Why Doesn’t Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?*

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Abstract

What is the role of a country’s financial system in determining technology adoption? To examine this, a dynamic contract model is embedded into a general equilibrium setting with competitive intermediation. The terms of finance are dictated by an intermediary’s ability to monitor and control a firm’s cash flow, in conjunction with the structure of the technology that the firm adopts. It is not always profitable to finance promising technologies. A quantitative illustration is presented where financial frictions induce entrepreneurs in India and Mexico to adopt less-promising ventures than in the United States, despite lower input prices.

Keywords: Costly cash-flow control; costly state verification; dynamic contract theory; economic development; establishment-size distributions; finance and development; financial intermediation; India, Mexico, and the United States; long- and short-term contracts; monitoring; productivity; retained earnings; self-finance; technology adoption; ventures

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1 Introduction

Why do countries use different production technologies? Surely, all nations should adopt best-practice technologies, which produce the highest levels of income. Yet, this does not happen. To paraphrase Lucas (1990): Why doesn’t technology flow from rich to poor countries? The question is even more biting when one recognizes that poor countries often have much lower factor prices than rich ones. Hence, any technology that is profitable to run in a rich country should be even more profitable to run in a poor one. The premise here is that the efficiency of financial markets plays a vital role in technology adoption. In particular, when financial markets are inefficient, it may not be profitable to borrow the funds to implement certain types of technologies, even when factor prices are very low. If a country’s financial markets affect its technology adoption, then it is a small step to argue that they will affect the nation’s total factor productivity (TFP) and income.

1.1 The Theoretical Analysis

A dynamic costly state verification model of venture capital is developed. The model has multiple unique features. First, production technologies are represented in a more general way than in the usual finance and development literature. Entrepreneurs start new firms every period. There is a menu of potential technologies that can be operated. Entrepreneurs can select and operate a single blueprint from this menu of technologies. A firm’s blueprint is represented by a non-decreasing stochastic process that describes movement up a productivity ladder. Some blueprints have productivity profiles that offer exciting profit opportunities; others are more mundane. This is operationalized by assuming there are differences in the positions of the rungs on the productivity ladders, as well as in the odds of stepping between rungs. Blueprints also differ in the required capital investment. Some may require substantial investment before much information about the likely outcome is known. The structure of a technology is very important. It interacts with the efficiency of a financial system in a fundamental way to determine whether it is profitable to finance a project and, if so, the terms of a lending contract.

A start-up firm will ask an intermediary to underwrite its venture. The financial contract between the new firm and intermediary is long term in duration, unlike most of the literature,
which assumes short-term contracts. Short-term contracts may lie inside the Pareto frontier characterizing the payoffs for the borrower and lender. Therefore, it may be possible that a technology that cannot be financed with a short-term contract, because it entails a loss for one of the parties, can still be financed with a long-term one. A contract specifies a state-contingent plan over the life cycle of the project, outlining the advancement of funds from the intermediary to the firm and the payments from the firm back to the intermediary. A firm’s position on a productivity ladder is private information. Since the flow of funds depends on reports by the firm to the intermediary, there is an incentive for the firm to misrepresent its position to the intermediary. Intermediaries can audit the returns of a firm, as in the prototypical costly state verification paradigms of Townsend (1979) and Williamson (1986).

A distinguishing feature of the contracting framework is that the intermediary can pick the odds of a successful audit. The cost of auditing is increasing and convex in these odds. This cost is also decreasing in the productivity of a country’s financial sector. Another unique feature of the analysis is the notion of poor cash-flow control. Specifically, it is assumed that some fraction of a firm’s cash flow can never be secured by the intermediary via contractual means due to a poor rule of law in a country. The analysis allows for a new firm to self-finance some of the start-up costs of the venture at the time of writing a contract. The contract also specifies the amount of self-financing of inputs that the firm undertakes over time using the cash that flows into retained earnings.

Several propositions are proved. It is established that in general the intermediary pays the firm its rewards only if it reaches the top of the productivity ladder (modulo any payments it has to make due to poor cash-flow control). Additionally, when the firm has an incentive to lie, the intermediary will audit all reports of a failure to move up the ladder. Auditing reduces the incentive to deceive. When there is poor cash-flow control, the intermediary will also have to provide rewards even when the firm fails to move up the ladder. This reduces its ability to backload. The nature of the blueprint, a country’s input prices, and the state of its financial system will determine the profitability of a project. For certain blueprints it may not be feasible for any intermediary to offer a lending contract that will make the project profitable. This situation can arise because \textit{given the structure of the technology ladder}: (i) Input prices are too high, (ii) the level of monitoring needed to make the project viable is simply too expensive given the efficiency of the financial system, or (iii) poor cash-flow control makes it
impossible to implement enough backloading. It is shown that an entrepreneur starting a new venture should commit all of his available funds to the project. When the firm self-finances some of the start-up costs, there is less incentive to cheat on the contract in an attempt to avoid paying some of the fixed costs. Not surprisingly, if the new firm’s funds are large enough, then the project will be financed in the first-best manner. Interestingly, if there is a distribution of internal funds across new firms in a country, then there may be a corresponding distribution over the technologies adopted by these firms. Thus, the state of a nation’s financial system will have an impact on the type of ventures that will be financed. Financial sector efficiency will affect a nation’s income and TFP. Therefore, a link between finance and development is established.

1.2 The Quantitative Illustration

A quantitative illustration of the theory developed here is provided. The purpose is twofold. First, it establishes the potential of the financial mechanism developed here to explain cross-country differences in incomes and TFPs. On this, the quantitative illustration is not intended as a formal empirical assessment of the theory outlined here or as a means to discriminate between this and other financial mechanisms.¹ Second, the quantitative illustration elucidates some of the theoretical mechanisms at play: (i) the interplay between the efficiency of a financial system and technology adoption, (ii) the role of monitoring, (iii) the efficiency gains from long- versus short-term contracts, and (iv) the relationship between backloading, retained earnings, and internal (self-) financing of investment.

Motivated by Hsieh and Klenow (2014), the applied analysis focuses on three countries at very different levels of development: India, Mexico, and the United States. There are some interesting differences in establishments across these three countries. The average establishment size is much smaller in Mexico than in the United States and is much smaller in India

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than in Mexico. (These facts are presented later in Table 3, Section 10). This may be due to
the fact that TFP is higher in a U.S. plant than in a Mexican one, which in turn is higher
than in an Indian establishment. The share of employment contributed by younger (older)
establishments is also much larger (smaller) in India and Mexico than in the United States.
On this, TFP in a U.S. establishment increases much faster with age than in a Mexican one,
which rises more quickly than in an Indian plant. These facts suggest that these countries are
using very different technologies.

To undertake the quantitative illustration, a stylized version of the model is used where
there are only three production technologies available: advanced, intermediate, and entry level.
A firm in India, Mexico, and the United States is free to pick the technology that it desires.
Each project has a different blueprint. The structure of a technology plays an important role
in the quantitative illustration. The advanced technology promises high returns. When the
project successfully climbs all of the rungs of the productivity ladder, the time path of TFP
has a convex shape. This implies that growth in employment, output, and profits materialize
toward the end of the project’s life cycle. The project requires large up-front investment.
The entry-level technology has a lower expected return. Employment, output, and profits
follow a concave time path when the project scales the ladder triumphantly. The project’s
returns are therefore more immediate. It requires less start-up investment. The intermediate
technology lies between these two. To impose some discipline on the analysis, the model’s
general equilibrium is constructed so that factor prices match those in the Indian, Mexican,
and U.S. economies. Labor is much less expensive in India than in Mexico, which in turn is
less expensive than in the United States. Thus, on first appearance, the advanced technology
should be more profitable in India than in Mexico and more profitable in Mexico than in the
United States.

Some questions arise: Can an equilibrium be constructed where the United States will
use the first technology, Mexico the second, and India the third? Can such a structure
match the above stylized facts about the Indian, Mexican, and U.S. economies, including
the observations on establishment-size distributions? Does financial development matter for
economic development? The answers to these three questions are yes. Differences in financial
development play an important role in economic development. They explain a significant
portion of the differences in cross-country incomes, but primarily through the technology
adoption channel and not through capital deepening (or misallocation, which is not touched on in current analysis). Still, they do not explain the majority of the differences in incomes among India, Mexico, and the United States.

The quantitative analysis is also used to highlight some key points in the theoretical analysis. In particular, it is shown explicitly how the pattern of technology adoption is a function of monitoring efficiency and the extent of the cash-flow control problem. The advanced and intermediate technologies cannot be implemented when monitoring is not efficient and/or when there is a significant cash-flow problem. Additionally, it is illustrated that the advanced technology cannot be put into effect in the United States using a short-term contract. This is because a short-term contract leaves too much money on the table. By contrast, the use of a short-term contract is not that limiting for funding the entry-level technology. Given the structure of the entry-level technology, it can be financed quickly using the flow of cash into retained earnings. This is not the case for the advanced technology, which requires significant amounts of external financing throughout the life of the project. The fact that the evolution of retained earnings depends on the technology being financed has implications for a country’s private-debt-to-GDP ratio. The framework predicts that the ratio of private debt to GDP will rise with GDP. Why is this important? The observed concordance of this ratio with GDP is often interpreted as indicating that firms in poor countries rely more on internal funds (either start-up funds or through retained earnings) than those in rich nations. The current analysis suggests that this arises, in part, because of differences across countries in the pattern of cash flow into retained earnings related to variations in the patterns of technology adoption. These differences in technology adoption arise, to some extent, from variations in financial structures.

1.3 Finance and Development: A Brief Literature Review

Earlier work has drawn a connection between finance and the adoption of technologies. For example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) allow for two technologies: a primitive one with a low, certain rate of return and an advanced one with a higher expected but uncertain rate of return. By pooling risks intermediaries reduce the vagaries associated with the advanced technology. There are fixed costs associated with intermediation, so only the wealthy choose
to use this channel. Banerjee and Duflo (2005) present a stylized model where more advanced technologies require larger investments in terms of fixed costs. Given the presence of borrowing constraints, countries such as India lack the wherewithal to finance advanced technologies. They suggest this as a potential explanation for the productivity gap between India and the United States.

Within the context of a two-sector model where technologies may differ, Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) quantitatively examine the link between financial development and economic development. They emphasize the importance of borrowing and enforcement constraints. Greenwood, Sanchez, and Wang (2010, 2013) allow for an infinite number of technologies. Better intermediation prunes the ones with low returns from the economy. In all of these papers, technologies differ in a simple way. The prototypical setting is similar to Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990): Better technologies have higher expected levels of productivity, are riskier, and usually involve a higher fixed cost in terms of adoption.

The decision to finance a venture is likely to depend on the nature of the technology in a more deep-rooted manner. Selling drinks on the street is much different than launching rockets into space. The former requires a small investment that yields returns relatively quickly and with little risk. The latter requires years of funding before any returns are realized and there is tremendous risk associated with financing such ventures. To capture this notion, technologies are given a much richer representation than is conventionally assumed.

Why is this important? The structure of the technology adopted and the effects of financial structure are likely to be inextricably linked. Consider a model where entrepreneurs are constrained by some initial level of wealth and can borrow only a fixed limited amount per period on short-term markets. Intuitively, one would expect a firm to be much more capable of self-financing a project over time if the profile for TFP is flat, implying a flat profile of capital, as opposed to one where productivity perpetually grows in a convex manner requiring ever-increasing levels of investments. Midrigan and Xu (2014) argue that with stationary AR(1)-style productivity shocks (in logs), the capital required by a firm can be accumulated reasonably quickly by self-financing [see also Moll (2014) for an analysis of how the degree of

\footnote{The parameter governing the limited enforceability of contracts in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) resembles the parameter governing the cash-flow control problem here.}
persistence in technology shocks and the ability to self-finance interact].\(^3\)

In an extension, Midrigan and Xu (2014) conclude that the impact of intermediation on technology adoption is more important than its impact on the allocation of capital across plants for explaining TFP. They do this in a setting where the technology in the modern sector can be upgraded once, with complete certainty, at a fixed cost. This rules out technologies of the type considered here with convex productivity profiles where the high returns are skewed toward the end of the firm’s life cycle and occur with low probability.\(^4;\)\(^5\) Additionally, the focus of their analysis is on a single country, South Korea. Hence, they do not ask how technology adoption is interconnected with cross-country differences in factor prices and financial systems. The fact that factor prices are much lower in countries such as India is an important consideration when modeling the cross-country technology adoption. Doing this in general equilibrium while matching cross-country differences in factor prices and firm-size distributions, as is done here, is not an easy task. Finally, given that the main focus of their paper is the impact of finance on the misallocation of capital, and not technology adoption, Midrigan and Xu (2014) do not try to match their extension with facts about the firm-size distribution.\(^6\)

The analysis here uses dynamic contracts, as opposed to the use of short-term contracts in the bulk of the literature. Short-term contracts leave money on the table. They do not allow lenders to commit to extended punishment strategies, such as withholding future funds based on a bad report or auditing cash flows over some probationary period of time and seizing them if malfeasance is detected. For example, in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), an entrepreneur who defaults would gain full access to the credit market in the subsequent period—the contract

\(^3\)Strictly speaking the random component of the productivity shocks in Midrigan and Xu (2014) follows a Markov chain, but the shocks are tuned to resemble an AR(1) process.

\(^4\)The upgrading appears to occur quickly. This can be gleaned from Midrigan and Xu (2014, Table 1). In the extension, younger firms grow 3 times faster (relative to older firms) than in the benchmark model, and additionally, as compared with the data.

\(^5\)One could add a technology with a convex productivity profile to the type of environment studied by Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011); Midrigan and Xu (2014); and Moll (2014). A conjecture is that such profile would slow the self-financing process. How much so is impossible to say without conducting the exercise, which is far afield from the current analysis.

\(^6\)Again, in their extension, small firms grow far too quickly compared with the Korean data, as noted in footnote 4.
is designed, though, so default won’t happen. Long-run punishment strategies are important for achieving efficient contracts. So, one could always ask if long-term contracts would better facilitate both capital accumulation and technology adoption. In the equilibrium modeled here, the adoption of the advanced technology in the United States cannot be supported using short-term contracts.

Long-term contracts obtain more efficient allocations by using backloading strategies, where the rewards to owners of firms are delayed until the desired outcomes are obtained. In fact, when productivity shocks are independently and identically distributed over time, contracts can be designed such that the deviations from first-best allocations are relatively small, as noted in Marcet and Marimon (1992). [Perhaps this result can be thought of as Midigaran and Xu (2014) on steroids.] But the structure of the technology being financed matters for this result. It is shown here that this is no longer the case when the return structure offered from a technology is generalized. It may be impossible to write contracts that allow for certain technologies to be funded. If an investment cannot be funded with a long-term contract, then it cannot be funded with a sequence of short-term contracts because a long-term contract can always be written to mimic a succession of short-term ones. In the analysis here, India and Mexico do not adopt the advanced technology even though long-term financial contracts can be written.

2 Empirical evidence on the availability of financial information and the cost of enforcing contracts

Is the ability of a nation’s financial system to produce information about a firm’s finances and to enforce contracts important for its level of output and TFP? Some direct evidence on this question is presented now. The data used in this section are discussed in Appendix 18. Bushman et al. (2004) construct an index measuring financial transparency in firms across countries. The index is based on six series for each country. The first series measures disclosures about research and development (R&D), capital investments, accounting methods, and whether disclosures are broken down across geographic locations, product lines, and subsidiaries. The second measure reflects information about corporate governance, such as the
identity and remuneration of key personnel and the ownership structure of the firm. The quality of the information provided by the accounting principles adopted is captured in the third measure. The frequency and timeliness of financial reporting are given in the fourth series. The amount of private information acquisition by private analysts is captured by the number of analysts in a country following large firms. This constitutes the fifth series. The last series proxies for the quality of financial reporting by the media. Bushman et al. (2004) aggregate these six series using factor analysis into a single index of financial transparency, dubbed “info” here. (Info can be thought of as reflecting the monitoring variable, $z$, in the subsequent analysis.) Figure 1 presents scatterplots showing how GDP and TFP are related to this index representing the production of financial information. Both GDP and TFP are positively associated with the series measuring the production of financial information. The relationship is quite tight.

Next, an index is constructed that measures the cost of enforcing contracts in various countries. The underlying data are obtained from the World Bank’s *Doing Business* database. In particular, three series are used. The first measures the cost of settling a business dispute. The second series records the number of procedures that must be filed to resolve a dispute. The number of days required to settle a dispute constitutes the last index. These three series are aggregated up using factor analysis into a single index reflecting the cost of contract enforcement, called “enfor.” (Enfor can be taken as a proxy for the costly cash-flow control parameter, $\psi$, in subsequent formal analysis.) Figure 2 presents scatterplots showing the relationship of GDP and TFP to this index. Both GDP and TFP are negatively related.
Figure 2: The relationship between the cost of enforcing contracts, on the one hand, and GDP per capital (left panel) and TFP (right panel) on the other hand.

to the cost of contract enforcement. The relationship between the cost of contract enforcement, on the one hand, and GDP or TFP, on the other, is cloudier than the relationship between the production of financial information and either of the latter two variables. Still, the relationships plotted in Figure 2 are statistically significant (at the 1 percent level).

Table 1 presents the results of some regression analysis. This analysis is intended for illustrative purposes only.\textsuperscript{7} In particular, both GDP and TFP are positively related with info and negatively associated with enfor. They are also economically and statistically significant. If Kenya increased its financial transparency to the U.S. level, then its GDP (per capita) and TFP would rise by 215 and 62 percent, respectively. Similarly, by reducing the cost of enforcing contracts to the U.S. level, Bangladesh could increase its GDP and TFP by 159 and 69 percent, respectively. Interestingly, when a traditional measure of the efficiency of financial intermediation is added to these regressions, the private-credit-to-GDP ratio (labeled “findev”), it is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on this variable in the regression for TFP even takes the wrong sign. When taking these coefficients at face value (even though they are not significantly different from zero), an increase in Bolivia’s credit-to-GDP ratio to the U.S. level would increase its GDP by 37 percent and reduce its TFP by 1.7 percent. Two measures of collateral requirements and a measure of access to financial markets were also used as the third variable. They, too, are insignificant. All in all, these regressions suggest that the ability of a nation’s financial system to produce information and enforce contracts is important for output and TFP.

\textsuperscript{7}A more careful analysis would proceed along the line of the papers surveyed in Levine (2005) and would constitute a paper in its own right.
<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
<th>ln(GDP per capita)</th>
<th>ln(TFP)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Information, ( z )</td>
<td>0.688***</td>
<td>0.605***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of enforcement, ( \psi )</td>
<td>-0.370***</td>
<td>-0.326***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Credit-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>9.069***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
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<td>0.760</td>
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Note: Robust standard errors listed in parentheses; * \( p < 0.1 \); ** \( p < 0.05 \); *** \( p < 0.01 \). Table 1: Cross-country regression results. All data sources are discussed in the Appendix.

3 The Environment

At the heart of the analysis is the interplay between firms and financial intermediaries. This interaction is studied in steady-state general equilibrium. Firms produce output in the economy. They do so using capital and labor. New firms are started by entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur selects a blueprint for his firm from a portfolio of plans. He can operate only one type of project. Implementing this blueprint requires working capital. While an entrepreneur may have some personal funds, in general this working capital is obtained from financial intermediaries. Projects differ by the payoff structures they promise. For example, some projects may offer low returns but are ones that will materialize quickly with reasonable certainty and without much investment. Others may promise high returns. These projects may be risky in the sense that the odds are high that the returns are unlikely to materialize, plus the ventures may require extended periods of finance. Intermediaries borrow funds from consumers/workers in the economy at a fixed rate of return. Intermediation is competitive. The structure of a financial contract offered by an intermediary will depend on the type of venture being funded, the fraction of the start-up costs of the project the entrepreneur can self-finance, input prices, and the state of the financial system. Of course, an entrepreneur will choose the most profitable blueprint to implement. For certain blueprints it is sometimes not possible for an intermediary to offer a financial contract that will generate positive profits. Finally, in addition to supplying intermediaries with working capital, consumers/workers provide firms with labor. Consumers/workers own the intermediaries. In equilibrium, intermediaries will earn zero profits. Since consumers/workers play an ancillary role in the analysis, they are
relegated to the background.\(^8\)

4 Ventures

The theory of entrepreneurship here is simple. Each period there is a fixed amount of risk-neutral entrepreneurs that can potentially start new firms. Let \(T\) denote the set of available technologies in world and \(\tau \in T\) represent a particular technology within this set. Entrepreneurs differ by types of technology that they can operate, indexed by \(t \in T\), and in the amount of funds they have, \(f \in \mathcal{F} \equiv [0, \overline{f}]\). Let the (non-normalized) distribution for potential type-\(t\) entrepreneurs over funds be represented by \(\Phi_t(f) : \mathcal{F} \rightarrow [0, 1]\). A type-\(t\) entrepreneur can start up and run a project of type \(\tau \leq t\). Think about higher levels of \(\tau\) as corresponding to more advanced technologies. Thus, an entrepreneur that can run technology \(\nu \in T\) can also operate any simpler one \(\tau < \nu\). The entrepreneur faces a disutility cost, \(\varepsilon_{\tau}\), measured in terms of consumption, connected with operating technology \(\tau\). Envision \(\varepsilon_{\tau}\) as representing the disutility of acquiring the skills necessary for operating a technology or as the disutility associated with running it.\(^9\) An entrepreneur can operate only one firm at a time.

A new firm started by an entrepreneur can potentially produce for \(T\) periods, indexed by \(t = 1, 2, \ldots, T\). There is a setup period denoted by \(t = 0\). Here the firm must incur a fixed cost connected with entry that is represented by \(\phi\). Associated with each new firm is a productivity ladder \(\{\theta_0, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_S\}\), where \(S \leq T\). As mentioned earlier, the firm’s blueprint or type is denoted by \(\tau\). This indexes the vector \(\{\theta_0, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_S, \phi\}\). An entrepreneur selects the type of the blueprint for his firm, \(\tau\), from a portfolio of available plans, \(T\). Again, only one plan can be implemented. The firm enters a period at some step on the productivity ladder from the previous period, denoted by \(\theta_{s-1}\). With probability \(\rho\) it moves up the ladder to the next step, \(\theta_s\). At time \(s - 1\) the firm can invest in new capital for period \(s\).

