Lucas Meets Baumol and Tobin*

Yi Wen
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
&
Tsinghua University

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Abstract

Many issues that were traditionally analyzed using the Baumol-Tobin model can also be analyzed, perhaps more easily, using the Lucas (1980) cash-in-advance model where money serves both as a medium of exchange and as a store of value. This is illustrated by three examples (implications) of the Lucas model: (i) the velocity of money is time varying, volatile, and inflation-dependent; (ii) transitory money injections have expansionary real effects on output and employment; and (iii) the welfare cost of anticipated inflation is a couple of orders larger than the conventional estimates.

Keywords: Cash-in-Advance, Distribution of Money Demand, Velocity, Welfare Costs of Inflation.


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1 Introduction

Many important issues in applied monetary theory that have been analyzed traditionally using the Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) model can also be analyzed, perhaps more easily, using the Lucas (1980) model. In particular, it is shown that allowing money to serve as a store of value in addition to a medium of exchange can lead to dramatically different implications of monetary policies, in contrast to standard cash-in-advance (CIA) models. These differences include the following: (i) The velocity of money is highly variable in response to environmental changes, in contrast to the findings of Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991) based on a representative-agent CIA framework. (ii) Transitory lump-sum monetary injections have expansionary effects on aggregate consumption, employment, and output. (iii) Anticipated inflation is potentially very costly: with a sufficiently strong precautionary motive for cash holdings to match the interest elasticity of aggregate money demand in the United States, households are willing to give up 10% to 15% of consumption to avoid 10% annual inflation, in sharp contrast to the findings of Cooley and Hansen (1989), Lucas (2000), and others in the literature based on the representative-agent assumption.¹

The key feature of the Lucas (1980) model, in contrast to standard CIA models, is that there exists a precautionary motive for holding money (because of uninsured idiosyncratic preference shocks) and thus a well-defined and endogenously determined distribution of money balances in equilibrium, as in the Baumol-Tobin model. All of the aforementioned implications of the Lucas model are generated through the responses of this endogenous distribution of money demand to monetary policy changes.

For example, there are three factors contributing to the large welfare cost of inflation in the Lucas model: (i) Precautionary money demand motivates agents to hold excessive amounts of cash to avoid liquidity (CIA) constraints, and agents with large money holdings suffer disproportionately more from inflation tax than do agents with smaller real balances. (ii) The fraction of the population with a binding CIA constraint increases with inflation. This especially hurts those with the greatest urge to consume and generates additional welfare costs along the extensive margin. (iii) In addition, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989), agents opt to switch from "cash" goods (consumption) to "credit" goods (leisure), thereby reducing labor supply and aggregate output. These effects together yield a much larger welfare cost of inflation compared to that in representative-agent CIA models where only the third factor operates.

However, the most crucial factor is the sensitivity of the distribution of money demand (or

¹E.g., also see Dotsey and Ireland (1996).
aggregate velocity) to policy and environmental changes. CIA constraints are effectively borrowing constraints and such constraints do not always bind. So aggregate velocity is linked to the distribution of money demand because cash-poor agents spend money more "quickly" than cash-rich agents when inflation rises and the portion of cash-poor agents also increases with inflation. This link between velocity (or the distribution of money demand) and inflation has important welfare consequences. As noted by Aiyagari (1994, 1995) and Huggett (1993, 1997) in real models, under borrowing constraints agents have strong incentives to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks through precautionary savings. Hence, in equilibrium the probability of a binding borrowing constraint, or the proportion of the liquidity-constrained population, is very small. This implies that heterogeneous consumers are sufficiently self-insured and their consumption level behaves like that of the median or representative agent. However, the same precautionary-saving mechanism works against these individuals when the chief means of saving is money, because the motive for self-insurance implies that agents opt to hold too much cash in hand to avoid a binding CIA constraint. Thus, they would be heavily taxed by inflation unless they could rapidly reduce money holdings as inflation rises. However, although reducing money demand can lower the inflation tax, it creates another cost: The portion of liquidity-constrained population increases. This raises the welfare cost of inflation along the extensive margin because liquidity-constrained agents must face a higher variance of consumption than nonconstrained agents.²

The aggregate economy reacts positively to transitory monetary shocks because monetary injections stimulate consumption for liquidity-constrained individuals but not for cash-rich agents; thus, the aggregate price level does not move one for one with aggregate money supply. In addition, under precautionary saving motives, money demand will increase more than proportionately with consumption, which induces labor supply to rise so that income can increase sufficiently to satisfy both the higher consumption and the higher money demand. These together imply that the aggregate price level appears "sticky", the velocity of money is countercyclical (because aggregate money demand rises more than consumption), and money has expansionary effects on aggregate employment and output.³ This is in sharp contrast to representative-agent CIA models where the velocity is constant, prices move nearly one for one with money injections, and monetary shocks are contractionary.⁴

Since the original Lucas (1980) model is not analytically tractable under standard constant-

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²Imrohoroglu (1992) noted that a similar mechanism in the Bewley (1980) model can lead to a large welfare cost of inflation. However, the fraction of the population with a binding liquidity constraint is fixed in her model, leading to a smaller welfare cost of inflation than is implied by this model. See Wen (2009) for more discussions on this issue.

³Based on a Baumol-Tobin inventory-theoretic model with heterogeneous money demand, Alvarez, Atkeson, and Edmond (2008) also noted that velocity is countercyclical and aggregate price is "sticky" under monetary shocks.

relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) utility functions, representative-agent versions of this model are routinely used in the literature for monetary-policy and business-cycle analyses (see, e.g., Lucas, 1984; Lucas and Stokey, 1987; and Cooley and Hansen, 1989; among many others). However, under indivisible labor (or quasi-linear preferences), the Lucas (1980) model can be made analytically tractable and the equilibrium distribution of money demand can be characterized by closed forms. Consequently, both the short-run and long-run implications of monetary policies can be examined by standard solution methods available in the real-business-cycle (RBC) literature without the need to rely on numerical methods (such as Krusell and Smith, 1998). Analytical tractability not only reduces computational costs but also makes the model’s mechanisms transparent.

In a separate paper (Wen, 2009), I study welfare implications of monetary policies in a generalized Bewley (1980) model where money serves solely as a store of value and is not required as a medium of exchange. There I show that anticipated inflation can also be extremely costly when the model is calibrated to match the distribution of household money demand in the data. The major differences between Wen (2009) and this paper include the following: (i) A monetary equilibrium does not always exist in the model of Wen (2009) especially if the rate of inflation is sufficiently high, whereas agents must hold money for transaction purposes in the Lucas (1980) economy even under hyperinflation. (ii) The velocity of money can be infinity in a Bewley economy but bounded above by unity in the Lucas (1980) economy. In addition, Wen (2009) considers idiosyncratic wealth shocks, which are more difficult to self-insure than preference shocks. For these differences, there is no a priori reason to expect the implications of monetary policies be the same in the two economies. An independent methodological contribution of this paper is to make the Lucas (1980) model analytically tractable.

This paper is also related to a recent strand of the monetary literature that studies the welfare implications of inflation in heterogeneous-agent models with incomplete markets and borrowing constraints. In particular, Algan and Ragot (2010) show that the long-run neutrality of inflation on capital accumulation obtained in complete market models no longer holds when households face binding credit constraints. In their model, borrowing-constrained households are not able to rebalance their financial portfolio when inflation varies, and thus adjust their money holdings differently compared to unconstrained households. This heterogeneity leads to a precautionary savings motive, which implies that inflation increases capital accumulation, à la Aiyagari (1994). A fundamental modeling difference between Algan and Ragot (2010) and this paper is that they derive money demand by assuming money in the utility function. In addition, the asset that

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5It is noted by Stokey and Lucas (1989, ch13.6-7) that the Lucas model is analytically tractable with a linear utility function in consumption. In this paper, I follow Wen (2009) and consider CRRA utility functions (e.g., log utility).

provides self-insurance in their model is capital, instead of money (as in this paper).

