Report to the Executive Board

The Task Force on AAA Engagement on Israel-Palestine

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ACRONYMS
AAA - American Anthropological Association
AAUP – American Association of University Professors
ASA – American Studies Association
ASOR – American Schools of Oriental Research
BDS – Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions Movement
FAO – Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
IAA – Israeli Anthropological Association
ICAHD – Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions
IDF – Israeli Defense Forces
IMFA – Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
IMR – Infant mortality rates
MESA – Middle East Studies Association
MLA – Modern Languages Association
NAISA – Native American and Indigenous Studies Association
NGO – non-governmental organizations
PACBI – Palestinians for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel
PJSA – Peace and Justice Studies Association
TFIP – AAA Task Force on Engagement with Israel/Palestine
UNDESA – United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNHRC – United Nations Human Rights Commission
UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recent years have seen increasing pressure in the American Anthropological Association (AAA) and many other professional academic associations to discuss alleged Israeli violations of academic freedom and human rights, and to move toward sanctioning Israel. More than 1,100 anthropologists, many of whom are AAA members, have now signed a petition asking the AAA to undertake a boycott of Israel. This particular position, along with the perspectives of others encouraged AAA to consider how it might best engage with the issues the situation in Israel/Palestine raises. On August 1, 2014, the AAA Executive Board announced the formation of the Task Force on the AAA Engagement on Israel/Palestine (hereinafter referred to simply as the Task Force, or TFIP). The Task Force was charged with helping the Executive Board consider the nature and extent to which AAA might contribute – as an Association – to addressing the issues that the Israel/Palestine conflict raises. The Executive Board specifically asked the Task Force to: (1) enumerate the issues embedded in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine that directly concern the Association; (2) develop principles to be used to assess whether the AAA has an interest in taking a stand on these issues; (3) provide such an assessment; and (4) on the basis of that assessment, make recommendations to the Executive Board about actions the AAA could undertake.¹

The Task Force has focused on helping the Board determine what is of importance to anthropologists, to the AAA as an international scholarly society, and to the discipline of anthropology. We set out to understand current perspectives on and experiences of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Our data are primarily obtained through extensive interviews and during a visit by a Task Force delegation to Israel and Palestine in early May 2015. Interlocutors included AAA members and other academics, especially those with expertise in the region, members of NGOs, and other Palestinians and Israelis. We also compiled background material and information on actions taken by other scholarly associations on the issues.

This report provides details about the Task Force’s work, including (1) the methods used, (2) the issues of relevance to anthropologists and the AAA, and (3) the Task Force’s recommendations to the AAA Executive Board on actions the Association could take, as

¹ http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/commissions/Task-Force-on-AAA-Engagement-on-Israel-Palestine.cfm
well as the potential implications of taking these actions. Task Force members wrote this report collaboratively and all agree on its content. We have done our best to confirm the report’s accuracy. Any remaining errors, omissions, or misinterpretation are the Task Force’s responsibility and not the responsibility of the AAA Executive Board.

**Relevant Issues and Realities for Scholars in the Region:** The largest portion of the report catalogues the lengthy history of displacement, land loss, discrimination, restrictions on movement and free speech, and adverse health and welfare effects that Palestinians have experienced as a result of Israeli state policies and practices. This portion of the report is divided into two sections. The first, examining the situation through the frame of human rights, looks at the experiences of Palestinians in both the Occupied Territories and Israel itself. The second section focuses on issues of academic freedom and responsibility in Israel/Palestine, synthesizing testimony from interviews with Israeli, Palestinian and American academics.

**Principles and Recommendations for Potential Action:** The American Anthropological Association is a scholarly society with commitments to academic freedom and to protecting the personal welfare of professional anthropologists and other academics all over the world.

We find that the policies and practices of the Israeli government place significant limitations on academic freedom and have led to substantial deprivations in the health and welfare of Palestinians in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, as well as within Israel itself.

This report recommends a range of possible courses of action available to the AAA Executive Board to intervene on behalf of academic freedom and the rights of Palestinians. These courses of action are based on a number of principles, each of which is discussed in some detail in the report, including:

- A commitment to human rights
- A commitment to academic freedom
- A commitment to advocate for minorities, disadvantaged groups, and indigenous groups
- A commitment to human subjects
- A critical awareness of US complicity in the region
- A fiduciary obligation to the Association
- An obligation to flexible democratic practice within the Association
- An awareness of the extent of the Association’s leverage.

The possible courses of action the Executive Board could consider, each of which is discussed in detail in the report, include:

- No Action, a possibility we do not recommend
- Issue statement of censure of the Israeli government
- Institute an academic boycott of Israeli universities
- Institute an academic boycott of selected Israeli universities
- Make AAA members aware of individual economic boycott choices
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- Develop and make available teaching resources for AAA members
- Undertake a public education initiative (comparable to the *Race: Are We So Different?* and *World on the Move™* initiatives)
- Work with sister societies on the problem of the de-politicization of archaeological research results in Israel
- Make AnthroSource available to Palestinian university libraries at minimal or no cost
- Offer travel or academic scholarships to Palestinian scholars and students
- Publish special issues on topics of relevance in relevant AAA journals
- Maintain an up-to-date library and/or bibliography of relevant sources
- Provide support for visiting scholars to give short courses in Palestinian universities
- Call on relevant agencies of the US government to work towards effective changes in Israeli government policies and practices
- Call on relevant ministries of the Israeli government to:
  o Repeal Israeli laws that make it a crime to speak publicly in favor of a boycott
  o Change visa regulations for foreign scholars to teach, study and do research in Palestine
  o Eliminate checkpoints
  o Improve Internet access in the Occupied Territories
  o Cease IDF raids of universities, arrests of students on campus, and use of tear gas on campus
  o Stop withholding accreditation from Al-Quds University
  o Grant the same rights to Palestinian students on Israeli university campuses for gathering and action, including expression of their identity, as Israeli students enjoy.

We are of the unanimous opinion that, in terms of the principles outlined above, there is a strong case for the Association to take action on this issue, and that the Association should do so. The pros and cons of each of these possibilities can be assessed on the basis of the principles we have recommended. If there ever was a time when this was a fringe issue within the Association, that time has passed.
INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been increasing interest within the American Anthropological Association (AAA) and other academic associations in researching, debating and intervening in the situation in Israel/Palestine. Since 2005, the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel has been mobilizing scholarly societies and their members to engage with the Israel/Palestine issue and to boycott Israel until its government meets a specific set of demands with respect to Palestinian rights. While many anthropologists are wary of embroiling the AAA in political controversies and many oppose a boycott of Israel for this or other reasons, many others feel that the Association should use its resources to leverage debate about Israel/Palestine within and outside AAA, and should move toward a boycott. More than 1,100 anthropologists, many of whom are AAA members, have now signed a petition asking the AAA to undertake a boycott of Israel. This particular position, along with the perspectives of others encouraged AAA to consider how it might best engage with the issues the situation in Israel/Palestine raises.² It is in this context that the AAA Executive Board decided to appoint a Task Force to investigate the Israel/Palestine issue and make recommendations to the membership.

As AAA President Monica Heller has noted elsewhere,³ the Executive Board’s view is that the debate over Israel/Palestine is historically important and anthropologically relevant. The association is well placed to offer AAA members a chance to gain an anthropologically informed perspective on the region and on the broader questions it raises, and to participate in productive conversations about them. Many AAA members have particular knowledge of both the region and its past, and many of us have deep knowledge of the anthropological questions that the region raises for all of us. Our members can provide us with a diverse and rich set of lenses through which to explore and understand these questions.

Just as important, we have an opportunity here to develop and employ modes of mutually respectful exchange on controversial topics that can be illuminated from an anthropological perspective. Our engagement in this case will serve the Association well now and in the future. After all, anthropologists work at understanding multiple perspectives for a living; indeed, it is one of our signature strengths.

The Board felt that it has been important to take the time to have this conversation well, and with all interested members—recognizing that while some of us have been thinking about some of these issues for a long time, others may well be relatively new to this set of topics and deserve to have the chance to inform themselves to their satisfaction. Some of

² The petition and a list of signatories can be found at https://anthroboycott.wordpress.com/. There are also counter-petitions at https://anthroantiboycott.wordpress.com/ and https://facultyforacademicfreedom.org. See also http://thirdnarrative.org.
our sister associations have devoted years of conversation to this topic; certainly we feel it should be given due consideration.

Towards that end, on August 1, 2014, the AAA Executive Board announced the formation of the Task Force on the AAA Engagement on Israel/Palestine (hereinafter referred to simply as the Task Force, or TFIP). The Task Force’s work is part of a more encompassing AAA effort to respond to members’ interest in dialogue about the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict. The Task Force was charged with helping the Executive Board consider the nature and extent to which the AAA might contribute - as an Association - to addressing the issues that the Israel/Palestine political situation raises. It was asked to complete its work by October 2015 by:

1) enumerating the issues embedded in the political situation involving Israel and Palestine that directly concern the Association. These issues may include, but are not limited to, the uses of anthropological research to support or challenge claims of territory and historicity; restrictions placed by government policy or practice on scholars’ academic freedom; or commissioning anthropological research whose methods and/or aims may be inconsistent with the AAA statement of professional responsibilities;

2) developing principles to be used to assess whether the AAA has an interest in taking a stand on these issues (and also to act as a template for future controversies);

3) providing such an assessment; and

4) on the basis of that assessment, making recommendations to the Executive Board about actions the AAA could undertake.

Over the course of our work, the Task Force’s focus evolved. When we first developed our interview plans, we focused on issues of academic freedom, the actions scholars thought the AAA as an organization should take with respect to Israel and Palestine, and the degree to which anthropological knowledge might be implicated in the political situation. With the delegation’s trip to Israel and Palestine, the human rights dimension took on greater prominence. Our interviewees in the United States had spoken to some of these issues but they came into much clearer focus during the delegation’s visit. For the Board’s benefit, we then explored some important framing dimensions (historical timeline, settler colonialism, what actions other scholarly societies have considered).

We want to acknowledge that the Task Force members, like most AAA members, do not have a deep history of expertise in the region. In that way their selection departs from the pattern of other Task Forces, Commissions, and Working Groups that the Executive Board has previously established to advise it on important timely issues. Instead, they have engaged widely with experts on and in the region. Each member is an established scholar with expertise in one or more of the discipline’s major subfields (linguistic anthropology, archaeology, sociocultural anthropology and biological anthropology). As a result, together the Task Force members bring a wide range of forms of enquiry and analysis to this endeavor. They also have expertise in conflict and historical memory, ethnopolitics, political economy, issues of identity, and the use of anthropology/archeology in political efforts, among the many content area specialties relevant to the
political situation in Israel/Palestine. Finally, almost all of the Task Force members have a record of significant service to the Association, and thus a strong sense of its mission and governance. The Board kept the group small to ensure its agility and its ability to do its work with all deliberate speed; that is, to have sufficient time to assure that all relevant perspectives are duly considered, but to accomplish its task in the time allocated.

The remainder of this report is divided into three broad sections. The first, Human Rights, describes what the Task Force learned with respect to human rights issues in terms of the broader experience of Palestinians in Israel/Palestine to be able to lay out the issues that are relevant to the Executive Board’s deliberations. Our account focuses on troubling structural inequalities in terms of access to resources, education and health outcomes. It also maps the complex system of identity cards, checkpoints and other restrictions that has been put in place to control the movement of Palestinians, with particular attention to the case of Jerusalem. Throughout, we see a tragic instance of victims of one of the most egregious instances of nationalism / colonialism creating a system of oppression with echoes of the very system they had managed to escape. The second section looks at issues of academic freedom, both on the West Bank and at universities in Israel itself. In the final section, we move to principles for assessing these issues and our recommendations.

Some readers will already feel they know the history of Israel/Palestine, while others will come to this issue with little sense of the relevant history. We have prepared a detailed historical outline, which we have attempted to make as factual and objective as possible (granted the ultimate impossibility of achieving such an objective). It can be found in Appendix B, and we recommend that readers consult it for a deeper understanding of the historical background to the situation we explore in this report.

A Bibliography of references cited is included, along with four appendices: A) the Task Force Charge, B) a timeline of key historical events in the region, C) a summary of previous public AAA statements and other forms of engagement, and D) a list of interlocutors involved in the Task Force’s work.

RESEARCH METHODS

Data Overview
The Task Force used a three-pronged approach to data collection and management.

1. Subject Matter Expert Interviews: We conducted open-ended interviews with a snowball sample of people identified by reputational or positional criteria as subject matter experts on one or more aspects of relevant issues in the region.

2. Background Materials: We collected published background materials, with a focus on the materials published in the past 20 years (see Bibliography), materials made public by scholarly societies concerning their deliberations about engaging with issues in the region, as well as news coverage, opinion pieces, and commentaries issued from a variety of political and ideological perspectives.
3. **Research Conference Symposia:** We attended the multiple symposia concerning Israel, Palestine, the BDS Movement and other relevant topics at the AAA Annual Meeting in 2014.

After several months of work, we determined that it would be of significant benefit to validate, correct and amplify the observations gained from these three sources by sending a Task Force delegation to Israel and the West Bank. In particular, the delegation was asked to focus on the lived experience of our colleagues, their students, and their interlocutors in the region.

**Interviews with Experts at the 2014 Annual Meeting**

We developed criteria for selecting interlocutors; built a list of potential individuals; identified data we needed to gather from the interviews; developed the interview questions and coding systems to assure interlocutor confidentiality; built a secure mode of transportation and storage for the recorded and coded interviews; and established guidelines for the transcription or précis of each interview followed by the process of thematic coding. All interviews were conducted in English and no translation was necessary.

Prior to initiating interviews, we established positional and reputational criteria for identifying potential interlocutors. We wanted to be sure to talk with individuals who occupy key positions as scholars, NGO representatives, scholarly society representatives, and students, as well other persons recommended for their subject matter expertise.

Seventeen individuals responded to email invitations, and interviews were established at the 2014 Annual Meeting in Washington, DC. An additional 29 individuals were contacted and agreed to phone interviews after the Annual Meeting. At the Annual Meeting, Task Force members interviewed each interlocutor in pairs, with some exceptions due to scheduling. Almost all of the interviews were conducted in a private setting and were audio recorded. Each interlocutor was asked to provide informed consent and given the option of remaining anonymous or having his or her name listed in this report (see Appendix A). All interviews were assigned an identity code before the interview, and the audio recording filenames referred to the assigned code rather than the interlocutors’ identities. The coding key has been kept separate from the actual recordings and their transcriptions. The key is known only to the Task Force members and two AAA staff members. Each interlocutor was also asked to recommend other anthropologists or professionals that the Task Force ought to interview, either at the Annual Meeting or shortly thereafter.

In the Task Force’s efforts to understand the impacts of Israeli government policies and practices, the key points around which the interviews were based included the following:

**Academic Issues:**

- Access to higher education and research opportunities for Israeli and Palestinian faculty, students, and activists.
The professional conditions of Israeli and Palestinian academics and anthropologists working in the region.

How issues of academic freedom impact the research opportunities of international anthropologists.

**Use of Anthropological Knowledge in the context of the Conflict/Occupation**

- The production, circulation, and destruction of anthropological research in the region and its impact (past and present) on the political situation.

**Forms of Scholarly Society Engagement**

- Should the AAA take a stand on the issue?
- If so, how should it voice concern about academic institutions and their potential complicity with human rights injustices?
- What would be the likely impacts of various forms of engagement?

Interlocutors were also asked whether they wished to provide any other information.

**Interviews after the 2014 Annual Meeting**

Twenty-nine interviews were completed after the 2014 Annual Meeting. Each interlocutor was asked for his/her permission to record the conversation. Most interviews were recorded and followed the same protocol as the interviews at the 2014 Annual Meeting. In addition, interviews with about 100 persons were completed in May 2015 by the Task Force delegation in Israel and the West Bank. These interviews were not recorded. Informed consent was obtained. As with the interview data from the Annual Meeting, data on all post-Meeting interviews were de-identified and the coding scheme kept separate from the transcribed interviews.

All told, the Task Force interviewed about 120 people. No one turned down the invitation to be interviewed, but the Task Force did not have the resources to interview everyone on the initial list and received recommendations for at least ten other people to interview too long after reporting deadlines would have permitted their observations to be included.

The Task Force recognizes that its report will likely generate additional discussion, and the Board may wish to consider specific ways in which additional information can be captured from such discussion.

