Collaboration at the Crossroads

The Enabling of Large-Scale Cross-Sector Collaborative Developments

GERRY ADLARD

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This book is dedicated to those who are led into chaos. May you be led forth in peace.

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

Gerry Adlard

Gerry Adlard was born in England and raised and educated in pre-independent Zimbabwe. He has engaged in a variety of collaborative development initiatives in South Africa. Most of these have addressed the housing needs of the poor, the largest of which was the Integrated Serviced Land Project in Cape Town, which provides the case study for this book. That process involved the collaboration of all four tiers of government, thirty homeless communities and various other organisations, and delivered 32 000 starter homes plus all the other facilities required for integrated human settlements. He has also actively promoted the collaborative and incremental improvement of the growing number of urban informal settlements.

Gerry has consulted to provincial and local government, private

sector organisations and associations, the United Nations Development Programme in Southern Sudan, the World Bank Institute and movements affiliated to Slum Dwellers International. For him development is as much an art as a science and in addition to his original social science degree he holds a Master of Philosophy degree in Urban Infrastructure Design and Management from the University of Cape Town. His focus now rests upon the more general application of cross-sector collaborations to address social and environmental problems within rapidly changing societies and, in particular, the training of collaboration Enablers.

He and his wife Gill have three married sons and six granddaughters.

Acknowledgements

Many have learned that when operating in a constantly changing environment credit is seldom given to those who have quietly and carefully held and steered the wheel. Furthermore, in the hurly-burly of a large-scale cross-sector collaborative development, it is prudent to stay under the radar. So there we shall stay. But there would not have been a project to study without the enthusiastic contribution of people such as:

Alastair, Andre, Andreas, Basil, Billy, Brian, Briand, Bukiwe, Carel, Cecil, Charl, Charlotte, Christy, Clive, Cobus, Colin, Corné, Dave, David, Dennis, Derek, Enoch, Eulalie, Faan, Francois, Gary, Gerald, Gericke, Gerritt, Hans, Heinrich, Helen, Herman, Hougaard, Hugh, Jackie, James, Janet, Jens, Joel, Johan, John, Kent, Koos, Latief, Leon, Lorelle, Louis, Marek, Mary, Mbuyi, Monica, Nadiyah, Nat, Neil, Neville, Nico, Niel, Norah, Paul, Pauline, Peter, Pierre, Piet, Reginald, Ray, Rieger, Rob, Rosina, Schalk, Sean, Sebastian, Seth, Seymour, Simon, Stembiso, Surita, Valencia, Welcome, Weziwe, Wilson, Zofia, and Zoli.

The research for the book would never have taken place without the support and encouragement of the African Centre for Cities[1] team at the University of Cape Town and I am particularly appreciative of the thoughtful and enthusiastic guidance provided by Prof. Sophie Oldfield. It was a great privilege to 'go back to varsity' after so many years.

However, the solitariness of writing has been followed by the pleasure of collaborating in its publication. I am indebted to my sister, Barbi Jay, who graciously and meticulously undertook the copy edit. I was then introduced to accomplished editor Melissa

[1] http://http://africancentreforcities.net/

Fagan[2],who drew in innovative book designer Sharna Sammy[3], and together they enthusiastically took responsibility for the finished product. Furthermore, we three began to realise that each of us could add more value than our conventional functions, and so 'my manuscript' has evolved into 'our book' and we are publishing it and promoting its values collaboratively. Collaborations create friendships and I am fortunate indeed. I hope that this book will provoke and enable the growing of many such friendships – especially between opponents, in places where trust is lacking and the needs are almost overwhelming.

Neither I nor my dear wife, Gill, realised how long and lonely would be the task of writing of a book such as this. She has been wonderfully patient, understanding and encouraging, for which I am very grateful.

[2]http://www.linkedin.com/in/melissafagan
[3]http://www.linkedin.com/in/sharnasammy

Preface

I journeyed into cross-sector collaboration reluctantly, nervously and at times fearfully. Especially through the night when I was held hostage, in those moments when bullets were ricocheting off the ground near me and in a memorable meeting in a wooden shed where the Crossroads warlords, doubtless armed to the teeth, began attacking each other with chairs while my mentor, *the Democrat*, whom you will meet, cried "Order! Order!" like some odd character in *Through the Looking Glass*. In retrospect, after reading some of the literature referred to in Part 2 of this book, I realise that reluctance, nervousness and fear can help to validate the need for a cross-sector collaboration. It is the last resort on a wild, stormy night – a door that you have to enter because it is the only one that opens.

That said, if you appreciate the opportunity to tackle a real social challenge, if you enjoy engaging with people who have diametrically opposing views and if your secret sport is 'thin ice skating' then nothing beats the adventure of participating in a large-scale cross-sector collaborative development. If such an opportunity comes your way – and the way the world keeps erupting it just might – grab it with both hands! Then remember to pray.

My career in development began in the property investment division of a very large financial institution in South Africa. We had enough money to buy whatever land and buildings we wanted, to employ whatever expertise we needed and to construct anything that would make more money. We set the terms for the deals and drove the development process as the client. It was a powerful position for a young man. However, and somewhat to my surprise, I then spent six years in a radically different environment, encouraging people to apply their faith in their work. It was there

that I began to learn something about collaboration because the church is quite a segmented institution and my calling was to do something inclusive. The 'something' was in downtown Cape Town, the prosperous heart of a very beautiful city. I have written about those years in a book that took its title from a great hymn, *Great Things He Has Done*, which placed my rather puny efforts in perspective. But this season was followed by another surprise, another paradigm shift, with a call to move beyond the familiar neighbourhoods of my city to the surrounding world of sprawling shantytowns and to focus on their housing challenge.

My new job was with a business-backed NGO in Durban, on the country's east coast, leading a team to devise and test ways to demonstrate viable alternatives to government policy and practice in housing, education and business development in that region – which included the largest conglomeration of shantytowns in South Africa. It was 1984, and George Orwell's *Big Brother* was alive and well in South Africa as the apartheid government repeatedly dug in its heels, entrenching racial discrimination that was not only inhumane but patently unsustainable. Our NGO, the Urban Foundation, which will also make a brief appearance in this story, had been established to improve the quality of life of urban communities.

It was a daunting prospect: a completely different kind of job with strange people in a strange city. I had never dealt with poverty, politics or housing, but what made the work possible for me was the encouragement and inspiration that I received from time to time from unanticipated sources. In retrospect I recognise those people as Enablers in my life, even though they didn't realise it, and I give the word a capital 'E' because of their indispensability. I now know that Enablers provide the keys to success in cross-sector collaboration – and their contribution in so many different ways and depths is the real subject of this book. Enablers come in all shapes and sizes and make their impact in diverse ways.

My first Enabler in Durban was a small elderly man whom I

just saw at a distance. A white man in a sea of black faces at a famous girls' school, Inanda Seminary, that was now surrounded by thousands of shanties. He was Alan Paton, author of *Cry the Beloved Country*, the world-renowned heart-rending novel that had challenged the evils of apartheid philosophy. Although he was the school's patron he had very little to say to us all, yet just to see him was to be challenged, inspired and encouraged. If he could make the effort to stand up and be counted perhaps we could.

There was another challenge that morning: at intervals through the programme the headmistress would cry out "*Inanda!*" to which the hundreds of assembled present and former scholars would enthusiastically roar back, "Shine where you are!" To shine in a shantytown? They shouted it with such conviction that it was impossible not to be moved. What a statement of intent to make the world a brighter place!

Shortly after that I was paid a surprise visit by a professor from Cape Town who introduced me to the works of Fr Jorge Anzorena and John Turner. Reading their simple books I learned that real development is not something that the haves do to benefit the have-nots, but a shared activity, in which we all learn from each other. As a result the product is owned and maintained by the beneficiaries because they were so involved in its design, construction and all the choices that were made from start to completion. With this in mind I began to learn my new trade. Unbeknown to either of us the professor had not long to live, but the few seeds he sowed in my mind in those thirty minutes are still bearing fruit.

By 1990 I was a consultant helping municipal officials to collaborate with residents on small rural projects. Two years later I was back in Cape Town, assisting *the Democrat* in helping the provincial government explore possibilities of collaboration on a very much larger scale to create housing in a tumultuously violent place called Crossroads. In this way I was introduced to what became the Integrated Serviced Land Project (iSLP). It was initiated with the simple

proposition that the Crossroads crisis had infected and affected so many groups of people that it could only be addressed by involving every one of them. No sooner had the first steps been taken when, rather like opening the fabled Pandora's box, the process was put at risk of becoming infected itself and consumed by the writhing convolutions for power that should probably be expected when attempting large-scale cross-sector collaborative development in a constantly changing environment. At the time we had no textbooks and developed our processes and manuals from a combination of shared values, participative principles and development experience.

