Targeted Search in Matching Markets

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Targeted Search in Matching Markets*

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Abstract

In reality matching is not purely random nor perfectly assortative. We propose a parsimonious way to model the choice of whom to meet that endogenizes the degree of randomness in matching, and show that this allows for better identification of preferences. The model features an interaction between a productive and a strategic motive. For some preference specifications, there is a tension between these two motives that drives an endogenous wedge between the shape of sorting patterns and the shape of the underlying match payoff function, allowing for better empirical identification. We show the empirical relevance of our theoretical results by applying it to the U.S. marriage market.

JEL: E24, J64, C78, D83.
Keywords: Matching, sorting, assignment, search.

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1 Introduction

When searching for a match, circumstances can influence whom you meet.\(^1\) However, whom to meet is also affected by individuals’ choices. As a result, matching is not purely random nor perfectly assortative.\(^2\) In this paper we propose a parsimonious way to model the choice of whom to meet that *endogenizes the degree of randomness* in matching, and show that this allows for better identification of preferences.

We blend the stochastic discrete choice literature with the frictionless matching environment of Becker (1973) with two-sided heterogeneity, and assume that agents choose whom to contact in a probabilistic way, and the strategies chosen are a discrete probability distribution of interests over types. Each element of this distribution represents the probability with which an agent will target (i.e. ask out) each potential match based on its expected payoff.

When agents choose the probability of asking someone out, they know the distribution over types and their preferences over them (i.e. we all know what are the attributes we are looking for in a person), but they don’t know where to find a particular type. In order to do so, agents exert search effort and pay an associated cost in order to locate their preferred types more accurately (just as in real life we sort through people and then decide who to ask out).

Paying a higher search cost allows agents to locate a particular type more accurately, resulting in a more targeted probability distribution of interests (i.e. they assign higher probabilities to specific types). As such we associate a proportional search cost with a measure of distance between an “uninformed” strategy where agents simply contact any type with the same probability, and the agent’s strategy of choice.\(^3\)

\(^1\)Where you live, where you study, etc. see e.g. Belot and Francesconi (2013).

\(^2\)The empirical marriage literature documents an abundance of matches between inferior and superior partners (see survey by Chiaporri and Salanie (2015)). One reason for apparent mismatch may be that the econometrician does not observe all the match-relevant characteristics (see Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanie (2012)). Another important reason is search frictions. Matches between inferior and superior types may form if one of the partners cannot afford to wait for their best match and decides to settle for an inferior one (see Eeckhout (1999), Shimer and Smith (2000), Adachi (2003)).

\(^3\)We borrow our cost specification from the literature on discrete choice under information frictions, see Cheremukhin et al. (2015) and Matejka and McKay (2015).
When choosing their probability distribution of interests, agents have a productive motive (they want to maximize actual payoffs), and they have a strategic motive (they want to maximize the odds of forming a match), because payoffs are irrelevant if you target someone that has no interest in matching with you (the odds of forming a match are zero). Thus, people act strategically not only when deciding whether to form a match or wait for a better option (like in Eeckhout (1999)), but also when choosing whom to contact.

The interaction between the productive and the strategic motive determines the meeting rates in the model. The relative strength of the two motives depends on the search cost. When exerting effort to find the best partner is not very costly, it is easy for agents to locate their preferred types accurately, and reciprocity of interest is the paramount determinant of who meets whom: The strategic motive dominates.

When exerting search effort is costly, agents won’t be able to locate their preferred partners with accuracy, so the likelihood of contacting an inferior (or superior) partner increases. In this case, payoffs become the driving force behind who meets whom. In the unique equilibrium, every agent’s strategy is to chase the partner that would yield the highest payoff: The productive motive dominates the strategic motive.

This property can be used for empirical identification of agents’ preferences. In particular, it can be used to estimate whether agents preferences are vertical—attraction is based on a commonly agreed upon ranking—or horizontal—people are attracted to agents with similar characteristics. The existing literature finds it hard if not impossible to distinguish between these cases empirically. Both cases lead to identical assortative stable matching in the frictionless case. In contrast, the equilibrium matching rates predicted by our model differ markedly for these two cases. When preferences are horizontal, the strategic and productive motives pull agents in the same direction, as look-alikes both get the highest payoff from each other and their interests are also more likely to be mutual. In this case, a stochastic version of assortative matching is preserved in equilibrium and the shape of the observed matching rate and the underlying

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4See Banerjee et al. (2013) and references therein.
5See Hitsch et al. (2010) and related studies.
payoff function are highly correlated.

However, in the case of vertical preferences, there is common agreement on the ranking of agents and everybody tries to chase the top type despite the lower likelihood of mutual interest. The productive and the strategic motive pull in opposite directions. This case gives rise to a novel and surprising equilibrium pattern that reminisces neither positive nor negative assortative matching. We call it the mixing equilibrium, and it implies that there is a wedge between the shape of the observed matching rate and the underlying payoff function (i.e. the correlation between them is not very high).

Our model is not the first one to generate this wedge between the shape of the matching rate and the underlying payoff function. This wedge can arise in models that have a strategic motive (see Eeckhout (1999), Adachi (2003), Shimer and Smith (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) among many others). However, what makes the wedge that arises in our model unique, is that its size will be endogenously determined, unlike the existing literature where its size is add-hoc because the degree of randomness in the matching equilibrium is built in. If this feature is built in an add-hoc way, then it cannot be used for empirical inference of preferences. Because in our model the degree of randomness in matching is endogenous, so is the size of this wedge, and our theoretical results are empirically relevant.

To make this point we show how preferences can be identified from the data on matching rates and from the data on contact rates if those are observed. We find that the model does a very good job rationalizing the observed matching rates in the U.S. marriage market based on income, age, and education, and for these three cases we estimate the underlying payoffs through the lens of our model. Our empirical results suggest that strategic interactions can be used to recover preferences and distinguish between the vertical and horizontal case.

We present a bare-bones one-shot model that has the minimal ingredients to showcase the mechanism mentioned above. We define a matching equilibrium of the model

\footnote{Our taxonomy of equilibria in this case follows that of Burdett and Coles (1999).}

\footnote{Note that our model is fully equipped to analyze the complicated matching patterns that arise in the presence of multidimensional attributes since it places no restrictions on preferences, nor does it assume any correlation structure for the attributes.}
as the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium between agents’ probabilistic strategies. This solution concept is less restrictive than the stability requirement coming from cooperative games. Nonetheless, we prove existence of equilibrium, derive the necessary conditions characterizing it, and show sufficient conditions for its uniqueness. Furthermore, we show that the equilibria that emerge from a positive and finite cost are inefficient relative to the constrained Pareto allocation.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model and derives the theoretical results. In Section 3 we provide an extensive discussion of properties of equilibria and how they can be used to identify preferences. We apply the model to the U.S. marriage market data in Section 4. Section 5 states some final remarks.

**Related Literature**

Our paper effectively blends two sources of randomness used in the literature. The first source is a search friction with uniformly random meetings and impatience, as in Shimer and Smith (2000). The second approach introduces unobserved characteristics as a tractable way of accounting for the deviations of the data from the stark predictions of the frictionless model, as in Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanie (2012). We introduce a search friction into the meeting process by endogenizing agents’ choice of whom to contact. We build on the discrete choice rational inattention literature—i.e., Cheremukhin, Popova, and Tutino (2015) and Matejka and McKay (2015)—that derives multinomial logit decision rules as a consequence of cognitive constraints that capture limits to processing information. Therefore, the equilibrium matching rates in our model have a multinomial logit form similar to that in Galichon and Salanie (2012). Unlike Galichon and Salanie, the equilibrium of our model features strong interactions between agents’ contact rates driven entirely by their conscious choices, rather than by some unobserved characteristics with fixed distributions.

The search and matching literature has seen multiple attempts to produce intermediate degrees of randomness with which agents meet their best choices. In particular, Menzio (2007) and Lester (2011) nest directed search and random matching to generate
outcomes with an intermediate degree of randomness.\textsuperscript{8} Our paper produces equilibrium outcomes in-between uniform random matching and the frictionless assignment, endogenously, without nesting these two frameworks.

Also note, that although the directed search literature, such as Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) and Shimer (2005),\textsuperscript{9} technically involves a choice of whom to meet, the choice is degenerate—directed by signals from the other side. The key friction in directed search is the congestion externality, where agents on one side of the market compete with each other to match with specific agents on the other side. Congestion slows down matching and can produce mismatch but does not distort sorting patterns compared with frictionless assignment. The search friction in our model results in miscoordination between agents on opposite sides of the market, which leads to detectable distortions of sorting patterns.