Each Task Force member transcribed or summarized the interviews s/he conducted, added field notes, observations and other relevant information directly related to the interviews. Interlocutors were de-identified and any information that could be used to identify the interlocutor was deleted from the notes. The transcriptions were stored on a secured shared folder. Only Task Force members, the AAA staff liaison, and the AAA Executive Director have access to this archive. The transcription and archiving system allowed all Task Force members to review all interviews and determine trends in the data that shaped this report.
Rapid Assessment Project, May 2015

Three Task Force members (Besnier, Gusterson, and Spielmann) made a 10-day rapid assessment trip to the region in May 2015. The purposes of this trip were to collect information from people in the region to complement the observations that had been gained from the interviews and background material, and to talk with subject matter experts who had not been available earlier in the year. The three delegates were selected mainly on the basis of their availability. The trip was planned with the assistance of two Washington, DC-based consultants who both have strong ties to the region and specialized expertise in conflict analysis and resolution techniques. When the delegation began its work in the region, however, they adjusted their itinerary with the help of an additional facilitator, a local Palestinian, as it became clear that some Palestinian stakeholders viewed the “conflict resolution” approach that the two DC-based consultants took as problematic.4

Background Materials

The bibliography included in this report represents the materials that were sent to us by multiple scholars with expertise on the region, our interlocutors, various organizations with whom we interfaced during our investigation, and other associations that have responded to their membership in regards to the BDS movement. We each added materials to this bibliography as we sought deeper understandings and data for our own knowledge as we wrote and edited this report. Data from websites and other online media have been verified as active as of the date of this report.

Sessions at the 2014 Annual Meeting

Prior to the 2014 Annual Meeting, the AAA Office provided us with a listing of all sessions relevant to Israel, Palestine, the BDS movement, and other relevant issues that we were invited to or were suggested by our colleagues. At least one of us attended each session and debriefed the other members. All of us attended the General Business Meeting, where the membership engaged with this issue.

LANGUAGE AND HISTORY

Our knowledge and understanding of the region deepened as we compiled materials on the history and politics of the region, on anthropological engagements with Israel/Palestine (with a specific investment in parsing out such engagements across the four disciplinary subfields), and on the arguments advanced by advocates and detractors of the BDS movement, many of whom provided references to books, articles/essays, as well as online links. Of course, a vast and rich literature frames a diverse range of perspectives that inform the larger context within which we addressed our charge. For example, considerable scholarly attention has been given to the politics of

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4 Palestinian stakeholders objecting to the “conflict resolution” approach argued that such an approach mistakenly assumes a symmetrical balance between Israeli and Palestinian positions, normalizing the conflict/occupation. They also argued that since attempts grounded in the conflict resolution frame have failed to ameliorate the Palestinians’ situation, the approach is ineffective. See Bishara (2015) and Giacaman (2009).
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conflict/occupation in the region, including the works of anthropologists based in the United States, the Middle East, and elsewhere. The documents referenced in this report represent only a small selection of the material currently available. We recommend that the AAA maintain and regularly update a library and/or bibliography of relevant sources, some of which can be made available online.

Anthropological analyses of the conflict/occupation have focused on such issues as: the role of academic institutions in crafting what become official histories of the region; the various, specific claims for historical and contemporary politico-spatial configurations of the land; and state-sponsored allocations of the region’s resources. Arguments about the best way to induce the Israeli state to address questions of human rights violations against Palestinians take many forms, and include contentions about the political value of boycotting Israel. In contrast, arguments have been advanced claiming that academics should never promote censorship, and that a boycott of Israeli academic institutions would single out Israel unfairly.

An important aspect of the issues that the TFIP had to address is the very role of “the political” in anthropological research, analysis, and practice. Some anthropologists envision anthropology as a discipline that should broadly confine itself to addressing academic research questions, where possible with an approach that transcends politics. As one such anthropologist put it to the Task Force, “anthropology should not have its own foreign policy.” Others maintain that the discipline has a responsibility to take an “activist” role in critiquing how the powerful maintain their power and marginalize the less fortunate. Some of these latter anthropologists still see anthropological knowledge as objective, while for others claims that anthropological research can be apolitical bespeak a romanticizing of scholarship that downplays its undeniably political coefficients. For them, since Michel Foucault (1970) and Edward Said (1978), the production of knowledge can never again be thought of as autonomous of its political foundation and implications, and anthropology should deconstruct the inequities of everyday social life and anything less entails a complicity with power and oppression. The conflict between these different positions is just one contentious backdrop to debates about how the AAA should respond to calls for action on the subject it tasked the TFIP to examine.

Potent Language Choices

One important concern in writing this report – and the work on which it is based – is that the very language we use to characterize the issues is fraught with political meaning. In a divisive context such as Israel/Palestine, language itself is deeply politicized. It is especially effective as a political tool in that it can subtly orient towards one perspective while excluding or downplaying other perspectives. A prime example is whether Israel and Palestine are engaged in a conflict, which assumes that the parties involved have comparable access to resources (including material resources, freedom of movement, freedom to express oneself, as well as the forces of violence), but that they clash because their interests are mutually incompatible; or whether one is dealing with an occupation, which consists in one party controlling, militarily or otherwise, the territory, time, liberty, and other resources deemed to be under the rightful control of the other party. In addition to indexing different political positions, contrasting ways of referring to the context also
index the different ways in which the various parties are experiencing it, and they affect readers’ perceptions of it.

Basing our remarks on the Task Force’s conversations with Israeli anthropologists, Palestinians, and regional experts, as well as our direct observation of conditions in the West Bank, we use the term “conflict/occupation” to refer to the political situation involving Israel and Palestine.

Over the last few decades some commentators have proposed an analogy between the apartheid regime that prevailed in South Africa between 1948 and 1994 and the policies and systems of controlling Palestinians that the Israeli government is maintaining (Pappé 2015; Clark 2012, Davis 2003). A description of Palestine as being under apartheid foregrounds the salience of ethno-religious categories and the military checkpoints, identity documents, movement restrictions, frequent military operations, arrests (particularly “administrative detentions” that can take place without charges), unequal access to and confiscations of land, buildings, water, and other vital resources, segregated roads, unequal legal regimes, and so on. However, most Israelis, including many Israeli anthropologists, reject the analogy to apartheid (the word for which in Hebrew has strong negative connotations, unlike the words for “separation” and “settlement”), as do a number of Palestinians and anthropologists of Palestine who observe demographic and labor market differences between Israel and South Africa (Bowman 2015).

An important mode of categorization involves the use of ethnonyms, which has strong political overtones. The Israeli state designates non-Jewish Arabic-speaking holders of Israeli citizenship as “Arab citizens of Israel” or “Arab Israelis” for short. The category obviously has only existed since the founding of the state of Israel in 1948, as before that date no distinction was made between different groups of Jewish and Arab Palestinians living within Mandatory Palestine. Today the category is comprised of Arab Palestinians, regardless of their religion, and those descendants who were not expelled in 1948/49. The term also includes Palestinians who were displaced but remained within the State borders (they are also sometimes referred to as “present-absentees” in human rights discourse and critical scholarship). Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship constitute about 20% of the country’s population, hold some legal rights as Israeli citizens (e.g., the ability to vote) but not others (e.g., being legally ineligible to buy land in most of the country and, especially, in the most cultivable areas, which are held by the Jewish National Fund). They are exempted from Israeli military service, which is expected of all other Israelis except ultra-orthodox Jews (Ben-Ari 2003; Pasquetti 2013). They generally self-designate as “Palestinian Israelis” or, more recently, “1948 Palestinians,” asserting their identification with Palestinian people as a whole (i.e., in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestinian diaspora in other countries), with whom they continue to share kinship, cultural, religious, and other ties, as well as some aspects of their political struggles. The term “Arab Israeli” obscures these commonalities and, for those it designates, has the effect of severing the relationship between Palestinians in Israel and in the Occupied territories. At the same time, mainstream Israelis in daily conversation tend to use the term “Israeli” to mean “Jewish Israeli” exclusively (contrasting, for example, “Arabs” and “Israelis” even though both are citizens of the country).
A special case are the “Bedouin,” a term applied to people, once semi-nomadic, who inhabit the southern part of Israel (the Negev or Naqab Desert). 12,000 Bedouin people who were not expelled in 1948/49 (out of an original population of 70,000) became Israeli citizens but were confined to about 10% of the territory they had inhabited previously. Today, 135,000 Bedouins live in seven special townships where they have been relocated by the State, while about the same number, who have refused relocation, live in so-called “unrecognized villages.” The Israeli State refuses to supply the latter with basic services like water and electricity. In contrast to the term “Bedouin,” ethnonyms like “Naqab Arabs” or “Palestinian Bedouins” emphasize their historical and cultural affinity to other Palestinians and the commonalities of their political struggles.

Place names and the choice of scripts to write them also have strong political implications. For example, the Israeli government takes issue with the designation “Al-Quds University” (Al-Quds being the Arabic name for Jerusalem) and, as we will explain later, refuses to grant it accreditation. The Israeli State and other agents refer to the West Bank (minus East Jerusalem) as “Judea and Samaria,” a term that asserts Israel’s historically and politically justified control of the area. Since 1948, most Arabic place names have been replaced with Hebrew place names, in some cases successfully obliterating all signs of the previous Palestinian presence (particularly where inhabitants were eliminated and settlements destroyed). Many road signs in Israel are in two or three scripts (Hebrew, Arabic, and English), but the Arabic script commonly spells out the Hebrew-language, rather than the Arabic-language, place name (see Figure 1).

A number of other designations have contrasting political and experiential connotations. To give only a few examples, the concrete structure, averaging 8m in height and 3m in width, which is supplemented by electronic fences and which snakes inside the Green Line throughout the West Bank and renders everyday travel extraordinarily difficult for

Figure 1: Trilingual road sign: The Arabic version spells out “Urshalim,” the transliteration of Hebrew “Yerushalaim” and is followed, in brackets, by the Arabic name “Al-Quds” (the latter disappears on many other road signs). Source: Flickr (https://www.flickr.com/photos/57153777@N05/5797072351)

Palestinians, is referred to as a “security fence” by many Israelis, but is a “separation barrier” or “apartheid wall” for Palestinians (see Figures 2 and 3). The armed intervention in Gaza in 2014, in which approximately 2,100 Gazans, and 72 Israelis were
killed (BBC News 2014), is a “war” for one side (named “Operation Protective Edge”) but an “attack” for the other. Israeli “settlements” in the West Bank are deemed “illegal” by virtually all international organizations and governments, while the Israeli State reserves this adjective for Palestinian homes it regularly demolishes (250 structures in the first half of 2015; more than 40,000 structures since 1967, according to the Israeli Committee Against Housing Demolitions (ICAHD) [http://icahd.org/].)

For the purpose of this report, we often flag different terms used to describe the same phenomenon: the fact that, in many cases, terminological choices are associated with perspectives that have very different political valences and epistemological groundings. For the vast majority of Israelis the everyday Palestinian experience of checkpoints, lines, passes and searches is altogether removed from their everyday realities.

For example, the complex system of identity documents imposed by the Israeli State on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, which determines where they can go and when, looms large in their everyday lives, as we will discuss presently (“Palestinian Experiences”). Yet most Israelis have limited understanding of the details of this system and of the myriad ways in which it inflects Palestinian life in a way that is often experienced by Palestinians as capricious, intrusive, and demeaning.
HUMAN RIGHTS

In its 1999 Statement on Anthropology and Human Rights, the Association stated:

*Anthropology as a profession is committed to the promotion and protection of the right of people and peoples everywhere to the full realization of their humanity, which is to say their capacity for culture. When any culture or society denies or permits the denial of such opportunity to any of its own members or others, the American Anthropological Association has an ethical responsibility to protest and oppose such deprivation. This implies starting from the base line of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and associated implementing international legislation, but also expanding the definition of human rights to include areas not necessarily addressed by international law. These areas include collective as well as individual rights, cultural, social, and economic development, and a clean and safe environment.*

The statement went on to observe that “as a professional organization of anthropologists, the AAA has long been, and should continue to be, concerned whenever human difference is made the basis for a denial of basic human rights.”

Given the AAA’s on-going commitment to the protection of human rights and anthropology’s commitment in general to promoting the right of people and peoples everywhere to the full realization of their capacity for culture, one of the dimensions of the Israel-Palestine conflict/occupation that we investigated was whether Israel was denying such rights to Palestinians. We found the “settler colonialism” frame suggested by many of our interlocutors to capture some aspects of the relationship of the Israeli government to Palestinians that concerned us and we present that frame first. We then consider ways in which the Israeli government routinely denies access to basic rights. These include housing, education, water, freedom of movement, freedom from harassment, and freedom of full political expression. We also investigated the degree to which the Israeli occupation negatively impacts Palestinian health.

The “Settler Colonialism” Frame

Although Israelis often speak of a “conflict” between Israelis and Palestinians (a locution that critics of the term’s applicability in this situation believe implies a dispute between more or less equal parties that might be resolved peaceably), the majority of Palestinians refer to “the Occupation” of Palestinians by Israelis. Indeed, one Israeli anthropologist advised us to avoid “any talk of symmetry, any talk of two sides, both in the wrong. Any outsider who came in and talked in those terms would truly be guilty of colonialism.” While there is something to be said for both frames, conflict and occupation, we became convinced (on the basis of our interviews with Israeli Jews, Palestinians and outside academic experts) that one cannot fully understand the conflict / occupation without situating it as the product of a colonial structure, albeit a unique one. In the case of Israel,

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Jewish settlers have an ancient claim that their ancestors were dispossessed of the land to which they have moved, and have themselves fled persecution, racialized violence and genocide enacted against them by the citizenries of other states.

A Palestinian academic with expertise in comparative colonial history whom we interviewed suggested an analogy between the current objectives of the Israeli State and earlier settler colonial projects. Recognizing the complexity and specificity of this case, we nonetheless found this analogy helpful. One interlocutor observed that in the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and Rhodesia, a group of settlers established themselves and, moving toward military, political and demographic dominance, sought to take over land from the people who were already there, using a mixture of force, treaty negotiations and legal instruments to marginalize previous inhabitants and push them into progressively smaller and less desirable islands of land. These outside groups were often animated by a messianic sense that the land they were expropriating was destined to be theirs and that the groups who had inhabited it for centuries were inadequate to the task of cultivating it properly.

In the case of Israel and Palestine, Jews had been driven from this land millennia ago and thus, unlike these other settler-colonial examples, they have a deep historic connection with the land. However, in the words of Roy Isacowitz (2015), “The Israel of today… is the culmination of a process that began at the turn of the twentieth century, when the early Zionists created the myth of ‘a land without people for a people without land’ and set about expropriating Palestinian land.”

In most settler colonial states, an initial (and protracted) expansionary phase marked by conflict was generally followed by one of “normalization” once unquestionable settler dominance was established, as happened with Native Americans in the United States, First Nations in Canada, and Aboriginal peoples in Australia. In South Africa and Rhodesia, normalization was never fully achieved, and the settler colonial ambitions were never fully realized, in part because the international geopolitical context did not afford the settler colonialists the isolation from external pressure that had facilitated the achievement of closure for colonizing efforts in the U.S., Canada and Australia. The Palestinian academic who proposed this comparison to the Task Force said it was as yet unclear whether Israel would achieve the kind of normalization of settler colonialism seen in American, Canadian, and Australian history, or whether it would instead follow the path of Rhodesia and South Africa. As well as providing a suggestive framework within which to think about the Israeli state’s activities, this comparison reminds us that American anthropologists come to their investigations of the Israel/Palestine issue marked by their own country’s history of settler colonialism, not from any position of easy moral superiority.

Colonialism has not always taken the form of settler colonialism. Large parts of colonial Africa, for example, were administered by European colonial powers in the absence of significant settler populations. Historically, where there were large settler populations – Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia, and South Africa are examples – colonialism tended to generate more violent conflict. It was accompanied by more extreme kinds of
supremacist ideology, involved greater displacement of native peoples, the development of mechanisms to separate natives from settlers, and enforced restrictions on the everyday movements of indigenous populations seen as threatening. Settler colonialism, in other words, tends to be the more extreme form, and the most painful and intrusive for indigenous populations (Elkins and Pederson 2005; see also Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2014b).

Israeli state activities have historically centered on the colonization and development of land and urban space in a demographically congested region where many Jews view this land as belonging to them, the claims of others to the land notwithstanding. As this process of colonization has unfolded, many Palestinians have been forced off ancestral land, and deep inequalities between Jewish and Palestinian populations have developed in terms of wealth, employment and access to public facilities and services such as healthcare, education, electricity and water.

