On the Essentiality of Credit and Banking at the Friedman Rule

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On the Essentiality of Credit and Banking at the Friedman Rule

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Abstract

We investigate the essentiality of credit and banking in a micro-founded monetary model in which agents face heterogeneous idiosyncratic time preference shocks. Three main results arise from our analysis. First, the constrained-efficient allocation is unattainable without banks. Second, financial intermediation can improve the equilibrium allocation even at the Friedman rule because it relaxes the liquidity constraints of impatient borrowers. Third, changes in credit conditions are not necessarily neutral in a monetary equilibrium at the Friedman rule. If the debt limit is sufficiently low, money and credit are perfect substitutes and tightening the debt limit is neutral. As the debt limit increases, however, patient agents always hold money but impatient agents prefer not to since it is costly for them to do so given they are facing a positive shadow rate. Borrowing instead is costless when interest rates are zero and increasing the debt limit improves the allocation.

Keywords: Money, Credit, Banking, Heterogeneity, Friedman rule

JEL codes: E40, E50

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1 Introduction

In the theoretical monetary literature, two very robust results emerge regarding the essentiality of credit and banking. First, Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) (hereafter BCW) show that away from zero interest rates, a policy known as the Friedman rule, banks are essential and improve welfare. This effect arises because depositors can earn interest on idle money balances, which are costly to hold. This lowers the opportunity cost of holding money, which in turn increases the demand for money as well as its real value. BCW also show that relaxing the credit limits of borrowers has no effect on either the allocation or welfare—borrowers are indifferent between carrying more cash or using bank loans to finance purchases. At the Friedman rule, however, banks are inessential. This is because when nominal interest rates are set to zero agents can perfectly self-insure against consumption risk by holding money at no cost. Consequently, the equilibrium allocation is the same with or without credit.

The second result comes from Gu, Mattesini and Wright (2016) (hereafter GMW), who show that credit is not essential in a monetary equilibrium and changes in credit conditions are neutral. Changing buyers’ credit limits simply affects the demand for money and its real value such that the allocation and welfare are unchanged. This is especially true at the Friedman rule. GMW prove that this result is unlikely to be overturned for a wide variety of changes to the payment environment and the determination of terms of trade. However, they conjecture a situation in which credit would be essential away from the Friedman rule—heterogeneity in the need for money balances such that some agents use money while others rely on credit to finance purchases. Even in this case, it is difficult to imagine how credit could be essential at the Friedman rule since in that case it is costless to carry cash for all agents.

In this paper, we further investigate the essentiality of banking and credit at zero interest rates in a microfounded model of banking based on Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007). We amend the standard model by introducing idiosyncratic shocks to agents’ discount factors as in Boel and Waller (2019). Consequently, some agents will be more patient than others in terms of their opportunity costs of holding liquid assets across time. At the Friedman rule, it is costless to carry money across time for patient agents but it is still costly for impatient agents to do so.

Three main results arise from our analysis. First, the constrained-efficient allocation is unattainable when banks do not exist and credit is unavailable. This is because equilibrium deflation is bounded by the lowest discount rate since giving cash a return exceeding the lowest shadow interest
rate generates arbitrage opportunities. Thus, impatient agents are always constrained when they cannot borrow. Financial intermediation, however, can improve the allocation by allowing patient agents to deposit idle cash balances and impatient agents to borrow if needed. Indeed, if the borrowing limit is high enough—that is, if there are enough patient depositors—the constrained-efficient allocation can be achieved with credit.

Second, unlike in Gu, Mattesini and Wright (2016), changes in credit conditions may not be neutral even when interest rates are zero. When the debt limit is low, money and credit are perfect substitutes for impatient agents and tightening the debt limit is neutral. As the debt limit increases, however, impatient agents prefer not to hold money and simply borrow cash if needed. This is because money is costly for them to carry since they face a positive shadow interest rate, whereas borrowing is costless at zero interest rates. In this case, increasing the debt limit can improve the allocation.

Third, unlike the benchmark model in BCW, the gains in welfare due to banking do not come from raising the return on idle balances, since deposit rates are always zero at the Friedman rule. Welfare is instead improved from relaxing the liquidity constraints of impatient borrowers.

2 Literature Review

The coexistence of money and credit has been investigated extensively in the New Monetarist literature, but the types of credit studied vary across models. Specifically, the literature has focused on three categories of credit. First, there is real trade credit, which occurs when sellers of a good extend financing directly to the buyer in return for a payment of goods in latter periods. Second, there is financial credit, where buyers obtain a loan from a financial intermediary instead of the seller. In these models, financing is carried out in units of money—buyers borrow cash from the intermediary and repay in the same form. Finally, there is secured credit, whereby the buyer posts collateral to obtain a loan.

Gu, Mattesini and Wright (2016) is a standard example of a model with trade credit. Sellers extend financing to buyers up to a limit and credit is an IOU promising repayment of goods in the next period. Their main result is that if the borrowing limit is low enough, then money and credit are perfect substitutes and changes in the credit limit are neutral. Lowering the credit limit just increases the demand for money and in turn increases its real value, which offsets any decrease in the credit limit. Consequently, credit is not essential in any monetary equilibrium. Other models
of trade credit impose assumptions to ensure that money and credit are not perfect substitutes. Gomis-Porqueras, Peralta-Alva and Waller (2014) assume that credit transactions can be monitored and, as a result, sellers must pay income taxes. Since cash trades cannot be monitored, there is a tax arbitrage opportunity for using cash. They show that for low inflation rates, credit is inessential. However, for sufficiently high inflation rates, buyers pay with cash for small transactions but use cash and credit for large transactions. In several papers, researchers have assumed that credit is not possible in all bilateral matches. Telyukova and Wright (2008) make such an assumption to explain why people hold money and have high credit card balances. Gomis-Porqueras and Sanches (2013) assume that credit transactions are only available in some bilateral matches and they are costly. As a result, money and credit coexist and both are essential. Lotz and Zhang (2016) assume sellers have to choose ex ante whether to pay a fixed cost to access a credit system. If they do, then credit is available to buyers. They find that for a range of parameters money and credit coexist. Otherwise, either only money is used or only credit is used. Dong and Huangfu (2019), on the other hand, assume that the buyer can access a credit market by paying a fixed cost. They find similar equilibria to Lotz and Zhang. However, in the equilibrium where money and credit coexist, buyers are indifferent between using money or credit, much in the spirit of GMW. A critical point is that, in all of these models, credit is inessential at the Friedman rule.

Unlike these models of trade credit, BCW developed a model of banking whereby all contracts involve transfers of money, not goods. Agents with idle cash can deposit it in a bank and earn interest, while those needing more cash can borrow it from the bank and pay interest. As was mentioned earlier, this financial credit arrangement improves welfare by compensating agents with idle cash. This makes money less costly to carry so the demand for it increases thereby raising its real value. Chiu and Meh (2011) amend BCW by making credit costly. Bencivenga and Camera (2011) study an environment similar to BCW but banks in their model are closer to the ones in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), which offer insurance contracts and undertake investment in physical capital. Agents withdrawing from the bank must pay a real transaction cost. They show that, away from the Friedman rule, banks improve welfare. Gomis-Porqueras and Dominguez (2019) assume buyers can acquire cash loans in some trades, but not in others. However, buyers also hold government bonds which can be liquidated to help finance consumption. Again, in all of these models, credit and banks are inessential at the Friedman rule.

Finally, there is a strand in the literature that studies the coexistence of secured credit and money. Ferraris and Watanabe (2008, 2011) assume agents can pledge their physical capital to
banks to obtain cash loans to finance consumption. They then study how various monetary policies affect real allocations and the accumulation of capital. Ferraris and Mattesini (2019) use the Lagos and Wright framework to study a model where agents may randomly have two buying opportunities simultaneously—an opportunity to buy consumption goods and another to buy a valuable Lucas tree. Since agents need the money to buy goods, they cannot use it to buy the Lucas trees. However, the agent can pledge her current holdings of Lucas trees as collateral to acquire additional trees. Consequently, money and secured credit are both essential away from the Friedman rule. Yet, once again, at the Friedman rule credit is inessential—agents can carry enough money to buy the optimal amount of consumption and assets.

3 The model

The model builds on Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) and Boel and Waller (2019). Time is discrete, the horizon is infinite and there is a large population of infinitely-lived agents who consume perishable goods and discount only across periods. In each period, agents may visit two sequential rounds of trade—we refer to the first as DM and the second as CM.

Rounds of trade differ in terms of economic activities and preferences. In the DM, agents face an idiosyncratic trading risk such that they either consume or produce. An agent consumes with probability \( \alpha_b \) and produces with probability \( 1 - \alpha_b \). We refer to consumers as buyers and producers as sellers. Buyers get utility \( u(q) \) from \( q > 0 \) consumption, where \( u'(q) > 0, u''(q) < 0, u'(0) = +\infty \) and \( u'(\infty) = 0 \). Producers incur a utility cost \( y \) from supplying \( y \geq 0 \) labor to produce \( y \) goods. In the CM, everyone can consume and produce instead. As in Lagos and Wright (2005), agents have quasilinear preferences \( U(x) - n \), where the first term is utility from \( x \) consumption, and the second is disutility from \( n \) labor to produce \( n \) goods. We assume \( U'(x) > 0, U''(x) \leq 0, U'(0) = +\infty \) and \( U'(\infty) = 0 \). Also, let \( q^* \) be the solution to \( u'(q) = 1 \) and \( x^* \) be the solution to \( U'(x) = 1 \).

