

Roundtable on Rethinking International Studies in a Changing Global Context

In late spring 2002, the Social Science Research Council hosted a one-day roundtable in Washington, DC, on the subject of rethinking international studies in a changing global context. The dialogue was guided by a small number of commissioned papers that offered different perspectives on the historical development of international studies in the United States. Our intent was to explore how rethinking international studies might be advanced by attention to the historical processes through which it was developed over the course of the 20th century. What follows are introductory comments by SSRC President Craig Calhoun, essays that cover both the origins and recent history of international studies in America, and key comments by discussants, including observations on the period of "Soviet Studies," which arguably presents parallels for international studies after September 11. The following materials are not intended as a transcript of the day's discussion, but as a partial and necessarily selective account of the day's proceedings. A list of participants and their institutional affiliations can be found on page 19.

Opening Remarks by Craig Calhoun

You have made time for this event because you share a sense that something called international studies is important. It is important yet it is internally diverse and prone to internecine struggles. Whatever this "international studies" field is—and I doubt we shall have conclusively settled that question by the end of the day—its existence and vitality in intellectual and especially university life is poorly represented to the broader public or to decision makers here in Washington and in other centers that control funding. Federal budget allocations and for that matter foundation funding priorities are often set without any clear understanding of the range of activities and topics that international studies scholars consider crucial to the field. They are sometimes responses to public themes of the day—from the Cold War to economic competitiveness to terrorism after September 11. But it should worry us if policy makers and funders spend money in ways at best obliquely related to the actual organization of intellectual work. And it should worry us if our own internal competitions over turf and status and definitions of science and knowledge make it impossible for us to present a clear account of the nature of international studies in the social sciences and related fields. It should worry us not *(continued on page 3)*

International Studies in America

By Robert Vitalis

In the dazzle of the moment—any moment—people are likely to seem pure reflexes of current conditions. The guy on the cell phone with the flag pin in his lapel has "Bush II" written all over him. Back in the days of Bush I, he was probably a slob who bummed rides and wore a Megadeth T-shirt, unrecognizable even to his present self. From a novelist's point of view, though, the flag pin and the T-shirt can seem surface events, exterior decoration on an unvarying internal structure. That inside space used to be called "human nature," a term with regrettable universalist implications. Now we call it "hardwiring," and we feel much better about ourselves. But it is basically the same thing: the residue of personality that no change can corrode.

-Louis Menand

The thing about globalization is that if you blink you miss it entirely.

-Trevor Manuel

This is a modest contribution—a start—to an adequate account of the social history of international studies in the United States.¹ Time and resource constraints aside, it is not possible to do more. Our present knowledge base is too thin to support such a project. Consider the fact that no more than a handful of published accounts to date rest on the convention of archival research that we take for granted when we tell or revise the history of any subject other, apparently, than ourselves. Having spent some time reading the records of professors and institutions, it is apparent to me what is gained and lost at those moments each decade, beginning in the 1920s, when our ancestors first commissioned papers and convened for a day or two to consider the past and future of the enterprise.

Insider histories and state of the art reviews routinely forget what preceding generations had established as fact, beginning with the idea of international *(continued on page 2)*

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studies itself. Today some may believe that the term demarcates a field of knowledge distinct from another called international relations but, if so, this was not the understanding as late as the mid-1970s. Similarly, insiders in the 1960s argued that area studies grew out of work on Europe, although those at the birth of the area studies centers and institutes in the 1940s pointed to the new 1930s American civilization and Latin American studies programs (along with OSS protocols) as inspiration. Those same up and comers in the '40s worked valiantly to recast the origin story about a project promoted originally in the 1920s as a new approach to the challenge of the revolt of the non-white peoples against white domination and control.

The creation of chairs, programs, institutes, and associations of international studies in the US beginning around 1910-1915 also cannot be disentangled from belief in what we now call globalization. The premise that markets and ideas have overturned assumptions from some earlier day

about the inviolability of sovereignty was advanced *each decade* of the last century as a fundamental justification for building international studies. The first American textbook with the title *International Relations* (1925) is organized around the problem of nationalism and internationalism. Ten years later, even as the free trade system of the *Pax Britannica* collapsed, Eugene Staley's *War and the Private Investor* (1935) purported to prove that "the growth of international capital investment" was pushing toward "increased integration of the world." Ten years later, the Republican Wendell Willkie popularized the same arguments in the widely read *One World* (1944) while American designers developed a new international architecture in support. By the end of the 1950s the West Coast founders of the new International Studies Association were rallying to the cry that the state-centric view was "now reactionary and obsolete."

The rest of the story is easier to fill in because we were told it by our teachers and we are probably passing it on to our graduate students today. In the 1960s and '70s the same old "new" challenges to US power and world order during a time of upheaval drove a process of theoretical innovation. The editors of the collection *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (1972) sought to understand the significance of "contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of governments." Multinational capital was undermining the nation-state. The once controversial Trilateral Commission Report on *The Crisis of Democracy* (1975) found "there has been an explosion of human interaction and correlatively a tremendous increase of social pressure...Dispersion, fragmentation, and simple ranking have been replaced by concentration, interdependence, and a complex texture."

Most histories of American international studies rest on some claim about external events shaping the intellectual agenda and institutional architecture of the field, obviously, but most also appear to take some position on what turns out to be a never-ending debate on the obsolescence of states and the interdependence of societies. Unlike most others, I trace the founding of the first courses, chairs, research programs, textbooks, and institutes of international studies or what used to be called international relations to the turn of the century. The context that matters is, for lack of a better term, empire: whereby the Northeast consolidated its control of the Southern and Western states and territories, and began to exert dominion over races and resources beyond the formal boundaries (continued on page 12)

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Correction: In the last issue (Vol.3, No. 1-2), on page 8, Kenneth Prewitt's sentence introducing the point that global trends do not render the specifics of place inconsequential should have read "Self-evidently, the obverse holds," rather than "Self-evidently, the observation holds." -ed.

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least because it makes us unable to explain the importance of the work we do, and too often it makes us more effective as competitors than as allies.

Our quarrels, however, are of public as well as scholarly consequence. They may—perhaps—advance knowledge through competition as much as they distort it through artificial divisions between subfields and paradigms. But they unquestionably do not advance funding or public presence for our work.

The decision to convene this meeting came as new proposals to increase (or axe) the budgets for various versions of international studies were being mooted in Washington in the wake of September 11. That wake is now crossed by substantial waves from the Middle East, the War on Terrorism, conflicts in South Asia, and a variety of other issues. It is telling, in passing, that the various African conflicts which have cost many more lives in recent years do not figure as more than a tiny ripple in this turbulent sea.

AIDS gets more attention, but not nearly enough. Foreign affairs and perceived national interests (or potential for geopolitical breakdown) shape the focus of attention in this town and in the media. However, as Bob Vitalis' paper suggests, the history of our intellectual fields also shapes the way in which international affairs and issues are understood. Recovering some of the partially erased

history of focus on race and development helps to explain some of the ways in which the very ideas of international (or foreign) affairs and international studies were constituted.

What I want to do in these comments is simply to alert us to some of the stakes and issues before us in thinking about how to move forward in international studies today.

First, let me make a point that is most clearly suggested also by Burkart Holzner's paper. International studies thrives in universities not as a single field (whatever the arguments over its definition or orientation) but as a very wide-ranging congeries of activities. This is a point Michael Kennedy has also made well in the paper we circulated pointing out why no one group or approach can "own" international studies today. On the contrary, nearly all of us depend—though in varying degrees—on exchange and study abroad programs for faculty and students, on libraries, and on language teachers as well as on the different intellectual fields usually designated "international studies." An inclusive case for federal and other support should make that clear. I would

draw an even broader range of work under the international studies tent than Burkart does as well as define the groups he describes somewhat differently. I would urge us, for example, to include comparative researchers whether or not they are area specialists (and note the dependence of most non-area specialists on area studies work when they do comparative research). I would remind us of the importance of anthropological work that is not organized in terms of either area studies or national units of analysis, but often more local settings and sometimes translocal diasporas and relations. Burkart mentions international studies in professional schools, and I would suggest that however different much of this work is from that in Arts and Sciences faculties, it has in fact moved from an early trend in the 1980s to a major actuality today. And the professional schools actively doing something that must be recognized as "international studies" by any commonsensical definition includes not only schools of international affairs, but of business, law, architecture and

urban design, public health, social work, and education, among others. That genie is out of the bottle. Figuring out what wishes might be granted—what alliances with professional schools might be built and how effective advances in knowledge might be produced—is the most productive approach to this development.

And this is my point more generally. We need to

figure out modes of peaceful co-existence and even cooperation for disciplinary and interdisciplinary projects, area studies and non-area international studies, work on global economics and on the plurality of transnational cultural projects, many of which contest the idea of singular globalization. We need to be able to articulate—in Washington discussions and with deans and provosts—why it is important to support a wide and diverse range of international studies in American universities.

Gaining the ability to advance international studies in general, rather than only specific bits of turf within it, is a difficult business. Area studies center directors know it can be hard enough to unify their diverse constituencies and should have sympathy for colleagues like Burkart Holzner and Michael Kennedy who have taken on the task of leading university-wide efforts to coordinate international studies. The International Institute at Michigan, for example, has helped considerably to advance the interests and the public presence of international studies at Michigan. It is note-

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worthy that there exists no collective organization that works in the same way beyond individual campuses. It is not the ISA, nor is it the Association of International Education Administrators. And it is not the SSRC, however much the Council may have been in the thick of some of the battles of the past and however vocal it has been in collective representations of international studies.

I'm not saying we should form an organization, but I would hope we might see some grounds for social movement activism. We might take lessons from the coalition-building so important to those who would gain public attention for various causes. Human rights activists do not give up their special identities when they cooperate with campaigners for international debt relief. We need not either.

But let me put a couple more issues on the table for discussion, starting with just who this "we" is. One of the most striking and positive trends in international studies in recent years is the internationalization of the field. This hasn't solved the problems of definition of the fractured and diverse whole, but it has improved both scholarship and its practical significance. The most important outcome of the reorganization of regional programs undertaken by my predecessors at the SSRC, for example, did not involve siding with either disciplinary or area studies visions of the field but rather making an effort to organize international social science on the basis of international participation. This doesn't mean that the education of American specialists on foreign areas isn't important. It does mean that this education happens best in working with and alongside colleagues from those other places. And this capacity for international collaboration is not guaranteed in a world that is not only post-1989 but post-9/11.

"For internationalization per se, we face new problems when we think about funding. The repeated reliance on the US government is constantly challenged. For example, the government does not fund non-citizens, as important as they are to the internationalization of our scholarship and education. A typical solution—endowment will liberate us from everything—will lessen dependence on the government, but may also cause us to be isolated and disconnected from the rest of the world. Intellectual projects risk being perpetuated because they have money, not because they have redeeming value. We do need the capacity to sustain work on issues or places that have perhaps fallen out of favor, but the problem is that we risk supporting something like modernization theory forever just because somebody endowed it. How do we maintain autonomy and yet respond to reality?" **-Lisa Anderson**

Whatever we do to try to advance international studies, we do in a changing institutional context. Not only internationalization of universities is at issue. Higher education is being transformed much more deeply than most of us realize. The transformation is fiscal—in terms not just of size of budgets but shifting roles of different sorts of funding. Privatization and market considerations—and sometimes neoliberal ideologies—are indeed changing the academic base available in nearly every region of the world.

Internationalization of participation as well as content is intellectually important. It—like good scholarship—helps us contest the implicit comparative framework that treats the US case as normal and others as deviant.

Unfortunately, I can't tell you that the SSRC holds the answer to all the puzzles—or even so much money that it is the crucial means for advancement. It is only one institutional player among many in this collective project. What I'm trying to argue is that we need to see international studies as a project, and one advanced not mainly by internal struggle over ideological purity but by coalition-building.

This is all the more important for one last reason that I want to articulate. Whatever we do to try to advance international studies, we do in a changing institutional context. Not only internationalization of universities is at issue. Higher education is being transformed much more deeply than most of us realize. The transformation is fiscal—in terms not just of size of budgets but shifting roles of different sorts of funding. Privatization and market considerations—and sometimes neoliberal ideologies—are indeed changing the academic base available in nearly every region of the world. Publishing is in severe straits internationally, and so is the circulation of intellectual work. In this country we should not overlook the fact that endowment funds are increasingly critical to elite research universities. In Title VI centers, there is a shift from foundation and government funding to endowment funding, which creates greater inequality between institutions externally and internally because of a differential capacity to raise funds.

I hope we can discuss today all these issues in a combined spirit of reflective understanding. ■

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Global Change and the Organizational and Intellectual Challenges for International Studies in the United States

By Burkart Holzner

The 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century brought especially rapid and extensive global transformations. They changed the configuration of the world and of America's roles and position in it. They are of major significance and occurred in a surprisingly short time. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are one tragic, dramatic and important event in this historical period. This event has its contexts among the multiple challenges of extremely rapid, pervasive and risky global and institutional transformations that mark the beginning of the 21st century and also the beginning of a new, uncertain and very demanding era for international studies. These transformations and their turbulent rapidity are now influencing what I, and others, have called the international knowledge (IK) system in America. Several of these developments are discussed here as points for consideration.

Recent Global Changes and America

The United States has become the world's sole "hyperpower" in political, military, financial, economic and scientific dimensions and finds itself deeply enmeshed with multiple aspects of global transformations—sometimes by choice, often by reluctantly recognized necessity. Specifically, the current "War on Terrorism" constitutes an American effort in global engagement of potentially enormous scope that may have no historical precedent. At the same time there is strain in America's relations with its allies and there are manifold uncertainties to be faced. There are noticeable and increasing differences in values between the US and its European allies. In much of the developing world, attitudes toward America are ambivalent, in some parts they are outright hostile. The culture conflicts resulting from global pressures have been especially severe and dangerous in autocratic Islamic countries, contributing to the worldwide (and multi-directional) scourges of terrorism, but unfortunately there are many other sources of terror movements as well.

Global inequality has increased in recent years. The efforts to reduce poverty in developing countries have yielded different effects in world regions, but on the whole they have been disappointing. This has increased risks of disease, environmental degradation, and streams of migrants. There is now a widely shared sense that the dominant American strategy of free market economic globalization is in need of reassessment and that attention to the effectiveness of institutional frameworks for markets and social policies is also required. Increasingly, corporate trustworthiness has become questionable and serious public debate has begun on whether and how to strengthen public oversight and accountability.

Accompanying the growth of globalization has been an increasing call for some form of "global governance." The struggle for and against global norms in many domains of human rights, economics, social support systems, security, law and environment have given rise to influential nongovernmental organizations nearly worldwide. Issues of the legitimacy of trans- and supra-national authorities and the need for innovations enabling democratic rule beyond the nation state level have also been raised.

These developments have all played a part in the changing global context of international studies. We need to pay attention to a number of factors and processes of change in America's international knowledge system as it continues to respond to new needs, pressures, and constituencies.

Small Beginnings, Gradual Change

International studies in the United States has today become a complex knowledge system that connects multiple actors and institutions. There are many different professional communities involved, including area studies specialists, international relations professionals, scholars in security studies, international affairs, world history, economics, global studies, certain fields of post-modern studies, the technical and natural sciences, and professional schools, as well as support agencies like federal agencies, foundations, academic organizations and professions in the management and financing of these activities, in international exchanges, and

"The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 produced a dramatic reconfiguration of the international system, and with it a new challenge to prevailing paradigms affecting international studies. The state has returned to center stage (along with much of the imagery associated with realist models of the international system) with the renewed focus on enhancing security by strengthening state capacity to defend its territory and population and to deter or preempt internal or external threats.

Much in the new campaign against international terrorism evokes an earlier era preoccupied by the threat of international communism. But the new international environment lacks the coherent organizing structure once provided by the USSR. The threat is both more diffuse and potentially more insidious and deadly than the one once attributed to international communism, not readily linked to a single state 'center,' and correspondingly more difficult to identify, comprehend, or hold accountable."

-Gail Lapidis

in library and information services. They are linked in varying degrees to a broad process of production of knowledge about the world, as well as to its distribution, storage, use and misuse.

Yet, international studies had small and disconnected beginnings in American higher education. It grew in diverse places in the universities and colleges as a result of the efforts of enterprising faculty members, or sometimes via special initiatives of the central administration. Some institutions came to place their emphasis on study abroad programs and exchanges, while others focused on area studies, international relations or international affairs. Systematic efforts to institutionalize the international dimension of academic institutions began in the 1960s, in part encouraged by an initiative of the Ford Foundation. The role of the Federal Government in providing support for area studies programs and centers, first through the National Defense Education Act and later through the Higher Education Act, was also crucial. During the Cold War, area studies scholarship advanced and was, in part, justified to government donors by the knowledge requirements of national security.

The public face of international studies began to change in the mid-1980s, as Cold War themes began to give ground to a cluster of more explicitly economic concerns. The general decline of American heavy industry raised fears about America's ability to compete in the world economy, and placed a premium on the comparative study of other steel-producing and industrial regions of the world. The theme of "competitiveness" of labor, technology, business, cities, regions, states and nations were the key concerns of the day, and had a corresponding impact on international studies. The introduction of a new program establishing "Centers of Business Education and Research" (CIBERs) within the programs of Title VI of the Higher Education Act was a direct result of this demand for stronger "competitive" knowledge and skills. The Commerce Department involved some international studies centers in the program of "District Export Councils" as well as in other efforts to engage and support American business. This period also witnessed the beginnings of a growing internationalization of professional schools, including the fields of business, law, public and international affairs, education, social work, engineering and all of the health sciences such as public health, medicine, pharmacy, dentistry and nursing.

By the 1990s, the emphasis had shifted subtly from global competitiveness toward demands for "global competence." The concept of global competence was and remains difficult to define, but includes such skills as "working effectively in a multi-cultural environment," "communicating skillfully across language barriers," and "living without destructive stress in foreign settings." It also calls for fairly extensive knowledge of world geography. For many university leaders, global competence became an important justification for expanding the internationalization of their universities.

As early as the mid-1980s, universities had become increasingly convinced of the centrality of international studies to their mission. Although government deficits and tight university budgets limited the possibilities of expansion and major restructuring, many universities made progress in integrating their international activities into centrally organized programs. By the 1990s, the expansion of university-wide international studies centers was underway in many major institutions. Highly dispersed international activities were gradually bundled into a central office, often reporting directly to the Provost of the university rather than to a department chair or dean. Increased resources were allocated to these new institutional arrangements. The transition from widely dispersed, small international islands of international activity, virtually ignored

"Recent polling of students showed that graduating seniors going to college wanted to pursue foreign languages, study abroad, take courses in international fields and so forth. The percentage of students who actually went on to do so, however, shrank appallingly. For example, of 60% who expressed an interest in studying a foreign language, 3% actually did. Obviously, something happens along the way.

I have spent time reading reports from universities promising to make their students 'globally competent.' First paragraphs usually state the mission of educating globally literate citizens, but there's nothing about how it will be done, just a huge hole. Something here needs to be addressed. Students are not moving toward resembling global citizens.

Training the next generation of scholars is another serious question—what kind of people do we want to train? It is necessary to have regional expertise, but how will it be achieved? Because of complicated university politics, disciplinary departments and the question of where to put area experts, it is hard to fit them in.

The move toward centralization of 'highly dispersed international activities' has had very varied motivations. Centralization hasn't necessarily been driven by higher motives or 'globalization,' but is often driven by money issues to cut overlap and reduce administrative cost, avoiding duplication. Sometimes it is a political issue. Reasons leading to the formation of international institutes and international studies may include the wish to achieve a higher international profile of the university. It is a matter of competition: if another university is doing it, so must I." -Sheila Biddle

by the university administrations, to central and centrally funded structures closely linked to the top leadership gathered speed throughout the 1990s.

The International Knowledge System in the US Today

The contemporary world configuration has implications for important changes in international studies today. Some of these changes have evolved over the last decade and are identified in my paper (with Matthew Harmon), "Intellectual and Organizational Challenges for International Education in the United States: A Knowledge System Perspective," delivered in January 1997 at a policy conference at UCLA. Others are newly emergent.

Renewed interest in security concerns is perhaps the most recent and obvious of these shifts. The emphasis on security after September 11 will most likely lead to an expansion not only of the profession of security experts, but also of training programs for language and area specialists and technical experts. This emphasis on national security may compete with scholarly attention to broader issues of global security.

Global security issues have become an increasing focus of university centers or programs related to international studies. These deal with human rights, women's rights in developing countries, the rule of law, the containment of conflicts, environmental and health risks, government and corporate accountability, and regimes of global governance. The programs are often linked to local or global social movements and/or non-governmental organizations such as Transparency International, the World Federalist Movement, Amnesty International, and many others. This development in universities reflects the growth of non-governmental, political initiatives on global issues often leading to transnational networks of both action and knowledge production.

