A Model of Near-Rational Exuberance*

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Abstract

We study how the use of judgement or “add-factors” in forecasting may disturb the set of equilibrium outcomes when agents learn using recursive methods. We isolate conditions under which new phenomena, which we call exuberance equilibria, can exist in a standard self-referential environment. Local indeterminacy is not a requirement for existence. We construct a simple asset pricing example and find that exuberance equilibria, when they exist, can be extremely volatile relative to fundamental equilibria.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Judgement variables in forecasting

Judgement is a fact of life in macroeconomic forecasting. It is widely understood that even the most sophisticated econometric forecasts are adjusted before presentation. This adjustment is so pervasive that it is known as the use of “add-factors”—subjective changes to the forecast which depend on the forecaster’s assessment of special circumstances that are not well summarized by the variables that are included in the econometric model.\(^1\) Recently, some authors have argued that economic theory needs to take explicit account of the effects of judgement on the behavior of macroeconomic systems.\(^2\)

We wish to think of the news or add-factor that modifies the forecast as a qualitative, unique, commonly understood economy-wide variable. An example of a judgemental adjustment is suggested by Reifschneider, et al. (1997), when they discuss the “financial headwinds” that were thought to be inhibiting U.S. economic growth in the early to mid-1990s. As they discuss, the headwinds add-factor was used to adjust forecasts over a period of many quarters. It was communicated to the public prominently in speeches by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. It was thus widely understood throughout the economy and was highly serially correlated. This is the type of variable we have in mind, although by no means would we wish to restrict attention to this particular example. Other examples might include the Y2K millenium bug, or the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., as well as a host of more minor events thought to influence economic performance. We think add-factoring is occurring continuously.

Conventional wisdom among economists suggests that judgement is all to the good in macroeconomic forecasting. Models are, of course, crude approximations of reality and must be supplemented with other information not contained in the model. While we motivate our ideas in terms of macro-

\(^1\)See Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox (1997) for a discussion of the extent of judgemental adjustment in macroeconomic forecasting at the Federal Reserve.

economic forecasting, our framework applies more generally to economic environments where expectations and qualitative judgements about the effects of unique events play an important role.

1.2 Feedback from judgement

Our focus in this paper is on how the add-factor or judgemental adjustment of forecasts may create more problems than it solves. In particular, we study ways in which judgemental adjustment may become self-fulfilling.

We study macroeconomic models in which expectations play an important role. Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), we replace the rational expectations assumption with one of recursive learning. This involves the assignment of a well-chosen perceived law of motion, an econometric forecasting model, to the agents. We supplement that model with a qualitative, judgemental adjustment variable and study the resulting dynamics.

The main contribution of the paper is to define the concept of an exuberance equilibrium. We impose three requirements on the judgementally-adjusted system to define this concept. The first is that any equilibrium reached is a rational expectations equilibrium with limited information. For this we use the consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE) concept. The second is a Nash equilibrium in the inclusion of judgement—given that all agents are using judgementally adjusted forecasts, no agent wishes to discontinue using the judgemental adjustment. The last requirement is expectational stability or learnability of the equilibrium.

In this paper we do not discuss policy applications. For a discussion of some of the implications for monetary policy the reader is referred to related work in Bullard, Evans, and Honkapohja (2007).

1.3 Near-rationality

Our Nash equilibrium does not correspond exactly to a rational expectations equilibrium. This is because the judgement variable is assumed to be unavail-

\footnote{See Sargent (1991), Marcet and Sargent (1995) and Hommes and Sorger (1998).}
able in the statistical part of the forecasting. We think of this as reflecting the separation of the econometric forecasting unit from the actual decision makers. Decision makers treat the econometric forecast as an input to which they are free to add the judgement variable. The judgementally adjusted forecasts are the basis for the decisions and actions of the agents, but the adjustments are not observables directly available to the econometricians.

In other words, we are assuming that the judgement variable is not one that can be extracted by the econometric forecasting unit and converted into a statistical time series that can formally be utilized in an econometric forecasting model. In a similar vein the decision makers face a dichotomy in their use of judgement: they either incorporate the variable as an add-factor or they ignore it and directly use the econometric forecast. This inability of the decision makers to transmit to the econometric forecasters in a quantitative way the judgemental aspects behind their final economic decisions is the source of the deviation from full rational expectations and the reason for our use of the term “near-rationality.”

1.4 Main findings

We isolate conditions under which exuberance equilibria exist in a standard dynamic framework in which the state of the system depends on expectations of future endogenous variables. We show that exuberance equilibria exhibit higher asymptotic variance of the endogenous variable than the standard rational expectations equilibrium. As an application we study a simple univariate asset-pricing model. We interpret the exuberance equilibrium in

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4 The term “near rationality” has been used elsewhere in the literature, often to mean less-than-full maximization of utility. See, for example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Caballero (1995). Ball (2000) analyzes a model where the agents use a forecasting model that does not encompass the equilibrium law of motion—a “restricted perception.” Our concept is based on full optimization but subject to the restriction that some information is not quantifiable—“judgement.” Our concept of near rationality is discussed further in Section 5.2.

5 The standard rational expectations equilibrium is also an equilibrium solution in our framework.
the asset-pricing model as an example of “excess volatility.”

Our results may lead one to view the possibility of exuberance equilibria as particularly worrisome, as exuberance equilibria may exist even in otherwise benign circumstances. In particular, we show that exuberance is a clear possibility even in the case where the underlying rational expectations equilibrium is unique (a.k.a. determinate). Thus an interesting and novel finding is the possibility of “sunspot-like” equilibria, but without requiring that the underlying rational expectations equilibrium of the model is indeterminate. In a sense, we find “sunspot-like” equilibria without indeterminacy.

2 Economies with judgemental adjustment

2.1 Overview

We study systems in which agents use recursive algorithms to learn equilibria. These systems can converge to a rational expectations equilibrium provided certain conditions are met. The conditions are outlined in some detail in Evans and Honkapohja (2001), and the key condition is known as expectational stability. In this paper, we alter the econometric model that the agents use to forecast in order to allow them to use judgemental adjustment.

We consider a scalar model

\[ y_t = \beta y_{t+1} + u_t \] (1)

in which \( \beta \) is a scalar parameter, \( u_t \) is stochastic, and \( y_t \) is the state of the system. This type of equation often describes economies linearized at a steady state. We have normalized the steady state component to zero,

\(^6\)“Exuberance” (which in our equilibria leads to both positive and negative deviations from the fundamentals solution) has a long informal tradition as a potential explanation of asset price “bubbles.” For its possible role in “financial fragility” see Lagunoff and Schreft (1999).

\(^7\)Indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria are distinct concepts, as discussed in Benhabib and Farmer (1999). We consider only linear models, for which the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria requires indeterminacy—see for example Propositions 2 and 3 of Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991).
so there is no constant term. We use the notation $y_{t+1}^e$ to represent the expectations of the agents in the model, which may initially be non-rational. These expectations are formed through the use of an econometric model, and the expectations from this model are denoted by $E_t^* y_{t+1}$. We then add a judgemental adjustment variable to this econometric forecast, denoted by $\xi_t$. Thus expectations are given by

$$y_{t+1}^e = E_t^* y_{t+1} + \xi_t. \quad (2)$$

Without the addition of judgement, this system would be the same as the systems analyzed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001). For those systems, convergence properties are well-established. Our goal in this paper is to understand how the addition of judgemental adjustment may influence convergence properties and lead to the existence of new equilibria in the economy.

### 2.2 The nature of judgemental adjustment

The judgemental add-factor allows the agent to adjust the forecast in response to qualitative, unique events that may have an impact on the economy. Let us denote the qualitative “news” as $\eta_t$. This news is thought to have an impact on $y_{t+1}$ which is not captured by the econometric forecast $E_t^* y_{t+1}$. The impact will persist for some time, which we denote by

$$\frac{\partial y_{t+1+j}}{\partial \eta_t} = \psi_{t,j}, \text{ for } j = 1, 2, 3, \ldots$$

The $\eta_t$ can be viewed as having two components. The first is the impact from new qualitative events, and the second is news concerning the impact from qualitative events that occurred in the recent past but whose impact has not yet completely dissipated. We assume $\eta_t$ follows a martingale difference sequence; we will assume it is white noise. Zero may be a common value for $\eta_t$.