These inequalities are reinforced by an apparatus that classifies people according to both their ethnic identity and their place of residence. It is a matter of policy and practice that Israeli public administration acts according to a complex matrix that allocates different rights to people of different categories. Jews and Palestinians in Israel have different rights, but Palestinians in Israel and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories also have different rights. For example: anyone anywhere in the world who can plausibly claim to be Jewish has a prima facie “right of return” to Israel, while Palestinians whose ancestors lived there for centuries do not;6 Israeli Jews have a right and obligation to serve in the military (with exemptions for the Ultra-Orthodox), while Palestinians in Israel do not (with the exception of the Druze), and very few volunteer. Israeli settlers in the West Bank are, unlike the Arabs living around them, under Israeli law; Palestinians lack habeas corpus and can be detained indefinitely without trial while Jews cannot.7 Palestinians from Jerusalem who go abroad lose their property while Jews do not. Thus one Israeli academic told the Task Force, “I wouldn’t say Israel isn’t a democracy, but it’s a democracy for Jews only.” This has led some, such as Halper (2008) and Balakrishnan et al (2015) to refer to it as an “ethnocracy.” 8

While the parallels between this system of bureaucratic classification and discrimination and the apartheid regime of South Africa appear striking, several Palestinians warned the Task Force not to treat the analogy as too exact. One referred to the Palestinian situation as one of “soft apartheid,” while another said “it’s a new system of apartheid here with more sophisticated methods.” In South Africa, for example, people of different “races” were not allowed to marry. In Israel, by contrast, although it is not possible for a Jew and

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6 One Israeli academic told the Task Force that, while Israel claims it has no space for the Arabs who fled in 1948 to return, “we absorbed one million Russians, no problem. A half of those Russians are non-Jews.” (Many non-Jewish Russians seeking to emigrate from Russia claimed to be Jewish so they could move to Israel).

7 However, as the Task Force was drafting this report, Israel’s government turned the tool of detention without trial, which had been used against many Palestinian activists, against a small number of Israeli settlers believed to be inciting settler violence against Palestinians -- in particular an arson attack by settlers that killed a Palestinian toddler. See Booth (2015).

8 For a discussion of the Palestinian place in Israel defined as an “ethnic state,” see also Rouhana and Ghanem (1998) and Rouhana (2006). For further discussion of the unique national identity of Israel from the point of view of Israeli anthropologists, see Markowitz et al. (2015).
an Arab to marry within the country, marriages performed elsewhere are recognized. In South Africa, universities were segregated; in Israel, Palestinian Israelis take classes alongside Israeli Jews (cf. Cole 2002).

An Israeli anthropologist warned the Task Force that “when Americans come [to Israel] they have a particular frame about racism,” a “black-white frame” that focuses only on Palestinians and Jews. She pointed out that the picture is complicated by “internal Jewish racism” experienced by Mizrahi and Ethiopian Jews at the hands of Ashkenazi Jews whose families derive from Europe. While this is not a focus of our report, the Task Force does want to take note of the fact that the Mizrahi and Ethiopian Jews have lower incomes, lower levels of employment, poorer educational resources and, within the army, are more likely to be assigned the tasks of direct, sometimes violent policing of Palestinians, while the more prestigious and sanitized roles of gathering intelligence on Palestinians tend to be reserved to Ashkenazis.

While the Task Force delegation was visiting Israel/Palestine, there was a large demonstration protesting this situation. Referring to this protest, a group of Palestinian Israeli students likened the situation of Ethiopian Jews to that of African-Americans in Ferguson, Missouri, and Baltimore. These same students pointed out that, even as it creates lines of stratification within the Jewish community, the Israeli state also creates divisions among Palestinians by encouraging separate identities and allowing special privileges for particular Arab groups. The Druze have been given a separate educational system, for example, and, as noted, the Druze are subject to military conscription while the Bedouin have been encouraged to volunteer for military service, unlike other Palestinians. “The government won’t deal with us as a national collective. They divide us into sects,” said one student.

Thus the Israeli system of settler colonialism can be seen as a single unified system stretching from Tel Aviv to Gaza and Ramallah, with different modulations for different spaces and different Arab communities (Weizman 2007). The ultimate unity of these official policies and practices was emphasized by an Israeli anthropologist, a self-identified “centrist,” who observed about the “settlement movement” that while settlements inside and outside Israel seem different in a context where Palestinians are only 20% of the population in Israel, but are 85% of the population in the West Bank, they are all ultimately part of a single settlement project; “1967 is not the real issue. 1948 is the real issue.”

We do not want to understate the important differences between the circumstances of Palestinians in Israel and in the Occupied Territories. While Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank live under occupation, Israeli Palestinians may experience discrimination, but they can also vote and have access to the Israeli court system if they want to try to assert their rights. Nevertheless, to many Palestinians, it looks as if they are, as a people, subject to what Israeli anthropologist Jeff Halper (2008, 2009) has controversially called a single “matrix of control” that operates flexibly in different spaces.
Palestinian Experiences

In the pages that follow we characterize the experiences of Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories within the “settler colonialism” frame. Where nineteenth and twentieth century colonial systems often relied on crude violence, the Israeli system relies, to a striking degree, on bureaucratic rules (regulating property ownership, for example) and on an environment that is custom-built to channel access to space. We note, however, the on-going use of administrative detention, particularly aimed at young Palestinian men, in which people are held often for years with no charge and no due process, and the leveling of much of Gaza by the Israeli army. Again, the reason why it is important to characterize these experiences is because of anthropology’s historic concern for human rights and the felt obligation of anthropologists who have worked with Palestinians to advocate within their professional community and more broadly for the well-being of the people with whom they study – an anthropological obligation that goes back to Franz Boas’ historic advocacy for Native Americans and immigrants. But we also want to note the complexity of a situation in which Israelis have their own powerful claims to victimhood and the irony of a situation in which they have recreated some of the same forms of victimization to which they were subjected.

History Denied

An important element of control, as emphasized by Eric Wolf in his historic account of colonization *Europe and a People Without History*, is the erasure or denial of one’s history. 1948 was the year Israel declared independence. This declaration followed from the end of World War II, and the refusal of the West to take in Jewish refugees from Nazism. 1948 was also the year of what Palestinians call the “Nakba” – the catastrophe. Historians have found evidence that 700,000 – 750,000 Palestinians fled, were driven out, or were killed during the Nakba. Hundreds of Arab villages were destroyed and many Palestinians lost their homes to Jewish families. The Palestinians who remained now constitute 20% of Israel’s population, while those who left had to make lives for themselves in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan or elsewhere.

The Nakba is profoundly important to Palestinians inside Israel as well as outside. If for most Israeli Jews May 1948 represents an important moment when a new nation state was established just three years after the end of the Holocaust, for Palestinians this date represents a moment of primal suffering and loss. It symbolizes for them a point of origin of a process of dispossession and subordination that continues today. “We are still inside the Nakba,” a Palestinian student told us. Thus while the Israeli state publicly celebrates its independence every May, Palestinians want to publicly memorialize the counter-history of independence, to bear witness to the cost of independence borne by their community (Hammami 2003; Shehadeh 2002).
Historians and sociologists, Israeli as well as Palestinian, are still debating the nature of the Israeli independence struggle and the relative culpability of Jews and Arabs for the course of events in 1947-49. The Task Force is in no position to adjudicate these historiographical debates, but we are concerned by the degree to which the Israeli State, a self-described democracy, suppresses public memory of and debate about Palestinians’ version of their own history, and seeks to curtail open academic debate of these issues. In our view, this is damaging to civil society and to academic freedom. Because Israeli history books give only the official Israeli version of the birth of Israel, many Israelis are unfamiliar with even the word “Nakba” (Khoury 2007). We were told by Israeli academics that history faculty who try to teach about the Nakba are harassed by students and by right wing groups such as IsraCampus and Israel Academia Monitor, which track faculty speech. Israel’s most prominent revisionist historian, Ilan Pappé, has said that such harassment caused him to leave the University of Haifa for an academic position in the UK after Israel’s Minister of Education called for him to be fired, his university barred him from attending conferences, and Yedioth Ahronoth, Israel’s best-selling newspaper published a photograph of him with a bull’s eye superimposed (Arnot 2009).

Israeli law prohibits public commemoration of the Nakba. The “Nakba Law” (2011) authorizes the Minister of Finance to withhold monetary support from an institution or municipality if that institution were to hold an event that undermines the “existence of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state” or marks the date of Israel’s establishment “as a day of mourning” (Olesker 2014). Public commemorations have been broken up by the police, and hotels that rent conference rooms for discussion of the Nakba are subject to fines. Calling this law “a very bad law,” one Israeli anthropologist said, “people have a right to their memories.” A Palestinian told the Task Force, “this is occupation of the mind, the most dangerous occupation of all.” An Israeli academic, pointing out that “the people who Israel bombards in Gaza are the sons and daughters of the people it
expelled,” made the most provocative statement, saying “there’s a denial about the Nakba which, to me, is comparable to Holocaust denial.”

The Task Force is concerned that academics in Israel are pressured to conform their teaching and research to official state ideology in the context of the Nakba. We are also concerned that the state has passed laws designed to repress public memory and debate and to suppress the historical narratives of one fifth of its population.

**Control of Space**

The recent (20th and 21st century) history of the control of Palestinian space documents a process not unlike the US creation of Native American reservations. Compared with the size of British Mandatory Palestine in 1923 (see Appendix B), Palestinian territory has shrunk by about 90%. Compared with size of the West Bank and Gaza in 1948, the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II) reduced the area ostensibly in Palestinian control by about 50% through the creation Areas A, B, and C. Area A is governed by the Palestinian Authority and policed by Palestinians, Area B is ostensibly governed by the Palestinian Authority and policed by Israel, and Area C is governed and policed by Israel. Oslo II allowed the redeployment of Israeli troops into the West Bank. By 2000, through a series of negotiations Area A comprised 17% of West Bank territory distributed in 11 separate clusters and Area B comprises 24% of West Bank territory, distributed in 120 separate sections. Area C comprises a continuous 59% of West Bank territory (Gordon 2008:178).

![Figure 5. Areas A, B, and C](http://www.ethosreview.org/intellectual-spaces/accessing-justice/)
Israeli policies have the effect of expropriating Palestinian land and concentrating Palestinians in ever-shrinking territorial parcels. Their *modus operandi* also involves the surveillance and control of Palestinian bodies across a range of spaces. Over time an elaborate system for the regimentation of space has evolved that monitors and tracks Palestinians, restricts and channels their movements, often separating them from spaces marked as exclusively Jewish, while rationing the resources and services available to them. Key tools of this system, which is flexible enough to operate differently in different spaces, are walls, checkpoints, special access roads, car license plates, identity cards, electronic eavesdropping towers, zoning laws, building permits, and the built infrastructure for the delivery of services such as water and electricity.

As noted elsewhere in this report, while there is what one Israeli anthropologist calls a “matrix of control” that stretches from Gaza to Nahariyya and from Ashqelon to Jericho, it functions differently in different spaces. Gaza lies at one extreme. Although the Task Force scarcely interviewed anyone from Gaza, and the Task Force delegation to Israel/Palestine did not go to Gaza, we repeatedly heard Gaza likened to “an open-air jail” (Dawber 2013). British conservative Prime Minister David Cameron has compared it to “a prison camp” (Watt and Sherwood 2010); the *New York Times* columnist Roger Cohen has described it as “little better than an open-air prison” (Cohen 2014); and the philosopher Georgio Agamben has likened it to a concentration camp (Whyte 2013). The 1.8 million people who live in the 360 square kilometers that constitutes the Gaza Strip are, unless they make use of illegal tunnels, largely prevented from leaving by Israeli and Egyptian border guards, and their ability to import the necessities of daily life, including medical supplies and even food, is heavily restricted. (The issue of caloric control and health is discussed further in the report and demonstrates the impact of such restrictions).

By most accounts, especially in the wake of Israel’s 2014 bombing campaign in retaliation against Hamas rocket attacks, Palestinians in Gaza live a “bare life” that is, by any objective measure, the worst of the various iterations of the Palestinian experience. One Israeli academic told the Task Force, “Gaza is a prison. Two million people live there. Some of them would like to study anthropology, but they can’t because they can’t exit.”

At the other end of the spectrum, Palestinians who live in Israel proper live a more normal life and, as Israeli citizens, are free to travel within Israel as well as internationally. This does not mean, however, that they are free from discriminatory mechanisms policing their movement through space. For example, in a way that reminded Task Force members of police treatment of urban minorities in the U.S., Palestinians complain that they are much more likely than others to be stopped by police on the street and asked for their papers. (Two Task Force members witnessed this first hand while watching Israeli police to see whom they stopped on the street to question.) Many Palestinian-Israeli academics complained to the Task Force that they have been subjected to protracted humiliating interrogations, even strip-searched and forced to surrender their shoes and laptops before boarding international flights, when flying from Ben Gurion airport, especially on El Al. A well-known case of this concerns a Palestinian law professor at Hebrew University who sued the airport after being detained at Ben
Gurion for three hours and having her laptop confiscated on her way to an international conference; and a Palestinian anthropologist in Israel was encouraged to sue by colleagues after similarly discriminatory treatment at the airport. This kind of treatment, rarely inflicted on Jewish travelers, was experienced by Palestinians as a bureaucratized exercise in petty humiliation calculated to send a message that they are second-class citizens.

Other kinds of discriminatory structures act more subtly on the access to space by those Palestinians who live in Israel proper. These range from public transport routes that serve Jewish communities better than Palestinian communities to mechanisms that keep Palestinians from living in some Jewish communities – in a way that brings to mind the mix of formal and informal mechanisms that kept black Americans from living side-by-side with whites in many American cities before the Civil Rights era. Some Palestinians complained that they are subjected to eligibility tests, including income tests, when they try to move to certain communities in Israel.

The most elaborate system for surveillance of Palestinians and controlling their movements, however, exists in East Jerusalem (see Figures 6, 7, and 8 below) and the West Bank. The most obvious device for controlling the movements of Palestinians and separating them from Jews is the construction of what are variously called walls, separation barriers, and fences. Smaller separation walls have been built around Jewish settlements in the West Bank, through East Jerusalem, and even through the campus of Al-Quds University, but the main separation wall is the 700-kilometer barrier, started in 2002 and not yet completed, to separate West Bank Palestinians from Israel. Palestinian activists often refer to this as the “apartheid wall.” At the same time, more than one of our Israeli interlocutors noted the decline in suicide bombings within Israel since construction of the wall began. Although the wall is often described in Israel as separating Israel from the West Bank, it does not follow the internationally recognized dividing line between these two entities. Instead, it is configured in the West Bank to encompass Israeli settlements housing hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews, in the process cutting off thousands of Palestinian farmers from their crops. This cropland is some of the most fertile in the West Bank (B’tselem 2011). Thus the wall is a device of annexation as well as separation. Largely for this reason, it was condemned as illegal by the World Court in 2004 (International Court of Justice 2004).

Palestinians seeking to cross the wall legally must do so at checkpoints. At these checkpoints, Palestinians are funneled through cage-like spaces toward policed turnstiles where their papers are examined and soldiers may interview them. Their movement through the checkpoints is recorded in Israeli databases. Palestinians we interviewed complained that the turnstiles are designed to make it impossible to take much across the border and painful for larger people to squeeze through. At one checkpoint, at least, Sha’ar Efraim, the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported that Palestinians traveling to Israel for 12-hour work shifts were forbidden from bringing with them large bottles of water or soda. The rules allowed them five pitas, one container of hummus and canned

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tuna, one small drink, one or two slices of cheese, sugar, and up to ten olives (Hass 2009). At some checkpoints, such as the notorious Kalandia checkpoint near Ramallah, Palestinians may have to wait as long as three hours to cross at some times of day, although wait times can be wildly unpredictable. For those who live in the West Bank and work in Israel, this makes it very difficult to plan their commute (Dowani 2013; Hammami 2004). But beyond the obvious inconvenience of the checkpoints, Palestinians complain that Israeli soldiers’ decisions are often arbitrary, varying from one soldier to another; that Palestinians are subjected to demeaning searches; and that young children have been separated from their parents while they are interrogated for an hour or more.

Activists from the Israeli women’s human rights group Machsom Watch, which posts women in shifts to observe Israeli soldiers’ behavior at checkpoints, refer in a publication...
to “Israel’s imprisonment of an entire population in a web of enclosures and checkpoints,” saying they have “witnessed the daily humiliation and abuse, the despair and impotence of Palestinians at checkpoints” (Kirstein Keshet 2006).