My role in those first years was largely that of *the Scribe*. I listened and watched and wrote minutes and reports, drafted policies, proposals and speeches, compiled business plans and progress charts and drafted letters for signature by all sorts of people. I have written the story of the iSLP in many different ways for different purposes, but never to the extent that you will find in this book.

After the iSLP was completed in 2005 I embraced an opportunity to study at the University of Cape Town, through its African Centre for Cities, and eventually to reflect upon the iSLP by engaging with what others had written about such projects. I began by reading in the field with which I was most familiar – community participation in development projects, particularly housing. There I found much on motivations and modes of participation but very little about how collaboration and the strife within it can be managed. Approaching the subject from the opposite angle, in the field of collaborative governance, I found much about how government can structure a collaborative process in a controlled systematic manner, but very little suggestion that it might be fraught with difficulty let alone offering any ideas on how that might be managed.

Those two streams of theory meet in what some scholars call the 'participative sphere' where the focus is on analysing how power is shared or manipulated by collaborating parties, but it apparently presumes that there are only two parties, which manage

the collaboration on their own and within a reasonably stable environment. So I moved on to the literature on cross-sector collaboration which reflects the iSLP experience much more closely, although, beyond warning about the extreme difficulty inherent in such initiatives and recommending facilitative leadership, it offers very little explanation of what kinds of challenges may arise and the necessity and centrality of enabling functions.

I then reviewed the story of the iSLP in more detail, synthesising and analysing interesting aspects. These included changes in the political and social environment; the attendance of individuals, parties and sectors at meetings; the making and breaking of alliances; the tensions and subterfuges; the process of making decisions; and how deadlocks were broken. Through this process I came to realise that although the iSLP lasted for 14 years and involved hundreds of individuals, its success as a coherent collaboration rested on the performance of a small number of what I now refer to as Enablers and the influence of a few very significant decisions. I then interviewed some of those Enablers to obtain their perspectives on how and why they became involved, the implications for them of serving in that way, and their roles in creating or fulfilling the iSLP's major mandates.

The more I worked on the material that I had compiled the clearer it became that the literature fails to fully reflect the experience of the iSLP in four ways: It understates the incessant complexity, overstates the ability of stakeholders to manage the collaborative process, inadequately registers the necessity and function of what I term Enablers, and makes very little reference to the power and leverage of high-level approvals. I have therefore explored how focusing on these four factors (complexity, incapacity, Enablement and mandates) can provide a key to making large-scale cross-sector collaborative developments more achievable.

Some of the Enablers are introduced in Chapters 1 and 2 to give the reader some understanding of their different backgrounds and

the motives behind their commitment to the iSLP. For the story I have given each of them a symbolic name to make them more easily recognisable through the case study and to not distract from a story that is already complicated. Similarly, some of the characters who worked hard to disable the iSLP have been similarly renamed, and although their backgrounds remain largely mysterious the roles that they played in the iSLP are instructive.

Although the circumstances that characterised the iSLP may be a world away from those assumed in much of the literature, I suspect that they resonate with many social crises across our changing world – in which manoeuvres no less convoluted and surprising than those of the iSLP must be expected. What will be required are processes of cross-sector collaboration that are founded not only upon model systems and structures, which I offer in Part 3, but upon cross-sector understanding, respect and empathy combined with a flexible and creative approach to development. To foster this, 39 'Lessons for Enablers' have been included in the Notes and References section of this book. There are also some 'lessons learned' in the housing delivery process at the end of Chapter 7.

The three parts of this book provide a case study of the iSLP, a review and analysis of the relevant literature and a manual for Enablers. They are written in slightly different styles to suit the subject matter. Part 1 is a case study, as understood by the Scribe, trying to give a real sense of the life and times of the iSLP. In Part 2 a more academic style is adopted for reviewing and commenting on the literature. Part 3 has been written out of consideration for practitioners at the cutting edge who find themselves having to create and manage cross-sector collaboration but are uncertain about what to do – so I have attempted to cover everything that might be needed, in a simple manner. Likewise I have drawn the maps and diagrams myself – although I am certainly no artist – to encourage you to draw your own diagrams for your project, and be proud of them!

My hope is that this book will provide encouragement and practical help for the many people from all kinds of backgrounds who have the vision, ambition and energy to enable polarised sectors of society to collaborate in development to address social crises. Writing it has forced me to reflect even further on the subject, out of which has driven something quite unexpected – a new kind of collaboration vehicle! Readers are likely to encounter it when deep into the book, and perhaps one day they will recognise one and hail it as they would a taxi cab, to take them on a crucial cross-sector collaborative development at one of the crossroads of life.

Enjoy the bumpy ride!

The Scribe

PART ONE: The iSLP Case Study

“The willingness of powerful participants to respect others and share decision-making processes with them is fundamental to a successful collaboration.”

Chapter 1: The Crisis and its Causes

Relevance of the history

Many crises are the product of an accumulation of harmful events. What might begin as challenging circumstances for individuals can become group problems and if not addressed they may infect a community or society and degenerate into a deep-seated, chronic and sometimes violent malaise. In such cases the presenting problem at some point late in time, such as inadequate housing, may be so fraught with diverse histories of oppression, betrayal, hurt, fear, mistrust and anger that the obvious technical solution of providing housing is neither adequate nor acceptable. For such reasons it is essential to take the trouble to discover how a particular crisis originated.

In the iSLP case study the roots of crisis can be traced back over 300 years and it is not difficult to identify a succession of punitively discriminatory decisions and actions. But that was not all – they were accompanied by the development of divisive and destructive attitudes within and between different groups of people, whose mutual co-operation would one day be required as a last resort to achieve development. If all the role-players and their circumstances are to be understood the history has to be respected. So this chapter offers a brief summary of the historical background to the iSLP case study. It is far from the complete story, so the reader would be wise to ponder and try to imagine a little of what the narrative represents in order to appreciate the strength of attitudes and emotions that were accumulating.

South Africa's social history is dominated by issues of race, the

classification of which was, particularly under apartheid legislation, based upon four primary descriptors: Indian, white, coloured and black, with enormous implications for every person within a very segregated and discriminatory society. In the historical sections of this book (Chapters 1 to 8) the use of some of this terminology is unavoidable, with 'black' denoting indigenous Bantu-speaking peoples; and 'coloured' referring to people of mixed race, predominantly consequent upon the occupation of the Cape of Good Hope by Europeans from 1652. Coloured people comprised the largest segment of Cape Town's population until the end of the 20th century, when the black population overtook them.

Discriminatory housing practices in Cape Town

When the Dutch began creating a permanent settlement near the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 the residents of the region were the Khoikhoi, nomadic herdsman who showed no interest in working for the settlers. Furthermore the Dutch East India Company prohibited the slavery of local inhabitants and therefore imported slaves from countries that fringed the Indian Ocean, particularly Madagascar, East Africa, India and the East Indies. Slavery was the source of almost all labour until the 1830s. Although the British, who governed the Cape from 1805, banned the slave trade in 1807 the practice was not abolished in its Cape Colony until 1834 after which freed slaves were required to work as apprentices for another four years. Consequently very few indigenous black people lived in Cape Town during the city's first 180 years.

Historical records suggest that it was only in the 1830s that the first black residents of the eastern Cape began to move to Cape Town, some fleeing from the Frontier Wars in 1834–35. The first record of a settlement is of a small community of some 20–40 people who "lived in 6 or 8 huts … near the foot of Table Mountain" in 1839.

In the 1865 census, out of Cape Town's total population of 28 400 there were about 700 black people living in Cape Town, apart from those imprisoned on Robben Island. By 1900, of the city's total population of 160 000 there were about 1 500 black dockworkers living in the harbour barracks, plus 8 000 living in very overcrowded and unhygienic conditions in District Six who worked primarily as labourers but also as office messengers and cleaners.

By 1900 racial segregation was practised in government hospitals and schools and by private employers. Fears of a 'black invasion' circulated. The prime minister of the Cape, WP Schreiner, asserted that black people did not really belong in Cape Town, even though the city needed their labour. The idea of establishing compounds of single quarters to control black workers, as had been done on the diamond and gold mines, was increasingly suggested, and in 1900 a government commission recommended that such a facility be established on Uitvlugt, a state farm near Maitland, about 8 kms from the city centre.

