

CURRENT STATUS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSSAD AND NIA

1. BACKGROUND

1.1 The MOSSAD was handled by [REDACTED] from 1996 to 2004. At that stage it was the only country in the Middle East that was represented and declared to NIA. Relations were always more tense with the MOSSAD than with any other country, solely because of the history between the two countries.

1.2 The representative initially met, was [REDACTED] he was succeeded by [REDACTED]. During the time of [REDACTED] relations were standard and regular exchange took place. Exchanges regularly took place, mostly on individuals and organizations suspected of terrorism involvement. A counter terrorism expert visit took place in 1996. Background on terrorism modus operandi was shared by them, even before the first PAGAD related bombs exploded in the Western Cape. Meaningful exchanges became less at the end of [REDACTED] term. The MOSSAD at that stage also indicated they were thinking of a part time representative responsible for handling the whole of Africa. NIA discarded the idea and [REDACTED] subsequently was placed in South Africa, although he regularly traveled to West and East Africa where he also was the declared member. Reasonable relations existed with [REDACTED] until he was handed over to [REDACTED].

Examples of exchanges are attached as Annexure A, during the above-mentioned period.

1.3 During February 2005, [REDACTED], the MOSSAD Director for Foreign Relations, led a MOSSAD delegation that visited NIA Head Quarters in Musanda Liaison Centre. The objective of the MOSSAD visit was to create a space for dialogue on how cooperation between MOSSAD and NIA can be improved. Mr NJENJE, former NIA DDG led the NIA delegation

1.4 [REDACTED] mentioned that non-conventional threats are more worrying to the MOSSAD and the Israeli government. He also mentioned that was priority threat for Israel because it Iran possessed nuclear capability that could be used against Israel and for funding Hezbollah and HAMAS.

1.5 Mr. NJENJE welcomed the sentiments expressed by [REDACTED] regarding the need for Intelligence Services to cooperate and work together to avert terrorist threats. He assured MOASSAD that NIA was a willing partner in the fight to combat international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He emphasised the importance of that meeting as having brought to the fore bases for productive cooperation between NIA and MOSSAD in the area of Counter Terrorism and Counter Proliferation.

1.6 There was improvement of information exchange soon after the MOSSAD delegation visit. In May 2006 NIA Counter Proliferation experts delegation visited Israel. MOSSAD was pushing to hard to included information request on Counter Intelligence area such as [REDACTED] the Iranian national staying in Cape Town. He alleged that [REDACTED] was in contact with [REDACTED] a Hezbollah member based in Lebanon. NIA did not provide feedback to MOSSAD on this request.

1.7 In 2007 MOSSAD provided information on [REDACTED] to NIA with the hope that the information would benefit South Africa. They expected that NIA would share information with them on what are finding of their monitoring and investigation. However, [REDACTED] bluntly told [REDACTED] the Local Representative of MOSSAD that he was prevented by NIA Management to share information on [REDACTED] could not understand [REDACTED] because MOSSAD provided to NIA information on [REDACTED]. He stormed out of the meeting.

1.8 [REDACTED] former Head FIS Liaison MOSSAD grievance on NIA's action to refuse to share information on [REDACTED] activities after his return from Somalia to NLC to get guidance. He was confused by the actions of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and sought NIA's position on cooperation with MOSSAD. The NLC reversed Mr [REDACTED] decision to refuse IM to share information on [REDACTED] with MOSSAD. However, [REDACTED] took over from IM Analysts.

1.9 [REDACTED] the former DDG instructed [REDACTED] to confine cooperation between NIA and MOSSAD to Counter Proliferation and Counter Terrorism.

1.10 The political stance of from Minister KARSILS contributed to the perception that NIA was not willing to cooperate with MOSSAD because the adversaries of Israel are allies of South Africa. Of course Mr KARSILS has openly demonstrated political differences with Israel and supported the cause of the Palestinian. He also favoured Iran's material support to Palestinians Resistance Movement. He ordered audit of information NIA liaised with MOSSAD.

1.11 Mr. MANZINI the former DG paid unofficial visit to MOSSAD HQ in March 2009. MOSSAD complaint to him about lack of concrete cooperation with NIA. According to MOSSAD the situation has not changed. Instead it has deteriorated to the levels which have compelled MOSSAD to withdraw their Representative from South Africa. Hence they have withdrawn their Representative but have not severed the relations from residing in South Africa.