The economy is subject to idiosyncratic demand shocks, with respect to which agents are heterogeneous. Specifically, at the beginning of each CM, agents draw an idiosyncratic time-preference shock \( \beta_z \in \{ \beta_L, \beta_H \} \) determining their interperiod discount factor. This implies at the beginning of each period an agent can be either patient (type \( H \)) with probability \( \rho \) or impatient (type \( L \)) with probability \( 1 - \rho \). We consider the case \( 0 < \beta_L < \beta_H < 1 \) with no serial correlation in the draws. Note that time-preference shocks introduce ex-post heterogeneity across households, but the long-run distribution of time preferences is invariant.
3.1 Information frictions, money and credit

The preference structure we selected generates a single-coincidence problem in the DM since buyers do not have a good desired by sellers. Moreover, two additional frictions characterize the DM. First, agents are anonymous as in Kocherlakota (1998), since trading histories of agents in the goods markets are private information. This in turn rules out trade credit between individual buyers and sellers. Second, there is no public communication of individual trading outcomes, which in turn eliminates the use of social punishments to support gift-giving equilibria. The combination of these two frictions together with the single coincidence problem implies that sellers require immediate compensation from buyers. So, buyers must use money to acquire goods in the DM.

Agents can borrow cash from a bank to supplement their money holdings, but do so at the cost of the nominal interest rate. Following BCW, we assume banks can do so because they operate a record-keeping technology of financial histories (but not trading histories) at zero cost. Note that since record keeping can only be done for financial transactions, trade credit between buyers and sellers is not feasible. This implies money is still essential to trade in the DM even if credit is available via financial intermediaries. We also assume that all financial contracts are one-period contracts, which are optimal in this economy due to quasi-linear preferences.

Money is not essential for trade in the CM instead, and indeed agents can finance their consumption by getting credit, working or using money balances acquired earlier. To model CM credit, we assume agents are allowed to borrow and lend through selling and buying nominal bonds, subject to an exogenous credit constraint $A$. Specifically, agents lend $-p_{at}a_{t+1}$ (or borrow $p_{at}a_{t+1}$), where $p_{at}$ is the price of a bond that delivers one unit of money in $t+1$, and receive back $a_t$ (or pay back $-a_t$). We assume that any funds borrowed or lent in the CM are repaid in the following CM. One can show that, even with quasi-linearity of preferences in the CM, there are gains from multi-period contracts due to time-preference shocks.

Of course, default is a serious issue in all models with credit. However, we simplify the analysis by assuming a mechanism exists that ensures repayment of loans in the CM. In the DM, as a benchmark we first investigate the case in which banks can force repayment of loans at no cost. As an extension, we then consider the case in which banks cannot force repayment of loans and therefore borrowers have an incentive to default. The penalty for this will be permanent exclusion from the banking sector. Of course, for credit to exist, we will need to ensure voluntary repayment.
3.2 Policy tools

We assume a government exists that is in charge of monetary policy and is the only supplier of fiat money, of which an initial stock $M_0 > 0$ exists. We denote the gross growth rate of money supply by $\pi = M_t/M_{t-1}$, where $M_t$ denotes the money stock in the CM in period $t$. The central bank implements its long-term inflation goal by providing deterministic lump-sum injections of money $\tau = (\pi - 1)M_{t-1}$, which are given to private agents at the beginning of the CM. If $\pi > 1$, agents receive lump-sum transfers of money, whereas for $\pi < 1$ the central bank must be able to extract money via lump-sum taxes from the economy.

4 Constrained-efficient allocation

We start by discussing the allocation selected by a benevolent planner subject to the same physical and informational constraints faced by the agents. We will refer to this allocation as constrained-efficient. The environment’s frictions imply the planner can observe neither types nor identities in the DM and therefore has no ability to transfer resources across agents over time in that market. Furthermore, at the start of the DM, all agents are identical ex ante since the previous period $\beta$ shock is no longer relevant and the DM shocks have not been realized. Thus, if we look at welfare from this point in time, we effectively have a representative agent problem.

Therefore, the planning problem in the DM corresponds to a sequence of static maximization problems subject to the technological constraints. This implies in the DM the planner must solve:

$$\begin{align*}
\text{Max}_{q, y} & \quad \alpha_b u(q) - (1 - \alpha_b)y \\
\text{s.t.} & \quad \alpha_b q = (1 - \alpha_b)y
\end{align*}$$

In the CM, once the $\beta$ shocks are realized, the agents are heterogeneous with regards to intertemporal choices. We also do not have the informational frictions in this market that exist in the DM. Consequently, the planner can transfer resources across agents over time and therefore chooses consumption and labor sequences $\{x_{j0}, x_{j1}, ..\}$ and $\{n_{j0}, n_{j1}, ..\}$ for $j = H, L$ that maximize...
a weighted sum of individual utility functions subject to feasibility and non-negativity constraints:

\[
\text{Max } \sum_{j=H,L} \sigma_j \left[ U(x_{j0}) - n_{j0} + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta_j \beta^{t-1} (U(x_{jt}) - n_{jt}) \right]
\]

s.t. \( \rho x_{Ht} + (1 - \rho)x_{Lt} = \rho n_{Ht} + (1 - \rho)n_{Lt} \) for \( t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \) (2)

s.t. \( n_{jt} \geq 0 \) for \( j = H, L \) and \( t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots \)

where \( \sigma_H \) and \( \sigma_L \) are positive utility weights. A solution to this problem is characterized by:

\[
\begin{align*}
U'(x_{j0}) &= 1 - \mu_j^t / \sigma_j & \text{for } j = H, L \text{ and } t = 0 \quad (3) \\
U'(x_{jt}) &= 1 - \mu_j^t / \sigma_j \beta_j \beta^{t-1} & \text{for } j = H, L \text{ and } t \geq 1 \quad (4)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \mu_j^t \) denotes the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint on \( n_{jt} \). Note that the difference between equation (3) and (4) implies a different allocation when \( t = 0 \) than when \( t \geq 1 \). In short, once \( t = 1 \) is reached, the planner would prefer to reoptimize and give each agent the allocation solving (3) rather than (4) evaluated at \( t = 1 \). In short, the social planner problem is not time consistent. Consequently, satisfying (3) and (4) requires that the planner be able to commit to future promises of consumption and labor in CM exchange. If the planner cannot commit to fulfill such promises, then the only consistent solution to this problem is \( \mu_j^t = 0 \) in all periods. This implies that a discretionary planner allocation has \( U'(x_{jt}) = 1 \) and \( n_{jt} > 0 \) for \( j = H, L \) and \( t \geq 0 \)—the discretionary planner wants both types to work and consume a constant and equal amount in every period.

We adopt the allocation corresponding to the discretionary planner as our benchmark for welfare. We do so for several reasons. First, at the beginning of the DM all agents are ex ante the same. So, viewing welfare from this point in time is equivalent to having a representative agent problem. Second, there are no ex-post welfare gains from transferring labor across agents based on the \( \beta \) shocks because of quasi-linear utility—shifting labor from one agent to fulfill earlier promises is zero-sum ex post.

In sum, in the constrained-efficient allocation we focus on marginal consumption utility equals marginal production disutility in each market and in every period. Such allocation is therefore stationary and defined by \( u'(q) = 1 \) in the DM and \( U'(x) = 1 \) in the CM. The constrained-efficient consumption is therefore defined uniquely by \( q_H = q_L = q^* \) and \( x_H = x_L = x^* \), thus implying equal consumption for type \( H \) and type \( L \) agents.
5 Stationary monetary allocations

In what follows, we want to determine if the constrained-efficient allocation can be decentralized in a monetary economy with competitive markets. Thus, we focus on stationary monetary outcomes such that end-of-period balances of real money and bonds are time invariant.

We simplify notation omitting $t$ subscripts and use a prime superscript $'$ and a $-1$ subscript to denote variables corresponding to the next and previous period respectively. We let $p_1$ and $p_2$ denote the nominal price of goods in the DM and the CM respectively of an arbitrary period $t$. We also let $\beta_j$ and $\beta_z$ denote the discount factors drawn in period $t-1$ and $t$ respectively. In addition, we normalize all nominal variables by $p_2$, so that DM trades occur at the real price $p = p_1/p_2$. In this manner, the timing of events in any period $t$ can be described as follows.