Since we are talking about unique, qualitative events, the impact coefficients $\psi_{t,j}$ would in principle follow a complicated time profile. However,
to keep the model tractable we make an important simplifying assumption, namely that
\[ \psi_{t,j} = \rho^j \text{ with } 0 < \rho < 1, \]
so that the impact of these qualitative events decays at a geometric rate, and in fact at the same geometric rate for all events. This is somewhat unrealistic from the point of view of actual qualitative events but it facilitates our analysis and allows us to make statements about the impact of judgemental adjustment on equilibrium outcomes. Given this assumption we define \( \xi_t \) as
\[ \xi_t = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \psi_{t-j} \eta_{t-j} = \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho^j \eta_{t-j} = (1 - \rho L)^{-1} \eta_t. \]
The amount of judgemental adjustment contained in \( y_{t+1} \) is given by
\[ (1 - \rho L) \xi_t = \eta_t, \]
where \( L \) is a lag operator, or \( \xi_t = \rho \xi_{t-1} + \eta_t \). This means that the expected effect of past qualitative events, \( \rho \xi_{t-1} \), plus the effect of today’s news \( \eta_t \), gives the complete judgemental adjustment at time \( t \).

We stress that the assumption that \( \xi_t \) follows an AR(1) process has been adopted here for analytical convenience only. We caution the reader not to think of the judgemental adjustment as a quantifiable variable even though it is written in AR(1) form. Past judgements certainly had an impact on past forecasts, and in that sense they could be quantified. But an adjustment for the Korean War would not be comparable to adjustments for wage and price controls or for the Y2K millennium bug, or for a host of other, more minor events, and for this reason the past judgements do not provide useful time series information.

We also make the limiting assumption that \( u_t \) and \( \eta_t \) evolve independently. Thus, the economy (1) is fundamentally unaffected by the judgemental variable. This stark case is perhaps the most interesting one for our main points. We also relax this assumption later in the paper and show how our results would be modified when judgement is partially correlated with fundamental shocks.
2.3 Econometric forecasts

In the recursive learning literature, agents are assigned a *perceived law of motion* which summarizes how they use available economic data to form expectations about the future. This assignment is not made arbitrarily. An important consideration is that the perceived law of motion can be consistent with the way the system actually evolves and in particular with the equilibrium law of motion under rational expectations. The actual evolution of the system (1) will depend in part on how agents are forming expectations, including any judgemental adjustments they are making.

For the system with judgement, we show below that an ARMA(1,1) process
\[ y_t = by_{t-1} + v_t - av_{t-1}, \]
(4)
is appropriate since the actual law of motion will follow an ARMA(1,1) process. In this equation \( v_t \) is stochastic and \( |a| < 1 \) and \( |b| < 1 \) are parameters. This can be written as
\[ y_t = \theta (L) v_t, \]
(5)
where
\[ \theta (L) = \frac{1 - aL}{1 - bL}. \]

Then
\[ E_t^* y_{t+1} = by_t - av_t = [b\theta (L) - a] v_t \]
(6)
is the best forecast in a mean square error sense for the given perceived law of motion. We refer to (6) as the *econometric forecast*. This part of the agents’ forecast depends on the econometric model alone. In the standard learning literature it would be the only basis for forecasts.

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\[8\] We can think of this as corresponding to the existence of a forecasting community using econometric-based models to guide the expectations of private sector and governmental agents. Forecasting communities like this exist in all industrialized nations. Our analysis differs from but is related to the literature in finance on strategic professional forecasting, see e.g. Ottaviani and Sørensen (2004) and the references therein.
2.4 Exuberance equilibrium

We can now deduce the actual law of motion for this system by combining the expectations (2) and the effect of these expectations on the state of the economy (1). This yields

\[
y_t = \beta y_{t+1} + u_t \\
= \beta \left( \frac{b-a}{1-bL} \right) v_t + \frac{\beta}{1-\rho L} \eta_t + u_t \\
= \beta \left( \frac{b-a}{1-bL} \right) \left( \frac{1-bL}{1-aL} \right) y_t + \frac{\beta}{1-\rho L} \eta_t + u_t.
\]

Solving for \( y_t \) implies that the actual law of motion is

\[
y_t = \frac{1-aL}{\beta(a-b) + 1-aL} \left( \frac{\beta}{1-\rho L} \eta_t + u_t \right). \tag{7}
\]

The judgement term \( \eta_t \) enters this actual law of motion. This is natural because the judgement is affecting the expectations of agents and through that channel is affecting actual macroeconomic outcomes \( y_t \). Of course, the agents could decide not to use a judgemental adjustment, in which case the actual law of motion would not involve this term. Thus a critical aspect of the analysis will be to develop the conditions under which economic actors will use a judgemental adjustment, given that all other agents are making such an adjustment and causing the actual law motion to be (7).

We proceed by defining the concept of an exuberance equilibrium. The general concept is that of an equilibrium in which the judgemental adjustment influences the actual evolution of the economy, even in the case where the judgement bears no relationship to the fundamental shocks on the economy. The exuberance concept has three parts, and we discuss each in detail below. We first require that the perceived law of motion of the agents, their econometric forecast, is consistent with the actual data being generated by the economy. This is a type of non-falsifiability assumption for the econometric model. We use the consistent expectations equilibrium concept to
impose this condition. A second requirement is that there is a Nash equilibrium in the use of judgement, so that given that all agents are using a judgementally-adjusted forecast, no agent wishes to discontinue using that forecast. Finally, since our agents are learning using recursive algorithms, we impose learnability as a requirement for an exuberance equilibrium.

We now turn to an analysis of the scalar model in order to find conditions under which all three of these requirements can be met simultaneously.

3 Analysis

3.1 Consistent expectations

The main idea behind consistent expectations equilibrium is that econometricians in the model should be unable to reject their model of the economy. The econometric model should provide a good fit to the data produced by the economy itself. We impose this idea through a requirement that the autocovariance generating function of the econometric model (the perceived law of motion) is equivalent to the autocovariance generating function generated by the economy (the actual law of motion). We can analytically verify the existence of a solution to the equation implied by this statement for the univariate case.

The autocovariance generating function for the perceived law of motion in the scalar case is given by

$$G_{PLM}(z) = \sigma_v^2 \frac{(1 - az)(1 - az^{-1})}{(1 - bz)(1 - bz^{-1})}$$

where $\sigma_v^2$ is the variance of $v$, and $z$ is a complex scalar. For the actual law of motion, or ALM, the autocovariance generating function is the sum of two such functions

$$G_{ALM}(z) = G_\eta(z) + G_u(z)$$

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9CEE and rational expectations equilibrium with limited information are equivalent in our linear settings.

10See e.g. Hommes and Sorger (1998) and Branch and McGough (2005).

by the independence of $\eta$ and $u$. These functions are

$$G_\eta(z) = \frac{\sigma^2_\eta \beta^2 (1 - az) (1 - az^{-1})}{[\beta (a - b) + 1 - az] [\beta (a - b) + 1 - az^{-1}] (1 - \rho z) (1 - \rho z^{-1})},$$

and

$$G_u(z) = \frac{\sigma^2_u (1 - az) (1 - az^{-1})}{[\beta (a - b) + 1 - az] [\beta (a - b) + 1 - az^{-1}]}. $$

We use these functions to demonstrate the following result in Appendix A.

**Lemma 1** There exists a CEE with $b = \rho$ and $a \in [0, \rho]$.

As also shown in Appendix A, there are interesting limiting cases: when $\sigma^2_\eta \to 0$, so that the relative variance of the judgement process is small, $a \to \rho$, while for $\sigma^2_u \to 0$, meaning that the relative variance of the fundamental process is small, $a \to 0$. Thus the value of $a$ depends in an interesting way on the relative innovation variance $R \equiv \sigma^2_\eta / \sigma^2_u$, as well as the discount factor $\beta$ and the serial correlation $\rho$. Since a solution $a \in [0, \rho]$ always exists, the conditions for a CEE can always be met in the scalar case.

We now ask whether individual rationality holds with respect to inclusion of the judgement variable in making forecasts.

