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Working Paper 2007-024A
https://doi.org/10.20955/wp.2007.024

April 2007

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Trade and Child Labor: A General Equilibrium Analysis

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August, 2006

Abstract
This paper augments the existing literature on trade and child labor by exploring the effects of terms of trade changes in the context of a three good general equilibrium model, where one of the goods is a non-traded good. We find that under quasi-linear preferences the effect of the terms of trade on child labor depends critically on the pattern of substitutability (or complementarity) in the excess demand functions between the export good and the non-traded good. We extend the analysis to the case where factors move freely between the three goods as in a Heckscher-Ohlin type framework. Finally, we show that a balanced budget policy of taxing the education of skilled families and subsidizing the education of unskilled families must reduce child labor without any impact on aggregate welfare.

Keywords: Child Labor, Trade Sanctions, Terms of Trade, Non-Traded Goods.

JEL Classification: F1, O19.

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1. Introduction

The problem of child labor has occupied a central place in recent discussions on trade and development policy. Trade sanctions, import tariffs and product labeling (for example the Rugmark initiative in the carpet industry) have been proposed and in some instances, implemented, to reduce the extent of child labor. These sanctions have the effect of reducing the price of the exported good produced using child labor. The intended effect of this policy is to lower the demand for labor and thereby reduce the incentive to provide child labor. However, as Basu and Van (1998) have noted parents dislike child labor but have to endure it for generating household income. Therefore, a fall in the export price due to the sanction that leads to a lowering of the family income may induce the parents to offer more child labor. Since the substitution effect and the income effect go in opposite directions, it is unclear whether child labor may rise or fall due to a trade sanction.

Along with the theoretical literature on the issue there have been substantial empirical progress in recent times. A recent paper by Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) looks at the effect of change in rice price in Vietnam on child labor and finds that the income effect is the dominant factor. Indeed, they find that when the price of rice goes up, the supply of child labor is lower because of the income effect. The implication of this finding is that a trade sanction may actually end up raising child labor because of the strength of the income effect. Cigno et al. (2002) focuses on the effect of globalization on child labor. They point out that nations with child labor are heterogeneous. Some have a greater proportion of skilled labor than others. The ones that have a greater proportion of skilled labor can participate in trade more effectively (by supplying intermediate products etc.) with developed countries. The rise in wages in these developing countries will be for the relatively more educated workers, raising the skill premium and discouraging child labor. On the other hand,
countries that have a relative abundance of uneducated workers will see a rise in the unskilled wage through Stolper-Samuelson effects (as they face a greater demand due to globalization for their low skill intensive goods). For these countries there is more ambiguity regarding the effect of trade on child labor. The rise in the unskilled wage will raise the incentive to send children to work. However, as in Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005 and 2006), the wage hike will raise family incomes and may reduce child labor if it is considered undesirable by the family.\textsuperscript{5}

This paper provides a framework within which one can see the interplay between these effects. It also presents a model of skill formation in general equilibrium that highlights the role of the factors that may affect the choice between child labor and skill acquisition. An issue that is closely related to this discussion is the presence of alternate employment opportunities for child labor outside of the sector that is facing the trade sanction. In other words, a trade sanction may be ineffective because of at least two reasons: (i) the income effect; and, (ii), the general equilibrium interaction between the traded good and the alternate sector (say the non-traded service sector). The first has been discussed extensively in the literature. The second works as follows. A trade sanction on one of the sectors using child labor will tend to reduce its demand. However, the wage of child labor is also determined by the supply-demand condition in the non-traded sector. It is quite possible that the non-traded sector may soak up all the excess supply of child labor at the prevailing wage, leading to no impact of the sanction on child labor. Given the importance of the non-traded sector in hiring child labor in developing nations, this is an issue that should not be ignored. We propose a model that captures this general equilibrium linkage and lays down precise conditions under which a decline (or rise) in the terms of trade may reduce or raise child labor.\textsuperscript{6}

Our model pays close attention to some of the stylized facts pertaining to child labor. The
latest global count of child labor (ILO, 2002) is at 245.5 million children in the 5-17 age group in year 2000 of which 178.9 million children are engaged in hazardous work and unconditionally worst forms of child labor (as defined by ILO Convention 182, 1999) including forced and bonded labor, prostitution, etc.\(^7\) The problem is especially significant for Asia and the Pacific, with the highest count, and Sub-Saharan Africa, with the highest participation rate of working children. The agricultural sector employs most of the world’s children (about 70% of economically active children). The children often work long hours for low pay under difficult or hazardous working conditions. On the other hand, less than 17% of economically active children work in manufacturing, trade, hotels and restaurants, combined. According to ILO 2002, “The informal economy is a burgeoning field of economic activity to be found throughout the developing world as well as in transition and in some developed countries....The informal economy is where by far the most child laborers are found. It cuts across all economic sectors and may be closely linked to formal sector production”. The sector is typically characterized by a preponderance of small or micro establishments that are unregulated, untaxed with no formal employment relationships or any links to the formal institutions of a country.

