A Search-Based Neoclassical Model of Capital Reallocation

Feng Dong†  Pengfei Wang‡  Yi Wen§

This Version: July, 2018

Abstract

As a form of investment, the importance of capital reallocation between firms has been increasing over time, with the purchase of used capital accounting for 25% to 40% of firms’ total investment nowadays. Cross-firm reallocation of used capital also exhibits intriguing business-cycle properties, such as (i) the illiquidity of used capital is countercyclical (or the quantity of used capital reallocation across firms is procyclical), (ii) the prices of used capital are procyclical and more so than those of new capital goods, and (iii) the dispersion of firms’ TFP or MPK (or the benefit of capital reallocation) is countercyclical. We build a search-based neoclassical model to qualitatively and quantitatively explain these stylized facts. We show that search frictions in the capital market are essential for our empirical success but not sufficient—financial frictions and endogenous movements in the distribution of firm-level TFP (or MPK) and interactions between used-capital investment and new investment are also required to simultaneously explain these stylized facts, especially that prices of used capital are more volatile than that of new investment and the dispersion of firm TFP is countercyclical.

Key Words: Capital Reallocation, Capital Search, Fragmented Markets, Endogenous Dispersion of firms’ TFP, Endogenous Total Factor Productivity, Business Cycles.

JEL Codes: E22, E32, E44, G11.

*We have benefited from comments by Benoit Julien, Erica X.N. Li, Valerie Ramey, Zhiwei Xu, and in particular Randy Wright, as well as participants at the Annual Conference on Money, Banking and Asset Markets at University of Wisconsin Madison, Tsinghua Workshop in Macroeconomics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, and China International Conference in Finance. The views expressed here are only those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.

†Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China. Tel: (+86) 21-52301590. Email: fengdong@sjtu.edu.cn
‡Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong. Tel: (+852) 2358 7612. Email: pfwang@ust.hk
§Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, MO 63166; and School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Office: (314) 444-8559. Fax: (314) 444-8731. Email: yi.wen@stls.frb.org
1 Introduction

"In the process of creative destruction [...] many firms may have to perish that nevertheless would be able to live on vigorously and usefully if they could weather a particular storm."

— J.A. Schumpeter, "Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy," Part II, Ch. VIII.

Merges, acquisitions and cross-firm trade in used capital have been an important form of firm investment and resource reallocation over the business cycle.\(^1\) For example, the existing empirical literature (notably Ramey and Shapiro, 2001; Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006; Cui, 2014; Lanteri, 2015; Kehrig, 2015; Kurmann, and Pestroky-Nadeau, 2007; among others) documents that the purchase of used capital alone (not including acquisitions and merges) accounts for more than 25% of firm investment, suggesting the importance and significance of capital reallocation across firms in the economy. Moreover, this empirical literature (most notably Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006) identifies several firm-level business-cycle facts on capital reallocation that have attracted a growing amount of theoretical studies, such as:

1. the dispersion of firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) or marginal product of capital (MPK) is counter-cyclical, suggesting that the benefit of cross-firm capital reallocation is high in recessions and low in booms;\(^2\)

2. however, firm investment in used capital is strongly procyclical and as volatile as gross domestic product (GDP);

3. the prices of used capital are strongly procyclical.

Table 1 quantifies the three stylized facts documented by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006). At the business-cycle frequencies (under HP filter), The correlation of dispersion of firms’ TFP and output (real GDP) is strongly negative and significant, with a point estimate of -0.465. For capital reallocation the correlation is strongly positive and significant, with a point estimate of 0.637. For acquisitions the correlation is 0.675, for PPE (sales of property, plant and equipment) it is 0.329, for prices of used capital it is 0.565, all are statistically significant.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
 & TFP dispersion & reallocation & acquisitions & sales of PPE & Prices \\
\hline
Correlation with output & -0.465 (0.194) & 0.637 (0.112) & 0.675 (0.122) & 0.329 (0.173) & 0.565 (0.08) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Reallocation of Capital\(^*\)}
\end{table}

\(^*\)Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Data source: Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006).

\(^1\)See Chang (2011) among others on labor reallocation with frictions.

\(^2\)Following Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), Kehrig (2015) uses US census manufacturing data to document the counter-cyclicality of the dispersion of firm TFP. In addition, if the benefit of reallocation is measured by the dispersion of firm-level Tobin’s q, it is also weakly countercyclical, suggesting higher benefit of acquiring used capital in recessions than in booms (see Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006).
The stylized facts (1) and (3) suggest that Schumpeter may be right about the cleansing effect of recessions; namely, recession should be a time of creative destruction and thus the time of more capital reallocation across firms—namely, because of a larger dispersion of firm-level TFP and significantly lower prices of used capital during recessions, it is more beneficial for capital to be reallocated from less productive firms to more productive ones in recessions than in booms. If this were the case, however, one would expect sales (or turnover rate) of used capital to be high in recessions and low in booms—the very implication of creative destruction. But stylized fact (2) indicates the contrary: capital appears more illiquid in recessions than in booms.

Figure 1: Capital reallocation (solid line is GDP, dotted line is property, plant, and equipment sales, and dashed line is acquisition).

More specifically, Figure 1 shows three time series de-trended by the HP filter: real GDP (black solid line), sales of used capital (dotted blue line, including property, plant, and equipment), and firm acquisitions (dashed red line). Clearly, capital reallocation under either measure (sales of used capital or acquisitions) is strongly procyclical, with a correlation with real GDP about 0.4 for sales of used capital and 0.7 for acquisitions. As discussed in the literature, especially Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), both PPE (property, plant, and equipment) sales and acquisitions are important part of capital reallocation. So the main message from Figure 1 is that capital reallocation is strongly procyclical.

How to reconcile the Schumpeterian view of capital reallocation implied by his business-cycle theory and the three stylized facts presented above? One possible explanation is the hypothesis proposed by
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) that the cost of reallocating capital is strongly countercyclical so that capital appears more liquid in booms than in recessions. This hypothesis, however, does not reveal the underlying mechanism of the countercyclical costs of capital reallocation. Why is it more costly to sell/purchase used capital in recessions when firms are stuck with excess capacity and desperately need more cash to repay their debts?

Another possible explanation is the idea of financial friction proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) that asset resaleability is low in recessions and high in booms, resulting in procyclical turnover rate of used capital. Indeed, the probability of selling used capital is procyclical (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2016), suggesting that the resaleability of capital is procyclical (Kiyotaki and Moore, 2012). But this theory also fails to provide the underlying mechanism of countercyclical resaleability and it also implies that the price of used capital is high in recessions when less capital are available for sale, but low in booms when more capital are available for sale—which contradicts stylized fact (3) above.

Our explanation detailed in this paper is search and matching in the used capital market. Since search efforts are endogenously procyclical, the measured "costs" and "resaleability" of capital appear to be countercyclical. Thus, un-utilized capital (capacity) is like unemployed labor, both have lower market values in recessions and higher market values in booms. Allocative efficiency through search and matching implies that capital is less misallocated in booms than in recessions, leading to a countercyclical dispersion of firm-level TFP or Tobin’s q.

But we also show that search frictions are not enough albeit essential in explaining the data. Search frictions can generate costs of capital reallocation in the steady state, but not their aggregate movements without aggregate shocks. Yet different types of aggregate shocks (such as aggregate TFP shocks, preference shocks, or financial shocks) can all generate movements in aggregate output, but they may have different implications for the movements in the volume and prices of capital and the comovements between aggregate output and the dispersion of firms’ TFP.