\(^8\)It also does not matter whether the analysis is considered as modeling (i) a closed economy in a steady state where the real interest rate rate earned by savers is equal to the rate of time preference or (ii) a small, open economy where savers can borrow or lend at some fixed real interest rate.

\(^9\)The determination of who becomes an entrepreneur is of secondary importance for the analysis undertaken here. Interested readers are referred to the work of Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) and Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008) to see how such a consideration could be appended onto the current analysis. Abstracting from this factor allows the current work to focus on the novel aspects of the analysis.
investment is made before it is known whether \( \theta_{s-1} \) will move up in period \( s \) to \( \theta_s \). With probability \( 1 - \rho \) the project stalls at the previous step \( \theta_{s-1} \), implying that the move up the ladder was unsuccessful. If a stall occurs, then the project remains at the previous level, \( \theta_{s-1} \), forever after. Capital then becomes locked in place and cannot be changed. At the end of each period, the firm faces a survival probability of \( \sigma \). Assume that an entrepreneur dies with his firm. Figure 3 illustrates potential productivity paths for a firm over its lifetime. The ladder is somewhat reminiscent of Aghion and Howitt (1992).

In the \( t \)th period of its life, the firm will produce output, \( o_t \), according to the diminishing-returns-to-scale production function

\[
o_t = \theta_s [\tilde{k}^\omega_t (\chi l_t)^{1-\omega}]^\alpha, \text{ with } 0 < \alpha, \omega < 1,
\]

where \( \tilde{k}_t \) and \( l_t \) are, respectively, the inputs of physical capital and labor that it employs. Here \( \chi \) is a fixed factor reflecting the productivity of labor in a country; this factor will prove useful for calibrating the model. Denote the rental rate for physical capital by \( r \) and the wage for labor by \( w \). The firm finances the input bundle, \( (\tilde{k}_t, l_t) \), that it will hire in period \( t \) using working capital provided by the intermediary in period \( t - 1 \).

Focus on the amalgamated input, \( k_t \equiv \tilde{k}^\omega_t l_t^{1-\omega} \). The minimum cost of purchasing \( k \) units of the amalgamated input will be

\[
[\chi^{-1}(\frac{\omega}{\omega})(\frac{w}{1-\omega})^{1-\omega}]k = \min_{k_t, l_t} \{rk + wl: \tilde{k}^\omega_t (\chi l)^{1-\omega} = k \}.
\]
Thus, the cost of purchasing one unit of the amalgam, $q$, is given by

$$q = \chi^{\omega-1}(\frac{r}{\omega})^{\omega}(\frac{w}{1-\omega})^{1-\omega}. \quad (1)$$

The cost of the intermediary providing $k$ units of the amalgamated input is then $qk$. This represents the working capital, $qk$, provided by the intermediary to the firm. In what follows, $k$ is referred to as the working capital for the firm, even though strictly speaking it should be multiplied by $q$. The rental rate, $r$, consists of the interest and depreciation linked with the physical capital. It is exogenous in the analysis: In a steady state, the interest rate will be pinned down by savers’ rate of time preference, modulo country-specific distortions such as import duties on physical capital. The wage rate, $w$, will also have an interest component built into it. The wage will be endogenously determined. Hence, the cost of purchasing one unit of the amalgam, $q$, will be dictated by the equilibrium wage rate, $w$, via (1).

Finally, it is also easy to deduce that the quantities of physical capital and labor required to make $k$ units of the amalgam are given by

$$\tilde{k} = (\frac{w}{r} \frac{\omega}{1 - \omega})^{1-\omega} \chi^{\omega-1}k \quad (2)$$

and

$$l = (\frac{w}{r} \frac{\omega}{1 - \omega})^{-\omega} \chi^{\omega-1}k. \quad (3)$$

## 5 Intermediaries

Intermediation is a competitive industry. An intermediary borrows from consumers/workers and enters into financial contracts with new firms to supply working capital for the latter’s ventures. The entrepreneur starting a new firm may have some personal funds of his own, $f$. He can choose to use some or all of its funds to finance part of the venture. At the time of the contract, the intermediary knows the firm’s productivity ladder, $\{\theta_0, \theta_1, ..., \theta_s\}$, and its fixed cost, $\phi$. The contract specifies, among other things, the funds that the intermediary will invest in the firm over the course of its lifetime and the payments that the firm will make to the intermediary. These investments and payments are contingent on reports that the firm makes to the intermediary about its position on the productivity ladder. The intermediary cannot observe without cost the firm’s position on the productivity ladder. Specifically, in any period $t$ of the firm’s life, it cannot see $o_t$ or $\theta_s$. 
Now, suppose that in period \( t \) the firm reports that its productivity level is \( \theta_r \), which may differ from the true level \( \theta_s \). The intermediary can choose whether it wants to monitor the firm’s report. The success of an audit in detecting an untruthful report is a random event. The intermediary can choose the odds, \( p \), of a successful audit. Write the cost function for monitoring as follows:

\[
C(p, k; q, z) = q(kz)^2(\frac{1}{1-p} - 1)p. \tag{4}
\]

This cost function has four noteworthy properties. First, it is increasing and convex in the odds, \( p \), of a successful audit. When \( p = 0 \), both \( C(0, k; q, z) = 0 \) and \( C_1(p, 0; q, z) = C_2(0, k; q, z) = 0 \); as \( p \to 1 \), both \( C(p, k; q, z) \to \infty \) and \( C_2(p, k; q, z) \to \infty \). Second, the marginal and total costs of monitoring are increasing in the price of the amalgam, \( q \); that is, \( C_3(p, k; q, z) > 0 \) and \( C_{13}(p, k; q, z) > 0 \). This is a desirable property if the amalgamated input must be used for monitoring. Third, the cost is increasing and convex in the size of the project as measured by the amalgamated input \( k \); that is, \( C_2(p, k; q, z) > 0 \) and \( C_{22}(p, k; q, z) > 0 \). A larger scale implies there are more transactions to monitor. Detecting fraud will be harder. Fourth, the cost of monitoring is decreasing in the productivity of the financial sector, which is represented here by \( z \). (The dependence of \( C \) on \( q \) and \( z \) is suppressed when not needed to simplify the notation.)

### 6 The Contract Problem

The contract problem between an entrepreneur and an intermediary is now formulated. In preparation, note that the probability distribution for the firm surviving until date \( t \) with a productivity level \( s \) is given by

\[
\Pr(s, t) = \begin{cases} 
\rho^s\sigma^{s-1}, & \text{if } s = t, \\
\rho^s(1 - \rho)\sigma^{t-1}, & \text{if } s < t, \\
0, & \text{if } s > t.
\end{cases} \tag{5}
\]

The discount factor for both firms and intermediaries is denoted by \( \beta \).

A financial contract between an entrepreneur and intermediary will stipulate the following for each step/date pair, \((s, t)\): (i) the quantities of working capital to be supplied by the intermediary to the firm, \( k(s, t) \); (ii) a schedule of payments by the firm to the intermediary,
\(x(s, t)\); and (iii) audit detection probabilities, \(p(s, t)\). The contract also specifies the amount of funding, \(\tilde{f}\), that the entrepreneur will invest in the project. Take the entrepreneur as turning over these funds to the intermediary at the start of the project. Because a large number of competitive intermediaries are seeking to lend to each firm, the optimal contract will maximize the expected payoff of the firm, subject to an expected nonnegative profit constraint for the intermediary. The problem is formulated as the truth-telling equilibrium of a direct mechanism because the revelation principle applies. When a firm is found to have misrepresented its productivity, the intermediary imposes the harshest possible punishment: It shuts the firm down. Since the firm has limited liability, it cannot be asked to pay out more than its output in any period. The contract problem between the entrepreneur and intermediary can be expressed as

\[
v = \max_{\{k(s, t), x(s, t), p(s, t), f\}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t, S\}} \beta^t \left[ \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha - x(s, t) \right] \Pr(s, t) + f - \tilde{f}, \tag{P2}\]

subject to

\[
\theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha - x(s, t) \geq 0, \text{ for } s = \{0, \cdots, \min\{t, S\}\} \text{ and all } t, \tag{6}\]

\[
\sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min\{t, S\}} \beta^t \left[ \theta_s k(u, t)^\alpha - x(u, t) \right] \Pr(s, t) \geq \sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min\{t, S\}} \beta^t \left[ \theta_s k(u-1, t)^\alpha - x(u-1, t) \right] \prod_{n=u}^{t} [1 - p(u-1, n)] \Pr(s, t),
\]

for all \(u \in \{1, \cdots, S\}\), \tag{7}

\[
k(t, t) = k(t-1, t), \text{ for all } t \leq S, \tag{8}\]

\[
k(s-1, t) = k(s-1, s), \text{ for } 1 \leq s < S \text{ and } t \geq s + 1, \tag{9}\]

\[
k(S, t) = k(S, S), \text{ for } t > S,
\]

and

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t, S\}} \beta^t \left[ x(s, t) - C(p(s, t), k(s, t)) - qk(s, t) \right] \Pr(s, t) - \phi + \tilde{f} \geq 0, \tag{10}\]

\[
f - \tilde{f} \geq 0. \tag{11}\]
The objective function in (P2) represents the expected present value of the profits for the firm. This is simply the expected present value of the gross returns on working capital investments, minus the payments that the firm must make to the intermediary. The maximized value of this is denoted by $v$, which represents the value of a newly formed firm. The value of running the firm to an entrepreneur, $v$, will be a function of the amount of funds the entrepreneur possesses, $f$; the price of inputs, $q$; the state of the financial system, $\psi$ and $z$; and the type of technology that is being operated, $\tau$ (note that $\tau$ has been suppressed in the above contracting problem to ease notation). Equation (6) is the limited liability constraint for the firm. The intermediary cannot take more than the firm produces at the step/date combination $(s,t)$.

The incentive constraint for a firm is specified by (7). This constraint is imposed on the firm only at each state/date combination where there is a new productivity draw. Since no information is revealed at dates and states where there is not a new productivity draw, the firm can be treated as not making a report and hence as not having an incentive constraint at such nodes. The validity of this is established in Appendix 16.1. There a more general problem is formulated where reports are allowed at all dates and times. These reports are general in nature and can be inconsistent over time or infeasible; for example, the firm can make a report that implies that it lied in the past. This general problem has a single time-1 incentive constraint that requires the expected present value to the firm from adopting a truth-telling strategy to be at least as good as the expected present value to the firm from any other reporting strategy. It is shown that any contract that is feasible for this more general formulation is also feasible for the restricted problem presented above and vice versa. This establishes the validity of imposing $S$ stepwise incentive constraints along the diagonal of Figure 3.

The left-hand side of the constraint shows the value to the firm when it truthfully reports that it currently has the step/date pair $(u,u)$, for all $u \in \{1,\ldots,S\}$. The right-hand side denotes the value from lying and reporting that the pair is $(u-1,u)$ or that a stall has occurred. Suppose that the firm lies at time $u$ and reports that its productivity is $u-1$. Then, in period $t \geq u$ the firm will keep the cash flow $\theta_x k(u-1,t) - x(u-1,t)$, provided that it is not caught cheating. The odds of the intermediary not detecting this fraud are given by $\prod_{n=u}^{t}[1 - p(u-1,n)]$, since the intermediary will engage in auditing from time $u$.
to $t$. One would expect that in (7) the probabilities for arriving at an $(s, t)$ pair should be conditioned on starting from the step/date combination $(u, u)$. This is true; however, note that the initial odds of landing at $(u, u)$ are embodied in a multiplicative manner in the $Pr(s, t)$ terms and these will cancel out on both sides of (7). Thus, the unconditional probabilities, or the $Pr(s, t)$’s, can be used in (7).

Note that in each period $t - 1$, when there is not a stall, the contract will specify a level of working capital for the next period, $t$. This is done before it is known whether there will be a stall in the next period. Therefore, the value of the working capital in the state where productivity grows, $k(t + 1, t)$, will equal the value in the state where it does not, $k(t, t)$. This explains equation (8).

The information constraint is portrayed in Figure 4 by the vertical boxes defined by the solid lines. The two working capitals within each vertical box must have the same value. Equation (9) is an irreversibility constraint on working capital. Specifically, if a productivity stall occurs in period $s$, working capital becomes locked in at its current level, $k(s - 1, s)$. The irreversibility constraint is illustrated by the horizontal boxes drawn with the dashed-dotted lines in Figure 4. All working capitals within a horizontal box take the same value. Envision a plant as having a putty-clay structure: In the event of a stall, all inputs become locked in.

The penultimate constraint (10) stipulates that the intermediary expects to earn positive
profits from its loan contract. For an \((s, t)\) combination the intermediary will earn \(x(s, t) - C(p(s, t), k(s, t)) - qk(s, t)\) in profits after netting out both the cost of monitoring and raising the funds for the working capital investment. The intermediary must also finance the up-front fixed cost for the project. This is represented by the term \(\phi\) in (10). Finally, equation (11) is the self-financing constraint. It simply states that the new firm cannot invest more in the venture than it has.

The contract between the entrepreneur and the intermediary specifies a plan for investment, monitoring, and payments such that the firm always truthfully reports productivity. This plan generally leads to a suboptimal level of investment due to the need to provide incentives so that the firm will always report the true state of productivity. Intuitively, one might think that this incentive problem will be reduced if the entrepreneur uses some of his own money to start up the firm. In fact, the entrepreneur should invest everything in his project. This yields an expected gross return on investment at least as great as the \(\frac{1}{\beta}\) that the entrepreneur can earn from depositing his funds in a savings account with an intermediary.

**Lemma 1** *(Go all in)* It is weakly efficient to set \(\tilde{f} = f\).

**Proof.** See Appendix 16.3.

Suppose that the firm reports at time \(t = u\) that the technology has stalled at step \(u - 1\). If the incentive constraint is binding at step \(u\), then the intermediary should monitor the firm over the remainder of its life. As the right-hand side of (7) shows, this monitoring activity reduces the firm’s incentive to lie. In fact, a feature of the contract is that the firm will never lie, precisely because the incentive constraint (7) always holds.

**Lemma 2** *(Trust but verify)* Upon a report by the firm at time \(u\) of a stall at node \((u - 1, u)\), for \(u = 1, 2, \cdots, S\), the intermediary will monitor the project for the remaining time, \(t = u, u + 1, \cdots, T\), contingent upon survival, if and only if the incentive constraint (7) binds at node \((u, u)\).

**Proof.** See Appendix 16.5.

How should the intermediary schedule the flow of payments owed by the firm, \(x(s, t)\)? To encourage the firm to always tell the truth the intermediary should backload the rewards that the firm can earn. In particular, it is (weakly) optimal to let the firm realize all of its awards
only upon arrival at the terminal node \((S, T)\). The intermediary should take away all the cash flow from the firm before this terminal node by setting \(x(s, t) = \theta_s k(s, t)\alpha\) for \((s, t) \neq (S, T)\). It should then give the firm at node \((S, T)\) all of the expected accrued profits from the project. This amounts to a negative payment from the firm to the intermediary at this time so that \(x(S, T) \leq 0\). The profits from the enterprise will amount in expected present-value terms to

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t, S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(s, t)\alpha - C(p(s, t), k(s, t)) - qk(s, t)] \Pr(s, t) - \phi + f \geq 0.
\]

There may be other payment schedules that are equally efficient but none can dominate this one.

**Lemma 3** *(Backloading)* An optimal payment schedule from the firm to the intermediary, \(\{x(s, t)\}\), is given by

1. \(x(s, t) = \theta_s k(s, t)\alpha\), for \(0 \leq s \leq S, s \leq t, 1 \leq t \leq T\), and \((s, t) \neq (S, T)\);

2. 

\[
x(S, T) = \theta_S k(S, T)\alpha - \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t, S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(s, t)\alpha - C(p(s, t), k(s, t)) - qk(s, t)] \Pr(s, t)
\]

\[
- \phi + f \right\} / [\beta^T \Pr(S, T)] \leq 0.
\]

**Proof.** See Appendix 16.6. ■

### 7 The Contract with Costly Cash-Flow Control

The theory developed up to this point stresses the role of monitoring in designing an efficient contract. The ability to monitor reduces the incentive of the firm to misrepresent its current situation and misappropriate funds, which makes it easier for the intermediary to recover its investment and to finance technology adoption. When monitoring is very costly, an intermediary must rely primarily on a backloading strategy to create the incentives for truthful behavior. As will be seen in the quantitative illustration, which is the subject of Section 10, it may not be possible to finance certain technologies absent the ability to monitor effectively. This is most likely to happen when a project has a large up-front investment and promises payoff streams tilted toward the end of the venture’s lifetime. This is the case in the Mexico/United States example studied in Section 10. Here, Mexico has an inefficient monitoring
technology relative to that of the United States. Thus, it is not able to adopt the advanced 
technology used by the United States, which has a large fixed cost and a convex productivity 
profile. This occurs despite the fact that production cost is lower in Mexico. Instead, Mexico 
uses a less-productive technology, with a lower fixed cost and a concave productivity schedule, 
which can be financed using a backloading strategy that requires little monitoring.

The cost of production in some countries is much lower than in Mexico. These lower pro-
duction costs should imply bigger profits that, in turn, will make it easier for the intermediary 
to recover its investment. The intermediary could promise the firm these extra profits at node 
\((S, T)\), which will increase the incentive effects of backloading. Maybe such countries could 
implement the U.S. technology at their lower cost of production. If not, then what prevents 
them from using the Mexican technology? After all, it requires little in the way of monitoring 
services.

An extension to the baseline theory that provides one possible answer is now developed. 
The premise is that it is very costly for intermediaries in some countries to force firms to pay 
out all of their publicly acknowledged output. Perhaps a fraction of output inherently benefits 
the operators of firms in the form of perks, kickbacks, nepotism, and so on. The intermediary 
can offer enticements to the operators of firms so they will not do this, of course, but this 
limits the types of technology that can be implemented. The extended model is applied in 
Section 10 to India, where labor costs are extremely low.

### 7.1 Adding Costly Cash-Flow Control

Assume that a firm can openly take the fraction \(\psi\) of output due to weak institutional struc-
tures. The intermediary cannot recover this output unless it catches the operators of the firm 
lying about the firm’s state during an audit. The intermediary must design the contract in a 
manner such that the retention of output will be dissuaded. How does this affect the contract 
presented in (P2)?

Before characterizing the optimal contract for the extended setting, two observations are 
made:

1. The intermediary wants to design a contract that dissuades the firm from trying to 
   retain the fraction \(\psi\) of output at a node. To accomplish this, the payoff at any node
from deciding not to retain part of output must be at least as great at the payoff from retaining a portion of output.

2. A retention request is an out-of-equilibrium move. Therefore, it is always weakly efficient for the intermediary to threaten to respond to a retention by lowering the firm’s payoff to the minimum amount possible.

These two observations lead to a no-retention constraint at each node \((s,t)\) on the design of the contract:

\[
\sum_{j=t}^{T} \beta^j \left[ \theta_s k(s,j)^\alpha - x(s,j) \right] \Pr(s,j)
\]

\[
\geq \psi \sum_{j=t}^{T} \beta^j \theta_s k(s,j)^\alpha \Pr(s,j), \quad \text{for } 1 \leq s \leq S, s < t, 2 \leq t \leq T \quad \text{(off-diagonal node)}
\]

\( (12) \)

and

\[
\sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t \left[ \theta_s k(s,t)^\alpha - x(s,t) \right] \Pr(s,t)
\]

\[
\geq \psi \sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t \theta_s k(u-1,t)^\alpha \Pr(s,t), \quad \text{for } 1 \leq u \leq S \quad \text{(diagonal node)}
\]

\( (13) \)

The first constraint (12) applies to the case of a stall at state \(s\). Here, productivity is stuck at \(\theta_s\) forever. The second constraint (13) governs the situation where the firm can still move up the productivity ladder. If the firm exercises its retention option, then the intermediary will keep the capital stock at \(k(u-1,t)\); that is, it will no longer evolve with the state of the firm’s productivity. Equation (9) then implies that the capital stock is locked in.

To formulate the contract problem with costly cash-flow control, simply append the no-retention constraints (12) and (13) to problem (P2). Lemma 2 still holds. Thus, the intermediary will again monitor the firm for the rest of its life whenever it claims that technological progress has stalled (if and only if the incentive constraint at the stalled step is binding). The payment schedule \(\{x(s,t)\}\) now takes a different form. In the baseline version of the model, it is always optimal to make all payments to the firm at the terminal node \((S,T)\) to relax the incentive constraints. The retention option precludes this, however. To discourage the firm
from exercising its retention option, it pays for the intermediary to make additional payments, \( N(s, T) \), to the firm at the terminal date \( T \) for all steps \( s \leq S \) on the ladder, provided the firm does not exercise its retention option at any time before \( T \). This payment should equal the expected present value of what the firm would receive if it exercised the retention option. Thus,

\[
N(s, T) = \psi \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \frac{\beta^t \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha \Pr(s, t)}{\beta^T \Pr(s, T)}, \text{ for } 0 \leq s \leq S. \tag{14}
\]

Hence, Lemma 3 now appears as Lemma 4. Observe how the necessity to provide retention payments reduces the size of the reward, \(-x(S, T)\), that the intermediary can give to the firm if and when it reaches the end of the ladder or node \((S, T)\). Thus, retention payments reduce the intermediary’s ability to redirect the firm’s rewards (or cash flow) to the top of the ladder.

**Lemma 4** *(Backloading with retention payments)* An optimal payment schedule from the firm to the intermediary, \( \{x(s, t)\} \), is given by

1. \( x(s, t) = \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha \), for \( 0 \leq s \leq S, 1 \leq t < T, \) and \( s \leq t \);

2. \( x(s, T) = \theta_s k(s, T)^\alpha - N(s, T) \), for \( 0 \leq s < S \);

3. \[
x(S, T) = \theta_S k(S, T)^\alpha - \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t, S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha - C(p(s, t), k(s, t)) - qk(s, t)] \Pr(s, t) \right. \\
- \left. \sum_{s=0}^{S} \beta^T N(s, T) \Pr(s, T) - \phi + f \right\} / [\beta^T \Pr(S, T)],
\]

where \( N(s, T) \) is specified by (14).