In many aspects my model may appear isomorphic to the search model of Lagos and Wright (LW, 2005) for the following reasons: (i) My model assumes quasi-linear preferences to achieve analytical tractability. (ii) My model has two subperiods in every time period—labor supply and capital investment are determined in the first subperiod and money demand and consumption are determined in the second subperiod. (iii) LW also find much larger welfare cost of inflation then the representative-agent monetary literature (e.g., Cooley and Hansen, 1989; Lucas, 2000). But the similarities may be more superficial than substantive. First and most importantly, the motives for holding money are fundamentally different in the two models. There is no lack of double coincidence (or search friction) in my model, which is the key physical environment in LW to motivate money demand as a medium of exchange. In contrast, even though CIA constraints are imposed, the main function of money in my model is a store of value that provides self insurance against idiosyncratic shocks (as in Bewley, 1980; Svensson, 1985). Consequently, all trades take place in centralized markets and there is no need to assume consumers to have two utility functions in the two subperiods (which is the case in LW). Second, there exists a well defined and analytically tractable distribution of money holdings in my model, whereas money distribution in the LW model is not analytically tractable without a sequential centralized market and it becomes degenerate under quasi-linear preferences. Third, my model has a standard neoclassical DSGE environment with capital accumulation whereas capital is absent in the LW model. Because of these differences, there is no reason to expect a priori that the two models generate similar results. As emphasized by LW, search frictions are critical to obtaining their large welfare results; yet the welfare cost of inflation in my model is several times larger than found in LW. Nonetheless, in many aspects one may re-interpret the model as a stochastic version of the LW model with anonymous centralized trading in both the first and second sub-periods. Since not much work has been done to study quantitatively the short-run dynamics in the LW model, not all of the results in the two papers are directly comparable and it remains an interesting research topic to formally establish the equivalence of the two models.\footnote{A recent literature has extended the LW framework to incorporate capital accumulation and uninsured idiosyncratic risk. See, e.g., Aruoba and Wright (2003) and Aruoba, Waller, and Wright (2009) for how to introduce neoclassical firms and capital accumulation into the LW framework, and Telykova and Visschers (2009) for how to introduce uninsured idiosyncratic uncertainty (and the literature therein).}

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model and shows how to obtain closed-form decision rules for money demand at the individual level. Section 3 characterizes general equilibrium. Section 4 presents a representative-agent version of the model (as the control model) to further highlight the critical role played by the distribution of money demand. The implications of heterogeneity are studied and compared with those of the control model in Sections 5 through 8. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 The Model

2.1 Households

There is a continuum of households indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$. As in Lucas (1980), each household is subject to an idiosyncratic preference shock to the marginal utility of consumption. The preference shock, $\theta(i)$, has the distribution $F(\theta) \equiv \Pr[\theta(i) \leq \theta]$ with support $[\theta_L, \theta_H]$, where the upper bound $\theta_H \leq \infty$ can be arbitrarily large. A high realization of $\theta(i)$ indicates a high marginal utility of consumption or a great urge to consume. For example, $\theta(i) = \infty$ can be interpreted as a life-threatening medical need, for which agents are willing to do everything to meet the demand. Leisure enters the utility function linearly as in Cooley and Hansen (1989) and LW (2005). This linearity is necessary for obtaining closed-form solutions. That linearity in utility function may lead to analytical tractability of the Lucas (1980) model is also suggested by Stokey and Lucas (1989, chapter 13.6-7). The major difference here is that the utility function is nonlinear in consumption and can take the general constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) form without losing tractability.

More assumptions are needed to render the model analytically tractable under CRRA utility functions. In particular, I assume that cash accumulated in the current period, $m_t(i)$, can be used immediately to facilitate consumption transactions, instead of waiting for one period as in the standard CIA literature. Although this assumption is necessary for obtaining closed-form solutions, it is innocuous for the main results (such as the large welfare cost) in this paper. This assumption may also be viewed as more realistic because business-cycle models are typically calibrated to quarterly or yearly frequencies; hence, requiring households to hold cash for that long to purchase consumption goods may be unrealistic.

Since labor supply is perfectly elastic, agents may be able to perfectly insure themselves against idiosyncratic risk without carrying real balances in excess of consumption. Hence, to capture the liquidity function of money as a store of value when its rate of return is dominated by interest-bearing assets, I also assume that the decisions for labor supply and investment on interest-bearing assets (such as capital) must be made before observing the idiosyncratic consumption-demand shock $\theta_t(i)$ in each period. Thus, if there is a strong urge to consume due to a high realization of $\theta_t(i)$, money stock is the only asset that can be adjusted costlessly (up to a borrowing limit) to meet consumption demand. Borrowing of liquidity (money) from other households is not allowed. These assumptions imply that households may find it optimal not to spend all cash in hand for consumption purchases in some periods because carrying excess money balances to the next period may be beneficial when the current marginal utility of consumption is low but future marginal utility of consumption may be high. As in the standard literature, any aggregate uncertainty is

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8Because the essential role of the CIA constraint in this model is to impose a borrowing limit on consumption.
resolved at the beginning of each period and is orthogonal to idiosyncratic uncertainty.

An alternative setup of the model’s information structure for decision-making is as follows. Each time period is divided into two subperiods. The preference shock $\theta_t(i)$ is realized only in the second subperiod. In the first subperiod, after aggregate shocks are realized, household $i$ chooses labor supply $n_t(i)$ and a nonmonetary asset $s_t(i)$ that pays the real rate of return $r_t > 0$. In the second subperiod, after the idiosyncratic shocks are realized, the household chooses consumption $c_t(i)$ and nominal balance $m_t(i)$ to maximize utility subject to a liquidity (CIA) constraint.

Define

$$x_t(i) \equiv \frac{m_{t-1}(i) + \tau_t}{P_t} + W_t n_t(i) + (1 + r_t) s_{t-1}(i) - s_t(i)$$

as the cash in hand of household $i$, which includes real cash balances carried over from the previous period plus any lump-sum transfers, $\frac{m_{t-1}(i) + \tau_t}{P_t}$, labor income, $W_t n_t(i)$, and capital gains net of investment in the nonmonetary asset, $(1 + r_t) s_{t-1}(i) - s_t(i)$; where $P_t$ denotes aggregate price, $W_t$ the real wage, and $\tau_t$ a lump-sum per capita nominal transfer. Taken as given the macroeconomic variables $\{P_t, W_t, r_t, \tau_t\}$, household $i$’s problem can thus be expressed compactly as

$$\max_{\{c,m\}} E_0 \left\{ \max_{\{n,s\}} \mathbb{E}_0 \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t [\theta_t(i) \log c_t(i) - an_t(i)] \right\} \right\}$$

subject to

$$c_t(i) + \frac{m_t(i)}{P_t} \leq x_t(i) \quad (2)$$

$$c_t(i) \leq \frac{m_t(i)}{P_t}, \quad (3)$$

where the operator $\mathbb{E}_t$ denotes expectations conditional on the information set of period $t$ excluding the idiosyncratic shocks $\theta_t(i)$, whereas the operator $E_t$ denotes expectations conditional on the full information set of period $t$ including $\theta(i)$. Without loss of generality, assume $a = 1$ in the utility function.

Note the following important features of the model:

(i) Cash in hand, $x_t(i)$, is predetermined in the second subperiod (after $\theta_t(i)$ is realized) because labor supply and asset investment are chosen in the first subperiod without observing $\theta_t(i)$. A question thus naturally arises: Would the CIA constraint in equation (3) always bind, as in representative-agent CIA models? The answer is "No." In fact, how often the CIA constraint may bind in this model depends crucially on labor supply and the anticipated inflation rate — the cost

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9The model remains analytically tractable even if the period-utility function takes the more general CRRA form, $u(c, n) = \theta_t(i)^{\gamma(i) - 1} - an_t(i)$. 9
of holding money. If the inflation rate is low, the CIA constraint may rarely bind because the household can almost fully self-insure itself against random liquidity-demand shocks by working harder and accumulating more cash in the first subperiod. On the other hand, if holding cash is too costly because of high inflation, the CIA constraint may bind frequently because the household opts to reduce real balances by working fewer hours. Hence, the probability of a binding CIA constraint depends on the distribution of \( \theta(i) \) and the inflation rate.

(ii) In anticipating that the CIA constraint may or may not bind in the second subperiod, the household opts to choose labor supply in the first subperiod optimally based on expected inflation and the distribution of \( \theta_t(i) \) so that the level of cash in hand is optimal \( \text{ex ante} \), although \( \text{ex post} \) the actual cash in hand may be below or above what is required to satisfy the realized liquidity demand determined by \( \theta_t(i) \).

