



Louisiana State Police

ASSESSMENT REPORT



AUGUST 2023

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Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA)(www.fleta.gov) Standards

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01.

Community Policing & Engagement



Community Policing & Engagement

Scope

This is the review examining community relations between the community of Louisiana and the Troopers of the Louisiana State Police (hereinafter referred to as LSP). The purpose of this review is to ascertain the breadth and depth of community engagement, outreach practices, and activities in which LSP engages - as well as any internal framework (i.e. directives, training, etc.) currently in place to effect and embody such engagement and activities. TBG also talked with outside stakeholders to ascertain their views on LSP.

Law enforcement cannot serve effectively without public support that demonstrates the primacy of voluntary compliance with laws and the acceptance of the use of coercive authority by law enforcement officers. The public confers legitimacy only on those who act in a procedurally just way, i.e., people believe they are treated with dignity and respect, have an opportunity to voice or express concerns during encounters, have input into the policies and practices of the organization, and believe coercive authority, when used, is used proportionally and reasonably. In addition, law enforcement leaders are beginning to understand how internal perspectives of the organization influence how members interact with the public. Arguably, in organizations where internal procedural justice is challenged, relations with members of the public may be adversely affected as well.

Method

Information gathering was conducted in a variety of ways – through searching for applicable policy on the LSP website; interviewing members of the executive staff, including members of the Public Affairs as well as Operational Development Sections of LSP; and researching the programs LSP identified as community partners and collaborations. TBG reviewed strategic plans and had several unsolicited direct contacts from interested citizens. Furthermore, TBG also sought information and customer satisfaction/community feedback data in regards to LSP's ability to, and success in, fostering positive community relations. Additionally, TBG also mined the Internet, media reports and stories for organizations that have spoken about LSP. TBG spoke to Troopers, impacted members of the community, law enforcement from other agencies, attorneys, local/statewide organizations, and the business community. These interactions occurred in the form of roundtables, focus groups, small group meetings and one on one interviews in person on the ground, as well as virtually. TBG also observed training in the Academy and reviewed lesson plans.

References

Records & Documents

Website lsp.gov?

Lesson plans?

Use of force videos and reports?

Data

No data was available on community engagement

Limitations

TBG encountered several limitations in this review. First, LSP as an operational organization does not seem to collect, maintain, or track much data in relation to its interactions with the community. A fundamental concern in this regard is the fact that neither internal members nor LSP as a collective seem to have or hold a shared definition and opinion as to what constitutes “community engagement. Another limitation TBG encountered was the availability of willing parties to provide feedback. Despite several and broad attempts to connect to local community and advocacy groups as well as state officials, the count of established connections was low. Lastly, the role of the State police has not traditionally been community engagement. Their main role and identity is associated with enforcement of traffic laws and investigation of traffic crashes. While they supply support services to all other law enforcement agencies, they are embedded within individual communities, and answer to local authorities on matters of concern.

Were there any challenges?

There was no data collected on community engagement. There were no surveys conducted previously on community engagement, nor was there a method for community members to provide feedback on their interactions with LSP. Another challenge was to earn community trust; TBG learned that many marginalized communities are distrustful of LSP, resulting in a desire not to engage in discussions about their work.

Is there a need for further review of certain topics/areas beyond this scope?

First, LSP needs to create consensus around how it defines “community engagement” and which activities would (or should) qualify as such activity in order to engage in more accurate data collection, maintenance, and tracking. Secondly, review should be ongoing. As recommendations are implemented, the LSP executive team should assess whether or not the changes are effective through surveys, reviews, and interviews to ensure that they are being responsive to community needs. The Bowman Group also sought to determine from the agency, the community, and state government what the role of LSP should be. Disparate understanding of roles will continue to be a source of discontent, erode trust, make it difficult to build bridges with the community and reduce LSP overall effectiveness.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

LSP Community Engagement

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Create a community engagement policy with the assistance of internal and external stakeholders.

After extensive reviews of the LSP website, and internal inquiries, TBG learned that there is no formal policy on community engagement. It is difficult to ask Troopers to do this type of work without a clear understanding of what community engagement actually is (how the department actually defines it), and what actions a Trooper can take in order to build a better relationship with the community LSP serves. Secondly, without clear metrics, it will not be possible to determine whether or not engagement is successful. This policy can assist in creating standards by which Troopers can be held in terms of promotion, raises, and other incentives. It will also set the standard for disciplinary consequences if the metrics/criteria are not met. The same information should be integrated into job descriptions (especially for higher ranking and executive leadership members) and a metric/factor assessed during the application process.

As LSP explores the right path towards community engagement, LSP will need to broadly engage stakeholders as to what an effective policy will look like. These stakeholders must include people who have been supportive as

well as critical of LSP. LSP should also be including changes to the vision/mission statement so that community engagement becomes part of the culture. Policy alone will not be sufficient.

The United States Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) defines community policing as having three critical components: community partnerships, organizational transformation and problem solving – with community partnerships being the most important of the three. 21st century policing embraces the need for community involvement in order to restore community trust. The Lincoln Police Department (Nebraska) provides a robust definition on community policing on their website.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Make robust community engagement part of each Trooper's job through incorporating it as a metric in hiring, performance reviews and promotion decisions.

It was clear from the discussions TBG had with Troopers, supervisors and others that they did not view community engagement to be part of their daily duties. They appear to view community engagement as something to do, rather than how they behave – a task as opposed to a behavioral attribute. Many believed that it should only be the Public Affairs unit doing this work; others indicated a desire to engage, but were unsure where to start. A commonly expressed opinion, including supervisors, was that arrests, stops and calls for service were community engagement. With a clear definition and metrics, Troopers can have clear guidance on how to engage, and have a common language regarding the goals LSP are trying to achieve in this work.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

Conduct regular community meetings around community restoring/building.

Regular, consistent open forums around policing issues, especially surrounding French Quarter concerns, should be held at an accessible time (i.e. not during the work day, or with only 24 hours notice). An underutilized option is to use the cafeteria at headquarters in Baton Rouge as an opportunity for Troopers to interact with the community. The location (and menu) can provide a relaxed way for Troopers, Cadets and the community to “break bread”. It is a way to introduce Cadets into the mindset of community policing. This location, however, is the starting point and should not be the default. LSP needs to proactively engage in the community by going to various geographic and demographic areas. Each Troop should mimic this at their headquarters or at a centrally located part of their jurisdiction easily accessible to transit, parking, and for differently abled people. Types of events could include having a “Meet the Cadets” day each month; host back to school events/giveaways; host town halls for community feedback; and providing educational seminars on a variety of topics, in partnership with local community groups. Some events can even be hosted virtually if it is more informational in nature. Our review revealed that LSP has not conducted any such town halls in recent memory. TBG learned that community members have a desire to interact with LSP outside of an encounter, but there are no opportunities to do so.

Having regular community meetings is a way to rebuild community trust, and to hear about issues before they spiral into a terrible situation. Doing so also creates an air of dialogue and transparency, which is critical to trust building. However, a critical aspect is who is being sent to these meetings. One mistake that often occurs in community engagement is relying on staff of color to engage. Community members have indicated that they would like to see a variety of Troopers at events, because of who they are likely to interact with on a stop. In terms of attendance, LSP should keep in mind that supporters often come to meetings, but adversaries do not. LSP should identify adversarial groups and engage in outreach activities to begin dialogues, perhaps through faith-based organizations. This must be done in a preventive, proactive manner, and prioritized to focus on marginalized communities.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Create an active social media strategy through collaborating with local police departments at beat meetings, community events and other stakeholders.

TBG reviewed LSP's social media presence. LSP has accounts on Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and YouTube. Facebook and Twitter have the highest number of followers. There is an opportunity to be able to use this by sharing community announcements, solicit feedback, or host community town halls via Facebook, Twitter or Instagram Live. LSP should also look at other virtual ways of engagement beyond these traditional accounts, knowing that different generations gravitate towards different platforms (for instance, the boom of TikTok). LSP will also need to determine which platforms align with their values (vis a vis the changes at Twitter).

The nonprofit Urban Institute provides suggestions on how to maximize the use of social media to interact with the community.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Track data surrounding community engagement in a centralized manner to include how many events each Trooper attends, where, and the demographic served (race/gender/ethnicity).

Currently, this is done for Public Affairs, but effective tracking is necessary in order for community engagement to be a part of each Trooper's job. Effective data collection and management is a best practice of 21st century policing.

A better way to handle this would be to create a stand-alone Community Relations Division/Unit, with a community relations person based at each Troop, and at least one data person to support data and tracking.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Expand on the types of community events that LSP engages in and attend.

From our interviews, it appears that there is a "we go where we are invited" mentality. Instead, LSP should be more proactive in creating opportunities to engage, especially in marginalized communities. The Sudden Impact program, while good overall, is not run by LSP. LSP needs to take the lead on programming with the community in collaboration with local community groups. A helpful model, which can be replicated on LSP's website, is found here.

Have the community be part of Academy and in-service training especially for procedural justice and other training focusing on DEI and other interpersonal or community dynamics/ use community members as part of the instructor team or have panels to share lived experiences with Cadets or Troopers during training.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Send out quarterly customer satisfaction surveys to learn community views of LSP.

1.5.7.1 In our review, TBG learned that LSP has never surveyed the community to understand how they are doing in terms of customer service. Customer satisfaction feedback data should be collected for any interaction: calls for service, community events by LSP, events by partners that LSP is a part of, etc. Just having a practice of seeking customer/community satisfaction feedback will create a more proactive environment, and should not only be in response to a crisis or harm.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

Encourage Troopers to meet community assist targets.

Our interviews indicate that Troopers have been falling short in community assists for a number of years. This is a non-enforcement way of interacting with the community by changing flat tires and other positive interactions. Calls for service are not the same as community engagement.

RECOMMENDATION 9:

Encourage LSP to be fully engaged in the chaplain programs and capitalize on clergy relationships.

It appears that not every Troop utilizes the chaplain program. This is a missed opportunity. Police chaplains, for the most part, have their own church and are part of a network of clergy members. Knowing that a particular clergy member is a police chaplain, other clergy can bring issues to the chaplain for resolution with LSP. Additionally, chaplains have a wider weekly reach due to their congregations and networks. This relationship can assist with the chaplain being the intermediary between concerned community members and LSP, de-escalating issues before they reach a boiling point.

Community Engagement Hiring/Staffing

RECOMMENDATION 10:

Create a Community Relations Division/Unit; then hire at least one community engagement person per Troop who will assist in tracking activities, identifying opportunities for engagement, and be the central point of contact for the community.

Presently, as per interviews with the Public Affairs Unit and supervisory staff, the Public Affairs Unit in Baton Rouge handles public interactions. While there is one public affairs staff member per Troop, it is important for Troopers to view community engagement as everyone's job, not just the lone Public Affairs Trooper. Additionally, in implementing tracking of community engagement for purposes of promotion and reviews, a more efficient system needs to be developed. Troopers cannot be expected to seek out engagement opportunities in addition to their daily duties - or have the responsibility of following up with parties interested in having a Trooper attend their event or speak. Centralizing the activities on a more local basis will lead to better tracking, enhanced connection with the community, and will allow communities to meet a variety of Troopers - not the same person every time. Additionally, having data on the levels of engagement, who is engaging, and what the needs are will better direct future community engagement efforts as well as staff allocations towards this aspect. LSP will be better able to determine what is working in terms of engagement, and what is not.

In support of the above, a new division/unit should be created for Community Relations. Public Affairs should continue to handle FOIA requests, media relations and other aspects; the Community Relations Unit would be solely charged with identifying events, creating community relationships, and tracking the data of each Trooper that does a community engagement activity. The staff member that handles community engagement could be an administrative assistant rather than a sworn Trooper.

Another alternative (while not preferred due to current Public Affairs workload) could be to change the role of the Public Affairs Officer stationed at each Troop to incorporate more of the duties listed above.

RECOMMENDATION 11:

Revamp hiring/recruiting as well as make a public statement regarding a commitment to diversity in terms of race, gender, sexual identity and background.

Per the most recent census, Louisiana is 51% female, 62% white, and 33% African American. At LSP, 87% of Troopers are male, 72% of Troopers are White, 15% African American, and 2.5% Hispanic. LSP should be a reflection of the state that they serve. This can be achieved by outlining explicit hiring goals with demographic metrics.

The Academy is another important pathway to diversity. In our onsite visits, TBG received feedback from Cadets or people who separated from the Academy that being estranged from their families for the majority of the Academy was too difficult. In the Academy class TBG visited over the summer, half of the people who left the Academy before graduation were people of color. This format makes it difficult for single parents and can make it harder to attract diverse talent. Making the Academy more accessible will not sacrifice quality, while creating an environment for others to succeed.

RECOMMENDATION 12:

Create fixed shifts for Troopers – i.e. a night, day and weekend shift so that Troopers can have a balanced life.

Rotating shifts are too stressful and overwhelming, which can cause stress in relationships at home, which then can spill into interactions on the road between the Trooper and the public. Several Troopers and outside stakeholders noted that this was a problem contributing to burnout.

Several studies have shown that a fixed shift is better on the body, and that sleep deprivation causes impaired decision-making. Some sources that shed light on this issue can be found [here](#) and [here](#).

RECOMMENDATION 13:

Conduct national searches for the next LSP Colonel.

TBG encourage LSP to advocate for a change in Louisiana law to allow for the Colonel to be recruited nationally, as opposed to only an active Trooper from LSP. As the LSP leans into change, there will be Troopers that are opposed to change internally. With a change to this law, a national search can be conducted, availing LSP of a wide bench of leaders that understand 21st Century policing. Community members and advocates have stated that the lack of outsiders at the helm contributes to the view that LSP is secretive and not transparent.

The LSP should foster a culture where employees can willingly engage the community through relationship building in an official capacity or during non-enforcement roles. During community engagement opportunities, police can collaborate on strategies to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in communities. The LSP should develop increase community involvement toward youth engagement, and collaboration opportunities with local parishes to educate drivers on public safety initiatives.

Community Engagement Policy

RECOMMENDATION 14:

Create a written policy around community engagement.

There is no community engagement policy in existence at this point. Having a policy communicates expectations

to which Troopers can be held accountable, and educates the public on what to expect. It also shows that a particular issue is a priority. The development of this policy should include feedback from internal as well as community stakeholders, and be placed on the LSP website for public comment. To get the most robust public feedback, create a social media campaign letting the community know that a new policy is being considered, that they are invited to submit comments, and advise as to the deadline. However, the policy needs to support the mission. Policies that are not connected to purpose are not followed. Until the mission changes, policy will be of little value. Additionally, any new policy must be reinforced positively, as well as with discipline if the policy is not followed.

IACP has great resources around community engagement, including a 30,000 foot view of how to implement this work that can be found [here](#). A model community engagement policy can be found [here](#); an example of soliciting public comment can be found [here](#).

RECOMMENDATION 15:

Streamline the complaint process so that any entity is able to make a complaint easily via the LSP website.

TBG was told by law enforcement from neighboring departments as well as civilians that they have been directed to file complaints in person at the Baton Rouge headquarters. This could be a result of Troopers misunderstanding the complaint process, or a deliberate attempt to circumvent the process. Regardless of the reason, a barrier is created for people to file a complaint – which does not make the problem/concern disappear. The easiest method of accomplishing this is to place a link on the website by which people can submit complaints much like what was done in New Orleans. The website should also include a way to easily share feedback (positive or negative) about Trooper interactions with a link and form to fill out that can be submitted with one click. The New Jersey State Police also has a streamlined model.

RECOMMENDATION 16:

Post draft policies on the LSP website with a window for public comment.

As mentioned above, posting draft policies for public comment with a set deadline (for instance, 21 days) is a best practice. LSP should ensure public posting of all non-sensitive policies for public comment with a feedback loop to the public on what feedback can and cannot be incorporated and why. This helps address transparency and increase public trust. It is also good practice to have community partners with expertise in a topic area (e.g. behavioral health professional to review the mental health policy etc.) for assistance with best practice/language before it gets posted for public comment. Social media can be utilized to highlight that the public comment time frame is open, and as the process continues, what has been changed, and reasons for why certain changes were/were not implemented.

A model solicitation for public comment can be found [here](#).

Additionally, as policies are being drafted and updated, care should be taken to use gender inclusive language. Our review of LSP policies showed that most, if all policies, refer to “he”, with a few references to “he or she”. Using a term like “they” will result in all genders/gender identities being included in the policy. The Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services explains the importance as well as how to implement it in their report “Gender, Sexuality and 21st Century Policing: Protecting the Rights of the LGBTQ+ Community”.

RECOMMENDATION 17:

Take steps to promote greater transparency of day to day operations.

A common theme that was repeated in individual meetings is the perceived lack of transparency of how LSP is run. Utilizing public facing dashboards and annual reports can address this. The annual report can include aspects such as mission and goals, organization and personnel, statistical information, and major accomplishments. The Baltimore Police Department provides a robust example of a community centered annual report. The dashboard can show outcomes and number of complaints against LSP, level of activity in each Troop, number of calls for service, number of community assists, use of force numbers, Trooper demographics and other key metrics of importance to the community. The Chicago Police Department has a number of dashboards, as well as the New York Police Department.

Implementing a civilian oversight is a way to educate the community on the day to day work of a Trooper, and can be a tool to build trust in the community. While civilian oversight is typically seen in local police departments, there is tremendous value that can come from LSP being one of, if not the first, statewide policing entity to be transparent. Some key goals and guiding principles on how to create this model can be found from the National Association for Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement.

Community Engagement Training

RECOMMENDATION 18:

Expand training to include bias awareness, how to interact with diverse community members, and de-escalation.

A consistent theme from the community members that were interviewed was a need for better training on some of the “soft” skills of interactions with people that identify as minorities.

Presently, the Academy curriculum does not include these topics; de-escalation is only a 12 hour block during the Academy, with no real in-service follow up to encourage practice of these tactics. As such, LSP should expand Academy and in-service training sessions to address these concerns.

RECOMMENDATION 19:

Utilize community members as instructors or as members of DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion) panels during training.

Outside instructors bring lived experiences that can be beneficial to Cadets learning how to be a Trooper. Also, if possible, Troopers should be taken to important historical sites that are important to marginalized communities (either as Cadets or as part of in-service training, or roll call in each Troop)

Key LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: LSP Weaknesses & Threats

LSP's greatest weakness, and its strength, is its Troopers. Repeatedly, concerns around Troopers disrespect of the community, rough arrests, and having a callous demeanor have risen to the surface. If Troopers are holding on to the warrior mindset, it will not bode well for community interaction. The Ronald Greene case and the subsequent cover-up remain a black eye on the organization; but it is a high profile example of what community members have been complaining about for decades.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

LSP is viewed by others in the law enforcement community as being the premier agency in Louisiana. It has a higher pay scale, a well respected crime lab, and the ability to recruit statewide due to having a strong name. As such, LSP has the distinct opportunities to broaden diversity in hiring, and has the budgetary allotment to create new positions to respond to community needs. LSP should continue its engagement via the Sudden Impact program, holiday food giveaways and back to school backpack drives; however they should expand on this work through targeted outreach in each Troop area.

02.

Disciplinary Complaints & Internal Affairs



Disciplinary Complaints & Internal Affairs

Scope

The Bowman Group conducted a review of the LSP's disciplinary complaint system, including evaluating whether LSP's policies, practices, and procedures effectively define the roles, authority, and operational responsibilities for all parties in the complaint and disciplinary process.

TBG identified policies and practices that guide the investigation of complaints of misconduct and LSP Internal Affairs (IA). Policy review was used to establish a baseline understanding of the LSP's policy and practices; to examine the degree to which the policies are consistent or inconsistent with recommended practices; and to educate and inform team members prior to interviewing LSP Internal Affairs personnel.

Method

On-site observations and interactions with members of the Internal Affairs unit provided key perspectives on the complaint investigation process, especially how complaints are received, assigned, investigated, and adjudicated. Additionally, TBG conducted interviews of leadership, commanders, supervisors, and Troopers to determine LSP personnel's perceptions of the disciplinary complaint and IA process, consistency of discipline outcomes, internal procedural justice, and their understanding and views on LSP policies.

TBG also reviewed a representative sample of LSP complaint investigations to assess whether investigations are consistent with written policy and national best practices, and whether investigations are conducted with fairness and impartiality, especially with respect to disciplinary decisions.

Members of the public reached out to TBG to provide input on their experiences with the LSP. These discussions informed this evaluation of the LSP's commitment to procedural justice, transparency, and openness to ensuring the complaint investigation process maintains trust, fairness and transparency.

References

Records & Documents

TBG analyzed LSP policies to inform our findings and recommendations as well as assess adherence to national best practices and peer organizations. This included assessing how to enhance existing policy to align with national best practices for supporting fair and impartial policing, give the public and Troopers voice, and improve accountability.

These policies include:

- P.O. 205 Bias-Based Policing
- P.O. 209 Complaints and Administrative Investigations, which describes the complaint investigation process
- P.O. 212 Discrimination and Harassment Complaint Procedure
- Policy 801 Administration, which describes the duties and responsibilities of the Internal Affairs Unit; and Policy
- SOP 1.5.9.1(d)

Data

TBG looked at 171 internal affairs and non-internal affairs complaint files for the period 2019-2021. The total number of complaints for each year is provided in the following table.

Table 1: Number of Complaints by Year

Year	Number of Complaints	Internal Affairs		Non-Internal Affairs	
		N	%	N	%
2019	50	34	68.0	16	32.0
2020	36	25	69.4	11	30.6
2021	85	64	75.3	21	24.7

TBG randomly selected a representative sample of completed investigations for review, and assessed investigation facets including, but not limited to: the integrity, quality, and thoroughness of investigations; whether files included appropriate notice to complainants and personnel; and whether dispositions were adjudicated in a manner consistent with the documented evidence and national best practices. This review informs our findings and recommendations in the area of LSP disciplinary complaints and internal affairs.

Limitations

What is not covered in the scope of this review?

The TBG identified practices LSP can adopt to enhance its goal of becoming a model professional law enforcement department. However, our review was limited as the evaluation of data was not as robust as planned because the LSP lacks key historical records related to complaints of misconduct, stops, search, and arrest, and complaints of use of force. TBG acknowledges but did not evaluate contractual or statutory requirements that govern the complaint investigation process.

Were there any challenges?

LSP complaint data is not archived in an electronic format that allows for the identification of trends that could inform policy development, supervision, or training.

Is there a need for further review of certain topics/areas beyond this scope?

The LSP must fully implement a records management system with searchable data fields that includes key behavior and performance indicators related to disciplinary complaints and internal affairs. The assessment of this data may provide additional guidance in the future.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Establish an overall department philosophy regarding the investigation of complaints of employee misconduct.

How a department prioritizes and addresses complaints is critical to public legitimacy. LSP needs to strengthen institutional approaches to addressing complaints of discrimination, harassment, and biased policing. Currently policies appear to focus solely on internal complaints, and do not consider the unique challenges of investigating complaints from members of the public.

The LSP must articulate an overall philosophy guiding the considerate evaluation and resolution of all internal and public complaints. Policy and practice should demonstrate a commitment to the timely acceptance, review and investigation of all complaints from any source. This does not mean all complaints should be assigned to internal affairs for investigation; LSP should clearly define and categorize the type of complaint/allegations to be investigated by IA or other units. The LSP should document, track and audit all complaints, regardless of type or source.

Contractual agreements and legal requirements uniquely challenge the process of investigating complaints within law enforcement. The LSP should identify such requirements that challenge complaint investigation, but also engage the public and department members to communicate any legislative changes that would strengthen legitimacy.

The LSP should consider revising policies related to the investigation of complaints of Discrimination, Harassment, and Bias-Free Policing and developing the capacity to use data to assist in evaluating and investigating complaints and allegations of unfair and partial policing.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Commit to open, fair and transparent public access and communication regarding the IA disciplinary complaint process.

The provision permitting the filing of perjury charges against persons who make a false complaint may deter persons from filing legitimate complaints.

There are limited means of filing a complaint, which may inhibit some aggrieved parties from using the process.

In general, the complaint investigation process should strengthen the department's relationship with the community, not elicit tension or dissatisfaction. To assist in building trust, national best practices promote engaged dialogue with the community, such as distributing the complaint policy and detailing the complaint process broadly and specifically, including the LSP website and other social media. The LSP should provide this information in multiple languages, and make it available in public areas, such as government and community buildings.

This should include open communication regarding state laws affecting administration of the IA process, and the rights of persons who are not satisfied with the outcome of an investigation.

Department leaders, commanders, and supervisors must seek every opportunity to demonstrate the organization is committed to hearing community complaints or commendations, especially from members of communities that have historically struggled to achieve positive relations with law enforcement. "The complaint process should not discourage, dishearten, or intimidate complainants, or give them cause for fear." For example, the LSP can consider including a third party in the intake process that provides complainants a neutral alternative to make the complaint.

The department should explore developing a Complaints and Internal Investigation Strategic Communication Plan to support a focused, systematic cadence of dialogue with members of the public and employees.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

Develop specialized training that reinforces the concepts of procedural justice and the legitimate, credible and fair investigation of all complaints and allegations of misconduct or poor performance.

LSP members expressed dissatisfaction with the complaint investigation process and perceived disparities in disciplinary outcomes.

The LSP should ensure that personnel at all levels are knowledgeable of the protocols for receiving, filing and investigating a complaint. Non-supervisors should be directed to immediately notify a supervisor upon receiving information or knowledge of a complaint of misconduct.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Analyze IA data regularly to identify training needs and emerging trends.

The LSP lacks the ability to conduct data analysis regarding the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, including its disciplinary complaints process.

Analysis of data is a key component of an organization's accountability systems. National practices generally cite three important benefits of evaluating IA data: it allows an organization to track complaints and the progress of an investigation; it allows the organization to establish and assess the investigator's communications with complainants, a key transparency variable; and it allows the department to identify challenges and opportunities to inform policy development, leadership, supervision, and training. Reference?

LSP leadership has indicated its commitment to developing capacity to evaluate data. The department is in the early stages of implementing a new data collection and records management system that will track IA data, use of force data, and stop, search, and arrest data. LSP should prioritize the full implementation of data collection and records management systems, which will increase opportunities to apply data analysis.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Demonstrate a commitment to transparency concerning critical incidents.

TBG received feedback from members of the public critical of the access and timeliness of information regarding department events

LSP line personnel expressed dissatisfaction with routine and strategic communications.

Members of the public and the LSP expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of communication regarding the disciplinary outcomes as a result of the investigation of the death of Ronald Greene.

TBG received feedback in which community members questioned the LSP's commitment to releasing accurate and timely information relating to the department knowledge of and investigation of critical incidents.

The lack of meaningful dialogue has created an environment of distrust that permeates the department's relationship with some community groups and cultures. The distrust is not limited to the public. TBG conducted

interviews or ridealongs with Troopers from all regions of the organization. During these discussions, Troopers commonly cited frustration with the lack of knowledge of information related to internal investigations, disciplinary and corrective action decisions, and the reason or motivation for policy or procedural changes. Troopers expressed frustration that the lack of information contributes to negative perceptions that unfairly taints all Troopers.

The LSP should consider releasing key information as soon as possible, excluding information that cannot be released for legal reasons or without threatening the integrity of the investigative process. Police organizations have enacted various strategies for communicating information regarding internal investigations and critical events. For example, the San Francisco Police Department has committed to holding an Officer Involved Shooting Town Hall meeting within fifteen days of the occurrence of the event to discuss basic facts of the incident, a description of the internal investigations process, and a description of the criminal investigative process. (Cite)

TBG recognizes legislation and contractual rights of LSP members may limit the scope of information that is subject to release. However, the LSP should consider adopting a strategy that supports accurate and timely discussion of critical events with the community and department members as a critical first step in restoring confidence in the integrity of the department's accountability systems.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Commit to regular evaluation and modification of policies and practices with input from members of the public and a representative ranking of department members.

Members expressed lack of voice in determination of key policies and practices of the department.

TBG received input that public involvement in the development of policy or practices are limited to enforcement-oriented tasks related to traffic safety. Consent decrees and collaborative reform agreements commonly recommend departments include members of the public in policy evaluation and development processes. For example, the New Orleans Police Department, San Francisco Police Department, New Jersey State Police, Baltimore Police Department and the Chicago Police Department each have developed policies and practices with the public and third-party interest groups.

The LSP should consider incorporating community voice into the process of developing or modifying its policies on complaint investigation, use of force, early intervention systems, and policies that address fair and impartial policing practices. Collaborative policy development is an essential component of good governance.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Provide access to outside training for IA personnel.

It is essential for internal affairs investigators to receive on-going professional development and training. IA is responsible for investigating, but IA personnel may receive limited special training prior to being assigned a case to investigate. Otherwise training is "OJT" – and consists of pairing with a more experienced investigator until the investigator is deemed capable to work alone.

Ensuring investigators have the requisite skills to investigate these cases should be a priority. A complete and thorough complaint investigation is essential to support the integrity of the investigative process. All parties involved in a complaint investigation, including the complainant, the employee, the organization, and the public require assurance that the investigative process is fair and objective. Additionally, the complainant and the employee seek assurance the department has treated them with dignity and respect by accurately and completely vetting their allegations and defenses. A thorough investigation signals the public and department members the organization is committed to using the complaint investigation process to demonstrate trustworthiness.

Training and professional development should consist of interview and interrogation training, laws regarding the contractual and legal rights of police officers, case structure, and special investigative topics. The training can be developed internally or from an external source.

Training is especially important within the context of investigating complaints of discrimination, harassment, and bias, as required by LSP policy. Typical “OJT” or internal affairs investigation courses do not adequately address the knowledge, skills, and aptitude necessary to investigate and adjudicate these type complaints. TBG received data showing that complaints of discrimination, bias, and harassment accounted many of internal complaints for the period 2019-2022, with most of the investigations adjudicated to be “Not Sustained.” TBG received input from members of the public questioning the investigation and disposition of these type complaints, perhaps challenging the credibility of the investigative process.

TBG received feedback from LSP members identifying the varied and ancillary responsibilities of personnel assigned to Internal Affairs such as conducting background investigations of Governor appointees to state offices, boards, and commissions, background investigations of LSP candidates for employment and promotion , and managing the Early Warning System.

Ancillary responsibilities take away staffing and personnel hours that could be used for the investigation of complaints. TBG encourages shifting these responsibilities to another unit or group to allow IA to focus solely on the investigation of complaints.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

Develop and implement standard operating procedures (SOP) which details functions and roles within the disciplinary complaint investigation and review process.

The LSP should consider establishing clear standards that guide the review, processing and investigation of IA complaints. This guidance should outline specifically all requirements of a professional investigation including the organization of related files, documentation and evidence.

For example, TBG reviewed IA files and reports that fail to address misconduct discovered but not alleged in the original complaint ; with dispositions that were unsigned or did not identify the person responsible for adjudicating the complaint; and IA investigations where adjudicated findings were not consistent with written department policy.

Further, some IA files did not identify who was responsible for adjudicating the complaint. LSP uses adjudication categories or definitions commonly used in the profession- Sustained, Not Sustained, Unfounded, etc. In our file review investigations generally were adjudicated in a manner consistent with these common definitions, however, more scrutiny is required to ensure dispositions also are consistent with policy.

IA employs a checklist to assist in on-the-job training of newly assigned investigators; this guidance also should be included in the SOP.

RECOMMENDATION 9:

Consider designating and including external or pulic representatives to participate in certain internal review processes, i.e. Disciplinary Review, EIS, Use of Force Review Board, etc.

Public involvement in the IA and other key department processes can support the Department’s accountability systems. Public involvement increases transparency and contributes to increasing public knowledge of how departments function to meet the needs and expectations of their constituents. Troopers and members of the

public informed TBG that one reason for dissatisfaction with the IA process is they do not receive timely and accurate information about investigations and disciplinary outcomes. In our review of IA files, TBG observed that the majority of the files included evidence of notification to the complainant and the employee of the conclusion of the investigation. However, TBG did not receive feedback indicative of a strategic approach to communicating outcomes to the public and within the organization.

Giving members and the public visibility into the disciplinary complaint investigation process is increasingly common, and can be included as a key component of accountability.

The LSP should explore the possibility of creating an Ombudsman, or similar official, to represent the interests of persons, such as those dissatisfied with the outcome of an IA investigation.

LSP personnel indicated that IA has no role in discipline or corrective action decisions, however LSP should evaluate the efficacy of IA findings and outcomes.

Despite IA having the role of “fact-finders” with no role in recommending disciplinary outcomes, some respondents suggested IA may have some influence over discipline decision-making. TBG recommends that LSP adopts a disciplinary matrix to help facilitate consistency in disciplinary outcomes, and to address real and perceived inequalities these outcomes. This also provides clear guidance for the public and Department regarding corrective action standards, alternatives and processes.

LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: Weaknesses & Threats

Standardizing the disciplinary complaint and internal affairs processes can ensure transparency, consistency and demonstrate the department is committed to internal and external procedural justice. Currently, there seems to be a lack of trust in the process that affects members internally and members of the public externally. There are a number of changes that LSP can implement that will positively address these perceptions. Specifically, the LSP should consider:

- Articulating an overall philosophy of the complaint process
- Developing protocols and practices to guide strategic communication regarding critical incidents and their investigation
- Creating the opportunity for members of the public to have visibility and voice in the IA process, including expressing dissatisfaction when appropriate
- Ensuring fairness and consistency of investigations and outcomes
- Updating reporting process protocols to ensure barriers that impact the process currently are eliminated or modified to the extent the law allows

The Good Overall: Strengths & Opportunities

Our review noted IA utilizes some practices that are consistent with contemporary practices in 21st century policing. For example, LSP IA investigators primarily serve as “fact-finders” only and generally must complete an investigation within sixty-days. Document reviews demonstrate that interviews of all parties to the investigation are audio or recorded and included in the case file. Both complainants and employees receive notice of the initiation and conclusion of an investigation.

Administrative and criminal investigations are bifurcated. Internal Affairs investigates all administrative complaints. Criminal complaints are investigated by either the Criminal Investigations Bureau or Force Investigations Unit.

The LSP segregates complaints into categories, identifying a complaint as an “IA Case” or a “Non-IA Case. An “IA Case” includes complaints of use of force, racial bias, discrimination and harassment, and allegations deemed significant and serious (Superintendent’s directive). Non-IA Cases generally involve all other complaints.

Non-IA cases presently are investigated by a supervisor of the Trooper’s assigned Region. This ensures the Trooper’s chain of command has knowledge of pending complaints of misconduct and has an immediate opportunity to remediate performance and/or behavior deficiencies. To address concerns of investigator bias, the LSP is piloting assigning “Non-IA cases” to a Region different from the subject Troopers Region of assignment. A secondary goal of this protocol is to ensure investigations and outcomes are consistent across regions.

The LSP should continue to capitalize on these strengths and opportunities to re-build internal and external legitimacy and trust.

03.

Assessment Of Use Of Force Policies, Procedures, & Protocols



Assessment of Use of Force Policies, Procedures, & Protocols

Scope

In this section of the report, The Bowman Group provides findings and recommendations regarding LSP's use of force policies, protocols, and practices. TBG assessed whether the agency's use of force policies and practices are consistent with the LSP's vision, mission, and core values, as well as national standards and recognized policing practices. TBG also evaluated supervisors' roles following a trooper's use of force and LSP personnel's understanding of the use of force protocols. In addition, TBG assessed LSP's process for evaluating use of force incidents to determine the comprehensiveness of the investigations or reviews.

Below, we outline the methodology used to conduct this review, the limitations of our review, and the legal standards and community expectations upon which our assessment is based. We detail our observations and provide recommendations LSP should adopt to improve its protocols and practices.

Method

To conduct this assessment, The Bowman Group reviewed force-related documents, met with dozens of LSP personnel, and reviewed a sample of use of force incidents, including all available video footage. TBG began the use of force assessment by conducting initial interviews focused on the Department's current force procedures and the systems in place to review and investigate troopers' uses of force. TBG interviewed the Majors and Captains assigned to each of LSP's Regions to learn more about the roles and expectations of supervisors and command staff. We also sought information about the particular use of force practices and challenges unique to each Troop. The Bowman Group met with staff from the Office of Legal Affairs to learn more about legal staffs' role in the use of force review and disciplinary processes, the development of policy and training, and other relevant topics. TBG also reviewed force-related policies and LSP's annual use of force reports. TBG provided feedback on the policies and initial interviews in an interim report.

The Bowman Group conducted a preliminary review of the systems in place to evaluate serious and deadly uses of force and began a more in-depth review of uses of force reviewed by the chain of command. TBG met with the Lt. Col. who chairs the Use of Force Review Board, as well as representatives from the Force Investigation Unit. TBG also met with the LSP personnel responsible for the implementation of Mark43 to learn more about the protocols in place to document and track uses of force and the review process.

To assess how LSP's use of force policies operate in practice, The Bowman Group reviewed a sample of use of force incidents, primarily from 2021. For each use of force incident, TBG reviewed all available information, including video footage and use of force reports. TBG closely examined how first-line supervisors evaluated each of these incidents, observations from subsequent reviewers in the chain of command, and supervisors' decision-making about whether officers' uses of force were within policy and consistent with the agency's core values. TBG also assessed whether reviewers identified opportunities to improve policies, training, or tactics in the course of their review.

Finally, The Bowman Group conducted a series of one-on-one, in person interviews with troopers and supervisors. TBG met with troopers and supervisors in at least one Troop in each Region and met with other LSP personnel with direct experience with use of force practices. These interviews were geared towards seeking answers to questions raised by the policy and incident review. TBG also assessed whether troopers' and supervisors' day-to-day practices align with the agency's policies, core values, and national best practices.

References

Records & Documents

The Bowman Group analyzed LSP policies and other force-related documents to inform our findings and recommendations, as well as to assess their adherence to national practices. These policies and other documents include:

- P.O. 238, Use of Force, Effective 9/20/2021
- P.O. 505, Force Investigation Unit, Effective 2/9/2022
- P.O. 1117, Body Worn Camera & In-Car Camera Systems, Effective 4/1/2022
- 2021 Training Academy Annual Use of Force Report
- Louisiana State Police 2020 Annual Use of Force Report
- Use of Force Annual Summary for 2019
- Bridging the Gap, Office of Legal Affairs Louisiana State Police Presentation, November 1, 2022
- Bridging the Gap on Legal Aspects of Use of Force, Office of Legal Affairs, Louisiana State Police In Service Presentation
- Louisiana State Police Mark 43 New Use of Force/Pursuit Reporting guide, Effective 1/1/2022

Data

Throughout the assessment, TBG analyzed patterns in troopers' use of force based on the available data. TBG distilled and analyzed data on a variety of force-related topics, including the following:

- A selection of descriptive tables and bivariate analysis of data provided by LSP. This analysis included a review of data on the number of reported uses of force per year from 2018-2022, including the types of force used, force use by Troop, and the race of the persons subjected to uses of force.
- After transitioning to Mark43, LSP began collecting data on uses of force where officers reported using de-escalation techniques as well as whether those techniques were successful. TBG provided an assessment of this data.
- TBG reviewed data collected in Mark43 about the use of force review process, including an assessment of the timeframes for a troopers' use of force to complete the various steps of the chain of command review process.

As discussed later in the report, we have concerns about the quality and the accuracy of the use of force data currently being tracked in Mark43.

Limitations

What is not covered in the scope of this review?

The Bowman Group requested but did not receive investigations completed by the Force Investigation Unit or Criminal Investigations Division, nor did we receive any information about disciplinary decisions related to troopers' uses of force. A comprehensive review would include an initial file review, potentially followed by in-depth interviews and follow up document requests to answer questions raised by the initial file review. The delayed and incomplete production has significantly hampered our ability to conduct such a review. At this time, TBG cannot make any observations or recommendations about the quality and objectivity of LSP's investigations of these incidents.

Notably, these materials represent the agency’s response to its officers’ most serious uses of force. These are precisely the types of incidents that are often the subject of community concerns. A review of LSP’s investigations of these incidents is critical to an evaluation of whether the department has the systems in place to effectively identify unnecessary and unreasonable serious uses of force, hold individual officers accountable, and make systemic changes to practices, policies, and training when warranted. It’s concerning that it has been so challenging for the Department to compile and make these documents available.

The Bowman Group did not have an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive review LSP’s investigations of critical and deadly uses of force.

Were there any challenges?

The initial production of completed investigations regarding serious and deadly uses of force included only the final case reports created by Internal Affairs and, when applicable, a brief letter documenting the decision of the Use of Force Review Board. The production did not include the source documents and materials that those recommendations and decisions were based upon. The production did not include related investigations conducted by the Force Investigations Unit or the Criminal Investigations Division. This information is necessary for TBG to make an independent determination regarding the quality, objectivity, and comprehensiveness of LSP’s investigations of serious use of force.

[The main challenge was in limited records]

Is there a need for further review of certain topics/areas beyond this scope?

Another limitation is that this section does not address the level of interaction and communication with the community prior to and from the onset of a critical or deadly force incident through the conclusion of the investigative process. As discussed in the community outreach section of the report, LSP needs to take significant steps to improve the way it interacts and communicates with the community, including through greater transparency.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

Use of Force – Legal Backdrop

A police officer’s “right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat to effect it.” While police officers have the authority to use “some degree” of force to effect an arrest, that authority is not unlimited. Under the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of a seizure “depends not only on when it is made, but how it is carried out.” Specifically, in *Graham v. Connor*, the Supreme Court held that an officer’s use of force must be “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.”

Objective reasonableness is not a rigid or mechanical standard. Instead, reasonableness is determined by “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each case.” These factors include, but are not limited to, “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” These factors and others will determine “whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of ... seizure.” Any use of force is “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”

Graham sets the criteria for determining whether an officer’s use of force complies with constitutional mandates, however, a law enforcement agency’s accountability to the community it serves often requires that officers exercise a higher standard. Even when the force an officer uses is constitutional, it can be contrary to the values and expectations of the community. Community members expect that police officers will make concerted efforts to avoid and minimize the use of force and that force will be limited to those circumstances in which alternatives to

force cannot be safely applied. Even a small number of unnecessary or excessive uses of force by officers can significantly undermine community trust and the legitimacy of an entire department.

Given this backdrop, the sole question under a law enforcement agency's policies and practices should not be whether uses of force are lawfully authorized and meet the minimal constitutional standard. Departments should also assess whether an officer's use of force was necessary, proportional to the threat posed, and whether it could have been avoided or minimized through alternative tactics. These are the basic principles that underlie our review of LSP's use of force policies and practices.

Use of Force Policy: Clarify the use of force standard and reporting requirements.

LSP's current use of force policy includes numerous requirements that are consistent with nationally recognized best practices. For example, the policy requires officers to intervene if they observe another officer using unreasonable force, notify a supervisor, and document the unreasonable use of force they observed. The policy explicitly prohibits the use of retaliatory force "against an individual who is clearly no longer posing a physical threat or resisting." P.O. 238 also prohibits officers from using deadly force against someone who is only a danger to themselves, an important limitation on officers' use of force.

However, the policy lacks clarity in some critical areas. In this section of the report, we highlight a few deficiencies that require urgent attention given our observations of LSP's use of force reporting and review practices. Later in the report, we provide additional guidance on how LSP should further refine its use of force policy, including specific provisions regarding deadly and less-lethal force.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Establish a clear standard for when officers are permitted to use force and when force should be avoided.

P.O. 238 appears to primarily rely on the Graham standard. At the outset, P.O. 238 states, "the Department's policy is that officers shall use only the amount of force that is objectively reasonable to bring an incident or pursuit under control..." However, the policy includes only minimal information describing the requirements set out in Graham.

In addition to providing limited information about the constitutional standard, the policy does not clarify that officers' authority to use force may be more limited. While P.O. 238 (2)(ii) notes that "officers should attempt to use the least amount of force necessary," this guidance is not incorporated into or emphasized in the body of the policy. As discussed above, the sole question under LSP's policy should not only be is the use of force lawfully authorized, but it should include an assessment of whether the use of force was appropriate under the circumstances: Specifically, the assessment should consider: Was the force reasonable? Was the force necessary? Was the force proportional to the resistance encountered? And, whether the use of force could have been avoided?

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Define terms that are key to evaluating whether an officer's use of force is reasonable, necessary, and proportional.

Numerous terms that are critical to any evaluation of whether an officer's use of force was reasonable, necessary, and proportional are not clearly defined or absent from the policy altogether. The policy does not define the levels of resistance that Troopers might encounter and when force might become necessary based on the level of resistance. The section on the use of Conducted Energy Weapons ("CEW" or Taser) permits their use when a person is "actively resisting," but that term is not defined or used elsewhere in the policy. As discussed in more detail later, this lack of clarity has contributed to a pattern of officers reflexively using Tasers to apprehend people under questionable circumstances.

In addition, P.O. 238 does not refer to or define “passive resistance,” suggesting that there is no explicit prohibition on officers using force when a person is being unresponsive but is not posing a threat to the trooper or others.

As noted in the discussion of Graham above, the policy provides limited information about the constitutional standard. It refers to the “totality of the circumstances” in the sections regarding ramming and the use of chokeholds, but never defines the phrase or identifies any factors that may be included in the totality of the circumstances. The term is not used elsewhere in the policy. In later sections of the policy, officers are required to “articulate the objective reasonableness” justifying their use of force but, again, this term is not defined in the policy.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

Revise P.O. 238 (15)(i) to provide a more clear and concise definition of what conduct does and does not amount to a reportable use of force, including examples.

P.O. 238 lacks clarity on the specific types of physical contacts that qualify as reportable uses of force. P.O. 238 requires an officer to “complete an electronic Use of Force Report” if the officer’s actions fall into an enumerated list of reportable uses of force, including the discharge of a firearm or a use of force that results in death. The policy requires officers to report a use of “non-deadly force,” which is defined as “any physical effort to control, restrain, or overcome an individual’s resistance.” The policy does not provide specific examples of the types of force that might fall into that category, including open or closed-handed strikes, or whether there are types of physical contact that do not amount to reportable force.

The deployment of a Taser appears to be a reportable use of force only if, “one of its probes makes contact with an individual or animal, regardless of whether there is an injury involved.” As written, an officer could potentially deploy repeated cycles of a Taser but would not have to report this action as a use of force if none of the probes made contact. At a minimum, this might suggest a training issue that a supervisor should be made aware of. Moreover, for the person who is the target of the officer’s Taser deployment, the event is likely intrusive even if the deployment is unsuccessful, warranting documentation and review.

In our interviews with LSP personnel, Troopers and supervisors often expressed confusion about what types of contact amount to a reportable use of force. From troopers to commanders, the definition of reportable force appeared to vary from person to person and Region to Region. As a result, some Troops have developed a practice of documenting any physical contact as a use of force “just in case.” While all uses of force should be accurately documented, the current lack of clarity has resulted in a time-consuming process of multiple supervisors reviewing hours of the body-worn camera footage for incidents that may or may not constitute a reportable use of force under the policy. As discussed in more detail later, this increases the likelihood that the chain of command use of force review has become a check-box review that will not have a meaningful impact on the conduct of officers or the agency as a whole.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Require officers to report use of force by end of the shift.

P.O. 238 requires an officer involved in a reportable use of force to “complete an electronic Use of Force Report within five calendar days.” Some of the commanders we interviewed reported that, in practice, officers typically report uses of force more quickly than the policy requires. Unless there are extenuating circumstances, officers should be required to complete the electronic Use of Force Report by the end of their shift.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Establish consistent procedures immediately following a trooper’s use of force, including the responsibilities of troopers and first-line supervisors, and enforce adherence to the procedures.