**Proof.** See Appendix 16.6. \( \blacksquare \)

Backloading the retention payments helps to satisfy the incentive constraint. To understand this, suppose that the firm lies and declares a stall at node \((u, u)\). The intermediary will audit the firm from then on. Recall the intermediary can recover all output if it detects a lie at some node \((u, t)\), where \( t \geq u \). Some firms will indeed stall and find themselves at node \((u - 1, u)\). Under the old contract, a stalled firm would receive nothing because \( x(u - 1, t) = \theta_{u-1} k(u - 1, t)^\alpha \) for all \( t > u - 1 \). This firm can exercise its retention option and take \( \psi \theta_{u-1} k(u - 1, t)^\alpha \) for \( t > u - 1 \). Now a firm that is at node \((u, u)\), but declares that it is
at \((u - 1, u)\), would also like to claim this part of output. It can potentially do this provided it is not caught. To mitigate this problem, the intermediary gives the firm the accrued value of these retentions, \(N(u - 1, T)\), at the end of the contract, or time \(T\), assuming that the latter survives. This reduces the incentive for a firm to lie and declare a stall at node \((u, u)\). A deceitful firm will receive the payment \(N(u - 1, T)\) only if it successfully evades detection along the entire path from \(u\) to \(T\). This happens with odds \(\prod_{n=u}^{T}[1 - p(u - 1, n)]\).

Note how the intermediary’s ability to monitor interacts with the firm’s potential to retain output. The expected value of the retention payment from lying at \((u, u)\) is \(N(u - 1, T)\) for all \(u \in \{1, ..., S\}\). When monitoring is very effective, it is difficult for a masquerading firm to capture this payment, which reduces the incentive to lie. When monitoring is ineffective, it is easy to do this. The incentive to lie is then higher.

Finally, when is investment efficient or when will it match the level that would occur in a world where the intermediary can observe the firm’s shock without cost? Suppose that after some state/date combination \((t^*, t^*)\) along the diagonal of the ladder that neither the incentive nor no-retention constraints, (7) and (13), ever bind again. Will investment be efficient from then on? Yes.

**Lemma 5** (*Efficient investment*) Suppose that neither the incentive nor the diagonal-node no-retention constraints ever bind after node \((t^*, t^*)\) for \(t^* < S\). Investment will be efficiently undertaken on arriving at the state/date combination \((t^*, t^*)\). (That is, the capital stock will be at its efficient level from period \(t^* + 1\) on.)

**Proof.** See Appendix 16.7. ■

### 8 Self-Financed Start-Up Funding

The self-financing of projects is discussed in this section. To highlight some points related to self-financing, per se, the environment outlined previously is simplified slightly. In particular, assume that there is one type of entrepreneur that can operate any type of project. To map this into the developed structure, let \(t = \overline{\tau} = \max_{\tau \in T}, \Phi(f) = \Phi_\tau(f)\) (the highest type), and \(\Phi_\tau(f) = 0\) for \(\tau \neq \overline{\tau}\) (no entrepreneurs of other types).
The higher the level of funds that an entrepreneur possesses, then the greater is the fraction of the project that he can self-finance. This circumvents the informational problem. At some point, the first-best allocations can be achieved.

**Lemma 6** *(Efficient self-finance)* There exists a level of self-financed start-up funding, $\hat{f}$, such that the first-best allocations obtain.

**Proof.** See Appendix 16.8.

At a given level of factor prices some technologies, $\tau \in T$, will be able to produce a higher level of potential output than others. In particular, suppose that the following condition holds.

**Condition 7** *(Technology ranking)* Assume that, at some particular input price, $q$, technology $\nu$ yields a higher first-best level of expected discounted profits than technology $\tau$ whenever $\nu > \tau$. *(Note that the ranking of technologies may change as the input price changes.)*

Now, an entrepreneur is free to choose any technology he likes. He will select the one, $\tau^{*}$, that maximizes his surplus. That is,

$$ \tau^{*} = \arg \max_{\tau \in T} v(f; \tau) - \varepsilon_\tau. $$

As an entrepreneur’s level of funds increases, allowing him to self-finance his project better, the incentive problem disappears. The entrepreneur should start favoring more advanced technologies (higher $\tau$’s) over less advanced ones.

**Proposition 8** *(Technology switching)* Suppose that at some level of wealth, $f_{\tau,\nu}$, technology $\tau < \nu$ is chosen by an entrepreneur because it maximizes the value of his firm. There exists a set of wealth levels, $F_{\tau,\nu} \subset [f_{\tau,\nu}, \hat{f}_\nu]$ such that the more advanced technology $\nu$ is preferred to technology $\tau$ whenever $f \in F_{\tau,\nu}$ and technology $\tau$ is preferred to the more advanced technology $\nu$ whenever $f \in [f_{\tau,\nu}, \hat{f}_\nu] - F_{\tau,\nu}$.

**Proof.** Appendix 16.9.

Given that there is a distribution of funds across new entrepreneurs, as represented by $\Phi(f)$, some entrepreneurs may prefer to use one type of technology while others pick different ones. Thus, in general, multiple technologies may be used in an economy.
Corollary 1 (Coexisting technologies) It is possible for multiple technologies to coexist in an economy.


Some simple two-period examples illustrating the contracting setup are presented in Appendix 19.

8.1 Discussion

The solution to the above contract problem shares some features common to dynamic contracts, but it also has some properties that are quite different. The contract problem (P2) is presented in its primitive sequence space form as opposed to the more typical recursive representation. This is more transparent, given the structure adopted here for the economic environment. The current setting allows for a nonstationary, non-decreasing process for TFP, or for the $\theta$’s. The steps on the ladder need not be equally spaced. Thus, the analysis allows for the odds of moving up the ladder and the probabilities of survival to be expressed as functions of $s$ and $t$. On this, note that the theory is developed in terms of the left-hand side of (5), $\Pr(s,t)$, which is a general function of $s$ and $t$. As a result, the binding pattern of the incentive constraints may be quite complicated. In particular, the incentive constraint could bind at node $(s,s)$, not bind at node $(s+1,s+1)$, and bind again at some node $(s+j,s+j)$ for $j > 1$. This depends on the assumed structure for the productivity ladder. Additionally, it is easy to add a technological limit on the amount of capital that can be invested at each point along the diagonal. These features mean that the capital-to-output ratio does not need to be increasing with age, a feature that is implied by the simplest borrowing-cum-enforcement constraint model, and a prediction that may not be supported in the data; see Hsieh and Klenow (2014, Fig. XI).

Recall that when a stall occurs along the diagonal time $s = t$, productivity remains at the previous level, $\theta_{s-1}$, forever after. This assumption avoids the persistence private information analyzed in Fernandez and Phelan (2000). A similar insight is exploited in Golosov and Tsyvinski’s (2006) work on disability insurance. 10 By extending the analysis undertaken in

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10In Golosov and Tsyvinski’s (2006) analysis, a person is either able or disabled according to a two-state Markov chain. Disability is an absorbing state. The similarity with the current analysis ends there. In their
Appendix 16.1, it can be deduced in the current setting, that subsequent to a failure to move up the diagonal, productivity can actually follow either a deterministic process or a stochastic process where the shocks are public information. For example, the $\theta$’s could fall after a stall, either deterministically or stochastically. This could be thought of as representing some type of business failure. It is assumed that following a stall capital becomes locked in place and cannot be changed. It is possible to allow for capital to be adjusted along a stall path so long as this is public information.\footnote{Various things could be imagined. Suppose that capital can be freely adjusted. Then, after a stall has been declared the intermediary could withdraw some working capital from the venture to dissuade cheating. Alternatively, suppose the intermediary cannot reduce the level of working capital but that the firm can use some of the funds it retains to increase inputs. To dissuade this possibility the intermediary could (i) monitor the firm more heavily and take everything (including the additional inputs) if it detects malfeasance and/or (ii) offer a larger retention payment to entice the firm not to retain some of its output.}

Additionally, it would make little difference if the firm had to incur a fixed cost to adjust its capital stock every time it moved up the productivity ladder rather than pay a large fixed cost up front. One would just have to check, as part of the optimization problem, whether it is worthwhile to adjust capital at a diagonal node given the fixed cost. If it is worthwhile, then the incentive constraints would be unaffected since the level of working capital is unchanged at each node on the productivity ladder. Associating the fixed costs with the possibility of stepping up the ladder, or in other words an improvement in productivity, perhaps because of R&D expenditures, would add some additional complications. In particular, if the firm misrepresents its productivity and output by declaring a stall, then it would have to pay the fixed costs to move up the ladder subsequently. An assumption would have to be made about whether the firm could use the secreted part of current revenue to do this or not. In either case, this would alter the incentive compatibility constraints.

In the current setting the firm has no incentive to “lie upward” under the efficient contract. To see this, suppose that the firm stalls at time $u$ and therefore finds itself at the node $(u-1, u)$. Would it have an incentive to lie upward and claim that it did not stall? No. By reporting that it was at node $(u, u)$ the firm might hope to receive a higher level of working capital, $k(u+1, u+1) > k(u, u)$ from the intermediary. In the current setting, this is impossible because analysis, there is no productivity ladder, no investment in capital, no monitoring, no cash-flow control problem, no start-up funding, no technology adoption decision, and so forth.

In the current setting, the firm has no incentive to “lie upward” under the efficient contract.
the intermediary could simply demand that the firm shows output in the amount $\theta_u k(u, u)$. This is greater than what the firm can actually produce at its current node, $\theta_{u-1} k(u, u)$. Alternatively, the intermediary could ask for a payment, $x(u, u)$, larger than $\theta_{u-1} k(u, u)$.

A more interesting question is what would happen if the firm sees a private signal in the current period, before the working capital is chosen, as to the likelihood of moving up the ladder in the next period. Assume for concreteness that the signal can be either high or low. The generic form of the incentive constraints (7) associated with whether the firm moves upward or stalls in the next period is unchanged. This is because once the current value of $\theta$ is realized the signal yields no additional information about the realizations for the subsequent $\theta$’s. Now, in general, the levels of the working capital and payments that are contracted upon will be functions of the history of signals reported by the firm. So, at each step along the diagonal there will be an incentive compatibility constraint for each current value of the signal, high or low (given a history of the signals up to that point). In addition, a reporting constraint will now have to be added at each node along the diagonal of the ladder. This constraint ensures that the expected value of truthfully reporting a low value of the signal exceeds the expected value of lying and reporting the high value instead.

Finally, it is worth noting that the cash-flow control problem is introduced in a way that leaves the incentive constraints unchanged. This follows from the assumption that the intermediary can take everything when the firm is caught lying in an audit. It serves to separate the incentive constraints (7) from the no-retention constraints, (12) and (13). If the firm could retain output even when it is caught cheating then this would change the right side of the incentive constraints. The value of the cash flows in those states where the firm is caught cheating would have to be added. The intermediary’s incentive to monitor would be affected in a fundamental way. Under the assumption made here the cash-flow control problem affects the contract only by limiting the ability to direct all payments to the firm upon reaching the final node $(S, T)$. This feature is a virtue for both analytical clarity and simplicity.
9 Equilibrium

There is one unit of labor available in the economy. This must be split across all operating firms. Recall that a firm’s type is given by $\tau \in T$, which indexes the vector $\{\theta_0, \theta_1, \ldots, \theta_S, \phi\}$ connected with a particular productivity ladder and fixed cost. Again, the technologies are ordered so that higher $\tau$’s correspond with more advanced technologies. An entrepreneur of type $t \in T$ can potentially start a new firm of type $\tau \leq t$. He incurs the disutility cost, $\varepsilon_\tau$, (measured in terms of consumption) to operate a type-$\tau$ firm. Entrepreneurs may differ by the level of funds, $f$, that they bring to the project. The (non-normalized) distribution for potential type-$t$ entrepreneurs over funds is represented by $\Phi_t(f) : [0, \bar{f}] \to [0, 1]$.

Clearly an entrepreneur will operate the technology that offers the largest surplus. The choice for a type-$t$ entrepreneur with $f$ in funds is represented by $\tau^*(t, f)$, where

$$\tau^*(t, f) = \arg \max_{\tau \leq t} [v(f; \tau) - \varepsilon_\tau].$$

(16)

It may be the case that this entrepreneur does not want to operate any type of project, because $v(f, \tau^*) < \varepsilon_{\tau^*}$. Let the indicator function $I_\tau(t, f)$ denote whether a type-$t$ entrepreneur with $f$ in funds will operate (or match with) a type-$\tau$ venture. It is defined by

$$I_\tau(t, f) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \tau = \arg \max_{\tau \leq t} [v(f; \tau) - \varepsilon_\tau] \text{ and } v(f; \tau) - \varepsilon_\tau \geq 0, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}$$

(17)

Note that the entrepreneur’s type, $t$, will not influence his decision about how much working capital and labor to hire. Represent the working capital and labor used at an $(s, t)$ node in a type-$\tau$ firm, operated by an entrepreneur with $f$ in funds, by $k(s, t; \tau, f)$ and $l(s, t; \tau, f)$, respectively.

The labor market clearing condition for the economy then reads

$$\sum_{\tau \in T} \sum_{t=1}^{\bar{\tau}} \int I_\tau(t, f) \sum_{t=1}^{\bar{\tau}} \sum_{s=1}^{\min\{t, S\}} [l(s, t; \tau, f) + l_m(s, t; \tau, f)] \Pr(s, t) d\Phi_t(f) = 1,$$

(18)

where $l_m(s, t; \tau, f)$ is the amount of labor that an intermediary will spend at node $(s, t)$ monitoring a type-$\tau$ venture operated by an entrepreneur with funds $f$. Every period some firms die; this death process is subsumed in the probabilities $\Pr(s, t)$. The quantity of the amalgamated input used in monitoring, $k_m(s, t; \tau, f)$, is given by

$$k_m(s, t; \tau, f) = \left[\frac{k(s, t; \tau, f)}{z}\right]^2\left[1 - \frac{1}{1 - p(s, t; \tau, f)} - 1\right]p(s, t; \tau, f) \text{ [cf. (4)]},$$

(19)
which implies a usage of labor in the following amount:

\[ l_m(s, t; \tau, f) = \left( \frac{w}{r_1 - \omega} \right)^{-\omega} k_m(s, t; \tau, f) \] [cf. (3)].

(20)

A definition of the competitive equilibrium under study is now presented to crystallize the discussion so far.

**Definition 1** For a given steady-state cost of capital, \( r \), a stationary competitive equilibrium is described by (a) a set of working capital allocations, \( k(s, t; \tau, f) \), labor allocations, \( l(s, t; \tau, f) \) and \( l_m(s, t; \tau, f) \), and monitoring strategy, \( p(s, t; \tau, f) \); (b) a set of optimal matches between entrepreneurs and technologies represented by \( I_\tau(t, f) \); and (c) an amalgamated input price, \( q \), and wage rate, \( w \), all such that

1. The working capital financing program, \( k(s, t; \tau, f) \), and the monitoring strategy, \( p(s, t; \tau, f) \), specified in the financial contract maximize the value of a type-\( \tau \) venture for an entrepreneur with \( f \) in funds, as set out by (P2), given the amalgamated input price, \( q \). [Here (P2) should be amended to include the no-retention constraints (12) and (13).]

2. The set of optimal matches between entrepreneurs and technologies, as represented by \( I_\tau(t, f) \), is specified by (17).

3. A type-\( \tau \) venture operated by an entrepreneur with \( f \) in funds hires labor, \( l(s, t; \tau, f) \), to minimize its costs in accordance with (P1), given wages, \( w \), and the size of the loan, \( k(s, t; \tau, f) \), offered by the intermediary. [This implies that \( l(s, t; \tau, f) = \{(w/r)[w/(1 - \omega)]\}^{-\omega} k(s, t; \tau, f) \).

4. The amount of labor, \( l_m(s, t; \tau, f) \), used to monitor a venture is given by (20) in conjunction with (19).

5. The price of the amalgamated input, \( q \), is dictated by \( w \) in accordance with (1).

6. The wage rate, \( w \), is determined so that the labor market clears, as written in (18).

**10 A Quantitative Illustration**

Why might one country choose a different set of production technologies than another country? A quantitative illustration is presented to show that the financial mechanism proposed here
offers some promise for explaining cross-country differences in technology adoption and, hence, income. There are many reasons, of course, why countries may adopt different technology: differences in the supplies of labor or natural resources that create a comparative advantage for certain types of firms; government regulations, subsidies, or taxes that favor certain forms of enterprise over others; and the presence of labor unions and other factors that may dissuade certain types of business. While these are valid reasons, the focus here is on differences in the efficiency of the financial system. This is done without apology, because abstraction is a necessary ingredient for theory. A formal empirical assessment of the mechanism, and a comparison with other explanations (including financial ones), is beyond the scope of this work.

In the quantitative illustration, an entrepreneur is free to adopt one of three technologies: advanced, intermediate, and entry level. Additionally, it is assumed that entrepreneurs have no start-up funds of their own ($f = 0$). The advanced technology has a (convex) productivity ladder that grows faster than the intermediate one (which has a concave ladder), which in turn grows faster than the entry-level technology (which also has a concave ladder). The fixed cost for the advanced technology is bigger than that of the intermediate one, which is larger than that of the entry-level technology. The advanced technology, with its convex payoff structure and high fixed cost, is difficult to implement without monitoring at high factor prices. It is also difficult to adopt at low factor prices when there is a costly cash-flow control problem. The entry-level technology with its very low fixed cost is easy to implement in the absence of monitoring and when there is a costly cash-flow control problem. A country’s choice of technology depends on its factor prices and the state of its financial system. An equilibrium is constructed in which the United States will adopt the advanced technology, Mexico selects the intermediate one, and India chooses the entry-level technology.

Assume that there are many entrepreneurs capable of running each technology; that is, set $\Phi_t(0) = f_\tau$, where $f_\tau$ is some large number. This implies that there is free-entry into running a firm, as in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993). Assuming that only one technology, $\tau$, will be run in a country, the labor-market clearing condition (18) now appears as

$$
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=1}^{\min(t,S)} [l(s, t; \tau, 0) + l_m(s, t; \tau, 0)] Pr(s, t) \epsilon_\tau f_\tau = 1,
$$

where $\epsilon_\tau \leq f_\tau$ is the equilibrium fraction of potential type-$\tau$ entrepreneurs that run a firm.
Since the focus here is on the long run, let the length of a period be 5 years and set the number of periods to 10, so that $T = 10$. Given this period length, the discount factor is set so $\beta = 0.985$, slightly below the 3 percent return documented by Siegal (1992). This is a conservative choice since it gives backloaded long-term contracts a better chance. The weight on capital in the production function, $\omega$, is chosen so that $\omega = 0.33$. A value of 0.85 is assigned to the scale parameter, $\alpha$. According to Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008), this lies in the range of recent studies.

10.1 Estimating the Input Prices

A key input into the analysis is the price for the amalgamated input, $q$. Start with Mexico and the United States. (All data sources used are discussed in Appendix 18.) The price of this input in Mexico relative to the United States is what is important. Normalize this price to be 1 for the United States, so that $q^{US} = 1$. (A superscript attached to a variable, either $MX$ or $US$, denotes the relevant country of interest; viz, Mexico or the United States.) This can be done by picking an appropriate value for U.S. labor productivity, $\chi^{US}$, given values for the rental rate on capital, $r^{US}$, and the wage rate, $w^{US}$. How to do this is discussed below. Is the price for this input more or less expensive in Mexico? On the one hand, wages are much lower in Mexico. On the other hand, capital is more expensive and labor is less productive. Hence, the answer is unclear ex ante. Estimating the price of the input in Mexico, $q^{MX}$, requires using formulas (1), (2), and (3) in conjunction with an estimate of the rental price of capital in Mexico, $r^{MX}$, the wage rate, $w^{MX}$, and the productivity of labor, $\chi^{MX}$.

How is $q^{US}$ set to 1? First, the rental rate on capital, $r^{US}$, is pinned down. To do this, suppose that the relative price of capital in terms of consumption in the United States is 1. Thus, $p^{US}_k/p^{US}_c = 1$, where $p^{US}_k$ and $p^{US}_c$ are the U.S. prices for capital and consumption goods. Assume that interest plus depreciation in each country sums to 10 percent of the cost of capital. Hence, set $r^{US} = (1.10^5 - 1) \times (p^{US}_k/p^{US}_c) = 1.10^5 - 1$, which measures the cost of capital in terms of consumption. Second, a value for the wage rate, $w^{US}$, is selected. This is obtained by dividing the annual payroll by the number of employees in all establishments in the manufacturing sector using the 2008 Annual Survey of Manufactures. Thus, $w^{US} = 47,501$. Last, given the above data for $r^{US}$ and $w^{US}$, the value for $\chi^{US}$ that sets $q^{US}$ equal to 1 can
be backed out using equation (1). This implies $\chi^{US} = 96,427$.

Turn now to Mexico. What is the value of $q^{MX}$? Determining this value requires knowing $r^{MX}$, $w^{MX}$, and $\chi^{MX}$. First, a value for the rental price of capital, $r^{MX}$, is determined. The relative price of capital is estimated (from the Penn World Table) to be about 21 percent higher in Mexico than in the United States. Therefore, $(p^M_k/p^M_c)/(p^US_k/p^US_c) = 1.21$, where $p^M_k$ and $p^M_c$ are the Mexican prices for capital and consumption goods. Therefore, $r^{MX} = (1.10^5 - 1) \times (p^M_k/p^M_c) = (1.10^5 - 1) \times (p^US_k/p^US_c) \times [(p^M_k/p^M_c)/(p^US_k/p^US_c)] = r^{US} \times [(p^M_k/p^M_c)/(p^US_k/p^US_c)] = (1.10^5 - 1) \times 1.21$. This gives the rental price of capital in terms of consumption for Mexico.