Nor are checkpoints only found on the “Green Line” that separates the West Bank from Israel. Because the Oslo Accord gave the Israeli military police authority over parts of the West Bank (effectively, Areas B and C), and because Palestinian territory increasingly takes the form of an archipelago, rather than a geographically contiguous area, there are also checkpoints within the West Bank. Ninety-six are permanent, and hundreds more are mobile “flying checkpoints.” These checkpoints within the West Bank hamper the movement of Palestinians (to and from work, to universities, to visit friends and relatives), subject them to further surveillance and risk of detention, and remind them that, even outside Israel proper, they are under Israeli control.

The checkpoints can be crossed by car as well as on foot. Those who have black on yellow Israeli license plates (Figure 9) are usually waved through by Israeli soldiers at checkpoints, while those with green on white Palestinian license plates will have a harder

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time and are barred from spaces in Israel (Harris 2015). Meanwhile the new well-paved, well-lighted roads that lead to the Israeli settlements in the West Bank are reserved for those with Israeli black and yellow license plates, while Palestinians are confined to less well-maintained and more circuitous roads.

Underlying this labyrinth of walls, checkpoints, searches and coded license plates is a system of identity cards that uses chips and scanners to track the movements of individual Palestinians, while dividing the Palestinian population into different categories with different rights of access to space. Gazans found in the West Bank are deported to Gaza, even if they are studying at West Bank universities. As for Palestinians who live in the West Bank, some are allowed to go to East Jerusalem or even Israel on a regular basis, and some are not. This can depend on age, family history and individual circumstances (including the degree to which they have collaborated with Israeli authorities). At the same time Israeli listening towers dotted throughout the West Bank monitor the movements of Palestinians in electronic space as well.

The Special Case of Jerusalem

Jerusalem represents a special case in the Israeli/Palestinian landscape. Since the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel has occupied East Jerusalem. In 1980, the Knesset passed a “Basic Law” that united East and West Jerusalem administratively and declared the city to be the capital of Israel. This was followed by a series of laws that consolidated Israeli presence in Jerusalem. No country has recognized the annexation and the declaration of the city’s status as capital, and these points are a source of serious conflict between Israel and the international community. One consequence of these actions was that, in Israel’s view, East Jerusalemites ceased being protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention, meaning that they were no longer considered “civilian persons in time of war” deserving of protection. The presence of major religious sites in Jerusalem increases its symbolic importance to Jews, Muslims, and Christians. Israel’s control over who can access these sites and when adds to the atmosphere of tension in the city. Many Palestinians, both Muslim and Christian, are aggrieved at the possibility of losing their right of residence in Jerusalem not only because it is their home, but because the city is freighted with deep religious and symbolic significance.

Residence Permits and Identification Documents

Roughly 300,000 Palestinians reside in East Jerusalem, making up 36.8% of the city’s total population. Their entitlement to live in the city is based on the 1967 census: anyone who was not counted lost his or her right to residency. If a Palestinian applies for residency anywhere else, or if Israeli authorities demonstrate to their own satisfaction that a person’s “center of life” is not in Jerusalem, they can be stripped of their Jerusalem residence right. According to Palestinian activists, from 1967 to 2010, 14,000 Palestinians had their right of residency in East Jerusalem revoked.11

11 http://www.palestinecampaign.org/information/factsheets/jerusalem/
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem are holders of the so-called “blue ID,” which refers to the color of the plastic sleeve in which the identity card must be kept. While the blue ID entitles East Jerusalemites to live in the city, they are only permanent residents, not citizens, and are under constant scrutiny by Israeli authorities as to whether East Jerusalem is their “center of life,” in other words their place of residence, work, and all other essential activities (Shlay and Rosen, 2010). Finding work in Ramallah, for instance, can lead to the loss of one’s blue ID card and expulsion from East Jerusalem. Yet, within East Jerusalem, the labor market is very restricted. For example, since the Israeli educational authorities refuse to grant Al-Quds University accreditation, graduates of the university are unable to obtain positions commensurate with their training and are forced to seek menial employment in the service industries or in retail. East Jerusalemites must thus find ways of juggling a precarious labor market, coupled with extremely high rents and cost of living, to retain their eligibility to live in the city while their movements are tracked by the state to determine where they spend their time.

Since 2000, nearly 15,000 people have had their application for a blue ID denied.12 Residency does not automatically transfer to spouses or children, who must apply for family reunification, a process that can take as long as 10–15 years and can be very costly. One of our interlocutors applied for a blue ID for his non-resident wife in 1996; it was granted in 2005, and the cost amounted to $2,000. In the meantime, the spouse was issued temporary permits that stated that her case was in process. The permits, which lasted for 6 months at a time, had to be renewed one month before their expiration date. She was often denied passage at checkpoints, where IDF personnel did not accept the temporary permit. She was only granted a blue ID when an Israeli lawyer took the case and argued that, since she had spent most of her life overseas, she could not possibly pose a security risk; the lawyer threatened to take the case to High Court if the authorities did not approve the application. Generally speaking, it is easier for a woman to get residency than for a man, and easier for a US citizen than for a West Bank resident. These policies have been fragmenting Palestinian families.

One alternative for Jerusalem residents who live separately from their families because they have different IDs or who cannot find decent employment in Jerusalem is to self-deport, and thus give up their blue ID. This decision has serious consequences, however. Moving to the West Bank means losing access to better health care, losing the right to freely enter Jerusalem ever again, moving to an economy in disarray, and living in a territory that is decreasing in size because of land confiscations and the encroachment of settlements. Under current circumstances, exiling oneself overseas typically means never returning to the region other than for short visits. In both cases, one must uproot, leaving relatives and friends and a support network, and not infrequently a family house that goes back generations.

“Smart IDs” have been introduced in Israel; they provide biometric data on the holder’s family, life, and residency, or “center of life.”13 They enable authorities to electronically

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track the movement of Palestinians through checkpoints. In one case we heard about, smart IDs helped Israeli authorities to prosecute a Palestinian who did not have a residence permit for Jerusalem for spending the night with his wife in Jerusalem, where she lived.

**Figure 10:** Random check by four Israeli police officers of a Palestinian man’s identity documents near the public toilets inside Damascus Gate, Old City (Jerusalem, May 2015).

### Movement in and out of Jerusalem

Jerusalem used to be the hub between different parts of Palestine, but after closures began in the early 1990s, people had to use roundabout routes. Trips that used to go through Jerusalem now go along less direct routes, which can take several hours, depending on the checkpoints.

For example, Al-Quds University, the broader context of which will be discussed presently, has several centers in the Old City, including a Center for Jerusalem Studies, located on the Via Dolorosa and Tareeq Al-Wad, that offers an MA program in Jerusalem Studies (taught in Arabic and English), alternative tours of the Old City, and courses in Arabic. However, students from the West Bank and colleagues from the Abu Dis campus of Al-Quds University cannot enter the area, and therefore cannot participate in its programs. Only students who hold a blue ID can study at the center. The Center organizes visits to Jerusalem for West Bank children before they turn 14, who are exempt from the restrictions on movement imposed by the ID system: this may be the last time they will get to see the city for decades. Permits are a little less restrictive for older people, and most people older than 55 can travel from the West Bank to Jerusalem without permits.

Even with the “right” kind of identity documentation, Palestinians in East Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine live with the constant threat that IDF personnel or the police will find their documents wanting. In addition to the pattern of laws that are obscure, contradictory, and incoherent, their application is in large part at the whim of those who control checkpoints or make routine and frequent identity checks elsewhere (Kelly 2006; Tawil-Souri 2011).
**House Demolitions and Green Belt Politics**

In exercising control of Jerusalem, the Israeli state seeks to maintain a demographic “balance” that ensures a Jewish majority of over 70 percent, with the remainder made up of minorities, including Palestinians. The state is constantly changing the legal and geographic landscape to ensure the maintenance of this ratio (Braveman 2007) in a policy the UN Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian territories has likened to “a form of ethnic cleansing” (Jerusalem Post 2014, Margalit 2005, Shlahoub-Kevorkian 2014a, Zink 2009).

The al-Bustan neighborhood of Silwan, inhabited by about 1,000 people, has long been a major focus of contention. It was originally an agricultural area, but crowding forced the Palestinian inhabitants of Silwan to build in the valley where al-Bustan is located. Most buildings date from the 1980s. Since Israel rarely issues building or expansion permits to Palestinians, most buildings are deemed illegal and face the constant threat of demolition. In 2005, the area was declared a conservation area, based on the belief, impossible to corroborate, that the area is the “Garden of the King” that the Bible mentions three times, and demolition orders were issued. Some demolitions have taken place. Others are stuck in the legal system.14

![Figure 11: House in Silwan taken over by Israeli settlers on August 26, 2015](https://example.com/silwan-house.jpg)

According to various estimates, between 28 and 33% of Palestinian homes in Jerusalem are unpermitted, placing 93,000 residents at risk of displacement.15 Prior to 2014,

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international pressure in the context of peace negotiations resulted in some slowing in the pace of demolitions, but since negotiations have collapsed, the number of demolitions has escalated. According to Palestinian activists, over 2,000 Palestinian homes have been demolished in East Jerusalem (see also Kershner 2009).16 Palestinians say that Israel is seeking to deport Palestinians or induce them to leave the city in order to create a decisive shift of the demographic balance.

Closely related to the question of house demolitions is the implementation of a green belt all around the eastern border of Jerusalem. This green belt runs from Silwan all the way north to a settler area by the name of E1, which is currently enclaved in the West Bank and undergoing expansion. The official rationale for the green belt is to showcase archeological sites and create green space around them, protecting wild fauna and flora, and to boost tourism. Included in the scheme is the planned demolition of 80 Palestinian homes in Silwan to make way for a parking lot for tourist buses. But Palestinians allege that the green belt greenwashes a plan designed to further the Israeli settler project: in addition to involving numerous house demolitions, it will isolate entire Palestinian neighborhoods and link Jewish settlements, such as the E1 area, to the city of Jerusalem. A notable segment of the scheme is the establishment of a Mount Scopus Slopes National Park in an area that is the only possible expansion of the crowded Jerusalem neighborhood of Isawiya, home to 15,000 Palestinians. Most of the neighborhood will be confiscated without compensation to make room for the park (Amro 2015, Bronner and Kershner 2009).

Figure 12: Al-Bustan neighborhood, most of which is under demolition orders (Silwan, May 2015)

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Figure 13: IDF soldiers guarding a house in Silwan recently taken over by Jewish settlers (August 2015)

Figure 14: Israeli technicians installing a remote-controlled machine gun on the roof of a house in Silwan recently taken over by Jewish settlers (August 2015)
The Separation Wall through East Jerusalem

In 2002, the Israeli government began implementing a plan to build a separation wall around and within East Jerusalem to isolate it from the West Bank. Since then, segments of the wall (which is not one continuous structure but a series of walls that create a labyrinth effect on the territory) have been built in multiple locations. The eastern suburbs are now cut off from the city. These suburbs are currently inhabited by about 55,000 Palestinians who, prior to the wall’s construction, conducted their lives in such a manner that East Jerusalem and the suburbs were continuous with one another. Areas that are administratively part of East Jerusalem are now cut off from the rest of the city by the wall and their residents face losing their ability to travel and their blue ID. These areas lack basic services, as will be explained presently. The now isolated suburbs do not have a single hospital, for example.

One of our interlocutors, a professor, is a Jerusalem resident who works in the Old City. Before the construction of the wall through Jerusalem, he could drive 5 minutes between home and work, a distance of 1 kilometer as the crow flies. Now that he lives behind the wall, to cross over to the city, he needs a security clearance and a permit, which lasts two years. He can only cross through one of three specific checkpoints, and has to do so on foot. He is thumb-printed each time he crosses. By car, he has to drive 30 kilometers, and he cannot bring the car to other side of the wall anyway; so he takes the bus and walks. “I’m treated like an illegal alien although I was born here and studied in Jerusalem, whereas settlers can come from somewhere else and move freely.”

In practice, East Jerusalem has been severed in two. Palestinians in the outer part of East Jerusalem, behind the new walls, have lost access to many city services (such as garbage collection), find their movements obstructed, and experience increasing difficulty accessing and interacting with those in the other parts of East Jerusalem. Meanwhile Palestinians in the inner part of East Jerusalem may have more city services and easier access to the core sites of Jerusalem, but many feel they are in a never-ending struggle of attrition with a government and a settler community determined to squeeze them into ever smaller spaces.

Expanding Settlements

East Jerusalem has the largest concentration of Israeli settlements, with an estimated 200,000 settlers. A construction boom occurred in the late 1990s during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first term as Prime Minister. He had run for office on the promise of settlement expansion. This was followed by a reduction in new homes in the early 2000s, and a steady resurgence since 2010, during Netanyahu’s second term in office. Two-thirds of new construction falls on the Palestinian side of the line proposed by the Geneva Accord of 2003. Because of their size and common location on hilltops, illegal Israeli settlements dominate East Jerusalem’s landscape.

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17 http://www.palestinecampaign.org/information/factsheets/jerusalem/
18 http://www.palestinecampaign.org/information/factsheets/jerusalem/
In addition, the Old City is dotted with “micro-settlements,” namely individual houses and neighborhoods that have been claimed in one way or another and are now occupied by Israeli settlers. Settlers utilize a number of strategies for this purpose, which are well-documented (e.g., OCHA OPT 2012), including:

- the purchase of homes from Palestinian owners through ostensibly neutral and trustworthy agents (including Jordanian nationals who pose as wishing to own property in the city)
- the use of blackmail and related techniques to compel Palestinian owners to sell
- the application of the Absentees Property Law of 1950, which authorizes the confiscation without compensation of property owned by Palestinians who were not physically present in Israel in 1947–48
- legal proceedings based on pre-1948 Jewish ownership of the property, which Palestinian occupants find difficult to counter-claim
- simply moving in while the residents are absent and then changing the locks.

Entire neighborhoods of the Old City and East Jerusalem are now occupied by Israeli settlers. These neighborhoods stand out for their orderliness, cleanliness, and gentrified look with a patina of antiquity, in contrast to neighborhoods where Palestinians still reside. In the latter neighborhoods social services are typically absent, so that rubbish piles up or accumulates on overhead safety nets that Palestinian residents erect to prevent settlers from throwing rubbish into the street (Figure 15), and house improvements that the occupation authorities never authorize are haphazard, improvised, and always subject to the next wave of demolition orders.

Old City of Jerusalem became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1981 and is on the list of World Heritage in Danger. It is a unique kind of place in that it is home to foundational holy places for the three religions of the book. These include, among many others, the Wailing Wall, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock, and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. Israeli police and the IDF keep strict control of Muslim and Christian

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19 http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/148
access to holy sites; for example, Friday prayer at the Dome of the Rock is limited to Muslims over 50 years of age. Holy sites, particularly those that are claimed by both Jews and Muslims, are the theater of constant violence.

The increasing Israeli presence in East Jerusalem is implemented in multiple ways, from the purchase or occupation of houses to banal acts like the obliteration of Arabic street names with stickers (Figure 17). Every late May and early June, thousands of Jewish settlers stage a demonstration in the Old City to celebrate “Jerusalem Unification Day,” commemorating the occasion in 1980 when the Israeli State declared that West and East Jerusalem were now under the control of the Israeli state. During this event, in a way that reminded one Task Force member of Anglo-Protestant behavior during commemorative parades in Northern Ireland, settlers sometimes vandalize Palestinian shops, prevent families living in the Old City from returning to their homes, and attack Palestinians in the streets. Interlocutors told us that at this time Palestinian families board up their businesses and stay indoors until the hostility dies down. These demonstrations receive funding from the Municipality of Jerusalem (Kestler-D’Amours 2011).
Water Allocation and Other Basic Services

The Jerusalem municipality spends less than 10% of the taxes it collects from East Jerusalemites on the development of East Jerusalem.\(^{20}\) Despite the municipality’s claim to the contrary, utilities, road and street maintenance, waste collection, and emergency services are absent in many neighborhoods and very slow, infrequent, and limited in others. Residents of East Jerusalem frequently must rely on their own initiative to obtain basic services, such as taking garbage with them to be thrown elsewhere, an endeavor that checkpoints make extremely difficult (Hasson 2012).

Water is a particularly visible problem in the East Jerusalem landscape: Israeli settlers’ houses are all connected to municipal water supplies, while many Palestinian households must rely on rooftop water-collection tanks and, when it does not rain, must buy their water at exorbitant prices. It is thus very easy to distinguish Palestinian houses from settler houses. Since the construction of the separation wall within the limits of the city, entire neighborhoods are left without connection to city water, creating a severe water crisis (Zonszein 2015).

