on the idea of global justice, is the only way to minimize the exclusive political appeal of the networks.

"Muslims in the West: A Positive Asset"

Tariq Modood, Professor of Sociology and Director of the University Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, University of Bristol

Bridge-building, however, does not simply mean asking moderate Muslims to join and support the new project against terrorism. Muslims must be at the forefront of asking critical questions such as why there are so few non-repressive governments in Muslim societies, and help to create constructive responses. But we must also ask where are the moderate western governments when moderate Muslims call for international protection and justice in Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir or for the easing of sanctions against Iraq after it became apparent that it was the weak and the poor who were bearing the brunt of their effects? US policy in relation to the Muslim world and many other parts of the world has been far from moderate. Now that a terrible tragedy has happened to the US, the US is asking moderate Muslims to get on side. The fundamental question, however, is whether there is a recognition by the US and its allies of a need to radically review and change its attitude to Muslims.



Data Resources and Research Opportunities in Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector

On October 4, 2001, the SSRC Program on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector, with support from the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, sponsored a one-day conference to deepen the engagement of the social science disciplines in research on philanthropy and the nonprofit sector.

The event, held at the Cosmos Club in Washington, DC, brought together researchers and policymakers to discuss the availability and uses of data sets as well as to speculate on new avenues for research. Although the study of philanthropy and the nonprofit sector is flourishing, it continues to occupy an uneasy position within the social sciences, and the expansion of research funding has not been accompanied by a cross-disciplinary assessment of how best to make use of



Arts and Social Science Fellows' Workshop

The Program on the Arts hosted its first fellows' workshop on September 28–October 1, 2001, at the Chauncey Conference Center in Princeton, New Jersey. The workshop was chaired by Lynn Liben (the committee chair) and Frank Kessel (program director). Members of the Arts Committee were joined by 11 of the 14 newly appointed fellows for a highly productive, even heartwarming, weekend of dissertation presentations and panel discussions. It served as an opportunity for the fellows to review their projects and initiate discussions with one another and the committee. The purposes of the workshop were to foster cross-disciplinary dialogue, to build scholarly networks in the emerging field of the arts and social science, and to assist fellows both in pursuing their dissertation research and preparing for postdoctoral careers. As well as exploring broad themes, such as the creation of aesthetic value and the relation of art and society, the various panels also considered issues of methodology and professional development. Maxine Greene and Stanley Katz contributed to the workshop as guest speakers, providing insightful perspectives on cultural policy analysis (Katz) and the place of imagination and the arts in society (Greene). Both during those presentations and at other points during the workshop, the participants created time for deeply felt reflections on the place and purpose of scholarly inquiry in light of the reverberating, very recent events of September 11.

Participants: James Averill, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Nicola Beisel, Northwestern University; Katherine Giuffre, Colorado College; David Halle, University of California, Los Angeles; Gretchen Jennings, Smithsonian Institution; Lynn Liben, Pennsylvania State University. Guests: Maxine Greene, Columbia University; Stanley Katz, Princeton University; Joan Shigekawa, Rockefeller Foundation.

Staff: Frank Kessel, Molly Brunson.

► <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/arts/>

new resources and where their impact is most needed—from the perspective of the disciplines themselves. The upsurge of interest in civil society, social capital and civic engagement has spurred new interest in the sector on the part of some disciplines, notably political science, yet the representation of this new work in other disciplines is highly uneven and, as many of the speakers noted, data sets collected for one reason are often unsuitable for other research.

This conference was a successful attempt to begin developing a map of where new research opportunities lie, how they are organized and how they can be further exploited at a time in the development of the field when such guidance can be particularly useful and influential. The conference speakers identified the most promising opportunities for advancing theories and methods in the study of philanthropy and the nonprofit sector; evaluated data resources currently available for research on this sector; established where existing data have not adequately been exploited and where additional data are needed to strengthen the presence of the philanthropic and nonprofit sectors in research agendas across the social sciences.

The result of the conference will be a publication providing a state-of-the-art evaluation of data resources and research opportunities in philanthropy and the nonprofit

Current Activities Online

Follow the ► symbol to our website to read more about the activities described here.

sector. The Committee on Philanthropy and the Nonprofit Sector has commissioned a set of 30-40 page essays from scholars with expertise in areas that have been most influential in shaping research agendas in the field of philanthropy and nonprofit studies.

Participants: Paul Arnsberger, Internal Revenue Service; Elizabeth Boris, Urban Institute; Colin "Brad" Burke, Yale University; Tom Bradshaw, National Endowment for the Arts; Lynn Burbridge, Rutgers University; Marc Chaves, University of Arizona; Jan Clement, Virginia Commonwealth University; Sarah Dewees, Johns Hopkins University; Paul DiMaggio, Princeton University; John H. Evans, University of California, San Diego; Kirsten Grønberg, Indiana University; Peter Dobkin Hall, Harvard University; David Hammack, Case Western Reserve University; Linda Lampkin, Urban Institute; Tami Mark, Medstat Group; Lester Salamon, Johns Hopkins University; Darwin Stapleton, Rockefeller Archive Center; Richard Steinberg, Indiana University; Diane K. Vinokur, University of Michigan School of Social Work; Janet Weiss, University of Michigan Business School.

Staff: Steven Heydemann, Aaron Beebe.

<http://www.ssrc.org/programs/philanthropy/>

Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum

The Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum (CPPF), in partnership with the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, hosted a two-day meeting on "Ecuador, Plan Colombia and the Andean Crisis" on October 5-6, 2001. The meeting brought together academics from the region, representatives of the Ecuadorean government, local authorities, nongovernmental actors (NGOs and representatives of the Catholic Church) and a small number of representatives of the diplomatic community in Quito. UN participants included representatives of the UN system in Quito, from the Andean region and from UN headquarters. The second day of the meeting was a concentrated examination of the situation of the Ecuadorean region bordering Colombia, structured to make concrete recommendations for follow-up. Program activities on the Andean region are planned for the remainder of 2001 and 2002.

Staff: Teresa Whitfield, Renata Segura.

On October 23, CPPF convened a consultation on Indonesia between UN officials and experts from Indonesia and elsewhere. The consultation focused on the transition in Jakarta, particularly as it relates to the prospects for civil conflict and stability (with an emphasis on Aceh and Papua) and opportunities for the engagement of the UN system. The relationship between events in Afghanistan and Islamist movements in Indonesia was also discussed. The experts invited to the meeting included: Donald K. Emmerson, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Studies, Stanford University; Martin Griffiths, Director, Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Geneva; Bambang Harymurti, Editor-in-chief, *Tempo* newsmagazine, Jakarta; Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Professor of Economics, University of Indonesia; and Sidney Jones, Director, Asia Division, Human Rights Watch. A follow-up meeting in the region is planned for 2002.

Staff: Teresa Whitfield, Asa Pikaya.