### 3.2 Incentives to include judgement

The agents can choose not to use the judgmenmentally adjusted forecast. But when all other agents are using the judgemental adjustment, they cause the actual law of motion of the system to be given by equation (7). An individual agent faces the question of whether the outcomes generated by this actual law of motion can be better forecast with a model that incorporates the judgemental adjustment, or by one that ignores the judgemental adjustment. If each agent chooses the latter course, then no agent will use the

\footnote{Appendix A also makes it clear that there is a second, negative value of $a$ that equates the two autocovariance generating functions. We found that the other conditions for exuberance equilibrium are not met at this value of $a$, and we refer to it only in passing in the remainder of the paper.}
judgementally adjusted forecast, and the judgement variable will not affect equilibrium outcomes. But, if each agent chooses the former course, then all agents will use the judgementally adjusted forecast and the actual law of motion will remain as given in equation (7).

This individual rationality condition can be assessed by comparing the accuracy of the forecasts generated by each model, that is, the judgementally-adjusted forecast versus the econometric forecast alone. This can be accomplished by comparing the forecast error variance of the two models, (2) and (6), when all other agents are including judgement in their forecasts and hence causing the actual law of motion to be given by (7).

To make this calculation, we use the condition from the consistent expectations calculation that \( b = \rho \). We then note that \( v_t = \left(\frac{1-\rho L}{1-aL}\right) y_t \). The econometric forecast is therefore given by

\[
E_t y_{t+1} = \frac{\rho - a}{1 - \rho L} v_t = \frac{\rho - a}{1 - aL} y_t \tag{9}
\]

whereas the judgementally adjusted forecast is given by

\[
y_{t+1}^J = \frac{\rho - a}{1 - aL} y_t + \frac{1}{1 - \rho L} \eta_t. \tag{10}
\]

The question from an (atomistic) individual agent’s point of view is then whether they should use (9) or (10) as a basis for their expectations of the future state of the economy.

Is it possible for the variance of the judgementally adjusted forecast to be lower than the variance of the econometric forecast? It is. Consider the special case when \( \sigma^2_\eta \to 0 \) so that the positive root \( a \to \rho \). Then it is shown in Appendix B that, apart from additive terms in \( u_t \) that are identical for the two forecasts, the forecast error without judgement is

\[
FE_{NJ} = \frac{\beta}{1 - \rho L} \eta_{t+1}
\]

whereas the forecast error with judgement is

\[
FE_J = \frac{\beta \left(1 - \beta^{-1}L\right)}{1 - \rho L} \eta_{t+1}.
\]
Thus, as $\sigma_{\eta}^2 \to 0$ the ratio between the variances of these two forecast errors is

\[
\frac{Var[FE_j]}{Var[FE_{NJ}]} = 1 + \beta^{-2} - 2\beta^{-1}\rho.
\]

This is less than one if and only if

\[
\rho\beta > \frac{1}{2}.
\]

By continuity, it follows that if $\beta > 1/2$ there are non-trivial judgement processes (with $\rho > 1/2\beta$ and $\sigma_{\eta}^2 > 0$ sufficiently small) for which the agents have incentives to include the process as an add factor in their forecasts. The preceding argument considered the limiting case $a \to \rho$, but as we will show below, it is not necessary for $a$ to be close to $\rho$ for our results to hold.

We conclude that individuals will decide to use the judgementally adjusted forecast in cases where $\rho$ is relatively large, meaning that the serial correlation in the judgement variable is substantial, and when $\beta$ is simultaneously relatively high, meaning that expectations are relatively important in determining the evolution of the economy. We remark that these conditions are exactly the ones that correspond to the most likely scenario for the asset pricing example given below.

Another, polar opposite, special case is one where $\sigma_{u}^2 \to 0$ so that the positive root $a \to 0$. Then

\[
FE_{NJ} = \frac{\beta}{1 - \rho\beta} \eta_{t+1}
\]

whereas

\[
FE_j = \frac{\beta (1 - \beta^{-1}L)}{(1 - \rho\beta) (1 - \rho L)} \eta_{t+1}.
\]

The difference between the variances of these two forecast errors is then

\[
Var[FE_J] - Var[FE_{NJ}] = \left( \frac{(\beta^{-1} - \rho)^2}{1 - \rho^2} \right) \sigma_{\eta}^2.
\]

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13See, for instance, Harvey (1981, p. 40). The variance of $x_t = [(1 + mL) / (1 - \ell L)] \epsilon_t$ is $[(1 + m^2 + 2\ell m) / (1 - \ell^2)] \sigma_{\epsilon}^2$. 
This can never be less than zero under maintained assumptions. We con-
clude that it cannot be individually rational for agents to use a judgemen-
tally adjusted forecast in the scalar case when the relative variance of the
judgemental variable is very large.

By continuity we deduce from these two special cases that if \( \rho \beta > \frac{1}{2} \) there
are values of \( R = \sigma_n^2/\sigma_u^2 \in (0, \infty) \) such that \( a \in (0, \rho) \) and agents rationally
choose to use a judgementally adjusted forecast, given that all other agents
are doing so.\(^{14}\) The conclusion that it can be optimal to judgementally adjust
the econometric forecast is striking since this forecast already reflects the
effects of judgement on the time series properties of the observable variables.
By construction, the econometric forecast is the best forecasting model based
on observable information.

To illustrate the point that the individual rationality constraint can be
met even when \( a \) is substantially less than \( \rho \), we consider a numerical example.
The forecast error variances in the general case involve the variance of an
ARMA\((2, 2)\) process. We show how to compute this variance in Appendix
B, and illustrate the findings in Figure 1.

The Figure is drawn for \( \beta = .9 \) and \( \rho = .9 \), which corresponds to what
might be regarded as a realistic case. The variances of the forecast errors
with and without judgement are plotted on the vertical axis, while the value
of \( a \) is plotted on the horizontal axis. Each value of \( a \) between zero and
\( \rho \) corresponds to a different relative variance \( R = \sigma_n^2/\sigma_u^2 \), and larger values
of \( R \) are associated with smaller values of \( a \).\(^{15}\) We have already seen from
the examination of special cases that as \( R \rightarrow \infty \), \( a \rightarrow 0 \) and we expect
the forecast error variance of the econometric forecast to be smaller. This
result is borne out in the Figure. In addition, we expect the variance of
the judgementally adjusted forecast to be lower when \( R \rightarrow 0 \), in which case
\( a \rightarrow \rho \). This is also borne out in the Figure. But the Figure also shows

\(^{14}\)The case with \( a \approx \rho \) is a near-common factor representation of the time series, but the
required variances remain continuous in the parameters, as can be seen from the formulae
in Appendix B.

\(^{15}\)To draw Figure 1, we consider changes in \( R \) resulting from changes in \( \sigma_u^2 \) with \( \sigma_n^2 \)
fixed.
Figure 1: The variance of the forecast error, with (FEJ) and without (FENJ) judgement. The variance can be lower with judgement included, even for values of $a$ far from $\rho$.

Intermediate cases, and indicates that $a$ does not have to be particularly close to $\rho$ for the individual rationality condition to be met. In fact, the two forecast error variances are equal at $a \approx .21$, which is far from the value of $\rho$ in this example, which is .9. We conclude that the conditions for exuberance equilibria to exist are quite likely to be met for a wide range of relative variances $R$ provided both $\beta$ and $\rho$ are relatively close to one.

This intuition can be partially verified by checking cases where $\beta$ and $\rho$ are not so large. Based on condition (11), one might conjecture that the individual rationality constraint is binding at values $\rho \beta < 1/2$. In fact, at $\rho = .7$ and $\beta = .7$, an exercise like the one behind Figure 1 shows that there
are no values of $a$ that make the judgementally adjusted forecast preferable to the econometric forecast.