(iii) Since preference shocks are i.i.d. and the marginal cost of labor supply is constant, households can adjust hours worked (labor income) elastically to target any optimal level of cash in hand \( (x_t(i)) \) regardless of the initial wealth level \( \left( \frac{m_{t-1}(i)}{P_t} + (1 + r_t) s_{t-1}(i) \right) \). In such a case, individual history (such as \( m_{t-1}(i) \) and \( s_{t-1}(i) \)) no longer matters and households can all start the second subperiod with the same optimal amount of cash in hand when making consumption and money-holding decisions. This property simplifies the model tremendously and makes the model analytically tractable.\(^{10}\)

Define \( S_t \) as household \( i \)'s state space that includes all predetermined variables and exogenous shocks but excludes \( \theta_t^i \) (we use \( \theta^i \) and \( \theta(i) \) interchangeably). With this notation, labor supply can be denoted as \( n_t(i, S_t) \) because it is independent of \( \theta_t^i \). Denoting \( \{\lambda_t(i, S_t, \theta_t^i), v_t(i, S_t, \theta_t^i)\} \) as the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (2) and (3), respectively, the first-order conditions for \( \{c_t(i, S_t, \theta_t^i), n_t(i, S_t), m_t(i, S_t, \theta_t), s_t(i, S_t, \theta_t)\} \) are given, respectively, by

\[
\theta_t(i)c_t(i, S_t, \theta_t)^{-1} = \lambda_t(i, S_t, \theta_t) + v_t(i, S_t, \theta_t)
\]

\[
1 = W_t \tilde{E} [\lambda_t(i, S_t, \theta_t)]
\]

\[
\frac{\lambda_t(i, S_t, \theta_t)}{P_t} = \beta E_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}(i, S_{t+1}, \theta_{t+1})}{P_{t+1}} + \frac{v_t(i, S_t, \theta_t)}{P_t}
\]

\[
\tilde{E} [\lambda_t(i, S_t, \theta_t)] = \beta E_t [(1 + r_{t+1})\lambda_{t+1}(i, S_{t+1}, \theta_{t+1})],
\]

where the operator \( \tilde{E} \) in equations (5) and (7) reflects the fact that labor supply and asset investment must be chosen in the first subperiod before observing the idiosyncratic shock \( \theta_t(i) \). By the law

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\(^{10}\)This property is reminiscent of Lagos and Wright (2005).
of iterated expectations and the orthogonality assumption of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, equations (6) and (7) can be rewritten as

$$\lambda_t(i, S_t, \theta_t) = \beta E_t \left[ \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \tilde{E} [\lambda_{t+1}(i, S_{t+1}, \theta_{t+1})] \right] + v_t(i, S_t, \theta_t) = \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} + v_t(i, S_t, \theta_t)$$

(8)

$$\frac{1}{W_t} = \beta E_t \left[ (1 + r_{t+1}) \tilde{E} [\lambda_{t+1}(i, S_{t+1}, \theta_{t+1})] \right] = \beta E_t \frac{1 + r_{t+1}}{W_{t+1}}$$

(9)

where the first equality in each of the above two equations applies the law of iterated expectations and the orthogonality condition, and the second equality in each of the above two equations uses equation (5).

In a steady state without aggregate uncertainty, $W_t = W$ and $r_t = r$; hence, equation (9) implies $1 = \beta (1 + r)$, a standard relationship for interest-bearing assets. Hence, unlike Aiyagari (1994), this model does not have the "over accumulation of capital" problem because there are no precautionary saving motives for capital, so taxing capital is not optimal here. As shown below, however, taxing money holdings (by inflation) is not optimal either despite the precautionary saving motive for real balances.

2.2 Decision Rules

**Proposition 1** The decision rules of household $i$’s consumption, money holdings, and cash in hand are given by

$$c_t(i) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta_t(i)}{\theta_t^*} x_t & \text{if } \theta_t(i) \leq \theta_t^* \\ \frac{1}{2} x_t & \text{if } \theta_t(i) > \theta_t^* \end{cases}$$

(10)

$$m_t(i) = \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \left( 1 - \frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta_t(i)}{\theta_t^*} \right) x_t & \text{if } \theta_t(i) \leq \theta_t^* \\ \frac{1}{2} x_t & \text{if } \theta_t(i) > \theta_t^* \end{array} \right. \quad (11)$$

$$x_t = 2 \theta_t^* W_t R(\theta_t^*),$$

(12)

where the cutoff $\theta_t^*$ is uniquely determined by

$$\frac{1}{W_t} = \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} R(\theta_t^*),$$

(13)

where

$$R(\theta_t^*) \equiv \left[ \int_{\theta_t(i) \leq \theta_t^*} dF(\theta) + \int_{\theta_t(i) > \theta_t^*} \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\theta_t(i)}{\theta_t^*} + 1 \right) dF(\theta) \right] > 1.$$
Proof. See Appendix. ■

These decision rules are economically very intuitive. Both consumption and saving are proportional to cash in hand $x_t$ but with the marginal propensity to consume (and the marginal propensity to save) state-dependent. When the urge to consume is high ($\theta(i) > \theta^*$), total cash in hand is split perfectly between consumption and cash (because cash is needed to purchase consumption goods); so the marginal propensity to consume is $\frac{1}{2}$, as in a standard representative-agent CIA model. When the urge to consume is low ($\theta(i) < \theta^*$), less than half of the total cash in hand is allocated to consumption, more than half is allocated to saving; so the marginal propensity to consume is $\frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta(i)}{\theta_t} < \frac{1}{2}$, and consumption comoves perfectly with preference shocks and saving absorbs any extra cash in hand not spend. Hence, saving (money demand) is a buffer stock.

The probability of a binding liquidity constraint is given by $F(\theta^*_t)$, which is endogenously and optimally determined by each household according to the macroeconomic states because the cutoff is determined by equation (13). The determination of the optimal cutoff is thus related to the determination of optimal cash in hand, which in turn is related to the optimal labor supply (or wage income).

The function $R(\theta^*)$ in equation (13) measures the (shadow) rate of return to liquidity (or cash inventory). The left-hand side of equation (13) is the opportunity cost of holding one more unit of real balances as inventory instead of one more unit of real capital asset. The right-hand side is the expected real returns to money, which takes two possible values: The first is simply the discounted next-period utility cost of inventory $\left( \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}W_{t+1}} \right)$ in the case of low liquidity demand ($\theta < \theta^*$), which has probability $\int_{\theta(i) \leq \theta^*} dF(\theta)$. The second is the marginal utility of consumption $\left( \frac{\theta(i)}{\theta_t^*} \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}W_{t+1}} \right)$ in the case of high liquidity demand ($\theta > \theta^*$), which has probability $\int_{\theta(i) > \theta^*} dF(\theta)$. The optimal cutoff $\theta^*_t$ (or labor income) is chosen so that the marginal cost equals the expected marginal gains. Hence, the rate of return to inventory investment in money (liquidity) is determined by $R(\theta^*_t)$. Notice that $R(\theta^*_t) > 1$ as long as $\theta^*_t < \theta_H$. That is, the liquidity premium $R(\theta^*)$ exceeds 1 as long as the probability of being cash constrained is strictly positive. The fact that $R > 1$ implies that the option value of one dollar exceeds 1 because it provides liquidity in the event of a high urge to consume. This inventory-theoretic formula of the rate of return to liquidity is similar to that derived by Wen (2008, 2009) in different models.

Equations (13) and (14) imply that the cutoff $\theta^*_t$ is independent of $i$ under the assumption that $\theta(i)$ is i.i.d. Equation (12) then implies that the optimal cash in hand, $x_t(i)$, is also independent of $i$. The intuition for $x_t$ to be independent of $i$ is as follows: (i) $x_t$ is determined before the realization of $\theta_t(i)$ and agents face the same distribution of $\theta(i)$ when choosing $x_t$. (ii) The marginal cost of
leisure is constant; hence, labor is elastically supplied. Therefore, labor income can be adjusted elastically through labor supply to target any optimal level of cash in hand that balances the expected marginal costs and benefits of carrying money. In other words, since the expected benefits and costs of holding one extra dollar depend only on the distribution of $\theta(i)$ and macro variables that individuals take as given, and since labor can be adjusted elastically with constant marginal utility cost, all households opt to choose the same target level of cash in hand regardless of their initial wealth. In other words, such a target policy is both feasible and optimal because of the quasi-linear preference. This implies that the distribution of cash in hand ($x_t$) is degenerate, similar to LW (2005). This property greatly simplifies the computation of general equilibrium and makes the model analytically tractable. However, unlike LW (2005), even though the distribution of $x_t$ is degenerate, the distributions of money holdings $m_t(i)$ is not degenerate, and this is what matters for our subsequent welfare analysis regarding the costs of inflation.