In response to processes that encompass multiple world regions and/or affect the human planetary habitat, the challenge of global studies has been taken up and the necessary cooperative cross-disciplinary alliances are being formed. In several universities, efforts are under way to encourage not only interdisciplinary cooperation in global studies, but also to support international research linkages. The emergence of such programs (as well as environmental studies) often includes greater cooperation with the natural sciences (planetary science, geophysics, geology, oceanography, biology, chemistry, etc.).

Increasingly, area specialists no longer deal only with area-specific cultural knowledge, but often have to address issues of a transnational, regional or global nature. The period of acrimonious debate about the role of area studies and social science, one may hope, is now over. It has been replaced by workman-like cooperation between area scholars and other specialists. The discussions initiated by the SSRC on this topic, the efforts of the Ford Foundation, and the lively work of area studies scholars have created opportunities for enor-

mous improvement in both area studies and the social sciences. In addition, comparative and trans-area studies work has grown.

The humanities—especially cultural studies and related fields—have begun to play an important role in area and international studies, especially as issues of American hegemony and cultural conflicts have come to the fore. They often bring epistemic assumptions to the table that differ from those of the social sciences. The internationalization of American Studies is another dimension of this process, in part because of the recognition that there needs to be more attention to the links between domestic social, political and cultural dynamics and international and global affairs, and in part because of increasing recognition that the perspectives of others on America are crucial as its global engagement dramatically expands.

The American international knowledge system as a whole has also increased its own "internationalization" in the sense that each of its components, and indeed the US IK system as a whole, has its recognized counterparts in the European Union and in the OECD countries, and to some extent in developing countries. Increasingly, the American IK professions link, sometimes quite closely, with their counterparts in other countries, transforming what were in the past unilaterally based international studies activities into cooperative partnerships. Information and communication technology has improved the quality of work in international studies centers in many places, including growth in national and international networks of scholars, improved instruction, and cooperation in the establishment of international libraries. The work of the Mellon Foundation and the Association of Research Libraries has created some progress in the difficult area of library collections and access. Efforts continue to increase the number of advanced, specialized graduate programs at American universities dealing with international subjects, while also providing effective international knowledge to all undergraduate students. There have been significant changes in Study Abroad Programs creating opportunities for research, internships, service learning and language study. Yet security concerns rate high in these efforts, and it remains to be seen what sort of obstacles these present post-9/11.

Conclusion

Despite widespread support for international education and research, resources are frequently scarce in America and support systems have become overloaded. The era of budget deficits at the federal and state levels has begun again, and many universities will encounter difficulties.

Calling American international studies a "system" is meant to emphasize the interconnectedness of the components; it does not imply anything like a high degree of "orderliness" or "rationality." The expanded need for international studies and education in the face of increasing global challenges will require a national policy for interna-

tional studies, its institutions, and its support systems. Such a program will need to provide strength to the major centers of excellence in the country, while also pursuing a policy of effective cross-institutional and cross-disciplinary linkages. Resource sharing that takes into account the 3,000 degree-granting institutions in the United States and their 12 million students must be a component of this approach.

Also, given the rapidity and pervasiveness of global change and the complexity of today's international knowledge, a major effort to increase public enlightenment is necessary. The most urgent task may very well be to drive home the point that the Planet Earth is the habitat of all humanity. Certain global imperatives follow from this simple fact. They deal with global security issues, and with humility, civility, tolerance and with the commitment to joint global problem solving. It is to be hoped that the emphasis on national security does not expand at the expense of intellectual engagement by the American IK system with these concerns, and with educating the public about them. It is also to be hoped that a reasonable balance can be struck between the universalistic norms that inform global security issues and the

“At Stanford, the institutes of international studies are multidisciplinary, but embrace two cultures—they have people from science, biology, etc., working with us because new issues such as biological and chemical terrorism require specialists on the technical side as well those with humanistic and social science expertise. It embraces non-US scholars as well. Collaboration is possible if focused on larger international problems that can help overcome disciplinary tensions.” **-Gail Lapidis**

particularistic preferences and commitments of local communities. The best course for achieving this is the continued pursuit of a genuinely inclusive international knowledge system. ■

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Comment by Michael Kennedy

Professor Holzner's focus on the international knowledge system seems just right. Burkart identifies a list of components to this system whose range I am still coming to appreciate. I am also struck by their lack of coordination and recognition, and perhaps more, the difficulties of cumulating their experience and insight into a single knowledge system.

I would underscore that this knowledge system extends well beyond the university. I think here of the knowledge production associated with multilateral organizations like the World Bank, of different agencies of various states, and of NGOs like Human Rights Watch. We should consider how their temporalities, priorities, validities and resources articulate with those embedded in higher education.

Burkart is also right in identifying the internationalization of the knowledge system; however, I am also struck by the challenge of identifying its radiance. Should we examine that system from America outwards, or might we consider its starting points in different places?

When we begin to question the center of internationalization we are drawn into powerful normative questions associated with the grounding of our knowledge. How does the extension of linkages across the world affect our normative assumptions? Consider, for instance, how some, like Americans for Victory over Terrorism, wish to frame the search for a scholarly position on 9/11 that is embedded in America first, and in transnational scholarly values only second. Clearly the search for an internationalization of knowledge and the articulation of national interests in that internationalization is a complicated endeavor.

How do we articulate a mission around international studies that takes its starting point in academic and intellectual values that articulate universities attending to global publics and not only local or national ones? I borrow from one of my associate directors, Linda Lim:

In this view, “globalization” of the American university may mean simply offering American programs and teaching American models to foreigners at home or abroad—as in “We have a campus in Singapore” or “We offer programs in London” or “International students are 30 percent of our class,” ergo, we are “global.” Or it may be taken to mean sending our own students or faculty abroad on “exchanges” for training, internship and research collaboration, many of which involve merely replicating or extending in “their” territory what we already do here, and conducted in our language, not theirs.

Importing talent from other countries to teach our students is often seen as another possible path to “globalization.” It certainly increases the ethnic and nationality diversity of the faculty population, but this in itself does not necessarily mean a global-

ization of knowledge and intellect, as distinct from a globalization of personnel. The vast majority of foreign-born faculty—like nearly all the other foreign-born talent imported into the US scientific, technical and industrial establishments—are in fields where "global" content is essentially American, or at least Western, in form and origin, because of a quite justifiable Western scientific and technological dominance, e.g., in science, medicine, engineering and business.

Foreign-born faculty at American universities for the most part do not—nor should they be expected to—embody and impart specialized scholarly knowledge about their own cultures. The same is true of most foreign-born students. Thus, importing non-US faculty and students does not provide an easy answer to the intellectual challenge of globalizing the American university. Indeed, it may actually undermine the globalization of the American intellectual universe if it results in institutionalization of the belief that "the rest of the world comes to us, so we don't have to learn about the rest of the world."

In this era of increasingly open borders, geographical and cultural mobility and the unquestioned supremacy of individual rights, the US attracts "the best of the best" from around the world to its "world class" (i.e., "American standard") universities, R&D laboratories, entrepreneurial incubators and commercial centers. In this way it advances and cements its role as the global center of knowledge and wealth creation while simultaneously undermining the ability of other "feeder" countries to develop in this role.

It is not surprising, then, that so many around the world dismiss "globalization" as a smokescreen for "American domination," and are beginning to resist the spread or at least question the superiority of the "American gospel" of free markets and even of democracy. I have seen this resistance surface even in my nationally diversified classroom, where many international students' hyper-sensitivity to US hegemony interferes with rather than facilitates instruction and discussion on globalization and the world economy.

Many in our community of scholars and students reinforce this resistance when they act as if it is all right to ignore what makes the rest of the world different from "us" (the US), while discussing only what makes it the same.

The hegemonic US university's ethnocentric and parochial misidentification of the intellectual challenge of globalization could actually diminish our capacity to understand, interact with, and enrich the "globalized" world in which we live. Only rarely does it acknowledge the importance of globalization in the intellectual content of what its members research, study, teach and learn—the language, culture, business or scientific practices of the "other." (Linda Lim's essay on Globalizing the Intellect may be found at www.umich.edu/%7Eiinet/journal/vol8no2/lim.htm)

Globalizing the mind, internationalizing scholarship, has always been complicated. In light of recent changes, especially with the increasing importance of security over globalization in the articulation of the principal challenge of internationalism, it's even more challenging. And that is why we need to think about the international knowledge system and global transformations in tandem as Burkart Holzner recommends. ■

Michael Kennedy is vice provost for international affairs, director of the International Institute and professor of sociology at the University of Michigan. His latest book is *Cultural Formations of Postcommunism: Emancipation, Transition, Nation, and War* (University of Minnesota Press, 2002). His current research focuses on the sociology of globalizing knowledge.

Comment by David Engerman

There are three observations we can make about Soviet Studies that have a bearing on today's discussion:

1. Sovietology provided a pioneering role for the area studies model: from supposedly failed programs of the inter-war period to the USSR Division of the OSS during WWII. One historian called it "Social Science in One Country."
2. Sovietology covered many of the same issues facing aspects of area studies today as well, e.g., the sense of national security urgency as well as serious information problems.
3. Soviet Studies in the 1950s were very productive and influential across social sciences. It provided varied models and a number of terms for the scholarly agenda in social sciences—e.g., totalitarianism, ideology, and modernization theory in its earliest incarnations.

What made the intellectual environment in early Sovietology so vibrant? First, there was a sense of urgency, a sense that we know so little and need to know more. It was this that attracted a new group of scholars to the subject. The intellectual challenges it presented were very attractive.

Second was the availability of funding. Fundable projects were those related to national security. The availability of funding provided impetus for broad visions of what area study was and contributed to the intensification and expansion of the WWII

generation's networks.

Sovietology in the 1950s was not just fundable, but widely read, available and published. As any visit to a used bookstore demonstrates, paperback editions of classics and even of somewhat narrower monographs are still widely available. (As time went on, Sovietology became more and more specialized, but also became read by narrower and narrower audiences, which is especially true of economic Sovietology, which came virtually out of existence by end of the Soviet Union.)

Finally, there was a new demographic diversity. People in the field were still predominantly white and male, but the urgency of developing expertise on the Soviet Union freed up a backlog of impressive talents that had been kept out of the academy (Harvard, Columbia, Yale, and elsewhere). After an initial opposition, Slavs were allowed to contribute to Slavic studies: Riasanovsky and other Slavs were initially thought to be incapable of objective scholarship. A broader diversification brought in Catholics like Robert Byrnes who were previously excluded from the academy. And especially, most important numerically in the 1950s, were Jews, especially Russian Jews—sons and grandsons of immigrants. From this diverse mix came a special sense of excitement.

What do we take from this now? Based on our experience with Soviet Studies, there are reasons for optimism in the current post-September 11 environment. There is a sense of urgency and determined effort to understand broader international processes in the context of 9/11. There is renewed interest in international processes, especially in the Islamic world, which will result both in larger funding for research, and speaking to broad audiences. (We should insist on speaking to a broad audience, across and beyond the academy.) This points to some issues—e.g., fundamentalisms—inadequately treated in recent scholarship. Again, plenty of reconsiderations of existing fields are possible, even required. New demographic diversity will enhance the internationalization of international studies. Training institutions

and programs are well established. To the extent that training programs aided early Sovietology, it will happen again.

But there are also reasons for pessimism. Institutions that injected new energy into post-WWII scholarship are getting starved. Most recently, the Kennan Institute was close to losing State Department support, which accounted for 40% of its budget. There has been a decline in area studies funding more generally. Some of the signal institutions that created *esprit de corps* in the 1950s are missing and the sense of national involvement in the OSS and WWII is gone, as is the excitement of being the first generation to develop area expertise. The hubristic mode of 1950s social science had its advantages. Nowadays, social science is plagued by self-doubt (except among economists). It may be harder to promote new interest in these studies. Other potentially unfavorable circumstances are increasing specialization of scholars, denigration of public discourse and a stronger divide between scholars and pundits in area studies.

In conclusion, as a historian, one is predisposed against analogy between the past and present. And yet, we see how the cutting edge of area studies in the 1950s can inform us today. ■

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“On the issue of epistemic communities and linkages, networks have been important in linking US scholars to Soviet ones—primarily thanks to exchange programs. The role that exchanges played for the Russians is significant—these individuals later became leaders in *perestroika*. The exchange experience helped them in addressing specific country problems—e.g., Pugwash participants were later involved in nuclear arms control negotiations, they became human rights activists in newly emerging states, or economists—this has not been explored fully.” **-Gail Lapidis**

Comment by Fredrick Cooper

Since the 1980s, we have witnessed two revolutions that I never expected in my lifetime, the end of Soviet empire and the end of the white racist regime in South Africa. It is not clear social scientists did better than novelists in predicting when, within 20 years, or by what process either Soviet communism or apartheid would end. I was 0 for 2 myself. Both represent not only the overthrow of a particular system, but revision of available political possibilities. South Africa, to be sure, stands at the end of a process that ended colonial empires, with their structural linkage of "subordination" and "difference." Empires had a longer and more extensive history than did nation-states, and the exclusion of colonial empire from the realm of political possibility seemed visionary in 1930s and obvious by 1960s. Basic categories through which the world was perceived and possibilities assessed were being reconceived.

How should these shifts affect ways we should think about organizing international studies? They point, first, to the importance of a critical attitude toward theoretical conformity, be it in disciplinary or interdisciplinary guises; second, to the importance of an infrastructure for international education that respects and supports specific forms of knowledge—from Pashto to religious doctrines; and third, the value of thinking about history as a process that proceeds through lumps and jerks, through which the normal can become impossible and categories take on new meaning.

I am stressing above all the importance of specific knowledge, of specific places in specific times. This points to the continued relevance of area studies in the old fashioned sense, not in an insular way, and not without problematizing what we mean by region. But international studies will not be able to serve an unknown future without stressing the importance of knowing something about someplace. Afghanistan came to play a particular role in the history of New York City and Afghani warlords played a crucial role in deciding limits of what US military power could and could not do on the ground, and all the generalizations we can make about global links remain hot air unless someone can tell us something about Afghanistan. We learned recently that not many know much, and it is not clear that this knowledge has been effectively deployed. General statements about miracles of the market or one-size-fits all recommendations about shock therapy for the post-Soviet economy show the limits of understanding if one doesn't know the messy specificities of Soviet life. The idea of peasant revolution or proletarian revolution do not tell much about what actually happened in South Africa between the mid-1980s and the election of 1994.

The most needed extension of area-specific knowledge is toward specific cross-area knowledge. To understand the Afrikaner elite that governed South Africa in the post-WWII era, one needs to grasp its sense of being part of what they would call a Christian world and probably by the 1980s was more of a cross-national bourgeois world—focused on entitlement to certain kinds of commodities, sports events, media, etc. To understand the African National Congress one cannot see it simply as a movement focused on an identity category but on certain kinds of transnational linkages too—to other African states, liberal church groups, radical intellectuals, international trade unionists, and at times the Soviet bloc. Such linkages also need specific study, sensitive to historical processes that opened or shut new possibilities. Studying linkages is the area where the social sciences do least well, compared to either area-specific studies or comparative/generalizing analyses; such research requires multiple languages and multiple research sites. The difficulties and costs of such research need to be addressed, but its importance is clear.

The collapse of colonial empires or the Soviet empire give rise to questions about how the range of possible actions in the international arena has been reconfigured. In that sense, the most interesting questions aren't how to fit changes into a scheme of political relations, for they are not mere instances of a process, but changes in the rules of the game. Such events reconfigured, not least of all, the political imagination. The homogenization/differentiation debate is, as most of us would agree, based on a false dichotomy. But we are facing a situation of living in a world that is both interactive and disarticulated, where some actors are trying to make it more disarticulated or insisting that interaction take place on their rules only. The discourse on Islam in recent months is a case in point. Some social scientists have tried to shape that discourse for the better, others have done their best to promote the clash of civilizations they claim to be describing. This is

“The ex-USSR became the focus for ‘transitologists,’ bringing out the lesson (which should have been learned before) that market economies cannot be seen as simply webs of interaction among individuals but as networks built on specific, often personal relations.”

-Frederick Cooper

“Transitology is not much different from nationalism, modernization, globalization or Soviet studies. Each of these fields organizes scholarship around particular axes of inquiry, sometimes more and sometimes less directed, sometimes more open, sometimes more closed. Social science can work in any of these fields of inquiry, but it does not have to be defined by their objects. Modernization created the space for its critique in dependency theory; nationalism creates the space for asking about how nations are social constructions. Soviet studies enabled me to ask how ‘Soviet’ 1980s Poland was. Transitology can also create the space for its own transcendence through immanent critique. Globalization might not explain, but nationalism, modernization and transition didn't explain either. They all create a space for new kinds of questions and theoretical engagements that move us beyond nationalist histories and presumptions.” **-Michael Kennedy**

There is the tension of producing knowledge about the world while we, as American scholars, are socially located in a particular—and hardly neutral—part of it. Ignoring the question of stand-point and assuming stand-point to be all determining are both stifling, but the tension between the two positions is a useful antidote to hubris.

hardly a new issue: debate over whether natures of people are inherently different or subject to change has been going on for hundreds of years. The clear articulation of the idea of universal rights in 1780s produced in Paris and in Haiti a debate over what was the universe to which rights applied, one which threw into question boundaries of nation and empire, of race and class. This is not the first age that questioned its categories or the position of the observer in the process of doing science.

There are opportunities in the current conjuncture. We can learn to live with tensions in our own scholarly practices, without claiming hegemony. There is the tension of producing knowledge about the world while we, as American scholars, are socially located in a particular—and hardly neutral—part of it. Ignoring the question of stand-point and assuming stand-point to be all determining are both stifling,

but the tension between the two positions is a useful antidote to hubris. There is the tension of studying distinct moral practices and confronting the fact that the world is highly interactive and that such practices and beliefs are neither self-containing nor unchanging.

There is no reason why we can't wear our area studies hats and our disciplinary ones, and our interdisciplinary ones as well. That the origins of disciplines lie in some 19th century history we don't like to think about or that area studies came out of cold war politics is a useful reminder that knowledge production is always historically, socially, politically located, but it doesn't mean that disciplines and area studies can't challenge the assumptions out of which they sprang. New entrants into scholarly discourse can frame new ways of thinking, and all scholarship contains the possibilities of sustaining the frameworks within which it was produced or subverting them. The record indicates that solid research as well as new events and new input into the scholarly community can challenge old assumptions, but it also indicates that

the power of convention is a strong one, enforced by article reviewers and tenure committees, and that buzz words and bandwagons operate in interdisciplinary contexts as well as disciplinary ones.

My nightmare is that the departmental structure of universities, however conservative its orientation, gives way to a division into two camps, one who says that everything is about choice under conditions of constraint and scarcity and the other saying that everything is culture or discourse. Then we will truly have reduced scholarship to two preachers with two choirs. Better to live with the tensions of distinct approaches, varied forms of training, and diverse intersections of context and connection. ■

Frederick Cooper is professor of history at New York University. His latest book is *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 2002). Cooper's recent work has focused on 20th century African history, theoretical and historical issues in the study of colonial societies, and the relationship of social sciences to decolonization.

International Studies in America - Robert Vitalis

(continued from page 2)

of the Republic. This is also the period of the consolidation and farthest extension of the Jim Crow regime.


Scholars confronted a world of increasing complexity and interdependence (they said) and sought practical strategies for administering territories and uplifting backward races, using the tools of racial science. The professors saw themselves occupying a new intellectual space by right of the failure of the international legal scholars and *antiquo-historians* to deal adequately with the problems posed by empire. New race development and eugenics advocates vied and intersected with practitioners of *rassempolitik* who predicted the inevitability of war between the Anglo-Saxons and one or more competing racial alignments.

Raymond Leslie Buell, at Harvard, coined the term "complex interdependence" in 1925 to describe this new order among the natural and historic states and races, which is the same term developed by Robert Keohane and others of the new generation of the 1960s and '70s. Like them, Buell and other ancestors argued that traditional approaches in political history, theory, and international law could not recognize let alone solve the problems introduced by a transformed world order. Chief among these problems for Buell was that of "race progress" and "how best to aid the progress of the undeveloped." New, combined, and interdisciplinary forms of

expertise were thus necessary, chief among them the social sciences of geography, eugenics, anthropology, contemporary history or political science, and colonial administration.