### 3.3 Learnability

Because we have agents using recursive algorithms to learn, a plausibility condition for exuberance equilibrium is that any candidate equilibrium is learnable. We follow the literature on recursive learning to impose this requirement.\textsuperscript{16}

In the current context, the CEE formulated above takes the form of an ARMA(1,1) process. Estimation of ARMA(1,1) processes is usually done using maximum likelihood techniques, taking us beyond standard least squares estimation. Recursive maximum likelihood (RML) algorithms are available and they have formal similarities to recursive least squares estimation.\textsuperscript{17} Because this technical analysis is relatively unfamiliar, we confine the formal details to Appendix D. However, the results are easily summarized. Let $a_t$ and $b_t$ denote estimates at time $t$ of the coefficients of the ARMA forecast function (6). Numerical computations using RML indicate convergence of $(a_t, b_t)$ to $(a, \rho)$, where $a > 0$ is the CEE value given in Lemma 1. Thus this CEE is indeed stable under learning. Moreover, in Section 3.4 we state a formal convergence result as part of our existence theorem.

### 3.4 Existence and properties of equilibrium

We now collect the various results above. The following theorem gives the key results about existence of an exuberance equilibrium in the univariate model and characterizes its asymptotic variance:


\textsuperscript{17}They are also called Recursive Prediction Error (RPE) algorithms—see Evans and Honkapohja (1994) and Marcet and Sargent (1995) for other uses of RPE methods in learning.
Theorem 2 Consider the univariate model with judgement and suppose that \( \beta > 1/2 \). Then

(i) for appropriate AR(1) judgement processes there exists an exuberance equilibrium and

(ii) the exuberance equilibrium has a higher asymptotic variance than the rational expectations equilibrium.

Proof. (i) The preceding analysis has verified that the conditions 1 and 2 for an exuberance equilibrium defined in Section 2.4 are met for all \( \sigma_\eta^2 > 0 \) sufficiently small. In Appendix D it is proved that condition 3 also holds, that is, the CEE is stable under RML learning, when \( \sigma_\eta^2 > 0 \) is sufficiently small.

(ii) The rational expectations equilibrium for the univariate model is \( y_t = u_t \) since \( 0 < \beta < 1 \) and \( u_t \) is iid with mean zero. The exuberance equilibrium with \( a > 0 \) can be represented as the ARMA(1,1) process \( y_t = \rho y_{t-1} + v_t - av_{t-1} \) where \( a \) solves equation (18) given in Appendix A. From (17) of Appendix A it can be seen that

\[
\sigma_v^2 = \rho \frac{\sigma_u^2}{a(\beta(a - \rho) + 1)} > \sigma_u^2
\]

since \( a < \rho \) and \( 0 < \beta, \rho < 1 \). Next, using the formula for the variance of an ARMA(1,1) process we have

\[
\sigma_y^2 = \frac{1 + a^2 - 2\rho a}{1 - \rho^2} \sigma_v^2
\]

and since \( \frac{1 + a^2 - 2\rho a}{1 - \rho^2} > 1 \), the result follows.

The theorem states that in an exuberance equilibrium, the variance of the state variable \( y_t \) is larger than it would be in a fundamental rational expectations equilibrium. This is because the REE has \( y_t = u_t \), so that \( \sigma_y^2 = \sigma_u^2 \), but in an exuberance equilibrium \( \sigma_y^2 > \sigma_u^2 \).

4 An Asset Pricing Example

A simple univariate example of the framework (1) is given by the standard present value model of asset pricing. A convenient way of obtaining the key
structural equation can be based on the quadratic heterogeneous agent model of Brock and Hommes (1998). In their framework agents are myopic mean-variance maximizers who choose the quantity of riskless and risky assets in their portfolio to maximize expected value of a quadratic utility function of end of period wealth.

We modify their framework to allow for shocks to the supply of the risky asset. For convenience we assume homogeneous expectations and constant known dividends. The temporary equilibrium is given by

$$p_{t+1}^e + d - R_f p_t = s_t,$$

where $d$ is the dividend, $p_t$ is the price of the asset and $R_f > 1$ is the rate of return factor on the riskless asset. Here $s_t$ is a linear function of the random supply of the risky asset per investor, assumed $i.i.d.$ for simplicity.\footnote{Using the notation of Brock and Hommes (1998) $s_t = a\sigma^2 z_{st}$, where $\sigma^2$ is the conditional variance of excess returns (assumed constant), $a$ is a parameter of the utility function and $z_{st}$ is the (random) asset supply.} Defining $y_t = p_t - \bar{p}$, where $\bar{s} = E s_t$ and $\bar{p} = (d - \bar{s})/(R_f - 1)$, we obtain (1) with $\beta = R_f^{-1}$ and $u_t = -R_f^{-1}(s_t - \bar{s})$. We assume that $0 < \beta < 1$.

The univariate equation (1) is a benchmark model of asset pricing and there are, of course, alternative ways to derive the same equation. Because $0 < \beta < 1$ the model is said to be regular or determinate, that is, under rational expectations there is a unique nonexplosive solution, given by the “fundamentals” solution $y_t = u_t$. In particular, under rational expectations, sunspot solutions do not exist.

Theorem 2 shows that the basic asset pricing model is consistent with excess volatility. If investors incorporate judgemental factors that are strongly serially correlated, they will find that this improves their forecasts, but in an exuberance equilibrium this will also generate significant stationary asset price movements in excess of those associated with fundamental factors. The stationarity of our exuberance movements is in marked contrast to the literature on rational asset price bubbles. Because the latter are explosive, the literature on rational bubbles has been punctuated by controversy and com-
Table 1: Exuberance equilibria in the asset pricing model. A dash indicates that exuberance equilibrium does not exist. The entries in the table give one measure of the degree of excess volatility generated, namely, the ratio of the standard deviation of \( y \) to the standard deviation of \( u \). The model can easily generate substantial excess volatility like that estimated by Shiller (1981).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \rho )</th>
<th>( \sigma_y/\sigma_u )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.54 2.74 − −</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.85 3.62 5.58 −</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2.70 5.82 9.11 12.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>3.99 8.75 13.64 18.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 provides some illustrative calculations of exuberance equilibria for representative parameter values. In the Table, instead of considering the relative variance \( R = \sigma_y^2/\sigma_u^2 \), we consider the perhaps more intuitive ratio of

\[ \frac{\sigma_y}{\sigma_u} \]

A natural question is whether the excess volatility associated with an exuberance equilibrium is economically meaningful, or if the exuberance conditions outlined in Theorem 2 are only met for situations in which the variance \( \sigma_y^2 \) is just trivially larger than the fundamental variance. This is not clear from the theorem since \( a \) is itself a nonlinear function of \( \beta, \rho \), and \( R = \sigma_y^2/\sigma_u^2 \).

It is also of interest to know if the excess volatility effect isolated in the theorem is large enough to be comparable to empirical estimates of the degree of excess volatility in financial data. One famous calculation due to Shiller (1981) put the ratio of the standard deviation of U.S. stock prices to the standard deviation of prices based on fundamental alone at between 5 and 13.\(^{19}\)

Shiller (1981) actually compared the variance of equity prices to the variance of their ex post price (the present value of actual future dividends), but the latter must exceed the variance of the fundamentals price under rational expectations.

\(^{19}\)Shiller (1981) actually compared the variance of equity prices to the variance of their ex post price (the present value of actual future dividends), but the latter must exceed the variance of the fundamentals price under rational expectations.
the standard deviation of the exuberance variable to the standard deviation of the fundamental shock $\sigma_\xi/\sigma_u$.\footnote{Note that $\sigma_\xi^2 = \sigma_\eta^2 / (1 - \rho^2)$.} Ratios of $\sigma_\xi/\sigma_u$ near unity correspond to ratios of innovation variances $\sigma_\eta^2/\sigma_u^2$ on the order of 0.1 for a high degree of serial correlation, so that the noise associated with judgement in the economy is actually quite modest. The table gives results for several possible values of $\sigma_\xi/\sigma_u$, ranging from 0.5 to 2.0. We examine the empirically realistic case where the discount factor $\beta = 0.95$, and where the degree of serial correlation $\rho$ is relatively high, as indicated in the leftmost column. A dash in the table indicates that an exuberance equilibrium does not exist for the indicated parameter values. The entries in the table are a measure of excess volatility corresponding to Shiller’s (1981) concept, namely, $\sigma_y/\sigma_u$. The results indicate that these measures are often in the range of 5 to 13 estimated by Shiller. We conclude based on this illustrative calculation that the model can generate substantial excess volatility without difficulty. We remark that if we push the discount factor $\beta$ closer to unity, the degree of excess volatility can rise to very high levels for high degrees of serial correlation, with $\sigma_y$ many hundreds of times larger than $\sigma_u$. In this sense, the model can generate arbitrarily large amounts of excess volatility.

