in tho Gf?cr: of Clerk of Court, Orange County Florida 2Dt1 Jun 29 03:40 PM Lydia GardnerTN THE. CIRCUIT COURT OF THENINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR ORANGE COUNTY, CHRISTOPHER C-OMINS,Plaintiff,V. Case No; i'7Ri'il)ERlCK VAN Defendant.IORDERGRANTING MOTION FOR SUTWMARY JUDGMENTThis matter come before the Court in a hearing on June 10, 2011, on FREDERJCK. VAN VOORHIS or Motion forSummary Judgment on multiple grounds, and after reviewing the various rnernoranda and thecase law ?led and cited by all parties, the argument of counsel and the evidence on record? thatcould be considered by the Court pursuant to Florida: Rule Civil Procedure 1.5 ii), the Court ?ndsas follows:This is :1 libel case.Defendant made various arguments in support of his Motion for Summing! Judgment.They include (1) P1ai13tiiT?s failure to comply with, section 770.01, Florida Ststutcs, bars his libelclaim; (2) that VAN statements did not constitute deformation, (3) that saidstatements were matters of opinion, (4) that the statements constituted rhetorical hyperbole, (5)that if Plaintiff was a public is no showing of the required actual malice necessary,and (6) that any statements made did not tortiousiy with business.In light of the Court's finding that the Plaintiff failed to fully comply with section 770.01,Florida Statutes, it is for the Court to address Dcfendanfs other argurnentsA Motion for Consideration of Suntniruy Judgment Evidence was filed after the hearingunder csrtificat-c of June 29, 2011, and set and heard on Line 15, 201 regarding a DVD withvideo and audio that had not been entered into evidence in timely manner by the date of theltcuring. Subsequently, a ?Defendant's Notice of Withdrawal of Motion ForConsideration of Summary Judgment and Request or Ruling on Motion Forwas filed under certificate ofiunc 17, 2011. Accordingly such evidencewas not considered.summarized above.Section 778.01, Florida Statutes (ltcreinafter ?Defamation Notice Law?), is entitled?Notice condition precedent to action or prosecution for libel or slender." It provides that:Before any civil action is brought for publication or broadcast, in anewspaper, periodical, or other rnediurn, of a libel or slander, theplaintiff shall, at least 5 days before instituting such action, servenotice in writing on the defendant, specifying the article orbroadcast and the statements therein which he or she alleges to befalse and defttmatory.770.01, Fla. Stat. (2003).Here, the Defendant is a blogger and the Plnintiffclaims that he was libeled by statementsposted by on the blog. The parties do not dispute that Defendant is neither anewspaper nor periodical. The issue, then, is whether or a not Defendanfs biog falls under therubric of ?other medium? as used in section 770.0l. i?|aintit?f contends that it does not. TheCourt disagrees and concludes that Defendant?s blog is ti ?medium? covered by the DcfrunationNotice Law.Plaintiff argues that section 770.01 does not apply here because the Defendant ?was underno pressure whatsoever to deliver any information at all, much less deliver it quickly." (Opp toMot. Sum, at 15). This, Plaintiff contends, weighs against application of section 770.01because ?[t]he -rationale behind notice statutes throughout the country provides that the more timea. defendant has to ascertrriu the truth of his accusations before publishing them, the lessdeserving he is ol?I1o'tice and an opportunity for retraction.? (Opp. Mot. Sururn. .1. at 15). insupport of this characterization of notice statutes ?througltout the country.? Plaintiff cites twocases-both from California. The Court finds them inepposite. The cases upon which Plaintiffrelies do not express any national purpose of libel notice statutes. Instead. they interpret only theCalifornia statute which, by its express terms, requires notice only to ?newspapers." TheCalifornia cases resist any effort atjudicial expansion of this word to other media.The Florida law at issue here is far more broad. lt applies not only to newspapers but alsoto periodicals and, of import here, to any ?other medium." The -Court, then, rejects 'P1nintili?sargument that the ?public policy behind . . . notice statutes simply does not apply to Defendantor his behavior.? (Opp. Mot. Sum. J. at 15.) The public policy ofFloride, as expressed insection 770.01, is that the entities entitled to notice of an alleged defamation make up at largeclass, not the narrow one expressed in the California statute and embraced by the Precious little case law appears available on this issue. It is clear that the ?purpose of therequirement of statutory notice to the publisher is to enable him to retract any false statements, orstaternents contended by