We try to incorporate these institutional features in a three sector model of child labor where children may either work in Agriculture, or the Service sector. The Service sector is modeled here as producing a non-traded good. It is assumed that children do not work in the Manufacturing sector. Also, the Service sector produces a non-tradable good while those produced by Agriculture and Manufacturing may be traded. It may be useful to visualize this setup in terms of a Cocoa exporting country of Sub-Saharan Africa. Cocoa is the exportable commodity and its production routinely involves child labor in these nations. Children also work in the Service (non-traded) sector.
Suppose a sanction is imposed on cocoa exports, it will contract the cocoa sector and set off general equilibrium adjustments in the goods and factor markets. A-priori it is difficult to know the direction of these adjustments and their effects on child labor. Our model and analysis provides some insights on this issue.

We find that the effect of a change in the terms of trade on child labor critically depends on the pattern of substitutability (or complementarity) between the Service sector and the exportable sector. If the export good is a substitute (complement) for the non-traded good, then an improvement in the terms of trade must raise (reduce) child labor. This result is surprising because one expects that a trade sanction on the export good produced by child labor should lead to a reduction in child labor. Clearly, that is not true under complementarity. This result holds regardless of whether the sanction is imposed in period-1 or in period-2 (in this two period model). This may be explained as follows. Under substitutability between the traded sector and the non-traded sector, a sanction in period-1 that reduces price of the export good will reduce the excess demand for the non-traded good. Thus, the unskilled wage in that period must fall. This will lead to a greater incentive for skill acquisition and lead to lower child labor. A second period sanction has a similar effect on the second period unskilled wage. Of course, that raises the skill premium and raises the incentive to acquire skills, thereby reducing child labor. While sanctions in either period leads to lower child labor (under substitutability), they work through different channels. The first period sanction works through the cost side of the education decision. It reduces the opportunity cost of sending a child to school by lowering the first period wage. The second period sanction works through the benefit side of the equation. It raises the skill premium and encourages more children to acquire education, thereby reducing child labor.
Although terms of trade deterioration in both periods reduce child labor (under substitutability) their welfare implications differ. A first period sanction must reduce utility of the unskilled household while a second period sanction may raise it. In the former case a trade sanction reduces employment opportunities in the first period and reduces the unskilled wage in the first period. On the other hand, it raises the unskilled wage in the second period and reduces the premium from skill acquisition. Thus the labor hours that went off child labor in period-1 in response to the sanction do not benefit much from the education acquisition. On the other hand, a second period sanction reduces the unskilled wage in period-2 and raises the wage premium. This reduces child labor in period-1 and confers benefits (in period-2) to the children who have acquired education. Thus, a sanction in the future (that is effective in reducing child labor) may be better than a current sanction from the perspective of the unskilled families. A practical application may be to have pre-announced sanctions (to be imposed in future periods) on goods using child labor.\textsuperscript{10} Section-2 presents the basic model and the analysis. Section-3 discusses modeling choices that we have made and how our conclusions may be affected under alternate assumptions. Section-4 briefly discusses alternate policy choices outside the arena of trade policy that may yield better outcomes. Section-5 concludes.

2. The Model and Analysis

Let there be three representative households: skilled, unskilled and landowning. There are three goods, manufacturing ($M$), agriculture ($A$) and services ($V$) and two periods (1 and 2). $M$ and $A$ are traded by this small open economy.\textsuperscript{11} $V$ is a non-traded good. The landowners have an endowment of land $\bar{T}$ in both periods. They do not supply labor, have no children and simply consume their income from land. The skilled households are characterized by an endowment of
adult skilled labor $\bar{S}$ in period-1. These households have children all of whom acquire education (i.e., they supply no child labor). In period-2, the skilled adults (of period-1) retire and their children grow up to supply skilled labor. Unskilled households are characterized by adult unskilled labor $\bar{L}$ in period-1. Their children either perform child labor $(C_u)$ or acquire education. Adults in period-1 retire from the labor force in period-2. The children who receive education in period-1 grow up to be skilled adults in period-2. The child labor from period-1 grow up to be unskilled adults in period-2. Let $\theta$ be the number of children per unit of adult labor for both skilled and unskilled households. We also assume that there are no credit opportunities. So families spend what they earn in period-i, $(i = 1, 2)$.

Let the utility function of an unskilled household be described by $U$. Also, let $\beta(C_u)$ capture the disutility from child labor. The household discounts the future at the rate $\delta$. $M_t^u$, $A_t^u$ and $V_t^u$ are the $i$-th period consumption of the three goods by the unskilled household. Prices of the three goods in each of the two periods are given by $p_t^j$, where $i$ denotes period $(i = 1, 2)$ and $j$ denotes a good $(j = A, M$ or $V)$. The wage $w_t^j$ denotes the period-i wage of the j-th kind of labor: skilled $(j = s)$, unskilled $(j = u)$. Child labor is assumed to earn the unskilled wage. The cost of education for an unskilled (skilled) family is $e_u (e_s)$. It is the adult unskilled (skilled) labor time used up to provide successful education to their respective children. Unskilled households have the following optimization problem:

$$U^u(A_1^u, V_1^u, M_1^u, A_2^u, V_2^u, M_2^u, C_u) = U(A_1^u, V_1^u, M_1^u) - \beta(C_u) + \delta U(A_2^u, V_2^u, M_2^u),$$ (1a)

subject to the following constraints:

$$p_1^M M_1^u + p_1^A A_1^u + p_1^V V_1^u = w_1^u (\bar{L} - e_u (\theta \bar{L} - C_u)) + w_1^u C_u,$$ (1b)
\[ p_2^M M^u_2 + p_2^A A^u_2 + p_2^V V^u_2 = w_2^u(\theta \bar{L} - C_u) + w_2^u C_u. \]  

