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David Andolfatto,
Aleksander Berentsen
and
Fernando M. Martin

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Money, Banking and Financial Markets*

David Andolfatto  
*Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and Simon Fraser University*  
Aleksander Berentsen  
*University of Basel*  
Fernando M. Martin  
*Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis*

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Abstract

The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. To this end, we integrate the Diamond (1997) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005) dynamic model of monetary exchange—a union that bears a framework in which fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable for government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are constrained by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort. Among other things, the model provides a rationale for nominal deposit contracts combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.

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1 Introduction

The fact that money, banking, and financial markets interact in important ways seems self-evident. The theoretical nature of this interaction, however, has not been fully explored. Diamond and Dybvig (1983), for example, explain the existence of banking, but do so in a model without money or financial markets. Diamond (1997) explains how banks and financial markets compete as mechanisms for liquidity insurance, but does so in a model without money. Loewy (1991) develops a model with money and banking, but abstracts from monetary policy and financial markets. Smith (2002) presents a model of money, banking, and monetary policy, but abstracts from financial markets. As far as we know, there has been no comprehensive theoretical analysis of how these three factors interact with each other.

In this paper, we combine the Diamond (1997) model of banking and financial markets with the Lagos and Wright (2005) model of monetary exchange. The result is a model where fractional reserve banks emerge in equilibrium, where bank assets are funded with liabilities made demandable for government money, where the terms of bank deposit contracts are constrained by the liquidity insurance available in financial markets, where banks are subject to runs, and where a central bank has a meaningful role to play, both in terms of inflation policy and as a lender of last resort.

In our model, money takes the form of zero-interest nominal government debt. The real rate of return on money—the inverse of the inflation rate—is determined by policy and is financed with lump-sum taxes or transfers. Money is necessary in the economy because an absence of trust between some trading parties precludes the use of credit (Gale, 1978). Money, however, is dominated in rate of return by securities representing claims against an income-generating capital good. Securities are illiquid in the sense they cannot be used to buy consumption goods. But securities possess a degree of indirect liquidity to the extent they can be readily exchanged for money on short notice. A financial market in which securities trade for money provides one mechanism for investors to access liquid funds. A bank that stands ready to convert deposit liabilities for cash provides another such mechanism.

Following Allen and Gale (2007, § 3.2), our investigation begins by asking how the economy might function in the absence of banks, but where investors have access to a market where they can liquidate securities. A well-known conclusion in this body of literature is that the resulting competitive equilibrium is inefficient, except for a knife-edge case relating to the nature of preferences (see also Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski, 2009). We find that this conclusion is an artifact of the static nature of the models employed. Our first result demonstrates that if monetary policy follows the Friedman rule, then the competitive equilibrium of an economy with a securities markets is efficient and that, moreover, the ability to save money across time is critical for this to be true. That is, a dynamic model is necessary for this result. The economic rationale for a banking system in this environment must therefore stem from one of two frictions, either: (i) monetary policy departs from the Friedman rule and/or (ii) the requisite securities market is either absent or sufficiently palsied.
Next, we examine how the economy might function in the absence of a securities market, so that cash and securities are held indirectly as bank deposit liabilities. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the optimal risk-sharing arrangement entails demandable debt, except that in our case, this debt is made redeemable for government money (instead of goods). We find that a competitive (or monopolistic, but contestable) banking system is also consistent with efficiency, but once again, only when monetary policy follows the Friedman rule. Thus, the choice of banks vs. securities markets becomes less consequential at low rates of inflation and becomes inconsequential when inflation policy is set optimally.

Away from the Friedman rule, the return on money is too low and thus, liquidity is scarce in both financial markets and banking systems. However, inflation impacts these two systems differently. In financial markets, inflation also taxes any excess money investors would like to carry across periods—as argued above, these savings are necessary for first-best implementation. In contrast, banks do not hold any excess cash and are thus not subject to this additional inefficiency.\(^1\) More generally, we show that, as inflation rises, risk-sharing deteriorates more rapidly in the market economy than with banking. Thus, even though welfare under both types of arrangements suffers with higher inflation rates, banking becomes relatively more valuable as inflation increases.

As alluded to above, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume that depositors are prevented from engaging in financial transactions outside of their banking relationships. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) suggest that this is approximately true in developing economies where government legislation and regulation often serves to repress financial markets in favor of banks. Securities markets are relatively well-developed in more advanced economies so that depositors have more options. It has been known since at least Jacklin (1987) that if depositors cannot be refrained from engaging in \textit{ex post} financial market trades, the \textit{ex ante} superior liquidity insurance made possible through banks may not emerge in equilibrium. Indeed, we reproduce the Jacklin (1987) result: if depositors have free and easy access to an \textit{ex post} securities market, banks are essentially constrained to offer a liquidity insurance contract that replicates what is offered in a competitive financial market. Since, as argued above, banking becomes relatively more valuable as inflation increases, the welfare loss from this “excess competition” is also increasing in the rate of inflation.

Even in more advanced economies, access to securities markets is not costless so that participation is limited. Following Diamond (1997), we introduce a parameter that governs how easily depositors can access the securities market. At one extreme, depositors are completely shut-off from securities markets—the standard Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assumption. At the other extreme, depositors can always access securities markets—the Allen and Gale (2007, § 3.2) assumption. We find that the Friedman rule implements the efficient allocation independent of the degree of market access by depositors, provided securities markets are frictionless.\(^2\) The first-best allocation obtains, even though some depositors are withdrawing cash from banks to buy assets in the securities markets, thus seemingly

\(^1\)This result supports the argument put forth by Diamond (1997) that banks improve the allocation by centralizing the holding of short-term liquidity—which reduces the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets. In contrast, in the equilibrium with financial markets, for a low enough inflation rate, investors hold \textit{idle} liquidity by saving money across periods.

\(^2\)That is, securities markets themselves are not subject to frictions that distort equilibrium prices.
impairing the ability of banks to provide risk-sharing. As in the case with financial markets but no banks, first-best implementation requires that depositors are able to save money across periods. Away from the Friedman rule, inflation is generally detrimental to welfare as it cuts into the ability of both markets and banks to provide liquidity insurance.

The results reported to this point rest on the assumption that banks are not subject to bank panics (or bank runs). Panics refer to events in which banks fall into insolvency owing to a fear of insolvency that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model was motivated by the question of whether the banking system is prone to panics and whether a government deposit insurance scheme could be designed to eliminate them. However, as far as we know, the question of how the presence of a securities market interacts with the phenomenon of bank panics in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework has not been investigated. Our results here are summarized as follows.

In the case of a perfectly liquid securities market, banks cannot improve the market allocation and so, if banks did exist, the welfare consequences of a bank panic are inconsequential as depositors are in a position to liquidate their securities at non-distressed market prices. The downside to liquid securities markets is that risk-sharing is relatively poor. In the case of an illiquid securities market, banks provide superior risk-sharing, but are vulnerable to panics. In the event of a panic, early liquidation of banks’ assets leads to financial losses for all depositors. Those without market access are further harmed by holding an improper portfolio mix, which they are now unable to rebalance according to their needs.

Thus, we identify what we think is an interesting trade-off. Innovations designed to improve securities market liquidity lead to less risk-sharing, but conditional on a bank panic lead to better *ex post* liquidation outcomes. Conversely, restrictions on the trading of securities improve liquidity insurance, but leave the economy vulnerable to the dislocations associated with banking panics. This latter prediction is broadly consistent with evidence showing that financial crises tend to be significantly more disruptive in developing economies relative to economies with more developed financial markets; see Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, Figure 4; 2014, Table 2).

The trade-off between insurance and stability is shown to depend on how the bankruptcy is resolved. Our model suggests that dispersing assets in the form of cash and “clearing-house certificates” generally dominates asset liquidation. This apparent trade-off, however, vanishes under an appropriate and more comprehensive monetary policy. The source of instability in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model is a contractual incompleteness that renders bank deposit liabilities “run-prone”. In principle, a fiscal policy that insures deposits against such events could prevent panics from occurring. But the effectiveness of an intervention depends on its credibility and a fiscal intervention must ultimately resort to direct taxation. Relative to fiscal policy, monetary policy has a distinct advantage because the object under its control (cash) also happens to be the object of redemption in demand deposit contracts. Thus, if deposit liabilities are purposely designed to be claims against cash (instead of goods), the monetary authority is always in a position to print the cash

\[\text{In particular, if promised redemption rates are made invariant to the volume of early withdrawals, a wave of heavy redemption activity may leave a bank (or the banking system) without enough cash to fulfill its obligations. If the fear of such an event leads depositors to withdraw cash en masse, the result is a self-fulfilling bank panic.}\]
necessary to help banks fulfill their nominal obligations. The fact that cash can be printed costlessly greatly enhances the credibility of the intervention and, in this way, the threat of such an intervention is sufficiently credible to discourage bank panics.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the physical properties of the model economy and characterize the nature of an efficient allocation. In Section 3, we introduce the frictions that motivate monetary exchange and we characterize the competitive equilibrium with a securities market, but absent banking and a banking equilibrium, absent a securities market. In Section 4, we examine how banks are affected when they must compete with a securities market for the provision of liquidity insurance. In Section 5, we examine the interaction between bank panics and the degree of securities market liquidity, and discuss the merits of a central bank lending facility. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix A.

2 The environment

Time, denoted $t$, is discrete and the horizon is infinite, $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, \infty$. Each time period $t$ is divided into three subperiods: the morning, afternoon and evening. There are two permanent types of agents, each of unit measure, which we label investors and workers.

Investors can produce morning output $y_0$ at utility cost $-y_0$. This output can be divided into consumer ($x$) and capital ($k$) goods, so that $y_0 = x + k$. Investors are subject to an idiosyncratic preference shock, realized at the beginning of the afternoon, which determines whether they prefer to consume early (in the afternoon) or later (in the evening). Let $0 < \pi < 1$ denote the probability that an investor desires early consumption $c_1$ (the investor is impatient). The investor desires late consumption $c_2$ (the investor is patient) with probability $1 - \pi$. There is no aggregate uncertainty over investor types so that $\pi$ also represents the fraction of investors who desire early consumption. The utility payoffs associated with early and late consumption are given by $u(c_1)$ and $u(c_2)$, respectively, where $u'' < 0 < u'$ with $u'(0) = \infty$. Investors discount utility payoffs across periods with subjective discount factor $0 < \beta < 1$, so that investor preferences are given by

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [-y_{0,t} + \pi u(c_{1,t}) + (1 - \pi)u(c_{2,t})]$$

Workers have linear preferences defined over morning and afternoon goods. In particular, workers wish to consume in the morning $c_0$ and have the ability to produce goods in the afternoon $y_1$. Goods produced in the afternoon can be stored into the evening of the same period, but are perishable across periods. Workers share the same discount factor as investors, so that worker preferences are given by

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [c_{0,t} - y_{1,t}]$$

The investment technology available to investors works as in the manner described in Cooper and Ross (1998). In particular, capital goods produced in the morning ($k$) are
assumed to generate a high rate of return \((R > 1)\) if left to gestate into the evening and a low rate of return \((0 < r < 1)\) if gestation is interrupted and operated in the afternoon.\(^4\) For simplicity, we assume that capital depreciates fully after it is used in evening production.

To characterize an efficient allocation, consider the problem of maximizing the \textit{ex ante} welfare of investors, subject to delivering workers an expected utility payoff no less than a given number (normalized here to zero, so that \(c_0 = y_1\)). The condition \(r < 1\) implies that workers can supply afternoon output more efficiently than investors who operate capital prematurely in the afternoon. As a consequence, efficiency dictates that premature capital utilization is never optimal. In addition, the morning resource constraint \(x = c_0\) must hold since the morning transfer of utility from investors to workers must balance. With these conditions imposed, the planning problem may be written as

\[
\max \{-x - k + \pi u(c_1) + (1 - \pi)u(c_2)\} 
\]

subject to

\[
x - \pi c_1 \geq 0
\]
\[
Rk + [x - \pi c_1] - (1 - \pi)c_2 \geq 0
\]

The \textit{first-best allocation} is characterized by the following two restrictions,

\[
u'(c_1^*) = R u'(c_2^*) = 1
\]

where, using (4) and (5), \(x^* = \pi c_1^*\) and \(k^* = (1 - \pi)c_2^*/R\). For the special case \(u'(c) = c^{-\sigma}\), \(\sigma > 0\), we have,

\[
(c_1^*)^* = 1 \quad \text{and} \quad (c_2^*)^* = R^{1/\sigma}
\]

If, in addition, investor types are private information, then incentive-compatibility conditions are necessary to ensure truthful revelation. Incentive-compatibility requires \(c_2 \geq c_1\) for patient investors and \(c_1 \geq 0\) for impatient investors. Note that (6) implies that \(c_2^* > c_1^* > 0\), so that the first-best allocation is incentive-compatible. Note too that conditions (6) imply \(u'(c_1^*) = R u'(c_2^*)\) as in the standard Diamond-Dybvig model. However, unlike the standard model, ours is a production economy with linear costs, which is why both \(u'(c_1^*)\) and \(R u'(c_2^*)\) need to equal the constant marginal cost of production at the first-best.

### 3 Competitive monetary equilibrium

Workers and investors meet in the morning and in the afternoon (but not in the evening). Ideally, investors would like to borrow output from workers in the afternoon, repaying the loan in the next morning. Such credit arrangements are ruled out here because workers and investors are assumed not to trust each other (Gale, 1978). As a consequence, any trade between workers and investors must occur on a \textit{quid-pro-quo} basis through the use of an exchange medium. The exchange medium here is assumed to take the form of a zero-interest-bearing government debt instrument (money), the total nominal supply of which is denoted \(M_t\) at the beginning of date \(t\).