Denoting as aggregate variables $C_t = \int c_t(i) di$, $M_t = \int m_t(i) di$, $S_t = \int s_t(i) di$, $N_t = \int n_t(i) di$, and $X_t = \int x_t di$, and integrating the household decision rules over $i$ by the law of large numbers, we have

\begin{align}
X_t &= 2\theta^*_t W_t R(\theta^*_t) \\
C_t &= W_t R(\theta^*_t) D(\theta^*_t) \\
M_t &= W_t R(\theta^*_t) H(\theta^*_t),
\end{align}

where

\begin{align}
D(\theta^*) &= \int_{\theta \leq \theta^*} \theta(i) dF(\theta) + \int_{\theta > \theta^*} \theta^* dF(\theta) \\
H(\theta^*) &= \int_{\theta \leq \theta^*} (2\theta^* - \theta(i)) dF(\theta) + \int_{\theta > \theta^*} \theta^* dF(\theta).
\end{align}

and these functions satisfy $D(\theta^*) + H(\theta^*) = 2\theta^*$.

### 2.3 Some Immediate Implications

**The Quantity Theory.** Before studying general equilibrium, we may observe that the aggregate relationship between the consumption equation (16) and the money-demand equation (17) implies the quantity equation,

\[ P_t C_t = M_t V_t, \]

where $V$ denotes the consumption velocity of money and is determined by

\[ V_t = \frac{D(\theta^*_t)}{H(\theta^*_t)}. \]
which has the support $\left[\frac{E\theta}{2\theta - E\theta}, 1\right]$ (where $E\theta$ is the mean). Velocity is thus bounded above by 1 and below by $\frac{E\theta}{2\theta - E\theta} < 1$.\footnote{Alternatively, we can also measure the velocity of money by aggregate income, $PY = M\bar{V}$, where $\bar{V} \equiv V\frac{Y}{N}$ is the income velocity of money.}

**Distributional Effects.** Notice that monetary policies will generally affect the distribution of money holdings across households by affecting the cutoff $\theta^*_t$. Equation (13) is the key to understanding such effects. For example, consider the situation without aggregate uncertainty and assume that a steady state exists (which can be easily verified). Equation (13) implies that the cutoff $\theta^*$ is determined by the following relationship:

$$R(\theta^*) = \frac{1 + \pi}{\beta},$$

where $\pi \equiv \frac{P_t - P_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}$ is the steady-state rate of inflation.\footnote{The quantity relation (20) implies $\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = \frac{M_t}{M_{t-1}}$ in the steady state, so the steady-state inflation rate is the same as the growth rate of money.} Hence, the distribution of money holdings depends on inflation. In particular, since $\frac{\partial R}{\partial \theta} < 0$, an increase in the rate of inflation decreases the cutoff, hence shifting the distribution of money holdings toward a situation where more agents are liquidity constrained. This suggests that with heterogeneous agents the welfare costs of inflation can be significantly different from those in representative-agent models because inflation affects the distribution of real balances and agents with a binding CIA constraint have a higher variance of consumption than cash-rich agents.

### 3 General Equilibrium

The heterogeneous-agent Lucas model outlined above can be easily embedded in a standard neo-classical growth model with capital accumulation. For example, assume that capital is the only non-monetary asset and is accumulated according to $K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta) K_t = I_t$, where $I$ is gross aggregate investment and $\delta$ the rate of depreciation; the production technology is given by $Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha N_t^{1-\alpha}$, where $A$ denotes total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. Under perfect competition, factor prices are determined by marginal products: $r_t + \delta = \alpha \frac{Y_t}{K_t}$ and $W_t = (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{N_t}$. Market clearing implies $S_t = K_{t+1}, \int n_t(i) = N_t$, and $M_t = \overline{M}_t = M_{t-1} + \tau_t$, where $\overline{M}_t$ denotes aggregate money supply in period $t$. Notice that equations (15), (16), and (17) with money market clearing ($M_t = M_{t-1} + \tau_t$) imply the aggregate goods market-clearing condition,

$$C_t + K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta) K_t = Y_t.$$  

Note equation (15) implies
\[
\frac{M_{t-1} + \tau_t}{P_t} + W_t N_t + (1 + r_t)K_{t-1} - K_t = 2\theta_t^t W_t R(\theta_t^t). \tag{24}
\]

A general equilibrium is defined as the sequence \( \{C_t, Y_t, N_t, K_{t+1}, M_t, P_t, W_t, r_t, \theta_t^t\} \), such that given prices \( \{P_t, W_t, r_t\} \) and monetary policies \( \{\tau_t\} \), households maximize utilities subject to both resource and CIA constraints, firms maximize profits, all markets clear, the law of large numbers holds, and the set of standard transversality conditions is satisfied. The equations needed to solve for the nine aggregate variables in general equilibrium include equations (9), (13), (16), (17), (23), and (24); the production function; firms’ first-order conditions with respect to \( \{K, N\} \); and the law of motion for money, \( M = M_{-1} + \tau \).

By applying the eigenvalue method, it can be confirmed that the aggregate model consisting of the nine equations has a unique saddle-path steady state. The aggregate dynamics of the model can be solved by standard methods available in the RBC literature, such as log-linearizing the system around the steady state and then applying the method of Blanchard and Kahn (1980) to find the stationary saddle path as in King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).

**Monetary Policy.** We consider two types (regimes) of monetary policies. For the short-run dynamic analysis, money supply shocks are purely transitory without affecting the steady-state stock of money,

\[
\tau_t = \rho \tau_{t-1} + \frac{M}{\bar{M}} \varepsilon_t, \tag{25}
\]

\[
M_t = \bar{M} + \tau_t, \tag{26}
\]

where \( \rho \in [0, 1] \) and \( \bar{M} \) is the steady-state money supply. This policy implies the percentage deviation of money stock follows an AR(1) process, \( \frac{M_t - \bar{M}}{\bar{M}} = \rho \frac{M_{t-1} - \bar{M}}{\bar{M}} + \varepsilon_t \). Under this policy regime, the steady-state inflation rate is zero, \( \pi = 0 \).

For the long-run (steady-state) analysis, money supply has a permanent growth component with

\[
\tau_t = \bar{\mu} M_{t-1}, \tag{27}
\]

where \( \bar{\mu} \geq 0 \) is the constant growth rate of money that determines the anticipated inflation rate.

### 4 The Control Model

To further highlight the critical role played by the distribution of money holdings in generating the implications of monetary policies, we introduce a control model with a degenerate distribution of

\[\text{\footnotesize \footnote{This policy is analogous to the "quantitative easing" policy currently adopted by the United States, which increases money supply in the short run and withdraws the injected money gradually without affecting the long-run stock of money.}}\]
money demand. The control model is a version of the CIA model studied by Cooley and Hansen (1989), where a representative agent chooses consumption \( C \), hours worked \( N \), capital stock \( K' \), and money demand \( M \) to solve

\[
\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \{ \theta \log C_t - N_t \}
\]

subject to

\[
C_t + \frac{M_t}{P_t} + K_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t \leq \Lambda_t K_t^{\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha} + \frac{M_{t-1} + \tau_t}{P_t}
\]  

(28)

\[
C_t \leq \frac{M_t}{P_t}.
\]  

(29)

where \( \bar{\theta} \equiv E\theta \) is the mean of \( \theta \). This parameter is added to make the control model symmetric to the heterogeneous-agent model. Denoting \( \{ \Lambda_t, \Pi_t \} \) as the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (28) and (29), respectively, the first-order conditions for \( \{ C, N, M, K' \} \) are given, respectively, by

\[
\bar{\theta} C_t^{-1} = \Lambda_t + \Pi_t
\]  

(30)

\[
1 = \Lambda_t (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{N_t}
\]  

(31)

\[
\frac{\Lambda_t}{P_t} = \beta E_t \left( \frac{\Lambda_{t+1}}{P_{t+1}} + \frac{\Pi_t}{P_t} \right)
\]  

(32)

\[
\Lambda_t = \beta E_t \left( \frac{Y_{t+1}}{K_{t+1}} + 1 - \delta \right).
\]  

(33)

As argued by Cooley and Hansen (1989) and numerically confirmed by Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991), the CIA constraint (29) will almost always bind in all states, as long as the inflation rate is above the Friedman rule, \( \pi_t = \frac{P_t - P_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}} > \beta - 1 \). Hence, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989), we assume the constraint holds with equality and the Lagrangian multiplier \( \Pi_t > 0 \) for all \( t \).