2 Model

We build on the frictionless matching environment of Becker (1973), where males and females are heterogeneous in their type and all are searching for a match. Both males and females know the distribution and their preferences over types on the other side of the market, but there is noise—agents cannot locate potential partners with certainty. However, they can pay a search cost to help locate them more accurately.

We model this by assuming that each agent chooses a probability distribution over types. This distribution reflects the likelihood of contacting a particular agent on the other side. A more targeted search, or a probability distribution that is more concentrated on a particular group of agents, is associated with a higher cost, as the agent needs to exert more effort in deciding whom to contact. The probability distribution needs to satisfy two properties: 1) By the nature of the choice between a finite number of options, the distribution must be discrete and 2) for strategic motives to play a role, agents should be able to vary each element of the distribution and consider small devi-

\textsuperscript{8}Also, see Yang’s (2013) model of “targeted” search that assumes random search within perfectly distinguishable market segments.

\textsuperscript{9}See Chade, Eeckhout and Smith (2016) for a neat summary of this literature.
ations of each element in response to changes in the properties of the options. Hence, this probability distribution cannot be confined to a specific family of distributions.

The choice of functions in economics that satisfy these requirements is very limited. We use the Kullback-Leibler divergence (relative entropy) as the measure of search effort. This specification accommodates both full choice of a distribution and a discrete choice problem. In addition, it turns out that, in our specific case of a choice among discrete options, this specification enhances tractability and leads to closed-form solutions. Specifically, the solution has the form of a multinomial logit that is well understood and already widely used in empirical studies of discrete choice environments and of the marriage market.

After choosing their optimal probability distribution over types, both males and females simultaneously make a single draw from their distributions. If the draw is reciprocated, a match is formed if it is mutually beneficial and the output from the match is split between the two parties.

2.1 Environment

There are $F$ females indexed by $x \in \{1, ..., F\}$ and $M$ males indexed by $y \in \{1, ..., M\}$. Both males and females are heterogeneous in types and are actively searching for a match. After choosing their optimal probability distribution over types, both males and females simultaneously make a single draw from their distributions. If the draw is reciprocated, a match is formed if it is mutually beneficial and the output from the match is split between the two parties.

Each female chooses a discrete probability distribution, $p_x(y)$, which reflects the probability with which female $x$ will target male $y$ (seek him out). Each female $x$ rationally chooses her strategy while facing a trade-off between a higher payoff and

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10The extension to multiple identical agents of each type is straightforward and is not discussed in the paper.

11Note that we do not place any restrictions on the payoff function.

12For simplicity we assume that payoffs are fixed. We discuss the role played by (non)transferability in Section 3.1.
a higher cost of searching. Likewise, we denote the strategy of a each male \( q_y(x) \). It represents the probability of a male \( y \) targeting a female \( x \). Each agent can vary and choose each element of their distribution. Placing a higher probability on any particular potential match, implies that the agent choosing the distribution has exerted more search effort, will target a potential partner more accurately, and hence will have a higher probability of matching with them.

A female’s total cost of searching is given by \( c_x(\kappa_x(p_x(y))) \). This cost is a function of the search effort, \( \kappa_x \), and hence of the probability distribution, \( p_x(y) \), chosen by female \( x \). Likewise, we denote a male’s cost of searching by \( c_y(\kappa_y(q_y(x))) \), where the cost is a function of the search effort, \( \kappa_y \), and hence of the probability distribution, \( q_y(x) \), chosen by male \( y \).

Figure 1 illustrates the strategies of males and females. Consider a female \( x = 1 \). The solid arrows show how she assigns a probability \( p_1(y) \) of targeting each male \( y \). Similarly, dashed arrows show the probability \( q_1(x) \) that a male \( y = 1 \) assigns to targeting a female \( x \). Once these are selected, each male and female will make one draw from their respective distribution to determine which individual they will actually contact. A match is formed between male \( y \) and female \( x \) if and only if: 1) according to the female’s draw of \( y \) from \( p_x(y) \), female \( x \) contacts male \( y \); 2) according to the male’s draw of \( x \) from \( q_y(x) \), male \( y \) also contacts female \( x \); and 3) their payoffs are non-negative.

Since negative payoffs lead to de facto zero payoffs due to the absence of a match, we can assume that all payoffs are non-negative:

\[
\Phi_{xy} \geq 0, \quad \varepsilon_{xy} \geq 0, \quad \eta_{xy} \geq 0.
\]

Each female \( x \) chooses a strategy \( p_x(y) \) to maximize her expected net payoff:

\[
Y_x = \max_{p_x(y)} \sum_{y = 1}^{M} \varepsilon_{xy} q_y(x) p_x(y) - \kappa_x(p_x(y)).
\]

The female gets her expected return from a match with male \( y \) net of the cost of searching. The probability of a match between female \( x \) and male \( y \) is given by the
product of the distributions $q_y(x)p_x(y)$. Note that in equilibrium the matching rate that female $x$ faces from male $y$ equals male $y$'s strategy $q_y(x)$. As matching rates are equilibrium objects, they are assumed to be common knowledge to participating parties.

The cost function is given by $c_x(\kappa_x) = \theta_x\kappa_x$, where $\theta_x$ is the marginal cost of search. Here, we are using the linear cost function for simplicity, but all of our proofs will hold for more general cost functions. As mentioned earlier, $\kappa_x$ reflects search effort and needs to accommodate the full choice of a discrete distribution. One function that satisfies these requirements is the following:\footnote{In the model of information frictions used in the rational inattention literature, $\kappa_x$ would represent the relative entropy between a uniform prior \{1/$M$\} over males and the posterior strategy, $p_x(y)$. This definition is a special case of Shannon’s channel capacity where information structure is the only choice variable (See Thomas and Cover (1991), Chapter 2). See also Cheremukhin et al. (2015) for an application to stochastic discrete choice with information costs.}

$$\kappa_x = \sum_{y=1}^{M} p_x(y) \ln \frac{p_x(y)}{1/M}, \quad (1)$$

where $p_x(y)$ must satisfy $\sum_{y=1}^{M} p_x(y) = 1$ and $p_x(y) \geq 0$ for all $y$.

Note that $\kappa_x$ is increasing in the distance between a uniform distribution \{1/$M$\} over males and the chosen strategy, $p_x(y)$. If a female agent does not want to exert any search
effort, she can choose a uniform distribution $p_x(y) = \frac{1}{M}$ over types, the effort involved in search is zero, and her search is random. As she chooses a more targeted strategy, the distance between the uniform distribution $\{1/M\}$ and her strategy $p_x(y)$ is greater, increasing $\kappa_x$ and the overall cost of searching, and her search will be less random. By increasing search effort, agents bring down uncertainty about the location of a prospective match, which allows them to target their better matches more accurately.

Similarly, male $y$ chooses his strategy $q_y(x)$ to maximize his expected payoff:

$$Y_y = \max_{q_y(x)} \sum_{x=1}^F q_{xy} p_x(y) q_y(x) - c_y(\kappa_y(q_y(x))) ,$$

where

$$\kappa_y = \sum_{x=1}^F q_y(x) \ln \frac{q_y(x)}{1/F} ,$$

and $q_y(x)$ must satisfy $\sum_{x=1}^F q_y(x) = 1$ and $q_y(x) \geq 0$ for all $x$.

### 2.2 Matching equilibrium

**Definition 1.** A matching equilibrium is a set of strategies of females, $\{p_x(y)\}_{x=1}^F$, and males, $\{q_y(x)\}_{y=1}^M$, that simultaneously solve problems of males and females.