\(^4\)Note that Diamond and Dybvig (1983) assume \(r = 1\).
Assume that the initial money supply $M_0 > 0$ is owned entirely by workers (this initial condition is immaterial for what follows). New money is created at the beginning of each morning at the constant rate $\mu$, so that $M_t = \mu M_{t-1}$. We assume that new money $T_t = (1 - 1/\mu) M_t$ is injected as lump-sum transfers to workers. Because preferences are (quasi) linear, the positive implications of our analysis are unaffected by precisely who gets the new money although, of course, there are redistributional consequences. We assume that trade in goods (for money) occurs on a sequence of competitive spot markets. Let $(p^m_t, p^a_t)$ denote the dollar price of output in the morning and afternoon, respectively.

Workers produce output in the afternoon for money, and carry the money forward to the next morning where they spend it on consumption. Because workers have linear preferences, their cost-benefit calculation is simple to characterize. To acquire a dollar in the afternoon, a worker must expend $1/p^a_t$ units of labor. This dollar is convertible for $1/p^m_{t+1}$ units of output the following morning. In present value terms, this future output is worth $\beta/p^m_{t+1}$ units of afternoon $t$ output. For an arbitrary price-system, the solution is at one of two corners: workers will want to work as much as possible, or not at all. In equilibrium, the output prices adjust so that workers are indifferent between working and not working. Hence,

$$1/p^a_t = \beta/p^m_{t+1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Condition (8) implies that workers are willing to supply output passively (elastically) in the afternoon to accommodate any level of investor demand.

We focus our analysis on stationary monetary equilibria. As is well known for this class of models (e.g., see Lagos and Wright, 2005), in a stationary monetary equilibrium, nominal prices grow at the same rate as the money supply. That is,

$$p^m_{t+1}/p^m_t = p^a_{t+1}/p^a_t = \mu$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)

Combining this latter restriction with condition (8) implies,

$$p^m_t/p^a_t = \beta/\mu$$  \hspace{1cm} (10)

Condition (10) says that when monetary policy is away from the Friedman rule (i.e., $\beta < \mu$), the price of afternoon money is discounted relative to morning money, i.e., $1/p^a_t < 1/p^m_t$. This is because money acquired in the afternoon can only be spent the next day and, away from the Friedman rule, money earns less than its socially optimal rate of return.

Condition (10) expresses the real rate of return to money held from the morning to afternoon. The return to capital goods held over the same period is $r$. In what follows, we assume that $\beta/\mu > r$ so that money is preferred to capital goods as a “short-run” investment vehicle. We also assume that $\mu \geq \beta$, since monetary equilibria otherwise fail to exist. To summarize, throughout the remainder of the paper we assume,

$[A1] \; r < \beta/\mu < 1.$

---

5While we permit any amount of deflation here in the range $\beta \leq \mu < 1$, there is the question of whether lump-sum taxation is an incentive-feasible policy. Andolfatto (2013) addresses this issue, but we ignore it in what follows. Note that assuming new money is distributed to workers only is made for expositional clarity (see Appendix B for how to map the general case into our results).
Because \( R > 1 \), capital goods (or claims to capitals goods, which we call securities) are preferred to money as a “long-run” investment vehicle. But the willingness of investors to hold securities will depend in part on how easily they can be liquidated (convertible to cash) in the random event they become impatient. This, in turn, depends on the availability of a securities market, or some institution (like a bank) that stands ready to perform the conversion. In what follows, we study the role of securities markets and a banking system as alternative mechanisms for providing the desired liquidity insurance.

3.1 A securities market

In this section, we follow Diamond (1997) and Allen and Gale (2007, § 3.2) in first examining how this economy might solve the “liquidity problem” through the use of a competitive securities market where investors can exchange securities for money in the afternoon after their preference types have been realized. Let \( q_t \) denote the nominal price of a security (a claim to a unit of the capital good, measured in units of money).

The existence of a securities market opens up the possibility that workers may want to acquire capital in the morning, sell it in the afternoon for money and use the cash to buy consumption in the following morning. Since workers have linear preferences, if the afternoon price of securities is too low then they will want to short capital, which they cannot (since they are unable to produce capital and lack commitment to repay debts); conversely, if the price is too high they will want to buy an infinite amount of capital in the morning. In Appendix C we show that the equilibrium price we derive below is such that workers do not have an incentive to trade capital.

Since capital goods depreciate fully at the end of each period, investors will enter the morning with zero securities and \( m_t^m \geq 0 \) units of money. In the morning investors will want to rebuild their depleted wealth portfolios. They can do so in two ways, first, by working to produce consumer goods in exchange for money and second, by working to produce new capital goods. Define real money balances at the beginning of the morning \( z \equiv m_t^m / p_m^m \) and real money balances after morning trading by \( x \equiv m_a^m / p_a^m \).

In the afternoon, investors learn whether they are patient or impatient. Impatient investors will want to sell securities and patient investors will want to buy them. Let \( k_1 \) and \( k_2 \) denote the securities sold and bought, by an impatient and patient investor, respectively. An impatient investor faces the constraint \( k \geq k_1 \) while a patient agent faces the constraint \( m_a^m \geq q_t k_2 \).

Because \( x \equiv m_a^m / p_a^m \), the real value of money balances in the afternoon is given by \( m_a^m / p_a^m = (p_m^m / p_a^m) x \). Using condition (10), we can write \( m_a^m / p_a^m = (\beta / \mu) x \). It will also prove useful to define \( \rho \equiv q_t / p_a^m \), the afternoon price of capital goods measured in units of afternoon output. All investors carry their morning wealth \( x + k \) into the afternoon, where it is worth \( (\beta / \mu) x + \rho k \), measured in units of afternoon output. Let \( m_{1,t+1}^m, m_{2,t+1}^m \geq 0 \) denote the money carried forward to the next morning for the impatient and patient investor, respectively. Using (8) and the fact that (in a stationary equilibrium) \( \mu = p_{t+1}^m / p_t^m \), we

\[ ^6 \text{Note that, from this point on, we drop the time script notation for real variables. A contemporaneous variable } x_t \text{ is simply denoted } x \text{ and a future variable } x_{t+1} \text{ is denoted } x^+. \]
have $m_{i,t+1}/p_t = \beta z_i^+$ for $i = 1, 2$.

Now consider the budget equation for an impatient investor, $c_1 + m_{1,t+1}/p_t = m_t^i/p_t + (q_t/p_t^i)k_1 + r(k - k_1)$. Using the notation developed above, rewrite this equation as

$$c_1 = (\beta/\mu)x + \rho k_1 + r(k - k_1) - \beta z_1^+$$

(11)

The impatient investor is subject to the following constraints,

$$z_1^+ \geq 0$$

(12)

$$k - k_1 \geq 0$$

(13)

$$(\beta/\mu)x + \rho k_1 - \beta z_1^+ \geq 0$$

(14)

Condition (12) says that cash balances carried forward in time cannot be negative (there is no borrowing). Condition (13) says that the impatient investor cannot sell more capital goods in the afternoon securities market than he brings into the period. Condition (14) says that the amount of cash brought into the next period cannot exceed the amount of cash brought into the afternoon augmented by the cash acquired via afternoon sales of capital goods.

Next, consider the budget equation for a patient investor, $c_2 + m_{2,t+1}/p_t^a = R(k + k^P) + m_t^i/p_t^i - (q_t/p_t^i)k_2$. Again, using the notation developed above, rewrite this budget equation as

$$c_2 = R(k + k_2) + (\beta/\mu)x - \rho k_2 - \beta z_2^+$$

(15)

The patient investor is subject to the following constraints,

$$z_2^+ \geq 0$$

(16)

$$(\beta/\mu)x - \rho k_2 \geq 0$$

(17)

$$(\beta/\mu)x - \rho k_2 - \beta z_2^+ \geq 0$$

(18)

Condition (16) stipulates that cash balances going forward must be non-negative. Condition (17) states that the value of capital goods purchased in the securities market cannot exceed the amount of cash on hand. Condition (18) says that the amount of cash carried forward plus cash spent on securities cannot exceed the amount of cash on hand.

As it turns out, constraints (14) and (17) are redundant and hence, can be omitted from the investor’s problem.

**Lemma 1** The inequality constraints (14) and (17) do not bind.

The inequality (14) does not bind since the impatient investor can always relax it by selling all his capital while (weakly) increasing consumption, given $r \leq \rho$. Inequality (17) does not bind since it is implied by (16) and (18).

Let $V(z)$ denote the value function associated with real money balances $z$ in the morning. This value function must satisfy the following recursive relationship,

$$V(z) \equiv \max_{x, k, k_1, k_2, z_1^+, z_2^+} \left[ z - x - k + \pi \left[ u(c_1) + \beta V(z_1^+) \right] + (1 - \pi) \left[ u(c_2) + \beta V(z_2^+) \right] \right]$$

(19)
subject to (12), (13), (16) and (18), and where \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \) are given by (11) and (15), respectively.

Let \( \pi \beta \zeta_1 \) and \( (1 - \pi) \beta \zeta_2 \) denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraints (12) and (16), respectively. Let \( \pi \lambda_1 \) and \( (1 - \pi) \lambda_2 \) denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (13) and (18), respectively. In what follows, we assume (and later verify) that \( x > 0 \) and \( k > 0 \). After some simple rearrangements the first-order necessary conditions for an optimum imply

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi u'(c_1) + (1 - \pi) \left( \frac{R}{\rho} \right) u'(c_2) &= \frac{\mu}{\beta} \quad (20) \\
\pi u'(c_1) + (1 - \pi) \left( \frac{R}{\rho} \right) u'(c_2) &= 1/\rho \quad (21) \\
(\rho - r)u'(c_1) &= \lambda_1 \quad (22) \\
(R/\rho - 1)u'(c_2) &= \lambda_2 \quad (23) \\
u'(c_1) - 1 &= \zeta_1 \quad (24) \\
(R/\rho) u'(c_2) - 1 &= \zeta_2 \quad (25)
\end{align*}
\]

Conditions (20) and (21) imply that the equilibrium price of capital goods in the afternoon securities market is pinned down by monetary policy, i.e.,

\[ \rho = \frac{\beta}{\mu} \quad (26) \]

At the individual level, investors are indifferent between holding money or capital goods in their wealth portfolios because the short-run rate of return on money and capital goods is equated, in equilibrium, through a no-arbitrage condition.

It is worthwhile to think through the intuition that governs the no-arbitrage condition (26). Suppose that \( \rho > \beta/\mu \). In this case, investors have no incentive to accumulate money in the morning because in the event they need money, they expect to be able to liquidate securities for a higher rate of return. Collectively, this means that the demand for real money balances goes to zero, which cannot be a part of any monetary equilibrium.\(^7\) Suppose, alternatively, that \( \rho < \beta/\mu \). In this case, investors would prefer to accumulate only money in the morning because in the event they want securities (because they turn out to be patient), they expect to purchase these securities cheaply. However, because securities would in this case be absent, their price would be infinite—a contradiction.

Securities market-clearing in our model implies,

\[ \pi k_1 = (1 - \pi) k_2 \quad (27) \]

Note that, given \([A1]\) and (26), conditions (22)–(23) imply \( \lambda_1 > 0 \) and \( \lambda_2 > 0 \), respectively. That is, constraints (13) and (18) bind. Thus, \( k_1 = k \) which, when combined with (27), implies \( k_2 = \pi (1 - \pi)^{-1} k \), and \( (\beta/\mu) x = \rho k_2 + \beta z_2^+ \). Thus, (15) implies

\[ c_2 = Rk / (1 - \pi) \quad (28) \]

Because capital goods depreciate fully at the end of the evening, securities issued in the morning are fully redeemed in the evening. Furthermore, patient investors use their cash

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\(^7\)Of course, \( x = 0 \) is consistent with a non-monetary equilibrium, which exists in every monetary model.
holdings either to purchase securities in the afternoon or to save on effort in the following morning. Recall that any cash on hand in the evening cannot be spent because by assumption investors are not in contact with workers in the evening. It therefore follows that evening consumption is financed entirely through securities redemptions.

Since constraint (18) binds, \((\beta/\mu)x - \rho k_2 = \beta z_2^+\). Use (26) and \(k_2 = \pi(1 - \pi)^{-1}k\) to rewrite this condition as

\[
\mu z_2^+ = x - \pi(1 - \pi)^{-1}k
\]  

(29)

\[\text{[A2]} - \frac{u''(c)c}{u'(c)} > 1\]

Under assumption [A2], when monetary policy is away from the Friedman rule, i.e., \(\mu > \beta\), impatient investors will never choose to carry money across periods; i.e., \(\zeta_1 > 0\) \((z_1^+ = 0)\). At the Friedman rule, we can set \(z_1^+ = 0\) without loss of generality.\(^8\)

Lemma 2 Assume [A1] and [A2]. Then, \(z_1^+ = 0\).

Combine the fact that \(z_1^+ = 0\), \(k_1 = k\), \(\rho = \beta/\mu\) with (11) to derive

\[c_1 = (\beta/\mu)(x + k)\]  

(30)

Finally, use (21) and (26) to form,

\[
\pi(\beta/\mu)u'(c_1) + (1 - \pi)Ru'(c_2) = 1
\]  

(31)

There are two cases to consider depending on whether \(z_2^+ = 0\) or \(z_2^+ > 0\). Assume for the moment that \(z_2^+ = 0\) (we will later describe a region in the parameter space where this assumption is valid). In this case, conditions (29) and (30) imply \(k = (\mu/\beta)(1 - \pi)c_1\) which, when combined with Lemma 2, results in the condition

\[c_2 = R(\mu/\beta)c_1\]  

(32)

Conditions (31) and (32) characterize the equilibrium allocation \((c_1, c_2)\) when investors choose to carry no cash across periods. This case corresponds closely to the static models studied by Diamond (1997) and Allen and Gale (2007, § 3.2) except that in our case, zero saving is derived as a property of the equilibrium in some cases, rather than assumed to hold at all times.