5 Steady-State Analysis

5.1 Control Model

A "steady state" is defined as the situation without aggregate uncertainty and where all aggregate real variables are constant over time. For the representative-agent control model, equation (33) implies \( \frac{K}{Y} = \frac{\alpha\beta}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)} \); the budget constraint (28) implies \( \frac{C}{Y} = 1 - \frac{\delta\alpha\beta}{1 - \beta(1 - \delta)} \). Equation (32) implies
\( \Lambda(1+\pi-\beta) = (1+\pi)\Pi. \) Notice that \( \Pi > 0 \) as long as \( 1+\pi > \beta. \) Equation (30) implies \( \tilde{\theta}C^{-1} = \Lambda \left( 1 + \frac{1+\pi-\beta}{1+\pi} \right), \) and equation (31) then implies

\[
C = \frac{1+\pi}{2(1+\pi) - \beta \tilde{\theta}W}, \tag{34}
\]

where \( W = (1-\alpha) \left( \frac{\alpha\beta}{1-\beta(1-\delta)} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\delta}} \) is the marginal product of labor, which is independent of inflation. Hence, consumption is decreasing in \( \pi. \) At the limit where inflation approaches the Friedman rule, \( 1+\pi = \beta, \) we have the maximum consumption given by \( C^* = \tilde{\theta}W. \) Given the real wage \( W, \) hours worked are given by

\[
N = \frac{(1-\alpha)}{W} Y = \frac{(1-\alpha)}{W} \frac{1 - \beta(1-\delta)}{1 - \beta(1-\delta) - \beta \delta \alpha} C. \tag{35}
\]

### 5.2 Heterogeneous-Agent Model

For the heterogeneous-agent model, the aggregate capital-to-output and consumption-to-output ratio in the steady state are given by \( K = \frac{\beta \alpha}{1-\beta(1-\delta)} \) and \( C = 1 - \frac{\delta \beta \alpha}{1-\beta(1-\delta)}, \) respectively. Since \( r + \delta = \alpha \frac{Y}{K} \) and \( W = (1-\alpha) \frac{Y}{N}, \) the factor prices are given by \( r = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 \) and \( W = (1-\alpha) \left( \frac{\beta \alpha}{1-\beta(1-\delta)} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\delta}}, \) respectively. These results are the same as in the control model. Hence, heterogeneity does not alter the steady-state capital-to-output ratio and the real factor prices. However, the levels of income, consumption, employment, and capital stock are different from their counterparts in the control model because they are affected by monetary policy through the cutoff \( (\theta^*) : \)

\[
C = WR(\theta^*)D(\theta^*), \quad Y = \frac{1 - \beta(1-\delta)}{1 - \beta(1-\delta) - \beta \delta \alpha} C, \quad N = \frac{(1-\alpha)}{W} Y, \quad K = \frac{\beta \alpha}{1-\beta(1-\delta)} Y. \tag{36}
\]

To facilitate quantitative analysis, we assume that the idiosyncratic shock \( \theta(i) \) follows the Pareto distribution,

\[
F(\theta) = 1 - \theta^{-\sigma}, \tag{37}
\]

with \( \sigma > 1 \) and the support \( \theta \in (1, \infty). \) An infinite value of \( \theta \) can be interpreted as a life-threatening medical need (although the probability measure of such an event is zero). In the case of a life-threatening medical need, the marginal utility of consumption is infinity and agents are willing to give up everything to meet such a demand. This implies that the optimal demand for money may be infinity if holding money has zero costs. This property is important for the model to match the empirical money-demand function analyzed by Lucas (2000). Since the support is
not bounded above, monetary equilibrium with a strictly positive price level \( P > 0 \) does not exist under the Friedman rule. Hence, our analysis in this section of the paper treats the Friedman rule as a limiting case.\(^{14}\)

With the Pareto distribution, we have \( E\theta = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} \) and

\[
D(\theta^*) = \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1} - \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \theta^{1-\sigma}, \quad H(\theta^*) = 2\theta^* - D(\theta^*), \quad R(\theta^*) = 1 + \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\sigma - 1} \theta^{1-\sigma}; \tag{38}
\]

which imply (by equation 22)

\[
\theta^* = \left[ \frac{1 + \pi - \beta}{\beta} 2(\sigma - 1) \right]^{-\frac{1}{\sigma - 1}}. \tag{39}
\]

As the inflation rate approaches the Friedman rule \( 1 + \pi \to \beta \), we have \( \theta^* \to \infty, \ R(\theta^*) \to 1, D(\theta^*) \to \frac{\sigma}{\sigma - 1}, \) and \( H(\theta^*) \to \infty; \) that is, aggregate money demand approaches infinity and the velocity of money becomes zero. In such a case, because it is costless to hold money, people opt to hold infinite amount of real balances and are thus fully self-insured against idiosyncratic preference shocks.

Also, interior solution requires \( \theta^* > 1 \), which implies

\[
1 + \pi < \beta \frac{2\sigma - 1}{2(\sigma - 1)} \equiv 1 + \pi_{\text{max}}. \tag{40}
\]

If an inflation rate exceeds this upper bound \( \pi_{\text{max}} \), we have \( \theta^* = D(\theta^*) = H(\theta^*) = 1 \) and \( C = \frac{M}{P} \).

That is, agents opt to keep a minimum amount of cash so they all have a binding CIA constraint in all states. In such a case, the velocity of money becomes 1 (\( V = \frac{D}{H} = 1 \)) and the model degenerates to the representative-agent control model in terms of resource allocations.

### 6 Calibration

The key parameter determining the welfare costs of inflation in the benchmark model is \( \sigma \), which determines the standard deviation of the preference shock and the shape of the velocity curve. In this section, we calibrate the value of \( \sigma \) so that the model-implied aggregate money-demand function (or velocity) closely matches its empirical counterpart of the United States, as suggested by Lucas (2000).\(^{15}\)

\(^{14}\)With the Pareto distribution, as \( 1 + \pi \) approaches \( \beta \), the demand for real balances approaches infinity. Since in equilibrium money demand must equal money supply (which is finite), this implies that the price level must approach zero (or the value of money must approach infinity).

\(^{15}\)Bailey (1956) first proposed to measure the welfare costs of inflation by the area underneath the money-demand function.
Using long-term time-series data for nominal GDP, money stock (M1), and the nominal interest rate, Lucas (2000) showed that the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP is downward sloping against the nominal interest rate. Lucas interpreted this downward relationship as a "money-demand" curve and argued that it can be rationalized by the representative-agent Sidrauski (1967) model of money in the utility:

\[ \frac{M}{PY} = Ar^{-\eta}, \quad (41) \]

where \( A \) is a scale parameter, \( r \) the nominal interest rate, and \( \eta \) the interest elasticity of money demand. He showed that \( \eta = 0.5 \) gives the best fit.

Analogous to Lucas (2000), the money-demand curve implied by the heterogeneous-agent CIA model of this paper takes the form

\[ \frac{M}{PY} = A H(\theta^*) \frac{D(\theta^*)}{D(\theta^*)}, \quad (42) \]

where \( A \) is a scale parameter influenced by the definition of money in the data and the cutoff \( \theta^* \) is a function of the nominal interest rate implied by equation (22). Experiments show that at annual frequency, setting \( \sigma = 1.5 \) and \( A = 0.08 \) provides a good fit between the model and the data. Figure 1 plots the money-demand curves of the United States (solid circles) and that implied by the model (solid line with cross symbols). The curve represented by the open circles is discussed below.\(^{16}\)

The figure shows a good fit of the model. A key factor for the close fit of our model to the U.S. data, in addition to the variability of the velocity of money, is the Pareto distribution for \( \theta \). The long tail property of this distribution implies that aggregate money demand (or the inverse of velocity) can increase rapidly as inflation approaches the Friedman rule. This property is reinforced if the value of \( \sigma \) is close to 1. As an example, if we set \( \sigma = 3.0 \), then the fit is worsened significantly (see the curve represented by the open circles in Figure 1). As noted by Lucas (2000), that money demand can rise rapidly toward infinity near zero interest rate is important for a monetary model to match the data.\(^{17}\)

If the goodness of fit is measured by the metric, \( d = \frac{1}{k} \sum |m_1 - m_2| \), where \( k \) is the number of sample points, \( m_1 \) denotes \( \frac{M}{PY} \) based on the US data,\(^{18}\) and \( m_2 \) denotes the theoretical counterpart

---

\(^{16}\)The circles in Figure 1 show plots of annual time series of a short-term nominal interest rate (the commercial paper rate) against the ratio of M1 to nominal GDP for the United States for the period 1892–1997. The data are from the online Historical Statistics of the United States–Millennium Edition. The solid line with the cross (\( \times \)) symbols is the model’s prediction calibrated at annual frequency with \( \beta = 0.97, \delta = 0.1, \alpha = 0.3, \) and \( \sigma = 1.5 \). The nominal interest rate in the model is defined as \( \frac{1}{1+r} \). The scale parameter is set to \( A = 0.08 \).