(1c)

We assume that the utility function is quasi-linear and takes the form:\(^{16}\)

\[ U(A^u_i, V^u_i, M^u_i) = u(A^u_i, V^u_i) + M^u_i, \ i = 1, 2. \]  

(1d)

The solution to this problem yields:

\[ u_1(A^u_i, V^u_i) = p_1^A, \ u_2(A^u_i, V^u_i) = p_2^V, \ u_1(A^u_i, V^u_i) = p_2^A, \text{ and } u_2(A^u_i, V^u_i) = p_2^V; \]  

(2a)

and, \( w_1^u(1 + e_u) + \delta(w_2^u - w_2^u) - (d \beta / d C_u) \leq 0, \) or, \( C_u = \theta \bar{L}. \) \(^{17}\)  

(2b)

If the inequality is strict, we have \( C_u = 0. \) With no child labor in unskilled households, we will not have a sensible child labor problem to consider. At the other extreme it is possible that all the children in the unskilled household are child laborers \( (C_u = \theta \bar{L}). \) These are uninteresting cases where marginal policy changes will not make a difference in reducing child labor or skill acquisition.

Therefore, we focus on the interior solution. In this case, we have a mix in unskilled households, with some children receiving education, and marginal policy changes having an impact on this mix.\(^{18}\)

On the production side, we assume that the economy is characterized by competitive firms producing the three goods. Good-\( M \) uses unskilled and skilled labor and is CRS in the two inputs. Skilled labor is specific to \( M. \) Good-\( A \) is CRS in land and unskilled labor. Land is specific to \( A \) and is given at the same level \( \bar{T} \) throughout our analysis. Thus, sector-\( A \) exhibits diminishing returns to unskilled labor. Good-\( V \) is assumed to be produced by unskilled labor only. The production functions are:

\[ M_i = M_i(L_i^M, S_i^M); \ A_i = A_i(L_i^A, \bar{T}) = f_i(L_i^A), \ a^2 f_i / d(L_i^A)^2 < 0; \ V_i = L_i^V, \ i = 1, 2. \]  

(3)

where \( M_i, A_i, \) and \( V_i \) are the production of the three goods in period-\( i. \) \( L_i^M, L_i^A, \) and \( L_i^V \) are the
unskilled labor used in $M$, $A$ and $V$, respectively, in period-$i$. $S_{i}^{M}$ is the skilled labor used in $M$ in period-$i$. $T_{i}$ is the land used in $A$ in each period. We assume that manufacturing employs unskilled adult labor only. Child labor is not used in the organized manufacturing sector but is used in agriculture and services.\(^{19}\) First period factor supply and demand must satisfy the following relationships:

\[
L_{1}^{M} + L_{1}^{A} + L_{1}^{V} = \bar{L} - e_{u} (\theta \bar{L} - C_{u}) + C_{u} ; \quad L_{1}^{A} = l_{1}^{A} + C_{u}^{A} ; \quad L_{1}^{V} = l_{1}^{V} + C_{u}^{V} ,
\]

\[
S_{1}^{M} = \bar{S} (1 - e_{u} \theta) , \text{ and, } T_{1}^{A} = \bar{T} .
\] (4a)

where, $(l_{1}^{A}, C_{u}^{A})$ and $(l_{1}^{V}, C_{u}^{V})$ are the combinations of child and adult labor used in $A$ and $V$, respectively, in period-1. Note that in period-2 the unskilled labor force is simply the child labor of period-1 who are now adults. The skilled labor are the educated children from period-1. There is no child labor in period-2. Thus:

\[
L_{2}^{M} + L_{2}^{A} + L_{2}^{V} = C_{u} , \text{ and, } S_{2}^{M} = \theta (\bar{L} + \bar{S}) - C_{u} , \quad T_{2}^{A} = \bar{T} .
\] (4b)

Competitive profit maximization yields:

\[
w_{i}^{v} = p_{i}^{v} ; \text{ and, } \quad C_{i}^{M} (w_{i}^{v}, w_{i}^{v}) = 1 ; \quad i = 1, 2.
\] (5a)

$C_{i}^{M} (.)$ is the marginal cost function of sector-$M$. (5a) implies that:

\[
w_{i}^{v} = w_{i}^{v} (w_{i}^{v}) , \quad i = 1, 2.
\] (5b)

Using (5a) and (5b) in (2b) and focusing on the interior solution, we have:

\[
p_{i}^{v} (1 + e_{u}) + \delta \{ p_{2}^{v} - w_{2}^{v} (p_{2}^{v}) \} - (d \beta / d C_{u}) = 0 .
\] (6a)

