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DMS: 100000342728

**ISRAEL**



**GEOPOLITICAL COUNTRY AND  
INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT**



**ALJAZEERA**



National Intelligence Agency

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## GEOPOLITICAL COUNTRY AND INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ISRAEL

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## GEOPOLITICAL COUNTRY AND INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT ISRAEL

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Following World War II, the British withdrew their mandate of Palestine, and the UN partitioned the area into Arab and Jewish states. Rejected by the Arab state, this dispensation led to a succession of wars between the two states and though Israel claimed victory, the deeply rooted tensions between the warring parties are still very much in evidence. The territories that Israel had occupied since the 1967 war are not included in this country profile.

Israel withdrew from Sinai on 25 April 1982, pursuant to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. In keeping with the framework established at the Madrid Conference in October 1991, bilateral negotiations were conducted between Israeli and Palestinian representatives and Syria to achieve a permanent settlement. Israel and Palestinian officials signed a Declaration of Principles (also known as the "Oslo Accords") on 13 September 1993 guiding an interim period of Palestinian self-rule. The Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace signed on 26 October 1993 settled unresolved territorial disputes. In addition, on 25 May 2000, Israel withdrew unilaterally from southern Lebanon, which it had occupied since 1982.


Working in conjunction with the EU, UN, and Russia - the "Quartet" -, US President BUSH took the lead in April 2003 in laying the groundwork for a final solution to the conflict by 2005, which would culminate in the establishment of two states, Israel and a democratic Palestine. However, progress toward a permanent status agreement was undermined by Israeli-Palestinian violence between September 2003 and February 2005. An Israeli-Palestinian agreement reached at Sharm al-Sheikh in February 2005 and an internally-brokered Palestinian cease-fire significantly reduced the violence. In the summer of 2005, Israel unilaterally disengaged from the Gaza Strip, evacuating settlers and withdrawing its military while retaining control over most points of entry into the Gaza Strip.

The election of HAMAS in January 2006 to head the Palestinian Legislative Council froze relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA). Ehud OLMERT became prime minister in March 2006; he shelved plans to unilaterally evacuate from most of the West Bank following an Israeli military operation in Gaza in June-July 2006 and a 34-day conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon in June-August 2006. OLMERT resumed talks with the PA in June 2007 after HAMAS seized control of the Gaza Strip and PA President Mahmud ABBAS formed a new government without HAMAS. OLMERT resigned in September 2008 in the wake of several corruption allegations, but remained prime minister until the new coalition government under former Prime Minister Binyamin NETANYAHU was formed in late March 2009, after the February general election.



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## 2. BACKGROUND

Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem as a result of the 1967 War. Pursuant to negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established in the Gaza Strip and West Bank in 1994. HAMAS, a US-designated terrorist organisation, took control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and exercises control in that region. The division of responsibilities and jurisdiction in the West Bank between Israel and the PA is complex and susceptible to change. Palestinian Authority security forces are responsible for maintaining order in areas of the West Bank where the PA exercises a range of civil functions. Definitive information on entry, customs requirements, arrests, and other matters in the West Bank and Gaza is subject to change without prior notice or may not be available.

## 3. LEADING MEMBERS OF GOVERNMENT

	NAME
Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Strategy, of Pensioner Affairs and of Health	Binyamin NETANYAHU ( Likud)
Vice-Prime Minister and Minister for Regional Co-operation and the Development of the Negev and Galilee	Silvan SHALOM (Likud)
Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Strategic Affairs	Moshe YA'ALON (Likud).
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence	Ehud BARAK (Labour)
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs	Avigdor LIEBERMAN (Israel Beytenu).
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence and Atomic Energy	Dan MERIDOR (Likud).
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the	Eliyahu YISHAI ( Shas)

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Interior	
Minister of Finance	Yuval STEINITZ (Likud)
Minister of Communications	Moshe KAHN ( Likud)
Minister of Industry, Trade and Labour	Binyamin BEN-ELIEZER (Labour)
Minister of Religious Services	Yaacov MARGI (Shas)
Minister of Immigrant Absorption	Sofa LANDVER (Israel Beytenu)
Minister of National Infrastructure	Uzi LANDAU (Israel Beytenu)
Minister of Improvement of Government Services	Michael EITAN (Likud)
Minister of Public Safety	Yitzhak AHARONOVITCH (Israel Beytenu)
Minister of Environmental Protection	Gilad ERDAN (Likud)
Minister of Justice	Yaacov NE'EMAN ( Likud)
Minister of Construction and Housing	Ariel ATIAS (Shas)
Minister of Welfare and Social Affairs	Isaac HERZOG (Labour)
Minister of Transport and Road Safety	Yisrael KATZ (Likud)
Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development	Shalom SIMHON (Labour)
Minister of Tourism	Stas MISEZHNIKOV (Israel Beytenu)
Minister of Education	Gideon SA'AR (Likud)
Minister of Science and Technology	Rabbi Daniel HERSHKOWITZ (Jewish Home)
Minister of Culture and Sport	Limor LIVNAT (Likud)
Minister of Minority Affairs	Avishay BRAVERMAN (Labour)
Minister of Public Diplomacy and the Diaspora	Yuli-Yoel EDELSTEIN (Likud).
Ministers without Portfolio	Ze'ev Binyamin BEGIN (Likud), Meshulam NAHARI (Shas), Yossi PELED (Likud)

## 4. DOMESTIC SITUATION

The State of Israel is a parliamentary democracy with a modern economy. Two main parties hold a similar number of seats in the 120-seat Knesset (parliament), and no single party controls sufficient seats to secure a majority within its own coalition government. The new government headed by the leader of the right-wing Likud party, Binyamin NETANYAHU, is predominantly right-wing but includes the left-wing Labour Party. With 12 parties represented in the Knesset and six in the government, the new coalition will be fragile and unlikely to last its four-year term. This is despite the fact that, in theory, it has a comfortable Knesset majority, controlling 74 seats. The loyalty of some coalition members to the government is weak, with several Labour MPs likely to break away from the party. Moreover, the leader of the second largest coalition party, Yisrael Beiteinu, is facing a possible criminal charge which could affect his party's standing in the coalition. Given internal ideological and personal rivalries, as well as some financial demands from coalition parties, the government will be vulnerable to desertions. The departure of almost any one of Likud's partners could push the coalition below the 60-seat threshold needed for a majority government.

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Policymaking is likely to be deadlocked, given the divergent views of coalition members on various issues. This will make it difficult to deal with the most pressing security and economic challenges and may slow efforts to implement measures to counteract the impact of the global economic crisis on Israel's economy. The failure of any one party to gain a significant margin over the others will also impede decision-making, with several politicians vying for influence.

The recent broad consensus on the general direction of economic policy has been tested by the global downturn. Although Mr NETANYAHU was able to introduce policies during his tenure as finance minister in 2003-05 that helped Israel to emerge from recession, the political climate is now more challenging. There is little chance of substantial movement on issues of peace and diplomacy, given the composition of the government, although there is a broader range of views held within the coalition than the election results suggest. International pressure may force even a right-wing government to make modest diplomatic concessions, although this may presage the collapse of the government.

#### 5. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Key foreign policy concerns will be Iran's regional ambitions and the conflict with the Palestinians. Following the incursion into the Gaza Strip, the new Israeli government will seek to improve security by cracking down on Palestinian militants and, reluctantly, by continuing peace talks with Fatah, which governs the West Bank. Despite Mr NETANYAHU's recent concession on Palestinian statehood, substantive progress on peacemaking is unlikely (despite the attempts of the new US administration to re-engage with the issue) given Mr NETANYAHU's right-wing stance, the fragility of his government and the political stalemate within the Palestinian Territories. Both Mr NETANYAHU and his defence minister, Ehud BARAK, will focus increasingly on the strategic threat from a potentially nuclear-armed Iran, but the government is unlikely to agree to an attack on Iran's nuclear installations unless it is certain that weaponisation is imminent and that it has the support of the US. This support is unlikely to be forthcoming, at least in the short term, given the new US administration's greater emphasis on diplomatic engagement with Iran.

The government may make further concessions to the Palestinian president, Mahmoud ABBAS, including prisoner releases, and has removed a few checkpoints and small Jewish settlement outposts in the West Bank. However, much progress beyond these modest steps is unlikely, particularly since Mr NETANYAHU is leaning towards halting settlement expansion completely and keen to push for an "economic peace" rather than the step-by-step process to a two-state solution sought by international mediators. Tensions with Syria could also flare up, although Mr NETANYAHU may seek to reopen indirect peace talks, to try to draw Syria away from Iranian influence and also as a means to deflect attention away from the Palestinian issue. Tensions between Israel and Hizbullah will remain high, but the Lebanese Shia group is unlikely to risk a massive Israeli retaliation by launching an offensive. The US will remain Israel's key strategic ally, despite the increasingly divergent policy stances of both countries.

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6. **ROLE OF ISRAEL IN AFRICA**

Israeli foreign minister LIEBERMAN visited 5 African countries in July 2009: the first visit by an Israeli foreign minister in 20 years which was allegedly used, *inter alia*, to lay the groundwork for arms deals. While LIEBERMAN talked with African leaders about hunger, water shortage, malnutrition and plagues afflicting their nations, Tel Aviv's promises to African states could be seen as the gloss on an exercise in cynicism, eg that Israel's military, security, economic and political tentacles have reached every part of Africa behind a philanthropic façade. Africa's 54 nations have rebuffed Israel's diplomatic overtures for decades. Today the NETANYAHU administration believes it stands a chance to breach that wall.

Now, not only are many African nations prepared to thaw their relations with Israel, some have already begun to explore the possibility of strategic cooperation. Tel Aviv fully appreciates the vast potential that Africa offers. In addition to copious natural resources Africa represents strategic depth for the Arab world, for which reason Israel has been allegedly instrumental in arming some African regimes and allegedly aggravating crises among others, including Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea and South Africa.

Israel's concerns in Africa are suspected to be exclusively shaped by its own agenda. LIEBERMAN visiting these countries is thus not only intended to show interest in boosting their economies, enhancing agricultural production, optimising their vast water resources and putting Israeli technological expertise at their disposal. Sudan offers a possible proof of this. Accused by Israeli officials of arming and supporting the Palestinian resistance, Tel Aviv is working assiduously to encircle and isolate Sudan from the outside, and to fuel insurrection inside Sudan.

Israel has long been keen to capitalise on Africa's mineral wealth. It plans to appropriate African diamonds and process them in Israel which is already the world's second largest processor of diamonds. And if the composition of LIEBERMAN's entourage was anything to go by, Israel is also interested in African uranium, thorium and other radioactive elements used to manufacture nuclear fuel. In addition it is looking for new markets for its range of lightweight weapons. It also appears that a few Israeli military pensioners are on the lookout for job opportunities as trainers of African militias, while other members of LIEBERMAN's delegation were facilitating contracts for Israelis to train various militias. The huge oil reserves in a number of African countries are also high on Israel's agenda, with Tel Aviv seeking a share in exploration, extraction and export operations.

Since the 1950s Israel has sought to compromise Egypt's water security by consolidating its influence over countries straddling the sources of the Nile in the central African great lakes and the Ethiopian highlands. By keeping Egypt preoccupied with its water security Israel imagines that it can diminish Cairo's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Towards this end Israel's Ministry of Science and Technology conducted extensive experiments and eventually created a type of plant that flourishes on the surface or the banks of the Nile and that absorbs such large quantities of water as to significantly reduce the volume of water that reaches Egypt.

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Israeli concerns with Iran also featured high on the agenda of LIEBERMAN's African tour. Israel has been keeping a close eye on the Iranian drive in Africa where Tehran, following Beijing's footsteps, has become involved in a number of major development projects. Tel Aviv is very wary of Tehran's ambitions in a continent so rich in the raw materials for producing nuclear fuel. It hopes to forge a network of strategic relations in order to check the expansion of Iranian influence in Africa. Working to its advantage are its close ties with Washington, which can use its extensive influence in Africa to smooth out many of the bumps that would otherwise hamper Israel's African drive.

7. BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL

7.1.1 History of Relations

Israel established a Legation in South Africa in 1952 and upgraded it to an Embassy in 1974. In 1972 South Africa established a Consulate General in Tel Aviv which was upgraded to an Embassy in December 1975. Israel continued to enjoy close relations with the Apartheid Government in South Africa. Following the democratic transition in South Africa and the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Palestine, South Africa adopted an approach which favours resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict through peaceful negotiations, on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

7.1.2 Israeli Relations with Apartheid South Africa

In the 1950s and 1960s, Israel prioritised building relations with the newly independent states of sub-Saharan Africa; this, in turn, led it to take a critical stance on the question of apartheid. On 11 October 1961, Israel voted for the General Assembly censure of Eric LOUW's speech defending apartheid. In 1963, Israel informed the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid that it had taken steps to comply with the military boycott of apartheid South Africa and had recalled its ambassador to South Africa. According to Chris MCGREAL, "Israel was openly critical of apartheid through the 1950s and 60s as it built alliances with post-colonial African governments. In 1971, Israel offered the Organisation of African Unity a gift of \$2,850, which was rejected by the organisation, but not before causing tension between South African Jews and their government.

7.1.3 Most African states broke ties after the 1973 Yom Kippur war and the government in Jerusalem began to take a more benign view of the isolated regime in Pretoria. Ethan A. NADELMANN has claimed that the relationship developed due to the fact that many African countries broke diplomatic ties with Israel during the 70s following the Arab-Israeli wars, causing Israel to deepen relations with other isolated countries.

7.1.4 By the mid 1970s, Israel's relations with South Africa had warmed. In 1975, increasing economic co-operation between Israel and South Africa was reported, including the construction of a major new railway in Israel, and the building of a desalination plant in South Africa. In April 1976 South African Prime Minister John VORSTER was invited to make a state visit, meeting Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak RABIN. Later in 1976, the 5th Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Colombo, Sri Lanka, adopted a resolution calling for an oil embargo against France and Israel because of their arms sales to

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South Africa. In 1977, South African Foreign Minister Pik BOTHA visited Israel to discuss South African issues with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem BEGIN and Foreign Minister Moshe DAYAN.

- 7.1.5 In 1981, Israeli Defence Minister Ariel SHARON visited South African forces in Namibia for 10 days, later saying that South Africa needed more weapons to fight Soviet infiltration in the region.
- 7.1.6 In 1984, Pik BOTHA again visited Israel but this time only for an unofficial meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak SHAMIR.
- 7.1.7 By 1987 Israel found itself alone among the developed nations in still maintaining strong, even strategic relations with apartheid South Africa (Among African nations, only Malawi maintained diplomatic relations with South Africa throughout the Apartheid era ). On 18 March 1987 the Inner Cabinet of the Israeli government denounced the Apartheid policy of South Africa and limited Israel's security ties with Pretoria. On 16 September 1987 the Israeli Cabinet approved a series of measures designed to limit trade, sports and cultural ties with South Africa. Among them was a clause in the "measures" package stating that effective immediately, only coloured, Indian and black students would be allowed to attend leadership courses held in Israel.

7.1.8 **Nuclear Collaboration**

US Intelligence believed that Israel participated in South African nuclear research projects and supplied advanced non-nuclear weapons technology to South Africa during the 1970s, while South Africa was developing its own atomic bombs. According to David ALBRIGHT, "Faced with sanctions, South Africa began to organise clandestine procurement networks in Europe and the United States, and it began a long, secret collaboration with Israel." However, he goes on to say "A common question is whether Israel provided South Africa with weapons design assistance, although available evidence argues against significant cooperation." According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in 1977 Israel traded 30 grams of tritium in exchange for 50 tons of South African uranium and in the mid-80s assisted with the development of the RSA-3 ballistic missile. Also in 1977, according to foreign press reports, it was suspected that South Africa signed a pact with Israel that included the transfer of military technology and the manufacture of at least six atom bombs.