According to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (2015), 75.4% of Palestinians in Jerusalem live under the poverty line, including 83.9% of children. The unemployment rate in the city is 40% for Palestinian men and 80% for women. Since 2000, 35 NGOs have been closed in East Jerusalem, usually in the name of security, with no evidence provided (see section entitled “A Week in the Life”). According to international law, the State must provide education for all, yet many Palestinian children in East Jerusalem experience structural obstacles to the exercise of this right. East Jerusalem is

experiencing a serious shortage of classrooms, teachers, and facilities. In 2014, there were 10,000 5-year-olds in East Jerusalem, only 1,667 of whom found a place in the state education system and 3,709 in the private educational system, while the rest remained unschooled (Association for Civil Rights in Israel 2014). Israel imposes severe restrictions on the building of new schools, and five schools have demolition orders pending.

Most independent schools were originally built as homes and thus are old, humid, and lacking in basic educational facilities such as science and computer labs. While there is a surplus of Palestinian teachers in both Israel and Palestine, there is a severe shortage in East Jerusalem, a situation that has been aggravated by the fact that many who formerly commuted from suburbs are now prevented from entering East Jerusalem by the wall and checkpoints. Meanwhile Israel has been putting a great deal of pressure on East Jerusalem schools to adopt an Israeli (Hebrew language) curriculum, claiming it is based on better pedagogical principles than the Jordanian curriculum currently in use (Eglash and Booth 2013). Palestinians complain that the Israeli curriculum presents an exclusively Israeli perspective on history and politics.

“One ordinary week in the life of Palestine”

The week in May 2015 that the three members of the TFIP spent in Jerusalem and neighboring areas was not characterized by any events out of the ordinary. Here are a few of the events that took place in the context of the conflict/occupation during that week:

- On Wednesday, May 6, 2015 Israeli activists moved into a building in Silwan that they claimed had been built as a synagogue but abandoned in 1938; a Palestinian family has been living in the building since 1968. 21
- On Thursday, May 7, Israeli Intelligence closed down for a period of twelve months the Shu‘afat office of the Health Work Committees in East Jerusalem, an NGO dedicated to providing health education and services to Palestinian schoolchildren; following a raid of the NGO offices, Israeli Intelligence alleged that the organization is a terrorist organization subject to the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance of 194822
- On Thursday, May 7, the Jerusalem District Planning Committee ratified the building of 900 additional housing units in the illegal settlement of Ramat Shlomo in East Jerusalem23
- On Thursday, May 7, one family in the neighborhood of Silwan returned from an overnight trip to attend a family wedding to find themselves locked out of their home by Jewish settlers, who had invaded the house and now claim back rent for the last 50 years24
- A report published on Friday, May 8, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, a bureau of the UN Secretariat, provided details of 13 Palestinian civilians, including two children and five journalists, who were injured

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at the hands of the occupation forces in different clashes throughout Palestine between April 28 and May 4.  

**Impacts of the Conflict/Occupation**

As with every conflict, the one in Israel/Palestine has caused tremendous suffering for those exposed, for military personnel and civilians alike. Several studies from armed conflicts around the world demonstrate that civilians are often more likely than combatants to be killed or injured (Roberts, 2010). It is likely that the conflict in Israel/Palestine follows this trend. It is inherently difficult to get precise estimates on the number of deaths that result from any conflict because unsafe conditions prevent accurate data collection. Retrospective population surveys are the preferred technique, since passive data collection, such as through morgue tallies or media reports, may miss some cases and underestimate casualty estimates (Alkhuzai et al., 2008).

The exact proportion of civilian-to-military casualties varies by conflict on a case-by-case basis, and this ratio is often contested. However, general trends from global conflicts over the past several decades indicate that civilians inevitably comprise a substantial proportion of victims. Estimates of the proportion of casualties occurring among civilians are quite consistently well above 50%, though they may range from perhaps as low as 40% (in the case of Bosnia) to 90% (in the cases of Cambodia and Rwanda) (see Roberts, 2010).

It is clear is that there has been tangible suffering for all involved in the conflict / occupation in Israel/Palestine. Following the most recent severe episode of conflict in July and August 2014, which primarily affected Gaza and southern Israel, multiple reports of casualty statistics were produced by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and the Palestinian Health Ministry (Figure 19). The three sources showed high concordance on the total number of deaths, including 73 Israelis (67 IDF soldiers, 6 civilians) and between 2,125 to 2,310 Palestinians in Gaza. More than 1,600 Israeli civilians were injured, while there were more than 10,000 injured Palestinians in total (no distinction was made between civilians and militants here). In addition, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) estimated that more than 7,000 homes in Gaza were completely destroyed, with another 87,000 suffering some structural damage (UNRWA 2014a).

However, there was strong disagreement about the percentage of Palestinian deaths occurring in civilians among the three sources. The UNHRC and the Palestinian Health Ministry estimated that 65 to 70% of those killed were civilians, while the IMFA indicated that only 36% were “assessed or reasonably assumed” to be civilians (children, women, and the elderly). Of the remaining killed, the IMFA says 44% were militants, with 20% still to be determined.

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25 [http://www.arn.ps/archives/163951 - .VU2sqZxClIds.gmail](http://www.arn.ps/archives/163951 - .VU2sqZxClIds.gmail)
Casualty statistics alone cannot convey adequately the total suffering that has resulted over the years from conflict/occupation, and the trauma experienced has had other effects. As the report to the UNHRC said:

*Palestinians and Israelis were profoundly shaken by the events of the summer of 2014 and many witnesses described the trauma that resulted from the violence they experienced. In particular, children on both sides were savagely affected by the events. As a result of their lengthy displacement and fear of what the future would bring, many reportedly suffered from bed-wetting, shaking at night, clinging to parents, nightmares and increased levels of aggressiveness* (2015: 148).

These and similar effects were likely the case not only for the summer of 2014 in and near Gaza, but throughout the history of the conflict/occupation, with varying degrees of severity for all exposed. For example, according to the organization B’Tselem, which monitors human rights in the Occupied Territories, 492 Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinians between September 2000 and December 2008.26

Furthermore, epidemiologists note that armed conflict can affect civilian populations in ways other than direct deaths via physical trauma and violence. There are also indirect deaths, from hazards exacerbated by conflict and forced displacement such as malnutrition, transmission of communicable diseases, destroyed homes and infrastructure, or insufficient water or electricity supplies (Salama et al. 2004; Levy and Sidel 2007); these can also lead to other co-morbidities, such as impaired mental health and nutritional status.

**Other Effects on Health**

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the health situation (food security, nutritional status, child mortality rates) in the West Bank and Gaza was fairly good in the 1990s. It then worsened considerably following the start of the second Intifada in September of 2000 (FAO, 2005). The FAO attributed this decline to “severe restrictions on the movement of goods and people both within and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip combined with the loss of jobs and incomes and the destruction of assets and property” (FAO, 2005:16). These circumstances are unfolding in areas under the jurisdiction of a country whose standard of living is ranked 19th in the world, above France, Austria, Finland, and Spain, according to the UN Human Development Report.27

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26 http://www.btselem.org/statistics/fatalities/before-cast-lead/by-date-of-event
Figure 19: Comparison of Israeli and Palestinian Casualties - 2014 Gaza Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source and Date</th>
<th>Israeli Casualties</th>
<th>Palestinian Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Israeli Deaths</td>
<td>% of deaths identified as civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 2015)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Human Rights Council (June 2015)</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Health Ministry (Jan 2015)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Footnotes

x – no specific figure given
1) – 67 IDF soldiers and 6 Israeli civilians were killed. In addition, 2 elderly women were reported to have died from heart failure while running for shelter from rockets fired from Gaza. Those two cases were not included in violent deaths.
2) – Both the IMFA and UN reported that more than 1,600 Israeli civilians were injured, but did not give an exact figure.
3) – The IMFA wrote that 44% of Gazans killed were confirmed militants, 36% were "reasonably assessed" as civilians (women, children, and elderly), and the status of the remaining 20% were unknown.

Full references


In fact, FAO data from several Middle Eastern nations suggest that the prevalence of undernourishment in Palestine has doubled from 15% in 1996 to 32% by 2011 as shown in Figure 20. This 2011 figure was higher than Yemen and even Iraq. The FAO methodology has been critiqued elsewhere. It is seen as having strengths and weaknesses. De Haen et al. (2011) noted that the FAO rates of undernourishment are based on a complex formula that estimates the calories available per capita, based on food balance sheets, population size, and inequality in access to calories. One of the strengths of this approach is the ease of comparison between nations, as well as the ability to see trends over time within nations. On the other hand, a weakness is that estimates of calories available at the national level are not equivalent to caloric intake at the individual, or even sub-population, level. However, other markers of nutritional status, namely anthropometrics such as height and weight, appear to corroborate the patterns reported by FAO.

At the population level, the physical growth of children is often viewed as a proxy for the quality of the environment, in terms of overall socio-economic and ecological conditions. In poorer environments, children as a group often show deficits in height and weight compared to reference data of healthy children. In 1996, survey data demonstrated that in children less than 5 years old, the prevalence of stunting (defined as a low height for age) was not excessive in the West Bank (7%) or in Gaza (8%) (FAO, 2005: 21). There was no wasting (low weight-for-height, essentially a measure of severe malnutrition that leads to excessive thinness) in the West Bank. By way of comparison, the prevalence in Gaza was 4%.

By 2002, several studies showed rates of growth faltering had begun to worsen (Figure 21). One study conducted by USAID and Johns Hopkins University found that stunting rates increased slightly in the West Bank to 7.9%, but rose to 17.5% in Gaza, while a larger 2004 survey by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) found rates of 8.6% and 11.0%, respectively (FAO, 2005: 22).

In 2013, Nahida Gordon of Case Western Reserve University and Samia Halileh of Birzeit University analyzed the growth of 9,051 Palestinian children from 7,056 households, using data collected by the PCBS in 2006-07 (Gordon and Halileh 2013). They reported stunting rates of 8.2% and 14.2% in the West Bank and Gaza, respectively. However, they also reported that rates varied dramatically by specific locality. In Gaza North, rates were as high as 30%, while in places like Bethlehem, Jenin, and Nablus they were between 5 to 7%. This reflects local levels of food insecurity. Finally, Radi et al. (2013) reported stunting rates of 15% in Gaza City, with children from food insecure household 2.8 times as likely to be stunted as those from food secure households. Taken as a whole, the literature strongly suggests that the health of Palestinian children, as indicated by their physical growth, has deteriorated, especially in Gaza where Israel restricts the importation of food based on calculations of necessary daily caloric intake. In 2006, The Guardian quoted Dov Weisglass, an adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, as implying that the Israeli import restrictions might be deliberately punitive,
saying 'The idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger.'

Food insecurity and micronutrient deficiencies are also a cause for concern. In early June 2014, UNRWA reported that 57% of households in Gaza were food-insecure, compared to 19% in the West Bank (UNRWA 2014b). In 2004, rates of iron deficiency anemia were around 14% to 22% in the West Bank and 30% in the Gaza Strip (FAO 2005: 28). By 2012, El Kishawi et al (2015) found that the overall prevalence of anemia was 59.7% among preschool children in the Gaza Strip.

Figure 21: Rates of stunting (low height-for-age) in five surveys of young Palestinian children, under age 5 years. Rates appear to have increased since the mid 1990s, particularly in Gaza, indicating a deterioration in nutritional status at the population level. (no 2009 data available for West Bank).

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/16/israel.
The overall health environment for children appears to be dramatically better in Israel. Data from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) Millennium Development Goals indicate that – although there had been marked improvement in Palestine as a whole between 1990 and 2013 – mortality rates for children under age 5 years were four to five times higher than in Israel (Figure 22).

A recently published article found that infant mortality rates (IMR) in Gaza actually increased slightly between 2008 and 2013, the first increase observed in five decades of steady progress (van den Berg et al. 2015). In 1960, the IMR in Gaza was 127 per 1,000 live births. By 2008, this rate had declined to 20.2. In 2013 it had risen slightly to 22.4. By comparison, the IMR in Israel was estimated to be 3.5 per 1,000 live births.

The 2013 statistic was also before the events in Gaza in the summer of 2014 that killed over 2,000 people. Van den Berg et al. (2015) wrote that the surprising increase will lead them to do a follow-up study this year, ahead of the normal schedule of conducting their survey every five years. Particularly affected was neonatal mortality (death within the first 28 days after birth), which increased from 12.0 to 20.3 between 2008 and 2013. Van den Berg et al. suggested that among the causes of the increase could be inadequate neonatal care in hospitals. However, they also wrote that this was possibly a consequence of the Israeli blockade of Gaza and armed conflicts, which have “contributed to a health and healthcare environment that may have affected pregnancy outcomes and the health care provided to infants.”

Other studies demonstrate that the conflict has taken a health toll on civilians, Israelis and Palestinians, as well. Among Israeli civilians in 2002, Bleich et al. (2003) found that 16.4% had been directly exposed to a terrorist attack, 9.4% met criteria for PTSD, and 58.6% reported feeling depressed, and 60.4% felt unsafe. Similarly, in 2005, 81% of Palestinians said that they feared for their own safety in their daily life, and 95% feared for the safety of their families, illustrating the toll that the conflict and occupation has had on psychological well-being (Giacaman et al. 2009).
Finally, the conflict and occupation have also taken a toll on military personnel. The organization “Breaking the Silence” has interviewed many Israeli soldiers about their time in the occupied territories, and reported that several have experienced feelings of guilt or shame over certain morally suspect situations. In an academic study of 147 Israeli reserve combat troops, one-fifth (19.7%) who served in the Occupied territories had “high moral objection” to the commands given to them (Ritov and Barnetz, 2014). For example, the researchers mentioned one soldier’s anecdote about a combat situation in Gaza. Troops were ordered to fire upon a Palestinian sniper, even though there were children nearby who were interpreted as intentionally assisting the shooter. Ultimately, the troops were evacuated before further engagement, and the soldier described himself as ‘lucky’ that he did not have to fire because it would have violated his own moral code. Importantly, troops who had more moral objections also had significantly more PTSD symptoms, illustrating some of the effects that the combat can have on soldiers.

Altogether, these cumulative health impacts should be considered when estimating the total costs of the conflict / occupation.

**ACADEMIC FREEDOM**

Limitations on academic freedom were a primary focus of the Task Force’s charge. Here we discuss the issue from both Israeli and Palestinian perspectives, and consider issues of representation, censorship, and access to education, to colleagues and to scholarly materials and research technology.

**Israeli Anthropology**

As we have discussed throughout this report, much of our work has been undertaken in a highly politicized context, one that is somewhat differently politicized even depending on the anthropological sub-field in question. An argument can be made (and some scholars have made it) that we, as a Task Force, are complicit in the further politicization of this domain/issue. With an ethnographic impulse as our organizing principle and underlying methodological ethos, a delegation embarked on a visit to Israel / Palestine to supplement our other interviews. There was some discussion among us about the logic and appropriateness of such a visit, several voicing slight concern that the Task Force delegation’s trip might be seen by some as a kind of “moral inspection tour.” And indeed some Israeli anthropologists expressed discomfort with the delegation’s visit. As one put it, “you see people in the U.S. who live in big homes in well appointed suburbs who make easy judgments and don’t appreciate the complexities on the ground, how hard it is to be a good person in this situation. So people are really offended to have people come from a more privileged situation and judge them.”

Once in country, however, we realized that not to have undertaken such a trip would have left us with only a partial, distant view of a reality that as anthropologists we should witness directly. Some anthropologists in Israel characterized pointing the finger at Israeli academia and at Israel in general as a form of American hypocrisy. If the AAA feels compelled to criticize Israel, the argument goes, then it also needs to condemn ISIS, US actions in Afghanistan, and US inaction in Syria. Why, they argue, pick on Israel and
none of these other nation-states? Moreover, scholars point out that Arizona-based academics, for instance, are not asked to publicly contest the immigration policies and practices of their state. “I don’t think academics should boycott each other at a general level,” said one Israeli anthropologist. As for this particular boycott, you have to look at proportionality. What’s happening in the Middle East in general is much worse than what’s happening in Israel.” At the same time, the committee has heard a recurring counter-argument referencing precedents for academic participation in contesting injustices in Vietnam, South Africa, and other areas.