Consider next the case for which \(z_2^+ > 0\). Because \(\zeta_2 = 0\), condition (25) and (26) imply that \(c_2\) is characterized by

\[Ru'(c_2) = \beta/\mu\]  

(33)

Thus, conditions (31) and (33) characterize the equilibrium allocation \((c_1, c_2)\) for the case in which a patient investor desires to carry cash over time. As we discuss further below,\(^8\) in the proof of Lemma 2 we also consider the case when [A2] is not satisfied. Specifically, if \(-\frac{u''(c)c}{u'(c)} < 1\) then it is patient investors that never carry money across periods \((z_2^+ = 0)\).
the ability to save cash across periods has important implication for the market allocation and distinguishes our results substantially from Allen and Gale (2007, § 3.2).

While it is possible to proceed in a slightly more general manner, in what follows we restrict ourselves to a class of utility functions that permit a closed-form solution. In particular, assume the following:

\[ A3 \] \( u'(c) = c^{-\sigma} \), where \( \sigma > 1 \).

Note that condition \([A3]\) implies that condition \([A2]\) holds as well. For the case \( z_2^+ = 0 \), we need to verify that condition (25) holds with \( \zeta_2 > 0 \), that is \((R/\rho) c_2^{-\sigma} > 1\). Using (32), this latter condition can be expressed as \((R/\rho)^{1-\sigma} c_1^{-\sigma} > 1\). Now use (31) and (32) to solve for \( c_1^{-\sigma} = [\pi \rho + (1 - \pi) R^{1-\sigma} \rho^\sigma]^{-1}\). Thus, the necessary condition is given by,

\[(R/\rho)^{1-\sigma} > \pi \rho + (1 - \pi) R^{1-\sigma} \rho^\sigma\] (34)

Condition (34) will of course hold for a wide range of parameters. But there are also regions in the parameter space where it does not hold. For the special case \( \sigma = 2 \), (34) implies that the inflation rate \( \mu \) needs to exceed a critical value \( \mu_0 > \beta \), i.e.,

\[ \mu > \left( \frac{1 - \pi}{1 - \pi R} \right) \beta \equiv \mu_0 > \beta \] (35)

Thus, patient investors dispose of all their cash holdings in the afternoon securities market only if the inflation rate is sufficiently high (\( \mu > \mu_0 > \beta \)). Otherwise, they are willing to carry cash over time even if monetary policy operates away from the Friedman rule, at least, as long as inflation is sufficiently low (\( \mu_0 > \mu > \beta \)).

Let \((c_1^D, c_2^D)\) denote the equilibrium allocation assuming \([A1]\) and \([A3]\). Using the restrictions deduced above, we have

\[ c_1^D = \begin{cases} (\pi \rho)^{1/\sigma}[1 - (1 - \pi) \rho]^{-1/\sigma} & \text{if } \mu < \mu_0 \\ [\pi \rho + (1 - \pi) R^{1-\sigma} \rho^\sigma]^{1/\sigma} & \text{if } \mu \geq \mu_0 \end{cases} \] (36)

\[ c_2^D = \begin{cases} (R/\rho)^{1/\sigma} & \text{if } \mu < \mu_0 \\ [\pi R^\sigma \rho^{1-\sigma} + (1 - \pi) R]^{1/\sigma} & \text{if } \mu \geq \mu_0 \end{cases} \] (37)

where \( \rho = \beta/\mu \).

**Proposition 1** Assume \([A1]\) and \([A3]\). The equilibrium allocation in the securities market economy possesses the following properties: (i) \( c_1^D(\mu) < c_1^D(\beta) \) and is strictly decreasing in \( \mu \), with \( c_1^D(\beta) = c_1^D \); (ii) \( c_2^D(\mu) > c_2^D(\beta) \) and is strictly increasing in \( \mu \), with \( c_2^D(\beta) = c_2^D \).

Proposition 1 asserts that inflation harms risk-sharing. Evidently, securities markets are less able to provide liquidity insurance in high-inflation environments. Why is this the case? Inflation affects the short rates of return (morning to afternoon) of cash and capital differently: it reduces the return on cash, \( \beta/\mu \), and increases the return on capital, \( R/\rho \).
In effect, inflation penalizes afternoon consumption (financed with cash) in favor of higher evening consumption (derived from maturing capital), thus reducing risk-sharing.  

3.1.1 The role of savings

It is of some interest to compare our results with Allen and Gale (2007, § 3.2) who report that the market mechanism studied here implements the first-best only in the special case of logarithmic utility. Our Proposition 1, in contrast, asserts that a market mechanism implements the first-best allocation for a broader class of preferences, so long as monetary policy is set optimally.

The discrepancy in these results can be traced to the fact that our model is explicitly dynamic. Allen and Gale (2007, § 3.2), in contrast, use a version of the original Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, which is static in nature. In our model, when the return on the short asset is equal to its social optimal level (in Allen and Gale, the short-rate return is given technologically), patient investors want to save across periods. In Allen and Gale (2007, § 3.2), they are not permitted to do so. The equivalent restriction in our model would be to require \( z_1^+ = z_2^+ = 0 \) always. In this case, the allocation described in (36) and (37) for \( \mu \geq \mu_0 \) would now hold for the entire range of \( \mu \geq \beta \), in particular,

\[
\begin{align*}
    c_1^D &= \left[ \pi \rho + (1 - \pi) R^{1-\sigma} \rho^\sigma \right]^{1/\sigma} \\
    c_2^D &= \left[ \pi R^\sigma \rho^{1-\sigma} + (1 - \pi) R \right]^{1/\sigma}
\end{align*}
\]

At the Friedman rule, \( \rho = 1 \), so that

\[
\begin{align*}
    c_1^D &= \left[ \pi + (1 - \pi) R^{1-\sigma} \right]^{1/\sigma} \\
    c_2^D &= \left[ \pi R^\sigma + (1 - \pi) R \right]^{1/\sigma}
\end{align*}
\]

In this case, \((c_1^D, c_2^D) = (c_1^+, c_2^+) = (1, R)\) if and only if \( \sigma = 1 \). However, as our analysis makes clear, this result seems to have less to do with the nature of preferences and more to do with an implicit restriction on saving behavior.

Proposition 1 is important because it implicitly contains the conditions necessary to obviate a role for banking in the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. The first condition is that monetary policy corresponds to the Friedman rule. The second condition is the availability of a freely-available competitive securities market that permits the selling of securities. If either or both of these conditions do not hold, then a bank-like institution that improves risk-sharing is likely to emerge.

Proposition 1 holds for a wider class of preferences. Under [A2], we show that impatient investors never save money across periods (see Lemma 2) while patient investors may or

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9 Note that these results hold for any \( \sigma > 0 \), except for \( c_2^D(\mu) \) being strictly increasing in \( \mu \) for \( \mu \geq \mu_0 \), which requires \( \sigma > 1 \), i.e., a strong enough income effect.

10 We implement the Friedman rule via a contraction of the money supply. However, it is equally feasible to implement the first-best allocation with interest-bearing money financed by lump-sum taxation (see Andolfatto, 2010). This result is also related to Grochulski and Zhang (2017) who find that optimality requires to pay interest on reserves.
may not save. The behavior of patient investors in this regard depends on the inflation rate: for low enough inflation rates ($\mu < \mu_0$) they save and for high enough inflation rates ($\mu \geq \mu_0$) they do not. We impose [A3] to derive an explicit cutoff value for the inflation rate $\mu_0$. With the more general assumption [A2] the cutoff value may not exist; i.e., it may be the case that $\mu_0 \to \infty$, implying that patient investors always save.

### 3.2 A banking arrangement

In the model described above, monetary trade with a securities market does not implement efficient risk-sharing when monetary policy operates away from the Friedman rule. When this is the case, a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) style bank that replaces the securities market may provide a superior risk-sharing arrangement. We now investigate this possibility.

A bank is an intermediary that offers investors a contract $(y, c_1, c_2)$, where $y$ denotes an investor’s initial (morning) deposit and $(c_1, c_2)$ denote history-dependent withdrawal limits for the afternoon and evening, respectively. Agents participating in a banking arrangement are henceforth labeled depositors. Because depositor type is private information, the liabilities issued by the bank will have to be made demandable (the early withdrawal option must be made exercisable at depositor discretion). Because depositors wanting to withdraw early will want cash, the bank must hold cash reserves for the afternoon trading period. To acquire cash, the bank sells $x \leq y$ units of (claims to) morning output (to workers in the form of consumer goods) in exchange for $m^a_t = p^m_t x$ dollars of cash to be carried as reserves into the afternoon. The remaining claims to morning output $k = y - x$ are used to purchase income-generating capital goods.

Workers do not trust the unsecured promises of investors. Thus, workers need to be paid with an exchange medium, which we assume takes the form of government money. We might instead have assumed that workers accept bank deposit liabilities as in Skeie (2008). In this case, the demand for government money would be driven out of circulation if it did not offer the same rate of return as private money. While we assume that workers only accept government money, our analysis would survive if we had assumed that workers prefer to hold some of their liquidity in the form of government money. At the end of the day, we want there to be a demand for government money since empirically we observe banks creating deposit liabilities made redeemable in government money.

Thus, a bank effectively takes deposits $y$ in the morning which it divides between cash $x$ and physical capital $k$, i.e., $y = x + k$. The liabilities issued against these assets are assumed to be perfectly enforceable. Deposit liabilities not redeemed in the afternoon constitute pro rata claims against a bank’s remaining assets (any residual cash and the income generated from capital goods). Because capital depreciates fully at the end of each period and because preferences are quasi-linear, without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to “static” contracts.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, we assume that banks behave symmetrically in equilibrium. From this point on any reference to a bank should be understood to mean a representative price-

\textsuperscript{11} That is, we may assume without loss in generality that cash net of afternoon redemptions taken into the evening are fully paid out, along with any returns to capital. See also Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007).
taking bank unless it is otherwise noted.

Measured in units of afternoon output, afternoon cash reserves are given by \((\beta/\mu)x\) and capital goods are given by \(k\). Let \((k_2, y_2)\) denote the amount of capital goods and cash, respectively, used to finance \(c_2\). Let \((z_1^+, z_2^+)\) denote the purchasing power of cash carried into the next morning by the impatient and patient investors, respectively. Then, the bank faces the following afternoon budget constraint

\[
(\beta/\mu)x + r(k - k_2) - y_2 - \beta z_1^+ - \beta z_2^+ = \pi c_1
\]

The evening budget constraint is given by

\[
Rk_2 + y_2 = (1 - \pi)c_2
\]

Given assumptions [A1] and [A2], it is straightforward to demonstrate that optimality will entail the following: (i) \(k_2 = k\) (capital goods are not used prematurely), (ii) \(y_2 = 0\) (cash will never be used to finance evening consumption), and (iii) \(z_1^+ = 0\) (impatient depositors spend all their cash in the afternoon). Thus, in what follows, we impose these restrictions beforehand to enhance the clarity of the exposition.

As an aside, note that we can think of banks here either as a depositor-cooperative, or as a monopoly bank interested in maximizing its own profit. In this latter case, we could assume that banks have linear preferences over morning output. As such, we could model banks as designing deposit contracts \((y, c_1, c_2)\) that maximize the expected welfare of depositors, charging depositors a lump-sum participation fee \(f\) in the morning for services rendered. A monopoly bank would be able to charge a fee \(f\) that extracted the entire investor surplus (their gains from entering into the banking arrangement net of the payoff associated with their next best alternative). Because utility is transferable here (i.e., preferences are quasilinear), the amount of surplus extracted by a monopoly bank would in no way affect the equilibrium allocation \((c_1, c_2)\). If markets are contestable (Baumol, 1982), then the fee \(f\) is, in equilibrium, bid down to the cost of banking (normalized to zero here). The point of mentioning this here is that in what follows, parameter changes that affect depositor welfare could equally well be interpreted as affecting bank profits to the extent that banks have some bargaining power.

Let \(W(z)\) denote the welfare of a depositor who enters the morning with real money balances \(z\). These balances allow a depositor to save on effort in the morning; hence, \(W(z)\) is linear in \(z\) and so, \(W(z) = W(0) + z\). Competition will drive banks to create a depositor base sufficiently large to diversify away idiosyncratic liquidity risk. A competitive and fully diversified bank maximizes the representative depositor’s welfare by solving the following problem,

\[
W(z) \equiv \max_{x,k,z_2^+} z - x - k + \pi u(c_1) + (1 - \pi)[u(c_2) + \beta z_2^+/(1 - \pi)] + \beta W(0)
\]

subject to \(z_2^+ \geq 0\), \(\pi c_1 = (\beta/\mu)x - \beta z_2^+\), \((1 - \pi)c_2 = Rk\), and the incentive-compatibility condition

\[
u(c_2) + \beta z_2^+/(1 - \pi) \geq u(c_1)
\]
Condition (40) ensures truthful revelation on the part of patient investors, i.e., they will prefer to wait until the evening to withdraw their deposits.\textsuperscript{12}

Let $\beta \psi$ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint $z_2^+ \geq 0$, and $\phi$ the Lagrange multiplier for the incentive constraint (40). The conditions for optimality are given by

\begin{align}
(1 - \phi/\pi) \left( \frac{\beta}{\mu} \right) u'(c_1) &= 1 \\
\left[ 1 + \phi/(1 - \pi) \right] Ru'(c_2) &= 1 \\
1 + \phi \left[ 1/(1 - \pi) + u'(c_1)/\pi \right] + \psi &= u'(c_1)
\end{align}

Let us conjecture (and then verify) that the Lagrange multiplier $\phi = 0$. In this case, the banking allocation $(c_1, c_2)$ is determined by

\begin{align}
\left( \frac{\beta}{\mu} \right) u'(c_1) &= 1 \\
Ru'(c_2) &= 1
\end{align}

From (44)–(45), $c_2 > c_1$, since $R > \beta/\mu$. Thus, since $z_2^+ \geq 0$, it follows that (40) is slack, which confirms our conjecture that $\phi = 0$.