We again emphasize that $0 < \beta < 1$ corresponds to the determinate case for this model, that is, the rational expectations equilibrium is unique. However, for $0.5 < \beta < 1$ exuberance equilibria exist even though sunspot equilibria do not exist. We think this feature of our findings is striking as it means that what would normally be regarded as benign circumstances can actually be dangerous situations, with the possibility of near-rational exuberance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\sigma_\xi/\sigma_u$</th>
<th>$\sigma_y/\sigma_u$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We again emphasize that $0 < \beta < 1$ corresponds to the determinate case for this model, that is, the rational expectations equilibrium is unique. However, for $0.5 < \beta < 1$ exuberance equilibria exist even though sunspot equilibria do not exist. We think this feature of our findings is striking as it means that what would normally be regarded as benign circumstances can actually be dangerous situations, with the possibility of near-rational exuberance.

\footnote{Note that $\sigma_\xi^2 = \sigma_\eta^2 / (1 - \rho^2)$.}
5 Further Discussion

5.1 Correlation between judgement and fundamentals

Thus far, we have assumed that the judgement variable is not intrinsically related to the fundamentals. To widen the scope of our analysis we consider correlation between judgement and unobserved fundamentals. In this case, judgement can be viewed as imprecise knowledge of some unobserved shocks that hit the economy. In this section we will show that our results are unaffected by this extension.

The extended model is

$$y_t = \beta y_{t+1} + u_t + w_t,$$

(12)

where we have added a second unobservable shock $w_t$, which is assumed to be iid and independent of $u_t$ for simplicity. The judgement process is still (3), where the “news” or innovation of the judgement process is now

$$\eta_t = fw_t + \hat{\eta}_t.$$

(13)

In other words, the news consists of both information on the shock $w_t$ as well as extraneous noise $\hat{\eta}_t$. (We assume that $w_t$ and $\hat{\eta}_t$ are independent.) The latter can be interpreted either as extraneous randomness or as measurement error of $w_t$.

The formal analysis can be extended a straightforward way. The ALM (which previously was (7)) can now be written as

$$y_t = \frac{1 - aL}{\beta(a - b) + 1 - aL} [(1 - \rho L)^{-1}\beta(fw_t + \hat{\eta}_t) + (u_t + w_t)]$$

(14)

and the requirements for CEE, incentives to include judgement and learnability can be modified accordingly. We have:

Proposition 3 Consider the univariate model with judgement correlated with fundamentals as above. If $\beta > 1/2$, then for appropriate AR(1) judgement processes there exists an exuberance equilibrium.
Formal details are in Appendices C and D. We remark that the result goes through with a significant degree of correlation between the economic fundamental \( u_t + w_t \) and the judgement innovation \( \eta_t \) (see Appendix C).

5.2 Rationality tests of judgement

Our exuberance equilibrium is near-rational but not fully rational. There are two ways in which we have imposed assumptions that deviate from full rationality. First, the judgement process \( \xi_t \) is assumed not directly available to (or usable by) econometric forecasters, who rely purely on the observables \( y_t \). This seems realistic because \( \xi_t \) represents the impact of "unique" qualitative events. More specifically, \( \xi_t \) is the adjustment the judgemental forecasters believe is appropriate to make to the econometric forecast. This procedure thus reflects a natural division of labor in which the econometricians produce the best statistical forecast based on the observable variables of interest, and the judgemental forecasters modify these forecasts as they think appropriate to reflect additional qualitative factors. Although \( \xi_t = y^e_{t+1} - E_t y_{t+1}^* \) may possibly be obtainable by the econometricians (at least with a lag), we would expect the judgemental forecasters to resist the incorporation of \( \xi_t \) into the econometric model.

Furthermore, older \( \xi_{t-j} \) represent different unique events, unrelated to the current judgemental variable. Econometric models sometimes incorporate dummy variables (or other proxies) to capture the quantitative effects of qualitative events, but as the events become more distant such variables tend to get dropped and rolled into the unobserved random shocks in order to preserve degrees of freedom. The impact of recent qualitative events could be estimated by incorporating dummy variables into the econometric model, but for forecasting purposes this would be unhelpful, and would still leave the problem of forecasting the future impact of qualitative factors to the judgemental forecasters.

The second way in which our exuberance equilibrium is not fully rational is that the incentive condition is assumed dichotomous. This also seems realistic, since its inclusion is determined by the judgemental forecaster. Fur-
Table 2: Exuberance equilibria in the asset pricing model. Percent of test rejections at 5 percent level of the null hypothesis that including judgement is fully rational, that is, Ho: k=1. Results given are based on 1000 replications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>n</th>
<th>0.7</th>
<th>0.8</th>
<th>0.85</th>
<th>0.9</th>
<th>0.95</th>
<th>0.99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>480</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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thermore, econometric tests of whether “all” of $\xi_t$ should have been included would (often) have low power. Suppose we allowed for just a proportion $k \in [0, 1]$ of the judgement to be included in the forecast. It can be shown that the minimum MSE in the univariate case occurs at $k = \beta \rho$, where for an exuberance equilibrium we expect $0.5 < \beta \rho < 1$. For $\beta \rho$ near one, rationality tests using

$$y_{t+1} - y_{t+1}^e = (1 - k) \xi_t + \zeta_{t+1}$$

(15)

of the null hypothesis $H_0 : k = 1$, would have low power, and considerable data would be required to detect that not all of $\xi_t$ should be optimally included.

We illustrate this point in Table 2, which takes into account both points just discussed. Suppose that econometricians do have access ex post to the judgementally adjusted forecasts $y_{t+1}^e$, and therefore to $\xi_t = y_{t+1}^e - E_t^* y_{t+1}$, and that they estimate (15) and test the null hypothesis $H_0 : k = 1$ that the inclusion of judgement is fully rational. For the purposes of this test we set the discount factor at $\beta = 1 - 0.05/12 = 0.9958$ in line with a real monthly risk-free rate of return of $0.05/12$.\footnote{In the Brock and Hommes (1998) set-up, $\beta$ is the inverse of the risk-free real rate-of-return factor. The value chosen here corresponds to an annual discount rate of 5% p.a., but the results of Table 2 are quite similar if 3% p.a. (or 7% p.a.) is used.} We also set $\sigma^2_\xi/\sigma^2_u = 1.0$. The three sample sizes shown correspond to 10, 20 and 40 years of monthly data and the nominal significance level of the test is set at 5%. When $\rho$ is below 0.8 one would expect to eventually detect a deviation from full rationality. However,
it can be seen that for $\rho$ at or above 0.85, rejection of the null is unlikely even with 40 years of data. In particular, for $\rho = 0.9$ or $\rho = 0.95$ any deviation of the judgmental forecasts from full rationality would be virtually undetectable except with enormous sample sizes. Furthermore, these cases correspond to large, empirically plausible values of excess volatility: for the parameter settings of Table 2 we have excess volatility measures of $\sigma_y/\sigma_u = 8.40$ for $\rho = 0.9$ and $\sigma_y/\sigma_u = 16.39$ for $\rho = 0.95$.

From Table 2 we see that, for an exuberance equilibrium with $\rho$ values above 0.85, decision makers are likely to conclude that the functional division of labor between econometricians, who supply forecasts based on the observable variable $y_t$, and judgemental forecasters, who adjust these forecasts to take account of perceived qualitative events omitted from the econometric model, is entirely appropriate. Because an exuberance equilibrium is a CEE, the econometricians are fully taking into account the predictable serial correlation properties of the variable being forecast. At the same time, the mean square forecast error is smaller for the judgemental forecasts than for the pure econometric forecast, and thus there is a clear gain to forecast performance in making use of the judgemental adjustment. Furthermore, for sufficiently serially correlated judgement processes, econometric tests of the forecast errors would not detect any deviation from full rationality of the judgementally adjusted forecasts. Exuberance equilibria thus appear to be plausible outcomes in the asset pricing model.

