MEMORANDUM

TO: Recruits

FROM: BASE OPS/ International Spy Museum

RE: Operation Minute by Minute

DATE: 01 October, 1962 (time travel skills required)

You have been asked to report to the International Spy Museum for a very important mission. This mission is so sensitive that we cannot fully brief you on it until you arrive. What we can tell you is that you must travel back in time to 01 October 1962. We know you can do this – after all you’ve been studying this period in history, right? Well... we’ll just assume you have.

In preparation for your mission, please read your position description as an All Source Analyst at the CIA. This is the job you will have upon arrival. Additionally please read our most recent Memorandum on the situation on Cuba — it was distributed on 20 August. It will bring you up to speed on this matter.

Please also review the provided map and diagram and glossary of key terms.

We look forward to a more full briefing upon your arrival.
The all source analyst is responsible for using many different types of intelligence to analyze current and future issues. You apply your knowledge in the areas of HUMINT (human intelligence), PHOTINT (photo or imagery intelligence), SIGINT (signals intelligence) and OSINT (open source intelligence). You work with team members to research, evaluate, analyze and interpret multiple sources of intelligence to produce reports, estimates, and recommendations. You prepare intelligence assessments and conduct briefings on findings. You advise key leadership of issues and challenges as appropriate. You may support targeting, information collection, and crisis action planning in 24/7 operations.
MEMORANDUM ON CUBA

The Soviet -- and probably bloc -- support of Cuba was stepped up in July and August. 21 ships docked in July and 17 have docked, or are en route, in August, 5 of which are passenger ships.

CLA has received approximately 60 reports on this increased activity; 40 out of Opa Locka, and the balance from controlled sources considered dependable.

It appears that between 4000 and 6000 Soviet/Bloc personnel have arrived in Cuba since 1 July. Many are known to be technicians, some are suspected to be military personnel; there is no evidence of organized Soviet military units, as such, being included. A great many of the arriving Soviet/Bloc personnel are isolated from the Cuban population.

The unloading of most ships takes place under maximum security, with the Cuban population excluded from the port areas. Large equipment is noticeable; large crates have been observed which could contain airplane fuselages or missile components.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
13 September 1962

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Analysis of the Suspect Missile Site at Banas, Cuba

1. A review of all available evidence leads us to conclude it is highly likely that the suspect missile site near Banas, Cuba is a facility for launching cruise missiles against ship targets at fairly close ranges.

2. The site, which is located about 300 feet above sea level and 3.5 km from the sea is oriented in a general easterly (seaward) direction. It consists of two 30 foot rail launchers in revetments, each connected by cable to a Soviet Whiff tracking radar. Ground support equipment consists of eight canvas-covered, missile-type trailers, two probable generators and electronic vans, and other general purpose vehicles. The area is being fenced, and the personnel are housed in tents. The site configuration and the equipment observed are compatible with a cruise missile system and not compatible with surface-to-air or ballistic systems.

3. Although our knowledge of Soviet cruise missiles is incomplete, we know of three systems which could fit those facilities observed at Banas. We have eliminated other operational Soviet cruise missile systems, with ranges from 1000 to 4000 nm, because their missiles probably would be too large for the Banas facility. A 600 nm cruise missile has also a test range firing in the USSR, but it too would be too large for the Banas site.
6. There are several items of circumstantial evidence which tend to support the conclusion that the Banes site is for relatively short range coastal defense cruise missiles. The fact that the site is near the coast suggests that the range of its missile is short; otherwise it could be located inland in a less vulnerable area. It is located where short-range missiles could defend against seaborne assault on deep water ports in Nipe Bay south of Banes. Thus far, the Soviets apparently have not given Cuba any weapons which provide them a long range striking capability, suggesting that their policy is to provide for Cuba's defense only. Because neither the SS-N-1 nor the SS-C-1 has sufficient range to hit any target in the United States, such missiles would fit this policy pattern.

7. If the analysis that the Banes missile site is a coastal defense installation is correct, it would follow that similar facilities may be set up at a number of other locations favorable for protecting beaches against amphibious attack.

8. We doubt that Cubans have been given sufficient training in the use of such missiles to allow them to have operational control over the sites. It seems likely that Soviet technical training personnel would be needed for some time to come and would be available for operating the installation in time of crisis.

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Cuba's two nickel plants are in this general area. Their output is being sent to the Soviet Bloc and is equivalent to 20 percent of Soviet production. The more important of these two plants is on the bay protected by the Banes site.
All Source Analysts: Analysts who consider all forms and sources of intelligence. See Intelligence Analysis.

Ballistic Missile: A missile that is guided or directed as it ascends in the air but then falls freely to the ground.

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency; U.S.’ foreign intelligence gathering service.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT): Intelligence collected by human sources.

Intelligence Analysis: The process of examining information about situations to find out the known data (what we know for certain) and then determine the possible outcomes to specific actions.

Intelligence Problem: A problem that can be addressed and possibly solved with analysis of available intelligence.

Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM): A type of ballistic missile with medium range. Within the U.S. Department of Defense, a medium range missile is defined by having a maximum range of between 1,000 and 3,000 km.

MI-6: The British foreign intelligence service.

Photographic Intelligence (PHOTINT): Usually involving high-altitude reconnaissance using spy satellites or aircraft such as a U-2 spy plane.

Reconnaissance: The active seeking to determine an enemy’s intentions by collecting and gathering data and information related to size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment, and other conditions, via direct observation, usually by scouts and military intelligence soldiers specially trained in critical surveillance.

SS4 or R12 Dvina: A ballistic missile developed and deployed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The R12 rocket provided a capability to attack targets at medium ranges with a megaton-class nuclear warhead and constituted the bulk of the Soviet offensive missile threat to Western Europe. It was the R12 missile that was deployed in Cuba during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

Task Force Chief: The head of a specific project. Term used by the CIA.

U-2: A single-engine, high-altitude aircraft flown by the United States Air Force and previously flown by the Central Intelligence Agency. It provides day and night, high-altitude (70,000ft, 21,000m plus), allweather surveillance. The aircraft is also used for electronic sensor research and development, satellite calibration, and satellite data validation.