It is immediately evident from (44)–(45) that the banking equilibrium implements the first-best allocation at the Friedman rule. Moreover, because of the quasilinearity of preferences, the evening allocation is invariant to inflation. The afternoon allocation is strictly decreasing in the rate of inflation, reflecting the usual inflation-tax effect on cash goods. For the preferences given in [A3], conditions (44)–(45) imply that the bank allocation is given by,

\begin{align}
c_1^B &= \left( \frac{\beta}{\mu} \right)^{1/\sigma} \leq c_1^* \\
c_1^B &= R^{1/\sigma} = c_2^*
\end{align}

**Proposition 2** Assume [A1] and [A3]. The equilibrium allocation in the banking economy possesses the following properties: (i) $c_1^B(\mu) < c_1^*$ and is strictly decreasing in $\mu$, with $c_1^B(\beta) = c_1^*$; (ii) $c_2^B = c_2^*$ and is invariant to $\mu$.

Finally, it is of some interest to note that under a banking arrangement, it is never optimal for either banks or depositors to carry “excess” cash over time. Combining (44) with (43) implies

$$\psi = \mu/\beta - 1$$

Thus, for inflation rates satisfying $\mu > \beta$, we have $z_2^+ = 0$. When $\mu = \beta$ we have $z_2^+ \geq 0$, but we can set $z_2^+ = 0$ without loss of generality. This is in contrast with the securities market equilibrium where patient investors found it optimal to carry cash balances over time for inflation rates $\mu \leq \mu_0$.

\textsuperscript{12}A patient depositor prefers to wait until the evening if the value of doing so is at least as large as the value of misrepresenting himself, i.e., declaring to be impatient and withdrawing in the afternoon. The bank contract needs to provide incentives for truthful revelation of type. Formally, this implies the incentive compatibility condition, $u(c_2) + \beta W(z_2^+/(1 - \pi)) \geq u(c_1) + \beta W(0)$, which given $W(z) = W(0) + z$ simplifies to (40).
3.3 Comparing banks and markets

In this section, we compare equilibrium allocations under a securities market (36)–(37) with a banking system (46)–(47). The first thing to note is that both institutions deliver the optimal level risk-sharing arrangement when monetary policy follows the Friedman rule. Away from the Friedman rule, the banking arrangement offers superior risk-sharing than the securities market and hence, higher \textit{ex ante} welfare for depositors.

**Proposition 3** Assume [A1] and [A2]. Investors’ welfare in a competitive banking equilibrium is greater than in a competitive securities market equilibrium; that is, $W(z) > V(z)$, for all $z \geq 0$.

The differences in allocations depend on whether inflation is below or above the threshold $\mu_0$ we identified above. For impatient investors we have

$$
c_B^1/c_D^1 = \begin{cases} 
\pi^{-1/\sigma}[1 - (1 - \pi)(\beta/\mu)]^{1/\sigma} & \text{if } \mu < \mu_0 \\
[\pi + (1 - \pi)(R\mu/\beta)^{1-\sigma}]^{-1/\sigma} & \text{if } \mu \geq \mu_0
\end{cases}
$$

Given [A1] and [A2], it is easy to show that $c_B^1 > c_D^1$ for all $\mu > \beta$. Also, from the expressions above, it is clear that the distance between $c_B^1$ and $c_D^1$ increases with inflation.

Since evening consumption is at its first-best level in the banking equilibrium, the allocation here dominates the market allocation for all inflation rates. In particular, $c_B^2 = c_D^2 < c_B^1$ for all $\mu > \beta$. Furthermore, given Proposition 1 the distance between $c_B^2$ and $c_D^2$ also increases with inflation. Thus, as inflation rises, the consumption of impatient and patient investors spreads out more rapidly in the market economy than with banking. Thus, even though welfare under both types of arrangements suffers with higher inflation rates, banking becomes relatively more valuable as inflation increases.

The allocation under banking can be viewed as \textit{constrained-efficient} in the sense that the banking equilibrium replicates what a planner facing a rate of return of $\beta/\mu$ between morning and afternoon would implement. This is analogous to assuming the rate of return on the short-term technology in a standard Diamond-Dybvig setup may be less than one; in this case, banks would implement the first-best for any given rate of return on the short-term technology. The difference is that in our model the short-term rate of return is determined by government policy rather than technology.

What can banks do that markets cannot? One way to think about this is to note that both banks and markets are mechanisms for liquidity insurance. Our competitive financial market structure is a linear mechanism, whereas our banking structure is a nonlinear mechanism. We know that nonlinear mechanisms weakly dominate linear mechanisms. But what exactly is the intuition for why in the present context? In the market equilibrium, we have shown that patient investors save money across periods if the inflation rate is sufficiently low. That is, investors face a liquidity shock where they end up holding idle money balances, for which they do not earn interest. In the banking model, this is never the case. No money is ever saved by investors. The entire money stock ends up in the hands of workers, which carry it to the next period. This clearly shows that the market mechanism is less efficient than the bank in allocating the money into those hands that need it.
Unlike the standard result in the banking literature, however, the market economy here implements the first-best when the rate of return on money is just right (i.e., at the Friedman rule), regardless of preferences. As we explained above, allowing investors to save money across periods is critical for this result. Away from the Friedman rule, the market and banking allocation differ. This is because inflation taxes the idle money balances that investors in the market economy would like to hold across periods, creating an inefficiency in addition to the low rate of return between morning and afternoon. In contrast, banks do not hold idle cash and are thus not subject to this wedge since they face no aggregate uncertainty with respect to their liquidity needs.

The market economy here shares a property often found in models where money and capital must compete to some extent as stores of value: a high rate of inflation induces an overaccumulation of capital (Tobin, 1965). Interestingly, for the reasons mentioned above, the banking system here insulates long-term capital returns completely from inflation.

4 Banking and securities market

In the analysis above, we studied two monetary economies, one with a securities market and one with a banking system. Each of these alternative liquidity risk-sharing mechanisms deliver the same afternoon and evening consumption when monetary policy operates at the Friedman rule. When monetary policy operates away from the Friedman rule, Proposition 3 asserts that a banking system delivers superior risk-sharing for investors. Proposition 3, however, was derived under the assumption that bank depositors cannot access a securities market after types are revealed. While this assumption is commonly employed in the literature beginning with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), it is not innocuous—see Jacklin (1987), Haubrich (1988), von Thadden (1997) and Diamond (1997). In this section, we assume the existence of a securities market in the afternoon where investors can trade money for capital. We make the realistic assumption that depositors cannot commit to deal exclusively with banks.

4.1 Banking vs securities market

Consider a depositor who turns out to be patient in the afternoon. Since the incentive-compatibility condition (40) holds, he clearly prefers to withdraw his funds in the evening—assuming his only option is to spend what he withdraws in the afternoon on afternoon consumption. However, if the depositor has access to a securities market then, instead of spending the cash he withdraws on afternoon goods, he could use it to purchase capital goods at price $\rho$. The question is how the opportunity for securities market trading impinges on the ability of banks to offer liquidity insurance.

To begin, we study banking arrangements that coexist with an afternoon securities market that trades money for capital at an exogenous price $\rho$. In due course, we will consider specific environments that determine this price. Both individual banks and depositors are assumed to take $\rho$ parametrically.
Patient depositors can withdraw $c_1$ units of (real) money in the afternoon, exchange it for capital at price $\rho$ and earn a return $R$ in the evening. Assuming they spend all their money, the resulting evening consumption is equal to $(R/\rho)c_1$. If this amount is larger than $c_2$, patient depositors will withdraw their funds in the afternoon rather than wait until the evening. Thus, patient depositors have an incentive to withdraw early when the price of capital is low enough. When $\rho < R(c_1/c_2)$, the deposit contract needs to be modified to take this behavior into account, while when $\rho \geq R(c_1/c_2)$, the contract we described in Section 3.2 applies.

**Proposition 4** Assume [A1] and [A2]. Let $\bar{\rho} \equiv R(c_1^B/c_2^*)$, where $c_1^B$ solves (44). Then, a patient depositor with access to a securities market prefers to withdraw his deposit in the afternoon if and only if $\rho < \bar{\rho} \in (\beta/\mu, R)$.

The highest securities price for which patient depositors have incentives to withdraw early, $\bar{\rho}$ is bounded by $\beta/\mu$ and $R$. Note that a patient depositor would never pay more than $R$ for capital in the afternoon. As for the lower bound, recall that $\rho = \beta/\mu$ is the equilibrium price we derived in Section 3.1 when we studied financial markets in the absence of banks. Below, we consider generalizations of that environment to allow for the possibility of limited market participation. In all these applications, the following property holds.

[A4] $\rho \leq \beta/\mu$.

Since $\beta/\mu < \bar{\rho}$, [A4] is a sufficient condition for patient depositors to withdraw in the afternoon—see Proposition 4. As we discuss further below, $\rho \leq \beta/\mu$ is a property of a large class of financial markets structures. After analyzing the deposit contract that arises under [A4], we will discuss the case $\rho \in (\beta/\mu, \bar{\rho})$.

### 4.2 Bank deposit contracts in the presence of financial markets

We now study how banks structure their deposit contracts when some measure of agents have access to a securities market. Following Diamond (1997), we assume that each patient depositor gains access to a securities market with probability $\tilde{\eta} \in [0, 1]$. When $\tilde{\eta} = 0$, patient depositors are shut out of the securities market completely, so that the analysis collapses to the scenario studied in Section 3.2. As $\tilde{\eta} \to 1$, patient depositors access the securities market with greater ease. Again, we assume no aggregate uncertainty so that $\tilde{\eta}$ also represents the measure of patient depositors that gain access to the securities market. Finally, we assume that depositors realize their “market-access shock” after making their morning deposit but prior to visiting the bank in the afternoon. Without any loss in generality, we assume that impatient depositors can always access the securities market.\(^{13}\)

If $\tilde{\eta} > 0$ then the bank anticipates that, in addition to impatient depositors, there will be a measure $\tilde{\eta}$ of patient depositors wishing to withdraw funds early. The bank sets

\(^{13}\)This assumption follows Diamond (1997) and is immaterial in this section, as impatient depositors never have an incentive to access the market, but will come into play when we analyze bank runs.
aside $m^q_t$ dollars in reserve in the morning or, measured in units of afternoon consumption, $c_1 = (m^q_t/p^q_t)/[(\pi + (1-\pi)\tilde{\eta})]$.

Let $\tilde{k}$ denote the amount of securities purchased by a patient depositor with market access. Since the nominal value of purchased capital cannot exceed the cash withdrawn from the bank, we have $q_t\tilde{k} \leq m^q_t/[(\pi + (1-\pi)\tilde{\eta})]$ or, in real terms, $\rho \tilde{k} \leq c_1$ (recall that $\rho \equiv q_t/p^q_t$). Any unspent cash is carried into the next morning; hence, $\beta \tilde{z}^+_2 = c_1 - \rho \tilde{k} \geq 0$. The capital goods purchased in the securities market generate $\tilde{c}_2 = R\tilde{k}$ consumption goods in the evening. We can combine these latter two expressions to write the budget constraint of the patient agents with market access as follows:

$$\beta \tilde{z}^+_2 = c_1 - (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2 \geq 0 \quad (49)$$

As before, the bank faces an afternoon budget constraint and an evening budget constraint. The evening budget constraint is $(1-\pi)(1-\bar{\eta})c_2 = R\bar{k}$. The afternoon budget constraint is derived as follows. At the beginning of the afternoon, the bank holds $m^q_t$ units of money and each impatient depositor and each patient depositor with access receives $m^q_t/\pi (\pi + (1-\pi)\bar{\eta})$ dollars. Hence, in real terms the budget constraint satisfies $(\beta/\mu) x = [\pi + (1-\pi)\bar{\eta}]c_1$.

Let $W(z)$ denote the value of beginning the morning with real money balances $z$. These balances allow a depositor to save on effort in the morning; hence, $z$ enters linearly and we again obtain $W(z) = W(0) + z$. Thus, we can use (49) to write $\beta W(\tilde{z}^+_2) = \beta W(0) + c_1 - (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2$. The choice problem facing a bank on behalf of a depositor who enters the morning with real money balances $z$ can be written as

$$W(z) \equiv \max_{x,k,\tilde{c}_2} z-x-k+\pi u(c_1)+(1-\pi)\bar{\eta}[u(\tilde{c}_2) + c_1 - (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2] + (1-\pi)(1-\bar{\eta})u(c_2) + \beta W(0)$$

subject to the bank’s budget constraints $(\beta/\mu) x = [\pi + (1-\pi)\bar{\eta}]c_1$ and $(1-\pi)(1-\bar{\eta})c_2 = R\bar{k}$; the budget constraint of a patient depositor with market access (49) and the incentive-compatibility conditions $u(\tilde{c}_2) + c_1 - (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2 \geq u(c_2) \geq u(c_1)$. Note that if (49) binds, then $\tilde{z}^+_2 = 0$ and the incentive compatibility conditions simplify to $\tilde{c}_2 \geq c_2 \geq c_1$.

Let $(1-\pi)\bar{\eta}\tilde{\zeta}$ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint (49), $c_1 - (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2 \geq 0$. If the incentive-compatibility conditions are slack, the first-order conditions imply

$$\pi u'(c_1) + (1-\pi)\bar{\eta}(R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) = (\mu/\beta)[\pi + (1-\pi)\bar{\eta}] \quad (50)$$

$$Ru'(c_2) = 1 \quad (51)$$

$$(R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) = 1 + \tilde{\zeta} \quad (52)$$

We now verify that the incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied and further characterize the deposit contract.

**Proposition 5** Assume $[A1]$ and $[A4]$. The bank deposit contract $(c_1, c_2, \tilde{c}_2)$ characterized by (49)–(52) is incentive-compatible. Furthermore, $c_1 < c_1^B < c_2^* < c_2 = \tilde{c}_2$, where $c_1^B$ solves (44).
How does the bank deposit contract change in the presence of a securities market? Patient depositors without market access receive the same evening allocation ($c_2 = c_2^∗$). Patient depositors with market access profit from the low market price of capital ($\rho \leq \beta/\mu$). They achieve a higher level of consumption ($\tilde{c}_2 > c_2^∗$) by withdrawing their money and using it to buy cheap capital goods. This higher consumption for patient depositors comes at the cost of lower consumption for impatient depositors ($c_1 < c_1^0$). This result follows from the bank holding an inefficient asset portfolio—too much cash, too little capital—to counteract the outside option offered by access to the securities market.