In this paper, we embed search frictions in the used capital market into a standard neoclassical model to qualitatively and quantitatively rationalize the stylized facts. The neoclassical framework imposes strong discipline on our analysis not only because we can introduce different types of aggregate shocks to generate equilibrium fluctuations, but also because the decision to purchase or sell used capital is only part of firms’ investment problems and thus must be studied together with decisions for new investment and dynamic capital accumulation over a long horizon, all of which may be dictated by common macroeconomic forces such as financial frictions. If under certain aggregate shocks the demand for production factors (labor or capital) are high in booms, firms not only invest more in new capital but would also search harder for used capital, so both the turnover rate of used capital and new investment as well
as their prices would be procyclical. However, the procyclical capital reallocation across firms does not necessarily imply that the benefit of capital reallocation (or illiquidity) is countercyclical, especially when firms’ investment is financially constrained.

In addition to the three stylized facts listed above, there also exist other empirical regularities in the firm-level data to test our model, such as (i) the prices of used capital is more procyclical and twice as volatile as that of new capital goods (Lanteri, 2015), and (ii) the dispersion of firms’ gross investment rate is procyclical despite the fact that the dispersion of firms’ TFP is countercyclical (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2006).

We study the implications of three types of aggregate shocks: aggregate TFP shocks, financial shocks to firms’ borrowing constraints, and shocks to matching efficiency. We find that all the three shocks can generate procyclical movements in the volume and prices of used capital, but only under the "right" type of aggregate shocks can search frictions simultaneously explain all of the stylized facts presented above, especially the countercyclical dispersion of firm-level TFP.

The main intuition for the different degree of successes of different aggregate shocks is that search friction in general leads to equilibrium capital "unemployment", i.e., the proportion/probability of selling out un-utilized capital is below 100% at any point in time.\footnote{Capital "unemployment" is the same thing as excess capacity or capital hoarding during recessions.} Equilibrium capital unemployment, however, may imply that the prices of used capital are less volatile than that of new capital goods, contradicting with the data. This is especially the case if search frictions in the capital markets are endogenously countercyclical due to time-varying search efforts. In other words, higher aggregate demand for capital (both used and new) during a boom leads to higher prices of capital in general, but the prices of used capital rise significantly more than those of new capital only if the demand for used capital is proportionately stronger than that of new capital in a boom for any given level of search frictions.

Also, the procyclical capital reallocation implies that resources are less misallocated during booms than in recessions, which may or may not necessarily imply that the dispersion of firms’ TFP is countercyclical unless the distribution of firms TFP is endogenously affected by both aggregate shocks and search frictions in certain ways. Therefore, a fully-fledged DSGE model is required to sort out these complicated issues even if we believe that search frictions are important in explaining the stylized empirical facts about capital reallocation.

Hence, we build a model in which not only firms’ investment in used capital and new capital interact with each other, but search frictions in the capital market also interact with credit frictions in the financial market in important ways such that the distribution of firms’ TFP can endogenously respond to different types of aggregate shocks.
Our work complements the existing literature on capital reallocation. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) show that if the costs of reallocating capital are countercyclical, then capital reallocation would be procyclical. However, they do not explain why prices of used capital are more procyclical than those of new capital goods and why the dispersion of firms TFP is countercyclical. Lanteri (2015) also studies the business-cycle dynamics of secondary markets for physical capital and tries to explain why the prices of used capital are twice as volatile as those of new capital over the business cycle. However, Lanteri (2015) does not use search frictions to explain this fact and he does not address the other stylized facts of capital reallocations.

We are not the first to use search frictions in the capital markets to explain the stylized facts on capital reallocations. First, Kurmann, and Pestroky-Nadeau (2007) build a dynamic model with search frictions for capital allocation from households to representative firms, and then use the model to investigate implications of search frictions for the business cycle. Ottonello (2015) studies the issue of capital unemployment as well, but he mainly addresses the effect of search frictions for the slump of new investment after the 2007 financial crisis (as it takes time to transform resources into investment goods under search frictions). Cao and Shi (2017) build a simple model to address some of the stylized facts presented above. However, their model is unable to generate countercyclical dispersion of firms’ productivity or TFP, thus contradicting the first stylized fact presented in the very beginning of the paper. Also, their model is not a genuine DSGE model with capital accumulation, so their model is unable (i) to reveal the different implications of different aggregate shocks on capital reallocation under search, (ii) to address the interactions between used capital investment and new investment, and (iii) to generate endogenous movements in the distribution of firms’ TFP, frictions. Wright, Xiao and Zhu (2017) develop a model of capital reallocation based on Lagos and Wright (2005) model where firms trade used capital in frictional markets with either ex ante or ex post firm heterogeneity under different market microstructures. Finally, Kurmann and Rabinovich (2017) develop a purely theoretical model of capital reallocation to study the efficiency implications of bargaining in frictional capital markets for capital reallocation.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 builds the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium properties of the model. Section 4 conducts a series of quantitative analysis after calibrating to the US economy. Section 5 lists several model extensions. Section 6 concludes. Data description and
proofs are put in the Appendix.

2 Model

2.1 Environment

Time is discrete with \( t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, \infty \). There are three types of agents: (i) a representative household, (ii) a unit measure of heterogeneous firms, and (iii) a unit measure of capital dealers (intermediaries) in the used capital markets.

The representative household is the owner of firms and intermediaries, and makes decisions on consumption, labor supply to firms, and holdings of firm equities.

Firms receive both aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks in the beginning of each period. After observing these shocks, each firm decides whether to purchase or sell used capital in the secondary capital markets. Firms opting to purchase used capital need to search and meet capital dealers in the buyers’ market, while firms opting to sell used capital need to search and meet capital dealers in the sellers’ market. Capital dealers can freely move across the two types of capital markets, but firms cannot. Capital reallocation across firms is realized only through search and bilateral trading with capital dealers in decentralized capital markets. The terms of trade is determined by Nash bargaining.

The matching technology in the sellers’ buyers’ markets are given, respectively, by \( \mathcal{M}^S (x^S, S) \) and \( \mathcal{M}^B (x^B, B) \), where \( x^S \) and \( x^B \) denote, respectively, the measure of dealers in the sellers’ market and the buyers’ market, and \( S \) and \( B \) the measure of firms selling capital (capital sellers) and firms buying capital (capital buyers). Both matching functions are constant returns to scale. The matching probabilities for firms \( (p^S, p^B) \) and dealers \( (q^S, q^B) \) are determined, respectively, by

\[
p^S \equiv \frac{\mathcal{M}^S (x^S, S)}{S}, \quad q^S \equiv \frac{\mathcal{M}^S (x^S, S)}{x^S},
\]

\[
p^B \equiv \frac{\mathcal{M}^B (x^B, B)}{B}, \quad q^B \equiv \frac{\mathcal{M}^B (x^B, B)}{x^B};
\]

the market tightness in each market is \( \theta^S \equiv S/x^S \) and \( \theta^B \equiv B/x^B \).

To focus on the implication of search frictions for capital reallocation, we rule out any information frictions. Therefore, firms’ productivity and their outside options are public knowledge, at least to the dealers the firms are matched with.

After trading in the decentralized capital markets, each firm makes decisions on production (employment), investment for new capital, and dividends distributed to shareholders.