An opportunity to implement this plan arose that year when bubonic plague broke out in Cape Town. It was carried by the rats that inhabited the hay which had been imported from Argentina to feed horses used by the British troops in the Boer War. Because black dockworkers were the first to contract the deadly disease they were blamed for its transmission and health legislation was used to forcibly relocate black residents of District Six to a barbed wire enclosed 'native location' at Uitvlugt, soon renamed Ndabeni. Accommodation there comprised five big corrugated iron huts, each sleeping 500 men, plus 615 unlined lean-to corrugated iron huts approximately 6 m by 4 m in floor area, each accommodating eight people, together with a small number of tents. There was no privacy, cooking and ablution facilities were inadequate and there were initially no floors, resulting in flooding in winter. Rent of 10 shillings a month was charged.

In 1902 the Native Reserve Locations Act was passed by the Cape

government, which empowered the state to force black urban dwellers to live in locations, excluding only domestic servants, registered voters (who were very few, because of the high income earning and property ownership qualifications) and those with special permission. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was established, followed rapidly by a string of legislation that controlled the accommodation and movement of black people. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 required that all black residents of urban areas throughout the country be segregated in locations and that controls be exercised over the movements of black people to towns and cities – 'influx control' had arrived. Black urban work-seekers required a permit, which expired after a short period, after which the person could be ordered to leave town. An employer of a black person had to register the employment contract and pay a fee. Only black people who owned land, were on the voters role, or who were chiefs, clergymen, or (in some cases) teachers were exempt the registration provisions. Its Amendment Act of 1937 specified that no black person could acquire land outside the rural reserves, except from another black person.

Labourers were much in demand in Cape Town during the First World War and Ndabeni grew rapidly. By 1920 it was "indescribably filthy and derelict". It was transferred by the government to the Cape Town municipality, which soon came under pressure for the land to be used for industrial purposes as it adjoined the new 'garden city' of Pinelands. So in 1926 Ndabeni was closed down and its residents forcibly removed to a new township, Langa (meaning 'sun' – and also an abbreviation for Langalibalele, a Hlubi chief who had led an uprising against the British in Natal in 1875). Langa was designed for control by the authorities and migrant worker hostels were separated from each other by very high fences with only one point of access. Trading, gatherings, dances, etc. were all subject to the permission of the superintendent. By 1938 the housing in Langa was full, and the lack of housing for black urban dwellers in the Western Cape had become a social and political

crisis. The government commissioned eight three-storey hostels in Langa, which were completed by 1945.

Cape Town expanded through the creation of new local authorities which serviced suburbs but were not well-equipped to impose influx control measures. Consequently shantytowns of black (and coloured) people proliferated, particularly after the declaration of the Second World War when the increased demand for labour in Cape Town resulted in a relaxation of the pass laws. After the war, however, influx control was re-imposed with a vengeance, including railway authorities in the Eastern Cape being authorised to prevent blacks from travelling to Cape Town and a requirement that Cape Town employers pay for their black employees to return to their rural homes at the end of their contracts.

In 1948 the 'Old Location' of Nyanga ('moon') was opened and the first 210 four-roomed houses became available for a weekly rental of 7 shillings and 6 pence - fifteen times the going charge of 6 pence for a shack in a shantytown. In that year about 80% of Cape Town's black population lived outside of the townships, mainly in shantytowns.

In 1950 apartheid legislation began to be introduced by the recently-elected National Party government. This included the Population Registration Act, which officially divided South Africans into four racial groups and became the vehicle for implementing broad-scale segregation, and the Group Areas Act, which was used to create racially-based residential areas, invariably requiring forced removals. The Group Areas Board designated group areas, and 'disqualified' people were given notice that they would be removed to alternative accommodation, whenever it should become available. In Cape Town it predominantly affected coloureds, but hundreds of blacks were also forcibly relocated. Barren 'buffer areas' were created to separate non-white residential areas from white suburbs as well as highways.

In 1952 more racist legislation followed. The Prevention of Illegal

Squatting Act required local authorities to set up emergency camps in which to control squatters, and authorised the demolition of shacks without offering alternative accommodation. The government refused to allow the Cape Town City Council to erect family housing in Langa and instead ordered it to build 70 more single sex barracks to cater for 17 000 male black migrant workers. Further legislation permitted black men and women to stay only three days in an urban area seeking work. Only black males who could prove that they had been born in the urban area or had lived there continuously for at least 15 years, or had worked for one employer for 10 years, were given the right of permanent residence ('Section 10 status') - which they could share with their wives and children. Furthermore the Natives (abolition of passes and co-ordination of documents) Act required every black man over the age of 16 to carry a reference book with a photograph - the hated *dompas*. Pass raids against 'illegals' became the order of the day, and those caught (who amounted to more than 18 000 men and 6 000 women just between 1954 and 1962) were 'endorsed out' of Cape Town and returned to what the government termed their native reserves or homelands in the Eastern Cape, hundreds of kilometres away.

In 1954 Dr Hendrik Verwoerd, then minister for 'native affairs', declared the Western Cape to be a 'labour preference area for coloureds'. No one could employ a black person if a coloured person was available to do the job. Influx control came to be applied more harshly in Cape Town than anywhere else in the country. The Secretary for Native Affairs, Dr Werner Eiselen, drew a line near the Fish River in the Eastern Cape and declared that only blacks with Section 10 rights would be allowed to live to the west of it. In 1958 the Native Affairs Department (NAD), which had become almost a 'state within a state', was renamed the Bantu Affairs Department (BAD) as part of a centralising exercise to implement influx control more effectively than was being achieved by local authorities, some of which, like Cape Town and Johannesburg, were controlled by the opposition United Party and had not co-operated with the NAD.

The BAD proceeded to engage in a long and protracted struggle to wrest control of 'native affairs' from local authorities.

The second phase of Nyanga location had been completed in 1953, comprising 700 semi-detached family units for black households whose shacks had been demolished. Then in 1958 a new township was established at Nyanga West, which became known as Guguletu ('our pride'). All houses there were designed so that they could be converted into single quarters. For many families their home comprised no more than one bed. In 1959 Dr Verwoerd, now prime minister, announced that apartheid had been succeeded by the supposedly non-racist policy of 'separate development' in terms of which black people would live in Bantustans and urbanisation would be stemmed. In 1960 the government infamously demonstrated its determination by shooting protesters, establishing a state of emergency, banning political parties whose members were predominantly non-white and jailing their leaders for long terms. Locally, the government divided the Cape peninsula into two 'proclaimed areas' for the administration of black people. One included Nyanga and was administered by the divisional council and northern municipalities (all National Party controlled); and the other included Langa and Guguletu and was administered by Cape Town municipality (controlled by the opposition United Party). Black people were supposed to work only within the proclaimed area in which their township was located, and had to obtain permission to visit family or friends in the other area. The persecution of black urban dwellers, even those with permits, was inexorable.

From 1965, as a strategy by government to interrupt employment service and avoid additional awards of permanent residence, black people in the Western Cape were required to return to their homeland at the end of each contract period and from there reapply for their work. By the late 1960s those who were endorsed out of Cape Town were sent to 'resettlement camps' in the Eastern Cape, sometimes located near artificially-created, unsustainable industrial areas. Furthermore, the Bantu Affairs Department was given

the right to remove anyone's Section 10 rights if they were deemed to be 'idle' or 'undesirable'. In spite of this, official figures show that the black population of Cape Town rose from approximately 70 000 in 1960 to 250 00 in 1974.



Figure 1.1: Cape Town: Black townships constructed between 1900–1960

The Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAABs) were created in 1971 and appropriated responsibility for administering African townships from municipalities. They also largely took over the enforcement of the pass laws from the police, and usually simply deported offenders to the 'Bantustans'. It has been reported that by this means 3.5 million people were forcibly relocated between 1960 and 1982. However black urbanisation continued – it is reckoned that at the end of 1970 many would prefer to find work in an urban area for nine months and then spend three months in jail rather than be confined to a Bantustan. The BAABs also took control over the provision of housing for black people in urban areas, which they limited to the provision of single quarters, and a decree was issued that black people could only get permission to work in white urban areas if housing was available. A consequence was the incessant growth of slums and informal settlements.

These were years of vigorous and unrelenting government oppression of black people in Cape Town, probably more so than in any

other city. There was actually no place in the whole Western Cape province where a black person could own a home. Nevertheless in spite of all the oppression the black population grew exponentially and housed itself in shanties. They were not alone – there were thousands of coloured people who were also without housing. Shantytowns, later called 'informal settlements' grew in size and number and became an increasingly visible evidence of both the impracticality and injustice of apartheid. It would not be long before the informal settlements of Cape Town became the stage for a scandalous and devastating confrontation that raised an international furore, located on a patch of land that had not yet been heard of – Crossroads.