(6a) implicitly defines (suppressing $\delta$):

\[
C_{u} = C_{u} (p_{1}^{v}, p_{2}^{v}, e_{u}) .
\] (6b)
Now consider the demand for the non-traded good. Under the assumption of quasi-linearity in $M$ and identical utility functions across all households, and noting the structure of first order conditions in (2a) we recognize that the demand for the non-traded good in period-i must be a function of the prices of $A$ and $V$ in that period only. Thus the market demand for $V^D$ in period-i is given by:

$$V^{Di}(p_1^A, p_i^V) = V^s_i(p_1^A, p_i^V) + V^u_i(p_1^A, p_i^V) + V^T_i(p_1^A, p_i^V).$$

(7)

Noting relations (4a), (4b) and (6b), and denoting $C_u(p_1^V, p_2^V, e_u)$ by $C_u(.)$, the revenue function describing the supply side in periods 1 and 2 (suppressing $T$) are:

$$R^1 = R^1[p_1^A, p_1^V, p_1^M, \bar{L}(1-e_u, \theta) + C_u(.) (1+e_u, \bar{S}(1-e, \theta)], \text{and},$$

$$R^2 = R^2[p_2^A, p_2^V, p_2^M, C_u(\theta(\bar{L} + \bar{S}) - C_u(.)].$$

(8)

The supply function for the non-traded good in the two periods are $\partial R^i / \partial p_i^V$ ($i = 1, 2$). Thus, the equilibrium in the non-traded market in period-1 requires that:

$$V^{Di}(p_1^A, p_1^V) = \partial R^1 / \partial p_1^V; \text{ or,}$$

$$V^{Di}(p_1^A, p_1^V) = R^1[p_1^A, p_1^V, p_1^M, \bar{L}(1-e_u, \theta) + C_u(.) (1+e_u, \bar{S}(1-e, \theta)].$$

(9)

where $R_i^j(.)$ is the partial derivative of the revenue function in the $j$-th period with respect to the $i$-th argument (i.e., $R_2^1$ is the supply of $V$ in period-1). Suppressing the labor endowments and the parameter $\theta$ and noting that $p_i^M$ is fixed at unity, (9) implicitly defines:

$$p_1^V = p_1^V(p_1^A, p_2^V, e_u, e_s).$$

(10)

Period-2 equilibrium in the non-traded market requires that:

$$V^{D2}(p_2^A, p_2^V) = R^2[p_2^A, p_2^V, p_2^M, C_u(\theta(\bar{L} + \bar{S}) - C_u[,]

(11)

where, using (10), $C_u = C_u(p_1^V, p_2^V, e_u) = C_u(p_1^V(p_1^A, p_2^V, e_u, e_s), p_2^V, e_u)$. Relation-(11) implicitly
defines:

\[ p_2^\nu = p_2^\nu (p_1^A, p_2^A, e_u, e_s). \]  \hfill (12)

Relation (12) completes the description of the model. The small country takes the prices of good-\( A \) (in the two periods) to be given. Therefore, \( p_2^\nu \) can be solved from (12), and this allows us to solve for \( p_1^\nu \) from (10). Working backwards we can solve for the other endogenous variables.

Section 2.1: Improvement in the terms of trade in period-1 (i.e., rise in \( p_1^A \))

Proposition 1\textsuperscript{21}

An improvement in the terms of trade in period-1 must raise (reduce) child labor if \( V \) is a substitute (complement) for \( A \) in that period. If \( A \) and \( V \) are substitutes in period-1, a rise in \( p_1^A \) raises \( p_1^\nu \) (and hence \( w_1^u \)), reduces \( p_2^\nu \) (and \( w_2^u \)) and must raise \( w_1^t \). The utility effect is ambiguous in general.

If the first period consumption of goods \( A \) and \( V \) is sufficiently small, utility of the unskilled families must rise (under substitutability between \( A \) and \( V \)).

Comment: The direct effect of a rise in \( p_1^A \) is to reduce utility because of a rise in the price of a consumption good for the unskilled families. On the other hand, note that \( p_1^\nu \) and \( p_2^\nu \) are endogenous and thus there are indirect effects on utility that work through these variables.

Assuming substitutability, a rise in \( p_1^A \) raises \( p_1^\nu \) (and hence \( w_1^u \)), reduces \( p_2^\nu \) (and thus \( w_2^u \)) and raises \( w_1^t \). Unskilled households benefit from a rise in the wage income in period-1, are hurt by the loss of unskilled wage income from period-2 but benefit in that period from a higher skilled wage earned by the educated members of the family. As we show above, the beneficial effects dominate, assuming consumption of \( A \) and \( V \) are sufficiently small for these families. \( \blacksquare \)
Section-2.2: Improvement in the terms of trade in period-2 (i.e., rise in $p_2^A$)

Proposition-2

An improvement in the terms of trade in period-2 must raise (reduce) child labor if $V$ is a substitute (complement) for $A$ in that period. If $A$ and $V$ are substitutes in period-2, a rise in $p_2^A$ reduces $p_1^V$ (and hence $w_1^v$), raises $p_2^V$ (and $w_2^v$) and must reduce $w_2^s$. If the first period consumption of $V$ is sufficiently small, utility of the unskilled families may fall.