The following proposition establishes how markets impinge on the ability of banks to provide liquidity insurance. At one extreme, when patient depositors cannot ever access the securities market, banks are not hindered by the presence of markets. At the other extreme, when patient depositors can always access the securities market, banks cannot offer more risk-sharing than the market, rendering their existence redundant.

**Proposition 6** Assume [A1] and [A4]. When $\tilde{\eta} = 1$ (frictionless access to the securities market) the banking system is constrained to offer the risk-sharing allocation available in the securities market. When $\tilde{\eta} = 0$ (no access to the securities market), the banking allocation (44)–(45) is implemented.

Propositions 5 and 6 are related to Diamond (1997) who, like us, asks how the *ex post* availability of markets disciplines the amount of risk-sharing that can be made available through banks. In our setting, we can further ask what type of monetary policy is generally best for welfare. Note that to answer this question we need to allow for the possibility that the securities price $\rho$ depends on inflation $\mu$.

**Proposition 7** Assume [A1] and [A4]. If $(d\rho/d\mu)(\mu/\rho) \geq -1$ then welfare is strictly decreasing in inflation.

The result above provides a sufficient condition for which inflation is bad for welfare. This condition, expressed as the elasticity of the securities price with respect to inflation, is trivially satisfied when $\rho$ is nondecreasing in $\mu$; when $\rho$ is decreasing in $\mu$, the condition places a restriction on how fast the securities price falls with inflation. In these cases, the best policy is to implement the Friedman rule, i.e., let $\mu \downarrow \beta$. Note that, although the Friedman rule is the best policy, it is not typically enough to achieve the first-best allocation. Below, we show that first-best implementation requires both the Friedman rule and a financial market that prices securities at $\rho = 1$.

Up to this point, we have maintained [A4], $\rho \leq \beta/\mu$, which is sufficient but not necessary for patient depositors to withdraw in the afternoon (see Proposition 4). When

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14Diamond (1997) also considers the restrictions placed by the possibility of an *ex ante* deviation, which was also considered by Jacklin (1987). The deviation in this case has an investor bypass the bank and directly acquire only capital in the morning. If he turns out to be patient he enjoys the high return to his large capital investment. If he turns out to be impatient he uses the securities market to sell it. As it turns out, this deviation places no additional restrictions in our model.

15When $\rho = \beta/\mu$ (as in Section 3) it is easy to show that $(d\rho/d\mu)(\mu/\rho) = -1$, which satisfies the condition in Proposition 7.
\[ \rho \in (\beta / \mu, \bar{\rho}) \] the bank deposit contract characterized by (49)–(52) may or may not be incentive-compatible. To see this, note that as \( \rho \nearrow \bar{\rho} \equiv R(c_1/c_2^*) \) condition (49) converges to \( c_1 - (c_1^2/c_2^*) \bar{c}_2 \geq 0 \). Since \( c_1 < c_1^* \), this implies \( \bar{c}_2 < c_2^* \). When \( \tilde{\zeta} = 0 \), the incentive-compatibility constraint \( u(\bar{c}_2) + c_1 - (\rho/R)\bar{c}_2 \geq u(c_2) \) may still be satisfied. This can happen when \( \mu \) is low enough to induce large enough cash savings by the patient agent with market access. However, when \( \tilde{\zeta} > 0 \), which happens when \( \mu \) is high enough, \( \bar{c}_2 < c_2^* \) implies the incentive-compatibility constraint \( \bar{c}_2 \geq c_2 \) is not satisfied. In this case, an incentive-compatible deposit contract would have to offer \( \bar{c}_2 = c_2 \); since as argued above \( \bar{c}_2 < c_2^* \), it must be that \( \bar{c}_2 = c_2 < c_2^* \). In other words, the bank needs to reduce consumption for patient depositors without market access to keep the contract incentive-compatible.

When [A4] is not satisfied and the contract characterized above prescribes \( \bar{c}_2 = c_2 < c_2^* \), the bank may prefer to offer a different contract, in which the consumption of all patient depositors is financed with capital. This contract is identical to the one described in Section 3.2, but with an additional incentive-compatibility constraint to ensure no patient depositor accesses the securities market, \( c_1 - (\rho/R)c_2 \leq 0 \), which given Proposition 4 necessarily binds.

### 4.3 Price determination in the securities market

Up to this point, we have studied how banks and markets coexist for a given securities price, \( \rho \). An important result was that if \( \rho < \bar{\rho} \) then markets hinder the ability of banks to provide liquidity insurance. We characterized deposit contracts under the stronger assumption [A4] and we now consider specific environments where this condition is met.

As shown in Proposition 4, patient depositors with market access facing a securities price \( \rho < \bar{\rho} \) will withdraw their deposits in the afternoon and use that money to buy capital. The question now is who do they buy it from? Impatient depositors also withdraw money from the bank in the afternoon, so there are no gains from trade with them. Workers are unable to create capital, so they cannot offer any for sale either. Hence, for a spot securities market to exist, we must introduce a set of investors that do not participate in the banking system. We call these unbanked agents *investors* to distinguish them from *depositors*. We provide some examples below.

Suppose there is a large measure of investors that do not participate in the banking sector but have access to a securities market. As is the case with patient depositors, patient investors can only access the afternoon securities market with probability \( \eta \in [0, 1] \). This market-access shock is realized in the afternoon, before the securities market opens. Impatient investors always have access to the securities market. This sector of the economy is a generalization of the securities market economy analyzed in Section 3.1. We assume the unbanked sector is large enough, so that the measure of depositors accessing it does not affect the equilibrium price. Later, we discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption.

Note that the market-access probability faced by depositors, \( \tilde{\eta} \) is not necessarily equal to the probability faced by investors, \( \eta \). The former probability determines the measure of depositors that may exploit market access to improve on the bank contract, whereas the latter probability determines the prices at which securities trade in the market. We make this distinction to understand which of the two parameters matter for the results we derive.
The constraints faced by impatient investors and patient investors with market access are the same as those described in Section 3.1. Consider then a patient investor that has no access to the securities market. His budget constraint is \( \hat{c}_2 = \frac{\beta}{\mu} x + Rk - \beta \hat{z}_2^+ \) and he also faces a non-negativity constraint on money holdings, \( \hat{z}_2^+ \geq 0 \).

In any equilibrium, the price of capital goods in the afternoon securities market is bounded by the short and long rates of return on capital: \( r \leq \rho \leq R \). In Appendix D we derive the following condition, which generalizes the pricing equation (26) to allow for limited participation in financial markets:

\[
(1 - \pi)(1 - \eta)(R/\rho - 1)u'(\hat{c}_2) = 1/\rho - \mu/\beta
\]

**Lemma 3** Consider a securities market with price characterized by (53). Then, \( \rho = \beta/\mu \) if \( \eta = 1 \) and \( r \leq \rho < \beta/\mu \) if \( \eta \in (0,1) \).

Lemma 3 establishes that as long as the securities price is determined independently by investors, [A4] is satisfied and hence, all the results from Propositions 4, 5, 6 and 7 apply.

There are several scenarios in which a financial market characterized by (53) would naturally coexist with a banking sector. Consider a financial market formed by institutional investors, such as investment banks, mutual funds, insurance corporations, etc. Compared to households, entrepreneurs and retail investors, institutional investors are typically more risk-tolerant and have easier/cheaper access to financial markets. As such, they have a low demand for banks services. In the limiting case where investors are risk-neutral, they would have no demand for liquidity insurance. Similarly, if investors have frictionless access to the securities market, their demand for banking services would also be zero, as banks cannot improve on the risk-sharing provided by markets (see Proposition 6). In either of these limiting cases, the equilibrium securities price would be determined by a no-arbitrage condition that does not depend on the relative sizes of the banked and unbanked sectors.

Deposit contracts designed to insure risk-averse, limited market-participation agents, could however be exploited by institutional investors. That is, institutional investors could arbitrage from the terms of trade offered by banks to risk-averse depositors, either due to their higher risk tolerance or superior market access. In such a case, coexistence of markets and banks would require banks to be able to distinguish investors’ ex ante type. In the real world, banks engage in this very practice, offering different services and contracts to retail and institutional level investors.

Another plausible scenario in which markets and banks could coexist is when the unbanked correspond to the informal sector. For legal, regulatory or financial reasons, these agents cannot or choose not to participate in the formal banking sector. They can, however, still trade cash for assets. Pawn shops, for example, can be accessed by anyone, including depositors, but cater to individuals excluded from more formal financial mechanisms.

Whatever the interpretation, it is worthwhile noting that our set up features equilibrium coexistence of banking and securities markets. In all other settings we are aware of, beginning with Jacklin (1987), securities markets only represent a threat to equilibrium banking arrangements.
4.4 Optimal monetary policy

The next result shows that when banks and securities markets coexist, the first-best allocation can be implemented in equilibrium if and only if monetary policy is at the Friedman rule and (unbanked) investors have frictionless access to the market.

Proposition 8 Assume [A1]. Consider a competitive banking sector and a securities market with an equilibrium price satisfying (53) for \( \eta \in (0, 1] \). If patient depositors have market access, \( \tilde{\eta} \in (0, 1] \), then the first-best allocation is implementable if and only if \( \eta = 1 \) (investors have full access to securities markets) and \( \mu \leq \beta \) (monetary policy is at the Friedman rule). Furthermore, assuming [A2], first-best implementation requires that patient depositors with market access carry strictly positive amounts of money across periods.

In the proof of Proposition 8, we show that when \( \mu = \beta \) and \( \eta = 1 \), \( \rho = 1 \) and the savings constraint does not bind, i.e., \( \tilde{\zeta} = 0 \). Then, from (50)–(52), it immediately follows that \( c_1 = c_1^* \) and \( c_2 = c_2^* \). Given our previous analysis on market and bank arrangements, it is perhaps not surprising that the first-best allocation is attainable at the Friedman rule. However, it is important to note that the result holds only if investors face no market access frictions, i.e., \( \eta = 1 \). It is only in this case that the securities market yields the price necessary for first-best implementation, \( \rho = 1 \). In contrast, the probability of market access for depositors, \( \tilde{\eta} \) plays no role in determining optimality of the Friedman rule.

Since frictionless markets and banks in isolation each implement the first-best at the Friedman rule, it may seem natural to expect the same result to apply when the two systems coexist. However, at the Friedman rule, patient depositors with market access still find it optimal to withdraw their bank deposits in the afternoon, since it is still the case that \( (R/\rho)c_1^* > c_2^* \) when \( \rho = 1 \). That is, patient depositors do not behave as they do when the securities market is not available. How can this behavior be consistent with first-best implementation? Proposition 8 again highlights the role of savings: it is critical that depositors have an opportunity to save across periods in order to implement efficient liquidity insurance. In effect, they use the withdrawn funds to purchase only enough capital to finance \( c_2^* \) and carry the remaining cash into the next period, so that they won’t have to work as hard to rebalance their portfolios.

4.5 General equilibrium effects on the price of securities

The results derived above rest on the assumption that market prices are not affected by the measure of patient depositors accessing it. Alternatively, the measure of depositors accessing the market could be large enough to affect the equilibrium securities price. In this case, the additional money brought in by patient depositors with market access is going to bid up the price of capital \( \rho \). As established in Proposition 4, as long as the effect on the price is not too large, i.e., \( \rho \) remains below \( \tilde{\rho} \), patient depositors with market access will still have an incentive to withdraw early. Furthermore, as long as \( \rho \) does not exceed \( \beta/\mu \), the results in Propositions 5, 6 and 7 still hold.
There is a limit to how far general equilibrium effects can push \( \rho \) above \( \beta/\mu \), given by workers' incentives to arbitrage in the securities market. As we characterize in Appendix C, if workers access the securities market with probability \( \pi_w \), then the securities price \( \rho \) cannot exceed \( 1/\pi_w \) in equilibrium—if the price were any higher, workers would demand an infinite amount of capital in the morning to sell in the afternoon. How far securities prices can rise above \( \beta/\mu \) depends inversely on workers' market access: the upper bound on the equilibrium securities price converges to one as \( \pi_w \) goes to one and converges to infinity as \( \pi_w \) goes to zero.

The optimality of the Friedman rule established in Proposition 8 still applies when allowing for general equilibrium effects. When \( \eta = 1 \) the securities price is pinned down by the no-arbitrage condition \( \rho = \beta/\mu \). At the Friedman rule, \( \rho = 1 \) and the first-best allocation \((c_1^*, c_2^*)\) is implemented. Patient depositors withdrawing in the afternoon and accessing the securities market are happy to trade \( c_1^* \) for \( c_2^* \) at \( \rho = 1 \) and save any extra money to save on effort in the following period. Hence, with full participation in the securities market (\( \eta = 1 \)) and monetary policy at the Friedman rule (\( \mu = \beta \)), there is no effect of the securities price (\( \rho = 1 \)), regardless of the relative sizes of the banked and unbanked sectors.

### 4.6 Related literature

It is some interest to compare our results relative to Farhi et. al. (2009) and a closely related paper by Allen and Gale (2004). These authors highlight the interaction of two key frictions: private information over preference types and unobservable side trades. Our paper adds a dynamic dimension and an additional friction—a lack of commitment over debt repayment—that generates a demand for money.

In particular, Farhi, et. al. (2009) demonstrate the usual underprovision of liquidity that occurs when \textit{ex post} trading cannot be discouraged. They then demonstrate how an intervention in the form of a broad-based minimum reserve requirement can be selected such that banking equilibrium with side trades implements the efficient risk-sharing allocation. The intervention works through a general equilibrium effect. In particular, a legislated increase in bank reserves has the effect of lowering the equilibrium interest rate on the long-maturity instrument. This, in turn, has the effect of discouraging patient depositors from cashing out early for the purpose of arbitrage (i.e., by re-investing the proceeds in the long-maturity instrument).