Second, a real wage rate is needed for Mexico, or a value for $w^{MX}$ is sought. Again, this is pinned down using data on annual payroll and the total number of workers in manufacturing establishments; in this case, the data come from Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). The result is $w^{MX} = 21,419$ once Mexican pesos are converted to U.S. dollars on a purchasing power parity basis.

Third, what is the productivity of labor in Mexico? A unit of labor in Mexico is taken to be 55 percent as productive as in the United States, following Schoellman (2012). So set $\chi^{MX} = 0.55 \times \chi^{US} = 53,035$. Finally, by using the obtained values for $r^{MX}$, $w^{MX}$, and $\chi^{MX}$ in equation (1), it then follows that $q^{MX} = 0.9371$. The upshot is that the amalgamated input is 6 percent less expensive in Mexico relative to the United States.

Move now to India. The rental price of capital in India, $r^{IN}$, is about 23 percent higher in India than in the United States (from the Penn World Table). Therefore, $r^{IN} = (1.10^5 - 1) \times 1.23$. The real wage rate for India, $w^{IN}$, will be chosen to approximate the output per worker in the manufacturing sector relative to the United States. As a result, $w^{IN} = 7,000$, which is about 15 percent of the U.S. wage rate. Finally, what is the productivity of labor in India? A unit of labor in India is taken to be 35 percent as productive as in the United States. Here 1.6 years of education are added to the number in Barro and Lee (2013) to adjust their aggregate number upward to reflect the higher level of education in the manufacturing sector. The procedure developed in Schoellman (2011) is then used to obtain a measure of labor productivity. This leads to $\chi^{IN} = 33,750$. Finally, by plugging the obtained values for $r^{IN}$, $w^{IN}$, and $\chi^{IN}$ into equation (1), it follows that $q^{IN} = 0.6$.
10.2 Parameterizing the Technology Ladder

There are nine unique rungs (eleven) on the technology ladder; the last three are the same. The generic productivity ladder is described by

\[ \theta_s = \ln[\theta_0 + \theta_1(s + 1) + \theta_2(s + 1)^2 + \theta_3(s + 1)^3], \text{ for } s = 0, \ldots, 9. \]

The parameter values for this ladder are different for India, Mexico, and the United States. The odds of stalling are fixed over the age of a firm and are given by \( \rho \). This differs by technology.

The probability of surviving (until age \( t \)) is also allowed to differ across technologies. The survival probabilities follow the process

\[ \sigma_t = \sigma_{t-1}[1 - (\sigma_0 + \sigma_1 t + \sigma_2 t^2)]^5, \text{ for } t = 2, \ldots, 10, \text{ with } \sigma_1 = 1. \]

This structure characterizing the odds of survival and stalling can easily be added onto the theory developed, as discussed in Section 8.1. Finally, an upper bound on working capital is imposed. This is denoted by \( \bar{k} \) and is common across technologies.\(^{13}\)

10.3 The Choice of Technology in India, Mexico, and the United States

A quantitative illustration is now provided where India, Mexico and the United States all choose to adopt different production technologies. The U.S. (or advanced) technology offers a productivity profile that grows much faster with age than the Mexican contour (which represents an intermediate-level technology). The start-up cost for the U.S. technology is higher than the Mexican one. Even though Mexican factor prices are slightly lower than in the United States, it is not profitable to operate the advanced technology in Mexico. This is because financing the advanced technology (at Mexican factor prices) requires a level of efficiency in monitoring that is too high for the Mexican financial system. Without efficient

\(^{13}\)This upper bound prevents the scale of a venture becoming unrealistically large as input prices drop to low levels. That is, the upper bound forces decreasing returns to bite more sharply at some point than the adopted Cobb-Douglas representation of the production function allows. This could be due to span of control or other problems.
monitoring it is not possible for financiers to recover the cost of investment. The intermediate-level technology does not require such a high level of monitoring efficiency. The productivity profile for the Indian technology is lower and flatter than the Mexican one. The cost of production in India \(q^{IN} = 0.6\) is much less expensive than in Mexico \(q^{MX} = 0.94\) and the United States \(q^{US} = 1\). Therefore, at first glance, one would expect that India could easily adopt the technology used in Mexico. But adopting the Mexican technology is not feasible for India because of a costly cash-flow control problem. This factor prevents financiers from recovering their up-front investment. Thus, India is forced to adopt the entry-level technology with a relatively flat productivity schedule but low fixed cost. The quantitative illustration is constructed so that the framework matches the size distribution of establishments by age that is observed for India, Mexico, and the United States. It also replicates the average size of firms in these three countries—in fact, for the United States the entire size distribution is fit. These four sets of facts discipline the assumed productivity profiles.

### 10.3.1 Calibrating the Technology Ladders

First, the survival probabilities are obtained from the Indian, Mexican, and U.S. data. In particular, a polynomial of the specified form is fit to the data from each country. It turns out that these survival probabilities are remarkably similar for Mexico and the United States. So, assume that they are the same.

Second, this leaves the parameters for describing productivity and the odds of a stall along the diagonal. These parameters are selected so that the model fits, as well as possible, several stylized facts about the Indian, Mexican, and U.S. economies. These facts are output per worker, average plant size, the average growth in TFP over a plant’s life, the (complementary) cumulative distribution of employment by establishment age, and the private-debt-to-GDP ratio. The (complementary) distribution of employment by establishment age is characterized by a set of points. For the United States alone, the establishment size distribution in Lorenz-curve form is also added to the collection of stylized facts. So, let \(D_j\) proxy for the \(j\)th data target for the model and \(M_j(p)\) represent the model’s prediction for this data target as a function of the parameter vector \(p \equiv \{\theta_0, \theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3, \phi, \rho, \kappa\}\). The parameter vector \(p\) is chosen
for each country in the following fashion:

$$\min_p \sum_j [D^j - M^j(p)]^2.$$ 

The parameter values used in the simulation are reported in Table 2.

Figure 5 shows the salient features of the technologies used in India, Mexico, and the United States. The productivity of a firm increases with a move up the ladder. The U.S. ladder has a convex/concave profile, while the Indian one is concave. The Mexican ladder lies between the other two. Note that the ascent is much steeper for a U.S. firm than a Mexican one. The productivity profile for the Indian ladder is lower and flatter than the Mexican one. The survival rate is higher for younger establishments in India than for plants in either Mexico or the United States (recall that the survival rates for the latter two countries are the same). The structure of the technology ladder, or the θ’s, is identified from the age distribution of employment in each country. In Appendix 19.3, the two-period example presented earlier is used to illustrate how this is done.

Another parameter governing the technology ladder is the fixed cost, φ. This number is selected as part of the minimization routine to hit the data targets–Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) follow a similar strategy. The fixed costs associated with adopting the advanced technology are larger than those connected with the intermediate technology, which in turn are bigger than those linked with the entry-level one. As a fraction of GDP, these fixed costs are 16.4, 5.0, and 0.0 percent for the United States, Mexico, and India, respectively. If these fixed costs are interpreted as intangible investment, as Midrigan and Xu (2014) do, then the number for the United States is close to the 15.7 percent reported by Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) for the U.S. Non-Farm Business sector in 2000-2003. Estimates on intangible investment in India and Mexico are not readily available, but Midrigan and Xu (2014) present a number of 4.6 percent for South Korea, which is not too far from the 5.0 percent estimated for Mexico here.

10.3.2 Establishment Size Distributions

The model matches the U.S. establishment-size distribution very well, as seen in Figure 6, which plots this distribution in Lorenz-curve form. However, the model overpredicts the share of small establishments in employment. Mexican plants are about half the size of U.S. plants.
Figure 5: Productivity and survival in India, Mexico, and the United States (model). The diagram displays the assumed productivity ladders (right panel) for India, Mexico, and the United States. It also illustrates the probability profiles for survival (left panel).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Values</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount factor, $\beta$</td>
<td>0.98(^*$)</td>
<td>0.98(^*$)</td>
<td>0.98(^*$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production function, scale, $\alpha$, capital’s share, $\omega$</td>
<td>0.8, 0.33</td>
<td>0.8, 0.33</td>
<td>0.8, 0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital, upper bound, $k$</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed cost, $\phi$</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor efficiency, $\chi$</td>
<td>96,427</td>
<td>53,035</td>
<td>33,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr Stall, $1 - \rho$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steps along ladder, the $\sigma$’s (productivity)</td>
<td>See Fig. 5</td>
<td>See Fig. 5</td>
<td>See Fig. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pr survival at time $t$, the $\sigma$’s</td>
<td>See Fig. 5</td>
<td>See Fig. 5</td>
<td>See Fig. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Input price, $q$</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring efficiency, $z$</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention, $\psi$</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The parameter values used in the simulations.
The model mimics this feature of the data well, as shown in Table 3. Plants in India are even smaller, about 10 percent of the size of American plants; the model predicts 7 percent. Figure 7 plots the model’s fit for the complementary cumulative distributions of employment by age for the three countries; that is, it graphs one minus the cumulative distribution of employment by age. Establishments older than 30 years account for a smaller fraction of employment in India or Mexico relative to the United States, as the right sides of the graphs show. The calibrated framework mimics the share of employment by age for Indian firms (the top panel) very well. The size of old Indian plants in the model is slightly too small, though. Next, consider Mexico (the middle panel). The fit is good, but the model has a little difficulty matching the size of young plants in Mexico; for example, the model overpredicts (underpredicts) the employment share for establishments older (younger) than 10 years. Now switch to the United States (the bottom panel). The model matches the share of employment by age for the United States very well. Still, it does not quite capture the fact that some old firms in the United States are very large. Finally, note from Table 3 that the model’s...
predictions about the relationship between employment and establishment age are captured using TFP profiles for plants that grow at roughly the correct rates for India, Mexico, and the United States. That is, employment grows with age faster in an American plant than in an Indian one because TFP grows faster in a plant in the United States compared with one in India.

### 10.3.3 Productivity

Can the above framework generate sizable differences in productivity between India, Mexico, and the United States, due to differences in technology adoption, which are in turn induced by differences in financial markets? Before proceeding, some definitions are needed. Aggregate output in a country is given by

\[
o(\tau) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \min\{t,S\} \sum_{s=1}^{T} o(s,t;\tau) \Pr(s,t;\tau),
\]

where \(o(s,t;\tau)\) represents a firm’s production at the \((s,t)\) node when it uses the \(\tau\) technology. Note that the odds of arriving at node \((s,t)\) are now also a function of \(\tau\). In a similar vein, define the aggregate labor amounts of labor and capital that are hired by

\[
l(\tau) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \min\{t,S\} \sum_{s=1}^{T} l(s,t;\tau) \Pr(s,t;\tau),
\]
**Stylized Facts for India, Mexico, and the United States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
<th>U.S. Data</th>
<th>U.S. Model</th>
<th>Mexico Data</th>
<th>Mexico Model</th>
<th>India Data</th>
<th>India Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output per worker</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average firm size</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt-to-output ratio</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment share, age $\leq 10$ yr</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ln(\text{TFP}<em>{\text{age}&gt;35}) - \ln(\text{TFP}</em>{\text{age}&lt;5})$</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Stylized Facts, Data Versus Model. All data sources are discussed in the Data Appendix.

$$k(\tau) = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=1}^{\min\{t,S\}} k(s,t;\tau) \Pr(s,t;\tau),$$

where $k(s,t;\tau)$ and $l(s,t;\tau)$, respectively, denote the quantities of capital and labor that a firm will hire at node $(s,t)$ when it uses the $\tau$ technology.

Labor productivity in a country reads $o(\tau)/l(\tau)$. As can be seen, the model performs well in replicating the fact that productivity in Mexico is only one-third of productivity in the United States. Indian productivity is only one-tenth of the American level. The model duplicates this as well. Likewise, a measure of TFP can be constructed. In particular, TFP is defined as $o(\tau)/[k(\tau)^{\kappa}l(\tau)^{1-\kappa}]$, where $\kappa$ is capital’s share of income and is set to $1/3$. The framework mimics excellently the facts that Indian and Mexican TFPs are 46 and 24 percent, respectively, of the U.S. level.

11 Why Doesn’t Technology Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?

What determines the technology a nation will use? Can differences in cash-flow control and monitoring justify the adoption of less productive technologies, even when input prices are substantially less expensive (implying that the advanced technology would be very profitable in the absence of any contracting frictions)? As it turns out, there is a wide range of values for $\psi$ and $z$ that are consistent with the United States adopting the advanced technology, Mexico the intermediate one, and India the entry-level technology. Some diagrams are developed next to show this.
For technology $\tau$ to operate in a country with a financial system characterized by $(\psi, z)$ requires that\footnote{This condition is the analog of (17) for the simulated economy.}

$$v(q; \psi, z, \tau) - \varepsilon_\tau = 0,$$

and

$$v(q; \psi, z, t) - \varepsilon_t \leq 0, \text{ for } t \neq \tau \text{ and } \tau, t \in \{IN, MX, US\}.$$

Recall that $\varepsilon_\tau$ is the cost to an entrepreneur of running technology $\tau$. Equation (21) is the zero-profit condition for technology $\tau$, while equation (22) ensures that it is not profitable for an entrepreneur to deviate and operate one of the other two technologies. Focus on the choice between the advanced and intermediate technology. If an equilibrium occurs where the advanced technology is operated, then condition (21) implicitly describes an equilibrium price function defined by $v(q; \psi, z, US) - \varepsilon_{US} = 0$. Write this relationship as $q^{US} = Q(z; \psi, \tau = US)$. Similarly, when the intermediate technology is adopted, the condition $v(q; \psi, z, MX) - \varepsilon_{MX} = 0$ will specify a price locus $q^{MX} = Q(z; \psi, \tau = MX)$. Figure 8 plots the two price schedules, which result from the simulation, as a function of monitoring efficiency, $z$, when $\psi = 0.06$ (the value in Mexico and the United States). For either technology, as monitoring becomes more efficient investment will increase, which will drive up wages and hence $q$. The function $Q(z; \psi, \tau = US)$ moves up faster with $z$ than the function $Q(z; \psi, \tau = MX)$ because the advanced technology responds more to shifts in the efficiency of monitoring, $z$, than does the intermediate one.

Now focus on the points to the right of the vertical line in Figure 8. In this region, the advanced technology is adopted so equilibrium prices will lie on the dashed line. It is not profitable for an entrepreneur to deviate and operate the intermediate technology. To see why, note that along the lower solid line an entrepreneur would earn zero profits from operating the intermediate technology. Thus, at higher prices he would incur a loss. Suppose, counterfactually, that the intermediate technology is adopted in equilibrium; then input prices would be on the solid line. Here, an entrepreneur should deviate and run the advanced technology. This occurs because along the higher dashed line the entrepreneur earns zero profits from the advanced technology. So, clearly, he would earn positive profits at the lower prices on the solid line. Therefore, an equilibrium where the intermediate technology
Figure 8: The choice between the advanced and intermediate technologies as a function of monitoring efficiency.

is operated is not deviation proof. Observe the wide range of $z$’s that are consistent with adopting either technology.

Figure 9 shows the adoption zones in $(\psi, z)$ space for each technology. That is, it illustrates the combinations of $\psi$ and $z$ that are consistent with the adoption of each technology. The diagram takes into account that as $\psi$ and $z$ change, so does $q$. In other words, it is done in general equilibrium. Focus on the boundary between the advanced and intermediate technologies, shown in the left panel of the figure. This “zooming in” spotlights Mexico and the United States. There is a trade-off between $\psi$ and $z$. Higher levels for $\psi$, which imply poorer cash-flow control, can be compensated for by higher values of $z$ or by greater efficiency in monitoring, at least up to a point. The points labeled “Mexico” and “USA” indicate the values for $\psi$ and $z$ that are used for these two countries in the simulation. At these two points,

16The retention parameter has a natural interpretation. It represents the fraction of output that the firm can always keep, unless it is caught cheating, notwithstanding any action the intermediary takes. So, in India the firm can always keep 48 percent of output. This parameter has a similar interpretation to $1 - \phi$ in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), which represents the fraction of undepreciated capital and output net of labor payments that an entrepreneur can keep if he reneges on his financial contract. It can be calculated that the value need for $1 - \phi$ in Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) so that their model would match the Indian external debt-to-GDP ratio is 0.88. This corresponds to $\psi = 0.57$ in the current setting, a magnitude similar to that used here. A discussion of the monitoring parameter, $z$, is deferred to Section 11.1.
the cost of the amalgamated input, $q$, is the same as in the data for Mexico and the United States; that is, 0.94 and 1.0.

The right panel of Figure 9 portrays the boundary between the entry-level and intermediate technologies. Again, there is trade-off between $\psi$ and $z$ but now it is not as steep because monitoring is less important for these technologies. The point labeled “India” indicates the values for $\psi$ and $z$ for this country in the simulation. At this point, the price for the amalgamated input is 0.6, the value observed in India. The retention problem in India is so severe that it is far removed from being able to adopt the advanced technology. Last, note that each technology has large adoption zones. Thus, there are many combinations of $\psi$ and $z$ that are consistent with the adoption of the particular technology. In this sense, the analysis is quite robust.

Finally, by how much would the fixed cost, $\phi$, for the advanced technology need to lowered so that India and Mexico would adopt it, holding fixed their price for the amalgamated input? India would adopt the advanced technology at 77 percent of the U.S. value and Mexico at 88 percent. Note that because the price of amalgamated input is lower in India and Mexico, firms in these countries would produce more output than in the United States. Thus, the fixed-cost-to-output ratio in India is 43.4 percent of the U.S. one, while for Mexico it is 84.9. If $q$ were allowed to change, then the fixed cost in each country would need to be lowered further to entice adoption. This experiment shows that the fixed costs would need to be
lowered considerably to switch the pattern of adoption.

11.1 The Role of Monitoring

The average odds of being monitored by state, \( s \), or \([\sum_{t \geq s} \Pr(s,t)p(s,t)]/\sum_{t \geq s} \Pr(s,t)\), are illustrated in the left panel of Figure 10. As can be seen, for the U.S. technology the odds of being monitored after declaring a stall rise steeply toward the top of the ladder. The U.S. technology ladder is very convex, so the payoffs from lying are greatest at the last steps. At step \( s = 7 \), the average monitoring probability (across all \( t \geq 7 \)) exceeds 25 percent. Monitoring is also done for the Indian ladder, but for a different reason. Monitoring helps with the cash-flow control problem. With monitoring someone who lies is more likely to be caught. They can then no longer retain part of the firm’s cash flow. Very little monitoring is done for the Mexican ladder because monitoring is inefficient and expensive and the cash-flow control problem is small.

Imagine a contract with terms \( \{k(s,t), x(s,t), p(s,t), f\}_{t=1, s=0}^{T, \min\{t,S\}} \). How does the cost of monitoring for this contract in India compare with the United States? It is easy to deduce from (4) that the relative cost of monitoring is simply given by

\[
\frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t C(p(s,t), k(s,t); q^{IN}, z^{IN}) \Pr(s,t)}{\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t C(p(s,t), k(s,t); q^{US}, z^{US}) \Pr(s,t)}
= \frac{C(p, k; q^{IN}, z^{IN})}{C(p, k; q^{US}, z^{US})} = \frac{q^{IN}}{q^{US}} \left(1 - \frac{z}{z^{IN}}\right)^2 = 7.4.
\]

Thus, monitoring for a given contract is much more expensive in India than in the United States, due to the low level of \( z \). The monitoring-cost-to-GDP ratio is much higher in the United States compared with India—specifically, 2.6 versus 0.01 percent. Why? The contracts are not the same. Note that the cost of monitoring rises convexly in \( k/z \) and \( p \). Firms are much larger in the United States (implying a higher \( k/z \) ratio) than in India and monitoring in the United States increases sharply toward the end of the productivity ladder.

12 Long- versus Short-Term Contracts

Long-term contracts allow the lender to monitor the borrower over extended periods of time. Therefore, long-term contracts may be more efficient than short-term ones. To examine this,
Figure 10: The left panel shows average monitoring probability in each state. The right panel illustrates aggregate output loss by state due to the inability to use long-term monitoring. The sum over all states gives the aggregate loss in output.

Suppose that the intermediary can monitor the firm for only one period following a report of a stall. Note that it is relatively straightforward to embed this restriction into the dynamic contract formulated above.

In fact, it can be shown that along the diagonal nodes of the ladder the restricted problem can be rewritten in a recursive form where in each period, given the node and a level of state-contingent debt, the contract specifies for next period (i) the level of working capital, (ii) payments from the firm to the intermediary for the events of moving one step up the ladder or for a stall, (iii) the level of monitoring in the event of a stall, and (iv) two new levels of state-contingent debt for the events of moving up the ladder and stalling. This resembles a sequence of one-period contracts, where any state-contingent debt must be repaid—see Appendix 17 for a formal statement of the one-period contract and a proof that it coincides with the restricted long-term contract. In the real world, a mixture of long- and short-term contracts between borrowers and lenders exists. The average maturity of U.S. corporate debt in 2013 was 13.6 years. Interestingly, the fraction of long-term debt in total debt rises with a country’s GDP [see Fan, Titman and Twite (2012, Figure 2)]. For instance, between 1991 and 2006 this ratio was about 65 percent in India, 69 percent in Mexico, and 80 percent in the United States. Perhaps short-term contracts suffice for financing simple ventures while long-term ones are needed for more complex ones.
First, it is not feasible to implement the advanced technology in the United States (at current factor prices) using one-period monitoring. Second, this restriction reduces aggregate output in the United States by 12.5 percent, a large number. This loss in U.S. output is broken down across states in the right panel of Figure 10. The biggest losses in outputs occur in the later states where productivity rises steeply and the incentive to lie is the greatest; recall from Figure 5 that the U.S. productivity profile is convex. Note that state 8 is at the top of the ladder. So, there is no need to ever monitor a report of being in state 8, since here the top of ladder has been reached. The loss of output declines from state 6 to state 7. This occurs because once state 7 has been reached, there is only a maximum of 3 periods left so the difference between one-period and multi-period monitoring begins to shrink.