Comment: It is interesting to compare and contrast the implications of the two propositions. Both suggest that a terms of trade improvement in a particular period will lead to a rise in child labor if and only if the non-traded good is a substitute for the export good in the respective period. An implication of this finding is that a trade sanction (in either period) on nations using child labor will lead to a reduction in child labor if and only if the respective substitutability conditions are satisfied. However, the utility effects (on unskilled families) of the sanctions in the two periods under substitutability (i.e., in the situation when the sanction is effective in reducing child labor) may be opposite. If we ignore the consumption effects (i.e., assume that $A_i^n$, $V_1^n$, $A_s^n$, and, $V_2^n$ are zero), a first period sanction must reduce utility. On the other hand, a second period sanction that reduces $p_2^A$, must raise $p_1^V$, and the unskilled utility. This effect may dominate the other effects and lead to a net rise in unskilled utility. The intuition follows. A first period terms of trade improvement raises employment and the unskilled wage. On the other hand, it reduces the unskilled wage in the second period and raises the premium from skill acquisition. The unskilled families gain on both counts and these effects dominate the others. On the other hand, a second period terms of trade gain raises the unskilled wage in period-2 and has the effect of reducing the skill premium
as well as reducing the first period unskilled wage. The two latter effects dominate and dictate the negative utility impact. ■

3. Modeling Choices and Relevance of Modeling Assumptions

3.1: The Model Without the Non-Traded Good but with Quasi-Linear Preferences

We highlight the role of the non-traded good in our analysis by providing a specific factor model along the lines of section-2 with one important difference - the absence of the non-traded good. Let utility function for all households be quasi-linear of the following form:

\[
U(M_i, A_i, C_u) = u(A_i) + M_i - \beta(C_u) ; \ i = 1;
\]

\[
= u(A_i) + M_i ; \quad i = 2. \tag{13}
\]

where \(u(\cdot)\) is strictly concave. Relation-(2b) carries over to this context. Therefore:

\[
C_u = C_u[w_1^u, w_2^u, w_2^v(w_2^u)]. \tag{14a}
\]

Using (14a) and suppressing \(e_u\) and \(e_s\), note that:

\[
w_1^u = R_1^u[p_1^M, p_1^A, \bar{L}(1 - e_u \theta) + C_u(\cdot)(1 + e_s), \bar{S}(1 - e_s \theta)] = w_1^u(p_1^A, w_2^u) , \text{ and,}
\]

\[
w_2^u = R_2^u[p_2^M, p_2^A, C_u(\cdot), \theta(\bar{L} + \bar{S}) - C_u(\cdot)] = w_2^u(p_1^A, p_2^A); \quad p_1^M = p_2^M = 1. \tag{15}
\]

Using (15) in (14a):

\[
C_u = C_u[w_1^u(p_1^A, w_2^u), w_2^u, w_2^v(w_2^u)]. \tag{14b}
\]

Using (14b):

\[
dC_u / dp_1^A = (\partial C_u / \partial w_1^u)(\partial w_1^u / \partial p_1^A) + \mu(dw_2^u / dp_1^A), \tag{16a}
\]

where, \(\mu = (\partial C_u / \partial w_1^u)(\partial w_1^u / \partial w_2^u) + (\partial C_u / \partial w_2^u)(\partial w_2^u / \partial w_2^u) > 0; \ dw_2^u / dp_1^A < 0; \)

\(\partial C_u / \partial w_1^u > 0; \) and, \(\partial w_2^u / \partial p_1^A > 0. \) It can be shown that [noting the concavity of \(R(\cdot)\) in the
endowment vector]

\[
(\frac{\partial C_u}{\partial w_i^u})(\frac{\partial w_i^u}{\partial p_i^A}) + \mu(\frac{\partial w_i^u}{\partial p_i^A}) = \left[(\frac{\partial C_u}{\partial w_i^u})(\frac{\partial w_i^u}{\partial p_i^A})/\left(1 + \mu(R_{34}^2 - R_{35}^2)\right)\right] > 0
\]

\[
\Rightarrow \frac{\partial C_u}{\partial p_i^A} > 0. \quad (16b)
\]

Similarly,

\[
\frac{\partial C_u}{\partial p_2^A} = \mu(\frac{\partial w_2^u}{\partial p_2^A}) > 0, \quad \text{because,} \quad (16c)
\]

\[\mu > 0, \text{ and because it can also be shown that } \frac{\partial w_2^u}{\partial p_2^A} > 0. \text{ It is important to maintain the assumption of quasi-linearity for (16b) and (16c). If we relax quasi-linearity and move to homotheticity, these derivatives cannot be signed unambiguously.} \]

**Proposition-3**

Under quasi-linear preferences, a terms of trade improvement in either period-1 or period-2 will necessarily raise child labor.