Figure 4 shows schematically the two decentralized capital markets for seller-firms and buyer-firms, where \( \{Q^S (z), Q^B (z), Q^D (z)\} \) denote respectively the terms of trade for the seller-firms, buyer-firms, and the dealers. Note that the dealers face the same terms of trade \( Q^D \) in both the sellers’ market and the buyers’ market under free arbitrage across these markets.
2.2 Firms’ Problem

The firm-specific idiosyncratic productivity shock $z$ is iid across firms and over time with the support $\mathcal{Z} = [z_{\text{min}}, z_{\text{max}}]$. Given $z_t$, firms adjust their capital stock accordingly. So a firm $i \in [0, 1]$ can be denoted as firm-$(k, z)$. Consequently, firms are heterogeneous along two dimensions: (i) firm-level productivity $z_t$, and (ii) firm-level capital stock $k_t$ carried over from last period.

The production function of each firm is given by

$$y = \left( Az^{\bar{k}} \right)^{1-\alpha}$$

where $\bar{k}$ is the total capital stock available for production after capital reallocation, and $A$ the aggregate productivity shock. Given $\bar{k}$, define

$$R(z) \equiv \max_{n \geq 0} \left\{ \left( Az^{\bar{k}} \right)^{1-\alpha} - Wn \right\} / \bar{k} = \alpha A^{1/2} \left( \frac{1-\alpha}{W} \right)^{1-\alpha} A z$$

as the rate of capital returns, which measures the average rate of profit after substituting in the optimal labor demand $n(\bar{k}, z) = \left( \frac{(1-\alpha)}{W} \right)^{1/2} A z \bar{k}$.

Given the realization of $z$, a firm decides how much used capital to sell ($\bar{k}^{S}$) and how much to buy ($\bar{k}^{B}$), before making new investment and dividend decisions. Then the amount of capital in hand equals $\bar{k} = k - \bar{k}^{S} + \bar{k}^{B}$. Given the amount of capital in hand ($\bar{k}$), the firm decides new investment $i_t$. So the the law of motion for capital accumulation is $k_{t+1} = (1-\delta) \bar{k}_t + \Psi \left( i_t/\bar{k}_t \right) \bar{k}_t$, where $\Psi \left( i_t/\bar{k}_t \right) \bar{k}_t$ represents adjustment costs for investment as in Hayashi (1982). As is standard in the literature, we assume there are no adjustment costs in the steady state: $\Psi (i^{*}) = i^{*}$ and $\Psi' (i^{*}) = 1$, where $i^{*}$ denotes the steady-state investment rate.
The resource constraint for new investment is given by
\[ i_t = R_t (z_t) \tilde{k}_t + \tilde{k}_t^S Q_t^S (z_t) - \tilde{k}_t^B Q_t^B (z_t) - d_t, \]
where the first term is profit from production, the second term is the value added from capital sales, the third term is the cost of purchasing used capital, and \( d_t \) is dividend.

Due to search frictions in the used capital markets, only \( \tilde{k}_t^S (k_t, z_t) \equiv p_t^S k_t^S \) units of capital are traded between a dealer and a firm-\((k_t, z_t)\) that intends to sell \( k_t^S \) units of capital. Similarly, only \( \tilde{k}_t^B (k_t, z_t) \equiv p_t^B k_t^B \) units of capital are traded between a dealer and a firm-\((k_t, z_t)\) that intends to buy \( k_t^B \) units of capital. The intended capital-to-sell and intended capital-to-buy satisfy the following constraints:
\[ k_t^S \leq k \text{ and } k_t^B \leq \mu p_t^S k_t. \]

Since we assume that dealers can be in one market only (at any moment) but can nonetheless freely enter either market, namely, dealers in the capital sellers’ market can purchase used capital from capital sellers and sell the used capital to other dealers in the capital buyers’ market through inter-dealer trading, they face the same terms of trade \( Q^D \) in both the sellers’ market and the buyers’ market.\(^6\)

To summarize, the optimization problem of firm-\((k, z)\) in time \( t \) is to choose \( \{k_t^S, k_t^B, i_t, d_t\} \) to maximize the present value of future dividends. The value of firm-\((k_t, z_t)\) is then given by
\[
V_t (k_t, z_t) = \max_{k_t^S, k_t^B, i_t, d_t} \left\{ d_t + \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\beta \Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \int V_{t+1} (k_{t+1}, z_{t+1}) dF (z_{t+1}) \right\}, \tag{3}
\]
subject to
\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{k}_t &= k_t - p_t^S k_t^S + p_t^B k_t^B, \\
d_t + i_t &= R_t (z_t) \tilde{k}_t + p_t^S k_t^S Q_t^S (z_t) - p_t^B k_t^B Q_t^B (z_t), \\
k_{t+1} &= (1 - \delta) \tilde{k}_t + \Psi \left( i_t / \tilde{k}_t \right) \tilde{k}_t, \\
k_t^S &\in [0, k_t], \\
k_t^B &\in [0, \mu p_t^S k_t].
\end{align*} \tag{4-7}
\]

### 2.3 Household

A representative household solves
\[
\max_{C_t, N_t, N_{t+1}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \log (C_t) - \psi \frac{N_t^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma} \right], \tag{9}
\]
\(^6\text{This assumption simplifies our analysis and is harmless. We later show that our results hold when the same dealer can purchase capital and sell it to firms or firms simply search for each other in bilateral meetings (see the remark in section 3.2).}\)
subject to
\[
C_t + \int_{i \in [0, 1]} s_{t+1}^i (V_t^i - d_t^i) \, di = \int_{i \in [0, 1]} s_t^i V_t^i \, di + \Pi_t^i + W_t N_t,
\]
where \( \beta \) denotes the discount factor, \( C^h \) consumption, \( N_t \) labor supply, \( (V_t^i, s_t^i) \) the value of firm-\( i \) and the associated share holdings by the household. The household receives total profits \( \Pi_t^i \) from intermediaries and labor income \( W_t N_t \) from work. Denote \( \Lambda_t \) as the Lagrangian multiplier of the household’s budget constraint, the first order conditions (FOCs) on consumption \( (C_t) \), labor supply \( (N_t) \) and share holdings \( (s_{t+1}^i)_{i \in [0, 1]} \) are given by
\[
\begin{align*}
\Lambda_t &= \frac{1}{C_t}, \\
\Lambda_t W_t &= \psi N_t, \\
V_t^j &= d_t^j + E_t \frac{\beta \Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} V_{t+1}^j.
\end{align*}
\]
where \( \beta \Lambda_{t+1}/\Lambda_t \) denotes the pricing kernel.

2.4 Equilibrium

An equilibrium consists of a series of prices and quantities such that (i) given prices, the household, firms and dealers maximize their own objective functions; and (ii) all markets clear.

3 Characterization of Capital Market Equilibrium

3.1 Firms

As is standard in the adjustment cost literature, given \( \tilde{k}_t \), the FOC for new investment \( i_t \) implies
\[
1 = \Psi_t^f \left( \frac{i_t}{\tilde{k}_t} \right) \tilde{k}_t E_t \frac{\beta \Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \frac{\partial V_{t+1}(k_{t+1}, z_{t+1})}{\partial k_{t+1}}
\]
\[
\equiv \Psi_t^f \left( \frac{i_t}{\tilde{k}_t} \right) Q_t,
\]
where \( Q_t \) denotes Tobin’s \( Q \)—the marginal value of one unit of new capital:
\[
Q_t \equiv E \left[ \left( \frac{\beta \Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \right) \phi_{t+1}(z_{t+1}) \right].
\]
In turn, equation (14) implies that investment can be expressed as
\[
i_t = \omega(Q_t) \tilde{k}_t,
\]
where \( \omega(Q_t) \equiv \Psi_t^{-1}(Q_t). \) Since \( \Psi(\cdot) \) is assumed to be strictly concave, \( \omega(Q_t) \) is strictly increasing in Tobin’s \( Q \).
We guess and will verify later that firm’s value function is linear in capital $k_t$:

$$V_t(k_t, z_t) = \phi_t(z_t) k_t.$$  \hfill (17)