Chris McGREAL has claimed that "Israel provided expertise and technology that was central to South Africa's development of its nuclear bombs". In 2000, Dieter GERHARDT, Soviet spy and former commander in the South African Navy, claimed that Israel agreed in 1974 to arm eight Jericho II missiles with "special warheads" for South Africa.

7.1.9 **Israel Relations with Post-Apartheid South Africa**

Former ANC leader Nelson MANDELA first visited Israel in 1999. MANDELA said: "To the many people who have questioned why I came, I say: Israel worked very closely with the apartheid regime. I say: I've made peace with many men who slaughtered our people like animals. Israel cooperated with the apartheid regime, but it did not participate in any atrocities". Then Israeli

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Deputy Prime Minister Ehud OLMERT visited South Africa in 2004, meeting with South African President Thabo MBEKI, the first visit by an Israeli leader since the end of apartheid.

Some prominent South African figures, such as Desmond TUTU and Ronnie KASRILS have criticised Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, drawing parallels between apartheid South Africa and modern-day Israel.

The Congress of South African Trade Unions, which represents 1.2 million South African workers, has also accused Israel of practising apartheid and supported the boycott of the Canadian Union of Public Employees, as well as all Israeli products.

However, South African ambassador to Israel Major General Fumanekile GQIBA generally did not agree with the analogy, saying about his time in Israel *"Before I came here. I regarded Jews as whites. Purely whites. But when I came here I discovered that, no, these guys are not purely whites. ... You've got Indian Jews, you've got African Jews, and you've got even Chinese Jews, right? I began to say to our comrades, No, Israel is not a white country. ... Perhaps we would say there are those who came from Poland, who happened to be, white- ie Ashkenazi their culture still dominates. It's difficult to say Israel is racist, in a classic sense."*

Malcolm HEDDING, a minister who railed against apartheid during its time, currently Executive Director of the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem, says *"Calling Israel an 'apartheid state' is absolute nonsense. You might have structures that look like apartheid, but they're not. The barrier fence has nothing to do with apartheid and everything to do with Israel's self-defence. There was no such barrier until the second intifada, when people were being murdered on the highways. And the country does not dehumanise its minority in the sense of apartheid. The issues are totally different."* HEDDING believes Israel has more than proven its desire to reach an accommodation with the Palestinians, while granting political rights to its own Arab citizens within a liberal democratic system. Nevertheless, the Palestinians remain committed to Israel's destruction. By contrast, he says, it was a tiny minority in South Africa that held power and once democracy came, the National Party that had dominated the masses disappeared.

South Africa is an advocate of the two-state solution. In 2004 South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz PAHAD criticised Israel's building of the Israeli West Bank barrier.

Annual trade between Israel and South Africa totalled \$500 million USD as of 2003.

According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project in 2007 the vast majority of South Africans were indifferent to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Of those with opinions on the matter, the majority sympathized more with Israel: 28 per cent of South Africans overall sided with Israel compared to 19 per cent with the Palestinians.

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7.2 **Diplomatic Representation**

7.2.1 **South African Representation in Israel**

H E Mr I COOVADIA  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

**South African Embassy**

Office hours  
Mon-Thurs: 07:00-16:00  
Friday: 07:00-12:00

7.2.2 **Israeli Representation in South Africa**

H E Mr D SEGEV-STEINBERG  
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

7.2.3 **Embassy of Israel**

**Israel (State of)**  
(Embassy of the State of)

Pretoria  
428 King's Highway cor.  
Elizabeth Grove Street  
Lynwood

Postal Add:  
Private Bag x 50  
Menlo Park  
0102

Tel: 012 470 3500  
Fax: 012 470 3555

**Consular Department**  
Tel: 012 470 3511  
Tel: 012 470 3542/3  
Fax: 012 470 3561

E-mail:  
cao-sec@pretoria.mfa.gov.il

Web:  
<http://pretoria.mfa.gov.il>

Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary - H  
E Mr D Segev-Steinberg

Second Secretary (Admin & Consular) - S  
Dadon

Second Secretary (Political) - Mr E Inbram  
Second Secretary (Chief Security Officer) - A  
Almog

Attaché - G Sabah  
Attaché - E Maimon

Attaché - R Efodi  
\*Attaché (Police & Public Security) - A L Granit  
(Ms)

Defence & Armed Forces Attache (Non  
Resident) - Col. E Shermeister

\*non-resident

First Secretary (Economic Affairs) - O R Pearl

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E-mail : pearl@moital.gov.il

National Day varies annually


#### 7.2.4 Travel Info

##### Visa Requirements for South Africans

Visas are not required for South African passport holders not intending to stay for more than three months. Persons holding temporary or emergency passports are excluded and it is imperative for persons with such travel documents to obtain visas prior to departure.

### 8. ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

#### 8.1 Organogram of Israeli intelligence and security community (1997)



#### 8.2 History/Background of the Mossad

- 8.2.1 The first Israeli intelligence service was Shai (Information Service), the intelligence arm of the underground, pre-independence army of Palestine's Jews known as the Haganah, which means Defence. Haganah was swallowed up by the Israel Defence Forces with the birth of the state of Israel. A new intelligence community was created consisting of four intelligence agencies: military intelligence (called the Intelligence Department of the army), a domestic secret service (known as Shin Bet), a foreign intelligence service, the foreign ministry's Political Department, Varash, and The Institute for Aliyah B responsible for smuggling Jews to Israel.

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The founder of Shai, Reuven SHILOAH, became the special adviser to the Prime Minister on foreign affairs and broad strategy. Israeli intelligence was based on his views: clear identification of enemies, the comprehensive collection of information about them, and the perpetual search for allies. He defined the secret side of Israeli diplomacy and foreign policy:

- "Enemy number one of the Jewish community was the Arab people, and Arab society had to be penetrated by professional agents.
- Israel intelligence also had to think beyond Palestine, as a "Jewish-Zionist" protector of Jews throughout the world.
- Clandestine work should be based on modern technology, keeping up with the latest in espionage methods by maintaining ties with friendly agencies in Europe and the United States."

Overlapping of functions led to restructuring that included the formation of the Mossad that was directly subservient to the Prime Minister. All responsibility for special assignments was transferred to Aman, the military intelligence agency. The agency established a top secret "Unit 131" to plant agents in Arab countries. When Mossad was created it did not have an operations department. All it did was take part in a joint committee with Aman, to oversee the use of Unit 131. Otherwise the Mossad's function was to collect facts.

In late 1950s an Aman agent committed murder in Argentina and lead to restructuring. Responsibility for operations in Arab countries remained in the hands of military intelligence, but Mossad was permitted an operations department with responsibility for the rest of the world. In the initial years it was available to both the Mossad and Shin Bet. His agents began running all over the world: London, Paris, Geneva, Rome, Antwerp, Johannesburg and New York.

The Israeli intelligence community is a synthesis of various traditions that were learned, adopted, inherited or copied from other countries, especially Britain, France, United States and the former Soviet Union.

The current Israeli Intelligence Community includes the following organisations:

- Aman: the supreme military intelligence branch of the Israeli Defence Forces
- Mossad: the agency responsible primarily for overseas intelligence work
- Shabak (Shin Bet): the organisation responsible for internal security, including in the Israeli-occupied territories
- The intelligence branch of the Israeli Police
- The Centre for Political Research: the intelligence branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Former Foreign Intel Agencies**

- Aliyah B was disbanded in March 1952. During its time Aliyah B was a huge organisation involved in the global conveyance of its people. Built around a massive undercover travel agency, Aliyah B owned over sixty ships and airplanes and countless cars and trucks. Their movements were well coordinated by a world-wide network of quasi-legal radio transmitters. The agency helped hundreds of thousands of Jews make their way to Israel. Aliyah B's budget was in the tens of millions of dollars, a sum so impressive that it had genuine economic impact in some of the

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port areas of war-ravaged Europe, so extensive was the system of bribes paid to policemen, port officials, government functionaries, and ship owners. Israel's agents distinguished themselves in the black markets of France, Greece, Italy, Austria and other countries. Some of its planes became the first El Al airliners. Its vessels helped form the core of Israel's national shipping company, Zim. Aliyah B also had some of Israel's finest forgers and field agents, whom the Mossad put to good use.

- Nativ: the organisation responsible for bringing Jews from Soviet Bloc countries, a later manifestation of the Mossad Le'aliyah Bet. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it was moved out of the intelligence community and became a department within the Prime Minister's office.

Lekem @ Lakam @ Lakem: the technological agency responsible for the security of Israel's nuclear project as well as locating and purchasing parts and materials for Israel's nuclear reactor at Dimona. It was also responsible for open and covert collection of scientific and technical information. The agency's personnel were sent abroad as science attachés in Israeli embassies in Europe and the United States. It was disbanded after the American Jonathan POLLARD, who was run by Lakam, was convicted of spying. Some sources assert that open and covert collection of scientific and technical information formerly conducted by Lekem is now conducted by a unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

For years various committees tried to resolve disputes about the division of responsibilities and jurisdictions between Aman, Shabak, and Mossad. In a document known as the "Magna Carta," the heads of the three services continue their attempt to arrive at agreements regarding these. According to Magna Carta the directors of Aman and Shin Bet agreed to transfer internal security tasks within the West Bank and Gaza, now under the administrative control of Palestinian Authority, from Shin Bet to Aman officials. Shin Bet had dealt with internal security functions in these areas for over thirty years. Further, Aman reportedly agreed to transfer its Unit 504 that controls its covert agents to Mossad, while Mossad acknowledged the control over signals intelligence collection by Aman's Unit 8200. These changes in responsibilities are intended to avoid duplication in effort.

Shabak (Shin Bet) conducts counterintelligence and internal security operations for the Israeli intelligence community. Shabak is regulated by the Law on General Security Service of February 2002. The agency focuses on domestic and regional intelligence operations, but maintains a network of personnel worldwide.

Three internal departments aid Shabak operations. The Arab Affairs Department maintains information on Arab terrorist networks, and conducts anti-terrorism operations. The Non-Arab Affairs department concerns itself with other nations, with special attention paid to Russia and Eastern Europe. Both agencies operate within Israel and abroad. The third Shabak department, Protective Security, is responsible for the protection of Israeli diplomatic missions abroad, as well as internal security at military, government, industrial, and scientific installations within Israel's borders.

Shabak is also a political espionage agency. The agency monitors extremist political groups. Scrutiny and surveillance of the political associations of

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foreigners living within Israel is an additional routine Shabak activity. The agency also possesses the authority to arrest and detain persons suspected of anti-government activity.

8.2.2 **Aman**

The Directorate of Military Intelligence (Aman) is Israel's central, overarching military intelligence in the Israel Defence Forces. Aman collates, processes, and disseminates military intelligence information, as well as coordinates interagency operations. The agency produces reports for military and government use. Aman, produces comprehensive national intelligence estimates for the prime minister and cabinet, daily intelligence reports, risk of war estimates, target studies on nearby Arab countries, and communications intercepts. Aman acts as liaison between the military and government, coordinates the flow of information between civilian and military intelligence agencies, conducts across-border agent operations and assesses the threat of war.

Staff units

- The Intelligence Corps
- The Collection Department (responsible for the humint running of agents and informers just over the borders, for sigint radio interceptions and often for plugging into the telephone systems of Arab countries to eavesdrop and record landline conversations.

Collection units

- Unit 8200
- The Hatzav Unit
- The Visual Intelligence Branch
- The Mapping Unit
- The HUMINT Branch

Research

- The Research Department
- Information security
- The Information Security Department
- The Military Censor *[Part of Aman, but an entirely independent unit, not subordinate to any military or political level, only to parliamentary and judicial oversight]*

Other units

- The Supervision Department
- The External Relations Department is the agency liaison with foreign military commanders and military intelligence services.

The Sayeret Maktal, or Deep Reconnaissance Unit, conducts counter-terrorism operations.

Professionally subordinate units

- Air Intelligence Directorate: the intelligence unit of the Israeli Air Force

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- Naval Intelligence Department: the intelligence unit of the Israeli Sea Corps
- Field Intelligence Corps: the intelligence unit of GOC Army Headquarters
- The intelligence units of the Regional Commands: Central, Northern, Southern and Home Front Commands

Production Department: largest with the task to receive and analyse the information that has been collected. They are organised into desks and are divided along geographical and functional lines: the Western area for Egypt, Sudan and Libya, the Eastern for Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; a separate desk for Jordan and Arabic Peninsula; a Palestinian desk to track guerilla groups; analysts of inter-Arab relations and a desk for Middle East economic. There is a tiny Research and Development Department that devises hardware and software to help in the collection of intelligence. Aman is also responsible for sending military attaches to Israel's overseas embassies.

A number of electronic intelligence collection and observation facilities are located on the Golan Heights, including a facility at Har Avital which monitors Syria, and another at Mount Hermon which monitors both Lebanon and Syria.

8.2.3 **MOSSAD**

The Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations), often referred to as The Mossad (meaning The Institute), is Israel's foreign intelligence agency. Mossad was created by instruction of Prime Minister David BEN-GURION placing it under the Foreign Ministry. Besides the above instruction there is no legislation to regulate the activities of the Mossad.

Reuven SHILOHA made certain to establish working relationships with foreign intelligence agencies, especially the CIA. He set up an economic intelligence unit, which looked for loopholes around and poked holes through the Arab embargo against trade with Israel. He also emphasized the need for Israel to have close and trusting relationship with Jews around the world.

Over the years, the Mossad has expanded into many fields, the most prominent of which are:

- Covert intelligence collection beyond Israel's borders.
- Preventing the development and procurement of non-conventional weapons by hostile countries.
- Preventing terrorist acts against Israeli targets abroad.
- Developing and maintaining special diplomatic and other covert relations.
- Bringing Jews home from countries where official Aliya agencies are not allowed to operate.
- Producing strategic, political and operational intelligence.
- Planning and carrying out special operations beyond Israel's borders.

Mossad's original motto: "For by wise counsel thou shalt make thy war" (Proverbs XXIV: 6) The less accurate but more recognised translation "By way of deception thou shalt make war" was changed recently as part of the Mossad's public 'coming out' to another Proverbs passage: "Where no counsel is, the people fall, but in the multitude of counsellors there is safety." (Proverbs XI: 14).

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Departments:

In addition to numerous specialised forces, the Mossad maintains eight operational divisions.

- Collections Department is the largest, with responsibility for espionage operations, with offices abroad under both diplomatic and unofficial cover. The Mossad has a virtual monopoly on the collection of intelligence outside Israel, with the exception of certain military targets – usually not far from Israel's borders on which Aman may spy. The department consists of a number of desks organised on both regional and functional bases, and they are highly specialised, directing case officers based at "stations" around the world, and the agents they control. Their field intelligence officers, called katsas, are similar to case officers of the CIA. Thirty to forty operate at a time. The katsas are organised in a division known as Tsomet (intersection) or Melucha (kingdom). The katsas are responsible for recruiting human intelligence (moles and snitches) in foreign countries.

They are further split into three geographic branches:

- Isarelis Branch: Includes the Middle East, North Africa, Spain, and the 'jumper' katsas who move between operations.
  - Branch B: Covers Germany, Austria, and Italy.
  - Branch C: Covers England, France, Low Countries, and Scandinavia.
- Political Action and Liaison Department called Tevel, conducts political activities and liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services and with nations with which Israel does not have normal diplomatic relations. In larger stations, such as Paris, Mossad customarily has under embassy cover two regional controllers: one to serve the Collections Department and the other the Political Action and Liaison Department. It coordinates Mossad activities and shares information with allied nations.