In our model, the rate of return on the long-maturity instrument is related to the inflation rate, as established in (53). Thus, our preferred intervention—the Friedman rule—shares the flavor of the Farhi, et. al. (2009) result. In particular, by running a deflation, the monetary authority increases the rate of return on the short-instrument (cash) and lowers the rate of return on the long-instrument (securities). This is exactly the type of relative price distortion that is necessary to correct the externality generated by the market frictions in this environment.
5 Bank panics and securities markets

Consistent with the literature we have cited repeatedly above, the analysis here supports the idea that banks are generally superior to markets as mechanisms for delivering liquidity insurance. However, to the best of our knowledge no one has asked how the availability of markets interacts with bank sector fragility. The main purpose of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), of course, was to formalize the notion of bank sector “fragility” and the rationale for deposit insurance. How are the results we derived above sensitive to the existence of bank panic equilibria?

In what follows, we assume a common form of contractual incompleteness that gives rise to the existence of a bank panic—a situation in which all patient depositors misrepresent themselves as being impatient. In particular, we assume that the bank contract described above does not anticipate the possibility of a panic. Moreover, we assume that banks cannot commit to suspending redemptions after cash reserves are depleted. Instead, we simply assume that if the contractually stipulated early redemption promise cannot be met for every depositor requesting early redemption, then the bank becomes bankrupt and is forced to disperse its assets in some prescribed manner. Below, we consider a number of ways in which bankruptcy is resolved.

An important property of the bank contract analyzed in Section 4 is that the afternoon market value of the bank’s asset portfolio is not enough to cover all its obligations if all depositors decide to withdraw in the afternoon. That is, even in the best-case scenario that the bank is able to liquidate all its capital at market prices, it would not be able to keep its promise to depositors in the event of a bank panic.

Lemma 4 Assume [A1] and [A4]. Then, the bank deposit contract characterized by (49)–(52) implies $(\beta/\mu)x + \rho k < c_1$.

The equilibrium securities price $\rho \leq \beta/\mu$, which the bank faced when designing the deposit contract is an upper bound on the price it faces in the event of a bank panic. To see this, note that the bank needs to liquidate capital and obtain cash in order to meet deposit redemptions. If there are any general equilibrium effects of a bank panic in the securities market, they will put downward pressure on $\rho$, due to the simultaneous increase in the supply of capital and the demand for cash. That is, the market value of the bank’s portfolio may be even lower than that assumed in Lemma 4. General equilibrium effects are not central to our results, so we ignore them in our discussion below.

The resolution of a bank panic depends on whether the bank itself has access to the financial market or not. Even in that case it may not be optimal to access the market and convert capital into cash. We consider each case in turn.

5.1 Asset liquidation

Suppose that banks are forced to liquidate their assets in the event of bankruptcy. Given market price $\rho \leq \beta/\mu$, the bank sells $k$ units of investment for $\rho k$ units of cash (measured
in units of afternoon consumption). At the end of the liquidation process, the bank has real
money balances totalling \((\beta/\mu)x + \rho k\), which it disperses on a pro rata basis to depositors
(all of whom are asking for cash in the afternoon). By Lemma 4, \((\beta/\mu)x + \rho k < c_1\) and
so, the bank has insufficient cash to honor all its obligations (if this condition were not to
hold, then the bank would be in a position to fulfill its early redemption promises, so that
a panic could not be an equilibrium).

What do depositors do with the cash they receive? The answer depends on what trading
opportunities depositors have. Impatient depositors simply spend their cash in the afternoon
goods market. The measure \(1 - \eta\) of patient depositors that do not access the securities
market are compelled to spend their cash for afternoon goods as well, which they store
into the evening; hence, they obtain the same consumption as impatient depositors. The
measure \(\tilde{\eta}\) of patient depositors who gain access to the securities market can sell all their
cash in exchange for capital goods; however, depending on circumstances, they may want to
carry over some cash to the following period. Let \(c_{l1}, c_{l2}, \tilde{c}_{l2}\) be the allocation resulting from
a liquidation of the bank’s asset portfolio, where the superscript \(l\) denotes “liquidation.”

We next establish the properties of this allocation.

**Proposition 9** Assume \([A1]\) and \([A4]\). Consider a deposit contract \((c_1, c_2, \tilde{c}_2)\), as charac-
terized by (49)-(52). In the event of a bank panic, if the bank liquidates its asset portfolio
in the securities market and disperses the proceeds pro rata among all depositors, then all
depositors receive \((\beta/\mu)x + \rho k\) units of cash in the afternoon and the resulting allocation
\((c_{l1}, c_{l2}, \tilde{c}_{l2})\) has the following properties: \(c_{l1} = c_{l2} < c_1 < c_2\); and \(\tilde{c}_{l2} = \tilde{c}_2 \leq (R/\rho)c_{l1}\) if
\((R/\rho)u'((R/\rho)c_{l1}) \leq 1\), and \(\tilde{c}_{l2} < \tilde{c}_2\) otherwise.

In general, all depositors obtain lower consumption. The only exception is for patient
depositors with market access, when the market value of liquidated bank assets is high
enough. In such a case, these depositors would still be able to afford \(\tilde{c}_2\) and save the
remaining cash to economize on effort in the following morning. Note that, when (49) is
satisfied with equality in the original bank contract, \(\tilde{c}_2 = (R/\rho)c_1 > (R/\rho)c_{l1} \geq \tilde{c}_{l2}\), i.e.,
patient depositors with market access obtain strictly lower consumption when banks assets
are liquidated.

### 5.2 Clearinghouse certificates

Cash liquidations are not the only way to handle an unexpected mass redemption event. An
alternative protocol is to disperse assets on a pro rata basis through equity shares, leaving
depositors with the option of whether to hold or liquidate claims to bank assets. In
effect, this protocol converts debt to equity, an operation sometimes used in the business
sector when firms are under financial distress. In the context of banking, the practice was
used extensively during the U.S. National Banking Era (1863-1913); see Gorton (1988). In
particular, mass redemption events were often dealt with by having banks coalesce into a
consolidated entity, suspending cash redemptions, and issuing clearinghouse certificates rep-
resenting claims against the assets of the consolidated entity. These claims would circulate
in secondary markets and once the crisis passed, operations returned to normal.
Assume that the bank disperses its cash holdings, \((\beta/\mu)x\), on a pro rata basis, so that the certificates it issues constitute claims to its capital investments, \(k\). How does this mechanism differ from asset liquidation in our model? As before, we need to ask what depositors do with their certificates which, in turn, depends on what trading opportunities they have available. Impatient depositors need cash, so they will want to dispose of their certificates in the securities market. In this case, impatient depositors receive the same allocation as with asset liquidation.\(^{16}\) Likewise, the measure \(\tilde{\eta}\) of patient depositors who gain access to the securities market can use the cash to acquire capital goods and also obtain the same consumption as with asset liquidation. The group treated differently are the patient depositors without market access, who in this case obtain a higher consumption allocation: \((\beta/\mu)x + Rk\) instead of \((\beta/\mu)x + \rho k\). The reason for this is that, since they cannot access the securities market, they prefer to hold on to capital until it matures, rather than have the bank liquidate the capital on their behalf.

**Proposition 10** Assume [A1] and [A4]. Consider a deposit contract \((c_1, c_2, \tilde{c}_2)\), as characterized by (49)–(52). In the event of a bank panic, if the bank disperses its cash holdings pro rata and issues claim certificates on its capital, then all depositors receive \((\beta/\mu)x\) units of cash and \(k\) claims on capital, and the resulting allocation \((\tilde{c}_1, \tilde{c}_2, \tilde{\tilde{c}}_2)\) has the following properties: \(\tilde{c}_1 = c_1^h; \ c_2 > \tilde{c}_2 > c_2^h\); and \(\tilde{\tilde{c}}_2 = c_2^h\).

In our model, satisfying depositor demands through the use of cash and certificates is preferable to the use of cash alone. The reason for this hinges on the pattern of market access. When the bank liquidates, it provides cash to depositors that would have preferred to keep their investment. If these depositors have difficulty in rebalancing their portfolio (in our model because market access is costly or imperfect), then they are made worse off by being forced to hold a low-yielding asset. If these depositors were instead handed certificates representing claims to investment, the bank is in effect moving their portfolio in the direction they want. That is, why liquidate securities on behalf of depositors who wish to stay invested? In this case, they spend their cash on afternoon goods and hold their certificates until they mature in the evening. The resulting allocation dominates what they would have received if they had instead been given cash only.

### 5.3 A trade-off between insurance and stability

Banks offer superior liquidity insurance relative to markets. But if banks are subject to panics, then the benefit of this added insurance must be weighed against the costs of disruptions in the payments system. It is interesting to note that conditional on a bank panic, the cost of the subsequent disruption is smaller for economies in which depositors have easier access to securities markets. Hence, there is a sense in which the availability of securities markets helps stabilize the financial system.

On the other hand, our analysis suggests that such stability will come at a cost. In particular, as access to securities markets becomes progressively less costly over time, the

\(^{16}\)This result relies on the assumption that impatient depositors have full market access, which allows them to always sell their certificates for cash.
ability of banks to provide superior liquidity insurance arrangement will diminish accordingly. The quantitative impact of these developments is predicted here to depend largely on the inflation rate regime. For high inflation rate regimes, the economic benefits of liquidity insurance through the banking sector is higher. But for low inflation rate regimes, the welfare gains of banks over markets diminish. We conclude that a policy of keeping inflation low and stable as access to financial markets improves over times seems like a good way to promote financial stability along with ensuring access to liquidity insurance.

The discussion above is related to the literature on the stability role of the maturity structure of government debt (e.g., Greenwood, Hanson and Stein, 2017 and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson, 2015). In this literature, providing more short-term safe assets crowds out production of short-term deposits and increases financial stability. In our model, there is only one government security—a zero-interest bond (money). This government security is useful in transactions.

One could imagine adding to the model a long-term illiquid bond that would be priced at its “fundamental” value. Away from the Friedman rule, the short-term debt (money) would trade at a premium relative to the long-term debt. That is to say, the exchange medium (or collateral asset) would be “scarce.” The scarcity of liquidity would motivate the formation of fractional reserve banks. The effect of this is to expose the economy to financial instability. The effect of lowering the inflation rate is to increase the real rate of return on short-term debt (money), encouraging banks and other agencies to become satiated with liquidity.

At the Friedman rule, banks are willing to hold “excess reserves,” i.e., they voluntarily hold enough cash to meet the highest possible redemption activity so that panics are no longer possible.17 The financial system becomes stable in this sense. However, there is no meaningful “crowding out” of private production of short-term deposits—all that happens in our model is that bank deposits become more highly-backed by cash.

5.4 Lender of last resort

The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework is a static, non-monetary model. Accordingly, the type of crisis-prevention intervention they studied—deposit insurance—was non-monetary in nature. In reality, most debt obligations constitute promises to deliver money. And in a panic, banks have trouble meeting their short-run nominal obligations. This leads to the question of whether an emergency money-lending facility—a lender-of-last-resort—might be designed in a manner to eliminate bank panics.

The lender-of-last-resort function associated with central banking has a long history. Rolnick, Smith and Weber (2000), for example, describe how the Suffolk Bank (a private bank) acted as a clearinghouse and lender-of-last-resort for the Suffolk Banking System in 19th century New England. Evidently, the Suffolk bank extended loans of specie to its member banks during the crisis of 1837, an action the authors credit with rendering the

17 At the Friedman rule, monetary equilibrium is not unique because agents are indifferent of how much money they demand since holding money is costless. Accordingly, the real quantity of money is indeterminate but consumption and production are the same in all monetary equilibria. See Lagos and Wright (2005).
ensuing recession in the New England area much less severe than in other parts of the country.

Of course, the Suffolk Bank had to rely on reserves of cash in the form of specie. The inelastic supply of specie in commodity money systems is likely what motivated Bagehot (1873) to suggest that central banks lend freely but at “high rates” against good collateral to help stem a bank panic. In particular, Bagehot (1873, chapter 7) wrote his first principle as:

First. That these loans should only be made at a very high rate of interest. This will operate as a heavy fine on unreasonable timidity, and will prevent the greatest number of applications by persons who did not require it. The rate should be raised early in the panic, so that the fine may be paid early; that no one may borrow out of idle precaution without paying well for it; that the Banking reserve may be protected as far as possible (italics our own).

That is, the so-called penalty rate of interest was designed to help protect central bank reserves against depletion. Note that such a constraint is entirely absent if cash takes the form of fiat money instead of specie (or any other commodity). One is led to speculate whether lending freely against good collateral at a low interest rate might instead be optimal in a fiat money based system. Indeed, Antinolfi, Huybens and Keister (2001) show that in their model, zero-interest emergency loans are exactly the correct policy for a fiat-based central bank concerned with stemming a liquidity crisis.¹⁸

We think that a monetary economy is essential for evaluating the efficacy of a central bank lender-of-last-resort policy over other types of interventions designed to stabilize financial markets. The reason for this is based on the simple fact that modern day central banks can costlessly manipulate the supply of base money—which is closely related to the object of redemption in bank deposit contracts. To be sure, the ability to costlessly create money “out of thin air” is often portrayed as a defect, especially for those who fear that governments are too easily seduced by the prospect of inflation finance. But precisely because creating money in this manner is costless, the threat of injecting money into the banking system if it is needed can be made perfectly credible. This is in contrast to fiscal interventions, which must invariably resort to tax finance in one way or another. While it is possible that a government treasury may raise the money needed for emergency lending, why not have the central bank simply create the needed money at a stroke of a pen?