Substituting equations (17) and (16) into firm-$(k, z)$’s optimization problem (3) yields

$$\phi_t(z_t) k_t = \max_{\{k^S_t, k^B_t\}} \{(m_t + Q_t (1 - \delta)) k_t + [Q^S_t(z_t) - m_t] p^S_t k^S_t + [m_t - Q^B_t(z_t)] p^B_t k^B_t\},$$  \hfill (18)

where $m_t \equiv [R_t(z_t) + \Gamma(Q_t)]$ denotes the marginal-value product of capital; so the term in the first square brackets on the right-hand side is the gain from trade by selling one unit of used capital, and the term in the second square brackets is the gain from trade by purchasing one unit of used capital. Notice that the marginal-value product of capital has two terms: the marginal product $R_t(z_t)$ and an additional term $\Gamma(Q_t)$ defined by

$$\Gamma(Q_t) \equiv Q_t (1 - \delta) + Q_t \Psi(\omega(Q_t)) - \omega(Q_t).$$  \hfill (19)

This additional term reflects the option value of capital arising from adjustment costs of investment—since installing new capital through investment is costly, having one additional unit of capital in hand avoids the adjustment costs with the gain of $\Gamma(Q_t)$. When the adjustment costs vanish, we have $Q_t = 1$ and $\Gamma(Q_t) = Q_t \Psi(\omega(Q_t)) - \omega(Q_t) = Q_t \frac{1}{k} - \frac{1}{k} = 0$.

### 3.2 Terms of Trade

**Proposition 1** A firm-$(z, k)$ opts to be a capital seller if $z \leq z^*$ and a capital buyer if $z > z^*$. The terms of trade between the capital seller and a dealer is given by

$$Q^S_t(z) = (1 - \eta) Q^D_t + \eta (R_t(z) + \Gamma(Q_t)), \quad \text{if } z \leq z^*,$$  \hfill (20)

and the terms of trade between the capital buyer and a dealer is given by

$$Q^B_t(z) = (1 - \eta) Q^D_t + \eta (R_t(z) + \Gamma(Q_t)), \quad \text{if } z > z^*,$$  \hfill (21)

where $z^*$ is the cutoff productivity at which we have

$$Q^S_t(z^*) = Q^B_t(z^*) = R_t(z^*) + \Gamma(Q_t) = Q^D_t.$$  \hfill (22)

**Proof:** See Appendix I.  ■

The terms of trade indicate that the gains from trade are split between the firm and the dealer, depending on their respective bargaining power $\eta \in [0, 1]$. If the dealer has all the bargaining power, $\eta = 1$, then the terms of trade $Q^S = R(z) + \Gamma(Q)$ for $z \leq z^*$ and $Q^B = R(z) + \Gamma(Q)$ for $z > z^*$, so firms earn zero profits from trade. Since the marginal product of capital $R(z)$ is increasing in $z$, we
have $Q^S \leq Q^D \leq Q^B$. It is worth noting that $\{Q^S_t, Q^B_t\}$ are independent of $k_t$ and are both increasing functions of $z$.

**Remark 1** For tractability, we have assumed that firms do not directly trade with each other for capital reallocation. Alternatively, we can let firms directly contact each other in bilateral trading between high-productivity firm $i \in B$ and low-productivity firm $j \in S$. We know that $R(i) \geq R(j)$ holds for $i \in B$ and $j \in S$. Since $z$ shock is iid over time and across firm, the terms of trade (price of capital), $Q(i,j)$, is determined by Nash bargaining as below,

$$\arg \max_{x \in [R(i), R(j)]} \left\{ (R(i) - Q(i,j))^\eta (Q(i,j) - R(j))^{1-\eta} \right\},$$

which delivers

$$Q(i,j) = (1 - \eta) R(i) + \eta R(j).$$

where $\eta \in (0,1)$ denotes the bargaining power of the buyer. Then the expected prices facing $i \in B$ and $j \in S$, are given respectively by

$$\overline{Q}(i) = \mathbb{E}(P(i,j) | j \in S),$$

$$\overline{Q}(j) = \mathbb{E}(P(i,j) | i \in B).$$

We can then verify that the linear structure of the model is still well preserved, but the algebra is more involved.

### 3.3 Value of the Firm

Now we characterize the value function $\phi_t(\cdot)$. Substituting equations (20) and (21) into (18) yields individual firm’s Tobin $Q$, i.e., the shadow value of a firm with each additional unit of capital with productivity $z_t$ at the beginning of time $t$, is

$$\phi_t(z_t) = \max_{k_t^F \in [0,k_t^C], k_t^B \in [0,\mu k_t]} \left\{ (R_t(z_t) + \Gamma(Q_t)) k_t + (1 - \eta) (R_t(z_t^*) - R_t(z_t)) p_t^C k_t^C + (1 - \eta) (R_t(z_t) - R_t(z_t^*)) p_t^B k_t^B \right\}. \hspace{1cm} (27)$$

This immediately generates the policy functions of individual firm’s capital reallocation as below:

**Lemma 1** The individual firm’s supply and demand of used capital is given by

$$k_t^S(k_t, z_t) = \begin{cases} k_t, & \text{if } z_t \leq z_t^*, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad k_t^B(k_t, z_t) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } z_t \leq z_t^*, \\ \mu k_t, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \hspace{1cm} (28)$$

and the level of firm’s capital stock after reallocation is given by

$$\tilde{k}_t(k_t, z_t) = k_t - p_t^S k_t^S + p_t^B k_t^B = \begin{cases} (1 - p_t^B) k_t, & \text{if } z_t \leq z_t^*, \\ (1 + \mu p_t^B) k_t, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}. \hspace{1cm} (29)$$
As indicated in Lemma 1, the demand and supply of used capital is characterized by a cut-off strategy. Firms with low productivity opt to sell their used capital while firms with high productivity opt to purchase used capital. Due to the linear structure shown in equation (27), both seller- and buyer-firms will choose a corner solution, i.e., they sell and buy as much as they can. However, due to search frictions in capital reallocation, only $p^S_t$ and $p^B_t$ fraction of firms’ intended capital sales (purchases) are realized.

Substituting equation (28) into equation (27) simplifies individual firm’s Tobin Q as

$$
\phi_t (z_t) = R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t) + (1 - \eta) p^S_t (R_t (z^*_t) - R_t (z_t)) 1_{\{z_t \leq z^*_t\}} + \mu_t (1 - \eta) p^B_t (R_t (z_t) - R_t (z^*_t)) 1_{\{z_t > z^*_t\}}.
$$

The first line on the RHS of equation (30) is the marginal-value product of capital, the second line denotes the additional benefit from capital reallocation. Note that $\phi_t (z_t)$ is independent of $k_t$, and therefore the conjecture in equation (17) is verified.