Housing at the Crossroads

In 1974 a few shacks were erected next to a crossroads in a triangle of unused land to the east of Nyanga bounded by Lansdowne, Klipfontein and New Eisleben Roads. They were constructed by people who were told by unspecified 'white men' that they could no longer stay on Brown's Farm in nearby Philippi. When asked where they should go, they were told "to the Crossroads". Around the Easter weekend of the following year many more people arrived at Crossroads, swelling the number of dwellings to around 1 100 by August 1975. At first the settlement was tolerated by the authorities as a temporary camp. By 1977 it had 18 000 inhabitants.

In 1977 an amendment to the Illegal Squatting Act empowered Bantu Affairs officials to demolish shacks without a court order. They wasted no time and demolished the squatter areas of Unibel and Modderdam near the airport. KTC, located between Guguletu and Nyanga, was tolerated, but Crossroads was the next target. However the women of Crossroads, supported by the Black Sash and other civil society organisations, mounted a 'Save Crossroads' campaign and in 1978 won a declaration by the Cape Supreme Court

that Crossroads was an emergency camp and that the state must supply water taps and remove refuse and night-soil for the payment by residents of a nominal fee. News of this victory, combined with persistent urbanisation, prompted a proliferation of shack settlements in the vicinity of Crossroads and in open spaces within Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu.

In 1979 Mr Johnson Ngxobongwana formed a group of Crossroads men into a Residents' Committee and, as reported by the Goldstone Commission of Enquiry, "turned Crossroads into his personal fiefdom, raising numerous taxes by means of which he could reward himself and his male enforcers with salaries and 'community cars'". In May of that year, as a result of negotiations that included the Urban Foundation, Dr. Piet Koornhof, national minister of co-operation and development, made an exclusive concession to Crossroads – that its residents would be enumerated and that those who wished to stay and who qualified in terms of certain criteria would be granted temporary urban rights and be provided with formal housing in an area between Nyanga and Guguletu. As a result of this unprecedented decision the demand for space in Crossroads, associated with an implied right to 'stake a claim' for a house, became immense. Ngxobongwana and his deputy controlled the 'housing lists', charging residents to have their names included.

Introducing some Enablers: *The Veteran*

The Veteran made the acquaintance of Johnson Ngxobongwana soon after minister Koornhof's concession to Crossroads. He had joined the underground movement of the ANC military wing *Mkonto we Sizwe* (MK) soon after the ANC's banning in 1960 and for many years was actively involved in clandestinely moving people, arms and food parcels in and out of Cape Town on instructions of the external ANC

structures. He lived in a local township, and in spite of the general mutual antagonism between residents of townships and informal settlements he maintained good relationships with some of the warlords because dense informal settlements such as Lusaka and Nyanga Bush were ideal places for hiding MK personnel.

Over the next few years, in response to an ANC 'programme of action' that civic associations be created that were not overtly political, he and others canvassed in the townships for the creation of the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA). By 1982 there were about 32 such civic organisations in Cape Town, with the WCCA representing black communities as one of three umbrella organisations. One of the instructions that *the Veteran* had received from his handlers in the ANC in Exile was to get close to Johnson Ngxobongwana, the Crossroads warlord, and draw him and his people into the Western Cape civics. He responded by spending entire days with Ngxobongwana, having his meals with him, and eventually inducing him to become chairperson of the WCCA and to bring many of his followers with him.

Koornhof's promised housing project for Crossroads residents, New Crossroads was located a kilometre away and its first phase of about 1 100 houses was completed in 1981. However in 1983 the government announced a new grand plan: all Blacks who had the right to stay in the Cape Peninsula would be housed in a huge new 'city' on the urban edge to be named Khayelitsha ('New Place') - and the estimated 100 000 'illegals' in Cape Town would be returned to their homelands. Khayelitsha was to be built on a 3 220 hectare site in the south-west of the Cape Flats that had been personally selected from a helicopter by Prime Minister PW Botha. By the end of that year the land intended for Phases 2 and 3 of New Crossroads had been appropriated by the residents of the 'KTC squatter camp' that had existed in the vicinity since the early 1970s, and who

needed room for expansion.

Introducing some Enablers: *The Urban Planner*

He had been born in Cape Town but spent his childhood in Johannesburg and then Nairobi, where his secondary school became increasingly multi-racial during his time there. After returning to South Africa he studies at Rhodes and Cape Town universities and became a town planner for the Cape Divisional Council, under whose jurisdiction was Crossroads and much of the Philippi area to its south. He had become particularly well acquainted with the new Philippi industrial area and its old landmark – an almost derelict cement factory on Lansdowne Road. It was there that he gathered with his wife and many others one day in 1980 to celebrate the opening of a clinic.

A few months earlier he had been one of thousands of Christians from across the denominations to attend the South African Christian Leadership Assembly in Pretoria in order to seek God's guidance regarding the parlous state of the nation. They had each been challenged to personally make a difference, and there Dr Ivan Toms had felt called to establish a clinic to serve Crossroads – which was now being opened and dedicated. *The Urban Planner* had been challenged to pray more fervently for the country, and in particular to pray not just for peace but for justice. Through the months and years that followed he keenly followed the events at Crossroads, praying for a breakthrough.

Tensions within a grossly overcrowded Crossroads escalated and at the end of 1983 it exploded in violence, when some of Ngxobongwana's old supporters turned against him. The bloody clashes spilled over into nearby areas such as KTC.

> Ngxobongwana's supporters identified themselves by wearing pieces of white cloth, and became known as the *witdoeke*.

The political sweetener offered to blacks for the 'separate development' of Khayelitsha in 1984 was the offer of 99-year leasehold property rights to its residents and the abolition of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy. Although the state announced that Khayelitsha would comprise 120 000 brick houses, only 14% of the 450 000 people who actually settled in Khayelitsha over the next six years were accommodated in small core houses (built with cement blocks), 54% in shanties on individually serviced sites, and 32% in informal settlements with shared services. A lack of job creation produced an unemployment rate of 80%.

The government intended that the first residents of Khayelitsha be drawn from Crossroads, but it faced considerable resistance and insistence from the residents that Koornhof's promise to provide housing nearby be honoured. The population of the Crossroads triangle continued to grow, creating four distinct settlements: Old Crossroads in the eastern corner; whilst in the western sector were the satellite areas of Nyanga Extension in the north, Nyanga Bush in the centre, and Portland Cement in the south, as illustrated in the map below.



Figure 1.2: Crossroads 1983: The four settlements

On the national stage in 1983 the government was approving its highly controversial tricameral constitution, creating separate houses of parliament for whites, coloureds and Indians and reinforcing the 'homeland' policy for blacks - the affairs of urban Africans would be managed by the whites. With most political parties still banned, leaders of civic organisations across the country launched the United Democratic Front (UDF) which rapidly grew into a powerful mass movement of some 600 organisations (including trade unions) and three million people. One of these organisations was the Western Cape Civic Association, whose chairman, Johnson Ngxobongwana, was publicly hailed as the leading opponent of forced removals to Khayelitsha.

Introducing some Enablers: *The Community Planner*

The Community Planner was one of the helpers at the launch of the UDF. As a white man he had not been able to find a political home in opposition to the government, and the organisations affiliated to the UDF were all either black consciousness groups or women's movements. The UDF itself

was a conglomeration of organisations, so unless one was in an organisation there was no way of being involved in the struggle. Therefore he and his white comrades had volunteered their services to the United Women's Congress to help with the launch of the UDF. Through this exposure they made such an impression that they were allowed to form one of the only three UDF branches – and he was elected chair of the Claremont branch.

His political baptism had occurred in 1972 when he had witnessed at close hand a brutal attack by riot police on peaceful demonstrators outside and within St George's Cathedral. He began reading alternative literature, some of it on anarchism, and studied – working his way through a BA by correspondence. While employed by a town planning firm he won a bursary to the University of Cape Town to study town planning during 1979–80. There he was exposed to Marxism and was an active member of a reading group on Marx until 1983, when the UDF was formed and his politics began to take a practical turn. It was not long before he found ways to employ his planning skills to advise and help civic organisations.

The Urban Foundation (UF) had been established in 1977 by concerned South African business leaders to investigate and test viable alternatives to government policy and practice that would improve the quality of life of urban Africans. Its focus areas were urbanisation, housing, education and small business development. The UF's financial sponsors straddled the conventional English/Afrikaans and white political party divisions and its chief executive was a supreme court judge – from an esteemed and socially responsible Afrikaner family. The UF had garnered very strong support amongst moderate leaders of all races, although unsurprisingly was regarded with suspicion by the extreme left and right of the political spectrum. The UF's Cape Town office took a particular interest in

Crossroads, which had by then achieved international repute as a symbol of resistance to apartheid laws. In 1985 the UF, after wide-ranging consultations with the various squatter leaders and their committees, proposed reducing the housing density in Crossroads by a third and then upgrading the whole area in situ.