The policy appears to only specifically require officers to notify a supervisor of a use of force if death or injury occurs, after using deadly force, or during a “critical incident.” This includes circumstances where a trooper reasonably believes “there exists a significantly heightened potential for serious bodily injury or death to occur . . . an individual is using, attempting to use, or threatening to use a weapon violently . . . [or] an individual is experiencing a mental health crisis and is resisting the officer or acting violently.”

Once an officer notifies a supervisor of a critical incident, the policy directs supervisors to “attempt to respond to the scene,” but only “when staffing allows, and a timely response is possible.” LSP should revise this language to require a supervisory response to the scene of a critical incident unless there is a significant justification preventing this from occurring.

The practices regarding notification of supervisors following a use of force, as well as whether supervisors are expected to report to the scene following a use of force, appear to vary by Region. For example, some Troopers are expected to immediately notify a supervisor following any use of force, while in other Troops, Troopers may only be required to notify a supervisor of more severe uses of force and injuries. This should be standardized.

The expectations for first-line supervisors also appeared to vary in each Region and Troop. For example, in certain Troops, sergeants are expected to arrive at the scene following every use of force, assess what happened by conducting basic interviews, and debrief with the involved officers. In other Troops, whether supervisors are expected to arrive at the scene varies with the type of force or level of injury. In at least one Troop, supervisors are expected to rely primarily on BWC only to assess what happened and rarely arrive on the scene of a use of force.

Unlike a local police department precinct that might be charged with responding to calls for service in a discrete geographic area, some LSP Troops may be responsible for enforcing traffic laws on close to ten thousand highway miles. Under certain circumstances, it may not be feasible for a supervisor to reach the scene of a minor use of force in a timely manner. However, the LSP should strive to limit the extent to which its formal use of force policies and expectations of supervisors are supplanted by informal practices that vary from Troop to Troop. Instead, the LSP can develop reasonable criteria permitting exceptions, when necessary, and document applied exceptions in the use of force file.

Use of Force Policy and Practice: Equip supervisors to conduct consistent, thorough, and objective review of Troopers’ Uses of Force.

LSP’s policies lack: 1) clear guidance on the expectations and responsibilities of supervisors; 2) the necessary steps to assess whether a use of force was within policy; and 3) guidance on how conclusions should be documented. The use of force incidents TBG reviewed demonstrated that supervisors need robust guidance, training, and accountability measures to ensure that the use of force review process is meaningful and effective. We address this topic separately from our general policy recommendations because more systemic changes are necessary to ensure that first-line supervisors have the resources and support to do their jobs effectively.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Develop clear guidance on the requirements for meaningful supervisory review of uses of force. The guidance should detail the information that first-line supervisors need to collect and analyze as well as the factors supervisors should consider when determining whether a use of force was consistent with policy and LSP’s core values.

The section in P.O. 238 covering “Use of Force Reporting” outlines the responsibilities of supervisors following an officer’s use of force. It mandates that “all supervisors in the officer’s chain of command up to the Command

Inspector level shall review the Use of Force Report” and all supporting records, “including any available video(s).” The goal of each supervisor’s review is to “ensure accuracy and completeness by the reporting officer.” The policy also requires supervisors to take the following actions:

“complet[e] a thorough supervisor review to determine if the officer’s actions complied with Department Policy and Procedure and Training”;

“make appropriate comments and recommendations up the chain-of-command regarding the use of force”; and

“make notes of any potential deficiencies in training or equipment;” and

“address . . . or investigate as soon as possible” any policy violation not directly related to the use of force.

This guidance is a significant improvement from earlier iterations of the use of force policy. However, the policy provides little guidance on what constitutes a “thorough supervisor review” of a use of force or how that review should be documented. In practice, the supervisors’ reviews in some Troops primarily consists of a review of video footage with little, if any, additional investigation. Although the policy clearly mandates that supervisors assess whether a use of force is within policy, the policy does not specifically require supervisors to assess whether an officer attempted to resolve an incident without resorting to force, unnecessarily escalated an incident, or used only the amount of force that was necessary and appropriate.

The Bowman Group reviewed a sample of use of force incidents, including any investigation or review conducted by the officer’s first-line supervisor and any assessments of the use of force as it was reviewed up the chain of command. Supervisors’ use of force reviews are not thorough and key information is either not collected or not documented. TBG consistently found that supervisors did not document the review or investigation they conducted, beyond the review of BWC. For both lower-level uses of force and Taser, the lack of a narrative explanation makes it difficult to discern what action the supervisor took. For example, supervisors did not document whether they conducted any interviews, including interviews of the person subjected to the use of force, or officer and civilian witnesses to the use of force.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Require supervisors to document their assessment of an officer’s use of force, the factors they considered, and a final determination.

Supervisory reviews of uses of force are inconsistent and often incomplete.

The outcomes of supervisors’ reviews are often unclear. Supervisors rarely documented a decision or recommendation about whether an officer’s use of force was within policy and the basis for that decision. Reviews by initial supervisors are often just notes that the BWC was “reviewed.” Supervisors occasionally added that the use of force was “approved,” typically without justification. This practice was consistent even when troopers used higher levels of force like the Taser. Supervisors’ reviews of Taser incidents typically did not provide an analysis of the type or duration of discharge.

Instead of evaluating whether an officer’s uses of force was necessary or reasonable, supervisors’ comments were often limited to non-substantive corrections to the narrative or other details in the use of force report. For example, in one incident where a Trooper deployed a Taser, the reviewing sergeant left the single-word note – “narrative” – but made no other comments or decisions regarding the use of force. The use of force file included no comments or decisions from higher ranking supervisors. In another incident where a Trooper deployed a Taser, the file contained no assessments or comments from supervisors except a note from a lieutenant about adding the correct parish.

In a smaller number of incidents, it appeared that supervisors identified problems but failed to document them

in the use of force report. In another incident where an officer used a Taser, the reviewing sergeant didn't document whether the use of force was consistent with the policy. The reviewing lieutenant also failed to comment on whether the use of force was reasonable, necessary, and within policy. Instead, the lieutenant commented that the "issues or policy violations were corrected," but never identified the issues or policy violations and how they were corrected.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

Embrace thorough and transparent supervisory reviews of uses of force and communicate that expectation.

Supervisory reviews of uses of force are hampered by mixed messages from leadership.

Onsite interviews revealed that first-line supervisors have been instructed, at least informally, to not document specific details and analysis in their use of force reviews. The Bowman Group learned that supervisors who typically conduct even a minimal investigation following a use of force are instructed not to include those details in their use of force reviews. TBG heard a variety of justifications for this informal guidance. We heard that supervisors in the chain of command don't document their investigation or evaluations of uses of force because "they don't want to be held accountable for their comments or analysis." We also heard that supervisors don't write more than "reviewed" and "approved" because they don't want to contradict each other as a use of force moves through the chain of command. Some first-line supervisors were clear on the instruction that "they don't want us to say whether the use of force was justified or not," but not the reasoning behind this practice, simply accepting that it was a decision made by the "higher ups."

At best, first-line supervisors are being forced to navigate mixed messages from the Department's leadership as they review troopers' uses of force. While the current policy mandates "thorough" supervisory reviews, the informal mandate still appears to be that supervisors' review should be minimally documented. This is contrary to national best practices.

RECOMMENDATION 9:

Develop a supervisory training curriculum that includes guidance on first-line supervisors' roles and responsibilities in the use of force review process.

Supervisors do not receive sufficient training before assuming their new roles. During interviews, sergeants uniformly conveyed that they had received little or no formal training on the expectations and responsibilities of their new roles, particularly the expectations for the review of uses of force. Some sergeants reported benefitting from on-the-job training and mentoring by lieutenants, but sergeants consistently expressed that additional formal training on use of force review would be valuable.

In our review of use of force incidents and supervisor reviews, sergeants rarely assessed whether an Trooper could have avoided using force by relying on de-escalation strategies. LSP should ensure that all supervisors are appropriately trained on de-escalation and incorporate that information into their assessments of Troopers' uses of force.

**Consider Trends in uses of force are considered in conducting training needs assessments

RECOMMENDATION 10:

Develop a template to ensure structure and consistency for supervisors' reviews of uses of force.

In addition to enhanced training and policy guidance, LSP supervisors may benefit from using a template to ensure

that supervisory reviews are thorough, reliable, and consistent.

Move up (after document rec before training rec)

RECOMMENDATION 11:

Develop timelines for the use of force review process and hold supervisors accountable to those timelines.

While the policy mandates that all supervisors through an officer's Commander should review a use of force, it provides no timelines for when each stage of that review should be completed. As currently written, an officer must submit a use of force report within five days. That report, all supporting records, and all body-worn camera footage must then be reviewed by the officer's sergeant, lieutenant, captain, and the Commander of the Region. As detailed in our section on Mark43's use of force data collection, the current system has resulted in significant delays and numerous uses of force falling through the cracks.

RECOMMENDATION 12:

Require all relevant video to be collected and reviewed, including witness officer BWC, and hold troopers accountable for failure to record incidents on BWC.

Numerous use of force incidents that TBG requested were missing video footage of the officer's use of force. Video footage was not available in nearly half of the incidents in our initial sample of 2021 uses of force. In numerous incidents where BWC footage was available, officers didn't activate the camera until well into the encounter.

This information is particularly critical given that LSP supervisors do not have consistent practices regarding interviewing witnesses or the person subjected to the use of force.

The Bowman Group has seen little evidence that officers have been held accountable by the chain of command for failing to record uses of force on their body-worn cameras.

In some incidents, the involved officer's body-worn camera footage showed the presence of other witness officers, but this footage was not consistently included in the use of force file. This deficiency may be alleviated by the Department's adoption of Mark43 since all downloaded camera footage is automatically associated with a single incident number.

RECOMMENDATION 13:

Clarify when BWC should be activated and strictly limit when audio may be turned off.

In some of the incidents we reviewed, portions of the encounter are muted. The audio is typically disabled during interactions with other officers on scene, which appears to be permitted by LSP policy. TBG also reviewed incidents where the full audio of the interaction with civilians is not captured. This creates a potential transparency and credibility problem.

RECOMMENDATION 14:

Conduct regular audits of supervisors' reviews of uses of force to make sure they are adequately documented.

The Bowman Group has reason to believe that a small subset of first-line supervisors have approved uses of force

without reviewing the body-worn camera footage or other available information at all, although we could not verify this information. It's clear that there are no check-valves in place to prevent this from happening.

Requiring regular audits of supervisors' reviews, including all available information related to a use of force, will help ensure consistent and thorough reviews.

RECOMMENDATION 15:

Require that supervisors include a BWC audit trail, documenting review of available footage, in the use of force case file.

LSP should require that a BWC audit trail be included as a use of force proceeds through the chain of command review process.

Use of Force Policy and Practices: Use of Tasers on Fleeing Persons

In our review of troopers' uses of force, The Bowman Group identified a disturbing pattern of officers immediately resorting to Tasers when other force options should have been considered. Specifically, TBG reviewed numerous incidents where officers appeared to reflexively deploy their Taser to apprehend a person fleeing on foot. A Taser may be the appropriate use of force option under certain circumstances, however, some officers resorted to Tasers as a default strategy, without considering if it was necessary and the risk of injury to the fleeing person.

Our review revealed a pattern of instances where troopers' justification for Taser use was questionable due to the nature of the offense, or they deployed Tasers on fleeing persons under dangerous circumstances. In one incident we reviewed, an officer attempted to stop a vehicle for driving erratically. Shortly after the traffic stop was initiated, both occupants of the vehicle attempted to flee on foot. An LSP trooper pursued the passenger, who was not responsible for the alleged erratic driving. The trooper discharged his Taser at the passenger twice but missed. The supervisor who reviewed the trooper's use of force did not question why the officer deployed the Taser on the fleeing passenger and simply concluded "no issues noted."

In other incidents TBG reviewed, the use of Taser was likely justified due to the nature of the offense and level of resistance, but it was deployed in circumstances where there was a higher risk of injury to the person who was fleeing. In one incident, a Trooper engaged in a vehicle pursuit to apprehend a man who was driving a stolen car and had evaded police earlier in the day. The driver exited the vehicle and attempted to flee on foot. The Trooper discharged his Taser as the man was running onto a concrete sidewalk. When the man got up and began to flee again, the Trooper discharged his Taser again, striking the subject in the back as he ran onto the concrete roadway. The use of some force to effect the arrest was legally justified, however, there was a significant risk of the Taser causing an uncontrolled fall on a hard surface.

This incident was also problematic due to what occurred after the deployment of the Taser. Once the subject hit the concrete, he laid on his back moaning and his arms became rigid. Shortly thereafter, his body began to shake as he continued to moan, clearly in medical distress. In the use of force report, the Trooper checked "no injuries", but the video footage clearly shows that the man required medical attention and an ambulance was called to the scene. The supervisor's finding simply stated, "no issues." Although the report was reviewed by the use of force instructor and the Director of Training Academy, neither indicated whether there were opportunities for additional training with respect to use of Tasers during foot pursuits.

In another incident, a driver attempted to flee on foot following a vehicle pursuit. The driver climbed out of the passenger side of the vehicle and attempted to climb over a fence next to the passenger door. The Trooper deployed a Taser multiple times to apprehend the man, and the man fell from the fence onto the ground. The use

of force report does not specify why the Trooper initiated. It appears that driver was Tased solely for fleeing. None of the reviewing supervisors questioned whether it was appropriate to deploy a Taser on a driver in this situation. Instead, the lieutenant noted “good job!!”

The Bowman Group provides the following recommendations related to LSP Taser usage:

RECOMMENDATION 16:

Prohibit officers from using Tasers to apprehend people when fleeing is the only justification or for minor offenses.

For more than a decade, it has been a best practice to limit officers’ use of a Taser on a person who is fleeing on foot, unless the offense committed justifies its use and it’s safe to do so. For example, in 2011, the office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) issued guidelines for the use of Tasers, concluding that “[f]leeing should not be the sole justification for using an ECW against a subject.”

Instead, officers “should consider the severity of the offense, the subject’s threat level to others, and the risk of serious injury to the subject before deciding to use an ECW on a fleeing subject.” Consistent with this guidance, some Departments prohibit the use of Tasers on a fleeing person alleged to have committed a minor offense. Similarly, deploying a Taser at a fleeing person may only be permitted if the person poses an imminent threat of physical harm to the officer or others.

RECOMMENDATION 17:

Prohibit Troopers from using Tasers to apprehend people when there’s a significant risk of serious injury.

Deploying a Taser on a fleeing person raises concerns regarding the safety of persons who, once Tasered, are at risk of uncontrolled falls. Some law enforcement agencies have explicitly directed officers to consider alternative options when the person fleeing is at risk of injury because of “an uncontrolled fall while the subject is running.”

LSP’s policy does not specifically address when it is appropriate to use a Taser on a fleeing person and when alternative methods should be employed. The use of force policy limits Taser use under circumstances where “an elevated risk may be present” and requires additional justification for Taser use. This includes Taser use on vulnerable populations, such as small children and frail persons, and under particularly dangerous circumstances, for example while a person is operating a vehicle. The LSP policy is silent on the potential harm of using a Taser against someone who is running and does not prohibit its use to apprehend someone accused only of fleeing.

The Bowman Group also observed a less frequent, but nonetheless concerning pattern of encounters involving a single officer. TBG reviewed incidents where a single officer reported using a Taser or other higher levels of force because they did not have assistance controlling a resisting person. In one use of force we reviewed, an LSP trooper discharged multiple Taser cycles to get a person to exit a vehicle and comply with the officer’s commands. The officer was “forced” to cycle the Taser seven times before he could subdue and handcuff the man. LSP should consider assessing whether its deployment strategy is impacting Troopers’ use of force decision-making and Trooper safety. As noted in the section with additional policy guidance, LSP should also provide additional guidance on the risks of multiple and repeated Taser discharges.

Use of Force Policy and Practice: Use of Abusive and Aggressive Language

Critical cultural issues, particularly officers' use of aggressive language, are not sufficiently addressed by the chain of command. The Bowman Group observed officers who were unable to control their anger, particularly following a vehicle or foot pursuit. In these incidents, officers used foul and abusive language during and after effecting an arrest. This creates a climate where aggressive language can spill over into unreasonable uses of force. In many of the cases TBG reviewed, this coarse language was not addressed by supervisors, or supervisors identified the foul language but excused it.

In one of the examples identified above, where an LSP officer deployed his Taser on a person attempting to flee by climbing a fence, the officer yelled "Let me see your fucking hands. I will shoot your fucking ass." According to the use of force report, the sergeant reviewed the video and concluded that the use of force was justified but did not comment on the officer's language. The reviewing lieutenant reported "discuss[ing] language use during arrest," but concluded "understand [the trooper] was amped up." In another example, a man led officers on a high-speed pursuit. His vehicle appeared to become disabled in a ditch on the side of the road. As a trooper approached, the officer immediately yelled "show me your fucking hands," as the man was holding both hands above his head. None of the reviewing supervisors commented on the trooper's language.

In another incident, a trooper attempted to stop a man who has speeding on a motorcycle. The man refused to stop and led officers on a high-speed vehicle pursuit. The man stopped his vehicle and began to flee on foot into a grassy field. One trooper discharged his Taser, which was successful and caused the man to fall on the grass. When the man failed to respond to officers' commands, a second officer struck the man in the back using a closed fist. While restraining, handcuffing, and later searching the man, troopers were clearly angered by the man's actions and verbally berated him. Troopers called him a "stupid mother fucker" three times, a "fucking idiot," a "dumb ass," and told him he was going to get "his fucking stupid ass shot." While one of the officers was counseled for his language use, the counseling didn't occur until months after the use of force was reported.

RECOMMENDATION 18:

Ensure supervisors enforce policies prohibiting officers from using profane and aggressive language.

LSP's Code of Conduct and Ethics notes that an officer "shall be diplomatic and tactful in the performance of his duties, controlling his temper and exercising patience and discretion." It specifically prohibits officers from using "coarse, violent, profane or insolent language" at all times. While the code indicates that these requirements are "strictly observed," TBG did not see evidence that chain of command reviewers routinely held officers accountable for resorting to aggressive language.

RECOMMENDATION 19:

Ensure supervisors take corrective action, including requiring retraining when warranted.

The Bowman Group did review a small number of incidents where supervisors reported counseling troopers about their use of coarse language, but supervisors did not take additional corrective actions, including recommending retraining.

Use Of Force Policy And Practice: Revamp Existing Use of Force Review Structure.

The current structure of the review process creates delays and does not encourage thorough reviews and analysis; this should be revamped. P.O. 238 requires "all supervisors in the officer's chain of command" to review the Trooper's use of force, including video footage. In practice, this requires each Major to review all video footage for all uses of force that arise in each of the three Troops under their command.

The Bowman Group reviewed use of force report and case review information from Mark43 for use of force reports submitted between January 1, 2022 and July 20, 2022. By August 2022 when the review/approval data was received, most use of force reports had been approved by the first level supervisor. However, the timeframe for that review varied significantly. Eighteen (24.7%) of cases had a first report approval between 9-83 days after the use of force report event date. While 13 of the 18 cases had a first report review between 9-18 days, five (27.8%) of the 18 cases had a first review between 32-83 days. Seventeen (23.3%) of the cases had a last report approval between 17-164 days after the use of force report event date. Specifically, eight (47.1%) of the 17 cases had a first review between 50-83 days and one (5.9%) of the 17 cases had a last review at 164 days. In practice, this means that a portion of Troopers' uses of force remained open and unresolved for months after the use of force occurred.

In addition to strengthening the force reporting and supervisory review requirements, as detailed above, TBG recommends the below modifications to the structure of the chain of command review.

RECOMMENDATION 20:

Revamp the use of force review process to rely more heavily on first-line supervisors to conduct timely, thorough, consistent, and well-documented reviews of Troopers' uses of force.

The current review structure is problematic for several reasons. First, by pushing so much responsibility up to the Majors, it creates delays in the process and unreasonably limits the roles and responsibilities of first-line supervisors. Second, the time-consuming, multi-layered review of body-worn camera footage creates the potential that this will become a check-box review activity instead of a meaningful and robust review of officers' uses of force. Finally, some LSP personnel expressed concerns that Majors may be disconnected from the day-to-day work of troopers in the field and current use of force practices and training.

In our interviews with LSP personnel, The Bowman Group heard concerns that too much responsibility is pushed up to the highest ranks in the organization and sergeants and lieutenants are not sufficiently empowered. One Captain acknowledged that "We need to be able to trust our sergeants and lieutenants." A sergeant mirrored that sentiment, asking "If the Captain and Major can't trust me, then why am I here?"

Timely, thorough first-line supervisor review, analysis, and documentation will eliminate reliance on the current, inefficient review structure. Instead of pushing significant force review responsibilities up to Majors, LSP should provide first-line supervisors with the guidance, resources, and support to do their jobs more effectively.

RECOMMENDATION 21:

Streamline the Mark43 use of force supervisory review structure.

The LSP should consider streamlining the supervisory review structure to limit and prioritize the uses of force that require review by Majors.

LSP can use its current systems to streamline the use of force review process. After an officer completes a use of force report in Mark43, the supervisor can create a "case" with all available video linked. After the Sergeant and Lieutenant review the incident, the Captain can approve or disapprove, but retains the discretion to send it to the Major for review if warranted. This will ensure that the Major is aware of and retains a role in reviewing potentially problematic uses of force.

The Major should still play an important role in evaluating use of force practices in Troops under the Major's command. However, instead of reviewing all video footage for every use of force, the Major can be responsible for an auditing function, including a review of a specific number or percentage of uses of force per quarter. This auditing function can also include a regular review of the use of force trends and analytics available in Mark43.

RECOMMENDATION 22:

Utilize the functions in Mark43 that notify users of overdue use of force review.

While the Mark43 system provides mechanisms to alert the next person in the chain of command review, in practice these systems are not consistently utilized. For example, the system permits a user to send a “task” to the next person in the chain of command. However, due to the paramilitary structure of the organization, some supervisors expressed discomfort about “tasking” a higher-ranking supervisor. As a result, cases remain pending. LSP should better utilize this function.

If the Majors adopt a broader auditing role, they can receive regular updates on use of force incidents where the supervisory review is delayed or overdue.

Use of Force Data: Prioritize collecting and reporting complete, objective, detailed, specific, reliable data and information on all use of force.

The Bowman Group identified numerous gaps and deficiencies in the implementation of Mark43 for use of force tracking. Many of these deficiencies stem from the lack of clarity in the LSP’s use of force policy and use of force reporting requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 23:

Provide additional training and guidance to improve the accuracy of collected use of force data, including encounters with people in crisis.

During our review of troopers’ uses of force incidents, TBG observed numerous incidents where officers misreported various factors related to the use of force and the person subjected to the use of force. This included the inaccurate reporting of injuries and the subject’s need for medical care. In other incidents, the video footage clearly showed that the person subjected to the use of force was in mental health crisis, but officers did not accurately report this information. In one incident where a man led police on a high-speed chase, the reporting officers justified his Taser use by noting that the man was “forcefully resisting while saying irrational phrases, like quoting Biblical scripture,” but failed to accurately report that the use of force involved someone in crisis. In another incident where a trooper Tased a man fleeing on foot, the man repeatedly asked officers to shoot him, an indication that the man was suicidal. Again, this information was not accurately tracked. LSP may be underestimating the extent to which officers are encountering people in crisis.

RECOMMENDATION 24:

Incorporate additional de-escalation concepts in the use of force policy and ensure that these techniques are well-defined and accurately tracked in Mark43.

Mark43’s collection of information regarding officers’ use of de-escalation techniques is incomplete. Currently, Mark43 includes only four possible de-escalation tactics for an officer to select from. This is an incomplete accounting of the range of techniques that officers have at their disposal.

The information collected may also be inaccurate. As noted earlier, TBG reviewed the data LSP began collecting after its transition to Mark43. This included information on whether officers used de-escalation techniques and whether those techniques were successful. TBG determined that LSP officers reported using de-escalation techniques in 79% of their uses of force in 2022. Officers also reported that those strategies were successful in only 15% of these incidents. This data may not accurately reflect troopers’ actual practices. For example, in one 2022 use of force that we reviewed, an officer reported that he used “verbal de-escalation” prior to resorting

to a use of force, but it was unsuccessful. The video footage showed that the officer assisted a local police department engaged in a vehicle pursuit. After the man stopped his vehicle, the LSP officer immediately ran to the man's car with his Taser drawn. As the man exited the vehicle, the trooper immediately yelled "get down" multiple times while simultaneously deploying his Taser. In this instance, an officer's immediate use of a Taser, without first providing an opportunity for voluntary compliance, was tracked as an unsuccessful verbal de-escalation attempt. This is contrary to basic de-escalation principles.

RECOMMENDATION 25:

Define all terms used in Mark43 data collection to promote consistency and prevent data collection based on subjective interpretations of terms.

Some use of force data in Mark43 is being collected based on undefined terms. For example, Mark43 tracks the severity of injuries to officers and the person subjected to a use of force using the terms "minor injury," "moderate injury," and "serious injury." These terms are not defined anywhere nor are examples provided.

RECOMMENDATION 26:

Ensure that comprehensive injury information is collected for both officers and civilians.

There are additional gaps in the injury information being collected. The Mark43 use of force report includes a section tracking "officer medical aid received" which includes nine options in the drop-down list. However, there isn't a similar section or drop-down list tracking medical aid received by the person subjected to the use of force.

RECOMMENDATION 27:

Collect accurate information about the specific types of force used by officers and the level of resistance.

LSP does not accurately track the type of force officers used. For example, LSP relies on the broad terms "defensive tactics" and "hands on," which both could potentially include numerous types of force.

Mark43 also has the capability to group types of force into various levels, based on the severity of the use of force, but this function isn't currently being utilized.

The level of resistance can also be modified to be more specific and objective. For example, Mark43 currently tracks uses of force where the subject was "assaultive," but it's unclear how this term is defined. This can be replaced with a more objective term.

RECOMMENDATION 28:

Track more comprehensive data regarding the disposition of incidents involving a use of force.

LSP does not track complete information about the disposition following a use of force incident. Currently, "arrest" is the only option for the disposition of the encounter. There are no alternative dispositions (for example, hospitalization) and no drop-down options to provide additional details about the arrest, including the charges or whether it was a misdemeanor or felony.

RECOMMENDATION 29:

Increase transparency by making use of force data available to the public.

While LSP has consistently produced annual reports tracking use of force trends, it doesn't appear that these reports are made available to the public. LSP would benefit from greater transparency.

Additional Use of Force Policy Recommendations

As noted earlier, there is guidance in P.O. 238 that reflects nationally recognized best practices. However, LSP should consider further strengthening and refining its use of force policy by implementing the recommendations below. In addition, while there are consistent references to “non-deadly” force throughout the P.O. 238, the force techniques described, including the use of CEW, may result in death.

RECOMMENDATION 30:

Specify the goals and purpose of the policy.

The stated purpose of P.O. 238 is to “establish[] guidelines for the use of deadly and non-deadly force.” The objectives of the use of force policy should be greater than establishing policy. The purpose should detail why the use of force guidelines are being established and the goals of this particular policy.

Expanding the purpose will also provide LSP with an opportunity to draw connections between this policy and the agency's broader mission. Some departments have prefaced their use of force policies with a set of core principles that will guide all use of force decision-making. These core principles might include priorities that are already referenced in the body of LSP's use of force policy, including the deep reverence for human life, the requirement to de-escalate when feasible, and officers' duty to intervene. Other core principles should include a requirement that all uses of force must be reasonable, necessary, and proportional and a commitment to prohibiting use of force decision-making based on biases. Documenting that LSP will adhere to these core principles at the outset of the policy sends a clear message that all uses of force will be assessed in light of these priorities.

RECOMMENDATION 31:

Incorporate additional de-escalation concepts into the use of force policy.

P.O. 238 requires that “when practicable, officers shall use reasonable de-escalation tactics gained through training and experience.” It defines de-escalation as “a range of integrated strategies and tactics to lower the intensity of potentially volatile situations, reduce the necessity or amount of force required for successful resolution, and optimize officer and public safety.” These are the only references to de-escalation in P.O. 238. The policy does not provide examples or further guidance on conduct that might de-escalate an encounter and prevent the need to resort to force. LSP should consider adding additional guidance on how de-escalation may be implemented in practice, including repositioning to create space and increase time to react to resistance, permitting a person the opportunity to make statements or ask questions, and avoiding the unnecessary display of weapons.

In the section on the use of CEWs, the policy identifies categories of people who may be particularly vulnerable and present “an elevated risk . . . while using a CEW,” including “individuals who are perceived to be mentally ill.” When incorporating additional de-escalation concepts into the use of force policy, LSP should ensure that vulnerable populations are protected more broadly beyond the limitations on the use of the CEW. Specifically, before resorting to any type of force, troopers should consider whether a person's lack of compliance is a deliberate

attempt to resist or an inability to comply based on factors such as medical conditions, behavioral or mental health disabilities, language barriers or other factors.

RECOMMENDATION 32:

Develop mechanisms for meaningful community and trooper input on use of force policies.

In our interviews with troopers, The Bowman Group repeatedly heard that there aren't currently systems in place for troopers to provide meaningful input on use of force policies. Many troopers reported that use of force policy changes are distributed through PowerDMS often and without explanation. They expressed concerns that there's no line of communication up and the unspoken message to troopers is "be quiet and do your job."

As discussed in the community engagement section, LSP should develop meaningful opportunities for input on its policies before they are finalized and implemented.

RECOMMENDATION 33:

Ensure Legal Affairs provides input on use of force policies and provide regular legal updates on use of force.

The Bowman Group learned that there was no formal process in place for legal staff to review use of force policies, provide troopers with regular guidance and updates regarding force-related legal developments, or give input on force-related training. More proactive legal staff involvement in force-related policy and training might provide an opportunity to mitigate potential misconduct before it results in harm to the community and civil lawsuits.

TBG learned from other interviews with LSP personnel that the LSP staff charged with writing and revising policy had no specialized expertise or background in developing policy. Often, they relied solely on sample policies from other Louisiana law enforcement agencies that were not undergoing reforms and rarely conducted broader research on national best practices.

Legal Affairs recently conducted a series of trainings, including the legal aspects of use of force, for LSP's command staff. Legal Affairs should provide refresher trainings and regular updates on changes in the law. This information should be provided in an easily accessible manner.

RECOMMENDATION 34:

Clarify or eliminate P.O. 238's Policy Statement that "absent reasonable articulation, officers shall not consciously disregard substantial and unjustifiable risks."

It's unclear under what circumstances a Trooper could use force in a manner that "consciously disregards" an "unjustifiable risk," and still reasonably articulate or justify that use of force.

RECOMMENDATION 35:

Clarify the potential harm of repeated or prolonged use of CEWs.

Policy Section 14 requires that after an officer discharges one cycle of the CEW, "the officer shall reevaluate the situation to determine if subsequent cycles are needed." It also requires that an officer "shall independently justify each CEW cycle in a Use of Force Report." These are important limitations that are consistent with best practices. LSP should consider adding additional guidance regarding the potential harm caused by repeated and prolonged exposure to the CEW. While section (14)(ix) notes that "officers should avoid extended, repeated, or prolonged

CEW exposures where practicable,” LSP should consider treating three or more applications of a CEW or CEW application for longer than 15 seconds as deadly force.

RECOMMENDATION 36:

Clarify when a firearm can be unholstered or displayed. Section (8)(3) states “Officers shall not remove a firearm from the holster or display a weapon unless there is sufficient justification.”

LSP should clarify what qualifies as “sufficient justification” display or unholster a firearm. LSP should also consider requiring officers to report when they point a firearm at a person.

RECOMMENDATION 37:

Clarify the limited circumstances when it is permissible to shoot at or from moving vehicles.

Section (8)(v) of the guidance on deadly force states “Firing at or from a moving vehicle is prohibited except where the use of deadly force is justified, in accordance with this order.”

Firing a weapon at any time is prohibited except where the use of deadly force is justified. LSP should revise this language to strictly limit when firing at or from a moving vehicle is permissible, to minimize the potential harm to innocent bystanders and others.

RECOMMENDATION 38:

Require a supervisor’s authorization before ramming is permitted.

Section (9)(i) prohibits officers from ramming a vehicle except where the use of deadly force is justified. LSP should consider requiring Troopers to obtain supervisory authorization, when feasible.

RECOMMENDATION 39:

Consider eliminating the use of chokeholds.

Section (10)(i) currently permits officers to use chokeholds “where the use of deadly force is justified.” LSP should consider eliminating this practice.

RECOMMENDATION 40:

Consider requiring officers to carry OC spray.

Section (13)(ii) notes that officers “electing to carry OC spray” must complete the required training course. OC spray should not be optional to carry. It is an intermediate use of force that is less likely to cause physical harm than a baton strike or CEW deployment. Currently, the policy provides no guidance on the appropriate deployment of OC Spray or the procedures following deployment.

RECOMMENDATION 41:

Codify information about all authorized weapons in policy.

Section 12(iii) states that the Mobile Field Force is authorized to use less-lethal weapons and chemical munitions

and notes that a current list of approved weapons and munitions will be posted on the LSP Bulletin Board. LSP should consider codifying this list in policy. A bulletin board should not be the only place where this information is posted.

RECOMMENDATION 42:

Clarify the definition of positional asphyxia.

Section (3)(v) defines positional asphyxia as “a sustained, abnormal body position that impedes the upper airway or chest such that it impairs an individual’s ventilation over an extended timeframe.” However, ventilation merely speaks to airflow. There are circumstances where a person may be talking, which suggests airflow is moving, yet the person has passed out because adequate airflow was not taking place to allow them to breathe.

Investigations and Reviews of Critical and Deadly Uses of Force

The documents provided by LSP were not sufficiently detailed to conduct a thorough, objective analysis of the adequacy of LSP’s investigation of critical and deadly uses of force. Therefore, the observations below are informed by the information TBG could gauge from interviews with the LSP personnel, incomplete use of force reporting data, and policy language.

RECOMMENDATION 43:

Create and implement a Critical Incident Review Board, in recognition that LSP should have a standard process for reviewing all incidents involving death, injury, or critical responses.

It is consistent with best practices to look beyond the use of force, including a department’s response to protests and mass arrests, and other important events.

LSP should consider developing guidelines or a template to ensure that the Board provides a more holistic review of critical incidents. The template should require consideration, discussions, and findings with respect to the following areas, where applicable:

Evaluation of prior planning and decisions: How did the officer or department prepare for the call or event?

Event response: Assess and describe the officer’s actions.

Evaluation of tactics, including de-escalation, used prior to the use of force: Was there an opportunity to de-escalate the situation?

Was the use of force was proportional to the level or threatened level of resistance?

Was the use of force reported in a timely and accurate manner?

Assessment of the supervisory response and evaluation of the incident.

Evaluation of policy, including the degree to which policy provided the proper and necessary guidance to resolve the incident satisfactorily.

Scene Management: Was the scene integrity protected?

Evaluation of the post-incident response by all department members involved in the notification of and response to the incident.

Training and Equipment: Would specific training, technology, or equipment have improved the outcome?

RECOMMENDATION 44:

Require the Use of Force Review Board to document the evidence reviewed, the Board's analysis of the evidence, and the justification for the Board's final decision.

The Bowman Group received and reviewed a series of brief letters or memos that represented the findings of the Use of Force Review Board. The memorandum format currently used by the Board contains language that structures the limits of the Board's decision-making authority. The Board can make the following findings and/or recommendations: Findings: Exonerated; Policy Violations-Not Sustained; Policy Violation- Sustained; Accidental. Although these documents are labeled as "findings" and include a final decision regarding whether a use of force was justified, they did not include any information about the evidence that was considered, the Board's deliberations, or the basis for the final decision.

The Board should be required to document their decision in a memorandum that describes the facts of the incident, the evidence reviewed, their analysis of the evidence, and their decision, including a description of the vote and/or recommendation of each member.

It is our understanding that the Board's decision-making is based solely upon presentations by the Force Investigation Unit or Internal Affairs. The Bowman Group did not have an opportunity to review these presentations, so we do not have observations about whether they are high-quality, comprehensive, and objective. LSP should assess whether the presentations alone provide sufficient evidence for the Board to make well-supported decisions.

RECOMMENDATION 45:

Develop protocols and a template to ensure the UFRB conducts a comprehensive analysis of critical incidents.

The Use of Force Review Board's protocols are captured in the Use of Force Policy, P.O. 238. The policy outlines the types of incidents the Board is charged with reviewing, the Board's membership, the voting requirements, and the Superintendent's review of the Board's recommendations. The Board is tasked with "determin[ing] if the involved officer's actions were justified, proper, and consistent with current Departmental policy."

The Board's current scope primarily includes deadly force incidents and in-custody deaths. Currently, the Board's role and impact is limited.

RECOMMENDATION 46:

Ensure the UFRB's review of use of force incidents should include an assessment of the actions of each officer who used force, whether there were opportunities to de-escalate, and the supervisor's review of the use of force.

When reviewing uses of force, the Board's assessment should not be limited to the moment an officer used force. A template will be an effective tool to encourage comprehensive and consistent reviews of troopers' uses of force, as well as the events leading up to the use of force and the supervisory response following the use of force.

LSP should consider charging the Board with regularly reviewing a random sample of other uses of force to assess the quality of the reporting and supervisory review.

RECOMMENDATION 47:

Modify or expand the membership of the Use of Force Review Board.

The Use of Force Review Board is currently chaired by the Deputy Superintendent of Support and is primarily comprised of various members of the Command staff, including the Section Commander of the involved officer, the Commander of Internal Affairs, and the Commander of Operational Development. Membership appears to primarily be based on rank.

The Board should expand or modify its membership to include representatives with more diverse experiences, backgrounds, and perspectives. Including a broader array of voices might improve the legitimacy and credibility of the Board. The Bowman Group recommends including a representative from the Trooper level, which will promote peer review and internal procedural justice. We also recommend including a member of the community to promote trust, transparency, legitimacy, and external procedural justice.

RECOMMENDATION 48:

Develop and implement an education and training curriculum that would assist UFRB members in following their duties.

At the time of our interview, UFRB members had not received enhanced training, including training on de-escalation, but recognized that additional training would be valuable.

RECOMMENDATION 49:

Create protocols to establish review and feedback loops.

The UFRB representative reported that the UFRB considers issues beyond the use of force, including training or equipment issues, and remediates the problems it identifies. However, this information was not documented in the files we reviewed and the UFRB does not have any guidelines detailing this process.

LSP should develop feedback loops that will ensure that the UFRB's recommendations and feedback are incorporated into education, training, supervision and leadership.

The Bowman Group requested but did not receive completed investigations conducted by the Force Investigation Unit. Without this information we cannot accurately assess whether LSP has effective systems in place to conduct objective, thorough, and well-supported criminal investigations of critical and deadly uses of force. Accordingly, this section details limited observations and recommendations based solely on interviews with LSP personnel, the Unit's policy, and our understanding of the Unit's structure.

RECOMMENDATION 50:

Develop comprehensive protocols to promote consistent, objective, and thorough investigations.

The Force Investigation Unit is charged with conducting criminal investigations of troopers' uses of force, including the use of firearms, canine bites, intentional strikes to the head with an impact weapon, and ramming. The FIU's policy outlines the goals of the investigations, the organization of the Unit, and the Unit's other responsibilities, including coordinating with the Public Affairs section and compiling a Use of Force Annual Report.

At the time of our interview, the Unit did not have a separate set of protocols or a manual to guide its investigations. LSP should consider developing a more detailed set of procedures to guide how the Unit will conduct its investigations, including the collection of evidence and protocols for officer interviews.

RECOMMENDATION 51:

Consider consolidating the use of force review process into a single entity.

The Force Investigation Unit currently has a separate Captain and a separate chain of command from Internal Affairs. Given this structure, LSP doesn't have a single entity or body that is responsible for the review of serious uses of force outside of an officer's chain of command. LSP should consider whether its force review entities are appropriately integrated.

Under a more integrated structure, where a single body is responsible for the review of serious uses of force, Internal Affairs could be responsible for the intake and administrative investigations, while the Force Investigation Unit remains responsible for conducting the criminal investigation.

With the appropriate training and protocols, a more integrated structure will promote consistency, greater scrutiny, and information sharing, when permitted. The single entity can also be responsible for ensuring implementation of the policy, training, and other recommendations that result from the force review process.

RECOMMENDATION 52:

Review the training received by Force Investigation Unit personnel to ensure that it is consistent with best practices, LSP's core values, and community expectations.

Based on information learned during interviews, members' training appears to be heavily focused on the teachings of the Force Science Institute. The Force Science Institute has been criticized as focusing too heavily on justifying officers' uses of force and some communities have rejected this approach.

TBG requested, but did not receive, a more complete list of the training received by the Unit's personnel to determine if members were, overall, receiving balanced training that represented a variety of perspectives.

Commit to Capturing, analyzing and reporting More Robust Data and information to uphold transparency and accountability for all uses of force.

The Bowman Group reviewed data elements collected in the Mark43 Pursuit/Use of Force report. The table below documents data elements collected and available responses. The Bowman Group recommends LSP create clear policy and practice guidance on how to complete Pursuit/Use of Force reports including definitions for each data element in the Mark43 report. This type of documentation is crucial to ensure consistency across troopers.

RECOMMENDATION 53:

Make all Pursuit/Use of Force data elements mandatory.

Currently troopers do not have to complete all questions/data elements on the report.

The Recommendation column in the table below indicates specific recommendations from The Bowman Group related to each pursuit/use of force data element.

LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: LSP Weaknesses & Threats

Our key findings include the following:

- LSP's use of force policy lacks the clarity necessary to guide officer behavior and ensure effective supervisory review of uses of force;
- Supervisory reviews of uses of force are inconsistent, often incomplete, and hampered by mixed messages from leadership;
- There's a concerning pattern of officers' reflexively using Tasers on fleeing persons;
- The current structure of the review process creates delays and does not support thorough reviews and analysis; and
- LSP should improve the use of force data collected in Mark43 and increase public transparency.

Over the past year, LSP has made significant changes to its use of force policies and force review systems. Many of these changes were geared towards enhancing transparency and accountability, as well as improving use of force tracking and data analysis. Upon initial review, these changes appear to meet the basic requirements of a functioning use of force review system. However, upon closer inspection, it's apparent that these systems have not been designed and implemented to ensure timely, thorough, meaningful, and objective reviews of Troopers' uses of force. The force review systems currently in place will not result in the robust review necessary to improve the organization and move it closer to alignment with national best practices.

For example, LSP recently changed its review of Troopers' less lethal uses of force to require a lengthy process that involves extensive review of officers' body-worn camera footage by all levels of the chain of command. To the extent LSP's goal was to ensure all uses of force are thoroughly reviewed, the intent is laudable. In practice, supervisors' reviews of use of force are routinely incomplete and chain of command reviewers rarely provide any meaningful assessment of the reasonableness or necessity of the use force. As a result, potentially problematic use of force patterns may be missed. For example, we observed potentially unreasonable uses of the Taser, and officers using foul and aggressive language during their encounters with the public. These patterns were often not identified or addressed in the chain of command review.

Additionally, we saw no evidence that LSP is routinely assessing these uses of force to identify changes to policies, training, or tactics. This is a missed opportunity for the organization. If the review process isn't geared towards assessing uses of force to better the practices of individual troopers and the agency as a whole, there's little benefit to this process.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

LSP's current use of force policy includes numerous requirements that are consistent with nationally recognized best practices. For example, the policy requires officers to intervene if they observe another officer using unreasonable force, notify a supervisor, and document the unreasonable use of force they observed. The policy explicitly prohibits the use of retaliatory force "against an individual who is clearly no longer posing a physical threat or resisting." P.O. 238 also prohibits officers from using deadly force against someone who is only a danger to themselves, an important limitation on officers' use of force.

LSP's leadership appears committed to developing effective systems to identify, investigate, and address problematic use of force practices, and has taken the initial steps to do so. The Bowman Group encourages the agency to critically evaluate the systems and entities in place to ensure that they have the basic structures, protocols, and support to achieve their goals. Finally, during The Bowman Group's force-related interviews we found that LSP personnel were consistently engaged and receptive, devoted to bettering the organization, and committed to improving its use of force practices and protocols.

Table 2: Recommendations from The Bowman Group related to each pursuit/use of force data element

Data Element	Type (Drop Down/ Narrative etc.)	If Drop Down, Response Options	Recommendations
Initial Contact Type	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Affecting Arrest • Ambush – No Warning • Assisting Another Agency • Narrative box ‘Other Initial Contact Type’; required • Civil Disorder • NIBRS Incident Report Number (Known, Pending, Unknown) • NIBRS Offense 1 (Known, Pending, Unknown) • Defending Another Person • Narrative box ‘Other Initial Contact Type’; required • Defending Self • Follow up investigation • Foot Pursuit • Mass Demonstration • Medical, mental health, or welfare assistance • Other • Narrative box ‘Other Initial Contact Type’; required • Pending further investigation • Pre-Planned Ops Activity • Public Contact/Flag Down • Response to unlawful or suspicious activity • NIBRS Incident Report Number (Known, Pending, Unknown) • NIBRS Offense 1 (Known, Pending, Unknown) • Routine patrol other than traffic stop • Traffic Stop • Vehicle Pursuit • Warrant Service 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Include suicidal ideation or attempt • Unclear which category would capture family disputes, potentially add additional category
Officer	Drop Down	All officers	
Officer Badge #	Narrative		
Officer Date of Birth	Narrative		
Is Officer Employed Full Time?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No • Unknown • Pending 	
Officer Sex	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Male • Female • Unknown 	

Data Element	Type (Drop Down/ Narrative etc.)	If Drop Down, Response Options	Recommendations
Officer Race	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • American Indian or Alaska Native • Asian • Black • Hispanic • Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander • White • Unknown 	
Officer Dress	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrol Uniform – Class A • Plainclothes • Tactical • Utility – Class B • Utility – Class C 	
Officer Medical Aid Received	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Admitted to Hospital • Admitted to Hospital with Critical Injuries • Medical Assistance (Treated on Scene) • Medical Assistance (at Facility and Released) • No Medical Assistance or Refused Assistance • Officer Provided Care/Admitted to Hospital • Office Provided Care/ Admitted to Hospital with Critical Injuries • Officer Provided Care/Medical Professional Provided Assistance on Scene • Officer Provided Care/Medical Professional Provided Assistance at Medical Facility and Released 	
Was Officer on Duty	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Officer Duty Type <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agency had ability to map additional attributes • Regular Duty • Special Duty • No • Pending • Unknown 	
Did Incident Result in Crime Report	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No 	
Officer Rank	Narrative		
Officer Duty Assignment	Narrative		
Officer Years of Service	Narrative		
Officer Height (ft)	Narrative		
Officer Height (in)	Narrative		
Officer Weight (lbs)	Narrative		

Data Element	Type (Drop Down/ Narrative etc.)	If Drop Down, Response Options	Recommendations
Did Officer Approach?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No • Pending • Unknown 	
Was a Supervisor Present?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No • Pending • Unknown 	
Was a Supervisor On-Scene?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supervisor Name (drop down of all supervisors) • Supervisor HR # (narrative) • Supervisor Unit (narrative) • No 	
Officer Ambushed	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No • Pending • Unknown 	
Other Officers Involved but Unknown	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimum # of Unknown officers involved (narrative) • No 	All officers on scene of a Use of Force should be completing statements, it is unclear why this is unknown.
Use of Force Location	Narrative	Street address; Region/ Troop/ District/ Court/ Parish (I think determined from the street address)	
Subject Firearm Discharge – Intentional	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No 	
Subject Firearm Discharge – Accidental	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No 	
Did the Officer Fire Any Shots?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Officer Number of Shots Fired (narrative) • Officer Number of Shots Hit (narrative) • No • Pending • Unknown 	
Threat Directed At?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Another Party • Both Officer and Others • Officer • Pending • Unknown 	Add “self (i.e., threat directed at self) for instances of harm to self

Data Element	Type (Drop Down/ Narrative etc.)	If Drop Down, Response Options	Recommendations
Was Subject Impaired?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Impairment Type <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alcohol Impairment • Mental Health Condition • Drug Impairment • Pending Further Investigation • Unknown And Is Unlikely To Ever Be Known • No • Pending • Unknown 	Add Developmental, Intellectual Disability
De-escalation Attempted?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • De-escalation Type <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dispatch Requests (Addt'l Personnel) • Stabilization Tactics • Verbal • Warning Arc • De-escalation Successful (Yes/No) • No 	Expand options. Include things like “time, distance, cover, non-verbal tactics like body stance, tone of voice, eye contact; specialized resources (e.g.Crisis Negotiations Unit, Mental Health Clinicia), a single voice (not multiple commands from multiple people), procedural justice techniques like giving someone a voice (can you tell me why you are speeding)?
Subject Perceived Armed With	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Firearm • Knife, Blade or Stabbing Instrument • Other Dangerous Weapon • Unknown • None 	Add a narrative box for when “other dangerous weapon” indicated
Subject Confirmed Armed With	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Firearm • Firearm Replica • Knife, Blade or Stabbing Instrument • Non-Dangerous Object • None 	Add “Other”
Officer Attempted to Disarm Subject?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • No 	
Subject Resisted?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subject Resistance Type <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Active Resistance • Assaultive • Cooperative • Life-Threatening • Passive Non-Compliance • No • Pending • Unknown 	Review “Cooperative” Subject resistance, it is unclear what this means.