An arbitrary agent of type $j = H, L$ enters the DM in period $t$ with a portfolio $\omega_j = (m_j, a_j)$ listing $m_j = m(\beta_j)$ real money holdings and $a_j = a(\beta_j)$ bonds from the preceding period after experiencing a time-preference shock $\beta_j$. Trading shocks $k = b, s$ are then realized, where $b$ and $s$ identify a buyer and a seller respectively. The banking sector then opens and the agent decides if and how much she wants to borrow $\ell^k_j = \ell(\beta_j)$ and/or deposit $d^k_j = d(\beta_j)$, where $k = b, s$ denotes the trading shock experienced in the DM. It is straightforward to show that $d^b_j = \ell^s_j = 0$. Thus, we use the notation $d^s_j = d_j$ and $\ell^b_j = \ell_j$. Finally, the banking sector closes and agents trade goods. Note that the bank closes before the onset of trading in the DM, which implies sellers cannot deposit receipts of cash earned from selling in the DM.

After the DM closes, an agent of type $j$ enters the CM with portfolio $\omega^k_j = (m^k_j, a_j)$, where $m^b_j = m^b_j(\beta_j)$ denotes money holdings carried over from the DM. If we let $q_j = q(\beta_j)$ denote consumption and $y_j = y(\beta_j)$ production in the DM, individual real money holdings for an agent $j$ evolve as follows:

$$m^b_j = m_j + \ell_j - pq_j$$
$$m^s_j = m_j - d_j + py_j \quad (5)$$

That is, buyers borrow but deplete balances by $pq_j$ while sellers deposit and increase balances by $py_j$. Idiosyncratic time-preference shocks $\beta_z$ are realized at the beginning of the CM. Left-over cash is then used to trade and settle bonds positions and $x$ and $n$ are respectively consumption bought and production sold in the CM. Note that bonds positions $a_j$ at the beginning of the CM are not affected by trading shocks in the DM, since they can only be used in the CM. Agents repay
loans plus interest \((1 + i)\ell_j\) if they were borrowers in the DM, get \((1 + i_d)d_j\) if they were depositors, and receive lump-sum transfers \(\tau\). They also adjust their money balances \(m'_z = m'(\beta_z)\) and decide whether they want to borrow or lend \(a'_z = a'(\beta_z)\), where \(m'_z\) and \(a'_z\) denote real values of money holdings and bonds at the start of tomorrow’s DM. Figure 1 displays the timeline of shocks and decisions within each period:

![Timing of events within a period](image)

Figure 1: Timing of events within a period.

Since we focus on stationary equilibria where end-of-period real money balances are time and state invariant so that \(M/p^2 = M'/p'_2\), we have that:

\[
\frac{p'_2}{p^2} = \frac{M'}{M} = \pi \tag{6}
\]

which implies the inflation rate equals the growth rate of money supply. The government budget constraint therefore is:

\[
\tau = (\pi - 1)[\rho m_H + (1 - \rho)m_L] \tag{7}
\]

### 5.1 The CM problem

Given the recursive nature of the problem, we use dynamic programming to analyze the problem of an agent \(j\) at any date, with \(j = H, L\). We let \(V(\omega_j)\) denote the expected lifetime utility for an agent entering the DM with portfolio \(\omega_j\) before trading shocks are realized. We also let \(W_z(\omega^k_j)\) denote the expected lifetime utility from entering the CM with portfolio \(\omega^k_j\) and receiving a discount factor shock \(\beta_z\) at the beginning of the CM.
The agent’s problem at the start of the CM then is:

\[
W_z(\omega^k_j) = \max_{x^k_{jz}, n^k_{jz}, m'_z} U(x^k_{jz}) - n^k_{jz} + \beta_z V(\omega'_z)
\]

s.t. \( x^k_{jz} + a_j + (1 + i)\ell_j + \pi m'_z = n^k_{jz} + m^k_j + (1 + i_d)d_j + \tau + p_a \pi a'_z \)

\[
\lambda^a_z : a'_z \leq A
\]

\[
\mu^m_z : m'_z \geq 0
\]

where \( A \geq 0 \) is the borrowing constraint for CM bonds, which is determined in equilibrium in order to ensure a positive labor effort. Also, \( i \) and \( i_d \) are the nominal interest rates paid on a bank loan and received on a bank deposit respectively. The budget constraint in the problem above expresses that resources available in the CM to an agent \( j \) depend on the realization of the DM trading shock \( k \), as well as the idiosyncratic shocks \( \beta_j \) and \( \beta_z \). Specifically, an agent has \( m^k_j \) real balances carried over from the DM and is able to borrow \( \pi a'_z \) (or lend if \( a'_z < 0 \)) at a price \( p_a \). Other resources are \( n^k_{jz} \) receipts from current sales of goods, lump-sum transfers \( \tau \) and deposits plus interest \((1 + i_d)d_j\). These resources can be used to finance current consumption \( x^k_{jz} \), to pay back loans \( a_j \) and \( (1 + i)\ell_j \) and to carry \( \pi m'_z \) real money balances into next period. The factor \( \pi = p'_2/p_2 \) multiplies \( a'_z \) and \( m'_z \), because the budget constraint is expressed in real terms and both money and bonds are nominal assets. Note that here we are focusing on a stationary equilibrium in which all agents provide a positive labor effort. Conditions for \( n^k_{jz} \geq 0 \) are in Lemma 3.

Rewriting the constraint in terms of \( n^k_{jz} \) and substituting into (8), we find that in a stationary monetary economy we must have:

\[
1 = \frac{\partial W_z(\omega^k_j)}{\partial m^k_j} = -\frac{\partial W_z(\omega^k_j)}{\partial a_j}
\]

This result depends on the quasi linearity of the CM preferences and the use of competitive pricing. It implies that the marginal valuation of real balances and bonds in the CM are identical and do not depend on the agent’s current type \( z \) or past type \( j \), wealth \( \omega^k_j \) or trade shock \( k \). Moreover:

\[
\frac{\partial W_z(\omega^k_j)}{\partial \ell_j} = -(1 + i) \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial W_z(\omega^k_j)}{\partial d_j} = 1 + i_d
\]
This allows us to disentangle the agents’ portfolio choices from their trading histories since:

$$W_z(\omega_j^k) = W_z(0) + m_j^k - a_j - (1 + i)\ell_j + (1 + i_d)d_j$$

i.e. the agent’s expected value from having a portfolio $\omega_j^k$ at the start of a CM is the expected value from having no wealth, $W_z(0)$, letting $\omega_j = (0, 0) \equiv 0$, plus the current real value of net wealth $m_j^k - a_j - (1 + i)\ell_j + (1 + i_d)d_j$. Note also that everyone consumes identically in the CM since:

$$U'(x_{jz}^k) = 1$$

which also implies $x_{jz}^k = x^*$. That is, everyone consumes $x^*$ independent of current type and past shocks, the reason being that agents in the CM can produce any amount at a constant marginal cost. Thus, goods market clearing in the CM requires:

$$x^* = \alpha_b N^b + (1 - \alpha_b)N^s$$

where $N^k = \rho^2n_{HH}^k + \rho(1 - \rho)(n_{HH}^k + n_{HL}^k) + (1 - \rho)^2n_{LL}^k$ is labor effort for all agents who experienced a trading shock $k$ in the DM. Let $\mu^m_z \geq 0$ denote the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint for money. Also, let $\lambda^a_z$ denote the multiplier on the CM borrowing constraint. The first order conditions for the optimal portfolio choice are:

$$1 = \frac{\beta_z}{\pi} \frac{\partial V(\omega'_{jz})}{\partial m_{jz}'} + \frac{\mu^m_z}{\pi}$$

$$-p_a = \frac{\beta_z}{\pi} \frac{\partial V(\omega'_{jz})}{\partial a_{jz}'} - \frac{\lambda^a_z}{\pi}$$

The left-hand sides of the expressions above define the marginal cost of the assets. The right-hand sides define the expected marginal benefit from holding the asset, either money or bonds, discounted according to time preferences and inflation. From (13) and (14) we know that money holdings $m_{jz}'$ and bonds $a_{jz}'$ are independent of trading histories and past demand shocks, but instead depend on the current type $z$ and the expected marginal benefit of holding money and bonds in the DM, which may differ across types. We will study this next.
5.2 The DM problem

An agent with a portfolio $\omega_j$ at the opening of the DM before trading shocks are realized has expected lifetime utility:

$$V(\omega_j) = \alpha b V^b(\omega_j) + (1 - \alpha b)V^s(\omega_j)$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (15)

First, we determine $y_j$. The seller’s problem depends on the current disutility of production and the expected continuation value. Specifically, the seller’s problem can be written as:

$$V^s(\omega_j) = \max_{y_j,d_j} - y_j + \rho W_H(\omega_j^s) + (1 - \rho)W_L(\omega_j^s)$$

s.t. $d_j \leq m_j$  \hspace{0.5cm} (16)

where the constraint means that deposits must be financed by money holdings. The first order conditions, together with (5) and (9), give:

$$p = 1$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (17)

$$i_d = \lambda^s_j$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (18)

where $\lambda^s_j$ is the multiplier on the deposit constraint and (17) implies production is not type dependent, i.e. $y_j = y$ for $j = H, L$. Moreover, if $i_d > 0$, then it must be that $\lambda^s_j > 0$ and therefore a seller of type $j$ will deposit all her money holdings, so that $d_j = m_j$.