**Proof and Comment:**

The discussion above provides the proof. This proposition is important as a benchmark. It shows that the presence of the non-traded good is crucial to our analysis. Without it, a terms of trade improvement leads to an unambiguous rise in child labor. Quasi-linearity also plays a role as it isolates the price effects. Without it, income effects come into play and it is possible that child labor may decrease in response to a terms of trade improvement even in the absence of a non-traded good. ■

**3.2: The Model With Intersectoral Factor Mobility**

In this section we consider production characterized by the three sectors, all using three factors, unskilled labor, skilled labor and land. The production functions are CRS. Competitive
profit maximization conditions yield:

\[ p_i^j = C_{i}^j (w_i^w, w_i^i, w_i^T); \text{ and, } \ p_2^j = C_{2}^j (w_2^w, w_2^i, w_2^T); j = V, M \text{ and } A. \]  (17)

Using (17) and the normalized prices: \( p_i^A = p_i^M = p_2^M = 1 \), we have:

\[ w_i^w = w_i^w (1, 1, p_i^V) = w_i^w (p_i^V); \ w_i^w = w_i^{w} (1, p_2^A, p_2^A) = w_i^{w} (p_2^A, p_2^A); \text{ and, } \]

\[ w_i^w = w_i^w (1, p_2^A, p_2^A) = w_i^w (p_2^A, p_2^A). \]  (18)

Using (17), (18) and the interior solution for (2b):

\[ w_i^w (p_i^V) (1 + e_u) + \delta \{ w_i^w (p_2^A, p_2^A) - w_i^w (p_2^A, p_2^A) \} - (d \beta / d C_u) = 0. \]  (19)

Relation-(19) implies that:

\[ C_u = C_u (p_i^V, p_2^A, p_2^A). \]  (20)

Using (20) and the first period equilibrium for the non-traded good, we have:

\[ p_i^V = p_i^V (p_2^A, p_2^A). \]  (21)

Using (20) and (21) in the second period equilibrium condition, we get:

\[ p_2^V = p_2^V (p_2^A). \]  (22)

It is easy to check that \( dp_2^V / dp_2^A > 0 \), if \( V \) is a substitute for \( A \) in period-2. Using (20) through (22):

\[ dC_u / dp_2^A = X (dp_2^V / dp_2^A) + Y, \text{ where, } X = (\partial C_u / \partial p_1^V) (\partial p_1^V / \partial p_2^A) + \partial C_u / \partial p_2^A; \text{ and, } \]

\[ Y = (\partial C_u / \partial p_1^V) (\partial p_1^V / \partial p_2^A) + \partial C_u / \partial p_2^A. \]  (23)

Let us now make the following assumptions:\(^{23}\) (1). In sectors \( M, A \) and \( V \), the largest shares of income belong to skilled labor, landowners and unskilled labor, respectively; (2). Technology is CRS and Cobb-Douglas in both periods in all the three sectors:
\[ M = (L_M)^\beta (S_M)^\alpha (T_M)^\alpha \quad \text{and} \quad A = (L_A)^\beta (S_A)^\alpha (T_A)^\alpha \quad \text{and} \quad V = (L_V)^\alpha (S_V)^\beta (T_V)^\beta , \]

where, \( \alpha > \beta \), and, \( \alpha + 2\beta = 1 \).

Clearly, shares of skilled labor in \( M \), unskilled labor in \( V \) and land income in \( A \) all equal \( \alpha \). All other factor shares equal \( \beta \). Using this functional form we can show:

\[ \frac{\partial w_1}{\partial p_1^M} > 0 ; \quad \frac{\partial w_2}{\partial p_2^M} > 0 ; \quad \frac{\partial w_2}{\partial p_2^V} < 0 ; \quad (\frac{\partial w_2}{\partial p_2^A}) - (\frac{\partial w_2}{\partial p_2^V}) > 0 \quad (24) \]

Using (24), we can show that: \( X \) and \( Y \) are both positive. Thus, assuming substitutability, (23) implies that: \( \frac{dC_u}{dp_2^A} > 0 \). On the other hand, since \( Y > 0 \), (23) suggests that under complementarity the sign of \( \frac{dC_u}{dp_2^A} \) is ambiguous.

**Proposition-4**

In a 3x3 Heckscher-Ohlin type model characterized by Cobb-Douglas technology with equal factor shares between non-intensive factors, a terms of trade improvement in period-2 leads to an increase in child labor if the non-traded labor intensive good is a substitute for the land intensive export good. If it is a complement, then the effect of the terms of trade on child labor is ambiguous.

**Proof and Comment:**

Relations (23) and (24) provide the proof. Under substitutability, our finding from proposition-1 in the text carries over to a 3x3 Heckscher-Ohlin context. However, the result is altered under complementarity to some degree. In section-2, for a given \( p_1^A \) and \( p_2^V \), relation-(10) implied that \( p_1^V \) is fixed. Thus, (6b) implied that \( C_u \) is given if \( p_1^A \) and \( p_2^V \) are held constant. This is not the case in the H-O model. Even if \( p_1^A \) and \( p_2^V \) are held constant, a rise in \( p_2^A \) will change both
\( p_t^v \) and \( C_v \). This is captured by the term \( Y \) in (23). To that extent, proposition-1 is modified under complementarity. ■

Section-4: Changes in Costs of Education for Unskilled and Skilled Families (i.e., changes in \( e_u \) and \( e_s \))

Proposition-5\(^{24}\)