Apart from intelligence sharing with friendly foreign services, the division's most important jobs are to develop joint projects targeting terrorist groups and rogue regimes, and to provide a karit-raka, or "soft landing", should any of Mossad's operatives get in trouble while on unilateral operations in a friendly country. Tevel also acts as a sort of 'shadow' foreign ministry by maintaining covert quasi-diplomatic relations with the governments of nations normally considered hostile to Israel, such as Indonesia and the Arab Gulf countries. It also maintains relations with stateless groups, such as the Kurds in northern Iraq. Tevel also arranges training courses and seminars to allied services on subjects of Israeli expertise, such as dealing with Islamic terror. India, in particular, has benefitted enormously from the counterterrorism training it has received through Tevel.

The desks are organised on both regional and functional bases, and they are highly specialised. The various departments include Far East, Western Europe, "A" (northern Europe, including Germany, France and the UK), Western Europe "B" (southern Europe including Italy, Spain and Greece), Eastern Europe, North America, Africa, Americas and another department that maintains covert intelligence ties with Muslim countries. Tevel brings in about 70% of intelligence Mossad receives; the head of the Tevel foreign liaison department is Itzik Barzilai.

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- Special Operations Division, also known as Metsada or Caesarea (also called Kesaria and Komemiute) conducts highly sensitive assassination, sabotage, paramilitary, and psychological warfare projects. Metsada is responsible for running Mossad's most secret agents, known as "combatants" (Lohamim in Hebrew). These are Jewish people, usually of Arab origins and Arabic speaking, who are sent under "borrowed identities" to conduct special operations in "target countries" - "the most hostile Arab countries". Jews with European features and accents are also placed under deep cover usually in Europe from where they operate into Arab countries. Kidon (Hebrew: "bayonet") is the name of a department that is responsible for assassination and kidnapping. The Massada unit, "together with Kidon are regarded as the 'holy of the holies'" in the Mossad. [Aaron Klein.Politiek in Israel Plaats van misdaad 28-09-2007
- LAP (Lohamah Psichlogit) Department is responsible for psychological warfare, propaganda and deception operations. The department had built up a global network of media contacts and used them with great skills giving info to give stories the spin LAP wanted. The unit also created information for press attaches at Israeli embassies to pass on to a journalist.
- Research Department is responsible for intelligence production, including daily situation reports, weekly summaries and detailed monthly reports. The Department has 15 sections or desks targeting Arab states. The US, Canada, Latin America, Britain, Europe and Russia all had separate desks expanding over years to include China, South Africa, and the Vatican.[ Gideon's Spies. The secret history of the Mossad. Gordon Thomas. New York: St Martins.1999] it also includes the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Iran. A "nuclear" desk which specialises solely in nuclear developments around the world.
- Technology Department is responsible for development of advanced technologies for support of Mossad operations. Agents trained in computers and engineering staff the Technology Department. The department extracts data from stolen, damaged, or foreign information systems, while ensuring the security of Mossad systems. In April 2001, the Mossad published a "help wanted" ad in the Israeli press seeking electronics engineers and computer scientists for this department.

Later publications also mention other units within Mossad such as:

Bitsur was involved in counterterrorism operations in Southeast Asia and Africa. Bitsur was mandated with recruiting locally based assets (helpers who are either recruited or inherited by predecessors) to provide intelligence, background information, and logistical support, conducting covert operations and helping out other overstretched operational divisions. One of its primary missions was helping Jews in countries where they faced persecution. It is for example Bitsur that helped secretly ex-filtrate Israel's immigrants from North Africa, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Ethiopia. This unit made use of jumpers.

A counterproliferation unit that was responsible for operations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to countries and organisations of concern to Israel.

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#### 8.2.4 Neviot

The Neviot department is the specialist surveillance unit in the agency which collects intelligence for Mossad through the medium of break-ins, street surveillance, installation of listening devices and other covert methods.

The latest director has since restructured Mossad into two halves, an operational directorate and headquarters directorate ("H") responsible for non-operational units and long-term planning). The division of the above old directorates within the new structure is not clear.

Mossad was established in 1951 by the then Prime Minister, BEN-GURION. The Mossad was established as a result of the Jews' dire struggle for an own homeland/ state of Israel. The predecessor of the current organisation was already established in 1937 by Haganah (the Jewish liberation organisation). It was known as the Mossad Le Aliya Beth (Institution for Intelligence and Special Services). The name MOSSAD (Institution) was retained.

Initially the Mossad was responsible for aiding and facilitating the large-scale illegal immigration to Palestine. The Mossad's task was later extended to include espionage activities abroad, the obtaining of armaments and related technologies and counter-espionage.

Up until 1942, the Mossad resorted under the leadership of first Eliahu GOLOMB and after that, Shaul AVIGUR, but David BEN-GURION, leader of Haganah and later Prime Minister of Israel, still had a leading role to play in the Mossad.

Other organisations were, however also involved in intelligence, namely:

REKESH was established by Haganah in order to obtain weaponry and other supplies for the organisation. This effort required the launch of clandestine operations on an international scale.

Shin Bet - especially after 1948 - BEN-GURION paid special attention to this organisation and the development thereof.

In 1951 after Israel's war of independence, BEN-GURION united the above-mentioned three organisations under the command of a single head - Isser HAREL.

With the passage of time and due to personality clashes as well as enmity and clashes among the organisations themselves (due inter alia to each one's individual and specific needs), three intelligence services came into being, namely the Mossad (foreign intelligence service), the Shin-Beth (domestic security service) and the Aman (military intelligence service). These services form the current Israeli intelligence community of Israel.

Due to clashes between the Mossad and AMAN, Prime Minister BEN-GURION established a joint intelligence committee with the head of the Mossad as the ex-officio chairman. The head of the Mossad then became known as the "father figure" of the intelligence community, a title which has ever since been "awarded" to every head of the Mossad.



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A former head of the Mossad, Mr Nahum ADMONI, made history with his 1982 appointment in the intelligence community. He is the first member of the Mossad to be appointed head of the Mossad from within the ranks of the organisation itself. Prior to the appointment of Mr ADMONI it was considered an unwritten rule that the Head of the Mossad would be appointed from outside the ranks of the intelligence community.

### 8.3 Management

- 8.3.1 **Director:** The head of Mossad is the Director. The current director is Meir DAGAN. He was appointed in 2002 and his term was extended in 2007.

Meir Dagan unexpectedly broke with Israel's official line in mid-June 2009 by announcing that Iran would have a nuclear bomb in 2014 rather than in 2010 as numerous Israeli government officials have claimed up until now. Dagan's statement, which came as supporters of Mir Hossein MOUSSAVI demonstrated in Tehran, weakened the position of prime minister Binyamin NETANYAHU vis a vis the United States. Claiming the threat to be imminent, NETANYAHU wants to persuade the US to attack Iran before any resumption of the Middle East peace process. In making common cause with CIA analysts on Iran's nuclear bomb, DAGAN pulled the rug from under NETANYAHU's feet. NETANYAHU plans to replace Dagan at the end of 2010.



### 8.3.2 Personnel

From its headquarters on the Geliloth intersection, on Highway 1, between Tel Aviv and Hertzlia, the Mossad oversees a staff estimated at between 1200 to 1 500 personnel, although it may have numbered up to 2 000 in the late 1980s. The Mossad is a civilian service, and does not use military ranks, although most of its staff have served in the Israel Defence Forces as part of Israel's compulsory draft system, and many of them are officers.

Meir DAGAN, nicknamed *the gun*, was born in Russia. He is a retired general and expert in counterterrorism. He was adviser on terrorism to the prime ministers Ehud BARAK and Binyamin NETANYAHU. He has also undertaken extremely sensitive diplomatic missions for them. During his 32-year military career he commanded intelligence units in southern Lebanon and directed infiltration operations on the West Bank. DAGAN was for some time engaged in private business activity. He specialised in security consulting and provided intermediary services in the arms and special technical equipment market. He was successful in several countries of Southeast Asia, Russia and Africa.

*Intelligence Online no 437, 26 September 2002:*

### 8.3.3 Recruitment

In the past, the Mossad recruited almost exclusively through word of mouth and front companies that screened potential applicants at generic offices set up around Israel and the world. Moreover, the Mossad even set up false foreign intelligence agencies – staffed by men and women from Denmark, Turkey or Spain for instance – to recruit and give assignments to newly "hired" Israeli agents taken in from the cold. Agents who refused to carry out fake "spying assignments" against their own nation were quickly promoted by the Mossad, having passed the test of loyalty.

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The Mossad has substantially opened up the recruitment process since 2001. The agency features ads on government websites and in various national newspapers.

In July 2007, Mossad published a job vacancy ad in several Israeli newspapers: "A governmental institution is recruiting people who speak Persian for an interesting and highly challenging job. The applicants will speak Persian as their mother tongue and be ready to make a long-term engagement. In recruiting Persian speakers, Mossad is intent on keeping on top of the Iranian issue.

#### 8.3.4 HUMINT

During 1963-1968 Mossad Director Meir AMIT turned HUMINT into an art form. He resisted attempts to turn Mossad into a version of CIA or KGB who employ thousands. He insisted on permanent appointing a staff of 1200 handpicked and multiple skill staff. A scientist must be able to work in the field if the need arises, a katsa must be able to use his specialist skills to train others.

Salaries paid to employees were in line with those paid to ordinary civil servants in Israel, but approximately doubled for operatives on foreign assignments. Those who worked in Support division were also eligible to enjoy benefit of overseas trips. From time to time, technicians, mechanics or secretaries were sent abroad on missions that did not require special skill, such as acting as couriers or for guard duty. In return, Harel demanded total loyalty and commitment.

#### 8.3.5 Katsas

A katsa is a field intelligence officer of the Mossad. He collects information and runs agents, similar to the case officer of the CIA. Katsas are organised under the Mossad Head of Operations, in a division known as Tsomet (intersection) or Melucha (kingdom). There are typically 30-40 katsas at a time, operating mainly in Europe and somewhat in the Middle East. They have operated to a lesser degree in Africa and Asia. Some sources also suggest that they have had a presence in the United States. Most of the information being gathered for Israel is on the Arab world. Because it is more difficult to operate in Arab countries, Mossad recruits many of its agents in Europe. While some katsas are stationed permanently in foreign countries, others are moved among operations, hence their nickname 'jumpers'. The jumpers (or hoppers) work from the Israel Station, or local station, which handles countries it considers dangerous to operate in including Cyprus, Egypt, Greece and Turkey. They travel back and forth for a few days at a time, to recruit, operate the agents and the sayanim and run operations.

Attack case officer: A case officer who has the ability to make fast contact with a target and proceed quickly with recruiting him to work as an agent for the Mossad. Once the person has been recruited, the attack case officer will transfer the everyday running of the agent to a regular case officer and start a new recruiting operation elsewhere. Attack case officers within Mossad number about five men at the most, and are usually stationed in The Mossad European headquarters in Brussels.

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AMIT's rules for selecting katsas were:

- No katsa is accepted who is primarily motivated by money.
- The overly zealous Zionist has no place in this work.
- The job calls for calm, clear, farsighted judgement and a balanced outlook.
- Unacceptable reasons for joining were: glamour, idea of adventure, enhancement of one's status or belief that being in the Mossad would give them secret powers.

Traits of katsas:

Aptitude for languages

Good at filling gaps in case study drawing fact out of speculation and know limits of informed conjecture. Natural manipulator of people, can persuade, cajole, and if all else fail, threaten.

Female katsas (Bat laveyha):

For many years women have worked in the Mossad, in military intelligence and on special missions. Alone she usually provokes less suspicion. If she works with a male colleague, it is believed that an apparently married or courting couple attracts less attention than single men in a surveillance operation. The Mossad does send women into action for purposes of sexual entrapment, but reluctantly. First, intelligence chiefs prefer to use single women for entrapment. Secondly, they are almost always used in this way only once. While there is no pressure on female agents to exploit their gender, it is expected of them to use sex as one of many weapons in their field. If sexual blackmail or entrapment is an integral part of the mission, however, Mossad often employs actual prostitutes. It is said to be common practice when debriefing Arab informants run by either Mossad or Aman to reward them with prostitutes afterwards. Their activities are occasionally photographed for potential blackmail leverage to ensure the Arab agents' loyalty in the future.

There is less hesitation in sending Mossad men abroad to befriend and usually to become intimate with an international array of embassy secretaries and airline stewardesses, for they can provide much valuable information about the diplomats, airports and cities of the Arab world.

### Combatants

Kememiute (Metsada) operates almost like a Mossad within the Mossad, a highly secretive department that handles the combatants, regarded as the real spies working under deep cover.

The combatants work closely together in pairs. One is a target-country combatant, his partner a base-country combatant. They do not spy inside friendly countries like England, but may operate a business together there. When needed, the target-country combatant operates using the company as cover, while the partner combatant acts as his lifeline and gives whatever support is needed.

Combatants' role has changed over the years as Israel itself has evolved. At one time the Mossad had people working for long periods of time in Arab countries, but often they were too long there and got burned. In the early days many Jews came from Arab countries and there were no shortage of people

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who could pass as Arabs. This is no longer true, and Arabic learned in school is not considered suitable for deep cover.

Now most combatants pose as Europeans. They usually sign up for a four-year stint. It is crucial for cover that they have an actual business that will allow them to travel at any time on short notice. The business usually deals in export import sales. About 70% of the base-country businesses are in Canada.

The combatants' only contact with the office is through their case officer/controller. Controllers are the unit's representatives who operate under diplomatic cover overseas and act as intermediaries between the Office and the combatant in the field. They are usually on official Israeli documents and have access to diplomatic missions. Controllers convey the details of missions, bring funds, provide directions as per HQ commands, and are the combatant's only contact with the 'real' world outside of cover. Each controller usually operates four or five sets of combatants.

An example of a combatant is the case of Michael ROSS a Canadian who operated as a combatant in Europe. The Mossad created for him a new identity which had to be developed into a "three-dimensional persona". He devised plans to live undercover in a European nation for an extended period and had to study history, culture, literature, language and regional idioms of the area.

When he was ready for deployment, the Mossad drew up an operational order for deployment, known as a pakam. It contains all relevant details about timing, codes, and itinerary documents to be used. There is also a section called Mikrim v'Tguvot (occurrences and reactions) designed to set out expected responses to contingencies that may arise.

When he arrived in Europe, he met his Caesarea controller at a café where they discussed his pakam. He gave ROSS money and took his travelling Israeli passport (an alias) in exchange for ROSS's foreign operational papers.

ROSS established himself as a respectable commodities broker. He kept office in Switzerland as his business address, and even hired someone to answer the phone in the name of the cover company he devised. He received a clothing budget as his clothing had to match the social standing of a successful businessman.

He rented a suitable apartment. Combatants select their apartments with care. Multiunit buildings in upscale areas, far from prying eyes, are preferred. So are buildings with plenty of exits and a secure main entrance equipped with a camera and coded entry. Such precautions are aimed as much at thwarting common criminals as rival intelligence agents. Combatants often find themselves carrying large amounts of cash (Credit cards are eschewed where possible because they leave a paper trail).

He opened a bank account, joined a gym and followed the local sports team. He also had to form opinions about the country's politics and become a regular at bars and restaurants. He had to make sure that all relationships would be superficial. He had to become known without being known about. After establishing his cover in Europe in just two months, ROSS went back to Israel to receive his next assignment.