The equilibrium of the matching model can be interpreted as a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a strategic form game. In what follows we shall apply the results for concave $n$-person games from Rosen (1965). The game consists of the set of players, the set of actions and the players payoffs. The set of players is given by $\mathcal{I} = \{x \in \{1, ..., F\}, y \in \{1, ..., M\}\}$. The set of actions $s \in S$ is given by the cartesian product of the sets of strategies of females $p_x(y) \in S_x$ and males $q_y(x) \in S_y$, where

$$S_x = \left\{ p_x(y) \in \mathbb{R}^M, p_x(y) \geq 0, \sum_{y=1}^M p_x(y) \leq 1 \right\} ,$$

$$S_y = \left\{ q_y(x) \in \mathbb{R}^F, q_y(x) \geq 0, \sum_{x=1}^F q_y(x) \leq 1 \right\} .$$
The payoffs \( u_i(s) = \{Y_x(s), Y_y(s)\} \) are defined as follows:

\[
Y_x (p_x (y) , q_y (x)) = \sum_{y=1}^{M} \varepsilon_{xy} q_y (x) p_x (y) - c_x \left( \sum_{y=1}^{M} p_x (y) \ln \frac{p_x (y)}{1/M} \right),
\]

\[
Y_y (q_y (x) , p_x (y)) = \sum_{x=1}^{F} \eta_{xy} p_x (y) q_y (x) - c_y \left( \sum_{x=1}^{F} q_y (x) \ln \frac{q_y (x)}{1/F} \right).
\]

**Theorem 1.** A matching equilibrium exists.

**Proof.** Note that the strategy set of each player is a unit simplex and therefore a non-empty, convex and compact set. For a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium to exist, each payoff function \( u_i(s) \) needs to be continuous in the strategies \( s \), and \( u(s_i, s_{-i}) \) needs to be quasi-concave in \( s_i \). Indeed, under the assumption that cost functions are continuous, non-decreasing and (weakly) convex, the payoff functions are continuous and concave in the own strategies of players. For the case of a linear cost function, these restrictions are trivially satisfied.

To show uniqueness, we need to introduce some additional notation. Note that for each player \( i \in I \) the strategy set can be represented as \( S_i = \{s_i \in \mathbb{R}^{m_i}, h_i(s_i) \geq 0\} \), where \( h_i \) is a concave function.

The functions \( h_x (p_x (y)) = \left[ p_x (1) , \ldots , p_x (M) , 1 - \sum_{y=1}^{M} p_x (y) \right] \) and \( h_y (q_y (x)) = \left[ q_y (1) , \ldots , q_y (F) , 1 - \sum_{x=1}^{F} q_y (x) \right] \) are concave. Following Rosen, define the gradient \( \nabla u (s) = [\nabla_1 u_1 (s) , \ldots , \nabla_m u_m (s)]^T \) and Hessian: \( U (s) = \nabla_i \nabla_j u_i (s) \). Then, if the constraints \( h_i \) are concave and the symmetrize Hessian \( U (s) + U^T (s) \) is negative definite for all \( s \in S \), then the payoff functions are diagonally strictly concave for \( s \in S \). We can then use the result that if \( h_i \) are concave functions, if there exist interior points \( \tilde{s}_i \in S_i \) such that \( h_i(\tilde{s}_i) > 0 \), and if the payoff functions are diagonally strictly concave for all \( s \in S \), then the game has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

**Theorem 2.** The matching equilibrium is unique if
a) cost functions are non-decreasing and convex;
b) \( \frac{\partial c_x(\kappa_x)}{\partial \kappa_x} \bigg|_{p^*_x(y)} = \theta_x > \varepsilon_{xy} p^*_x(y) \);
c) \( \frac{\partial c_y(\kappa_y)}{\partial \kappa_y} \bigg|_{q^*_y(x)} = \theta_y > \eta_{xy} q^*_y(x) \).

Proof. If the cost functions \( c(\kappa) \) are (weakly) increasing and (weakly) convex in \( \kappa \), then the payoffs of all males and females are continuous and also concave in their strategies. Assuming that the cost functions are twice continuously differentiable functions, the Hessian of this game is the matrix of all second derivatives. The diagonal elements are all non-positive, consistent with concavity of the payoffs:

\[
\frac{\partial^2 Y_x}{\partial p_x \partial p_x} = -\frac{\partial c_x}{\partial \kappa_x} (\kappa_x) \frac{1}{p_x(y)} - \frac{\partial^2 c_x}{\partial \kappa_x \partial \kappa_x} (\kappa_x) \left(1 + \ln \frac{p_x(y)}{1/M}\right)^2 \leq 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 Y_y}{\partial q_y \partial q_y} = -\frac{\partial c_y}{\partial \kappa_y} (\kappa_y) \frac{1}{q_y(x)} - \frac{\partial^2 c_y}{\partial \kappa_y \partial \kappa_y} (\kappa_y) \left(1 + \ln \frac{q_y(x)}{1/F}\right)^2 \leq 0.
\]

The off-diagonal elements are all non-negative:

\[
\frac{\partial^2 Y_x}{\partial p_x \partial q_y} = \varepsilon_{xy} \geq 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial^2 Y_y}{\partial q_y \partial p_x} = \eta_{xy} \geq 0.
\]

The remaining cross-derivatives are all zero. Note also that the Hessian is itself symmetric, so there is no need to symmetrize it. To guarantee that the Hessian is negative definite, we require the following diagonal dominance conditions:

\[
\left| \frac{\partial^2 Y_x}{\partial p_x \partial p_x} \right| > \left| \frac{\partial^2 Y_x}{\partial p_x \partial q_y} \right|,
\]

\[
\left| \frac{\partial^2 Y_y}{\partial q_y \partial q_y} \right| > \left| \frac{\partial^2 Y_y}{\partial q_y \partial p_x} \right|.
\]

Diagonal dominance conditions postulate that diagonal elements of the Hessian are larger in absolute value than any off-diagonal elements, which in turn guarantees that the Hessian of the game is negative definite. It is clear that when the cost functions are linear, these conditions simplify to \( \theta_x \frac{1}{p_x(y)} > \varepsilon_{xy} \) and \( \theta_y \frac{1}{q_y(x)} > \eta_{xy} \). While Rosen’s version requires that these conditions hold globally for all \( s \in S \), which would imply \( \theta_x > \varepsilon_{xy} \) and \( \theta_y > \eta_{xy} \), these conditions could be relaxed to require diagonal dominance
to be satisfied only along the equilibrium path. For this we note that since the constraints are given by unit simplexes (for which the index equals 1 and every KKT point is complementary and non-degenerate), we can invoke the generalized Poincare-Hopf index theorem of Simsek, Ozdaglar, and Acemoglu (2007), which in this case implies that the equilibrium is unique if the Hessian is negative definite at the equilibrium point. Thus, the equilibrium is unique if diagonal dominance conditions hold only along the equilibrium path, i.e. if conditions (b) and (c) are satisfied.

Note that the assumptions we make to prove uniqueness are by no means restrictive. The assumption that cost functions are non-decreasing and convex is a natural one. The additional “diagonal dominance” conditions in our case can be interpreted as implying that the search cost should be sufficiently high for the equilibrium to be unique. If these conditions do not hold, then there can be multiple equilibria. This is a well-known outcome of the assignment model, which is a special case of our model under zero search costs. In a frictionless environment, the multiplicity of equilibria is eliminated by requiring that the matching be “stable,” a solution concept from cooperative games requiring that there is no profitable pairwise deviation. In our framework, checking for pairwise deviations would require that all males know the location of all females and vice versa. Since locating agents is costly in our model, we use the Nash equilibrium solution concept, which implies that the equilibrium outcome generically does not satisfy “stability.”

Under the assumptions on the cost functions made earlier, we can also obtain a characterization result. The derivatives of the constrained payoff functions with respect to own strategies are

$$\frac{\partial Y_x}{\partial p_x} = \varepsilon_{xy} q_y(x) - \frac{\partial c_x}{\partial \kappa_x} (\kappa_x) \left(1 + \ln \frac{p_x(y)}{1/M}\right) - \lambda_x,$$

$$\frac{\partial Y_y}{\partial q_y} = \eta_{xy} p_x(y) - \frac{\partial c_y}{\partial \kappa_y} (\kappa_y) \left(1 + \ln \frac{q_y(x)}{1/F}\right) - \lambda_y.$$

When cost functions are non-decreasing and convex, it is easy to verify that first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium. Rearranging the first-order conditions for males and females, we obtain
\[ p_x^*(y) = \exp \left( \frac{\varepsilon_{xy}q_y^*(x)}{\theta_x} \right) \sum_{y' = 1}^{M} \exp \left( \frac{\varepsilon_{xy'}q_{y'}(x)}{\theta_x} \right), \]

\[ q_y^*(x) = \exp \left( \frac{\eta_{xy}p_x^*(y)}{\theta_y} \right) \sum_{x' = 1}^{F} \exp \left( \frac{\eta_{x'y}p_{x'}(y)}{\theta_y} \right). \]  

These necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium cast the optimal strategy of female \( x \) and male \( y \) in the form of a best response to optimal strategies of males and females, respectively.

### 3 Implications of the Model

#### 3.1 Properties of matching equilibria

The result of Theorem 2 is intuitive. Recall that there are two motives for female \( x \) to target male \( y \): the productive and the strategic. The payoff of a female depends on the product of the portion she appropriates from the output of the match and the probability of reciprocation. While her private payoff does not depend on equilibrium strategies, the strategic motive does.