A rise (fall) in the education cost for the skilled (unskilled) households reduces child labor. An education tax on skilled families that finances education subsidies for unskilled families must reduce child labor with no impact on aggregate welfare.\(^{25}\)

Comment:

The education subsidy works as follows.\(^{26}\) Recall that we model the cost of educating children as time costs for the respective households.\(^{27}\) Therefore, a subsidy for unskilled households for education takes the form of a reduction in \( e_u \). A fall in \( e_u \) has two effects, both of which reduce child labor by lowering the effective cost of education as described in (2b). First, it raises the labor available for production in period-1. This expands production in \( V \), reduces \( p_t^v (= w_t^v) \) and hence the cost of education. Second, it lowers the effective cost of education directly as is clear on inspection of relation-(6b). On the other hand, the tax that finances the education subsidy raises the time costs for educating the children from skilled families. The corresponding rise in \( e_s \) reduces the amount of skilled labor available to the economy (for production) in period-1. As skilled labor used in production falls, sector-\( M \) contracts. More unskilled labor is available for the non-traded sector. At given prices production in \( V \) must expand, the excess supply reduces \( p_t^v (= w_t^v) \). As \( p_t^v \) is reduced, the effective marginal cost [i.e., \( p_t^v (1 + e_u) \)] of acquiring
education for the unskilled family falls. Therefore, more children acquire education (i.e., \( C_u \) must fall). ■

In view of proposition-5, a balanced budget tax-subsidy scheme has no trade-offs vis-à-vis child labor, since the tax (on the skilled) actually accentuates the reduction of child labor that will be obtained by providing the subsidy.\(^{28}\) In contrast to a trade sanction, this policy has no adverse welfare effect (on aggregate).

5. Conclusion

This paper complements the existing literature on the subject of child labor by discussing the role of the non-traded sector in a general equilibrium model. We derive qualitative results on when one may expect terms of trade movements to aggravate or reduce the incidence of child labor and also explore the income distribution effects of such changes. The results seem to be fairly robust to alternate model specifications. The analysis casts doubts about the wisdom of using trade sanctions to control child labor. Instead, we suggest that education policies that finance the education of unskilled households by taxing the education of skilled households are effective in reducing child labor and may cause no reduction in aggregate welfare. ■
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Endnotes:

1. We would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks are also due to Arnab Basu, Eric Bond, Nancy Chau, Sajal Lahiri, Arvind Panagariya and to seminar participants at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale and IZA, Bonn for their helpful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.

2. See Labeling Child Labour Products by Hilowitz (1998). Also, see Basu et al. (2005) for a general equilibrium analysis of the effects of social labeling in the context of the child labor problem.

3. Besides the papers discussed above, some other widely cited theoretical contributions are Baland and Robinson (2000), Ranjan (2001) and Jafarey and Lahiri (2002), among others.

4. In a related paper, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2006) explore this issue with cross-country evidence. Their findings suggest that a greater degree of openness of a nation is associated with lower child labor. When they control for income differences between nations, they find “...no evidence of a substantive or statistically significant association between trade and child labor.” Therefore, the conclusion is that greater openness leads to higher incomes, reducing the incidence of child labor. As in their other paper, the role of income in determining child labor is of critical importance.

5. This paper is more closely related to the household level analysis of Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) rather than to the cross country studies of Drenovsky (1992), Shelburne (2001) and Cigno et al. (2002). While the income effect of a price change is crucial to Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005), it is the cross substitution effect that is the central to this paper.

6. To show this substitution possibility for child workers the model introduces the non-traded
good. This alternate sector where child labor is employed is central to our analysis. Proposition 3 of the paper shows that if we drop this good (while retaining the rest of the model), we lose the central result. On the other hand, quasi-linearity of preferences which is assumed in section-2 is less important. If this assumption is relaxed by allowing for homothetic preferences (see Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay, 2006, henceforth BB) we obtain qualitatively similar results. It is, however, quite useful to assume quasi-linearity to make our point, because it allows us to focus on price effects by ruling out income effects. If we allow for the latter, it is not difficult to see (based on the existing literature) that trade sanctions may raise child labor. We also assume that skilled households do not send children to work. This assumption is investigated in detail in BB.

7. There were 351.7 million economically active children in the world in year 2000. Of these 245.5 million count as child labour that need to be abolished (see ILO Conventions 138, 1973 and 182, 1999). For a recent analysis of bonded child labor, see Basu and Chau (2004). An interesting finding of their paper is that although in the short run trade sanctions may reduce the incidence of child labor, in the long run its effect may be zero (or negligible). In addition, they find that the welfare impact of such a sanction is unambiguously negative for agrarian households.

8. Under complementarity, the excess demand for the non-traded good rises and therefore there are two opposing effects on the demand for child labor. In general, the fall in demand in the traded sector may be offset by the rise in demand by the non-traded sector with ambiguous effect on the net final demand for child labor. Our model structure is designed to highlight this possibility and presents a case where the rise or fall in child labor in response to a terms of trade
movement depends precisely on the nature of substitutability in excess demand functions.

9. We should note that the generality of these findings may be limited by the two-period nature of this model. For example, a second period sanction can have an impact on the third generation which we do not account for. Second, pre-announced carrots and sticks have the usual credibility problem. Also, in this model, the time inconsistency problem may be pronounced because a second-period sanction affects first-period child labor.