<http://www.ssrc.org/programs/conflictprev/>

African Youth in a Global Age

The Africa Regional Advisory Panel sponsored its first fellows' training workshop for the program "Understanding Exclusion, Creating Value: African Youth in a Global Age" on October 1-5, 2001, in Maputo, Mozambique. The program is supported by a grant from the Education for Democracy and Development Initiative of USAID, with additional support from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. The workshop, hosted by the social science faculty (Unidade de Formação e Investigação em Ciências Sociais) of Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM), included 13 fellows as well as resource people from institutions in Africa, Europe, Canada and the United States and UEM faculty.

To open the workshop, the resource people, UEM faculty and SSRC Africa Program staff took part in a roundtable discussion on the study of youth in African social science preceded by welcoming remarks from the UEM rector. The remainder of the workshop was dedicated to refining the research designs of fellows' projects and discussions of conceptual and methodological issues related to research on youth. Each fellow's presentation was followed by intense and engaged discussion with resource people, other fellows and UEM faculty.

Immediately following the workshop, fellows began their field research. They will reconvene in June 2002 to present their research findings.



Participants: Filip De Boeck, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium; Alcinda Honwana, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (OSRSG), United Nations; Bogumil Jewsiewicki, Université Laval, Québec, Canada; Owen Sichone, University of Cape Town, South Africa. From Universidade Eduardo Mondlane: Manuel Agostinho, Obede Baloi, Luís Abel Cezerilo, Aurélio Chiconela, Manuel Macie, Zefanias Alberto Matsimbe, Adriano Mauricio, Filimone Meigos, Margarida do Rosário Paulo, João Cândido Graziano Pereira, Padil Salimo, António Xavier.

Staff: Beverlee Bruce, Ronald Kassimir, Funmi Vogt.

http://www.ssrc.org/programs/africa/african_youth_and_globalization/index.page

Middle East and North Africa Program Regional Advisory Panel

The Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) of the Middle East and North Africa Program held its first meeting on October 19-20, 2001. Members of the RAP gathered at the Council's office in New York City to discuss the role of the RAP and to get acquainted with the activities undertaken by the program, such as the International Collaborative Research Grant competition and a survey of the state of Middle East centers in several countries around the world. Craig Calhoun joined the RAP for one session where discussion focused on the history of the SSRC and its current activities and policies regarding regional studies, fundraising and project development. In addition to providing useful input into ongoing activities of the program, RAP members came up with several project ideas for the panel to develop. These include: the economics of conflict and conflict resolution; study of intellectuals in Muslim societies; continuums among the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia; and planning for women's studies in the Middle East and Central Asia. RAP members volunteered to spearhead these projects. In light of recent events, RAP members suggested several possible contributors for the website essays that SSRC is organizing and recommended work on an edited volume that would include essays providing perspectives from the region (widely defined to include Central Asia).

RAP members were also treated to dinner with several student activists from Columbia University who organized teach-ins in the aftermath of the WTC disaster and a tour of the Arab-American Family Support Center in Brooklyn—in order to give them a sense of how various groups in New York City were dealing with the consequences and aftermath of the attacks.

Participants: Mona Abaza, American University, Cairo; Mohammed Arkoun, University of Paris (emeritus); Riccardo Bocco, University of Geneva; Michael Fischer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Homa Hoodfar, Concordia University, Montreal; Anh Nga Longva, University of Bergen, Norway; Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb, Kuwait University; Sesma Özar, Bogazici University, Istanbul; Dwight Reynolds, University of California, Santa Barbara; Tsugitaka Sato, University of Tokyo; Fawwaz Trabulsi, Lebanese American University, Beirut.

Guests: Craig Calhoun, Social Science Research Council, Zachary Lockman, New York University, Lucine Taminian, Social Science Research Council.

Staff: Seteney Shami, Laleh Behebanian, Nazli Parvizi.

► <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/mena/>

Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru

As part of continuing efforts to disseminate the results of the SSRC's work on Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru, and to help program participants become engaged with an array of research networks, the Latin America Program organized two panels at the September 2001 Latin American Studies Association meeting. One involved 7 junior researchers from the second

cohort of fellows, who discussed their work; and the other consisted of presentations by several senior scholars who have taken part in the program. For US-based and Latin American fellows alike, the events were an occasion to call attention to their work, to increase their familiarity with international scholarly activity and to establish new contacts with researchers from the US and elsewhere.



Participants: Elizabeth Jelin, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina; Steve Stern, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA; Carlos Ivan Degregori, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, Peru; Alesandra Carvalho, Laboratorio de Estudos do Tempo Presente, Brazil; Priscila Brandao Antunes, Universidad Federal de Fluminense, Brazil; Ponciano del Pino, Universidad Nacional de San Cristobal de Huamanga, Peru; Claudio Barrientos, University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA; Angelica Cruz, Universidad Arcis, Chile; Patrick Dove, State University of New York, Binghamton, USA; Victoria Langland, Yale University, USA.

Staff: Eric Hershberg, Rebecca Lichtenfeld.

► http://www.ssrc.org/fellowships/coll_mem/

South Asia RAP

The South Asia Regional Advisory Panel (RAP) held a meeting in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on January 4-6, 2002. Most of the meeting was devoted to planning the new five-year fellowship program in the region and its novel administrative structure. The meeting included a discussion with local Bangladeshi scholars and practitioners on the South Asia program's sponsored report, "Social Science Research Capacity in South Asia." Highlights from the meeting included discussion on the impact of the September 11 events on South Asia and the need to study Afghanistan an integral part of South Asia.

RAP members: Dipak Gyawali; Raj Chandavarkar, Trinity College; Partha Chatterjee, Centre for Studies in Social Science; Hameeda Hossain, Ain-o-Salish Kendra; M.S.S. Pandian, independent scholar; Jayadeva Uyangoda, University of Colombo; Willem van Schendel, University of Amsterdam.

Participants (local scholars): Monwarul Islam, East West University; Anisur Rahman, economist; Debopriya Bhattacharjya, Centre for Policy Dialogue; Anisuzaman, Dhaka University; Amina Mohsin, Dhaka University; Imtiaz Ahmed, Centre for Alternatives, Dhaka University; Meghna Guhathakurta, Dhaka University; Iftekharuzaman, Freedom Foundation; Sonia Amin, Dhaka University; Ahmed Kamal, Dhaka University; Hussain Zillur Rahman, Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies; Sajeda Amin, Population Council, NY; Faustina Pereira, lawyer; Shamshul Bari, Research Initiatives in Bangladesh.

Staff: Itty Abraham, Munmeeth Soni.