This account complicates the standard view of the external events that typically matter to a field of knowledge that we imagine is exclusively concerned with spaces beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. It forces us to think about boundaries we take for granted and to ask: events external to what? The lead article of the premier issue of the country's first IR journal, *The Journal of Race Development*, raises precisely this kind of question in making the case for a research agenda on the progress of backward races and states. The US "has as fundamental an interest in races of a less developed civilization as have the powers of Europe. The key to the past seventy-five years of American history is the continuing struggle to find some solution for the negro problem—a problem still unsolved." Sixty years later, in analyzing the "malaise" that was prompting government, foundations, and scholars to rethink international studies, James Rosenau ended up back where forgotten

founders like G. Stanley Hall, George Blakeslee, Raymond Leslie Buell, and W.E. B. Du Bois had started (and where we still seem to be today) "with the surfacing of many new types of international issues—ranging from ecology to racial



conflict to political kidnapping to traffic in drugs—which reflect the world’s growing interdependence and which, consequently, do not fall neatly or logically into any of the established disciplines.”

This essay draws attention to continuity in the basic idea that scholars have used for about a century to define what is different about the world in the 1920s or ‘40s or ‘70s or ‘90s that demands a new kind of interdisciplinary expertise. I do not say much about the equally familiar counter argument in defense of the immutability or “nature” of hierarchy in relations among races and states. I have also tried to resist harnessing the history to some agenda for the present in ways that run ahead of the evidence or treat evidence as dispensable. The impulse to signify may indeed be hardwired in us, however, and claims about what all this might mean now are not yet excised entirely.

The naming of a new interdisciplinary field or science of international relations in the 1910s in the United States is bound up with the wider intellectual and political currents that American historians call Progressivism and its vision of new possibilities and imperatives in administrative and social reform. That vision was abandoned in stages, and international studies served as the last redoubt. Every special report on international and area studies since the 1960s repeats the twin themes of a decline in resources and of the crisis in relevance. The controversies of the mid-1990s over the fate of the old area studies model are harbingers of what is to come if we, as we probably should, actually begin to talk to business, government, and labor about the post-September 11 world.

In opening the Progressive past of American international studies to scrutiny we may also find ways to overcome the increasingly rigid and self imposed divide that segregates those who “do” political economy and international relations from those who do postcolonial, culture, and area studies. In the day, W. E. B. Du Bois not only read but wrote for *Foreign Affairs*. Very few who claim Du Bois as a model today actually follow in the footsteps of this boundary-defying cultural critic and theorist of international inequality.

Birth of A Discipline

I follow Dorothy Ross’s account of the *Origins of the American Social Sciences* with an important amendment. Ross situates the rise of disciplines like political science in relationship to the national ideology of American exceptionalism and the experience of civil war and rapid industrialization. As Ross’s colleague Paul Kramer notes, the irony in a

book dedicated to turning away from ideological national history and loosening the hold that exceptionalism has over the national imagination is its blind spot when it comes to empire, imperialism’s relationship to the social questions of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, and its consequences for the American social sciences.


Work in the archives of Clark University, the University of Chicago, Harvard, Princeton, Wisconsin, and the Foreign Policy Association reveals the contours of the emerging enterprise. The American Political Science Association’s second vice president Paul Reinsch (1869-1923) pressed for APSA’s first organized subfield in colonial administration. Reinsch, author of *World Politics* (1900), probably the most renowned political scientist after Wilson himself and originator of the first courses on international relations in the United States, was also America’s first expert in colonial administration. He participated along side Du Bois in the

Universal Races Congress in 1911. The first professors of the science of IR depicted themselves as occupying a new intellectual space between established disciplines.

Buell’s *International Relations*, like any other textbook before and since, represents the accumulation of knowledge in circulation for one or two decades, presented, argued, refuted, and reformulated in books, journals, conferences, and seminars. Its representation of the state of knowledge is mirrored in *Syllabus on International Relations* (1925) by Columbia’s Parker Moon, which was organized around the three themes or units of nationalism and war, imperialism, and militarism and armaments. Moon’s own most famous work, *Imperialism and World Politics* (1930), was reprinted a dozen times through the

1960s. This line of research continued into the 1940s by, among others, those who founded Princeton’s Center for International Studies. Ironically, a CIS director in the 1980s began his own book on empires with the claim that the topic had been ignored in comparative studies and international relations. “Empire and imperialism are indeed not words for scholars in these disciplinary traditions.”

Before the opening salvos of the Great War, G. Stanley Hall, the country’s distinguished theorist of the race children, and his colleague at Clark, George Hubbard Blakeslee, who would head its new department of history and international relations, began publishing *The Journal of Race Development* (1910). This was the first IR journal in the country, renamed *The Journal of International Relations* in 1919. Three years later it became *Foreign Affairs*, the house publication of the New York Council on Foreign Relations. The founders of the JRD were also conveners and builders



of the first area studies-like conferences and research institutes in the country in the decade between 1915-1925. Intellectual trends in the West mirrored those in the East. At Berkeley in 1915 the academic senate resolved to “give increased emphasis to the work of instruction and research in problems of international and inter-racial relations.”

As the publication of the premier volume of *The Journal of Race Development* makes clear, the boundaries we draw today between what is inside and outside the national territorial space and that are now distinct domains of expertise were not made in the same way in 1910. Perhaps more accurately, who is inside and who is outside the national space was not so much a territorial question as it was a biological one. So it was possible to imagine an interdisciplinary field of expertise and a journal to support it that would bring together men like George Hubbard Blakeslee, the country’s most famous scholar of US relations with Latin American and Asia once Reinsch had left Madison to become Wilson’s ambassador to China; G. Stanley Hall, the country’s most important psychologist after William James and the first president of the new graduate institution Clark University; the great Franz Boas of Columbia; Ellsworth Huntington, the geographer at Yale and a future president of the American Eugenics Society; and W. E. B. Du Bois.

One way to think of *The Journal of Race Development/Journal of International Relations* is that it was an early version of what *World Politics* is today, spanning the overlapping fields we now call comparative, development, and international studies. The first two 1910-1911 and 1911-1912 volumes included articles on the “French Scheme of Empire in Africa,” the “Pacific Ocean in the Racial History of Mankind,” “Islam as a Factor in West African Culture,” the “Indian National Congress,” “Turkey and the United States,” “Physical Environment as a Factor in the Present Condition of Turkey,” the “Contribution of the Negro to Human Civilization,” “Bulgaria: The Dynamics in the Balkan

“The story of American international studies cannot be fully told without mentioning Europe. Both theoretical works from Europe as well as events from Europe such as founding journals, etc., were very influential. That dynamic is missing. Also missing are European émigrés—you can’t tell the story of international studies without reference to Europe.” -**Thomas Biersticker**

Development studies becomes a story about models of European reconstruction exported to Latin America. Empire disappears. Thus the myth of a race-blind tradition is propagated.

“There is a notion of the static implications of international studies. It always looks the same. But when you start exploring concepts like dependency, you see that they are changing over time. Superficially, perhaps, things seem the same, but meanings change. Another dynamic is a periodic narrowing and broadening of the subject—what is a legitimate domain for analysis in international studies? And what is legitimately included? There has been a significant broadening of security as the core, in the 1970s identity was included and so forth. Is Vitalis too focused on race? The larger broadening should be, rather, the conception of ‘the other.’ Who was identified as inside/outside the domain?” -**Thomas Biersticker**

“I am not saying that we are all racist (people take it very personally), but a history like this asks us What are the equivalent blind spots today? That can lead us forward.”

-**Robert Vitalis**

Situation,” the “Japanese in America,” and the “Anglo-Saxon in India and the Philippines.”

In New York, a mix of millionaire lawyers, bankers, and professors who had served on Wilson’s Inquiry founded the Council of Foreign Relations in 1921 and began publication of the now famous quarterly journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1922. The CFR quickly became the vanguard of the Atlanticist or Anglo-Saxon current in American internationalism. Certainly, the outlook of this group resembled bondholders more than it did missionaries. The first editor, Archibald Cary Coolidge, the Harvard historian who negotiated the takeover of Clark University’s *JRD/JIR* and, reluctantly, its name change to *Foreign Affairs*, was frank about “the plutocrats” who steered it, and who had millions of dollars more at stake in Europe than in the undeveloped areas, Mexico excepted.

Virtually all post-World War II histories of academic international relations begin the story at this point, adopting the monied view of internationalism as the normative one. One data point thus anchors beliefs about Paris in 1919 as the galvanizing moment (rather than the gatherings of activists and scholars at the Lake Mohonk Conferences, near New Paltz, New York, beginning in the 1880s, devoted at first to Indian policy and gradually expanding to include “Other Dependent People” of the US, to the Pan-American Conferences, to the Berlin Conference, to the Universal Races Congress held in London in 1911). Development studies becomes a story about models of European reconstruction exported to Latin America. Empire disappears. Thus the myth of a race-blind tradition is propagated.

Progressives founded an alternative research and education organization to the CFR in New York in the 1920s, the Foreign Policy Association. Raymond Leslie Buell, the

author of *International Relations*, moved to Manhattan after two years of field work in Africa, the first by a US political scientist, to become research director in 1927. The FPA had grown out of a study group, the Committee on American Policy in International Relations, which began to meet in the summer of 1918. Charles Beard designed a course for them that focused on the nature and extent of future racial antagonisms, control of international water-ways, the status of backward countries, control of natural resources, the place of nationality in world organizations, and, finally, the idea of a League of Nations. By the mid-1920s a research department had been set up and the first of many local branch organizations were built, although we now know them as the World Affairs Councils.

The apogee of this Progressive two decades in American international studies that Cold War Whigs would lament is found in the creation of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The IPR is actually the first formal area studies center in the United States. Businessmen, educators, and disciples of the YMCA in Honolulu founded it in Hawaii in 1925. It was set up to “study the conditions of the Pacific peoples” using the “YMCA idea of bringing leaders of different racial communities together for frank discussions of differences.” Multiple national councils (in the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, China, and Japan) supported the secretariat, and members convened in a biannual series of conferences. The US council, the American Institute of Pacific Relations, dominated the organization, and the secretariat moved to New York in 1930. Owen Lattimore at Johns Hopkins became editor of the Institute’s journal *Asian Affairs*, and the IPR grew into the preeminent research organization on East Asia, supported by Blakeslee, Chicago’s Quincy Wright, and dozens of other IR scholars.

The IPR model, an original form of the boundary-crossing Indian Ocean, Pacific Rim, Atlantic World approach that took off in the 1990s, reflected the intense interests in immigration issues, race conflicts, and “pioneer belts” (that is, on the vital significance of white settler movements in history) through the interwar years.

The creation in 1937 of the International Committee on African Affairs (later the African Affairs Council) was another effort at building an IPR-type institute, dedicated in this case to the cause of decolonization and to educating the US public on Africa. Its founder, Max Yergan, had spent twenty years in the YMCA movement in South Africa. The Council brought together white Progressives such as Buell and Mary Van Kleeck, who headed the research arm of the Russell Sage Foundation, and black scholars and activists such as Ralph Bunche, Mordecai Johnson (President of Howard University), and Paul Robeson. The organization’s rapidly evolving left-wing identity (“radical, black-led, and interracial”) left it searching in vain for established foundation support. Communists in the leadership ranks drove out people like Buell and took the CAA down the road that led, as with the IPR, to government harassment and collapse.

During and just after World War II there were two more

attempts to build IPR-like programs. The first, sponsored by the Princeton-based American Committee for International Studies, began planning for a Conference on Atlantic Relations in 1941. Progressives pressed for inclusion of representatives from the entire Atlantic world, including Brazil, the Caribbean and Africa, but they also had a fall back position. Howard University’s Ralph Bunche, the African-American political scientist, could represent the Atlantic dependencies. They lost this battle, unfortunately. Buell, by then editor of *Fortune* magazine, continued to argue for bringing African-American intellectuals into the wartime planning work of the Committee. He failed to move the Princeton group as well, and the “North Atlantic” became the organizing framework and took on the cast that we associate with the early Cold War era.

Melville Herskovitz’s correspondence with Carnegie in the 1940s and Ford in the 1950s for a Black Atlantic-model of combined “African and Afro-American Studies” program at Northwestern University is a final example of the old Progressive current in American international race/relations/studies. The documents were unearthed in the 1990s by Jane Guyer who, because all she knows is the familiar story about the founding of area studies after World War II and the relative insignificance of Africa to it, has trouble explaining Herskovitz’s ideas. She constructs him as an outlier, ahead of his time, “who did not support the area studies model” but instead was proposing a model that “reflected a disciplinary rather than a political division of the world.”

Yet, forty years earlier his teacher, Boas, had pioneered a new, interdisciplinary and quite explicitly political enterprise at the dawn of the twentieth century to which Herskovitz’s thinking owed a great deal. International relations or international studies placed great emphasis on Africa and Asia as part of a new racial world order of increasing complexity. As Buell and others taught, complex interdependence had brought a host of new policy issues to the fore. These problems included drug trafficking, white slavery, the environment (as a factor in future colonization projects), miscegenation or, in other words, the “race question.” Lord Zimmern, the first holder of the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, the first ever created in the new field of international relations, argued in a packed lecture at Columbia in 1926 that race was “the most urgent problem of our time” and a “primary cause of war in the world.” Progressive scholarship and institution building were put forward as the alternative to theories of Anglo-Saxon hegemonic decline and to prophecies of a coming clash of civilizations with a rising East.

What Happens Next? What Now?

Much remains to be done before we can claim to understand the history of international studies in America. There were two unstable boundary lines at play in the scholarship of the interwar era—between states and between races—but

there is no good account as yet of the way this is worked out. A few international relations scholars in the 1930s adopt the position that Gunnar Myrdal will in 1944. They depicted racism as an atavistic, irrational prejudice found mainly in the traditions of lower-educated whites of the backward areas of the Deep South. Somewhat contradictorily, they dismissed the learned books then on everyone's IR reading lists as the products of pseudoscientific apologists for hierarchy. A few others, beginning with Ralph Bunche, adopt the race as world capitalist class strategy of divide and rule. These liberal and Marxian arguments notwithstanding, racialism in theory and practice is traceable across the divide of the war.

Similarly, in the case of area studies, it is impossible to trace the history in the absence of more knowledge about American studies in the 1930s and how this alternative national or civilizational model crowds out the IPR model of culture contact and interaction. Were these in fact alternatives?

Enough is known however to be confident that practitioners are unreliable guides to the history of international studies for a number of reasons. One is the line they continue to draw that ostensibly defines their unique domain of expertise. Thus, where in *The Journal of Race Development* one did not find articles on the Anglo-Saxon race and its branches, so in *World Politics* and every other international studies journal today one does not find articles on the domestic politics and culture of the United States. We sustain the fiction of occupying a position outside culture from which to observe the social world. Here the postcolonial studies critique matters a great deal. This blind spot in our definition of the field is hard to overcome.

International relations and international studies therefore cannot generate the accounts of the intersection of civil

rights and Cold War foreign policy, to give just one example. Research programs by people like Rogers Smith, Mary Dudziak, Gerald Horne, and Azza Layton, which show how identity and hegemony are intertwined in the Cold War (and after), are not eligible for funding. Yet more needs to be done just in this one area—not in uncovering the logic, but in recovering the accounts by those who first theorized about these processes decades ago but are left out of the literature reviews and bibliographies. C. Eric Lincoln's work in *New South* and Charles Cheng's essays in *Freedomways* in the 1960s are two examples among many that argue what Dudziak and others will stumble upon in the archives 25 years later. A third example is Harold Issacs's *New World of Negro Americans* ("the impact of world affairs on the race problem in the United States") published in 1963 under the auspices of none other than MIT's Center for International Studies. A work like this will not qualify for support today.

These are complex matters. In comparison, the constant refashioning of academic self image and the routine rediscovery that the world is growing more complex—elements in what Ben Fine describes as the increasing vulgarization of scholarship—are easier to understand. It is at such moments that our past is obliterated, making the task of recovery that much harder. ■

¹ This essay is based on ongoing research in the records of scholars (Blakeslee, Buell, Corwin, Curti, Friedrich, Merriam, Reinsch, Wright) and institutions (Foreign Policy Association, Council on Foreign Relations) from about 1900-1960. I have omitted all citations to records for reasons of space. For a fully annotated version, contact me at rvitalis@sas.upenn.edu. I am grateful for criticisms or ideas suggested by Cathy Boone, Fred Cooper, Lee Ann Fujii, Jane Gordon, Vicky Hattam, Ido Oren, David Rousseau, Nicole Sackley, Brian Schmidt, Rogers Smith, and Kent Worcester

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Comment by Thomas Bender

There is much talk among diplomatic historians these days about "opening archives." That talk does not refer to the archives Vitalis so fruitfully examined. Too bad for them, for he has found and told a very important story. Even if—as Vitalis freely admits—this story is not fully worked out in the paper, there are two immediate contributions, and he offers important pointers to others.

1. He extends the story of American awareness of the "international" and its study back to the turn of the century, that is, to the beginning of the modern era of globalization.
2. He reveals a more complex story of the creation of international studies, with more voices in dialogue, than is commonly understood. Moreover, he shows that this dialogue (or "large tent" understanding of the field) persisted longer than one might have thought.

In laying out this material that describes earlier visions and debates, Vitalis provides a larger platform than usual upon which to build our discussions. He thus gives us a starting point that opens up more space for imagining a different future. Vitalis, like Jessica Wang in a recent paper, shows that there were internationalist idealists before WWI, and they did not all go away. Recovery of this history, even if we make the Progressives seem naïve in their neo-enlightenment vision of peace through knowledge, is invaluable, for we ought not wholly ignore that aspiration, especially since we, too, are in the business of knowledge for peace—and more.

We should also recall that the "tough-minded" had their early visions of internationalism. I recently perused Alfred Thayer

Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*. The turn of the century internationalists had his tough realism; for him knowledge strategically informed power. And he taught it at the Naval War College.

We are usually taught (and we teach) that Americans are historically ignorant of the world and without institutions for learning about it: only after WWII did they get serious about it. That story is not wholly true; and knowing that gives us more space to think. And it helps us get a better fix on how our approach to worldly knowledge changed in the wake of WWII.

Vitalis also introduces a word too uncommon in discussions of American history. Save for what I will call the William Appleman Williams era, empire has been invisible in American history. Of course, we know something about it, but it is never quite important, and certainly not central. But it was central, and knowing that as well as why we keep overlooking it helps us understand our approach to worldly knowledge. Our denial of empire is part of our sense of specialness, even separateness, of our exceptionalism, of being not like European powers.

By naming our first empire with the euphemism "western expansion" we obscure its meaning; our second empire (after 1898) is usually understood as a momentary deviation from our natural course. What I will call our "informal" empire, evident from the time of Wilson to the present, is called free trade and the exercise of the police power essential to a world of commerce.

US engagement with internationalism that Vitalis documents derives from our shared interest, from our participation in internationalism, which was, he reminds us, mostly about colonial administration, since most of the world's territory was under colonial rule. That changes after World War II—but only partly.

World War II marks the beginning of mass decolonization and the emergence of new nations. That is important. But so is the continuity that we tend to overlook.

Here one of the special revelations of Vitalis' paper is fundamentally important; I refer to his bringing DuBois into the story. DuBois' famous declaration that the problem of the twentieth century is the color line is central. It supplies the principle of continuity that we tend to overlook.

The internationalists in Vitalis' account (mostly Anglo-American liberals) were trying to find better ways to manage and maintain colonies, a way that fused "improvement" of colored peoples and "prosperity" at home. The internationalists of the second half of the twentieth century, working along that same color line, sought to manage decolonization and "modernization."

I do not think we can understand the context of the founding of modern area studies in the early Cold War without understanding this two-chapter story.

What we call the Cold War era—whose ending is forcing a rethinking of international and area studies—is really a complex *pas de deux* bringing together two entangled but

distinct conflicts. The first, which I will call the Cold War *proper*, was a conflict focused on Europe managed by the US and the USSR—and after the later 1950s managed fairly well. The second was not so cold, or at least, not peaceful. Untold numbers were killed during the Cold War era in the third world. Here the contest was over decolonization and emergent nationalisms.

These two aspects of the Cold War at times merged, but they were also separate. Third world wars were not proxies (or not always proxies) for the main war in Europe; they had their own dynamic and purposes. And these wars continued and continue after the conclusion of the first.

In thinking about the past and future of international and area studies it is important to keep this difficult-to-define but essential distinction clear—for different area studies have different logics.

I am saying that we need to locate area studies and international studies in a larger history of the world. And that history is too complex for the "us" and "them" way we in the US, whether academics or the general public, think about the international.

These comments point to my final two observations—both of which concern false boundaries, though quite different ones.

The first addresses the great schism within the social sciences that places area studies in conflict with the so-called mainstream disciplines. The second concerns the place of the US in our thinking about international and area studies.

In the 1950s the social sciences were central to area studies, whether in new areas or built upon older "orientalist" programs.

The independent research units that populated a campus like Berkeley and provided leaves, reduced teaching loads, travel, and student support were funded with international studies money. Social scientists were recipients of this support. Few historians were involved—most of Asia and Africa was outside of the domain of history as then understood—and scholars of comparative literature, a product of the world wars, thought it was reaching far enough to consider both French and German texts.