As was mentioned, in the restricted setting the entrepreneur is committed to meeting his financial obligations to the intermediary. Ex post (after contracting), the entrepreneur may misreport the level of his productivity and/or seek to retain output. That is, unlike the models of Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Midrigan and Xu (2014), and Moll (2014), the entrepreneur cannot just default on financial obligation to an intermediary (and lose some of his capital) but must do so through either misreporting and/or retention. In these three papers, as in the current work, contracts are designed to prevent this sort of event. In the current setting if the entrepreneur could partially renge on his liabilities (that is default on his state-contingent debt in the short-term version of the contract), then the difference between a long- and short-term contract would be even bigger.

The results of a similar exercise for India are also shown in Figure 10. The loss in Indian aggregate output is 0.9 percent, a much smaller number. Thus, the structure of the productivity profile (convex versus concave) matters for the importance of monitoring. In India the productivity profile is concave (again, recall Figure 5). With such a productivity profile, backloading strategies can be efficient. When monitoring is restricted to one period, the intermediary can compensate for the inability to undertake long-term monitoring by reducing the working capital it lends to the firms early on. This leads to an output loss in the early states, states 0 to 3. Upon receiving good reports from the firm, the intermediary lends more capital to the firm in the later states, states 4 to 8. This increases the firm’s incentive to tell the truth. By tilting capital accumulation more toward the end, the intermediary can minimize the loss due to the inability to engage in long-term monitoring. In Mexico monitoring was
never used much due to the non-convex structure of the productivity profile and the absence of a retention problem.

13 The Role of Retained Earnings in Financing Investment

“The entrepreneur does not save in order to obtain the means which he needs, nor does he accumulate any goods before he begins to produce.”

“The entrepreneur is never the risk bearer. ... The one who gives credit comes to grief if the undertaking fails.” Joseph A. Schumpeter (1961, pp. 136 and 137).

Two questions of interest are addressed here: (i) How does the entrepreneur’s stake in the firm evolve over time? (ii) How much of the cost of capital is financed by the entrepreneur’s share of cash flow? That is, how much capital expenditure is financed internally? To answer these two questions, objects from the dynamic contract must be translated into objects from accounting. Start with the notion of retained earnings. At any step/date pair \((s,t)\), the value of the firm to the entrepreneur, \(v(s,t)\), is given by

\[
v(s,t) = \sum_{\tilde{t}=t}^{T} \sum_{\tilde{s}=s}^{\min\{\tilde{t},S\}} \beta^{\tilde{t}} \left[ \theta_{\tilde{s}k}(\tilde{s},\tilde{t})^{\alpha} - x(\tilde{s},\tilde{t}) \right] \Pr(\tilde{s},\tilde{t}) / Pr(s,t), \quad \text{cf (P2)}.
\]

This is just the expected present value of output net of payments that the entrepreneur is obligated to make to the intermediary. In accounting parlance, \(v(s,t)\) is the owner’s equity or retained earnings at node \((s,t)\).

Next, what is the firm’s debt at node \((s,t)\)? To answer this, the stream of payments \(\{x(\tilde{s},\tilde{t})\}\) is broken down into two mutually exclusive parts, a positive stream, \(\{\max\{x(\tilde{s},\tilde{t}),0\}\}\), and a negative stream, \(\{\min\{x(\tilde{s},\tilde{t}),0\}\}\). The firm’s financial liability (which can be loosely thought of as debt) at \((s,t)\), or \(d(s,t)\), coincides with the positive part and is given by

\[
d(s,t) = \sum_{\tilde{t}=t}^{T} \sum_{\tilde{s}=s}^{\min\{\tilde{t},S\}} \beta^{\tilde{t}} \max\{x(\tilde{s},\tilde{t}),0\} \Pr(\tilde{s},\tilde{t}) / Pr(s,t).
\]

This financial liability is composed of two things. First, the firm must pay back the intermediary’s loan. Second, the firm is surrendering some of its cash flow for contractual reasons that
The Firm’s Balance Sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Liabilities and Retained Earning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present value of cash flow</td>
<td>Financial liabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( y(s, t) )</td>
<td>( d(s, t) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial assets</td>
<td>Retained earnings (owner’s equity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a(s, t) )</td>
<td>( v(s, t) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Translating model objects into accounting parlance.

involve the creation of incentives. This part of the cash flow will be returned with interest at date \( T \).

The payments that the intermediary will pay the firm in the future constitute a financial asset for the firm. The worth of this asset, \( a(s, t) \), is given by

\[
a(s, t) = -\sum_{\hat{t}=t}^{T} \sum_{\hat{s}=s} \beta^\hat{t} \min\{x(\hat{s}, \hat{t}), 0\} \Pr(\hat{s}, \hat{t}) / \Pr(s, t).
\]

The firm also owns the present value of its output, \( y(s, t) \), which represents another asset:

\[
y(s, t) \equiv \sum_{\hat{t}=t}^{T} \sum_{\hat{s}=s} \beta^\hat{t} \theta_3 k(\hat{s}, \hat{t})^\alpha \Pr(\hat{s}, \hat{t}) / \Pr(s, t).
\]

Now, it is easy to see that \( y(s, t) + a(s, t) = d(s, t) + v(s, t) \). Putting everything together on a balance sheet gives Table 4.\footnote{The firm’s financial liability, \( d(s, t) \), is an asset for the intermediary and will enter on the left side of the latter’s balance sheet. The intermediary incurs a financial liability (dubbed a note payable) to supply the firm with working capital and to engage in monitoring, which enters on the right side of the intermediary’s balance sheet. This liability, \( n(s, t) \), reads \( n(s, t) = \sum_{\hat{t}=t}^{T} \sum_{\hat{s}=s}^{\min(\hat{t}, s)} \beta^\hat{t} [gk(\hat{s}, \hat{t}) + C(p(\hat{s}, \hat{t}), k(\hat{s}, \hat{t}))] \Pr(\hat{s}, \hat{t}) / \Pr(s, t) + I(t)\phi \), where \( I(t) = 1 \) if \( t = 0 \) and is zero otherwise. The contract contributes the amount \( d(s, t) - n(s, t) \) to the intermediary’s retained earnings (which is on the right side of the balance sheet).}

So, how does the entrepreneur’s ownership of the firm evolve over time? The entrepreneur’s share of the firm is given by \( v(s, t) / [y(s, t) + a(s, t)] \). At each point in time, take an average across states. The upshot is displayed in the left panel of Figure 11. As time progresses, the entrepreneur owns more of the firm in all three countries. There is not much investment associated with the entry-level technology. Therefore, in India an entrepreneur quickly owns most of his firm. By contrast, the advanced technology requires substantial investment, both
Figure 11: The left panel shows the share of the firm owned by the entrepreneur evolves over time. The right panel displays the fraction of the cost of physical capital that is financed by the firm.

in terms of the initial fixed cost and subsequent capital expenditures. Hence, an American entrepreneur’s share of the firm increases more slowly; in fact, he never fully owns it. Not surprisingly, the curve for Mexico lies between the ones for India and the United States.

The evolution of the entrepreneur’s stake in the firm will be reflected in the firm’s debt. The importance of external finance in the literature is usually gauged by cross-country comparisons of measures of private credit to GDP. The private-credit-to-GDP ratio rises with GDP. This fact can be interpreted as indicating either that an entrepreneur’s own start-up funds are more important in developing countries vis-à-vis developed ones or that internal finance is more important in the former countries than the latter. Another interpretation is that developed countries use more advanced technologies than developing countries and that these technologies require more external funding than less advanced ones. What are the model’s predictions for the private-debt-to-GDP ratios? These are presented in Table 3. As can be seen, in the data the private-debt-to-GDP ratio is much higher in the United States (1.65) than for either India (0.24) or Mexico (0.24).18 The model captures this fact in a qualitative

18Debt is constructed using the above formula for $d(s, t)$, but here $x(s, t)$ is replaced with $\tilde{x}(s, t)$, where $\tilde{x}(s, t) = x(s, t) - qk(s, t)$. That is, the firm is thought of as using its own cash flow to pay for its inputs instead of surrendering its cash flow to the intermediary and having the intermediary lend the money to buy its inputs. Clearly, this does not change the nature of the contract. It is easy to deduce that this does not change the value of retained earnings or the value of the firm’s assets. Hence, the time pattern of the entrepreneur’s stake
sense (1.83, 0.08, and 0.08). It does reasonably well in matching the magnitudes for the United States, but it underpredicts the magnitudes for India and Mexico. Again, in the quantitative analysis, the entrepreneur’s self-financed start-up funds are set to zero ($f = 0$). This suggests that cross-country differences in the private-debt-to-GDP ratio may reflect differences in technology adoption. That is, more developed countries adopt more advanced technologies that, in turn, require higher levels of financing and hence debt. Selling drinks on the street requires smaller and less sustained levels of borrowing than launching rockets into space, so to speak.

How much of physical capital expenditure is financed by the entrepreneur’s share of cash flow? The change in retained earnings across two consecutive periods reflects the portion of current cash flow that accrues to the firm. The change in retained earnings includes any realized capital gains/losses that occur when the firm transits across states and time and nets out payments to the intermediary. The change in retained earnings, $\Delta e(s,t)$, is defined by

$$
\Delta e(s,t) = \begin{cases} 
  v(s,t) - v(s-1,t-1), & \text{diagonal}, \\
  v(s,t) - v(s,t-1), & \text{off diagonal}.
\end{cases}
$$

The fraction of the cost of physical capital that is financed by (changes in) retained earnings (or that is financed internally) is

$$
i(s,t) = \begin{cases} 
  \Delta e(s,t)/[rk(s+1,t+1) + \phi I(t)], & \text{diagonal}, \\
  \Delta e(s,t)/[rk(s,t+1)], & \text{off diagonal}.
\end{cases}
$$

where $r$ is the country-specific cost of capital and $I(t) = 1$, if $t = 1$, and $I(t) = 0$, if $t > 1$.

The right panel of Figure 11 plots the fraction of physical capital expenditure that is financed internally, where at each point in time an average across states is taken. For India the fraction of capital expenditure that is financed internally rises rapidly early on. By contrast, the increase is much slower for the United States. This occurs for two reasons. First, the advanced technology has a much larger setup cost, which must be paid off to the intermediary. Second, the convex productivity profile implies that a much of capital expenditure occurs toward the end of the project. In fact, the advanced technology always relies on some external finance.

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in the firm remains the same.
Imagine endowing India and Mexico with the U.S. financial system. Three questions come to mind: By how much would Mexican and Indian GDP increase? Would this bring them to the U.S. level of development? How much of the gain in output is due to the adoption of new technologies versus capital deepening? To address these questions, let $O(z, \psi; r^{MX}, \chi^{MX})$ represent the level of output that Mexico would produce if it had the financial system proxied for by $(z, \psi)$, given the Mexican rental rate on capital, $r^{MX}$, and the Mexican level of human capital, $\chi^{MX}$. The percentage gain in output from Mexico adopting the U.S. financial system is $100 \times [\ln O(z^{US}, \psi^{US}; r^{US}, \chi^{MX}) - \ln O(z^{MX}, \psi^{MX}; r^{MX}, \chi^{MX})]$. The percentage of the gap in the difference between Mexican and U.S. output that would be closed is measured by $100 \times [\ln O(z^{US}, \psi^{US}; r^{US}, \chi^{US}) - \ln O(z^{US}, \psi^{US}; r^{US}, \chi^{US}) - \ln O(z^{MX}, \psi^{MX}; r^{MX}, \chi^{MX})]$. Similarly, let $T(z, \psi; r^{MX}, \chi^{MX})$ represent the level of TFP that Mexico would produce if it had the financial system $(z, \psi)$, again given $r^{MX}$ and $\chi^{MX}$. Here TFP is measured in the manner discussed earlier. By standard Solow accounting, the contribution of TFP growth to output growth, when Mexico adopts the U.S. financial system, is just $100 \times [\ln T(z^{US}, \psi^{US}; r^{US}, \chi^{US}) - \ln T(z^{US}, \psi^{US}; r^{US}, \chi^{US}) - \ln O(z^{US}, \psi^{US}; r^{US}, \chi^{US})]$.

Table 5 shows that both Mexico and India could increase their outputs considerably by adopting the U.S. financial system: 46.1 percent and 71.8 percent, respectively. These seemingly large numbers are in accord with those in the quantitative models developed by Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), Greenwood, Wang, and Sanchez (2013), and Townsend and Ueda (2010). Yet, adopting the U.S. financial system would close only 40.0 percent of the gap between Mexican and American incomes and 38.4 percent of the gap for India. This transpires because Mexico and India have lower levels of human capital than the United States and higher prices for physical capital. TFP would jump up by 42.8 percent in Mexico and by 46.4 percent in India. This is a consequence of adopting the U.S. technology.

Interestingly, the capital-to-labor ratio rises by only 9.8 percent in Mexico. In India it moves up by 76.3 percent. The improvement in TFP accounts for 93 percent of Mexican output growth and 65 percent of Indian output growth. This is in line with King and Levine (1994), who report that differences in productivities, and not factor supplies, are likely to
Impact of Adopting U.S. Financial System

\( z = z^{US} \) and \( \psi = \psi^{US} \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase, %</strong></td>
<td>46.1</td>
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<td><strong>Gap Closed, %</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Growth, %</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Output per worker</strong></td>
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<td><strong>TFP</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capital-to-labor ratio</strong></td>
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<td>312.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Debt-to-output ratio</strong></td>
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<td>100.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contribution from TFP</strong></td>
<td>93</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contribution from Capital</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: The impact for India and Mexico of adopting the U.S. financial system.

explain differences in incomes across countries. The finding here is echoed in Midrigan and Xu (2014), who use a quantitative model and argue that the impact of financial frictions on economic development through the capital-deepening channel, versus a technology adoption one, is likely to be small. Last, the debt-to-output ratio increases by over 300 percent for both India and Mexico. When India and Mexico are endowed with the U.S. financial system they adopt the advanced technology. From (21) it follows that the price of the amalgamated input in both of these countries is the same as in the United States; that is, \( q^{IN} = q^{MX} = q^{US} = 1 \). (This does not imply that wages are the same in the three countries because \( r \) and \( \chi \) are different.) Consequently, the same financial contract is offered to entrepreneurs in all three countries, resulting in equal levels of debt relative to output.

15 Conclusion

The role of financial intermediation in underwriting business ventures is investigated here. The analysis stresses the interplay between the structure of technology and the ability of an intermediary to fund it. A dynamic costly state verification model of lending from intermediaries to firms is developed to examine this. The model is embedded into a general equilibrium framework where intermediation is competitive. A firm’s level of productivity is private information. The framework has several unique features not found in the literature.

First, the costly state verification model presented has several novel characteristics. As in the conventional costly state verification paradigm, an intermediary is free to audit a firm’s returns. The auditing technology imposed here, however, is quite flexible. Specifically, the
intermediary can pick the odds of a successful audit. The costs of auditing are increasing and convex in this probability. Additionally, these costs are decreasing in the technological efficiency of the financial system. Also, it may not be possible to write a contract that secures, when desired, all of a firm’s cash flow. This leakage in cash flow limits the ability of intermediaries to create incentives for firms that increase the likelihood of a successful venture. The analysis allows new firms to supply some of their own funds to help venture start-up. The financial contract between the firm and the intermediary delimits the amount of self-financing that the firm can achieve over time using retained earnings.

Second, to stress the nexus between finance and the structure of technology, the latter is given a more general representation than is traditionally found in the finance and development literature. Differences in business opportunities are represented by variations in the stochastic processes governing firms’ productivities. A stochastic process is characterized by a non-decreasing movement along a productivity ladder. The positions of the rungs on the ladder and the odds of moving up the ladder differ by the type of venture. A stall on the ladder is an absorbing state.

The form of the technology has implications for finance. Some ventures may have exciting potential for profit, but intermediaries may be required to provide large up-front investments of working capital and have to wait for prolonged periods of time before any potential returns are realized. For such investments, the ability of an intermediary to conduct ex post monitoring and to control cash flows is important for the viability of long-term lending contracts. Monitoring is important for detecting malfeasance. The more efficient the monitoring, the less incentive there will be for a firm to cheat on the financial contract. Likewise, the ability to secure cash flows in the contract is vital for creating incentives using backloading strategies that improve the odds of a successful venture. The upshot is that the set of desirable technologies within a country is a function of the state of the nation’s financial system. Therefore, a country’s income and TFP also depend on its financial system.

The theory presented is illustrated using a quantitative example. In line with Hsieh and Klenow (2014), the example focuses on three countries, India, Mexico, and the United States. The framework is specialized to a situation where there are three technologies: an advanced technology, an intermediate one, and an entry-level one. A general equilibrium is constructed where, given the efficiency of a country’s financial system, firms in the United States choose to
adopt the advanced technology, those in Mexico pick the intermediate one, and firms in India select the entry-level technology. This is done while matching each country’s input prices and establishment-size distributions, so the analysis has some discipline. In the example, financial development plays an important role in economic development. Both Mexico and India could increase their GDPs significantly by adopting the U.S. financial system, with the technology adoption channel playing a more important role than the capital accumulation channel. Financial development is important but is not the sole driver of economic development.

The quantitative illustration is used to underscore some key features of the theory. Both the structure of available technologies and the efficiency of a country’s financial systems are important for determining which technologies will be adopted. Given the efficiency of a nation’s financial system, it may not be possible to finance the adoption of certain technologies. This is highlighted here by plotting the adoption zones for technologies as a function of financial system parameters. In the illustration here, India and Mexico could not adopt the advanced technology used in the United States. Second, the use of long-term contracts may be important for funding some technologies. In the example presented, the advanced technology cannot be supported in the United States using short-term contracts. Financing this technology requires a commitment by the intermediary to (potentially) monitor firms for a prolonged period of time. The structure of a technology also determines how quickly a firm’s capital accumulation can be self-financed using the cash flowing into retained earnings. The entry-level technology, used in India, did not require much up-front investment and yielded a payoff quickly. This technology can be self-financed rapidly using retained earnings. By contrast, the advanced technology, employed in the United States, had a large start-up cost and a long maturation period. It relies on external finance for an extended period of time. The cross-country differences in technology adoption led to the United States having a higher debt-to-GDP ratio than India and Mexico, in addition to greater GDP and TFP.
16 Appendix: Theory

16.1 The General Contract Problem with Reports at All Dates and States

Consider the general contract problem where reports for all states and dates are allowed. To construct this problem, more powerful notation is needed. To this end, let $\mathcal{H}_t \equiv \{0, 1, \ldots, \min\{t, S\}\}$ represent the set of states that could happen at date $t$. The set of all histories for states up to and including date $t$ then reads $\mathcal{H}_t \equiv \mathcal{H}_t \times \ldots \times \mathcal{H}_1$. Denote an element of $\mathcal{H}_t$, or a history, by $h^t$. Some of these histories cannot happen. It is not possible for a firm’s productivity to advance after a stall, for example. Given this limitation, define the set of feasible or viable histories by $\mathcal{V}_t \equiv \{h^t \in \mathcal{H}_t : \Pr(h^t) > 0\}$, where $\Pr(h^t)$ is the probability of history $h^t$. To formulate the retention constraints it is useful to define $\mathcal{V}_t(s,j)$ as the set of viable (or feasible) histories that can follow from node $(s,j)$.

The period-$t$ level of productivity conditional on a history, $h^t$, is represented by $\theta(h^t)$. Finally, let the state in period $j$ implied by the history $h^t$ read $h_j(h^t)$ and write the history of states through $j$ as $h^j(h^t)$.

Let $\zeta_t(h^t)$ be a report by the firm in period $t$ of its current state to the intermediary, given the true history $h^t$, where the function $\zeta_t : \mathcal{H}_t \to \mathcal{H}_t$. A truthful report in period $t$, $\zeta_t^*(h^t)$, happens when $\zeta_t^*(h^t) = \zeta_t(h^t) = h_t(h^t)$. A reporting strategy is defined by $\zeta^t \equiv (\zeta_1, \ldots, \zeta_t)$. Recall that the firm is unable to report a state higher than it actually has. As a result, the set of all feasible reporting strategies, $S$, consists of reporting strategies, $\zeta$, such that

1. $\zeta_t(h^t) \in \mathcal{H}_t$, for all $t \geq 1$ and $h^t \in \mathcal{H}_t$;
2. $\zeta_t(h^t) \leq h_t(h^t)$, for all $t \geq 1$ and $h^t \in \mathcal{H}_t$.

Taking some liberty with notation, denote the contract elements in terms of the history of reports by $\left\{k(\zeta_t(h^t), t), x(\zeta_t(h^t)), p(\zeta_t(h^t)), f, \bar{f}\right\}_{t=1}^{T}$. Given this notation, the general contract problem (P3) between the firm and intermediary can be written as

$$\max_{\left\{k(h^t, t), x(h^t), p(h^t), f, \bar{f}\right\}_{t=1}^{T}} \sum_{h^t \in \mathcal{H}_t} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \beta^t \left[\theta(h^t) k(h^t, t)^\alpha - x(h^t)\right] \Pr(h^t) + f - \bar{f}, \quad \text{(P3)}$$

subject to

$$\theta(h^t) k(h^t, t)^\alpha - x(h^t) \geq 0,$$  \quad \text{(23)}
\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in H^t} \beta^t \left[ \theta(h^t) k(h^t, t) - x(h^t) \right] \Pr(h^t)
\geq \max_{\zeta \in S} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in H^t} \beta^t \left[ \theta(h^t) k(\zeta(h^t), t) - x(\zeta(h^t)) \right] \prod_{n=1}^{t} \left[ 1 - p(\zeta^n(h^n)) \right] \Pr(h^t),
\]

(24)

\[
\sum_{t=j}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in V^t(s,j)} \beta^t \left[ \theta(h^t) k(h^t, t) - x(h^t) \right] \Pr(h^t)
\geq \psi \sum_{t=j}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in V^t(s,j)} \beta^t \theta(h^t) k(h^{s-1}, s)^\alpha \Pr(h^t), \text{ for } s = 1, \ldots, S \text{ and } s \leq j \leq T.
\]

(25)

\[
k((h^{t-1}, t), t) = k((h^{t-1}, t - 1), t), \text{ for all } t \text{ where } t - 1 = h_{t-1}(h^{t-1}),
\]

(26)

\[
k(h^t, t) = k((h^{s-1}, s - 1), s), \text{ for all } t > s = h_{s-1}(h^t) \text{ and } s < S,
\]

(27)

\[
k(h^t, t) = k(h^S, S), \quad \text{for } t > S \text{ and } S = h_S(h^t),
\]

and

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in H^t} \beta^t \left[ x(h^t) - C \left( p(h^t), k(h^t, t) \right) - qk(h^t, t) \right] \Pr(h^t) - \phi + \tilde{f} \geq 0,
\]

(28)
in addition to the self-financing constraint (11). Note how (24) differs from (7). Here a truthful reporting strategy must deliver a payoff in expected present discounted value terms over the entire lifetime of the contract that is no smaller than the one that could be obtained by an untruthful report. The general notation also allows the two no-retention constraints, (12) and (13), to be expressed in the more compact single constraint (25). The objective function (P3) and the rest of the constraints (23) and (26) to (28) are the direct analogs of those presented in (P2), so they are not explained.