Johnson Ngxobongwana, who had not participated in most of the negotiations with the UF because of imprisonment, refused to contemplate a reduction of a third of his support base (and income) and accused the leaders of the satellite camps of having settled their supporters on his land. Furthermore groups affiliated to the UDF were established in Crossroads in 1985 and challenged Ngxobongwana's regime. This initiated and ignited a succession of violent conflicts between Ngxobongwana's *witdoeke* and the UDF's comrades. The police blamed the youth (i.e. the comrades) who were based in the satellite areas, and commended Ngxobongwana for keeping his area under control. The police also recommended against the UF's upgrading proposals on the grounds that in situ development would take too long and would create a product that would not satisfy its security requirements. On 17 May 1986 the state's intentions became dreadfully clear - the security forces sealed off Crossroads, and until 12 June allowed the *witdoeke* to set fire to all the shanty settlements around Old Crossroads, displacing about 60 000 people.

The Veteran recalls that just before this 'war' broke out in Crossroads he was instructed by his handlers to drive 1 000 kms to Bloemfontein to collect a parcel. Almost halfway there, at Beaufort-West, he came across a huge military convoy heading for Cape Town. He alerted his comrades, went on to run his errand and then returned without stopping and immediately went to Crossroads. There he found utter devastation and from Guguletu alone 18 of the locally-trained MK cadres had lost their lives. "After the enemy had destroyed whatever they could at Crossroads they came to KTC, and they knew we had externally-trained people here – and it was a terrible fight. I remember one woman comrade who was trained

outside of the country – she was short, big and vicious and was armed with an AK – who was eventually shot through the head from a helicopter."

The refugees included a group which settled in Miller's Camp, south of Klipfontein Road; some which settled in Black City on the west side of New Eisleben Road opposite the Crossroads municipal buildings; and a group which settled on Brown's Farm. Under such fraught circumstances the UF withdrew from Crossroads.

Introducing some Enablers: *The Democrat*

He was a small, quiet, determined man – who described himself simply as 'a democrat'. He confessed to being a very private person, and his language was often unusually old-fashioned – he never 'made a date' with anyone, but he would 'procure an appointment'. He was raised in a public-spirited family and principles and ethics in public life were extremely important to him. He was a professional quantity surveyor but in 1982 made a radical career change and joined the Urban Foundation, which he regarded as presenting a businesslike, apolitical opportunity to make a difference in a very unjust country. He joined the UF as its regional director in Cape Town, where he began turning himself into a specialist at combining technical expertise with community participation.

In the midst of huge public and international outrage at the Crossroads violence one of the more constructive responses was by *the Community Planner* and some fellow town planners. They decided to petition the government to desist from using violence as a planning tool – as it had just done at Crossroads. More than 150 professionals in the built environment field signed the petition, to which the government gave no response. However the

initiators of the petition decided to invite all of its signatories to some meetings in order to inform them about what was happening – consciousness-raising, to use the phrase that was popular at the time. Some of them were already advising civic groups on planning issues in a voluntary capacity, but as the requests for advice grew it became obvious that an NGO should be created for this purpose. They created the development action group (DAG) which offered training and mentoring to planners who wished to serve communities and offered introductions to situations where their expertise could be applied.

Mr Ngxobongwana, who had been in voluntary exile in Transkei for most of 1986, had achieved control of Crossroads. On his return he set about reorganising his leadership, and in the process instituted disciplinary proceedings against some of his followers. One of these responded by leaving Crossroads and forming, with leaders of other informal settlements, the Western Cape Squatters Association, with the exclusive purpose of undermining the leadership of Crossroads and Khayelitsha. Although the association only lasted a year, it demonstrated a different organisational model and was immediately succeeded by the Western Cape United Squatters Association (WCUSA), whose leadership now included a former lieutenant of Nxogongwana, Jeffrey Nongwe. The aim of WCUSA was to promote development in the black communities and negotiations with local and provincial authorities. At the same time Ngxobongwana was being wooed by organs of the government to become the first mayor of Crossroads.

In 1986 the national government acknowledged the inevitability of urbanisation and repealed its influx control legislation, but by then the situation in and around Crossroads had become chaotic. There was no effective local authority in the area so the provincial government had to take charge – and because there was no democratic urban black representation the only people with whom government could parley were the squatter leaders. Businesses in the Philippi Industrial Area, just south of Crossroads, found themselves in a war

zone - isolated, impotent, increasingly victims of crime, violence and land invasion, and lacking any effective recourse.

Introducing some Enablers: *The Defender*

She had been born and raised in Brazil, but married a Capetonian in 1961 and settled in one of Cape Town's oldest and most sought-after 'leafy suburbs'. She had no family history of social or political awareness or activism, but in 1962 she decided to do some voluntary work and drove a van, delivering meals to poor coloured families on the Cape Flats. A year later she was introduced to the work of the Black Sash by a friend and joined the movement. One of her reasons for joining was that in Brazil the government fought mass illiteracy by establishing night schools all over the country whereas the South African government was closing down night schools on the grounds that they were subversive. Another factor that stirred her into action was that she had encountered some of the tragic consequences of the Group Areas Act.

The Defender recalls that in the 1960s the Black Sash believed that if only people in power could be shown the evidence of the destructive nature of their policies they would change them. She would therefore join fact-finding missions to migrant labour hostels and then seek appointments with cabinet ministers to explain the implications of government policy and make recommendations for how it should be changed. She would join a team attending a Group Areas hearing at which it was determined where people may live. Black Sash members, all perfectly attired with hats and gloves as well as their black sashes, would make formal protests at the hearings, which were always ignored. By the end of that decade the Black Sash realised that reason would not prevail but continued employing demonstration as a strategy, in addition to running their advice offices to guide victims of apartheid. They mounted silent demonstrations at significant

locations and events, such as the route used for the opening of parliament – and she reflects on how they learned to encapsulate the essence of their protest in just four words on a placard. She clearly remembers the demonstrations at St George's cathedral in 1972 (in which *the Community Planner* had first encountered the state's brutality).

She was well aware of her lack of knowledge and understanding of the complexities of both housing problems and inter-community tensions and politics. They were also limitations to the capacity of the Black Sash – she recalls the organisation having to decline a rare invitation to monitor a local government election in Crossroads because they lacked the necessary resources or knowledge. "We felt very bad," she recalls, "because obviously there was need for an impartial agency to be present." There was also a period when she was obliged to chair weekly meetings of all the different squatter groups that were threatened with bulldozing and eviction, and who accused each other of corruption and taking sides. "Those meetings were terrible … there was huge mistrust and anxiety – they didn't know whether to accept the bona fides of the lawyers who were trying to help them, whether the government was telling the truth, whom to believe – it was a terrible time." In 1986, at the height of the Crossroads conflagration, *the Defender* was elected national president of the Black Sash for a four-year term.

In the early 1980s the government had made a policy change to allow black people who possessed Section 10 rights to elect their own community councils in urban black townships. Such 'Black Local Authorities' (BLAs) could eventually replace the BAABs and, so the convoluted thinking went, these new structures could eventually be tied to Bantustans. However, when the tricameral parliament was established in 1984 it excluded black urban dwellers from the franchise, which accentuated the incongruity of the BLAs, which therefore acquired very little popular support and their councillors

were widely regarded as sell-outs. Nevertheless in 1987 Crossroads was declared a BLA, and Ngxobongwana was appointed its first mayor.

During 1988, in yet another change in national policy, a start was made to transfer the responsibility for the affairs of the urban black population from national government departments and their development boards to its provincial administrators. The challenge in Cape Town was daunting – the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA) had never been responsible for the administration of the extensive and complex business of 'black affairs', and had no employees with the required experience. Included in this transfer was Crossroads, which had been the responsibility of the board, the police and the army – but not the province. Black Local Authorities in general and Crossroads in particular were veritable 'hot potatoes' which very few provincial officials or politicians wished to handle. The CPA urgently created a community services branch, and appointed as its director responsible for black affairs in the Western Cape a very experienced official from the disbanded Bantu Administration Board: *the Wrestler*.

Introducing some Enablers: *The Wrestler*

The Wrestler had very little idea of what he had let himself in for. He had been grateful for the offer of promotion and for a transfer out of an oppressively managed department in the Eastern Cape, but it had been twenty years since he had worked in Cape Town, and then it had been the coloureds that he had been administering. "Some of them very beautiful, too, but of course you weren't allowed to look at a coloured girl in those days. A pity …", muses *the Wrestler*, now in his retirement and the apartheid prohibition on crossing the colour bar

long dead. He had been in black administration ever since, like his father before him – Native Affairs, Bantu Affairs, Bantu Administration then Bantu Development. Between them they had spent 75 years in the service.