Now, of course, history and literature have opened up to the world, while the harder social sciences have abandoned the analytical axes of time and space. So instead of supplementing the social sciences, the humanities are replacing them. The result is a double loss rather than a double win.

Forty years ago area studies mainly came under the administrative umbrella of the social science dean or subdean. By contrast, and I do not think this was unique, when I was Dean for the Humanities at NYU in the second half of the 1990s, I discovered that all of the areas studies programs (as well as ethnic studies ones) reported to me.

I found working with the programs interesting, but their migration was, I fear, a kind of demotion. The humanities are not a place of honor in universities. There is a war going on in universities between formalistic and quantitative social

sciences (mostly economics and political science) and the humanities, including history and anthropology.

While the humanities have taken area studies into their home, the home is in pretty bad shape. There are many indicators—numbers of majors are one.

But the stakes are larger than the university pecking order. The simple-minded debate about "theory" vs. "description," "universal" vs. "local" knowledge must be ended. Space must be created for a richer debate and richer social analysis. Textual analysis offers much—as an intellectual historian I am quite sympathetic to it—but it cannot alone explain the world. Neither can numbers or models.

I have no solution to this problem, but I think a solution resides in a more sophisticated understanding of theory as necessarily embedded. And in a related recognition that disciplines are not things in themselves to be protected and developed as disciplines. Rather disciplines are agreed upon protocols for guiding the work of inquiring into the natural and social worlds. Quite differently from Kant's dictum for the regard of humans, disciplines should be valued only as means, not ends.

I might note here that political scientist Charles Lindblom, surely one of the important post-war American social scientists, has argued (in a context other than the one that concerns us here) that the so-called "theoretical" achievements of his discipline are of far less consequence than works of rigorously realized description, especially in the international field. I like the point. But he makes too sharp the distinction between what I would call "embedded theory" and description.

There are a number of opinions out there that the social sciences are in crisis—just a couple of weeks ago Rogers Smith had a piece in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* saying political science was in crisis. If enough accept that notion, there may be the possibility for a renovating dialogue.

My final point concerns the place of the United States in the area studies enterprise. Vitalis raises this question at the end of his paper. American studies and foreign area studies were institutionalized at the same time, with some of the same logic. But never was a relation between them imagined or developed. New understandings of the borders of areas are

"I am struck by what changes are involved in getting outside of our own perspective. To de-center ourselves is a very difficult thing to do, especially as this connects with the current debate over 'globalization'—scholars from other countries shy away from it because globalization is linked to Americanization." **-Dorothy Ross**

being developed, and interrelations between them are being considered. But the US is absent from the whole ecology being developed.

Area studies scholars and Americanists apparently agree: international is "over there," separate from us. We are not integrated into the world, except for those unfortunate moments of crisis when we are forced to enter. There is no recognition that what is now the US has been continuously involved since the beginning of the 16th century.

How can we understand the international world and any place on the globe if we exclude the manifold ways the US (or America) has been and continues to be a part of that history?

In 1898, the *New York Journal of Commerce* observed that "we are part of abroad." The year and the title of the publication were just right for the point. But Americans, whether intellectuals or the general public, did not grasp the essential fact being insisted upon. And, of course, we American historians have specialized in isolating the nation. It is self-contained. One

would never know from most historiography that the American revolution was part of a larger age of democratic revolutions, or, until recently, that the American South was on the fringes, not the center, of an Atlantic slave system that Curtin has called the plantation complex, or that more Italians emigrated to France and Germany in the 1890s than to the US, or that those with the most resources went to Buenos Aires rather than to New York.

One could go on. But the point is that American history is understood to be the singular focal point, never on the periphery of anything or part of a history larger than itself—and always self-contained.

The argument can be made that from the 1890s till the 1940s the US was less intellectually isolationist—and Daniel Rodgers of Princeton recently made that argument. While acknowledging that the notion of American exceptionalism precedes settlement and can be traced in various phases of American intellectual history, Rodgers insists that the 1940s marked a massive intensification of the idea.

Until WWII, there was considerable interest in a transnational understanding of American history. J. Franklin Jameson, founding editor of the *American Historical Review*

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"Disciplines aren't ends in themselves; neither are interdisciplinary fields. True. But we are compelled to act and this requires a commitment to the field, to see how the reproduction process works, and what we think deeper ends are—we too seldom have discourses about our purposes." **-Craig Calhoun**

and of the National Archives, in a lecture of 1912 on "The Future of History," observed that "the nation is ceasing to be the leading form of the world's structure; organizations transcending national boundaries are becoming more and more numerous and effective." These include some of the organizations Vitalis notes, and that Akira Iriye has studied in depth. Frederick Jackson Turner, who, because of his frontier hypothesis is usually seen as the founder of the exceptionalist version of American historiography, was a strong advocate of locating American history in larger histories.

The big change comes later in the 1940s.

Let me conclude with a revealing incident.

Prompted by the war, the AHA leadership proposed to develop a world history curriculum that would include the US. Toward this end, they commissioned Bessie Pierce of the University of Chicago History Department to develop a syllabus.

However, when Alan Nevins—the journalist turned historian at Columbia University—heard about this he complained. At a time when we were at war, he argued, we should concentrate on teaching American history. More not less American history was needed; enlarging the context would dilute the necessary story.

The New York Times jumped onto the Nevins bandwagon and ran a campaign for more American history, pure and simple. The AHA dropped the whole idea—and until recently the episode was entirely forgotten, discovered by an Australian historian.

Unfortunately, there is a September 11 *coda* to this little story. The newly-appointed head of the National Endowment for the Humanities, Bruce Cole, probably prompted by the "Second Lady," Lynne Cheney, announced that in the wake of September 11th the most important contribution the NEH can make is to fund increased study

of American history. Period. That policy announcement was not linked to a proposal to increase funding for the study of the histories of cultures about which we manifestly know too little. ■

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"Many specialists now interested in the study of areas have been trained in subject matter fields that are very much the product of our own Western culture. This holds particularly for economics, sociology, psychology, and political science. The conceptual schemes upon which these disciplines are based are, in large measure, the product of Western thought and institutions. Much of our thought in these fields has developed greatly within recent decades and largely within a capitalistic and democratic society. Specialists whose training derives from this context are now attempting to apply their methods of analysis to cultures that are very different. The assumption of the economist concerning economic behavior, the findings of the psychologist concerning freedom and authority, the premises of the sociologist in examining familial and social structures may undergo considerable modification. At any rate, if there be a provincialism within these disciplines, it will be quickly revealed when the expert applies his formulation to alien cultures." **-Pendleton Herring, Former SSRC President, at the SSRC/Carnegie Conference on the Study of World Areas, 1947.**

Participants in the SSRC Roundtable on *Rethinking International Studies*

Lisa Anderson, dean of the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University.

Thomas Bender, University Professor of the Humanities and director of the International Center for Advanced Studies, New York University.

Sheila Biddle, former director of the Ford Foundation's International Studies Program.

Thomas J. Biersteker, director of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and the Henry R. Luce Professor of Transnational Organizations, Brown University.

Craig Calhoun, president of the Social Science Research Council and professor of sociology and history, New York University.

Frederick Cooper, professor of history, New York University, and former chair, department of history, the University of Michigan.

Joseph Duffey, senior vice-president of Sylvan International Universities, director of the US Information Agency during the Clinton presidency, and past president of American University.

David Engerman, assistant professor of history, Brandeis University, participant in the NYU Project on Internationalizing the Study of American History.

Louis Goodman, dean of the School of International Service, American University.

Steven Heydemann, director of the SSRC Program on International Peace and Security and the Program on the Near and Middle East, 1990-1997, and now director of the Program on Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies.

Burkart Holznier, Distinguished Service Professor of International Studies, professor of sociology and public and international affairs, and former director of the Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh.

Michael Kennedy, vice provost for international affairs, director of the International Institute, and associate professor of sociology, University of Michigan.

Gail W. Lapidus, senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies, Stanford University.

Mary Byrne McDonnell, executive director and chief operating officer of the SSRC.

Gilbert W. Merks, professor of the practice of sociology, director of the Center for International Studies and vice provost for international affairs and development, Duke University.

Elizabeth Povinelli, professor of anthropology with a joint appointment in the history of culture, University of Chicago.

Dorothy Ross, Arthur O. Lovejoy Professor of History, Johns Hopkins University.

John Tirman, co-director of the Program on Global Security & Cooperation at the SSRC.

Robert Vitalis, associate professor of political science and director of the Middle East Center, University of Pennsylvania.

Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., Hass Professor of Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley.

Islam *In Situ*: A Fellows Symposium

At a moment when public interest in Islam is acute but in-depth analysis is often lacking, it was striking that a significant number of the fellows who gathered at our most recent International Dissertation Field Research Fellowship (IDRF) workshop in New Orleans had been studying Islam in a variety of social settings.

The three essays carried in our previous issue and the three below describe the key questions our fellows are trying to answer in their field work and discuss how an understanding of Islam and the role of Muslim actors in particular settings reveals both its cultural unity and marked diversity.

The IDRF program promotes dissertation field research that treats place and setting in relation to global and transnational phenomena as well as particular histories and cultures. It exemplifies the Council's commitment to advancing knowledge derived from careful empirical research in ways that intersect with broad comparative and transnational themes.

Empire Building and Islam: Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1872-1919

By Thomas Kühn

In 19th- and 20th-century Africa, Middle East and South Asia, political actors from very different regional and socio-political contexts—from Maghrebi Sufi *shaykhs* to reformist scholars from Cairo—drew on and reworked Islamic symbols and concepts in an attempt to rally support against or to cope with the imperial presence of the British, French, or Italians.¹ The encounter between the Muslim population of these regions and the European imperial powers was among those factors that shaped what today is referred to as political Islam, which still provides a powerful platform for local leaders and political activists to denounce Western political and economic influence as imperialist. This could easily lead us to the conclusion that “Islam” in the 19th and 20th centuries was first and foremost an idiom of anti-imperialist struggle.

A recently published monograph that studies the ways in which the regime of the Ottoman Sultan ‘Abdülhamid II (who ruled from 1876-1909) used Islamic concepts, seems to confirm this impression. Its author argues, for instance, that “[t]he uses of religion for propaganda purposes by Europe and by the Ottoman sultan may be sharply contrasted. Whereas Christianity was used as the ideological weapon of colonial expansion, Islam was used in defending against colonialism.”²

However, as I will demonstrate in this essay, results from fieldwork conducted for my dissertation on “Shaping Ottoman Rule in Yemen, 1872-1919” suggest that this was only one aspect of a more complex picture. It is my contention that Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals used Islamic concepts not just defensively but also to justify the conquest of southwest Arabia between 1870 and 1873 and the subjugation of the local people during the following decades. More specifically, I will argue that the Ottomans adapted and redeployed earlier Islamic concepts, such as the idea of a righteous order embodied in the term *shari‘a* or anti-Shi‘i polemics, to legitimate and sustain a modern project of imperialist expansion that came to display

elements of colonial rule. While an in-depth discussion of these points is beyond the scope of this essay, I would nevertheless like to summarize some results of my research in progress. The broader purpose of this paper is to propose a more nuanced and complex understanding of the forms and dynamics of imperialism and modernity in the 19th/20th century Middle East.

In a series of campaigns between 1870 and 1873 Ottoman military forces conquered large parts of southwest Arabia from a few strongholds along the southern Red Sea coast seized in the late 1840s.³ Much of the territory that the conquerors sought to organize as the Province of Yemen (*Yemen vilayeti*) had already been part of the Ottoman Empire from the 1530s to 1635 when a local dynasty of Shi‘i Imams brought this first period of Ottoman rule to an end. Sources such as government papers from the Prime Ministry Archives in Istanbul, newspaper articles or historiographical works show that Ottoman bureaucrats, soldiers and intellectuals represented the conquest and administration of Yemen as a “civilizing mission,” echoing elite perspectives on the empire’s borderland peoples in general. This, in turn, reflected new visions of state and society that Ottoman elites had adopted since the early decades of the 19th century as part of a complex transformation of the empire’s administrative, military and fiscal structures, known as *Tanzimat*.

It is interesting to see that Ottoman notions of a mission to civilize the local population had a strong Islamic coloring. Indeed, for authors like Colonel Ahmed Rashid who wrote an official account of the campaigns of 1870-73, civilizing the indigenous population to an important degree meant turning them into good Muslims.⁴ In other words, Rashid represented adherence to local forms of Islam as one of those features that marked off the locals as “backward,” “primitive” and “uncivilized.” His main target were the Zaydi Imams, the leaders of a local branch of Shi‘i Islam, who had ruled parts of the region after winning their independence from the Ottoman Empire in the 1630s. In this way anti-Shi‘i

polemics that had been current among Ottoman-Sunni elites during the early modern period were re-deployed within a modern imperial discourse according to which the civilized and modern were entitled to rule over the backward. Whereas earlier on Sunni scholars had viewed adherence to Shi'ism simply as heresy,⁵ late 19th-century Ottoman observers like Rashid argued that support for the Zaydi Imams was essentially due to the "backwardness" and cultural "inferiority" of the local people. Education and religious instruction *à l'ottomane*, so the argument went, would raise the indigenous population to the civilizational level of the conquerors. They were, therefore, considered critical to ensure their loyalty to the new rulers and to undermine the influence of the Imams.

While Ottomanist historians have pointed to the parallels between these perspectives and the notions of a civilizing mission that we know from the context of 19th/20th-century imperialism, they have nevertheless insisted that Ottoman expansion in southwest Arabia was not part of an imperialist project comparable to those pursued by European powers of the time. Werner Schmucker, for instance, does not consider the Ottoman conquest and administration of Yemen imperialist because it was, in his view, motivated by a genuine feeling of responsibility on the part of the Ottoman government to protect its fellow Muslims in the region against encroachments of imperialist Christian powers, such as Great Britain.⁶ However, a comparative look at the case of 19th- and 20th-century Japanese empire-building, for example, shows that imperialism and what Japanese officials and intellectuals represented as cultural affinity for the population of Korea or Taiwan were not mutually exclusive.⁷ With this in view, it appears more plausible to suggest that what we are dealing with is a specifically Ottoman form of imperialism. Like the Japanese with regard to their East Asian dependencies, the Ottomans with regard to Yemen—and possibly other borderlands—developed a perspective on local society that acknowledged common cultural bonds with the conquered and yet insisted on their cultural inferiority.

There is evidence that initially the Ottoman government had no intention to formalize perceived cultural hierarchies through the creation of specific administrative structures.⁸ However, not least as a result of local opposition, decision-makers in Yemen and Istanbul appear to have realized by the late 1870s that assimilating the local people into the structures of the empire in the ways that had been projected would not work. Obviously, the Province of Yemen as an imperial borderland could not be governed like provinces where government influence was much stronger. Very much like colonial officials in various parts of the British, French or Russian empires during the 19th and 20th centuries, Ottoman officials came to argue that maintaining the Ottoman presence in southwest Arabia depended critically on adapting administrative structures and practices to what they perceived as local conditions.⁹ To be sure, implementing the structures of the *Tanzimat* state involved various degrees of adaptation throughout the empire. What characterized

borderlands such as Yemen was the high degree to which administrative practices departed from supposedly empire-wide standards combined with the fact that government officials assumed a perspective of cultural superiority toward the local population. The high degree to which government officials had to "negotiate" the terms of rule with the local population was due not only to the precarious position of the state at the frontier of the empire, but also to the fact that Yemen, like other imperial borderlands, was the site of intense competition between the Ottoman government and its European rivals.¹⁰

Particularly important in this context was the dismantling of the newly established, largely secular *nizamiye* ("regular") courts in the 1880s with their functions being assumed by *shari'a* courts. It is clear from Ottoman government correspondence that the decision to abolish the *nizamiye* court system in the Province of Yemen was a key element of what Brinkley Messick has termed "*shari'a* politics,"¹¹ i.e., the attempt on the part of the imperial government to appear as legitimate rulers to the indigenous population by showing its commitment to upholding the specific form of righteous order associated with the application of the Sacred Law (*shari'a*).

The upgrading of the *shari'a* courts has to be seen as part of a broader effort on the part of Ottoman officials to elaborate a form of governance that would be in accordance with the "dispositions" (*emzice*) and "customs" (*adat*) of the local people. It was in this connection that the government decided, for instance, not to introduce conscription but to create units of locally recruited volunteers who were outfitted with "native style" uniforms.¹² Similarly, for a brief period in the late 1880s "commissions for Bedouin affairs" were set up to settle conflicts in rural areas according to "customary" law while 10 years later all government officials were required to wear what was meant to resemble the characteristic attire of local religious scholars.¹³

What we observe, then, is an attempt to objectify and control "the local" in ways that paralleled similar efforts undertaken by modern British, French or Russian colonial regimes in India, West Africa or the Central Asian dependencies of the Tsarist Empire. At one level, these administrative structures and practices were "negotiated": they represented the outcome of power struggles between the representatives of government and various segments of the local population, showing that power equations in Yemen often favored the latter. Like the concepts of "indirect rule" and "association" in British and French-ruled Africa, these Ottoman attempts to govern in accordance with local conditions were thus a reflection of the failure of government efforts to remake local society.¹⁴

However, since the soldiers and administrators from outside the province viewed local ways, including what they perceived as people's attachment to the *shari'a*, as backward and culturally inferior, the above-mentioned measures formalized cultural hierarchies and produced the effect of distancing the indigenous population from the conquerors.

In other words, the homogenizing project of a civilizing mission that was to turn the local people into Ottomans was contradicted and undermined by administrative practices that created and reproduced difference. Ideas of governing the Province of Yemen as a colony and not as a province on the same footing with *vilayets* such as Syria or Bursa, formulated by high-ranking officials around 1909, reflected this process of distancing.

There is, of course, no question of viewing Ottoman conceptions of “the local” in the Province of Yemen as objective renderings of local realities or as mere inventions. It is, therefore, a central aspect of my research to explore how these conceptions were elaborated in a context that was shaped by the interaction of Ottoman officials with the local population and the interstate competition that pitted the Ottoman Empire against its European rivals. In many ways, however, these two levels of interaction were connected and cannot be thought of as separate.

Perhaps the most important result of the Ottoman quest for the “local” was the treaty of Da‘an concluded by Imam Yahya (d. 1948) and the Ottoman government in 1911. Bringing to an end years of armed conflict between the supporters of the Imam and Ottoman military forces, the Da‘an agreement made Yahya the autonomous ruler over those parts of the province with a mainly Zaydi population. While with the treaty the government finally accepted some of the most important demands of the Imam, the effort was in keeping with Ottoman attempts to order and contain local society, carrying one step further the formalizing of difference and the distancing of the Ottomans from the indigenous population. This is reflected in statements by high-ranking officials who likened the new political arrangement and previous autonomy schemes to forms of indirect rule in parts of the British Empire. Official correspondence shows that plans to partition the Province of Yemen along sectarian lines, into Sunni and Zaydi populated regions, had been discussed in government circles at least since the 1890s. There is evidence that since the 1870s sectarian divisions played an increasingly prominent role within Ottoman conceptions of local society.¹⁵

These perspectives were certainly shaped through the conflict between the Ottoman administration and supporters of the Imams, which in turn were precipitated not least by the aggressive anti-Shi‘i stance of the Hamidian regime with its concept of Sunni-led Islamic unity under the Sultan-caliph. It also may be argued that they were informed by emerging forms of sectarian politics in Ottoman Lebanon and other parts of the empire, which emerged to an important degree as a result of European imperial influence.¹⁶ However, since the Ottomans were keen observers of British colonial politics it might be more than mere coincidence that these plans were debated at a time when Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, was trying to push through the partition of Bengal along sectarian lines.¹⁷ The political arrangement laid down in the treaty was perhaps one of the most important consequences of Ottoman rule over this part of the

Arabian Peninsula: it allowed the Imam to consolidate his position against his political rivals in the region and, thus, enabled him to launch his bid for the creation of an independent Yemeni state in the aftermath of World War I.

The case of Ottoman Yemen shows that Islamic concepts were an integral part of modern empire building and were not just used as a defense against imperialist encroachments. As we have seen, Ottoman imperialists’ use of these concepts was shaped not least by their struggles and encounters with the local population that had to cope with Ottoman expansion. ■

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¹ See, for instance, Edmund Burke III and Ira M. Lapidus, eds. *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1988, Julia A. Clancy-Smith, *Rebel and Saint*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1994, Michael Gilsenan, *Recognizing Islam*, London, 1992, 142–163, 215–250, Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State*, London, 1993, 38–63.

² Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam. Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State*, Oxford, 2001, 221.

³ Paul Dresch, *Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen*, Oxford, 1993, 198–218.