Combining equations (15) and (30) yields the expected (aggregate) Tobin Q as

$$
Q_t = \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( \frac{\beta \Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \right) \left( \int R_{t+1} (z) dF (z) + \Gamma (Q_{t+1}) \right) \right] + \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( \frac{\beta \Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \right) (1 - \eta) p^S_t \int_{z_{\min}}^{z^*_t+1} \left( R_{t+1} (z^*_t+1) - R_{t+1} (z) \right) dF (z) \right] + \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( \frac{\beta \Lambda_{t+1}}{\Lambda_t} \right) \mu_{t+1} (1 - \eta) p^B_t \int_{z_{t+1}^*}^{z_{\max}} \left( R_{t+1} (z) - R_{t+1} (z^*_t+1) \right) dF (z) \right].
$$

Given Tobin’s $Q_t$, the new investment and gross investment are given respectively by

$$
i_t (k_t, z_t) = \omega (Q_t) \tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t),
$$

$$
i_t^g (k_t, z_t) = \tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t) - k_t + i_t (k_t, z_t).
$$

### 3.4 Inter-Dealer Market

The cut-off strategy of buying and selling capital implies that the number of sellers is given by $S_t = \{z | z \in [z_{\min}, z^*_t], \forall k_t\}$ and the number of buyers is given by $B_t = \{(k_t, z_t) | z \in [z^*_t, z_{\max}], \forall k_t\}$. Then the measure of seller-firms and that of buyer-firms is given respectively by

$$
S_t (z^*_t) = F (z^*_t), \quad B_t (z^*_t) = 1 - F (z^*_t).
$$
In turn, the total supply and demand of used capital in the markets are given respectively by

\[ K_t^S = \int_{S_t} k_t^S dF (z) dG (k) = K_t S_t, \] (35)
\[ K_t^B = \int_{B_t} k_t^B dF (z) dG (k) = \mu_t K_t B_t. \] (36)

Following Lagos and Rocheteau (2009) and Zhang (2017), we assume there exists a competitive inter-dealer market in which dealers’ total demand for capital equals dealers’ total supply of capital, i.e.,

\[ K_t^S p_t^S = K_t^B p_t^B. \] Then we have

\[ S_t p_t^S = \mu_t B_t p_t^B, \] (37)

or equivalently,

\[ \mathcal{M}^S (x_t^S, S_t) = \mu_t \mathcal{M}^B (x_t^B, B_t), \] (38)

where the LHS and RHS of the above equation denote, respectively, the total matched amount of capital in the capital-sellers’ market and capital-buyers’ market. Clearly, the financial friction \( \mu_t \) affects the prices of used capital and the quantity of capital reallocation by influencing the demand for used capital in the capital markets.

Assuming that the measure of dealers is normalized to one,

\[ x_t^B + x_t^S = 1, \] (39)

then arbitrage-free condition for dealers at either end of the capital market is given by

\[ q_t^S \left( Q_t^D - \overline{Q}_t^S \right) K_t = q_t^B \mu_t \left( \overline{Q}_t^B - Q_t^D \right) K_t \equiv \Pi_t^d, \] (40)

which implies that the dealer’s profit-maximizing price is given by the average (weighted sum) of the expected terms of trade for capital sellers and capital buyers:

\[ Q_t^D = \lambda_t \overline{Q}_t^S + (1 - \lambda_t) \overline{Q}_t^B, \] (41)

where

\[ \overline{Q}_t^S \equiv \mathbb{E} \left( P_t^S (z_t) | z_t \in S_t \right) = (1 - \eta) P_t + \eta \mathbb{E} \left( R_t (z_t) + \Gamma \left( Q_t \right) | z_t \leq z_t^* \right), \] (42)
\[ \overline{Q}_t^B \equiv \mathbb{E} \left( P_t^B (z_t) | z_t \in B_t \right) = (1 - \eta) P_t + \eta \mathbb{E} \left( R_t (z_t) + \Gamma \left( Q_t \right) | z_t > z_t^* \right), \] (43)
\[ \lambda_t \equiv \frac{q_t^S}{q_t^S + q_t^B} \mu_t \in (0,1). \] (44)

Substituting equations (1), (42) and (42) into (41) yields the cutoff capital return as a linear combination of the expected capital returns for the low-productivity and high-productivity firms:

\[ R_t (z_t^*) = \lambda_t \mathbb{E} \left( R_t (z_t) | z_t \leq z_t^* \right) + (1 - \lambda_t) \mathbb{E} \left( R_t (z_t) | z_t > z_t^* \right). \] (45)
Combining equations (37), (38) and (39) suggests that dealers’ probabilities of matching, \( q^S_t, q^B_t \), are functions of the distribution of firms characterized by \( z^*_t \). In turn, we can denote \( \lambda_t \) as \( \lambda_t(z^*_t) \). Moreover, substituting equation (2) into equation (1) reveals that the cutoff is determined by

\[
\begin{align*}
  z^*_t = \lambda_t \mathbb{E}(z_t|z_t \leq z^*_t) + (1 - \lambda_t) \mathbb{E}(z_t|z_t > z^*_t).
\end{align*}
\]

(46)

Note that, so far we have treated \( \lambda_t \) as given. However, \( \lambda_t \) is related to \( z^*_t \) in equilibrium since \( q^B_t; q^S_t \) are related to \( z^*_t \). This is because the measures of buyers and sellers \((B_t, S_t)\) are determined by \( z^*_t \), and given \((B_t, S_t)\), we can easily pin down \((x^B_t, x^S_t)\) and \((q^B_t, q^S_t)\).

To sharpen the analysis, we can specify the matching technology as

\[
\begin{align*}
  M^S_t &= x^S_t = \frac{\frac{1}{\mu_t} \left( F(z^*_t) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}}{1 + \frac{1}{\mu_t} \left( F(z^*_t) \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}},
\end{align*}
\]

(47)

In turn, the market tightness is

\[
\begin{align*}
  \theta^S &= \frac{S}{z^*} = \frac{F(z^*)}{F(z^*_t)} \quad \text{and} \quad \theta^B = \frac{B}{z^*} = \frac{1-F(z^*)}{F(z^*_t)},
\end{align*}
\]

and thus the matching probability is given by

\[
\begin{align*}
  \lambda_t = \frac{1}{1 + \left( \frac{B}{S} \right) \mu_t} = \frac{1}{1 + \left( \frac{F(z^*_t)}{1-F(z^*_t)} \right)^{\frac{1-\rho}{\rho}} \mu_t^{\frac{1}{\rho}}},
\end{align*}
\]

(48)

In general, we can determine \( z^*_t \) by solving equations (46) and (48) jointly. Moreover, we may obtain multiple equilibrium values for \( z^*_t \). To generate a unique interior solution, we set \( \rho = \frac{1}{2} \), which then implies \( \lambda_t \) is independent of \( z^*_t \) and only related to \( \mu_t \) in the following manner:

\[
\begin{align*}
  \lambda_t = \frac{1}{1 + \mu_t^{\frac{1}{2}}},
\end{align*}
\]

(49)

which clearly suggests that \( z^*_t \) increases with \( \mu_t \). That is, relaxing borrowing constraints enlarges the population of capital sellers so that capital can be concentrated in the hands of a few very productive firms. In the first-best scenario, only the most productive firm produces output and the rest of firms all become capital sellers. Hence, financial liberalization (increase in \( \mu_t \)) helps alleviate capital misallocation. Multiple equilibria may arise because of search externalities. In this paper we focus on the scenario of unique equilibrium and leave the case of multiple equilibria to another project.
4 Quantitative Analysis

4.1 Aggregation

Using equation (32), we can derive the aggregate investment and the law of motion of aggregate capital stock as

\[ I_t \equiv \int \int i_t dk_t dz_t = \omega (Q_t) K_t, \]  
(50)

\[ K_{t+1} \equiv \int \int [(1 - \delta) \bar{k}_t + \Psi \left( \frac{i_t}{\bar{k}_t} \right) \bar{k}_t] dk_t dz_t = (1 - \delta) K_t + \Psi (I_t/K_t) K_t, \]  
(51)

Also, using equations (37) and (33), we obtain

\[ I_t^{gross} \equiv \int \int i_t^{gross} dk_t dz_t = I_t. \]  
(52)

Meanwhile, the aggregate resource constraint is

\[ Y_t = C_t + I_t. \]  
(53)

Given aggregate productivity \( A_t \), aggregate capital \( K_t \), aggregate labor \( N_t \), and the cutoff value \( z_t^* \), we can characterize aggregate output and the associated aggregate TFP as follows.