When the search cost, \( \theta \), is very low, females (and males) are able to place a high probability of targeting one counter-party and exclude all others. It does not matter what portion of the payoff female \( x \) will get from a match with male \( y \) if the male places a low probability on female \( x \). In the extreme, any pairing of agents is an equilibrium since no one has an incentive to deviate from any mutual reciprocation. The strategic motive dominates and multiplicity of equilibria is a natural outcome. As the search costs go to zero, targeting strategies become more and more precise. In the limit, in every equilibrium each female places a unit probability on a particular male and that male responds with a unit probability of considering that female. Each equilibrium of this kind implements a matching of the classical assignment problem (although not all of them are stable).

As \( \theta \) increases, probability distributions become less precise, as it is increasingly costly to target a particular counter-party. That is, the search costs dampen the strategic motive and the productive motive plays a bigger role. At some threshold level of
\( \theta \), the strategic motive is dampened enough that all agents will choose probabilities primarily seeking a match with a higher payoff. This level of costs is characterized by the diagonal dominance conditions of Theorem 2. Agents require the strategic motive, characterized by the off-diagonal element of the Hessian of the game, to be lower than the productive motive, captured by the diagonal element. Above the threshold, the unique equilibrium has the property that each agent places a higher probability on the counter-party that promises a higher payoff; i.e., the productive motive dominates. When search costs go to infinity, optimal strategies of males and females approach a uniform distribution. This unique equilibrium implements the standard uniform random matching assumption extensively used in the literature. Thus, the assignment model and the random matching model are special cases of our targeted search model, when \( \theta \) is either very low or very high.

Equilibrium conditions (3) also have an intuitive interpretation. They predict that the higher the female’s private gain from matching with a male, the higher the probability of targeting that male. Males are naturally sorted in each female’s strategy by the probability of the female targeting each male. The strategies of males have the same properties due to the symmetry of the problem. Theorem 2 predicts that an increase in \( \theta \) reduces the interaction between search strategies of females and males. Once \( \theta \) is sufficiently high, the intersection of best responses leads to a unique equilibrium. Note that, by the nature of the index theorem used in the proof of uniqueness, it is enough to check diagonal dominance conditions locally in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. There is no requirement for them to hold globally. This suggests a simple way of computing the unique equilibrium. We first need to find one solution to the first-order conditions (3) and then check that diagonal dominance conditions are satisfied.

In appendix A we analyze whether an equilibrium of the model is efficient from the point of view of a constrained planner. We find that except for the two extreme cases—random matching (when costs are infinite) and the frictionless limit (when costs are zero)—the equilibria of the model are socially inefficient. While it is socially optimal for both females and males to consider the total payoff of the match, in the decentralized equilibrium they consider only their private payoffs. This result is reminiscent of the
holdup problem where there are goods with positive externalities and the producer undersupplies the good if she is not fully compensated by the marginal social benefits that an additional unit of the good would provide to society. In our model, additional search effort exerted by an individual male or female has a positive externality on the whole matching market. In appendix B we show that the constrained optimum is possible to achieve if only one side of the market searches actively.

In appendix C we consider an extension of the two-sided matching model to a repeated setting. Following Eeckhout (1999) and Adachi (2003), we assume that at the moment that male $y$ and female $x$ meet, each of them has an additional decision to make. Each agent may choose to form a match and receive the corresponding share of the surplus or refuse to form a match and wait for a better potential partner in future periods if their continuation value is higher than the payoff from matching with the proposed partner. The continuation value is assumed to be simply the expected payoff from matching in the future discounted at the rate $\rho$, a patience parameter.

When the agents are unable to distinguish partners until they meet, i.e., when the cost parameter $\theta$ approaches infinity, we obtain the Adachi (2003) model. In that case, if the patience parameter $\rho$ approaches 1, the model replicates the frictionless matching outcome, as agents are able to wait as long as necessary to meet their best match. Similarly, when agents cannot wait and match everybody that they meet, i.e., the patience parameter $\rho$ is set to zero, we obtain our baseline one-shot model. In that case, if agents are nonetheless able to perfectly distinguish among potential partners, i.e., the parameter $\theta$ approaches zero, the model, with a refinement permitting only stable matchings, also reproduces the frictionless matching outcome.

The repeated game with patience is instructive, as it highlights two independent sources of search frictions: the costs of waiting and the costs of distinguishing among agents. According to Smith et al. (1999), search costs are divided into external and internal costs. External costs include the monetary costs of searching and contacting partners as well as the opportunity costs of the time spent on searching. These costs are captured by the parameter $\rho$ in the repeated model. Internal costs include the mental effort associated with the search process, sorting the incoming information,
and integrating it with what the agent already knows. Modeling the internal costs is the novel feature of our model. Internal costs are captured by the parameter $\theta$, which describes the agents’ ability to evaluate available information, depending on intelligence, prior knowledge, education and training. The properties of the extended model highlight that both internal and external costs of search are necessary to obtain outcomes where superior agents are matched with inferior agents in equilibrium: The agents need to be both reasonably impatient and unable to perfectly distinguish among potential partners. Although the two types of frictions are quite different in nature, we find that they reinforce each other: If agents can distinguish their best matches better, the equilibrium likelihood of meeting is higher, which increases the continuation value of waiting, just like an increase in patience.

This extension also highlights two distinguishing features of our model. First, it emphasizes the difference between the choice of whom to meet constrained by cognitive costs and the choice of whether to form a match or keep looking for a better one constrained by the physical costs. Ours is an explicit model of how agents choose whom to meet. Second, the extended model makes clear the source of the difference between the TU (transferable utility) and the NTU (non-transferable utility) cases. If agents are able to reject potential partners that are not good enough, then it is important whether those potential partners can offer a larger share of the surplus in return for forming a match. The more impatient agents are, the smaller the difference between the TU and NTU cases. In our one-shot model, the TU case and the NTU case are identical, as the continuation values are zero and all matches are viable.

### 3.2 Implications for Sorting

To better understand the effect of the productive and strategic motives on equilibrium strategies and matching rates, it is useful to consider simple examples of payoffs. Let us consider a matching market where there are just two males and two females, with types high (H) and low (L). Let us also consider two specific cases of the form of the payoff function, which in the literature are often referred to as horizontal and vertical
preferences.\footnote{See e.g., Hitsch et al. (2010) and Herrenbrueck et al. (2016).}

Case one: The high-type female is better off with the high-type male, and the low-type female is better off with the low-type male. The same property is true for males. We shall generally refer to a payoff function where for each type the best option on the other side is different, as the case of horizontal preferences. Case two: Both females prefer the high-type male, and both males prefer the high-type female. We shall generally refer to a payoff function for which everyone's best option is the same type as the case of vertical preferences. These definitions place restrictions only on the structure of agents’ best options and are therefore less restrictive than existing definitions in the literature.

In the case of horizontal preferences, the strategic and the productive motives are aligned. The productive motive points all agents in different directions—toward their best options—and the strategic motive ensures that the agent that implies a higher payoff is also the one more likely to reciprocate (because agents have no incentive to compete for the same match). However, in the case of vertical preferences, the productive motive points all agents in the same direction, while the strategic motive tends to drive agents to pay attention to those whom their competitors are less likely to consider, to maximize the odds of finding a match. Thus, there is a conflict between the two motives as they pull intentions in different directions.

If preferences are horizontal and the search costs are low, our model can have two different equilibrium patterns. The first pattern is where the high type is more likely to target the high type and the low type to target the low type (HH, LL). This is the case of positive assortative matching (PAM). The second pattern is when the high type is more likely to target the low type, because the low type is more likely to reciprocate (HL, LH). This is the case of negative assortative matching (NAM). However, if search costs are high, only the PAM equilibrium survives, because the productive motive dominates.

If preferences are vertical, and search costs are low, in addition to the PAM and NAM equilibria, there is a third equilibrium pattern, which we call a mixing equilibrium. In the mixing equilibrium, both females target the high-type male (they assign a higher
probability to him), and both males target the high-type female (they assign a higher probability to her). Moreover, for high enough search costs, the unique equilibrium has the mixing pattern, while the PAM and NAM equilibria disappear. These patterns are illustrated in Figure 2.

This last result is in stark contrast with the literature on optimal assignment, which predicts a PAM equilibrium as the only stable outcome for either horizontal or vertical preferences. The prediction of the assignment model is driven by the strategic motive. If search costs are low, the high types are only interested in each other, so it makes no sense for the low types to target the high types as, despite a higher potential payoff, the chance their interest will be reciprocated is zero. However, when search costs are high enough, the strategic motive is dampened to the extent that the productive motive starts to play a dominant role. The productive motive instructs people to place a higher probability on the type that promises a higher payoff—hence, the unique mixing equilibrium. This intuition naturally extends to richer environments with a multitude of types and various shapes of preferences, yielding unique PAM equilibria in the case of horizontal preferences and unique mixing equilibria in the case of vertical preferences.