⁴ See, for instance, Ahmed Rashid, *Tarih-i Yemen ve San’a* [History of Yemen and of Sanaa], 2 vols., Istanbul, 1291 H./1875, 2, 252–256. Prime Ministry Archives, Istanbul/Ottoman Archives [BBA-OA]/Yıldız Esas Evrakı [YEE] 7-19; memorandum by General Ferid Pasha [no date, date given on the seal: 1322].

⁵ See, for instance, Colin Imber, *Ebu’s-Su’ud. The Islamic Legal Tradition*, Edinburgh, 1997, 86–89.

⁶ Werner Schmucker, “Zur Begründung der zweimaligen türkischen Besetzung des Jemen nach Ahmad Rashids ‘Geschichte des Jemen und San’a’s’,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* IX (1984), 203–278, 203–204, 276–277.

⁷ See Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Attitudes towards Colonialism, 1895–1945,” in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, Princeton, N.J., 1984, 79–127.

⁸ Jon Mandaville, “Memduh Pasha and Aziz Bey: Ottoman Experience in Yemen,” in *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*, ed. B. R. Pridham, London, Sydney, 1984, 20–33, 21.

⁹ See, for instance, Daniel R. Brower, “Islam and Ethnicity: Russian Colonial Policy in Turkestan,” in *Russia’s Orient. Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–1917*, ed. Daniel R. Brower and Edward J. Lazzerini, Bloomington, Ind., 1997, 115–137, 117–118, Alice L. Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize. The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895–1930*, Stanford, 1997, 176–211, Frederick Cooper, “Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History,” *American Historical Review* 99, 5 (December 1994): 1516–1545, 1531.

¹⁰ See particularly Huri İslamoğlu’s recent work, which demonstrates this with regard to parts of the Balkan provinces: “Property as Contested Domain: a Reevaluation of the Ottoman Land Code of 1858,” in *New Perspectives on Property and Land in the Middle East*, ed. Roger Owen, Cambridge, Mass., 2000, 3–61, particularly 35–39.

¹¹ Brinkley Messick, *The Calligraphic State*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1993, 50.

¹² See Thomas Kühn, “Clothing the ‘Uncivilized’: Military Recruitment in Ottoman Yemen and the Quest for ‘Native’ Uniforms,” in *Costume and Identity in the Ottoman Empire*, eds. Suraiya Faruqi and Christoph K. Neumann, Istanbul (forthcoming).

¹³ BBA/YEE 8-26, memorandum by the governor (mutasarrıf) of Malatya, Mahmud Nedim [date given on the seal: 1311], 5.

¹⁴ See Cooper, “African History,” 1531.

¹⁵ The work of Isa Blumi and Ussama Makdisi suggests a similar trajectory for Ottoman Lebanon and the Albanian-populated territories in the Ottoman Balkans. See Ussama Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 2000, Isa Blumi, “The Social Parameters of Identity: The Role of Education in Albanian Identity Formation,” in *International Congress on Learning and Education in the Ottoman World*, ed. Ali Caksu, Istanbul, 2001, 225–235.

¹⁶ Cf. Makdisi, *Sectarianism*, 7–10, 166 and Blumi, “Identity,” 227, 230, 232.

¹⁷ Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, *A Concise History of India*, Cambridge, 2002, 153–160.

Hizballah's Geographical Imagination: An Islamist Approach to Urban Governance and Planning

By Emma Naughton

In 1985, in the midst of Lebanon's civil war (1975-1991), one of Beirut's daily newspapers published a two-paragraph article describing the appearance of *Jihad al-Bina'a*, or, roughly translated, the "Jihad Construction Association." According to the article, *Jihad al-Bina'a* had arrived in Bir Al-Abed, a war-torn neighborhood in Beirut's impoverished southern suburbs, to repair damaged houses.¹

Seventeen years, 1200 houses and several schools, hospitals and infrastructure projects later, *Jihad al-Bina'a* is part of a sophisticated and effective urban planning machine allied to Hizballah, one of Lebanon's Islamist political parties. Although registered as a charitable organization, *Jihad al-Bina'a*, along with Hizballah's other urban planning organs, surpasses common notions of charitable works by engaging in Lebanon's messy and complex postwar urban politics. They do so on behalf of thousands of displaced Shi'ite families who occupy Beirut's southern suburbs, commonly referred to as the Belt of Misery because of the squalid squatter settlements located there. *Jihad al-Bina'a* executes the construction and development projects researched and designed by Hizballah's Center for Consultation and Documentation, an institute established by the party in 1988 to devise an urban development policy for the southern suburbs. To this end, the Center's engineers, architects and planners have conducted exhaustive studies of the southern suburbs in order to produce a master plan for the area, which forms the basis for decisions regarding which projects are implemented, when and where.²

Jihad and reconstruction? Hizballah and urban planning? An army of engineers, architects and planners? How do such things fit into our notions of what a radical Islamist group is supposed to be? According to the US State Department, Hizballah is an Iranian-backed terrorist organization dedicated to sowing chaos and disorder in the name of Islamic fundamentalism. But the US government's view ignores the fact that Hizballah today is a far more complex organization than it was in the mid eighties. There is no question that the party's military wing remains strong and that they continue some guerrilla activities.³ But Hizballah has also evolved into a political party that is today an essential player in Lebanon's post-war social and economic recovery. In fact, it is precisely Hizballah's urban development efforts in *Dahiya* (Beirut's southern suburbs) that have contributed in large part to this transformation. In the face of government neglect, Hizballah's implementation of large-scale public work projects, including water distribution, garbage collection, road repair and sewage removal, has earned them the political allegiance of hundreds of thousands of *Dahiya*'s residents and a place at the negotiating table when it comes to government development initiatives in the area.

It was only after living in Beirut for several months that

the importance of Hizballah's urban development efforts became clear to me. I had originally planned to focus on the much better-known and spectacular postwar reconstruction of Beirut's Central District (BCD). It was the revival of the former "Paris of the Middle East" that had captured the imagination of the international media and the attention of urban scholars. I had been similarly seduced by the image of Beirut's ravaged cityscape giving way once more to the cosmopolitan, Mediterranean city nostalgically evoked by former residents and visitors.

Exposure to local media and the excellent work of local scholars, however, made me realize that the restoration of Beirut's historic downtown is only one part of the postwar reconstruction story. Beirut's urban elites, despite their desire to restore Beirut to its prewar glory, have been forced to take into account new urban realities arising from Lebanon's bitter 16-year civil war. Hizballah's entry onto Beirut's urban political scene through the control of significant urban space is one such postwar reality.

Hizballah and the politics of locality

Traveling from Beirut's trendy, upscale central district into the shanty-towns of *Dahiya* is like traveling to another country; one has the distinct feeling of crossing borders, of entering a differently ordered space. This effect is produced in part by the obvious differences in their respective built environments: the central district's wide cobblestone pedestrian walkways and graceful Ottoman arches contrast sharply with *Dahiya*'s densely populated maze of ramshackle apartments and vegetable stalls. Moreover, Hizballah's presence throughout *Dahiya* is readily apparent to the outside observer: giant posters of Khomeini and Nasrallah (Hizballah's Secretary General) line the streets, the party's yellow and green flags fly from rooftops and windows, and memorials to Hizballah's martyrs mark traffic circles and other public spaces.



But the distinction is also reinforced in the popular discourse of members of Beirut's middle and upper classes: *Dahiya* is represented as a chaotic, dirty, disease-filled space where peasant ways threaten Beirut's cosmopolitanism. Impolite behavior in Beirut proper is met with the common admonishment, "this isn't *Dahiya*, you know." And what Beirut's middle classes reject, Hizballah embraces. *Dahiya* is appropriated in Hizballah's discourse as "our territory," and fashioned into a kind of moral space that provides security and rootedness for Lebanon's internally displaced.

Hizballah's role in Beirut's urban spatial politics began during the civil war. Previously excluded from Beirut's urban political hierarchy, it competed with other warring factions to exercise control over parcels of urban territory. The party competes particularly with Amal, Lebanon's other Shi'ite Muslim party, for pre-eminence among Beirut's large displaced Shi'ite refugee population that fled to *Dahiya* from the war-torn south. Although parts of *Dahiya* remain Amal strongholds, most observers agree that Hizballah is the area's more effective representative, both in terms of project implementation and lobbying the central government on residents' behalf.

Hizballah's urban strategies are informed by a distinct philosophy of "self-sufficiency" for the southern suburbs and its residents. Accusing the government of sectarian discrimination against the southern suburbs over the years, Hizballah seeks to promote the area's independence through provision of services and the cultivation of human resources. This contrasts with Amal's desire to strengthen ties between *Dahiya* and the rest of Beirut, and to encourage increased heterogeneity in the area's demographic makeup. Associations such as *Jihad al-Bina'a* and the Center for Consultation and Documentation, however, mean that Hizballah is able to operationalize its philosophy in very concrete ways where Amal cannot.⁴

Despite its aims for self-sufficiency in *Dahiya*, Hizballah cannot escape the fact that it is not the only actor with an important stake in the area's future. The area holds strategic importance for Solidere, the real estate company overseeing the reconstruction of Beirut Central District (BCD), because

it contains the Beirut international airport and the highway that links it to the downtown district. There are physical and logistical issues of unimpeded and efficient transportation to and from the airport, especially important to transnational executives and tourists. There are also issues of image-making and impression management for Solidere. For potential tourists and investors, the first impressions of Lebanon and Beirut are produced on the trip from the airport to the BCD and hotel district. Until recently, the only road to the airport was flanked by shanty-towns, Palestinian refugee camps and other scenes of poverty and blight (not to mention obvious manifestations of Islamism that make Western investors nervous). A new highway has been constructed which bypasses most of this scenery, and there are comprehensive plans to transform part of the area into a regulated middle-class and high-end tourist spot (along the coast). The name of the urban redevelopment project is Elyssar, and its contentious genesis provides an interesting example of Hizballah's growing expertise in the game of urban spatial politics.

Hizballah, Elyssar and the Contested Right to the City

After the war ended in the early 1990s, the government turned its attention to *Dahiya* for several reasons. Primarily, the state wanted to curtail the power of the Islamist groups and reassert its authority over the territory. Second, as part of its modernizing program, the Hariri government wanted to cleanse and redevelop the suburb that lay on the road between the city center and the international airport, including potentially lucrative waterfront acreage. Third, Prime Minister Hariri wanted to counter the popular image that he was concerned only with the rehabilitation of the more affluent and economically viable city center. Thus in 1994 the government launched the Elyssar Project, which aims to restructure the western part of the suburb that borders the Mediterranean.

Elyssar was originally envisioned by Prime Minister Hariri as a private real estate company established by the same law that created Solidere. Hizballah and Amal, however, refused to allow a private company to take charge of the reorganization and restructuring of their "territory." As a result of strenuous Islamist opposition, Elyssar became a public entity rather than a private enterprise. Further, representatives from Amal and Hizballah sit on the board of Elyssar along with government officials. The government has also committed itself to allowing *Dahiya's* residents to retain property rights by temporarily expropriating land, retaining 25% for public use, and then redistributing plots of land to owners.⁵ Large plots of land on the coast that are currently the site of illegal squatter settlements will be expropriated and developed in order to realize their full real estate potential. Elyssar has pledged to use the benefits from the real estate development to finance the construction of housing to shelter most of the area's illegal inhabitants.⁶ In



its first phase, yet to be carried out, the plan calls for 1800 residential units contained within 100 housing units of either six or eight stories, organized into 15 blocks of five buildings.

If all goes according to plan, the residents of Beirut's "belt of misery" will have access to a higher standard of living. Due in large part to Hizballah's protracted negotiations on their behalf with the government and real estate speculators, they will not be displaced yet again, but will ostensibly benefit from the new socio-spatial organization designed by Elyssar's planners. Their residency will be normalized, and they will gain certain rights as tenants and owners. This is no small feat, considering *Dahiya's* illegal residents would surely have been victimized if the voracious Lebanese real estate development sector had free reign in the area.

Despite these positive elements, Elyssar is not without warts. Hyper-rationality and the idea of ordering space through zoning are two prominent elements in Elyssar's plans. The end result, according to one critical urban planner, will be the homogenization and segregation of the southern suburb's population in anonymous housing blocks.⁷

But there are signs of increasing public debate about the costs and benefits of Elyssar for *Dahiya's* residents. Hizballah's Center for Consultation and Documentation organized a substantive and well-attended conference on Elyssar in 1998, where some of the country's top planners and architects tackled important issues of population density, relocation, and the importance of incorporating residents' rural traditions into urban design. The Center has published and disseminated the conference proceedings⁸, which have been discussed extensively in the local press.

Transforming Spaces of War into Social Spaces

Photographs of Beirut's southern suburbs in the mid-80s show incredible scenes of massive urban destruction. Although the cramped, ramshackle structures and narrow streets that characterize today's *Dahiya* compare poorly to

the rest of Beirut, they're a far cry from the urban battlefield of the civil war. And *Dahiya* is the only home that many of its "illegal" residents have ever known. Although many residents will be relocated as a result of the Elyssar development project, Hizballah has ensured that they will receive housing in the same area. So not only will *Dahiya's* residents be spared complete dislocation once again, Hizballah is allowed to keep its urban political base intact. Within the framework of what has been described by some commentators as "liberation Shi'ism,"⁹ Hizballah is engaged in the politics of locality while simultaneously fulfilling one of its primary ideological tenets: the promotion of social welfare. And in the midst of Lebanon's raucous politics and the wider regional instability, Hizballah continues to mobilize its "army" of engineers, architects and planners to ensure a viable urban existence for Beirut's underclass. ■

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Photos from the 1980's archives of the newspaper *An-Nahar*.

Endnotes

¹ *An-Nahar*, July 31, 1985.

² Mona Harb, *Politiques Urbaines dans la banlieue-sud de Beyrouth* (Beirut: CER-MOC, 1996), p.33.

³ It is worth noting that Hizballah's resistance activities against the Israeli occupation are officially sanctioned by the Lebanese government. Hizballah is the only Lebanese militia other than the Lebanese Army formally allowed by the state to bear arms.

⁴ For discussions of urban politics in the southern suburbs, see Harb, *Politiques Urbaines* op.cit., Wafa Charefeddine, *La Banlieue-sud de Beyrouth: structure urbaine et economique, these d'amenagement* (Paris: Universite de Paris, 1987), and Judith Harik, *The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias* (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1994).

⁵ This contrasts with property-owners in the BCD, whose land was expropriated by Solidere in return for shares in the company.

⁶ Mona El-Kak, "Transforming the Site of Dereliction into the Urban Culture of Modernity: Beirut's Southern Suburb and the Elisar Project," in Peter Rowe and Hashim Sarkis, eds., *Projecting Beirut: Episodes in the Construction and Reconstruction of a Modern City* (New York: Prestel, 1998), pp. 173-181.

⁷ El-Kak, "The Site of Dereliction" op. cit.

⁸ "Elyssar, al-Waq'a wa al-tahawalat: Medina, Iqtisad, wa Ijtima'a," (Beirut: Center for Consultation and Documentation, 1998).

⁹ Judith Harik, *The Public and Social Services of the Lebanese Militias*, op.cit., p.24

Disaggregating Islam for Social Science Analysis: The Internal Dynamics of Parliamentary Islamism In Comparative Perspective

By Khaled Helmy

Since September 11, the high stakes accompanying the advent of the civilizational banner of Islam to the center stage of global politics call our attention more than ever to the need for a grounded understanding of Islam beyond simplified overgeneralizations. The term Islam itself as an analytic category necessarily invites overgeneralization because of the high level of abstraction it entails—an abstraction of a myriad worlds involving multiple diverse elements, sometimes contradictory and often in flux. Islam as high abstraction has hampered social science efforts to generate testable hypotheses on the workings of Muslim societies. In

political science, this is evident in attempts to address the Middle Eastern lag in democratization. In that context, Islam emerges as a subject of debate over its compatibility with democracy. Some scholars have argued for an incompatibility rooted in an Islamic historical legacy (e.g., Pipes 1983, Lewis 1993) and in various Islamic doctrines and beliefs (e.g., Huntington 1985, 1991, 1996). Others have refuted those claims citing aspects of Islamic culture that are conducive to democracy (e.g., Esposito & Voll 1994). The challenge to disaggregate the high abstraction of the Islam variable poses several problems. Islam as a set of doctrines with multiple facets

and often contradictory interpretations begs the question of which guidelines define the particular doctrines at play in influencing political realities. Similarly, Islam's historical legacy raises the problem of which aspects of that legacy exert an influence in any given political setting—putting into question the explanatory power of a single Islamic legacy to account for diverse outcomes and for change.

The failure to disaggregate Islamic culture occurs on the level of *political actors* and of *mechanisms*. There is general lack of clarity in the literature on Islam and democracy on the specification of which category of actors bears or determines the cultural influence of Islam on politics: masses, elites, clerics, lay Muslims, Islamist moderates or radicals? In a similar fashion, that literature fails to specify the *mechanisms* through which culture exerts its supposed effect, the observable processes linking either doctrine or historical legacy to actual political phenomena in the modern world. The cultural text (doctrine or Islamic legacy) is thought to find its expression irrespective of context. The problem this presents to empirically-minded social science research, aside from lack of testability, is the failure to specify the conditions under which the presumed cultural effects are expected to last across time and space. The failure to specify actors and mechanisms inevitably entails tautological reasoning: the supposed effect of Islamic culture, democratic or undemocratic, turns out to be a function of the particular doctrine or aspect of historical legacy an author chooses to define as Islam's essence—whose manifestation occurs unadulterated by context and mediated by no specified category of actors.

Against this theoretical background, the phenomenon of parliamentary Islamism, central to the issue of the relationship of Islam and democracy, emerges as the under-studied phenomenon of the Middle East, even though it lies at the intersection of two trends that have gained much scholarly attention—political liberalization and the rise of Islamism. Since 1984, Islamists have taken part in parliamentary elections and made electoral gains in Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Kuwait, Yemen, Lebanon, Turkey, Morocco and pre-1989 Sudan. The spectrum of parliamentary Islamism on the Islamization-liberalization issue is defined by two dramatic electoral experiences in which the military played an ultimate role: Algeria (1991) tending toward a possible theocratic outcome, and Turkey (1995) tending toward an Islamist democratic outcome. The phenomenon thus raises empirical questions concerning Islamists in parliament as the embodiment of a built-in tension between the teleological direction of Islamist ideology (theocracy) and that of the liberalization process (democracy): what goals, motivations, behaviors characterize their functioning? Are they anti-system ones that seek the establishment of an alternative theocratic order, or pro-system ones seeking the consolidation of a new role within the liberalizing order? As such, parliamentary Islamists belong to the broader species of anti-system forces in democracies or democratizing systems: communist parties in West European systems and the latter-day versions of communist parties in post-socialist Eastern

and Central Europe. On the theoretical level, parliamentary Islamism offers opportunities for theorizing on the dynamics of political culture. The phenomenon generates a quasi-experimental environment of a specified Islamic cultural variable placed in settings of different political structure variables, generating observable sets of outcomes. This offers opportunities to test hypotheses on the makings of change in political culture.

My dissertation research focuses on a specific question within the broad phenomenon of parliamentary Islamism: what is the relationship between the parliamentary share of power held by Islamists and their orientation toward pluralism and democracy? Short of the majority necessary for undoing the constitutional order, what is the effect of variation in share of power on Islamist behavior and dynamics? Seeking to correct the problem of earlier treatments of the issue of Islam and democracy, my focus on the narrower question of Islamism and orientations toward democracy involves both a clear specification of actors bearing the cultural banner of Islam and a pursuit of the mechanism or process by which Islam as cultural text interacts with structural contexts.

My approach to this question is comparative. The cases I selected are Jordan and Egypt, representing variation in Islamist share of parliamentary power. Jordan's Islamists gained 40% of the parliamentary seats in 1989 and 22.5% in 1993. By contrast, Egypt's Muslim Brothers were a minor partner in an opposition coalition gaining 2% of the parliamentary seats in 1984 and a major partner in another opposition coalition in 1987 with 8%. The larger Islamist gains in Jordan also translated into a speakership of Parliament and a few cabinet posts held in 1990-1991. Both countries have large Sunni Muslim majorities (over 90%) and hence the potential Islamist constituency is roughly the same. In both cases, the parliamentary sessions in question coincided with periods of conciliation between the state and moderate Islamism, and in both it ended with a heightening of tensions with the state and the boycott of elections by Islamists.