► <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/southasia/>

Crises in the Andes

In response to a perceived dearth of theoretically informed social scientific research devoted to understanding the social, economic and political crises sweeping countries in the Andean region, the Regional Advisory Panel for Latin America convened two planning meetings this fall to explore the possibility of launching initiatives. Jointly sponsored with the Consortium in Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and Duke University, the first meeting on September 10-11, 2001, brought over 20 scholars to Chapel Hill. A second group met in Quito, Ecuador, on October 4-5 in a follow-up meeting organized with the collaboration of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-Ecuador). Participants in these meetings included anthropologists, economists, historians, political scientists and sociologists from throughout Latin America as well as from the United States and Europe. Discussions sought to highlight linkages across social, economical and political dimensions of crisis in the region, and to place these in a comparative and historical context.



Participants, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: Jennifer Collins, University of California, San Diego; Catherine Conaghan, Queens University, Ontario; Brian Crisp, University of Arizona; Carlos Iván Degregori, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; James Dunkerley, University of London; Arturo Escobar, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; John French, Duke University; Lesley Gill, American University; Paul Gootenberg, State University of New York, Stony Brook; Jonathan Hartlyn, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Evelyn Huber, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Miriam Kornblith, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, Universidad Central de Venezuela-Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración; Francisco Leal, Universidad de los Andes and FLACSO-Ecuador; César Montufar, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Quito; Juan Pablo Pérez Sainz, FLACSO-Costa Rica; Gonzalo Portocarrero, Universidad Católica de Perú; Karen Remmer, Duke University; Luís Salamanca, Universidad Central de Venezuela; Lars Schoultz, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; John Sheahan, Williams College; Richard Soloway, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Martín Tanaka, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; Luís Verdesoto, Corporación para la Democracia y el Desarrollo, Quito.

Staff: Eric Hershberg, Mara Goldwyn

Participants in Quito, Ecuador: Felipe Burbano, FLACSO-Ecuador; Adrián Bonilla, FLACSO-Ecuador; Jo-Marie Burt, George Mason University; Julio Cotler, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; Carlos Iván Degregori, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; Andrés Guerrero, FLACSO-Ecuador; Francisco Gutiérrez, Universidad Nacional de Colombia; Francisco Leal, Universidad de los Andes and FLACSO-

Ecuador; Jorge León, CEDIME; Ann Mason, Universidad de los Andes; Enrique Mayer, Yale University; César Montufar, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar; Simón Pachano, FLACSO-Ecuador; Aníbal Romero, Universidad Simón Bolívar; Kim Theidon, Stanford University; Arlene Tickner, Universidad de los Andes; Donna Lee Van Cott, University of Tennessee; Luís Verdesoto, Corporación para la Democracia y el Desarrollo, Quito.

Staff: Eric Hershberg.

http://www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica/program_initiatives/crisis_in_andes/index.page



Regional Advisory Panel for Latin America

The Regional Advisory Panel for Latin America met in the office of the Social Science Research Council in New York City on October 29-30, 2001, to discuss ongoing and potential initiatives. Highlights of the meeting included a report by Peter Winn on his evaluation of the program on Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru, and updates on continuing research, training and network-building projects on such topics as cultural agency in the Americas, comparative industrial upgrading income inequality across Caribbean economies, crises in the Andes, and Central American modernization and indigenous communities and social problems in the Andes. Also discussed were possible initiatives in a number of areas, including new approaches to labor market mobility, the impact of the Internet on cultural diversity, a virtual anthropology network in Peru, and Council-wide initiatives to promote social scientific research addressing a variety of issues relevant to understanding the consequences of the events of September 11, 2001.

Participants: Jeremy Adelman, Princeton University; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Royal Institute for International Affairs; Carlos Iván Degregori, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; Nadya Guimaraes, Universidade de São Paulo; Charles Hale, University of Texas, Austin; Elizabeth Jelin, Universidad de Buenos Aires; Robert Kaufman, Rutgers University; Juan Pablo Pérez Sainz, FLACSO-Costa Rica; Doris Sommer, Harvard University.

Staff: Eric Hershberg, Mara Goldwyn, Rebecca Lichtenfeld, Mira Edmonds, Amy Withers, Marcial Godoy.

http://www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica/regional_advisory_panel/

ITIC Summer Institute

The Program on Information Technology, International Cooperation and Global Security (ITIC) held its summer institute on the University of California, Berkeley, campus from July 15-21, 2001. At the institute, the ITIC summer 2001 fellows shared their research—which addressed information technologies and transnational relations and activism; legitimacy and public spheres; and economy, society and institutions—with the program committee and other senior faculty and practitioners.

The week opened with a series of public talks to the greater Berkeley community. Whitfield Diffie of Sun Microsystems; Saskia Sassen, professor of sociology at the University of Chicago and ITIC committee chair; and John Seeley Brown, chief scientist of the Xerox Corporation and an ITIC committee member, all discussed IT and new forms of cooperation and conflict.

In other sessions of the institute, committee members and other experts addressed the issues of information technologies and social interactions and frontiers in research methods. Michael Traynor and Laura Pirri, lawyers from Cooley Godward, LLP, spoke with the group about Internet jurisdiction issues and the proposals of the Hague Conference on Private International Law Documents.

Participating ITIC committee members: Hayward Alker, University of Southern California; John Seely Brown, Xerox Corporation; Dieter Ernst, East-West Center; Jane Fountain, Harvard University; Linda Garcia, Georgetown University; Dina Jordanova, University of Leicester; Robert Keohane, Duke University; Rohan Samarajiva, Delft University of Technology; Saskia Sassen, University of Chicago; Nigel Thrift, University of Bristol; Steven Weber, University of California, Berkeley.

Participating Research Working Group Members: Lars-Eric Cederman, University of California, Los Angeles; Michael Chwe, University of Utah; Peter Kraus, Humboldt University

Other Attendees: David Bollier, independent journalist, political advisor, and consultant; Yale Braunstein, Berkeley School of Information Management Systems; John Canny, University of California, Berkeley; Nicolas Deucheneaut, School of Information Management and Systems; Whitfield Diffie, Sun Microsystems; Marena Drlak, Nautilus Institute; Thomas Gold, University of California, Berkeley; Michel LaGuerre, Berkeley Center for Globalization and Information Technology; Laura Pirri, Cooley Godward LLP; Mark Poster, University of California, Irvine; Woody Powell, Stanford University; John P. Robinson, University of Maryland; Gene Rochlin, University of California, Berkeley; Lisa Rofel, University of California Santa Cruz; Warren Sack, University of California, Berkeley; Christian Sandvig, Oxford University and University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; John Santos, Ford Foundation; Anno Saxenian, University of California, Berkeley; Douglas Schuler, Evergreen State College; Michael Traynor, Cooley Godward LLP; Michael Watts, University of California, Berkeley; Ernest Wilson, University of Maryland.

Attending as Learning Consultants: Rafal Rohozinski, UNDP; Jonathan Bach, "CODES" (Center on Collaborative Organization and Digital Ecologies), Columbia University.

Doctoral Fellows: A. Aneesh, Rutgers University; Toby James Arquette, Northwestern University; Monica Rao Biradavolu, Duke University; Katja Cronauer, University of British Columbia; Sonika Gupta, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi; Patricia Anne Owens, University of Wales, Aberystwyth.