Data Element	Type (Drop Down/ Narrative etc.)	If Drop Down, Response Options	Recommendations
Signs of Impairment of Disability?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes • Observed Behavior • Signs of Alcohol Impairment • Signs of Developmental Disability • Signs of Drug Impairment • Signs of Mental Disability • Signs of Physical Disability • No 	
Officer Used Force on Subject?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Type of Force Used by Officer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baton • Chemical Spray (e.g., OC/CS) • Clothing Disconnect • Defensive Tactics • Deliberate Vehicle Strike • Discharge of Firearm – Handgun • Discharge of Firearm – Rifle • Discharge of Firearm- Shotgun • Drive Stun • Hands On • Impact Projectile • K-9 Contact • Knife, Blade or Stabbing Instrument • One Probe Contact • Probe Contact/Wire Broke • Probes Missed • Taser • Two or More Probe Contacts • Other • None- Pursuit Only • Location of Force Used by Officer (body and vehicle location drop down) • Subject Injury Severity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Death • Gunshot Wound • Minor Injury • Moderate Injury • Serious Injury • Unconsciousness • No Injury • No 	<p>Include medical aid received by subject if subject indicated as injured</p> <p>“Defensive tactics” should have a drop down option or some way to capture which defensive tactic was used.</p> <p>If not already available, add narrative field when “Other” Type of Force Used by Officer selected.</p>

Data Element	Type (Drop Down/ Narrative etc.)	If Drop Down, Response Options	Recommendations
Subject Used Force on Officer? (Or Fled from Officer – Pursuit Only)	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Type of Force Used by Officer <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baton • Chemical Spray (e.g., OC/CS) • Clothing Disconnect • Defensive Tactics • Deliberate Vehicle Strike • Discharge of Firearm – Handgun • Discharge of Firearm – Rifle • Discharge of Firearm- Shotgun • Drive Stun • Hands On • Impact Projectile • K-9 Contact • Knife, Blade or Stabbing Instrument • One Probe Contact • Probe Contact/Wire Broke • Probes Missed • Taser • Two or More Probe Contacts • Other • None- Pursuit Only • Location of Force Used by Officer (body and vehicle location drop down) • Subject Injury Severity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Death • Gunshot Wound • Minor Injury • Moderate Injury • Serious Injury • Unconsciousness • No Injury • No 	Add narrative field when “Other Dangerous Weapon” selected.
Was Officer Injured?	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Yes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Officer Injury Severity <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Death • Gunshot Wound • Minor Injury • Moderate Injury • Serious Injury • Unconsciousness • No Injury • No 	
Subject Disposition	Drop Down	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arrested 	

04.

Crisis Intervention / De-escalation



Crisis Intervention (De-Escalation)

Scope

In this assessment, a key area of consideration is the LSP's policies, training and operational practices related to crisis response, vulnerable populations, communication, de-escalation skills and tactics and building community trust through twenty first century policing practice. This section of our assessment includes not only LSP as an agency, but also a deeper dive into the crisis response specialized units (SWAT, CNT and MFF) due to their role in mobilizing statewide deployment to crisis events.

Method

Interviews of department personnel including LSP leadership, commanders, supervisors, and Troopers informed our understanding of LSP's overarching preparedness for twenty first century crisis response as well as the department's more targeted specialized crisis response units. In-person and virtual interviews and focus groups spanned gender and race and were inclusive of various departments and specialized units; Additionally, TBG participated in case file review; virtual and in-person lesson plan review and training observation; Trooper ride along; record review and data analysis related to discipline, use of force, special operations deployments, and internal affair file review. Finally, the five-year strategic plan informed this section of the report.

References

Records & Documents

The following policies related to LSP Crisis Response have been reviewed:

- 2017 Employee Survey
- 2021 Annual Use of Force Report
- BWC Use of Force Incidents
- Data Analysis related to LSP Demographics
- IA File Review
- LSP Complaint Review
- LSP Five Year Strategic Plan
- P.O. 1106 Enforcement
- P.O. 117 BWC and In-Car Camera Systems
- P.O. 203 Arrests and Searches
- P.O. 205 Bias Based Policing
- P.O. 209 Complaints and Administrative Investigations
- P.O. 210 Crisis Leave
- P.O. 212 Discrimination and Harassment Complaint Procedure
- P.O. 214 Domestic Violence
- P.O. 226 Mentally Ill Persons/Substance Abuse Patients
- P.O. 237 Uniform Policy

- P.O. 238 Use of Force
- P.O. 239 Victim Assistance
- P.O. 240 Violence in the Workplace
- P.O. 402 Communications
- P.O. 601 Critical Incident Response and Special Task Planning
- P.O. 603 Mass Arrest
- P.O. 604 Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) -which includes Crisis Negotiations Team (CNT)
- P.O. 605 Threat Alert Levels
- P.O. 606 Mobile Field Force (MFF)
- P.O. 801 Administration (BIA)
- P.O. 901 Code of Ethics
- Standard Operating Procedures— Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) and Crisis Negotiations Team (CNT)
- Standard Operating Procedures—Mobile Field Force (MFF)
- Tactical Response and Operations Standard for Law Enforcement Agencies (NTOA-National Tactical Officers Association) April, 2018.

The following training has been reviewed:

- 2019-2022 Annual In-Service Training
- CISM (Critical Incident Stress Management) Overview
- Crisis Negotiations Team-40 hour Basic Training
- De-escalation
- Emotional Survival
- L.E.A.D.S-Law Enforcement Active De-escalation Strategies-Plus Tactical Options
- Mental Health Disorders
- Staircase 101
- Suicide Presentation
- The Challenge of Mental Illness to Law Enforcement
- The Challenge of Mental Illness to Law Enforcement-SWAT Extract
- Use of Force

Limitations

Were there any challenges?

The most pertinent limitation across this section was unreliable data. Inadequate data platforms, CAD/RMS utilization, excel spreadsheets and word documents were all insufficient to draw reliable analysis.

Additionally, nearly all POST (Peace Officer Standards and Training) lesson plans and curricula were not provided to this assessment team. Some LSP lesson plans and curricula were also not provided. Consequently, crisis related training content was unable to be fully assessed.

Is there a need for further review of certain topics/areas beyond this scope?

The LSP may want to examine the needs of its special victim’s unit. Due to the nature of these investigations (Sex Crimes etc.), it is recommended that this unit undergo assessment as part of a thorough crisis response analysis against best practice.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

LSP's Crisis Response Unit is made up of three primary units (MFF, SWAT and CNT). The assessment and associated recommendations will be addressed by individual unit. LSP's current crisis response unit is primarily made up of:

Mobile Field Force (MFF)

- MFF is authorized for 110 sworn members and 1 full time lieutenant and sergeant.

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)

- SWAT is authorized for 60 sworn members, and 1 fulltime lieutenant and Sergeant.

Crisis Negotiations Team (CNT)


- CNT is authorized for 22 sworn members with no dedicated full-time positions or leadership. It is recommended that CNT increase their authorized sworn from 22 to 32, along with the addition of a full time lieutenant.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Re-evaluate the Crisis Response Unit structure.

Strong consideration should be given to balancing the structure of the Crisis Response Unit, prioritizing the legitimacy and importance of the crisis negotiations team (CNT) to 21st century policing practices.

TBG recommends the following structure for the Crisis Response Unit Command:



RECOMMENDATION 2:

Ensure intentional improvements be made to elevate diversity among crisis specialized units.

Diverse experiences bring value, especially with inherent tension and extraordinary circumstances common in specialized deployment conditions.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

Strengthen operational practice for communication of deployments to the public.

By policy, the Crisis Response Unit is required to coordinate with Public Affairs for any major deployment, but it is unclear who, how, when etc. Consideration should be given to whether this reliably occurs, the timeframe that it occurs, who is responsible and accountability measures to ensure policy is followed. Reliability in communication about major events is crucial for improving public trust.

Consideration should be given to whether the policy should designate the on-scene commander or his/her designee to serve in this role. The on-scene commander who is responsible for the perimeter could also be designated to coordinate with PAO.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Enter all MFF/SWAT/CNT incident documentation into RMS/CAD and integrated with the LSP technology department.

All such documentation should be tied to the same event/incident number so that all after action reports and associated documentation from all entities are tied to the same event.

All files are presently saved as PDFs in the Crisis Response Shared Drive.

Presently CNT only completes an after-action report if they are engaged in negotiations, and then that report is given to SWAT to include in their case file. If CNT is deployed but not engaged in negotiations, there is not documentation completed by CNT at all, rather SWAT indicates in their after-action report that CNT was activated.

There is opportunity for nefarious activity, and unreliable information and data using this approach. A more professional, accountable system should be developed, fully integrated into CAD and RMS. The CAD system should also have event codes identified to reflect different types of deployments. Informal incident records can also be kept, but those should be secondary.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Require a commander to review and approve all after-action reports by at least two supervisory levels (e.g. Sgt./Lt or Lt/ Captain etc.).

The Commander should also produce an annual summary of crisis response unit deployments based on reliable data.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Ensure the MFF, CNT and SWAT leadership teams (minimally the Captain, LT., Sgt., and Regional Platoon leaders) complete the 40-hour crisis negotiations training.

The intent is not to make them crisis negotiators, or in any way to supplant the CNT. Rather, it provides the MFF leadership with excellent de-escalation, communication, and crisis negotiation skills, which not only is exceptionally useful when MFF/SWAT arrives first on scene, or must engage first on-scene, but also helps MFF/SWAT leadership understand the important role, function and expertise that CNT members bring.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Broaden collaborative training priorities across specialized units.

By policy, the SWAT Supervisor determines training priorities; Training priorities for all three specialized units should be collaboratively developed to ensure operational practices, policy requirements and training needs are aligned.

Each entity will have their own specialized training priorities as well, but there should be collaborative priorities, which is memorialized in policy, requiring training priorities be developed by all three crisis response unit leadership.

Crisis Response Related Policies

In addition to the SWAT, MFF and CNT specialized unit policies and standard operating procedures, TBG reviewed additional crisis response-related policies governing LSP. Nearly all policies are outdated, utilize almost exclusively non-inclusive male gendered language, and because they are outdated, frequently do not represent current operational structure or practice.

Broad policy recommendations follow. Unit specific policy recommendations are also addressed.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

Develop and implement a Policy for policy review and revisions.

This should include how often policy review occurs (recommend annually), by whom, documentation of what changes are made, signatures required, and the date of rescindment and enactment. All policies and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) should include case law review, training updates and operational practice changes. Additionally, all prior versions of polices and SOP's should be archived.

RECOMMENDATION 9:

Ensure all policies, where appropriate, are opened for public comment.

Additionally, where appropriate, community subject matter experts should review and provide input on best practice (e.g. mental health policy, human resource related policies etc.)

There should be a feedback loop on which recommendations were included in the revisions and which were not (and why not). Exposure of sensitive operations or tactics to the public should not be included. All policy changes should be documented and dated including the LSP staff and rank of who reviewed/ revised the policy.

RECOMMENDATION 10:

Change the term “should” throughout policies to “will” wherever LSP expects certain behavior.

E.g. not leaving someone in the prone position; bystander intervention; reporting to supervisors’ observation of excessive force; requiring audio or video recording of interrogations, rather than just “when possible”.

RECOMMENDATION 11:

Include hyperlinks when referencing other policies, forms, laws etc.

They should reference relevant Louisiana state law and/or other LSP policies as a cross reference.

RECOMMENDATION 12:

Maintain consistency throughout all LSP policies.

Eg. MFF directive stipulates Use of Force Documentation will be completed “if a person is injured”. This is not consistent with LSP Use of Force Directive and should be changed to reflect when any force is used, regardless of injury.

RECOMMENDATION 13:

Provide clarity for special considerations in policy.

As with any person with a disability, special considerations, such as a heavier focus on constitutional law, should be defined, including more clarity supporting Miranda rights being read, and when an attorney should be present.

RECOMMENDATION 14:

Update directives to gender neutral language.

The directive uses masculine specific language (manpower, he, his etc.) and must be updated to gender neutral language.

RECOMMENDATION 15:

Review P.O. 226 with subject matter experts and persons living with mental health conditions to ensure best practice language and practices are utilized.

NAMI (National Alliance on Mental Illness) is a good resource for this.

P.O. 226 Mentally Ill Persons/Substance Abuse Patients was developed in 2012, a decade ago. Reviewing, and ensuring that the policy is consistent with best practices is an important step toward public transparency and building trust. P.O. 226 encourages inclusion of family, caretakers and mental health professionals when interviewing individuals in crisis. Consideration should be given to whether this is occurring operationally, and whether the policy language is strong enough to establish requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 16:

Update P.O. 226 policy language.

In general, “Mentally Ill” should be updated to support person-centered language (e.g.: “Persons living with severe mental health conditions”, or “Persons in mental health crisis” or “Response to Persons living with or affected by mental health and/or substance abuse conditions”).

RECOMMENDATION 17:

Review and establish incident protocols related to EMS involvement on scene.

Section 4.iii of P.O. 226 references a report in which Troopers “should carefully document their observations, or those of the EMS technician in a report whenever a person is taken into protective custody”. It is unclear whether this is occurring operationally.

In an in-custody death file review, EMS was on scene and transported the individual with a Trooper in the ambulance who died in route to the hospital due to suspected police use of force. There was no written documentation in the Trooper reports of what occurred in the ambulance.

RECOMMENDATION 18:

Provide consideration for any alternative medical response versus a criminal justice response for individuals in mental health crisis.

Section 5.v of P.O. 226 states “Patients will not be transported by EMS merely to restrain them”. Often it is more trauma informed to provide EMS transport rather than handcuffed in a patrol vehicle.

RECOMMENDATION 19:

Revise policies, like P.O. 606, to improve selection criteria for LSP crisis specialized units.

Selection criteria should include consideration of performance evaluations, and a review of conduct/disciplinary history. For example, with SWAT qualifications according to policy, applicants for SWAT must score 60% or above on physical fitness. However, there is no disciplinary or performance history required. Rather, misconduct (with disciplinary action) is grounds for removal.

Repeat Use of Force incidents should be considered in selection, even if it did not result in discipline as it is presently written, as well as a pattern of behavior inconsistent with mission and values of the organization. This should cover off-duty behavior. LSP has had a history of inconsistent discipline, and in some cases no discipline for unacceptable behavior. Consequently, including a provision only for “misconduct resulting in disciplinary action” is not necessarily appropriate.

The directive does a good job considering these factors for a departure from the unit, but it is absent in the MFF/CNT selection criteria.

Consideration should be given to including thresholds in policy that would eliminate applicants prior to, as well as after appointment.

RECOMMENDATION 20:

Task the CNT and SWAT leadership with co-writing and updating both the policy and SOP.

SWAT policy changes should be made to memorialize command structure to elevate the CNT and protect against change in leadership.

The current SWAT policy and SOP is heavily slanted toward SWAT, and CNT's role should be far more heavily integrated into policy.

RECOMMENDATION 21:

Specific policy guidelines on Body Worn Camera (BWC) activation should be revised to reflect best practice, with accountability measures in place for failure to activate BWC, inclusive of progressive discipline.

Some examples include: Troopers "are not required to disclose to the public that recording equipment is in use". This should be changed.

Additionally, policy states "Troopers equipped with BWC or in car camera..." but does not state who is not required to be equipped.

Also, policy states "A supervisor shall review at least three BWC recordings and one in car recording per officer per quarter". This is a low threshold. Consideration should be given to weekly review with standardized reporting that is auditable (including tangible de-escalation strategies utilized).

The Use of Force Policy appears to permit five days to complete Use of Force documents. There also is no apparent timeline for supervisors to review Use of Force documents. Use of Force documentation, in most cases, should be required before the end of shift unless it is a deadly use of force incident.

RECOMMENDATION 22:

Consider developing MOU's (Memorandum of Understanding), MOA's (Memorandum of Agreement) and/or IGA's (Inter-governmental Agreements) delineating law enforcement chain of command, operational duties and responsibilities on joint deployments.

Mobile Field Force (MFF)

Mobile Field Force (MFF) is the largest of the crisis response specialized units. Authorized for 110 sworn personnel, they are fully staffed, and while historically have been a "voluntold" unit, today, they are voluntary and they have more applications than open positions. MFF is commanded by a full-time dedicated LT.

MFF training consists of:

- 40-hour operations course to qualify as a MFF member.
- Three 8-hour days of training provided per quarter, with the option of members to attend another Region's training should there be a patrol shortage or other conflict.
- 8 hours once monthly with SWAT and CNT, which is relatively new to LSP and essential.

The MFF Policy P.O. 606 was written 1/29/2020. It is a comprehensive, and generally strong directive. The directive largely reflects current operational structure and practice, is concise and thorough. It overall reflects best practice with some notable exceptions.

MFF Operations Manual

The MFF has a 71-page operations manual, which this assessment team has reviewed.

RECOMMENDATION 23:

Review and revise the MFF Operations Manual with strong input and collaboration by CNT and SWAT.

All three Crisis Response leaders should review and revise the SOP's/operations manual as a team, which can then inform operational planning for joint training.

This assessment team recommends: the Operations Manual should open with a commitment to sanctity for life and utilizing the least amount of force necessary.

The section on 1st amendment rights should also be moved to the top of the operations manual, which in addition to commitment to the sanctity of life, demonstrates a priority on recognizing and respecting 1st amendment rights.

The "Mass Arrest" policy included in the operations manual is dated 2012 and should include case law review, training updates and operational practice changes.

All language should be gender neutral, with inclusion of moving away from terms like "last man", "point man". While these may be long-standing tactical terms, in 21st century policing, they should be updated.

The Basic Operator Course does not cover any topic related to de-escalation, procedural justice, active communication, rather focuses heavily on use of force and defensive tactics. Training collaboration with SWAT and CNT in the Basic course would also be useful to consider.

CNT is not listed as one of the "types of training" and should be considered.

The manual does not identify any role of the Fusion Center. If there is a role, it should be added to the operations manual.

Under the primary questions listed, in addition to consideration on whether small children are in the crowd, consideration should also be given to other vulnerable populations (persons with disabilities, aging population etc.)

After Action reports should also document use of force outcomes and injuries, which is presently not identified.

The utilization of drones should be included in the operations manual.

The following are recommended additional changes related to the MFF Unit:

RECOMMENDATION 24:

Update MFF training to reflect best practice.

The MFF training identified in the directive does not include anything related to de-escalation, active communication skills, crisis negotiation skills, body language as a communication tool etc.

While the MFF indicates it does train on these topics, they are not listed in policy with other trainings and should be considered enough of a priority to include in the training topics presently identified in policy (and listed in order first to reflect the priority). Because MFF is deployed to civil unrest situations, these skills are especially crucial and should be reinforced.

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)

SWAT is the second largest of the crisis response specialized units. Authorized for 60 sworn personnel, they are fully staffed. SWAT is commanded by a full-time dedicated LT and a full-time Sgt.

SWAT training consists of:

- 18 –(8)-hour days per year for all operators
- For specialized Operators, there is additional training as indicated below:
 - Counter-Snipers – 12 (8)-hour days per year
 - Breachers – 6 (8)-hour days per year
 - Crisis Negotiators housed under SWAT– 12 (8) hour days per year (4 of those days with SWAT tactical support)
 - Mobile Field Force--12 (8) hour days per year (once monthly) with both SWAT and CNT

Directive P.O. 604 Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) was written in 2013. For such an important unit, operational and best practices have necessarily changed since 2013. Additionally, SWAT and CNT have a 23-page Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that no one was aware of until this assessment team requested it after it was referenced in the P.O. 604 directive. It was unclear to everyone interviewed who actually authored the SOP, or when. (This is another reason why a policy on policy development/revision should be developed).

SWAT Directive

The SWAT SOP addresses important operational practices and both the directive and SOP should be revised and updated to reflect best practices and current operational tactics. The LSP was very responsive to the need to update both the Directive and the SOP, but this should only be done in strong partnership with the CNT and MFF leadership. Upon discussion with the LSP about the outdated SWAT SOP, the LSP made a good attempt to update the SWAT SOP during the course of this assessment.

The current draft is far stronger than the previous one. However, additional consideration should be given as follows:

RECOMMENDATION 25:

Review and revise the SWAT Directive.

The SOP should open with a commitment to sanctity for life and to utilizing the least amount of force necessary. This should also be included in the “SWAT Doctrine”.

Consideration should be given to moving the CNT section to the top of the SOP, demonstrating a commitment to the sanctity of life, a focus on expert crisis negotiations, active communication, and least amount of force whenever possible, which CNT represents. As written, the SOP starts with tactical engagement, which occupies 81 of the 87-page SOP, with CNT occupying 6 pages at the end.

Both the SWAT Directive and accompanying SOP must be updated to reflect best practice. All language should be gender neutral, which is presently in the masculine.

Clarification should be made of the co-deployment of the CNT team on all SWAT deployments.

Consideration should be given to the CNT team coordinating the surrender plan, in close communication with the SWAT tactical team. The FBI CNT training prioritizes this because a trusting relationship has often been developed between the person in crisis and the primary negotiator. Consequently, seeing the person all the way through the surrender process should be considered and trained collaboratively with SWAT. Presently it is the SWAT team who takes the lead by policy.

For Crisis Response Policies, leadership of MFF, SWAT and CNT should have strong input into policy revisions. All three Crisis Response leaders should review and revise the Policies/SOP's as a team, which can then inform operational planning for joint training. Each entity must agree on operational practices and philosophy, and know what is expected of one another

The CNT section of the SOP should include serving as a training instructor as part of their CNT role. Crisis negotiators are uniquely qualified to teach crisis negotiations, de-escalation, communication tactics etc. and should be utilized at the LSP Cadet, annual in-service and pre-promotion service training and this should be put into policy and activated in training.

In the glossary of terms portion of the SOP, consider expanding CNT to include the purpose the team serves, as is done with other outlined roles.

TBG suggests one general policy for SWAT, CNT, and MFF (P.O. ###), then an SOP outlining the details of the operational expectations of each unit.

The following are recommended operational changes related to the SWAT Unit:

RECOMMENDATION 26:

Consider use of BWC when appropriate in SWAT deployment.

The directive does not require SWAT to utilize BWC and this should be changed. Not only does BWC often protect a department from complaints but is also provides opportunities for video review, training corrections, alignment of pre-op planning with deployment while promoting public transparency and trust. This is essential for 21st century policing.

The directive does not require SWAT or CNT to utilize BWC and this should be reconsidered. All CNT negotiations are audio recorded which does address transparency and training opportunities. These practices should be memorialized into policy.

Recommendation 28: Develop Event Codes for call out types and integrated into CAD.

SWAT leadership must then be trained on CAD. At present, there is no reliable way to extract data on the types of deployment. Informal records can be kept secondarily where appropriate.

Recommendation 29: Require that each SWAT (and CNT) deployed Trooper write a supplemental report to the original "call for service" (CFS) report and outline in detail their assignment, location, tactics or operations conducted, along with other pertinent details.

RECOMMENDATION 30:

Ensure that Use of Force incidents during SWAT deployments have all accompanying use of force documentation linked to the incident event with BWC supporting it.

TBG reviewed Use of Force files within the Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) that included SWAT deployment. The Use of Force report simply states "SWAT protocols followed". There is no way to account for whether this is true,

which erodes trust. TBG reviewed two SWAT officer-involved shooting (OIS) fatalities, which without BWC, leaves one unable to assess legitimacy.

This not only positions the LSP poorly in regard to legal vulnerabilities, but also provides no opportunity for accountability or training review.

RECOMMENDATION 31:

Include critical information relevant to CNT in the SWAT intel packet on planned deployments and in pre-op planning.

While SWAT intel may be more focused on criminal history for example, CNT intel may be more focused on for example, crucial information gleaned from social media (does the person(s) have children, ages, parents, pets, military history, jobs, special interests/hobbies etc.). This is useful to successful de-escalation.

CNT should be tasked with developing a CNT specific Intel matrix that will be useful to them that the Fusion Center can work to provide during deployment activation.

RECOMMENDATION 32:

Deploy CNT with any security element deployment (even if they are not on scene, but just in the area).

This goes a long way toward reducing the likelihood that a negotiator is an hour or two away if needed.

RECOMMENDATION 33:

Consider having a rescue unit on standby in the area along with CNT for specific operations, for example, a high-risk search warrant or fugitive with firearms involved.

Consideration should be given to including rescue units in portions of training.

Crisis Negotiations Team (CNT)

CNT is the smallest of the crisis response specialized units. Authorized for 22 sworn personnel, they have recently lost one negotiator due to resignation from the unit so are presently staffed at 21. This is insufficient and must be changed. Because CNT has historically not been elevated or recognized for the expertise they bring, CNT has struggled with recruiting and retaining volunteers.

Like MFF and SWAT, crisis negotiators serve full time largely in patrol. If an event occurs, and the CNT member is on patrol shift with a Trooper who is a MFF member and a Trooper who is a SWAT member, CNT tends to be the ones “held back” to remain on patrol. Reflective of this undervalued resource, there is no full-time dedicated leadership assigned to CNT while both MFF and SWAT each have both a full-time dedicated LT and SGT. This also must change. CNT team members report up through the SWAT LT.

Because CNT is housed under SWAT, P.O. 604 Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) is the policy that governs CNT, written in 2013. Additionally, SWAT and CNT have a 23-page Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that no

one was aware of until this assessment team requested it. It is unclear when it was written and who authored this information.

As indicated previously, CNT falls under the command of SWAT, which is operationally legitimate. However, having a lower ranked leader commanding CNT presents opportunity for SWAT to diminish the important role of CNT, and also sends a message to the department and community that CNT is not equal in importance. The same rank (LT to LT) provides more opportunity to level the playing field, even if the SWAT LT is the one who makes the ultimate incident decision. In LSP, an incident commander (CPT or above) is not always on scene, which requires someone to serve in a decision-making role.

A full-time dedicated LT should be added to the CNT team, elevating it on equal footing with the tactical operation specialists of SWAT and MFF. Operationally, all SWAT operations would have a SWAT incident commander and MFF operations a MFF incident commander. Having an equal rank for CNT is crucial.

While departments all over the country are shorthanded, this cannot be the reason to not expand a team as important to best practice as CNT. In fact, for CNT, the increase in negotiators would actually assist with patrol shortage challenges. Negotiators have their regular full-time jobs, and with more trained negotiators, there are more people to choose from for deployment, providing buffer to patrol operations. Training would be a resource investment, but can be planned with enough runway to accommodate operational challenges.

The CNT needs strong leadership, and just adding bodies without leadership is not recommended. Presently, there are too few negotiators which results in burn out and opportunity for delay to get on-scene. This creates a culture where SWAT can be on-scene prior to CNT, and operationally lends itself to tactical operations as opposed to crisis negotiations first whenever appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION 34:

Add a full-time dedicated LT and additional CNT members to the CNT team.

The Crisis Response Unit is commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, Major, Captain and then for each SWAT and MFF, a full-time dedicated LT and Sgt. The CNT Team does not historically or presently have a full time LT or Sgt assigned to it, which must be changed. LSP's CNT needs to be elevated on equal footing with the tactical operation specialists of SWAT and MFF. In 21st century policing, CNT brings with it exceptional training and capabilities in de-escalation, communication and slowing things down to use time as a tactic—with notable nationally recognized specialization in resolving a situation peacefully whenever possible. Communities rightfully expect that today. While SWAT and MFF are well trained in operational tactics, which are necessary for some types of service calls, it should not be at the expense of strong leadership and engagement of a CNT.

Ten additional CNT team members (negotiators) should be added to the understaffed CNT team, after the dedicated LT is vetted and selected. With the addition of up to ten negotiators, CNT should assign negotiators to squads based on historical deployments. For example, if Squad one has the most deployments, perhaps six of the new negotiators should come from Squad one. Presently, there are 22 negotiators across the state. If this were elevated to 32, and aligned with squad activity, it would promote less burnout, more timeliness on scene, and elevate CNT to the level it should be. It also promotes less lethal force when CNT arrives on scene and can engage first where appropriate.

It is also important to remember that all troopers respond to crisis, not just specialized units. As will be highlighted later in this report, enhanced crisis response training is both a community and officer safety measure and must be prioritized for all troopers to integrate into LSP culture. A robust CNT would be a significant resource to the LSP to increase this type of crucial training for all troopers.

The CNT team, especially the recommended addition of a dedicated full-time LT, should be tasked with substantially increasing dedicated training to Cadets and all troopers at annual in-service on crisis negotiation, crisis

intervention, active communication skills, de-escalation strategies and tactics, and identification of and response to vulnerable persons, including mental health crisis. Presently, LSP does not adequately prioritize these trainings, essential to 21st century policing. Note: The LSP academy, for the first time during the most recent Cadet class, has provided an 8-hour Law Enforcement Active De-escalation Strategies (L.E.A.D.S) training. The LSP intends to provide it at annual in-service as well. The training, observed by this assessment team, was led by a current crisis negotiator, which is commendable.

The recommended addition of a full-time dedicated LT to the CNT team should be tasked with prioritizing state-wide CNT coordination with other regional law enforcement departments along with research/implementation of national best practices.

RECOMMENDATION 35:

Prioritize sending all Crisis Negotiators to the 40-hour Crisis Intervention Team Training (CIT) which is a specialized course on the identification of and response to persons in mental and behavioral health crisis.

This training is presently provided by surrounding law enforcement departments which LSP negotiators can be triaged to attend. Given high incidents in which negotiators are deployed to persons living with or affected by mental or behavioral health conditions, this training would complement the forty-hour CNT training.

Task CIT trained negotiators with re-purposing pertinent portions of the CIT training curricula to increase dedicated teaching hours on response to mental and behavioral health crisis to LSP Cadets and all troopers at annual in-service.

Key SWAT operators and leadership should also be prioritized to receive the 40-hour Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) Training.

CNT should develop a roll call training or video (or both) for troopers to provide some fundamental skills of what to do in the event they are the first on scene. For example, have a secondary trooper take notes for intel and document any demands.

Consideration should be given to having the academy staff develop and oversee the SWAT/CNT collaborative scenario-based training exercises. This way, no one on SWAT or CNT has insight into the scenarios, which provides a greater opportunity for “live” practice of the unknown situations they will be called to.

Consideration should be given for each Troop executive officer (XO) to be CNT certified. This not only promotes awareness of the importance of CNT, but also teaches a skill set necessary to increase the likelihood of a call for service starting out from a place of de-escalation and not escalation.

RECOMMENDATION 36:

Memorialize into policy that the CNT leadership position is the rank of LT, equivalent to MFF and SWAT.

LSP indicates presently there are no LT’s serving as negotiators and of the three SGT’s presently serving as Crisis Negotiators, they are not eligible for promotion to LT for at least one year (LSP requires Sgt’s must serve a minimum of two years before eligibility for promotion). Should LSP decide to promote one of these SGT’s to a full time CNT leadership role, it is strongly recommended that it be memorialized in policy that the position be a LT (and an exception has been made due to exigent circumstances). As soon as the right leader is eligible for promotion to LT, this transition should occur. If there is a current LT on the LSP who was previously a negotiator, and would be a good fit for the role, he/she can be considered for this role. Alternatively, a full-time sergeant could function as an

assistant statewide coordinator under the current CNT CPT until a full time LT can be identified. Again, memorializing this position be a LT into policy helps to protect against reversion to old ways when leadership changes occur and prioritizes equal chain of command, even if the SWAT LT is the one to ultimately make an incident decision. A subordinate rank is and would be problematic.

RECOMMENDATION 37:

Utilize CAD/RMS to track deployments.

Due to the historic lack of an RMS and CAD system, record management is unreliable. There is no validated data on deployments over the last five years of any of the crisis response units. Rather, after action reports are saved as PDF's in the crisis response shared drive, requiring excessive personnel time to try to determine what kind of event it was (barricade; high risk warrant etc.), what teams were or were not deployed etc. Consequently, the number of deployments, type of deployment, team or squads activated etc. is largely unreliable and in cases simply unknown at this time.

Event Codes should be developed to reflect the type of call out and entered into CAD.

RECOMMENDATION 38:

Prioritize a more intentional focus to establish a relationship and/or contract with community subject matter experts (e.g. mental health clinical social worker, psychologist etc.) for utilization as a call-out resource.

This should be a tightly developed relationship, with cross training (he/she is CNT trained; trains together with the unit etc.).

Crisis Response Deployments and Incident Data

The Bowman Group requested data on SWAT, Mobile Field Force and Crisis Negotiation Team Deployments over the last 5 years, as well as data on calls for service involving specific codes relevant to crisis response (Mental Health, Trespassing, Barricaded Subject etc.). Until the new CAD system was implemented, dual codes were uncommon. Record management has been insufficient and unreliable at the LSP. Without an integrated agency Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) and Police Record Management System (RMS) until 2021, reliable data has been challenging.

Consequently, The Bowman Group requested the last two years of deployments, which also proved challenging. The CAD/RMS system is not currently used by SWAT, MFF or CNT, so there is no reliable incident data including the type of call (high risk warrant, barricaded subject, security detail etc.), which units were deployed (CNT, SWAT, MFF etc.) and in what Region, by which squad etc. Instead, records are kept in a Crisis Response Shared Drive in PDF format. While leadership at LSP did try to ascertain records from their shared drive for the last two years, this data cannot be deemed reliable. In the last few years, CNT always deploys with SWAT, part of a SWAT's operational change from a dynamic entry to a "surround and call out" response, which requires active involvement by the CNT.

In 2021

While this data cannot be validated, it was reported that CNT was deployed six times with SWAT for high-risk search warrants and 1 time with SWAT for a manhunt. There were no deployments alongside MFF in 2021.

MFF is predominantly deployed to planned events like Mardi Gras, the Final Four, NYE Sugar bowl, dignitary response (e.g. NOBLE) or Mother Nature events like a Tornado. These deployments generally do not require co-deployment with CNT or SWAT. Consequently, in 2021, there were no co-deployments.

In 2022:

1st Squad – 6 high risk warrants and 1 barricade (SWAT/CNT)

2nd Squad – 3 high risk warrants and 1 barricade (SWAT/CNT)

3rd Squad – 1 high risk warrant (SWAT/CNT)

Six deployments with SWAT and MFF for demonstrations

When MFF is deployed to civil disturbances, CNT and/or SWAT are often co-deployed. There were more frequent co-deployments in 2022. For example, CNT was deployed six times with both SWAT and MFF for demonstrations.

These increased co-deployments are encouraging. This demonstrates an increased awareness of and support for utilization of each other's crisis response specialization.

RECOMMENDATION 39:

Enter relevant data into the FBI Hostage Barricade System (HOBAS) if not presently occurring, and it is required by policy.

RECOMMENDATION 40:

Implement a new requirement to utilize primary and secondary Call/Clear Codes, which the current CAD now has the capability to capture.

Doing so will dramatically improve data collection efforts. Interviews with Troopers have indicated that use of force occurs more frequently when Troopers are backing up other Departments for special events like Crawfish Festival, Mardi Gras, Operation Golden Eagle, etc.

The LSP is currently considering ways to capture this important data. For example, to differentiate between Use of Force events occurring on "Normal" LSP activities, and on "Other" LSP activities, such as designated instances where the LSP is backing up another department.

RECOMMENDATION 41:

Give consideration to breaking call for service events down even further for SWAT, CNT, MFF or other specialized units.

This would allow LSP to analyze the data associated with normal activities as well as planned events (Arrests, Guns Seized, Drugs seized, Use of Force, etc.)

LSP has just begun labeling reports, and the last Mark43 update now allows for the ability to label CAD Events. LSP is also considering setting up labels for extended duration activities.

For example, if LSP were called to assist NOPD with an uptick in street racing activity, and LSP responds with extra patrols over the next 6 months, LSP could create a label to capture / analyze the activity related to street racing. In summary, while the new CAD system is relatively new, the data analyst and LSP leadership are engaged in ways to utilize it in ways it historically has not.

LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: LSP Weaknesses & Threats

As discussed in a previous part of this section, it is of crucial importance that SWAT, CNT and MFF be trained on CAD/RMS and begin to reliably use this for all deployment and incident information rather than just a Shared Drive.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

It is important to note that the Crisis Response Unit is presently commanded by strong leaders (LTC, Major, Captain, Lieutenant, Sergeant) who are experts in their field, understand the importance of 21st century policing and who are eager to improve. This is foundational to success and the LSP should be commended for making these relatively recent leadership changes. It has been repeated by many within LSP that, historically, turf wars, silos, and egos have gotten in the way of best practices. While there has been institutional knowledge and data lost with new promotions, the “right” leaders appear to be in a strong position to implement much needed change.

Additionally, during this assessment period, active steps have been taken to improve policy and training. LEADS training was added to the current Cadet class with an intention to add to annual in-service as well. This is an important step to begin to integrate and prioritize de-escalation and communication skills. It is important that LSP do this throughout its Troops and not just for Cadets. Policy changes within SWAT began to be updated and a new policy review team has been put in place.

A new CAD/RMS system has been implemented which will improve reliable data, which can inform LSP strategy. The new CAD system permits dual codes, and training on this will be crucial to more reliably track important data. For example, a traffic stop that also may involve a person with mental health concerns should be dually noted. Both codes utilized would significantly improve accurate data, which can be used to inform training and operational practices. SWAT, MFF and CNT should also reliably track deployments involving persons with disabilities, in mental health crisis etc. along with the deployment type (high risk warrant, barricaded subject etc.). Additionally, LSP appears to be called to support metro area police departments with some regularity. Until the new CAD system became operational, this was largely not being reliably tracked. Presently, even with the new CAD system, it is more globally tracked rather than with any intentional strategy.

The LSP senior leadership has been very open to reform recommendations and have recognized the need for change. This is crucial and a good indicator for change momentum.

05.

Fair & Impartial Policing Practices (Stops, Searches, Arrests)



Fair and Impartial Policing Practices (Stops, Searches, Arrests)

Scope

This review assesses LSP's policies and practices with respect to stops, searches, and arrests (SSA) and how they align to contemporary fair and impartial policing practices. Further, the review seeks to determine internal and external perspectives on SSA policies and practices, identify SSA reporting requirements, and to evaluate organizational use of data collection and review to inform leadership, policy, supervision, and training.

Policies and practices that demonstrate commitment to fair and impartial policing are key to build and maintain public trust. Voice and representation in the process is an important pillar supporting procedural justice. Prior to starting this assessment, TBG researched open-source material to gather any information that would aid our assessment. Some community members contacted the TBG to share concerns regarding possible interactions with the LSP, and LSP's responsiveness to complaints related to stops, searches, and arrests.

The assessment of the LSP's SSA policies and practices is conducted considering national models and practices and the policies and practices of contemporary law enforcement organizations. Our review includes the search for and review of relevant data to further our understanding of reporting mandates and supervisory review of SSA decisions. Our scope of review is comprehensive and includes evaluating whether the policies and the practices of the LSP support the underlying philosophy of fair and impartial policing and procedural justice.

Method

To further our understanding of SSA policies and practices, the TBG identified primary and secondary policies governing expected performance and behavior when a Trooper stops, detains, or arrests a person. This policy review informed a baseline understanding of the LSP's policy and practices; allowed TBG to examine the degree to which the policies are consistent or inconsistent with recommended practices; and educated and inform the TBG prior to interviewing LSP members on the subject matter.

To further our assessment, TBG interviewed leadership of LSP Troop Regions regarding the policies and practices expected of Troopers with respect to stop, search, and arrest. Interviews and focus groups with demographically and geographically diverse Troopers and supervisors informed us of their understanding of department expectations and SSA philosophy. The information TBG gathered through interviews and focus groups with department personnel; our participation in community forums; and our review of department documents and records informs the findings and recommendations described below.

Understanding the community perspective of the LSP is a key component of our assessment. TBG engaged with members of the public from various areas of the state and jurisdictional regions of the LSP. Dissatisfaction with the LSP's treatment of persons who are stopped, detained, or arrested; the LSP's lack of institutional controls governing SSA decisions; and the lack of community voice in the development of department policy and practices were consistent themes TBG heard in community forums and discussions.

References

Records & Documents

TBG analyzed LSP policies to inform our findings and recommendations as well as assess their adherence to national practices. The following policies in whole or in part govern SSA decisions:

- P.O. 203 Arrests and Searches
- P.O. 1103 Checkpoints
- P.O. 1106 Enforcement
- P.O. 1117 Body Worn Cameras and In-Car Camera Systems

We assessed these policies considering national model policies, and recommended practice guides, including the Center For Policing Equity, the California racial and Identity Profiling Act, and the New Jersey State Police Aggregate Data reports. Our focus included evaluating how to enhance policy to align with practices supporting fair and impartial policing and giving the public and the department tools to assist in evaluating data to assist in institutionalizing audit and review of SSA data to improve the LSP and holding the department and its members accountable.

Key findings and observations regarding policy are summarized:

LSP POLICY P.O. 203 ARRESTS AND SEARCHES

- This is the Cornerstone policy for SSA.
- P.O. 203 is prescriptive in nature, focusing on legal requirements and how to effect a stop, search, or arrest.
- Policy should include training mandates and reporting and review requirements
- Definitions of important concepts are narrowly defined and offer limited guidance in comparison to policies of contemporary organizations.
- The policy does not link to other critical decision points, e.g., use of force and use of force reporting, foot patrol, field interviews, reporting and documenting consent and non-consent encounters.
- The LSP should strengthen guidance for supervision of its stops, searches, and arrests.

LSP P.O. 1103 CHECKPOINTS

- P.O. 1103 Defined philosophical perspective - “checkpoints shall not be utilized as a subterfuge for conducting searches, seizures, or arrests inconsistent with law or department policy.”
- The LSP should consider moving this language to the beginning of the policy.
- Policy requires an operational plan and if an arrest occurs, the operational plan and arrest report will be forwarded to the District Attorney and Department of Motor Vehicles.
- Operation plan must include mandatory language – “motorist shall not be detained unless there is articulable probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify belief in the existence of another offense.

LSP P.O. 1106 ENFORCEMENT

- Officers issue Uniform Summons/Complaint Affidavits (US/CA) for traffic citations and arrests
- Actual physical arrests must be documented and described in narrative form using the State Report of Arrest form (DPSSP 3131 or DPSSP3104)
- The policy requires shift supervisors to review and assess the US/CA for quality of arrest (citation decisions)

P.O. 1117 BODY WORN CAMERAS AND IN-CAR CAMERA SYSTEMS (BWC/IC)

- Troopers are encouraged to use BWC/IC to record probable cause or reasonable grounds for planned enforcement action (Responsibilities section 6 b 1)
- Supervisors must complete three (3) random reviews per quarter and one review must be of an incident involving a criminal arrest
- Required report to IA if misconduct observed or suspected (However, this policy specifically tells a supervisor to follow the procedures for reporting an anonymous complaint).

Data

TBG discerned the LSP has not institutionalized the collection of data that would permit the robust analysis necessary for evaluating fair and impartial policing practices. LSP does not currently track stops in Mark43 RMS. The Bowman Group did not receive data related to stops. The Bowman Group is providing recommendations on where in the Mark43 case flow to create a stop report and what data elements to include in the report.

The LSP does track arrests in Mark43 through an Arrest report. The LSP produced arrest and charges data for the period 2021-2022 in a searchable format, however, data prior to that period is not archived and therefore cannot be easily retrieved or analyzed. Arrest and charge data for the period 2021-2022 is described in inventory categories including but not limited to limited to demographic information regarding the “age,” “race,” and “sex,” of Troopers and persons arrested; the unit and assigned Region of the Trooper who made the arrest and charge decision; the most prevalent arrest or charges by type; and the LSP Region in which the most arrest and charges occurred.

Limitations

What is not covered in the scope of this review?

TBG determined LSP does not mandate the reporting and collection of SSA data in a comprehensive and consistent manner. A Trooper’s offense report or traffic citation are the primary means of reporting a stop, search, and arrest. However, the information is not collected or stored in a manner that is easily retrieved or analyzed. For example, policy requires physical arrests be documented and described in narrative form using the State Report of Arrest form (DSSP 3131 or DSSP 3104). TBG did not observe or receive evidence that these records are evaluated to inform training, supervision, or organizational practices.

Were there any challenges?

TBG observed the reporting requirements for stop, search, or arrest are not distinguishable, which limits the ability to analyze the data for understanding the actual or perceived motivation for the stop, search, or arrest.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Draft a comprehensive stop, search, and arrest policy that exceeds constitutional standards in a manner consistent with contemporary or recommended practices.

Policy must address legal and philosophical reasons that support policing in a manner that promotes core principles, including fair and impartial policing and procedural justice.

Develop a more substantive, comprehensive training framework to support policy and practices that go beyond

mere compliance with probable cause or legal standards

LSP leadership should provide internal (rank and file personnel) and external (community, third-party organizations, government) stakeholders a meaningful opportunity to participate in developing SSA policies and practices.

TBG encourages the LSP to provide a written explanation or comment explaining why specific recommendations of the community were not considered or adopted into policy.

LSP Policy P.O. 203 Arrests and Searches is the foundation for the department stop, search, and arrest practices (SSA). Related policies include P.O. 1103 Checkpoints; P.O. 1106 Enforcement; and P.O. 1117 Body Worn Cameras and In-Car Camera Systems (BWC/IC). While the policies are consistent with basic legal requirements for how to effect a stop search, and arrest, these policies should be enhanced to reinforce best practices for fair and impartial policing.

LSP's SSA policies focus on compliance with legal standards with minimal discussion of how policy impacts broader dynamics affecting race, culture, treatment of persons, and legitimacy. Additionally, the policies do not link sufficiently to other critical decision points, e.g., use of force and use of force reporting, foot patrol, field interviews, reporting and documenting consent and non-consensual encounters. The deficit of guiding philosophy has presented internal and external challenges.