Thanks to an IDRF fellowship, I was able to conduct fieldwork research in Jordan and Egypt in 2000/2001. Working with parliamentary records, Islamist party publications and official newspapers, my data gathering focused on the Islamist experience within parliament and on the internal debates and dynamics within the Islamist parties. This focus on parliamentary performance and on party debate and dynamics aimed at gauging the roots and internal repercussions within the party of the parliamentary experience. My hypothesis involves a paradoxical positive relationship between Islamist share of (non-majoritarian) parliamentary power and the party's conciliatory posture towards democracy. The logic of the hypothesis entails a process of change which the party undergoes as it moves from a phase of operation outside the political arena to a phase of operation within the electoral process. Outside the political arena, much of Islamist intellectual efforts are geared towards the

elaboration of Islamic theocracy—a political system governed by Islamic Law (*Shari'ah*). Involvement in electoral politics leading to an outcome of partial gains entails the abandonment of the ultimate goal of Islamic theocracy and the relegation of the implementation of Islamic Law to a long-term, divisible and gradual goal. This necessitates the elaboration of a policy-specific program going beyond the moral and cultural agenda of the call for the implementation of Islamic law. In the course of this process, Islamists forge legislative alliances with non-Islamist forces hitherto considered irrelevant or even antithetical to Islamism. The champions of this new phase of Islamist political action are a category of Islamists I refer to as renewalists (as opposed to ideologues) whose ascendancy within the party oscillates with Islamist electoral gains.

Thus, my research constructed and enriched an empirical profile of the two analytic categories of my project—ideologues and renewalists. The better-studied distinction between radical and moderate Islamists divides Islamists between those who are inclined to fight the political system in order to establish an alternative theocratic system and those who are prepared to work on Islamizing it from within. But equally important and more subtle, I argue, is the division within the ranks of moderate Islamists. The ideologues and renewalists comprising moderate Islamism share the call for the implementation of Islamic Law as the broad aim of Islamist political action while using a gradualist approach to changing the legal basis of legislation from secular sources to Islamic Law. Yet they differ in other important respects. The ideologues perceive the function of Islamist parliamentary participation to be the propagation of the Quranic message of “the enjoining of good and the forbidding of evil” in a system they regard with suspicion as un-Islamic. Their participation is reluctantly accepted as the only course available short of a militant path. They perceive their role predominantly as overseers of the executive branch and as moral guardians against legislation they hold to be un-Islamic. By contrast, renewalists are those who accept the system as not inherently un-Islamic and who perceive their participation therein to help improve such a system through active legislation in various policy areas not traditionally considered the province of Islamic Law. Renewalists tend to see the service of their constituents as central to their role. This is exemplified by the Islamist head of Zarqa municipal council in Jordan (Yasir al-Umary) who was disciplined by the party in 2001 for his refusal to resign his position in defiance of the party’s decision which was intended as a symbolic protest against the government’s plan to merge and dissolve the local councils. He explained his position as putting the service of his constituents ahead of the party, emphasizing his function as representative of his constituency over his party affiliation.

Ideologues are also more prone to focus on Islamic doctrine as a basis for political action whereas pragmatists are more flexible in terms of ideas they draw upon for action. Furthermore, since doctrine itself is malleable and subject to

interpretation, pragmatists tend to adopt more liberal interpretations than ideologues. For example, renewalists were more open to the acceptance of Christians as members of an Islamist party and to the possibility of women becoming judges or heads of government. Though not yet conclusive, the sociological profile of the bulk of renewalists tends to point to a younger age group with more experience in elective offices within civil society associations. This contrasts with the “old guard” profile of the ideologues, though some of the leading renewalists do emerge out of the ranks of the old guard.

The dichotomy within moderate Islamism rises in importance upon entry into the political arena. The interaction between the two trends and the institutional setting defined by the share of parliamentary power involves a greater policy-specificity of party programs along with more cooperative legislative efforts with non-Islamist parties, both of which heighten the differentiation within Islamist ranks. The relatively larger share of Islamist power in Jordan generates more room for effective legislative activity in which the pragmatic renewalists play the key role. On the other hand, the lower share of power in the Egyptian case does not offer such an opportunity for the ascendancy of renewalists.

“Islam is the solution!” is the slogan of both Egypt’s and Jordan’s Islamists, which upon entry into the political arena has to be translated into a more concrete policy-specific program. My research revealed a process of change in the direction of the policy-specificity of programs as well as increased cooperative legislative efforts with other parties, with Egypt lagging behind Jordan. Significantly, in Jordan, ideologues seemed more satisfied with the overall assessment of Islamist parliamentary experience than renewalists. Although seemingly paradoxical, this is consistent with the expectations of the respective groups in the parliamentary participation process: ideologues envisioning a more passive role emphasizing oversight of the executive branch of government, whereas renewalists envision a more active role involving actual legislation. For Jordanian renewalists, the assessment of their parliamentary experience is a function of a gap between their assessment of actual Islamist law-making record relative to the perceived opportunities afforded by a large share of power. Based on this relative dissatisfaction with law-making accomplishments, a leading Jordanian Islamist MP (Ishaq al-Farhan) suggested future remedies, now underway, involving expansion of policy research organs within the party. In Egypt, the oversight and moral guardian roles, characteristic of the ideologue outlook, dominated the Islamist parliamentary record.

Participation in parliamentary politics exhibits, accentuates and is itself the subject of contention between the two Islamist groups over the very principle of Islamist participation and its limits, as well as the substance of different policy orientations and the alliances they entail. Thus, one of the focal points of the occasional conflict between ideologues and renewalists in Jordan involved the offer made in 1990 by the government of cabinet posts to 5 parliamentary Islamists.

Disputes erupted over the acceptance of the offers, with ideologues standing firmly in opposition to participation in government as antithetical to the party's platform or even as religiously forbidden (*muharram*). Other disputes also emerged over the giving or withholding of a vote-of-confidence in the government. In Egypt in 1996, a group of young renewalists sought to establish a new Islamist party with a more liberal agenda, the Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat), after facing opposition and hostility within the ranks of the Muslim Brothers where ideologues dominate. The general substance of these conflicts is closely linked to the context of liberalization and the promise it offers of a political space for Islamist activity. Ideologues and renewalists perceive this political space differently as either a threat or an opportunity.

How can this research inform our understanding of cases beyond Egypt and Jordan? The possibility of generalization is a function of other variables that could affect and modify share of Islamist power. Thus my research treats the hypothesis relating share of power to Islamist orientations toward pluralism as the nucleus of a broader theoretical model. This will be achieved through the specification of the possible effects on the independent variable (share of power) of other variables held constant in the two-case comparison. The resulting sets of specified relationships would gauge a broader composite variable, *Islamist political influence* (rather than mere share of parliamentary power) which would include share of power along with type of political system, type of party system, cabinet positions held, state posture *vis-à-vis* Islamists, etc. This will make possible an account of the myriad ways in which share of power can vary across contexts when measured as political influence. Thus a given share of power measured simply in terms of percentage of parliamentary seats would not entail the same level of influence in a two-party system, for instance, as it would in multiparty system, or a given share of parliamentary power in a context in which the state assumes an inclusionary posture towards Islamist opposition differs from one where the state seeks to reverse gains made by the opposition through subversive political maneuvers. By expanding the conceptualization of the independent variable—Islamist share of parliamentary power—into Islamist political influence, a generalization of the findings is made possible in different contexts and timeframes.

In conclusion, this highly schematic exposition of my dissertation research project is meant to illustrate an actor-focused, process-driven approach to the disaggregation of the highly abstract concept of Islam. Retaining an undifferentiated notion of Islam renders much of the internal dynamics of moderate Islamism opaque and obscures a phenomenon

of crucial importance: parliamentary Islamism. The focus on moderate Islamists and on the mechanisms through which they attempt to render Islamic doctrine into practice in the course of their participation in parliamentary politics makes for a more grounded understanding of Muslim societies in flux. This focus enables the study of a dynamic process in which Islam is being negotiated, elaborated, re-interpreted, contested and turned into bridges or barriers to other political forces, generating multiple outcomes across the Muslim world. It goes beyond the simple notion of a one-to-one relationship between doctrine and practice. More broadly, the approach entails a correction of the much-lamented parochialization of Middle East studies within the disciplines (see Tessler 1999, Bayat 2001). Much theoretical insight for this research was gained from political science research on the integration of communist parties in Western Europe. The research on Islamist integration in Muslim political systems

in turn contributes to the broader literature on the political integration of anti-system parties as well as to the on-going efforts to refine the concept of political culture and the conceptualization of culture change (see e.g., Wilson 2000). Disaggregating Islam in terms of actors and mechanisms not only enables us to view the kaleidoscopic complex that is in

motion behind the abstraction of Islam, but it also enables us to connect insights of the picture thus revealed to the broader social science enterprise. ■

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Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal Democracies

By Richard A. Shweder, Martha Minow and Hazel Rose Markus

This article is adapted from the editors' introduction to Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge to Liberal Democracies, Russell Sage Foundation, 2002. The volume emerged from the SSRC Working Group on Ethnic Customs, Assimilation, and American Law (program director Frank Kessel), which the Russell Sage Foundation has supported. For more on the volume see p. 41 of this issue.

Tolerance often appears in discussions of difference. Yet what does tolerance mean in liberal democracies such as the United States, Germany, France, India, Norway, and South Africa, where an increasingly wide range of diverse cultural groups hold contradictory beliefs about appropriate social and family life practices? How wide should be the scope of social and legal tolerance?

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the levels of fear and suspicion in the United States and the “West” about “others” has understandably heightened, while the jeopardy to civil rights and civil liberties has grown. Questions about how to balance commitments to liberty and equal regard with the goals of security, patriotism, and community have taken on new urgency. But the answers must grow from deeper and more enduring normative analyses of how liberal democracies should respond to the range of differences in the values, religions, and practices of their residents, who are increasingly migrants from around the world. Democratic societies are those in which the authority of those who govern is derived from the will of the people (typically determined by some form of vote). These societies are liberal to the extent that they are organized to guarantee basic liberties (such as freedom of association, expression, and religious practice) as well as various protections (for example, against discrimination, coercion, and abuse) to all society members in pursuit of a good life. Liberal democratic societies, however, are not identical in their legal and moral dimensions or in the extent to which the role of those who govern is kept limited. They differ in the extent to which the meaning of a good life is left up to individuals or families to define privately. They differ in the balance struck between two often contradictory liberal impulses: the impulse to leave individuals free to live their lives by their own personal, cultural, or religious lights and the equally liberal impulse to protect those who are vulnerable to exploitation and to promote social justice. These differences among liberal democracies produce different experiences for immigrant minority groups when public conflicts arise over cultural practices that offend the sensibilities of mainstream or dominant groups.

One Nation, Many Cultures

In a rapidly “globalizing” world, people migrate because of better labor market opportunities abroad or political turmoil at home. Some leave their home nations because they wish to become cosmopolitan; others seek a safer space to preserve their own traditions. Given these global economic developments and emerging cultural and political trends, liberal democracies not only face burgeoning numbers of immigrants. They also come face to face with their own hidden assumptions about the scope and limits of tolerance for cultural diversity in a liberal democracy.

The particular history or lack of a history of prior struggles over racial and religious diversity within each nation sets the legal and political framework for responses to current immigrants. A nation organized to permit multiple linguistic and/or religious groups to coexist will greet newcomers with the prior framework for coexistence as the starting point. A nation founded upon slavery and still struggling with its legacy will respond with a template shaped by racism and the political and legal responses to it. Responses to current immigrants in turn shed light on and even raise for reconsideration prior understandings of tolerance and assimilation. In the United States, for example, constitutional doctrines redressing racial discrimination and implementing free exercise of religion—doctrines that adopt some notions of equality and tolerance but also limit them to dimensions of race and religion—set the legal standards when new immigrants engage in practices which teachers, police, employers, and social workers find problematic.

In the United States and elsewhere, recent immigrants may engage in practices or express ideas concerning gender, discipline, authority, sex, marriage, reproduction, intimate violence, and work that clash with the views of other residents from more dominant groups, who are powerful enough to have their views embraced by prevailing institutions. Many immigrants retain strong links to their places of origin and to others in their diasporic communities; many travel back and forth with some frequency. Some emphatically hang onto the valued traditions of their ethnic community; some, in contrast, consciously embrace dominant liberal practices. Others are repelled by what they perceive to be highly commercial, violent, degrading, or insufficiently protective practices in the capitalist liberal societies they have entered; they may try to reinforce norms and customs they consider far more ethical and moral than the traditions of the cultural majority, and become more insistent about practices

that mark them and their families as different from those they encounter in the new land. They may view the environment of the broader liberal society as sinful, jeopardizing the character and future life prospects of their children. They may feel perplexed and even under siege as intergenerational conflicts emerge within their own families and cultural groups. For members of the immigrating generation cultural assimilation may be viewed as a mixed blessing or even a problem, rather than a cure (Stolzenberg, 1993). Resisting assimilation may even serve to protect some immigrants and their children from the patterns of criminal behavior and low school performance they find among their neighbors in the poor communities where they are able to find a home.

Some immigrants confront prejudice against newcomers, or against people with dark skins, or against people with minority religious beliefs or practices. They may confront restrictive legislation or bureaucratic interventions into the most intimate aspects of their family life. They may find the efforts by child protection agencies offensive and interfering and experience such state interventions as forms of political persecution. "Cultural differences are beautiful," commented Marceline Walter, director of community education in the New York State Administration for Children's Services, "but they have nothing to do with the law. We can't possibly have a set of laws for Americans, a set of laws for immigrants, and a set of laws for tourists" (Ojito, 1997). Should immigrants from Asia, Africa and Latin America then be given detailed instruction in the norms governing parent-child relations in the United States? What makes such norms valid for everyone in the first place? Are they valid for everyone? When might our pluralistic ideals call for legal accommodations sensitive to cultural differences in ideas about what is good, true, beautiful and efficient? Will the need for such accommodation become more apparent if a deeper and more accurate cultural understanding of those governed is achieved by those charged with enforcing the law?

Consider these examples:

- Groups of Cubans and Haitians migrate to a city in Florida, where they continue to practice their Santeria religion. Hence they sacrifice animals to feed their sacred deities. They suddenly discover that their Santeria church has been zoned out of town by means of an ordinance prohibiting animal slaughter outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses. Additionally, the Santerias discover that their religious ritual has been criminalized by means of various ordinances making it illegal to kill animals for reasons other than food consumption. The newly enacted laws are written in such a way as to protect the practices of interested parties—local hunters, those who construct buildings in which they slaughter animals for human consumption, pest control specialists who kill mice and other animals, and local farmers who kill small numbers of hogs and cattle for purposes other than food consumption. The Santerias challenge the ordinance in court. Animal rights advocates side with the town. The Supreme Court of the United States

ultimately rules in favor of the Santerias—after several years of litigation.

- An Afghani immigrant lives in Maine and provides child-sitting services to local families. One of these children sees him place a kiss on the genitals of his own 18-month-old son. The father's gesture is customary and familiar to members of his family and within the Afghani community where it is understood as a display of love and affection. But this type of physical contact is viewed differently by his neighbors in Maine. The parent of the visiting child reports the incident and the man finds himself arrested for sexual assault and separated from his child as the case slowly makes its way to the state Supreme Court. Two years later, the charge is dismissed, although the Court warns against any repeated conduct of this nature.

- A Peruvian man named Jorge Arvelo migrates to Miami. A child protection agency confronts him and threatens possible action after an observer in a parking lot complains that he grabbed his five-year old by the neck. "It's amazing the things we don't know about this country," he later remarks. "I learned that in this country anyone can call the police if they see you pulling your son's ear." (Ojito, 1997).

These and similar examples are the kind of stories gaining media attention and triggering public debate today. Did similar encounters with immigrants produce cultural clashes in earlier eras? Did prior waves of immigration result largely in assimilation while new groups resist absorption—or is this juxtaposition itself a product of contemporary myth-making as people respond to difference? Current research on immigration and adaptation must keep open such questions while emphasizing the agency, the decisionmaking of people who seem different to dominant groups as well as of people who label others as different. Yet members of each group also respond to narratives and myths not of their own making; this, too, is part of the context that must be explored.

Contested Practices and the Place of Group Rights in Liberal Democracies

It is not always predictable what becomes identified as the kind of group difference that is not accepted by a society, yet some sites of cultural collision over difference in the contemporary scene have become familiar. Women's status, clothing, and scope of options are central topics; treatment of children is another. Underlying many of these issues are contests over the relative importance of liberty and equality compared to honor and decency. As noted above, liberal democratic nations do not come to terms with cultural differences in identical ways. Their own legal and moral traditions, their own histories of benign and/or hostile contact across cultural, religious, and racial groups, and their own mythical narratives of themselves affect the context in which individuals negotiate and confront differences and also affect the formal, institutional treatments of such conflicts.

Some liberal democracies proceed by assigning people to distinct legal regimes depending upon their membership in a particular group. In India, for example, the public, secular legal system assigns individuals on the basis of their religions to distinctive normative regimes for regulating marriage, inheritance, and divorce. This type of group-based system would not be countenanced in the United States; it is difficult even to imagine where there would be sources of support for a system structured by the state to enact separate legal regimes for Christians, Jews, Muslims, and other religious groups. Yet the United States has permitted a somewhat analogous regime in the special context of adoption and child welfare within American Indian communities.

South Africa, in turn, historically pursued a strategy of group-based legal treatment for family law matters, although it deployed the notion of customary law, enforceable within the public regime. With the adoption of the new South African Constitution after the fall of apartheid, the country stands poised to negotiate new relationships between individual rights and group rights. The new constitution recognizes individual rights to gender equality and children's rights but also recognizes rights to culture, to religion, and to family. Some advocates have pressed for one universal public law, ensuring the same rights for all regardless of their membership in ethnic or tribal communities traditionally bound by customary law. They have encountered many sources of resistance. The clash over individual and group rights could occasion unprecedented legal innovation; it will not produce an easy or simple answer.

In contemporary Germany and France, claims by Muslims to be treated the same as Christians and Jews could be understood as efforts to embrace the dominant structures of individual rights. But historic accommodations for Christians and Jews within the public realm of the state may also suggest that Muslims simply want to be treated as a group the way others have been able to in the past.

As these examples indicate, nations, including liberal democratic ones, differ considerably in their constitutional conceptions of the proper relationship between state and religion. In Germany the state approves of public schools teaching and promoting Christianity; the United States, at least up until the present, has interpreted its constitution to call for a sharp separation between public schools and religious instruction. These differences can affect not only how the individual nations respond to emerging cultural differences, but also how members of minority groups position and advocate for themselves. Given the German practice of public school religious instruction, Islamic Turks residing in Berlin now ask, why shouldn't Islamic instruction also be available—as an elective—in public schools? The closest analogous argument available for Islamic residents in the United States is that public school facilities should be no less open to an after-school student-organized Islamic group than they are to an after-school Christian group—though both have had to struggle for use of public school facilities.

Freedom of religion can be interpreted as a right of individuals, with no additional protection for groups, yet it can also lead to recognition, support, and preservation of religious groups. As liberal democracies work with their own constitutional frameworks and respond to claims and controversies around religious differences, they press closer toward or further away from group-based protections. Either approach can generate friction with those perceived as “different” from the dominant group or unable to fit within settled practices.

Communitarian and liberal individualist approaches to cultural diversity bear contrasting implications, especially about whether people should have distinct legal status based on their membership in particular groups. In general, liberal individualists tend to seek a certain type of state neutrality toward the ultimate ends of individuals and toward the good life. For liberal individualists, the state's purpose, and therefore the justifiable limits on its power, stem from a vision of liberty ensuring individuals freedom to act, to affiliate with subcommunities if they wish (but also to exit from them as they desire), the freedom to associate with others voluntarily, and to express themselves as individuals through choices about religion, culture, and family life. Accordingly, many liberal individualists reject a conception of constitutional rights that would give any pride of place to cultural traditions, or religious or ethnic groups. These should be accorded no more (and no less) respect than any other freedom accorded to individuals. Thus, according to liberal individualists any accommodation for religion or culture should be rendered on an even-handed basis with accommodations for any other individual or communal practice. Procedural justice and non-discrimination become the vital guides for this constitutional vision and the measure of free exercise of religion, and by extension, free exercise of culture. It should be noted, however, that the liberal tradition is complex and variegated enough to permit some to argue that there is a transcendental or spiritual side to the human nature of individuals that in matters of conscience is entitled to special protection from the dictates of majoritarian government rules (McConnell 1990).

Communitarians, in contrast, identify an inherent value in the existence and perpetuation of cultural traditions and the communities sustained by them. They doubt that law can ever be purely neutral or procedural. They evaluate a given constitutional framework as either corrosive or protective of cultural traditions. Communitarians disagree among themselves over whether to identify the community with the entire polity—and thus the state—or instead to view the communities that matter as necessarily smaller and often in tension with the state. Nonetheless, communitarians share the view that society is composed not only of distinct individuals but also of social and ethnic groups and cultures. Communitarians most basically reject the idea of the unencumbered or unbounded self, and see people formed and inevitably embedded in relationships with others. This makes

the liberal assumption of the individual as the fundamental unit of analysis seem mistaken or even cruel. Communitarians and liberal individualists may converge or diverge, however, when it comes to evaluating how acceptable they find a given ethnic minority practice. These differences may stem from competing theories of the good.