Now, we determine $q_j$. A buyer’s problem is:

$$V^b(\omega_j) = \max_{q_j,\ell_j} u(q_j + \rho W_H(\omega_j^b) + (1 - \rho)W_L(\omega_j^b)$$

s.t. $pq_j \leq m_j + \ell_j$ and $\ell_j \leq \bar{\ell}$  \hspace{0.5cm} (19)

The first constraint means consumption can be financed by money holdings and bank loans. The second constraint exists because borrowers are subject to a technological constraint $\bar{\ell}$, that depends on the funds available to the bank. Using (5), (9) and (17), the first order condition with respect to $q_j$ implies:

$$u'(q_j) = 1 + \lambda^b_j$$  \hspace{0.5cm} (20)

where $\lambda^b_j$ is the Lagrange multiplier on the buyer’s budget constraint. From (17) and (20) we know that if the buyer is constrained and $\lambda^b_j > 0$, then $u'(q_j) > 1$ and $q_j < q^*$. If instead the buyer is
unconstrained and therefore $\lambda^b_j = 0$, then $u'(q_j) = 1$ and $q_j = q^*$. The first order condition with respect to $\ell_j$ instead implies:

$$i = \lambda^b_j - \lambda^\ell_j$$

where $\lambda^\ell_j$ is the Lagrange multiplier on the buyer’s borrowing constraint. If $i > 0$, it must be that $\lambda^b_j > 0$ and therefore a buyer will be constrained in the DM and $q_j < q^*$. If instead $i = 0$, two cases are possible: (i) $\lambda^b_j = \lambda^\ell_j = 0$ so that the borrowing constraint does not bind, buyers are unconstrained and $q_j = q^*$; (ii) $\lambda^b_j = \lambda^\ell_j > 0$ so that the borrowing constraint binds, buyers are constrained and $q_j < q^*$.

Goods market clearing requires:

$$(1 - \alpha_b)y = \alpha_b[\rho qH + (1 - \rho)qL]$$

The bond market clearing condition instead is such that:

$$\rho a_H + (1 - \rho)a_L = 0$$

### 5.3 Bank’s problem

Banks accept nominal deposits $D$ on which they pay the nominal interest rate $i_d$, and make nominal loans $L$ at the nominal interest rate $i$. The banking sector is perfectly competitive with free entry, so banks take these rates as given. There is no strategic interaction among banks or between banks and agents and there is no bargaining over the terms of the loan contract. We also assume repayment of bank loans can be enforced at no cost, there are no reserve requirements and banks face no operational costs. There is however a feasibility constraint limiting the amount of loans to be no more than the amount of deposits taken in, so that $L \leq D$. Banks cannot recognize agents’ types and therefore will charge the same interest rate $i$ and impose the same borrowing limit to all agents. The representative bank therefore solves the following problem in every period:

$$\begin{cases} 
\text{Max} & L, D \quad iL - i_dD \\
\text{subject to} & L \leq D 
\end{cases}$$

subject to the balance-sheet constraint:

$$L \leq D$$
where $D = (1 - \alpha_b)[\rho d_H + (1 - \rho)d_L]$ is total deposits and $L = \alpha_b[\rho \ell_H + (1 - \rho)\ell_L]$ is total loans. Market clearing in the banking sector implies:

$$(1 - \alpha_b)[\rho d_H + (1 - \rho)d_L] = \alpha_b[\rho \ell_H + (1 - \rho)\ell_L]$$

(25)

With free entry the bank makes zero profits, and from (25) we have that:

$$i = i_d$$

(26)

5.4 Marginal value of money

To find optimal savings for an agent $j$ use (8), (15), (16), (17) and (19) to obtain:

$$V(\omega_j) = m_j - a_j + \alpha_b[u(q_j) - q_j] + i_d(1 - \alpha_b)d_j - i\alpha_b\ell_j + \rho W_H(0) + (1 - \rho)W_L(0)$$

(27)

s.t. $a'_z \leq A$, $m'_z \geq 0$, $q_j \leq m_j + \ell_j$, $\ell_j \leq \bar{\ell}$, $d_j \leq m_j$

The expected lifetime utility $V(\omega_j)$ therefore depends on the agent’s net wealth $m_j - a_j$ and three other elements. First, there is the expected surplus from trade in the DM—with probability $\alpha_b$ the agent spends $q_j$ on consumption deriving utility $u(q_j)$. Second, there is the expected intermediation rent $i_d(1 - \alpha_b)d_j - i\alpha_b\ell_j$. Third, there is the expected continuation payoff $\rho W_H(0) + (1 - \rho)W_L(0)$. Therefore, the marginal value of money satisfies:

$$\frac{\partial V(\omega_j)}{\partial m_j} = \alpha_b u'(q_j) + (1 - \alpha_b)(1 + i_d)$$

(28)

If the agent is a buyer, she receives the marginal benefit $u'(q_j)$ from using money to finance consumption. If instead she is a seller, she receives $(1 + i_d)$ from depositing money in the bank. The marginal value of bonds instead satisfies:

$$\frac{\partial V(\omega_j)}{\partial a_j} = -1$$

(29)

Note that (28) and (29) imply money is valued dissimilarly by agents, whereas bonds are valued identically in the economy. Combining (13) with (28) and (14) with (29) one gets that in equilibrium the following Euler equations must hold:
\[
\frac{\pi - \beta_j}{\beta_j} = \alpha_\theta [u'(q_j) - 1] + (1 - \alpha_\theta)i_d + \frac{\mu_j^n}{\beta_j}
\]  
\( (30) \)
and
\[
\pi p_a = \beta_j + \lambda_j^g
\]  
\( (31) \)

We now want to investigate whether a CM to CM bond would indeed circulate in this economy. As in Boel and Waller (2019), we find that the following result holds:

**Lemma 1** A stationary monetary equilibrium exists with impatient agents borrowing and patient agents lending at a price \( p_a = \beta_H/\pi \). Specifically, \( a_L = A \) and \( a_H = -(1 - \rho)A/\rho \).

Once we know the price at which these bonds circulate in equilibrium, we can pin down their net nominal yield, which is:

\[
i_a = \frac{1}{p_a} - 1 \Rightarrow i_a = \frac{\pi}{\beta_H} - 1
\]  
\( (32) \)

Note that there are two nominal interest rates in our model. The first one is \( i_a \), which is the rate on an illiquid asset and is affected directly by long-term monetary policy through \( \pi \). The second nominal interest rate in the model is the bank’s rate \( i = i_d \). Combining (20), (21), (26) and (32) we have that (30) for \( j = H, L \) can be written as:

\[
\frac{\pi - \beta_j}{\beta_j} = i + \alpha_\ell \lambda_j^\ell + \frac{\mu_j^m}{\beta_j}
\]  
\( (33) \)

\[
i_a = i + \alpha_\ell \lambda_H^\ell + \frac{\mu_H^m}{\beta_H}
\]  
\( (34) \)

The expression in (34) illustrates a no-arbitrage condition between illiquid bonds and money. When an agent holds an additional unit of money, she gives up the interest rate \( i_a \) but earns the rate \( i \). Note also that, given (33) and (34), long-term monetary policy also controls the bank rate \( i \) via changes in the growth rate of money supply \( \pi \). The following result holds:

**Lemma 2** Any stationary monetary equilibrium must be such that \( \pi \geq \beta_H \), i.e. \( i_a \geq 0 \).

This result derives from a simple no-arbitrage condition—in a monetary equilibrium, the value of money cannot grow too fast with \( \pi < \beta_H \) or else type \( H \) agents will not spend it.\(^1\) This, together

\(^1\)Other models with heterogeneous time preferences have analogous results, in that the rate of return on the asset cannot exceed the lowest rate of time preference. See for example Becker (1980) and Boel and Camera (2006). In those models, however, types are fixed.
with (32), implies that to run the Friedman rule the monetary authority must let \( \pi \to^+ \beta_H \) and cannot target \( \beta_L \) instead.

We must also ensure that the labor effort in the CM is non negative and this is guaranteed by the condition in Lemma 3. The intuition is that agents work if the debt limit is tight enough, and how tight depends on the difference between \( x^* \) and \( q^* \).

**Lemma 3** If \( i_a = 0 \), \( A \leq [x^*-(1+\rho\beta_H)q^*]/[\beta_H+(1-\rho)/\rho] \) guarantees that \( n_{jz}^k \geq 0 \) in a stationary monetary equilibrium.

## 6 Equilibrium with exogenous debt limit

In this section, as a benchmark, we assume that banks can force repayment of loans at no cost. We want to study the coexistence of money and credit at the Friedman rule, so we will focus on the case \( \pi \to^+ \beta_H \). Throughout, we will be making the limit argument that agents still want to deposit if interest rates are approaching zero. We can then state the following:

**Definition 1** A symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium consists of \( m_j \) and \( a_j \) satisfying (30) and (31) for \( j = H, L \).