\(^{17}\)However, Ireland (2009) shows that the more recent data from the United States do not support a steep money-demand curve near the zero interest rate. Hence, a value of \( \sigma = 3 \) is more consistent with Ireland’s finding based on the more recent data.

\(^{18}\)The US data are sorted according to the nominal interest rate.
in the model, then the model proposed by Lucas (2000) gives $d = 0.077$, whereas our benchmark model gives $d = 0.059$.\footnote{We set $A = 0.5$ in the Lucas (2000) model.} Thus, the generalized heterogeneous-agent Lucas (1980) model fits the data better than the representative-agent Sidrauski model adopted by Lucas (2000).

![Figure 1. Predicted Money Demand Curve (× × ×) and U.S. Data (●●●).](image)

Based on the goodness of fit for aggregate money demand, we calibrate the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution to $\sigma = 1.5$. We set the other structural parameters according to the standard RBC literature. For example, if the time period is a year, we set $\beta = 0.97$, $\delta = 0.1$, and $\alpha = 0.3$; if the time period is a month, we set $\beta = 0.97^{1/12}$ and $\delta = 1.1^{1/12} - 1$, and so on.

### 7 Welfare Costs of Inflation

Following Cooley and Hansen (1989), we measure the welfare costs of inflation by a $\lambda\%$ increase in compensation so that each household $i$ is indifferent in terms of expected utilities between accepting a positive inflation $\pi$ and the Friedman rule:

$$
\int \theta \log (1 + \lambda) c(i, \theta) dF(\theta) - N = \int \theta \log \tilde{c}(i, \theta) dF(\theta) - \tilde{N},
$$

(43)
where \( \{ \tilde{c}(i, \theta), \tilde{N} \} \) denotes allocations under the Friedman rule. By the law of large numbers, the expected utility of an individual is the same as the aggregate utility of all households in the economy with equal social-welfare weights.

Given the consumption function in equation (10), the welfare cost is given by

\[
\log (1 + \lambda) = \frac{\theta^{1-\sigma}}{\sigma - 1} - \log R(\theta^*) + (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y}{C} \left[ R(\theta^*)D(\theta^*) \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} - 1 \right].
\] (44)

Analogously, the welfare cost of inflation in the control model is given by

\[
\log (1 + \lambda^\sigma) = \log \left[ 2 - \frac{\beta}{(1 + \pi)} \right] - (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y}{C} \left[ \frac{(1 + \pi) - \beta}{2(1 + \pi) - \beta} \right].
\] (45)

Notice that when \( \pi = \pi_{\text{max}} \), we have \( \log (1 + \lambda^\sigma) = \log \left( \frac{2\sigma}{2\sigma - 1} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \frac{(1-\alpha)Y}{C} \) in the control model.

**Figure 2. Welfare, Velocity, and Money Demand.**

When the time period is a month by setting \( \beta = 0.97^{12} \) and \( \delta = 1.1^{12} - 1 \), the welfare costs of inflation, the velocity of money, and the aggregate money demand implied by the heterogeneous-agent model are depicted by the curves shown in Figure 2, where in each panel solid lines represent
the heterogeneous-agent model and dashed lines the control model. In the figure, the top-left panel shows the welfare costs of inflation, the bottom-left panel the velocity, and the bottom-right panel aggregate money demand. We defer discussions for the top-right panel.

Notice how heterogeneity alters the model’s implications of monetary policy. First, the top-left panel in the figure shows that the welfare cost curve with heterogeneous agents is astonishingly much higher than that implied by the representative-agent model for any rate of inflation except near the Friedman rule. For example, when inflation increases from 0% to 10% a year, the welfare cost is equivalent to only 0.78% of consumption in the control model, but it is 14.6% in the heterogeneous-agent model.

Second, the velocity of money in the heterogeneous-agent model is not constant but highly variable with respect to inflation. It equals zero at the Friedman-rule inflation rate and rises gradually with inflation. It becomes constant at unity after the inflation rate reaches \( 1 + \pi_{\text{max}} = \beta \frac{2(\sigma - 1)}{2(\sigma - 1)} = 1.9949 \). That is, the velocity of money reaches its upper bound of 1 after the inflation rate becomes 200% per month — in which case the CIA constraint binds for all agents in all states of nature because holding money becomes too costly. At this point, the precautionary motive of money demand disappears completely and the model becomes identical to the control model in terms of aggregate allocations.

Third, the aggregate money demand in the heterogeneous-agent model is far larger and more inflation elastic than that in the control model. In particular, near the Friedman rule, aggregate demand for real balances in the heterogeneous-agent model is arbitrarily close to infinity; but, as inflation rises, demand for real balances drops rapidly and converge from above to that in the control model. The excessively large aggregate demand for money in the heterogeneous-agent model at low inflation rates arises because of a strong precautionary motive for holding cash to buffer idiosyncratic preference shocks. However, when the inflation rate increases, such an incentive for self-insurance diminishes. In contrast, money demand declines very slowly with inflation in the control model. Such a difference in the behavior of money demand implies a large discrepancy of the welfare cost of inflation between the two models for two reasons: (i) The precautionary insurance motive induces agents to hold an excessively large amount of cash at low inflation rates; which raises the welfare cost of inflation due to a larger base for the inflation tax (the Bailey triangle). (ii) More importantly, inflation destroys the liquidity value of money and raises the portion of the cash-constrained population by reducing the incentives of holding money; when households become cash-constrained, they are not able to raise consumption according to the marginal utility.

To see how the representative-agent assumption seriously distorts the estimates of the welfare costs of inflation, consider an alternative (but incorrect) measure of the welfare cost of inflation in the heterogeneous-agent model, which is to use the average consumption \( C = \int c(i)di \) to measure

20
social welfare:

\[ \bar{\theta} \log \left[ (1 + \bar{\lambda}) \int c(i)di \right] - \bar{N} = \bar{\theta} \log \left[ \int \tilde{c}(i)di \right] - \tilde{N}. \]  

(46)

This implies

\[ \log (1 + \bar{\lambda}) = \log \frac{\beta}{1 + \pi} - \log \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \left[ \frac{1+\pi - \beta}{\beta} 2(\sigma - 1) \right]^{\frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma}} \right) + (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y}{C} \left[ R(\theta^*) D(\theta^*) \frac{\sigma - 1}{\sigma} - 1 \right]. \]  

(47)

With this alternative measure, if \( \pi = \pi_{\text{max}} \), then \( \log (1 + \bar{\lambda}) = \log \left( \frac{2\sigma}{2\sigma - 1} \right) - \frac{1}{2} \frac{(1-\alpha) Y}{C} \), which is identical to that in the control model. In fact, at both the Friedman-rule inflation rate and for inflation rates \( \pi \geq \pi_{\text{max}} \), the aggregate allocation of the heterogeneous-agent model is identical to that of the control model; hence, the welfare implications are also identical in those ranges of inflation rates if we use the utility of average consumption (instead of the average utility of individual consumption) as the base to measure welfare.

The top-right panel in Figure 2 shows that the alternative measure of welfare in equation (47) is far closer to that of the control model, and it differs from the control model only moderately in the inflation range \( \pi \in (\beta - 1, \pi_{\text{max}}) \). This incorrect measure coincides with that of the control model for high inflation rates because all households are liquidity constrained when \( \pi \geq \pi_{\text{max}} \) and this measure ignores the idiosyncratic risk facing individual agents when they become liquidity constrained. That is, from the point of view of average consumption, it does not matter whether or not individuals are self-insured. In contrast, with the correct welfare measure that takes into account individual risk, the costs of inflation are dramatically different between the two economies even when inflation is sufficiently high (i.e., \( \pi \geq \pi_{\text{max}} \)) so that all agents become liquidity-constrained.

Why does heterogeneity matter so much for welfare costs? The crucial reason is that, with low inflation, the CIA constraint does not bind for most agents (or not very often for the same agent) because of precautionary saving motives under idiosyncratic risk. This is very different from representative-agent models where the CIA constraint always binds under aggregate risks. This implies a larger welfare gain from reducing inflation toward the Friedman rule in the heterogeneous-agent model than in the control model.

Figure 3 plots the probability of a binding CIA constraint in the heterogeneous-agent model as a function of the inflation rate. It shows that the probability of liquidity constraint is very low under moderate inflation, suggesting that most agents are very well self-insured most of the time. However, as inflation increases, the probability of a binding CIA constraint rises rapidly, thus more agents (especially those with the most urge to consume) will become liquidity-constrained, which reduces social welfare significantly along the extensive margin because self-insurance can provide
far larger welfare than a low inflation tax could — namely, the opportunity cost of holding non-interest-bearing cash (the Bailey triangle) is relatively less important compared with the loss of self-insurance as inflation increases.