The longstanding debate between liberal individualists and communitarians receives a healthy challenge in arguments by John Rawls, who has called for a kind of political liberalism that respects even world-views inconsistent with features of a tolerant liberalism. Rawls (1993) argues that in a politically liberal society, “it is unreasonable for us to use political power, should we possess it, or share it with others, to repress comprehensive doctrines that are not unreasonable.” Comprehensive doctrines include conceptions of the world and ideas about the good life, including family life, elaborated from standpoints that may include religious and cultural traditions. Taken seriously, this commitment to political liberalism carries with it an injunction to do more than “tolerate” those who are different and, instead, to scrutinize dominant beliefs and practices to guard against ill-considered restrictions or unjustifiable distinctions in both who can be accommodated and how.

Yet what works well in theory may be far from illuminating in practice and can produce ironic results. Existing institutions governing child protection and schooling may disrupt moral and effective practices held dear by some subcommunities. And other liberal institutions such as private property may empower deeply illiberal communities, whose very empowerment may provoke illiberal reactions in dominant groups and trigger attempts at regulation or eradication.

Even liberal theorists recognize one group that deserves distinctive treatment: the family. It is especially challenging for a liberal society, committed to the freedom of each individual, to determine how much latitude parents or elders should have to inculcate certain values and not others, to offer some experiences and prevent others, to govern children’s bodies and bodily movements. For the precise measure of the freedom of the parent is the restraint on the child. Yet until some age—itself a subject of dispute—children simply cannot make decisions for themselves. Especially during this period of massive immigration, predictable points of conflict arise between immigrant parents and their children. Such potential conflicts between parents and children bring into view the limits of liberal democratic deference to self-determination. How much can and how much should government agents intervene, and on whose side? Should the parent be permitted to exercise control over children in the name of the parent’s own self-determination, or should the state

step in to protect the child—or assist the child in voicing a preference, preserving future options, or becoming self-determining at once? The parent-child relationship is especially likely to generate conflicts around tolerance for cultural variety. This kinship bond also exposes the limits of the very idea of individualism even for the adult, i.e., when the adult sees himself as a member of an ethnic or religious group seeking to reproduce itself. Here, in efforts to pass on cultural traditions, control of marriage and education are key. Should the liberal democratic state simply exemplify its values through state-sponsored options such as public schools and the secular practices of marriage and divorce or should the government also use its coercive power to control decisions parents may wish to retain for themselves concerning the education and marriage of their children? In cases interpreting the United States Constitution, the US Supreme Court at times has favored toleration for diverse practices by parents and at other times has ordered restraints

on parents control over their children’s access to liberal democratic values.¹ These inconsistent decisions manifest the compelling arguments on each side of these issues.

Creating or respecting group-based legal status, giving strong protections for freedom of religion, and according much latitude to parents over their children are three devices that liberal democratic states may use to allow considerable

room for group-based cultural variety, even if the resulting array of practices would be viewed negatively by many in the society. These devices do not, however, dictate the results in particular controversies. They do frame the methods of analysis and may tilt the results for or against tolerance for difference.

Cultural Accommodation and its Limits

Debates over accommodation are especially pronounced in societies that seek a secular public space and restrict freedom of religion, or question parental prerogatives. When liberal democracies resist the creation of group rights, and instead embrace the individual as the proper holder of enforceable rights, accommodation of group-based differences must take other forms. One method is to enforce a sharp distinction between public and private, while ensuring large scope to the private sphere. Within a liberal framework, this makes room for cultural differences—as long as they remain in the private sphere. Typically, that means the sphere of the family; it may also include schooling. Nation-states differ in their legal and cultural distinctions between what is public and what is private, in their ideas about whether children ultimately are the responsibility—and object of instruction—of the state or the parent, and in the stance taken

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toward the public protection of children. France and Norway are more likely to support consistent public protection of children than are the United States and India.

As a comparison case, employment can be characterized as private and thus insulated from public regulation. When employment and workplaces are instead treated as part of the public sphere and subject to public norms, they become sites for governmental scrutiny of differences in religious practices, attire, treatment of women and sexuality, and other potential points of conflict between employees and either their employers or other employees.

Liberal societies that embrace a right to culture, the best interests of the child, a right to fair trial and equal protection of the laws may offer resources for accommodating different cultural traditions that might not be initially obvious. Arguments for recognizing a cultural defense to certain criminal charges thus can draw on values and rights well embedded within liberal states. Yet these arguments generate counterarguments; there are no trumps in these debates.

Beyond cultural defenses, public and private, parent and child, state and religion, and group rights, additional points of conflict involve the relation between formal laws and customary practices. How much uniformity of enforcement of formal laws is expected and enacted? How much room should be left, officially or unofficially, for the operation of customary practices? Liberal legal systems may share many fundamental commitments and still differ in the precise degree to which they expect and implement universal enforcement or, instead, permit or even provide for plural norms and local variations.

More important than any of these variations is the fact that any liberal constitutional arrangement inevitably takes a position on the relationships between religion and state, public and private, individual and group, thereby setting highly particular stages for enacting conflicts and negotiations of cultural differences. As a result, constitutional and legal frameworks affect the room available for expressing and maintaining cultural differences, while also arranging how conflicts between mainstream and minority groups will be identified, addressed, and resolved. The public and legal responses to immigrants are closely tied to a nation's stance toward multiculturalism, toward neutrality about religion and race, toward gender equality, and toward conceptions of universal individual human rights.

Thus, most fundamentally, legal systems differ in the extent to which they try to curb or, instead, try to intensify the imposition and inculcation of the substantive beliefs and values of a particular cultural group, whether majority or simply dominant. These differences in legal pressures to assimilate profoundly shape the experiences of cultural minorities, and must be taken into account to understand both processes of conformity and the reasons for resistance to mainstream cultural beliefs and practices. Understanding the relation between these stances and the treatment of particular groups and conflicts requires attention to history

but also to the dynamic interaction between groups, ideologies, and formal and informal norms.

The Universal Human Rights Debate: Mobilization and Resistance

It is not just domestic constitutions and laws that come into play with conflicts over cultural practices. International law and the discourse of international human rights increasingly offer resources for people to mobilize against traditional cultural practices. Then others face decisions about whether to join or instead resist the importation of international human rights language in assessments of tensions over cultural practices. In the meantime, international human rights offer institutions and sites for action as well as resources for analysis and debate. Women within minority groups, members who identify as tribes, First Nations, or indigenous people have found the use of an international forum promising for mobilization and dialogue otherwise unavailable either within their own communities or inside their own national states. The plural settings available for debating the relationships between rights and culture, thus, can afford avenues for action even for people with relatively little power in their own settings. Yet when multiple legal arenas become available for debating international human rights, different arguments and results will emerge.

The International Convention on the Rights of the Child provides a vivid example of the contests generated over human rights. Adopted by more than 100 nations, the Convention pursues a strong child-centered approach to social decision-making. Its use of the legal principle of "the best interests of the child" and its articulation of rights running to each individual child strike some critics as corrosive of pluralism and counter to the rights of adults to perpetuate their language, culture, and ancestral lineage. Interpreting this Convention, and considering its very meaning in the context of diverse cultural traditions, exposes for debate and disagreement basic questions such as these:

- Are parents the ultimate guardians of their children or merely temporary state agents, subject to state review and control?
- Should each parent have equal authority in rearing the children or should cultural traditions—elevating the father according to some traditions, the mother in others—receive public deference?
- When should police, school officials, social workers, religious leaders, or judges second-guess and supersede the judgments of parents about their children?
- When and how should the child's age matter? Should there emerge a cross-cultural, universal notion of when a child becomes an adult for purposes of self-determination, or should cultural and national variety persist on this question? Even before a child reaches adulthood, when and how should the child's expressed wishes—concerning which religion to follow, where to live, where to go to school, what to

wear, and whom to marry—matter to third-party actors such as teachers and judges?

• Does the state's assessment of a child's best interests include the child's membership in a given culture or does it abstract the child from that membership, as if the child had no such connection and was really a "citizen of the world"? For example, should it count as part of the child's "best interests" to have her tribal or ethnic community continue to exist and provide a context for her own development and future? Or are the child's interests better assessed in terms of the education, life-style, and income aspirations that the mainstream culture heralds for each individual?

Addressing just these sorts of questions proves divisive within communities and among scholars and theorists. People outside particular communities may be surprised by the degree of resistance to individual rights approaches even among imagined beneficiaries, such as women.

Anthropologists, long associated with efforts to promote tolerance of cultural variety, have struggled for 50 years with the notion and scope of international human rights. Multiple layers of analysis emerge from such struggles. It is one step to unearth the particular cultural assumptions and potential imperialism behind the rhetoric of international human rights; then we have a choice among cultural practices rather than a collision between rights and culture. It is another step to acknowledge the variety and contestability of views about the flexibility of particular notions, such as children's best interests, or freedom of choice, within the human rights world—and the variety and contestability of views about any given cultural practice that allegedly conflicts with a human right. Yet until these levels of analysis proceed, the contrast between rights and culture is a caricature, ungrounded in any genuine practice.²

Conceptions of Difference, and the Differences They Make

Lying even further beneath arguments about accommodation of cultural differences are the very perceptions and conceptions of difference held by members of various groups. Close study indicates that contrasting and diverging perspectives of diversity affect how people in different groups make sense of one another and how they express themselves. Yet people may hold ideas of difference that prevent them from even recognizing how others experience their mutual encounters. The actual social position of individuals as well as their historical experiences and cultural frameworks can affect how they understand diversity and approach people they view as different.

At this moment in which cultural collisions, large and subtle, are escalating due to the high levels of mobility across national borders, understanding the variety of potential responsive legal frameworks compatible with liberal democracy would expand the resources available for working through conflicts. By sorting through the promise and peril

of group rights, a public/private division, respect for parental rights, commitment to the best interests of the child, strong religious freedom protections, customary law, international law, and recognition of the variety of perceptions and cultural models of diversity, the cross-disciplinary conversations we are engaged in seek to enrich understandings and responses to cultural conflicts. Individuals do and will continue to differ about how to reconcile commitments to individual freedom and to communal traditions and meanings; yet they may do so with greater understanding of the sources of their differences and even the potential points of convergence. By offering a window onto a variety of legal, cultural, historical, and psychological frameworks for addressing cultural collisions—by raising questions about the ends and aims of tolerance—we hope our conversations and analyses will provide people in all walks of life with richer resources for communicating and coexisting with people they think are unlike themselves. In many ways the effort is inspired by this Clifford Geertz (2000) comment:

Positioning Muslims in France, Whites in South Africa, Arabs in Israel, or Koreans in Japan are not altogether the same sort of thing. But if political theory is going to be of any relevance at all in the splintered world, it will have to have something cogent to say about how, in the face of a drive towards a destructive integrity, such structures can be brought into being, how they can be sustained, and how they can be made to work. ■

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Endnotes

1. See *Pierce v. Society of Sisters*, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); *Prince v. Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); *Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also *Mozert v. Hawkins Board of Education*, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).

2. On the supposed contrast between rights and culture, see Okin, 1999; for a sustained critique of the contrast, see Volpp, 2001.

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Next Issue—The Conflict in Gujarat: Essays by Paul Brass, Ashutosh Varshney, and others.

Applied Economics Fellows' Conference

The Program in Applied Economics held a conference for its 2001-2002 cohort of fellows from May 16-19, 2002, at the Airlie Conference Center in Virginia. All 14 members of the outgoing group of fellows supported by the PAE fellowship presented their work. The conference was structured to provide those students planning to enter the academic job market with a chance to practice their job talks and receive feedback. Several junior faculty members who had recently found employment offered especially helpful advice about the job market process.

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Program in Health and Social Sciences

On May 16, 2002, the Working Group on Integrative Doctoral Programs in Health and the Social Sciences held its first meeting at the SSRC's New York office. Chaired by Burt Singer (Princeton University), the group considered the question relevant to all integrative training programs, namely, "What lines of inquiry are needed to achieve a more comprehensive picture of pathways to health outcomes?"

All members of the working group have experience integrating facets of the social and behavioral sciences with aspects of the biomedical sciences, and all have contributed pieces to the multi-level puzzle called "pathways to health." Several participants have administrative experience dealing with the challenge of facilitating integrative programs in the face of rigidities imposed by extant institutional arrangements. Thus, an important feature of this meeting was discussing experience with research that integrates social and biomedical sciences. All discussions laid firm ground for

subsequent meetings intended to generate recommendations on how to facilitate future training and career development at the intersection of the social and biomedical sciences.

Opera and Society

From May 31-June 2, 2002, the SSRC and New York University co-sponsored a conference entitled "Opera and Society in France and Italy, 1600-1950" at the NYU Villa La Pietra in Florence. The conference, which brought together 20 scholars from a variety of disciplines to present papers and discuss the origins, evolution, and study of opera in France and Italy, was organized around the following 6 panel topics:

- The Seventeenth-Century Origins of Opera in France and Italy
- Eighteenth-Century Opera between State and Market
- The French Revolution and Its Impact on Opera in France and Italy
- Opera and National Identity in the Nineteenth Century
- Opera in the First Half of the Twentieth Century
- Studying Opera and Society: Theoretical and Methodological Issues

The conference is part of a wider SSRC initiative aimed at developing a Working Group on Opera and Society (under the broad umbrella of the Arts program) and organizing a series of four further conferences, which will focus on opera and opera studies in different national and thematic contexts. This first conference served as an excellent beginning to the primary agenda of the Working Group, which is to assemble international scholars, drawn from the various disciplines newly engaged in the study of opera, to examine and unite these partial perspectives on opera and establish a framework for future interdisciplinary collaboration. During the coming months the manuscript for a volume based on the conference will be completed and a proposal for the funding of future activities finalized.

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SSRC-Mellon Minority Fellowship Conference: Building our Own Legacies: Spaces of Communi- ty, Spaces of Scholarship

From June 6-9, 2002, the annual SSRC-Mellon Minority Fellowship Conference was hosted by Dillard University, a historically black university in New Orleans. One hundred fifty-nine Fellows who are enrolled in PhD programs at universities around the US and in England gathered in workshops, at panels, and during scholarly presentations to listen to and comment on a range of ideas related to their academic interests. In their presentations, Mellon scholars from the humanities, social sciences, mathematics and natural sciences traced their intellectual trajectories and reflected on how these pathways invigorate past legacies and influence contemporary research paradigms that will frame future scholarship.



On the day prior to the conference, 32 recent PhDs (up from 14 last year) met at a local hotel to address issues of concern to the junior faculty members most have become. During the mini-conference, two publisher's representatives joined five academics to initiate discussion about such practicalities as the job market, publishing, postdoctoral fellowships, grant writing and pedagogy. Other presentations addressed issues of race, gender, and sexuality in the academy and another suggested a framework for collaborative, interdisciplinary research among interested fellows. Committees were formed to identify specific possibilities for such research as presentations at next year's conference, which will convene June 12-15 at the University of Pennsylvania.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/mellon

Information Technology and Social Research

A Summer Institute on "Information Technology and Social Research: Setting Agendas," hosted by the SSRC program on Information Technology, International Cooperation and Global Security (ITIC) and Columbia University's Center for Organizational Innovation was held in the first week of June at Columbia University. Leading scholars and practitioners brainstormed directions for future social research on

IT as it bears on: communities and boundaries; design and the politics of access and openness; property, personhood and information; the securing of social spaces; and socio-economic development.

Kicking off the institute was an evening roundtable featuring Zoë Baird (president of the Markle Foundation), Michael Edwards (director of the Ford Foundation's Governance and Civil Society Unit), Denis Gilhooly (director of Information & Communication Technology for Development at the UNDP), ITIC committee chair Saskia Sassen (Ralph Lewis Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago), and SSRC President Craig Calhoun. The roundtable speakers addressed the international dimensions of governance of information technologies and the role of IT in governance. They shared their views on what possibilities—or lack of possibilities—exist for wider participation in governance decisions and explored what they believe is at stake in such decisions.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/itic

The Program on Latin America and the Caribbean

On June 7, 2002, in collaboration with the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos (IEP) at their offices in Lima, Peru, the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean co-hosted a one-day seminar on decentralization in Peru and the Andes region. The meeting brought together members of the SSRC's Regional Advisory Panel on Latin America with IEP researchers, representatives of regional NGOs and members of the World Bank. The first discussion panel addressed decentralization, state reform and governability, while the second focused on parties, party systems and regional diversity.

The Regional Advisory Panel for Latin America and the Caribbean met in the offices of the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos in Lima, Peru, on June 8-9, 2002, to examine ongoing and potential initiatives. Highlights of the meeting included a discussion of the final report by Professor Peter Winn on the program on Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru, and updates on continuing research, training and network-building projects on such topics as comparative industrial upgrading, crises in the Andes, and reconfiguration of Central American economies, politics, and societies. Also considered were potential initiatives in translocal flows in the Americas, the political economy of market reforms in Latin America, hemispheric research networks on migration and construction of a virtual anthropology network in Peru.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica

Transnational Religion and Migration

The Working Group on Transnational Religion and Migration met in Istanbul June 12-15, 2002, to establish a framework for examining theoretical and methodological issues

faced in the study of transnational relationships between religion, migration and socio-cultural diversity. The first of four meetings, this one brought together scholars of religion, migration and transnationalism from across the Americas, Europe and the Middle East. Future meetings will explore further ways of employing the framework developed to analyze empirical cases and to guide the design of future research. The meeting was coordinated by the programs on Eurasia (Seteney Shami) and International Migration (Josh DeWind and Sarah Shanley).

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/religionimmigration

African Youth in a Global Age

The African Youth in a Global Age Fellowship Program held the second training workshop for its first cohort of fellows on June 7-10, 2002, in Dakar, Senegal. The workshop was sponsored by the SSRC Africa Regional Advisory Panel (RAP), and the program is supported by a grant from the Education for Democracy and Development Initiative of USAID, with additional support from the National Research Foundation of South Africa. The workshop included 13 fellows as well as resource persons from institutions in Africa and the United States, and faculty from Université Cheikh Anta Diop (UCAD).

To open the workshop, Dr. Adebayo Olukoshi, Executive Secretary for the Council for the Development for Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), gave a keynote address on the Challenges of Social Science Research in Africa. The remainder of the workshop was dedicated to presentations by the fellows of their research findings, and discussions of conceptual and methodological issues related to youth research. Presentations by each fellow were followed by intense and engaged discussions with resource persons, other fellows and UCAD faculty.

Following the workshop, several of the fellows remained in Dakar to attend a symposium on Fieldwork in Africa, organized by the West African Research Association (WARA). Some of the fellows participated in a roundtable discussion sponsored by the SSRC African Youth program, entitled "Researching Youth in Africa: Trends and Methods."

It is with mixed emotions that the African Youth program bids farewell to its 2001 fellows, who have now concluded their fellowship. We shall miss them but also look forward to working with many of them on an individual basis in the future, and to keeping the network going.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/africa

Economic History and Performance of Caribbean Countries in the 20th Century

The Regional Advisory Panel for Latin America and the Caribbean was co-convenor of a June 17-18, 2002, meeting in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, on the Economic History and Performance of Caribbean Countries in the 20th Century. The meeting, which took place at the headquarters of the



Association of Caribbean States, was organized in conjunction with the Association of Caribbean Economists and INTAL/IDB (Institute for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean/Inter-American Development Bank). The occasion marked the launching of an SSRC-sponsored special issue of the INTAL journal *Integration & Trade*, which features the papers produced during the first phase of the project (see Recent Publications). In addition to an assessment of the project by a number of prominent economists from the region, the meeting provided an occasion to consolidate an intellectual agenda and organizational plan for the next phase of the project. At this juncture, as contemplated from the outset, the SSRC is devolving this project entirely to institutions in the region, including the Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies, the Sir Arthur Lewis Institute for Social and Economic Studies, and all three campuses of the University of the West Indies. Plans for Phase II include elaboration of the database of 20th-century Caribbean economic indicators that was constructed during the first phase, as well as the writing of a number of additional country case studies.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica

Political Violence

The Program on Global Security and Cooperation (GSC) has partnered with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) to launch a new research project on political violence. The overarching objective of this project is to narrow the large gap between policy makers and analysts with regard to appropriate responses to political violence. Through a combination of detailed case analysis and a comparative framework, the project aims to provide a better understanding of political violence as well as to formulate realistic policy recommendations. In later phases of the project, a Policy Reference Group will be established to assist the project in concrete policy formulation. This group will consist of four to five eminent policy-makers who will disseminate as broadly as possible the project results to relevant governments and organizations.