Annexure A

FEEDBACK

We would like to express our appreciation for providing leads on [REDACTED]. It is, however, at this stage only possible to provide preliminary feedback. In this regard the following:

Information that is currently available on [REDACTED] also known as [REDACTED] neither confirms nor refutes suspected links to terrorism in general and al-Qaeda in particular. An accurate assessment of the real or potential threat posed by [REDACTED] and his followers is thus not viable at this stage.

[REDACTED] is associated with an organisation called Majlis Ul Ulama and a newspaper called the Majlis. The current status of the organisation and the newspaper is being investigated.

He is furthermore involved in a project to establish and fund madrassas locally and abroad. Funding of this project has previously been done through two organisations, namely Mujlisul Ulama of South Africa and Servants of Suffering Humanity. The current status of this project, as well as details about the organisations involved, still need to be determined.

Details about possible followers are sketchy at this stage, which could be attributed to [REDACTED] unpopularity within the broader Muslim community and the animosity between him and his family.

There is at this stage no information available pertaining to suspicious money collection, as well as transfers to and from South Africa involving [REDACTED].

Although the existence of "The Centre Director Islamic Information Charitable Trust" could not be confirmed, the banking details provided are being followed up.

It is suspected that [REDACTED] travels abroad are linked to the above-mentioned project. He is said to have connections in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Details and confirmation of his trips, however, are still outstanding.

Investigations into the matter continue and any relevant information that may become available would be liaised.

Thank you for your attention.

EVENTS THAT FOLLOWED THE 'WALK-IN' SITUATION AT THE ISRAELI EMBASSY.

1. Liaison report NIA/A32/13/2/5(LS825) dated 5 June 2001 refers.
2. Information regarding the 'walk-in' was conveyed to NIA on 4 June 2001 as was stated in the report. All the relevant chief directorates were tasked for information on [REDACTED] through J62. It was already established by the liaison officer that he used a false passport number and that he was not Algerian as he stated.
3. [REDACTED] apparently called the Embassy twice and threatened to blow-up the Embassy if they did not give him money as he requested. As far as could be established he never personally came to the Embassy again. [REDACTED] wife reported to the liaison officer while he was in Paris to visit his parents. He did call from Paris on 15 June 2001 to ask about the situation regarding [REDACTED]. He then indicated that [REDACTED] contacted the embassy again and threatened them if they did not pay him.
4. The events that happened resulted in the liaison officer of NIA and [REDACTED] SAPS member in the protection unit assigned to the Israeli Embassy, making contact on a daily basis. New facts came to light and other Embassies became involved.
 - The Canadians reported that they received information from Montreal that the Israeli Embassy in Canada could be a target. They reported the info to NIA. They did however not indicate that they also got the information from the Israeli Embassy in Pretoria. They also said that the same person might have walked-in at their Embassy. This

information was confusing and was followed up by CDCE. The SAPS showed a photo of [REDACTED] to them. Only then did they realise that it was the same person. The photo was received by NIA from the Mossad and given to the SAPS.

-The Americans requested to see [REDACTED] on 18 June 2001 who met with [REDACTED] and gave him the following information:

On 25 April 2001, one [REDACTED] (Given name) [REDACTED] (Muslim name) walked into the US Embassy in Pretoria offering information on individuals allegedly involved in the US Embassy bombings in Nairobi. [REDACTED] provided his date and place of birth as [REDACTED]. He indicated that he was a resident of [REDACTED]. He appeared to be East African, was of medium height and built, had a dark complexion and a small amount of facial hair. He provided some information of potential interest concerning a former employer in [REDACTED] who [REDACTED] claimed was involved in the US Embassy bombings and is now threatening his life. This information dated to December 1998. He also claimed to have attended Jama'at Al- Tabligh meetings in Cape Town. He maintained that he destroyed his [REDACTED] passport and left his [REDACTED] residency permit in [REDACTED] he could not provide any identification.