Figure 3. Probability of a Binding CIA Constraint.

Notice in Figure 3 the probability of a binding borrowing constraint is a linear function of the inflation rate. A formal proof of this result is provided here. Equation (22) implies $1 + \frac{\pi}{\beta} = R(\theta^*) = 1 + \frac{1}{2} (\sigma - 1) \theta^{* - \sigma}$, which implies $\theta^{* - \sigma} = 2 (\sigma - 1) \frac{1 + \pi - \beta}{\beta}$. Hence, $1 - F(\theta^*)$ is a linear function of inflation. Suppose $\beta = 0.97$ and $\pi = 0.1$; then $1 - F(\theta^*) = 13.4\%$. That is, when the time period is a year and the annual inflation rate is 10%, households still opt to hold so much money that the probability of a binding CIA constraint is less than 14%. This result is in sharp contrast to that obtained by Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991) based on a representative-agent CIA model, where they show that the probability of a binding CIA constraint is close to 100% regardless of the inflation rate.

In other words, although precautionary demand for money will raise the inflation tax on households, the more important contributing factor to the large welfare cost of inflation is the inability to self-insure when the CIA constraint binds. With idiosyncratic risk, the Friedman rule ensures that agents are fully insured against such shocks so that consumption comoves perfectly with preference shocks ($\theta$). When inflation rises, the probability of a binding CIA constraint increases because of lower money demand, which implies that the portion of CIA-constrained agents also increases. Since the welfare of a liquidity-constrained agent is significantly lower than that of a cash-rich agent be-
cause of the lack of self-insurance, inflation—by making more agents liquidity-constrained—is very costly. This adverse liquidity effect along the extensive margin is also noted by Imrohoroglu (1992) and Wen (2009) based on a Bewley (1980) model.

As the variance of idiosyncratic risk diminishes, the heterogeneous-agent model gradually reduces to a representative-agent model. The example shown in Figure 4 is generated under the same parameter values as before but a significantly smaller variance of $\theta$ by setting $\sigma = 30$. The figure shows that the heterogeneous-agent model converges to the representative-agent counterpart. In particular, the velocity of money in the heterogeneous-agent model approaches unity almost as soon as the inflation rate departs from the Friedman rule (see the lower-left panel), and aggregate money demand in the two models becomes virtually identical when the monthly inflation rate $\pi$ is as low as 1.014 (see the lower-right panel). Most notably, the gap in the welfare costs of inflation between the two models is no longer so dramatic (albeit still significant, see the upper-left panel), and the welfare measure based on average consumption becomes virtually identical to that in the representative-agent model for all inflation rates (see the upper-right panel).

Table 1 provides sensitivity analyses of the welfare costs to different calibrations when the annualized inflation rate increases from 0% to 10%. The table shows that the welfare costs are...
significantly smaller when the model is calibrated to higher frequencies such as the weekly frequency. For example, the last row of Table 1 shows that the welfare cost is 23% of consumption when \( t \) is a quarter, and this number reduces to 9.1% when \( t \) is a week. The intuition is that the cutoff \( \theta^* \) is a decreasing function of \( \beta \): a higher value of \( \beta \) implies that holding money (as an asset) over time is less costly, hence the demand for money increases. This has two consequences: First, a higher money demand increases the inflation tax; second, it reduces the probability of a binding CIA constraint and the portion of liquidity-constrained population. Since the second effect dominates, the welfare cost of inflation is reduced.

Table 1 also indicates that a higher value of \( \sigma \) leads to significantly lower costs of inflation. The middle row (\( \sigma = 3 \)) shows that the welfare cost is reduced by ten-folds in a monthly model when \( \sigma \) is increased from 1.5 to 3. The reason is that a smaller variance of \( \theta \) (i.e., a larger value of \( \sigma \)) creates a weaker incentive to hold money as a store of value because of a smaller welfare gain of self-insurance when the idiosyncratic risk is small. Consider the more extreme case where \( \sigma = 30 \) (see Figure 4); in such a case the precautionary motive for money demand remains strong near the Friedman rule but weakens rapidly as inflation rises. Hence, the optimal probability of a binding CIA constraint increases rapidly away from the Friedman rule because self-insurance is not as important when the dispersion of \( \theta \) is insignificant. This further illustrates our previous conclusion that the loss of self-insurance caused by inflation (rather than the inflation tax) is the most important reason that inflation may be far more costly in a heterogeneous-agent economy with idiosyncratic risk than in a representative-agent economy.

Table 1. Welfare Costs of 10% Inflation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency (( t ))</th>
<th>Week</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Quarter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control model</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.08%</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma = 3 )</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \sigma = 1.5 )</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Consumption Inequality*

The analysis shows that the size of the welfare cost in the generalized heterogeneous-agent Lucas (1980) model depends crucially on the variance of preference shocks. Based on the aggregate money-demand curve of the United States, Figure 1 shows that the model requires \( \sigma = 1.5 \) to match the data. This value implies a large dispersion of idiosyncratic preference shocks across households. How realistic is this value?

Since the variance of preference shocks determines the dispersion of consumption across agents in the model, an independent consistency test is to examine the implied consumption distribution of the model and determine if the model overstates the consumption inequality of the United States. In the model, the portion of population with \( \theta \leq z \) is given by \( F(z) \). Given the consumption
function in equation (10), the portion of total consumption of households with \( \theta \leq z \) as a fraction of aggregate consumption is given by

\[
F_c(z) = \frac{1}{D(\theta^*)} \int_1^z c(\theta)dF(\theta) = \frac{1}{D(\theta^*)} \begin{cases} 
\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} (1 - z^{1-\sigma}) & \text{if } z \leq \theta^* \\
\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1} (1 - \theta^*(1-\sigma)) + \theta^* (\theta^* - \sigma - z^{-\sigma}) & \text{if } z > \theta^* 
\end{cases}
\]

(48)

Notice that \( F_c(1) = 0 \) and \( F_c(\infty) = 1 \). The cumulative function \( F_c(z) \) depends on the cutoff \( \theta^* \), which in turn depends on the inflation rate.

If we calibrate the model at annual frequency as in Figure 1 (the solid line with cross symbols), and fix the annual inflation rate at 4% in the model (which is consistent with the average postwar inflation in the United State), the implied Lorenz curve is graphed in Figure 5. The figure shows that the model does not imply a unrealistic distribution of consumption across agents. In particular, the implied Gini coefficient of consumption is 0.32, whereas that in the United States is about 0.3 (see, e.g., Krueger and Perri, 2002; and Ragot, 2009). Hence, the calibrated value of \( \sigma = 1.5 \) is consistent not only with the interest elasticity of aggregate money demand but also with the dispersion and inequality of consumption across households in the data.

Figure 5. Consumption Inequality.

However, the Lucas model driven by idiosyncratic preference shocks does not generate a realistic joint distribution of consumption and money demand to match the U.S. data. In the data, the

\[20\text{Namely, } \beta = 0.97, \delta = 0.1, \alpha = 0.3, \text{ and } \sigma = 1.5.\]
distribution of consumption is positively correlated with that of money demand (see, e.g., Ragot, 2009). This implies that households with low consumption also hold less cash in the data. But with i.i.d. preference shocks, households with the least urge to consume will carry the largest amount of money in the model, which implies a negative correlation between consumption distribution and cash distribution. This counterfactual joint distribution of consumption and money demand does not exist in the model of Wen (2009) in which the source of idiosyncratic risk comes from wealth. It is therefore expected that introducing wealth shocks or highly persistent preference shocks into the Lucas model may resolve this problem.\footnote{If preference shocks are persistent, agents with high urges to consume may opt to choose to hold more money in the anticipation of high future consumption demand in the next period. This will help reduce the correlation between consumption and \( \theta \) but improve the correlation between consumption and money demand.}

8 Business-Cycle Implications

Heterogeneity not only alters the welfare costs of anticipated inflation, but can also lead to different implications for the business cycle. To see this, we follow the standard RBC literature and recalibrate the model to quarterly frequency by setting \( \beta = 0.97^{\frac{1}{4}} \) and \( \delta = 1.1^{\frac{1}{4}} - 1 \). The inflation rate is set to zero in the steady state. The impulse responses of the model to a 1\% transitory increase in the money stock under the first policy regime in equation (25), \( \frac{M_t - \bar{M}}{\bar{M}} = \rho \frac{M_{t-1} - \bar{M}}{\bar{M}} + \varepsilon_t \), where \( \rho = 0.9 \), are shown in Figure 6 by the lines with circles, whereas the lines with triangles represent the control model.