What is interesting here is that the ability of a central bank lending facility to eliminate bank panics is enhanced greatly if bank deposit contracts are stipulated in nominal terms—as they are in reality. A private bank’s ability to make good on a nominal promise can be made perfectly credible if it has access to a central bank lending facility. So, let us reconsider our model above and assume that banks and depositors contract in nominal terms, understanding that banks have access to a central bank lending facility that will help banks honor early redemption requests in any state of the world. Because the central

¹⁸Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996) suggest that panics can also be avoided by permitting banks themselves to issue currency.
bank’s promise is stated in nominal terms, it is clearly credible. And because banks now do not need to liquidate capital unnecessarily, patient investors know that their deposits will be safe and available for evening withdrawal; hence, a self-fulfilling bank panic cannot exist in equilibrium. In this way, depositors may reap the benefits of banking without fearing the losses that are incurred in a banking panic.\textsuperscript{19} In our model, a central bank lending facility would have the most merit in economies where securities markets are relatively less developed (low $\eta$) and the inflation rate is high (say, because money finance constitutes an important source of revenue for the government).

The notion of nominal debt being conducive to financial stability has been recently explored by Allen, Carletti and Gale (2014). Their model, like ours, relies on some notion of contractual incompleteness. A similar idea underpins the notion of nominal GDP targeting as optimal policy; see, for example, Koenig (2013).

6 Conclusion

Much of what we have learned from the canonical Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond (1997) models of banking and financial markets appears to remain intact when we extend that framework to a dynamic setting where fiat money plays an essential role. In particular, banks and securities markets remain competing mechanisms for liquidity insurance and bank deposit contracts remain constrained by a degree of financial market development. Moreover, the fragility of banking structures that rely extensively on simple demand deposit liabilities as a form of financing remains a possibility.

Embedding the canonical banking framework in a dynamic monetary model yields the following additional insights. First, in non-monetary versions of the framework, the rate of return on the short asset is determined by technology. In a monetary model, inflation policy affects the rate of return on the short asset. Of course, the same would be true in a non-monetary model that considered a distortionary tax or subsidy on some asset classes. In a monetary version of the model, this type of tax wedge emerges naturally and becomes an integral part of the analysis. In particular, we have demonstrated how a competitive securities market can produce efficient liquidity insurance if inflation policy follows the Friedman rule. Notably, allowing for money savings across periods, a natural property of monetary models, is essential for this result to hold. In addition, we demonstrated how the welfare benefit associated with banking \textit{vis-à-vis} markets is larger in economies with higher target inflation rates. Second, we show throughout the paper that the ability to save money across periods has important implications for the allocation. For that reason, some of our results differ substantially from standard static models.

We have also shown how the degree of securities market liquidity introduces an interesting trade-off between banks and markets as liquidity insurance mechanisms. Conditional on a bank panic, a more liquid securities market results in less \textit{ex post} disruption. However, an \textit{ex ante} more liquid securities market implies less efficient liquidity insurance and, more-

\textsuperscript{19}Of course, offsetting this benefit is the prospect of moral hazard induced by the lending facility. While our model abstracts from moral hazard, it seems clear that if it was operative, then the obvious trade-off would present itself.
over, this is especially true in high-inflation regimes. Finally, consistent with other recent research, the model provides a possible rationale for nominal debt combined with a central bank lender-of-last-resort facility to promote efficient liquidity insurance and a panic-free banking system.
7 References


A Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1. In any equilibrium with positive money and capital holdings, \( r \leq \rho \leq R \). Suppose first that \( \rho > r \). Then, an impatient investor is strictly better off by selling all his capital, i.e., \( k_1 = k \). Optimality implies \( c_1 = (\beta/\mu)x + \rho k_1 - \beta z_1^+ > 0 \); thus, (14) is satisfied with strict inequality. Next, suppose that \( \rho = r \). In this case, the impatient investor receives the same consumption allocation whether he sells or consumes the return to capital goods. However, selling capital goods relaxes the constraint (14); in particular, setting \( k_1 = k \) implies (14) is satisfied with strict inequality since \( (\beta/\mu)x + rk - \beta z_1^+ = c_1 > 0 \). Hence, (14) does not bind.

Constraints (16) and (18) imply (17).

Proof of Lemma 2. Using the results derived in the main body of the text, we can write the first-order conditions (20)–(24) as follows:

\[ u'(c_1) = 1 + \zeta_1 \]
\[ R(\mu/\beta)u'(c_2) = 1 + \zeta_2 \]
\[ \pi u'(c_1) + (1 - \pi) R(\mu/\beta) u'(c_2) = \mu/\beta. \] (56)

Furthermore, since \( \beta z_1^+ = (\beta/\mu)(x + k) - c_1 \) and \( \beta z_2^+ = (\beta/\mu)[x + \pi k/(1 - \pi)] \) the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are

\[ \zeta_1 ([(\beta/\mu)(x + k) - c_1]) = 0 \] (57)
\[ \zeta_2 (\beta/\mu) \left( x - \frac{\pi}{1 - \pi} k \right) = 0 \] (58)

There are four possible cases for the values of the multipliers \( \zeta_1 \) and \( \zeta_2 \).

1) Assume \( \zeta_1 = \zeta_2 = 0 \): both types save money across period. Then, from (54)–(56), we get \( 1 = \mu/\beta \). This case is only possible under the Friedman rule.

2) Assume \( \zeta_1 > 0 \) and \( \zeta_2 = 0 \): patient investor saves money across periods. Then, from (54)–(56), we obtain

\[ u'(c_1) = \frac{\mu/\beta - (1 - \pi)}{\pi} \] and \( R(\mu/\beta) u'(c_2) = 1, \] (59)

and from (28), (57), and (58) we obtain

\[ c_1 = (\beta/\mu)(x + k), \ c_2 = Rk/(1 - \pi) \] and \( (1 - \pi)x \geq \pi k. \] (60)

Existence of case 2 requires that

\[ u'(c_1) \geq 1 \] and \( (1 - \pi)x \geq \pi k \] (61)
It is easy to show that $u'(c_1) = \frac{\mu/\beta - (1-\pi)}{\pi} > 1$, unless $\mu = \beta$. Rewrite $(1-\pi)x \geq \pi k$ to get $(1-\pi)(x+k) \geq k$. Use (60) to get

$$c_1 R(\mu/\beta) \geq c_2$$

Use (59) to get

$$u'(c_1)c_1 \geq \frac{\mu/\beta - (1-\pi)}{\pi} u'(c_2)c_2$$

This case requires $u'(c)c$ to be decreasing as we assume with assumption [A2].

3) Assume $\zeta_1 = 0$ and $\zeta_2 > 0$: **impatient investor saves money across periods.** Then, from (54)–(56), we obtain

$$u'(c_1) = 1 \text{ and } R(\mu/\beta)u'(c_2) = \frac{\mu/\beta - \pi}{1-\pi} \quad (62)$$

and from (28), (57), and (58) we obtain

$$c_1 \leq (\beta/\mu)(x+k), \ c_2 = Rk/(1-\pi) \text{ and } (1-\pi)x = \pi k. \quad (63)$$

Existence requires $R(\mu/\beta)u'(c_2) \geq 1$ and $c_1 \leq (\beta/\mu)x/\pi$. It is easy to show that $R(\mu/\beta)u'(c_2) = R(\mu/\beta)\frac{1-(\beta/\mu)\pi}{(1-\pi)R} > 1$, unless $\mu = \beta$. Rewrite $c_1 \leq (\beta/\mu)(x+k)$ to get $c_1 \leq (\beta/\mu)k/(1-\pi)$. Rewrite again to get

$$c_1 R(\mu/\beta) \leq c_2$$

or

$$u'(c_1)c_1 \frac{\mu/\beta - \pi}{1-\pi} \leq u'(c_2)c_2$$

This case requires $u'(c)c$ to be increasing which our assumption [A2] precludes.

4) Assume $\zeta_1 > 0$ and $\zeta_2 > 0$: **no savings across periods.** Then, from (54)–(56), we obtain

$$\pi u'(c_1) + (1-\pi) R(\mu/\beta)u'(c_2) = \mu/\beta \quad (64)$$

and from (28), (57), and (58) we obtain

$$c_1 = (\beta/\mu)(x+k), \ c_2 = Rk/(1-\pi) \text{ and } (1-\pi)x = \pi k. \quad (65)$$

Note that

$$c_2/c_1 = R(\mu/\beta).$$

Existence of this case requires that $u'(c_1) \geq 1$ and $R(\mu/\beta)u'(c_2) \geq 1. \blacksquare$

**Proof of Proposition 1.** Follows from (36) and (37). \hfill \blacksquare
Proof of Proposition 2. Follows from (46) and (47). ■

Proof of Proposition 3. First, note that $V(z) = V(0) + z$ and $W(z) = W(0) + z$, so that $V(z) - W(z) = V(0) - W(0)$ for all $z \geq 0$. Second, note that a bank maximizes the ex ante welfare of an investor and can always implement the securities equilibrium allocation as feasibility is the only relevant constraint in the banking problem. Furthermore, given (59) (for the case when patient investors save cash) and (65) (for the case when patient investors do not save cash), $c_1 < c_2$ in a securities equilibrium; hence, $(c_1, c_2)$ is an incentive compatible allocation for the bank.

We will now show that when $\mu > \beta$ the bank, despite being able to implement the securities equilibrium as shown above, chooses a different allocation. Thus, it must be that the bank allocation provides higher ex ante utility for the investor, i.e., $W(z) > V(z)$. Suppose the securities equilibrium and the bank choose the same allocation. Then, both choose $c_2 = c^*_2$ and so $k = k^*$. By (25), $\mu > \beta$ and $c_2 = c^*_2$ imply $c_2 > 0$ and so $z_2^+ = 0$. Then (32) applies in a securities equilibrium and so, $(\mu/\beta)c_1 = c^*_2/R$. Given $c_1 < c_2$, assumption [A2] implies $u'(c_1)c_1 > u'(c_2)c_2$. Multiply both sides by $R(\beta/\mu)$ to obtain $R(\beta/\mu)u'(c_1)c_1 > R(\beta/\mu)u'(c_2)c_2$. Using $(\beta/\mu)u'(c_1) = Ru'(c_2) = 1$, this simplifies to $Rc_1 > (\beta/\mu)c_2$ and so $(\mu/\beta)c_1 > c_2/R$, which contradicts $(\mu/\beta)c_1 = c^*_2/R$. Thus, bank and markets implement different allocations. ■

Proof of Proposition 4. Assuming [A1], conditions (44)–(45) imply $c_1 < c_1^* < c_2 = c^*_2$. A patient depositor withdrawing his deposit in the afternoon and using the cash to buy capital in the securities market at price $\rho$ gets evening consumption equal to $\hat{c}_2 = (R/\rho)c_1$. Let $\tilde{\rho} \equiv R(c_1/c^*_2)$. If $\rho < \tilde{\rho}$ then $\hat{c}_2 > (R/\tilde{\rho})c_1 = c^*_2$. Hence, the decision to withdraw in the afternoon is optimal. If $\rho \geq \tilde{\rho}$ then $\hat{c}_2 \leq (R/\tilde{\rho})c_1 = c^*_2$ and so, there are no incentives to withdraw in the afternoon.

Now we show $\beta/\mu < \tilde{\rho} < R$. The latter inequality follows from $c_1 < c_2^*$. The former inequality requires [A2]. This assumption implies $u'(c_1)c_1 > u'(c_2)c^*_2$. Multiply both sides by $R(\beta/\mu)$ to obtain $R(\beta/\mu)u'(c_1)c_1 > R(\beta/\mu)u'(c_2)c^*_2$. Again using (44)–(45) we get $(\beta/\mu)u'(c_1) = Ru'(c_2) = 1$, which simplifies the previous expression to $Rc_1 > (\beta/\mu)c_2$ and so $R(c_1/c^*_2) > \beta/\mu$. ■

Proof Proposition 5. Condition (51) implies $c_2 = c^*_2 > c_1^*$. Let $\tilde{\pi} \equiv \pi/(\pi + (1 - \pi)\tilde{\eta})$ and rewrite (50) as

$$\tilde{\pi}u'(c_1) + (1 - \tilde{\pi})(R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) = \mu/\beta$$

(66)

If $\tilde{\zeta} = 0$ then (52) implies $(R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) = 1$ and so, by [A1], $u'(c_1) > \mu/\beta$. If $\tilde{\zeta} > 0$ then (49) implies $(R/\rho)c_1 = \tilde{c}_2$. Thus, (66) implies $\tilde{\pi}u'(c_1) + (1 - \tilde{\pi})(R/\rho)u'(R/\rho)c_1 = \mu/\beta$. By [A2] and $\rho < R$, $(R/\rho)u'(R/\rho)c_1 < u'(c_1)$. Hence, $\tilde{\pi}u'(c_1) + (1 - \tilde{\pi})(R/\rho)u'(R/\rho)c_1 < u'(c_1)$ and so, $u'(c_1) > \mu/\beta$ in this case as well.

We have $u'(c_1) > \mu/\beta > 1 = u^*_1$ and from (66), $(R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) < \mu/\beta$. The first set of inequalities imply $c_1 < c_1^* < c^*_2 = c_2$ and so, the incentive-compatibility constraint $u(c_2) \geq u(c_1)$ is satisfied. Furthermore, let $c_1^B$ solve (44); then, $c_1 < c_1^B < c_1^*$. The second inequality implies $Ru'(\tilde{c}_2) < \rho(\mu/\beta)$. By [A4], $\rho(\mu/\beta) \leq 1$ and so, $Ru'(\tilde{c}_2) < 1 = Ru_2^*$. 38
Hence, $\tilde{c}_2 > c_2^\ast$. Given $c_1 - (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2 \geq 0$ from (49), $\tilde{c}_2 > c_2^\ast$ implies the incentive-compatibility constraint $u(\tilde{c}_2) + c_1 - (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2 \geq u(c_2)$ is satisfied. ■

**Proof of Proposition 6.** When $\tilde{\eta} = 0$ the result is straightforward.

When $\tilde{\eta} = 1$, conditions (49)–(52) imply that the bank contract $(c_1, \tilde{c}_2)$ satisfies

$$\pi u'(c_1) + (1 - \pi)(R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) = \mu/\beta$$

and

$$c_1 - (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2 = 0 \text{ if } \tilde{z}_2^+ = 0$$

$$\frac{R}{\rho}u'(\tilde{c}_2) = 1 \text{ if } \tilde{z}_2^+ > 0$$

Condition (67) corresponds to (20) which characterizes the choice of money for a given market price $\rho$. Since $\rho \leq \beta/\mu$, (67) also satisfies (21) with weak inequality (if $\rho < \beta/\mu$, then the investor chooses not to hold any capital). Next, (68) and (69) correspond to conditions (32) and (33), respectively, if we replace $\beta/\mu$ for a general price $\rho$. Thus, the bank allocation is the same as in a securities market with price $\rho \leq \beta/\mu$. ■

**Proof of Proposition 7.** Given [A1] and [A4] the incentive constraints are slack. Thus, totally differentiating $W(z)$ with respect to $\mu$ yields:

$$dW/d\mu = -(1/\mu) \left\{ \pi u'(c_1)c_1 + (1 - \pi)(\tilde{\eta}(1 + \tilde{\zeta})[c_1 + (d\rho/d\mu)(\mu/R)\tilde{c}_2] \right\}$$

where we used the fact that $(\beta/\mu)x = [\pi + (1 - \pi)\tilde{\eta}]c_1$ and that $\rho$ may depend on $\mu$.