10. Two policy documents (Srivastava, 2003, and UNICEF-ILQ, 2004) are informative in this regard. Both show that threat of trade sanctions based on a proposed law (i.e., Harkin Bill in the US, Child Labor Deterrence Act, 1993 - this was never passed) was enough to reduce the incidence of child labor in the Bangladesh Garment industry.

11. We assume that this is a small open economy which exports $A$ and imports $M$. Therefore, the prices of $A$ and $M$ are exogenous to the model. However, the price of $V$ is endogenously determined. $M$ is assumed to be the numeraire good and we further assume that its price is constant between the two periods. Thus, the price of $M$ in both periods is set to unity. Changes in terms of trade are exogenous changes in the price of $A$ in either period-1 or period-2 (or both).

12. We believe this to be a sensible depiction of reality in developing nations. For example, children from educated middle class or upper class families in India do not work as child labor. It is extremely unusual for an affluent family to send its children to work as unskilled labor - the explanation may lie in the history or in social norms. Also, as a referee points out, although we do not model the possibility of credit in this paper, it may play a role in reality. It may be easier for richer families to obtain credit to educate their children and this will reduce their incentive to send children to work.
13. The issue of credit markets has already been explored in the literature by Jafarey and Lahiri (2002). Similarly the issue of survival has been explored by Basu and Van (1998). Extensions of our model can incorporate these. However, we choose to focus on other issues in this paper.  
14. We assume that marginal disutility from child labor is positive and increasing in it (i.e., $d \beta / dC_u$ and $d^2 \beta / dC_u^2$ are both positive).  
15. The optimization problems for the other households may be similarly derived. The important difference is that they are assumed not to supply any child labor.  
16. The analysis is extended to the case of homothetic utility functions in BB.  
17. BB analyzes a similar problem for skilled households and show that skilled families do not send their children to work as long as they face: (1) lower effective costs of educating their children; and, (2) if the social stigma attached to sending their children to work is sufficiently high.  
18. In reality, there is heterogeneity in this category. An affluent slum dweller may send his children to school at least part time. On the other hand, the poorest of the slum dwellers are unlikely to afford that luxury. There are people in between who may fit in well in terms of making marginal choices depending on their access to education. We felt that a good compromise in our modeling is to lump these into the unskilled category and consider the choice between school and work as a marginal decision.  
19. This fits reality in the sense that most formal manufacturing units will comply with labor laws and not hire child labor. On the other hand the Service sector and Agriculture in developing nations are not monitored carefully and child labor exists in these sectors.  
20. $V^s$ and $V^T$ are the demand functions for the non-traded good by the skilled households and
landowners, respectively. Their choice rules are similar to relation (2a).

21. Proofs of propositions 1 and 2 are in Appendix-B of BB.

22. The conditions that underline this model and these results are: (i) the cost of education is tied entirely to the adult wages; (ii) there are no credit market imperfections; and, (iii) the skilled do not send their children to work. However, for unskilled families a lowering of the unskilled wage, and hence the opportunity cost of education may not be sufficient to generate a decline in child labor if there is a fixed cost of education (not tied to wages) and /or households need to maintain a subsistence level of income (a la Basu and Van, 1998).

23. We know from Ethier (1984) and other related contributions that it is not easy to generalize Stolper-Samuelson type results in higher dimensions without imposing further restrictions. Therefore, to highlight our central results without getting into the details of higher dimensional issues, we choose to use a reasonable special case for our purpose.

24. The proof is presented in Appendix-B of BB.

25. In contrast, it is easily seen that a trade sanction (in either period) must reduce aggregate welfare through the adverse terms of trade effect.

26. We assume that the education budget is balanced through a tax-subsidy scheme that requires: 
\[(w_i^s \theta S)t_s = w^\alpha_s(\theta \bar{L} - C_u)s_u\]; where \(t_s\) is a unit tax on time resources spent by skilled labor to educate their children and \(s_u\) is a corresponding subsidy to unskilled households.

27. This is a convenient modeling tool in a real trade model. However, it does need a caveat. The tax-subsidy scheme has the effect of reducing the time cost for unskilled households and raising it for skilled households. This raises the supply of unskilled labor for production and reduces the period-1 unskilled wage. Therefore, child labor falls on two counts, direct and
indirect. First, the subsidy reduces the direct cost of acquiring education and reduces child labor.

Second, the fall in \( w^e \) reduces the opportunity cost (or indirect cost) of acquiring education.

This will also tend to reduce child labor. If we model this scheme differently, so that the tax-subsidy policy does not directly affect the labor supply for production, this second effect may either be absent or modified.

28. A referee points out that this result may not extend to a dynamic setting. A tax on skilled labor is a disincentive for acquiring skill in a multi-period setting. For example, consider a three period model. In this case, in period-1 you know that in period-2 you will be taxed more if you are skilled (to pay for education of your children so that they become skilled adults in period-3). This effectively reduces the skill premium for period-2. In such a setting, it is not clear that this tax-subsidy scheme will necessarily reduce child labor.