This basic intuition has important implications for empirical inference. If the productive and strategic motives are perfectly aligned, as they are for horizontal preferences, then the shape of the equilibrium matching pattern is very similar to the shape of the payoff function. The presence of a conflict between these motives, as in the case of vertical preferences, drives a wedge between the shape of the payoff and the shape of the matching rates. The conflict between motives creates a large number of competing
agents that would be able to compensate for the lower payoff by a higher probability of reciprocation. Therefore, the pattern of who meets whom will differ substantially from the pattern of who would be better off with whom.

To quantify this difference, we run a set of Monte Carlo simulations and compute the correlation between the equilibrium matching rate and the underlying payoff function. For the Monte Carlo simulations, we assume three males and three females and draw each element of the 3-by-3 payoff matrix from a uniform distribution. We make 25,000 draws. We then find all equilibria and corresponding matching rates for each draw of the payoff function. For all draws, we compute the correlation between the matrix of equilibrium matching rates and the payoff matrix. In Figure 3 we show the probability density functions of correlations for three classes of payoff functions: vertical preferences, horizontal preferences, or no clear preference pattern.

We find that, indeed, in the case of vertical preferences, the correlation is significantly lower than that in the case of horizontal preferences. The intermediate shapes of payoffs generate intermediate values of the correlation. Thus, when our model is the
true data-generating process, the conflict between the productive and strategic motives drives a substantial wedge between the shape of the underlying payoff function and the shape of the matching rate. Consequently, the empirical researcher could easily arrive at wrong conclusions about the shape of the underlying payoff and the optimal frictionless allocation by simply looking at the shape of the matching rates. As we shall discuss at the end of the empirical section, this is indeed what workhorse models of the marriage market do.

To put this result in context, we note that both random matching models à la Shimer and Smith (2000) and directed search models à la Eeckhout and Kircher (2010) can produce a substantial wedge between the shape of the payoff function and the shape of the matching rates. In the case of random matching, the distribution is uniform, while in the case of directed search matching is fully assortative. Matching patterns in both of these cases are accommodated by our model under extreme (very high or very low) values of search costs. Our model also spans the continuum of matching patterns in-between these two extremes.

To show that the wedge between the matching pattern and the payoff function is indeed present in the data and empirically relevant, in the empirical section, we explore three prominent examples of matching patterns in the marriage market. We show that, when viewed through the lens of our model, they exhibit strong vertical preferences. Also, we observe a substantial wedge between the shape of the underlying payoff function and the matching rate.

### 3.3 Identification

Identifying preferences empirically, in particular, distinguishing between horizontal and vertical preferences, is hard because both cases lead to identical assortative stable matching in the frictionless case. The interaction between the productive and strategic motives in our model makes it possible to use the data to distinguish empirically between horizontal and vertical preferences. The empirical strategy will depend on data availability, however.

The literature distinguishes two important situations. The first situation is when the
contact rates are available. For instance, Hitsch et al. (2010) observe the contact rates of both men and women on a dating website, from which one can infer for each type of male and female what their distributions of interest are, $p_x(y)$ and $q_y(x)$, respectively. Since these are distributions that sum up to one, in this case, the data contains observations with $2 \times M \times N - M - N$ degrees of freedom. Assuming non-transferable utility, these data allow the researcher to identify the shape of the payoff functions for each type of men and women, $\varepsilon_{xy}$ and $\eta_{xy}$, which have a total of $2 \times M \times N$ degrees of freedom. Our model allows for direct identification of these unobserved preferences up to a constant for each type by using the necessary conditions for equilibrium. Specifically, rearranging equations (3) we obtain

$$\ln \frac{p^*_x(y)}{p^*_x(y')} = \frac{\varepsilon_{xy}q^*_y(x)}{\theta_x} - \frac{\varepsilon_{xy}'q^*_y'(x)}{\theta_x},$$

$$\ln \frac{q^*_y(x)}{q^*_y(x')} = \frac{\eta_{xy}p^*_x(y)}{\theta_y} - \frac{\eta_{xy}'p^*_x'(y)}{\theta_y}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

If the researchers were to restrict attention to cases of equilibrium uniqueness (which is straightforward to test after finding the payoffs), then these equations uniquely identify the best match for each type of male and female and thus determine whether preferences are horizontal, vertical or some mix of the two. We were able to routinely recover the correct structure of preferences in Monte-Carlo simulations. Unfortunately we were unable to apply this strategy to the data in Hitsch et al (2010) due to their non-disclosure agreement. As this strategy requires substantial investment in data collection that goes beyond the scope of this paper, we leave the empirical application of this strategy for future research.

The second, more common, situation is when only matching rates are available. For instance, Choo and Siow (2006) observe matching rates for men and women in the U.S. marriage market for specific years, from which one can infer the product $p_x(y)q_y(x)$. In this case, the data contains observations with $M \times N$ degrees of freedom. Of course, there are not enough restrictions in the data to identify payoffs in a non-transferable utility case, but if one were to assume transferable utility with a predefined split of the joint payoff between males and females, $\Phi_{xy}$, then the unobserved payoff functions also have $M \times N$ degrees of freedom. This makes the payoff functions identifiable in
principle.

However, we find that in our model the mapping between the payoff and the matching rate is not necessarily invertible. By that we mean that there may exist matching rate patterns that cannot in principle be generated by our model. Also, we cannot exclude the possibility that some matching rate pattern could be generated by more than one payoff function (although we could not find an example of this in practice).

Given the potential non-invertibility of the mapping between the payoff and the matching rates, our empirical methodology proceeds in three steps. First, we assume that search costs are identical across agents on both sides of the marriage market, $\theta_x = \theta_y = \theta$. This assumption will allow us to identify the ratio of the payoff to search cost, $\Phi_{xy}/\theta$, for each pair of types. In addition, we assume that each payoff is split equally between males and females; i.e., $\epsilon_{xy} = \eta_{xy} = \Phi_{xy}/2$. Second, for any shape of the payoff function, $\Phi_{xy}$, we find all equilibria (if there are more than one) and compute all corresponding equilibrium matching rates implied by the model. Third, we search for a shape of the payoff that maximizes the likelihood function of the data given the predicted matching rates.

Whenever a proposed payoff function produces multiple equilibria, we select the one that fits the observed matching rate best, i.e. has the highest likelihood. Maximization of the likelihood function efficiently minimizes the properly weighted sum of distances between the data and the model’s prediction and should lead to consistent estimates. Maximum likelihood estimation of discrete games with multiple equilibria have been reasonably well studied in the literature, e.g., Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). Here we do not employ any computational tricks since the 3-by-3 case can be computed by brute force in reasonable time. The results of such estimation can be treated as an upper bound on the explanatory power of the model.

In the empirical section, we apply this method to three prominent examples of sorting in the marriage market and find that the model fits the data very well. Despite matching rate data suggesting mostly horizontal preferences, when viewed through the lens of our model with strategic motives, the data are consistent with a vertical preference structure.
4 Empirical Application

To take the model to the data, we use a standard dataset for matching rates in the U.S. marriage market. The data on unmarried males and females and newly married couples comes from IPUMS for the year 2001.\footnote{We thank Gayle and Shephard (2015) for kindly sharing the IPUMS data with us.} For computational transparency, we assign both males and females to three equally sized bins, which we refer to as low (L), medium (M), and high (H) types. We consider three dimensions along which males and females evaluate each other in the marriage market: income, age and education. In each case we choose the cutoffs between bins in such a way as to split the whole U.S. population of each gender into equally sized bins.

In the case of age, we restrict our attention only to adults between the ages 21 and 33. To make them as close as possible to equal size, the bins correspond to ages 21-23, 24-27, and 28-33. We discard all younger and older people from the analysis because there is a disproportionate amount of unmarried people in these other age categories who only rarely marry. One reason for this may be that a large fraction of them are not searching for a spouse and are thus not participating in the marriage market. To avoid misspecification due to our inability to observe search effort, we exclude them from our analysis. In the case of education, the natural breakdown into three bins is to have people who never attended college, those who are currently in college, and those who have graduated from college. Income is a continuous characteristic, so the three bins correspond to people with low, medium, and high incomes.