As secretary of the Native Resettlement Board in the mid-1950s his father had helped to implement apartheid's first large-scale forced removal of an urban black community from Sophiatown, on the instructions of Dr Verwoerd. The residents' homes, to which they had legal title, were razed by the state and the people trucked to Meadowlands in Soweto. Sophiatown was redeveloped for sub-economic white families and the suburb cynically renamed Triomf. Twenty years later *the Wrestler* himself had been exposed to some tragic events – whilst working for the West Rand Administration Board he had been in Soweto on June 16, 1976 when schoolchildren began their protest against the detested Bantu education system. He witnessed much of what became the Soweto revolt, in which hundreds lost their lives and which is regarded by many as the tipping point in the struggle against apartheid. He was seconded to help his chief director prepare evidence for the official commission of enquiry. With sadness he recalls the police and army chiefs telling him that although they were able to keep on shooting only he and his colleagues could bring about peace. "They were really terrible times", he reflected, and would prefer not to talk about them.

And now back in Cape Town in the year 1988 he found that his new employer, the Cape Provincial Administration (CPA), was completely and utterly ignorant of black affairs. Nor could he find anyone in the CPA who was remotely interested in or sympathetic to what was involved in administering an increasingly discredited and dysfunctional Black Local Authorities system. "They didn't have a clue – not a clue!"

But *the Wrestler* was no stranger to handicaps. At the age of two he had contracted polio and consequently suffered a shortened leg. "My whole life I had to get along on a piston-

and-a half, not two pistons. I think that had a lot to do with shaping my willpower and for enabling me to understand what it is to be less fortunate than other people." His early years had been spent in a rural area of the Eastern Cape, where he had learnt to speak fluent *isiXhosa* but at the age of six he began to attend the Hope Training Home for polio victims, located in Johannesburg. There he realised how greater were the disabilities of others, and learned how important was willpower. Years later, on arrival at Stellenbosch University, he quickly realised that not being a rugby player was in danger of becoming another handicap so he resolved to take up wrestling … and rose to become South African middleweight champion. "Sheer determination!" he reflects, "and in later life that was important."

The Wrestler's regional office was established in a suburb of Cape Town and staffed with personnel from the disbanded development board. His team felt alienated by the management and administration in the CPA head office. Out in the field it proved very difficult to maintain viable local authorities and for six years, 1988-94, he had the added workload of having to personally govern four of them, over 400 kilometres apart. In that role the full authority, powers and functions of the local council were vested in him. "A fearsome responsibility," he reflects. "You've got to have balls of steel to last." And in addition there was Crossroads, in circumstances beyond anything he had ever encountered.

In the late 1980s some advocacy work by the Development Action Group brought *the Community Planner* into contact with *the Wrestler* – "It was funny", the former recalls, "We were total adversaries, and I knew that he sat on security committees that probably had my name on all sorts of lists. But that was just the role-play that one went through while wearing those hats – what I did know about him was that he was somebody with whom you could engage in good faith."

In 1989 *the Veteran* was detained without trial in Cape Town's Polsmoor prison for a year under the 'State of Emergency' laws. It was his third spell behind bars. Meanwhile a young planner in the CPA began turning his mind towards Crossroads…

Introducing some Enablers: *The Provincial Planner*

Educated at an English-speaking school and then at the University of Cape Town he had just qualified as a town planner and had recently joined the provincial administration, an institution that was staffed overwhelmingly with Afrikaans speakers and National Party supporters. Sadly, he was no more welcomed into the CPA than *the Wrestler* had been: "I was told that I spoke the wrong language, had my account at the wrong bank, had been to the wrong university and had the wrong surname! My profile did not match what was desired at any level – I was simply tolerated." His job for the first two years was to consider plans submitted by developers of leisure resorts, but then in 1989 he was asked to focus on areas covered by Act No 4 of 1984 – urban land designated to be developed for occupation by black people.

His first challenge was to create a Crossroads structure plan. It was soon apparent that the triangle of land known as Crossroads could not possibly accommodate all the people who claimed a right to live there – so the objective expanded to 'a Crossroads and environs structure plan' because much more land in the vicinity would be required. He remembers beginning with a map which was only A4 in size on which Crossroads was drawn in the middle with the N2 highway nearby, onto which he and his colleagues then drew the outer perimeter of all the available land that was broadly contiguous with Crossroads. It included areas of Philippi, Delft and Mfuleni – and took into account a possible future expansion of the airport, as shown in the following diagram.

As had been intended, the scorched earth destruction within Crossroads had created space for some formal development, and the first phase of 800 contractor-built houses on the western edge of the triangle had been completed. But so few Crossroads residents could afford to buy them that many were sold to outsiders and some sites remained unsold for many years. When construction began on Phase 2, to provide 874 houses to the north of Phase 1, 1 401 households were relocated from that area to a 'transit camp' across Klipfontein Road that came to be called Boystown (see map). Priority in the housing waiting list was promised to those who fulfilled three requirements: residents of Boystown, bona fide inhabitants of Crossroads, and up to date with their payment of service charges.



Figure 1.3: Crossroads and environs 1989

In February 1990 the first twenty of the Phase 2 houses became available and were offered at a monthly rental of 55 Rands. No applications were received from Boystown, and once again they were made available more widely. The people of Boystown were left feeling betrayed on the sidelines in their informal settlement, which more than doubled in size to 2 400 households over the next two years. In Crossroads the mayhem continued, in which Ngxobongwana was ousted as mayor of Crossroads by Jeffrey

Nongwe. Violence erupted between the two factions and in September Ngxobongwana fled with his followers over the N2 highway into the southern edge of the Driftsands Nature Reserve.

The opening of parliament on 2 February, 1990 brought *the Defender* and her Black Sash colleagues out on to the streets again with their sashes and placards, never imagining that President de Klerk was about to announce the unbanning of the ANC and other political organisations and the imminent release from prison of Nelson Mandela. FW de Klerk's momentous speech was the death knell for all the apartheid legislation, functions and apparatus, including the tricameral parliamentary system which had excluded the majority black population from representation. The House of Representatives (for coloureds) and the House of Delegates (for Indians) each had extensive administrations, including housing functions, which would have to be dismantled and assimilated into whatever government structures were to follow.

Introducing some Enablers: *The Strategist*

As a young man he had decided that rather than follow his father's interest in politics he would join the civil service as a town planner. He prided himself on "serving the government of the day" and had established a reputation for addressing issues with expertise and integrity. His career had taken him from the National Department of Community Development, where he was the deputy town planner in 1974, involved with the development of Mitchell's Plain as a new town for coloured people, to the top housing position in the administration of the (coloured) House of Representatives. There he had introduced a holistic approach to housing in areas such as Delft and Blue Downs, incorporating assisted self-building schemes with technical resource centres, ensuring the provision of all the necessary community facilities, involving the

private sector in joint ventures and providing a professional social service to support vulnerable households. He believed that big problems deserved big solutions and was not afraid to innovate.

Two months after Nelson Mandela's release *the Strategist* transferred to the Cape Provincial Administration on promotion to lead the community services branch, with four gigantic responsibilities: the administration and development urban black settlements; the welfare of the urban black population; all spatial planning functions in the province; and the oversight of all local government institutions. *The Wrestler* was one of his three first line managers for 'black affairs'. *The Provincial Planner* was a junior planner, three tiers below. Not only had *the Strategist* inherited a large team of personnel from diverse backgrounds – he had also inherited the problem of Crossroads, its warlords and the incessant conflict there. He had never dealt with warlords before, or even with black communities.

The Strategist realised that although his predecessor had negotiated the funds to build the 'white houses' in Crossroads nobody had considered how they would be allocated. "And it was war! I realised that we cannot go on like this, fighting about resources. Khayelitsha was running alright, but in these older areas nothing was happening – they had suddenly made this small injection of housing but there was no holistic plan. We needed to provide some hope and get a plan on the table, even if it was going to take time."

The Strategist still had to work out how to deal with Crossroads. He recounts that when employed by the House of Representatives he had been kept well informed and advised by the National Intelligence Service. "They told us that we had to adapt, without telling us what to do. They provided very good briefings, including reports on their research on the realities of urbanisation. Their

message was that we had to adapt and in particular we had to consult and involve people – it wasn't easy, but we had to do it."