The uniqueness of qualitative events is also relevant to the issue at hand. Suppose, for example, that $\rho = 0.8$ and that rationality tests eventually indicate a statistically significant deviation from full rationality, with an estimated value near $k = 0.8$. It does not really seem plausible that forecasters would decide to downweight current judgemental adjustments, based on the finding that such adjustments over the last 20 years or so have been about 20% too high, since past judgemental adjustments mainly concerned different qualitative events, and since the adjustments may have been made by different judgemental forecasters. Furthermore, even if on this basis current judgement is downweighted, and even if this eventually results in the
role of judgement being gradually extinguished over time, a new qualitative event will at some point suggest the need once again for judgement, with the judgement process again becoming persistent. In this sense, an economy in which exuberance equilibria exist always remains “subject to judgement.” An economy subject to judgement contrasts strongly with an economy that is nonexuberant. In the latter case there is no incentive to include judgement, since unadjusted econometric forecasts have lower mean-square error, whether or not other agents include judgement.

6 Conclusions and possible extensions

We have studied how a new phenomenon, exuberance equilibria, may arise in standard macroeconomic environments. We assume that agents are learning in the sense that they are employing and updating econometric models used to forecast the future values of variables they care about. Unhindered, this learning process would converge to a rational expectations equilibrium in the economies we study. We investigate the idea that decision-makers may be tempted to include judgemental adjustments to their forecasts if all others in the economy are similarly judgementally adjusting their forecasts. The judgemental adjustment, or add factor, is a pervasive and widely-acknowledged feature of actual macroeconometric forecasting in industrialized economies. We obtain conditions under which such add-factoring can become self-fulfilling, altering the actual dynamics of the economy significantly, but in a way that remains consistent with the econometric model of the agents.

In order to develop our central points we have made some strong simplifying assumptions. We have assumed that the exuberance or judgement variables take a simple autoregressive form, but this assumption is mainly made for convenience. While we do believe that judgemental adjustments exhibit

\footnote{In line with this literature, the econometric forecasts are based on reduced form models. It would also be of interest to examine the questions we have studied in the context of econometric forecasts based on structural models.}
strong positive serial correlation, a more complicated stationary stochastic process could instead be used and in principle even time varying distributions could be incorporated into our framework. The assumption of identical judgements of different (representative) agents is correspondingly restrictive. Allowing for differences in judgements by individual agents would probably make the conditions for exuberance equilibrium more difficult to achieve. On the other hand, this could create new phenomena, such as momentum effects arising when a large fraction of agents begin to agree in their judgements.

The incorporation of judgment into decisions, in the form of adjustments to econometric forecasts, can have a self-fulfilling feature in the sense that decisions makers would believe ex post that their judgement had improved their forecasts. This result is similar in spirit to the self-fulfilling nature of sunspot equilibria, but with the novel feature that it can arise in determinate models in which there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium that depends only on fundamentals. This widens the set of models in which self-fulfilling fluctuations might plausibly emerge. In particular, we have shown that exuberance equilibria can arise in the standard asset-pricing model, generating substantial excess volatility.
Appendices

A Conditions for CEE

The sum of the two functions $G_\eta(z)$ and $G_u(z)$ is

$$ G_{ALM}(z) = \frac{(1 - az)(1 - az^{-1})}{(1 - \rho z)(1 - \rho z^{-1})} \times \left\{ \frac{\beta^2 \sigma_\eta^2 + (1 - \rho z)(1 - \rho z^{-1}) \sigma_u^2}{[\beta (a - b) + 1 - az][\beta (a - b) + 1 - az^{-1}]} \right\}. $$

It can be seen from the form of $G_{ALM}(z)$ that, for arbitrary $a$ and $b$, the ALM is an ARMA(2,2) process. As we will now show, there are choices of $a$ and $b$ that yield $G_{PLM}(z) = G_{ALM}(z)$. These choices of $a$ and $b$ also have the property that the corresponding ALM takes an ARMA(1,1) form that matches the PLM. This is possible if $a$ and $b$ are chosen so that there is a common factor in the numerator and denominator of the expression on the right-hand side of $G_{ALM}(z)$.

We now set $G_{PLM}(z) = G_{ALM}(z)$, under the condition $b = \rho$, so that the poles of the autocovariance generating functions agree. This yields

$$ \sigma_u^2 [\beta (a - \rho) + 1 - az][\beta (a - \rho) + 1 - az^{-1}] = \beta^2 \sigma_\eta^2 + (1 - \rho z)(1 - \rho z^{-1}) \sigma_u^2. $$

This equation can be written as

$$ \sigma_u^2 \{1 + \beta (a - \rho)\}^2 + a^2 = \sigma_\eta^2 a [\beta (a - \rho) + 1] (z + z^{-1}) = \beta^2 \sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_u^2 (1 + \rho^2) - \sigma_u^2 \rho (z + z^{-1}). $$

For the autocovariances of the perceived and actual laws of motion to be equal, the coefficients on the powers of $z$ in this equation must be equal. Equating these we obtain the two equations

$$ \sigma_u^2 \{1 + \beta (a - \rho)\}^2 + a^2 = \beta^2 \sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_u^2 (1 + \rho^2) \quad (16) $$
and
\[ \sigma_v^2 a \left[ \beta (a - \rho) + 1 \right] = \sigma_u^2 \rho. \]  \hfill (17)

We wish to solve for a value of \( a \) such that \(|a| < 1\). Solving equation (17) for \( \sigma_v^2 \) and substituting the result into equation (16), and in addition defining \( s \equiv \beta^2 \sigma_v^2 + \sigma_u^2 \left( 1 + \rho^2 \right) \), we obtain the quadratic equation
\[ F(a) \equiv c_2 a^2 + c_1 a + c_0 = 0 \]  \hfill (18)

with
\[
\begin{align*}
c_2 & \equiv s \beta - \rho \left( 1 + \beta^2 \right) \sigma_u^2, \\
c_1 & \equiv s \left( 1 - \rho \beta \right) - 2 \rho \beta \left( 1 - \rho \beta \right) \sigma_u^2, \\
c_0 & \equiv -\rho \left( 1 - \rho \beta \right)^2 \sigma_u^2.
\end{align*}
\]

We deduce that \( F(0) < 0 \), and that
\[ F(1) = \sigma_v^2 \beta^2 \left[ 1 + (1 - \rho) \beta \right] + \sigma_u^2 \left( 1 - \rho \beta \right) (1 + \beta) \left[ (\rho - 1)^2 \right] > 0. \]

These inequalities imply that there exists a positive root \( a \in [0, 1] \) to (18). Moreover, it is easy to compute that \( F(\rho) > 0 \), so that the root must be less than \( \rho \). We also note that for \( \sigma_v^2 \to 0 \), \( a = \rho \) solves equation (18), while for \( \sigma_u^2 \to 0 \), \( a = 0 \) is a solution. There can be a second, negative root. However, our numerical results indicate that the CEE corresponding to the negative root is not learnable.

\section*{B Impact of Judgement}

The induced actual law of motion, as depicted in equation (7), is
\[ y_t = \frac{1 - aL}{\beta (a - \rho) + 1 - aL} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \rho L} \eta_t + u_t \right) \]  \hfill (19)

By substituting equation (19) into both (9) and (10), we can write the two types of forecasts in terms of the shocks \( u_t \) and \( \eta_t \). These expressions become
\[ E_t^* y_{t+1} = \frac{\rho - a}{\beta (a - \rho) + 1 - aL} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \rho L} \eta_t + u_t \right) \]
in the case of no judgement, and

\[ y_{t+1}^c = \frac{\rho - a}{\beta (a - \rho) + 1 - a L} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \rho L} \eta_t + u_t \right) + \frac{1}{1 - \rho L} \eta_t \]

in the case of the judgementally adjusted forecast. The actual state of the economy at time \( t + 1 \) is, from equation (19),

\[ y_{t+1} = \frac{1 - a L}{\beta (a - \rho) + 1 - a L} \left( \frac{\beta}{1 - \rho L} \eta_{t+1} + u_{t+1} \right). \tag{20} \]

We can therefore compute forecast errors in each of the two cases. When computing these forecast errors, we save on clutter by ignoring the terms involving \( u \), as these will be the same whether or not the agent judgementally adjusts the forecast. The forecast error in the case of no judgement can be written as

\[ FE_{NJ} \equiv \left[ y_{t+1} - E_t^y y_{t+1} \right]_{|u=0} = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta (a - \rho)} \left[ \frac{1}{1 - \left( \frac{a}{1 + \beta (a - \rho)} \right) L} \right] \eta_{t+1} \tag{21} \]

whereas in the case of a judgementally adjusted forecast it is

\[ FE_J \equiv \left[ y_{t+1} - y_{t+1}^c \right]_{|u=0} = \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta (a - \rho)} \times \frac{1 - (a + \beta^{-1}) L + a \beta^{-1} L^2}{1 - \left( \frac{a + \rho (1 + \beta (a - \rho))}{1 + \beta (a - \rho)} \right) L} \eta_{t+1}. \tag{22} \]

These equations simplify to those given in the text for the case \( a \to \rho \).