For each of the three cases, we estimate the shape of the payoff function using the maximum likelihood methodology described earlier for the case of transferable utility. We assume that all currently unmarried males and females are searching, and the number of matches is proxied by the number of couples that were married in the past 12 months, as indicated by answers to the questionnaire. The dataset contains 93,599 unmarried males, 82,673 unmarried females, and 23,572 newly married couples above the age of 21.

The matching rate for the case of income is presented in the left panel of Figure 4.
The estimate of the underlying payoff is shown in the right panel of the same figure. A notable property of the payoff is that it shows strong vertical preference. That is, marrying a spouse with a higher income is always better. We find that the matching rate and the payoff have a correlation of 0.72.

The matching rate for the sorting by age is presented in the left panel of Figure 5. Looking at the shape of the matching rate, we would expect to see the horizontal preferences here, with slightly older males looking for slightly older females. However, the shape of the payoff that best explains this sorting pattern is also consistent with vertical preferences. Females have a strong preference for older males independent of their own age. Meanwhile, males are virtually indifferent to the age of their spouse. The highest payoff is produced by males at age 30 marrying females at age 23. The correlation between the matching rate and the payoff is a staggeringly low 0.42.

The matching rate for sorting by education is presented in the left panel of Figure 6. In this case, the payoff exhibits segments of both vertical and horizontal preferences. People with a lower level of education and people with a high level of education both prefer someone with their same level of education, generating a region of horizontal preferences. However, people with a medium level of education tend to prefer highly educated people, generating a region with vertical preferences. The matching rate and the payoff function have a correlation of 0.52.

A widely used workhorse model of the marriage literature is the model of Choo and Siow (2006). They estimate a static transferable utility model that generates a nonparametric marriage matching function. This model postulates that, in equilibrium, each pair of cohorts of males and females reaches an implicit agreement on the matching rate among themselves; matching (or staying single) is a voluntary decision. In their model, the payoff is recovered as a simple algebraic function of the matching rates and the number of people searching. An important feature of the model is that the matching rate depends only on the characteristics of the agents directly involved in the match but not on the characteristics of other agents present in the marriage market. The strategic motive is absent from their model, so the shape of the matching rate mimics closely the shape of the payoff function. This implies that the distance between the assumptions
Figure 4: Sorting by income

Figure 5: Sorting by age

Figure 6: Sorting by education
and implications is minimal: the correlation between the matching rates across pairs of types and the implied values of the payoff are close to 1.

We illustrate this feature in Figure 7, where we use the 3-by-3 Monte Carlo simulation from Section 3.2. We plot the correlation between the true underlying payoff and the equilibrium matching rate obtained from our model on the horizontal axis and the correlation between the same matching rate and the corresponding payoff function recovered by the model of Choo and Siow on the vertical axis. We find that in many cases, the shape of the true payoff and of the matching rate descends to 0.4, while the model of Choo and Siow would imply that they have a similar shape with a correlation above 0.75. We color the payoffs consistent with the three types of preferences in three different colors. We find that while the correlation depends significantly on the pattern of preferences in our model, in Choo and Siow’s model it does not.

Figure 7 also compares our empirical findings with the Monte Carlo simulation. We find that the three prominent empirical examples that we have considered indeed belong to the range of correlation values commonly generated by payoffs consistent with vertical preferences.

![Figure 7: Monte Carlo results and Data](image-url)
This result emphasizes the importance of considering the effect of strategic motives on the sorting patterns in empirical research. If a researcher looks at the data through the lens of a model with exogenous randomness, that model by construction ignores any strategic considerations that may affect agents’ search strategies. As we have shown, strategic considerations can drive a significant wedge between the shape of the preferences and the shape of the observed sorting pattern. Ignoring search frictions that affect the decision of whom to meet may thus lead to vastly misleading conclusions regarding the amount of mismatch present in a market and the size of the losses associated with it. In this paper, we have presented and demonstrated the effectiveness of an identification strategy that uses the strategic motives of agents to identify preferences, with emphasis on distinguishing vertical and horizontal preference structures.

5 Final Remarks

In this paper we propose a model of probabilistic choice by agents in a matching market where deciding whom to contact when locating the best partners involves cognitive effort. The model features a productive motive whereby agents target partners who render a higher payoff and a strategic motive that drives agents toward partners who are more likely to show mutual interest. We find that accounting for the interaction of strategic and productive considerations allows the identification of underlying preferences, while ignoring this interaction may result in misleading implications regarding the degree of mismatch and hence the losses associated with it. Understanding who meets whom is crucial for understanding who marries whom, and who should marry whom instead.

We applied the model to the U.S. marriage market to demonstrate its relevance, but our model is well-suited to study a host of real-life matching markets where agents have limited time and ability to quickly evaluate the relative merits of potential partners. A number of markets ranging from labor markets to education and health care provide examples of markets where equilibrium matches between superior and inferior types are prevalent. Our model can be a useful tool for analyzing these markets.
Furthermore, our model describes markets where the degree of centralization is fairly low. In many two-sided market models, a platform acts both as a coordination device and as a mechanism to transfer utility. Our model can be used to study the optimal degree of centralization and the social efficiency of pricing schemes in these markets. We view both the empirical study of matching markets and the optimal design of centralization in two-sided search environments as exciting areas of future research.
References


Appendix A: (In) efficiency of equilibrium

To evaluate the efficiency of the equilibrium, we compare the solution of the decentralized problem to a social planner’s solution. We assume that the social planner maximizes the total payoff, which is a utilitarian welfare function. To achieve a social optimum, the planner can choose the strategies of males and females. If there were no search costs, the planner would always choose to match each male with the female that produces the highest output. The socially optimal strategies of males would be infinitely precise.

To study the constrained efficient allocation, we impose on the social planner the same costs of search that we place on males and females. Thus, the social planner maximizes the following welfare function:

\[
W = \max_{p_x(y), q_y(x)} \sum_{x=1}^{M} \sum_{y=1}^{F} \Phi_{xy} p_x(y) q_y(x) - \sum_{x=1}^{F} c_x (\kappa_x (p_x(y))) - \sum_{y=1}^{M} c_y (\kappa_y (q_y(x)))
\]

subject to (1-2) and to the constraints that \(p_x(y)\) and \(q_y(x)\) are well-defined probability distributions.

Under the assumption of increasing and convex cost functions, the social welfare function is concave in the strategies of males and females. Hence, first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum. Rearranging and substituting out Lagrange multipliers, we arrive at the following characterization of the social planner’s allocation:

\[
p^*_x(y) = \exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{xy} q^*_y(x)}{\theta_x} \right) \sum_{y'=1}^{M} \exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{xy'} q^*_{y'}(x)}{\theta_x} \right),
\]

\[
q^*_y(x) = \exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{xy} p^*_x(y)}{\theta_y} \right) \sum_{x'=1}^{F} \exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{x'y} p^*_{x'}(y)}{\theta_y} \right).
\]

(5)
The structure of the social planner’s solution is very similar to the structure of the decentralized equilibrium given by (3). From a female’s perspective, the only difference between the two strategies is that the probability of targeting a male depends on the social gain from a match rather than on her private gain. Notice that the same difference holds from the perspective of a male. Thus, it is socially optimal for both females and males to consider the total payoff, while in the decentralized equilibrium they consider only their private payoffs.

In our model, additional search effort exerted by an individual male or female has a positive externality on the whole matching market. For instance, when a male chooses to increase his search effort, he can better locate his preferable matches. As a consequence, the females he targets will benefit (through an increase in the personal matching rate) and the females he does not target will also be better off as his more-targeted strategy will help them exclude him from their search (through a decrease in the personal matching rate). Nevertheless, in this environment, agents cannot appropriate all the social benefits (the output of a match) they provide to society when increasing their search effort. They only get a fraction of the payoff. This failure of the market to fully compensate both females and males with their social marginal products leads to an under supply of search effort by both sides in the decentralized equilibrium.

Because the social gain is always the sum of private gains, there is no feasible way of splitting the payoff such that it implements the social optimum. When \( \theta \) is finite and positive, a socially optimal equilibrium has to satisfy the following conditions simultaneously:

\[
\varepsilon_{xy} = \Phi_{xy}, \quad \eta_{xy} = \Phi_{xy}.
\]

In the presence of heterogeneity, these optimality conditions can hold in equilibrium only if the total payoff is zero, as private gains have to add up to the total payoff, \( \varepsilon_{xy} + \eta_{xy} = \Phi_{xy} \). Therefore, we have just proven the following theorem:

**Theorem 3.** The matching equilibrium is socially inefficient for any split of the payoff if all of the following hold:

1) cost functions are increasing and convex;
2) $\Phi_{xy} > 0$ for some $(x, y)$;
3) $\Phi_{xy} \neq \Phi_{xy'}$ for some $x$, $y$ and $y'$;
4) $\Phi_{xy} \neq \Phi_{x'y}$ for some $y$, $x$ and $x'$;
5) $0 < \frac{\partial c_x(\kappa_x)}{\partial \kappa_x} \bigg|_{p_x^*} = \theta_x < \infty$;
6) $0 < \frac{\partial c_y(\kappa_y)}{\partial \kappa_y} \bigg|_{q_y^*} = \theta_y < \infty$.