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Back in Europe he met his combatant partner, Charles. Combatants do not know the real names of those with whom they work, where they live, or if they are married or have children. The idea is that the more a Mossad agent knows, the more he will tell Israel's enemies under interrogation. ROSS and Charles both had their own companies in Europe. It was not mentioned whether it was in the same country or not. They carried out operations in various places like Tunisia, Casablanca, Iran, Khartoum and Turkey.

### Kidon

There is a small internal unit within Metsada called Kidon or "bayonet". They are the assassins, called "the long arm of Israeli justice". Their average age is in mid twenties. Normally there are two such teams training in Israel and one out on an operation abroad. They know nothing about the rest of the Mossad and do not know each other's real names. They are divided into three teams of about 12 men each.

According to Thomas (2007: 468) DAGAN increased the kidon number from 48 to 60, eight of them women. Kidon are fluent in Arabic and major European languages, eg English, Spanish and French. Some are even proficient in Chinese.

They are able to use any type of weapon and have access to an arsenal of guns: short-barrel pistols, sniper rifles with a mile killing range, long and short-blade knives, piano wire to strangle, explosives no bigger than a throat lozenge capable of blowing off a person's head and a laboratory of poisons, sealed in vials.

### Bodels

Bodels act as couriers between the Mossad headquarters and Israeli embassies from where katsas operate under diplomatic cover. They carry documents in diplomatic pouches and deliver packages from the Mossad station in the embassy to the safe houses and back. Bodels are usually fresh out of an elite military unit where they receive special anti-surveillance training.

### Sayanim

Meir AMMIT realised that katsas would need support in the field. He created the sayanim, volunteer Jewish helpers. Sayanim are Jews living outside Israel as foreign citizens that volunteer to provide assistance to the Mossad or are often recruited by relatives living in Israel.

Sayanim fulfil many functions. This assistance includes facilitating medical care, money, logistics, and even overt intelligence collection. Station Katsas are in charge of the sayanim, and most active sayanim will be visited by a katsa once every three months or so, which for the katsa usually means between two and four face-to-face meetings a day with sayanim, along with numerous telephone conversations. Sayanim also collect technical data and all kinds of overt intelligence: a rumour at a cocktail party, an item on the radio, paragraph in newspaper, and provide leads for katsas.

The idea is to have a pool of people available when needed who can provide services but will keep quiet about them out of loyalty to the cause. Suppose

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during an operation a katsa suddenly had to come up with an electronics store as a cover. A call to a sayan in that business could bring 50 television sets, 200 VCRs, whatever was needed, from his warehouse for the cover business. There are also address and telephone sayanim. If a katsa has to give out an address or a phone number, he can use the sayan's. And if the sayan gets a letter or a phone call, he will know immediately how to proceed. Sayanim only receive expenses for their services. They are never put at risk nor are they privy to classified information. No official number is known, but estimates put the number of sayanim in the thousands. In 1998 there were over 4 000 sayanim in the United Kingdom (UK).

### Agents

The Mossad likes to recruit personnel who serve in foreign embassies around the world, especially Europe, students studying abroad and military people. Since the Mossad has no time to develop talent in the hope that people will get into a position where they can provide information, but rather want people already in that situation, the targets are fairly easy to identify.

White agents: non-Arabs recruited, either by covert or direct means who may or may not know they are working for Israel.

Black agents: Arabs.

White agents are usually less risky to deal with than black agents. Arabs working abroad are very likely to be subjected to security by Arab intelligence and if they catch a katsa working with one as a black agent, they will want to kill him. The worst thing of a katsa being caught working with a white agent in France for example is deportation, while the white agent himself could be charged with treason.

According to overt information people make the mistake of thinking the Mossad is at a disadvantage for not having stations in obvious target countries. The Mossad however obtains information about them and recruits agents in other areas like Europe. Most Arab countries do not manufacture their own weapons. Most lack high-level military colleges, for example. If the Mossad wants to recruit a Syrian diplomat, katsas do not have to do that in Damascus. They can do it in Paris. If they want data on an Arab missile, they get that in Paris or London or the United States where it is made. And if they want to get to the senior officers, they recruit or collect on them while they are studying in England or the United States. Their pilots train in England, France, and the United States. Their commandos train in Italy and France. The Mossad attempts to recruit them there because it is easier and less dangerous.

The LAP department assists in the recruiting of agents with psycho profiling of the targets that will assist in discovering vulnerability and advice what is the best way to recruit a person. A favourite opening gambit for Mossad recruiters on a cold-approach operation is that they work for a company that was forever looking for ways to update its database and would pay good money to those who could help do so. A cold approach requires a real finesse. Move too quickly and the fish is off the hook. Take too long and suspicion is soon coupled with fear. Recruiting is an art all by itself and a European is different from hooking an Arab on the West Bank or Gaza Strip.

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The Mossad also uses false-flag recruiting. They used that method for example to recruit Jack Leon THOMAS, an Armenian who grew up in Cairo and worked for Israeli intelligence in Egypt without at first realising it. He was recruited by the Mossad in 1958 under the ruse of working for one of the NATO countries. It was only later revealed to him that he had been working for the Israeli intelligence.

The Mossad likes to have a hold on an agent. A paid agent feels obligated to deliver and the threat of blackmail lies in the background. The recruiters could always get the agent in trouble with documentary proof of money handed over. Lakam gave for example Pollard cash and a diamond ring for his fiancé.

### Training

Similar training was mentioned by both a former katsa and a former combatant. Training took place in stages. They had to create a convincing cover story. Then they were taken on streets of Tel Aviv. They had to appear on a randomly chosen apartment balcony after convincing the tenant to allow them access; get the first three names from a hotel register; start a conversation with a complete stranger and hold his attention for twenty minutes; put a device in a public phone mouthpiece in the heart of the Hilton Hotel foyer without being noticed; and a whole host of other odd but challenging tasks. In each case, they had to rely not only on an invented identity — a legend, or "status cover" — but also on what they later learned to refer to as his operational cover, that is, a fictional motive for being in a particular place and doing a particular thing at a particular time. A legend stays with them for years, but an operational cover is often invented on the spot. The tests varied, but they all had the same goal: to see how far one could be pushed before one broke cover.

They were also taught report writing. There is a saying in the Mossad: "If you complete a mission and don't report it, the mission never happened."

Katsas: If selected, a candidate must go through and pass the Mossad training academy, the Midrasha, located near the town of Herzliya. There they are taught the tradecraft of intelligence gathering for approximately three years. The main priority of training is to teach katsas how to find, recruit, and cultivate agents, including how to clandestinely communicate with them. They also learn how to avoid being the subject of foreign counter-intelligence, by avoiding car and foot surveillance, how to run SDRs (surveillance detection routes), and preventing foreign agents from creating 'traps' at meetings. Although katsas do not always carry a weapon, each is trained in the use of the .22 Beretta pistol. Even once training is completed, trainees will spend an apprenticeship period working on various projects before becoming full fledged katsas.

Female katsas are also trained to:

- draw a gun while sitting in a chair
- pack a Beretta inside her pants on the hip or to cut a concealed opening in skirt for easy access to the handgun
- use sex to coerce, seduce and dominate
- disguise herself by inserting cotton wool in the cheeks to subtly alter shape of face

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- steal cars
- pose as a drunk
- chat up men
- create a mishlashim (a dead letter box)
- read a floater (a strip of microfilm attached to the inside of an envelope).

They are sent on practice missions: breaking into occupied hotel room, stealing documents from an office, picking up tourists in a nightclub, and disengaging outside their hotel.

Combatants are also taught finance to be able to discuss stocks and bonds and appear to be able to make investment and business decisions.

Training for katsas going on special missions is extensive. Training for operations in the desert is described as:

A katsa underwent training in Negev Desert, mastering "memory training", how to recognize the target even in a sandstorm, and "self-image protection", how to blend in with his surroundings. The only weapon he had with him was a hunting knife which he could use to kill in a number of ways. A pharmacist taught him how to use his emergency medicine in the desert. A morning devoted to memorising the maps that would lead him across the sands. Part of each day was given over to testing his sheer physical stamina with a forced march in the fierce noon heat, carrying a rucksack weighted with rocks. He only ate the food he would live on in the desert. He had attended a one-day class with a Mossad psychiatrist on handling stress and how to relax. Aptitude tests determined his present emotional stability and his self-confidence. A dialect coach sat with him for hours listening to him repeating the correct dialect. Every night he was driven to a different part of Negev to sleep. Burrowing into the ground, he would rest for a short while, never more than dozing, then move to another place to avoid instructors he knew were hunting him. Discovery would almost certainly mean his mission would either be postponed for further training or assigned to another katsa.

**Kidon:** Kidon members must pass a two-year course at the Mossad training school at Henzelia, near Tel Aviv. They also go to a special camp in the Negev desert. The facility could be adapted to approximate a street or a building where an assassination was to take place. There are getaway cars and an obstacle course to negotiate. The instructors include former unit members who supervise practice with a variety of guns, and teach how to conceal bombs, administer a lethal injection in a crowd, and make a killing appear accidental. They are taught to use the weapon appropriate for the target. Kidons review videos of successful assassinations and study the faces and habits of scores of potential targets stored on their own highly restricted computer and memorize the constantly changing street plans of major cities as well as air and seaport layouts.

After graduation they regularly undergo the same physical checks as a front-line-pilot in the Israeli Air Force. To perfect their skill they watch some of Israel's leading forensic pathologists in Tel Aviv's Institute of Forensic Medical Research at work so as to better understand how to make an assassination appear to be an accident.

The agents used by katsas also receive training.

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For example Jack Leon THOMAS who was recruited to spy for Israel in Egypt received training in the basics of espionage: photographing documents and developing film, hiding negatives in toothpaste tubes, shoe boxes or books; writing with invisible ink; and passing coded messages by leaving them in "dead letter boxes" for unknown accomplices. His wife who acted as courier received training in how to use a radio transmitter. The chosen code book was Pearl Buck's *The Good Earth*.

**Cover**

Katsas work sometimes out of Israeli embassies. Katsas, combatants and kidon members all use covers to work in foreign countries. They use different guises like salesman, businessman, travel writer, journalist etc. They make use of a number of names and biographies drawn from library of aliases maintained by the Mossad. The list of aliases is kept on file in the Operations Division. Rafi EITAN had introduced the idea of a list after the Eichmann operation. They like to use British aliases as "no one would think a Jew would have a name like that."

All officers like katsas and combatants are trained to perfect their cover including that the personality portrayed match the supposed identity. That means getting the vocabulary and diction right, as well as the clothing, food preferences, mannerisms and grooming. They learned how to refine a cover to the point where they can fool true experts.

The Mossad has garments from all over the world and regularly updates it. It is given to katsas for operations to suite their specific covers. Most of the clothes are obtained by sayanim and delivered to local Israeli embassies and sent on to Tel Aviv in diplomatic bags. Other clothes are brought out of hostile Arab countries by pro-Israeli visitors. A few are actually made by the wardrobe mistress who presides over the storeroom who had developed a reputation for detail.

To assist in disguises especially for deep cover agents, the Mossad also has appearances changed. For example, the appearance of one of their officers working in Africa, Yaakov COHEN, who had distinguished himself in undercover missions in Egypt and elsewhere, was changed. As part of his disguise, Mossad had changed Cohen's physical appearance by arranging for a plastic surgeon to alter his distinctive ethnic feature – his nose.

**Documentation**

The Mossad uses forgers to compile documentation for operations overseas. Three different "qualities" of passports are used by the agency: top, second, field operation and throwaway. Top-quality passports are real passports with a real person's name that can withstand official checks in the country of origin.

Mossad was several times in trouble for using or trying to obtain passports of other countries. The Mossad provided its agents with forged British passports to carry out attacks on PLO officials abroad. The tactic was discovered when eight forged British passports were found in a Frankfurt telephone booth in 1986. Similar discoveries took place in 1973 and 1979, Mossad agents also were found to be carrying forged British identification while on anti-PLO missions in Beirut.

Canadian passports are also a favourite with Mossad as Canadians are regarded as the good guys and Canada is a nation of immigrants, populated by people of

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virtually every race and creed. Canadian passports were used during a bungled assassination attempt in Jordan and in 1973 Israeli agents travelling on doctored Canadian passports botched another execution attempt in Lillehammer, Norway. One member of that hit squad, arrested by Norwegian police, was found to be using the identity of Canadian Patricia ROXBOROUGH, a legal secretary whose passport had been stolen months earlier from the desk of her Montreal office.

In 1973 fifty blank passports were stolen from the vault of the Canadian Embassy in Vienna. One of those documents, traced by the registration number, turned up a year later in Nicosia, Cyprus. It was left behind by a member of a Mossad team that had detonated explosives under the hotel bed of a sleeping Palestinian guerrilla leader, killing him instantly.

In 1997, Canada recalled its ambassador to Israel after undercover Mossad agents were caught using falsified Canadian passports during an assassination attempt on a Palestinian militant leader.

In addition to creating false passports or theft, Israel's clandestine services have other means to obtain Canadian documents. New immigrants to the Jewish state, especially from Canada, are sometimes encouraged to donate passports, both valid and expired, to unidentified bureaucrats in the interests of what is euphemistically known as "the security of the state."

The Mossad also tried to illegally obtain a real New Zealand passport by applying for a passport in the name of an Auckland man with cerebral palsy. Urie Zoshe KELMAN and Eli CARA were caught and sentenced to six months in prison, while Zev William BARKAN for whom the passport was meant and the sayan David Tony RESNICK, an Auckland paramedic who provided the name for the passport, escaped New Zealand. Kelman also had a Canadian passport with him.

The Mossad used Jordanian, French and Italian documents.

#### **Communicating with Agents/ Case Officer:**

Mossad katsas use dead letter boxes at locations such as hotel corridors or restaurant rest rooms where a small envelope could be left to be picked up later by an unseen courier. They used to transmit urgent information to Israel on a tiny radio set.

A special method of communication was through a floater, a little microfilm attached to the inside of an envelope. The agent would rip the envelope and tip the microfilm into a glass of water. He'd then stick it on the outside of the glass and by using a magnifying glass read the message.

According to ROSS (2007) Mossad officers still use shortwave radios to receive messages from HQ when out in the field during operations. He stated: "Why use old-fashioned laborious method in era of instantaneous digital communication? Wouldn't it be simpler to use devices like cellphones, text messaging, e-mail or Internet chat room?" He said that "unlike all of these rival methods, shortwave radio broadcasts provide an eavesdropper with no means of identifying the person receiving the message, or of determining if anyone is receiving a message. Moreover the communication leaves no electronic residue and requires no specially configured gadgets; all you need is shortwave radio. E-mail and telephone lines are an open book to counterintelligence services. With other

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gadgets government snoopers can use voice recognition, calling patterns, and signal tracking to zero in on a suspect user. Need a one-time pad to decode. Each combatant is assigned his own one-time pad, which means you can't hack an entire network merely by seizing a single code."

One incident reported was of case in France where a case officer working out of the Israeli embassy set up meetings with his agent. They had regular meeting points in cafes and on the metro. The agent would carry a copy of that day's newspaper in which he had inserted his information. The case officer would have a similar copy in which was concealed the agent's instructions and his monthly salary. In a technique both had perfected at the Mossad training school, one would bump into the other and offer profuse apologies and they would go their separate ways, having exchanged newspapers.