Apart from the lead coefficient \( \beta/(1 + \beta (a - \rho)) \), each forecast error process is in the generic class

\[ x_t = \frac{1 + m_1 L + m_2 L^2}{1 - \ell_1 L - \ell_2 L^2} \epsilon_t, \]

and the variance of \( x_t \) is given by

\[ Var(x_t) = \frac{x_{num}}{x_{den}} \sigma^2. \tag{23} \]
where
\[ x_{num} = \frac{(1 + \ell_2) \ell_1 (m_1 + m_2 \ell_1 + m_2 m_1)}{1 - \ell_2} + (m_1 + m_2 \ell_1) (\ell_1 + m_1) + (1 + 2m_2 \ell_2 + m_2^2) \]
and
\[ x_{den} = 1 - \frac{\ell_1^2}{1 - \ell_2} - \frac{\ell_2 \ell_1^2}{1 - \ell_2} - \ell_2^2. \]

Considering the forecast error in the case without judgement included, equation (21), we set \( m_1 = m_2 = \ell_2 = 0 \) and \( \ell_1 = a/[1 + \beta (a - \rho)] \) in equation (23). For the case with judgement, we set
\begin{align*}
    m_1 &= -(1 + a \beta) \beta^{-1}, \\
    m_2 &= a \beta^{-1}, \\
    \ell_1 &= \frac{a + \rho [1 + \beta (a - \rho)]}{1 + \beta (a - \rho)}, \\
    \ell_2 &= \frac{-a \rho}{1 + \beta (a - \rho)},
\end{align*}
and \( a \) is determined by \( \beta, \rho \) and \( R = \sigma_n^2/\sigma_u^2 \) as described in Appendix A.

C The correlated case

The formal analysis in Appendices A and B is modified as follows. First, the autocovariance generating function for the ALM (14) is
\[ G_{ALM}(z) = \frac{(1 - az) (1 - az^{-1})}{(1 - \rho z) (1 - \rho z^{-1})} \times \left\{ \frac{\beta^2 \sigma_n^2 + (1 - \rho z) (1 - \rho z^{-1}) \sigma_u^2}{[\beta (a - b) + 1 - az][\beta (a - b) + 1 - az^{-1}]} + \frac{\sigma_w^2 (f \beta + 1 - \rho z)(f \beta + 1 - \rho z^{-1})}{(\beta (1 - a) + 1 - az)(\beta (1 - a) + 1 - az^{-1})} \right\}. \]
At a CEE \( a \) solves
\[ \hat{F}_f(a) \equiv \hat{c}_2 a^2 + \hat{c}_1 a + \hat{c}_0 = 0 \]
with
\[\hat{c}_2 = -\hat{t}(1 + \beta^2) + \hat{s}\beta,\]
\[\hat{c}_1 = -2\hat{t}\beta(1 - \rho\beta) + \hat{s}(1 - \rho\beta),\]
\[\hat{c}_0 = -\hat{t}(1 - \rho\beta)^2\]

where
\[\hat{s} = \beta^2 \sigma_\eta^2 + (1 + \rho^2)\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_w^2((1 + f\beta)^2 + \rho^2)\]
and
\[\hat{t} = \sigma_v^2\rho + \sigma_w^2(1 + f\beta).\]

When \( f = 0 \) we have the previous case. Moreover, \( \hat{F}_f(1) \) is increasing in \( f \) and thus there there exists a CEE with \( b = \rho \) and \( a \in [0, 1] \). It can also be shown that \( a < \rho \) and that \( a \rightarrow \rho \) when \( \sigma_v^2 \rightarrow 0, \sigma_w^2 \rightarrow 0 \).

Next, consider the incentives to include judgement. It can be computed that
\[y_{t+1} - y_{t+1}^f = \frac{1}{1 + \beta(a - \rho) - aL} \times \left[ \frac{[\beta f(1 - aL) - (\rho - a)\beta fL]}{1 - \rho L} + (1 - aL) \right] w_{t+1} + \left\{ \frac{\beta(1 - aL) - (\rho - a)\beta L}{1 - \rho L} \hat{\eta}_{t+1} \right\} \]
\[- \frac{k f L}{1 - \rho L} w_{t+1} - \frac{k L}{1 - \rho L} \hat{\eta}_{t+1} + \text{term in } u_{t+1},\]

where \( k = 1 \) if judgement is included, and zero otherwise. When \( \sigma_v^2 \rightarrow 0, \sigma_w^2 \rightarrow 0 \), the relevant terms in the forecast error for assessing judgement are:
\[\frac{1 + \beta f - (\rho + k f)L}{1 - \rho L} w_{t+1} + \frac{\beta - k L}{1 - \rho L} \hat{\eta}_{t+1}.\]

For the second term the comparison is as before. For the term involving \( w_{t+1} \) we get for the relevant variances
\[Var|_{k=0} - Var|_{k=1} \asymp \frac{f}{1 + \beta f} \left( 2\rho - \frac{2\rho + f}{1 + \beta f} \right),\]
where \( \asymp \) means “is positively proportional to.” It is seen that the term in the brackets is positive for all \( f \) when \( \beta \rho > 1/2 \). This implies that adding a
small correlation between judgement and unobserved fundamentals does not alter the incentive condition for inclusion of judgement. In other words, if $\beta \rho > 1/2$ an individual agent will make the judgemental adjustment to the forecast for sufficiently small values of $\sigma^2_\eta$ and $\sigma^2_w$.

To examine the amount of correlation between the fundamental $u_t + w_t$ and the judgement innovation $\eta_t$, we also considered the limit $\sigma^2_\eta \to 0$ and computed the correlation for different values of $\sigma^2_u$, $\sigma^2_w$ and $f$ under the constraints that learning convergence and inclusion of judgement is a CEE. For example, if $\beta = \rho = 0.95$, $f = 1$ and $\sigma^2_\eta$ very small, the correlation can be pushed beyond 0.9 before the conditions start to fail.

Finally, we show in Appendix D that the learnability requirement is also met in the extended model. Indeed, the proof of convergence in Appendix D is worked out for the extended model, with $\sigma^2_w = 0$ treated as a special case.