TBG followed up with members of the public who reached out to provide feedback about their experiences during interactions with LSP. These individuals expressed concern over mistreatment from the LSP during a stop, search, or arrest. Their concerns included allegations of stops based on race, use of unnecessary and unlawful force, and the use of offensive language.

TBG held focus groups and interviews to examine Troopers and supervisors' perceptions of LSP SSA policies and practices. In general, there was weak institutional knowledge of the contemporary foundations for SSA policies and practices, limited knowledge of fair and impartial policing concepts, and little reference made to how SSA decisions impact public perception of the organization. More specifically, Troopers, including supervisors, routinely discussed SSA solely in terms of highway enforcement. This primarily included command of the constitutional requirements for making a stop or effecting an arrest, and awareness that their actions are expected to be rooted in the 4th Amendment.

It is important to ensure the community voice in policy development is respected. TBG encourages the LSP to seek the active participation of members of the community, Troopers, and supervisors in developing SSA policies that reflect the department's commitment to procedural justice and fair and impartial policing. Opportunity for meaningful participation should include seeking volunteers to serve on policy development committees, hosting public policy forums where members of the community can offer input in person, and posting draft policies to the department's web and social media sites for public review and feedback.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Establish fair and impartial policing as a core pillar in the development and application of all SSA policies and practices.

Ensure Troopers and supervisors demonstrate and enforce expectations for fair and impartial policing, including SSA reporting requirements.

SSA reporting protocols are limited to arrest or citation outcomes.

Policy does not offer sufficient guidance with respect to documenting specific encounters, particularly pedestrian stops, nonconsensual stops, and traffic stops that do not result in arrest or citation.

Troopers and supervisors are required to reconcile and understand four distinct policies governing reporting of SSA data and supervisory review of Trooper SSA decisions.

Compliance with legal standards was the theme expressed by Troopers and supervisors as the sole expectation for guiding decisions and behavior for making traffic and pedestrian stops. Both groups expressed the view that requiring further documentation of SSA encounters may be unduly burdensome and adversely affect department operations. Their opinions are supported in whole or in part by what they perceive as an organizational philosophy, which stresses enforcement as their primary mission.

Troopers expressed the belief that their performance and effectiveness is gauged primarily by the number of citations issued and arrests made, resulting in pressure to “hunt” violations. One Trooper informed TBG pressure from supervisors to compile statistics or fill informal quotas may induce some Troopers to make stops as a matter of course rather than being rooted in constitutional grounds or in fair and impartial policing principles. TBG could not independently verify whether this practice occurs.

TBG reviewed LSP arrest and citation data for the period 2021 and 2022. The data tends to support the perspective that activity related to arrest and charges accounts for a significant portion of Trooper’s duties. For the period, department records show LSP Troopers made more than 10,000 arrest and charge decisions. Unfortunately, department records were not available to help explain the impact of these numbers in terms of the LSP’s fair and impartial policing practices and their impact on community perspectives of the department.

TBG interviewed department supervisors who rejected the perception that Troopers are pressured to make arrests or achieve statistical goals. The supervisors and commanders acknowledged Troopers are directed to pursue enforcement and road safety as primary goals, however, they disagree that such direction or instruction induces Troopers to make SSA decisions that are inconsistent with the constitution.

LSP command staff acknowledged the efficacy of developing a comprehensive statewide enforcement strategy centered on traffic and pedestrian stops. These leaders informed TBG currently each Region is responsible for developing a strategic plan, with involvement of community stakeholders, with specific goals of improving road safety through crash reduction and traffic enforcement. TBG reviewed a representative sample of these plans and confirmed the plans do not identify arrest goals or encourages accumulation of arrest statistics, as asserted by Troopers. However, TBG observed the plans do not indicate principles related to fair and impartial policing were included or discussed in the development of these or similar plans where SSA decisions and encounters can reasonably be anticipated.

The LSP should prioritize updating and revising all LSP policies and practices related to its stops, searches and arrests in order to establish and promote respectful encounters with members of the public. Target goals of crash reduction and road safety should be augmented with guidance explaining the LSP’s philosophy and commitment to fair and impartial enforcement practices.

National best practices encourage law enforcement agencies to collect and analyze robust data on stops, searches, and arrests. The information learned through data analysis can inform decisions regarding training, supervision, and policy development; and identify other ways of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization. Importantly, the analysis of data can assist in understanding the impact of SSA policies and practices on community perceptions of a department.

Our assessment of the LSP is based in part on negative perceptions of the department’s stop, search, and arrest practices. TBG interviewed members of the public who expressed dissatisfaction with the way the LSP treats persons of color. They expressed frustration that recent events suggest LSP condones a pattern and practice of mistreatment that is unknown and therefore has not been remediated. Unfortunately, the LSP has not institutionalized the collection, analysis, and reporting of data necessary to educate and respond objectively to these and similar community concerns.

The LSP should improve its capacity to regularly apply data analysis that informs supervision, policy, training, community engagement, and LSP SSA practices. More specifically, the LSP should institutionalize evidence based systems and procedures, including robust data collection, review, analysis and assessment to promote procedural justice and fair and impartial policing.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

Enhance public transparency of stop data through development of searchable databases accessible in a web or online format.

LSP stop data collection protocols and policies are not congruent with national practices.

LSP stop data is not available for review or assessment by department members, the public, or interested third parties.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Require Troopers document and report all stops, searches and arrests.

TBG received feedback that generally Troopers are not required to report traffic and pedestrian stop encounters and outcomes, unless an arrest or citation is issued.

Communication protocols are not used to aid supervisory review or document assessment of the actual or perceived reason for SSA encounters whether an arrest or citation occurs.

The LSP should consider aligning its communication protocols to ensure they link to the department's fair and impartial policing strategy. Ensuring Troopers are required to notify and inform dispatch of information regarding persons stopped or detained will provide valuable data to inform training, supervision, and accountability.

Troopers informed TBG they currently notify dispatch of their traffic and pedestrian stops but acknowledge such notifications do not always occur as required. Further, they expressed the view that additional notification requirements are superfluous because radio transmissions are documented in the department's computer-aided dispatch system (CAD), and all encounters are recorded on the Trooper's body worn camera (BWC).

Presently, the LSP lacks the capacity to analyze or evaluate the decisions, outcomes, oversight and accountability of Troopers' stops, searches and arrests. Further, the department only recently enhanced their protocols to require supervisors to conduct random review of BWC, however the focus is on the identification of misconduct rather than assessing adherence to procedural justice and fair and impartial policing principles.

The LSP should evaluate the documented reasons for stops and the actual outcomes of stop, search, and arrest decisions. The department can develop guidelines and protocols to assist supervisors to identify and understand disparities and take remedial or corrective action as a principle of leadership rather than reliance on complaints of misconduct from members of the public.

The LSP should evaluate the published CAD reports of the New Jersey State Police to assess the applicability of that protocol to the LSP. (this is footnote 67 above)

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Develop an internal and external dashboard that informs supervisors and the public of key fair and impartial policing data.

The LSP needs to improve and institutionalize the transparency of its stop, search, and arrest data.

Supervisors informed TBG the lack of timely access to data limits their knowledge of the SSA decisions of their Troopers.

The LSP data collection and reporting practices do not align with national best practices.

The LSP's capacity to manage, oversee and correct Troopers' stop decisions for indicators of bias, disparate treatment, fairness, impartiality and constitutionality – in general- is not institutionalized within the department. For example, the LSP expects supervisors to review SSA decisions as part of their usual and customary review of Trooper work product, however, that review is not completed in real-time. (Is this guided by policy at all?) Rather, these reviews are accomplished primarily when a supervisor reviews an arrest report or traffic citation, which does not occur uniformly. Troopers are not required to document all encounters, and the review expectations for supervisors do not systematically address accountability or oversight in respect to stops, searches and arrests, including traffic stops, pedestrian stops, or detentions based on consent or warrants.

The LSP does not collect or analyze search data in a manner consistent with national practices. Region managers and supervisors indicated that most searches occur during LSP traffic stops, however, they acknowledged the absence of data to support this perception. These leaders expressed support for the benefit of improved access to information and analysis of stop, search, and arrest data; however, they expressed concern that supervisors may be overburdened with administrative and review requirement which may limit the time needed to complete review of data for evidence of disparities, and institute remedial or correct action as required. Region leaders asserted the LSP must realign its current review protocols to ensure supervisors and commanders can prioritize review of stop, search, and arrest data for purposes consistent with fair and impartial policing.

The LSP should develop protocols that ensure stop, search, and arrest data, including any department analysis or reports thereof, are published to the department's website in a format that is indexed and searchable. This enhancement will assist in improving transparency and responding to public concerns regarding the department's constitutional policing practices. Data transparency also will create opportunities to inform the department and the public, and identify opportunities for improvement.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Commit to educating and training all employees in principles of fair and impartial policing that go beyond mere compliance with the 4th Amendment.

Awareness of the philosophical foundations which support fair and impartial policing practices is not institutionalized in department policies.

LSP members do not express fair and impartial policing considerations when they discuss the department's stop, search, and seizure practices.

Department education and training curriculum do not include discussion of principles of legitimacy, transparency, and procedural justice.

TBG asked Region managers and supervisors to describe the LSP's philosophy and practices which support stop, support, and arrest decision-making. The prevailing response was that stop, search, and arrest decisions must be supported by the 4th Amendment. When asked whether the department considered incorporating fair and impartial policing practices into 4th Amendment training Region, Region leaders deferred to the training division for guidance while other Troopers and supervisors pointed the difference in services provided and challenges facing state police organizations as opposed to local police organizations. TBG discerned the prevailing sentiment of Troopers is that fair and impartial policing education and training is not prioritized given the limited scope of the

LSP’s mission, which primarily is considered to be limited to traffic enforcement and roadway safety.

The LSP may be missing opportunities for assuring and documenting positive community interactions. Arrest and charge data account for only a portion of LSP’s contact with the public on a day-to-day basis. Department leaders noted that a significant role of the LSP includes supporting local law enforcement agencies’ responses to planned or catastrophic events, such as crowd control or weather emergencies across the state. In its day to day operations and practices, as well as during special deployments across the state, the LSP should embody a capacity to demonstrate fair and impartial, positive community interactions that occur in a respectful manner. LSP should focus awareness on the impacts of its enforcement practices, and cultural and community perspectives of LSP.

LSP personnel noted they are expected to conduct follow up investigation of vehicular crimes, criminal investigations, officer-involved shootings, and other special incidents. LSP policy and practice do not adequately address these issues. Further, more specialized training should prepare personnel, at all levels, for the unique challenges related to these duties and events.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Create and implementat a Stop and Arrest report in Mark43 for all stops, searches and arrests.

The Center for Policing Equity (CPE) suggests that a stop record should be captured for all stops, including roadblocks, checkpoints, as well as traffic, dispatch and any self-initiated activity. (citation?) Stops can be defined as any interaction when an officer takes action that would make a reasonable person feel they can’t leave the scene. LSP does not currently track stops in Mark43 RMS; however, Mark43 does have a Stop Report LSP could integrate into their case flow. The Bowman Group recommends implementing the Stop Report in Mark43, with some modifications/additions to the data elements collected (described below), for every stop. This should be required universally, even if a stop results in additional action or reporting, i.e. an arrest.

The table below provides a data inventory of the information tracked currently in the Mark43 Stop Report and highlights recommendations for modifications. The table compares the Stop Report data elements to reporting recommendations from Center for Policing Equity (CPE). Common CPE data elements are listed in the first column, the second column indicates whether LSP currently captures the element in M43. The Notes column provides additional information, and the recommendations column provides suggestions for adding or modifying data elements in the existing Mark43 Stop Report.

CPE Data Elements	Available in M43	Notes	Recommendations
Information Regarding Stop			
Unique identifier	Yes	Report # (REN) and CAD Event #	
Date of incident	Yes	CAD Event Time, Report Data/Time	
Time of incident	Yes		
Reason for stop/offense	Yes	CAD Call Type, CAD Call Event type, Reason for Stop	
Vehicle or pedestrian stop	Yes	Stop Type	
Location/address	Partial		
Latitude/longitude	No		
Street address details	Yes	CAD Address of Event, Stop Location	
Beat, precinct, district, police service zone, etc., and appropriate shapefiles/maps	Yes	Stop location Region, Troop, District, Court, Parish	
Location type (as coded by NIBRS/UCR)	No*		Add to M43 report
Whether stop occurred at a checkpoint	No*		Add to M43 report
Disposition(s) (e.g., citation, arrest, release)	Yes	Result of Stop, Disposition for Contact/ Stop	
Was stop intelligence-led?	No		
Was a search conducted on occupant(s) and/or the vehicle?	Yes*	Search/Frisk Conducted (Yes/No)	Separate fields for search and frisk.
Include if occupants other than driver were searched and the basis/consent.			
Nature of each search (e.g., incident to arrest, plain view, consent)	Yes	Reason for Search, Was Search Consented	
If searched, describe the probable cause (narrative), If searched, describe Exigent Circumstances (narrative)			
What contraband was found in each search, if any?	Yes	Was Contraband Discovered (Yes/No)	
Was property seized (name the property)?	No		
Was a K9 used to search?	No		
Was vehicle and/or foot pursuit involved?	Yes	If involved in pursuit, officer should complete Pursuit/Use of Force Report	
If Use of Force Occurs*			
Nature of contact (e.g., traffic stop, call for service, warrant)	Yes	Initial contact type	
Was the stop officer-initiated?	Partial	Not explicit question but could potentially use CAD call type and event type to determine	
Disposition(s) (e.g., citation, arrest, release) for each subject	Yes	Subject Disposition	
Subject resistance (e.g., verbal aggression, physical, fleeing)	Partial	(Subject) Threat directed at (drop down), Subject resisted (unclear if this is in reference to the preceding question only, Officer attempted to disarm subject), if yes resistance type	
Were de-escalation techniques used? (e.g., verbal judo, soft skills, social intelligence techniques that reduce the need for physical contact)	Yes	De-escalation Attempted (Yes/No), if Yes De-escalation Type (drop down) and De-escalation Successful (yes/No)	

Type(s) of force (e.g., restraint only, physical force, lethal)	Yes	Officer used force on subject (Yes/No), Type of force used by officer, location of force used by officer, subject injury severity	
Did subject(s) possess a weapon?	Yes	Subject perceived armed with (drop down), subject confirmed armed with (drop down)	
Did subject(s) use the weapon?	Yes	Subject firearm discharge intentional, subject firearm discharge accidental, Subject used force on officer (Yes/No), if yes Type of force used by subject, Location of force used by subject	
Police weapons/tools used (e.g., handgun, OC spray, taser)	Yes	Did the officer fire any shots, if yes number of shorts fired and number of shots hit, Type of Force Used by Officer (drop down)	
When a firearm is used, whether it was discharged	Yes	Did the officer fire any shots, if yes number of shorts fired and number of shots hit	
Number of officers involved	Partial	Other officers involved by unknown (Yes/No) if yes, Minim # of Unknown officers involved	
Camera on scene	Partial	No explicit question but officers are supposed to tag body camera footage with REN (report ID) so can easily link to RMS reports	
Camera activated/operating?	Partial		
Information Regarding Officer's Perception of Person Stopped			
Subject identification number (no PII)	Yes	MNI #	
Perceived race/ethnicity	Yes	Race/Ethnicity	
Perceived before stop? Y/N	Yes	Was race/ethnicity known prior to stop (Yes/No)	
Perceived sex	Yes*	Sex	Perceived sex/gender should include LGBT spectrum
Perceived age	Yes	Birth date (if unknown asked to provide age range)	
Perceived non-English speaking?	No		
Was translator provided? Y/N	No		
Perceived homeless?	No		
For vehicle stop only:			
Indicate whether driver or passenger	Partial	Subject Type (includes Driver/Operator, does not include passenger, could select 'Other' and in narrative description write passenger)	
Number of subjects in vehicle	Partial	Officer could add multiple involved individuals, no explicit question	
Information Regarding Officer			
Officer's identification number (no PII)	Yes		
Race/ethnicity	Yes		
Sex	Yes		
Age	Yes		

Agency years of experience	Unknown	The Bowman Group could not determine if this is tracked in M43	
Rank (at date of stop)	Yes		
Geographic assignment (at date of stop)	Yes		
Department assignment (e.g., patrol, SWAT, SRO) (at date of stop)	Yes		
Military background/experience	Unknown	The Bowman Group could not determine if this is tracked in M43	
Number of officers involved	Unknown	The Bowman Group could not determine if this is tracked in M43	

*Use of Force information is tracked through the Pursuit/Use of Force Report in M43 RMS

LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: Weaknesses & Threats

Failing to adequately capture SSA data has left LSP supervisors and management with major blind spots on many Trooper interactions with the public. Public trust in the LSP cannot be addressed until this area is remediated. The LSP must enhance data collection and reporting related to stops, searches and arrests, expand data inventory, and refine its records management system. This includes documenting more robust information such as the reason for all stops, probable cause justification for any searches and arrests, driver and vehicle passenger data, and officer-subject demographic data. We applaud the LSP for exploring ways to produce reports that aggregate more detailed SSA data elements, accessible for supervisory review. TBG recommends LSP make this effort one of its highest priorities.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

TBG found LSP personnel to be candid in their assessment of the department's strengths and weaknesses in this area. They acknowledged that improved data collection and analysis will greatly enhance both internal oversight and external accountability. The strength of LSP's commitment to implementing improvements in the accountability and transparency of its stop, search, and arrest practices should not be underestimated. For example, the LSP already has implemented an improved records management system, Mark43. It's data collection inventory includes additional variables, such as: demographics of the Trooper and the person stopped; the type of stop, e.g., pedestrian or vehicle; whether the person detained was a driver or passenger in a vehicle; and the reason for and outcome of the stop. This is a significant improvement compared to how the LSP has collected SSA related data in prior years.

06.

Organizational Culture, Leadership & Professional Development



Organizational Culture, Leadership & Professional Development

Scope

This section of the assessment report focuses on LSP organizational culture, leadership and professional development. These areas will be vital to the overall transformation, and assist with cultural change and alignment with national best practices in public safety and law enforcement.

The review considered whether appropriate policies and employee accountability measures are in place, and protocols are applied on a fair and equitable basis. This includes a review of how that impacts perceptions around the LSP's leadership development programs and initiatives to ensure effective succession planning and operational continuity. In addition to document review, internal surveys, interviews, focus groups and site visits were conducted to explore internal perceptions of procedural justice across various areas of the organization including discipline, promotions, assignments, accountability, mobility, leadership competencies), and other areas that contribute to overall confidence in LSP culture, structure, operations and leadership.

TBG reviewed strategic plans to assess the extent to which they are in concert with stated vision, mission, policies, procedures, and practices of the LSP. The strategic planning process was reviewed to assess the level of internal and external stakeholder input in the development of operational priorities.

Method

TBG conducted and utilized feedback from in person and virtual interviews, focus groups and patrol ride-along to deepen understanding of LSP culture internally. These discussions are used as a qualitative instrument to gain an in-depth understanding of social constructs.

TBG collected feedback across all three LSP regions, with personnel ranking from Trooper to Lieutenant. Patrol ride-alongs not only allow interpersonal interaction, but LSP Troopers can be observed interacting with the public in a real-world environment.

Each region All individual interviews and patrol-ride-alongs in each police Region were preselected personnel. Additionally, LSP virtual interviews were conducted in each of the three police regions including four persons from the rank of captain and major. Persons selected to participate in focus group discussions were identified by using a random sampling model. The random sampling selected 20% of employees across all three police regions from LSP who were provided a voluntary invitation to participate in virtual focus group interviews. All participants were provided anonymity in all interview processes. In doing so, those who participated in interviews provided transparent comments, free of judgment.

References

Records & Documents

- LSP Strategic Plan
- P.O. 102 Suggestions on Improving the State Police
- P.O. 103 Written Directives

- P.O. 204 Awards
- P.O. 211 Disciplinary
- P.O. 229 Promotions
- P.O. 901 Code of Conduct Ethics
- P.O. 903 Law Enforcement Role

Data

Other Relevant References

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Proposed Recommendations & Findings

The following recommendations are primarily related to the following policies: LSP P.O. 102 Suggestions on Improving the State Police, P.O. 103 Written Directives, P.O. 204 Awards, P.O. 211 Disciplinary, P.O. 229 Promotions, P.O. 901 Code of Conduct Ethics, and P.O. 903 Law Enforcement Role.

P.O. 102 Suggestions on Improving the State Police

“Suggestions on Improving the State Police”, enacted on 7/15/12 (check date formats throughout), outlines a mechanism for personnel to provide information seeking to improve the Louisiana State Police directly to the Commander of the Operational Development Unit. The strength of this policy is that it allows members of the LSP to make suggestions to improve their organization, and this process, when effective, contributes to procedural justice. Appropriate personnel study these suggested “improvements” then determine whether or not to approve the proposed improvement. If approved, the submitting officer may or may not be tasked to assist in further research or implementation. Also, if appropriate, a letter of commendation may be entered in the submitting officer’s file.

This policy fails to provide the opportunity for the public to submit recommendations for the improvement of the LSP.

P.O. 103 Written Directives

“Written Directives” policy, enacted 5/24/18, grants the State Police Superintendent, “sole authority to issue, modify and approve Departmental written directives”, with the Research Unit acting as “the official custodian of the system”. The Research Unit oversees the administration of departmental written directives and advises the “Superintendent, staff, and field units, on matters of policy formulation”. The LSP Operational Development Unit manages the distribution to all personnel through the Power DMS system. Troop/Section Commanders complete a

section specific operational manual / section policy which should cover “any additional and specific policies under their command” and conduct an annual evaluation of their operational manual/section policy.

P.O. 204 Awards

The “Awards” policy, enacted 5/17/21, outlines a process for recognizing exemplary work of LSP employees. Specifications of the policy are type of award, categories for commissioned and non-commissioned personnel, as well as non LSP (military or other LE), or citizens for exceptional bravery. Submittal for awards identifies a timeline and form requiring a substantive narrative. Primary areas for awards recognize good judgment, awards for most DUI arrests, and recovered autos. There are opportunities to expand awards categories that focus on decision-making and community merit. Awards would recognize de-escalation, duty to intervene successes, community interaction.

P.O. 211 Disciplinary

The “Disciplinary” policy, enacted 8/24/17, addresses the accountability requirements for the acts or omissions of LSP employees. “The goal of this system is to review office policies, procedures, and employee conduct, and to take action to correct deficiencies.”. The policy briefly states the role of supervisors and Troop/Section commanders and briefly discusses the extent of their authority. It further allows a large variance in the use of authority in initiating discipline, reduction in pay, demotions, reprimand and refers to the State Police Commission issues about appeals. Records of disciplinary actions must be maintained in a members file and are public records. Furthermore, the policy lacks definitions, detailed procedures and seems to allow far too much discretion. This policy does not meet the stated goal, it does not focus on the review of policies, procedures except indirectly as it mentions employee conduct must be in compliance with the expected acts or omissions of a public service employee.

P.O. 229 Promotions

“Promotions” outlines procedures for selecting candidates for ranks within the Louisiana State Police, and was enacted 10/15/12. The policy clearly states the role of the Promotional Panel, roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Superintendent, employees, and supervisors. Additionally, it identifies the personnel required to sit as Promotion Panel Members. Procedures are in place to ensure that appropriate data is considered in making final promotional decisions and details eligibility criteria, training requirements, and the final voting and selection process. It is unclear, based on the document presented, if the policy has undergone review or re-issue since the original effective date, which was over ten years ago.

P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics

The Code of Conduct Ethics policy specifies prohibited behaviors for employees, as well as setting guidelines for performance of specific duties for members of the organization. The first section of the policy contains the generic Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. The Code of Ethics sets lofty ideals that all members of law enforcement should ascribe to but may be better presented as a standalone document absent from the policy and does not require members to adhere to the code. The stated policy rules alone have little meaning and are subject to individual interpretation, which leads to performance ambiguity. In many cases, some of the behaviors and prohibitions should be removed and presented as individual policies due to their complexity and importance. For example, social media and Duty to Intervene should be individual policies. By compiling these subjects under general “Code of Conduct” they lose significance. The policy lacks a stated purpose and structure. The policy was enacted on 3/1/21.

P.O. 903 Law Enforcement Role

The Law Enforcement Role policy provides a generic overview of the role Louisiana State policy, and was enacted 7/15/12. There is no stated purpose for the policy, however, there is a section that states the purpose of the Office of State Police. There, it states, “The overall purpose of the Office of State Police is the protection of life and property. This goal is accomplished through numerous methods such as detecting crime, maintaining, and promoting

highway safety, and in general, through enforcing all state laws.” The policy is heavily focused on enforcement and does not take into consideration broader policing mandates. Without a clearly stated mission, it is difficult to define the role of law enforcement officials. By establishing a mission based on 21st Century Policing Principles, it will be much easier to determine what the actual role of law enforcement should be.

LSP Strategic Plan

The Louisiana State Police developed a five-year strategic plan from fiscal year 2020 to 2025. Although the strategic plan implementation encompasses 2020-2025, no public facing documents or updates could be located at the time of this assessment. The only LSP public reports available were annual reports from the Louisiana Fraud Task Force , which note annual report performance indicators for LSP’s efforts, outlined in the Criminal Investigation Program section of the strategic plan.

The subject areas of the LSP Strategic Plan are derived from legislative mandates addressing roadway safety through traffic enforcement, criminal investigation, personnel management, and public education. Contemporary elements of a strategic plan typically include SWOT analysis, action steps, yearly objectives, and short term and long term goals, in addition to other elements.

The LSP Strategic Plan is limited to the elements of vision, mission, values, goals, philosophy and some performance indicators. The plan’s agency vision expresses “The Louisiana State Police will be a model of an exemplary law enforcement organization providing service to the public, the law enforcement community, and allied agencies through impartial enforcement of the laws”. The LSP mission statement is, “The Louisiana State Police is a statutorily mandated, statewide law enforcement agency charged with ensuring the safety, order, and security of the people in the state through enforcement, regulation, education, and provision of other essential public safety services”. The strategic plan outlines some operational benchmarks for performance and outcomes, but fails to comprehensively reflect or articulate a well-defined roadmap to direct LSP personnel or priorities.

The LSP Strategic Plan is narrow in scope, not reflective of a 21st century law enforcement and public safety agency, and primarily focuses on traffic enforcement. The plan is centered around operations, rather than on building a strategic roadmap for reform and improvement. Beyond operations, this plan also should guide cross-functional collaboration for every aspect of the organization, data collection, and speak to broader topics, such as community policing and engagement, organizational diversity, accountability and transparency.

The philosophy of LSP’s strategic plan makes evident that a primary vision and mission of building an exemplary agency and service to the community is through the enforcement of laws. For example, goal number one of the plan states, “Promote public safety in our state through aggressive traffic enforcement, criminal investigation, administrative regulation, public education, and community involvement”. The plan, however, does not include the public or community.

In order to institute a shift in organizational culture, there must be a focus on strategic reforms centered on fair and impartial policing, procedural justice, and community engagement.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Conduct leadership and professional development workshops with LSP leadership and command to initiate the strategic planning and reimagining process.

The LSP must initiate a strategic reimagining process that guides an agencywide path forward. LSP should work to align strategic priorities, and identify short-term and long-term goals and initiatives. These preliminary steps should

engage leadership, civilians and Troopers across the state, and will be critical for directing the cultural and organizational changes and ensuring a sustainable paradigm shift across the LSP.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Develop, track and report initiatives to foster a culture of diversity, inclusiveness and equity.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Develop, track and report initiatives to strengthen and build relationships with stakeholders and the public.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Provide and communicate outcomes within LSP and the community to improve transparency and accountability.

The LSP should regularly provide updates on milestones, challenges and progress towards its strategic initiatives. Utilizing input from within the organization and the community, implementing improvements and assuring accountability also will demonstrate the LSP's commitment to procedural justice.

LSP Organizational Culture, Leadership & Professional Development

The culture of an organization is driven and supported by the leaders at the helm. Regardless of sector, geography, demographics or population, the foundation for organizational culture is primarily created by the men and women who fill critical leadership roles. This is true in the private sector, and it holds true through key societal institutions including law enforcement. As law enforcement leaders grapple with modern changes in the public safety profession, they must evaluate best practices, tools and programs that will enhance law enforcement from an ethical, efficient, and innovative framework for policy and oversight (Chan, 1996).

Under the authorization of the State Legislature, The Louisiana State Police (LSP) operates in the executive branch of state government as an office of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections. The overall purpose of the Office of State Police is the protection of life and property. This goal is accomplished through numerous methods such as detecting crime, maintaining, and promoting highway safety, and in general, through enforcing all state laws. For this initiative to find success the police culture must shift and find a willingness to change.

The Louisiana State policy promotes a culture of service to the community with a primary goal of enforcing traffic laws. Communicated by many troopers and supervisors, working for the State Police presented an opportunity to be a part of the best police agency in the State of Louisiana. In inquiring why LSP was a great organization, many troopers discussed the distinguishment of the uniform that separates them from other law enforcement agencies, accessibility to attend leadership training opportunities, and for some, a generational family lineage of being a state trooper.

In comparison to understanding why many troopers and supervisors recognized LSP as a great organization, there was a common belief that behaviors associated with greatness were not consistent with cultural norms and community expectations. Tenured troopers stated that LSP has a system of "good ole boys", specifying that historically, assignments and promotions were subject to whom an individual had favorable relationships with. Others

communicated a lack of accountability for misconduct in relation to use of force. For example, depending on a trooper's assignment, there was a variance in the level of oversight and culpability in decision-making. The primary demonstrated area was police use of force and policy interpretation.

Several troopers acknowledged concerns with the lack of management accountability and accountability for excessive use of force or the lack of reporting use of force. A primary indicator was discussing how troopers and supervisors felt about the Ronald Greene use of force incident. While conducting qualitative interviews, most troopers and supervisors shared disappointment in the lack of Troop management of employee misconduct noting that it has had a negative impact on the culture of LSP and increased community fear. In comparison of thought, a minority group of troopers and supervisors shared that many use of force incidents were justified, specifically Ronald Greene and that troopers were doing their job holding criminals accountable for violating the law.

The mindset of justifying use of force incidents with sole discretion of holding a law violator accountable and not adhering to use of force policy, not only leads to constitutional violations, but creates frayed relationships between the police and the community. Many troopers and supervisors believed the greater community supported LSP, but relationships and support from Black and Brown citizens, particularly African Americans had diminished. Evidence of deterioration in community relations were expressed during traffic stop interactions with African Americans. One trooper communicated, "When I stop someone Black, they exit the car with their hands up in the air stating please don't shoot me. In response to incidents such as this, troopers' express to Black motorists that they do not intend to harm anyone but are doing their job".

The example of police use of force incidents has a correlation to the development and interpretation of policy. Policies provide guidelines to direct employee actions and establish measures to take corrective actions. It was noted that members of LSP were not completely sufficient in understanding policy implications and uniformly were not following policy as written. After conversing at several State Police Troops, it was communicated that different rank and file officers varied in the understanding of policies, and many command level captains and majors gave different directions. Furthermore, troopers expressed each Troop runs it own way separate from others. To alleviate this concern, one Troop developed their own policy manual to ensure consistency among their Troop. No other Troop had access to the same manual which supports inconsistency throughout each of the three police regions.

Many State Police employees recognized since reforms were being implemented, the current state of LSP was improving. They acknowledged executive leadership was taking steps to improve police culture and advance 21st century practices. An example provided of building a path forward was the police superintendent visiting each Troop facility in the field. During this interaction, the police superintendent shared his organizational vision and answered questions for rank-and-file officers and supervisors. Members of LSP also shared while they had appreciation for the superintendent's visibility, there was low trust among other executive command members citing they never see them, have interactions or any contact with them. They are only have visibility among the workforce in Baton Rouge at police headquarters and would like to see increased visibility from executive staff in the field.

Finally, troopers and supervisors shared they desired more connectivity outside of their police Region to connect with other employees and to create a family environment and improve internal legitimacy and trust. Troopers mentioned the greatest relationships they had were among academy classmates and members of their assigned Troop. Seeking to increase engagement opportunities in a non-police capacity that unites family and friends, can improve culture and morale. For this section the following recommendations should be considered.

RECOMMENDATIONS 6:

Adopt procedural justice as a guiding principle to improve organizational culture and community trust.

Procedural Justice refers to the idea of fairness in processes that resolve disputes and allocate resources. It is not a practice, but a philosophy that promotes positive organizational change, upholds police legitimacy in the com-

munity, and enhances officer safety. The four pillars of procedural justice are (1) Fairness; (2) Voice; (3) Impartiality; (4) Transparency (Tyler, 1990). When the core principles of procedural justice are valued, research supports positive organizational transformation, improvement in work culture, and decrease in agency polarization. To incorporate this philosophy into the LSP culture, all personnel should receive updated training on procedural justice. Once personnel are trained on this topic, they can better understand how procedural justice applies internally and externally. Leadership should integrate procedural justice concepts into areas of employee discipline, policy, and promotions. When an officer is treated with the pillars of procedural justice internally, they apply similar principles when interacting with the public.

RECOMMENDATIONS 7:

Employ evidence-based practices using speed and crash data to direct roadway enforcement to reduce racial disparities in police contacts.

Evidence-based practices utilizes scientific research taking a data driven approach to crime and traffic safety. As a best practice, many police agencies have implemented the “Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety model (DDACTS) model. In review of this model, research supports that traffic reprioritization can reduce racial disparities in traffic stops and improve outcomes of public trust (Fliss, M.D., Baumgartner, F., Delamater, P., 2020). To implement evidence-based practices, consideration should be made to develop a traffic analyst unit to evaluate traffic patterns and roadway crashes to produce scientific inferences for traffic enforcement strategies and public education opportunities. Data analytics should be developed into intelligence bulletins and reporting for each police regions and dispersed to employees. Traffic data bulletins should be used as a management tool to improve roadway safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS 8:

Formalize an employee recognition program that distinguishes progressive workplace performance.

Creating an employee recognition program can have a positive impact on morale, stabilize the work environment as employees feel appreciated resulting in employee retention. The employee recognition program should define competencies, actions and behaviors that validate merit. Police leadership should evaluate formalizing the commendation system to include chain of command notarization and develop a sworn and non-sworn employee of the month. Selected employees should receive formal notice and a presentation from a higher-ranking supervisor. An example of a formal notice is an endorsed certificate of merit that affords the chain of command comment on positive work completed by the employee and internal recognition in a newsletter to be shared among employees.

RECOMMENDATIONS 9:

Seek compliance and professionalism through a law enforcement accreditation program.

Police accreditation assists public safety agencies in developing comprehensive uniform written directives that define authorities, performance, roles, and responsibilities. Not only does police accreditation improve organizational effectiveness, but it demonstrates a police agencies desire to maintain performance standards and practices. Organizations such as Lexipol and the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) are recognized accreditation agencies.

Community Collaboration

Collective efficacy between the community and police should encompass every developmental area of a strategic plan. This allows the police agency to hear from the community on how they desire to be policed and work in collaboration toward community safety. The body of the strategic plan fails to emphasize collaboration between citizens and LSP. This perspective was validated through interviews with the Operational Development Unit (ODU) who is accountable for developing the strategic plan. During the interview process, the ODU communicated there was no collaboration on strategic plan development with the LSP rank and file, professional staff, or community members. This was evident in organizational interviews as there was little to no knowledge of the strategic plan among employees. The plan has significant concentration on legislative mandates, numerical benchmarks, and data measurables for traffic safety and criminal investigations mostly directed by executive command.

As outlined by the Task Force Report on 21st Century policing and multiple police agency accrediting authorities, the police should aim to demographically reflect the communities they serve and work in collaboration on problem solving and crime reductions. While interviewing the ODU, it was noted that LSP lacked ethnic and gender diversity as a majority male Caucasian organization and did not include the community during the development of the strategic plan. The strategic plan has no indicators for improving diversity, equity, and inclusion through trooper recruitment, organizational assignments, leadership development or community collaboration.

In support of LSP's efforts to engage the community through collaboration, partnership examples were found online where troopers installed child car seats through public education campaigns. In 2017 LSP was featured partnering with migrant communities to improve child safety. (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JrBlc2jFf3k>) In 2019, LSP worked in conjunction with the Louisiana Highway Safety Commission and University Medical Center of New Orleans bringing awareness to Louisiana's new enhanced child safety seat law to better protect children in crashes. This collaboration was subject to a legislative update and based on the American Academy of Pediatrics guidelines with the goal of preventing injuries and maximizing the benefits of child safety seats and seat belts.

(<https://www.facebook.com/LouisianaStatePolice/videos/enhanced-child-safety-seat-laws/685210981925059/>)

To bridge the existing gap between leadership, rank and file, professional staff, and the community, LSP needs to solicit feedback on improving the strategic plan. Civic engagement and public educational opportunities in the strategic plan can expand to the recruit of diverse police Cadets, partnering with municipal police for community engagement events, public education for restaurant and bars on overserving of alcohol, partnering with faith-based institutions or civil rights organizations for training opportunities.

RECOMMENDATIONS 10:

Establish a culture of engagement to build strong employee connections and community relationships.

Building connections among the workforce can build trust and strengthen relationships between leadership and rank and file members. Executive staff members and supervisors should consider implementing quarterly ride-alongs with supervisors and troopers and conduct lunch and learn activities with special divisions throughout LSP. Additionally, leaders should solicit feedback from employees on how to increase connectivity between the police and family to merge both environments. An example replicated in other communities are having an annual employee picnic, where family members accompany employees. Coordinating events such as this fosters a culture that promotes compassion for relationship building.

Data Collection & Enforcement

Data collection and analysis improves law enforcement interactions, trooper deployment and strategic decision making to improve public safety outcomes. Several areas of LSP's strategic plan identify performance indicators for reducing vehicular and commercial fatalities by 5% under the Traffic Enforcement Program and increasing criminal investigations by 5% under the Criminal Investigation Program. These metrics are also attached to internal management decisions, and performance-based budgetary purposes.

In development of performance indicators, preexisting data should support the achieved outcome. The strategic plan shares no comparison data from the previous five years representative of defined core areas surrounding police-citizen traffic stops contacts, density of traffic accidents, traffic fatalities or employee demographics. During an interview with the ODU, they confirmed that LSP does collect numerical data on the number of traffic stops and arrests that are made, but failed to collect indicators on race, ethnicity and gender, and the reasons for a traffic stop. A failure to improve in this area supports increased risk of civil rights violations, racial profiling, and enforcement disparities. Furthermore, no information is outlined in the LSP's strategic plan to provide geographical density on where traffic stops, and fatalities have occurred or criminal enterprises to direct police resources. This lack of information could suggest inadequate personnel deployment strategies for troopers resulting in over enforcement in marginalized communities subject to performance indicators. The LSP is in the process of improving their reports management system, but there are no mentions of improving data collection surrounding the previously mentioned variables in the strategic plan. For this section the following recommendations should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 11:

Research and develop technological advancements to improve data latency, data retention, and accountability.

Paper management systems and failure to standardize policies can lead to organizational dysfunction. Centralizing an internal data system that interfaces with different programs creates sustainable solutions. By formalizing systems for policies, audits, procedural manuals, and reports, clarity is provided among employees and management functions are improved.

Diversity, Equity & Inclusion


When discussed, diversity, equity, and inclusion are not mutually exclusive; they are integral to a police agencies success. Diversity is concerned with representation and perspectives, but when an organization establishes equity, it pursues fairness and treatment to include equal opportunity. Inclusion prompts an environment conducive to feedback and openness (Russo C Rzemyk). All three areas play an essential role in developing a healthy police agency.

As a part of reform, the Louisiana State Legislature directed improvements for diversity of the State Police. In June of 2021, members of the Louisiana State legislature enacted H.B. 129, § 2401.2. Recruitment of minority candidates which stated "The council shall develop a policy designed to increase the recruitment of minority candidates for law enforcement positions which may be implemented by governmental entities that employ a peace officer. All governmental entities that employ a peace officer shall either develop and implement a policy designed to increase recruitment of minority candidates for peace officer positions or adopt and implement the P.O.S.T recruitment of minority candidates' policy.


In 2018, a report indicated the State Police lacked minority representation throughout the organization and at the command level. Reporting demographics presented out of 1,063 state troopers, 77.5% white males, 16% Black and 4 % females (Mustain, 2018). As of October of 2022, LSP demographics presented out of 868 troopers 76.9 %

were white males, 16.5% were Black and 4.5% were females. There has been little to no change in organizational diversity at LSP. The below chart illustrates current personnel demographics for the entire agency and demographics from trooper to major.

Racial Demographics of LSP officers as of 10/2022



Rank Demographics for LSP as of 10/2022



Regarding equity and inclusion, there was a variance of responses while conducting interviews. Many White males shared concern regarding equity and fairness for promotional opportunities with an understanding that LSP's goal was to increase organizational diversity. One employee stated, "If there is a woman and man eligible for promotion, the woman is getting promoted." In general, White males expressed they had no issues with organizational diversity but didn't want to be passed over for opportunities because of diversity initiatives. In relation to African Americans and women, many expressed the lack of opportunity to advance in the organization because historically, LSP was a predominately White male organization. One female stated, "To be accepted by my male counterparts, I feel like I have to exhibit toughness and show I can handle myself". Furthermore, in multiple interviews, masculine language and pronouns were used when referencing LSP personnel.

Finally, observations were made at each police Troop that no media or public facing photos were supportive of a diverse, equitable or inclusive organization. Upon entering the building, photos visually displayed were either outdated from the early years on LSP, majority male photos that lacked diversity, and a picture of the police superintendent. Understanding that representation matters, these images represent the current state and mind-set of LSP and does not present imaging of a 21st Century police agency. For this section the following recommendations should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 12:

Conduct an analysis of demographic information regarding promotions, special assignments, departmental policies, and discipline to identify any potential negative disparate outcomes that creates inequity.

Identifying root causes of any barriers to equal employment opportunities can improve organizational health and diversity. Police leadership should work with human resources to review interview processes and protocols for special assignments, departmental policies, and employee discipline to eliminate any systematic barriers and potential disparities. If barriers and disparities exist, LSP personnel should work with human resources to remedy issues by amending or adopting policies that ensure fairness and eliminate any discriminatory practices.

RECOMMENDATION 13:

Consider developing an analysis dashboard that provides management analytics on employee workplace assignments.

The purpose of dashboards is to provide data on comprehensive and transparent information in a centralized manner. Improving visibility on personnel management increases social awareness on assignments and selection processes. Dashboards also provide historical compositions tracking previous and current data to show failure or improvements of organizational growth. The LSP should consult with a vendor on how to develop an employee assignment dashboard.

RECOMMENDATION 14:

Complete a pay and benefit analysis to assess inequities in pay scales.

Pay equity is the idea of compensating employees who have a similar job function with comparably equal pay, irrespective of their gender, race, ethnicity, or identify. In coordination with Human Resources and Fiscal Services, LSP should establish salary benchmarking which will solidify equitable wages. Ensuring pay equity can assist in attracting and retaining employees.

Communication

Communication is a vital management component to any police organization to achieve desired public safety goals and outcomes. Whether the purpose is to update employees on new policies, or respond to a critical incident, to ensure safety throughout the organization or to listen to the attitudes of employees, effective communication is an integral issue in effective management. Listening to employee issues and concerns builds loyalty and drives improved productivity (SHRM, 2017). To achieve success, organizations must have comprehensive planning, strategies for communicating with employees, and community stakeholders to have meaningful impacts.

During interviews with LSP employees, several members provided historical examples of communication failures by LSP. Examples included when troopers had been injured in the line of duty or when a suspect was fleeing from officers after committing a crime. Troopers believed they had no awareness of these types of events as they were occurring in another area of the state. In relations to crime information regarding suspects who posed an immediate threat to the public, it was stated an email system was used as a communication platform. However, if you were not signed up for this email system, you would not receive information.

Overwhelmingly, employees recognized communication improvements that the current police administration had made. Attributions were given to the police superintendent for advancing critical information regarding criminal investigations of employees, key arrests of suspects, and public information that would impact the agency. For this section the following recommendations should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 15:

Establish a culture of information transparency that creates trust among the workforce and community.

A strategic communication plan should be developed to manage organizational information flow for internal and external messaging. The purpose of the strategic communication plan is to outline key communication objectives for the police agency. The plan should identify the target audience for communication, vehicle for which information will be shared, timing of the message and who is responsible for message delivery. Management of this task should be the authority of a public information officer.

RECOMMENDATION 16:

Develop an internal communication platform to employees from the police superintendent.

To manage the frequency of internal communication, the office of the superintendent should establish a monthly newsletter as a communication tool. The purpose of the new letter would be to share timely information with employees, highlight key organizational initiatives, acknowledge great work, or celebratory news.

RECOMMENDATION 17:

Consider establishing an employee relations board.

Personal interaction with leadership provides employees the opportunity to engage management on key issues concerning the workforce. Retrospectively, it allows leaders an opportunity to provide direct communication to employees, dispel false narratives, and give real-time feedback. Leadership should establish a board of sworn and non-sworn employees' representative of all sections of the State Police as an extension of the workforce to improve organizational communication.

RECOMMENDATION 18:

Formulate a notification system for delivery of officer safety information and major events.

Agency wide notifications improve increased capabilities to manage emergencies or major impacts on the community. A mass notification system not only improves the frequency of communication, but it establishes a platform for personnel deployment and increases knowledge on imminent public threats. In coordination with dispatch services, police leadership should implement a mass notification system for critical incidents, officer injuries, or any event that would solicit media or public attention. Communication outlets should be by email, cell phone, and an in car mobile digital communicator (MDC).

Promotional Process

The purpose of a promotional process is to assess the best candidates to lead within the organization. Promotions have been identified as one of the keys to effective policing, organizational efficiency, and positive community relations. Challenges typically arise when promotional processes are not in alignment with an agency's strategic plan. Not unlike other areas reviewed in this assessment, there is no clearly identifiable links between the promotional process, Louisiana State Police Strategic Plan, or clearly defined Mission Statement.

Procedural justice and police legitimacy are essential to the success of law enforcement agencies of the 21st Century. What is often overlooked is the concept of internal procedural justice. Promotional processes that lack transparency, fairness, impartiality, and voice often lead to feelings of inequity and decrease the likelihood of feelings of the absence of internal procedural justice within the agency. For this section the following recommendations should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 19:

Contract a credentialed independent vendor to facilitate a promotional process and assessment center.

The police agency should coordinate with the State Police Commission and Human Resource Department to identify a vendor who has experience in developing promotional testing and an assessment center process for law enforcement. The assessment center process should include job related interview questions, written exercises, oral exercises that enables candidates the ability to exhibit their knowledge, skills, and abilities through problem-solving. All exercises should establish clear weighted values and data points equitable to the required job function. To eliminate bias, the vendor should recruit a group of diverse subject matter experts who have expertise in the law enforcement at one rank higher than the position being assessed.

RECOMMENDATION 20:

Draft a clearly stated purpose for the promotional policy consistent with the Strategic Plan and Mission of the Louisiana State Police.

Police policies establish organizational guidelines that create uniformity and a framework to achieve desired outcomes. Policy purpose should communicate the organization's mission, goals, and values. Critical to creating a progressive police culture is establishing leadership that believes in the organizations mission and models organizational values. In reviewing the promotions policy for LSP, no section was designated for policy purpose, nor was there supporting language to establish the policy's purpose in additional sections of the policy.