For a large contingent of Israeli academics, there is clear anger and frustration with the BDS movement and its attempt to formalize a public rebuke of Israeli academic institutions. Some Israeli scholars feel there is already a kind of informal boycott in place, with Israeli academics ostracized and stigmatized as a function of their nationality. The Task Force delegation was told stories of Israeli students denied admission to PhD programs abroad because no faculty would supervise them, of foreign colleagues suddenly changing their minds about engaging in joint research, of Israeli academics dropped from editorial boards, of boycotts organized by email of invited lectures at U.S. universities, and of Israeli anthropologists at the 2014 AAA Annual Meeting being snubbed by people they had thought friends. Indeed several Israel-based anthropologists talked about the pain and discomfort of even attending the American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting in 2014 as an example of how, where, and when such stigma is most deeply felt, and one said they were secretly hoping their paper for the 2015 meeting would be declined so as to spare them the pain of being in attendance. Another said, “I thought long and hard before I renewed my AAA membership. I did renew because I have hope in my American colleagues.”

We heard reports of Palestinian academics refusing to engage in joint research with Israeli scholars, particularly since the 2009 attacks in Gaza. These refusals are ostensibly both for ideological reasons and for fear of being branded as collaborating with Israeli occupiers. This has been described by some as a purposeful refusal to “normalize” relations with Israel in such a delicate and contested political moment.

One argument against sanctions on Israeli academic institutions pivots on the idea that such maneuvers might actually make academic life more unfairly/unjustly difficult for individual Israeli scholars. There is fear that a boycott of academic institutions might unduly impact Israeli scholars’ chances for promotions and hinder their overall career development. Because Israeli anthropology is so small, Israeli anthropologists rely heavily on publications in U.S. journals and on letters of evaluation by U.S. colleagues to achieve tenure and promotion.

There was also discussion among Israeli anthropologists about the relatively marginal, liberal, and small size of their field, with different characterizations emphasized in

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29 The AAA enacted a resolution in 2010 that condemns the State of Arizona for its draconian anti-immigration legislation, and commits the Association to refuse to hold conferences there until the law is no longer in force (http://www.aaanet.org/issues/press/Arizona-Immigration.cfm).
AAA Task Force on Engagement with Israel / Palestine

different kinds of political arguments. For example, the idea that the size of the field of anthropology within Israeli scholarship is already small can imply, amongst other things, that any undue constraints on the field could do severe and even potentially irreparable damage to the long-term prospects of its growth – to the detriment of the discipline more generally.

There are some who specifically argue that a boycott would punish those most critical of the occupation, Israeli scholars sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, while only potentially pleasing or further emboldening the Israeli government. “It really bothers me that I’d be boycotted when I’ve been such a critical voice,” said one Israeli anthropologist. “You wouldn’t believe the email I get. When I go through the airport, I get harassed. I get pulled aside for extra questioning. I’ve been strip-searched… If I have a split with the people who are for a boycott, I’m left with these people I don’t want to be associated with.” Another Israeli anthropologist said, “It’s amazing that we should come under attack by our colleagues with whom we share a political orientation in addition to coming under attack from within.”

Some scholars claimed that an official AAA endorsement of BDS-like actions would be interpreted (by some within Israel) as yet another example of their nation being unfairly picked on and singled out, justifying a kind of circling of the wagons even more tightly around their national self-defense in ways that could translate into even harsher and more recalcitrant responses to Palestinian concerns. “Boycotting us makes our government very happy,” argued an Israeli anthropologist. “You’re saying, ‘no matter what efforts you make, you’re boycotted because you’re Israelis.’” One leading Palestinian academic who is skeptical of a boycott made an argument along similar lines: “I’m very sensitive to how Israelis react. One has to take into account how the other side might react. This bothers me. Israelis have a lot of complexes that other people don’t have. They might actually close in and say, ‘the world is against us.’ It’s not like South Africa. They are a special, unique, self-conscious people. They feel they have a long history of being persecuted. They don’t trust other people.”

We also heard some argue for the preference of an economic boycott (something with “real teeth”) over an academic boycott, the latter sometimes characterized as merely symbolic – and, therefore, not a truly substantive response to the political and material needs of the Palestinian community. “A mostly political and economic embargo can move things,” said one liberal Israeli academic. “Things here are stuck, and I’d like to see them move. When you touch the pockets of the middle class, it makes them move.” According to others, symbolism can go a long way towards compelling an appropriate response from the Israeli state. An example that some offered was the symbolism around rugby in the international push against South African apartheid in the 1980s.

Some Israeli anthropologists are active critics of the Occupation, but not all of these academics support BDS. In a meeting with a group of Israeli anthropologists that had signed a letter to AAA dissenting from the Israeli Anthropological Association’s letter, we were told, “we want AAA to take a stand on fifty years of continuing Occupation. We would like the AAA to connect the Occupation to continuing American support. We would like AAA to point to academic complicity with the Occupation and to give support
to those who oppose the Occupation… You need to open a space for us to speak out. The first time ever the IAA discussed the Occupation was after you opened up the issue.” However, it did seem clear that some Israeli anthropologists were in support of an academic boycott. It is hard to know whether the lack of overt advocacy for a boycott among some Israeli Palestinians is because, living inside Israel’s borders, they have a different structural relationship with the issue or because it is ostensibly illegal to advocate for a boycott in Israel. This law, which allows for damage suits to be filed against any person or entity that calls for an economic, cultural, or academic boycott of Israel, is currently upheld in the High Court.30

Palestinian Academics in Israel

The situation of Palestinian academics (faculty and students) in Israel is better than the situation Palestinian academics face in Jerusalem and the West Bank, which is discussed in the next section. They are free to travel, they do not have to cross military checkpoints to get to the university, their salaries are paid on time, they have more resources with which to conduct research, they have access to good libraries, and they do not have to worry about being tear gassed by Israeli soldiers or about students being detained without charges in the midst of the semester. Nevertheless, Palestinian academics in Israel encounter overt and subtle forms of discrimination, some of which are structural and some of which are interpersonal. Palestinian academics expressed concern about Palestinian rates of participation in academia, the lack of an Arab university in Israel itself, language issues, the role of the army in Israeli academia, informal pressure to stay within approved ideological bounds and, most troubling of all to the Task Force, constraints on the exercise of academic freedom and the expression of opinion. “Being a Palestinian student at an Israeli university, you have to close your eyes, shut your mouth,” said one Palestinian. “You see the occupation all around you, but the faculty are blind.”

Israeli Palestinians constitute roughly 20% of Israel’s population. Yet Israeli Palestinians attend university at much lower rates than Israeli Jews.31 Far fewer than 20% of faculty at Israeli universities are Palestinian. A recent study showed that in the 2012-13 academic year, Palestinians constituted 10% of undergraduate students, 7.3% of the graduate students, and only about 4% of doctoral students; they represent 1.75% of the faculty at the universities, and 0.9% of the administrators (Ali 2013). As of 2013, the Israel Academy of Arts and Scientists, the pinnacle of academic distinction, had no Palestinian Israelis among its 108 members (Skop 2013).

The Task Force heard many explanations for this underrepresentation: ethnic prejudice among Israeli faculty doing the hiring; a primary and secondary school system for Palestinians that encourages rote learning rather than the critical thinking that will build

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30 http://www.dailykos.com/story/2015/04/16/1378124/-Israel-Supreme-Court-Boycott-Divest-Sanction-campaign-is-political-terrorism-OK-to-sue-advocates
31 An OECD report on the Galilee region in northern Israel found Arabs attending university at less than half the rate of the local Jewish population, for example. http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/higher-education-in-regional-and-city-development-the-galilee-israel_9789264088986-en
toward an academic career; the marginalization of Arabic as a language of instruction in Israeli universities; and a preference among Palestinian faculty trained abroad not to return to Israel if possible. Even as some Jewish academics complained that Palestinians are now preferred over Jewish job candidates, some Palestinians complained that preference in hiring is given to American Jews over Palestinian candidates. Whatever the reason for the low numbers of Palestinian faculty (evident through even a cursory glance at the websites of Israeli academic departments), it is clear that Palestinian students will be taught by few Arab-identified faculty and that Palestinian faculty lead a lonely existence in which they have few Palestinian colleagues – as likely as not, none in their own department.

There has been a campaign underway for decades to establish a Palestinian university within Israel at Nazareth. “Why do we not have a Palestinian university in Israel? Why is there no Fordham or Brandeis?” asked one Palestinian academic. Palestinians complain that Israel has refused to allow such a university because they fear it would become an incubator of Arab nationalism, and they prefer Arabs to be educated in universities that are predominantly Jewish and where the primary language of instruction is Hebrew.32 The Task Force heard from Palestinian students that the marginalization of Arabic as a language of testing and instruction created difficulties for them, and that a number of students were forced to go and study in Moldova, Germany, Hungary and Jordan after failing non-Arabic language tests to get into degree programs. One was told that, if he wanted to speak Arabic, he should go to Birzeit University in the West Bank. Some Palestinian students feel not only that they are unable to fully compete academically in Hebrew and English, but also that the marginalization of Arabic within Israeli universities is taking a toll on their ethno-linguistic identity. “We’re losing our Arabic. I would like it if they made a little effort to learn some Arabic,” said one. A Palestinian faculty member said that, although he has never experienced interference in what he wants to teach, “I do feel inhibited from teaching a class in Arabic.” Although he can assign readings in English, and even French, students would complain if he assigned readings in Arabic (even though Arabic is an official language of Israel).

Just as Arabic is marginalized, Israeli military service is heavily privileged at Israel’s universities. As a delegation we visited Israeli university campuses and were struck by the number of students we saw who were Israeli soldiers, carrying their guns on campus. Palestinian students complain that they feel intimidated sitting near armed soldiers in class, and one Palestinian faculty member reported getting into a frightening altercation with a soldier-student after he hit her (presumably by accident) with his rifle in the corridor and she said, “that’s scary.”33 While Israeli students, women as well as men, often bond by talking about their recent military service, “they don’t ask us to serve in the army because they don’t trust us: we may have to fight our uncle or our cousin,” said one

32 At the time the Task Force delegation visited Israel/Palestine, Texas A&M University was in negotiations to partner with Haifa University and the Nazareth Academic Institute to develop academic programs at Nazareth. See Redden (2015) for an account of how these negotiations broke down
33 The incident was serious enough that a dean became involved and video camera footage of the incident was examined. The faculty member was threatened with disciplinary action until exonerated by the video footage.
Palestinian. And yet military service is so central to Israeli citizenship that exclusion from it comes with a price. Some universities offer special scholarships to students who served in the military campaign in Gaza, and a number of university administrators publicly declared their university’s support for the campaign in Gaza, although most Palestinian students and faculty were deeply opposed to it (Abunimah 2014). Students with military service get priority in registering for dorms and so on (with Air Force students getting the best choices), and graduates who have served in the military are often given preference in hiring decisions. (Some job ads even say that military service is “preferred,” and, in practice, some jobs are off-limits to those without military service). Also, to accommodate the majority of students who do military service after high school, all students, including Palestinians, must wait until they are twenty-one before they can start a medical degree. This particularly penalizes Palestinian women who have a separate timetable, a marriage timetable, to contend with in the pursuit of their careers. Palestinians also complained that some classes are closed to students without security clearances, and that there are even classes that offer credit to students who create social media posts in favor of Israeli military policy or monitor left wing activists on the web (Whyte 2014).

Some of these complaints were minor compared to grievances Palestinians shared about censorship, hate speech, and violations of academic freedom. Academic institutions, especially in a democracy, are supposed to provide spaces where different opinions can be presented and where difficult and divisive issues can be freely discussed and controversial ideas explored in an atmosphere where open inquiry prevails over intimidation and social pressure. Israeli universities fall short of this ideal.

If we start with students’ concerns, one group of Palestinian students with whom we had a lengthy, late-night meeting had a number of complaints. They said that a few classes were closed to Palestinian students because military information was discussed, and they were unhappy about a political science professor who said that terrorism was in Arabs’ DNA; but they were much more concerned by the university’s restrictions on Palestinian student political activity and by the university’s double standard with regard to Jewish and Palestinian political expression. Students are not allowed to commemorate the Nakba or to show the Palestinian flag, in case, they say they were told, they hurt the feelings of Israeli students. They said that when they tried to hold a moment of silence to commemorate the Nakba, the university brought in police to break up their gathering and did nothing as some Israeli students drank beer, danced and chanted “Death to Arabs!” on the margins of the event. They also complained that Jewish students were often allowed to organize demonstrations without permission while Palestinian students had to get the permission of university authorities to stage any kind of demonstration or event. To get permission, they had to submit ahead of time extensive details about the event, including samples of any flyers to be distributed. They were denied permission for a campus protest against the 2012 military campaign in Gaza, while a Jewish demonstration featuring settlers and members of the Knesset in favor of the attack on Gaza went ahead. They said that a street theater event was cancelled by university authorities because students added the logo and phone number of an Arab feminist organization to a brochure after it had
been reviewed. Meanwhile a university administrator insisted that Palestinian students remove a reference to President Bush as a “cowboy” from their student newsletter.

While we want to emphasize that we interviewed Israeli faculty who push for admission of Palestinian students and go out of their way to mentor them and help them speak their truth, we also heard stories from students about Palestinian graduate students being blocked from writing on controversial subjects. One student, for example, wanted to write her MA thesis in sociology on children who were traumatized by Israeli settler attacks and by military arrests. She was told she should avoid such an overtly political topic. When she changed her topic to differential access to medicine in Israel and the West Bank, that was blocked as well. Giving up her attempt to do a degree in Israel, where she grew up, she moved to Birzeit University in the West Bank instead. “This really shocked me,” she said. “They always talk about freedom of expression for Israeli academics, but I couldn’t write this paper.”

Palestinian faculty in Israel have their own set of concerns. While they may be condemned by Palestinians in the Occupied territories for being “Israelicized Arabs,” they have to contend with right-wing Jewish colleagues watching for any sign that they support Palestinian terrorism, liberal Jewish colleagues who give well meant advice that they not speak out too much, university administrators eager to avoid any controversy that would hurt them with wealthy donors, and groups that they perceive as McCarthyist, such as Israel Academia Monitor34 and Im Tirtzu,35 which track their writings and their behavior in class for anything they might cast as disloyalty. Critical Jewish faculty have to contend with many of the same pressures. “It’s very difficult for anyone without tenure to take any critical stance,” said one professor. “You have to calculate, you have kids to feed.”

The Task Force heard one story of a university dean cancelling a conference on housing demolitions, organized by a Palestinian faculty member, for fear that it would excite controversy, and Palestinian faculty told us they censored themselves so as not to get into conflicts with colleagues or administrators. One stopped coming to campus altogether during the military campaign in Gaza because it was so uncomfortable for her. But the most blatant and troubling attack on academic freedom at an Israeli university came in 2012 when the Israeli government attempted to close the political science department at Ben Gurion University on the alleged grounds that it was academically inferior to other political science departments. Neutral observers did not consider the department to be worse, in terms of publications and funded research, than some other Israeli political science departments, and the international committee that had reviewed the department strongly opposed the government’s attempt to close it. Rivka Carmi, president of Ben-Gurion, said at the time that "the approval of this decision by the Council for Higher Education will constitute a devastating blow to academic independence in Israel." The American Political Science Association and the American Sociological Association

34 http://www.israel-academia-monitor.com/
35 http://en.imti.org.il/
issued statements condemning the decision.\textsuperscript{36} It was widely believed that the government wanted to close the department because one of its most prestigious faculty members was Neve Gordon, a Jewish political scientist who had infuriated wealthy donors and right-wing activists with his persistent criticism of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians and, in 2009, by publishing an op-ed in the \textit{Los Angeles Times} in which he called for a boycott of Israel. After a national and international campaign in which the issue was framed as one of academic freedom, Israel’s government backed off its plan to close the department, where Gordon still teaches, but right-wing activists and donors continue to push for Gordon’s dismissal and have instituted a fundraising boycott (said to have cost the university $7 million so far) as long as Gordon teaches there.\textsuperscript{37} The Ben Gurion University code of conduct now prohibits advocacy of a boycott of Israel, with dismissal as the penalty. It is hard to imagine a major American university being allowed by courts to institute such a ban on the exercise of free speech by faculty members.

Another case is that of a well-known legal philosopher at Bar Ilan University, Professor Hanoch Sheinman. Sheinman sent an email message to his students saying that, in view of the disruptive effects on student schedules of the fighting in Gaza, he would schedule an additional exam date. Sheinman opened his message with wishes it “finds you in a safe place, and that you, your families and those dear to you are not among the hundreds of people that were killed, the thousands wounded, or the tens of thousands whose homes were destroyed or were forced to leave their homes during, or as a direct result of, the violent confrontation in the Gaza Strip and its environs.” Although the message did not adopt a political position on the war in Gaza, and would hardly raise an eyebrow on an American campus, its sympathy for victims on all sides earned Sheinman a public rebuke from his dean, who publicly stated that “both the content and the style of the letter contravene the values of the university and the law faculty… This constitutes the inappropriate use of the power given to a lecturer to exploit the platform given to him as a law teacher to convey messages reflecting his positions, in a way that, as noted, seriously offended the students and their families” (Kashti 2014).\textsuperscript{38}

**On the West Bank**

During our trip to Israel/Palestine, we formally engaged with roughly one hundred faculty members, administrators, and a few students from Birzeit, Haifa and Al-Quds Universities, along with five members of various Palestinian NGOs. The following section, about the academic situation on the West Bank, is drawn mainly from our notes on those conversations. Although the general information that they shared with us that goes beyond their direct experiences tends to be widely known, we have not had the resources to corroborate specific statements.