The figure shows that with heterogeneity the economy responds to transitory monetary injections very differently from its representative-agent counterpart. In particular, money is expansionary for aggregate output, consumption, and labor in the heterogeneous-agent model but contractionary in the control model.\footnote{Permanent increases in money, however, are no longer expansionary in the heterogeneous-agent model because of anticipated inflation.} The price level appears very "sticky" and velocity is highly countercyclical in the heterogeneous-agent model, whereas the price increases almost one for one with money supply and velocity remains constant in the control model. The sticky price behavior and countercyclical movements in velocity under transitory monetary shocks are consistent with the data (see, e.g., Alvarez, Atkeson and Edmond, 2008). The reason is as follows: Since only a small fraction of the agents face a binding CIA constraint, a monetary injection stimulates consumption only for the liquidity-constrained agents; hence, the aggregate price does not increase proportionately with money. On the other hand, since money is needed to purchase consumption goods and there are precautionary motives for holding money, money demand of the cash-constrained agents will increase more than proportionately with consumption (instead of one for one as in the representative-agent model). Hence, aggregate money demand rises more than aggregate consump-
tion, causing the aggregate velocity of money to decline. A larger consumption expenditure and
demand for real balances imply that households need more cash in hand; thus, labor supply also
increases, which raises aggregate output. Capital investment may either decrease or increase, de-
dpending on the labor’s share in the production function. If labor’s share is sufficiently high, then an
increase in employment can significantly raise the marginal product of capital and the real interest
rate, so aggregate saving and investment will also increase.

Figure 6. Responses to Money Shock.

Kehoe, Levine, and Woodford (1992) argue that lump-sum money injections benefit cash-poor
agents through a distributive effect because cash-poor agents receive disproportionately larger trans-
fers than cash-rich agents. They argue that such a distributive effect may render inflation welfare-
improving. In the generalized Lucas (1980) model studied here, such effects exist only when money
injections are purely transitory and unanticipated.
9 Conclusion

This paper provides an analytically tractable general-equilibrium version of the Lucas (1980) model. The model makes predictions about monetary business cycle and the welfare costs of inflation that are quite different from those of the representative-agent literature. For example, (i) the velocity of money is significantly variable in a heterogeneous-agent CIA model, in contrast to the findings of Hodrick, Kocherlakota, and Lucas (1991) based on a representative-agent CIA framework; (ii) transitory lump-sum monetary injections have expansionary effects on aggregate consumption, employment, and output despite flexible prices, unlike the implications of the representative-agent assumption; and (iii) anticipated inflation can be potentially far more costly than indicated by the literature: with a sufficiently strong precautionary motive for cash holdings to match the interest elasticity of aggregate money demand and consumption inequality in the United States, households are willing to give up 10% to 15% of consumption to avoid 10% annual inflation. This number is also several times larger than implied by the LW (2005) model.

The first two findings are comparable to those in the Baumol-Tobin model (e.g., Alvarez, Atkeson, Edmond, 2009; Rotemberg, 1984; and others). The third finding, to the best of my knowledge, has not been shown within the Baumol-Tobin framework. The large welfare cost of inflation arises because (i) the precautionary insurance motive induces agents to hold an excessively large amount of cash, which raises the welfare cost of inflation due to an increased opportunity cost for holding non-interest-bearing assets; (ii) more importantly, inflation destroys the liquidity value of money and renders an increasingly larger fraction of the population without self-insurance. Such effects and mechanisms are not captured by representative-agent CIA models (e.g., Cooley and Hansen, 1989).\(^\text{23}\)

The ability to obtain closed-form solutions for the distribution of money demand is an additional contribution of this paper. The analytical intractability of the original Lucas (1980) model has limited its applicability and hence induced researchers (i) to use representative versions of that model for policy analysis or (ii) to rely almost exclusively on the Baumol-Tobin framework to study the issue of heterogeneous money demand and the associated policy implications. Hopefully, the analysis here may convince readers that the Lucas (1980) model can serve as a fruitful alternative to the Baumol-Tobin framework for optimal money demand and policy analysis.

Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1

Proof. The decision rules at the individual level are characterized by a cutoff strategy. We assume an interior solution for hours worked and use a guess-and-verify strategy to derive the decision rules of individuals. The key to the analysis is to show that the cutoff is independent of \( i \) in each period. In anticipation of this result, we denote the cutoff by \( \theta_t^* \) without the index \( i \). Consider two possible cases:

Case A: \( \theta_t(i) \leq \theta_t^* \). In this case, the urge to consume is low. Hence, it is optimal not to spend all cash in hand to buy consumption goods but carry the excess money as inventories for the future. Thus, \( c_t(i) \leq \frac{m_t(i)}{P_t} \), \( v_t(i) = 0 \), and equation (8) implies the shadow value of good \( \lambda_t(i) = \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{W_{t+1} P_{t+1}} \). Equation (4) implies \( c_t(i) = \theta_t(i) \left( \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} \right)^{-1} \). Using the definition in equation (1), the budget identity (2) then implies

\[
\frac{m_t(i)}{P_t} = x_t(i) - \theta_t(i) \left( \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} \right)^{-1}.
\]

The requirement \( \frac{m_t(i)}{P_t} \geq c_t(i) \) then implies \( x_t(i) \geq 2 \theta_t(i) \left( \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} \right)^{-1} \), or

\[
\theta_t(i) \leq \frac{1}{2} x_t(i) \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} = \theta_t^*,
\]

which defines the cutoff \( \theta_t^* \). This definition of \( \theta_t^* \) implies

\[
x_t(i) = 2 \theta_t^* \left( \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} \right)^{-1}.
\]

Hence, we have \( \frac{m_t(i)}{P_t} = \frac{(2 \theta_t^* - \theta_t(i))}{2 \theta_t^*} x_t(i) \) and \( c_t(i) = \frac{1}{2} \frac{\theta_t(i)}{\theta_t^*} x_t(i) \), which together imply \( c_t(i) = \frac{\theta_t(i)}{2 \theta_t^* - \theta_t(i)} \frac{m_t(i)}{P_t} \leq \frac{m_t(i)}{P_t} \).

Case B: \( \theta_t(i) > \theta_t^* \). In this case the urge to consume is high. It is then optimal to spend all cash in hand for consumption, so \( v_t(i) > 0 \) and \( c_t(i) = \frac{m_t(i)}{P_t} \). By the resource constraint (2), we have \( c_t(i) = \frac{1}{2} x_t(i) \), which by equation (51) implies \( c_t(i) = \theta_t^* \left( \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} \right)^{-1} \). Equations (4) and (6) then imply \( v_t(i) = \frac{\beta E_t P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} - \lambda_t(i) = \left( \frac{\theta_t(i)}{\theta_t^*} - 1 \right) \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} - v_t(i) \), which gives

\[
v_t(i) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\theta_t(i)}{\theta_t^*} - 1 \right) \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1} W_{t+1}} > 0.
\]
Hence, the shadow value of goods is given by

\[ \lambda_t(i) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\theta_t(i)}{\theta_t^*} + 1 \right) \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}W_{t+1}}. \tag{53} \]

Notice that the shadow price \( \lambda_t(i) \) is higher under Case B than under Case A.

The above analyses imply that the shadow price \( \lambda_t(i) \) takes two possible values associated with Case A and Case B, respectively. Hence, the expected shadow value of goods, \( \bar{E} \lambda_t(i) \), can be explicitly solved. Consequently, equation (5) becomes

\[ \frac{1}{W_t} = \beta E_t \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}W_{t+1}} R(\theta_t^*), \tag{54} \]

where

\[ R(\theta_t^*) \equiv \left[ \int_{\theta_t(i) \leq \theta_t^*} dF(\theta) + \int_{\theta_t(i) > \theta_t^*} \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\theta_t(i)}{\theta_t^*} + 1 \right) dF(\theta) \right]. \tag{55} \]

Equation (54) is equation (13) in Proposition 1. Equations (54) and (55) imply that the cutoff \( \theta_t^* \) is independent of \( i \) under the assumption that \( \theta(i) \) is i.i.d. Equation (50) then implies that the optimal cash in hand, \( x_t(i) \), is also independent of \( i \). Using equation (54), based on case A and case B, the decision rules of household \( i \)'s consumption, money holdings, and cash in hand are then summarized by equations (10)-(12), respectively. ■
References


[3] Algan, X. Ragot, 2010...