### Technological Aids

When YATOM was head of the Mossad he ordered Mossad programmers to develop new software to hack into PLO computers and create electronic microbes to destroy, should the need arise, its communication systems. He had asked scientists in research and development to focus on "infowar" weapons that could insert black propaganda into enemy broadcasting systems. He wanted the Mossad to be part of the brave new world where the weapons of the future would be in keyboards that shut down an enemy's ability to mobilise its military forces. Mossad technicians were researching ways to infect enemy computer systems with a variety of virulent strains of software viruses. They would include the 'logic bomb' designed to remain dormant in an enemy system until a predetermined time when it would be activated and begin to destroy stored data. Such a bomb could destroy an enemy's air defence system or central bank. The technicians had already created a program that could insert booby-trapped computer chips into weapons a foreign arms manufacturer planned to sell to a hostile country like Iran or Syria. Mossad katsas in key Eastern European arms manufacturing countries had also been briefed to find independent software contractors who wrote programs for such weapon systems. They would be offered substantial sums to slip viruses into the systems. Mossad agents were also equipped with a briefcase-size device that generated a high-powered electromagnetic pulse. Placed near a building the pulse can burn out all electronic components in the building. The device had its own self-destruct mechanism that ensured its innards remain a secret.

It is also claimed that the Mossad prepared a bug capable of monitoring all calls in and out of a suspected PLO member's apartment. The bug would be linked to a miniature recorder capable of storing hours of phone calls. The recorder had a built-in capacity to be electronically emptied by a pre-arranged signal from the safe house. There the recordings would be transcribed and sent by secure fax to Israel. Agent would carry laptop that had been wired to provide the link between the concealed recorder to be installed in the apartment basement and the safe house.

In 1999 then Palestinian leader Yasser ARAFAT received information that Israel was able to eavesdrop on most of the mobile telephones used by the Palestinians, particularly the Leader telephone manufactured by the Israeli Miritz Telecommunications Company. Even when turned off, the telephones were able to record the voices around them. The signals were allegedly retransmitted and picked up by an antenna in Israel which transmitted them to a centre that

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eavesdropped (still does) on the Palestinians. ARAFAT then issued an order to keep the mobile telephones of all of his visitors in the main room of the guards which is situated 150 meters away from the presidential headquarters.

A Mossad scientist developed a microchip to plant under the skin. Using natural body energy, the bleep could be linked to one of Israel's new space satellites, enabling a person who wore it to be swiftly tracked to his or her hiding place.

It is being mentioned in overt sources that the Mossad had the best capability for cracking locks. He claims that various lock manufacturers in Great Britain send new mechanisms to British intelligence for security testing; they in turn send them on to the Mossad for analysis. The procedure was for the Mossad to analyse it, figure out how to open it, and report back that it was "impregnable."

Mossad's technological unit was involved in wireless communications and developed various communications systems to support Mossad operations abroad. There are very sophisticated systems. For example, there are departments involved in electronics -- from VLSI to embed and RF systems, while other are more involved in computers or physics. The Mossad keeps a yaholomin unit in New York to spy on Arab and other missions.

The Mossad was one of first intelligence services to monitor the Internet. As militants recognised that their mosques were almost certainly under surveillance, websites offered a new and relatively safe way to communicate with their followers. The Mossad had created a large number of its own websites on which it posted carefully constructed disinformation in all the languages of the Middle East.

#### Safe Houses

The Mossad has many safe houses all over world. There were scores of such department in all major cities all over the world, either purchased or rented on long leases. Many were left unoccupied for lengthy periods, ready for the time they would be needed for an operation.

The safe houses are also manned by Israeli students who make sure the houses are well stocked with food and other essentials, so that when they are activated they are ready. They live in some of the houses and visit the others to collect the mail, turn the lights on and off, and make phone calls, so the place is in use and does not raise suspicions when it is used by the case officers. They are usually the same age as the bodel and will meet with him socially.

A bodel takes packages from the Mossad station in the embassy to the safe houses and back. He makes most of the trips to the safe houses during the day and most of the pickups during the night. He rarely uses embassy vehicles and does not have any specific pattern of work.

The station does not use the safe houses for their sayanim. They meet them in their houses and under regular everyday circumstances. Rarely will they meet clandestinely, unless of course the sayan is in the process of bringing vital info from his place of work.

The safe houses are used purely for debriefing or field planning sessions with katsas or combatants who do not enter the embassy. Safe houses are also used

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as meeting places for an informer or to interrogate a suspect who had the potential to be recruited as a mole. In that case they will almost always discard it right after that. Sometimes safe houses are rented for specific operations. During Eichmann abduction at least half a dozen safe houses were rented in Buenos Aires.

### Covert Action

#### Kidnappings

On several occasions suspects were kidnapped and taken back to Israel to stand trial. Mossad also assisted other countries in kidnapping operations. Some of the known cases were:

- In 1960, the Mossad kidnapped Nazi war criminal Adolph Eichmann from Argentina.
- Nuclear technician, Mordechai VANUNU, who had revealed details of the Israeli nuclear weapons programme to a London newspaper, was kidnapped in 1986. (A bat leveyha enticed him to leave from Britain to Rome. When they arrived at the apartment in Rome, Mossad katsa overpowered him and injected him with a paralysing drug. Late that night an ambulance arrived and he was carried on a stretcher out of the building. The ambulance sped out of Rome and down the coast. At a pre-arranged point a speedboat was waiting, on which Vanunu was transferred back to Israel. (p190-194: Gideon's spies)
- In 1986 an Israeli naval patrol boat with Mossad agents on board stopped a ship called Opportunity on its regular shuttle between Beirut and Larnaca. From the bilges they dragged out Faisal Abu SHARAH, a terrorist wanted in Israel. He was trailed in Israel and received a long jail term.
- In 1984 the Mossad assisted the Nigerian military cabal led by Major General Muhammad BUHARI in a botched attempt to kidnap Umaro DIKKO, ousted transport minister. Dr Levi-Arie SHAPIRO who worked at Hasharon hospital in Tel Aviv was recruited by Mossad katsa Alexander BARAK. The kidnapping group consisted of two Mossad officers BARAK and Felix ABITHOL, Dr SHAPIRO and members of the Nigerian security service headed by Major YUSUFU. DIKKO was kidnapped on 04 July 1984 when he left his home, put in a van, anaesthetized into unconsciousness by Dr SHAPIRO, locked into a crate and taken to Stansted airport. A customs officer noticed an unusual medical smell and a noise emanating from one of two crates labelled "diplomatic baggage" and addressed to the Nigerian Ministry of External Affairs in Lagos as they were being loaded onto the Nigerian Airways and ordered the crates to be opened. DIKKO was found unconscious in the one crate with Dr SHAPIRO with him, while ABITHOL and BARAK were found in the second crate. The Nigerian and Israeli governments never acknowledged the role of the Mossad in this incident. The Israelis claimed they were mercenaries acting on behalf of Nigerian businessmen. All received heavy prison sentences and were deported after serving their time.
- In 1999 Mossad assisted Turkey to capture Abdullah OCALAN, the Kurdish leader that waged a guerrilla war against Turkey. The Mossad located OCALAN in the Greek embassy compound in Nairobi. Mossad was able to intercept radio traffic from the Greek Foreign Ministry to the compound. A Mossad agent influenced one of his Kurdish bodyguards to persuade OCALAN to get out of embassy and go to Iraq to regroup. He went on an aircraft that left for Athens but he ended up in a Turkey jail.

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### Assassinations

Israel accepted the legitimacy of assassination as a tactic to deal with terrorists. Assassinations procedures were clearly defined by Meir AMMIT when he was Mossad DG:

There would be no killing of political leaders. They needed to be dealt with politically. There would be no killing of a terrorist's family unless they are also proven to be implicated in terrorism. Each execution had to be sanctioned by the Prime Minister of the day. And everything must be done by the book. Minutes kept of the decisions taken. Actions must not be seen as state-sponsored murder but the ultimate judicial sanction the state could bring. "We would be no different from the hangman or any other lawfully appointed executioner." Since the successful hunting down of the nine terrorists responsible for killing of Israeli athletes at Olympic Games in Germany in 1972, all subsequent assassinations had broadly observed these conditions.

Executions were for vengeance, the biblical "eye for an eye" principle Israelis believe justified such killings. But sometimes Mossad killed a person when he stubbornly refused to provide his skills to support Israel's aspirations. Then, rather than risk those talents falling in the hands of the enemy, he too was ruthlessly terminated. For example Dr Gerald BULL, a Canadian scientist, the world's greatest expert on barrel ballistics, had a distaste for Israel and offered Saddam HUSSEIN to build a super-gun capable of launching shells containing nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads from Iraq directly into Israel. He was killed in his apartment in Brussels in March 1990.

Rafi EITAN responsible for capturing Adolf EICHMANN told how he travelled across Europe to find and execute Arab terrorists. To do so he used remote-controlled bombs; the Beretta; and where silence was essential, his own bare hands to either garrote a victim with steel wire or deliver a lethal rabbit punch. For each journey, he used a different nationality and identity, built around the vast number of stolen or perfectly forged passports Mossad had patiently acquired.

The usual composition of a hit team is four. One is the "target locator". His task is to keep tabs on the victim's movements. Another is the "transporter", to get the team safely away from the killing area. The remaining two men perform the execution. Preparation for an assassination can take weeks, even months.

Since DAGAN's appointment as Mossad DG he increased the number of kidons. He had sent kidon to seek out all those who had been condemned in a meeting he had chaired in his office. The assassins had done so in countries across the Middle East, in Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan; in each case the killing had been swift and unexpected, using anything from a single bullet to the nape of the neck, to garrotting with a cheese-cutting wire or a knife thrust into the larynx. They had also used nerve agents and a poison arsenal of substances specially prepared for them.

In Mossad's eye the need for kidon had increased with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in all its guises: Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Solidarity Front, PLO, the terrorists of the Philippines; all were pledged to destroy Israel. The kidon had killed in all those places regarded as Israel's enemies: Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Iran and numerous Islamic republics of the former Soviet Bloc.

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KENYA

The Mossad through its station in Nairobi has long maintained excellent ties with the Kenyan security service. The special interest for Israel is that Nairobi is not far from the Horn of Africa and is one of most important capitals on the continent, with diplomats and spies of all nationalities and allegiances at offices of the UN and OAU. Together with DRC in Central Africa and Nigeria in the west, Kenya became one of three strategic centres for Israeli intelligence activity in Africa.

Kenya and Israel had developed over the years a close 'understanding' on intelligence matters. As part of Mossad's safari in Central Africa it had exposed to the Kenyans the activities of other foreign spy networks. In return, Kenya continued to grant Mossad "special status", allowing it to maintain a safe house in the city and providing ready access to Kenya's intelligence service. Kenya for example allowed Mossad to operate from the country to free hostages at airport in Entebbe in Uganda.

The Director of Mossad Meir DAGAN and CIA DG Porter GOSS worked together in the early 2000s. They sent agents into the badlands of Kazakhstan, to the mountains of Kashmir, to the seaports of the Horn of Africa, into the highlands of Kenya and Ethiopia, and reinforced their presence in Saudi Arabia. While the CIA worked closely with the Saudi secret service to locate Islamic fundamentalists, Mossad's role was different. Mossad agents were concerned with tracking jihadists coming out of the country and heading toward Israel. All too often before reaching its borders, they met their deaths at the hands of Mossad's kidon unit.

DAGAN is also sending his agents to the jungles of Venezuela, the mountains of Colombia, the back streets of Mexico, the Amazon and down into Chile and Argentina where Al Qaeda was fermenting hatred against Israel.

Several known assassinations are:

- Nazi war criminal Herberts CUKURS hiding in Brazil in 1965.
- Ghassan KANAFANI, PFLP spokesperson and accused of planning Lord massacre was killed by letter bomb in Beirut in 1972
- The assassination of members of Black September, which was responsible for the Munich massacre at the 1972 Olympic Games, called "Operation Wrath of God". The first to die was shot eleven times at close range – a bullet for each murdered athlete. The next was killed by a bomb planted in the receiver of his telephone; another was pushed under a bus in London. The next was asleep in a hotel room in Nicosia when it was wrecked by a similar bomb that was placed in a bedside lamp. Their leader Ali Hassan SALAMEH was killed in 1979 on a Beirut street by a remote-controlled car bomb. To create panic among the remaining members, Mossad Arab sayanim arranged for their obituaries to appear in local Arab newspapers. Their families received flowers and condolence cards shortly before each was killed. While the kidon carried out the executions it had required a team backup of some eight units. One group was responsible for tracking down each killer. Technicians from yaholomin set up eavesdropping equipment to monitor each terrorist as he was located. Another team organised dead letter boxes in a dozen European capitals to receive messages from informers. Safe houses were rented for secret meetings in London, Paris and Madrid. LAP was responsible for sending cards flowers and publishing of notices in newspapers. All paperwork was produced by Mossad's forgery department. Explosives were created in Tel Aviv and brought to the team.
- The assassination of PFLP and PFLP-EO leader Wadie HADDAD in 1978.

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- The assassination of As-Sa'iqa leader Zuhayr MUHSIN in 1979.
- The assassination of Abu JIHAD from the Fatah in 1988 in Tunis. He was shot in his study and several of his guards killed in the process.
- Mohammed TAMIMI, one of PLO leaders of Intifada against Israel and two senior PLO officers were killed in motorbomb at Cypriot port of Limassol on 14 February 1988
- Gerald BULL, a Canadian scientist who developed the famed "Super Gun" for Iraq was killed by the Mossad at his Brussels apartment in March 1990. He was first visited by Israeli friends, both from the Israeli intelligence community to persuade him to stop, but he did not want to listen. Thereafter a kidon team was sent to eliminate him.
- In 1992 Hezbollah guerrilla leader Abbas MUSAWI is ambushed and killed in south Lebanon.
- In 1994 Islamic Jihad activist and journalist Hani ABED dies when his car explodes in the Gaza Strip.
- In 1995 Dr Fathi al-SHIQAQI, the leader of a small Islamic Jihad organisation dies on a busy street in Sliema, Malta, when he is shot five times in the head by two assailants on a passing motorcycle and who fled to an unknown destination in a ship that was positioned near the site of the incident.
- In 1996 Yahya AYYASH, known in the Hamas movement as "the engineer" for his skill in bomb-making, is decapitated when 50g of explosives planted in his cellular telephone detonates as he makes a call.
- Hamas leader Izz El-Deen Sheikh KHALIL in Damascus on 26 September 2004 was killed when a bomb exploded under the driver's seat of his SUV.

**Alleged but Unproven Assassinations/ Deaths:**

- Mossad is accused of the murders of Iraqi nuclear scientists. In 1980, Yahya al-MESHAD, a physicist working for the Iraqi government, was stabbed to death in a hotel room in Paris. The purpose of his visit to France was to examine the characteristics of uranium materials intended for nuclear reactors. In a period of a few months, two more nuclear physicists who worked for the Iraqi government were murdered. In their cases, they were poisoned. A number of workers at Osirak began receiving threatening letters from a shadowy organisation called the Committee to Safeguard the Islamic Revolution.
- Dr Majid Husayn ALI, an Iraqi nuclear scientist and a professor at the College of Science in Baghdad University was assassinated in Baghdad. This assassination incident is the ninth within four months to target distinguished Iraqi scientists.
- Dr Ardeshir HOSSEINPOUR, a scientist involved in the Iranian nuclear program, was according to Stratfor killed by the Mossad on 15 January 2007. He was killed by gas poisoning.
- Mossad is also suspected of murdering media tycoon Robert MAXWELL, their British sayan who was in financial trouble and insisted Mossad pay him back and threatened to reveal Mossad secrets. He disappeared overboard at sea in November 1991 off the Canary Islands. It is alleged that Maxwell Mossad agents boarded his private yacht under cover of darkness and plunged a needle filled with a lethal nerve agent into his neck, where after they lowered his body into the sea.
- Mossad is suspected of involvement in the death of Yasser ARAFAT, the Palestinian leader in October 2004. He complained of severe stomach pains after a meal and after drinking a homeopathic drink he made himself. The real

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cause of his death on 12 November 2004 was not revealed and there was no autopsy. Many speculated he was poisoned.