RECOMMENDATION 21:**Complete a job task analyses for all promotional ranks to ensure promotional criteria is consistent with the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities required of the position.**

Clear delineation should be outlined in policy for promotional ranks and job requirements. Promotional leadership roles should have descriptors illustrating essential job tasks, roles, responsibilities, expectations and required training. Defining each organizational rank ensures that the leader understands the scope of their assignment and has the prerequisites prior to promotion. Upon completing the promotional job analysis, information should be approved by human resources and added to the promotional policy.

RECOMMENDATION 22:**Formalize a final phase candidate review process with executive leadership to assess promotional readiness.**

Written testing, oral exercises and assessment centers allow promotional candidates the ability to illustrate their knowledge and skill sets. While these areas play a vital role in assessing core competencies, leaders should have the ability to better understand promotional candidates' character and capacity to lead through a final interview process. During the final interview phase, executive leadership should consider the employees discipline history, letters of support from the employees' chain of command, performance evaluations, and service to the community. The executive leadership panel should include ranks of Superintendent and Assistant Superintendent. This process should be amended in the promotional policy.

RECOMMENDATION 23:**Consider adding a requirement for the Superintendent to provide written justification for passing over an employee eligible for promotion.**

If a promotional candidate is passed over for promotion, the police superintendent should provide written notice to the employee and provide communication as to why they were not promoted. This action would provide an enhanced level of transparency and legitimacy to the promotional process. Additionally, will assist in minimizing perceptions of favoritism or bias in the promotional process. This process should be amended in the promotional policy.

Professional Development & Succession Planning

Police agencies must seek innovative ways to effectively train employees for growth opportunities with the understanding they will ultimately occupy leadership roles. Employees expressed great satisfaction with opportunities for training and professional development. Employees highlighted a variance of training on special topics such as police bias, de-escalation, and opportunities to advance their career by attending accident reconstructionist school or the ability to achieve a higher post certification. Lateral officers who came from other agencies also applauded LSP's efforts on professional development citing it was a reason why they departed their former police agency. One officer stated, "LSP provides me an opportunity for growth as a trooper. This isn't something I had at my other department". For this section the following recommendations should be considered.

RECOMMENDATION 24:

Establish an agency wide mentoring program for sworn and non-sworn employees.

Mentoring inside any organization mutually benefits relationship building and the exchange of knowledge to prepare for future leadership roles. As an agency wide initiative, leadership should develop a mentoring program that will provide cross-functional job-related experiences, educational resources and training, and one on one mentoring to enhance leadership effectiveness and improve police culture. The mentoring program should be formalized where participants and the agency can document employee progress and measure mentoring outcomes.

RECOMMENDATIONS 25:

Expand mid-level management and executive training opportunities.

As the policing profession continues to evolve police leaders will continue to face critical challenges. Professional standardized executive level training not only prepares leaders for such challenges, but it also provides educational opportunities to better understand emerging trends. Police leadership should consider sending mid-level managers and executive employees to recognized leadership institutions such as the Senior Management Institute for Police (PERF), Federal Bureau Investigation (FBI) Academy, Southern Police Institute (SPI), or the Institute for Law Enforcement Administration (ILEA) Management College. Attending one major management school should be a part of a leadership track and consideration for agency advancement.

RECOMMENDATION 26:

Consider amending the evaluation process requiring employees to develop a career plan.

Establishing a career plan would assist employees in mapping strategic goals for career growth and development. The career planning should consist of the employee and their supervisor identifying short- and long-term objectives to accomplish development goals. In doing so, the career plan should specify key trainings, degree and certification advancements, and a reasonable timeline for accomplishment. This should be documented annually in the employee's evaluation.

RECOMMENDATION 27:

Develop a policy requiring supervisors to write a transition plan when changing or vacating an assignment.

Often lost in transition periods are key roles and responsibilities between commands. Implementing a policy that requires supervisors to document historical benchmarks, current strategies, challenges, and budgetary items can assist in preparing incoming successors. Requiring a policy to accomplish this task solidify leadership transitions and set expectations for new leadership.

Key LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: Weaknesses & Threats

This assessment uncovered several emerging these related to LSP organizational culture, leadership, and professional development: (1) Employees had no comprehensive knowledge of the LSP strategic plan; (2) Lack of policy structure and inconsistency in policy application; (3) Racial Inequality; (4) A need to improve organizational diversi-

ty; (5) a need to formalize organizational communication; (6) Professional development opportunities. In review of these emerging themes, overall findings will be presented complemented by recommendations to improve LSP.

To achieve transformation in organizational culture, LSP must adopt meaningful and sustainable reforms. The foundation of all reforms must be rooted in constitutional policing practices that are evident in strategic planning, organizational policies, practices, and procedures. These articles must be institutionalized to establish guiding principles for police action and designate accountability measures. In assessing this area, LSP has historical culture that has caused punitive damage to communities of color, impeding public trust. This was clarified by officer testimony on interactions during traffic stops with African Americans. Repeated accounts of police fear during contacts were reiterated.

Furthermore, LSP lacks organizational diversity that is representative a failure to recruit and retain diverse employees, particularly women. With an average of 4% of women on their workforce, LSP ranks 8% below of the national average of female officers at 12%. The lack of consideration of female troopers is not only documented in quantitatively, but it was also verified in interviews as members of the organization primarily referred to troopers in a masculine vernacular. This status is not conducive for an organization that supports diversity, equity and inclusion.

Finally, if LSP is to seek improvements in organizational culture, procedural justice concepts must be implemented in every aspect of police operations. While there may be previous mention of training on procedural justice, employees failed to illustrate knowledge of philosophy and application. Implications for a police agency that lacks procedural justice processes can result in police misconduct and an established poor pattern and practice.

07.

Recruitment, Hiring, Promotions & Retention



Recruitment, Hiring, Promotions & Retention

Scope

The scope of this review of LSP Recruitment, Hiring, Promotions, and Retention is to determine LSP's ability to ensure employee suitability and promote diversity in these areas, while determining adherence to progressive hiring and retention best practices.

Method

Information gathering was conducted in a variety of ways which included through both group and individual interviews, policy and document review, data analysis and on-site visits to LSP headquarters and Regions.

References

Records & Documents

P.O. 229 Promotions

- Commission Examination and Eligibility Lists
- Public Affairs and Recruiting Section
- 2021 Recruitment and Hiring Analysis Report
- Troop L Recruiting Initiatives
- "Informal" Commission Information

Limitations

Were there any challenges?

The LSP lack of more expansive formal data related to its recruiting, hiring, promotion and retention activities. During this assessment, there was a notable lack of access to a greater sample of individuals who did not complete the hiring process in order to discern insights. Further, there was limited access to a greater sample of people who did not get promoted in order to learn more about the promotional process for those individuals.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

Recruitment & Hiring

For recruiting, each Troop has a PIO who also serves as a recruiter, FOIA admin, and social media administrator. All Troopers are encouraged to recruit potential candidates, and are provided palm cards with QR codes printed with information on the hiring process. There is a promising mentoring program being implemented for new recruits that starts after the application process.

For hiring, the LSP recruitment process requires external vetting with the Louisiana State Commission. The Commission and LSP, however, generally operate as separate entities in the recruitment and promotion processes.

Therefore, HR is not utilized fully to supplement the LSP hiring process for potential troopers. There are no current systems that formally measure recruit demographics, but an improved recordkeeping system will provide those capabilities

Interested applicants can access monthly testing conducted in person. Online testing is done for \$30. Out of state applicants are allowed this process to minimize travel burdens during the initial application. There is limited information and relatively no data analysis available related applicant numbers at the Commission level.

There should be consideration of the physical requirements for applicants and whether good prospects are eliminated due to the current standards. Additionally, in general Academy dates are based on funding and are not consistent. Prospective recruits are often lost because of the uncertainty of academy start dates.

At the time of this report, LSP was conducting a post certified expedited (14 weeks instead of 22) recruit class. There is evidence that both post certified and non-certified recruits quit during the academy due to limited access to family and only being allowed to call home once a week.

The current administration and academy leadership can be more focused on recruit completion of the academy instead of recruit elimination from the academy.

The FTO program is 12 weeks, with the possibility of 3 extensions. The probationary period is 2 years. The academy technically oversees the FTO program, but should have greater oversight. In addition, there is not much gender diversity in the academy staff overall.

If recruits or applicants are don't qualify as a Trooper, they are evaluated for other jobs within the LSP.

Creating a diversity plan fosters a culture of inclusiveness and equity better reflecting the communities police agencies serve. In developing a strategy to build organizational diversity, LSP should focus on the recruitment and hiring of minority candidates to become police troopers. In doing so, considerations should be made not only focusing on race and gender, but also seeking diverse candidates by religion, sexual orientation, language ability, and life experiences. Recruitment and hiring strategies should solicit partnership from high schools, military programs, college and universities and stakeholder's representative of the greater community.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Confirm scheduled Academy dates in advance when feasible.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Consider aggressive utilization of outside recruitment partners.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

Consider the Implementation of the mentorship program.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Allow daily or regular communication of Cadets with family members.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Evaluate any gender specific needs/concerns addressed by affiliated gender.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Allow organizations access to engage recruits (Female Outreach Program, Minority police organizations, LGBTQ organizations, etc).

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Implement periodic reevaluation of applicant exam content to ensure that it is applicable for what LSP is looking for in a Trooper and that it is equitable for all applicants.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

Reevaluate drug usage elimination criteria for new applicants that may eliminate applicants that have no abused drugs or that used drugs that are legal in some states.

RECOMMENDATION 9:

Reevaluate the physical requirements for entry to and completion of to the academy.

Promotions & Retention

For most promotions, there are training requirements that have to be fulfilled before Troopers can take the promotional exam. Troop Commanders determine when and if a Trooper can complete those trainings.

During the process, the Trooper gives their preferred Troop or assignment preference. Promotion tests are given every 2 years in general, in May, and sometimes in November. The test is developed with LSU with input from LSP SMEs. During this assessment, it was communicated to the TBG that, often, promotional test content is not seen to be practical in adequately measuring a Trooper's ability to do the next job role or in evaluating them in their current career role. If retested, the tester's most recent score counts. A curve is utilized with the results of each test to determine the passing scores (midpoint and standard deviation). Grade groups are defined by the numeric score. If there is more than one person with the same score that is considered 1 group. The top seven "grade groups" proceed through the process. Prior to the current LSP Colonel, it was the top 5 grade groups. A tester can pass the test but still not be permitted to proceed through the promotional process if not in the top 7 grade groups.

The Troop Commander determines the Troop interview process. Commanders determine their top 3 choices and present them to the LSP Colonel. Prior to his leadership, the Commanders' choices were honored without question. The current Colonel now requires Commanders to give their rationale for their ranking of the top 3 candidates, and to give an explanation for ranking the other Troopers below the top 3. The Colonel then exercises his authority to make the final determination about the promotion.

Some Troopers expressed that the promotional process has been abused in the past. "Everyone knows who is going to get promoted to specific positions." Some felt that in the past filling positions has even been halted in some instances because the desired Trooper didn't pass the exam. It was also expressed that, "In the current administration, if you are Black or a female you are going to get promoted."

RECOMMENDATION 10:

Reevaluate the testing process for practicality and equitable application.

RECOMMENDATION 11:

Make the examination a pass/fail result that allows all that pass the ability to proceed through the remainder of the promotional process.

RECOMMENDATION 12:

Allow the capability to use the highest test score as the reference score for the Trooper.

RECOMMENDATION 13:

Consider an external entity to complete the testing and assessment process through the Commission before Troop interviews.

RECOMMENDATION 14:

Implement a standardized interview process for every Troop.

RECOMMENDATION 15:

Ensure that every interview panel is diverse in its representation and that input is considered for all panelists.

RECOMMENDATION 16:

Create a “detail” rank of Corporal to give Troopers that have met specific requirements an opportunity for recognition prior to being promoted to Sergeant.

Currently OICs have specialized pay, like FTOs, only when they are acting in that capacity and that designation does not follow the Trooper.

RECOMMENDATION 17:

Expand LSP Mentorship programs to include Troopers for promotion.

RECOMMENDATION 18:

Promote leadership and inclusion programs for females, minorities, LGBTQ members, and others.

LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: LSP Weaknesses & Threats

A key challenge remains for LSP in overcoming the history and “tradition” that created the current culture and environment.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

The LSP is working to put in place strategic goals, strategies, and leadership that work forward to right the ship and enhance the organizations recruiting, hiring, promotion and retention efforts.

08.

Officer Wellness & Employee Assistance



Officer Wellness & Employee Assistance

Scope

The overall health and well-being of the LSP personnel is paramount to reform efforts. The assessment team has evaluated the LSP's policies, training and operational practices designed to support and promote trooper safety, physical health and mental wellness. An assessment of these efforts follows.

Method

Interviews of department personnel including LSP leadership, commanders, supervisors, and Troopers informed our understanding of how department members view LSP trooper wellness efforts. In-person and virtual interviews and focus groups spanned gender and race and were inclusive of various departments and specialized units; DPS Human Resources and 911 Call-takers were also interviewed. Additionally, TBG participated in case file review; virtual and in-person lesson plan review and training observation; trooper ride along; record review and data analysis related to TEAP, peer support, discipline, and internal affair file review. Finally, the five-year strategic plan informed this section of the report.

References

Records & Documents

The following policies related to Officer Wellness and Employee Assistance (EAP) have been reviewed:

- PO 901 Code of Ethics
- PO 247 Trooper Employee Assistance Program (TEAP)
- PO 227 Performance Evaluation System
- PO 229 Promotions
- PO 241 Workers Compensation
- PO 211 Disciplinary
- PO 234 Secondary Employment/Personal Investments
- PO 212 Discipline and Harassment Complaint Procedures
- PO 209 Complaints and Administrative Investigation
- PO 801 Administration (BIA)
- PO 601 Critical Incident Response and Special Task Planning
- PO 209 Complaints and Administrative Investigations
- PO 240 Violence in the Workplace
- PO 205 Bias Based Policing
- PO 237 Uniform Policy
- PO 214 Domestic Violence
- PO 239 Victim Assistance
- PO 210 Crisis Leave
- PO 1402 Field Training Officer Program

- PO 246 Chaplains Program
- PO 232 Return to Work/Light Duty
- PO 216 Early Identification System (EIS)
- PO 217 Education Leave
- PO 204 Awards

The following training has been reviewed:

- Use of Force
- De-escalation
- L.E.A.D.S
- Crisis Negotiations
- Mental Health Disorders
- Suicide Presentation
- Emotional Survival
- CISM Overview
- TEAP Program Overview
- Wellness App Training
- Wellness Intro for Leadership
- TEAP Roll Call
- The Challenge of Mental Illness to Law Enforcement
- Staircase 101
- 2019-2022 Annual In-Service Training

The following Documents and Files have been reviewed:

- 2017 Employee Survey
- Data Analysis related to LSP Demographics
- 2021 Annual Use of Force Report
- LSP Complaint Review
- BWC Use of Force Incidents
- IA File Review
- LSP Five Year Strategic Plan

Limitations

Were there any challenges?

The most pertinent limitation across this section was unreliable data. Inadequate data platforms or even data reliability in a simple excel spreadsheet was insufficient to draw reliable analysis. In addition, there is only one officer wellness coordinator to cover the entire state, which contributes to limitations in program structure and growth.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

LSP Strategic Plan

RECOMMENDATION 1:

TBG recommends the LSP give priority attention to wellness goals and actions in the five-year strategic plan, which is currently missing altogether, or not sufficiently strong.

The assessment team reviewed the previous (through 2025) and current (through 2028) LSP five-year strategic plan. It is unclear why, but the State updates their strategic plans two fiscal years before the previous one expires resulting in two strategic plans that are current during the same two years. Of the 124-page strategic plan, officer health and wellness should garner sufficient attention to have dedicated priorities in a five-year strategic plan, which is presently lacking.

With policing challenges noted around the country, including poor outcomes on overall wellness indicators affecting recruitment and retention, along with high rates of suicide, divorce and trauma, officer health and wellness must be prioritized.

Department of Public Safety (DPS) and Louisiana State Police (LSP)

The disconnect between DPS and LSP for appropriate policies must be addressed to support alignment and best practice. In order to inform the recommendations that fall under this section, it is important to give a brief overview of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety (DPS) because the LSP is one of three large organizational entities that falls within the scope of their responsibility. DPS policy “trumps” LSP policy, yet there is next to no interface between the two departments presently.

DPS resources are thin, with just 25 personnel under the HR umbrella. The Human Resources Department acknowledges having very few resources dedicated to support trooper wellness, rather, most DPS resources are offered through their three state insurance plans that all state employees are eligible for. Consequently, traditional EAP health and wellness offerings are more generic, insurance driven and not law enforcement specific. Additionally, smaller, more rural parts of the state do not benefit from some of the services, for example, LSP Headquarters may receive (e.g. mobile flu shots).

Presently, the DPS HR identifies themselves as more of a “document house” for LSP. It does not have access to digital software or a Record Management System (RMS). Rather, paper files are still common. They use Excel spreadsheets by calendar year that are largely self-defined on data deemed important to track. Key data is missing without a digital, robust, and uniform system. Digitizing would ensure a much more reliable and valid measurement of important HR functions like tracking worker’s comp claims, FMLA, crisis leave, promotions, demographics etc. which is data that impacts LSP. For example, qualifying events for Worker’s Comp and FMLA are not reliably tracked so trends are not being sufficiently monitored. This becomes problematic for LSP, who also does not reliably track this key data.

All DPS and LSP policies can be found on the PowerDMS (Policy Management System), which is used to disseminate policies from the Department of Public Safety (DPS) Human Resource Department.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Convene a high-level influential team between the LSP and the DPS-HR to review all relevant policies and develop a strategy to address silo's leveraging the expertise of Human Resource as it relates to law and best practice.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

DPS HR should be consulted in the writing and revision of all LSP specific policies that include a traditional HR function.

While DPS develops state-wide policies, LSP has revised many of them and listed them under their own directive (P.O XXX). For example, P.O. 232 Return to Work/Light Duty Policy can result from injury, pregnancy etc., on the job or off. There are legal implications of following FMLA etc. Presently, this process goes through LSP chain of command and DPS HR simply "keeps a copy". Not having DPS HR integrally involved in these determinations is a liability. LSP should utilize DPS policies (without a P.O. XXX assignment) for anything that does not require a distinct police policy. A regular cadence of inter-departmental meeting should then be prioritized and implemented.

Recommendation:

All LSP policies that involve traditional human resource involvement should have Human Resource oversight and sent down to chain of command when appropriate. Not only does this protect legality by allowing the Human Resource experts to oversee traditional Human Resource functions, but it also puts an important boundary of protecting troopers from chain of command interference in personal matters.

Recommendation:

The LSP and the DPS develop a tracking system for key data relative to transparency, data accountability and bias prevention. Presently, key data is not reliably tracked. For example, the reason a crisis leave request was denied is not noted.

Recommendation:

Update all policies to support best practice or reflect current LSP operational practices.

Policies

Many policies identified above are decades old, and nearly all policies are written in non-gender-neutral language (he, him, manpower etc.). These should be updated to inclusive language (e.g. personnel, his/her etc.) and remove references that can be discriminatory e.g. Code of Ethics utilizes "God", the definition of "family" is non-inclusive. In addition, the Crisis Leave policy does not allow for life partners under "eligible family member" which may deter LGBTQ+ families. Finally, in this same policy, a physician or someone with a mental health background should be considered as part of the "crisis committee". The Discrimination and Harassment Policy, there is a requirement or expectation to report internal complaints through the chain of command, which may challenge the expectation of confidentiality and enhance fear of retaliation. Alternative options for reporting should be included in policy. Additionally, in the Discrimination and Harassment policy, there is a requirement to "Advise the complainant that if future violations occur, he or she is to directly inform the violator that the conduct is unwelcome and must stop, and further, to report the new violations in accordance with Section 7 (Reporting Procedures) of this order." This is putting responsibility on the complainant to stop harassing behavior. Dependent upon the situation, this could be grossly inappropriate. Best practice would include removing from policy that the person being harassed is respon-

sible for telling the person who is harassing to stop. Further, sexual harassment complaints should be able to be brought directly to chain of command, HR or the legal division.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Policies should be reviewed (and revised when appropriate) annually.

A policy for policy development should be developed stipulating the frequency of policy review (annually), and should include requirements for uniformity including a particular policy format, the year rescinded, and year enacted, the person who oversaw the policy changes and approval, and a public comment period etc. Both DPS and LSP must create a protocol for how policies will be inclusive of each other's involvement, rather than operating in silos. Having joint signatures on policies could be one way to ensure accountability with this.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Where appropriate, the revision process should include public comment period, as well as the review and inclusion of feedback from community subject matter experts.

See Chicago, New Orleans etc. Policies like P.O. 226 Mentally Ill Persons/Substance Abuse Patients should be reviewed by subject matter experts in the mental health field.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

The term “should” throughout policies should be changed to “will” wherever LSP expects certain behavior (e.g not leaving someone in the prone position; bystander intervention; reporting to supervisors’ observation of excessive force; requiring audio or video recording).

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Consideration should be given to requirements on protocols involving Critical Incident Stress Debrief (CISD), RITS (Rest Information and Transition Services), Defusing, Family/Office Debriefing.

Under P.O. 247, Trooper Employee Assistance Program (TEAP), language should be strengthened to reflect required protocols with a system in place to operationalize and audit this. In addition, in the Use of Force policy, it reads: “TEAP shall provide, upon request, peer support to the officer involved in the deadly force event and to the officer’s immediate family member(s)”. Consideration should be given to requiring an initial outreach within 12-24 hours post incident, a secondary outreach 48 or 72 hours post incident and depending on the circumstances a third outreach 7-14 days post incident. Any divergence from this should be documented with the reason for it.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

P.O. 232 Return to Work/Light Duty Policy should be revised with inclusivity of mental health in addition to physical health.

RECOMMENDATION 9:

Develop a Fit for Duty Evaluation (FFDE) policy with DPS-HR integrally involved.

This assessment team heard consistently that the Fit For Duty (FFDE) qualifiers and protocols need clarification.

There is no official policy on FFDE and that must change. The Fit For Duty evaluation presently is overseen by Internal Affairs. LSP contracts with MATRIX to make fit for duty determinations. MATRIX is a local vendor that also conducts pre-hire screening. While termination is set forth by State Police Commission rules, it is reported that FFDE is so rare and has only occurred with criminal acts and excessive force which is “significant enough to make the news.”

RECOMMENDATION 10:

Review and consider expansion of criteria that qualifies for Workers Compensation.

P.O. 241 Workers Compensation—does not presently include repeat exposure to trauma which should be considered. Consideration should be given to tracking, perhaps in Mark 43, the repeat officers responding to fatalities (or other potentially high trauma calls). Entries related to fatal crashes and troopers who have worked them should currently be in the system and utilized for this analysis.

RECOMMENDATION 11:

Include hyperlinks when referencing other policies, forms, laws etc.

RECOMMENDATION 12:

Update P.O. 210 Crisis Leave Policy (dated 2012) and track both Crisis Leave approvals and denials, including the reason for denial.

DPS HR has an Excel spreadsheet that tracks approved crisis leave requests, but there is no tracking for those that have been denied. This would improve transparency, accountability, monitor trends, and help rule out bias. In the interim, if HR cannot modify this practice, LSP must. Preferably, HR should be responsible for this.

Officer Wellness Programs

The Officer Wellness Program at the LSP is largely in its infancy stages and consequently, while there are a number of programs identified below, none have been truly institutionalized. A recent funding allocation by the Brown Foundation has made it possible to gain some momentum.

It is important to note that presently, there is only one dedicated full-time position allocated to LSP officer wellness, which simply put, must change. The following programs have either been started, strengthened or are currently under development.

LSP Trooper Employee Assistance Program (TEAP); Peer Support Program and Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)

TEAP is seen as synonymous with CISM and peer support within the LSP and the acronym was used to describe the Peer support program throughout interviews. Peer support is a powerful resource nationwide for addressing stress management, mental health, suicide prevention and overall officer safety and wellness. Because of this,

high priority must be given to support this program.

The LSP Wellness Coordinator is diligently working toward a more structured peer support team by Troop and Region. This should remain a priority. While it is critically important that both the Peer support and CISM teams are included under the confidentiality laws found under the CISM training, LSP may want to consider structurally identifying (T)EAP programs like vetted therapists, mobile app, partner support groups etc. as (T)EAP resources with CISM and Peer support distinguished—moving away from TEAP being used to describe the peer support program.

LSP's first activation of peer support in its history did not occur until Hurricane Ida in 2021.

The first ever Statewide Peer support team meeting was held in 2022. This highlights the newness of the peer support program at LSP, and why it desperately needs dedicated resources.

RECOMMENDATION 13:

At minimum, there should be 3 full time dedicated assistant wellness coordinators added, one per Region.

These three assistant regional wellness coordinators would operate under the direction of the LSP Wellness Coordinator/Director. The three regions of the state have uniquely different cultures and resources. Rural communities may not have access to trained therapists (or confidentiality may be too constraining), limited access to fitness gyms supporting physical health etc. Specific cultures may have different stigma with mental wellness but may respond better to pastoral support or peer intervention. Nutrition support is often different by culture. Regional wellness coordinators would be able to identify the unique needs of the Troops they serve, engage their communities, work to develop accessible resources and “dig deep” into holistic health options suitable for their Troop/Region. In addition, regional coordinators would be responsible for Troop wellness training including topics related to financial health, legal health (wills), nutrition, sleep, spiritual health etc. They would provide assistance for expanded use of the wellness app, assist with peer support interventions, be CISM trained to coordinate and lead De-briefings and would be responsible to report Troop and Region-specific wellness trends to the Wellness Director.

RECOMMENDATION 14:

A trooper officer wellness needs assessment must be prioritized broken down by Region and Troop.

LSP must hear from troopers themselves about what they view as top priorities for improving their wellness.

RECOMMENDATION 15:

This assessment team recommends that peer support members meet in person at least quarterly and train at least quarterly (not the same day as their meeting) for a total of eight times per year.

To protect statewide deployment, meetings and training could be broken out by Region, with a statewide uniform strategy developed by the Wellness Director. While at least once per year all peer support members should convene together, a regional strategy would improve resource drain. Peer support volunteers complete 2 trainings, CISM and ASIST (Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training). These are excellent trainings.

RECOMMENDATION 16:

Consideration should be given to whether more uniformity should be explored for specific types of calls requiring peer support deployment.

Presently, there is great latitude in individual decision making.

Regional peer leaders have a lot of latitude in determining what type of peer response is appropriate to a specific event. While latitude is appropriate and supports empowerment of regional leaders to interpret varying needs based on the individual and specific incident involved, consideration should be given to whether more uniformity should be explored for specific types of calls. For example, a car crash resulting in the death of a child(ren) should require a 1:1 outreach with a follow up at week one and week two post event. Of course, based on these interactions, more or less response should then be given wider latitude.

RECOMMENDATION 17:

For specialized units with repeat exposure to trauma like Sex Crimes, Crime Scene investigators, Homicide, SWAT, CNT etc., a preventive outreach plan should be formalized for proactive outreach on a regularly scheduled basis by peer support members.

Consideration should be given to a “group notification” system for incidents requiring peer support response, including built in pre-scheduled reminders for follow up (e.g. 60 days, 1 year etc.).

There is not a “group notification” system to inform the peer support team of an event that may require peer response. Right now, the volunteer team utilizes word of mouth notification up through team leaders. A more formal notification system should be considered. Additionally, while peer support leaders felt they do a good job of initial response to persons needing support, there is not a system in place to remind peer support members to check in six months, a year or two years post an event. If there was an electronic notification reminder system in place, this would be addressed.

Consideration should be given to guidelines on performance and disciplinary history as exclusionary criteria for peer support members.

There is an application and interview process to volunteer to become a peer support member. However, there currently is no performance or disciplinary check completed. The LSP should consider this moving forward. The Bowman Group would encourage some general guidelines be developed. For instance, excessive force incidents, pattern of repeat incidents of force, sustained CR's that may include significant violations like sexual harassment, theft etc. should be considered disqualifying events. Problematic behaviors are generally important to exclude from these types of leadership roles that require credibility. While you don't want to punish someone for a mistake ten years ago, you do want to prioritize credibility.

Consideration should be given to where the Wellness Director position is housed. Housing the position under the Colonels office may give it more credibility and indicate its level of importance. The position is presently housed under the academy which has allowed greater access to training facilities and trooper training. There are benefits to both, but this should be considered with a program expansion.

RECOMMENDATION 18:

The recommended three new regional wellness coordinators should assist with promoting the Wellness App and providing a roll call training on all its features.

A wellness app (CordicoShield by Lexipol) was implemented in 2020 as a joint effort between the Louisiana State Trooper Association, Louisiana Troopers Foundation and the State of Louisiana. The LSP App offers yoga exercis-

es, breathing, mindfulness, links to the suicide hotline, written resources (e.g. panic, anxiety, compassion fatigue, fitness, nutrition etc.), over twenty self-assessment tools, peer support names, bio's and contact information, chaplain contacts and bio information, a therapist finder with geo location, Nike Run club, white noise and sleep sounds, state insurance benefits and it can push out messages (for example, with the hurricane, it let troopers know which churches have tarps). There is no utilization data collected, for confidentiality purposes, but the resources are comprehensive. Like other wellness options, this too is a new resource.

Physical & Mental Health Initiatives

RECOMMENDATION 19:

Incentivize physical health (e.g. steps walked, cardiovascular activity, weight loss, completed appointments with nutritionists, membership scans at the gym, discounted or free gym membership, on-duty work out hours etc.).

Even minimal incentives (e.g. gift certificates etc.) can be meaningful. This is another area the recommended regional wellness coordinators can promote.

Recommendation: Free cardiovascular screenings, wellness checks, flu shots, nutritionist sessions, legal assistance (to help develop wills etc.), financial assistance (retirement planning etc.) are not provided across the state, and the recommended new full time regional coordinators should have under their responsibility to work with drug stores, pharmacies, and other community specialists in their Troop areas to bring these services to troopers.

Recommendation: TBG recommends consideration be given to the types of wellness services identified above being deployed to Troop stations during the time there are roll call meetings or deployed to specific locations (e.g. churches) for ease of access. This must be modeled from the top down and made easily accessible (on duty whenever possible).

RECOMMENDATION 20:

LSP should continue to vet clinicians with law enforcement expertise.

LSP should ensure there are providers under each of the five insurance plans to ensure troopers have access to vetted clinicians with first responder experience covered under their insurance, rather than having to ask TEAP or anyone else in the LSP for help finding someone. The Wellness Coordinator has begun to vet clinicians with first responder training/experience to build a resource network around the state. LSP has a grant to send 13 vetted clinicians to CFRC (Certified First Responder Counselor) training. Like most LSP wellness programs, this is brand new and not yet institutionalized, but should be supported. Additionally, LSP should consider whether hiring external clinicians and embedding them by Region may be useful. Many departments have had success with hiring their own mental health clinicians. It is imperative to “house” them off-site to protect confidentiality.

Chaplains

There are presently only 22 volunteer chaplains around the state with one part time (WAE) chaplain overseeing the program. This program has a lot of opportunity to grow, however once again, with one wellness coordinator for the entire state, it is difficult to allocate the time to strengthen it. This is another area where the recommended full

time regional wellness coordinators could dedicate attention. Chaplains are generally expected to do ride alongs and proactively go talk with troopers to establish relationships, etc. Chaplains also do ceremonial work and must be Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) and Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST) trained. This is commendable.

RECOMMENDATION 21:

Per P.O. 246 Chaplains Program, policy appears to require the volunteer chaplain to cover the expenses for their own CISM training.

Consideration should be given to whether this should be adjusted in policy. It also does not appear that Chaplains are deployed to death notifications, which should be considered. Policy or training should also provide guidance on protocol should they observe unprofessional or concerning behavior of a trooper.

RECOMMENDATION 22:

Consider identifying the type of intervention for chaplain contacts.

For example, was this an informal visit to the Troop Station; A ride along; A 1:1 interaction; A pro-active outreach by the chaplain; An outreach by the trooper to the Chaplain. Add Region and Chaplain's name. Again, this gives good information to strengthen the program, and to monitor trends. Given the relatively small number of chaplains across the state, the data in the Jot form presented to this assessment team reported a very high number of Chaplain contacts which should be explored.

Trooper Wellness

Based on extensive interviews and site visit observation, the LSP culture leans toward a fraternity/brotherhood that operates under a heavy chain of command, with a militaristic presence. This culture has contributed to a history of officer wellness not being prioritized, and perhaps more accurate, put at risk. Troopers are seen as “weak” if they leave the Academy (see academy exit form) and have historically been expected to “man up” with trauma exposure. Perhaps linked to this culture, of 915 troopers, only 43 identify as women. This is problematic on many counts, but certainly is a contributing factor to the continuation of LSP culture.

There is strong agreement that the current command staff are very supportive of officer wellness, yet there is also strong agreement that words supporting wellness need to be followed with strong action. Presently, there is just one full time officer wellness coordinator covering the entire state. This is not sustainable and must change to align verbal support of wellness with operational support.

While public exposure and national policing incidents are shining a light on the importance of wellness, resources at LSP have largely been absent. The message is “we support wellness, but we are not backing that up with the resources to demonstrate that”. Efforts to strengthen resources with the LSP have gained some momentum in the last few years but must be heavily strengthened and should include additional full-time personnel and tangible department wide resources. The overall wellness initiatives are in such early stages, with only one dedicated person allocated to it, so in many ways LSP is building the plane while it is in the air –absent flight personnel.

Extensive on and off-site interviews and deep review of the last trooper satisfaction survey, strong themes emerged related to health and wellness:

Patrol Burnout

RECOMMENDATION 23:

The LSP should consider creative options to buffer patrol.

The assessment team heard repeatedly that LSP is operating as if patrol were fully staffed. The LSP's primary mission is highway safety, and patrol is the backbone to that. The Department must recognize this and make decisions to support a fully staffed patrol. This should not only be a recruitment effort, but in this time of staffing crisis, the LSP should consider creative options to buffer patrol. Some considerations could include rotating personnel from other departments (detectives, training etc.) to take patrol shifts for a few weeks to a few months at a time. It would also be useful to consider a "callout fatality team" so patrol troopers can be released from calls that take a significant amount of time. This leads to downstream wellness concerns like getting backed up on paperwork (and in some cases taking it home to get it done), pressure by chain of command for not producing patrol stats etc. There are concerns about Sgt's and Lt's not reliably answering calls, which should also be considered during this time where creative solutions are needed.

Suicide Awareness

RECOMMENDATION 24:

A department wide suicide awareness and intervention training should be considered as part of annual in-service.

Alternatively, or in addition to, the recommended three regional wellness coordinators should be trained in ASIST and dedicate training time in each Troop to promote identification of suicide risks and interventions.

LSP is working on building suicide awareness, but again, it is in infancy stages. There was a national guardsperson who died by suicide on the Headquarters compound last year. In the last two years, there have been 2 completed suicides, three verbalized ideations and two completed suicides by employee family members.

Discipline Inconsistency

RECOMMENDATION 25:

A discipline matrix consistent with best practice should be immediately developed and implemented to promote consistency and fairness.

Interviews with LSP personnel found inconsistent discipline, discipline that does not support the seriousness of the offense and lack of transparency in discipline to be a frequent contributor to mistrust in the department, affecting overall culture and mental wellness. When troopers can participate in egregious acts and either not be disciplined at all, or discipline is questionably low, the message is clearly sent to the entire LSP that deeply problematic behavior is the threshold that is acceptable to the LSP. In IA file review, this was consistent with what the assessment team observed.

Promotions

RECOMMENDATION 26:

The LSP should develop a clear promotional standard process, including a recusal process and ensure transparency in the process (See the Recruitment, Hiring, Promotion and Retention section of this report).

Nearly all interviewees identified promotions as one of the top areas of concern affecting morale indicating there is “zero” transparency, and that it is based on “political, family or fraternity connections”.

RECOMMENDATION 27:

The LSP should consider a minimum threshold of patrol experience (e.g. 3 years) to be eligible for promotion or transfer.

From a systemic perspective, there is concern that troopers are promoted or transferred within a short period of patrol assignment (e.g. six-twelve months). Downstream, this is problematic as these individuals come back to the Troop as supervisors or are overseeing training or other departments with very limited patrol experience which creates credibility and safety concerns. Additionally, it appears a trooper can be disciplined, and a rank removed, but there is no designated timeframe before you are eligible for promotion again. For example, one could be demoted from LT to Sgt. and then be eligible for promotion again immediately. Policy must clearly be developed to address this.

Gender

LSP has unacceptably low diversity rates in many areas, but certainly in gender. Some of the wellness concerns identified during interviews related to gender are outlined below:

RECOMMENDATION 28:

Conduct an assessment of the promotional ranks of women in the LSP and define strategies to promote equity.

Women are too frequently subjugated in the LSP culture. This was observed by the assessment team in many ways, but foundationally beginning in policy alone, nearly all policies are written in the masculine (his/him/man-power etc.). A brief review of academy gender ratio's and promotional gender ratios are clearly cause for concern. How this plays out in day to day work is important to address. “Some of us have learned if you are someone who can speak up and stand up, it teaches certain guys not to run over you. If they think they can walk all over you, they will. However, there is also fear about what will happen to you down the line if you do speak up.” Promotional ranks of women are indicative of this subjugation.

The assessment team heard repeatedly that the perception in the LSP right now is that if you get promoted or transferred, it is either because you are a woman or you are black. The LSP leadership must stand strong in the face of this criticism and simply do what is right, promoting or transferring qualified personnel, without sacrificing standards, and with a strong lens toward diversifying a department that is desperately in need of it. The LSP has had a lifetime of white male promotion, and it is clear from this assessment that many of these promotions should have been disqualified for different reasons.

There is presently a woman Major in the LSP, but female leadership must be strengthened. This brings diversity to the command structure, permits role modelling for other female troopers, and brings much needed perspective to the room in which important decisions are made.

There was a significant amount of concern identified about the possibility of a new colonel. “There are men standing by right now that are hostile toward women, and they are just waiting for the next administration”. Promoting diversity up the ranks, along with updating policies and training that guide the LSP with best practice, will help institutionalize a culture that is more conducive to women and other marginalized communities. This makes it more challenging to derail progress with a change in leadership.

The first ever female trooper conference was held in 2022, which is commendable and should be fully supported moving forward.

RECOMMENDATION 29:

DPS Human Resources should be leveraged to train LSP on policies and laws affecting women.

One female trooper said “we need more knowledge on FMLA and other rights as a woman. The female element is so small here that supervisors just don’t know”.

Shift Schedules

RECOMMENDATION 30:

Shift schedules should be re-considered in light of sleep wellness and family support.

LSP has 12-hour shifts (5am-5pm), rotating every two weeks nights to days (5a-5p and 5p-5a). There is no bidding process for shifts, and seniority is not considered. While shift schedules are liked by some, sleep health must be considered. The current shift schedule rotating nights to days is as follows:

- Monday and Tuesday work
- Wednesday and Thursday off
- Friday, Saturday, and Sunday work
- Monday and Tuesday off
- Wednesday and Thursday work
- Friday, Saturday and Sunday off

Mentor Program

RECOMMENDATION 31:

LSP should support a policy governing this program, and consideration given to the recommended three new regional wellness coordinators assisting with this program.

LSP has recently re-started a mentor program which is still being operationalized. This is a proactive program that can be quite impactful to culture and trooper retention. Mentors have been trained in Emotional Intelligence (EI) 2.0., which is good training. This is distinct from the FTO program, as not all mentors are FTO’s and not all FTO’s are mentors. Once the Cadet has received an offer of employment, the pairing can be made based on the Troop he/she is assigned to. The mentor assignment is intended to run 1 year past graduation to help introduce troopers to the agency.

Supervisors

A theme was identified regarding some supervisors creating harsh environments that affect wellness and accountability. Lack of a “safe” way to address these concerns was also shared. One example given: “When the Colonel came to talk with our Troop, our Sgt’s were in the room. So of course, we are not going to say anything”.

Equipment

RECOMMENDATION 32:

LSP should consider an annual vehicle and equipment replacement schedule, which would also include special operations equipment like SWAT, CNT and MFF.

Old equipment was identified frequently as a concern affecting feeling undervalued by the LSP (vehicles, cameras, specialized equipment etc). In addition, a concern about command staff driving new and nice cars while patrol is driving “2018’s with 150k+ miles” was also identified.

Degree Incentive Program

Recommendation 33: LSP (along with DPS) should consider investing in education, and include a period of service that the employee would need to remain with the department (e.g. 5 years) in order to not have to pay tuition back.

It was a common theme in interviews that one of the tangible benefits LSP could provide to improve wellness was to develop a tuition reimbursement program to prioritize education and personal growth.

CADET TRAINING

Of the 496 hours required to be a Level 1 Basic Peace Officer, the only identified training that touches on Officer Wellness is a 4-hour POST course called: Police Survival: Legal and Mental Aspects whereby “each student should be aware of the legal and mental aspects of a critical incident as well as his rights and responsibilities in making a full accounting of the incident”. This training is designed more for legal rights and responsibilities, and less related to officer wellness, so identifying it related to this topic is a stretch.

LSP Academy historically had only 1 hour of officer wellness exposure. However, for the first time in history, 8 hours were allocated to wellness training in 2022, provided by the LSP Officer Wellness Coordinator. This is commendable. Additionally, the Wellness Coordinator was given time to talk about the transition from training academy to field work and the chaplaincy program. Consequently, in 2022, providing 9 + hours of training in academy is clearly a dramatic improvement.

RECOMMENDATION 34:

The LSP should memorialize this 9+ hour block of wellness related training in its Cadet schedule to protect it from removal with leadership changes.

RECOMMENDATION 35:

Consideration should be given to having a small PEER support panel of trained team members, ideally made up of the recommended additional three regional full time wellness coordinators, dedicate training at Cadet, in-service, and pre-service to ensure program awareness, differences in regional resources and education on wellness related topics.

RECOMMENDATION 36:

Removal of phone privileges as a consequence in academy should be eliminated immediately.

The academy has been called “barbaric”. One poignant example given during interviews is the practice of removing phone privileges as a consequence. “When you have young kids who are relying on you calling every week on Sunday and you can’t explain to them why didn’t for two weeks, it affects not just you, but your whole family. It breaks trust between you and your kids”.

There was consistency among women troopers that while they know the physical requirements of academy are a barrier for some women, there was agreement they wouldn’t necessarily want that to change just to recruit more women. The words used to describe the academy by a number of women were: “unforgettable, challenging, growth, a milestone”. The challenge for the academy in 21st century policing is to create a culture that prioritizes wellness, and infuses a guardian mentality, while also maintaining the meaningful tradition LSP has created in academy.

Annual In-Service Training

Annual In-service training outlines were provided (absent lesson plans) for 2019 (2.5 days), 2020 (1 day-perhaps affected by COVID 19), 2021 (2 days) and 2022 (1 day in person plus 10 e-learnings). The following topics are core topics covered each year from 2019-2021.

- Lifesaving medical techniques
- Dim Light Course
- Firearms Re-qualification (Pistol, CAR-15 Rifle, Shotgun)
- Tactical Firearm Drills
- Plainclothes/Off-Duty Firearm Tactics
- EVO Qualification Course
- Traffic Stop Scenarios
- Use of Force Scenarios
- Legal Updates/Taser Awareness or Refresher
- Standardized Field Sobriety Test Refresher (2020)
- Defensive Tactics Recertification (2020)
- Pursuit Policy (2019)
- Officer Involved Shooting (2019)
- TEAP Class (2 hours-2021 only)

The 2022 Training for Annual In-service includes 10 mandatory online courses, which must be completed prior to

the 1st day of in-person training. The LSP was not able to provide us the length of the on-line training courses. They include:

- Domestic Violence
- Laws involving Crimes of Human Trafficking
- Autism Spectrum Disorder (The State of LA passed Act No. 137 during the 2020 legislative session requiring law enforcement to receive training on Autism)
- Protective Order Registry
- LA Victim Information and Notification
- Use of Force 1
- Use of Force 2
- Making the Arrest Decision
- Search and Seizure and
- LA e-Crash.

The In-Person Annual In-service is 1 day and includes:

- Firearm Range Qualifications
- Bloodborne Pathogens
- Taser Recertification
- Firearm Drills
- Shoot House Training

TBG reviewed annual in-training for 2019-2022. The lack of training supporting officer wellness and EAP is striking. While it is commendable that a two-hour block on TEAP was provided for the first time in 2021 (focused largely on the Kevin Gilmartin book (Emotional Survival for Law Enforcement), it appears to be absent (at least formally) for 2022. There is heavy emphasis on use of force related topics and tactical strategies. There is no real emphasis on community engagement, customer service-related topics, de-escalation, communication, impartial policing, procedural justice, officer wellness, or EAP.

RECOMMENDATION 37:

Annual In-service training should be strongly reconsidered with emphasis on community engagement, customer service-related topics, de-escalation, communication, impartial policing, procedural justice, officer wellness and (T)EAP.

While academy training is of great importance to preparing Cadets for 21st century policing best practice, annual in-service is crucial for changing department culture and equipping seasoned law enforcement in best practice. Consequently, heavy emphasis needs to be added to annual in-service on police reform and best practices, including wellness.

Pre-Service Promotion Training

Presently, there is no formal focus on wellness and wellness resources as part of the pre-promotion training in LSP. Not only is this detrimental to guiding a culture shift on wellness, but if supervisors aren't steeped in causes, signs

and symptoms of stress and trauma along with how to access resources, it is challenging to adequately take care of themselves and let alone those they supervise.

It has been reported that the LSP Sergeants get informal education on wellness options, but this is insufficient and must be formalized.

Note: Distinct from local police departments, state troopers don't necessarily see shift Sergeants every day, more typically, every few days depending on their assignments. Troopers more often interact with fellow troopers, not necessarily their sergeants or command staff. Consequently, efforts on wellness education should include the trooper level.

RECOMMENDATION 38:

There should be robust training and awareness on causes, signs and symptoms of stress and trauma along with how to access resources at all levels—Cadet, annual in-service and pre-promotion training, including the lowest, peer trooper level.

This is yet another area that the recommended three new regional wellness coordinators would prioritize.

Roll Call Training

Due to the shift structure and distance to Troop stations, LSP reports roll call sometimes only occurs every couple of weeks. However, roll call presents good opportunity to implement officer wellness programs, including breathing exercises, wellness checks, massage chairs, financial planning review, etc. LSP may need to get creative with providing overtime, collaborating on a "shift share" with local Sheriff's Departments or Police Departments to cover for one another periodically.

RECOMMENDATION 39:

LSP should get creative with ways to ensure roll call occurs to improve team building, comradery, and implementation of short but impactful wellness strategies.

Officer Wellness Data

Like nearly all other areas of this assessment, data supporting officer wellness has been challenging. Data is essential to track trends, identify needs and garner additional financial support.

RECOMMENDATION 40:

Develop a reliable data tracking system to ensure TEAP policies are being followed.

P.O. 247 Trooper Employee Assistance Program (TEAP), directs when TEAP should be notified of certain events. It is unclear at the time of this writing if these events are being reported reliably. For e.g., if a fatality occurs in Troop D, and the sergeant at the desk calls a Troop D peer support team member to respond to assess the situation, if he/she finds no need for CISM, the wellness coordinator may or may not be notified at all. The use of the JOT reporting form for this type of contact is increasing but is not always used. The Wellness coordinator is more likely to receive notifications when CISM is deployed, or when follow up peer support/resources are needed, but reliability in both response and notification protocol is needed. (See recommended data considerations under the officer wellness data section).