The reason is that once the equilibrium stocks of money and bonds are determined, all other endogenous variables can be derived. The following result also holds:

**Proposition 1** When \( i_a = 0 \), then \( m_H > 0 \) and \( q_H = q^* \). Three possible cases exist for type \( L \) agents: (i) \( m_L > 0 \) and \( q_L < q^* \) if \( \bar{\ell} \leq \tilde{q} \), where \( \tilde{q} \) solves (30) for \( j = L \) with \( \mu_L^m = 0 \); (ii) \( m_L = 0 \) and \( q_L < q^* \) if \( \tilde{q} < \bar{\ell} < q^* \); (iii) \( m_L = 0 \) and \( q_L = q^* \) if \( \bar{\ell} \geq q^* \).

Proposition 1 has several implications. First, patient agents always bring money when \( i_a = 0 \). The intuition is that money is costless to carry across periods for them in this case and they bring enough to afford the efficient allocation in the DM. Money is costly for impatient agents instead since \( \pi > \beta_L \) at \( i_a = 0 \) and therefore the shadow interest rate is positive for them. This implies they will bring money only if they are sufficiently constrained, that is if the borrowing limit is sufficiently tight at \( \bar{\ell} \leq \tilde{q} \). In this case, money and credit are perfect substitutes and agents \( L \) always consume \( \tilde{q} \). Thus, tightening the debt limit is neutral, much like in Gu, Mattesini and Wright (2016). As the borrowing limit starts increasing and \( \bar{\ell} > \tilde{q} \), agents \( L \) prefer not to carry money since borrowing is costless when \( i = 0 \). In this case, increasing the debt limit improves the allocation. Indeed,
when \( \bar{\ell} > \bar{q} \), the banking sector can fix the problems highlighted in Lemma 2 if there are enough depositors, and both patient and impatient agents are able to achieve the efficient allocation. Note that the debt limit here is a technical constraint and depends on total deposits. Thus, if there are enough depositors, impatient agents can afford the efficient allocation. Figure 2 illustrates.

![Figure 2: Consumption of type L agents as a function of the debt limit.](image)

**Notes for Figure 2:** The horizontal axis reports the exogenous debt limit. The vertical axis reports consumption of type L agents. For \( \bar{\ell} \leq \bar{q} \), agents L always consume \( \bar{q} \) and are indifferent between money and credit. For \( \bar{\ell} > \bar{q} \), agents L do not bring money. They are constrained if \( \bar{\ell} < q^* \), and are unconstrained otherwise. The figure is drawn with the utility function \( u(q) = ((q + b)^{1-\delta} - b^{1-\delta})/(1 - \delta) \), discount factors \( \beta_H = 0.98 \) and \( \beta_L = 0.95 \), measure of buyers \( \alpha_b = 0.2 \), measure of type H agents \( \rho = 0.3 \), \( \delta = 0.99999 \) and \( b = 0.00001 \).

We know from Proposition 1 that consumption for type L agents with financial intermediation is higher if \( \bar{\ell} > \bar{q} \) than with a tighter debt limit. This implies that financial intermediation can improve the allocation even at the Friedman rule when agents have different time preferences. This is unlike BCW, where financial intermediation was welfare improving only for positive rates. Figure 3 illustrates.
Figure 3: Difference in welfare for type L agents with and without financial intermediation.

**Notes for Figure 3:** The horizontal axis reports the exogenous debt limit. The vertical axis reports the measure DW, which is the difference in ex-ante welfare levels with and without banks. The difference is equal to zero for a debt limit lower than or equal to $\tilde{q}$. The figure is drawn with the utility function $u(q) = ((q + b)^{1-\delta} - b^{1-\delta})/(1 - \delta)$, discount factors $\beta_H = 0.98$ and $\beta_L = 0.95$, measure of buyers $\alpha_b = 0.2$, measure of type $H$ agents $\rho = 0.3$, $\delta = 0.99999$ and $b = 0.00001$.

But why does banking improve the allocation at the Friedman rule? Unlike BCW, this cannot be because banking allows payment of interest to depositors, since at the Friedman rule deposit rates are zero. So, banking improves the allocation here because it relaxes borrowers liquidity constraints and the following result must hold:

**Corollary 1** Let $i_a = 0$. For $\bar{\ell} > \tilde{q}$, the gain in welfare from financial intermediation is due to the fact that it relaxes borrowers’ liquidity constraints and not from the payment of interest to depositors.

### 7 Endogenous debt limit

We now focus on an equilibrium where banks cannot force repayment of loans, thus implying borrowers might have an incentive to default. We assume agents make their default decisions after time-preference shocks are realized. Note we focus solely on the choice of agents who were buyers in the DM because they are the only ones with loans to repay and thus having a possible incentive to renege on their debts. The short-term benefit from defaulting is additional leisure, as the agent will not have to work to repay her loan. The long-term cost is exclusion from the banking system in the following periods. The representative bank in this case solves the following per-borrower
problem:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Max} \quad & i\ell - i_d D \\
\text{s.t.} \quad & \lambda^B_L : \ell \leq \bar{\ell} \\
& \lambda^\Gamma_j : u(q_L) - (1 + i)\ell \geq \Gamma
\end{align*}
\]

for \( j = H, L \), where \( D = (1 - \alpha_b)\rho d_H + (1 - \rho)d_L \) is total deposits, \( \ell \) is loans from type \( L \) agents and \( \Gamma \) is the reservation value of a borrower of type \( L \), i.e. the borrower’s surplus from receiving a loan at another bank. With free entry the bank makes zero profits and therefore \( i = i_d \). The first order condition for the bank’s problem then becomes:

\[
-\lambda^B_L + \lambda^\Gamma_L \left[ u'(q_L) \frac{dq_L}{d\ell} - (1 + i) \right] = 0
\]

where \( \lambda^B_L \) and \( \lambda^\Gamma_L \) are the Lagrange multipliers on the bank’s borrowing constraint and on the participation constraint respectively. From (17) and rearranging, we get:

\[
u'(q_L) = 1 + i + \lambda^B_L / \lambda^\Gamma_L\]

Note that banks will always choose a loan size such that \( \lambda^\Gamma_L > 0 \). Then, if \( \lambda^B_L > 0 \), the constraint on the loan size is binding. This implies \( u'(q_L) > 1 \) and therefore \( q_L < q^* \) from (20).

In order for a monetary equilibrium with banking to exist, we must ensure voluntary repayment, i.e. agents prefer not to default, thus implying \( W_z(\omega^b_j) \geq \hat{W}_z(\omega^b_j) \), where the hat indicates the optimal choice by a deviator. The endogenous borrowing constraint therefore must satisfy:

\[
W_z(\omega^b_j) = \hat{W}_z(\omega^b_j)
\]

where \( W_z(\omega^b_j) \) and \( \hat{W}_z(\omega^b_j) \) denote the expected discounted utility for buyers entering the CM and repaying their loans or defaulting on their loans respectively, so that:

\[
W_z(\omega^b_j) = U(x^*) - n^b_{jz} + \beta_z V(\omega'_z)
\]

and

\[
\hat{W}_z(\omega^b_j) = U(\hat{x}^b_{jz}) - \hat{n}^b_{jz} + \beta_z \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}'_z)
\]

We can now state the following:
Definition 2. A symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium consists of a $m_j$ and $a_j$ satisfying (30), (31) and (37).

In this economy, the growth rate of money supply $\pi$ affects not only the marginal value of money, but also the value of either staying in the banking system $W_z(\omega^b_j)$ or of defaulting $\tilde{W}_z(\omega^b_j)$. This imposes constraints on the inflation rate $\pi$ the monetary authority can impose in a monetary equilibrium while still having a functioning banking system. We will investigate such constraints next, and in particular we want to understand if money and banking can coexist at the Friedman rule with an endogenous borrowing constraint. We find the following result holds:

Proposition 2. Let $i_a = 0$. With an endogenous debt limit $\bar{\ell}$, a monetary equilibrium with $m_H > m_L = 0$ and banking exists if $[u(\bar{\ell}) - \bar{\ell}] - [u(\tilde{q}) - \tilde{q}] > \rho \tilde{q}/\alpha_b$.

The intuition for Proposition 2 is that an equilibrium with credit and banking exists at the Friedman rule if the difference in DM surplus between an economy with and without default is big enough. The likelihood that such equilibrium exists depends on the probabilities of being a patient agent $\rho$ and of being a buyer $\alpha_b$, the discount factors for both patient and impatient agents and the DM preferences. Example 1 and Figure 4 illustrate.

Example 1: endogenous debt limit. In order to derive intuition for the results in Proposition 2, we consider an example with the following functional forms and parameter values:

$$u(q) = \frac{(q + b)^{1-\delta} - b^{1-\delta}}{1 - \delta}, \quad \beta_H = 0.99, \quad \beta_L = 0.4, \quad \alpha_b = 0.95, \quad \rho = 0.1, \quad \delta = 0.99999, \quad b = 0.00001.$$ 

According to Proposition 2, such equilibrium exists if $[u(\bar{\ell}) - \bar{\ell}] - [u(\tilde{q}) - \tilde{q}] > \rho \tilde{q}/\alpha_b$, that is if $[u(\bar{\ell}) - \bar{\ell}] > u(\tilde{q}) - \tilde{q}(\alpha_b - \rho)/\alpha_b$. Figure 4 shows that the equilibrium exists for intermediate values of the debt limit. If the debt limit is sufficiently low, then agents are better off defaulting on the debt since anyhow the debt limit is neutral in that case and agents can afford $\tilde{q}$ regardless of how it is financed. If the debt limit is sufficiently high, then agents $L$ are better off borrowing once and then defaulting on the debt.
Figure 4: Monetary equilibrium with banking and endogenous debt limit.