If $c_1 \geq -(d\rho/d\mu)(\mu/R)\tilde{c}_2$ then $dW/d\mu < 0$. From constraint (49) we have $c_1 \geq (\rho/R)\tilde{c}_2$. Thus, it is sufficient to require $-(d\rho/d\mu)\mu \leq \rho$, equivalently, $-(d\rho/d\mu)(\mu/\rho) \leq 1$, to obtain $dW/d\mu < 0$. ■

**Proof of Proposition 8.** Suppose that $\mu > \beta$. By Proposition 5, $c_1 < c_1^\ast$ and $\tilde{c}_2 > c_2^\ast$ for any $\rho \in [r, \beta/\mu]$. Thus, the first-best cannot be implemented for any $\eta \in (0, 1]$.

Suppose that $\mu = \beta$. Then conditions (50) can be re-arranged as

$$\pi[u'(c_1) - 1] = (1 - \pi)\tilde{\eta}[1 - (R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2)]$$

At the first-best, $c_1 = c_1^\ast$ and hence, both sides of the expression above must be equal to zero. This implies $(R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) = 1$. We get $\tilde{c}_2 = c_2^\ast$ only if $\rho = 1$. From Lemma 3, $\rho < 1$ when $\eta \in [0, 1)$ and $\mu = \beta$. Thus, the first-best cannot be achieved for any $\eta \in (0, 1)$.

The remaining case is $\mu = \beta$ and $\eta = 1$. By (53), $\rho = 1$. Conditions (50)–(52) become

$$\pi u'(c_1) + (1 - \pi)\tilde{\eta}Ru'(\tilde{c}_2) = \pi + (1 - \pi)\tilde{\eta}$$

$$Ru'(c_2) = 1$$

$$Ru'(\tilde{c}_2) = 1 + \tilde{\zeta}$$

If $\tilde{\zeta} > 0$, then (71) and (72) imply $\tilde{c}_2 < c_2$, a contradiction with Proposition 5.
If \( \tilde{\zeta} = 0 \) then (70)–(72) imply \( u'(c_1) = Ru'(c_2) = Ru'(\tilde{c}_2) = 1 \), so that \( c_1 = c_1^* \) and \( \tilde{c}_2 = c_2 = c_2^* \). All incentive constraints are satisfied since \( \tilde{c}_2 = c_2 > c_1 \). From (49), strictly positive money savings requires that \( c_1 > \tilde{c}_2/R \). That is, we need \( u'(c_1)c_1 > u'(\tilde{c}_2)c_2 \), which holds given \([A2]\) and \( c_1 < \tilde{c}_2 \). Hence, when \( \mu = \beta \) and \( \eta = 1 \) the first-best allocation is feasible, incentive-compatible and requires positive money savings.

**Proof of Lemma 4.** Condition (49) implies \( \tilde{c}_2 \leq (R/\rho)c_1 \). Since \( c_2 = c_2^* < \tilde{c}_2 \) by Proposition 5, we get \( c_2 < (R/\rho)c_1 \). From the bank’s budget constraints, we have \((\beta/\mu)x = \left[\pi + (1-\pi)\tilde{\eta}\right]c_1 \) and \( Rk = (1-\pi)(1-\tilde{\eta})c_2 \). Thus, \((\beta/\mu)x + \rho k = \left[\pi + (1-\pi)\tilde{\eta}\right]c_1 + (1-\pi)(1-\tilde{\eta})(\rho/R)c_2 \). Since \( c_2 < (R/\rho)c_1 \), we get \((\beta/\mu)x + \rho k < \left[\pi + (1-\pi)\tilde{\eta}\right]c_1 + (1-\pi)(1-\tilde{\eta})c_1 = c_1 \).

**Proof of Proposition 9.**

A bank liquidating its capital in the securities market hands out \((\beta/\mu)x + \rho k\) to each depositor. By Lemma 4, \((\beta/\mu)x + \rho k < c_1 \) and by Proposition 5 \( c_1 < c_2 \). Hence, both impatient depositors and patient depositors without market access obtain the same allocation, \( c_1^* = \tilde{c}_2 = (\beta/\mu)x + \rho k < c_1 < c_2 \).

A patient depositor with market access can sell \( c_1^* \) units of cash for capital and obtain a maximum consumption of \((R/\rho)c_1^* \). If \((R/\rho)u(c_1^*) \leq 1 \) then \((R/\rho)u'(R/\rho)c_1 < 1 \). Thus, by (49) and (52), \((R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) = 1 \) and \( \tilde{c}_2 \leq (R/\rho)c_1^* < (R/\rho)c_1 \). Since \( \tilde{c}_2 \leq (R/\rho)c_1^* = \tilde{c}_2 \), \( \tilde{c}_2 \) is feasible and optimal.

If \((R/\rho)u(c_1^*) > 1 \) then \( \tilde{c}_2 = (R/\rho)c_1^* \). If (49) is satisfied with equality, then \( \tilde{c}_2 = (R/\rho)c_1 > (R/\rho)c_1^* = \tilde{c}_2 \). If (49) is satisfied with strict inequality, then \( (R/\rho)u'(\tilde{c}_2) = 1 \) and so, \( \tilde{c}_2 > (R/\rho)c_1^* = \tilde{c}_2 \).

**Proof of Proposition 10.** Each depositor receives \((\beta/\mu)x\) units of cash and \( k \) claims on capital. Thus, impatient depositors obtain \( c_1^h = (\beta/\mu)x + \rho k = c_1^* \). Patient depositors with market access sell can get a maximum consumption of \((R/\rho)(\beta/\mu)x + Rk = (R/\rho)c_1^h \), same as before. Thus, \( \tilde{c}_2^h = \tilde{c}_2^h \). Patient depositors without market access buy afternoon goods with cash and hold their claims on capital until the evening; hence, \( \tilde{c}_2^h = (\beta/\mu)x + Rk > c_2^h \). Using the budget constraints of the bank we get \((\beta/\mu)x + Rk = [\pi + (1-\pi)\tilde{\eta}]c_1 + (1-\pi)(1-\tilde{\eta})c_2 \). Since \( c_1 < c_2 \) by Proposition 5, \( c_2^h = (\beta/\mu)x + Rk < c_2 \).

**B General specification for money injection**

In the main body of the paper, we assume new money is injected as lump-sum transfers to workers. Here, we consider the general case. Assume a fraction \( \alpha \in [0,1] \) of new money is transferred to investors. The linearity in workers’ preferences implies that the relative price of goods between morning and afternoon is still being characterized by (10). Thus, \( p_{t_m}^a / p_{t_a}^a = \beta/\mu \) for all \( \alpha \).

The morning budget constraint for investors is now: \( m_t = p_{t_m}^a x + \alpha T_t \). Since investors
acquire all the cash in the morning, \( m_t = M_t \), and given \( T_t = (1 - 1/\mu)M_t \) we obtain

\[
p_t^m x = M_t(\hat{\mu}/\mu)
\]

where \( \hat{\mu} \equiv \mu - \alpha(\mu - 1) \). Note that \( \hat{\mu} \in [\mu, 1] \) for \( \mu < 1 \), \( \hat{\mu} = 1 \) for \( \mu = 1 \) and \( \hat{\mu} \in [1, \mu] \) for \( \mu > 1 \). In addition, \( \hat{\mu} \) is strictly decreasing in \( \alpha \) for \( \mu \neq 1 \).

Afternoon real balances are given by

\[
(M_t/p_a^t) = (\beta/\hat{\mu})x.
\]

Thus, morning consumption for workers is equal to \( x \) and afternoon work for workers is \( (\beta/\hat{\mu})x \). So, workers’ flow utility in equilibrium is \( (1 - \beta/\hat{\mu})x \).

In other words, our analysis in the paper is functionally equivalent for any given \( \alpha \in [0, 1] \). All we need to do is use \( \hat{\mu} \) instead of \( \mu \). To retrieve the effects on monetary policy, note the correspondence between the two variables given by \( \hat{\mu} \equiv \mu - \alpha(\mu - 1) \). Note that when \( \alpha = 1 \), \( \hat{\mu} = 1 \), i.e., when new money is injected only to investors, monetary policy is super-neutral. For this extreme case, all our results for \( \mu = 1 \) apply.

C Upper bound on securities price

Consider the problem of a worker that wants to buy capital in the morning. Since capital depreciates in the evening and the worker only enjoys morning consumption, the only option is to exchange the capital acquired in the morning for cash in the afternoon securities market. The relative price of worker consumption and investor output in the morning is equal to 1. Thus, every unit of capital acquired by the worker costs 1 units of utility. Capital is exchanged for money in the afternoon at price \( q_t \), which can be used in the following morning to purchase consumption at price \( p_m^t + 1 \). Assume the worker can access the afternoon securities market with probability \( \pi_w \in [0, 1] \).

The problem of the worker buying capital in the morning is:

\[
\max_{k \geq 0} -k + \pi_w \beta(q_t/p_m^t)k
\]

Note that the worker cannot go short on capital, since he can neither produce it nor commit to repay debts.

Since \( \rho \equiv q_t/p_a^t \) and \( p_t^m/p_t^{m+1} = (p_t^a/p_t^m)(p_t^m/p_t^{m+1}) = (\mu/\beta)(1/\mu) = 1/\beta \), we have that \( \rho = \beta(q_t/p_m^{t+1}) \). Thus, we can rewrite the problem of the worker as

\[
\max_{k \geq 0} -k + \pi_w \rho k
\]

An interior solution is given by \( \rho = 1/\pi_w \), in which case the worker is indifferent between selling and purchasing capital. If \( \rho < 1/\pi_w \) then \( k \geq 0 \) binds and workers do not buy any capital. If \( \rho > 1/\pi_w \) then workers demand an infinite amount of capital. Hence, in a monetary equilibrium \( \rho \leq 1/\pi_w \).
If workers have perfect market access, $\pi_w = 1$, then $\rho \leq 1$. If workers have limited market access, $\pi_w < 1$, then the upper bound on $\rho$ is larger than 1; moreover, the upper bound converges to infinity as market access goes to zero.

The upper bound on the securities price is not binding for most our analysis, where $\rho \leq \beta/\mu \leq 1$, but could play a role when general equilibrium effects push the price above $\beta/\mu$, as explained in Section 4.5.

D Securities market with limited participation

The constraints of impatient investors and patient investors with market access are the same as those described in Section 3.1. Consider then a patient investor that has no access to the securities market. His budget constraint is:

$$\hat{c}_2 = (\beta/\mu)x + Rk - \beta\hat{z}_2^+ \quad (73)$$

There is also a non-negativity constraint on money holdings:

$$\hat{z}_2^+ \geq 0 \quad (74)$$

As in the full market-access case, the value function of the investor is linear in unspent money holdings, i.e., $V'(z) = 1$. The problem of an investor facing a probability $\eta$ of accessing the securities market if he becomes patient is then:

$$V(z) \equiv \max_{x,k,k_1,k_2,z_1^+,z_2^+,\hat{z}_2^+} z - x - k + \pi \left[ u(c_1) + \beta V(z_1^+) \right] + (1 - \pi)\eta \left[ u(c_2) + \beta V(z_2^+) \right] + (1 - \pi)(1 - \eta) \left[ u(\hat{c}_2) + \beta V(\hat{z}_2^+) \right] \quad (75)$$

subject to (12), (13), (16), (18) and (74), and where $c_1$, $c_2$ and $\hat{c}_2$ are given by (11), (15) and (73), respectively.

Let $\pi\beta\zeta_1$, $(1 - \pi)\eta\beta\zeta_2$ and $(1 - \pi)(1 - \eta)\beta\hat{\zeta}_2$ denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraints (12), (16) and (74), respectively. Let $\pi\lambda_1$ and $(1 - \pi)\eta\lambda_2$ denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints (13) and (18), respectively. After some simple rearrangements the first-order necessary conditions for an optimum imply

$$\pi u'(c_1) + (1 - \pi)\eta (R/\rho) u'(c_2) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \eta)u'(\hat{c}_2) = \mu/\beta \quad (76)$$

$$\pi u'(c_1) + (1 - \pi)\eta (R/\rho) u'(c_2) + (1 - \pi)(1 - \eta)(R/\rho) u'(\hat{c}_2) = 1/\rho \quad (77)$$

$$(\rho - r)u'(c_1) = \lambda_1 \quad (78)$$

$$(R/\rho - 1)u'(c_2) = \lambda_2 \quad (79)$$

$$u'(c_1) - 1 = \zeta_1 \quad (80)$$

$$(R/\rho) u'(c_2) - 1 = \zeta_2 \quad (81)$$

$$u'(\hat{c}_2) - 1 = \hat{\zeta}_2 \quad (82)$$

From (76) and (77) we get:

$$(1 - \pi)(1 - \eta)(R/\rho - 1)u'(\hat{c}_2) = 1/\rho - \mu/\beta \quad (83)$$