Faculty Fellows: Brian Keith Axel, Harvard University; Neki Frasheri, Institute of Informatics and Applied Mathematics, Albania; Lene Hansen, University of Copenhagen; Niall O'Dochartaigh, National University of Ireland, Galway; Iulia Dmitrievna Shevchenko, European University at St. Petersburg; Guobin Yang, University of Hawaii, Manoa.

ITIC Program Staff: Robert Latham, Deborah Matzner.

International Dissertation Field Research Fellows' Conference

The IDRF program hosted its seventh fellows' workshop in Montréal, Québec, from October 25-30, 2001. The 22 fellows were IDRF grant recipients from the 2000 cohort who have recently returned from their field research and are at the beginning stages of dissertation writing. Fellows presented their work on panels, which were grouped interdisciplinarily around common themes, such as "Beliefs, Agency and Social Change," "Democracies in Question," "Local Dynamics, Power and Resources," "Identity, Perception and



Some of the 2002 applications.

Performance," and "Citizen, Subject and State-Periphery Relations." The program invited Katie Hite (Vassar, political science) and Moustafa Bayoumi (Brooklyn College [CUNY], English) to facilitate the presentations, along with IDRF staff Ron Kassimir and Nicole Stahlmann.

While formal presentations dominated during the day, discussion of many topics and issues continued over dinner. Social science-inspired research was also the leitmotif of evening activities, such as visiting sports bars and observing the reactions of the local population on the World Series Championship. Preliminary results show that although Québécois felt compassion for New York City post-September 11, their sentiments did not extend to the Yankees. One of the many highlights of the workshop was the group dinner at La Gargote, a cozy restaurant in Old Montréal that the group of 27 invaded. After many engaging conversations on dissertation research and writing, most participants declared the group dinner a "work free" zone and discovered other topics of mutual interest.

Staff: Ronald Kassimir, Nicole Stahlmann

<http://www.ssrc.org/programs/idrf/>

<http://www.ssrc.org/programs/itic/>

Sexuality Research Fellows' Conference

The Sexuality Research Fellowship Program annual fellows' conference was held at Indiana University's Kinsey Institute in Bloomington, Indiana, from September 28- October 1, 2001. All 14 of the 2001 dissertation and postdoctoral fellows and second-year recipients of the 2000 postdoc fellowship attended, along with selection committee members John Gagnon (sociology, State University of New York, Stony Brook) and Martha Vicinus (English, University of Michigan). The conference led off with a panel on sexuality



During the Sexuality Research Fellows' Conference, program director Diane di Mauro, committee chair John Gagnon and postdoctoral fellow Gayle Rubin visit the grave of Alfred Kinsey.

research and methodology by scholar-researchers of the Kinsey Institute. Other speakers included Alain Giami, director of research at INSERM, Paris, who discussed "The Experience of Sexuality in the Era of AIDS" and Susan Newcomer, statistician for the Demographic and Behavioral Science Branch of the National Institute for Child Health and Development, who spoke about the "Public Sector Approach to Funding Sexuality Research." Conference presentation and discussion topics included research methodology, dissemination and outreach activities, and ethical issues in the field of sexuality research. Sessions also provided an opportunity for networking and discussions among the participants, who represented a variety of interests under the umbrella of sexuality research.

Staff: Diane di Mauro, Olivia Newman.

<http://www.ssic.org/programs/sexuality/>

Contemporary (East) Asian Popular Culture

On October 11, SSRC's East Asia Regional Advisory Panel and the Department of Cultural Studies of Lingnan University of Hong Kong held a one-day workshop on "Contemporary (East) Asian Popular Culture: Current Developments," at Lingnan University, in Hong Kong's New Territories. The workshop's wide-ranging discussions addressed such issues as: attempts to identify a "regional" East Asian popular culture; the appropriation of popular culture by various authorities, including the PRC government; theoretical and practical concerns in cultural studies for many sites in Asia; the media and urban culture; Asian diasporic cultures, particularly in Southeast Asia and in Australia; and the interpretation of phenomena of popular culture that have crossed national and language borders. Participants came from six university sites in Hong Kong and from a range of departments in universities in Japan, Korea, Australia, the US, Singapore and the People's Republic of China. The conference was organized by Stephen Ching-kui Chan of Lingnan University's Department of Cultural Studies and Barbara Brooks, SSRC program director, East Asia, to explore projects that might be developed under the auspices of the East Asia RAP.

Participants: Ackbar Abbas, University of Hong Kong; Ien Ang, University of Western Sydney, Australia; Stephan Chan, Lingnan University; Yuen Ying Chan, University of Hong Kong; Esther Cheung, University of Hong Kong; Haejoang Cho, Yonsei University, Korea; Stephen Chu, Hong Kong Baptist University; John Ermi, City University of Hong Kong; Koichi Iwabuchi, International Christian University, Japan; Chua Beng-Huat, National University of Singapore; Dai Jinhua, Beijing University; Leo Ou-fan Lee, Harvard University/University of Hong Kong; Lisa Leung, Lingnan University; Ping-Kwan Leung, Lingnan University; Siu-Leung Li, Lingnan University; Meaghan Morris, Lingnan University; Hector Rodriguez, City University of Hong Kong; Mandy Thomas, University of Western Sydney; Wang Xiaoming, East China Normal University; Wang-Chi Wong, City University of Hong Kong; Siu-Wah Yu, Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Staff: Barbara Brooks, Ellen Chan.

<http://www.ssic.org/programs/eastasia/>

Paradigm Shift in American Theater

On November 8, 2001, the SSRC Tokyo office hosted an Abe Fellowship seminar. Abe fellow Ikuya Sato, a sociologist whose grant was for comparative research on arts policy, spoke on "The Paradigm Shift in American Theater: How the Ford Foundation Helped Develop Nonprofit Theater." Sato's presentation included a description of his study of archival materials while affiliated with the Center for Arts and Cultural Policy Studies, Princeton University. Masao Katayama, the director of the Saison Foundation, moderated the discussion of strategies to encourage theater and other artistic disciplines in the United States and Japan. A reception followed the meeting.

Staff: Frank Baldwin, Takuya Toda.

<http://www.ssic.org/programs/abe/>

The Program in Applied Economics held its fourth annual summer workshop from August 5-12, 2001, at the Airlie Conference Center in Warrenton, Virginia. Twenty-five students from 13 of the nation's top economics programs attended this year's workshop, which covered several applied topics including behavioral finance, education reform and



monetary and fiscal policy in an era of budget surpluses. The workshop is aimed at examining these topics in a way that shows graduate students how to utilize economic tools to solve real-world problems. Also in attendance were more than a dozen prominent professors, researchers and policy-makers who shared their expertise with the students, and offered advice on how to develop original research ideas and stay focused on important social and economic issues. The informal atmosphere of the Airlie Center allowed students interact freely with the speakers and each other, and many said that the experience had given them new research ideas and a fresh outlook for their return to classes.