On June 17-18, 2002, the GSC along with NUPI convened an inaugural workshop entitled "Assessing Political/Military

Responses to Political Violence: A Comparative Case Analysis.” Held in Amsterdam, this workshop brought together nine distinguished scholars who have extensive field experience with militant groups of the type often designated as terrorist. The participants examined a broad cross section of groups ranging from the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia and the FARC in Columbia to the PKK in Turkey and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. The groups chosen include those that derive their legitimacy from religious as well as secular ideologies, and those that operate under varying degrees of authoritarian regimes as well as those active in modern democratic societies. Workshop discussions were guided by a series of analytical questions focusing on groups’ leadership structures, the character of their social bases, the role of diasporas and the function of violence.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc

The Vietnam Program

From June 16-24, 2002, the SSRC Vietnam Program held meetings in Hanoi, Vietnam, with our local partner, the National Center for Social Sciences and Humanities (NCSSH), to evaluate the first semester and to discuss the long-term goals of our interdisciplinary social science research and training project.

During the first semester of the intensive 8-month



training program, 40 young and mid-career researchers and lecturers from all regions of Vietnam gained knowledge in research problem formulation and research design and applied it in conducting literature reviews, structured observation, interviewing, and drafting research proposals.

From June 18-20, Council Executive Director Mary Byrne McDonnell attended meetings to evaluate the progress of the course, troubleshoot, and finalize plans for the second semester and second academic year. Vietnam program coordinator Van Tran stayed on for three weeks in Hanoi to support and coordinate the training course.

From June 25-29, and in early July 2002, the Vietnam Program and an international team of advisors worked with the Institute of Social Sciences in Ho Chi Minh City (ISSHO) on a joint research, training, institution and network building project. The project examines the social

consequences of economic transition in southern Vietnam through longitudinal research into issues related to poverty, migration, and urbanization. The SSRC team worked with local researchers to process, enter, and make available and usable the high quality data that the ISSHO team had collected from the past five years. Agreement was reached on the goals and format for an international conference, which is planned for June 2003. The conference will share the results of the project with a larger national and international community focusing on poverty and the impact of urbanization and migration on socio-economic mobility.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/vietnam

Conflict Prevention in Indonesia

The Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum hosted a workshop in Jakarta on “Conflict Prevention in Indonesia: Challenges and Prospects,” held jointly with the Jakarta-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, on June 19-20, 2002. The workshop brought together a select group of approximately 30 experts from Indonesian institutions, the Indonesian government, international NGOs, the United Nations, and the local donor community to examine the incidence and patterns of conflict in Indonesia and to identify practical measures for conflict prevention and mitigation in Indonesian society. Themes covered during the workshop included underlying patterns and dynamics of conflict in Indonesia, decentralization efforts and their implications, security sector reform, population movements and internal displacement, and accountability and reconciliation initiatives. The genesis of this workshop was a brainstorming meeting featuring experts on and from Indonesia and the UN held in New York in October, 2001. CPPF also hosted a working meeting on June 25, 2002, in New York on the role of the United Nations in Colombia.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/conflictprev

Remembering Communism

From June 29-July 1, 2002, the Eurasia Program held a planning meeting for its Regional Advisory Panel’s project on “Remembering Communism” in Sofia, Bulgaria. The meeting was organized in collaboration with, and held at, the Center for Advanced Study, a newly established research institution in Sofia. The proposed project will include a case-study on Bulgaria as an example of “eventless communism.” The comparatively eventless character of Bulgarian developments under communism distinguishes it from many other post-communist countries where transformative events occupy a central place in collective memory. This presents the opportunity for at least one research agenda in the project to be focused on the subjectivity of normality in remembering communism. The project will also organize comparative initiatives, both within the Eurasia region and cross-regionally.

The interdisciplinary meeting brought together 23 social scientists from different Bulgarian institutions and seven

scholars from the US, UK, Germany and Greece who work on histories of communism or on the ethnography of post-communist countries. Participants included historians, sociologists, anthropologists, literary critics, and a specialist on humor. The discussion focused on the parameters of the project, including objectives and relevant research questions, as well as on methods ranging from how to read archives to fieldwork methods in oral history, narrative and life-stories. Although several sessions of the meeting had to compete with matches for the World Cup in football, the discussion was lively and constructive and bodes well for developing an exciting initiative on this theme. SSRC staff included Seteney Shami and Elissa Klein.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/eurasia

War on Terrorism Roundtable Series

On July 2, 2002, the SSRC Washington office hosted the fifth luncheon seminar in the War on Terrorism Roundtable series. The event featured University of Toronto professor Ramin Jahanbegloo, recently named a fellow of the National Endowment for Democracy. His project focuses on the role of Iranian intellectuals in promoting Iranian democracy, including among youth and young professionals in Iran today. His presentation, entitled "Iran: Prospects for Democracy & the War on Terrorism," addressed US-Iran relations and the effect of President Bush's inclusion of Iran in his "axis of evil" speech. Additionally, Jahanbegloo made observations about the prospects for further democratization of the regime and for liberalization of Iranian civil society, taking into account both the domestic political situation as well as foreign influences. He proposed steps that the United States can take in order to help enhance this process. After a summer break, the roundtable series resumes in the second week of September.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc

Ralph Nader Lecture at University of Havana

The Latin America and Caribbean Program recently organized the visit of Ralph Nader and several of his colleagues to Cuba on July 6-10, 2002, at the invitation of Ricardo Alarcón, president of the Cuban National Assembly. Funded and co-organized by the Christopher Reynolds Foundation, the visit included a well-received lecture at the University of Havana as well as meetings with top government officials, labor union representatives, academics, and other representatives of civil society.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/latinamerica

Summer Workshop on Risk and Uncertainty

The Program in Applied Economics held its 5th annual Summer Workshop from July 21-28, 2002, at the Airlie Conference Center in Virginia. The workshop brings together graduate students from economics and related fields to hear presentations on current economic topics, and how the

methodological tools taught in core economics courses can be applied to real-world issues. This year the workshop addressed three topics, all related to the general theme of risk and uncertainty: Managing Catastrophic Risk, Risk and Financial Markets, and Trade, Globalization and Economic Risk. A diverse group of faculty and practitioners shared their insight and experience in these areas with the 36 students in attendance, and offered their advice on the various stages of research development and production. For their part, the students collaborated with each other throughout the week to devise original research projects based on the workshop topics, and exchanged thoughts on progressing through graduate school.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/app_econ

ASA Plenary on The Challenge of September 11th: Social Dimensions of Terrorism

On August 15, 2002, approximately 300 sociologists attended the opening plenary session of the American Sociological Association annual conference where three contributors to the SSRC-organized volume *Understanding September 11* made presentations: Nilüfer Göle, director of studies of the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, Timur Kuran, professor of economics and law and King Faisal Professor of Islamic Thought and Culture at the University of Southern California, and Craig Calhoun, president of the SSRC. In addition, recently retired SSRC board member Neil Smelser made a presentation. Barbara Reskin, sociology, Harvard University, presided. The topic was "The Challenge of September 11th: Social Dimensions of Terrorism." A reception followed the plenary to announce the release of *Understanding September 11* and its companion volume, *Critical Views on September 11: Analyses from Around the World*. A similar reception was planned for the American Political Science Association's annual conference on August 30, 2002, as well as an SSRC organized panel on *Politics and Perceptions: the Middle East After September 11*.

◆ www.ssrc.org/sept11/

Rethinking Social Science Research on the Developing World

The International Predissertation Fellowship Program announces that copies of the report on proceedings of its final conference last June on "Rethinking Social Science Research on the Developing World in the 21st Century" are now available. The report summarizes the reflections of conference participants and includes keynote addresses by Kenneth Prewitt on "The Social Science Project: Then, Now and Next" and by Saskia Sassen on "Globalization or Denationalization." If you would like to receive a copy of the report, please contact Asia Sherman, IPFP program assistant, at sherman@ssrc.org.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/ipfp

The South Asia Program

The South Asia Program has expanded the list of its partners in the region with the recent addition of the Centre for Alternatives, Bangladesh. Other existing partner organizations include the Social Scientists Association, Sri Lanka; Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Pakistan; the Himal Association, Nepal; and the Centre for Studies in Social Science, Calcutta. Overseeing these partnerships is our recently appointed program coordinator, Malini Sur, who is based in Dhaka, Bangladesh. She is also responsible for administering the South Asia Regional Fellowship Program and will be working with a program assistant based in each partner organization.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/southasia

Global Security and Cooperation Fellowships and Grants

With an initial pool of 193 applicants, a total of sixteen dissertation and professional fellows were selected for the 2002 Global Security and Cooperation fellowships and grants. Eight new teams were also selected to receive grants in support of collaborative research in conflict zones; the initial pool comprised 84 teams from 34 countries. The new GSC fellows and grantees have studied a diverse range of international security issues, from cooperation on issues of conflict, violence and transition between the successor states of former Yugoslavia to police development and democratic transition in Haiti and East Timor, as well as global environmental governance and community-based conservation in East Africa.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc

Bangladesh Predissertation and Dissertation Fellowship Program

After twelve years and 47 fellows, the Bangladesh Predissertation and Dissertation Fellowship Program completed its final round of competition this year. To mark its grand finale, the program will host a fellow's workshop and retreat in Comilla, Bangladesh in December, 2002. All current and past fellows based in Bangladesh will be invited to attend, along with members of the Bangladesh Selection Committee and local faculty.

◆ www.ssrc.org/fellowships/bangladesh

Program in Applied Economics Predissertation Fellowships

In May, 2002, the Program in Applied Economics selected its third cohort of predissertation fellows, wrapping up a highly competitive application season. Eighteen fellowships were awarded to support projects ranging from a study of local "community currencies" to an empirical examination of scientific innovation. The competition drew 63 applicants from a range of economics departments. Demographically, 10 of the 18 new fellows were born outside the US, and 6 are

women. A list of the 2002-2003 PAE fellows and their projects is available on the program's website at

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/app_econ/

Program on the Arts Fellowships

During the second year of its two-year pilot competition, the Program on the Arts received a total of 176 applications from 61 universities. The selection committee chose 15 dissertation projects for support during 2002-2003. The fellows represent a wide range of disciplines and fields, including American studies, anthropology, art history, comparative literature, economics, ethnomusicology, history, and sociology. The Program on the Arts will be holding a fall workshop, where the fellows will discuss their dissertation research with one another and with members of the committee. For a complete list of the 2002-03 Arts Fellows and their projects, please email arts@ssrc.org

Maputo Reception for book on *Living Spirits, Modern Traditions*


Alcinda Honwana's book *Living Spirits, Modern Traditions: Spirit Possession and Social Reintegration in Post-War Southern Mozambique* was launched on August 1, 2002, in Maputo, Mozambique. Honwana co-directs the Council's program on Africa and is director of the Children and Armed Conflict program. The book, published in Portuguese, deals with spirit possession practices in the context of a society in transition from war to peace, and with the debates about tradition and modernity in contemporary Africa. The launching reception was attended by a large group of social scientists, journalists and intellectuals based in Maputo. Amongst the local personalities present at the event was Mme Graca Machel, author of the UN Report on *Children and Armed Conflict*.

The Public Role of African Universities

In connection with an initiative on "The Public Role of African Universities," the Africa Program organized a workshop in Cape Town on July 19-20, 2002, during which case-study researchers presented their research plans. The Education Policy Unit (EPU) of the University of the Western Cape hosted the workshop. The principal goal of the workshop was to refine research plans and to create thematic linkages and potential comparisons across various case studies. The project is mobilizing a set of case studies (Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ghana, Sierra Leone) that focus on African universities during periods of both peaceful political transition as well as periods of upheaval and violence. Two advisory group members, Ebrima Sall and Yann Lebeau, along with Africa Program co-director Ron Kassimir, wrote an overview paper for the workshop. In addition, scholars from universities in Rwanda, Mozambique and Angola participated in discussions and presented perspectives on the role of their institutions in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation.

◆ www.ssrc.org/programs/africa

Recent Council Publications



ENGAGING CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: THE MULTICULTURAL CHALLENGE IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES, edited by Richard A. Shweder, Martha Minow, and Hazel Rose Markus. Sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation and organized by the SSRC Working Group on Ethnic Customs, Assimilation, and American Law. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2002. 485 pp.

Liberal democracies are based on principles of inclusion and tolerance. But how does the principle of tolerance work in practice in countries such as Germany, France, India, South Africa, and the United States, where an increasingly wide range of cultural groups holds often contradictory beliefs about appropriate social and family life practices? As these democracies expand to include peoples of vastly different cultural backgrounds, the limits of tolerance are being tested as never before. *Engaging Cultural Differences* explores how liberal democracies respond socially and legally to differences in the cultural and religious practices of their minority groups.

The contributors—an interdisciplinary group of legal scholars, anthropologists, psychologists, and political theorists—explore several interrelated questions: Does the law in these countries presuppose and codify the beliefs and values of the cultural mainstream? To what extent does the law affect the customs of ethnic minority groups, and how do these groups react to official attempts to force compliance with the dominant norms? How much cultural diversity in family practices ought to be permissible within the framework of a pluralistic, democratic

society? Some of the practices addressed include ethnic traditions about selecting marital partners, parent-child relationships, religiously-based clothing requirements for women, genital alteration, and religion and schooling.

Building on such examples, the contributors examine the role of tolerance in practical encounters between state officials and immigrants, and between members of longstanding majority groups and increasing numbers of minority groups. The volume also considers the theoretical implications of expanding the realm of tolerance. Some contributors are reluctant to broaden the scope of tolerance, while others insist that the notion of “tolerance” is itself potentially confining and demeaning and that modern nations should aspire to celebrate cultural differences.

Coming to terms with ethnic diversity and cultural differences has become a major public policy concern in contemporary liberal democracies, as they struggle to adjust to burgeoning immigrant populations. *Engaging Cultural Differences* provides a compelling examination of the challenges of multiculturalism and reveals a deep understanding of the challenges democracies face as they seek to accommodate their citizens’ diverse beliefs and practices.


Richard A. Shweder, an anthropologist, is professor of human development at the University of Chicago. Martha Minow is professor of law at Harvard University. Hazel R. Markus is professor of psychology at Stanford University. See page 29 of this issue for an abridged version of the introduction to this volume.

Explaining the Per Capita Income Gap Among Countries in the Caribbean. Special issue of *INTEGRATION & TRADE*. Volume 5, September-December, 2001, edited by Victor Bulmer-Thomas. Organized by the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition to overview and methodology chapters, this special issue of the journal published by INTAL (The Institute for the Integration of Latin American and the Caribbean) includes eight country studies. These are based on an extensive database of economic indicators of the 20th century Caribbean constructed by former Latin America Regional Advisory Panel members Victor Bulmer-Thomas and Shelton Nicholls. The essays examine the marked income inequality that exists among the various Caribbean nations, with particular attention to possible correlations between inequality and environmental degradation. A Spanish-language version of the special issue also has been recently released. Victor Bulmer-Thomas is director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.



LOS TRABAJOS DE LA MEMORIA (LABORS OF MEMORY), by Elizabeth Jelin, 146 pp.; DEL ESTRADO A LA PANTALLA: LAS IMÁGENES DEL JUICIO A LOS EX COMANDANTES EN ARGENTINA (From the Courtroom to the Screen: Images of the Trials of Military Rulers in Argentina), by Claudia Feld, 154 pp.; LAS CONMEMORACIONES: LAS DISPUTAS EN LAS FECHAS "IN-FELICES" (Dates of Controversy: Social Struggles and Commemoration), edited by Elizabeth Jelin, 254 pp. Sponsored by the Program on Latin America and the Caribbean. Madrid: Siglo XXI Editores, 2002.

The SSRC is pleased to announce that an initial set of volumes resulting from the Council's project on Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru has been published in Spanish by Siglo XXI Editores. For three years, the SSRC administered a research and training program that encouraged scholarship examining societal memory of past repression in contemporary Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay from the perspective of several disciplines. Struggles over how to remember human rights abuses, give public recognition to the victims and officially commemorate their suffering constitute a persistent feature of the political landscape in much of the region. As in other parts of the world emerging from periods of officially sponsored violence, the outcome of these conflicts is proving central to the process of crafting democracy and, at a more fundamental level, that of forging individual and collective identities. The multi-volume series, edited by Council Board member and Latin America Regional Advisory Panel member Elizabeth Jelin, treats myriad aspects of this process of collective memory and is produced by the program's fellows and faculty. The series will be released simultaneously in Madrid and Buenos Aires and distributed throughout the world. In addition to the three volumes already published, two volumes are currently in press (one with Siglo XXI and one with the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos in Lima) and we envision up to seven additional volumes to be published with Siglo XXI by the end of 2003. The University of Minnesota Press will publish an English language version of the first volume, *Labors of Memory*, in 2003.



MODELS OF CAPITALISM: LESSONS FOR LATIN AMERICA, edited by Evelyn Huber. Sponsored by the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies and the Regional Advisory Panel for Latin America and the Caribbean. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. 492 pp.

Latin American societies have undergone fundamental changes in the past two decades, moving from capitalist economies with very wide-ranging state intervention to more market-driven systems. After a prolonged period of recession, these changes produced some successes in economic growth in the 1990s, but they also exacerbated many problems, especially poverty and inequality. *Models of Capitalism* examines why some societies with market economies perform much better than others in combining growth and equity, and what the less successful countries can learn from the more successful ones.

The contributors look at different models of capitalism in Latin America, Northeast and Southeast Asia, and advanced industrial countries, asking which patterns of economic and social policies governments in the more successful societies pursued, and which configurations of institutions made pursuing such policies possible. The investigation focuses on economic policies designed to stimulate growth, on labor-market policies designed to promote a qualified labor force and increase productivity and wages, and on social policies designed to improve general human capital and to distribute life chances in an equitable way.

The volume is innovative in explicitly connecting the discussion of growth policies with an analysis of labor market and social policies and in going beyond comparison of Latin American with East Asian approaches to include reference to



equity-oriented policies in North America and Western Europe as well. This approach helps demonstrate how important policy design is in determining distributive outcomes at any given level of development. Evelyne Huber is Morehead Alumni Professor of Political Science and director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. She is a former member of the SSRC Regional Advisory Panel on Latin America and the Caribbean and the Joint Committee on Latin American Studies.

SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH CAPACITY IN SOUTH ASIA, by Partha Chatterjee, et al. Organized by the Regional Advisory Panel on South Asia. New York: SSRC. 160 pp.

In July 2001 the Social Science Research Council commissioned a report on the currently existing capacity for social science research in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and a forward-looking assessment of the potential and needs in those countries. The result was this volume, part of the SSRC Working Paper Series on "Building Intellectual Capital for the 21st Century." The work carried out for this project has recently been republished in leading regional journals. The report recently appeared in Sri Lanka's premier social science association journal, *Pravada*, and the country report on Pakistan by Akbar Zaidi has been republished by the Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan, as part of their monograph series. The paper is also available on their website at www.coss.sdnpk.org



Board of Directors News


The Board of Directors of the Social Science Research Council has recently elected two sociologists to its ranks: Troy Duster and Doug McAdam. Long-time Board member Neil Smelser, also a sociologist, resigned from the Board in the Spring. His sharp insights, gentle wisdom and brilliant tessellations on styrofoam coffee cups will be sorely missed.

Troy Duster is Professor of Sociology at New York University and holds an appointment at the Institute for the History of the Production of Knowledge (NYU). He is also chair of the Board of Directors of the Association of American Colleges and Universities. From 1996-99, he served as a member of the National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research, and during the same period served as member and then chair of the joint NIH/DOE advisory committee on Ethical, Legal and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project (The ELSI Working Group). Duster is the author of a number of articles on the social implications of new technologies. His most recent publications on the topic are "The Sociology of Science and the Revolution in Molecular Biology," in J. R. Blau, ed., *The Blackwell Companion to Sociology* (Blackwell, 2001), and "The Social Consequences of Genetic Disclosure," in Ronald Carson and Mark Rothstein, eds., *Culture and Biology* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

Doug McAdam is Professor of Sociology at Stanford University and was recently appointed Director of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California. He sits on the American Sociological Association's Committee on Publications (Fall 2000 to the present) and the Career of Distinguished Scholarship Committee (1996 to the present). McAdam is the author or co-author of eight books and more than 50 articles in the area of political sociology, with a special emphasis on the study of social movements and revolutions. Among his best known works are *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*, a new edition of which was published in 1999 (University of Chicago Press), *Freedom Summer* (1988, Oxford University Press), which was awarded the 1990 C. Wright Mills Award as well as being a finalist for the American Sociological Association's best book prize for 1991, and *Dynamics of Contention* (2001, Cambridge University Press) with Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly.

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Vol. 3
No.3-4
Summer/Fall
2002

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