Turn now to a more restricted problem where the firm is not allowed to make a report that is infeasible; that is, a claim about a zero probability event.\(^{19}\) The set of restricted reporting strategies, \(\mathcal{R}\), consists of all reporting strategies, \(\zeta\), such that

1. \(\zeta^t(h^t) \in V^t\), for all \(t \geq 1\) and \(h^t \in V^t\);

\(^{19}\)A similar restriction is made in Kocherlakota (2010).
2. $\zeta_t(h^t) \leq h_t(h^t)$, for all $t \geq 1$ and $h^t \in \mathcal{V}^t$.

The restricted contract problem (P4) between the firm and intermediary reads

$$
\max_{\{k(h^t, t), x(h^t), p(h^t)\}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in \mathcal{V}^t} \beta^t \left[ \theta(h^t)k(h^t, t)^\alpha - x(h^t) \right] \Pr(h^t) + f - \tilde{f},
$$

(P4)

subject to

$$
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in \mathcal{V}^t} \beta^t \left[ \theta(h^t)k(h^t, t)^\alpha - x(h^t) \right] \Pr(h^t) \geq \max_{\zeta \in \mathcal{R}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in \mathcal{V}^t} \beta^t \left[ \theta(h^t)k(\zeta(h^t), t)^\alpha - x(\zeta(h^t)) \right] \prod_{n=1}^{T} \left[ 1 - p(\zeta^n(h^n)) \right] \Pr(h^t),
$$

(29)

$$
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{h^t \in \mathcal{V}^t} \beta^t \left[ x(h^t) - C (p(h^t), k(h^t, t)) - qk(h^t, t) \right] \Pr(h^t) - \phi + f \geq 0,
$$

(30)

and (23), (25), (26), and (27) in addition to (11).

The lemma presented below holds.

**Lemma 9** The contracts specified by problems (P3) and (P4) are the same.

**Proof.** It will be demonstrated that any contract that is feasible for problem (P3) is also feasible for (P4) and vice versa. Now suppose that $\{k^*(h^t, t), x^*(h^t), p^*(h^t)\}_{t=1}^{T}$ represents an optimal solution to the general problem (P3). A feasible solution for the restricted problem (P4) will be constructed. To begin with, for reports $\zeta^t(h^t) \in \mathcal{R}^t$, let

$$
k^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t), t) = k^*(\zeta^t(h^t), t),
$$

$$
x^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t)) = x^*(\zeta^t(h^t)),
$$

$$
p^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t)) = p^*(\zeta^t(h^t)),
$$

where a \textquotedblleft\textasciitilde\textquotedblright\ represents a choice variable in the restricted problem. (Recall that for a truthful report $\zeta^t(h^t) = h^t$.)
The general problem also allows for infeasible histories to be reported—that is, for \( \zeta^t(h^t) \in S^t/R^t \). For these reports a plausible alternative will be engineered that offers the same payoff to the firm and intermediary and that also satisfies all constraints. To do this, let
\[
i = \max_j \zeta^j(h^t) \in R^j.
\]
Thus, \( i \) indexes the duration of feasible reports. Manufacture an alternative plausible history, \( \hat{\zeta}^t(h^t) \), as follows:
\[
\hat{\zeta}^t(h^t) = (\zeta^i(h^t), \underbrace{i, \ldots, i}_{t-i}).
\]
Finally, for \( \zeta^t(h^t) \in S^t/R^t \) set
\[
\begin{align*}
k^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t), t) &= k^*(\zeta^t(h^t), t), \\
x^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t)) &= x^*(\zeta^t(h^t)), \\
p^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t)) &= p^*(\zeta^t(h^t)).
\end{align*}
\]

The constructed solution will satisfy all constraints attached to the restricted problem. In particular, a solution to the general problem (P3) will satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint for the restricted problem because \( h^t \in H^t \) and \( R \subseteq S \). Therefore, the right-hand side of the incentive constraint for the restricted problem can be no larger than the right-hand side of the incentive constraint for the general problem. Hence, the value of the optimized solution for (P4) must be at least as great as for (P3), since the two problems share the same objective function.

Let \( \{k^\sim(h^t, t), x^\sim(h^t), p^\sim(h^t)\right]^T_{t=1} \) be an optimal solution for the restricted problem (P4). Now, for reports \( \zeta^t(h^t) \in R^t \), construct a feasible solution to the general problem (P3) as follows:
\[
\begin{align*}
k^*(\zeta^t(h^t), t) &= k^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t), t), \\
x^*(\zeta^t(h^t)) &= x^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t)), \\
p^*(\zeta^t(h^t)) &= p^\sim(\zeta^t(h^t)),
\end{align*}
\]
where the “\( \sim \)” denotes the quantity in the general problem. The constraints associated with the general problem will be satisfied by this particular solution. Focus on the incentive constraint and take an off-the-equilibrium path report, \( \zeta^t(h^t) \in S^t/R^t \). The intermediary can always
choose to treat this in the same manner as a report of \((\zeta^i(h^t), i, \cdots, i)\), with \(i = \max_j \zeta^j(h^t) \in \mathcal{R}^j\), in the restricted problem. Therefore, the value of the optimized solution for (P3) must be at least as great as for (P4). To take stock of the situation, the value of the objective function in problem (P3) must be at least as great as the value returned by problem (P4) and vice versa. Since the objective functions are the same, this can occur only if the optimal solutions for both problems are also the same.

Append the no-retention constraints (12) and (13) to problem (P2). It will now be established that the appended version of problem (P2) delivers the same solution as the restricted problem (P4). To do this, the incentive constraint (7) in (P2) must be related to the incentive constraint (29) in (P4). The restricted problem (P4) has just one incentive constraint, which dictates that a truthful reporting strategy must deliver a payoff in expected present discounted value terms over the lifetime of the entire contract that is no smaller than what could be obtained by an untruthful one. Problem (P2) has \(S\) incentive constraints requiring that reports along the diagonal in Figure 3 must have payoffs in expected present discounted value terms over the remainder of the contract that weakly dominate those that could be obtained by telling lies.

Lemma 10 The contracts specified by the appended version of problem (P2) and problem (P4) are the same.

Proof. The only differences between problems (P2) and (P4) are the incentive constraints, modulo differences in notation used for the states, viz \(h^t\) and \((s, t)\). Knowing \(h^t\) is the same as knowing \((s, t)\), and vice versa, given the structure of the productivity ladder. That is, there is a one-to-one mapping, \(G\), such that \((s, t) = G(h^t)\) and \(h^t = G^{-1}(s, t)\). It will now be shown that any allocation that satisfies the incentive constraint in one problem must satisfy the incentive constraint in the other. Given this, the two problems must be the same.

First, take an allocation \(\{k(h^t, t), x(h^t), p(h^t)\}\) that satisfies the incentive constraint (29) for the restricted problem (P4). Consider the same allocation \(\{k(G(h^t)), x(G(h^t)), p(G(h^t))\}\) for problem (P2). Suppose this allocation violates the incentive constraint (7) in problem (P2) at some node \((s^*, s^*)\). The expected present value of the path following telling the lie at \((s^*, s^*)\) exceeds the expected present value from telling the truth by assumption. The path
of truthful reports to this node is unique: There is only one sequence of steps to \((s^*, s^*)\), as is obvious from the structure of the ladder shown in Figure 3. Under a truthful reporting scheme, the paths of potential reports following this node are unique. So too is the path following a lie at \((s^*, s^*)\), because if the firm lies at this node, then it cannot report moving up afterward. Call the path following a lie at \((s^*, s^*)\) the “lie path.” Now, in the contract \(\{k(h^t, t), x(h^t), p(h^t)\}\) replace the unique potential truthful paths following \((s^*, s^*)\) with the unique lie path. That is, for \(t \geq s^*\) replace \(h^t\) with \(G^{-1}(s^* - 1, t)\). This must yield a higher expected present value than \(\{k(h^t, t), x(h^t), p(h^t)\}\). This is a contraction.

Second, consider some allocation that satisfies the incentive constraint (7) attached to the appended version of problem (P2). Assume that this allocation violates the incentive constraint (29) for problem (P4). This implies that at some nodes \((s, s)\) along the diagonal in Figure 3 it pays to tell lies. Choose the first such state/time pair \((s, s)\), denoted by \((s^*, s^*)\). The path of truthful reports up to this point must be unique. From this point on, the firm cannot report going farther up the ladder. Hence, it cannot tell any further lies. The expected present value of the path following a lie at \((s^*, s^*)\) must exceed the expected present value from telling the truth for (29) to be violated. This implies that (7) must have been violated at node \((s^*, s^*)\), a contradiction.

16.2 Proofs for the Contract Problem (P2)

Some lemmas and proofs describing the structure of the optimal contract are now presented. All lemmas and proofs apply to the appended version of problem (P2), where the no-retention constraints (12) and (13) have been added.

16.3 Proof of Go All In

Proof. Let \(\lambda\) be the multiplier associated with the zero-profit constraint (10) and \(\xi\) be the multiplier connected with the self-financing constraint (11). The first-order condition linked with \(\tilde{f}\) is

\[-1 + \lambda - \xi = 0.\]

If \(\xi > 0\) then the constraint (11) is binding and the result holds automatically. Alternatively, if \(\xi = 0\) then \(\lambda = 1\). In this situation the firm is indifferent between investing in its own project
or placing the funds in a bank. On the one hand, by giving \(\tilde{f}\) to the intermediary the firm lowers its payoff in the objective function by \(\tilde{f}\). On the other hand, this is exactly compensated for by loosening the zero-profit constraint that will result in an decrease in payments from the firm to the intermediary [or the \(x(s,t)\)'s] in the amount \(\tilde{f}\). ■

**Remark 1** Since \(\lambda = 1 + \xi\) and \(\xi \geq 0\), it must transpire that \(\lambda \geq 1\). This makes intuitive sense. When the entrepreneur hands over wealth to the intermediary, the lowest expected gross return that it can receive is \(1/\beta\). This is what a saver earns from depositing funds with the intermediary. This is worth exactly \(1\) in present-value terms.

### 16.4 Transformation of Problem (P2) with Self-Financing to Problem (P5) without It

Lemma 1 allows problem (10) with the possibility of self-financing to be converted into an equivalent problem (P5) without self-financing. The latter problem has a larger capitalized value for the fixed costs, \(\hat{\phi}\); specifically, \(\hat{\phi} = \phi - f\).

\[
v = \max_{\{k(s,t), x(s,t), p(s,t)\}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(s,t)^\alpha - x(s,t)] \Pr(s,t),
\]

subject to (6) to (9), the new zero-profit constraint (31) and the no-retention constraints (12) and (13). Note that the self-financing constraint (11) has now been eliminated.

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t [x(s,t) - C(p(s,t), k(s,t)) - qk(s,t)] \Pr(s,t) - (\phi - \hat{\phi}) \geq 0. \tag{31}
\]

**Lemma 11** (Conversion of problem with self-financing to one without self-financing) The problem with self-financed start-up funds (P2) reduces to problem (P5), where the fixed cost is \(\hat{\phi} = \phi - f\).

**Proof.** In line with Lemma 1, set \(\tilde{f} = f\). Use this fact to eliminate \(f - \tilde{f}\) in the objective function and to replace \(\tilde{f}\) with \(f\) in the zero-profit condition. ■

**Remark 2** All that matters for the contract is \(\phi - f\), given the above lemma. That is, what matters for the contract is the amount of initial funds that the intermediary must put up and
this is consistent with many different combinations of $\phi$ and $f$. Thus, a project with a fixed cost of $\phi$, where the entrepreneur has $f$ in start-up funding will have the same allocations as one where the fixed cost is $\phi - f$, but where the entrepreneur has no start-up funds. Therefore, without cross-country data on $\phi$ and $f$ separately, it may be difficult to ascertain how much start-up funds matter.

In what follows the proofs in Sections (16.5), (16.6), and (16.7) refer to the transformed problem (P5).

16.5 Proof of Trust but Verify

Proof. (Sufficiency) It will be shown that the intermediary will monitor the firm at node $(u - 1, t)$ (for all $t \geq u$) only if the incentive constraint (7) binds at $(u, u)$. Assume otherwise; that is, suppose to the contrary that the incentive constraint does not bind at $(u, u)$ but that $p(u - 1, t) > 0$ for some $t \geq u$. The term $p(u - 1, t)$ shows up in only two equations in the appended version of problem (P5): in the zero-profit constraint of the intermediary (31) and on the right-hand side of the incentive constraint (7) at node $(u, u)$. Picture the Lagrangian associated with problem (P5). By setting $p(u - 1, t) = 0$, profits to the intermediary can be increased through the zero-profit constraint (31). This raises the value of the Lagrangian. At the same time, it will have no impact on the maximum problem through the incentive constraint (7) because its multiplier is zero. Therefore, the value of Lagrangian can be raised, a contradiction.

(Necessity) Assume that the incentive constraint (7) binds at $(u, u)$ and that $p(u - 1, t) = 0$ for some $t \geq u$. Note that the marginal cost of monitoring is zero at node $(u - 1, t)$ since $C_1(0, k(u - 1, t)) = 0$. Now increase $p(u - 1, t)$ slightly. This relaxes the incentive constraint and thereby increases the value of the Lagrangian. It has no impact on the zero-profit condition (31) as $C_1(0, k(u - 1, t)) = 0$. This implies a contradiction because the value of the Lagrangian will increase. ■

16.6 Proof of Backloading: Lemmas 3 and 4

Proof. (Lemma 4, with Lemma 3 a special case) Consider the no-retention constraint (12) at node $(s, s + 1)$. Here a stall has just occurred. To satisfy the no-retention constraint at this
point the present value of the payments to the firm from there onward must be at least as large as
\[ \psi \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha \Pr(s, j). \] This is what the firm can take by exercising its retention option. This payment, which is necessary, should be made at node \((s, T)\). Thus, at node \((s, T)\) pay the amount
\[ N(s, T) = \psi \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha \Pr(s, j) / [\beta^T \Pr(s, T)]. \] Shifting the retention payments along the path \((s, s + 1), (s, s + 2), \cdots, (s, T - 1)\) to the node \((s, T)\), by increasing \(x(s, s + 1), x(s, s + 2), \cdots, x(s, T - 1)\) and lowering \(x(s, T)\), helps with incentives. It reduces the right-hand side of the incentive constraint \((7)\) at node \((s + 1, s + 1)\). This occurs because the firm will not receive the retention payment if it is caught lying at some node \((s, s + j)\) for \(j > 1\). It has no impact on the right-hand side at other nodes along the diagonal. This shift does affect the left-hand side of \((7)\), for \(u < s + 1\), and increases it, for \(u \geq s + 1\). Moreover, if the payments are set according to \((2)\) in the lemma, it follows by construction that the no-retention constraint \((12)\) holds at all nodes \((s, t)\), for \(t \geq s + 1\). It is not beneficial to pay a retention payment bigger than \(N(s, T) = \psi \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha \Pr(s, j) / [\beta^T \Pr(s, T)]\), as will be discussed.

Suppose that \(x(s, t) < \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha\) at some node \((s, t)\), for \(s \leq t < T\). It will be established that by setting \(x(s, t) = \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha\) the incentive constraint \((7)\) can be (weakly) relaxed. Suppose \(t = s\). Then, increase \(x(s, s)\) by \(\theta_s k(s, s)^{\alpha - x(s, s)}\) and reduce \(x(S, T)\) by \([\theta_s k(s, s)^{\alpha - x(s, s)}][\beta^{s-T} \Pr(s, s) / \Pr(S, T)]\). In other words, shift the payment to the firm from node \((s, s)\) to node \((S, T)\) while keeping its present value constant. The left-hand sides of the incentive constraints \((7)\), for \(u \leq s\), will remain unchanged. For \(u > s\), the left-hand sides will increase. The right-hand sides of the incentive constraints will remain constant, however. Thus, this change will help relax any binding incentive constraints. This shift also helps with the no-retention constraints \((13)\) for \(u > s\). Next, suppose that \(s < t < T\). Presume that a retention payment is made at \((s, T)\) in the amount \(N(s, T)\), as specified by \((14)\). It was argued above that a payment of at least this size must be made at node \((s, T)\) to prevent retention at node \((s, s + 1)\). It will be argued below that it is not beneficial to pay a higher amount. For the off-diagonal node \((s, t)\), raise \(x(s, t)\) by \(\theta_s k(s, t)^{\alpha - x(s, t)}\) and reduce \(x(S, T)\) by \([\theta_s k(s, s)^{\alpha - x(s, t)}][\beta^{s-T} \Pr(s, t) / \Pr(S, T)]\). This change can only increase the left-hand side of the incentive constraints for \(u > s\) and has no impact elsewhere. It reduces the right-hand side at node \((s, s)\). The right-hand sides elsewhere are unaffected. This change also helps with the no-retention constraints \((13)\) for \(u > s\). Finally, consider the node \((s, T)\), for \(s < S\). A similar line
of argument can be employed to show that is not optimal to set \( x(s, T) < \theta_s k(s, T)^\alpha - N(s, T) \); that is, to pay a retention payment bigger than \( N(s, T) \). ■

**Corollary 2** (Lemma 3) If \( \psi = 0 \), then \( x(s, T) = 0 \); that is, it is weakly efficient to take all of a firm’s output at every node but \((S, T)\). Thus, Lemma 3 is a special case of Lemma 4.

### 16.7 Proof of Efficient Investment

**Proof.** The first step is to define the first-best allocation. The first-best allocation for working capital solves the following problem:

\[
\max_{\{k(s, t)\}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t \left[ \theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha - qk(s, t) \right] \Pr(s, t) \right\} - \phi,
\]

subject to the information and irreversibility constraints, (8) and (9). Now, \( k(s, t) = k(s, s + 1) = k(s + 1, s + 1) \) for all \( t > s \), by the information and irreversibility constraints. This allows the above problem to be recast as

\[
\max_{\{k(s, s+1)\}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S-1\}} \beta^t \left[ \theta_s k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - qk(s, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s, t) \right. \\
\left. + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s+1} \left[ \theta_{s+1} k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - qk(s, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) \right\} - \phi.
\]

Focus on some \( k(s, s + 1) \). It will show up in the top line of the objective function whenever \( t \geq s + 1 \). The first-order condition for \( k(s, s + 1) \) that is connected with this problem reads

\[
\sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \left[ \alpha \theta_s k(s, s + 1)^{\alpha-1} - q \right] \Pr(s, t) + \beta^{s+1} \left[ \alpha \theta_{s+1} k(s, s + 1)^{\alpha-1} - q \right] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) = 0.
\]

For the second step, focus on the appended version of problem (P5). Now, using the information, irreversibility, and zero-profit constraints, (8), (9), and (31), in conjunction with the solution for the \( x(s, t) \)’s presented in Lemma 4, the contracting problem can be rewritten as

\[
\max_{\{k(s, s+1), p(s, t)\}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S-1\}} \beta^t \left[ \theta_s k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - C(p(s, t), k(s, s + 1)) - qk(s, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s, t) \right. \\
\left. + \sum_{s=0}^{S-1} \beta^{s+1} \left[ \theta_{s+1} k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - C(p(s + 1, s + 1), k(s, s + 1)) - qk(s, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) \right\} - \phi,
\]
subject to the $2S$ incentive and diagonal-node no-retention constraints:

$$
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \beta^t \sum_{s=u}^{\min\{t,S-1\}} [\theta_s k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - C(p(s, t), k(s, s + 1)) - qk(s, s + 1)] \Pr(s, t)
$$

$$
+ \sum_{s=u-1}^{S-1} \beta^{s+1} [\theta_{s+1} k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - C(p(s + 1, s + 1), k(s, s + 1)) - qk(s, s + 1)] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) - \phi
$$

$$
- \sum_{s=u}^{u-1} \psi \theta_s k(s, s + 1)^\alpha \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \Pr(s, t)
$$

$$
\geq k(u-1,u)^\alpha \left\{ \sum_{i=u}^{S} (\theta_i - \theta_{u-1}) \left\{ \sum_{j=i}^{T} \beta^j \Pr(i, j) \prod_{n=u}^{j} [1 - p(u-1, n)] \right\} + \beta^T \Pr(i, T) \prod_{n=u}^{T} [1 - p(u-1, n)] \left\{ \sum_{u=1}^{S} \beta^t \Pr(u-1, t) \right\} \right\},
$$

and

$$
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \beta^t \sum_{s=u}^{\min\{t,S-1\}} [\theta_s k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - C(p(s, t), k(s, s + 1)) - qk(s, s + 1)] \Pr(s, t)
$$

$$
+ \sum_{s=u-1}^{S-1} \beta^{s+1} [\theta_{s+1} k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - C(p(s + 1, s + 1), k(s, s + 1)) - qk(s, s + 1)] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) - \phi
$$

$$
- \sum_{s=u}^{u-1} \psi \theta_s k(s, s + 1)^\alpha \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \Pr(s, t)
$$

$$
\geq \psi k(u-1,u)^\alpha \sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min\{t,S-1\}} \beta^t \theta_s \Pr(s, t),
$$

for $u = 1, \ldots, S$. Let $\iota_u$ and $\nu_u$ represent the multipliers attached to the $u$th incentive and diagonal-node no-retention constraints, respectively. Now suppose that after some diagonal node $(t^*, t^*)$ that neither the incentive nor diagonal-node no-retention constraints ever bind again; that is, let $(t^*, t^*)$ be the last diagonal node at which one or both of incentive and no-retention constraints bind. Consider one of the incentive or no-retention constraints up to and including node $(t^*, t^*)$. The variable $k(s, s + 1)$ will not show up on the right-hand side of any of these constraints. Examine the left-hand side. The variable $k(s, s + 1)$ appears in the first line whenever $t \geq s + 1$. It does not appear in the third line because $s \leq u - 1$. 