Speakers: Alan Auerbach, University of California, Berkeley; Nick Barberis, University of Chicago; Alan Blinder, Princeton University; Raquel Fernandez, New York University; Ray Fisman, Columbia University; Michael Kremer, Harvard University; Henry Levin, Columbia University; Bridget Long, Harvard University; Susanna Loeb, Stanford University; Laurence Meyer, Federal Reserve Board of Governors; Sendhil Mullainathan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Una Okonkwo Osili, Indiana University; Vijaya Ramachandran, The World Bank; Richard Thaler, University of Chicago; David Wilcox, Federal Reserve.

Staff: Ashley Timmer, Liam Ristow.

► http://www.ssrc.org/programs/app_econ/

From July 4-6, 2001, the Vietnam Program held planning meetings in Hanoi with the National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities to discuss progress, faculty and participant recruitment, the curriculum framework for the interdisciplinary social science training course, training course goals and evaluation, and the role of the Advisory Council that will nurture the social sciences in Vietnam. The eight-month intensive training course is scheduled to start in January 2002. There was also a tour of the location where the training course will be held.

From July 9-10, 2001, the Vietnam Program staff and Dr. Hy Van Luong, a member of the SSRC interdisciplinary team of advisors, worked with our local partner, the Institute of Sociology in Ho Chi Minh City (ISSHO), to design the next phase of our joint research, training, institution building and network creating project. The "Poverty Alleviation in the Process of Urbanization" project examines the social consequences of economic transition in southern Vietnam through longitudinal research into issues related to poverty, migration and urbanization. ISSHO highlighted the successes of its May 2001 national workshop on exchanging information on research and poverty alleviation and networking with Vietnamese social scientists and policymakers from all over Vietnam. SSRC program director Seteney Shami also joined the team on a tour of one of the research sites that has been completely transformed from a village into an urban district. The researchers will be restudying this and two other communities in Ho Chi Minh City, which they first studied in 1997. The SSRC team provided technical consultation on sampling and other project design issues and discussed the goals and format of the international conference that is planned for December 2002 to share the results from five years of research.

From September 4-7, 2001, at the SSRC office in New York City, the Vietnam Program hosted a planning meeting for the intensive interdisciplinary social science research training course that will commence in January 2002. The course is a joint collaboration between the National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities and SSRC. The faculty includes Peter Xenos, senior fellow, East-West Center, Hawaii; John Kleinen, University of Amsterdam; Ronald Provencher, Northern Illinois University; and Huy Quoc Vu, Hanoi National Economics University. They discussed how to integrate economics, sociology and anthropology as complementary approaches to understanding complex social phenomena with relevant case studies on development and social change, and worked on course outlines.

Staff: Mary McDonnell, Van Tran and Angie Lam.

► <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/vietnam/>

Indigenous Households and Social Problems in the Andes

On November 16-17, 2001, the SSRC convened an interdisciplinary group of researchers and professionals at the Institute for Peruvian Studies in Lima to exchange perspectives on specific social problems affecting indigenous households and communities in Andean countries. The objectives of the workshop were: 1) to promote a better understanding of the complex processes that are contributing to the social, cultural and economic dislocation of indigenous peoples in the region; 2) to facilitate dialogue among an interdisciplinary group of social scientists, health professionals and representatives of nongovernmental and public agencies about alcoholism and domestic violence—two problems that appear to be fueled by the increasingly vulnerable situation of indigenous people in Andean countries; 3) to identify the relative importance of community and household dynamics for shaping the nature and intensity of these social problems; and 4) to generate discussion about an agenda for future research and about the design and implementation of future intervention programs.

Participants: Walter Adams, Brown University; Ligia Alencastre, Center for Development and Popular Education; Susana Chávez, Manuela Ramos Movement; Marcos Cueto, Universidad Cayetano Heredia; Jose García, Escuelas Fé y Alegría; Rocío Gutiérrez, Manuela Ramos Movement; Sergio Miguel Huaracaya, University of Michigan; Rosemary Luciano, Panamerican Health Organization-Peru; Ricardo Lopez, Aymara Language and Culture Institute, Bolivia; Jorge Lossio, Universidad Cayetano Heredia; Ivette Long, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés; Hortensia Muñoz, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; Patricia Oliart, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; Nelly Páucar, Centro de Proyección Familiar; Gisela Pimentel, Panamerican Health Organization-Peru; Miguel Ramos, Universidad Cayetano Heredia; Kimberly Theidon, Stanford University.

Staff: Marcial Godoy-Anatívia.

 http://www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica/program_initiatives/indigenous_households.page

Cultures of the Visual

The South Asia Program in collaboration with the Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (CSCS), Bangalore, held a two-day, exploratory workshop to discuss the cultures of the visual and the possibilities of creating a visual studies project. In the broadest sense of the term, visual culture refers to everything that can be seen, beginning with the obvious: images as exhibited through art, photography, cinema and advertising, but including also the not-so-obvious visual artifacts found in architecture, urban planning, media and public spectacles (political, religious, etc.) The meeting, which was held on December 28-29, 2001, in Bangalore, was aimed at generating a cross-disciplinary approach to the understanding of visual culture.

Participants were drawn from various fields including film studies, media studies, political science, sociology, architecture, biology and visual arts. They were invited to respond to a short statement by Madhava Prasad (Senior Fellow, CSCS) based on their own research and disciplines. Responses were posted on the SSRC website, giving participants a chance to begin a discussion prior to the meeting.

Among the many useful clarifications and findings from the workshop included the distinction between the visible and the visual, the latter referring to the disciplined and ordered process of seeing in the modern public sphere; by extension, this distinction drew attention to what "cannot" be seen or is made invisible. Visual studies could be considered a supplement (to existing modes of social science analysis), an intersection (between the visual studies fields), as a limit (especially in the natural sciences, but also in relation questions of visual literacy) and even, possibly, as an autonomous field (expressed variously as a network, zone of sensory perceptions, genre). A record of the discussions that took place at the workshop will be posted on the website shortly, even as next steps for developing this project are explored. Preliminary materials related to the workshop can be found at www.ssrc.org, under the South Asia Program's Working Documents section. For more information please contact s-asia@ssrc.org.

Participants: Ayisha Abraham, conceptual artist; Stephen Chingui Chan, Lingnan University, Hong Kong; Tapati Guha-Thakurta, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta; Satyajit Mayor, National Centre for Biological Sciences, Bangalore; Tejaswini Niranjana, Centre for the Study of Culture and Society (CSCS), Bangalore; Ashish Rajadhyaksha, CSCS; S.V. Srinivas, CSCS; M.S.S. Pandian, independent scholar, Chennai; Madhava Prasad, CSCS; Arvind Rajagopal, New York University; A. Srivatsan, Anna University, Chennai; R. Srivatsan, Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad; Patricia Uberoi, Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi; Ravi Vasudevan, Sarai Project, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi.