[REDACTED] was accompanied by a Belgian/Congolese national [REDACTED] with date and place of birth [REDACTED] was of medium height, very slight built and dark complexioned. It was assessed by the Embassy that [REDACTED] sought to benefit financially from his role in assisting [REDACTED] and convincing him to approach the US Embassy. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] initially were unwilling to provide an address or telephone number, where they could be contacted. They eventually provided the name of the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] claimed that he shared the room with three other males. [REDACTED] also indicated that he had a sister who resided just outside [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] admitted to having previously approached the Canadian Embassy and possibly the Swedish Embassy. Although [REDACTED] story initially appeared reasonably credible, he later admitted lying on certain aspects. It was clear that he tried to give information on an ongoing manner to receive money in return. He claimed on several occasions that his life was in danger

from his former employer in [REDACTED] one [REDACTED] [REDACTED] He was referred to the SAPS on these occasions.

[REDACTED] indicated to [REDACTED] that they have worked with [REDACTED] since October 2000. They indicated to the SAPS that they would assist them in locating him and to lure him to the American Embassy for an interview. The SAPS contacted the liaison officer to ask if NIA would be interested in being involved in the interview. This was relayed to CDCE who indicated that they were interested.

5. On Friday, 8 June 2001 the SAPS in Rosebank disabled a pipe bomb that was found at a company named Polaris in Waverly, Johannesburg. On Saturday, 9 June 2001 at 5:00 in the morning a petrol bomb was thrown into the building housing the Polaris Shipping Company and extensive fire damage was reported. The local representative contacted the liaison officer on 9 June 2001, giving the details of the incident and stating that the Polaris Company was connected to a big company in Israel named the Zintek Company. It was however not common knowledge that the Polaris Company was an affiliate of the Zintek Company. The MOSSAD expressed their concern on this issue, seeing that some kind of investigation had to be done by the person who attacked the company, in order to know that it was an Israeli company. This information was given through to the Alert Centre on 9 June 2001. It was later established through the SAPS that the Polaris Company was involved in shipping navigational systems. There is also no South African working at the Company. The SAPS are investigating possible internal personnel problems as well as an insurance fraud scheme.
6. The following counter intelligence information was gathered through liaising with the Police, after the two events and weighing it against information received from the MOSSAD:
-The Shin Beth member working with the security at the embassy is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The EL AL manager at JIA is also very involved in the gathering of intelligence. He is the individual that handled the whole issue of the pipe bomb at the Polaris Company. He took a video of the demonstration that took place outside the Israel Trade Centre on 8 June 2001, as well as video footage of the pipe bomb. The video was received by NIA and distributed to the relevant CD's. The head of Africa desk at the Shin Beth arrived in South Africa on 11 June 2001 to oversee the situation concerning the security of the Embassy after the two events. (Polaris and 'walk-in'). NIA was not informed of the arrival of the Shin Beth member.

-Through liasing with the SAPS it came to the attention that a security committee consisting of the Americans, British, Canadians and the Israelis comes together once a month to discuss any threat or terrorist activity. Previously the SAPS were invited to these meetings. It was on a meeting like this that the first information on the 'walk-in' was liased with one another.

COMMENTS BY LIAISON OFFICER

1. Investigators and analysts of CDCE and analysts in J5 were already given all the information as the situation evolved.
2. A lot of questions can be asked:
 - Was the CIA handling the walk-in as a source?
 - Did he actually walk-in at the Israeli Embassy or was this staged to ensure more protection by the SAPS?
 - Was the bombing incident also staged to attract more attention to safety at the Israeli Embassy and other Israeli Companies?
 - Why did the CIA not inform the SA authorities immediately after the first approach by the walk-in, and why did they not inform NIA at all about the incident?

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3. The Americans, Israelis and the Canadians compromised their relationship in the different information that was given to NIA and the SAPS. This was a good exercise for NIA and the SAPS and their co-operation in using all the information to our advantage.



LIAISON MEETING: LS 825(MOSSAD): 2002 SEPTEMBER 10 AND 12

TIME:

19:00

11:30

VENUE:

Giovanni's

Café

Barcelona

PERSONS INVOLVED:

Local representative for LS 825
[redacted] liaison officer NIA

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1. DETAILS OF CONTACT:

1.1 An urgent meeting was requested by [REDACTED] on 2002 September 10. He supplied the following information:

A Saudi Arabia travel agent in South Africa issued six plane tickets arriving September 11 at JIA on flight AT 402 (Airlines and time unknown) to the following persons from Arabic descent:



ALIQEILI SAUDI INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL AGENCY issued the tickets as 'collect tickets' in South Africa. Two of the individuals will travel from Morocco and the other four from Benin.