**Proposition 2** The aggregate output is given by

\[ Y_t = TFP_t \cdot K_t^\alpha \cdot N_t^{1-\alpha}, \]  
(54)

where

\[ TFP_t = \frac{Y_t}{K_t^\alpha \cdot N_t^{1-\alpha}} = \frac{\left[ A_t \left( \mathbb{E} (z) + p S_t \mathbb{E} (z | z \geq z_t^* \geq z_t) - \mathbb{E} (z | z \leq z_t^*) \right) \right] K_t}{K_t^\alpha \cdot N_t^{1-\alpha}}, \]  
(55)

which strictly increases with the cutoff \( z_t^* \), aggregate productivity \( A_t \) and the matching efficiency \( \gamma_t \).

Moreover, the wage rate is

\[ W_t = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{Y_t}{N_t} \right). \]  
(56)

**Proof:** See Appendix. ■

Note that aggregate TFP is endogenous in our model. Lagos (2006) also shows the endogeneity of aggregate TFP in a model of labor search (but without capital accumulation and financial frictions). Lagos shows that the endogenous TFP is jointly determined by aggregate TFP and labor search frictions. The equilibrium TFP in our model is jointly determined by aggregate productivity, search frictions and financial frictions in the capital markets. However, as shown in equation (58) below, the distribution of firm-level TFP is also endogenous in our model.
The amount of capital reallocation \( (CR^A_t) \) is given by
\[
CR^A_t = p^S_t \cdot S^T_t = p^S_t S_t K_t. 
\] (57)

As suggested by Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), we can use productivity dispersion to measure the benefit of capital reallocation \( CR^B_t \), which is given by
\[
CR^B_t \equiv A_t \cdot \left[ E(z | z \geq z^*_t) - E(z | z \leq z^*_t) \right]. 
\] (58)

As shown by Bachmann and Bayer (2014), the investment dispersion is procyclical, which is just opposite to the dispersion of productivity. In our model the gross investment rate at the firm level is given by
\[
i_{gt} (k_t; z_t) = e_{gt} (k_t; z_t) + \frac{k_t(k_t; z_t)}{k_t} = (1 + \omega (Q_t)) \left( \frac{k_t(k_t; z_t)}{k_t} \right) - 1. 
\] (59)

We can show that the standard deviation of the gross investment rate is given by
\[
\text{std} \left( \frac{i_{gt}}{k_t} \right) = (1 + \omega (Q_t)) \frac{\mathcal{M}^S_t (x^S_t, S_t)}{\sqrt{S_t B_t}}, 
\] (60)

which increases with \( Q_t \) and \( z^*_t \). See the appendix for the proof.

### 4.2 Calibration

**Standard Parameters.** As standard in the literature, we set the quarterly discount factor as \( \beta = 0.985 \), capital share \( \alpha = 0.33 \), depreciation rate \( \delta = 0.025 \), and normalize the aggregate productivity \( A = 1 \), the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply \( \gamma = 1 \), the coefficient of labor disutility \( \psi = 1.75 \). Following Miao and Wang (2010), we set the parameter for investment adjustment cost \( \sigma = 0.25 \).

**Remark 2** If we following Jermann (1998) and assume \( \Psi (i/k) = t^{1/\sigma}_{SS} (i/k)^{1-1/\sigma} \), where \( t^{1/\sigma}_{SS} \) denotes the investment-capital ratio in the steady state, and \( \sigma \in (0,1) \) a parameter for adjustment cost. Since in the steady state \( \Psi (t^{1/\sigma}_{SS}) = t^{1/\sigma}_{SS} \), equation (51) immediately implies \( t^{1/\sigma}_{SS} = \delta \). Then equation (14) implies \( \omega (Q_t) = \delta Q^*_t \). In turn, equations (50) and (51) can be rewritten as
\[
I_t = \delta Q^*_t K_t, 
\] (61)

and
\[
K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta \left( 1 - Q^*_t \right)) K_t. 
\] (62)

**Matching Technology.** We assume Cobb-Douglas matching technology, namely, \( \mathcal{M}^S_t (x^S_t, S_t) = \xi_t (x^S_t)^{\rho} (S_t)^{1-\rho} \) and \( \mathcal{M}^B_t (x^B_t, B_t) = \xi_t (x^B_t)^{\rho} (B_t)^{1-\rho} \) with \( \rho \in (0,1) \). The implied market tightness is \( \theta^S_t \equiv \frac{S_t}{s^S_t} = \frac{1 - P(z^*_t)}{1 - x^S_t(z^*_t)} \), \( \theta^B_t \equiv \frac{B_t}{b^B_t} = \frac{1 - P(z^*_t)}{1 - x^B_t(z^*_t)} \). Consequently, the matching probability is given by
\[
p^S_t = \gamma \left( \theta^S_t \right)^{-\rho}, \quad q^S_t = \gamma \left( \theta^S_t \right)^{1-\rho}, \quad p^B_t = \gamma \left( \theta^B_t \right)^{-\rho}, \quad q^B_t = \gamma \left( \theta^B_t \right)^{1-\rho}. 
\] (63)
We assume symmetry in bargaining power between firms and dealers by setting $\eta = 0.5$. Moreover, following the literature on labor search, we let the matching elasticity equal to the bargaining power, i.e., $\rho = 1 - \eta = 0.5$.

Productivity Distribution As standard in the literature, we assume individual productivity $z$ follows the Power distribution, $F(z) = z^\alpha$ with $z \in (0, 1)$. Following Kurmann and Pestroky (2007), we set the selling probability $p_S = 0.86$. Moreover, the proportion of used capital that is successfully purchased over total investment is $\theta = \frac{p_S F(z^*)}{p T F(z^*) + \delta}$. Following Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006), we set $\xi = 24\%$. Then we have $F(z^*) = (z^*)^\gamma = \left(\frac{\xi}{1-\gamma}\right)\left(\frac{1}{p}\right)$.

Moreover, equation (46) can be rewritten as

$$z^* = \lambda \left(\frac{\epsilon}{1+\epsilon}\right) z^* + (1 - \lambda) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{1+\epsilon}\right) \left(\frac{1 - (z^*)^{1+\epsilon}}{1 - (z^*)^{1+\epsilon}}\right),$$

which then implies that $\epsilon = 1.2$.

Other Parameterization. The ratio of credit market instruments to non-financial assets is 0.7. So we can set $\mu = 0.72$. Moreover, we use $p_S$ to back out coefficient of the matching efficiency as $\xi = 0.88$.

The calibrated parameter values are reported in Table 3.

| Table 3. Calibration |
|----------------------|--|---|
| Parameter | Value | Description |
| $\beta$ | 0.99 | discount factor |
| $\alpha$ | 0.33 | capital income share |
| $\delta$ | 0.025 | depreciation rate |
| $A$ | 1 | aggregate productivity |
| $\gamma$ | 1 | inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply |
| $\psi$ | 1.75 | coefficient of labor disutility |
| $\sigma$ | 0.25 | parameter of investment adjustment cost |
| $\eta$ | 0.5 | bargaining power of dealers |
| $\rho$ | 0.5 | matching elasticity |
| $\xi$ | 0.88 | matching efficiency |
| $\mu$ | 0.72 | parameter of borrowing constraint |
| $\epsilon$ | 1.2 | parameter of individual productivity distribution |

4.3 Impulse Responses

The system of dynamic equations in our model for the variables $\{Y_t, TFP_t, I_t, C_t, K_t, N_t, W_t, P_t\}$ is given in the Appendix. There are three aggregate shocks in the model: (i) $A_t$, aggregate productivity shock, (ii) $\mu_t$, financial shock; and (iii) $\xi_t$, matching efficiency shock. These three shocks are assumed to be orthogonal to each other and follow AR(1) process with the persistence coefficient 0.95. We summarize the results in Figures 3.