Introducing some Enablers: *The Sponsor*

In the years preceding South Africa's first democratic government 1994 state rule was centralised, aided by provincial administrations, each with an executive council which was chaired by the administrator of the province. Provincial governments, led by premiers, were introduced in 1994. *The Sponsor* was administrator of the Cape province from 1989-1994. He was a lawyer by training but had established himself very successfully as an executive in wine and wheat co-operative movements. He entered politics in 1972, first as a town councillor in Paarl, then as a member of the Cape Provincial Council, and in 1981 made it his occupation with a seat in parliament. From 1986 to 1989 he was deputy minister of foreign affairs – a very delicate job in those last years of State President PW Botha's reign – and in the subsequent reorganisation he was appointed provincial administrator. *The Strategist* comments: "We were lucky to have *the Sponsor* – you could speak to him and convince him of things. He was a people person, a Christian with good values, and if you came to him with the right kind of message he was willing to adapt".

At this time it was not state policy to build houses in urban areas for black people. The tricameral administrations had housing policies for coloureds and Indians that provided subsidised home loans plus advice and training for self-builders, but the state's policy for urban Africans was to create only serviced sites, which were then leased at an income-related rent. The tenants could build whatever they could afford, but they did not own the land and were not given access to loans, so most dwellings were informal shacks. The few

formal houses that had previously been built in New Crossroads, Khayelitsha and Crossroads had been political initiatives and were exceptions to the rule.

Crossroads had become the iconic contemporary example of the South African's government's absolute determination to apply its apartheid policies to the urban African population. Its control of Crossroads had been achieved only by joining forces with similarly autocratic and repressive leaders, and by doing so it had magnified opposition within the country and internationally. There was nothing constructive to show for all the energy expended except a few unaffordable houses, some cleared, scorched land and a tiny local authority run by white officials with a warlord as mayor and his henchmen as councillors. Meanwhile urbanisation had not abated – and in the 16 years since it was first occupied Crossroads had generated immensely more problems than it had solved. An estimated sixty thousand people were now struggling to survive in or around Crossroads with inadequate access to basic facilities.



Figure 1.4: Cape Town: Black townships as at 1990

As regional director of the Urban Foundation in Cape Town through most of the 1980s *the Democrat* had wanted to properly consolidate the settlement of Crossroads in a participative manner, starting with an infrastructure programme, but it had been thwarted by the

politics of the time. He had since resigned from the Urban Foundation and become a consultant in the facilitation of community involvement in development – and in that capacity *the Strategist* had employed him to do some work with rural coloured communities in the Northern Cape for the House of Representatives. Now, in 1990, *the Democrat* was busy co-ordinating community participation in 100 housing projects across the country that were being financed by the Independent Development Trust.

With adaptation as an imperative, but confronted by the multiple challenges of outdated attitudes and practices within government and of building real relationships with legitimate black leadership, *the Strategist* invited *the Democrat* to a discussion on Crossroads in October 1990.

The stakeholders and their characteristics

The case history tells of many parties and individuals who have played some kind of role in the crisis over time. In this case study the main actors were broadly government and community, and from time to time organisations in the private sector and civil society played a role. However, many of the organisational structures and the leading actors in the Crossroads saga changed over the period 1974–1990, and in order to consider how to move ahead it is necessary to pause in 1990 and record what forces were at work in Crossroads at that stage. Relational maps are an attempt to indicate the main actors at any time and which are related to each other and which are in conflict.

By this means the forces at work in Crossroads in the early part of 1990 can be represented as shown in the following relational map (Figure 1.5). See Figure 1.6 for the key to symbols:



Figure 1.5: Crossroads 1990: Forces at work



Figure 1.6: Relational map key to symbols

The right hand side of the map shows the state's establishment: responsibility had been delegated to the provincial government, which also administered the Black Local Authorities – and shown here is the Crossroads Town Council and its neighbouring Ikapa Town Council (for the old townships of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga) and the council for the massive new 'city' of Khayelitsha. The leadership of the Crossroads remnant had been co-opted into the Crossroads Town Council with first Ngxobongwana and then Nongwe as mayor. And Nongwe was an office-bearer in WCUSA – the association of squatter leaders.

Crossroads was not the only squatter settlement with autocratic leaders – a number of the groups who had entered Crossroads and later fled as refugees into previously uninhabited areas were led by autocrats, and these also joined WCUSA.

However, those refugees who settled in open spaces within existing formal townships and within hostel complexes relied on support from the leaders of their neighbourhood, most of whom were associated with civic movements and therefore with the United Democratic Front. They as a body were implacably opposed to the state and all its repressive manifestations and to any allies of the state, whom they regarded as sell-outs.

Between all of these refugee settlements was a cautious, competitive relationship. They each wanted to receive priority in any possible housing project and were willing to fight for it. It was reputedly also common practice for settlement leaders to extract tribute from their followers for protection, access to resources and for being placed on an unofficial waiting list for a site or house in a probably fictitious new project.

In addition to these rather obvious and high profile actors in the Crossroads drama there were a number of other parties who had an interest in the restoration of peace and development in Crossroads and in how the 30 unserviced refugee settlements would be provided with something better. These included the other local authorities in Cape Town from whom any responsibility for African housing had been removed by the state decades before. The principal of these was the City of Cape Town, containing most of the city's businesses, and which had a long history of opposition to apartheid. The metropolitan area of Cape Town contained over 50 local authorities, and should apartheid fall local government would have to be rationalised and the City would have a major role to play. The city council was very concerned about the ongoing violence and disruption in Crossroads yet had neither a mandate nor the capacity to intervene. There was also the Western Cape Regional

Services Council which was responsible for metropolitan planning and the provision of bulk services and on which the local authorities were represented, but had no authority to intervene in Crossroads either.

Business interests in Philippi, bordering Crossroads, had been badly disadvantaged by the violence and arson. Some had abandoned the area and those remaining were very concerned at the inability of government to bring stability. Organised business was unable to exert leverage in such a localised crisis and its main instrument for creating such change, the Urban Foundation, had been rebuffed in Crossroads.

Some civil society organisations, including welfare and faith-based groups, had been very active in and around Crossroads, providing emergency goods and services, legal and other specialist advice and humanitarian aid for various lengths of time. In the course of their work such people would have gained a deep insight into detailed aspects of the crisis, and be acutely aware of the damage that had been inflicted and its causes. The extent to which such organisations might be able to contribute to creating a development programme would require careful consideration, for some were more reactive than pro-active in nature and had tightly prescribed areas of interest.

Leaders of neighbouring black communities were very concerned at the spread of violence from Crossroads and the pressures being put on their own areas by the influxes of Crossroads refugees. These leaders needed development for their own people, many of whom were living in overcrowded houses and hostels, and their compassion towards the refugees was mixed with the fear that these outsiders or latecomers might somehow be given priority in development over those who had been suffering in Cape Town for a far longer time.

Also waiting in the wings were other parties who were keen to benefit from any housing development – the service providers:

consultants, contractors and materials suppliers. Over previous years the CPA had developed a reputation for awarding contracts to political supporters. These same beneficiaries were waiting for more. On the other hand those firms that had been excluded were waiting for political change and wanted to be first in the queue when the dispensation changed. But there was another huge group of people waiting for their turn – those who had been denied any opportunity for advancement and profit-making simply because of the colour of their skin – and they were determined not to be left out again.

Trust is usually in short supply in such crises, but in spite of opposing parties and philosophies it is possible that some individuals from opposing camps have a friendly or working relationship. They may have worked with each other long ago, or found themselves sitting side by side on a journey sometime and struck up a conversation, or perhaps are aware that they think more broadly or creatively than their job allows them to act. These are potential Enablers: bridge-builders, facilitators, deal brokers and conflict de-fusers whose contribution can be of great value. This case study has already revealed that there were potentially significant pre-existing relationships between *the Strategist* and *the Democrat*, and between *the Community Planner* and *the Wrestler*. *The Veteran* had a very broad span of connections. The Enablers include four town planners who shared an ethical code – three of whom had attended the same town planning school. And as will be revealed in the next chapter, although *the Defender* publicly opposed the government she was held in high esteem by *the Sponsor*.

Contrarily cross-party relationships might be used for personal advantage or an illicit or hidden purpose that is contrary to the public interest. The possibility of large-scale development can tempt opportunists to grasp control of resources, and a careful watch should be kept on the formation of any strategic alliances that are for such purposes.

PART TWO: Understanding Cross-Sector Collaboration

“A real problem is that participation or ‘working together’ cannot be built from only one side.”

Chapter 9: Participation and Beyond

"A first key challenge for the 21st century is the construction of new relationships between ordinary people and the institutions – especially those of government - which affect their lives."