- The assassination of Hamas military leader Izzedine Sheikh KHALIL in Damascus on 26 September was widely seen as a Mossad operation.
- Alan KIDGER in South Africa. He had been supplying high-tech equipment to Iran and Iraq that could be used to manufacture biochemical weapons. KIDGER had been found with his arms and legs amputated in Johannesburg.
- South African police also suspected Mossad involvement in the strange deaths of several people in South Africa in the 1990s: Seven South Africans, including a British immigrant, are believed to have been assassinated over three years. In some cases they were gassed in an attempt to fake a suicide, while in others they were executed and their bodies dismembered. The murders are being linked to similar investigations in Europe. They were chemical engineer Wynand VAN WYK who died in Cape Town in April 1993, two apparent suicides, one of former arms dealer Don LANGE (was found gassed in his home in July 1994) and chemical engineer John SCOTT. Another two young chemical engineers, Scott AYTON and Felix COETZEE were found bound and gagged at AYTON's parent's home with a single bullet wound in the head also in 1994. KIDGER and VAN WYK were all acquainted with each other and KIDGER knew SCOTT. LANGE apparently knew of Israeli involvement in KIDGER's death before police did. A business associate quoted him as saying several months later he feared he would be "eliminated". Connected to this is the alleged suicide of Dirk STOFFBERG and his wife at his home at Hartebeespoortdam, near Pretoria.
- Mossad is also suspected to be responsible for the assassination of Hezbollah's external security chief Imad MUGHNIYEH, nicknamed the "ghost," in Damascus on 12 February 2008. Just as he was climbing into his black Mercedes, a Mitsubishi Pajero parked just beside it exploded, killing him instantly.

Failed assassinations or wrong targets:

- In Damascus Nazi war criminal Alois BRUNNER lost an eye and several fingers from letter bombs sent to him by Mossad during the Operation Wrath of God campaign.
- In 1972 PFLP Basam Abu SHERIF lost an eye and several fingers with a letter bomb sent by Israel to his Beirut office.
- In Lillehammer Norway on 07 January 1974 Mossad agents mistakenly killed Ahmad BOUSHIKI, an Algerian waiter whom they mistook for PLO security head Ali Ahmad SALAMEH, believed to have masterminded the Olympics massacre. Two of those involved in his murder had rented cars under their own names, Dan ERT and Marianne GLADNIKOFF. They were arrested at Oslo airport. Once they had provided the address of a flat used by Mossad, six other agents were arrested. Five of the 15 agents involved in the operation serve sentences in Norwegian jails. **Remark:** Salameh was killed in a 1979 car-bomb explosion in Lebanon.
- On 24 September 1997 Mossad operatives attempted to assassinate Khalid MESHAAAL, a top leader of Hamas, in Jordan. The assassins injected MESHAAAL with poison. Two were caught; four other agents involved in the operation fled to the Israeli embassy. Israel was forced to provide the antidote to the poison and to release around 70 Palestinian prisoners.

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### Counterproliferation Activities

As noted above Mossad also uses assassinations were to prevent nuclear material to reach enemies, eg Gerald BULL who developed the super-gun for Iraq, Alan KIDGER who sold high-tech equipment to Iran and Iraq, several South Africans who were chemical engineers or involved in arms deals. They also targeted Iraqi and Iranian nuclear scientists.

### Intimidation

In early 1960s Mossad was concerned about the German rocket scientists in Egypt. Mossad Director Isser HAREL believed the Germans were involved in an effort to exterminate Jews. He responded with *Operation Damocles*, a sword hanging over the head of every German scientist working for the Egyptians. Israeli agents sent booby-trapped letters to German scientists involved in the missile project and their families in Egypt. Similar intimidation was being carried out throughout Europe. In the campaign there were a few injuries and much intimidation. Mossad used the 'false flag' game of posing as representatives of a NATO intelligence service, to meet with ex-Nazi officer Otto SKORZENY, who was friendly with some of the Germans in Cairo. They persuaded him to urge his friends to get out of Egypt for the sake of Western interests. Mossad also recruited an Austrian Dr Otto JOKLIK who had been one of the rocket scientists working for NASSER in Egypt. He was not an expert as he indicated to NASSER and worked on his project to build a high-energy cobalt bomb with no real success. HAREL sent JOKLIK later with Israeli agent Yosef Ben-Gal on a secret mission to Switzerland to frighten the daughter of Paul GÖRKA about the dire consequences if her father did not leave Egypt. She informed the Swiss police who arrested the two on 15 March 1963. Just a few weeks' earlier two Israeli agents had been arrested in West Germany near the home of one another rocket scientists. The Mossad had been lucky that its warm relations with BND persuaded them to release the Israelis. But in Switzerland they were not lucky and a public trial embarrassed Israel and the two were sent to prison, although only for short terms.

Mossad agents were also sent on briefing missions to journalists in various European countries and three leading Israeli newsmen – persuaded by HAREL – undertook a special assignment, partly for their newspapers and partly as an espionage mission to learn more about the German scientists. It was one of first times Mossad used Israeli journalists as agents. The articles they published caused panic among the Israeli public about the ballistic dangers from Egypt. But the Israeli president was not happy with Mossad head as he spoiled developing ties between Israel and West Germany and HAREL resigned.

### Africa

In mid 1950s Israel's policies in Africa were implemented through three major channels – The Histadrut, Israel's Federation of Trade Unions; the Mossad, and Mashav, the Foreign Ministry's Department of Technical Cooperation which was responsible for organizing the dispatch of hundreds of experts to Africa and the holding of a large number of courses for Africans in Israel. Israel opened embassies in many African countries after establishing diplomatic relations and provided various aid programs. Israel had Mossad agents working in the embassies under diplomatic cover. Where official relations were not established or were later cut owing to overt political disputes, the Mossad's alternative diplomats performed functions that are not customarily handled by intelligence services.

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Specifically in Africa Amit persuaded CIA to provide millions of dollars to underwrite Israel's clandestine activities. They were judged to be in the general interest of the West. Newly independent black African states of the 1960s saw Israel as an example to copy. Over a dozen African states welcomed Israeli technicians and instructors in agriculture, industry, commerce and defence. The number of Israeli advisors grew and naturally quite a few of them were Mossad agents. Israel developed excellent intelligence cooperation with Kenya, DRC, Liberia and Ghana. In each country, espionage agencies or security services were trained or assisted by the Israelis.

Israel also assisted African liberation movements in fighting colonialism and fascism in the African countries that were not independent. Contacts were established with African national movements. In Dar es Salaam Israeli Mossad agents established an Intelligence School which served the various Liberation Movements of Central and Southern Africa.

When the KGB became involved and brought with them Arab activists, the Israeli involvement changed. Meir AMIT reinforced his katsas with kidons. His new orders were to disrupt by all means possible relations between the Russians and their African hosts and between the KGB and Chinese intelligence; to kill Arab activists when the opportunity arose. Mossad operatives ambushed some victims driving on dirt roads; others were killed in their beds. One day it would be a KGB agent, the next a CSIS (Chinese intelligence) spy. Each side blamed the other for what Mossad had done.

Mossad was involved in a war against Chinese agents in Africa during the 1950s. Mossad wrecked a Chinese plot to overthrow the pro-West Hastings Banda regime in Malawi. Next it informed Kenya about the full extent of Chinese network in its midst. The Chinese network was kicked out of the country. Several Chinese intelligence operatives were killed by Mossad katsas. Kidons stalked Chinese intelligence operatives wherever they set up shop. In Ghana a Chinese intelligence agent was shot dead, another died in Mali in a car bomb, in Zanzibar a fire consumed an apartment block where Chinese intelligence staff lived. The Chinese intelligence local commander narrowly escaped when a car he travelled in Brazaville in the Congo exploded. In Zambia a Chinese intelligence agent was left bound to a tree for lions to consume. When Kwame NKRUMAH, the pro-Chinese ruler of Ghana, was on state visit to Beijing, Mossad orchestrated the uprising that led to his overthrow and destruction of Chinese intelligence infrastructure in Ghana.

For three years Mossad waged its war of attrition against the Chinese intelligence over the length and breadth of Africa. There was no mercy on either side. When Chin Intel hit team ambushed a Mossad katsa in Congo, they fed him to crocodiles, filmed it and sent footage to local Mossad station chief who retaliated by firing a rocket into the building from where Chin Intel operated. Three Chinese were killed.

Through an intermediary, President MOBUTO of Zaire (DRC), the Chinese intelligence led Mossad know it no longer wished to fight rather. They shared a common interest on the continent. The offer was accepted and the Chinese began to provide details about Arab movements in and out of Africa. Some Arabs were killed by usual Mossad method of car bombs or explosives placed in hotel rooms. Mossad on its part assisted China. It tipped off that Moscow intended to offer a massive financial aid package to Somalia and China doubled it. Next Mossad helped China in Sudan where KGB planned a coup. Mossad informed China who told President Nimeri and he expelled all Russian diplomats and suspended Soviet bloc aid schemes.

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African countries turned their back on Israel after the Six-Day War in 1967. By the end of 1973, only four African countries: Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mauritius – continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Despite the break in diplomatic ties, some countries still continued with bilateral relations.

At the same time, economic contacts continued unabated, especially in Nigeria where a large number of Israeli businessmen set up base, but also in Kenya, Ethiopia, Zaire (DRC) and elsewhere. African trainees continued to attend courses in Israel, especially at the Histadrut Afro-Asian Institute.

Mossad activities continued in Ethiopia, Southern Sudan, Kenya and elsewhere. The Horn of Africa and Ethiopia in particular, had always held a special interest for Israel, as that region was considered to be of strategic importance, bordering on the Red Sea.

In 1980 Israel's Foreign Minister, Yitzhak SHAMIR, and David KIMCHE, as his Director-General, decided to launch a concerted effort to renew diplomatic relations with the countries of Africa. Although there was no immediate rush to resume formal relations, the new dialogue which Jerusalem had initiated with African leaders bore fruit: instead of automatically supporting Arab or Soviet moves against Israel in international bodies as they had done previously, African delegates were now preventing initiatives against Israel.

During the 80s, Mossad was involved widely in Africa. As well as playing off the Chinese against Russians, it made matters difficult for CIA, MI6 and other European intelligence agencies operating on continent. Whenever one threatened Mossad's own position, Mossad exposed its activities. In Kenya an MI6 agent was blown. In Zaire (DRC), a French network was wrecked. In Tanzania a German intelligence operation was hurriedly aborted after being uncovered by Mossad through a tip to a local reporter.

Mossad policy was to work with anyone who would work with Israel. That enabled them to know everything that was happening in a country. The slightest mood change that could affect Israel was reported back.

### **Ethiopia**

Ethiopia is of strategic importance to Israel. Israel had good relations with Emperor Haile SELASSIE who had proclaimed himself a descendant of the ancient Hebrew tribe of Judah. The Israelis helped the emperor train his security forces and Israel was permitted to build a powerful listening post, which monitored Arab radio traffic. The Mossad ran a large "station" of operatives in the Ethiopian capital. After SELASSIE was overthrown in 1974, Colonel Mengistu Haile MARIAM, the new Marxist president of Ethiopia in 1977 wanted to renew Israeli arms sales to Ethiopia. Israel requested a letter from the president to permit Jews of Ethiopia to move to Israel. He agreed but when the covert relations were revealed he stopped the departure of more Jews. Mossad established an alternative plan and obtained permission from Sudan to move Ethiopians through that country across the border to Kenya and then from there to Israel. But after an airplane incident the clandestine plan was published in newspaper and Kenya withdrew permission. Thereafter Mossad received help from CIA and established a dummy corporation named Navco, which leased land by the Red Sea in Sudan with the stated intention of constructing a holiday village for undersea divers. The divers that arrived were not the amateur variety but from the naval commando force. Under cover of darkness the frogmen took the refugees in small boats to Israeli vessels anchored offshore. Sudanese

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president then became concerned about the flow of Jews through his country and wanted Israel to stop. US promised economic aid of \$200million in exchange for the use of Khartoum airport to fly them out as part of Operation Moses. When it was leaked the Sudanese stopped it.

Israel also helped Ethiopia against the Somalis.

**Ivory Coast**

In 1997 Mossad stumbled upon a CIA operation in Abidjan while they were targeting a local Hezbollah operative who had been identified as a possible recruit. The CIA accused Mossad of spying on them.

**Nigeria**

Mossad assisted the Nigeria security service in 1984 in the botched kidnapping of Umaro DIKKO from London. (See kidnappings)

**Morocco**

Israel had good relations with the Arab state, Morocco. In the 1960s Morocco felt threatened by Algeria and Egypt. Mossad experts helped King HASSAN II to establish a secret service.

In 1965 Mossad assisted Morocco intelligence service to help them kidnap dissident Ben-BARKA who was sentenced to death in absentia. (See kidnappings)

In 1976 clandestine cooperation between Israel and Morocco was reaffirmed. Mossad and CIA were free to roam Morocco, making contacts with potential useful Arabs, running listening posts to keep an electronic ear on North Africa and advising the king and top officials on internal security.

An Israeli general of Moroccan descent represented Mossad for a long time with King HASSAN II but the relationship had cooled. Relations increased later again and Mossad reportedly was allowed to set up a permanent station in Casablanca in 1993, injecting fresh impetus into security cooperation between Israel and Morocco.

**Tunisia**

When Tunisia arrested some Jews in 1961, Mossad feared for Tunisia's Jews and arranged for French warships to pick up 1000 Jews from the coast of Bizerte and transport them first to France and then on to Israel.

In 1988, Israeli commandos, led by future Prime Minister Ehud BARAK, slipped into the home of Palestine Liberation Organisation leader Khalil al-Wazir Abu Jihad in Tunis, Tunisia. Abu Jihad was killed in his sleep in a well-planned tactical military assault.

**Sudan**

Sudan was of great interest to the Mossad because the country was just to the south of Israel's nemesis, Egypt. During its transition to independence Sudan was afraid Egypt might intervene and Sudan turned to Israel in 1956 where various schemes for anti-Nasser cooperation were discussed. The contacts ended in 1958 when Prime Minister Agdallah KHALIL was overthrown by his army.

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In 1985 Sudanese intelligence lent a helping hand to Mossad and the CIA in carrying out Operation Moses, the transfer of Ethiopian Falashas to Israel via Sudan.

It was reported in 1995 that between 20 and 30 Israeli advisers headed by a former head of Aman operated in Khartoum. Some of them were responsible for the protection of the Sudanese president Gen. Omar Hassal al-BACHIR, while the others have set up a communications system which serves to both eavesdrop on and secure the security of presidential telecommunications.

#### Algeria

Said SAHNOUN, an Algerian journalist, was found guilty of spying for Israel and jailed for 10 years on 04 July 2007. A police officer, accused of giving him information, was acquitted. SAHNOUN was accused of collecting and supplying military information on Algeria and other Arab countries for Mossad. SAHNOUN was arrested at the borders between Morocco and Algeria in possession of several documents containing secret information about the Algerian army plans and lists of wanted terrorists. He provided information about Algerian army's military capabilities and an Islamist rebel group known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). He was said to have been in contact with the Israeli embassy in Abidjan since 1992 and went on a journalism and communications course in Israel. He was recruited there and started working for Mossad. He sent them detailed reports about economic and security situation in Algeria and the Kabylia area for \$1500 per month. At the same time, he allegedly also worked for Spain's intelligence and sent them the same reports.