1.2 The local representative mentioned that the information was received late September 10. The information is not confirmed. The reason why this issue raises suspicion is the way in which the tickets were purchased and the fact that they travel together from different locations.

1.3 A follow-up meeting was requested by [REDACTED] on 2002 September 12. The following additional information was received from LS 825 as a follow-up on the previous information regarding the suspicious travellers from Benin and Morocco:

[REDACTED] is a Moroccan citizen.
Passport number [REDACTED]
Born in [REDACTED]
Currently living in Marrakech
Moroccan ID [REDACTED]

The flight plan for the above-mentioned individual is as follows:
Departed Agadir, September 11 to Casablanca on Royal Air Moroc, flight AT 402.
Departed Casablanca, September 11 to Paris on Air France, flight 2497.
Depart Paris, September 18 to Johannesburg on Air France, flight 990.
Depart Johannesburg, September 19 or 20 to Paris.
Depart Paris, September 20 to Casablanca on Air France, flight 2195
Depart Casablanca, September 20 to Agadir on Inter Air, flight AT 423.

2. REQUESTS

2.1 Thirty individuals of the AL AQSA FOUNDATION will leave for Tel Aviv on 2002 September 20. They will be meeting the PLO in GAZA. Additional information is requested on the visit and specifically on [REDACTED] a member of the SOUTH AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATION. He attracts attention because he has contact with [REDACTED] in the West Bank in Palestine. NIA was requested to indicate if this group should be allowed to enter Israel and to indicate if this group will enhance the possibility of a peace process or hamper the possibility in the region.

2.2 The local representative requested a courtesy call with the DG, NIA. The reason is that he has a message from his Service regarding the WSSD to convey to the DG, NIA. He also wants to use the opportunity to shortly give a briefing on the situation in the Middle East.

3. DOCUMENTS EXCHANGED

3.1 The following documents were exchanged:
-SIGNIFICANT DATES IN SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2002

-GULF TENSION

-TERRORISM THREAT TO VESSELS

4. COMMENT BY LIAISON OFFICER

4.1 The initial information was received on September 10 and was forwarded to the National Operational Centre and to the JIA office for follow-up on the same day. Although the information is unconfirmed and not a specific threat, one could not ignore the information of this nature especially on the 11th of September.

4.2 The flight plan of [REDACTED] raises suspicion in the sense that he travels from very far and with a lot of effort to get to Johannesburg to stay only one day. It also needs to be highlighted again that the reason why the group of suspicious travellers attracted attention was that their tickets were bought in South Africa and were collected at their places of departure.

4.3 It was indicated to the local representative that the DG, NIA is very busy, but that the request for a courtesy call will be forwarded to his office.

LIAISON OFFICER

5 COMMENT BY CI 13

- 5.1 Even though the information was not confirmed, it could not be ignored especially that the travelling arrangements casts some suspicion.
- 5.2 It is a protocol procedure to allow a local representative to convey a message from his Service to the Director General.

HEAD FIS LIAISON CI 13

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NIA/IM20/1/5/2

DZ: IM20/2002/1653

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Office of the Manager
National Analysis (IM20)

2002 October 04

Head Foreign Intelligence Service Liaison (CI13)

**FEEDBACK TO REQUEST BY LS 825: AL AQSA FOUNDATION
MEETING WITH PLO IN GAZA**

AJAZZEREA

1. Your letter NIA/CI13/1/5/2 (LS 825) dated 2002 September 19 (entitled LIAISON MEETING: LS 825 (MOSSAD): 2002 SEPTEMBER 10 AND 12) refers.
2. Directorate IM20 would like to respond as follows to the request for information regarding a meeting between the Al Aqsa Foundation (AAF) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Gaza, with specific reference

to one [REDACTED], member of the South African Human Rights Organisation (SAHRO), who would be part of the South African delegation:

2.1 Meeting between AAF and PLO

The above-mentioned meeting between the AAF and the PLO in Gaza could not be confirmed. As to the question of whether the AAF group would enhance or hamper the possibility of a peace process in the Middle East, there is no information at this stage to support either likelihood.