**Proof.** The proof proceeds in 3 steps.

**Step 1.** Under the assumption of increasing convex cost functions, both individual payoff functions and the social welfare function are concave in the strategies of males and females. Hence, first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for a maximum.

**Step 2.** We denote by CEFOC the first-order conditions of the decentralized equilibrium and by POFOC the first-order conditions of the social planner. In formulae:

\[
\text{POFOC}_{p_x(y)}: \quad \Phi_{xy} \tilde{q}_y(x) - \frac{\partial c_y(\tilde{\kappa}_y)}{\partial \tilde{\kappa}_y} \bigg|_{\tilde{q}_y(x)} \left( \ln \tilde{q}_y(x) \frac{1}{1/M} + 1 \right) - \tilde{\lambda}_y = 0
\]

\[
\text{POFOC}_{q_y(x)}: \quad \Phi_{xy} \tilde{p}_x(y) - \frac{\partial c_x(\tilde{\kappa}_x)}{\partial \tilde{\kappa}_x} \bigg|_{\tilde{p}_x(y)} \left( \ln \tilde{p}_x(y) \frac{1}{1/M} + 1 \right) - \tilde{\lambda}_x = 0
\]

\[
\text{CEFOC}_{p_x(y)}: \quad \varepsilon_{xy} p_x(y) - \frac{\partial c_x(\kappa_x)}{\partial \kappa_x} \bigg|_{p_x(y)} \left( \ln p_x(y) \frac{1}{1/M} + 1 \right) - \lambda_x = 0
\]

\[
\text{CEFOC}_{q_y(x)}: \quad \eta_{xy} q_y(x) - \frac{\partial c_y(\kappa_y)}{\partial \kappa_y} \bigg|_{q_y(x)} \left( \ln q_y(x) \frac{1}{1/F} + 1 \right) - \lambda_y = 0
\]

For the equilibrium to be socially efficient, we need to have the following:

\[
\tilde{p}_x(y) = p_x(y) \quad \text{for all } x, y
\]

\[
\tilde{q}_y(x) = q_y(x) \quad \text{for all } x, y
\]

**Step 3.** By contradiction, imagine that the two conditions above hold. Then, by construction,

\[
\frac{\partial c_y(\tilde{\kappa}_y)}{\partial \tilde{\kappa}_y} \bigg|_{\tilde{q}_y(x)} = \frac{\partial c_y(\kappa_y)}{\partial \kappa_y} \bigg|_{q_y(x)} = a_y
\]
\[
\frac{\partial c_x (\tilde{\kappa}_x)}{\partial \tilde{\kappa}_x} \bigg|_{\tilde{p}_x(y)} = \frac{\partial c_x (\kappa_x)}{\partial \kappa_x} \bigg|_{p_x(y)} = a_x.
\]

Denote marginal cost by \(a_y\) and \(a_x\) for males and females, respectively. It then follows that

\[
\Phi_{xy} \tilde{p}_x(y) - \tilde{\lambda}_y = \frac{\partial c_y (\tilde{\kappa}_y)}{\partial \tilde{\kappa}_y} \bigg|_{\tilde{q}_y(x)} \left( \ln \frac{\tilde{q}_y(x)}{1/M} + 1 \right)
= \frac{\partial c_y (\kappa_y)}{\partial \kappa_y} \bigg|_{q_y(x)} \left( \ln \frac{q_y(x)}{1/M} + 1 \right)
= \eta_{xy} p_x(y) - \lambda_y;
\]

i.e., \(\Phi_{xy} \tilde{p}_x(y) - \tilde{\lambda}_y = \eta_{xy} p_x(y) - \lambda_y\) for all \(x\) and \(y\). We can use the first-order conditions of males to derive the formulas for \(\lambda_y\) and \(\tilde{\lambda}_y\):

\[
(i) \quad F \exp \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda_y}{a_y} \right) = \sum_{x=1}^{F} \exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{xy} p_x(y)}{a_y} \right)

(ii) \quad F \exp \left( 1 + \frac{\lambda_y}{a_y} \right) = \sum_{x=1}^{F} \exp \left( \frac{\eta_{xy} p_x(y)}{a_y} \right)

(iii) \quad (\Phi_{xy} - \eta_{xy}) p_x(y) = \tilde{\lambda}_y - \lambda_y \quad \text{for all } x.
\]

Jointly \((i)\), \((ii)\) and \((iii)\) imply

\[
\sum_{x'=1}^{F} \exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{xy'} p_{x'}(y)}{a_y} \right) = \frac{\exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{xy} p_x(y)}{a_y} \right)}{\exp \left( \frac{\eta_{xy} p_x(y)}{a_y} \right)} \quad \text{for all } x.
\]

Hence,

\[
\frac{\exp(\Phi_{xy} p_x(y))}{\exp(\eta_{xy} p_x(y))} = \frac{\exp(\Phi_{xy'} p_{x'}(y))}{\exp(\eta_{xy'} p_{x'}(y))} \quad \text{for all } x \text{ and } x'.
\]

Therefore, either

a) \(\Phi_{xy} = \eta_{xy}\) for all \(x\) or
b) \( \Phi_{x'y} = \Phi_{x''y} \) and \( \eta_{x'y} = \eta_{x''y} \) for all \( x' \) and \( x'' \).

Similarly, from females’ first-order conditions it follows that either

c) \( \Phi_{xy} = \varepsilon_{xy} \) for all \( y \) or

d) \( \Phi_{xy'} = \Phi_{xy''} \) and \( \varepsilon_{x'y} = \varepsilon_{x''y} \) for all \( y' \) and \( y'' \).

Cases b) and d) have been ruled out by the assumptions of the theorem. Cases a) and b) jointly imply that \( \varepsilon_{xy} = \eta_{xy} = \Phi_{xy} = \varepsilon_{xy} + \eta_{xy} \), which leads to a contradiction \( \varepsilon_{xy} = \eta_{xy} = \Phi_{xy} = 0 \). \( \Box \)

The first two conditions are self-explanatory; the case when all potential matches yield zero payoffs is a trivial case of no gains from matching. Conditions 5 and 6 state that marginal costs of reducing noise have to be finite and positive in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. When \( \theta \) is zero, the best equilibrium of the assignment model is socially optimal. When \( \theta \) is very high, the random matching outcome is the best possible outcome. For all intermediate values of marginal costs, the decentralized equilibrium is socially inefficient.

Conditions 3 and 4 together require heterogeneity to be two-sided. If heterogeneity is one-sided, i.e., condition 3 or condition 4 is violated, then the allocation of intentions toward the homogeneous side of the market will be uniform. In this case, search becomes one-sided and equilibrium allocations are efficient contingent on the actively searching side appropriating 100 percent of the payoff.\(^{16}\)

One notable property of the equilibrium is that, by considering only fractions of the total payoff when choosing their strategies, males and females place lower probabilities on pursuing their best matches. This implies that in equilibrium, probability distributions of males and females are more dispersed and the number of matches is lower than is socially optimal.

The inefficiency that arises in the two-sided model can in principle be corrected by a central planner. This can be done by promising both males and females that they will receive the entire payoff of each match and then by collecting lump-sum taxes from

\(^{16}\)See Appendix B for a version of the model with one-sided heterogeneity.
both sides of the market to cover the costs of the program. Nevertheless, to do so, the planner himself would need to acquire extensive knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs, which is costly. We leave this point for future research.
Appendix B: One-sided model

Here we consider a one-sided model where females are searching for males who are heterogeneous in type and females face a search cost. We assume that there is no heterogeneity on the female side of the market. As such the probability that a male reciprocates the intentions of a female is given by \( q_y \). The strategy of a female remains \( p_x(y) \). Like before, a female’s cost of searching is given by \( c_x(\kappa_x) \). Female \( x \) chooses a strategy \( p_x(y) \) to maximize her expected income flow:

\[
Y_x = \max_{p_x(y)} \sum_{y=1}^{M} \varepsilon_{xy} p_x(y) q_y - c_x(\kappa_x).
\]

A female receives her payoff in a match with male \( y \) conditional on matching with that male. She also incurs a cost that depends on search effort:

\[
\kappa_x = \sum_{y=1}^{M} p_x(y) \ln \frac{p_x(y)}{1/M},
\]

where the female’s strategy must satisfy \( \sum_{y=1}^{M} p_x(y) = 1 \) and \( p_x(y) \geq 0 \) for all \( y \).