In his confession SAHNOUN cited that Mossad was interested in information regarding Algeria's domestic crises, the thinking and positions of Algeria's top political figures, confidential Algerian financial information and the country's general morale, prosecutors said.

#### Uganda

On 27 June 1976 PLO terrorists hijacked Air France plane filled with Jewish passengers en route to Paris from Tel Aviv and landed at Entebbe airport in Uganda. They announced the aircraft would be blown up along with the Jewish passengers unless their demands were met. Israel decided to free them. Half a dozen katsas went to Nairobi and were installed in a Kenyan intelligence service safe house. Kenya provided approval for a fuel stop at Nairobi. Israeli paratroopers waited close to Ugandan shore ready to storm the airport. Six Mossad katsas surrounded the airport; each carried a high-frequency radio and an electronic device that jammed the radar in the control tower. A force of C-130 Hercules transporters swept down on Entebbe Airport and commandos raced into the building where the hostages were held and freed all killing all terrorists and 16 Ugandan soldiers. The attack force lost one man and three hostages died.

Three suicide bombers attacked an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya on 28 November 2002 and killed 16 people, including three Israelis. Minutes later, unknown assailants launched two shoulder-fired missiles that barely missed a chartered flight filled with Israeli tourists as it took off from Mombasa's airport. The previously unknown Army of Palestine claimed responsibility for the dual attacks. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel SHARON has pledged to avenge the killings of the Israelis in Kenya and has deployed agents from Mossad to Kenya. Mossad agents in Nigeria have provided important details on al-Qaeda in that country. Katsas in South Africa have

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joined colleagues in Mombasa, Rome, Malta and Cyprus went to Kenya to assist in the investigation. DAGAN also sent kidon to find and kill the men behind the three suicide bombers. He said that no one knows for certain what success the Mossad team had. But sources in a number of intelligence services say it did kill several suspected terrorists and dumped their bodies in crocodile-infested swamps.

### Egypt

In early 1960s Mossad was concerned about the German rocket scientists in Egypt. It was been alleged that the Germans were involved in an effort to exterminate Jews. Response was given with Operation Damocles, a sword hanging over the head of every German scientist working for the Egyptians. Israeli agents sent booby-trapped letters to German scientists involved in the missile project and their families. Similar intimidation was being carried out throughout Europe. In the campaign there were a few injuries and much intimidation.

During time as Mossad chief Meir AMIT he had placed spies everywhere including in Egypt. In the run-up to the Six Day War in 1967, there was either a Mossad katsa or an informer inside every Egyptian air base and military headquarters. There were three in the General High Command headquarters in Cairo. To each katsa and informer he gave the same instruction: as well as the big picture he wanted the small details. That helped to determine when to strike.

Some in Israel think the end of Israel would come at the hands of the Egyptians. That is why Israel has been continuously recruiting spies and sending them to Egypt. Mossad activity in Egypt is also extensive. Mossad used Egypt both as a source of information and as a jumping-off point to the rest of the Arab world. Mossad reasons that it would be much easier and much less suspicious to have an Egyptian who was recruited under a false flag in Cairo and had never set foot outside the Middle East to carry out intelligence gathering in other Arab countries than Arabs who had been to Europe and therefore might be suspected.

Ever since signing peace treaty with Egypt at Camp David in 1978, Israel has been trying to measure Egypt's military and economic power. Egyptian security authorities said since that time until 2000 it have managed to expose and apprehend at least 24 Israeli espionage networks operating against Egypt.

Various espionage operations and agents have been uncovered in Egypt over the years.

- Wolfgang LOTZ, a German Jew, was sent on a spying mission to Egypt from 1957-1965; he operated first under Aman and then Mossad. His cover was a riding instructor, an East German refugee who had served in Africa Corps in WW11 and had returned to Egypt to open an equestrian academy. It gave him access to Cairo's high society, but also meant his bills were high leading to Mossad accounting department dubbing him "the champagne spy". He also married a woman in Egypt, while he also had a wife in Israel.

LOTZ had developed a circle of clients that included the deputy head Egyptian military intelligence, and chief of security of Suez Canal zone. LOTZ was shown Egypt's formidable defences, the rocket launch pads in Sinai and on THE Negev frontier, the complete list of Nazi scientists living in Cairo working in Egypt's rocket and arms programs. LOTZ and his wife were arrested by Egyptian Mukhabarat on 22 February 1965. The radio transmitter

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hidden in his bathroom scale was detected by direction-finding equipment, just as Syrian intelligence and the Soviet GRU assisted to help plug security leaks affecting Syria and Egypt. LOTZ was sentenced to life imprisonment, but after a lot of lobbying and pressure from the UN LOTZ and wife were released in an Israeli-Egyptian swap of Six-Day War prisoners.

- Shaaltiel BEN-YAIR was a successful spy for the Mossad who lived in Egypt under deep cover from 1958-1962. He was in charge of mapping Egyptian airfields and providing details of military installations. It was dangerous, but he was one of the Israeli agents who completed their missions and returned home without being caught. He could pose as an Arab, talk English like the Scots, French like the Belgians.
- Jack Leon THOMAS, an Armenian who grew up in Cairo and hated NASSER was recruited via the false-flag method in 1958. Mossad recruited him under the ruse of working for one of the NATO countries. It was only later revealed to him that he work for Israeli intelligence. He ran a large network until May 1960 when he was caught. When he discovered that he was in trouble he obtained false passports for himself and his wife who was part of his network. She managed to escape together with another member of the network, a Jewish dancer. THOMAS was hanged in 1962. During his trial prosecutors revealed that the network offered pilots of Egyptian air force a US\$1 million to defect to Israel or Cyprus with a Soviet-made MIG jet.
- Aman recruited Ibrahim and Inshirah SHAHEEN, Palestinians living in Cairo. They provided good information re Egypt's preparations for the 1973 war. However they and their handlers became careless and Ibrahim was arrested in 1974 and hanged three years later. His wife and three children were imprisoned. After peace negotiations started they were released and slipped over the border to Israel. The intelligence community helped them create and start new lives.
- Max BINNOT and Moshe MARZUK, who ran Mossad's most successful network in Egypt, were caught and died a painful, lingering death in a Cairo prison.
- In 1996 Arab Assam AZZAM, who worked for a textile company, was sentenced to 15 years in prison for espionage for Israel, partly carried out by writing messages in invisible ink on lingerie. According to Egypt AZZAM was recruited by Mossad and sent to Egypt to work for an Israeli textile company. He then allegedly recruited an Egyptian to help him collect information. He was released after eight years as part of a prisoner exchange for Egyptian students who had allegedly crossed into Israel to carry out attacks.
- Egyptian engineer Sherif El-FILALI was sentenced in 2002 to 15 years in prison with hard labour for spying on behalf of Israel. He was convicted of trying to collect military information and data on Egyptian tourism and an agricultural project for Israel. Court sources said that a Russian man, who was convicted of espionage in absentia, recruited El-FILALI in Spain to obtain secret information about Egypt for Mossad. He died in jail in 2007.
- Mohammed Essam Ghoneium al-ATTAR was arrested on espionage charges at Cairo Airport on 01 January 2007 while on a visit to Egypt. He studied

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science at Al-Azhar University in Cairo but dropped out of the Islamic institution in 2001 after becoming involved in a civil dispute because he refused to pay for damaging a rental car. He fled to Turkey before serving his three-year sentence. Once in Ankara, ATTAR sought asylum at the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) on the basis that he was homosexual. He sought employment at the Israeli embassy there and was introduced to Daniel LEVI, a Mossad agent who allegedly became his handler in Turkey. According to the case file, Mossad agents tempted him with US\$56 000 and a new Mercedes. ATTAR was then trained to collect information from Arabs living in Turkey - an activity he later continued when he moved to Canada, where he obtained citizenship.

ATTAR left for Canada near the end of 2002 and moved to Vancouver, where he met Kemal KOSBA, a second Mossad agent who landed him a job at a restaurant. He then moved to Toronto and met up with another agent, Tuncay BUBAY. In 2005, Bubay landed him a job with CIBC in the customers' service sector. According to Egyptian reports, he spied on financial dealings of local Egyptians and Arabs to determine who would be suitable to work with the Mossad. He allegedly recruited several new agents in Canada, targeting gays and those he knew were in financial trouble within Arab communities. He also sought to recruit Egyptians for operations with the Mossad and has recruited Egyptians, Syrians, and Iraqis in Canada. The Egyptian intelligence service was monitoring him for five years since his travel to Turkey and Canada and his relations with the Israeli officers who recruited him. He was sentenced to 15 years in jail and his handlers in absentia.

- Mohammed Sayed SABER @ Muhammad Sayyid SABIR ALI, an engineer at the Nuclear Energy Agency, was arrested for espionage on 18 February 2007 after returning to Egypt from Hong Kong, where the prosecution said he used to meet his Mossad handlers namely Japanese Shiro IZO and Irishman Brian PETER. SABER first met the two foreigners in Hong Kong between 2004 and 2006. He allegedly passed on classified documents relating to the work of the AEA (Egypt's Atomic Agency), including information on experiments and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections at Inshas (Egypt's atomic reactor); the reactors' capabilities and hours of operation; and technological problems. He also purportedly used computer software provided by IZO and PETER to hack into the AEA computer system. According to the charges, he received US\$17 000 in return for confidential information. They gave him a laptop equipped with coded software and communicated with him in secret coded e-mails.

Ali ISLAM, head of Egypt's atomic agency, said the engineer stole confidential reports from the agency and gave them to the Israeli Mossad. SABER illegally obtained the documents from his department, kept them for 10 years although they were confidential and classified documents. During his trial SABER praised Israel for its advanced technology and claimed the documents he passed on were so outdated they posed no threat to Egyptian security.

He aroused the suspicions of Egyptian authorities when he went to the Israeli embassy in Cairo in 1999 to ask for a grant to study nuclear engineering at Tel Aviv University. He claimed that he did not know it was for Mossad but was under the impression it was a Japanese multinational firm, but that he did

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report his suspicions to the Egyptian Embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

*Remark: It is said that Israel has a clear interest in determining the nature and scope of the experiments carried out at Inshas, which could give indications as to Egypt's readiness for nuclear expansion following the Hosni MUBARAK government's decision to restart its shelved nuclear energy program in September 2006. Alleged covert Egyptian nuclear experiments, uncovered in 2005, have also raised fears that Egypt may be seeking a weapons option, should regional tensions worsen over time.*

## 9. ISRAEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

- 9.1 During the Apartheid era there were good relations between South Africa and Israel. Israel intelligence had friendly relations with South Africa's BOSS. Israel also bought uranium directly from South Africa. South Africa became Israel's partner in clandestine projects including nuclear and missile research. OSTROVSKY mentioned a certain URI from AL department. He came back from an assignment in South Africa. OSTROVSKY helped him prepare a large shipment of medication to South Africa to accompany several Israeli doctors who were headed for some humanitarian work in Soweto. The doctors were to assist in treating patients at an outpatient clinic for the Baragwanath hospital in Soweto. The hospital and clinic were supported by a hospital in Baltimore, which served as a cut-out for the Mossad. It has been alleged that Mossad was testing new infectious diseases and new medication that can't be tested on humans in Israel, for several of the Israeli medicine manufacturers.

After Apartheid Mossad was involved in various counter proliferation operations in the country including intimidation of Iranians and is suspect of the assassinations of a number of South African chemical engineers and arms dealers.

It is known that there are katsas working in South Africa. For example it was reported that during the bomb investigation in Kenya, Katsas in South Africa have joined colleagues in Mombasa to assist in investigations.

An SA Municipal Workers' Union (Samwu) official has claimed that Israeli security strip-searched him at OR TAMBO International Airport in Kempton Park. Samwu first vice-president Xolile NXU claimed he was detained and interrogated in June 2007 on his departure for the second annual conference on Popular Non-Violent Resistance in the West Bank village of Bil'in, in occupied Palestine. He further alleged that Israeli security escorted him directly to the aircraft a minute before take-off after covering his luggage and hand-luggage with red stamps.

However, the Airports Company South Africa (ACSA) said it knew nothing of the incident. No security police from foreign countries had offices at OR TAMBO.

### 9.2 Modus operandi in SA:

A former declared MOSSAD member in South Africa utilised the following modus operandi:

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- 9.2.1 By means of detail billing it was determined that [REDACTED] had regular contact with members of the South African Jewish community. It is known *modus operandi* of the MOSSAD to utilise the Jewish community around the world to assist the MOSSAD in its intelligence activities. The contact between [REDACTED] and these members of the South Africa Jewish community might have been an indication that the MOSSAD utilised them in its covert collection activities.

[REDACTED] head of the Africa and Latin American Division of the Foreign Relations and Special Political Operations Directorate of the MOSSAD and supervisor of [REDACTED] was in South Africa on a liaison visit. During [REDACTED] visit to South Africa he and [REDACTED] visited Cape Town. During this visit to Cape Town [REDACTED] had a possible "brush" meeting with two persons in a public toilet, one of them of Muslim origin. Radical Islam had been identified as one of the most important collection priorities of the MOSSAD in South Africa. In this regard the MOSSAD is interested in the activities of *inter alia* PAGAD and QIBLA. In light of the fact that one of the persons met by [REDACTED] was of Muslim origin, the possibility existed that this person might have had access to information with regard to PAGAD, QIBLA or other radical Islamic activities in South Africa and that this person operated as a source/agent for [REDACTED]. The possibility further existed that the information was urgently needed by the MOSSAD from its source and had to be provided to [REDACTED] while he was in South Africa.

It has also been determined that [REDACTED] utilised rental vehicles on some occasions to attend meetings. In this regard it was established that [REDACTED] was in regular contact with a member of the South African Police Service (SAPS). It was determined that [REDACTED] and the SAPS member's contact revolved around Islamic Militancy issues in South Africa. As mentioned earlier, the MOSSAD possesses good information on this topic and therefore the possibility existed that [REDACTED] would have endeavoured to verify his own information and also to glean more information from his SAPS contact. It was established that the liaison relationship between [REDACTED] and the SAPS member had been carrying on since 1996 without NIA (CDE) being informed about it. It has further been established that [REDACTED] also had contact with two other members of the same Division of the SAPS. Although the SAPS has indicated that this liaison with [REDACTED] was official, the fact that NIA (CE) had not been informed in this regard, should have been addressed on a higher level as this situation could have led to possible espionage opportunities.

It was also established that [REDACTED] had constant contact with the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, a very well organised body in the country with their offices spread around the country. This body has a direct influence over the Jewish community in South Africa, with strong emotional bonds with the State of Israel.

[REDACTED] also had contacts within government departments which included the Agriculture, Trade and Industry, Health and other institutions that deal with research. Most of his contacts within these departments were contacting him on his cellular phone precisely because he might have been aware that it was not easy to monitor a cellular phone. The most serious of the contacts he had, were within the Crime Intelligence of the SAPS.



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After [REDACTED] family had returned to Israel, [REDACTED] stayed at the Protea Lodge for almost three weeks. During this time he never utilised the room's telephone, neither did he receive any messages or visitors via the reception. On the last day of his stay at the Lodge, [REDACTED] requested that his account being divided in two parts, respectively in the names of EL AL Airlines and Tiger Wheel and Tyre. Through the analysing of the account it has come to light that [REDACTED] was also settling the account of a certain [REDACTED] an American. The reason behind [REDACTED] request to change the account to EL AL and Tiger Wheel and Tyre was unknown. EL AL made sense, but the link with Tiger Wheel and Tyre was unexplainable. The relation between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was yet another point of concern.