\textsuperscript{36} [http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/2012\%20APSA\%20letter\%20to\%20Israeli\%20C_H_E.pdf](http://www.apsanet.org/portals/54/Files/2012%20APSA%20letter%20to%20Israeli%20C_H_E.pdf)


\textsuperscript{38} For more on this incident, see Kalman (2012), Nesher (2013), Newman (2012), and see [http://jfjfp.com/?p=34797](http://jfjfp.com/?p=34797)

Status of Palestinian Academics

The distinction American academics tend to make between issues of academic freedom and those of social justice was not as salient to the Palestinian academics we interviewed because they experience their difficulties as academics as a symptom of their social and political subordination as Palestinians. An example of this scenario was provided by Ala Aladh who cannot conduct fieldwork in Jerusalem because of checkpoints (he has a West Bank ID). He reported that he is not considered an academic; he is considered a Palestinian. “We are not academics, we are Palestinians. We are discriminated against in total, not as academics.”

West Bank faculty depend on the Palestinian Authority and are paid lower salaries than faculty members working in Jerusalem. Al-Quds University employees complained that they have been receiving only 80% of their salary for the past 2-3 years because of the university’s financial troubles. Three to four years ago, Al-Quds salaries were 3 months in arrears. There is no financial support for conference trips and funds for research projects are limited (up to around $3,000 for an archaeological project). Sabbatical or conference trips outside Palestine require external funding, as faculty cannot afford to do this on their low salaries. It used to be possible to live in the West Bank (more cheaply) and teach in Jerusalem, but the permit system now makes that difficult if not impossible. The financial difficulties experienced by faculty on the West Bank – delayed and incomplete salary payments in particular – are in part a result of the complex set of arrangements whereby the Palestinian Authority pays faculty at Al Quds, for example, from taxes collected by Israel and from funds received from the United States and the European Union. These monies are sometimes halted or reduced to put pressure on the Palestinian Authority in regard to political disagreements with Israel or the United States (Hommos 2013, European Commission 2012, International Crisis Group 2012).

Palestinian faculty feel isolated from other countries, including the US. In the opinion of some, the EU has provided no genuine collaboration and has only paid lip service to research collaborations with Palestinians. Although Israel is a full signatory of the EU Horizon 2020 funding program (and benefits from it disproportionately compared to its contribution to the program), Palestinian institutions are excluded from this opportunity.

Israeli Military and the Palestinian Academy

A large number of Al-Quds University and Birzeit University students are or have been in prison. We were told that 45 Birzeit University students are currently in jail; three more were added in the month prior to our visit. The Israeli military is legally empowered to place Palestinians, including students, in “administrative detention,” a holdover from British colonial law, with no charge for a period of six months. Detention can then be renewed indefinitely in six-month increments. Prisoners have no right to visitations, no entitlement to due process, and no access to their families. One student said he had been told on the last day of his six-month detention that he was going to be released, only to have his sentence extended another six months on the following day. He was ultimately incarcerated for a total of two and a half years.
Incarceration means that Palestinian students have to miss classes; some have to stop halfway through a semester and can easily lose a year of study. The prevalence of student incarceration has resulted in Birzeit University modifying its academic regulations; it now allows students released from jail to continue with their studies where they left off when arrested without re-registering.

In June 2014, Israeli soldiers entered the Birzeit University campus, which is in Area A, for the first time since the Oslo Agreement. The soldiers entered a storage area in the student union and confiscated a collection of flags. Students were left fearing the soldiers will return to the campus, perhaps doing greater harm. We note that Area A is ostensibly under Palestinian governance.

IDF actions against the families of students can also affect their studies. “What does one do when students come to you and their excuse is that their house was demolished and they did not sleep the night before?” asked one professor, who claimed that students have been summoned by the IDF and given the choice of obeying the summons or having their house razed.

Students began organizing against the violation of student and faculty rights when Birzeit University was closed for three years during the First Intifada in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They formed the Right 2 Education Campaign, which seeks to document, research and raise awareness about the issues facing Palestinian students, teachers and academic institutions under the Israeli military occupation and demands unimpeded access for all Palestinians to their academic institutions.

**Al-Quds University**

The main campus of Al-Quds University at Abu Dis is the only Palestinian university near Jerusalem and as such seems to attract particular IDF attention. It is in Area B, which is under Israeli security control, and it is the largest gathering of West Bank youth close to the separation wall. An illegal Israeli settlement is also nearby. Faculty members we spoke with felt that Al-Quds University was a special target for the IDF because the Israeli State considers it dangerous to have so many Palestinians near flash points and seeks to contain this “dangerous population.”

In 2003, the Israeli State built a segment of the separation wall alongside the western perimeter of the campus. The State had originally planned the wall to go right through the middle of the campus, for which one third of the campus would have been bulldozed to make way for the wall. In response, students and faculty members staged a 34-day protest and 750 Israeli and international scholars signed a petition, an effort that was led by academics at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In an act of solidarity with their colleagues at Al-Quds University, some Israelis came in buses to participate in the sit-in. Ultimately,

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40 [http://right2edu.birzeit.edu/](http://right2edu.birzeit.edu/)
a university sports field was confiscated to build the separation wall, which runs 10 m from the perimeter of the campus.41

The accreditation of the university by the Israeli Council for Higher Education (CHE), which is in charge of accrediting Israeli educational institutions and recognizing non-Israeli diplomas, has been the object of protracted pressure on the university, with severe consequences for students. The CHE requires that the Al-Quds Jerusalem campuses be accredited through the Israeli accreditation process. After years of objecting to this requirement, Al-Quds did apply for accreditation, but the Council denied it, stating that two universities, namely Al-Quds University and Hebrew University of Jerusalem, cannot exist with the “same name.” (“Al Quds” is the Arabic name for the City of Jerusalem). If Al-Quds University abandoned its Jerusalem campuses and changed its name to Abu Dis University, after the West Bank town where its main campus is located, then they would receive accreditation as a West Bank university and its alumni would have recognized degrees. However, this is tantamount to eliminating the presence of all Palestinian institutions of higher learning from Jerusalem. There is a very strong possibility that, if the university agrees to this condition, students will close down the university. The matter is now held up in Israeli courts. The former president of the university, Professor Sari Nusseibeh, commented to us that the debate over Israel accrediting Al-Quds degrees is “so unending, it’s beginning to look like the occupation itself.”

Currently, diplomas from Al-Quds University are not recognized in Israel. “At the moment, a degree from Al-Quds, which is widely seen as among the best Palestinian universities and has medical, law, and engineering schools, is not recognized in Israel, meaning that teachers, for example, cannot get jobs with adequate pay in Israeli schools” (Bronner 2009). Al-Quds administrators and faculty members complained to us that graduates are not able to secure employment commensurate with their qualifications; they are faced with the choice of working at menial jobs in Jerusalem or seeking employment in the West Bank and thus losing their Jerusalem ID. Particularly affected are graduates of the School of Medicine, who cannot sit for certification exams and cannot practice medicine, despite the general shortage of medical staff. Many Palestinians end up going overseas to study medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy, commonly in countries like Romania and Latvia (Heruti-Sover 2013).

Because of the severe restrictions on movement, Al-Quds University needs to offer duplicate programs and courses at its East Jerusalem campuses and its West Bank campus because students and faculty cannot travel between the two areas. The university also has difficulties in finding qualified instructors because of the restrictions on mobility. In Jerusalem, which is a small place, the University has to rely on instructors who hold MA’s rather than doctorates to teach courses.

41http://www.theguardian.com/education/2003/oct/01/internationaleducationnews.highereducation
**Disruption of the Academic Year**

The semester we visited Al-Quds University, it was enjoying a normal 16-week semester, although typically the semester lasts only 12 weeks due to student strikes and Israeli tear gassing (Figure 23). One such attack occurred during an academic talk on human rights at Al-Quds where people attending could not breathe because of the tear gas. They had to be evacuated by the Red Cross. “Tear gas is an occupational hazard,” said one faculty member. In 2012–14, the IDF conducted 31 attacks on the campus, during which 2473 people were injured and 5121 tear gas canisters and bullets were shot.42

The Israel Defense Force (IDF) has repeatedly broken into Al-Quds facilities, several times in middle of the night (documented through official statements of the university). Israeli patrol cars periodically come and take students into detention in the middle of the night.43 According to our interlocutors, the IDF campus raids are usually timed at the beginning of the year, when many students are coming to university for the first time, at examination time, and at the end of year, when they can have the greatest disruptive impact on students. The Task Force delegation was told, but could not independently corroborate, that the IDF trains its recruits by making incursions onto the Al-Quds campus every Friday, the Muslim holy day. Fridays are said to be tense and tend to have numerous protests.

![Figure 23: Bullet holes at the entrance of a building, Abu Dis Campus of Al-Quds University, remnants of routine incursions by Israeli police and military (May 2015)](image)

**Palestinian Archaeology**

While archaeology in Israel is well-funded by the state and a variety of private and non-profit organizations and is taught at the BA through PhD levels, archaeology in the West Bank is underfunded and most teaching occurs at the BA level. There is a Masters

program in archaeology only at Al-Quds University. Palestinian archaeologists lack access to the vast majority of sites in the West Bank due to their location in Area C. The Palestinian Antiquities Authority only has jurisdiction to issue permits for archaeological work in the small confines of Area A. There is currently a collaborative project at Jericho between Palestinian archaeologists and archaeologists from the Oriental Institute of Chicago, and on the West Bank between Birzeit and Columbia Universities. Palestinian archaeologists we spoke with were interested in more truly collaborative projects like these.

While Areas A, B, and C appear immutable on maps, the Israeli government can effectively change them, affecting archaeological research in Palestine. A US archaeologist with whom we spoke collaborates with Palestinian colleagues in Area A. About two years ago Israel moved the Green Line and brought part of the village they were working in into Area C, so they no longer have access to that portion of his research area. The Area demarcations in Palestine are ever-changing, depending upon road-building by Israelis and where they are building the wall.

Palestinian archaeologists have great difficulty sending radiocarbon samples out of the West Bank due to the fact that all materials leaving the West Bank must go through Israel and Israeli customs. It is also difficult to get mail in and out of East Jerusalem. International collaborators do help get materials out of Palestine.

Palestinian archaeologists often have to use some of their salaries to fund their fieldwork due to lack of funds from the University for research. Excavation seasons can often be only two weeks because of this. Given the lack of resources for archaeological projects, one Palestinian archaeologist emphasized the critical need for fieldwork and training for students, suggesting that exchange programs might provide one avenue for this.

**Israeli Restrictions on Academic Life in Palestine**

Palestinians, including Palestinian academics, live in a web of intricate bureaucratic restrictions that hamper their movements and make the accomplishment of what should be mundane tasks vexing, time-consuming, and often demeaning. The restrictions on Palestinian academic travel offer a good example of this kind of institutionalized petty bureaucratic cruelty.

Palestinians invited abroad need permits to go to Jerusalem to get their visas, and these permits severely limit the number of hours they can spend there. An example: one of the faculty members we interviewed was invited to the U.S. She needed to go to the US consulate in Jerusalem to get a visa, but to do that she needed Israel’s permission. They gave her a permit to enter Jerusalem that lasted from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m.

No Palestinian residents of the West Bank can fly out of Ben Gurion airport, and it is very expensive to leave via Jordan. The fee charged by the Jordanian government to cross the Allenby Bridge is $200/person each way going to and coming from Jordan, and the trip takes much longer.
When Al-Quds faculty had joint projects with Israeli colleagues, they needed permits to go to Jerusalem. If there were no permits given (which was common), then the Al-Quds faculty would go to Turkey or Malta to meet with their Israeli counterparts. This meant that they would have to fly via Amman in Jordan, staying the night there and spending an extra 2-3 days on getting to and from the meeting. This is costly and time consuming.

**Restrictions on Foreign Scholar Entry to Palestine**

Restrictions on entry and movement of foreign researchers are major obstacles in bringing faculty members to teach and participate in other academic activities at Palestinian universities (Nagra 2013, Nemes 2014). It is very difficult to bring in faculty from outside Palestine as holders of foreign passports cannot get work visas to teach at Palestinian institutions, even if the institution issues the visitor a full-year contract. Invited academics from overseas have to lie upon entering Israel about the reason of their visit, as they are often denied entry at Ben Gurion airport if they say they are planning to teach in the West Bank. Israel issues visitor’s visas for only three months, but the semester lasts longer and is frequently extended even further if students go on strike or the IDF closes the university. If visitors leave when their three-month visas expires, they are uncertain whether they will they be able to come back and they and the university are left in limbo. Two chemistry and physics professors taught for three months in the West Bank, but then were denied visas to re-enter the country. We were also told of one foreign professor who worked for years without a work visa and had to leave every three months, and of one Palestinian who is married to an American, and who can only come on a three-month visa despite their being married. One outcome of these restrictions is that the ability of Palestinian academics and students to hear different voices from elsewhere and to engage in international dialogue is deeply curtailed. Another is that educational programs are frequently interrupted. For example, the supervision of MA students has to be passed from one professor to another according to who has the right ID or visa. MA and PhD defenses are frequently conducted via Skype when advisors cannot enter the country. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to ensure that students do not derail.

A number of academics would like to come to Palestine but are worried about bringing their families.44 There is a Right to Enter Campaign, which tracks cases in which visas have been denied.45

Other examples of the restrictions on academic entry into the West Bank that Task Force members were provided include:

- An NEH-funded researcher who stated that she was going to the West Bank and was then denied entry at Ben Gurion Airport; she had to redesign her research project so that it was based in Jordan.
- A US citizen of Palestinian descent who teaches at a West Bank university was forbidden to reenter the country after going overseas for a conference. She sued

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44 This point was also made by an AAA member whom the Task Force interviewed. He said that he changed his research location due to difficulties of bringing his family to the West Bank.

45 [http://www.righttoenter.ps/](http://www.righttoenter.ps/)
the Israeli government and waited 1.5 years for a resolution. She now has to come on tourist visas, resulting in constant anxiety about whether she will be allowed to enter, and meaning that the university has to be prepared to have others teach her classes.

• A teacher at the Ramallah Friends School was denied re-entry twice after she made trips abroad; she is now in the US.

• A participant in an interfaith delegation trip to Palestine was denied entry, held 24 hours, and put in jail. She called the US Embassy but they declined to assist her. (Her account of her detention and interrogation can be found at http://www.sandratamari.com/).

• A US citizen who researches public health in Palestine has been living in the West Bank with his family off and on for 30 years. Recently Israel allowed him to enter, but not his wife and children. The US embassy finally intervened and they were able to come in.

• At the airport, security personnel sometimes confiscate computers and do not return them (Hass 2012). They can insist that emails be opened to be read. Field notes cannot be mailed because they sometimes disappear. One of the people we spoke with was once interrogated at the airport for four hours, with person after person asking the same questions. Her husband, who is Palestinian, was strip-searched. All their luggage was searched.

Restrictions on Palestinian Students Studying in or Leaving Palestine

After the Oslo Accords of 1993, a few Gazan students were allowed to study at West Bank universities. They were afraid to leave until they finished their degree in case they were not allowed back into the West Bank. Since 2000, Israel has banned Palestinian students from Gaza from studying at West Bank universities and the IDF removed Gazan students and systematically deported them from the West Bank. USAID had international scholarships, some for Gaza students, but Israel would not allow them to leave Gaza. For example, Berlanty Azzam, a Gazan student at Bethlehem University, was randomly stopped at a checkpoint, interrogated for six hours, blindfolded and deported to Gaza two months before she graduated and was forbidden to finish her degree in person because her ID card listed a Gazan address (BBC 2009). She had to finish her degree online. Faculty members noted that Birzeit University used to have many professors and students from Gaza but now there are none.

Meanwhile, from the perspective of several people we interviewed, the separation of Gaza from the West Bank is fracturing Palestinian national identity. For the most part, young people from the West Bank do not know Palestinians from Gazans. Some people from the West Bank have reported seeing a Gazan for the first time when they travel to the US.