– John Gaventa (2004)

Participative development – a literature review

This book is about the practicalities of dissimilar and even opposing parties working together to successfully address major social problems, such as a housing crisis, in an unstable and uncertain environment. This chapter explores theories related to the mechanics of working together by engaging with various bodies of literature through a process illustrated in Figure 9.1 from steps A–F:



Figure 9.1: Literature review: Flow chart

This survey begins at 'A' by disaggregating the challenge posed by Gaventa in his own terms. From there the survey engages with two well-established schools of theory which approach the subject from opposite perspectives. The first is 'community participation' ('B'), generally representing community initiative, although some (e.g. Miraftab, 2004; Rahnema, 2010) regard it as an originally virtuous grassroots-based concept that has been hijacked by the state and thereafter sustained by prostitute intermediaries. Those who adopt a more pragmatic stance (e.g. Cleaver, 2004; Robbins, 2008) emphasise the value of even the subtle improvements in power and position that can be achieved by individuals or structures. The second school (e.g. Ansell and Gash, 2007; Thomson and Perry, 2006) is 'collaborative governance' ('C'), which takes a state-

based perspective of the same arena but questions whether it can successfully hijack or co-opt communities and squeeze them into a collaborative mould – or whether the building of collaborations is much more difficult. A further school ('D') has emerged around the 'participative sphere' (e.g. Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Bebbington, 2004) in which the parties engage, and from there the survey moves to the field of 'cross-sector collaboration' ('E') (e.g. Bryson et al., 2006), which studies the implications and dynamics of collaborations that are not necessarily an initiative of either government or communities but within society in general, represented by various sectors. The survey concludes ('F') with a summary of whom the literature (including Huxham and Vangen, 2007) identifies as the key role-players.

PART THREE: An Enabler's Manual

"This is for practitioners at the cutting edge who find themselves having to create and manage cross-sector collaboration but are uncertain about what to do."

Chapter 12: A Framework for the Process of Cross-Sector Collaboration

This manual is designed to enable you to approach the possibility of creating a cross-sector collaborative development in a careful, logical manner. The emphasis here is on the conceptualisation, design, structure and overall planning of the collaboration, rather than on the planning and implementation of its project components.

These are tools to assist the practitioner to design and manage an effective collaborative process. If that is done properly it will establish a strong and durable foundation for the planning and implementation of projects and programmes.

The manual is presented in the order of a typical collaborative development process, which could have 14 stages. These are listed below, and then in the pages that follow each stage is unpacked to show what they might contain. Where more detail is required a reference is provided to the notes section at the end.

The 14 stages in a collaborative development process

STAGE 1: Problem statement

Consider the circumstances and problems that lead you to believe that a collaborative project might be necessary.

STAGE 2: Conceptualisation

Develop an idea yourself of how a collaborative development might be created.

STAGE 3: Executive support

Obtain support for your concept from political and administrative superiors, and a mandate to canvass support more widely.

STAGE 4: Canvass support

Canvass the perspective of each party and the basis on which they would consider participating in a collaborative development.

STAGE 5: Invitation

Negotiate with all parties a few basic principles as a mutually acceptable basis for an invitation to collaborate â€“ and deliver such invitations on behalf of the patron.

STAGE 6: Inauguration

Organise the event, chaired by the patron, who seeks formal agreement on the objective of the collaboration, the basic principles of procedure and willingness to proceed to Stage 7.

STAGE 7: Establishment

Obtain agreement on the principles which will be used to anchor and guide the process towards achieving the agreed objective; on terms of reference for one or more committees; and on the initial research to be commissioned.

STAGE 8: Research

Collaboratively research, analyse and report on key unknowns and their implications; achieve agreement on project content.

STAGE 9: Business planning

Prepare a comprehensive business plan as an instrument to obtain the support and resources required to conduct detailed planning and implementation.

STAGE 10: Obtain resources

Obtain approval of the business plan by political, financial and other authorities, and an assurance that all the necessary resources will be made available.

STAGE 11: Planning of projects

Collaboratively plan individual projects in detail to be used in order to obtain an allocation of resources and as a basis for procurement and contracts.

STAGE 12: Project approvals

Obtain approval of each project and access to resources as they are required.

STAGE 13: Implementation

Collaborative implementation of individual projects according to approved plans; and co-ordinated implementation of the project as a whole.

STAGE 14: Completion

Achieve certified completion of every aspect of the project in terms of original approved plans and authorised amendments.

These stages are explained in detail in the pages that follow.

Notes and References

Chapter 1

My sources for this chapter

The purpose of this chapter is to provide some historical context. I am not a historian, so this chapter also provides an example of what a layman can easily learn about the history behind the crisis from easily available sources. I must acknowledge, however, that the popular literature from which most of this chapter has been drawn became very much more available after 1990 than it was before, under a regime which firmly repressed the availability of information. Had I attempted to write this little history under those conditions I would have had to interview informants, read restricted documents and banned books and then been very careful about what I wrote. The point is that in any crisis an understanding of, and respect for, the history is a prerequisite – and it might not be easily accessible.

In this Chapter 1 have drawn very heavily on the following popular books: On South African history:

Readers Digest . 1994. *Illustrated History of South Africa: The Real Story*. Readers Digest. Cape Town. A more recent edition of this book is now available.

On the history of Cape Town I have drawn from the following two volumes:

Bickford-Smith, V, van Heyningen, E and Worden, N. 1998. *Cape Town: The Making of a City*. David Philip. Cape Town.

Bickford-Smith, V, van Heyningen, E and Worden, N. 1999. *Cape Town in the twentieth century: An illustrated social history*. David Philip. Cape Town.

My source on the subject of forced removals within Cape Town was:

Field, S ed. 2001. *Lost Communities, Living Memories: Remembering Forced Removals in Cape Town*. Centre for Popular Memory, University of Cape Town.

Information on the administration of urban blacks under apartheid was obtained from:

Terreblanche, S. 2002. *A History of Inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002*. University of Natal Press and KMM Review Publishing Co.Ltd.

The history of Crossroads within this chapter was drawn from the above sources plus the following official report:

"Goldstone Crossroads Report" Report to the Commission of Enquiry regarding the prevention of public violence and intimidation by the committee investigating public violence and intimidation at Crossroads during March/June 1993. Republic of South Africa.

The contents of the 'Introducing the Enablers:' sections have been drawn from my interviews with them – with one exception (see below). The purpose in writing these short but personal biographies into the text has been to demonstrate the variety of backgrounds and motivations of people who were drawn into finding a solution to the problem of Crossroads. None of them were specialists on the subject but they all were willing to help, and their contributions proved to be pivotal to the success of various aspects of the project. I have not divulged their names for three reasons: because the purpose of this book is to call attention to the various enabling

functions that were performed in the collaborative project rather than to the actual people; because if I revealed their names I would have to write a great deal more about them to do justice to their own stories, which was not their intention in agreeing to be interviewed; and to respect their privacy. It was as I interviewed them that I reflected upon what a vital role is played by such Enablers.

The Enabler whom I did not interview was the Sponsor. I was, however, able to find some background information from The O'Malley Archives[4].

Lessons for Enablers: 1–2

Lesson 1

First steps towards understanding a chronic social crisis

1. Identify the presenting problems – but don't try to solve them, because they are superficial.
2. Then consider what the underlying problems might be – but don't try to solve them either because they probably are only symptoms.
3. Then dig deeper to find the real foundational problems – attitudes and policies.

Begin thinking of some principles that might create a better foundation.

Lesson 2

Questions about who could play useful roles

[4] http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley

1. Which are the parties that are currently involved and who are their representatives?
2. Which other parties have previously been involved and might demand participation?
3. Which parties or persons might contribute to resolving the crisis but have previously been excluded?
4. Of these which parties and persons are positively associated with each other?
5. On the other hand, which parties and persons are opposed to each other?
6. Which persons have constructive relationships with persons in opposing parties?
7. Which persons are in cross-party alliances that potentially could become destructive?
8. Which parties who have provided welfare services into the crisis might have a contribution to make in the future?

[5] https://leanpub.com/collaborationatthecrossroads
[6] https://twitter.com/search?q=gerry+adlard
[7] https://www.collabcab.com

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress

BLA – Black Local Authority

CCT – City of Cape Town

CPA – Cape Provincial Administration

ECD – Early childhood development

HDA – Hostel Dwellers Association, also called 'Umzamo'

iSLP – Integrated Serviced Land Project

NGO – Non-governmental organisation

NP – National Party

PIA – Philippi Industrialists Association

PAC – Pan African Congress

PPC – Peninsular People's Compact

PSC – Private Sector Consortium

RDC – Residents' development committee

RDP – Reconstruction and Development Programme

RSC – Regional Services Council

SANCO – South African National Civics Organisation

SLP – Preliminary name for iSLP

UDF – United Democratic Front

UF – Urban Foundation

WCCA – Western Cape Civics Association

WCCDC – Western Cape Community Development Company

WCUSA – Western Cape United Squatters Association

WECCO – Western Cape Community Organisation

Province – Provincial government (CPA until 1994)