Notes for Figure 4: The horizontal axis reports the endogenous debt limit. The vertical axis reports the DM surplus. The graph shows the debt limit values for which a monetary equilibrium with banking exists with an endogenous debt limit. According to Proposition 2, such equilibrium exists if 
\[ u(\ell) - \ell > u(\tilde{q}) - \tilde{q}(\alpha_b - \rho)/\alpha_b. \]

The figure is drawn with the utility function 
\[ u(q) = ((q + b)^{1-\delta} - b^{1-\delta})/(1 - \delta), \]

discount factors \( \beta_H = 0.99 \) and \( \beta_L = 0.4 \), measure of buyers \( \alpha_b = 0.95 \), measure of type \( H \) agents \( \rho = 0.1 \), \( \delta = 0.99999 \) and \( b = 0.00001 \).

Note that the following result also holds with endogenous debt.

Corollary 2 Let \( i_a = 0 \). With an endogenous debt limit, no monetary equilibrium with \( m_H > 0 \), \( m_L > 0 \) and banking exists.

That is, in a banking equilibrium with an endogenous debt limit impatient agents never bring money. Why? We know from Proposition 1 that agents of type \( L \) bring money only for \( \bar{\ell} \leq \tilde{q} \). In that case, however, the debt limit is neutral and agents are indifferent between money and credit. Thus, consumption of impatient agents is the same with and without debt and that is why they have an incentive to default.

8 Extensions

We now consider robustness, focusing on an exogenous debt limit.

8.1 Other forms of heterogeneity

We now investigate whether the coexistence of money and credit at the Friedman rule outlined in Proposition 1 is a common result when agents are heterogeneous in some dimension or if instead it hinges specifically on agents have different time preferences. Assume for example that agents
receive preference shocks in the DM in the form of marginal utility shocks instead of discount factor ones in the CM. That is, in each period in the DM agents have preferences $\epsilon_j u(q_j)$ for $j = H, L$ with $\epsilon_H > \epsilon_L$ and type $H$ and type $L$ agents in proportions $\rho$ and $1 - \rho$ respectively. In this case, (33) becomes:

$$\frac{\pi - \beta}{\beta} = \alpha_b \lambda^l_j + \frac{\mu_j^m}{\beta}$$

and the Euler equation for money (34) becomes:

$$\frac{\pi - \beta}{\beta} = \alpha_b [\epsilon_j u'(q_j) - 1] + (1 - \alpha_b) i + \frac{\mu_j^m}{\beta}$$

At the Friedman rule in this case $\pi \rightarrow^+ \beta$, which implies that $i = 0$ and $\mu_j^m = 0$ from (40) for $j = H, L$. Thus, both $H$ and $L$ agents bring money at zero interest rates. Moreover, from (42) we know that $\epsilon_j u'(q_j) = 1$ when interest rates are zero, so that both $H$ and $L$ agents are unconstrained and can afford the efficient quantity $q^*$ at the Friedman rule. How does this allocation differ from one without financial intermediation? In that case, (30) becomes

$$\frac{\pi - \beta}{\beta} = \alpha_b [\epsilon_j u'(\hat{q}_j) - 1]$$

The key result is that in this case financial intermediation does not improve the allocation at the Friedman rule. At zero interest rates, agents can perfectly self-insure against consumption risk only with money because the shadow rate is zero for both $H$ and $L$. This result goes through for other types of heterogeneity as well, as long as agents have the same discount factor.\(^2\)

### 8.2 Shocks

Now assume agents face idiosyncratic time-preference shocks, but the economy is subject also to aggregate demand shocks. These are modeled as a positive marginal utility shock $\epsilon_v$ to consumption, with $v = 1, 2$ and $\epsilon_1 > \epsilon_2$. We assume shocks are realized with equal probability at the beginning of each period. The Euler equation for money (34) becomes:

$$\frac{\pi - \beta}{\beta} = \alpha_b [\epsilon_v u'(q_{jv}) - 1] + (1 - \alpha_b) i + \frac{\mu_j^m}{\beta}$$

\(^2\)Note also that in this case there is no CM borrowing and lending since agents have the same discount factor. In this case, $i_a = (\pi - \beta)/\beta$ should be interpreted as the interest rate on an illiquid bond that does not circulate but can still be priced.
At the Friedman rule, $\pi \to^+ \beta_H$, which implies that $i = 0$ and $\mu^n_{H\nu} = 0$ from (43). Thus, $H$ agents bring money and can afford the efficient allocation. For type $L$ agents, (43) becomes:

$$\frac{\pi - \beta_L}{\beta_L} = \alpha_b[\varepsilon_n u'(q_{Lv}) - 1] + \frac{\mu^m_{Lv}}{\beta_L}$$

(44)

If $\pi \to^+ \beta_H$, three cases are possible for type $L$ agents: (i) $\varepsilon_n u'(q_{Lv}) > 1$ and $\mu^m_{Lv} = 0$, so that agents $L$ bring money but are constrained; (ii) $\varepsilon_n u'(q_{Lv}) > 1$ and $\mu^m_{Lv} > 0$, so that agents $L$ do not bring money but are still constrained; (iii) $\varepsilon_n u'(q_{Lv}) = 1$ and $\mu^m_{Lv} > 0$, so that agents $L$ do not bring money and are unconstrained. That is, the results in Proposition 1 still hold in this case and financial intermediation can improve the allocation also with aggregate demand shocks, for a sufficiently high debt limit. As shown by Figure 5, how high the debt limit should be for banking to become welfare improving depends on the magnitude of the aggregate shock $\varepsilon_v$.

![Figure 5: Consumption of type $L$ agents with aggregate demand shocks.](image)

**Notes for Figure 5:** The horizontal axis reports the exogenous debt limit. The vertical axis reports consumption of type $L$ agents. The figure displays consumption of type $L$ agents when the economy experiences aggregate demand shocks $\varepsilon_v$ with $v = 1, 2$ and $\varepsilon_1 > \varepsilon_2$. The solid line is $q_L$ when the economy experiences the aggregate demand shock $\varepsilon_1$, whereas the dashed line is $q_L$ when the economy experiences $\varepsilon_2$. The figure is drawn with the utility function $u(q) = ((q + b)^{1-\delta} - b^{1-\delta})/(1 - \delta)$, aggregate demand shocks $\varepsilon_1 = 1$ and $\varepsilon_2 = 0.6$, discount factors $\beta_L = 0.95$ and $\beta_H = 0.98$, measure of buyers $\alpha_b = 0.2$, measure of type $H$ agents $\rho = 0.3$, $\delta = 0.99999$ and $b = 0.00001$.

9 Conclusion

We investigate the essentiality of banking and credit at zero interest rates in a microfounded monetary model in which agents face heterogeneous idiosyncratic time preference shocks. Three main results arise. First, the constrained-efficient allocation is unattainable without banks because equilibrium deflation is bounded by the lowest discount rate since giving cash a return exceeding the
lowest shadow interest rate generates arbitrage opportunities. Thus, impatient agents are always constrained when they cannot borrow. Second, financial intermediation can improve the allocation at the Friedman rule because it relaxes the liquidity constraints of impatient borrowers. Thus, unlike the benchmark model in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007), the gains in welfare due to banking do not come from payment of interest on deposits, since those have to be zero at the Friedman rule. Third, unlike in Gu, Mattesini and Wright (2016) changes in credit conditions are not neutral even at the Friedman rule in a monetary equilibrium. When the debt limit is low, money and credit are perfect substitutes and tightening the debt limit is neutral. As the debt limit increases, however, patient agents keep holding money but impatient ones prefer not to. Why? Money is costly for them since they face a positive shadow interest rate, whereas borrowing is costless at zero interest rates. In that case, increasing the debt limit improves the allocation.
References


Appendix 1: Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1  From the Euler equation in (31) we have that the following must hold:

\[ \beta_L + \lambda^a_L = \beta_H + \lambda^a_H \]

Since \( \beta_H > \beta_L \), it must be that \( \lambda^a_L > \lambda^a_H \geq 0 \). If \( \lambda^a_L > \lambda^a_H > 0 \), then there is no borrowing or lending. If instead \( \lambda^a_L > \lambda^a_H = 0 \), then \( a_L = A \) and given the bonds market clearing condition (23) we have that \( a_H = -A(1 - \rho)/\rho \). Since \( \pi p_a = \beta_H \) from (31), then \( p_a = \beta_H/\pi \).

Proof of Lemma 2  Consider the first order conditions in the DM for an agent who experienced a shock \( k = s \) in the DM. Since \( \lambda^s_j \geq 0 \), then from (18) it must be that \( i_d \geq 0 \). Since the banking sector is competitive, \( i = i_d \) and therefore \( i \geq 0 \). Suppose \( \pi < \beta_H \). Then \( (\pi - \beta_H)/\beta_H < 0 \), which from (30) is incompatible with a monetary equilibrium for type H agents if \( i \geq 0 \). Thus, it must be that \( \pi \geq \beta_H \).