Staff: Itty Abraham, Munmeeth Soni.

 <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/southasia/>

Rethinking Central American Modernization in the Age of Modernization

In the context of the Regional Advisory Panel for Latin America's continuing interest in the state of the social sciences in Central America, a one-day planning workshop on "Rethinking Central American Modernization in the Age of Modernization" was held in the office of the Social Science Research Council in New York on October 28, 2001. Chaired by RAP committee member Juan Pablo Perez Sainz, the meeting involved seven social scientists from the United States, Central America and England to generate reflections on the changing concepts of "modernization" in the region. The seminar also explored the possibility of co-hosting a larger workshop with one of the FLACSO centers in Central America, and of eventually establishing new programs of research and training for Central American investigators.

Participants: Eduardo Baumeister, Rural Development Research Center, The Netherlands; Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Royal Institute for International Affairs, England; Charles Hale, University of Texas, Austin; Juan Pablo Perez Sainz, FLACSO-Costa Rica; Alex Segovia, Empresa Decoracia y Desarrollo Consultores; William Robinson, University of California, Santa Barbara; Edelberto Torres-Rivas, Programa de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD).

Staff: Eric Herschberg, Mara Goldwyn, Mira Edmonds.

 http://www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica/program_initiatives/rethinking_CA_modernization/index.page

International Predissertation Fellowship Program Final Fellows Conference

From November 1-4, 2001, the International Predissertation Fellowship Program (IPFP) held its final fellows' conference at the Arden Homestead in Harriman, New York. Designed to foster intellectual cross-fertilization across disciplines and across regional foci, the conference brought together 16 IPFP fellows from several cohorts to discuss theoretical and methodological concerns at issue in the conduct of research in the developing world. The fellows met in small groups where they offered each other feedback on their research plans, and also attended plenary sessions offered by conference faculty focusing on strengthening research design, research ethics and survey research methods. The fellows took advantage of the relaxed setting to organize impromptu discussions over meals and during free times on topics such as gender issues in field research, and to gain advice from the participating faculty.

Discussions at the conference also led to plans to publish a volume on social science research methods, which will include a bibliography developed in preparation for annual IPFP conferences by conference faculty, as well as essays on research methods and tools.



Participants: Oscar Barbarin, University of North Carolina; Sara Curran, Princeton University; Emily Hannum, University of Pennsylvania (1992 IPFP fellow); Andrew Schrank, Yale University (1991 IPFP fellow); Lisa Wedeen, University of Chicago.

Staff: Ellen Perecman, Sarah DeFeo.

► <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/ipfp/>

Middle East Studies Association Meeting

On November 18, 2001, the Eurasia Program and the Program on the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) organized a panel at the Middle Eastern Studies Association meeting in San Francisco. The panel, entitled "Thematic Conversation: Imagining Central Asia and the Caucasus at the Nexus of World History and Area Studies," gathered five invited speakers (Dru Gladney, East-West Center; Adeeb Khalid, Carleton College; Roberta Micallef, University of Utah; Sean Pollock, Harvard University; Nayereh Tohidi, California State University, Northridge) and 30 guests. The purpose of the panel was to encourage cross-disciplinary dialogue on studying the region, which has challenged scholar-

ship during the last decade; to address the need to reconsider the boundaries of traditional area studies and to discuss various problems related to teaching the region in social science programs, especially in the light of its renewed salience after September 11. The panel was chaired by program director Seteney Shami. A follow-up panel will be held at the next Middle Eastern Studies Association meeting in 2002.

Later that evening, the MENA program hosted a reception, which drew a large crowd. Seteney Shami spoke briefly about the program's new initiatives, including a collaborative research grants competition and a global survey of the state of Middle East studies. The new chair of the MENA Regional Advisory Panel, Dwight Reynolds of the University of California, Santa Barbara, also spoke, reiterating the dedication of SSRC committees to furthering research efforts within and about the region. The following day, Ms. Shami presented an overview of the activities of the MENA program to the business meeting of the directors of Middle East Studies Centers. Special focus was given to the importance of the survey being conducted by the program in collaboration with MESA, especially in light of post-September 11 debates on the "efficacy" of Middle Eastern studies and training programs in the United States.

Staff: Seteney Shami, Alexei Elfimov, Laleh Behebehanian.

► <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/mena/>

Intellectual Agendas and Localities of Knowledge: A Hemispheric Dialogue

On October 5-6, 2001, the Program for Latin America and the Caribbean convened a meeting at the Centro Cultural Casa Lamm in Mexico City to address some of the institutional questions posed by the ongoing redefinition of disciplinary boundaries and the growing interconnectedness among practitioners in the broadly defined field of cultural studies in the hemisphere. The objective of the meeting was to generate open-ended dialogue between scholars located in different settings about the impact of academic globalization, recent reforms in higher education and the blurring of disciplinary boundaries on their intellectual work and on the institutions in which it is carried out. The meeting was organized to provide a forum in which these concerns could be addressed, given the diverse and changing political and institutional contexts in which practitioners work in various parts of the hemisphere. Invitations were extended to journal editors, officers of disciplinary and area studies associations such as the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) and the American Sociological Association, directors of interdisciplinary institutes, and scholars who explore these kinds of institutional concerns in their work. Through these conversations, we sought to strengthen collaboration efforts, research planning and network-building initiatives around the study of culture. The meeting program included sessions on 1) academic globalization and the transnationalization of

knowledge, 2) changing disciplines and institutional challenges, 3) the changing role of intellectuals in the public sphere and 4) the role of publications in the field.

Participants: Sonia Alvarez, University of California, Santa Cruz; Arturo Arias, LASA President-elect/University of Redlands; Claudia de Lima Costa, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina/Revista de Estudos Feministas/Brazil; Nestor García-Cancelini, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana; Marta Lamas, *debate feminista*/Mexico; Gabriel Medina, Colegio de México; Daniel Mato, Universidad Central de Venezuela; Toby Miller, New York University/Social Text; Alberto Moreiras, Duke University/Nepantla; Nelly Richard, *Revista de Crítica Cultural*/Chile; Doris Sommer, Harvard University; Tomas Ybarra-Frausto, Rockefeller Foundation; George Yudice, New York University.
Staff: Marcial Godoy-Anatívia, Berenice Ortega.

► http://www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica/program_initiatives/culturalagency/IntAgendas-LocalitiesofKnowledge.page

Japan Studies Dissertation Workshop

From January 9-13, 2002, the seventh annual Japan Studies Dissertation Workshop met at the Asilomar Conference Grounds in Monterey, California. Funded by the Japan Foundation, 12 advanced graduate students in 6 disciplines met to confer with each other and an interdisciplinary group of faculty mentors over the progress of their dissertations and interdisciplinary issues in Japanese studies. Faculty included Leonard Schoppa, politics, University of Virginia; Akiko Hashimoto, sociology, University of Pittsburgh; Alan Tansman, literature, University of California, Berkeley; and Karen Wigen, history, Duke University. Mr. Fumitomo Horichi, Director General, Japan Foundation, New York office, also joined the group for one day.