Presently, the Officer Wellness Coordinator utilizes a “jot form” to track peer support related data. However, the data presently collected is minimal and unreliably completed. After review of this data, the Bowman Group recommends additional data be collected, with simple drop-down boxes and in an easily extractable manner.

RECOMMENDATION 41:

Consider more descriptive column titles and drop-down boxes to capture pertinent data. For example:

1. Type of Interaction: Drop down boxes should include: Debriefing, Defusing, One on One Individual Support; Small Group Team Support; Training; Other
2. Number of Individuals Served in the Interaction (1, 2, 4, 15, 64...): On the current jot form, there are instances where, for example, 54 individuals are identified as served in one contact, but there is no easily identifiable way to know what the interaction was for.
3. Interaction Provided By: Drop down boxes for CISM; Peer Support; Chaplain; Other (add narrative box for other).
4. Date Interaction Occurred: (drop down calendar).
5. Region/Troop Interaction Occurred: (Drop Down).
6. Region/Troop Served: For example, if the individual was from a different Region seeking support in a separate Region. This would help one understand the frequency this is occurring, which may be useful to identify if officers are more likely to seek out support from another Region, or to a specific peer/chaplain etc. which can indicate greater trust in that person.
7. Interaction Initiated by (no names- but drop downs for): Individual requesting support; Peer Support member; Chaplain; CISM Mandated Interaction (e.g: debriefing); CISM non-mandated...; Other. This will help collect data on percent of interactions that are mandated, self-initiated (officer reaching out for help), someone reaching out to the person after a serious incident, or because another person suggested a reach out etc.
8. Intervention provided by: Drop down of CISM, Peer Support, Chaplain.
9. Special Event Related: Yes/No (Natural Disaster-Hurricane; Officer suicide; Officer killed in the line of duty; Officer wounded in the line of duty; Officer wounded or killed off duty; Family Trauma; Other)
10. Badge/Star Number who provided the support (or Civilian Name for Chaplains or Retired Name if you have retired LSP serving as Peer Support). This helps you identify who is active in their peer support role.
11. Disposition/Outcome of Interaction: Informal Support Provided; External Referral Made; Internal Referral Made; Follow Up Support Needed etc. Other (narrative field).

These should all be drop down boxes for ease of completion and all should contain a “other” field with a narrative box to capture incidents that fall outside of these categories. When it is formatted with drop down boxes, the data is simple to both complete and to run reports and aggregate data.

There should never be personal identifying information included and completing the report should not take more than a minute or two. Access to this report should be limited to one or two people (e.g wellness coordinator and one additional person).

Identification of Region will help track if there are regions that may need more support, or perhaps are experiencing higher levels of trauma. On the other hand, if there are regions that interventions are far lower than would be

considered typical, it may be indicative of a culture problem.

Key LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: Weaknesses & Threats

The officer wellness section of this report has two key take aways for LSP chain of command. 1. Your troopers need help, which was both heard and observed with profound clarity and 2. Hire three regional assistance wellness coordinators immediately. The rest of the recommendations contained in this section of the report can be initiated once these positions are in place.

There are vulnerabilities that must be addressed. Patrol burnout is high, and as the backbone to LSP's mission, must be addressed. Creative solutions must be enacted to address wellness including looking at shift structure, pulling other LSP units to do patrol rotations, more road visibility by supervisors and efforts to improve wellness tailored to Troop and Region. Additionally, other sections of this report reinforce the importance of addressing promotion and discipline concerns which are affecting morale. Finally, training must be expanded at all levels-- Cadet, annual in-service, pre-promotion and roll call.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

The LSP has significant opportunity for transformation. After extensive interviews throughout all levels of LSP, there are solid leaders that have relatively recently been put in place who not only recognize the importance of the significant changes needed in the department, but perhaps more importantly are also eager for guidance. As with any organization, the right leaders must be in place for sustainable change. LSP appears to be doing a good job of identifying strong leaders with both the heart and courage to weather change. This is true for the officer wellness program too.

Additional strengths include a noticeable, at least verbal, leadership commitment to trooper wellness. Nearly all interviewee's indicated wellness has become more "talked about" than ever before. For the first time in its history, there is a full time dedicated officer wellness coordinator, with tangible support for some of the recent program growth. Additionally, integration of wellness training began in 2021 at both Cadet and annual in-service levels, which is commendable, but needs to be expanded.

There is significant opportunity as part of the recommended shift from a "warrior" to a "guardian" culture to affect both internal and external culture. When people feel "cared for", treated equally and with dignity and respect, relationships (and often performance) positively change. It is the hope of TBG that enactment of changes recommended across all sections of this report will provide a reprieve for your force, and more fully align the department with best practice. Shining light on questionable practice, followed by change, allows for a new, and better organization to build.

09.

Early Intervention System



Early Intervention System

An early intervention (EI) system or program is a non-disciplinary, supervisory management and accountability tool used by police agencies to identify at-risk behavior early. EI systems are data-driven; they track performance indicators and identify at-risk officers based on certain thresholds, which can trigger an intervention with the officer and post-intervention monitoring by the supervisor. Furthermore, identifying and addressing at-risk and problematic trends in officer behavior before a serious incident occurs can prevent harm to officers and community members, avoid erosion of the Department's legitimacy and community trust, and protect the Department from liability.

EI systems can be valuable supervisory management tool to increase agency accountability and help employees meet the agency's values and mission statement. Like performance evaluations, EI systems are critical components for effective personnel management processes. Separate from any disciplinary process, the EI systems can help officers improve their performance by providing a more holistic view of behavior. The strength of the EI system is the ability to scan an array of data points and identify personnel displaying potential at-risk behaviors in one domain or across many different domains.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and many policing experts have recommended EI systems as a promising practice. As a result, more than 65 percent of police agencies with 100 or more officers had an EI system as of June 30, 2016. Furthermore, because an EI system is non-disciplinary in nature, supervisors can receive alerts based on a threshold to address at-risk officer behavior early rather than waiting on the internal affairs process, including complaints and use of force investigations. Early interventions will also assist in addressing officers' use of force decisions being based on extralegal rather than legal factors, and thus, questionable conduct. To this end, police agencies must determine appropriate EI thresholds and intervention processes and hold their supervisors accountable for the review and execution of these EI intervention processes with their subordinates.

Scope

The scope of this EI system or program assessment includes reviewing if or how the LSP utilizes an EI system or program and how that data is used as a predictive tool versus a disciplinary tool, if applicable. In addition, if LSP has an EI system or program, determining whether it aligns with progressive departments, methods for addressing employee wellness, and providing support versus discipline as warranted in line with national standards and best practices. This also includes reviewing whether the LSP data collection and process is effectively identifying employee performance problems or behavioral changes that do not warrant discipline but suggest that an employee may be having a personal concern or crisis.

Method

TBG reviewed the LSP's early intervention (early identification to LSP) (EI) program and practices, including their policy, training, and communication of the EI program, the EI tracking process, and associated files for supervisor's handling of EI alerts and interventions. The TBG has completed over 100 interviews and focus groups with LSP, and conducted ride-alongs and virtual and in-person interviews with troopers, field trainers, first-line supervisors, middle management, commanders, and support staff of the Louisiana State Police to discuss the EI program and practices.

EI programs afford an agency the ability to engage in proactive supervision, counseling and mentoring with an employee to help prevent future at-risk behavior. The assessment team found that LSP has a fundamental EI program in place and commends LSP for recently implementing some interim accountability measures for the tracking and review of EI practices. In addition, an automated system and practice is currently being considered through either the Mark43 platform or other available records management systems. While the assessment team recognizes these steps will help LSP move forward with their EI program, there remains a need for consistency, transparency, and improvements in communication, training, processes and practices, supervision, oversight, and accountability of the EI policy and program.

References

TBG asked LSP to provide any EI-related policy, training, program or practices, supervision, oversight, or accountability materials, between January 1, 2017, to either December 31, 2021, or May 31, 2022, depending on the type of documents requested.

Records & Documents

The following reference materials were requested and reviewed:

- LSP P.O. 216 Early Identification System (EIS) policy effective 10-19-18
- Training records and training materials related to the communication and training of LSP's EI program including any training during the academy, in-service, or supervisor training from January 1, 2017, through May 31, 2022
- Any relevant EI reports related to the tracking, review, or evaluation of identified employees from January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2021
- Any annual EI reports produced by LSP from January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2021

Data

In addition to any records or documents related to LSP's EI program, the assessment team also reviewed LSP's data regarding trooper incidents and activities in their Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system and Records Management System (RMS). This also included reviews of records from their recently implemented Mark43 system, although this system is in the earliest stages; as of January 2022 use of force incidents, citations, and arrests are in their records management platform.

Limitations

Given there was no consistent, structured method for supervisors to track when EI-related risk indicators occurred and when thresholds were met across LSP, there were no assurances that all employees who met the EI thresholds were identified, incidents reviewed for trends and patterns, and EI interventions appropriately considered. This does not indicate that LSP did not identify and appropriately conduct reviews of EI-related risk indicators of employees when needed; only that TBG was unable to review or confirm this process during this assessment.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

Policy

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Revise the LSP P.O. 216 Early Identification System (EIS) policy to describe that the nature and purpose of the EI program is non-disciplinary.

While the EIS policy currently focuses on performance and/or stress related problems, it is important to state at the beginning of the policy and to reinforce that the early identification system is a non-disciplinary tool to address at-risk employees.

Ensure that the purpose of the EI program and its manner of use are clearly articulated in the policy, so it is not perceived as something to be feared.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Ensure the review and intervention processes outlined in the EIS policy align with national best practices.

Supervisors should review incidents that met the EI threshold and the associated body-worn camera (BWC) footage if available, as well as an employees' work history, to identify any trends and/or patterns.

Supervisors should meet with employees who met the EI threshold within a timely manner to discuss the incidents, their work performance, and any personal or job-related concerns they may be experiencing.

Supervisors should document these meetings with employees, including the date, location, reason(s) for the intervention meeting and threshold(s) met, review of incidents and work history, any patterns/trends identified, discussion with employee regarding any concerns that may be affecting their work performance, intervention outcomes, if any, and post-intervention monitoring if appropriate.

Managers should ensure the oversight and accountability of these EI intervention processes through regular review of EI reports and interventions handled by supervisors.

The EIS policy currently states that supervisors are only meeting with employees if correction action is taken, which was confirmed by LSP. In addition, this policy requires a brief summary of the incidents, but there is no indication of further documentation specifics for consistency including what supervisors should be considering such as trends and patterns in their review.

As a national best practice, all line supervisors and managers should be responsible for monitoring and meeting with employees who meet the EI thresholds and recommending specific supports or services for them. Certain police agencies require documentation of the intervention itself, including when (date/time) and where the meeting with the officer occurred, reason for the type of intervention selected, and outcome of the intervention including follow-up and/or post-intervention monitoring. Agencies that have implemented this cite the benefits of the direct supervisor-to-subordinate conversation it facilitates: the supervisor is held accountable and is not able to avoid or ignore an issue, and employees are made aware that their chain of command is paying attention to their performance and welfare. This approach also ensures that all an individual's chain of command is informed of the situation and the intervention; this helps ensure that the employee's supervisor will make a proactive effort to support the employee and follow through on recommendations for support or intervention.

RECOMMENDATION 3:

Consider including policy review, re-training, commendation, and enhanced supervision in the EI policy as additional intervention outcome options available to supervisors for identified at-risk employees.

Currently the EI policy outlines intervention outcome options to include chaplain program or peer counseling referral, mental health care provider referral, targeted training, reassignment or transfer, disciplinary action, or no action needed. However, given EI systems are non-disciplinary and intended to supervise and mentor employees, additional options such as policy review, re-training in certain topic areas, commendations for proactive troopers adhering to the tenets of the 21st century policing, and enhanced supervision may be useful in certain situations with different types of at-risk employees.

While interventions can vary, including a wider range of positive and corrective interventions can provide more options for supervisors to address at-risk employees and hopefully prevent future at-risk incidents. For example, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has intervention outcome options for interventions that include no action, commendation, informal meeting, training, modified field duties, directed health and wellness referral, notice to correct and complaint. Phoenix Police Department (PPD) includes outcomes such as no action needed, supervisor's discretion and training-based, or wellness-based, interventions. While the assessment team certainly understands that LSP is its own agency with different priorities and employee needs, these additional intervention outcome options may be worth considering.

Training

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Ensure communication and training of the EI Program is provided agency wide.

Continue to hold a separate training for supervisors and managers regarding their role and responsibility in the review of EI alerts and determination of appropriate interventions and post-intervention monitoring and expand this training to be more comprehensive.

While the assessment team confirmed that all LSP employees have signed off on the EI policy via PowerDMS, the EI program has not been properly communicated nor trained across LSP employees' agency wide. During interviews across the agency with rank-and-file employees of varying regions, units, and assignments, the assessment team found there was a lack of understanding of the nature and purpose of the EI program unless a fellow trooper had met an EI threshold and were called in by their supervisor, which was then shared with that trooper. In addition, while agency wide interviews with more tenured supervisors did largely demonstrate their general knowledge of the nature and purpose of the EI program, their knowledge regarding the expectations for handling the EI review and intervention process were inconsistent and at times unsure. Furthermore, many newly promoted supervisors indicated they had not received any training yet regarding how to handle the EI review and intervention process. And while supervisors understood per the EI policy that they were responsible to summarize the incidents that met the EI threshold, many indicated that once the EI report left their hands and went up the chain-of-command, they were often unaware of what happened with their subordinate or how decisions were made after that.

Standard components of an EI program include that personnel managing the program should have the proper training.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Revise training materials that include an EIS component to outline the nature and purpose of the EI program, properly articulate the supervisors' review in a fair and impartial manner, and to specify the expectations of monitoring employees and handling interventions, and the regular oversight and accountability of this process.

While some supervisors stated there may have been brief mention of the EI policy or program in their supervisory training, many stated that the training they received for EI did not go beyond the policy, and thus, they were unaware of how to handle the EI review and intervention process, until one or more of their subordinates had reached an EI threshold. In these cases, supervisors indicated that given the agency's lack of proper communication or training on the EI program and what is expected for a supervisor's EI review and intervention, they were forced to ask Internal Affairs or find a fellow supervisor that had experience with this process to learn how to handle the review and intervention, and the writing of the EI report. Furthermore, some EI review language in the training materials need updated to align with national best practices for progressive agencies. Finally, LSP personnel that may be subject to reaching the EI threshold but that do not have any review and accountability responsibilities can receive a more condensed version of the training to simply understand the nature and purpose of the EI program and what they may expect if an EI threshold is met based on their police incident(s).

Training on EI policy and processes is critical to the program's success. All users and all ranks should be trained on the EI program. Even if employees are not going to interact with the program on a regular basis, they should be trained on what the program is, how it functions, what it does, and—importantly—what it does not do. Progressive agencies should ensure they have an adequate EI policy and program including practices and processes in place and that agency personnel are adequately trained in it and understand the benefits of the program and the factors that are tracked. Ensure that first-line supervisors are trained on the EI system, understand their leadership role in using the system to address problems in a positive and productive manner, and to proactively identify potential at-risk behavior in their subordinates. Scholars have stated it is equally critical for all personnel to understand the EI system's limitations and the reasoning behind the agency's decisions regarding the selection of performance indicators and thresholds.

Implementation

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Ensure that all supervisors are consistently employing the newly implemented tracking procedures for monitoring employee incidents to determine when EI thresholds are met.

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Require consistent documentation that demonstrates interventions provided to employees were completed including the meeting with employees and outcomes, if any, and when post-intervention monitoring occurs, require documentation of that process and the outcome.

TBG commends LSP leadership for implementing the EI reporting process in October 2021 in which the supervisors are tracking EI events to more easily identify those employees that reach the EI threshold given this is currently a manual process. This current process will serve as the temporary reporting structure until a long-term solution is created in the recently implemented (January 2022) Mark43 records management system. The LSP requires supervisors to write an EI report that summarizes the incidents that meet the EI threshold. However, currently there is no documentation that the intervention took place with the employee, even if no action was taken, and no record for the review or outcome of post-intervention monitoring when it occurs. During interviews, LSP supervisors

restated that if no action was taken, they did not meet with the employee who met the EI threshold. While some LSP personnel shared that these interventions and post-intervention monitoring have occurred intermittently, there was no proper documentation to provide evidence needed to verify or evaluate the efficacy of this process or its outcomes.

The following components are becoming the national best practices standard in EI systems or programs:

- Tools are maintained and used by supervisors and managers
- Policies and protocols are developed for data collection, maintenance, analysis, security, and access
- Personnel managing the program have proper training
- Threshold criteria are developed for flagging
- Follow-up action is specified
- Interventions take place in a timely manner and outcomes are tracked
- Intervention progress is reviewed by a supervisor

For example, LAPD requires supervisors to document the intervention with the officer, providing a summary and analysis of each incident that occurred within the evaluation period, a comparison of the officer's performance against similar officers with an explanation of any significant differences, justification for the disposition selected (including no action), and a summary of the discussion with the officer regarding the supervisor's review and outcome. Seattle Police Department (SPD) requires documenting the assessment conducted for an employee who has either reached the threshold criteria or who has been referred for a discretionary assessment, and if appropriate, a mentoring plan, with a review of the assessment report and the mentoring plan by the managers in the chain of command.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

Consider including additional performance indicators in the EI program such as traffic and pedestrian stops, arrests, domestic violence issues including an employee subject to a restraining order, failure to appear in court, sick leave, claims and lawsuits, etc.

RECOMMENDATION 9:

Consider including positive performance indicators in the EI program along with the adverse events, to achieve a balance, so supervisors have a holistic view of an employees' attitude, behavior, and work history.

The accuracy and timeliness of EI data are key to the EI program's overall success. LSP should determine how many, and which performance indicators will suit their specific needs when considering these additional performance indicators. Additional performance indicators also worth consideration when the automation process is complete include searches and seizures, training records, awards, compliments and commendations, performance evaluations, transfers, secondary employment, failure to qualify, and trooper injury. If this shift to an automated process will be done in the near future, LSP may consider waiting until their EI program is automated in Mark43 or another selected platform.

In addition to adverse events, progressive agencies should include positive performance indicators such as awards, compliments, commendations, performance evaluations, etc. to have a complete and balanced perspective of that officer's work history. While performance indicators can include a variety of police incidents or job performance measures, a systematic review of early intervention systems for police outlined specific examples of performance indicators used by the Los Angeles, Seattle, and Phoenix Police Departments. For instance, the LAPD includes performance indicators for complaints, uses of force, traffic collisions, pursuits, stops and arrests,

and claims and lawsuits. The SPD includes supervisor recommended inquiries, complaints, uses of force, vehicle collisions, and claims and lawsuits. The PPD includes administrative inquiries (typically less serious complaints), integrity incidents, firearm discharges, Professional Standards Bureau (PSB) investigations (usually for more serious complaints), vehicle collisions, pursuits, and overall alerts for a combination of incidents. An EI program should include both positive and negative performance indicators, and be tracked historically, recording officers' assignments, activity, and performance over time.

RECOMMENDATION 10:

Assess the current EI thresholds to determine if they are appropriate based on the agency's data (i.e., average number of incidents in different time periods).

Continue to regularly assess the EI thresholds periodically to determine if updates are needed.

Review current data to determine appropriate EI thresholds that will trigger a review and intervention by supervisors. Supervisors and managers can then determine what follow-up is needed, if any. It is also important to have a combination threshold for identifying at-risk employees that meet a certain number of performance indicators in a specified time frame. This is key as those employees in need of supervision, mentoring, or support may be exhibiting signs across multiple types of incidents that are overlooked when only considering single-type incidents in a specified time period.

Finally, periodic review to determine if these EI thresholds are appropriate is key to identifying and addressing at-risk employees given crime, community context, manpower, budget, other resources, etc. are ever changing in police agencies.

RECOMMENDATION 11:

Consider using a "rolling" time period for the established EI thresholds and those that may be included in the future.

Using a rolling time period for EI thresholds is key for a successful EI program, as an employee could be involved in three incidents at the beginning of one time period (e.g., a 90-day period) and not be identified through the EI program for the remaining time period (e.g., 89 days). Conversely, an employee could be involved in two incidents at the end of a time period and one at the beginning of the next time period and avoid being identified through the EI program.

Several progressive agencies with successful EI programs including SPD utilize a rolling time period for their established EI thresholds.

RECOMMENDATION 12:

Consider including a combination threshold that identifies an at-risk employee when a certain number of any of the performance indicators occur within a specified time frame.

As a starting point, TBG conducted an analysis of LSP's use of force incidents for 2021 and 2022. The EI threshold of three or more use of force incidents in a 90-day period seems to be appropriate at this time. The Bowman Group encourages LSP to review the additional performance indicators including pursuits, complaints, weapons discharges, at-fault vehicle crashes, personal counseling sessions, and disciplinary action, to determine if three or more of these performance indicators in a 90-day period each are appropriate EI thresholds. In addition, currently there is no combination threshold to identify at-risk employees that may need supervision, mentoring, or support, when a certain number of performance indicators are met.

Oversight & Accountability

RECOMMENDATION 13:

Require supervisors to review employees' BWC footage when available, for the incident(s) that triggered the EI alert to determine if issues or patterns and trends are occurring.

During interviews with LSP supervisors, some indicated they proactively reviewed the BWC footage when reviewing the incidents that met the EI threshold. The review of BWC footage by some supervisors was also found in the assessment team's review of the EI reports completed. However, supervisors review of the BWC footage when conducting an EI review, writing the EI report, and having an intervention with an employee is not currently required.

Ensure body-worn camera footage is reviewed as part of the auditing function of the supervisors, as well as to assess employees' performance. This should include the review of BWC footage as a part of the role and responsibility of supervisors in handling EI interventions and the review of incidents that met the EI threshold for those identified at-risk employees.

RECOMMENDATION 14:

Require follow-up to be documented by supervisor for any EI intervention outcomes with employees and managers or internal affairs can ensure completion.

Once LSP's EI program is automated, follow-up can occur automatically without burden to the supervisors or managers.

RECOMMENDATION 15:

Require managers to regularly review the EI interventions handled by supervisors and document this review and accountability process.

RECOMMENDATION 16:

Consider conducting quarterly or semi-annual command staff meetings to review EI reports and interventions handled by supervisors to identify high performers, interventions taken, and opportunities for learning and improving this EI program and the review and accountability process.

RECOMMENDATION 17:

Share the EI policy and program with community stakeholders and community members for transparency, agency, and trooper accountability, and building trust and legitimacy.

Without sharing any specifics regarding the EI interventions or outcomes with employees, communicating the nature and purpose of the EI program may go a long way to bridging the gap between LSP and the community.

RECOMMENDATION 18:

Require documentation that demonstrates the Training Commander conducts regular reviews of EI reports and interventions handled by supervisors for identification of any agency-wide training needs and any determinations that were made from this process.

RECOMMENDATION 19:

Continue the annual review of the EI program for effectiveness and appropriate changes to the EI policy and program, and the documentation of any determinations that were made from this process.

Consider conducting more analyses across the agency and comparing regions, units, shifts, assignments, and employees to identify patterns and trends worth correction.

The assessment team commends LSP leadership for conducting annual EI program evaluations to assess the functionality of the program and to make any recommendations for improvement, as demonstrated in their annual EI reports. Expanding these efforts to analyze trends and patterns across the agency and among employees would assist in identifying improvements in the supervision and accountability of employees or supervisors and managers, and/or agency-wide policy changes and training opportunities.

Developing an EI program should not stop with the rollout of the EI policy. Rather, it should continue with an ongoing process and outcome evaluation that identifies successes and areas for improvement. The EI program evaluation can detect emerging patterns or trends in an agency which might call for policy revisions, training, changes to existing practices, or investigations into other factors not tracked by the program. Ultimately, a comprehensive EI program does not rely entirely on data. Instead, EI programs implement a data-driven process that proactively helps identify employees who may be at risk. An EI program should only be a tool that supplements, and does not replace, a supervisor's own observations and interactions with an employee. Human interaction with the EI program and the employee identified is an absolute must.

Key LSP Transformation Opportunities

LSP has the solid foundation of an early intervention (EI) policy and program, and after moving to a more consistent, structure, and automated process as well as implementing recommended reforms within this report, this EI policy and program will be aligned to national best practices and progressive policing agencies.

The Bad Overall: LSP Weaknesses & Threats

LSP needs to improve departmental accountability and oversight processes and procedures for their EI program. Revise the EI policy to reflect national best practices including aligning with the tenets of 21st century policing as outlined in the recommendations provided in this EI section. Ensure communication and training of the EI Program is provided agency wide. Continue to hold a separate training for supervisors and managers regarding their role and responsibility in the review of EI alerts and determination of appropriate interventions and post-intervention monitoring and expand this training to be more comprehensive. Supervisors should meet with employees who met the EI threshold within a timely manner to discuss the incidents, their work performance, and any personal or job-related concerns they may be experiencing and document these meetings and their outcomes if any. Managers should ensure the oversight and accountability of these EI intervention processes through regular review of EI reports and interventions handled by supervisors. Continue the annual review of the EI program for effectiveness and appropriate changes to the EI policy and program and consider conducting more analysis across the agency and comparing regions, units, shifts, assignments, and employees to identify patterns and trends worth correction.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

LPS has had an EI policy and program for many years, which is commendable and indicative of key supervision and accountability tools maintained by progressive agencies nationwide. LSP leadership implemented a new EI

reporting process in October 2021 in which the supervisors are tracking EI events to more easily identify those employees that reach the EI threshold given this is currently a manual process. LSP leadership conducts annual EI program evaluations to assess the functionality of the program and to make any recommendations for improvement, as demonstrated in their annual EI reports.

10.

Training Academy & Operations



Training & Academy Operations

A. INSTRUCTOR SELECTION & QUALIFICATIONS

Scope

This section of training and academy assessment specifically focuses on instructor selection and qualifications. This part of the assessment included the examination of the criteria to become an instructor at the Academy, what certifications or qualifications are required, how they are assessed, how often they are assessed, and by whom they are assessed. TBG sought to discern if there is a state certification process or external process requisite to become an instructor.

This also included reviewing and assessing the use of outside instructors or subject matter experts as co-instructors or solo instructors in areas of specialization, how are they screened and selected, and who is responsible for verifying and vetting the instructors and materials.

TBG also reviewed to see how the LSP integrates, if any, community voices in the Academy, classroom, or as subject matter experts with lived experience in curriculum development.

Method

The review of LSP Academy instructor selection and quality consisted of site visits, review of Academy policies, requirements from the Louisiana Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (POST) - Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (LCLE), one-on-one interviews with current Cadet class, Academy staff including both Academy commanders during this evaluation period, and research of records.

Observations of outside instructors or subject matter experts consisted of site visits, review of Academy policies, requirements from the Louisiana Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (POST) - Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (LCLE), one-on-one interviews with Academy staff including both Academy commanders during this evaluation period, and observations in the classroom.

References

The following policies relating to the Academy operations were reviewed.

- P.O. 101 Organizational Structure
- P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration
- P.O. 1402 Field Training Officer (FTO) Program
- P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics

The following manuals & documents were reviewed.

- Cadet instructor and program evaluations, ACADIS

- Instructor Personnel Files
- LSP Cadet Class 100 and 101 Schedules
- LSP Instructor Rosters
- LA POST, Academy Guidelines Manual (updated March 22, 2017)
- LSP Training Academy SOP Manual (09/02/2022 draft)

Data

[INSERT TABLES]

Limitations

What is not covered in the scope of this review?

The Academy’s LSP Records Management System was a paper system, but in the last couple of years it has been transitioning to an electronic database. Academy staff reported that CC 99 records were missing. CC 99 had several issues of hazing and Academy staff members were transferred because of their actions.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

RECOMMENDATION 1A:

Establish and follow a policy outlining the selection process for instructors.

During our first site visit (May 2022), the Academy staff stated they did not have a written policy regarding how LSP members become instructors or Academy staff members. Troopers interested in becoming instructors at the Academy would send an email to the Academy Operations Lieutenant stating their interest. Occasionally, the Academy will send out a survey to determine the interest among Troopers. Troopers were chosen by the Academy command staff. There were no qualifications required or criteria related to performance, merit, prior instructor experience, seniority, or other significant factors. In September (2022), TBG was provided a draft LSP Training Academy SOP Manual (dated September 2, 2022) that contains instructor qualifications and selection process. All FTOs, adjunct instructors, instructors, and role players are vetted through Internal Affairs for any open or pending investigations.

Interviews with LSP staff indicate that if “you know someone, you can get transferred” to the desired location. Additional support for this recommendation comes from interviews with numerous LSP staff across at least six Troop Headquarters and at the Academy revealed that there is no “fair” or standardized selection process for a transfer to the Academy. As one Sergeant stated regarding promotions and transfers, “I don’t know the Governor or a Senator. I cannot get promoted or transferred.”

The demographic makeup at the full-time Academy staff is primarily white males. The Captain/Commander of the Academy, the Executive Officer, a Sergeant, and two Troopers are African American males. The rest of the staff are white males except one Nurse who is a white female. Implementing a policy that is based on specific and defensible criteria may increase the number of minorities (race and gender) in the training cadre, thus being more reflective and conscious of the communities served by LSP.

RECOMMENDATION 2A:**Establish and follow a policy that addresses how and by whom outside instructors or SMEs are screened, selected, and verified/vetted.**

No LSP policy or procedure was located that addresses how outside instructors or SMEs are screened or selected and no policy or procedure located on who is responsible for verifying and vetting the instructors and materials.

However, Subsections 3 & 4 of the Instructor Records Policy Section of the POST Academy Guidelines Manual states certificates verifying credentials and resumes for all outside instructors must be on file at the Academy. Subsection 5 of the Academy Staff Section and subsection 2 of the Additional Instructors and Role-players Section of the LSP Draft Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual speaks to having a file for each outside instructor that contains certificates and resumes.

In practice, the Cadet Coordinator screens and selects outside instructors/SMEs and is responsible for verifying and vetting the instructors and materials. TBG reviewed electronic instructor files for the Legal and Crime Scene Investigation instructors. Some contained resumes and certificates as required by the POST and LSP Academy SOP manuals.

TBG observed 5 hours of POST curricula instruction (onsite) in Criminal Law & Procedure, on August 1 – 3, 2022. Outside instructors - an Assistant District Attorney in the Second Judicial Circuit and a Judge from the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The training was lecture based using PPT slides and handouts with references were provided to the Cadets.

Related Best Practice: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) Academy Standard 2.07 - When using guest presenters, the applicant ensures training quality is maintained. FLETA Standards are intended to ensure training programs are developed, implemented, and reviewed using an industry-recognized systematic approach to training.

RECOMMENDATION 3A:**Establish and follow a policy outlining the training, assessment, and continued education of instructors at the LSP Academy.**

There is no LSP policy for initial or ongoing training of Academy instructors. As per the LA POST Academy Guidelines Manual, Primary Instructors who teach the POST classes (state mandated curriculum) must be POST Certified Instructors – a two-week certification course (includes an Adult Based Learning component) delivered by POST. Additionally, POST requires skill area instructors (ex. Firearms, Emergency Vehicle Operations (EVO), Defensive Tactics) to possess current certification in the individual disciplines. Assistant instructors and those teaching LSP specific/enhanced curriculum do not have to be POST certified and can be subject matter experts (SMEs).

Most instructors continue their instructor education on their own with no Individual Development Plan (IDP) outlining what they hope to accomplish in six months, one year, and within the next five years. The IDP process requires communication and interaction between the supervisor and employee. It involves five phases:

- Pre-Planning - supervisor and employee prepare independently for meeting.
- Employee/Supervisor Meeting - discuss employee strengths, areas for improvement, interests, goals, and organizational requirements.
- Prepare IDP - employee, in consultation with supervisor, completes plan for individual development.
- Implement Plan - employee pursues training and development identified in plan.
- Evaluate Outcomes - supervisor/employee evaluate usefulness of training and development experiences.

There is no procedure for “teaching” an instructor how to “teach” other than sit in the classroom and watch another instructor. Suggest utilizing a “monitor, co-teach, teach” practice to develop instructors, a written training plan for each instructor, and multiple “training officers” for new instructors to develop their subject matter expertise. The instructor is responsible for maintaining a status on certifications needed to teach (e.g., Firearms). Consultant reviewed instructor files that contained resumes and certifications.

There is no LSP policy for assessing/evaluating Academy instructors. However, the POST Academy Guidelines Manual states “Each Academy Director (and/or Designee) must perform evaluations of instructors and courses on an annual basis.” Academy staff advised an instructor may be assessed by a supervisor, however, there were no instructor assessment reports available for review. Cadets can evaluate instructors in the ACADIS system anonymously (Consultant reviewed an example from Class 101). TBG conducted 8 instructor/class assessments of several blocks of instruction – all demonstrating vast knowledge of subject matter and effective instructional skills (evaluations on file with The Bowman Group).

There is no thorough End of Class report indicating issues, best practices, needs for updates, completion of student and instructor assessments. This is necessary. Occasionally, an After-Action report is completed by the Training Academy staff primarily to report how many began the class and how many finished (Consultant reviewed AARs (After Action Report) from 2020, 2021, and 2022).

Suggest utilizing a records management system for recording training, professional development, and for documenting instructor assessments.

Related Best Practices: Utilize FLETC Directive/Manual 500-12 Training Development and Certification of FLETC Staff as a best practice. This was provided to the LSP Academy in Sept. 2022 to add to their draft Training Academy SOP; FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-09 Student Feedback and End of Class Reports; FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-16 Student Evaluation Procedures; Review the Idaho POST Procedure 12.10 Instructor Certification, Renewal, Suspension, or Revocation policy; and U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Training and Development Policy Wiki, Individual Development Plan, (www.opm.gov)

RECOMMENDATION 4A:

Develop an Instructor’s Manual that addresses day-to-day duties and responsibilities.

There is no policy or existing manual/written guidance outlining the duties of training staff (Instructors, Sergeants, or Lieutenants). TBG’s observations and interviews with Academy staff indicate that new instructors/staff members learn by “on the job” training. A written guide for all Academy staff will ensure that no project or task is overlooked by a new or existing instructor.

- For example, the Instructor’s Manual should include specific preparation for:
- Cadet Class or In-Service Training
- Creating and reviewing lesson plans
- Conducting and documenting risk assessments for training
- Classroom preparation
- AV equipment use
- Use and scheduling of training facilities/venues (e.g., JSTEC, fitness facilities, water training facility)
- Equipment issues
- Resources
- Field Training Officer Training
- Conduct

RECOMMENDATION 5A:

Establish and follow a policy involving community members, including those with lived experience in training and curriculum development.

No policy or procedure exists related to utilizing community members in Cadet training as guest speakers or role players. The only community members involved in the Academy is a local Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) community group who conducts a victim impact panel during Cadet instruction on operating while prepared.

Suggest developing a community focus group to meet monthly/quarterly with LSP Academy staff. Discussions on how law enforcement officers are trained and the reasons behind the training can assist with transparency and trust building. From this group, invite members to speak to the Cadet classes or help organize a community service project for each class.

Suggest developing a Community-Engaged Training Plan. “[W]hen citizens interact with the training process, a positive effect on police-community relations has been demonstrated. Interactions through citizen police academies increase citizens’ understanding and generate positive views of police.”

The Bowman Group experts suggest utilizing trained role players from the community that have developed skills which permit them to stay on script and utilize facial expressions, body language, and voice inflection when interacting with others. Drama organizations and college students trained in acting should be used for these role players. This is another opportunity for the community to interact with LSP, provide input into their training, and recruit potential Troopers.

No community members or community-based SMEs are used in the development of LSP training curriculum. Suggest creating a training advisory group that includes community members. In addition to including community members with lived experiences, TBG recommends including a broad spectrum of community group representation.

Related Best Practices: Outside The Academy: Learning Community Policing Through Community Engagement, National Policing Institute, <https://www.policinginstitute.org/ideas-in-american-policing/>; IADLEST/Academy Innovations Curricula, Motor Vehicle Stops Practical Exercises, (www.IADLEST.org); FLETC Directive/Manual: 500-16 Student Evaluation Procedures; FLETC Directive/Manual: 500-11 Training Risk Assessment; FLETC Directive/Manual: 70-09U Non-lethal weapons; FLETC Directive Manual: 500-07 Chemical Agents; FLETC Directive/Manual: 500-06 Training Management; and FLETA Academy Standards -Section 4 – Academy Training Delivery, A4.05

If professional role players are used, the Academy has a process for acquiring, preparing, and evaluating them. Advisory: Potentially not applicable. (www.fleta.gov)

The Chicago Police Department implemented the “Training Community Advisory Committee” in September of 2021: To achieve and sustain the highest standard of excellence in police training for CPD members, the CPD seeks to establish a regular process of community engagement and input.

The Training Community Advisory Committee (TCAC) is a voluntary group of diverse stakeholders from community groups that will convene regularly to provide expertise and lived experiences to enhance the quality and effectiveness of the Chicago Police Department’s training programs. (Eg. Development of curriculum, Delivery of training & Observation of courses)”

B. ACADEMY PLANNING

Scope

This section of the training and academy assessment specifically focuses on planning. The review included samples of training plans for the various levels of instruction to include any needs assessments; feedback from prior Academy classes, instructors, and Troopers; and based upon community feedback, regarding any areas of concern with Trooper external behavior in the community. TBG reviewed teaching outlines and curricula to discern consistency in creating learning objectives, following adult teaching, and learning principles. This also included the consideration of how those curricula translate from policy to training to behavior change, and knowledge retention and application by the Troopers.

There was particular attention to core courses as well as overall training plans for the various levels of Troopers, including courses that highlight, cover, enhance, or include topics around interactions with diverse populations, vulnerable populations, constitutional policing, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, de-escalation (SSA), and related curricula. The purpose was also to assess the LSP curriculum and its level of coverage of these topics.

Another aspect of this review included ensuring learning objectives are aligned with the LSP goal of improving behaviors and beliefs about protecting the sanctity of life, emphasizing the concept of de-escalation techniques whenever possible prior to using any level of force, minimizing use of deadly force, incorporating principles of fair and impartial policing, and critical thinking and decision making as a Trooper and reinforcing community engaged tactics through LSP daily operations. Finally, LSP Curriculum was compared to national standards and evidence-based training design.

Method

The review of LSP Academy planning consisted of site visits, review of Academy policies, requirements from the Louisiana Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (POST) - Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (LCLE), one-on-one interviews with Academy staff including both Academy commanders during this evaluation period, and research of records. Observations of classroom and practical exercise training were also included in the evaluation method.

References

Records & Documents

The following policies relating to the Academy operations were reviewed:

- P.O. 101 Organizational Structure
- P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration
- P.O. 1402 Field Training Officer (FTO) Program
- P.O. 1403 Internship Program
- P.O. 1404 Training Academy and JESTC Lodging Facility Rental Procedures
- P.O. 1106 Enforcement - Section 28, Communicating with People Who Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing
- P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics
- P.O. 903 Law Enforcement Role

- P.O. 1106 Enforcement

The following manuals & documents were reviewed:

- 2019 Annual In-Service Training Memo
- 2020 Annual In-Service Training Memo
- 2021 Annual In-Service Training Memo
- 2022 In-Service Training - HQ-2-2080 Memo
- Adult Learning Techniques - Methodology and Retention sections, Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual, revised September 2, 2022
- Cadet evaluations of instructor and courses, ACADIS
- LA POST Adult Learning Course / Master Instructor Course (June 2014)
- LA POST, Academy Guidelines Manual (updated March 22, 2017)
- Lesson Plans - Learning Objectives section, Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual, revised September 2, 2022.
- LSP Cadet Class 100 and 101 Schedules
- LSP Enhanced/Additional Training: Fair & Impartial Policing curriculum, Relational Leadership curriculum, Law Enforcement Active De-escalation Strategies curriculum, Police Tactics and Training - Vehicle Stops, Reality Based Use of Force Decision Making - TASER Energy Weapon Reactionary Drills
- LSP Training Academy SOP Manual (090222 draft)
- Online course offerings – LEO
- Online course offerings – POST LMS (Learning Management System) Website
- The Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) Standards for Programs and Academy, (FLETA - www.fleta.gov/fleta-standards)
- POST Mandated Training Lesson Plans: Legal, Introduction to Patrol Rifle, Traffic Stop Tactics, Defensive Tactics Classroom & Practical, Civil Disturbances Classroom Segment, Becoming a Professional Peace Officer – The Role in the Community, Becoming a Professional Police Office - Becoming a Professional Police Officer

Limitations

Were there any challenges?

LA POST denied The Bowman Group access to any of the mandated 496 hours of Basic Law Enforcement Cadet Training Curriculum/Lesson Plans. TBG was given a seven-page outline describing the Basic Law Enforcement topical areas. The POST cited the LA Public Records law as the reason for not being allowed to release the Curricula/Lesson Plans in full. However, TBG obtained a limited number of curricula/lesson plans through other means.

The Bowman Group were not granted access to outlines, lesson plans, or other training materials associated with online training offered through the LEO training platform and LA POST LMS website.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

RECOMMENDATION 1B:

Establish a Training Oversight Committee (TAC) and develop a detailed policy for Academy operations to include a TAC.

Although LSP has a “Training Committee” in P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration, there was little evidence of its impact on training or procedures. This type of committee should be heavily engaged in Academy operations and training. Training Oversight Committees have been successfully used in law enforcement agencies across the United States to review, recommend, and assist with the implementation of policies and procedures. The TOC would have oversight of training policy, needs assessments, curriculum, and program reviews. It would review and oversee LSP’s training program. Additionally, it would review Best Practices in law enforcement training from other states, local, county, Parrish, and federal agencies.

The TOC would be composed of executive level staff from the LSP, with voting members, advisory members, and reporting members.

Related Best Practices: Training Oversight Committee, Chicago Police Department, Special Order S11-11. (June 2020); IADLEST Training Standards: What constitutes Good Training?; FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-06 Training Management; Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) Standards for Programs and Academy, (FLETA - www.fleta.gov/fleta-standards)

RECOMMENDATION 2B:

Create an LSP Curriculum Development Section

No policy or procedure was found related to an evidence-based curriculum development design model. However, Academy staff advised the Use of Force & EVOC (Emergency Vehicle Operations Course) training is based on evidence and analysis of yearly statistics related to agency (LSP only) data.

Based on the infrequency of review and revision by POST (TBG reviewed curricula/lesson plans that were revised in 2014), it is recommended that LSP/Training Academy create its own internal Curriculum Development Section that would develop additional curriculum with evidenced-based material and components. If there is a concern with POST material, LSP can make suggestions, however POST only updates curriculum when a Master Instructor course is held.

This Section should include outside/community personnel with a background in education and curriculum development. No staff are currently trained in curriculum development.

Related Best Practices: FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-10 Course Development; IPAC Science-Based Learning Report.; National Academies Police Training to Promote the Rule of Law and Protect the Population (2022)

RECOMMENDATION 3B:

Establish and follow a policy on the curriculum design, development, and revision process that is informed by needs assessments, stakeholder feedback (prior Academy classes, instructors, and Troopers), and external input from the community.

No policy or procedure on the curriculum design, development, and revision process was located. POST Academy Guidelines Manual states all lesson plans must be updated as often as necessary for each topic and/or block of instruction.

Suggest exploring ways to solicit community feedback to help identify any areas of concern with Trooper external

behavior in the community (surveys, citizen training review committees, citizen focus groups, etc.).

Related Best Practices: FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-09 Student Feedback and End of Class Reports; FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-16 Student Evaluation Procedures

RECOMMENDATION 4B:

Establish and follow a policy for curriculum creation, review, vetting, and approval.

Currently, LSP internal training curriculum revisions are instituted by the “Training Committee” (consisting of Academy command staff). The Training Committee reviews the training, brings in other SMEs, makes revisions, and then approves the curriculum. There is no policy that describes a vetting and approval process for curriculum.

Related Best Practices: FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-10 Course Development; FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-06 Training Management; Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) Standards for Programs and Academy, (FLETA - www.fleta.gov/fleta-standards)

RECOMMENDATION 5B:

Establish and follow a policy requiring the annual review of curriculum and lesson plans to ensure relevant content and skills are being taught.

No policy or procedure was located requiring the annual review of curriculum and lesson plans. However, the POST Academy Guidelines Manual states each Academy director or designee must perform evaluations of instructors and courses annually and be kept on file. Additionally, it states that students must be allowed to critique instructors and courses and kept on file.

The LSP Draft Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual states the Academy will develop and implement a process that provides data collection, analysis, and review to document the effectiveness of training and improve future instruction, course quality, and curriculum. It continues that as the Academy is committed to a continuous improvement methodology, formal course evaluations will target achievement of the learning objectives, overall classroom performance, student feedback critiques, and instructor self-assessments.

No formal data collection, analysis, or review processes were located. No annual instructor evaluations are conducted. Academy staff advised statistical data from annual reports, periodic internal agency focus groups with the Colonel, and citizen complaints helps identify areas of concern (staff were unable to produce examples). TBG reviewed examples of class 101 Cadet evaluations for instructors & courses in ACADIS.

Related Best Practices: FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-09 Student Feedback and End of Class Reports; FLETC Directive/FLETC Manual 500-16 Student Evaluation Procedures

RECOMMENDATION 6B:

Conduct a comprehensive review of curricula to assess the use of adult teaching and learning principles.

LSP P.O 1401 Training Administration provides a general overview of training using a Training Committee which develops training to “enable members to perform their duties in an effective and efficient manner.” It does not address topics or modality of instruction. The Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual does have a brief section on Adult Learning Techniques.

Most of the training in the classroom at LSP is lecture-based. TBG reviewed POST and LSP lesson plans for exam-

ples of adult teaching and learning principles. The lesson plans included several of the adult learning principles – experiential, self-directed, and mentorship. During an interview with an Academy staff member, they said that adult learning principles are present in their curricula, but they do not always have time to do the activities and skip over them. Based on our review, the principles are present in the curricula, but are not always implemented.

However, during an evaluation of the Relational Leadership block of instruction, TBG observed an excellent application of adult teaching and learning principles. The instruction followed the methodology outlined in the Adult Learning Techniques section of the Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual, revised September 2, 2022.

Related Best Practices: Adult Learning Theory: Methods and Techniques of Teaching Adults, <https://research.com/education/adult-learning-theory>; and 6 Tips for Teaching Based on Principles of Adult Learning Theory, Dr. Laura Lohman, Director, CSUF Faculty Development Center, August 13, 2016

RECOMMENDATION 7B:

Conduct a focused review of Cadet Class curriculum regarding diverse and vulnerable populations, constitutional policing, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, and de-escalation.

There is no policy requiring a review of curriculum to determine if additional training in the areas of diverse and vulnerable populations, constitutional policing, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, and de-escalation is necessary or required. There is no data or survey to follow up on recent Academy graduates to determine if additional crisis intervention and de-escalation training is necessary or required.

Conduct a thorough review of Cadet Class curriculum to determine if more crisis intervention and de-escalation topics can be added by reducing hours from LSP “add-on” classes/curricula which add another 600+ training hours to the POST requirements.

RECOMMENDATION 8B:

Establish and follow a policy that requires training related to diverse and vulnerable populations, constitutional policing, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, and de-escalation.