2.2

[REDACTED] is possibly identical to [REDACTED] (see Annexure for photo), who is a [REDACTED]. He is closely associated with the organisation People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), a staunch anti-American and involved in Muslim organisations, including SAHRO. He was involved in demonstrations in front of the USA Consulate in Durban from 5 to 19 April 2002. It is not known at this stage if [REDACTED] has links to individuals in other countries.

3. It would be appreciated if LS 825 could indicate whether [REDACTED] is indeed identical to [REDACTED]. If so, information on his contact with [REDACTED] in the West Bank, Palestine, would be appreciated.
4. Kindly place the above information in a format that is suitable for liaison purposes.
5. Thank you for your cooperation.

As signed: [REDACTED]

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RECORD CHECKS:

Information was obtained on [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Their travel records confirm that both persons exited South Africa onboard the same flight on 2001/07/07 and returned to South Africa onboard the same flight on 2001/07/21. This period coincides with the information supplied regarding their alleged activities in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are both linked to the Central Islamic School in Pretoria and the Media Review Network. Attached herewith the personal particulars, company links and detailed travel records of the two mentioned individuals.

Attempts are still being made to positively identify [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. The first mentioned may be identical to a [REDACTED] but according to the available information the latter is a South African citizen and not a Palestinian as indicated.

Thank you.

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RECORD CHECKS

1.

1.1 PERSONAL PARTICULARS

Date of Birth: [REDACTED]

Passport: [REDACTED] prior to 2001 utilised SA passport

Identity number: [REDACTED]

Physical address: [REDACTED]

1.2 COMPANY LINKS

- [REDACTED]
Private company registered as a Financial Intermediation, Insurance, Real Estate Business company.
Appointed as Director on 2000/08/31.
Address: [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
Registered as Article 21 company involved in Health and Social Work.
Appointed as Director on 2000/11/21.
Address: [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
Registered as Article 21 company involved in Community, Social and Personal Services.
Appointed as Director on 1990/10/15.
Address: [REDACTED]

1.3 TRAVEL RECORD

- Departed from Johannesburg International Airport onboard Emirates Airline flight EK464 on 1998/07/06 and arrived back from Dubai onboard South African Airways flight SA151 on 1998/07/17.
- Departed with British Airways flight BA6265 on 1999/10/30 from Johannesburg International Airport and arrived back onboard flight BA6266 on 1999/11/01.
- Departed from Johannesburg International Airport onboard Emirates Airline flight EK464 on 2001/01/26 and arrived back onboard flight EK463 on 2001/02/09.

- Departed from Johannesburg International Airport onboard Emirates Airline flight EK464 on 2001/04/21 and arrived back onboard flight EK463 on 2001/04/28.
- Departed from Johannesburg International Airport onboard Egypt Air flight MS878 on 2001/07/07 and arrived back onboard flight MS879 on 2001/07/21.

2. [REDACTED]

2.1 PERSONAL PARTICULARS

Date of Birth: [REDACTED]
Passport: [REDACTED] prior to 1994 utilised SA passport
Identity number: [REDACTED]
Physical address: [REDACTED]
Postal address: [REDACTED]

2.2 COMPANY LINKS

- [REDACTED]
Registered as Article 21 company involved in Community, Social and Personal Services.
Appointed as Director on 1990/10/15
Address: [REDACTED]

2.3 TRAVEL RECORD

- Departed through the Beitbridge border post between South Africa and Zimbabwe on 1993/12/04 in a vehicle registered as [REDACTED]
- Departed from Johannesburg International Airport onboard South African Airways flight SA276 to Mumbai on 1999/02/01 and arrived back onboard flight SA277 on 1999/03/01.
- Departed from Johannesburg International Airport onboard Egypt Air flight MS878 on 2000/06/08 and arrived back onboard flight MS877 on 2000/06/29.
- Departed from Johannesburg International Airport onboard Egypt Air flight MS878 on 2001/07/07 and arrived back onboard flight MS879 on 2001/07/21.

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