Proof of Lemma 3  We now want to provide conditions that guarantee \( n^k_{jz} \geq 0 \) when \( i_a = 0 \). Note that if \( n^s_{HL} \geq 0 \), then \( n^k_{jz} \geq 0 \) in all other cases. We know that \( x^k_{jz} = x^* \) for all \( j, z \). This, together with the budget constraint in (8), implies:

\[ n^s_{HL} = x^* - m^s_H + \pi m_L - \pi p_a a_L + a_H - \tau - (1 + i)d_H \]

From (5), Lemma 1 and (7) the expression above becomes:

\[ n^s_{HL} = x^* - m_H - py + d_H + \beta_H m_L - A[\beta_H + (1 - \rho)/\rho] - \tau - (1 + i)d_H \]

We know that in equilibrium \( p = 1 \) and \( y = \rho m_H + (1 - \rho)m_L \). Moreover, when \( i = 0 \) we have that \( \tau = (\beta_H - 1)(\rho m_H + (1 - \rho)m_L) \) and \( m_H = q^* \). So, rearranging we get:

\[ n^s_{HL} = x^* - A[\beta_H + (1 - \rho)/\rho] - q^*(1 + \rho \beta_H) + \rho \beta_H m_L > x^* - A[\beta_H + (1 - \rho)/\rho] - (1 + \rho \beta_H)q^* \]

Therefore, \( n^s_{HL} \geq 0 \) if the following condition is satisfied:

\[ A \leq \frac{x^* - (1 + \rho \beta_H)q^*}{\beta_H + (1 - \rho)/\rho} \] (45)
which implies that if the borrowing constraint is tight enough, then an incentive to work is generated in the CM. 

**Proof of Proposition 1**

Let \( \pi = \beta_H \) and therefore \( i_a = 0 \). Consider a type \( H \). In order for condition (34) to be satisfied for \( j = H \), it must be that \( i = 0 \), \( \mu^m_H = 0 \) and \( \lambda^i_H = 0 \) and therefore \( m_H > 0 \) and \( q_H = q^* \) from (20) and (21).

Consider now a type \( L \). We know from (34) that if \( \pi = \beta_H \) then \( i = 0 \). If \( \pi = \beta_H \), then \( (\pi - \beta_L)/\beta_L > 0 \). Therefore, from (30) we know that in order for (33) to hold for \( j = L \) at \( \pi = \beta_H \) one of the following three cases has to be true: (i) \( \lambda^i_L > 0 \) and \( \mu^m_L = 0 \); (ii) \( \lambda^i_L > 0 \) and \( \mu^m_L > 0 \); (iii) \( \lambda^i_L = 0 \) and \( \mu^m_L > 0 \). In case (i), \( m_L > 0 \) and \( q_L = \tilde{q} < q^* \) where \( \tilde{q} \) solves (33) for \( j = L \) with \( \mu^m_L = 0 \). In case (ii), \( m_L = 0 \) and \( q_L < q^* \). In case (iii), \( m_L = 0 \) and \( q_L = q^* \). For cases (ii) and (iii), if \( m_L = 0 \) then we know from the DM buyer’s problem that \( \alpha_b(1 - \rho)q^*_L = \rho(1 - \alpha_b)m_H \) since the only agents borrowing are type \( L \) agents, and type \( H \) sellers and idle agents are the only depositors with \( m_H > 0 \). Hence, \( q_L < q^* \) if \( (1 - \alpha_b)\rho/\alpha_b(1 - \rho) < 1 \), which implies \( \rho < \alpha_b \), and \( q_L = q^* \) otherwise.

**Proof of Corollary 1**

The proof follows directly from Proposition 1 and the fact that deposit rates are zero when \( i_a = 0 \).

**Proof of Proposition 2**

We first focus on the case \( j = L \) and \( z = H \), that is the case of an agent who is a borrower in this period and won’t need to borrow in the next one. We will then examine the case \( j = H \) and \( z = H \). The real borrowing constraint \( \tilde{\ell} \) must satisfy (37), and combining this with (38) and (39) we have:

\[
U(x^*) - n^b_{LH} + \beta_H V(\omega^H) = U(\hat{x}^b_{LH}) - \hat{n}^b_{LH} + \beta_H \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}^H_H) \tag{46}
\]

If the buyer repays her loans then she will have to work:

\[
n^b_{LH} = x^* + \pi^m_H - (m^L_H + \tau) + (1 + i)\tilde{\ell} + a_L - p_a\pi^a_H \\
= x^* + \pi^m_H - (m_L - q_L + \tilde{\ell} + \tau) + (1 + i)\tilde{\ell} + a_L - \beta_H a^H_H \\
= x^* + \pi^m_H - (m_L + \tau) + q_L + i\tilde{\ell} + a_L - \beta_H a^H_H
\]

Since \( \tau = (\pi - 1)\bar{m} \) where \( \bar{m} = \rho m_H + (1 - \rho)m_L \), then the expression above becomes:

\[
n^b_{LH} = x^* + \pi^m_H - m_L - (\pi - 1)\bar{m} + q_L + i\tilde{\ell} + a_L - \beta_H a^H_H \tag{47}
\]
If an agent instead decides to default on her loans, then she will have to work:

\[
\hat{n}_{LH}^b = \hat{x}_{LH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - (m_L^b + \tau) + a_L - p_a \pi \hat{a}_{H}^l
\]

\[
= \hat{x}_{LH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - (m_L - q_L + \ell + \tau) + a_L - p_a \pi \hat{a}_{H}^l
\]

\[
= \hat{x}_{LH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - (m_L + \tau) + q_L - \ell + a_L - p_a \pi \hat{a}_{H}^l
\]

and therefore

\[
\hat{n}_{LH}^b = \hat{x}_{LH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - m_L - (\pi - 1)\hat{m} + q_L - \ell + a_L - p_a \pi \hat{a}_{H}^l
\]

The defaulting problem in the CM for a buyer in the DM, therefore, is:

\[
\hat{W}_H(\omega_H^b) = \max_{\hat{x}_{LH}^b, \omega_H^l, \hat{n}_{LH}^b} U(\hat{\omega}_H) + \beta_H \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H)
\]

s.t. \(\hat{n}_{LH}^b = \hat{x}_{LH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - m_L - (\pi - 1)\hat{m} + q_L - \ell + a_L - \beta_H \hat{a}_{H}^l\)

The first order conditions for the problem above are \(\beta_H \partial \hat{V} / \partial \hat{m}_{H}^l + \hat{m}_{H}^l = \pi, \beta_H \partial \hat{V} / \partial \hat{a}_{H}^l - \hat{a}_{H}^l = -p_a \pi \)

and \(U'(\hat{x}_{LH}^b) = 1\) so that \(\hat{x}_{LH}^b = x^*\). This implies:

\[
\hat{n}_{LH}^b = x^* + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - m_L - (\pi - 1)\hat{m} + q_L - \ell + a_L - \beta_H \hat{a}_{H}^l \tag{48}
\]

Since \(a_H^l = \hat{a}_{H}^l\), combining (46), (47) and (48) we have that the following condition must hold:

\[
(1 + i)\ell = \pi (\hat{m}_{H}^l - m_H^l) + \beta_H [V(\omega_H) - \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H)] \tag{49}
\]

Since in a stationary equilibrium \(\hat{m}_{H}^l = m_{H}, m_H^l = m_H, \hat{\omega}_H = \omega_H\) and \(\omega_H = \omega_H\), the condition above becomes:

\[
(1 + i)\ell = \pi (\hat{m}_{H} - m_H) + \beta_H [V(\omega_H) - \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H)] \tag{50}
\]

Note that if the deviator is a seller in the DM, then his production choice has to satisfy \(c'(\hat{y}) = 1\). Thus off the equilibrium path, both deviating and non-deviating sellers will produce the same amount \(\hat{y} = y\). Therefore, the continuation payoffs are:

\[
V(\omega_H) = m_H - a_H + \alpha_b [u(q_H) - q_H - i\ell_H] + i(1 - \alpha_b)d_H + EV + U(x^*) - x^* \tag{51}
\]

and

\[
V(\hat{\omega}_z) = \hat{m}_H - \hat{a}_H + \alpha_b [u(\hat{q}_H) - \hat{q}_H] + EV + U(x^*) - x^* \tag{52}
\]

where \(EV = \rho \beta_H V(\omega_H) + (1 - \rho) \beta_L V(\omega_L)\) and \(EV = \rho \beta_H \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H) + (1 - \rho) \beta_L \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_L)\). Combining
We know that $q$ and therefore:

\[(49), (51) \text{ and } (52)\] we have that the real borrowing constraint $\bar{\ell}$ has to satisfy:

\[(1 + i)\bar{\ell} = (\pi - \beta_H)(\bar{m}_H - m_H) + \beta_H \{\Psi(q_H, \hat{q}_H) + [(1 - \alpha_b)d_H - \alpha_b\bar{\ell}]i + EV - E\hat{V}\} \tag{53}\]

where $\Psi(q_H, \hat{q}_H) = \alpha_b[u(q_H) - u(\hat{q}_H) - (q_H - \hat{q}_H)]$. From (52) we know that the marginal value of money for a deviator is:

\[\frac{\partial \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H)}{\partial \bar{m}_H} = 1 + \alpha_b \left[ u'(\hat{q}_H) - 1 \right] \tag{54}\]

and therefore:

\[\frac{\pi - \beta_H}{\beta_H} = \alpha_b \left[ u'(\hat{q}_H) - 1 \right] + \frac{\hat{\mu}_H}{\beta_H} \tag{55}\]