No policy or procedure was located requiring training in areas related to diverse and vulnerable populations, constitutional policing, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, and de-escalation. TBG did locate an LSP policy related to diverse and vulnerable populations (P.O. 1106 Enforcement - Section 28, Communicating with People Who Are Deaf or Hard of Hearing). Additionally, TBG reviewed P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics. This policy addresses the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics in the first section, Courtesy in the 23rd section, and Duty to Intervene in the 64th (last) section.

TBG evaluated two Academy classes during a site visit in October and November 2022 - Fair and Impartial Policing & Law Enforcement Active De-escalation. The training material of both blocks of instruction are from national vendors and were quality training. Training staff advised that the entire agency has already been trained in Fair and Impartial Policing and that Law Enforcement Active De-escalation would be pushed out to the entire agency in 2023. NOTE – these two trainings are being deployed to the agency as stand-alone programs, not part of annual training

TBG found that some of these topics are addressed in the following LSP & POST Academy blocks of instruction.

- Crisis Intervention (12 hrs. - dealing with mentally ill)
- De-escalation (12 hrs. - includes verbal judo and Law Enforcement Active De-escalation)
- Role/Diversity in the Community (2 hrs.)

- Bias Based Policing (4 hrs.)
- Law Enforcement and the Elderly (1 hr.)
- Victim Assistance/Reporting (1 hr.)
- Fair and Impartial Policing (8 hrs.)

TBG reviewed annual in-service training memos from 2019 – 2022. Except for an online segment on Code of Ethics for Public Servants in 2020, no in-service training related to diverse and vulnerable populations, constitutional policing, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, and de-escalation were found.

TBG reviewed the online training topics offered through the LEO training platform and POST LMS website. However, TBG was not granted access to outlines, lesson plans, or other training materials associated with these topics. TBG found that some of these topics are addressed in the following online courses.

- LEO Online Training Platform Courses
- Customer Service Overview
- Disability Awareness
- Disability Etiquette
- Emotional Intelligence
- Exploring Diversity
- Governmental Ethics 2022
- Cowboy Ethics
- Dealing with PTSD
- Life Lessons
- Communicating with Deaf
- De-escalation Tactics

POST LMS Website Training Courses

- Elder Abuse 2022
- Elderly Victimization: Violent Crimes, Fraud, and Scams 2022
- Elder Abuse in Later Life 2022
- Autism Spectrum Disorder 2022
- Communicating with the Deaf or Hard of Hearing 2022
- Communication Techniques for Working with Older Adults 2022
- Racial Profiling 2022

Best Practices:

- Michigan State Police Policy_02-03–Bias-Free Service
- Michigan State Police Policy_02-06–Duty to Intervene

RECOMMENDATION 9B:

Create a training strategy and training plan for all training for in-service training.

No written strategy or plan for Academy or in-service training was located. Having a strategic plan in place can enable the LSP to track progress toward goals. When each section of the department understands your larger departmental strategy. Having a training plan will help the LSP organize your topics and present the information in a logical order. The LSP can decide on which topics to train first and which to train last, and also plot the intervals of activities needed in training

Related Best Practices: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) Standards for Programs and Academy, (FLETA - www.fleta.gov/fleta-standards)

RECOMMENDATION 10B:

Survey student reactions (Level I of Kirkpatrick model or equivalent) to improve training of existing LSP and POST courses.

To ensure training goals are accomplished, survey student reactions (Level I of Kirkpatrick model or equivalent) to improve training. Review the examination results (Level II of Kirkpatrick model or equivalent) and gather/review feedback (Level III of Kirkpatrick model or equivalent) from graduates and others who observe the graduate's behavior.

Ensure that training programs are comprehensively reviewed with a five-year period and revised if necessary.

Related Best Practice: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (www.FLETA.gov) Program Standard 3.16 - Conducting, compiling, and reviewing student reactions (Level 1 of the Kirkpatrick model or an equivalent) to identify opportunities to improve the program, instruction, and support/administrative elements of the training received.

RECOMMENDATION 11B:

Incorporate the LSP goals of improving behavior, protecting the sanctity of life, minimizing deadly force, incorporating fair and impartial policing, etc. into a policy, possibly P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics.

No policy was found that specified this goal as guiding principles. LSP Policy P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics does not address this goal. Not only can this goal be incorporated into curricula, but they can also inform or be a basis for LSP's Department Mission Statement, the Education and Training Mission Statement, and a future LSP Training Strategy & Plan once they become policy.

Notwithstanding, following policies were found to contain bits and pieces of these goals: LSP Policy, P.O. 903 Law Enforcement Role - Section 2(i) states "The overall purpose of the Office of State Police is the protection of life and property." Subsection (i)(h) states "Provide assistance to persons who are unable to help themselves, are in danger, or are in need of other emergency services." LSP Policy, P.O. 1106 Enforcement - Section 5(ii)(a)(1) states "Officers making enforcement contacts should be professional in their appearance, speech, bearing and demeanor." Section 5(ii)(b)(2) states "Gestures, signals, abnormal operation of patrol vehicles, and other forms of non-verbal communication should be avoided unless necessary due to exigent circumstances." LSP Policy, P.O. 1106 Enforcement - Section 5(iii)(f) states "When speaking to the driver, the Trooper shall attempt to: (1) Greet the driver courteously, (2) Identify himself as (rank and name) an officer of the Louisiana State Police, (3) Inform the driver of the reason for the stop, and ... (5) Listen and consider any justification offered by the violator for having committed the violation."

Related Best Practices: Utilize the Kirpatrick Model or equivalent. Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) Standards for Programs and Academy, (FLETA - www.fleta.gov/fleta-standards)

RECOMMENDATION 12B:

Use the LSP goal (improving behavior, protecting the sanctity of life, minimizing deadly force, incorporating fair and impartial policing, etc.) to inform or be a basis for LSP curricula learning objectives.

LSP curricula learning objectives do not incorporate this goal specifically nor do the LA POST lesson plans (of the very few TBG have been able to review). LSP’s mission, vision, and values posted on their website do not address the goal of improving behavior, protecting the sanctity of life, minimizing deadly force, incorporating fair and impartial policing, etc.

The Education and Training Mission Statement described in the Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual, is loosely aligned with the goal. It states “... training shall reinforce departmental policies, establishing that in all situations, officers shall reasonably attempt to act prudently, and exercise sound judgment based on a deep reverence for human life.”

RECOMMENDATION 13B:

Review all curricula for consistency in creating learning objectives.

The Learning Objectives section of the Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual provides three points describing an acceptable learning objective, however there is no information provided on how to develop them. TBG conducted a review of lesson plans (POST and LSP) to evaluate consistency. Below are examples of reviewed that show inconsistencies.

EXAMPLE. LA POST Mandated Curricula Learning Objectives:

[INSERT TABLES]

Reality Based Use of Force Decision Making - TASER Energy Weapon Reactionary Drills

LSP should have members of the training staff (or the previously recommended Curriculum Development Section), trained in curriculum development and adult-based learning.

Related Best Practices: Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards (MCOLES) Basic Training Curriculum and Training Objectives; Idaho POST Instructor Development Training Program Manual; AAMC Writing Learning Objectives Document; Learning Objectives - A Practical Overview by Amy Acito Praxis Learning Networks; Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA, (www.fleta.gov)), Program Section 3 – Program Training Development, Standards 3.01 - 3.19. FLETA Section 3 standards are intended to ensure training programs are developed, implemented, and reviewed using an industry-recognized systematic approach to training.

RECOMMENDATION 14B:

Survey students who receive training to determine retention and behavior changes.

There is no process or policy in place to determine retention or changes in Trooper behavior. The FTO Program provides an early warning of retention and application. During the 16 to 22 weeks (about 5 months) of the FTO Program, recruits are evaluated daily during their 12-hour work shift. The Daily Observation Report (DOR) indicates

the recruit's retention of curriculum from the Academy to the actual work of being a Trooper.

The In-Service Training provides an opportunity to observe retention and changes in behavior of Troopers who have moved beyond the FTO phase and are no longer probationary employees.

LSP was accredited by The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA – www.calea.org) but dropped its accreditation in 2008. Discussions with LSP staff determined no one knew the reason for eliminating accreditation.

Related Best Practice: The Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA - www.fleta.gov/fleta-standards) standards for Academy and Programs is a Best Practice model. Accreditation standards for academies require Level I, II, and III follow up reviews (Kirkpatrick model or equivalent) and Lesson Plan reviews every five years can determine changes in behavior/retention.

C. ACADEMY INSTRUCTION

Scope

Observation of training courses instruction was a part of the assessment while on-site and/or remotely (if instruction is provided on alternative platforms). TBG observed and reviewed the types (i.e., e-learning, simulation, in person, web-based, scenario based) of instruction provided, for what topics, the process for deciding which modality is best used for which topics, and how that is determined, what criteria is used, and who approves the mode of instruction.

Method

This review of LSP Academy instruction included observations by the Bowman Group, on-line Zoom reviews and on-site classroom observations at the LSP Training Academy in Baton Rouge and the Joint Emergency Services Training Center (JESTC) in Zachary, LA. The review consisted of site visits, review of Academy policies, requirements from the Louisiana Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (POST) - Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (LCLE), one-on-one interviews with Academy staff including both Academy commanders during this evaluation period, and research of records. Observations of classroom and practical exercise training were also included in the evaluation method.

References

Records & Documents

The following policies relating to the Academy operations were reviewed.

- P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration
- P.O. 1402 Field Training Officer (FTO) Program
- P.O. 1403 Internship Program
- P.O. 1404 Training Academy and JESTC Lodging Facility Rental Procedures
- P.O. 101 Organizational Structure
- P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics
- P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration



Data

No data exists for scenarios risk assessment, training injuries, or use of role players.

Limitations

What is not covered in the scope of this review?

The Bowman Group was able to only review Cadet Class#100 for practical exercises utilizing role players (who

were LSP Troopers). LSP Policy P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration does not address training topics or modality of instruction.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

RECOMMENDATION 1C:

Rewrite all scenarios for practical exercises, especially those for PTT and include a Lesson Plan Risk Assessment Matrix.

The Bowman Group observed POST curricula instruction: Legal (5 hours of lecture, Aug 1 - 3 onsite); Introduction to Patrol Rifle (3 hours of lecture, Sept 20 virtual); Traffic Stop Tactics (3 hours of lecture, Sept 22 virtual); Defensive Tactics Classroom & Practical (3 hours, Sept 26 virtual); Civil Disturbances Classroom Segment (2 hours of lecture, Oct. 6 virtual).

Additionally, they observed LSP enhanced/additional curricula instruction: Fair & Impartial Policing (5 hours of lecture, Oct. 28 onsite); Relational Leadership (16 hours of lecture, Oct. 31 & Nov. 1 onsite); Law Enforcement Active De-escalation Strategies - LEADS (4 hours of lecture, Nov. onsite)

Several Patrol Tactical Training (PTT) scenarios were observed at JESTC where Cadets approached a vehicle for a traffic violation and had to respond to the actions of the role player (LSP Trooper). Staff members were in the vehicle with the Cadet. Cadets had Body Worn Cameras.

Scenarios: Three scenarios were observed – one involving an intoxicated suspect, one with an active shooter in a house, and one officer-involved shooting. No observed concerns other than the LSP policy of pulling suspects out of the car immediately and having them walk back to the Trooper's vehicle. All the suspects were white men – no concerns regarding demographics in that instance. Scenarios were pre-selected by Academy staff and relayed to the role players. Each scenario had a specific use-of-force level from level one (compliant) through level five (deadly force). After each scenario, the student explained what he/she did and why. The role players and staff offered suggestions and guidance, including one staff member who stated, "not every incident requires use of force."

Safety protocols are in place to eliminate any weapon from being introduced in the scenarios. Several of the instructors were retired Troopers that have come back as full-time instructors. While this is good from an institutional knowledge perspective, there is still a concern that some of the instructors may have a mindset from past decades, rather than teaching 21st century policing methods.

There is no written Risk Assessment for the PTT. The 1.7-mile driving track is more than adequate to allow multiple scenarios to be conducted simultaneously. A nurse is on scene at the PTT scenarios and tracks injuries on a log sheet. A report is written if the injury requires Worker's Comp. One Cadet suffered an Achilles tendon injury yesterday and last week a Cadet suffered a concussion. The nurse left with the first aid bag, but TBG was unable to determine that injury before leaving. Cadets were encouraged to be less "robotic" in their interaction with the scenario driving violator. This is in sharp contrast to the initial Academy culture of mentally and physically making the Cadets perform robotically.

During the PTT scenarios, every encounter has the potential to end in a deadly use of force because of the written scenarios and use of law enforcement officers to act as role players. TBG strongly suggest changes to or re-vamping the scenarios to offer several compliant encounters. We suggest the scripts include scenarios depicting minorities, mentally ill people, people of faith, senior citizens, children (properly vetted and approved), and other groups which will show a cross section of the culture of Louisiana.

Related Best Practices: FLETC Directive/Manual: 500-10 Course Development Process; FLETC Directive/Manual:

500-11 Training Risk Assessment; FLETC Directive/Manual: 500-14 Student Medical and Physical Requirements; and FLETA Academy Standard - 3.09 When the training program is inherently dangerous and/or creates potential safety risks, the applicant conducts risk assessments and implements procedures to mitigate identified hazards.

Bowman Group Interview Notes (Troopers/Employees):

“At the Academy, we only had one normal traffic stop like I usually deal with every day. The rest were these very extreme situations where you must be prepared to ‘fight for your life’ – it was ‘officer survival week’.”

“These scenarios teach officers what to expect on the road, but it’s not what most traffic stops are really like.”

“There needs to be more balance – “the balance isn’t all the way there.”

RECOMMENDATION 2C:

Utilize trained role players in all practical exercises.

Trained role players have developed skills which permit them to stay on script and utilize facial expressions, body language, and voice inflection when interacting with others. Law enforcement staff typically do not have these skills. When the importance of being graded on responses to scenarios, it is most important to ensure that all Cadets get the same role player’s responses to the extent possible. This is more likely done with the use of trained role players. When using trained role players (actors instead of law enforcement officers/Troopers), they can more reliably follow the script and be consistent for every Cadet who is being evaluated.

Drama organizations and college students trained in acting should be used for these role players. There are at least 24 colleges and universities in Louisiana. They are in areas where most Troop HQs exist including Alexandria, Hammon, Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Lafayette, St. Benedict, Monroe, Pineville, Shreveport, Grambling, Lake Charles, Thibodeaux, Natchitoches, and Ruston, LA. This is another opportunity for the community to interact with LSP and provide input into their training. Secure a Memorandum of Agreement with all organizations with which LSP conducts role player interaction.

During the PTT scenarios for Cadet Class#100, every encounter had the potential to end in a deadly use of force because of the written scenarios and use of law enforcement officers to act as role players.

TBG strongly suggest changes to the scenarios for several compliant encounters and use of trained role players (actors instead of law enforcement officers/Troopers). There can be a tendency to “ad lib” to create stress for the Cadet when the scenario does not warrant action.

Bowman Group experts observed POST curricula instruction: Legal (5 hours of lecture, Aug 1 - 3 onsite); Introduction to Patrol Rifle (3 hours of lecture, Sept 20 virtual); Traffic Stop Tactics (3 hours of lecture, Sept 22 virtual); Defensive Tactics Classroom & Practical (3 hours, Sept 26 virtual); Civil Disturbances Classroom Segment (2 hours of lecture, Oct. 6 virtual).

Additionally, they observed LSP enhanced/additional curricula instruction: Fair & Impartial Policing (5 hours of lecture, Oct. 28 onsite); Relational Leadership (16 hours of lecture, Oct. 31 & Nov. 1 onsite); Law Enforcement Active De-escalation Strategies - LEADS (4 hours of lecture, Nov. onsite)

Related Best Practices: IADLEST/Academy Innovations Curricula, Motor Vehicle Stops Practical Exercises, (www.IADLEST.org); FLETC Directive/Manual: 500-11 Training Risk Assessment; and FLETA Academy Standard - 4.06 When used, role players are prepared to perform roles required by the training program.

RECOMMENDATION 3C:

Review and assess the effectiveness of the current basic police Academy training model.

Bowman Group Interview Notes (Troopers/Employees):

“In Baton Rouge, you have guys training on use of force who have never been in a use of force.

Someone can become an instructor after 6 months on the road because the right people like them.

LSP Academy “was the hardest thing in my life.”

I learned a lot at Alexandria PD Academy and even taught there. I didn’t get anything useful from LSP Academy. LSP could cut the Academy time in half and teach more. I sacrificed a lot, left behind family, etc. for it.

The POST training courses still have the same materials as they were from 1970.

The way they train “took a lot of confidence out of me.” “I almost quit after that.” “It took 6 months to recover.”

They do a lot of “mind game crap” and take away all your confidence. Then they expect you to go out there and have the confidence to make stops and do your job. I fumbled through my first stop because I had no confidence.

They have duty officers that are “on a power trip.” “We were getting punished for stuff all the time.”

It was “a lot of wasted time.” We should have the best training in the state. Instead, it’s “all old school.” The mentality is “I went through it, so you have to.”

Later said training needs to prepare Troopers for the reality of what they’ll see on the job/the tough parts of the job – for example, you will see a person who died in a fatal crash.”

RECOMMENDATION 4C:

Provide training and education on Adult Based Learning Principles and implementation for all instructional staff.

LSP P.O 1401 Training Administration: provides a general overview of training using a Training Committee which develops training to “enable members to perform their duties in an effective and efficient manner.”

It does not address topics or modality of instruction. The Academy Administration P.O 1401 is too general. It does not address many topics such as development of Lesson Plans, instructor qualifications/selections, daily Academy operations, fraternization with students, training injuries and accidents, and many other important tasks.

Bowman Group experts observed POST curricula instruction: Legal (5 hours of lecture, Aug 1 - 3 onsite); Introduction to Patrol Rifle (3 hours of lecture, Sept. 20 virtual); Traffic Stop Tactics (3 hours of lecture, Sept. 22 virtual); Defensive Tactics Classroom & Practical (3 hours, Sept. 26 virtual); Civil Disturbances Classroom Segment (2 hours of lecture, Oct. 6 virtual).

Additionally, they observed LSP enhanced/additional curricula instruction: Fair & Impartial Policing (5 hours of lecture, Oct. 28 onsite); Relational Leadership (16 hours of lecture, Oct. 31 & Nov. 1 onsite); Law Enforcement Active De-escalation Strategies - LEADS (4 hours of lecture, Nov. 2 onsite).

Most of the Cadet classes are lecture-based instruction with little Adult Learning being modeled for the student. On a few occasions, the lesson plan has a rhetorical question which groups are to answer collectively for the topic. This seems more of an “ice-breaker” than utilizing Adult Learning throughout the lesson plan. If it is used only once in an eight-hour class, it is difficult to state that Adult Learning is being promoted.

Related Best Practices: FLETC Directives/Manuals: 500-11 Training Risk Assessment; 066-04 Heat Stress Guidance; 91-00A Assessment of Instruction; 121-18 Training Accident Investigations; 500-12 Training Development and Certification of FLETC Staff; 500-14 Student Medical and Physical Requirements; and 510-05 Training Resources Coordination; Adult Learning Theory: Methods and Techniques of Teaching Adults, <https://research.com/education/adult-learning-theory>; Field Training Programs: Understanding Adult Learning Styles, NCJ Number 226222, Journal, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Volume: 78 Issue: 2 Dated: February 2009 Pages: 1-5.

RECOMMENDATION 5C:

Utilize more outside instructors to serve as assistant or full-time faculty, instead of relying primarily on retired Troopers.

The LSP Academy Staff is often multi-tasking with several deadlines and tasks because they are a small number of staff who are responsible for delivering “all things training” to the LSP. This limited staff can be supplemented by using outside instructors who are vetted, shown to have subject-matter-expertise, and willing to give to the law enforcement community.

RECOMMENDATION 6C:

Ensure that the retired officers are using 21st century training techniques.

The retired officers TBG observed had no refresher training or formal training to supplement the function in which they assisted LSP Academy Staff. Incorporating fresh ideas and proven training techniques can enhance the quality of the LSP Academy. The six pillars of the US DOJ Community Oriented Policing Strategy are: Building Trust and Legitimacy; Policy and Oversight; Technology and Social Media; Community Policing and Crime Reduction; Officer Training and Education; and Officer Safety and Wellness.

The Training and Education portion of the COPS Office 21st Century study states “Law enforcement officers and leaders must be trained in a wide variety of areas involving youth, including how to engage young people positively, de-escalation techniques, understanding youth brain development, the impact of trauma and other mental health issues, cultural differences among youth populations, and more.

Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training—which state Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commissions should offer for basic recruit and in-service training, according to the task force—is an example of training that several agencies around the United States are using. The Montgomery County (Maryland) Police Department provides a 40-hour training course focused on handling incidents involving persons (including youth) with mental illness, developmental disabilities, co-occurring disorders (mental health and substance use), and brain injuries. All Montgomery County School Resource Officers are required to attend CIT training to learn about county resources that are available to youth in crisis.” Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, NCJ Number 248928, Date Published May 2015.

Related Best Practice: Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, NCJ Number 248928, Date Published May 2015.

D. SUPERVISOR TRAINING & COMPLIANCE

Scope

TBG reviewed LSP training and supervisory curriculum (pre-service and in-service training for first line supervisors) to ensure first-line supervisors (both sworn and non-sworn) and command staff have received effective training in areas of supervision to include but not limited to: mentoring, procedural justice pillars, fair and impartial policing, unconscious bias, community engaged policing, recognizing crisis and intervention techniques, feedback, performance evaluations, facilitating the proper handling of complaints, and identifying behaviors of at-risk employees, and other related leadership development skills, consistent with LSP policies, and procedures.

Is there a policy requiring this training? No.

Does LSP offer this training? Yes.

Did officers complete the required training? Yes.

What is the quality of the required training? Based on the content only (PPT Slides) reviewed, there is some quality information. However, we were unable to further evaluate due to no Learning Objectives or Lesson Plans.

What outcomes, if any, are remarkable or notable in these training areas for first line supervisors? Training includes Adult Based Learning activities and EIS overview. Does not include procedural justice pillars, fair and impartial policing, unconscious bias, community engaged policing.

Method

The review Supervisor training and compliance consisted of site visits, review of Academy policies, requirements from the Louisiana Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (POST) - Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (LCLE), one-on-one interviews with Academy staff including both Academy commanders during this evaluation period, and research of records. Observations of classroom and practical exercise training were also included in the evaluation method.

References

Records & Documents

The following policies relating to the Academy operations were reviewed.

- P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration
- P.O. 1402 Field Training Officer (FTO) Program
- P.O. 1403 Internship Program
- P.O. 1404 Training Academy and JESTC Lodging Facility Rental Procedures
- P.O. 101 Organizational Structure
- P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics

The following manuals & documents were reviewed.

- LSP Policy P.O. 229 Promotions

Data

Limitations

Were there any challenges?

There was no in-service or pre-service training took place during the review period.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

RECOMMENDATION 1D:

Review and update supervisory training.

Over forty interviews with LSP Troop Headquarters supervisors (Lieutenants and Sergeants) revealed that there was little preparation for leadership or supervision. There are two required courses prior to taking a promotion examination for Sergeant. These two courses: Relational Leadership (16 hours) and First Line Supervision/Sergeant (16 hours). Currently, the 16-hour Relational Leadership is provided to all Cadet classes prior to graduation. The First Line Supervision class is offered on an as-needed basis by the Academy staff but instructed by Sgts., Lts., and Captains.

LSP Policy P.O. 229 Promotions, Section 3, (l), (d) states - "During this period all eligible candidates who are interested in the position shall complete an availability form and return it to the State Police Commission prior to the closure of the announcement period." However, there is no description of what "eligible candidates" are.

In Section 6. PROMOTION TRAINING REQUIREMENTS (i) of LSP Policy P.O. 229 Promotions, it states "Effective with the 2013 promotion testing cycle, all commissioned officers under the purview of the Louisiana State Police Commission and wishing to test for sergeant, lieutenant or captain must satisfy the requirements of this policy before being permitted to take the promotion test." Again, there is no definition or description of what is meant by "the requirements of this policy."

In Section 7. EMPLOYEE'S RESPONSIBILITY (i) of LSP Policy P.O. 229 Promotions, it states "Officers wishing to take the promotion test for sergeant, lieutenant or captain shall: a) Know and understand the course requirements applicable to their desired rank. b) Apply for the required courses well in advance of the promotion test to ensure adequate time to complete the courses before the promotion test date." There is no clear definition or description of what the "course requirements" are in this policy.

The Bowman Group Interview Notes (Sergeants and Lieutenants):

Did LSP offer adequate supervisory training?

Supervisory itself, NO. After five years on the road, yes. For the first time Trooper who has never been a supervisor, yes. It is good to understand liability for all the folks who work for you now. Not from LSP Training, but through experience. Sgt.

I took First Line Supervisor training. No, it did not prepare me to be a sergeant. The preparation is on the job. Sgt.

Was training adequate?

No. I learned some principles and personalities. After I was promoted, there has been no training. Learned from another Sergeant.

LSP tried LSU leadership training before. It was a failure because professors were not law enforcement (LE). Now leadership is done by state police. I think it would be better if it came from outside LSP. Use “expert” and LSP supervisor. FTO Lt.

Leadership training is required to attend if Sergeant, Lieutenant, or Captain. At ten years, I wanted to be a Sgt. so I went to my Lt. and said I want to work the Sgt. desk to get exposed to the job. He did that for a year to learn. I had to ask for that unfortunately. There is no training other than leadership. You learn those things as you go. I am not a fan of our promotional process. It is jacked up! You may go five years w/o getting promoted after taking the leadership training. One of my Troopers went from great score to re-take and did not pass. He was going through a tough time at home with a child. How do you go from the best to not even on the list?? Not a fan of promotional process and we are limiting the state police to get the best. This is the weakest part of State Police. The Colonel has the right to pick and override the panel. Lt.

A lot of supervisors do not understand that training must be fluid and changes constantly and applicable across the state. We (LSP) teach supervision, not leadership. Lt.

The current leadership program is “silly” – “it’s a hodgepodge mess.”

The materials are outdated, not citing any sources – “it’s just a hoorah moment.”

Didn’t receive any formal training on what a sergeant’s role/responsibilities should be. No training on how to review uses of force.

For sergeants, it’s mostly on the job training. He was fortunate to have good mentors here who know the job and can teach you something.

After reviewing use of force BWC, we just write “reviewed” without any details/recommendation because we were instructed not to write a lot. “I’m not sure what else I would say.”

“It could be beneficial” to get additional training on use of force report writing and review/supervisor’s review.

We could use more training on use-of-force, updating people on the standards.

There’s “not a lot of training” when you make the transition from Trooper to supervisor.

There’s always going to be an experienced supervisor on shift. Received no formal training on what to do as a sergeant – “it’s pretty much on the job training.”

He also recommended hosting the FBI for the LEEDA leadership training – it would be good for supervisors. But the agency is always focused on “what can we pull off by ourselves?”

RECOMMENDATION 2D:

Review and update LSP Policy P.O. 229 Promotions.

The review of P.O. 229 Promotions must address in greater detail how promotions are conducted, who is eligible, what the requirements for each rank will be, and what course requirements are required. These are not in LSP Policy P.O. 229 Promotions currently. Make it clear and concise what the definitions of “eligible candidates,” “requirements of the policy,” and “course requirements” are.

The Bowman Group Interview Notes (LSP Employee):

Female Sgt. noted that she started with a group of eight other Troopers. Others have been promoted to the ranks of Capt. and Major, but she is still a Sgt. She's also an accident reconstructionist; helps with two scale drawings following an OIS; took courses in drone piloting.

Related Best Practices: Administrative Policy 11-1 Promotion Policy for Sworn Police Department Personnel, City of Lawton, OK.; and Promotion Procedure Guidelines Police Sergeant, Police Lieutenant, And Police Captain, City of Little Rock, Arkansas, November 13, 2014.

E. FIELD TRAINING OFFICER (FTO) PROGRAM

Scope

TBG also conducted a review of the Field Training Officer Program. Although LSP has policy P.O. 1402 Field Training Officer (FTO) Program (effective 01/2020), the Field Training Officer (FT) program lacks a thorough review to include how FTOs are selected, how FTOs are trained, what most current trends for FTOs are being utilized, and update of forms and documents.

Method

The review of the FTO Program included site visits, review of Academy policies, requirements from the Louisiana Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (POST) - Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (LCLE), one-on-one interviews with Academy staff including both Academy commanders during this evaluation period, and research of records. Observations of classroom and practical exercise training were also included in the evaluation method.

References

Records & Documents

The following policies relating to the Academy operations were reviewed.

- P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration
- P.O. 1402 Field Training Officer (FTO) Program
- P.O. 1403 Internship Program
- P.O. 1404 Training Academy and JESTC Lodging Facility Rental Procedures
- P.O. 101 Organizational Structure
- P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics

The following manuals & documents were reviewed.

- Field Training Officer Program Section, Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual (draft), revised September 2, 2022

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

RECOMMENDATION 1E:

Conduct a thorough review of the Field Training Officer (FTO) Program.

Although the FTO policy is current (2020), the content needs to be revised by a “working group” (WG) of individuals who review the practices of the FTO Program. A WG should consist of LSP members such as a Troop commander (Captain) and the Training Academy Captain, three FTO Coordinator Lieutenants (one from each Region), six FTO Sergeants (two from each Region), the TEAP (Troopers Employees Assistance Program) coordinator, and six FTOs (two from regions different than the FTO Sergeants). The WG should also include four community members rep-

representing all three Regions (if possible). Community members should include business owners, local government officials, faith members, and other members of the community. The WG will be facilitated by a neutral party whose primary function is to keep the WG moving toward the goal of reviewing the FTO Program. WG rules must allow equal standing by all members regardless of rank, no retribution for ideas or disagreements with current practices, mutual respect, confidentiality within the group, and deadlines established and met. A final report directly to the Colonel is due within thirty days of the last Working Group meeting.

Reasons for a review of the FTO Program include a lack of a selection process for FTOs. There are qualifications for FTOs but no rules for how the FTO is chosen. Additional reasons include the documentation forms are nearly 25 years old, one PowerPoint FTO training is outdated and provided by a vendor. The other PPT FTO training cites resources from 2011 and 2014. LSP has the talent to develop its own FTO training program which could be a model for other law enforcement agencies in the state and beyond. Move forward from the outdated, “way we’ve always done it” way of training FTOs and evaluating recruits the same way it was done twenty years ago.

Additionally, recruits should be evaluated on de-escalation, fair & impartial policing, ethics and integrity, interactions with diverse and vulnerable populations, procedural justice, constitutional policing, community policing, and crisis intervention, especially interactions with the mentally ill.

Related Best Practice: Michigan State Police Field Training Officer Program policy - Procedure Manuals/15 - Department Training and Professional Development, 15-02 - Field Training Officer (FTO) Program

RECOMMENDATION 2E:

Review and revise P.O. 1402 Field Training Officer (FTO) Program policy.

Reasons for reviewing the FTO policy are the same as review of the FTO Program. The policy, P.O. 1402, lacks a selection process for FTOs. There are qualifications for FTOs but no rules for how the FTO is chosen.

Additional reasons include the documentation forms are nearly 25 years old, one PowerPoint FTO training is outdated and provided by a vendor. The other PPT FTO training cites resources from 2011 and 2014. LSP has the talent to develop its own FTO training program which could be a model for other law enforcement agencies in the state and beyond. Move forward from the outdated, “way we’ve always done it” way of training FTOs and evaluating recruits the same way it was done twenty years ago.

Additionally, recruits should be evaluated on de-escalation, fair & impartial policing, ethics and integrity, interactions with diverse and vulnerable populations, procedural justice, constitutional policing, community policing, and crisis intervention, especially interactions with the mentally ill.

Related Best Practices: Michigan State Police Field Training Officer Program policy - Procedure Manuals/15 - Department Training and Professional Development, 15-02 - Field Training Officer (FTO) Program; Nassau County (FL) Sheriff’s Office Field Training Program – 3522.00, Supervisor Monthly Grade Categories; and Jacksonville (FL) Sheriff’s Office Field Training Officer Program policy. *Waiting on this policy from a FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) request (December 2022).

The Bowman Group Interview Notes (FTOs, FTO Sergeants, and FTO Lieutenants):

A vendor, Applied Police Training and Certification, provides the Field Training Officer training curriculum. LSP staff use these Power Point (PPT) slides to provide FTO training. There was no curriculum for review, only PPT. The PPT training is very dated in its design and references. For example, some of the court cases are dated 1963 and 2008.

The Daily Observation Reports (DOR) and other reports used in the FTO Program are dated 1999. The FTO supervisory report is dated 2000. Many FTO staff suggested more explanations for performance rather than a check box on the DOR.

Most FTOs, FTO Sergeants, and FTO Coordinator Lieutenant suggested that the FTO Program be revamped, should last longer than ten-week to sixteen-week period, and have more latitude to extend the training period because of the investment into training the Cadet.

RECOMMENDATION 3E:

Assess Cadet/Student evaluations at the end of each block of (FTO) Program instruction.

Cadet/Student evaluations at the end of each block of instruction is a determining factor of whether training is retained, especially after each examination. This could be used to determine retention when compared to the Recruit's performance in the FTO Program phases. FTO Programs provide an early warning of retention and application.

There is no process or policy in place to determine retention or changes in Trooper behavior. FTO Programs provide an early warning of retention and application. In-service training provides an opportunity beyond one year to evaluate Trooper behavior and retention from training.

The Bowman Group Interview Notes (FTOs and FTO supervisors):

"FTO training is more than just the LE part of the job. FTO makes the Trooper, not the Academy. Need to be more open minded and not my way or highway. Spend more time on how to connect with trainees. Lot of them feel like the FTOs need to interject all the time. Need to make the ten-week length a lot longer. Needs to be completely re-done. We need it for longer than 10 weeks (about 2 and a half months). We can extend it if necessary. FTO would be minimum of six months. I worked a crash near Mississippi and later that day worked a crash near Texas. Just learning the area takes a long time, weeks. The thought process is to get them out ASAP to at least do the minimum. Six months at least. Maybe, give a test to get out of FTO to trainee. This is the practical part of FTO." Sgt.

"LSP should have a different set of curricula for POST certified recruits in FTO Program. Teach them how to investigate crashes and use LSP computer. I had a 7-8-year experienced recruit and nothing on her computer worked. We spent the first three days on the phone with the Help Desk. It was a waste of time. I do not understand why all their stuff doesn't work while they are in the Academy BEFORE coming to FTO. It's a pawn off, no connection to computer, BWC (Body Worn Camera), etc. I don't expect it to change." FTO Sgt.

Should changes be made to the FTO Program?

"Yes, what we have is written in stone. Qt 16 weeks (the recruit) must pass or fail? No, we have invested time and money into a person, why can't we extend that to 20 weeks (about 4 and a half months) or longer? We shouldn't give up on them at sixteen weeks. Maybe 24 weeks (about 5 and a half months) which is the length of the Academy." FTO

Key LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: Weaknesses & Threats

The Bowman Group's evaluation of the Louisiana State Police (LSP) Academy is that their current military boot-camp style of training creates an adverse learning environment and an "enemy" mindset (us versus them) for Cadets toward the public. Key findings include the LSP:

- Military-style Academy eliminates many prospective law enforcement officers, either prior to or during the Cadet Academy.
- No training strategy.
- No training plans – Cadet Academy, detective, or in-service.
- No policies addressing most of the training and Academy operations.

The demeaning treatment of Cadets, instances of military like procedures, military/warrior labels and designations, and a regimen of continuous physical "punishment" for the slightest of rule violations, has created a warrior culture. There are more professional ways to develop and train Cadets than the military style boot camp used by LSP.

The Field Training Officer (FTO) Program and policy is the cornerstone for preparing Cadets yet lacks updated training, updated forms, policy clarity, and flexibility for extending training periods in unique situations.

The Academy policies or procedures are lacking details for:

- Establishing instructor selection, assessment, continuing education, and daily operations.
- Training staff in Curriculum development.
- Utilizing a Records Management System.
- Delivering extensive training in de-escalation and dealing with mentally ill individuals.
- Establishing an Academy/training unit mission and vision statement.
- Establishing an Academy/training unit strategic plan.
- Establishing an Academy/training unit training plan.
- Being gender neutral in all policies and procedures.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

The Bowman Group's evaluation of the Louisiana State Police (LSP) Academy instructors and command staff is that they are a dedicated, experienced, and hardworking group who work well together. Key findings include the LSP has:

- Dedicated staff who are experienced instructors.
- Generally a good reputation across Louisiana especially compared to other departments regarding training, equipment, benefits, and pension.
- Adequate training facilities at the Academy and practical exercise location at Joint Emergency Services Training Center (JESTC).

They are committed to turning out the best Cadets for LSP as they know how based on their legacy, knowledge, and historical traditions of how the LSP Academy is operated. Their instructors are dedicated to the mission of training and do the best with what they have. It should be noted that during our first site visit (May 2022), the Academy staff stated they did not have a mission statement for the Academy or training. In September (2022), TBG was provided a draft LSP Training Academy SOP Manual (dated September 2, 2022) that contains the following Education and Training

Mission Statement:

The mission of the Louisiana State Police Training Academy is to provide Cadet, In-service, and professional development training, grounded in constitutional and community policing and procedural justice. Additionally, training shall reinforce departmental policies, establishing that in all situations, officers shall reasonably attempt to act prudently, and exercise sound judgment based on a deep reverence for human life.

The LSP Academy staff is a dedicated but small group of professionally qualified instructors who work often beyond the call of duty to complete Cadet classes and In-service training programs.

F. TRAINING & ACADEMY OPERATIONS

Scope

The review focused on operations, specifically looking at the tracking of training completion, records, and certification management techniques, how learning objectives are measured in the classroom, and after the Trooper is engaging with the public to determine if policy and training has translated to appropriate actions and behaviors. TBG reviewed how training is being disseminated throughout the LSP and what mechanisms are being used to track compliance with the training, understanding, retention, and Trooper comprehension of new materials.

TBG also reviewed and assessed LSP methodologies for measuring changes in complaints, discipline, and behavioral indicator systems data after training to determine if effective state-wide processes exist to ensure effective learning needs assessments are being conducted and helping to drive training and adjusting LSP training priorities.

Our review also included training related to topical areas covered across the assessment, which include: Community Policing & Engagement; Use of Force; Crisis Intervention (De-Escalation) Policies; Fair and Impartial Policing Practices (SSA); Organizational Culture, Leadership, & Professional Development; Recruitment, Hiring, Promotion & Retention; Officer Wellness, Employee Assistance, Early Intervention Systems; and Technology, Data Collection, & Resources.

Method

The review consisted of site visits, review of Academy policies, requirements from the Louisiana Peace Officers Standards and Training Council (POST) - Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (LCLE), one-on-one interviews with Academy staff including both Academy commanders during this evaluation period, and research of records. Observations of classroom and practical exercise training were also included in the evaluation method.

References

- P.O. 1401 Training Academy Administration
- P.O. 1402 Field Training Officer (FTO) Program
- P.O. 1403 Internship Program
- P.O. 1404 Training Academy and JESTC Lodging Facility Rental Procedures
- P.O. 101 Organizational Structure
- P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics

The following manuals & documents were reviewed:

- Lesson Plans section, Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual (draft), revised September 2, 2022
- In-Service Training section, Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual, revised September 2, 2022
- PO 1401 Administration, Sections 3 - 6; 2022 In-Service Training - HQ-2-2080 Memo

- Broad Goals and Guidelines, Section, Subsection 4, Louisiana State Police Training Academy Standard Operating Procedure Manual, revised September 2, 2022
- LA POST, Academy Guidelines Manual (updated March 22, 2017)
- LSP Training Academy (TA) Review and Assessment of Attrition Report Cadet Class 99

Data

Table 6 Data from LSP Training Academy Review & Assessment report, 5/15/2020

[insert table]

Academy Graduation By Cadet Demographics

The Bowman Group examined how many Cadets graduated from the Academy, how many individuals who graduated completed field training, and how many individuals completed probation. LSP was unable to collect the information for Class 98 in addition to Class 101 in the current Cadet class and set to graduate in November 2022. The Bowman Group found almost all individuals who graduated from the Academy completed field training and probation and attrition is primarily occurring during Academy.

*LSP was unable to collect information for Class 98

*Class 101 is the current Cadet class; graduation is set for 11/4/2022

The Bowman Group examined reasons for failure from the Academy for the 47 Cadets who failed to graduate in Class 96, 97, 99, and 100. In some instances, multiple failure reasons were given for a single Cadet. Therefore, the percentages in the table below add to over 100.0%.

What is not covered in the scope of this review?

Overall limitations of the review for the Training Academy operations assessment consisted of:

- Lack of lesson plans – POST refusal to release for review and LSP not having for each block of instruction
- Inability to observe all types of training due to scheduling – supervisory training, FTO training, and annual in-service training
- Lack of or outdated policies addressing: selection, assessment, and training of instructors; requirements and eligibility for promotions; curriculum development; Cadet training; Duty Officers; storage of training records; Academy daily operations; use of role players; Field Training Officer Program; mission and vision statement; developing practical exercise scenarios; adult-based learning; using outside instructors; using community members to review and/or develop training; a training oversight committee; and measuring changes to training and behavior.

Were there any challenges?

Very few student training or class assessment records were available for review. Most are kept (disorganized) in an office file cabinet. No accessible system was being used to record or track training (specifically, annual in-service training). When asked about training records for the previous couple of years, TBG was told that there is no real record kept and that there may be some written lists in a file. When asked whether a record could be produced

showing which employees attended a certain training course, consultants were told that each employee had to be looked up in the POST LMS system individually to see what training to view their training record.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

RECOMMENDATION 1F:

Create policies covering all operational areas associated with training.

The overall lack of policies is a major concern. The most common answer during the review to the question about whether a policy exists was “No, we probably should though.”

These policies, whether an LSP P.O. or a standard operating procedure focused on a specialized unit, must address operational procedures which are clear across the organization of LSP. An example is having a general policy stating what LSP’s position is on a topic. Then have an operational manual attached to that policy on how to accomplish the policy in detail.

Policies assist by helping staff to make decisions more efficiently. Provides instruction on how to do tasks. Provides consistency. Creates confidence and reduces bias in decision-making. Helps reduce liability.

RECOMMENDATION 2F:

Increase the LSP Academy staff to adequately carry out the training mission

Personnel assigned to the training unit are competent, well trained, and well intentioned. However, the dwindling number of staff is hampering their ability to address most of our findings.

Planning is significantly impacted by the lack of personnel. Either the planning doesn’t get completed or the results are substandard, both of which create delays.

RECOMMENDATION 3F:

Create a training strategy and training plan to inform LSP Command Staff and Academy Staff of the way forward.

This should focus on Incorporating all recommendations in this report based on observations, reviews of policy and interviews will move the LSP training strategy forward.

RECOMMENDATION 4F:

Revise Day One indoctrination for Cadet classes.

Move from a military bootcamp style of training that promotes a Warrior culture to a professional collegiate style of training that promotes a Guardian culture. “Day One” of the LSP Police Academy is like the first day of Army/ Marine bootcamp known as “Hell Day.” The practice on this day degrades and disrespects Cadets unnecessarily. It is the consultants’ opinion that this form of indoctrination & training environment has a direct impact on the way Troopers perform in the community - speaking harshly and derogatorily to the public (as noted in citizen complaints). Consultants submit this is a learned behavior from first and subsequent days of the Academy. Instead, Consultants recommend starting the Academy with problem solving and team building activities.

Consultants were present on Day One of Class #101 and observed the Cadets being directed to carry their duffle

bags and luggage to the breezeway of the Academy between the classroom and War Room gymnasium and stand at attention in alphabetical order. After approximately 15 – 20 minutes, the LSP Academy staff (approximately 15) ran towards the Cadets yelling instructions (very loudly) which included moving the line from one end to the other end of the breezeway and back several times (for no apparent reason). The staff made Cadets perform pushups for letting their bags touch the ground during this line shuffling event. Cadets were also made to perform fitness exercises in the grass, run into the auditorium and back out, stand and sit in formation, and observe how to respond to orders (loudly), march, and turn. According to one staff member, this was to “break them down and instill stress” so the Cadets could be evaluated prior to becoming a Trooper. However, it instills fear of the staff and rules and creates robotic behavior that the staff tries to undo just prior to graduation. There is a more professional way to train law enforcement officers in the 21st Century than the military, boot-camp style used by LSP.

The culture of the training Academy is one of strict discipline and extreme physical fitness, creating robotic behavior. Cadets must adhere to strict guidelines from the 38-page Cadet Manual. Many of the training facilities and training operations are labeled as “tactical” or “war” related, furthering a military mindset throughout the entire Academy. As an example of the warrior mindset, the gymnasium at the Academy has signage designating it as the “WAR ROOM.”

Learning principles in the Cadet Class environment could be coined as “Don’t speak unless spoken to” due to the military boot camp atmosphere which begins on Day One with indoctrination through extremely strict discipline. Physical exercises are imposed as punishment for disobeying rules (which have not been clearly explained to the Cadets) and results in demeaning and disrespectful screaming and yelling that no one should have to endure. Moreover, the Cadets are required to walk or run in formation, look forward and have no eye contact with others, and jump (literally) to attention when an LSP Trooper enters the room or classroom. During site-visit interviews to five Troop headquarters in October 2022, several seasoned lieutenants, sergeants, and Field Training Officers mentioned that when Cadets come to their Troop, they are very “robotic”. Some described the Academy as “hazing.” The Field Training Officers and sergeants work diligently to dismantle this robotic behavior created in the Academy because of its unfriendly appearance to the public. Field training officers must undo what was indoctrinated for weeks at the Academy.

During Site Visit #1 Observation in May 2022, The Bowman Group observed that during a Subject Control training segment at the end of Cadet Class 100, the lead instructor shared his observation about the Cadet’s performance he observed in the Traffic Stop Scenarios - “ You can’t be robotic, you have to let your personality come out, just like you are talking to someone at the gym, be human.” Those comments are on point, however, they have already indoctrinated the Cadets into the “Robo Cop” persona by the military culture they have created in the Academy. The instructor was trying to undo something instilled over the previous 22 weeks (about 5 months).

Cookie story – During a Trooper interview in July 2022, one of The Bowman Group was told of an event that occurred while the Trooper was a Cadet in the last two weeks of his Academy class a few years earlier. An instructor brought into the classroom a platter of cookies covered with plastic wrap and told the Cadets to enjoy the cookies, relax, and that graduation was within a few days. Two days later, the cookies were still covered, and none had been eaten. All the Cadets thought it was a trick and were fearful of eating a cookie and being punished for disobedience, which would have resulted in push-ups, sit ups, or some other form of physical punishment. This anecdotal story is indicative of the mindset instilled in Cadets from Day One until graduation. It is then left to the FTOs to “undo” this mindset when the Cadet is assigned to a Troop. This was described several times to The Bowman Group during Troop interviews in October 2022.

The extreme physical demands of the Academy starting with Day One create an atmosphere where all those, even at the peak of their physical prowess, find it exceedingly difficult. For those who are in good physical condition, they find it overwhelming to keep up physically and many who are particularly good applicants are lost to the physical demands of the Academy. Not only to the physical training but to the incessant punishment in the form of physical “training” for disobedience. In LSP’s own After Action Reports (AAR), they find an average of 25% attrition rate, primarily attributable to physical conditioning. LSP claims in its AAR that “this model (military boot camp) has

and continues to best prepare the men and women for the demands of the job.” LSP is LOSING 25% of its Academy to this “military boot camp” model yet they declare it is the best preparation model.