Before showing the graphs, the key results are summarize below:
1. The amount of capital reallocation is procyclical under all three types of aggregate shocks, while the benefit of capital reallocation is counter-cyclical only under financial shocks and matching efficiency shocks.

2. The probability of selling out used capital is well below 100%, and is procyclical under all three shocks.

3. Both the price of used capital and that of new capital are procyclical. The former is significantly more volatile than the latter only under financial shocks.

4. The dispersion of firm investment rate is procyclical under all three shocks.

5. The dispersion of firms’ TFP is countercyclical only under financial shocks.

First, as shown in the black solid line in Figure 3, the aggregate productivity shock implies the amount of capital reallocation is procyclical, which fits the empirical regularity. However, the generated benefit of capita reallocation is also procyclical, which is at odds with the data. Although the prices of both used and new capital ($Q^p_t$ and $Q_t$) are procyclical, the volatility of the former is not significantly larger than the latter.
Second, the red dashed line in Figure 3 suggests that the time series generated by the financial shock are in line with all the aforementioned empirical facts. In particular, under the financial shock the volatility of $Q_t^D$ is significantly larger than that of $Q_t$. Here is the intuition. According to equation (1), we have $Q_t^D = R_t (z_t^*) + \Gamma (Q_t)$, which suggests that $Q_t^D$ increases with $z_t^*$ and $Q_t$. Given any $Q_t$, equation (46) suggests that $z_t^*$ increases with $\mu_t$ and $Q_t^D$. Therefore the financial shock ($\mu_t$) amplifies the interactions between $Q_t^D$ and $z_t^*$, and thus increases the relative volatility of $Q_t^D$ to $Q_t$.

Third, the blue dotted line in Figure 3 implies that, the matching-efficiency shock can also explain all the empirical facts about capital reallocation except that the volatility of used capital ($P_t$) is almost the same as that of new capital ($Q_t$). Combining all the findings from Figures 3 yields Table 4.

### Table 4. Summary Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>TFP Shock</th>
<th>Financial Shock</th>
<th>Search Shock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>amount of reallocation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>benefit of reallocation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>probability of reallocation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prices of used and new capital</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relative volatility of used capital price</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dispersion of investment rate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP dispersion</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Conclusion

This paper builds a search-based neoclassical model to explain a set of stylized facts about capital reallocation in the economy, including: (i) the dispersion of firms’ TFP (or the benefit of capital reallocation) is countercyclical, (ii) the quantity of used capital reallocation across firms is procyclical, and (iii) the prices of used capital are procyclical and more so than those of new capital goods. We show that search frictions in the capital market are essential for the empirical success of our model but not sufficient. We also show that endogenous movements in the distribution of firm-level TFP and endogenous interactions between used-capital investment and new investment under financial frictions are also required to simultaneously explain these stylized facts, especially the fact that prices of used capital are more volatile than that of new investment and that the dispersion of firms TFP is countercyclical. Existing models proposed to explain capital reallocation often succeeds in explaining a subset of the stylized facts but not simultaneously on all the stylized facts listed in the Introduction, thanks to our fully-fledged DSGE model. In this regard our work is a step forward in this growing literature.
References


Cui, W., 2014. Delayed capital reallocation. Working paper, UCL.


22
Appendix

Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1.

Proof: Seller Side. In the sellers’ market, only $p_t^S$ proportion of capital $k_t^S$ is traded between a dealer and a firm-$(k_t, z_t)$ who intends to sell $k_t^S$ units of capital. The marginal profit of the dealer is $\max\{Q_t^P - Q_t^S, 0\}$. The marginal profit of the seller is $\max\{Q_t^S - R_t (z_t) - \Gamma (Q_t), 0\}$. Therefore the total trading surplus per unit of capital is $\max \{Q_t^P - R_t (z_t) - \Gamma (Q_t), 0\}$.

Since $R_t (z_t)$ increases with $z_t$, which is evident from equation (2), trade on the seller side is beneficial if and only if $z_t < z_t^*$ such that $Q_t^S - R_t (z_t) - \Gamma (Q_t) > 0$, where the cutoff $z_t^*$ is determined by the zero profit condition for the marginal seller:

$$Q_t^S = R_t (z_t^*) + \Gamma (Q_t).$$ (1)

Denote $1 - \eta$ as the bargaining power of the firm side.\(^7\) Given $P_t$ and $z_t < z_t^*$, the terms of trade agreed between the dealer and the seller-firm are determined by the Nash bargaining problem:

$$\max_{Q_t^S (z_t) \geq 0} (Q_t^S (z_t) - R_t (z_t) - \Gamma (Q_t))^{1-\eta} (Q_t^P - Q_t^S (z_t))^{\eta},$$ (2)

which yields

$$Q_t^S (z_t) = (1 - \eta) Q_t^P + \eta (R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t)).$$ (3)

The above equation on $Q_t^S (z_t)$ is intuitive. As argued in the previous subsection, $\Gamma (Q_t)$ is the value of each unit of used capital. Therefore $R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t)$ denotes the expected value of each unit of capital with productivity $z_t$ if this unit of capital is put in production. Therefore the outside option of the dealer and the seller-firm-$z_t$ is $Q_t^P$ and $R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t)$ respectively. In turn, the Nash bargaining implies the trade price is weighted between these two outside options.

Buyer Side. Similarly, at buyer side, the trading surplus is given by $\max \{R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t) - Q_t^P, 0\}$. Therefore the trade on the seller side happens if and only $z_t > z_t^*$. Given $P_t$ and $z_t > z_t^*$, $Q_t^S (z_t)$ is also determined by a bilateral Nash bargaining such that

$$\max_{Q_t^P (z_t) \geq 0} \left((R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t) - Q_t^P (z_t)) \tilde{k}_t^P \right)^{1-\eta} \left(Q_t^P (z_t) \tilde{k}_t^P - Q_t^S (z_t) \tilde{k}_t^B \right)^{\eta},$$ (4)

which suggests that

$$Q_t^P (z_t) = (1 - \eta) Q_t^P + \eta (R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t)).$$ (5)

The intuition on $Q_t^B (z_t)$ is exactly the same to that on $Q_t^S (z_t)$ mentioned in the aforementioned remark.

Proof of Lemma 2: We obtain from equation (18) the demand and supply in the secondary market for capital reallocation as below.

\(^7\)The more general setup is to denote $1 - \eta^B$ and $1 - \eta^P$ as the bargaining power of firms as sellers and buyers respectively. Tractability is well preserved under the general setup. We implicitly assume symmetry, i.e., $\eta^S = \eta^B$, for simplicity.
\begin{align*}
k^B_t (k_t, z_t) &= \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t) - Q^B_t (z_t) < 0, \\ \mu_t P_t k_t, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}, \quad (.6) \\
k^S_t (k_t, z_t) &= \begin{cases} k_t, & \text{if } R_t (z_t) + \Gamma (Q_t) - Q^S_t (z_t) < 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}. \quad (.7)
\end{align*}

Substituting equation (.1) into the above equations yields desired results.