If $\pi = \beta_H$ then (53) can be expressed as:

\[\bar{\ell} = (\pi - \beta_H)(\bar{m}_H - m_H) + \beta_H \left[ \Psi(q_H, \hat{q}_H) + EV - E\hat{V} \right] \tag{56}\]

The right hand side of (56) must be positive in order for an equilibrium with credit to exist. By comparing (30) and (55), we know that if $\pi = \beta_H$ and therefore $i = 0$, then $\hat{\mu}_H = 0$ and $\hat{q}_H = q_H = q^*$. Thus, we have that $\bar{\ell} = \beta_H[EV - E\hat{V}] = \rho\beta_H[V(\omega_H) - \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H)] + (1 - \rho)\beta_L[V(\omega_L) - \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_L)]$. Since $V(\omega_H) = \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H)$, then in order to have $\bar{\ell} > 0$ we need $V(\omega_L) > \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_L)$. We now want to prove when that’s the case. Combining , we get:

\[V(\omega_L) = \frac{U(x^*) - x^* - \rho(m_H - m_L) - a_L + \alpha_b[u(q_L) - q_L] + \rho\beta_H V(\omega_H)}{1 - \beta_L(1 - \rho)} \]

\[\hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_L) = \frac{U(x^*) - x^* - \rho(m_H - \hat{m}_L) - \hat{a}_L + \alpha_b[u(\hat{q}_L) - \hat{q}_L] + \rho\beta_H V(\omega_H)}{1 - \beta_L(1 - \rho)} \]

Now we use $\hat{\alpha}_L = a_L$. That is because $\partial \hat{V}/\partial \hat{a}_j = -1$ and therefore the proof is the same as in Lemma 1 in the paper. So, we have $\hat{\alpha}_L = a_L = A$, $\hat{a}_H = a_H = -(1 - \rho)A/\rho$ and $\hat{p}_a = p_a = \beta_H/\pi$. Therefore, in order for $V_L(\omega_L) > \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_L)$ we need:

\[\rho(m_L - \hat{m}_L) + \alpha_b[u(q_L) - q_L] - \alpha_b[u(\hat{q}_L) - \hat{q}_L] > 0\]

We know that $q_L = m_l + \bar{\ell}$ and $\hat{q}_L = \bar{m}_L = \bar{q}$ where $\bar{q}$ is consumption in the equilibrium in Proposition 1 in which agents $L$ bring money. In that case, as in Gu, Mattesini and Wright (2016), agents are indifferent between using money or borrowing. If that is the case, then agents who don’t
default (and can use money or loans) and agents who do default (and can only bring money) will consume the same amount, which is \( \tilde{q} \). Therefore, in order for the inequality above to hold we need: 

\[
\rho(q_L - \bar{\ell} - \tilde{q}_L) + \alpha_b[u(q_L) - q_L] - \alpha_b[u(\tilde{q}_L) - \tilde{q}_L] > 0 \Rightarrow \rho(q_L - \tilde{q}_L) + \alpha_b[u(q_L) - q_L] - \alpha_b[u(\tilde{q}_L) - \tilde{q}_L] > \rho \bar{\ell}
\]

and therefore:

\[
\alpha_b[u(q_L) - u(\tilde{q}_L)] + (\rho - \alpha_b)(q_L - \tilde{q}) > \rho \bar{\ell}
\]  

(57)

Notice that in the case in which \( m_L > 0 \) and therefore \( q_L = \hat{q}_L = \tilde{q} \), the equation above does not hold since it implies \( \bar{\ell} < 0 \).

Now let’s consider the case \( m_L = 0 \). Then, \( q_L = \ell \) and \( \hat{q}_L = \tilde{q} \). In this case, equation (57) becomes:

\[
\alpha_b[u(\ell) - u(\tilde{q}_L)] + (\rho - \alpha_b)(\ell - \tilde{q}) > \rho \bar{\ell}
\]

\[
\alpha_b[u(\ell) - \alpha_b[u(\tilde{q}) - \tilde{q}]] > \rho \tilde{q}
\]

\[
[u(\ell) - \tilde{q}] - [u(\tilde{q}) - \tilde{q}] > \frac{\rho \tilde{q}}{\alpha_b}
\]  

(58)

The intuition for (58) is that an equilibrium exists if the difference in surplus between an economy with default and no default is big enough.

Now we focus on the case \( j = H \) and \( z = H \). The real borrowing constraint \( \bar{\ell} \) must satisfy (37) also in this case, and combining this with (38) and (39) we have:

\[
U(x^*) - n^b_{HH} + \beta_H V(\omega_H) = U(\hat{x}^b_{HH}) - \hat{n}^b_{HH} + \beta_H \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H)
\]  

(59)

If the buyer repays her loans then she will have to work:

\[
n^b_{HH} = x^* + \pi m_H' - (m^b_H + \tau) + (1 + i)\bar{\ell} + a_H - p_a \pi a_H'
\]

\[
= x^* + \pi m_H' - (m_H - q^* + \ell + \tau) + (1 + i)\bar{\ell} + a_H - \beta_H a_H'
\]

\[
= x^* + \pi m_H' - (m_H + \tau) + \tilde{q}_H + i\tilde{\ell} + a_H - \beta_H a_H'
\]

Since \( \tau = (\pi - 1)\bar{m} \) where \( \bar{m} = \rho m_H + (1 - \rho)m_L \), then the expression above becomes:

\[
n^b_{HH} = x^* + \pi m_H' - m_H - (\pi - 1)\bar{m} + q^* + i\tilde{\ell} + a_H - \beta_H a_H'
\]  

(60)

If an agent instead decides to default on her loans, then she will have to work:
\[ n_{HH}^b = \hat{x}_{HH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - (m_{H}^l + \tau) + a_H - p_a \pi \hat{a}_{H}^l \]
\[ = \hat{x}_{HH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - (m_{H}^l - q^* + \ell + \tau) + a_H - p_a \pi \hat{a}_{H}^l \]
\[ = \hat{x}_{HH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - (m_{H}^l + \tau) + q^* - \ell + a_H - p_a \pi \hat{a}_{H}^l \]

and therefore
\[ \hat{n}_{HH}^b = \hat{x}_{HH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - m_{H} - (\pi - 1)\hat{m} + q^* - \ell + a_H - p_a \pi \hat{a}_{H}^l \]

The defaulting problem in the CM for a buyer in the DM, therefore, is:
\[ \hat{W}_H(\omega_L^b) = \max_{\hat{x}_{HH}^b, \hat{m}_{H}^l, \hat{n}_{HH}^b} U(\hat{x}_{HH}^b) - \hat{n}_{HH}^b + \beta_H \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H) \]
\[ \text{s.t. } \hat{n}_{HH}^b = \hat{x}_{HH}^b + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - m_{H} - (\pi - 1)\hat{m} + q^* - \ell + a_H - \beta_H \hat{a}_{H}^l \]

The first order conditions for the problem above are \( \beta_H \partial \hat{V} / \partial \hat{m}_{H}^l + \hat{\mu}_z = \pi, \beta_H \partial \hat{V} / \partial \hat{a}_{H}^l - \hat{\lambda}_z = -\pi p_a \) and \( U'(\hat{x}_{HH}^b) = 1 \) so that \( \hat{x}_{HH}^b = x^* \). This implies:
\[ \hat{n}_{HH}^b = x^* + \pi \hat{m}_{H}^l - m_{H} - (\pi - 1)\hat{m} + q^* - \ell + a_H - \beta_H \hat{a}_{H}^l \] (61)

Since \( a'_{H} = \hat{a}_{H}^l \), combining (46), (47) and (48) we have that the following condition must hold:
\[ (1 + i)\ell = \pi (\hat{m}_{H}^l - m_{H}^l) + \beta_H [V(\omega_H^l) - \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H^l)] \] (62)

Since in a stationary equilibrium \( \hat{m}_{H}^l = \hat{m}_{H}, m_{H}^l = m_{H}, \hat{\omega}_{H}^l = \hat{\omega}_H \) and \( \omega_{H} = \omega_H \), the condition above becomes:
\[ (1 + i)\ell = \pi (\hat{m}_{H} - m_{H}) + \beta_H [V(\omega_H) - \hat{V}(\hat{\omega}_H)] \] (63)

Since (63) coincides with (50), then \( \ell \) will be defined by (57) also in this case.

**Proof of Corollary 2.** The proof follows directly from the one of Proposition 2.