According to the LSP Training Academy (TA) Review and Assessment of Attrition Report Cadet Class 99, “the LSP Training Academy has historically conducted physically and mentally challenging Cadet classes. LSP Cadet Classes are similar in difficulty and structure to a combination of military boot camps and Trooper candidate schools. TBG believes this model has and continues to best prepare the men and women for the demands of the job.” (See Data section).

Creating Guardians or Warriors? Examining the Effect of Non-Stress Training on Policing Outcomes, Li, Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 2021, Vol. 51 (1) 3-16.; and Transforming Police Recruit Training: 40 Guiding Principles. November 2022, Police Executive Research Forum.

RECOMMENDATION 5F:

Treat Cadets with dignity and respect.

During the Day One indoctrination of Cadet Class 101, LSP staff continuously told/shouted to the Cadets such things as:

“You are not the police anymore.”

“If you are ready to pull out of here, go ahead and save us some time.”

“If this is not for you, raise your hand. We will collect by your sweat.”

“There is a reason for everything we do.” (Consultants question that statement.)

“Get with my program or go away.”

“This is an abbreviated class. Think it’s going to be easy? The sheriff just gives you a star.”

“Get your trash (luggage) and follow me.”

“Sound like you want to be here or you can go away.”

“This is how you will move around MY compound.”

“We don’t want to see your personality or bad look on your face.”

“On my compound, don’t walk like robots. Natural walk from the waist down.”

“If your name is wrong, I couldn’t read your writing. And you’re not using my pen.”

“That’s the worst picture I have ever seen.”

“Did you have a shield? A five-point star? A six-point star?”

“If you’ve had enough, this is the voluntary resignation form.”

“If you’re ready to go home, it will save us a lot of trouble up front.”

Most of these statements and questions were given with a loud, often derogatory, tone. On the first day in the classroom, the Cadets stood at attention until ordered to be seated. After several practices, the Cadets finally were told they would be given a second command to “Adjust” so they could sit comfortably in their seats.

Although no data exists for real reason that Cadets leave the Academy other than “physical preparation,” “aca-

demics,” or “family matters,” The Bowman Group feels strongly that many Cadets leave because of the humiliation, degradation, and dis-respect shown to them by LSP Academy staff and Duty Officers in addition to the relentless physical demands often handed out as punishment to the Cadet class. In its own report, LSP Training Academy (TA) Review and Assessment of Attrition Report Cadet Class 99, LSP Academy staff reveals that since Cadet Class 92, the average attrition rate for Cadet class is 25.91%. In the same Report on Cadet Class 99, it states “the LSP Training Academy has historically conducted physically and mentally challenging Cadet classes. LSP Cadet Classes are similar in difficulty and structure to a combination of military boot camps and officer candidate schools. We believe this model has and continues to best prepare the men and women for the demands of the job.”

The Bowman Group Interview Notes (Troopers/Employees):

LSP Academy “was the hardest thing in my life.”

I learned a lot at my former PD’s Academy and even taught there. I didn’t get anything useful from LSP Academy. LSP could cut the Academy time in half and teach more. I sacrificed a lot, left behind family, etc. for it.

The POST training courses still have the same materials as they were from 1970.

The way they train “took a lot of confidence out of me.” “I almost quit after that.” “It took 6 months to recover.”

They do a lot of “mind game crap” and take away all your confidence. Then they expect you to go out there and have the confidence to make stops and do your job. I fumbled through my first stop because I had no confidence.

They have duty officers that are “on a power trip.” “We were getting punished for stuff all the time.”

It was “a lot of wasted time.” We should have the best training in the state. Instead, it’s “all old school.” The mentality is “I went through it, so you have to.”

Training needs to prepare Troopers for the reality of what they’ll see on the job/the tough parts of the job – for example, you will see a person who died in a fatal crash.

It seems many good Cadets are being lost to the Academy’s current practices.

Related Best Practices: Creating Guardians or Warriors? Examining the Effect of Non-Stress Training on Policing Outcomes, Li, Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 2021, Vol. 51 (1) 3-16.; and Transforming Police Recruit Training: 40 Guiding Principles. November 2022, Police Executive Research Forum.

RECOMMENDATION 6F:

Move from a Warrior culture to a Guardian culture.

Academy Operations: Move from a Warrior culture to a Guardian culture. Day One degrades and disrespects Cadets unnecessarily. LSP should not be surprised that Troopers speak harshly and derogatorily to the public. They learned it from the first day of the Academy!

LSP has a proud, long-standing tradition of using a military “boot camp” approach to introducing Cadets to the Academy atmosphere which begins immediately when the Cadets report to the Academy.

The Cadets in Class #101 were directed to carry their duffle bags and luggage to the breezeway of the Academy between the classroom and War Room gymnasium and stand at attention in alphabetical order. After approxi-

mately 15 – 20 minutes, the LSP Academy staff (approximately 15) approached the Cadets with instructions (loud) which included moving the line from one end to the other and back (for no apparent reason). The staff made the Cadets perform fitness exercises in the grass, run into the auditorium and back out, stand and sit in formation, and observe how to respond to orders (loudly), march, and turn. The Cadets completed paperwork, received their ID badges, and dorm room assignments. They were then escorted to their dorm room, instructed on the arrangements in their rooms, and how to make their beds.



This military boot camp style Academy is a legacy at the LSP. During interviews in October 2022 (and prior) with Troops across the state, The Bowman Group was told on numerous occasions that completing the Academy was a “rite of passage” but the hardest thing they had ever done and did not want to do it again. It is prevalent among state police but not in regional law enforcement academies. LSP can recruit veteran officers who bring hundreds of years’ experience to the organization, mainly because of benefits, pay, and professionalism. Because of the initial orientation into a para-military style Academy, LSP misses an opportunity to welcome aboard those Cadets with valuable experience. Instead, the Cadets are demeaned as no longer having a law enforcement commission, to the point of making light of their previous badge shape (shield or star). Many Cadets leave a department where they spent up to fifteen years and committed to the LSP for a more professional organization. Day One orientation fell short of giving the Cadets in CC101 the respect of over 200 years serving the public safety of Louisiana. LSP is and can be better than that.

In a recent (November 2022) interview with a sergeant from the Florida Department of Corrections who was recruiting officers at a public event, she was asked about the type of Academy that correctional officers attend in Florida. She described it as a college-type atmosphere where fitness and academics are important. When asked about a military, boot-camp style Academy, she responded, “Why would you want to run them off with that type of Academy?”

Related Best practices: Creating Guardians or Warriors? Examining the Effect of Non-Stress Training on Policing Outcomes, Li, Nicholson-Crotty, Nicholson-Crotty. The American Review of Public Administration, 2021, Vol. 51 (1) 3-16.; and Transforming Police Recruit Training: 40 Guiding Principles. November 2022, Police Executive Research Forum.

RECOMMENDATION 7F:

Develop and follow policy for measuring learning objectives in the classroom.

LSP Identifies two methods for measuring learning objectives in their New (Draft) Training Academy SOP: Knowledge-based Testing & Exams and Performance-based Testing & Practical Exercises. Recommend expanding their measuring paradigm to include additional measures like oral quizzing and teach backs.

RECOMMENDATION 8F:

Establish a policy to track all things related to training records, how learning objectives are measured, and determine if policy and training has translated to appropriate Trooper actions and behaviors.

Records and surveys can determine if training has impacted Trooper behavior but only if the surveys are deployed regularly and the analysis date utilized to make changes to training and policy. Use of the Kirkpatrick-type model of follow-up on training will provide valuable data on behavior.

Related Best Practices: FLETA Academy Standards, A1.15, A1.16, and A1.17 (www.fleta.org)

RECOMMENDATION 9F:

Establish a policy that outlines how training is being disseminated throughout LSP.

No policies located on this aspect of training. The Bowman Group found that the “In-Service Sergeant shall approve all training conducted by the Training Academy staff.” Many of the training opportunity information travels quickly by word-of-mouth among the Troops. Instead of posting training calendar via Lotus Notes, an In-Service Training Memorandum is disseminated annually with the current year’s training and schedule (Policy & Procedure still states via Lotus Notes - needs to be changed).

LSP plans to move to a new RMS system. Training is pushed out for Annual In-Service Training, Online Training Courses (LEO & POST LMS), Roll Call Training, Specialized Training, and by Training bulletins. Training Academy Staff may develop training bulletins for submittal through the chain of command for their consideration to disseminate to commissioned personnel if there should a change to a law, standard, etc., or make an urgent explanation necessary.

RECOMMENDATION 10F:

Conduct a “gap analysis” of what types of training courses are missing and needed for LSP.

Several recommendations in this report identify training programs or classes which could enhance the efficiency of the LSP, especially within the detective division and for experienced Troopers.

Related Best Practices: FLETA (www.fleta.gov) Section 3, Program Training Development Standards - 3.04 The applicant defines and validates tasks to derive training objectives. Advisory: The applicant may use subject matter experts, policies, legislation, etc. to determine: the tasks to be trained, the organization/grouping of job-related

tasks, and the special conditions under which tasks will be performed; and 3.05 Objectives are derived from job tasks (job requirements). Advisory: A task-to-objective matrix may be used to demonstrate this relationship.

RECOMMENDATION 11F:

Develop and adhere to a policy addressing methods for measuring changes in complaints after training.

There are no policies addressing methods for measuring changes in complaints after training. The Bowman Group reviewed the policy, LSP P.O. 901 Code of Conduct and Ethics, which barely addresses complaints. “44. CITIZEN COMPLAINTS (i), A commissioned officer shall courteously accept any written and signed complaint made by a citizen against any officer or the Department in accordance with these policies and procedures. ii) Officers may attempt to resolve the complaint consistent with Departmental policies and procedures but shall never attempt to dissuade any citizen from lodging a complaint against any officer or the Department.”

There is currently no connection between training and complaints or complaints about training. This is not addressed by policy or training for Cadets, Field Training Officer training, or In-Service training.

As there is no policy to measure changes in complaints after training, there should be changes to training beginning with In-Service training. Prior to IST, develop an e-Learning video to demonstrate if effective state-wide processes exist to ensure effective learning needs assessments.

For existing courses, survey student reactions (Level I of Kirkpatrick model or equivalent) to improve training. Review the examination results (Level II of Kirkpatrick model or equivalent) and gather/review feedback (Level III of Kirkpatrick model or equivalent) from graduates and others who observe the graduate's behavior. Ensure that training programs are comprehensively reviewed with a five-year period and revised if necessary.

There are currently no long-term assessments being conducted for determining if learning is taking place after training as outlined in survey models such as the Kirkpatrick model of Levels I, II, and III surveys for students.

Related Best Practice: Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA), Program Standard 3.16 - Conducting, compiling, and reviewing student reactions (Level 1 of the Kirkpatrick model or an equivalent) to identify opportunities to improve the program, instruction, and support/administrative elements of the training received.

RECOMMENDATION 12F:

Develop a “detective” or “investigator” training program.

There are no formal training programs offered to LSP staff when they are transferred to the detective division as an investigator. Much like the Field Training Officer Program, there is a need for formal training for detectives as the mission and operations of investigators can be much different than those of a Trooper. As suggested recently by The Bowman Group expert Michael Dirden, there is a need for a two-day detective training program, especially for those investigators in the Internal Affairs office where critical decisions and offenses are reviewed.

The briefing in November 2022 on Use of Force and Internal Affairs investigations by a Bowman Group Consultant revealed that there was no formal training for Internal Affairs investigators. This was left to their learning from other detectives and the use of a “checklist” for internal affairs matters.

Related Best Practices: Institute of Police Technology and Management (IPTM) at the University of North Florida, Jacksonville, FL.; Police Internal Affairs training course.; Criminal Investigation Techniques.; Interviews and Interrogations.; and Advanced Interviews and Interrogations.

NOTE: It is not the intent of The Bowman Group to endorse a training vendor, however, numerous LSP Academy

staff members have attended IPTM trainings in the past and are familiar with the quality of the instruction. This is only a suggestion.

RECOMMENDATION 13F:

Review, revise, and redevelop the use of force training components related to when to use force, appropriate use of force, and when to avoid using force (de-escalation).

The Bowman Group Interview Notes (Troopers/Employees):

At the Academy, we only had one normal traffic stop like I usually deal with every day. The rest were these very extreme situations where you must be prepared to “fight for your life” – it was “officer survival week.” These scenarios teach officers what to expect on the road, but it’s not what most traffic stops are really like. There needs to be more balance – “the balance isn’t all the way there.” There isn’t a lot of instruction about how to avoid the use of force in the first place. At LSU we got instruction on verbal judo; something like that is missing in the training Academy at LSP.

During force training, we watch videos from other agencies. We should be looking internally for training opportunities. We should consider videos from LSP officers – what worked and what could have been better.

Training/guidance re: supervisor’s use of force review - Didn’t receive any formal training on what a sergeant’s role/responsibilities should be. No training on how to review uses of force.

Recommended the FLETC use of force train the trainers – got pushback because it’s geared towards trainers, but it would be helpful to anybody; it’s grounded in the legal standards, discusses the difference between subjective and objective use of force report writing, etc.

Also, a recommendation was made to host the FBI LEEDA leadership training – it would be good for supervisors. But the agency is always focused on “what can we pull off by ourselves?”

RECOMMENDATION 14F:

Provide training for supervisors on use of force reviews, BWC reviews, and report writing.

The Bowman Group Interview Notes – Troopers/Employees:

After reviewing use of force BWC, we just write “reviewed” without any details/recommendation because we were instructed not to write a lot. “I’m not sure what else I would say.” “It could be beneficial” to get additional training on use of force report writing and review/supervisor’s review.

We could use more training in the use of force and updating subordinates on the standards. There’s “not a lot of training” when you make the transition from Trooper to supervisor. Received no formal training on what to do as a sergeant – “it’s pretty much on the job training.” The Lt. walked him through the force review process when one occurred recently. It was helpful – “you can get lost in Mark43.”

RECOMMENDATION 15F:

Expand training to include bias awareness, how to interact with diverse community members, and de-escalation.

A consistent theme from the community members who were interviewed was a need for better training on some of the “soft” skills of interactions with people that identify as minorities. TBG was told that LSP should be “training

Troopers to respect people for who they are, and don't draw conclusions;" "understand that Black women, like Black men, have a fear of police based on prior contact and the news;" and that Troopers need to "be mindful that how you treat people scars them and they carry that for a long time." Presently, the Academy curriculum does not include these topics; de-escalation is only a 12-hour block during the Academy, with no real in-service follow up to encourage practice of these tactics. As such, LSP should expand Academy and in-service training sessions to address these concerns. Also, de-escalation should also be integrated into all aspects, such as firearms, Taser, and defensive tactics – not solely stand-alone training. Additionally, Troopers have indicated one barrier to engaging with the community is a fear of "saying the wrong thing."

Conducting training on how to interact in a sensitive manner with a variety of marginalized groups, so that Troopers will have the confidence to proceed, while preventing harm. Training should include how to speak to 1) communities of color; 2) impartial policing; 3) interacting with persons living with intellectual and/or physical disabilities and people living with mental or behavioral health conditions; 4) LGBTQIA+ community; 5) immigrant populations. Procedural justice, communication skills, and conflict resolution skills should be included too, since these skill sets will help break down existing barriers that may lead to increased bi-lateral trust.

Implicit bias training, while not the only solution, can be helpful; however, it is important to understand historical trauma around policing. Resource: Civil Rights and Restorative Justice Project (CRRJ) at Northeastern University School of Law.

The mistakes and missteps of the Ronald Greene case should be taught as a cautionary case study in the Academy and during in-service training.

Additionally, another theme that was present was moving away from the "warrior" mindset. Concerns were raised by civilians and law enforcement from other departments that LSP will conduct pursuits and arrests at any cost, leading to the perception by some that the Troopers do not care about community safety. One incident, as reported by a law enforcement officer, involved a Trooper bragging about a pursuit where he hit a juvenile who was on a dirt bike with his patrol vehicle, stating "yeah, I hit him, but he shouldn't have been running from me anyway. I told his mama to go in person to Baton Rouge to file a complaint." The law enforcement officer was stunned to hear openly, with a callous tone, in front of multiple Troopers and officers. The "us versus them" mentality leads to community harm and disrespect.

Training should also highlight the importance of clearly stating the reasons for stopping motorists. When one leaves an encounter, there should be no questions as to why one was pulled over - it must not be a guessing game. Several community members felt that they left the encounter not understanding why they were stopped, leading them to fill in the blank that the stop was a result of racial profiling. There was also a common thread of if they asked questions as to the Trooper's reasons for stopping them, they were met with "are you talking back to me?" While there is no legal requirement for officers to reveal why a person is being stopped, probable cause remains the standard for a stop. There is no harm in the Trooper stating the reason for the stop, rather than the default "Do you know why I am stopping you?" as a rhetorical question with no concrete answer when the civilian responds in the negative.

LSP should revisit the policy of pulling civilians out of a vehicle, especially on the side of the highway in traffic. If it is unsafe for the Trooper to be out on the side of traffic, it would be unsafe for a civilian too.

Troopers working in New Orleans, and specifically in the French Quarter should learn and follow New Orleans Police Department's French Quarter (NOPD/FQ) social/local enforcement norms and be trained on rights and regulations on street performances to stop inconsistent enforcement between how the New Orleans Police Department handles certain encounters as opposed to how LSP handles the same situation. The Music and Culture Coalition of New Orleans (MaCCNO), who works with street performers, has done training on the laws involving street performances for NOPD, which has been a source of contention for some time. They are willing to train as well as create a guide for LSP. Troop N should engage a community engagement person with institutional knowledge regarding the French Quarter, street performers, and to liaise with NOPD.

RECOMMENDATION 16F:

Restructure the purpose and use of Duty Officers in the Academy.

Notwithstanding the job description provided in Appendix F of the LSP Training Academy SOP Manual (090222 draft), an Academy staff member advised Duty Officers conduct “remedial training” during the Academy off hours (evening/night). One staff member stated that the Duty Officers often conduct “extra” (used air quotes) physical training sessions which he termed “paying penance.” Appendix F states “[a]nother form of Counseling used to reinforce the LSP core values and correct minor infractions are corrective physical training exercises.” Appendix F specifically states “While the Duty Officer acts in a supervisory manner and has the authority to administer corrective PT, they are not a drill instructor. All counseling, be it corporal or administrative, should be within reason. The CADET(s) should be made aware of why they are doing corrective PT.” One Cadet interviewed by consultant said that there were times when they had to do corrective PT but were not told why.

RECOMMENDATION 17F:

Utilize Mark 43 to record training records, if possible, to consolidate to one records management system.

The Bowman Group has a few samples of training records. Academy staff reports that student records are kept in file cabinets and are disorganized. LSP is transitioning to an electronic records management system, Mark 43, but little data is available on it so far. ACADIS currently houses all the training records that are in electronic form.

At least one Academy staff member with a backup member must be responsible for recording all training records and the security of those records in the new Mark 43 Records Management System. At present, the paper records from previous training are kept in an office file cabinet with little or no security.

Related Best Practices: FLETA Academy Standards, A1.15, A1.16, and A1.17

A1.15 The Academy maintains records for each offering of the training program. At a minimum, each record will include curriculum content (e.g., syllabi, lesson plans, training materials, etc.); a listing of all instructors and other instructional personnel indicating the actual block of instruction in which each presented or participated; inclusive dates the program is conducted and actual dates and times when each segment of training occurs; roster of participants; and practical evaluations and/or written examinations and keys.

A1.16 The Academy maintains records for each student attending the program. At a minimum, each record will include: if the training has prerequisites, documentation that verifies the student met all prerequisites for attending the training program; a complete record of the students’ training evaluations (grades, scores, results); documentation of any exceptions, waivers or reasonable accommodations requested or granted to the student; and documentation that verifies the student successfully completes the training program.

A1.17 The Academy follows procedures for program-related and student training records (physical and/or electronic) regarding security; release; retention; and destruction.

Advisory: The intent of the standard is to address processes associated with program and student record keeping, and may include such items as transcript requests, FOIA requests, system backup notifications, records access logs, external requests for training materials, etc.

RECOMMENDATION 18F:

Use former staff or volunteers to recover previous records and incorporate them into the electronic RMS.

With limited LSP Academy staff, utilizing volunteer or former staff members (WAE) as part time employees to recover previous records for the new Records Management System. All staff should be vetted and have a background check when handling these important records. Another solution is to utilize college students as interns to assist those students working in logistics or records management.

11.

Technology



Technology

Scope

This report provides a summary of the work conducted to assess LSP's Information Technology (IT). TBG also provide our observations and recommendations for strengthening the gaps identified in foundational IT support and governance processes and provide policy guidance.

The Bowman Group was asked to conduct a review of information technology (IT) processes and systems currently in place at the Louisiana State Police (LSP), including its: (1) Records Management System (RMS); (2) Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system; (3) State Message Switch System (SMSS); and (4) Communications Management Systems.

Although not within the four subject areas The Bowman Group was specifically asked to review, we feel compelled to also discuss gaps identified during this assessment in several foundational IT support and governance processes that LSP must address to set itself up for success in modernizing its IT and supporting its workforce and the community into the future.

Method

The Bowman Group conducted multiple interviews on-site and remotely. Those interviewed included IT leaders and staff and end users in the field, including those in dispatch, patrol operations, and investigations. Troopers, managers, and LSP leadership were all interviewed to identify current IT systems and capabilities and to understand how users engage with technology and data systems across LSP.

References

LSP also provided The Bowman Group with policies, lesson plans, and other documentation related to the use of technology.

Records & Documents

The following documents were reviewed:

Body Worn Cameras and In-Car Video

- P.O. 1117 Body Worn Camera and In-Car Camera Systems (April 1, 2022)
- LSP TASER AXON Body 3 Camera –Fleet 3 In-Car Camera Training Course Lesson Plan (April 1, 2022)
- Axon Performance PowerPoint Presentation (2021)

RMS

- Mark 43 - RMS Basic End User Operations Manual
- Mark 43 – 1st Responder (CAD) Basic End User Operations Manual
- Mark 43 – RMS Internal Affairs/Non IA Training Presentation

Mobile Communications

- Draft Wireless Voice/Data Communications Equipment Policy

Data

Limitations

While there are dozens of other data systems in place at LSP, the scope of this assessment focused on the (1) Records Management System (RMS); (2) Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system; (3) State Message Switch System (SMSS); and (4) Communications Management Systems.

Is there a need for further review of certain topics/areas beyond this scope?

There are other efforts underway to modernize LSP technology. In particular, LSP is working to implement a document management solution to assist in the tracking of public records requests, and the movement of documentation across the Department of Public Safety.

While that effort is not specifically covered in this assessment, The Bowman Group has recommended that LSP and OTS ensure this project is approached with proper IT Governance and related business processes. Specifically, The Bowman Group recommends that LSP engage subject matter experts to help document LSP's operational and business requirements for a document management solution, prior to selecting a technology solution.

Proposed Recommendations & Findings

Foundational IT Support

When utilized effectively, technology can help shape a more efficient and transparent agency; one that emphasizes the appropriate use of data and analytics to put the right resources and services in the right places at the right time; leverages technology as a force multiplier; and uses technology to better serve the community. LSP can strengthen its technological capabilities by first focusing on three fundamental issues: (1) IT strategy; (2) IT governance; and (3) IT resources and capacity.

IT Strategy and Roadmap

An agency's vision for technology must be driven by its goals for public safety. Once those overarching operational goals are established, an agency must then develop an IT Strategy and Roadmap that include IT objectives and initiatives specifically tied to those agency goals.

A proper process for developing such a strategy should include the following steps:

- a. Identify overarching agency goals and objectives
- b. Interview executive and operational stakeholders to understand how each of their functional areas support those goals and objectives, and how technology and data systems come into play for each.
- c. Review existing IT and related infrastructure. Identify the state of core IT solutions and infrastructure. Identify challenges posed by current IT solutions or paper-based processes. Understand what is working and what is not.

- d. Create a roadmap over a defined period of time (3-5 years) based upon identified priorities, define resource allocation, and budget.
- e. Define metrics to determine how progress and outcomes of the IT strategy will be measured.
- f. Update the strategy annually to ensure it remains in line with agency needs.

As LSP continues with its Mark43 implementation, sets out to better manage its records, and ultimately seeks to improve upon its collection and use of data, a formal IT Strategy will become even more critical.

RECOMMENDATION 1:

Develop and adopt an organization-wide IT Strategic Plan to align technology modernization and data collection priorities.

The IT Strategic Plan should directly support the overall goals and objectives of LSP and set forth a roadmap for the IT initiatives that are a priority for the agency. The Strategic Plan should be developed in consultation with OTS, to ensure that fundamental IT needs (e.g., aging hardware and software, security, etc.) are considered during the development of the plan and roadmap.

IT Governance

Supporting the development and implementation of that IT vision should be a formal IT governance structure to help set and manage priorities. Clear lines regarding IT governance are critical to the operation of a public safety agency, as IT serves as the foundation for all operations, including mission-critical communications, accurate reporting, investigations, management, and transparency. Without a proper governance structure that includes both IT staff and business owners, IT is often misaligned with the business, is implemented in an IT “vacuum”, and is rarely successful.

A governance structure that allows leadership to define operational goals and objectives and ensure that all IT initiatives directly support those goals is key to successful IT. A proper IT governance structure should enable sound IT decisions making, ensure silos are not created, advocate for proper funding, plan for ongoing training and education, develop proper policies, and work to understand the needs and requirements of its users. Such a structure should also enable leadership to reprioritize initiatives as new or unexpected priorities arise.

Currently, within LSP, IT governance appears to rest mainly with the processes established by the Louisiana State Office of Technology Services (OTS). OTS is the centralized IT service provider to all Louisiana executive branch agencies. OTS is responsible for all IT procurement and supports the infrastructure, network, applications, information security, and end user devices across the LSP.

OTS has established the Enterprise Governance Group (EGG), in which LSP participates, as well as a Technical Working Group, which support IT projects by providing technical expertise and input. LSP, however, does not appear to have its own formalized IT governance structure, processes in place to assist with long-term IT strategic planning, and/or the documentation of business/functional requirements to work in conjunction with the OTS governance processes.

The following outlines a recommended governance framework.

Executive Level Governance

An executive level steering committee (ESC), comprised of leadership from various areas across an organization,

should set and oversee priorities for IT needs, ensuring all long-term plans for technology and data are in line with the organization's operational goals and objectives.

Often reporting up to the ESC is one or more working groups that develop and make recommendations to the ESC on IT initiatives. For example, a working group could focus on documenting business requirements and use cases for a particular business need the ESC has identified. They would then present that information to the ESC for review and approval.

The ESC should participate in the development of and ultimately oversee the implementation of the IT Strategic Plan, ensuring a roadmap is in place, and that each IT initiative that has been prioritized directly supports the goals and objectives of the larger organization.

If implemented effectively, leadership will know what stage each IT project or data initiative is in, what approvals are pending, and what business leaders and stakeholders (internal and external) are involved. The ESC must also be able to reprioritize initiatives as new or unexpected priorities arise, and to coordinate with the OTS EGG accordingly.

Project Level Governance

Any technology initiative must include a clear governance structure to ensure best practices are followed for the planning, implementation, and support of each technology or data system initiative. When IT initiatives fail, it is often not due directly to failures in the technology itself; rather, failures are often the result of gaps in the planning, management, and governance of the technology initiative.

A working group assigned to an IT initiative should define user needs and functional business requirements, work with IT resources to understand what capabilities or improvements are possible, communicate those user needs and business requirements to the appropriate IT resources, and then serve as subject matter experts to test new systems and capabilities to ensure they meet the needs of the business. They might also help provide input into use policies and procedures and even serve in a "train-the-trainer" capacity during deployment of the new technology.

The relationship between the LSP IT Governance framework, and the processes established by OTS must also be made clear. There is currently considerable confusion between LSP and OTS regarding which entity is responsible for which activities at both an executive level and project level. For example, during interviews, many at LSP thought OTS was responsible for documenting business/functional requirements for new IT initiatives, while many at OTS believed it is the responsibility of the requesting agency (LSP) to document those requirements. As such, large IT initiatives, such as the search for a records management solution for the Department of Public Safety, are beginning in a space of confusion, with either party wondering when the other is going to begin their documentation process.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

Implement an IT governance framework.

This should include an Executive Steering Committee (ESC), and a working group. A representative from OTS leadership should participate in the LSP IT ESC, as described below in Recommendation 4, so they can gain a direct understanding of business and policy goals/objectives and provide input regarding foundational IT considerations (e.g., information security issues, timelines re gaining legacy hardware or software, etc.)

RECOMMENDATION 3:

Document business/functional requirements and use cases for each initiative included in the IT Strategy and Roadmap.

Those functional requirements should be shared within the OTS governance framework so that OTS can help add technical requirements that best support the functional requirements and ensure LSP ultimately identifies the best IT solutions to meet its needs.

It should be noted that if LSP does not possess the expertise to implement the above recommendations, external subject matter experts should be engaged to assist with the development and implementation an IT governance structure, related processes, and ultimately the IT Strategy and Roadmap.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

Assign an LSP IT Portfolio Manager to work with the LSP IT ESC with OTS.

Such a position would focus on plans for IT modernization within LSP and work directly with LSP on the development of an IT Strategy, ultimately producing a roadmap and schedule to support the IT Strategy. This position should be a management or leadership position within OTS, as this will require strategic planning capabilities and management

IT Support

Without the proper resources in place, an organization cannot be successful in implementing and supporting modern technology and its users. Recently, as the need for IT has grown, the IT organization within LSP has not kept pace.

LSP IT is supported jointly by the LSP Technology and Business Support (TBS) Section, and OTS. Coordination between LSP and OTS, however, appears to be disjointed. If the governance processes described above are to be successful, the confusion surround the LSP/OTS working relationship must be clarified.

When interviewed, LSP staff and leadership were unclear as to how and when OTS resources are made available and whether there are OTS resources dedicated to supporting LSP. Further, LSP cited instances where they thought they had a project team assembled to support an LSP IT initiative, only to have the OTS resources swapped out, leaving LSP feeling as if they were starting from scratch on a project. Moreover, LSP indicated there are some occasions wherein they believe a project has been formalized and OTS resources have been assigned, yet resources are not readily available during critical phases of the project. Additionally, LSP indicated that OTS would sometimes make changes to an area of IT infrastructure (e.g., network equipment), without making the proper notifications across LSP, resulting in outages and connectivity issues for end users.

During interviews of OTS, on the other hand, OTS leadership conveyed a clear picture of how projects should be initiated, how resources are assigned, and how changes are to be managed. As such, it appears that much of the confusion between the two organizations is a communications issue. Without both parties being in lockstep through every phase of a project, however, IT initiatives will not be successful.

Moreover, while OTS focuses on traditional IT support (e.g., desktop support, IT security, infrastructure), it is not able to support other critical functions that directly impact the end users of LSP IT. Rather, LSP TBS manages those functions, as it should, given that those functions specifically require knowledge of public safety policies and business processes. A dedicated team within TBS must manage critical functions, such as system administration, end user training, reporting and quality assurance processes.

LSP TBS, however, is critically understaffed to perform these functions. For example, approximately 1.5 to 2 full-time equivalent (FTE) resources have been dedicated to those responsibilities for the rollout of the Mark43 CAD and RMS; two mission-critical, enterprise-wide systems, that impact every facet of the LSP. In most cases, a team of at least five to ten resources would be assigned to just one of these systems during implementation

If IT staff with the necessary subject matter expertise are not in place, proper support for existing systems becomes problematic and the expansion of IT and data systems will not be feasible. DPSS must address its IT staffing issues if it intends to maintain, let alone expand and improve, its use of technology and data systems.

- **System Administration** – Configuring software applications to ensure a smooth end-user experience (e.g., are the right fields in the RMS mandatory vs. optional, is a user prompted to complete the right forms for a specific crime type, etc.); ensuring appropriate records retention rules are built in based on evidentiary rules; and other tasks specific to public safety use cases.
- **End User Training** – Ensuring all end-users are trained in the policies and procedures pertaining to each system, not just from a technical perspective, but also from a practical/functional perspective. (e.g., training should not solely focus on how to click through a screen but should be based in operational policy and procedure.)
- **Reporting and Analysis** – Understanding the data to build reports, dashboards and analyses to support the needs of LSP management, leadership and external stakeholders. (e.g., produce regular statistics, reports for data-driven decision making, risk management analyses, etc.)
- **Quality Assurance** – Ensuring that IT systems are being used according to policy, quality data is being captured, and that gaps are identified and remedied.
- **End-User Support** – Ensuring that users encountering issues as they interface with LSO systems are supported 24/7.
- **Continuous Improvement** – Identifying frequently occurring end-user issues and ensuring system improvements are vetted and implemented accordingly.

RECOMMENDATION 5:

Define, document, and communicate exactly how it supports LSP with OTS.

This communication should cover:

- Exactly what the division of responsibilities is between OTS and LSP TBS, from the inception of an IT project through support and maintenance.
- The process by which a joint OTS/LSP TBS team is formed to plan for and support an IT initiative from inception of an IT project through support and maintenance.
- The process by which the right OTS resources will be assigned through each phase of a project, and a formalized process for phasing an OTS resource on or off a project, including the knowledge transfer process.

RECOMMENDATION 6:

Develop and implement a staffing plan to enable TBS to support LSP IT and data systems.

Responsibilities of TBS staff should include: system administration, training, reporting/analysis, quality assurance, end-user support, and system support/improvements. The staffing plan should include a near-term plan to support its ongoing Mark43 deployment and other new tech being deployed in the next 12 months, and a long-term plan to support the implementation of the initiatives to be included in an IT Strategy and Roadmap. Related costs should include annual training needs for all staff (e.g. system administrator training, instructor training, etc.)

Data & Communications Systems

The Bowman Group was asked to specifically assess the following four IT solutions: (1) Records Management System; (2) Computer Aided Dispatch system; (3) State Message Switch System; and (4) Communications Management Systems. The following offer our observations about LSP's implementation of each technology, and recommendations for any improvements that should be considered.

Records Management System

A modern Records Management System (RMS) should serve as the foundation to enable a law enforcement agency to collect, manage, and produce data that is integral to agency operations. An RMS should provide the ability to complete incident/crime/arrest reports, report crime to the public and the FBI/DOJ, produce copies of reports for those members of the community involved in an incident (e.g., traffic collision reports), maintain the chain of custody of property and evidence, and provide the necessary documentation to file cases.

LSP has deployed a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) RMS developed by Mark43 in a phased manner over the course of the past two years. The RMS is web based, user friendly, and appears to be generally accepted by those in the field in a positive manner.

Because the RMS has been deployed in a phased manner, with additional features and functionality still to come, most users expressed frustration in the duplicative data entry that is currently required. For example, citations are still handwritten on paper, but information must also be typed into Mark43; DWIs are either entered into a separate system or handwritten and then also typed into Mark43.

Other users expressed frustration regarding RMS functionality not working as expected. In some cases, the root cause of this frustration appears to be user error, however, these types of issues are difficult to assess in the absence of an RMS user support team.

While deploying an RMS in a phased manner is in line with best practices, it is not common that such a large scale, enterprise-wide IT deployment would be executed by such a small team of resources. Typically, such an endeavor would require an IT configuration team, a training cadre, and a user support/deployment team. The Mark43 RMS has been deployed with essentially only 1.5 full-time resources assigned to the project. While it should be noted that this very small team has accomplished a great deal, in deploying the Mark43 platform without additional resources, the issues regarding duplicative data entry and the need for additional user support and training will not be addressed in an effective manner.

Moreover, LSP does not have centralized Records Section to manage the day-to-day use of the RMS. Critical tasks, such as a quality assurance review of the data entered into the RMS, fall on the LSP TBS resources. A centralized Records Section should be responsible for a variety of tasks pertaining to the RMS, such as ensuring the proper use of the RMS and responding to records requests. Such a section should also be responsible for implementing a data management strategy, in conjunction with TBS. A data management strategy should involve verifying the quality of the data being entered by users, cleansing data as needed (e.g., resolving two individuals into one master name record, where a person has been entered into the system on two separate occasions), and identifying areas of needed improvement in the RMS (e.g., updating drop down lists, recommending mandatory fields, etc.).

Currently, there is no entity responsible for these tasks, and users interviewed expressed concern about reporting data out of Mark 43 when they are not sure if they can trust the data. A law enforcement agency's data must be

accurate, reliable and accessible to the right people at the right time. Without accurate data, an organization's statistics will be called into question, and management will be unable to make data driven decisions about deployment, crime strategies, and the like.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance and National Institute of Justice Standard Functional Specifications for Law Enforcement Records Management Systems describes the general requirements of an RMS as:

- Single entry (i.e., no duplicate data entry)
- RMS should automatically submit data to external sources as defined by the agency
- Maximum use of code tables
- Ability to enter and query narrative(s)/text fields
- Spell check and formatting capability on narrative(s)/ text fields
- Ability to access multiple systems from a single RMS workstation
- Single database (i.e., virtual or physical)
- Validation on data entry (i.e., logical edits, edit checks for all fields)

(See Standard Functional Specifications for Law Enforcement Records Management Systems, p. 1.)

An RMS should also include master indices that connect and aggregate information in various areas, including people, locations, property, vehicles, etc. "Master indices eliminate redundant data entry by allowing the reuse of previously stored information and the automatic update of the master indices upon the entry of report information." (See Standard Functional Specifications for Law Enforcement Records Management Systems, p. 3.)

Moreover, the International Association of Chiefs of Police Standard Functional Specifications for Law Enforcement Records Management Systems Version III, "[w]ithout strict data quality controls and reviews, inaccurate information entered in the RMS can propagate through justice agencies creating significant issues in the processing of a case." (See Standard Functional Specifications for Law Enforcement Records Management Systems Version III, April 2021, p. 11.)

RECOMMENDATION 7:

Establish a centralized Records Section.

The Records Section should ensure the proper use of the RMS, conduct data quality reviews, cleanse data as needed, identify areas of needed improvement in the RMS, produce data as needed, and respond to records requests.

RECOMMENDATION 8:

Develop a Data Management Strategy.

This should include a plan for how data is reviewed, corrected, maintained, and reported.

RECOMMENDATION 9:

Conduct a review of manually created reports and reports requiring duplicate data entry and develop a plan to incorporate all relevant reports into the RMS.

This should include the incorporation of eCitations and DWI forms, as well as the inclusion of data that should be captured by the LSP but has not been collected to date. (e.g., stops data, search data, etc.)

RECOMMENDATION 10:

Add resources to the LSP TBS team responsible for the deployment and support of the Mark43 platform.

The details of this need have been described throughout this report but are so critical to the continued success of the Mark43 implementation that it is called out again here.

Computer Aided Dispatch

A modern and reliable Computer Aided Dispatch (“CAD”) system is critical to the operation of a police department. CAD enables officers to be dispatched quickly to calls for service and be provided with the necessary information to respond to the call.

LSP deployed a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) CAD developed by Mark43 in March 2021. This is the first CAD to be deployed and utilized by LSP, and Dispatchers appear to be very happy with the addition. The system is easy to use and provides much more robust functionality than the Lotus Notes applications Dispatchers had to use in the past.

There were some needed areas of improvement noted by end users. Mapping capabilities were noted as needing improvement, as the initial version of the map in CAD did not have state highways and interstates labeled appropriately, and “common” names for certain roadways, bridges and other locations were not present in some instances. Dispatchers also expressed concerns that some of the older desktop computers in use might not be sufficient to support the demands of the CAD and related mapping software.

The remaining gaps identified to date regarding CAD appear to be less about actual IT needs, and more about business process and the lack of standard operating procedures and policy. Each regional dispatch center operates independently, without an overarching command or policy in place to standardize operations or the procedures Troopers should follow when interacting with Dispatch. There is also no official dispatcher training in place, which poses a risk to LSP given that the dispatch resources were traditionally viewed as radio operators and transcribers but are now expected to serve in a more traditional dispatch capacity.

Moreover, while Troopers are responsible for updating their status and clearing their calls, there does not appear to be an accountability mechanism in place to ensure Troopers are following proper protocol when interacting with Dispatchers and interfacing with CAD. This lack of accountability can lead to several issues related to data quality, and most importantly, Trooper safety.

RECOMMENDATION 11:

Develop and implement a training program for Dispatchers.

This should include operational policies and protocols that apply to Dispatchers and Troopers in the field. A dispatch training coordinator should also be established to ensure new Dispatchers receive consistent training, and that regular in-service training is provided to all Dispatchers.

RECOMMENDATION 12:

TBS and Dispatchers should meet regularly to identify potential areas for improvement within CAD.

This should include a review of system capabilities, as well as hardware needs for Dispatchers.

State Message Switch

A State Message Switch System (SMSS) enables law enforcement agencies throughout the state to connect in a secure manner to run the criminal history of an individual. LSP deployed a new web based SMSS in December 2021. While the SMSS is currently functioning well and no known issues have been reported recently, many interviewed about the SMSS expressed concern about the support provided by OTS during the deployment and day-to-day.

While the OTS resources appear to be well qualified, the primary concern is that OTS staff is often rotated through-out a project or project support. As new OTS support staff come into a project mid-stream, LSP resources must take several steps back to bring the OTS resource up to speed. This concern was echoed throughout interviews generally, even outside of SMSS discussions.

As the issues related to OIT are discussed previously in this report, no further recommendations are necessary in this area.

COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Communication Management Systems within LSP fall into two categories: (1) radio communications and (2) Smartphones/mobile devices.

Radio Communications

LSP manages a Statewide Motorola radio network system that hosts all statewide emergency responders. This includes 40 state-owned radio towers, which LSP IT staff inspects and tests on a periodic basis. LSP recently contracted to replace T1 lines with Fiber for better network reliability and upgraded all handheld subscribers/radios to the most recent model. The State also owns six deployable assets to help with coverage during major incidents.

The radio network appears to be well maintained via vendor support. IT staff, however, indicated that training on the maintenance of the system is provided via only two classes a year from the vendor, which is minimal, given the complexity of the system and its mission-critical nature to all first responders throughout the State. Additionally, updated vehicles are required to support towing deployable network assets, as many of the current aging vehicles are struggling to tow the heavy loads.

RECOMMENDATION 13:

Develop and implement a training plan to ensure LSP IT staff can properly support the day-to-day operation and use of the radio system.

This should include a review of current IT staff capabilities, the identification of any gaps in skills, and an annual training plan that is updated each year.

RECOMMENDATION 14:

Conduct an assessment of deployable assets and the vehicles assigned to deploy those assets and develop a plan to ensure the regular life cycle replacement of all assets and vehicles.

This should include a review of each deployable asset, site batteries, and vehicle capabilities.

Smart Phones/Mobile Devices

Quickly evolving mobile technologies provide the ability to capture, submit and receive data continuously, enabling technology to serve as a force multiplier. This increases efficiency and effectiveness, enables crime reduction, and aides in investigations. Mobile technology can also help strengthen police-community interactions, in that modern mobile technologies can empower a member of the community to interact with the LSP in a more efficient and effective manner.

Currently, Troopers are offered a stipend toward a smartphone plan, but not all Troopers take advantage of this, as many prefer to keep their personal phone for personal use only. LSP is looking to move toward all department-issued mobile devices, particularly in light of the Mark43 RMS deployment, which offers mobile features and functionality, such as the ability to capture evidence via video or photographs directly into Mark43 RMS.

During interviews, Troopers expressed a need for mobile devices to enable secure messaging, to categorize body worn video in a timely manner, and to capture critical data in the field.

RECOMMENDATION 15:

Develop a mobility strategy as part of an IT Strategy and Roadmap that includes the deployment of smartphones/mobile devices to all personnel.

This strategy should include how best to support critical operational needs such as mobile field reporting. This should also include a discussion with the wireless vendor regarding the potential use of FirstNet certified communications/messaging apps and any other available features or functionality.

Technology Policy Review

LSP P.O. 1117 Body Worn Camera and In-Car Camera Systems

RECOMMENDATION 16:

Consider revising BWC and In-Car Camera Systems policy.

The following modifications are recommended for consideration: Noting exceptions to wearing or deploying BWCs and/or ICC system such as detectives/investigators, undercover officers, etc.; Are desk/station officers required to record in-person contacts? If so, consider adding language. And, if applicable, are officers required to wear body worn cameras for special events or overtime assignments? If so, consider adding.

RECOMMENDATION 17:

Consider updating policy to state that officers are required to activate their cameras prior to the initiation or response to an investigative or enforcement activity with a member of the public, and identify examples of such instances.

These include but are not limited to:

Pedestrian stops and detentions including consensual encounters to investigate potential criminal activity

- Vehicle stops
- Vehicle pursuits

- Foot pursuits
- Witness interviews
- Suspect interviews
- Vehicle collision investigations
- Arrest
- Use of force
- Search of a person
- Response to a call for service involving a member of the public
- Transport

The policy should also indicate that the body worn camera shall be activated in specific investigative or enforcement activities without a member of the public present such as:

- Vehicle or building search
- Money count
- Use of force against an animal
- Booking process for an uncooperative arrestee

Consider highlighting the following with suggested language: “Inability to activate prior to initiating enforcement or investigative activity. If an officer is unable to activate his or her BWC and/or in-car system prior to initiating any of these enforcement or investigative activities, the officer shall activate the device as soon as it is practical and safe to do so. As in all enforcement and investigative activities including vehicle and pedestrian stops, the safety of the officers and members of the public are the highest priorities.”

Livestreaming – Is the Department planning to use the Axon Respond livestreaming features available with the AB3 and Axon Evidence platform? If yes, these features must be added to the policy.

Consider reorganizing the existing policy to ensure that responsibilities are called out by role (e.g., officers’ responsibilities, supervisor responsibilities, etc.) to make the policy clearer.

RECOMMENDATION 18:

Issue a separate body worn camera policy and not combine it with a policy regarding other video or audio equipment systems.

Each of the tools have unique features and different circumstances in which the Department may want them utilized. While it is important that the policies for in-car video, interview room video, and digital audio recorders are harmonized with a body worn camera policy, TBG recommends that the Department issue a separate policy for body worn cameras to provide clear directions and reduce potential confusion in a combined policy document.

Draft Wireless Voice/Data Communications Equipment Policy

RECOMMENDATION 19:

Simplify draft policy to make it clear under one heading in the policy, the responsibilities of those

issued wireless devices.

In its present form, the draft policy includes not only policy, but procedures for completing request forms, reviewing wireless bills, etc. TBG recommends focusing on the development of a Use Policy that makes the guidelines that dictate how wireless devices may be used clear to end users.

Key LSP Transformation Opportunities

The Bad Overall: Weaknesses & Threats

While LSP has recently made great strides in modernizing its technological capabilities, there is much more progress to be made. As LSP continues with its Mark43 implementation, sets out to better manage its records, and ultimately seeks to improve upon its collection and use of data, a formal IT Strategy will become even more critical. Without such a plan, LSP risks falling into the trap that so many public safety agencies experience, wherein IT is implemented in siloes, with no overall vision for how everything should work together, resulting in cumbersome business processes and disparate data sets of questionable quality and effectiveness.

The Good Overall: LSP Strengths & Opportunities

As things currently stand, LSP has made great strides in modernizing its technological capabilities over the past few years. The small but mighty team at TBS should be commended for enabling this progress. However, without an IT Strategy and Roadmap, proper IT governance, resources and support, and a data management plan, the evolving use and need for tech can quickly become unwieldy and problematic. LSP must take steps to close the gaps identified in these foundation areas of IT if it is to be successful in truly modernizing to best support its Troopers and the community they serve.

Citations

Acknowledgments



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