Thanks to one of the participants, the group now has its own website, <http://www.sit.wisc.edu/~rcmiller/monterey/>. It contains readings suggested by workshop participants and useful links. Workshop participants can also communicate on a discussion list.

Staff: Barbara Brooks, Hoa Duong.

► <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/japan/>

Culture, Diversity and the Internet

The SSRC co-organized a two-day workshop on "Culture, Diversity, and the Internet" with the Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias (CRIM). The workshop took place on January 11-12, 2002, at CRIM in Cuernavaca, Mexico. The workshop explored the complex and often contradictory effects of the "virtualization" of group networks and social identities, and especially the ways these processes differentiate along social, economic, linguistic, ethnic and regional lines. It mixed research on the Latin American context with work rooted in other regional and global perspectives—in part to ensure a critical mass of attention to the regional specificities of Latin America, but also to test whether the Internet provides a viable framework for a broader, global perspective on cultural identity and cultural change. The meeting produced a very thoughtful agenda for how serious international collaboration might be fostered

and coordinated—both in and outside Latin America.

Participants: Cristina Amescua, Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias; John Anderson, Catholic University, Washington, DC; Lourdes Arizpe, Centro Regional de Investigaciones Multidisciplinarias; Dina Iordanova, University of Leicester, UK; Teresa Márquez, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, México; Toby Miller, New York University; Mark Poster, University of California, Irvine; Scott Robinson, Telecentros Project; Héctor Rosales, Centro Regional de Estudios Multidisciplinarios; T.L. Taylor, North Carolina State University; Sergio Villena, FLACSO Costa Rica; Isabelle Vinson, Museum International, UNESCO, Paris; Rosalía Winocur, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, México; George Yudice, New York University.

Staff: Joe Karaganis, Marcial Godoy.

► http://www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica/program_initiatives/culturalagency/IntAgendas-LocalitiesofKnowledge.page

Engaging Cultural Differences

The Working Group on Law and Culture (previously the Working Group on Ethnic Customs, Assimilation and American Law) held a planning meeting on Sanibel Island, Florida, on January 10-13, 2002. The participants discussed plans for their volume entitled *Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal Democracies* (to be published by the Russell Sage Foundation in the spring) and explored thematic and organizational options for the next phase of the working group. With a particular focus on possible funding proposals, the participants also presented individual projects and discussed ideas for continuing joint activities. Among the topics explored were Islam in America and Europe, identity politics in India, affirmative action, workplace accommodations and liberal/illiberal communities. All these conversations laid important ground for the collaborative development of such projects, and associated proposals, over the next few months.



Participants: David L. Chambers, University of Michigan Law School; Jane Maslow Cohen, University of Texas Law School; Karen Engle, University of Utah College of Law; Kathy Ewing, Duke University; Maivan Clech Lam, American University; Hazel Markus, Stanford University; Usha Menon, Drexel University; Martha Minow, Harvard University Law School (unable to attend); Lloyd I. Rudolph, University of Chicago; Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, University of Chicago; Larry Sager, University of Texas Law School; Austin Sarat, Amherst College; Richard Shweder, University of Chicago; Claude Steele, Stanford University; Susan Sturm, Columbia University Law School; Unni Wikan, Ethnographic Museum, Oslo, Norway.

Guests: Robert C. Granger, William T. Grant Foundation; Stephanie Platz, Russell Sage Foundation.

Staff: Frank Kessel, Molly Brunson.

New Staff Appointments



Alcinda Honwana joined the Council as a program director for the initiative on Children and Youth Affected by Armed Conflict and the Africa Regional Advisory Panel's project on youth and globalization. Ms. Honwana was previously a program officer at the United Nations in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict in New York. There she coordinated the office's research activities and worked to develop a research agenda and program on children and armed conflict that would help create a network of research institutions and humanitarian organizations concerned with this issue. This program will be geared towards strengthening the links between academic research and policy and practice in this field.

Born in Mozambique, Ms. Honwana holds a BA degree in history and geography from the University Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo; a Maîtrise in sociology from l'Université de Paris 8; and another MA and a PhD in social anthropology from the School of Oriental and African Studies of the

University of London. Ms. Honwana lectured on anthropology at the University Eduardo Mondlane, and was a senior lecturer in the department of social anthropology of the University of Cape Town, South Africa.

Ms. Honwana has carried out extensive research in Mozambique on spirit possession and traditional healing, political conflict and politics of culture, and the impact of political conflict on children. Her studies on children, youth and armed conflict also took her to Angola, where she carried out her research as a consultant for Christian Children's Fund. Her work has given particular attention to the role played by local communities in processes of post-conflict healing, reconciliation and social reintegration of war-affected children, especially child soldiers and sexually abused girls.

She has published several journal articles and book chapters on these issues. Her dissertation on "Spirit Possession and Cultural Politics in Southern Mozambique" is being published this year in Portuguese. Ms. Honwana is the co-editor with Filip De Boeck of a book entitled *Makers and Breakers, Made and Broken: Children and Youth as Emerging Social Categories in Africa*, currently under review. She was also one of the coordinators of a special issue of the French journal *Politique Africaine* on children, youth and politics in Africa (December 2000).

Board of Directors News

Deepak Nayyar and Orville Schell have been elected as members-at-large of the Social Science Research Council Board of Directors, and attended the Board's January 2002 meeting.


Deepak Nayyar is Vice-Chancellor of the University of Delhi. He was previously a professor of economics at Jawaharlal Nehru University and has been an economic advisor to the government of India and a member of the governing body of the Indian Council of Social Science Research. Nayyar is also a long-time consultant to the United Nations and co-authored and edited its recent report on New Roles and Functions for the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions. He specializes in issues of globalization, trade and migration, and has written 8 books and numerous articles in journals around the world.

Orville Schell is Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at the University of California, Berkeley, and a research associate at the university's Center for Chinese Studies. He serves on the boards of the Yale-China Association and Human Rights Watch, and is a member of the Pacific Council and the Council on Foreign Relations. Schell was a founding editor of the Pacific News Service. He has written 14 books, many of them about China; the most recent, *Virtual Tibet: Searching for Shangri-La from the Himalayas to Hollywood*, appeared in 2000. Mr. Schell is a long-time contributor to the *New Yorker*, as well as to such magazines as the *Atlantic*, the *New York Times Magazine*, the *Nation* and the *New York Review of Books*.

Neil Smelser, a longtime director and friend of the Council, retired in September 2001 as director of Stanford University's Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. He is now professor emeritus of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley.