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Therefore, the first-order condition for \( k(s, s + 1) \) is

\[
[1 + \sum_{j=1}^{t^*} (t_j + \nu_j)] \left\{ \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \left[ \alpha \theta_{s} k(s, s + 1)^{\alpha - 1} - q \right] \Pr(s, t) \right. \\
+ \beta^{s+1} \left[ \alpha \theta_{s+1} k(s, s + 1)^{\alpha - 1} - q \right] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) \right\} = 0, 
\]

for \( s \geq t^* \). Recall that \( p(s, t) = 0 \) whenever the incentive constraint does not bind by Lemma 2, so that \( C_2(0, k(s, s + 1)) = 0 \).

Turn to the last step. Divide the above first-order condition by \( 1 + \sum_{j=1}^{t^*} (t_j + \nu_j) \). It now coincides with the one for the planner’s problem. Thus, investment is efficient. ■

### 16.8 Efficient Self-Financing

**Proof.** Let \( k^*(s, t) \) denote the allocations that are associated with the efficient investment plan. Set \( \hat{f} \) to

\[
\hat{f} = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min(t, S)} \beta^{t} k^*(s, t) \Pr(s, t) + \phi. 
\]

It will be shown that the efficient allocation is optimal when \( f = \hat{f} \). To see this, set

\[
x(s, t) = p(s, t) = 0. 
\]

This plan for the \( p(s, t) \)'s and \( x(s, t) \)'s will satisfy the incentive constraints and limited liability constraints. The zero-profit constraint is also satisfied because the amount that the intermediary initially receives from the entrepreneur, \( \hat{f} \), covers the expected discounted cost of the project. The information and irreversibility constraints are satisfied by construction. The expected discounted return to the firm is

\[
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min(t, S)} \beta^{t} \theta_{s} k^*(s, t)^{\alpha} \Pr(s, t) - \hat{f}, 
\]

which is of course the level of expected discounted profits occurring in the first-best allocation. Essentially, the firm is turning over to the intermediary sufficient funds to finance the present value of investments. The firm can then keep the resulting cash flow. ■

**Remark 3** The efficient allocation may be supported at lower levels of self-financed start-up funding than \( \hat{f} \).
16.9 Proof of Technology Switching

**Proof.** If at some level of wealth $f_{\tau,v}$ the more advanced technology $v$ is not preferred to technology $\tau$, then

$$v(f_{\tau,v}; v) - v(f_{\tau,v}; \tau) < 0.$$ 

By the previous lemma, at the level of wealth, $\hat{f}_v$, the more advanced technology delivers the first-best level of expected discounted profits. This cannot be replicated by technology $\tau$. Hence,

$$v(\hat{f}_v; v) - v(\hat{f}_v; \tau) > 0.$$ 

Now, $v(f; \tau)$ is continuous in $f$ for $\tau$ and $v$. By the intermediate value theorem there exists at least one threshold level of wealth, $f^*_{\tau,v} \in [f_{\tau,v}, \hat{f}_v]$, such that

$$v(f^*_{\tau,v}; v) - v(f^*_{\tau,v}; \tau) = 0.$$ 

Thus, the function $v(f; v) - v(f; \tau)$ must cross 0 at least once. Now pick

$$\mathcal{F}_{\tau,v} = \{f : v(f; v) - v(f; \tau) > 0\}.$$ (32)


16.10 Proof of Coexisting Technologies

**Proof.** Suppose that at some level of self-financed start-up funds, $f$, a firm picks technology, $\tau^*$, in line with (15). Now, consider some more advanced technology $v > \tau^*$. The firm will prefer $v$ to $\tau^*$ whenever $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\tau^*, v}$, where $\mathcal{F}_{\tau^*, v}$ is defined by (32). Technology $v$ may not maximize $v(f; \tau)$. Denote the optimal technology by $v^*$; note $v^* \neq \tau^*$ since $v^*$ is preferred to $v$, which in turn is preferred to $\tau^*$. Pick any $f' \in \mathcal{F}_{\tau,v}$. Let $v^*$ be the optimal technology that is associated with this level of start-up funding. Then, the technologies $\tau^*$ and $v^*$ will coexist whenever there are entrepreneurs with the start-up funds $f$ and $f'$.

17 Appendix: Short-term Contracts

In what follows assume that an entrepreneur has no start-up wealth; i.e., $f = 0.$
17.1 The One Period Contract Problem

Consider a one-period contract between the entrepreneur and the intermediary at a diagonal node \((s, s)\) for \(s = 1, ..., S - 2\). The entrepreneur will enter state \(s\) with a certain amount of debt, \(b(s)\), inherited from the previous node \((s - 1, s - 1)\). The contract will specify: next period’s capital stock, \(k\); the level of monitoring when a stall occurs, \(p\); the payments due at nodes \((s, s+1)\) and \((s+1, s+1)\) or \([x(s, s+1), x(s+1, s+1)]\); and the continuation debt levels \([b'(s), b'(s+1)]\). To simplify the problem, the information and the irreversibility constraints on capital will be directly imposed on the problem. Let \(L_s(b(s))\) denote the payoff at diagonal node \((s, s)\), given debt level \(b(s)\). With this notation, the optimal one-period contracting problem at the diagonal node \((s, s)\) can be expressed as\(^{\text{20}}\)

\[
L_s(b(s)) = \max_{k, p, x(s+1), x(s+1), b'(s), b'(s+1), \beta^{s+1}} \left\{ \beta^{s+1} \left[ \theta_{s+1} k^\alpha - x(s + 1, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) \right. \\
+ L_{s+1}(b'(s + 1)) + \beta^{s+1} \left[ \theta_s k^\alpha - x(s, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s, s + 1) + M_s(b'(s), k) \right\},
\]

subject to

\[
\theta_{s+1} k^\alpha - x(s + 1, s + 1) \geq 0, \quad \theta_s k^\alpha - x(s, s + 1) \geq 0, \tag{33}
\]

\[
\beta^{s+1} \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) [\theta_{s+1} k^\alpha - x(s + 1, s + 1)] + L_{s+1}(b'(s + 1)) \geq (1 - p) \left\{ \beta^{s+1} \Pr(s, s + 1) [\theta_{s+1} k^\alpha - x(s, s + 1)] + J_{s+1}(b'(s), k) \right\}, \tag{34}
\]

\[
L_{s+1}(b'(s + 1)) \geq \psi \sum_{t=s+2}^{T} \sum_{j=s+1}^{S} \beta^t \Pr(j, t) \theta_j k^\alpha, \tag{35}
\]

\[
M_s(b'(s), k) \geq \psi \sum_{t=s+2}^{T} \beta^t \Pr(s, t) \theta_s k^\alpha, \tag{36}
\]

and

\[
\beta^{s+1} \left\{ [x(s + 1, s + 1) - qk] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) + [x(s, s + 1) - qk] \Pr(s, s + 1) \right\} \\
- qk \sum_{t=s+2}^{T} \beta^t \Pr(s, t) - \beta^{s+1} C(p, k) \Pr(s, s + 1) \geq b(s) - b'(s + 1) - b'(s). \tag{37}
\]

\(^{\text{20}}\)At the nodes \((0, 0)\) and \((S-1, S-1)\) the problem is only slightly different. At \((0, 0)\) the fixed cost \(\phi\) must be added to the zero-profit condition and at \((S-1, S-1)\) the function \(L_{S-1}\) is just the top stall path.
In the above, the functions $M_s$ and $J_{s+1}$ are defined by

$$M_s(b'(s), k) = \sum_{t=s+2}^{T} \beta^t \Pr(s, t) \theta_s k^\alpha - b'(s),$$

(38)

and

$$J_{s+1}(b'(s), k) = \sum_{t=s+2}^{T} \sum_{j=s+1}^{S} \beta^t \Pr(j, t) \theta_j k^\alpha - b'(s).$$

(39)

Here $M_s(b'(s), k)$ represents the payoff (from period $t+2$ on) at stall node $(s, s+1)$, given debt level $b'(s)$ and irreversible capital level $k$. The function $J_{s+1}(b'(s), k)$ gives the expected payoff (from period $t+2$ on) from lying at node $(s+1, s+1)$ and claiming to be at node $(s, s+1)$. Note that $b(s), b'(s), b'(s+1), J_{s+1}(b'(s), k), L_s(b(s))$, and $M_s(b'(s), k)$ are all denominated in terms of expected period-0 output, an innocuous normalization. Equation (34) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the one-period contract. The retention constraints for the diagonal and off-diagonals are given by (35) and (36). Equation (37) is the current period zero-profit constraint. Last, in constructing the functions $M$ and $J$ the timing of payments after the stall node $(s, s+1)$ does not matter for the incentive compatibility constraint since monitoring is done only at node $(s, s+1)$. However, because of the retention constraint backloading is still (weakly) efficient.

17.2 The Long-Term Contract Problem with One Period Monitoring

Consider the long-term contract problem (P7) where monitoring is allowed only at the node $(s, s+1)$ where a stall is first declared. This problem is

$$v = \max_{\{k(s, t), x(s, t), p(s, s+1)\}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t, S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha - x(s, t)] \Pr(s, t),$$

(P7)

subject to

$$\theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha - x(s, t) \geq 0, \text{ for } s = \{0, \cdots, \min\{t, S\}\} \text{ and all } t,$$

(40)
\begin{equation}
\sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min(t,S)} \beta^t [\theta_s k(s, t)^\alpha - x(s, t)] \Pr(s, t) \geq [1 - p(u - 1, u)] \sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min(t,S)} \beta^t [\theta_s k(u - 1, t)^\alpha - x(u - 1, t)] \Pr(s, t),
\end{equation}
for all \( u \in \{1, \ldots, S\} \),

\begin{equation}
\sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min(t,S)} \beta^t \Pr(s, t) \theta_s [k(s, t)^\alpha - \psi k(u - 1, t)^\alpha] \geq \sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=u}^{\min(t,S)} \beta^t \Pr(s, t) x(s, t),
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
(1 - \psi) \sum_{j=t}^{T} \beta^j \theta_s k(s, j)^\alpha \Pr(s, j) \geq \sum_{j=t}^{T} \beta^j \Pr(s, j) x(s, j),
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
k(t, t) = k(t - 1, t), \text{ for all } t \leq S,
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
k(s - 1, t) = k(s - 1, s), \text{ for } 1 \leq s < S \text{ and } t \geq s + 1,
\end{equation}

\begin{equation}
k(S, t) = k(S, S), \text{ for } t > S,
\end{equation}

and

\begin{equation}
\sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min(t,S)} \beta^t [x(s, t) - qk(s, t)] \Pr(s, t) - \sum_{s=0}^{S} C(p(s, s + 1), k(s, s + 1)) \Pr(s, s + 1) - \phi \geq 0.
\end{equation}

Problem (P7) resembles problem (P2) with the addition of the retention constraints. Equation (35) is the retention constraint along the diagonal and (36) is the off-diagonal analogue. There are some changes. Note how monitoring enters into the incentive compatibility and zero-profit constraints, (41) and (46).

### 17.3 Equivalence of Problems (P6) and (P7)

**Lemma 12** (Equivalence of a sequence of one-period contracts and a long-term contract with one-period monitoring) Problems (P6) and (P7) are equivalent.

**Proof.** The proof proceeds by setting up the Lagrangians associated with problems (P6) and (P7), and then demonstrating that they are equivalent. When casting these Lagrangians, the analysis will focus on the incentive compatibility and zero-profit constraints. The other
constraints can be handled in a similar manner to that shown below. Start with the long-term problem (P7) first. The Lagrangian associated this problem can be written as

\[
\mathcal{L} = \max_{\{k(s,t), x(s,t), p(s,s+1)\}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(s,t)^\alpha - x(s,t)] \Pr(s,t) \\
+ \sum_{u=1}^{S} \mu(u) \left\{ \sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(s,t)^\alpha - x(s,t)] \Pr(s,t) \\
- [1 - p(u - 1, u)] \sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(u-1,t)^\alpha - x(u-1,t)] \Pr(s,t) \right\} \\
+ \lambda \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t [x(s,t) - qk(s,t)] \Pr(s,t) - \sum_{s=0}^{S} C(p(s,s+1), k(s,s+1)) \Pr(s,s+1) - \phi \right\}.
\]

Here \(\mu(s)\) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the incentive compatibility constraint (41) at node \((s,s)\) while \(\lambda\) is the multiplier connected with the zero-profit constraint (46). The other constraints are part of the Lagrangian, of course, but are not shown for convenience. The constraints can be handled in the same manner as the two shown here.

This Lagrangian can be rearranged to yield

\[
\mathcal{L} = \max_{\{k(s,t), x(s,t), p(s,s+1)\}} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \left[ 1 + \sum_{u=1}^{S} \mu(u) \right] \beta^t [\theta_s k(s,t)^\alpha - x(s,t)] \Pr(s,t) \\
- \sum_{u=1}^{S} \mu(u) \left\{ [1 - p(u - 1, u)] \sum_{t=u}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t [\theta_s k(u-1,t)^\alpha - x(u-1,t)] \Pr(s,t) \right\} \\
+ \lambda \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \sum_{s=0}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t [x(s,t) - qk(s,t)] \Pr(s,t) - \sum_{s=0}^{S} C(p(s,s+1), k(s,s+1)) \Pr(s,s+1) - \phi \right\}.
\]

(P7)

Observe how the impact of the past incentive constraints (41) appears in the objective as a reweighting of the current payoff. This fact is exploited below. This is called the sequence problem.

Return now to the short-term contract problem (P6). Substitute out for \(M_s(b'(s), k)\) in the objective function, using (38), and for \(J_{s+1}(b'(s), k)\) in the incentive compatibility constraint,
using (39). Additionally, get rid of \( b'(s) \) in the zero-profit condition (37) by using the condition

\[
b'(s) = \sum_{t=s+2}^{T} \beta^t x(s, t) \Pr(s, t) .
\]

This condition just says that the value of the entrepreneur’s state contingent debt at the stall node \((s, s + 1)\) is equal to the discounted present value of the payments he must make.

The problem can now be reformulated as shown below where the choice variables at node \((s + 1, s + 1)\) are \( k(s + 1, s + 1), x(s + 1, s + 1), p(s, s + 1), b'(s + 1), \) and \( \{x(s, t), k(s, t)\}_{t=s+1}^T \).

\[
L_s(b(s)) = \max \beta^{s+1} [\theta_{s+1} k(s + 1, s + 1)^{\alpha} - x(s + 1, s + 1)] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) \\
+ L_{s+1}(b'(s + 1)) + \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \Pr(s, t) [\theta_s k(s, t)^{\alpha} - x(s, t)],
\]

subject to the incentive compatibility constraint at node \((s, s)\)

\[
\beta^{s+1} [\theta_{s+1} k(s + 1, s + 1)^{\alpha} - x(s + 1, s + 1)] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) + L_{s+1}(b'(s + 1)) \\
\geq [1 - p(s, s + 1)] \left\{ \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \sum_{j=s+1}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t \Pr(j, t) [\theta_j k(s, t)^{\alpha} - x(s, t)] \right\},
\]

and the current period zero-profit constraint

\[
\beta^{s+1} [x(s + 1, s + 1) - qk(s + 1, s + 1)] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) + b'(s + 1) \\
+ \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \beta^t \Pr(s, t) [x(s, t) - qk(s, t)] \\
- \beta^{s+1} C(p(s, s + 1), k(s + 1, s + 1)) \Pr(s, s + 1) \\
\geq I(s)b(s) + [1 - I(s)]\phi,
\]

where \( I(s) = 1, \) if \( s > 0, \) and \( I(s) = 0, \) if \( s = 0. \)

At the final decision node \((S - 1, S - 1)\) the form of the above problem changes slightly to

\[
L_{S-1}(b(S - 1)) = \max \sum_{t=S}^{T} \beta^t [\theta_S k(S, t)^{\alpha} - x(S, t)] \Pr(S, t) \\
+ \sum_{t=S}^{T} \beta^t [\theta_{S-1} k(S, t)^{\alpha} - x(S - 1, t)] \Pr(S - 1, t),
\]

subject to the incentive compatibility constraint at node \((S - 1, S - 1)\)

\[
\sum_{t=S}^{T} \beta^t [\theta_S k(S, t)^{\alpha} - x(S, t)] \Pr(S, t) \geq [1 - p(S - 1, S)] \sum_{t=S}^{T} \beta^t [\theta_S k(S, t)^{\alpha} - x(S - 1, t)] \Pr(S, t),
\]

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and the current period zero-profit constraint
\[
\sum_{t=S}^{T} \beta^t [x(S, t) - qk(S, t)] \Pr(S, t) + \sum_{t=S}^{T} \beta^t [x(S - 1, t) - qk(S, t)] \Pr(S - 1, t)
\]
\[
- \beta^S C(p(S - 1, S), k(S, S) \Pr(S - 1, S) \geq b(S - 1).
\]

The above two problems are jointly dubbed the recursive problem.

To show that the solution to the recursive problem is the same as that of the sequence problem (P7), multiply everything in the Lagrangian for the recursive problem at node \((s, s)\) by the constant \([1 + \sum_{j=0}^{s-1} \mu(j)].\) This does not change the solution.\(^{21}\) The new recursive problem appears as

\[
\mathcal{L}(s, b(s)) = [1 + \sum_{j=0}^{s-1} \mu(j)] \max \left\{ \left\{ \beta^{s+1} \left[ \theta_{s+1} k(s + 1, s + 1)^\alpha - x(s + 1, s + 1) \right] \times \Pr(s + 1, s + 1) + \beta^{s+1} \left[ \theta_s k(s, s + 1)^\alpha - x(s, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s, s + 1) \right\}
\]
\[
+ L_{s+1}(b'(s + 1)) \right\} + [1 + \sum_{j=1}^{s-1} \mu(j)] \tilde{\mu}(s + 1) \left\{ \beta^{s+1} \left[ \theta_{s+1} k(s + 1, s + 1)^\alpha - x(s + 1, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1)
\]
\[
+ L_{s+1}(b'(s + 1)) - [1 - p(s, s + 1)] \sum_{t=s+1}^{T} \sum_{j=s+1}^{\min(t, S)} \beta^t \left[ \theta_j k(s, t)^\alpha - x(s, t) \right] \Pr(s + 1, t) \right\}
\]
\[
+ [1 + \sum_{j=1}^{s-1} \mu(j)] \tilde{\lambda}(s) \left\{ \beta^{s+1} \left[ x(s + 1, s + 1) - qk(s + 1, s + 1) \right] \Pr(s + 1, s + 1)
\]
\[
+ b'(s + 1) \right\} - I(s) b(s) - [1 - I(s)] \phi \right\}. \tag{P8}
\]

\(^{21}\) Consider \(\max_x F(x),\) subject to \(G(x) \geq 0.\) The Lagrangian is given by \(L = \max_x \min_{\phi} \{F(x) + a \times G(x)\}.\) Assume \(\bar{x}\) and \(\bar{a}\) are solutions to \(L.\) Now, think about the slightly transformed problem given by \(L = \max_x \min_{\phi} \{b \times F(x) + a \times G(x)\},\) where \(b > 0.\) It follows that \(\bar{x} = b \times \bar{a}\) are solutions to this problem, since if \(F'(\bar{x}) + \bar{a} \times G'(\bar{x}) = 0,\) then \(b \times [F'(\bar{x}) + \bar{a} \times G'(\bar{x})] = 0.\)
For the final problem at node \((S - 1, S - 1)\), an analogous problem is constructed using the different form of the recursive problem \(L_{S-1}(b(S - 1))\).

Consider the allocation \(\{k(s, t), x(s, t), p(s, s + 1)\}\) that solves the sequence problem \((P7)\) and let

\[
b'(s + 1) = \sum_{t=s+2}^{T} \sum_{j=s+1}^{\min\{t,S\}} \beta^t x(j, t) \Pr(j, t).
\]

Does this allocation solve the recursive problem \((P8)\)? Yes. To see this, set the new Lagrange multipliers as:

\[
\hat{\mu}(s) = \frac{\mu(s)}{[1 + \sum_{j=1}^{s-1} \mu(j)]} \quad \text{(47)}
\]

and

\[
\hat{\lambda}(s) = \frac{\lambda}{[1 + \sum_{j=1}^{s-1} \mu(j)]}. \quad \text{(48)}
\]

Given the relationship across the multipliers, the first-order conditions for the two problems will be exactly the same.

Note also that the allocation variables \(\{k(s, t), x(s, t), p(s, s + 1)\}\) solving the sequence problem \((P7)\) also satisfy all the current period zero-profit conditions \((37)\) in the recursive problems \((P6)\). To see this, use the current period zero-profit condition \((37)\) holding as an equality starting from the first period to solve out for debt level for next period, \(b'(1)\). Move forward recursively in time and solve out for all the debt levels in a similar manner. Then, by construction, all the current period zero-profit conditions \((37)\) will be satisfied until \(S - 2\). Finally, the terminal zero-profit condition at \(S - 1\) is also satisfied because this allocation solves the sequence problem \((P7)\), so it satisfies the zero profit constraint \((46)\).