**Definition 2.** A matching equilibrium of the one-sided matching model is a set of strategies of females, \( \{p_x(y)\}_{x=1}^{N} \), which solve their optimization problems.

**Theorem 4.** If the cost functions are non-decreasing and convex, the one-sided matching model has a unique equilibrium.

**Proof.** The payoffs of all females are continuous in their strategies. They are also concave in these strategies when cost functions are (weakly) increasing and convex. Hence, each problem has a unique solution.

When in addition the cost functions are differentiable, it is easy to verify that first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient conditions for equilibrium. Rearranging the first-order conditions for the female, we obtain

\[
p_x^*(y) = \exp \left( \frac{\varepsilon_{xy} q_y}{\theta_x} \right) \left/ \sum_{y'=1}^{M} \exp \left( \frac{\varepsilon_{xy'} q_{y'}}{\theta_x} \right) \right. \right.
\]

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The equilibrium condition (7) has an intuitive interpretation. It predicts that the higher the female’s expected gain from matching with a male, the higher the probability placed on locating that male. Thus, males are naturally sorted in each female’s strategy by probabilities of contacting those males.

**Efficiency.** To study the constrained efficient allocation, we impose upon the social planner the same constraints that we place on females. Thus, the social planner maximizes the following welfare function:

\[
W = \sum_{x=1}^{F} \sum_{y=1}^{M} \Phi_{xy} p_x(y) q_y - \sum_{x=1}^{F} c_x (\kappa_x)
\]

subject to (6) and to the constraint that the \( p_x(y) \)’s are well-defined probability distributions. Under the assumption of increasing convex cost functions, the social welfare function is concave in the strategies of females. Hence, first-order conditions are sufficient conditions for a maximum. Rearranging we arrive at the following characterization of the social planner’s allocation:

\[
p_x'(y) = \exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{xy} q_y}{\theta_x} \right) / \sum_{y'=1}^{M} \exp \left( \frac{\Phi_{xy'} q_y}{\theta_x} \right). \tag{8}
\]

Again, the structure of the social planner’s solution is very similar to the structure of the decentralized equilibrium. The only difference between the centralized and decentralized equilibrium strategies is that the probability of locating a male depends on the social gain from a match rather than on the private gain. Thus, it is socially optimal to consider the whole expected payoff when determining the socially optimal strategies, while in the decentralized equilibrium females consider only their private gains. To decentralize the socially optimal outcome the planner needs to give all of the payoff to the females, \( \varepsilon_{xy} = \Phi_{xy} \), effectively assigning them a share of 1. Note that, if the planner could choose the probability that a male reciprocates a female’s interest, \( q_y \), he would also set it to 1. When search costs are absent, the equilibrium of the model is socially optimal. When costs are very high, the random matching outcome is the best
possible outcome. For all intermediate values of costs, the decentralized equilibrium is constrained efficient contingent on the female receiving the whole output of the match.
Appendix C: Repeated two-sided model

Here we extend the two-sided matching model to a repeated setting. Following Adachi (2003), we assume that at the moment that male $y$ and female $x$ meet, each of them has an additional decision to make. Each agent may choose to form a match and receive the corresponding share of the surplus, or refuse to form a match and wait for a better potential partner in future periods if their continuation value is higher than the utility from matching with the proposed partner. The continuation value is assumed to be simply the expected utility of matching in the future discounted at the rate $\rho$, which is the patience parameter. In the Adachi model, the case $\rho = 1$ represented a frictionless case, which implied that agents could wait for their preferred match indefinitely at no time cost to them. Notice that our one-shot model represents the opposite case of $\rho = 0$.

We denote $v_x$ the continuation value of female $x$ and $w_y$ the continuation value of male $y$. Each agent chooses her strategy and pays the cost of search before the game starts and then makes a sequence of draws from the chosen distribution. Matched pairs of agents are replaced by their copies in the search process. The time-0 problems of the agents are like before:

$$Y_x = \sum_{y=1}^{M} EU_x(y) q_y(x) p_x(y) - \theta_x \left( \sum_{y=1}^{M} p_x(y) \ln \frac{p_x(y)}{1/M} \right) + \lambda_x \left( 1 - \sum_{y=1}^{M} p_x(y) \right),$$

$$Y_y = \sum_{x=1}^{F} EU_y(x) p_x(y) q_y(x) - \theta_y \left( \sum_{x=1}^{F} q_y(x) \ln \frac{q_y(x)}{1/F} \right) + \lambda_y \left( 1 - \sum_{x=1}^{F} q_y(x) \right).$$

The continuation values are defined as the solutions to the Bellman programs:

$$v_x = \rho \sum_{y=1}^{M} EU_x(y) q_y(x) p_x(y) + \rho \left( 1 - \sum_{y=1}^{M} q_y(x) p_x(y) \right) v_x,$$

$$w_y = \rho \sum_{x=1}^{F} EU_y(x) p_x(y) q_y(x) + \rho \left( 1 - \sum_{x=1}^{F} p_x(y) q_y(x) \right) w_y.$$ 

And the expected utilities from meeting are either equal to match utilities if both partners agree to a match or to continuation values if they do not reach an agreement:

$$EU_x(y) = v_x + (\eta_{xy} - v_x) I (\eta_{xy} \geq v_x) I (\xi_{xy} \geq w_y),$$

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\[ \text{EU}_y (x) = w_y + (\varepsilon_{xy} - w_y) I (\eta_{xy} \geq v_x) I (\varepsilon_{xy} \geq w_y). \]

An equilibrium of the model is a set of strategies \( \{p_x (y)\}_{x=1}^{F}, \{q_y (x)\}_{y=1}^{M} \), reservation values \( \{v_x\}_{x=1}^{F}, \{w_y\}_{y=1}^{M} \), and expected utilities \( \{\text{EU}_x (y)\}_{x=1}^{F}, \{\text{EU}_y (x)\}_{y=1}^{M} \) that jointly solve the problems of the agents and satisfy the system of equations above. Since the maximization problems are well-defined, the first-order conditions are still necessary conditions and must be satisfied in equilibrium. However, because the remaining functions are continuous, but not everywhere differentiable, the model may have multiple equilibria for many different combinations of parameters and it is hard to establish definitive results regarding uniqueness.

So far, this model explicitly postulates non-transferable utility (NTU), but it can easily be extended to the case of transferable utility (TU). Specifically, the TU case allows for redistributing the surplus in the cases when joint surplus of the match exceeds the sum of continuation values of the agents. Therefore, the last two equations are replaced in the TU case by:

\[ \begin{align*}
\text{EU}_x (y) &= v_x + \left( \eta'_{xy} - v_x \right) I (\eta_{xy} + \varepsilon_{xy} \geq v_x + w_y), \\
\text{EU}_y (x) &= w_y + \left( \varepsilon'_ {xy} - w_y \right) I (\eta_{xy} + \varepsilon_{xy} \geq v_x + w_y),
\end{align*} \]

where the utilities adjusted for the payments are defined as

\[ \begin{align*}
\eta'_{xy} &= v_x + \frac{\eta_{xy}}{\Phi_{xy}} (\eta_{xy} + \varepsilon_{xy} - v_x - w_y), \\
\varepsilon'_ {xy} &= w_y + \frac{\varepsilon_{xy}}{\Phi_{xy}} (\eta_{xy} + \varepsilon_{xy} - v_x - w_y).
\end{align*} \]

Note that in the one-shot model of the main text, the TU case and the NTU case are identical because the continuation values are zero. In Figure 8, using a simple payoff structure that exhibits vertical preferences for three males and three females, we illustrate the regions of the parameter space \((\theta, \rho)\) in which the equilibrium is non-unique (shaded), as well as the number of pairs of types that are matched in equilibrium with non-zero probability. The case with three pairs represents one-to-one matching, while the case with nine pairs implies that all possible pairings are observed. Like in the one-shot model, there is a threshold level of cognitive costs that generates multiplicity of...
equilibria. There are also small islands of multiplicity generated by the same mechanism as in the Adachi model. In the region where both costs are relatively high, all pairs of types are matched with some frequency in the unique equilibrium.

Figure 8: Number and types of equilibria depending on parameters