**D Recursive maximum likelihood**

We now consider recursive estimation when the PLM is an ARMA(1,1) process, that is,

$$y_t = by_{t-1} + v_t + cv_{t-1},$$

where $y_t$ is observed but the white noise process $v_t$ is not observed. Let $b_t$ and $c_t$ denote the estimates of $b$ and $c$ using data through time $t - 1$. The econometricians are assumed to use a recursive maximum likelihood (RML) algorithm, which we now describe.\(^{23}\)

Let $\phi'_t = (b_t, c_t)$. To implement the algorithm an estimate $\varepsilon_t$ of $v_t$ is required. Let $\varepsilon_t = y_t - x'_{t-1} \phi_{t-1}$, where $x'_{t-1} = (y_{t-1}, \varepsilon_{t-1})$. $y_t$ is given by $y_t = \beta [E_t^* y_{t+1} + \xi_t] + u_t + w_t$, where $E_t^* y_{t+1} = b_{t-1} y_t + c_{t-1} \varepsilon_t$. Thus the analysis below holds also for the extended model (12)-(13) (our basic model

\(^{23}\)For further details on the algorithm see Section 2.2.3 of Ljung and Soderstrom (1983). The algorithm is often called a recursive prediction error algorithm.
sets \( f = \sigma_w^2 = 0 \). The RML algorithm is as follows

\[
\begin{align*}
\psi_t &= -c_{t-1}\psi_{t-1} + x_t \\
\phi_t &= \phi_{t-1} + t^{-1}R_{t-1}^{-1}\psi_{t-1}\varepsilon_t \\
R_t &= R_{t-1} + t^{-1}(\psi_{t-1}\psi_{t-1}' - R_{t-1}).
\end{align*}
\]

Again the question of interest is whether \( \phi_t \) converges to an exact CEE. Convergence can be studied using the associated ordinary differential equation

\[
\frac{d\phi}{d\tau} = R^{-1}E\psi_1(\phi)\varepsilon_t(\phi)
\]

\[
\frac{dR}{d\tau} = E\psi_1(\phi)\psi_1(\phi)' - R.
\]

Here \( y_t(\phi), \psi_t(\phi) \) and \( \varepsilon_t(\phi) \) denote the stationary processes for \( y_t, \psi_t \) and \( \varepsilon_t \) with \( \phi_t \) set at a constant value \( \phi \). Using the stochastic approximation tools discussed in Marcet and Sargent (1989), Evans and Honkapohja (1998) and Chapter 6 of Evans and Honkapohja (2001), it can be shown that the RML algorithm locally converges provided the associated ordinary differential equation is locally asymptotically stable (analogous instability results are also available). Numerically, convergence of (24)-(25) can be verified using a discrete time version of the differential equation. A first-order state space form is convenient for computing the expectations \( E\psi_1(\phi)\varepsilon_t(\phi) \) and \( E\psi_1(\phi)\psi_1(\phi)' \) and this procedure was used for the numerical illustrations given in the main text.

We now prove convergence analytically for all \( 0 < \beta, \rho < 1 \) with \( \sigma_{\hat{\eta}}^2 \) and \( \sigma_w^2 \) sufficiently small. This completes the proof of part (i) in Theorem 1. We rewrite the system (24)-(25) in the form

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\phi}{d\tau} &= (R)^{-1}g(\phi) \\
\frac{dR}{d\tau} &= M_\psi(\phi) - R
\end{align*}
\]

where we have introduced the simplifying notation \( g(\phi) = E\psi_1(\phi)\varepsilon_t(\phi) \) and \( M_\psi(\phi) = E\psi_1(\phi)\psi_1(\phi)' \). An equilibrium \( \bar{\phi}, \bar{R} \) of the system is defined by
\(g(\tilde{\phi}) = 0\) and \(\bar{R} = M_{\psi}(\tilde{\phi})\). As mentioned in Appendix A, there can be two equilibrium values \(\tilde{\phi}' = (\rho, -a)\) determined by the solutions to the quadratic (18), but we here focus on the solution with \(0 < a < 1\). Recall that for this solution \(a \to \rho\) as \(\sigma_{\eta}^2 \to 0\).

Linearizing the system at the equilibrium point, it can be seen that the linearized system has a block diagonal structure, in which one block has the eigenvalues equal to \(-1\) (with multiplicity four) and the eigenvalues of the other block are equal to those of the “small” differential equation

\[
\frac{d\phi}{d\tau} = (\bar{R})^{-1}J(\tilde{\phi})(\phi - \tilde{\phi}),
\]

(26)

where \(J(\phi)\) is the Jacobian matrix of \(g(\phi)\). The system (24)-(25) is therefore locally asymptotically stable if the coefficient matrix \((\bar{R})^{-1}J(\tilde{\phi})\) of the two-dimensional linear system (26) has a negative trace and a positive determinant. Since \((\bar{R})^{-1} = (\text{det}(\bar{R}))^{-1}\text{adj}(\bar{R})\) we have

\[
\text{Tr}[(\bar{R})^{-1}J(\tilde{\phi})] = (\text{det}(\bar{R}))^{-1}\text{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\tilde{\phi})] \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
\text{det}[(\bar{R})^{-1}J(\tilde{\phi})] = \text{det}[(\bar{R})^{-1}]\text{det}[J(\tilde{\phi})].
\]

Now \(\text{det}(\bar{R}) > 0\) as \(\bar{R}\) is a matrix of second moments and thus positive definite for \(\sigma_{\eta}^2 > 0\). It thus remains to prove that \(\text{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\tilde{\phi})] < 0\) and \(\text{det}[J(\tilde{\phi})] > 0\) when \(\sigma_{\eta}^2 > 0\) is sufficiently small.

We consider the values of \(\text{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\tilde{\phi})]\) and \(\text{det}[J(\tilde{\phi})]\) when \(\sigma_{\eta}^2 \to 0\). Using the definition of \(\varepsilon_t\), the explicit form of \(g(\phi)\) is

\[
g(\phi) = E\psi_{t-1}(\phi)x'_{t-1} \left[ (1 - \beta b - \beta c)^{-1}\beta \left( \begin{array}{c} -bc \\ -c^2 \end{array} \right) - \left( \begin{array}{c} b \\ c \end{array} \right) \right] + (1 - \beta b - \beta c)^{-1}\beta \rho E\psi_{t-1}(\phi)\xi_{t-1},
\]

where the moment matrices \(E\psi_{t-1}(\phi)x'_{t-1}\) and \(E\psi_{t-1}(\phi)\xi_{t-1}\) can be computed from the state space form

\[
AX_t = CX_{t-1} + H \begin{bmatrix} u_t \\ \hat{\eta}_t \\ w_t \end{bmatrix}, \quad \text{with} \quad X_t = \begin{bmatrix} y_t \\ \varepsilon_t \\ \xi_t \\ \psi_t \\ \psi_{t-1} \end{bmatrix},
\]

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\[
A = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & -(1 - \beta b)^{-1} \beta c & -(1 - \beta b)^{-1} \beta & 0 & 0 \\
-1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\
-1 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\
0 & -1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\
\end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
C = \begin{pmatrix}
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
-b & -c & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & \rho & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & -c & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & -c \\
\end{pmatrix},
\]
\[
H = \begin{pmatrix}
(1 - \beta b)^{-1} & 0 & (1 - \beta b)^{-1} \\
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 1 & f \\
0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & 0 & 0 \\
\end{pmatrix}.
\]

For the limit \( \sigma^2_\eta \to 0 \) and \( \sigma^2_w \to 0 \) we first set \( \sigma^2_w = \lambda \sigma^2_\eta \), where \( \lambda > 0 \) is arbitrary. It can be computed using Mathematica (routine available on request) that \( \operatorname{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\bar{\phi})] \) and \( \det[J(\bar{\phi})] \) have the following properties as functions of (using temporary notation) \( \omega \equiv \sigma^2_\eta \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\lim_{\omega \to 0} \operatorname{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\bar{\phi})] &= \lim_{\omega \to 0} \frac{d}{d\omega} \operatorname{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\bar{\phi})] = 0, \\
\lim_{\omega \to 0} \det[J(\bar{\phi})] &= \lim_{\omega \to 0} \frac{d}{d\omega} \det[J(\bar{\phi})] = 0, \\
\lim_{\omega \to 0} \frac{d^2}{d\omega^2} \operatorname{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\bar{\phi})] &= -\frac{4 \beta^2 \rho^2 [\beta + f \lambda (1 + f \beta - \rho^2)]^2}{(1 - \beta \rho)(\rho^2 - 1)^6} < 0 \text{ and} \\
\lim_{\omega \to 0} \frac{d^2}{d\omega^2} \det[J(\bar{\phi})] &= \frac{2 \rho^2 [\beta + f \lambda (1 + f \beta - \rho^2)]^2}{\rho^2 - 1} > 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Expressing \( \operatorname{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\bar{\phi})] \) and \( \det[J(\bar{\phi})] \) in terms of Taylor series these results show that

\[
\operatorname{Tr}[\text{adj}(\bar{R})J(\bar{\phi})] < 0 \text{ and } \det[J(\bar{\phi})] > 0
\]

for \( \sigma^2_\eta > 0 \) sufficiently small. Q.E.D.
References