the offending party to be false.? Cook V. Pompano Shopgr. Inc., 582 Sold 37, 39 (Fla. -4111 BCA l99l)( Quoting Adams v. Atlanta Joumal-Constitution, 84 Sold649, 553 (F la. 1956)). At least one court has held that the term ?other rnedium? as used insection 770.01, included the ioterzoet and interact forums for the required notice under that law.Alvi Armani Med, Inc. Hennessev, 629 F. Supp. I302 (SD. Fla, 2008) (citing Canonico v. 35 Med. L. Rptr. 1549 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2007) (story posted an the internalwebsite) and Holt v. Tumoa Box? 34 Med. L. Rptr. 1540, 1542 (Fla. Cir. Ct, Mar.17, 2005), af?nned 9?6 So.2d 106 (Fla. 2nd DCA 20-07) (noting thst?otl1cr rnediurn? includedthe internet.)The Court ?nds Alvi Armani persuasive and plaintiff cites no case to the contrary.The view adopted by the Court herein also comports with the applicable rule of statutoryconstruction.In State v. Citv of Jacksonville, 30 So lid 532 (Fla. 1951), the municipality ?led itspetition for validation of a ?Radio Station Revenue Certi?cate in the aggregate principal amountof $400,000 to aid in Financ_ir1.g the Cost of the Enlargement, Extension and of theMunicipal Radio Broadcasting Station.? at 534. The State objected that Jacksonville wasproposing to acquire equipment and facilities for 2: television station, not a radio station, and thatit had no legal authority to construct, operate or issue revenue certificates for such is project. Theapplicable statute provided that: ?The Clay of .JocksonVille shall have the power, and it is herebyauthorized to acquire, construct, own and operate radio broadcasting -stations and allsuch buildings and improvements as said City may deem necessary or desirable for use inconnection therewith. . . id. at 535. The State contended that this law gave Jacksonville noauthority to operate 21 television station in its radio facility because it "[made] no mention oftelevision (the word ?television? being c.ornmerciully unknown -at the time of the enactment ofthcstatutes) . . . 3? id. The Florida Supreme Court rejected this position and concluded ?that:While the general rule is that the words of EL statute shouldordinarily be taken in the sense in which they were understood atthe time the statute was enacted, the rule is subject to the well?accepted quali?cation that where the statute to be construed incouched in broad, general and comprehensive terms and isprospective in nature, it may be held to apply to new situations,cases, conditions, things, subjects, methods, persons or entitiescoming into existence since the enactment of the statute; providedthey are in the some general class as those treated in the statute, canbe reasonably said to come within the general purview, scope,purpose and policy of the statute, and there is nothing in the statuteindicating an intention that they should not he brought within itsterms.151. at 536 (citing cases).Thus, in City of Jacksonville. ?television" was not available when the applicable statutewas enacted. Because that law was very broad, however, the Florida Supreme Court interpretedthe word ?radio" to impliedly include the TV. In the case at bar, the Court follows the rule ofstatutory construction explained in Cilv of Jacksonville and concludes that the words ?otherrnediurn,? adopted in 1976, to be expansive enough to include the internet and a blog. As the title of section 770.01 makes clear, giving the notice prescribed therein is acondition precedent to an action for libel or slander. That condition has not been met here.Plaintiff contends. alternatively, that even if the Defendant is entitled to notice undersection 770.01 he has waived his right to it. Plaintiff fails to cite any case, either dealing withsection 770.01 or addressing the elements of waiver, generally, in support to his waiverargument. Further, Plaintiff does not point to any record evident-e in support of this argument.The Court, therefore, rciects Plaintiffs waiver argument as without factual or legal basis.WHEREFORB, Defendant? 5, FREDERICK VAN VOORHIS, Motion forSummary Judgment is GRANTED.DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Orange County, Florida this day of June,2011. I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true oopyfof an foregoing was electronically filed thisday nrrune, 2011 with the Clerk of its by using the ECF System, which will send aNotice of Electronic Filing to H. Killgore, Jr., and Christopher M. Home, 13sq., Post OfficeBox 1913, Orlando, FL 32802-1913; Marc J. Rnndazza, Esq., 3969 Fourth Avenue, Suite #204,San Diego, FL 92103; and Paul S. Jones, Esq., and Douglas J. Petro, Esq., 255 South OrangeAvenue, Suite 750, Orlando, FL 3280].3? ..lud.icial Assistant