One last detail needs to be filled in. Recall that in the recursive problem \(b'(s + 1)\) is also a choice variable. The first-order condition in \((P8)\) associated with this variable is

\[
\frac{dL_{s+1}(b'(s + 1))}{db'(s + 1)} [1 + \hat{\mu}(s)] + \hat{\lambda}(s) = 0.
\]

Also, note that

\[
\frac{dL_s(b(s))}{db(s)} = -\hat{\lambda}(s),
\]

which implies

\[
\frac{\hat{\lambda}(s)}{\hat{\lambda}(s + 1)} = 1 + \hat{\mu}(s).
\]
Is efficiency condition consistent with the relationships across the multipliers? The answer is yes. To see this, observe from (48)

\[
\frac{\widehat{\lambda}(s)}{\lambda(s + 1)} = \frac{1 + \sum_{j=1}^{s} \mu(j)}{1 + \sum_{j=1}^{s-1} \mu(j)} = 1 + \frac{\mu(s)}{1 + \sum_{j=1}^{s-1} \mu(j)}.
\]

Using (47), this can be written as

\[
\frac{\widehat{\lambda}(s)}{\lambda(s + 1)} = 1 + \widehat{\mu}(s),
\]

which is the efficiency condition for \(b'(s + 1)\). □

18 Appendix: Data

18.1 Section 2

The data used for real GDP and TFP are derived from Penn World Table 8. For each country an average value for these series is calculated from 1995 on. The information variable is the FACTOR1 series presented in Bushman et al. (2004, Appendix B). Three series from the World Bank’s Doing Business database are aggregated using factor analysis to obtain an index for the cost of enforcing contracts. The series are time (days), cost (% of claims), and procedures (number). For each country an average of these series was taken from 2003 on. Last, the series on financial development are taken from the World Bank’s Global Financial Development dataset. The series used for “findev” is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (%). Here an average from 2005 on is taken. Three other series were also entered as the additional third variable in the regression: viz, firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint (%), loans requiring collateral (%), value of collateral needed for a loan (% of the loan amount). These series had no predictive power in the regressions (albeit they reduced the sample size) and so are omitted from the reporting.

18.2 Table 3

Average establishment size. Data for average establishment size are from different sources for each country. (i) The number for India is based on information obtained from two sources:
the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) for 2007-08, which gathers data on formal sector manufacturing plants, and the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) for 2005-06, which collects data on informal sector manufacturing establishments. (ii) The figure for Mexico is calculated using data from Mexico’s 2004 Economic Census conducted by INEGI. (iii) The number for the United States is derived from figures published in the 2002 Economic Census published by the U.S. Census Bureau.

18.3 Figure 6

A special request was made to obtain these data. Data for the United States are from the 2002 Economic Census published by the U.S. Census Bureau. They can be obtained using the U.S. Census Bureau’s FactFinder. These are businesses that have no paid employees but are subject to federal income tax in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Establishment Size</th>
<th>Raw Data</th>
<th>Cumulative Share</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Est</td>
<td>Empl</td>
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<tr>
<td>All establishments</td>
<td>350,828</td>
<td>14,699,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 to 4 employees</td>
<td>141,992</td>
<td>279,481</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 to 9</td>
<td>49,284</td>
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<td>20 to 49</td>
<td>51,660</td>
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<td>50 to 99</td>
<td>25,883</td>
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<td>100 to 249</td>
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<td>250 to 499</td>
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<td>500 to 999</td>
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<td>1,000 to 2,499</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>1,494,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500 or more</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1,131,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean establishment size</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18.4 Figure 7

The data for India, Mexico, and the United States displayed in Figure 7 are from Hsieh and Klenow (2014). The table below shows the statistics used to construct Figure 7.
### Hsieh and Klenow (2014) Facts

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<td>0.280</td>
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<td>10-14</td>
<td>0.115</td>
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<td>15-19</td>
<td>0.092</td>
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<td>20-24</td>
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<tr>
<td>&gt;39</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 19 Appendix: Some Two-Period Examples

Some simple two-period examples illustrating the contracting setup are presented here. They show how the structure of the productivity profile and the size of the fixed cost connected with a blueprint influence the form of the contract. They also demonstrate the importance that monitoring, retention, and self-financing play in the design of a contract. Last, a connection is drawn between the productivity ladder and survival probabilities, on the one hand, and the aggregate distribution of employment by plant age, on the other.

In all examples, a blueprint, $\mathbf{b}$, is described by the quadruple $\mathbf{b} \equiv \{\theta_0 = 0, \theta_1 > 0, \theta_2 \geq \theta_1, \phi \geq 0\}$. Output is produced in accordance with the Leontief production function $o = \min \{\theta, k\}$. The cost of the amalgamated input, $q$, is set to zero.

### 19.1 The Importance of Monitoring and Self-Financed Start-Up Funds

The first example focuses on the importance of monitoring and self-finance. To this end, let the cost of monitoring be *prohibitive* and abstract away from the issue of retention; in particular, set $z = \psi = 0$. A venture’s survival is guaranteed, implying $\sigma = 1$. Therefore, a project is financed only when a feasible backloading strategy exists. This strategy must induce the firm to repay the intermediary enough to cover the fixed cost of the venture. The entrepreneur has $f$ in self-financed start-up funds, which he can contribute to financing the project. Therefore, assume $f < \phi$. The entrepreneur turns all of his funds over to the intermediary at the start.
of the venture.

The first-best production allocation is very easy to compute in the example. Simply set \( k(0, 1) = k(1, 1) = k(0, 2) = \theta_1 \) and \( k(1, 2) = k(2, 2) = \theta_2 \). As a result, the first-best expected profit, \( \pi \), from implementing the blueprint is

\[
\pi \equiv \beta \rho \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho^2 \theta_2 - \phi.
\]

Now, focus on the set of blueprints, \( B \), that potentially yield some first-best expected level of profits, \( \pi \):

\[
B(\pi) \equiv \{ \theta_0 = 0, \theta_1 > 0, \theta_2 \geq \theta_1, \phi \geq 0, \beta \rho \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho^2 \theta_2 - \phi = \pi \}.
\]

Which blueprints \( b \in B(\pi) \) can actually attain the first-best level of expected profits, \( \pi \)?

Because monitoring is prohibitively expensive, backloading is the only way to satisfy the incentive constraints at nodes \((2, 2)\) and \((1, 1)\). Backloading implies that the firm receives a return of \((\pi + f)/(\beta^2 \rho^2)\) at node \((2, 2)\) and nothing elsewhere. (Recall that the intermediary earns zero profits.) If the firm reports \( \theta_1 \) at node \((2, 2)\), or lies, it can pocket \( \theta_2 - \theta_1 \). Hence, satisfying the incentive constraint at node \((2, 2)\) requires that \((\pi + f)/(\beta^2 \rho^2) \geq \theta_2 - \theta_1\) or

\[
\theta_2 \leq \theta_1 + (\pi + f)/(\beta^2 \rho^2).
\] (49)

Observe that backloading will work only when the total expected payoff of the project is not too concentrated on the highest productivity state, \( \theta_2 \). Or, in other words, the productivity profile cannot be too convex.

Next, consider the incentive constraint at node \((1, 1)\). By misreporting \( \theta \) at this node, the firm can guarantee itself \( \theta_1 - \theta_0 = \theta_1 \) in both periods 1 and 2. By declaring a stall, however, its capital stock will be locked in at \( \theta_1 \), in accord with the irreversibility constraint (9). Satisfying the incentive constraint at this node therefore requires that the expected payoff from truthfully reporting \( \theta = \theta_1 \), in the hope of reaching node \((2, 2)\) and receiving \((\pi + f)/(\beta^2 \rho^2)\), dominates the payoff from lying and claiming \( \theta = \theta_0 = 0 \). Thus, it must transpire that \( \pi + f \geq \beta \rho \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho \theta_1 \), implying that

\[
\theta_1 \leq (\pi + f)/[(1 + \beta)(\rho \beta)].
\] (50)

Hence, when \( \theta_1 \) is large relative to the project’s expected profits, \( \pi \), it pays for the firm to lie in the first period. The first-best allocation cannot be supported.
There are two additional constraints to consider. First, \( \theta_1 \leq \theta_2 \), by assumption. Second, recall that \( \phi \geq 0 \). This implies the restriction \( \beta \rho \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho^2 \theta_2 - \pi \geq 0 \), which can be rewritten as

\[
\theta_2 \geq \frac{\pi}{(\beta^2 \rho^2)} - \frac{\beta \rho [1 + \beta (1 - \rho)]}{(\beta^2 \rho^2)} \theta_1. \tag{51}
\]

To understand the impact of variations in the fixed cost, set \( \phi = 0 \). It is a simple matter to show that both incentive constraints must hold. In this situation, all of the returns from the project will be given to the firm. The payoff from lying arises solely from the possibility of evading the fixed cost. As \( \phi \) increases, the first-best gross profits of the blueprint, \( \beta \rho \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \theta_1 + \beta^2 \rho^2 \theta_2 \), rise to keep net profits constant. A larger fraction of the gross profits must be paid back to the intermediary to cover the fixed cost. This makes it harder to satisfy the incentive constraints.

The right panel of Figure 12 plots the two incentive constraints (49) and (50), the 45-degree line, and the fixed-cost constraint (51). The shaded quadrilateral illustrates the values of \( \theta_1 \) and \( \theta_2 \) where the first-best allocation can be implemented using a backloading strategy, given the four constraints. Again, a high value of \( \theta_1 \) will cause the node \((1, 1)\) incentive constraint to bind. Why? When \( \theta_1 \) is high, then either \( \theta_2 \) must be relatively small or \( \phi \) relatively large to maintain the fixed level of profits, \( \pi \). It pays for the firm to lie at node \((1, 1)\) when \( k(1, 1) = \theta_1 \). Likewise, when \( \theta_2 \) is large, the incentive constraint at node \((2, 2)\) will bite. The left panel shows how the two incentive constraints shift inward as the funds that the firm can use for self-financing shrink. The case where \( f = 0 \) is plotted in the diagram. The set of implementable first-best allocations shrinks from the quadrilateral to the triangle. With self-financing the intermediary funds a smaller fraction of the fixed cost, which reduces the incentive for the firm to lie.

Consider a point, such as \( A \), where \( \theta_1 = \theta_2 \). In this case, the incentive constraint (50) collapses to \( \theta_1 \leq \theta_1 - (\phi - f)/[(1 + \beta)(\rho \beta)] \). Then, the first-best allocation cannot be supported if \( \phi > f \); that is, when the project cannot be fully self-financed. Hence, the implication of this constraint is that the first-best payoff from the project cannot be supported when the productivity profile is too concave—that is, when \( \theta_2 \) is close in value to \( \theta_1 \). Thus, second-best allocations must be entertained. A contract can be written that supports a second-best allocation, provided that \( \phi - f < \pi \beta/(1 + \beta) \); this condition is explained below. Interestingly,
advancing the firm a level of working capital below $\theta_1$ may help to satisfy the first-period incentive compatibility constraint, so that here $k(1,1) = k(1,1) = k(0,2) < \theta_1$. This is because reducing the funding has a larger impact on the payoff to misreporting at node $(1,1)$ than it does to overall profits $\pi$, and thereby helps to generate a gradually increasing payoff profile. To see this, suppose that the firm will lie in period 1 when $\theta = \theta_1$. The expected profits from this lying strategy would be $\rho(\beta + \beta^2)k(1,1)$. Alternatively, the firm could tell the truth. Then, it will receive $\rho\beta k(1,1) + \rho^2\theta_1 - (\phi - f)$. To maintain indifference between these two strategies, set $\rho(\beta + \beta^2)k(1,1) = \rho\beta k(1,1) + \rho^2\theta_1 - (\phi - f)$. This implies $k(1,1) = \theta_1 - (\phi - f)/((\beta\rho^2) < \theta_1$. The condition that $\phi - f < \pi\beta/(1 + \beta)$ ensures that the payoff from telling the truth net of the funds used for self-finance is nonnegative, given the level of capital investment, $k(1,1)$. When $\phi - f > \pi\beta/(1 + \beta)$, it is not feasible to use such a strategy.

Finally, focus on a point such as $B$. Now, the incentive constraint at the $(2,2)$ node is violated, so that $\theta_2 \geq \theta_1 + (\pi + f)/(\beta\rho^2)$. This implies that $\theta_1 < (\phi - f)/[(\beta\rho(1 + \beta)]$. All expected profits derive solely from the return to node $(2,2)$, because the discounted expected value of the returns at nodes $(1,1)$ and $(1,2)$, or $[\beta\rho + \beta^2\rho(1 - \rho)]\theta_1$, is insufficient to cover the fixed cost net of the portion funded by the firm, $\phi - f$. Therefore, there are not enough resources available to employ a backloading strategy that will entice the firm to tell the truth at node $(2,2)$. That is, there are no profits-only losses that the intermediary can
redirect to node \( (2, 2) \) from the other nodes on the tree. The firm avoids these losses by lying. Monitoring must be used to implement such a point. If monitoring is perfectly efficient \( (z = \infty) \), then the first-best allocations can be supported at point \( B \). When monitoring is efficient, the first-best allocation can also be obtained at point \( A \). Therefore, in economies with poor monitoring the choice set for technologies is limited to those blueprints that can be implemented with backloading strategies. With better monitoring this choice set is expanded to include technologies that cannot be implemented with backloading alone.

### 19.2 Costly Cash-Flow Control

The second example focuses on how costly cash-flow control influences the design of the contract. To keep things simple, assume that the entrepreneur has no funds available for self-financing start-up costs; that is, set \( f = 0 \). All of the remaining features of the previous example are retained but now \( \psi \geq 0 \).

#### 19.2.1 The No-Retention Constraints

The firm now has the ability to retain the fraction \( \psi \) of output at any node on the ladder. The nodes \((0, 1)\) and \((0, 2)\) can be ignored because \( \theta_0 = 0 \), so there is nothing for the firm to retain here. Focus on the second period first. Suppose that the firm finds itself at node \((1, 2)\); that is, it stalls after reaching \( \theta_1 \). The firm will retain \( \psi \theta_1 \) units of output here. This event has an expected discounted value of \( \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \psi \theta_1 \). Alternatively, consider the case where the firm declares that it has reached node \((2, 2)\). Here it will receive the amount \( [\pi - \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \psi \theta_1]/(\beta^2 \rho^2) \). Note that the firm’s profits have been reduced by the necessity for the intermediary to make a retention payment at node \((2, 1)\). The firm can choose to retain the amount \( \psi \theta_2 \) at node \((2, 2)\). Thus, the no-retention constraint at node \((2, 2)\) requires that \( [\pi - \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \psi \theta_1]/(\beta^2 \rho^2) \geq \psi \theta_2 \). This can be rearranged to get

\[
\theta_2 \leq -[(1 - \rho)/\rho] \theta_1 + \pi/(\psi \beta^2 \rho^2).
\]

The line \( RC(2, 2) \) in the left panel of Figure 13 illustrates the no-retention constraint. It slopes downward.

Move back in time to period 1, specifically to node \((1, 1)\). If the firm moves to node \((2, 2)\), it will earn profits in the amount \( [\pi - \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \psi \theta_1]/(\beta^2 \rho^2) \). This occurs with probability
\( \rho \). If it moves to node \((1, 2)\), then it will receive \( \psi \theta_1 \). Therefore, its expected discounted profits from telling the truth at node \((1, 1)\) are

\[
\beta \rho [\pi - \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \psi \theta_1] / (\beta^2 \rho^2) + (1 - \rho) \beta \psi \theta_1 = \pi / (\beta \rho).
\]

If the firm decides to exercise its retention option, it will receive \((1 + \beta) \psi \theta_1 \). In this circumstance, the intermediary will not increase the working capital to \( \theta_2 \) (from \( \theta_1 \)). The period-1 no-retention constraint dictates that \( \pi / (\beta \rho) \geq (1 + \beta) \psi \theta_1 \), or that

\[
\theta_1 \leq \pi / [(1 + \beta) (\rho \beta \psi)].
\]

This is shown by the curve \( RC(1, 1) \) in the left panel of Figure 13.

### 19.2.2 The Incentive Compatibility Constraints

The incentive compatibility constraints are also affected by the firm’s ability to retain cash flow. Consider the incentive constraint at node \((2, 2)\) first. As just discussed, when the firm tells the truth, then it will receive

\[
\left[ \pi - \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \psi \theta_1 \right] / (\beta^2 \rho^2).
\]

When the firm lies, it can now pocket \( \theta_2 - \theta_1 + \psi \theta_1 \). Therefore, satisfying the period-2 incentive constraint requires that

\[
\left[ \pi - \beta^2 \rho (1 - \rho) \psi \theta_1 \right] / (\beta^2 \rho^2) \geq \theta_2 - \theta_1 + \psi \theta_1.
\]

This constraint can be rewritten as

\[
\theta_2 \leq \left[ (\rho - \psi) / \rho \right] \theta_1 + \pi / (\beta^2 \rho^2).
\]

The incentive compatibility constraint is represented in the left panel of Figure 13 by the line \( IC^\psi(2, 2) \). Note that it lies below the old curve \( IC(2, 2) \), because \( (\rho - \psi) / \rho < 1 \). In fact, it will slope down when \( \psi > \rho \).

Move back in time to node \((1, 1)\). The profits from lying will be \((1 + \beta) (\theta_1 + \psi \theta_0) = (1 + \beta) \theta_1 \), because \( \theta_0 = 0 \). As was mentioned, the expected profits from telling the truth are \( \beta \rho \pi \). Therefore, the period-1 incentive constraint is the same as before:

\[
\theta_1 \leq \pi / [(1 + \beta) (\rho \beta)].
\]

Hence, the old \( IC(1, 1) \) curve will still apply for period 1.

### 19.2.3 The Upshot

Observe that the period-1 retention constraint will be automatically satisfied when the first-period incentive constraint holds; therefore, it can be dropped from the analysis. Now, the
shaded triangle on the far left side in the left panel of Figure 13 shows those \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) combinations that satisfy the period-2 no-retention constraint, \(RC(2, 2)\), but not the incentive compatibility constraint, \(IC^\psi(2, 2)\). The \((\theta_1, \theta_2)\) combinations that satisfy \(IC^\psi(2, 2)\), but not \(RC(2, 2)\), are shown by the hatched triangle on the right. Note that the triangle on the left admits higher \(\theta_2/\theta_1\) ratios than the one on the right. Thus, the no-retention constraint does not penalize convex productivity ladders as much as the incentive constraint does. The fact that the \(IC^\psi(2, 2)\) slopes upward implies that it does not restrict the absolute sizes of \(\theta_1\) and \(\theta_2\); it is a restriction on how large \(\theta_2\) can be relative to \(\theta_1\) (for a given expected level of net profits). By contrast, along the \(RC(2, 2)\) constraint an increase in \(\theta_2\) must be met by a decrease in \(\theta_1\). If the firm can retain more cash flow in the second period, then the amount that it can retain in the first period must be decreased, so the payoff from exercising the no-retention option in the second period becomes larger (again, for a given level of expected net profits). Furthermore, the \(IC^\psi(2, 2)\) curve rotates downward as \(\psi\) rises. Thus, retention worsens the incentive problem because the payoff from lying increases when it can retain some of the output. Hence, retention further limits the ability to implement convex profiles and makes monitoring even more important.

The right panel in Figure 13 illustrates the upshot of the above analysis. Note that the \(RC(2, 2)\) constraint is located above the \(\phi > 0\) constraint, since \(\pi/(\psi \beta^2 \rho^2) \geq \pi/((\beta^2 \rho^2)\) and \(\pi/[(1 - \rho)]\beta^2 \rho > \pi/\{[1 + \beta(1 - \rho)]\beta \rho\}\). The hatched area illustrates the values of \(\theta_1\) and \(\theta_2\) where the first-best allocation can be supported using a backloading strategy. This area has shrunk due to the costly cash-flow control problem and lies within the old triangle.

### 19.3 Identifying the Productivity Ladder

The two-period example is resurrected here to illustrate the connection between the productivity ladder and survival probabilities, on the one hand, and the aggregate distribution of employment by plant age, on the other. It will be shown that in order for old firms to account for more of aggregate employment than young firms, it must transpire that \(\theta_2/\theta_1 > 1\) and that this ratio must rise with the plant death probability \(1 - \sigma\). The example illustrates how the productivity ladder can be identified in the applied analysis using data on the age distribution of employment. To see this, take the structure of the earlier examples but
Figure 13: Set of implementable first-best allocations with costly cash-flow control. The left panel portrays the no-retention constraints. The right panel shows the set of first-best allocations that can be implemented.
assume now that $\sigma \leq 1$, $z = \infty$, and $\psi = 0$; thus, a firm’s survival is not ensured, monitoring is perfect, and there is no retention. The first-best solution will obtain. Consequently, $k(0, 1) = k(1, 1) = k(0, 2) = \theta_1$ and $k(1, 2) = k(2, 2) = \theta_2$. Let $k(s, t) = \min\{k(s, t), l(s, t)\}$ so that the amount of labor used corresponds with the amount of working capital. (Note that $q = 0$ implies that $r = w = 0$.)

Employment by young and old firms in the economy is given by $\sigma \rho \theta_1$ and $\sigma^2 \rho(1 - \rho)\theta_1 + \sigma^2 \rho^2 \theta_2$. Note that $\sigma \rho \theta_1 \leq \sigma^2 \rho(1 - \rho)\theta_1 + \sigma^2 \rho^2 \theta_2$ as $\theta_1 \leq \sigma[(1 - \rho)\theta_1 + \rho \theta_2]$. Therefore, to have old firms accounting for more employment than young ones, when survival is not guaranteed ($\sigma < 1$), it must transpire that $\theta_2 > \theta_1$. In particular, it must happen that $\theta_2 > \theta_1[1-\sigma(1-\rho)]/(\sigma \rho)$, where $[1-\sigma(1-\rho)]/(\sigma \rho) > 1$ (when $\sigma < 1$). Note that $1-\sigma(1-\rho)]/(\sigma \rho)$ is decreasing in $\sigma$ so that this lower bound for $\theta_2$ will rise as $\sigma$ falls for a given value of $\theta_1$. In other words, the profile of productivity must become steeper as survival falls.

Now imagine two countries where plants have the same survival rate. Older plants can account for a higher level of employment in one of the countries only if plants there also climb a steeper productivity profile than in the other country. This consideration will be important when comparing plants in the United States with those in Mexico. Alternatively, suppose that in two countries young and old plants have the same aggregate levels of employment. Then, the country with the lower survival rate must also have a steeper productivity profile. This fact will be important when comparing India and Mexico.

References