Recent Council Publications

RENTS, RENT-SEEKING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN ASIA, edited by Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo K.S. Sponsored by the Southeast Asia Program. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 338 pp.




The concepts of rents and rent-seeking are central to any discussion of the processes of economic development. Yet conventional models of rent-seeking are unable to explain how it can drive decades of rapid growth in some countries, and at other times be associated with spectacular economic crises. This book argues that the rent-seeking framework has to be radically extended by incorporating insights developed by political scientists, institutional economists and political economists if it is to explain the anomalous role played by rent-seeking in Asian countries. It includes detailed analyses of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, the Indian subcontinent, Indonesia and South Korea. This new critical and multidisciplinary approach has important policy implications for the debates over institutional reform in developing countries. It brings together leading international scholars in economics and political science.

The book originated in a conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and cosponsored by the Japan Foundation's Asia Center.

Mushtaq H. Khan is lecturer in the economics department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Jomo K.S. is professor in the applied economics department, University of Malaysia, and the president of the Malaysian Social Science Association.

RIGHT-SIZING THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF MOVING BORDERS, edited by Brendan O'Leary, Ian S. Lustick and Thomas Callaghy. Sponsored by the Joint Committee on Near and Middle Eastern Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 429 pp.




In the 20th century borders were moved, re-moved and abandoned, and peoples were moved, re-moved and slaughtered, on an epic scale. In 1900, empires dominated most of the earth's surface—by 2000 they had gone, or had been reduced to rumps. But theories of the state rarely register these facts. Max Weber's famous definition of the state, a "human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory," assumes a given territory. Territories, however, are not given—they are variable, and they are contested.


This volume assembles a distinguished international team to address what we may know about the movement of borders, in detailed case studies of India, Pakistan, the Congo, Morocco, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Indonesia and the former Soviet republics. The authors focus on the efforts of state elites and their challengers to "right-size"—to have what they regard as appropriate external and internal territorial borders for their states. Introductory and concluding chapters provide frameworks and assessments of the case materials.

Brendan O'Leary is professor of political science at the London School of Economics. Ian S. Lustick and Thomas Callaghy are both professors of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.

J **JAPAN IN THE MUROMACHI AGE**, edited by John Whitney Hall and Toyoda Takeshi. With a new foreword by Paul Varley. Sponsored by the Joint Committee on Japanese Studies. Ithaca: Cornell East Asia Program, 2001. 400 pp.



D **DEMOCRACY, LIBERALISM AND WAR: RETHINKING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE DEBATE**, edited by Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey. Sponsored by the Program on International Peace and Security. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. 237 pp.



"Few other books in English can compete with [this one] for breadth of coverage of a major period in premodern Japanese history," writes Paul Varley, an emeritus professor at Columbia University, in the preface to this reprint edition of *Japan in the Muromachi Age*. Originally published in 1977, this volume offered a fresh interpretation of a neglected and misunderstood chapter in Japanese history. Both Western and Japanese scholars once looked upon the period (1334-1573) as a time of social confusion and institutional decay, chiefly an interlude between a classical era and an early modern age. A conference organized by the Joint Committee on Japanese Studies and held in Kyoto in 1973 brought together 25 Japanese and US scholars of the period. This "watershed" gathering, as Varley terms it, showed that many features of Edo-period culture were anticipated by Muromachi developments, and made the case that the Muromachi age was a seminal period in Japanese history.

The 18 essays in this volume range over nearly every major aspect of Muromachi—political, institutional, social and economic history; foreign relations; literature; painting, architecture; and Buddhism. "It is a great boon for the field of Japanese studies in general to have it once again in print," Varley concludes.


The connection between liberalism and peace—and the reason why democratic countries appear not to go to war with each other—has become a dominant theme in international relations research. This book argues that scholars need to move beyond the "democratic peace debate" to ask more searching questions about the relationship of democracy, liberalism and war.

The authors focus on the multiple and often contradictory ways in which liberalism, democracy, war and peace interrelate. Acknowledging that a "zone of peace" exists, they concentrate on the particular historical and political contexts that make peace possible. This approach allows the redefinition of the "democratic peace" as a particular set of policies and claims to knowledge—a worldview that allows the continuation of violence against "nonliberal" others and the justification of extreme divisions of wealth and power in international society.

This book grew out of a workshop sponsored by the Program on International Peace and Security in 1998. With SSRC support, the project was later presented at several universities in the United States and Britain.

Tarak Barkawi is lecturer in international relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Mark Laffey is lecturer in international relations at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

I **INVESTMENT AND RISK IN AFRICA**, edited by Paul Collier and Catherine Pattillo. Sponsored by the Joint Committee on African Studies. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 388 pp.




This book brings together essays by an international group of academics in the fields of economics, political science and law, with business practitioners in the fields of risk assessment and portfolio management. Their contributions are sequenced to tell a story. Africa is perceived as being a highly risky continent. As a result, investment is discouraged. These risks are partly exaggerated and often diverge from reality. However, to the extent that they reflect general problems they are capable of being mitigated by insurance and reduced by political restraints such as central banks, investment charters and international agreements.

The book has its origins in a conference on "Risk and Restraint: Reducing the Perceived Risks of African Investment," held under the sponsorship of the Joint Committee on African Studies at the Harvard Institute for International Development in September 1996.

Paul Collier, the conference organizer and one of the book's editors, is director of the policy research group at the World Bank, on leave from Oxford University, where he was professor of economics and director of the Centre for the Study of African Economies. Catherine Pattillo is in the research department of the International Monetary Fund and was previously a research officer at the Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University.

I **INTERVENTION AND TRANSNATIONALISM IN AFRICA: GLOBAL-LOCAL NETWORKS OF POWER**, edited by Thomas Callaghy, Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham. Sponsored by the Africa Program and the International Peace and Security Program. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 322 pp.



As the concept of globalization emerges in 21st century social sciences, understanding how external forces and phenomena shape the politics of nation-states and communities is imperative. This volume calls attention to "transboundary formations"—intersections of cross-border, national and local forces that produce, destroy or transform local order and political authority, significantly impacting on ordinary people's lives. It analyzes the intervention of external forces in political life, both deepening and broadening the concept of international "intervention" and the complex contexts within which it unfolds. While transboundary formations can emerge anywhere, they have a particular salience in sub-Saharan Africa where the limits to state power make them especially pervasive and consequential. Including conceptual contributions and theoretically informed case studies, the volume considers global-local connections, taking a fresh perspective on contemporary Africa's political constraints and possibilities, with important implications for other parts of the world.

Thomas Callaghy is professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania. Ronald Kassimir directs the Council's Africa Program and its International Dissertation Research Fellowship Program. Robert Latham is program director of the Council's program on Information Technology and International Cooperation.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL
810 SEVENTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10019 USA
phone: 212.377.2700
fax: 212.377.2727
e-mail: lastname@src.org
web: www.src.org

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