**Proof of Proposition 2:** We break the proof into two parts. To start with, the clearing condition in the labor market is given by

\[ \int \int n_t dG (k_t) dF (z_t) = N_t, \quad (.8) \]

where

\[ n_t (k_t, z_t) = \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{W_t} \right) \frac{1}{z_t} A_t z_t \tilde{k}_t, \quad (.9) \]

and

\[ \tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t) = k_t - \tilde{k}^S_t + \tilde{k}^B_t = \begin{cases} (1 - p^S_t) k_t, & \text{if } z_t \leq z^*_t \\ (1 + \mu_t p^B_t) k_t, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (.10) \]

Substituting equation (.9) and (.10) into (.8) yields

\[ \left( 1 - \frac{\alpha}{W_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} A_t K_t \left( \int_{z_{\min}}^{z^*_t} z_t (1 - p^S_t) dF (z_t) + \int_{z^*_t}^{z_{\max}} z_t (1 + \mu_t p^B_t) dF (z_t) \right) = N_t. \quad (11) \]

Note that

\[ \int_{z_{\min}}^{z^*_t} z_t (1 - p^S_t) dF (z_t) + \int_{z^*_t}^{z_{\max}} z_t (1 + \mu_t p^B_t) dF (z_t) \]

\[ = \int_{z_{\min}}^{z^*_t} z_t dF (z_t) + \int_{z^*_t}^{z_{\max}} z_t dF (z_t) + \mu_t p^B_t \int_{z^*_t}^{z_{\max}} z_t dF (z_t) - p^S_t \int_{z_{\min}}^{z^*_t} z_t dF (z_t) \]

\[ = E (z) + \mu_t p^B_t \left( 1 - F (z^*_t) \right) E (z | z \geq z^*_t) - p^S_t F (z^*_t) E (z | z \leq z^*_t) \]

\[ = E (z) + p^B_t S_t \left[ E (z | z \geq z^*_t) - E (z | z \leq z^*_t) \right], \quad (12) \]

where the last equality is held because of equation (37), the clearing condition in the inter-dealer market. Combining equation (.11) and (.12) yields

\[ \frac{1 - \alpha}{W_t} = \left( \frac{N_t}{A_t (E (z) + p^B_t S_t \left[ E (z | z \geq z^*_t) - E (z | z \leq z^*_t) \right]) K_t} \right)^{\alpha}. \quad (13) \]

Consequently, we have

\[ Y_t \equiv \int \int y_t \left( \tilde{k}_t, n_t \right) dG (k_t) dF (z_t) \quad (.14) \]

\[ = \int \int \frac{W_t n_t}{1 - \frac{\alpha}{W_t}} dG (k_t) dF (z_t) \]

\[ = \left( \frac{W_t}{1 - \frac{\alpha}{W_t}} \right) N_t \quad (15) \]

\[ = \left( A_t (E (z) + p^B_t S_t \left[ E (z | z \geq z^*_t) - E (z | z \leq z^*_t) \right]) K_t \right)^{\alpha} N_t^{1 - \alpha}, \quad (16) \]
where the last equality holds because of equation (.13). In the end, as a by-product, equation (.15) implies

\[ W_t = (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{N_t}. \]  

**Proof of Corollary on Standard Deviation of the Gross Investment Rate:** Equation (29) implies

\[
E \left( \frac{\tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t)}{k_t} \right) = 1, 
\]

\[
E \left( \frac{\tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t)}{k_t} \right)^2 = (1 - p_t^S)^2 F(z_t^*) + (1 + \mu_t p_t^B) (1 - F(z_t^*)). 
\]

Therefore

\[
std \left( \frac{\tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t)}{k_t} \right) = \sqrt{v \left( \frac{\tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t)}{k_t} \right)} \]

\[
= \sqrt{E \left( \frac{\tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t)}{k_t} \right)^2 - \left( E \left( \frac{\tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t)}{k_t} \right) \right)^2} \]

\[
= \frac{M_t^S (x_t^S, S_t)}{\sqrt{S_t B_t}}. 
\]

In turn,

\[
std \left( \frac{\tilde{\nu}_{\text{gross}} (k_t, z_t)}{k_t} \right) = (1 + \omega (Q_t)) std \left( \frac{\tilde{k}_t (k_t, z_t)}{k_t} \right) = (1 + \omega (Q_t)) \frac{M_t^S (x_t^S, S_t)}{\sqrt{S_t B_t}}. 
\]

**Dynamic System** Appendix.
\[ Y_t = (TFP_t \cdot K_t)^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}, \]

\[ TFP_t = A_t \left\{ \frac{\epsilon}{1 + \epsilon} + (z_t^\alpha)^\rho p_{t}^{S} [E(z|z \geq z_t^*) - E(z|z \leq z_t^*)] \right\}, \]

\[ W_t = \psi N_t^\gamma, \]

\[ K_{t+1} = \left( 1 + \frac{\delta \sigma}{1 - \sigma} \right) (1 - Q_t)^{\alpha - 1} K_t, \]

\[ P_t = \alpha \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{W_t} \right)^{1-\alpha} A_t z_t^\alpha + (1 - \delta) Q_t + \left( \frac{\delta}{1 - \sigma} \right) (Q_t - Q_t^\alpha), \]

\[ Q_t = E \left[ \frac{\beta C_t}{C_{t+1}} \left( \alpha \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{W_{t+1}} \right) \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} \frac{1}{z_t^\alpha} \right) + \Gamma (Q_{t+1}) \right] \]

\[ + E \left[ \frac{\beta C_t}{C_{t+1}} \alpha \left( \frac{1 - \alpha}{W_{t+1}} \right) \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha} p_{t+1}^{S} \int_{z_{t+1}^{\min}}^{z_{t+1}^{\max}} (z^\alpha - z) dF(z) \right], \]

\[ z_t^* = \lambda_t E(z_t|z_t \leq z_t^*) + (1 - \lambda_t) E(z_t|z_t > z_t^*), \]

\[ Y_t = C_t + I_t, \]

\[ I_t = \delta Q_t^\alpha K_t, \]

\[ W_t = (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{Y_t}{N_t} \right), \]

Moreover, \( \left( x_t^S, \theta_t^S, \theta_t^B, p_t^S, q_t^S, p_t^B, q_t^B, \lambda_t, \chi_t \right) \) emerges in the presence of search frictions:

\[ M^S \left( x_t^S, F(z_t^*) \right) = \mu_t M_t^B \left( 1 - x_t^S, (1 - F(z_t^*)) \right), \]

\[ \theta_t^S = \frac{F(z_t^*)}{x_t^S}, \]

\[ \theta_t^B = 1 - \frac{F(z_t^*)}{x_t^B}, \]

\[ p_t^S = M_t^S \left( \frac{1}{\theta_t^S}, 1 \right), \]

\[ q_t^S = M_t^S \left( 1, \theta_t^S \right), \]

\[ p_t^B = M_t^B \left( \frac{1}{\theta_t^B}, 1 \right), \]

\[ q_t^B = M_t^B \left( 1 - x_t^S, 1 - F(z_t^*) \right), \]

\[ \lambda_t = \frac{q_t^S}{q_t^S + q_t^B \mu_t}. \]

Finally, the amount and the benefit of capital reallocation, and the average bid-ask spread in the
decentralized markets for used capital is given by

\[ CR_i^A = p_i^S S_t K_t, \]

\[ CR_i^B = A_t \cdot [E(z|z \geq z_t^*) - E(z|z \leq z_t^*)]. \]