*All the abovementioned information indicated that the Israeli Intelligence Services, through its declared member, were involved in the collection of intelligence by means of covert activities.*

It was also known modus operandi of the Israeli intelligence services to utilise EL AL as cover for intelligence members. As mentioned above, 45 people are employed by EL AL as their security personnel at the JHB International Airport and 8 are employed at the Cargo and Passenger side. According to the Airports Company of South Africa (ACSA), EL AL has the privilege of not being searched at the restricted areas. EL AL officials are also allowed to travel freely with their weapons amongst the EL AL passengers. When a flight from Tel Aviv arrives, the EL AL personnel, carrying hidden handset two-way radios, disguise themselves as passengers. At check points they simply flash their EL AL cards and are allowed to go through any restricted area in the airport as been agreed to by ACSA.

EL AL cars are also allocated permits without specifying the make and model of each car. The reason for this is because EL AL does not have permanent cars, but utilises rental vehicles.

Because of the situation in Israel (terrorists attacks etc), EL AL is of the opinion that they are responsible for the security/guarding of Israeli planes and passengers at the airport, and therefore all the abovementioned privileges are afforded to them by ACSA.

*Because of abovementioned privileges the possibility exists that an Israeli intelligence officer can enter South Africa and under the disguise as an EL AL member go through all the checkpoints at the airport without presenting any documentation. As mentioned earlier, one of the members of EL AL has also been identified as a courier for the MOSSAD. Although this still needs to be investigated, his status as an EL AL member provides him with freedom of movement that will make it easy for him to act as a courier.*

#### 9.2.2 Counter surveillance

When attending liaison meetings [REDACTED] varied his driving speed between 30km/h and 90km/h. He would also pull over and waited next to the road for approximately 4 minutes for no specific reason.

- When leaving the embassy building for the Hatfield shopping centre on foot, [REDACTED] would first walk around the block instead of walking directly to the shopping centre.

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- [REDACTED] also changed his access routes to his house every time he used his vehicle.

#### 9.2.3 Communication

[REDACTED] had two cellular phones. One phone was registered in his name and the other phone was a rental phone. According to MTN no records were kept of calls made from a rental phone.

#### 9.2.4 Passports

[REDACTED] had two passports, an official passport and a private passport. He used his diplomatic passport to travel to Israel, Botswana and Mozambique.

#### 9.2.5 Cutting of rubbish bags

[REDACTED] cut his rubbish bags in such a manner that it could not be lifted from the dustbin without spilling the content.

#### 9.2.6 Utilisation of rental vehicles

Despite having two official vehicles, [REDACTED] had on ten occasions, rented vehicles from *Budget Rent a Car* for the period 1 January 1998 to 7 September 1998, for utilisation in the Gauteng.

#### 9.2.7 Front Companies

It is an internationally known practise of the Israeli intelligence services to utilise the following organisations as cover structures for its members:

- EL AL Airlines.
- Armament industries e.g., EL BIT and the Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI).
- Jewish Community organisations; e.g.: South African Jewish Board of Deputies (SAJBD) and individuals in the Jewish Community with legitimate business.

*Note: No members attached to these organisations in South Africa have to date been identified as intelligence officers.*

#### 9.2.8 Recruitment Methods

The possibility existed that some of [REDACTED] contacts were recruited unwittingly. The contacts were under the impression that the meetings with [REDACTED] were "above board" whilst [REDACTED] acted in a covert manner by not informing NIA about his meetings.

It is also possible that some of these contacts had been recruited wittingly, and that they were aware of exactly what they were doing, that is, providing information to a foreign intelligence service.



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#### 9.2.9 Communication with agents

It was determined that [REDACTED] utilised cellular phones for communication with his contacts.

Personal meetings also took place between [REDACTED] and his contacts.

#### 9.2.10 Agent Handling Procedures

It seemed as if some of [REDACTED] contacts might have been handled unwittingly by him.

#### 9.2.11 Collection Methods

It seemed as if [REDACTED] made use of personal meetings (interviews) with contacts. It was possible that during some of these meetings information was provided unwittingly to [REDACTED]

### 10. RELATIONS BETWEEN MOSSAD AND NIA

#### 10.1 Background

The Mossad was handled by [REDACTED] from 1996 to 2004. At that stage it was the only country in the Middle East that was represented and declared to NIA. Relations were always more tense with the Mossad than with any other country, solely because of the history between the two countries.

The representative initially met [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] he was succeeded by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] During the time of [REDACTED] relations were standard and regular exchange took place. Exchanges regularly took place, mostly on individuals and organisations suspected of terrorism involvement. A counter terrorism expert visit took place in 1996. Background on terrorism modus operandi was shared by them, even before the first PAGAD related bombs exploded in the Western Cape. Meaningful exchanges became less at the end of [REDACTED] term. The Mossad at that stage also indicated they were thinking of a part time representative responsible for handling the whole of Africa. NIA discarded the idea and [REDACTED] subsequently was placed in South Africa, although he regularly travelled to West and East Africa where he also was the declared member. Reasonable relations existed with [REDACTED] until he was handed over to [REDACTED]

Examples of exchanges are attached as Annexure A, during the above-mentioned period.

During February 2005, [REDACTED] the Mossad Director for Foreign Relations, led a Mossad delegation that visited NIA Head Quarters in Musanda Liaison Centre. The objective of the Mossad visit was to create a space for dialogue on how cooperation between Mossad and NIA can be improved. Mr NJENJE, former NIA DDG led the NIA delegation

[REDACTED] mentioned that non-conventional threats are more worrying to the Mossad and the Israeli government. He also mentioned that was priority threat for Israel because it Iran possessed nuclear capability that could be used against Israel and for funding Hezbollah and HAMAS.

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Mr. NJENJE welcomed the sentiments expressed by [REDACTED] regarding the need for Intelligence Services to cooperate and work together to avert terrorist threats. He assured Mossad that NIA was a willing partner in the fight to combat international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He emphasised the importance of that meeting as having brought to the fore bases for productive cooperation between NIA and Mossad in the area of Counter Terrorism and Counter Proliferation.

There was improvement of information exchange soon after the Mossad delegation visit. In May 2006 NIA Counter Proliferation experts delegation visited Israel. MOSSAD was pushing to hard to included information request on Counter Intelligence area such as [REDACTED] the Iranian national staying in Cape Town. He alleged that [REDACTED] was in contact with [REDACTED] a Hezbollah member based in Lebanon. NIA did not provide feedback to MOSSAD on this request.

In 2007 Mossad provided information on [REDACTED] to NIA with the hope that the information would benefit South Africa. They expected that NIA would share information with them on what are finding of their monitoring and investigation. However, [REDACTED] bluntly told [REDACTED] the Local Representative of Mossad that he was prevented by NIA Management to share information on [REDACTED] could not understand [REDACTED] because Mossad provided to NIA information on [REDACTED] He stormed out of the meeting.

[REDACTED] former Head FIS Liaison Mossad grievance on NIA's action to refuse to share information on [REDACTED] activities after his return from Somalia to NLC to get guidance. He was confused by the actions of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and sought NIA's position on cooperation with Mossad. The NLC reversed [REDACTED] decision to refuse IM to share information on [REDACTED] with Mossad. However, [REDACTED] took over from IM Analysts.

[REDACTED] the former DDG instructed [REDACTED] to confine cooperation between NIA and Mossad to Counter Proliferation and Counter Terrorism.

The political stance from Minister KASRILS contributed to the perception that NIA was not willing to cooperate with MOSSAD because the adversaries of Israel are allies of South Africa. Of course Mr KARSILS has openly demonstrated political differences with Israel and supported the cause of the Palestinian. He also favoured Iran's material support to Palestinians Resistance Movement. He ordered audit of information NIA liaised with MOSSAD.

[REDACTED] the former DG paid unofficial visit to Mossad HQ in March 2009. Mossad complained to him about lack of concrete cooperation with NIA. According to Mossad the situation has not changed. Instead it has deteriorated to the levels which have compelled MOSSAD to withdraw their Representative from South Africa. Hence they have withdrawn their Representative but have not severed the relations from residing in South Africa.

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## 10.2 Current status of relations between Mossad and NIA

During February 2005, [REDACTED] the Mossad Director for Foreign Relations, led a Mossad delegation that visited NIA Head Quarters in Musanda Liaison Centre. The objective of the Mossad visit was to create a space for dialogue on how cooperation between Mossad and NIA can be improved. Mr NJENJE, former NIA DDG led the NIA delegation

[REDACTED] mentioned that non-conventional threats are more worrying to the Mossad and the Israeli government. He also mentioned that was priority threat for Israel because it Iran possessed nuclear capability that could be used against Israel and for funding Hezbollah and HAMAS.

Mr NJENJE welcomed the sentiments expressed by [REDACTED] regarding the need for Intelligence Services to cooperate and work together to avert terrorist threats. He assured Mossad that NIA was a willing partner in the fight to combat international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He emphasised the importance of that meeting as having brought to the fore bases for productive cooperation between NIA and Mossad in the area of Counter Terrorism and Counter Proliferation.

There was improvement of information exchange soon after the Mossad delegation visit. In May 2006 NIA Counter Proliferation experts delegation visited Israel. Mossad was pushing to hard to included information request on Counter Intelligence area such as [REDACTED] the Iranian national staying in Cape Town. He alleged that [REDACTED] was in contact with [REDACTED] a Hezbollah member based in Lebanon. NIA did not provide feedback to Mossad on this request.

In 2007 Mossad provided information on [REDACTED] to NIA with the hope that the information would benefit South Africa. They expected that NIA would share information with them on what are finding of their monitoring and investigation. However, [REDACTED] bluntly told [REDACTED] the Local Representative of Mossad that he was prevented by NIA Management to share information on [REDACTED] could not understand [REDACTED] because Mossad provided to NIA information on [REDACTED] He stormed out of the meeting.

[REDACTED] former Head FIS Liaison Mossad grievance on NIA's action to refuse to share information on [REDACTED] activities after his return from Somalia to NLC to get guidance. He was confused by the actions of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and sought NIA's position on cooperation with Mossad. The NLC reversed [REDACTED] decision to refuse IM to share information on [REDACTED] with Mossad. However, [REDACTED] took over from IM Analysts.

[REDACTED] the former DDG instructed [REDACTED] to confine cooperation between NIA and Mossad to Counter Proliferation and Counter Terrorism.

The political stance of from Minister KASRILS contributed to the perception that NIA was not willing to cooperate with Mossad because the adversaries of Israel are allies of South Africa. Of course Mr KARSILS has openly demonstrated political differences with Israel and supported the cause of the Palestinian. He also favoured Iran's material support to Palestinians



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Resistance Movement. He ordered audit of information NIA liaised with Mossad.

[REDACTED] the former DG paid unofficial visit to Mossad HQ in March 2009. Mossad complained to him about lack of concrete cooperation with NIA. According to Mossad the situation has not changed. Instead it has deteriorated to the levels which have compelled Mossad to withdraw their Representative from South Africa. Hence they have withdrawn their Representative but have not severed the relations from residing in South Africa.

11. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN SA

11.1 Intelligence Representation:

[REDACTED] has been the declared MOSSAD member in SA and suspected of being involved in espionage activities. He has indicated through liaison that the Mossad give priority attention to CP and CT issues. He left South Africa in August 2009 and has been replaced by [REDACTED] who will only visit SA approximately once a month.

Surname	:	[REDACTED]
Name	:	[REDACTED]
Cell phone	:	[REDACTED]
Fax	:	[REDACTED]
Date of Birth	:	[REDACTED]
Dip Passport	:	[REDACTED]
Diplomatic Id number	:	Currently based in Israel
Date of arrival	:	[REDACTED]
Nationality	:	Israeli
Position in embassy	:	[REDACTED]
Intelligence status	:	[REDACTED]
Date of assumption of duty	:	[REDACTED]
End period stipulated	:	Based in Israel, so no period was
Marital status	:	Not known

11.2 Current activities indicating threat

The Mossad perceives SA to be close to the Iranians regarding Iran's nuclear development program and thus show interest in SA. MOSSAD is suspected of collecting CT-related information, for example financial information on the Al-Aqsa Foundation and the African Muslim Agency (AMA) and it is alleged that these organisations are responsible for the channelling of funds to terrorist organisations.

11.3 Interests

- Foreign involvement in/with Radical Islamic groups in South Africa.
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
- Activities of Iran and other Middle Eastern countries in South Africa.

The Iranian nuclear programme is seen as posing real and immediate danger to the MOSSAD / Israelis. MOSSAD in SA has the objective to persuade NIA

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to cooperation at the level of having joint operations against threats posed by the Iranian Intelligence Service to South Africa and Israel.

It is known that the MOSSAD is interested in Zimbabwe.

#### 11.4 Current modus operandi

11.4.1 The usage of front companies and placement of suspected Intelligence operator at OR TAMBO International Airport still needs to be investigated, as a former member of EL AL security and a suspected Israeli intelligence operative, was appointed as Security officer at OR TAMBO International Airport (ACSA). *Remark: It is known modus operandi of the MOSSAD to make use of EL AL as cover for intelligence collection activities.*

11.4.2 It is furthermore suspected that the MOSSAD might be using the company AMDOCS who also operates in South Africa as AMDOCS South Africa Joint Enterprises (ASAJE). According to the ASAJE website, TELKOM SA and Cell-C are currently their two main customers in South Africa. *Remark: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Security Agency (NSA), as well as other US Federal Law Enforcement agencies in the past had investigated AMDOCS in the USA and have raised their concern regarding the protection of identity information of US telephone customers. The implications are serious and speak for itself, since the same concerns, as in the USA, can be raised with regard to Telkom SA and Cell-C in South Africa.*

11.4.3 An Israeli procurement agent in the RSA [REDACTED] acts as the Israeli link for the supply of Israeli armaments to selected countries inter alia India. The initial investigation into Indian procurement identified a shopping list to procure inter alia nuclear, chemical, laser and conventional warfare technologies and hardware in the RSA market. India has an excellent trade relationship with the RSA, however, according to the source India accepted the fact that the RSA would not necessarily sell them sensitive technology or equipment. India has therefore set up a parallel procurement system to obtain goods or technology covertly. This system is also used to verify prices on equipment or technology. On their attempt to acquire early warning and trigger systems for their rockets, India has made contact with an Israeli procurement agent [REDACTED] based in the RSA. It was established through operations that [REDACTED] has also strong links with MOSSAD. [REDACTED] has a company, [REDACTED] is operated by Ex-Mossad members and if compromised, would not create a possible embarrassment for the Israeli government.

11.4.4 It has been determined that the previous Mossad member in SA, [REDACTED] was covertly active in South Africa, including agent handling and the co-ordination and running of Mossad operations in South Africa. He was additionally suspected that he runs Mossad operations directed against targets in Africa using South Africa as a base of operation. Information obtained that [REDACTED] utilised South African and Israel citizens as co-workers/cut-outs for these operations in order to protect the involvement of the MOSSAD. [REDACTED] had contact with several Government Departments, including the presidency. Investigations are currently underway to determine the activities, contacts and modus operandi of [REDACTED]

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Compiled by [REDACTED] in cooperation with [REDACTED] (Overt information)  
and EM41 (NIA Liaison), including covert information received from CI20.

IM23 October 2009



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