Restrictions on Graduate Education

There are only two PhD programs in Palestine, both at An Najah University (Nablus); one in chemistry and one in pharmacy. These were founded because people could not leave Palestine to study elsewhere. The vast majority of Palestinian PhDs have been
trained abroad because Israel allows Palestinian universities so few PhD programs. Seven medical researchers were sent to France to get their doctorates but did not return. Brain drain is a significant problem in Palestine—we were told that they lost their best neuroscientist to France and that many educated Palestinians cannot tolerate remaining in the West Bank; they get better offers overseas.

Al-Quds University, where there is an MA program in archaeology, is the primary location for archaeology training. Most Israeli universities have PhD programs in archaeology, but access to these programs by Palestinian students from the occupied territories is extremely restricted (Gray 2013).

**Restrictions on Palestinian Access to Research Technology and Materials**

Science is particularly hard hit by Israeli control of research technology and materials. In civil engineering programs, the labs lack certain equipment and tools, and the equipment they do have has not been updated since the 1980s. The process of getting equipment to Palestinian universities is very difficult and often equipment does not arrive. Palestinian faculty told us that Israeli authorities claim that duty must be paid. Sometimes a piece of equipment is allowed in, but not the instruction manual, so machines get damaged. There is also a lack of access to parts, so the machines may soon be useless. Some lab equipment is obtainable from dealers in Ramallah today, but maintenance is a serious problem due to lack of skills among Palestinians. By Israeli law, Israeli technicians cannot come to campuses on the West Bank.

There are a number of chemicals important for teaching and research that are not allowed into the West Bank out of fear that the chemicals will be used in weapons development. The catalogue used for ordering chemicals has most of these particular chemicals redlined.

In archaeology, access to laboratories for analyses can be difficult. Researchers can sometimes access labs in Jordan, and the chemistry department at Al-Quds University can also undertake some of the analyses archaeologists there need, but they cannot bring much of the necessary technology into Palestine. Earlier in 2015 Al-Quds University received a 3-D machine from the EU for the archaeology laboratory; it was kept at the Ben Gurion Airport for 3 months before its delivery was permitted.

**Restrictions on Palestinian Access to Books**

Israel controls the books that enter the West Bank, and Israeli officials have to agree to the source of the books. Books published in Lebanon are not allowed, even though most publishers of books in Arabic are located in Lebanon. This restriction applies even to books published elsewhere in a different edition. Another fact-finding delegation, visiting Israel/Palestine at the same time we did, wrote “We learned that there is a prohibition on most books published in Syria, Iran and Lebanon even though Beirut is a central publishing hub of Arabic literary materials in the region. Regardless, banning books is, in our view, a profoundly anti-democratic act” (Balakrishnan et al, 2015). “One of the main objectives of the Occupation is to stop books from coming here. Getting books is an act of resistance,” said one Palestinian. And doing so is a major challenge.
Chemistry, physics, medicine, engineering, and the applied sciences have the most serious problem. Thirty books from Stanford were donated, held in Haifa for months, and then “destroyed at the customer’s request” [obviously not the case]. Often books are held in Israeli customs for weeks, then the recipients are charged for their storage. Three boxes of used books were donated by Professor Joan Scott (Institute for Advanced Studies) to the Women’s Studies Department at Birzeit University. They were held for months, then Israelis demanded $800 in storage fees. Book donations must be approved by Israeli authorities, and they discourage mail to the West Bank or to anyone with a Palestinian name. One way to get around this is by having books sent to Israeli friends, but there are still problems crossing the border. Members of an NGO are working with Columbia University to translate current political science books into Arabic. Three volumes have been completed so far, but they cannot get them into Palestine.

The books that are available for purchase in the West Bank are very expensive and in Arabic. Israel blocks enough books from coming into Palestine that it has created a situation where books are falling out of Palestinian culture because they are not accessible. As a result, an indirect effect of occupation is ignorance. Lack of books affects whether Palestinian youth get used to reading or not. Internet, e-books, and Kindle™ have improved the situation for younger generations, but lack of access to books is still an issue. JSTOR is available in Birzeit but it is not free and it does not confer access to recent articles. It costs a lot for universities to subscribe to these publication packages, and electronic access to journals requires reliable Internet access.46

**Restrictions on Palestinian Internet Access**

Israel controls the Internet through four West Bank channels. Birzeit University buys its Internet connection from the Israelis. Four Israeli hilltop listening towers track every internet and phone transaction.

The Internet is expensive (as are phone calls). Service is rapidly expanding on the West Bank, but its growth is reported to be stunted in Gaza.47 Israeli sim cards are cheaper than Palestinian ones but since Palestinians are boycotting Israeli products, some refuse to buy them. Others, however, say “you have to be pragmatic” as Israeli or Jordanian sim cards are needed to connect to the Internet on a smart phone; it is not possible to connect using a sim card from one of the two Palestinian wireless service providers. Israel does not allow 3G or 4G network service in the West Bank, although there are indications that service may be coming.48

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46 The AAA’s journals are included among approximately 10,000 journals that are made available through HINARI and AGORA, two United Nations programs that assure access to scholarly publications at no (or greatly reduced) cost. Universities on the West Bank and Gaza are eligible to pay $1500/year for access to more than 10,000 journals. 47 http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/a_costly_divide/a_costly_divide_en-web.pdf. 48 https://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2015/08/14/agreement-marks-progress-on-bringing-3g-to-west-bank.
The Provincialization of Palestinian Universities

Israeli checkpoints deeply affect university life because they impede student and faculty travel to campus and across the West Bank. According to B’Tselem, there are 96 fixed Israeli checkpoints on the West Bank, and hundreds more “flying” checkpoints. We were told several times that on any day, one never knows which checkpoints will be operating, and what temporary checkpoints might appear. There are even checkpoints in Area A although it is supposedly under Palestinian control. B’Tselem reports a reduction in the flying checkpoints from 2014, but significant delays remain.

Road closures also increase the difficulty of travel across the West Bank. Jerusalem used to be the hub between different parts of Palestine, but after closures began in early 1990s, people had to use roundabout routes. As already noted, trips that used to go through Jerusalem now must be redirected, and may take several hours depending on the checkpoints (cf. Bishara 2015).

The delays created by the checkpoints and the roundabout routes that travelers must take change the perception of distance in the West Bank. Before the checkpoints it took one hour to get from Bethlehem to Birzeit. Now it may take 3-4 hours to get to school so one has to live near the university one attends. This is problematic because of the cost, and families are particularly reluctant to let their daughters live by themselves. As a result, Ramallah is now perceived as “far” from Bethlehem. Even after the major checkpoints were reduced between Ramallah and Bethlehem (the structures are still there but no soldiers are posted), people still perceive the distance to be great and the trip to be dangerous. They either choose not make it, or leave home early so as to be home before dark.

Checkpoints mean that the faculty are localized as well. Colleagues coming to Al-Quds in East Jerusalem from Ramallah have to go through checkpoints, for example, which takes an hour. Faculty at West Bank universities commented: “Being pulled aside and questioned is not a nice experience.” “Because of the checkpoints, something happens on the mental level.” “It changed the way we think about geography, about distance.”

The result of this reality is that universities are becoming provincial, which changes the entire atmosphere. “Faculty feel they’re teaching at a high school, not a university.” Localization cuts Palestinians off from one another, crippling the flow of ideas and cross fertilization. Birzeit University students had been a diverse mix of Palestinians, now they are mostly local. Twenty percent of Birzeit students used to be from Gaza; now there are none. As many as 50% of Birzeit University students had once been from Jerusalem, but the creation of the checkpoints in 1993 stopped this.

The difficulties of travel across the West Bank result in an enormous loss of time. Palestinians we interviewed told us that it had been calculated that Palestinians lose three million working hours per day to travel. Students traveling from East Jerusalem to Birzeit lose the equivalent of 4 days per month. The perception of some of the faculty we spoke

with is that wasting time is a desired outcome of the settlement process that can be achieved simply, through the re-routing of roads and maintenance of checkpoints. A Palestinian faculty member observed that the checkpoints are part of a strategy of pressure on Palestinians to give up their quest for independence. He observed that “Palestinians travel short distances but need long time, Israelis travel long distances but need little time,” and that these efforts result in “bleeding out from a society its time and effort.”

**Palestinian Embargo on Cooperation with Israeli Academics**

Birzeit University, established in 1924, is the primary university on the West Bank. In the 1980s there was some interaction between its faculty and Israeli academics. Some Israelis established “Friends of Birzeit” to teach Palestinian students mathematics, and the “Committee for Solidarity with Birzeit” organized common meetings of academics. At that time there were no road blocks, and there were few formal restrictions on Israelis’ and Palestinians’ movements.

During this period, however, there were growing national sentiments in Palestine. At Birzeit University there was increasing pressure from political activists, especially against Israeli settlements. Universities were flash points for protest, and they were often closed by the Israeli government. Quite a few Palestinian researchers continued to work with Israelis, however. The Oslo Accords also gave researchers the sense that Palestine would be a state by 1999, which further encouraged continued cooperation so that there would be strong relations between the two states. After 2000, as Israel began to build the wall and to proliferate checkpoints, some Palestinian faculty ceased collaborating with Israeli colleagues — lack of mobility was a major issue for them.

The December 2008 Israeli attack on Gaza was a political turning point. Universities and academic structures in Gaza were targeted, and Palestinian academics felt that Israeli academics were complicit with the attack whether actively or through their silence. Palestinian universities and most faculty ceased collaborating with Israeli colleagues after that invasion of Gaza. The Birzeit faculty took the position that cooperation was not possible unless the occupation ended. According to one of our interlocutors, in January 2009, there was a consensus in the Al-Quds University Council to freeze new cooperation, but not ongoing projects, “because of academic freedom to leave a window open for individuals to cooperate with Israeli researchers.” The University does not approve projects that involve Israelis. In some cases individuals can sign for a grant and the research can continue, but university administrators will not give their official imprimatur to joint Israeli-Palestinian research.

Cooperation in cancer research, physics, social sciences, and other such areas tends to be with Israeli professors who are progressive, support the two-state solution and defend Palestinians. In the view of one observer, “they are an important sector of support--we do not want to lose them, although they do not dare to speak out publicly. They don’t have the courage to do this. Sometimes these people pay a price, that’s why they don’t speak up. Sometimes they are sanctioned for support of Palestinians, but often they are under the radar and no big deal is made about this support.”
At the end of a long conversation about cooperation between Palestinian and Israeli faculty, one interlocutor noted that “the sector against cooperation is bigger than” those in favor of cooperation, so there is pressure from colleagues not to cooperate at all. Of late, pressure within the Palestinian community for full BDS has been growing. An Al-Quds faculty member noted that: “This is the situation: there’s a growing boycott movement and shrinking support for cooperation.”

**International Scholars**

The international scholars with whom we spoke, primarily AAA members from North America and Europe, cultural anthropologists and archaeologists, raised a number of concerns with how the discourse around Israel/Palestine has affected them, both personally and for their research. These generally fall into two categories: (1) restrictions on teaching or conducting research in Israel/Palestine itself, and (2) an increasingly tense climate around debates on Israel/Palestine, including the BDS movement, which has impacted individual academic freedom.

**Restrictions on Academic Work**

Several of the people who have done research in either the West Bank or Gaza spoke of having difficulties in conducting their work. While academia is sometimes portrayed as the Ivory Tower and above the fray, one North American anthropologist of Palestinian descent reminded the Task Force that “academics sometimes see themselves in a separate sphere, but so do artists and athletes. There are no separate spheres.”

In terms of how the wider world affects international academics, one issue that our interlocutors discussed was difficulties in basic access and getting permission from Israeli authorities to do research or teach in Israel/Palestine. This appeared to be more of a problem for cultural anthropologists who wished either to teach or to conduct field research in Palestinian territory. Some examples:

“It’s practically impossible to get a research visa in the West Bank or Gaza. The Israeli authorities send you to the Palestinian authorities, but the Palestinians will say “We’re not a state. How can we give one?” (European cultural anthropologist)

“In order to get into Israel, to be a regular faculty member at a Palestinian university in the occupied territories, you have to have some kind of permission from Israeli authorities. And since the early 2000s, those permissions have been given less and less frequently and have been revoked more and more frequently. And this is happening to faculty who are of Palestinian background and foreign backgrounds.” (North American cultural anthropologist)

“Israel did restrict my access to my research site, which was Gaza, not individually but systematically. During the Second Intifada they shut down international access to Gaza. They began to restrict and regulate it very heavily. Obviously it would be difficult to work there during an assault, but they..."
systematically tried to isolate Gaza. One of the mechanisms was to prohibit international entry except under very stringent circumstances.” (North American cultural anthropologist)

One of the fundamental effects of restricted access, as a graduate student in the U.S. reminded the Task Force, is that it is impossible to undertake comprehensive or comparative studies of Palestinian society because the Gaza Strip is off limits, and East Jerusalem and the West Bank are treated as separate regions. This can only impede scholarship.

Also, several scholars – again, primarily cultural anthropologists – revealed that they faced harassment from Israeli authorities upon arriving and leaving the country. This was particularly true whenever it became known that their research focused on Palestinians, or that they might be critical of Israeli governmental policies toward Palestinians. Several people complained that this often resulted in them being questioned and searched for hours, being detained in a jail cell, being refused entry entirely and deported to their country of origin without compensation, and/or being verbally harassed about their motives for undertaking any Palestinian-related research.

The Task Force is unable to document how common these episodes are, but these scholars shared that other researchers in their social networks reported similar experiences. They also indicated that such treatment appeared to be less about security and more about intimidation and harassment, which has increased over the last decade or so. They described the situation as creating “a climate of fear,” and said that they felt this was a tactic to repress academic freedom. One person said:

“Foreign academics and foreign researchers are curtailed. Ever since I’ve done research there (in Israel/Palestine), I am given special treatment from authorities. Ninety percent of the time I travel to Israel, I go through Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion Airport... As soon as the Ministry of the Interior understands that you’re there to study anything having to do with Palestinians, and as soon as they think you might have anything critical to say, they give you a harder time... I get extra questioning, extra searches, which means one to three hours, usually. It’s all done under the guise of security, and that’s the right of any state to protect its borders and its citizens. But what they’re doing this for is not security. The kinds of questions are not about whether I am a security risk. They’re questions like ‘Why are you studying Palestinians? Why not study Israelis? Aren’t your parents concerned about you?’ This has been a constant form of harassment for me and for others like me since about the mid 2000s.” (European cultural anthropologist)

Others added that they were frustrated by how arbitrary permission to enter or leave often seemed. Some of our interlocutors faced significant delays in travel, sometimes for up to five hours. One European scholar, who arrived soon after a particularly tense period of conflict had begun, was denied entry into the country entirely, and was detained in a jail cell before being put on a plane home, all without compensation for the time and energy s/he had expended into planning their research or for their original flight. Another North
American anthropologist said they had a close friend who had received a postdoctoral research grant in Palestine, but was denied entry and she had to change her research questions “on the fly.”

Three different people told the Task Force that Fulbright recipients faced restrictions in getting into Israel/ Palestine, and that the U.S. cedes authority to the Israeli government for Fulbright regulation. One North American anthropologist said:

“I have had many students who’ve worked in Israel or Palestine, and they each do it in a different way. If you have a Fulbright, you need to go through an Israeli university and get a sponsor there... I have a student now, who had multiple grants, but wasn’t sure if (s)he could get into the West Bank (they did).”

Several scholars revealed that their personal belongings were searched regularly, and sometimes damaged. These included items directly related to anthropological research, including computers, cameras, field notes, and other personal effects. One scholar said they had friends who had to open their email and Facebook accounts to border authorities, ostensibly to demonstrate that they did not have dubious motives for entering. Because of these measures, some scholars would not keep data on their laptops but would find other methods of storing data.

In the late 2000s, one academic was told upon arrival at Ben Gurion airport that s/he could enter Israel only, but not the West Bank, despite having her/his research itinerary there previously approved by an Israeli embassy in their country of origin. S/he was also told to pay a returnable ‘bond’ of several thousand U.S. dollars to ensure that s/he would not go to the West Bank, which would be recouped when s/he left the country. This person was notified that if s/he did violate this travel ban, the bond would be forfeited and entry to Israel would be denied for ten years. This situation was resolved several days later after getting assistance from her/his home university, which had contacted local authorities.

Furthermore, some of the people we spoke with said there were different types of treatment by Israeli authorities, depending on their background, such as whether one was a graduate student or a faculty member, or because of their ethnicity. Graduate students were sometimes able to conduct research using tourist visas, but more established faculty said they were given more scrutiny, indicating that this was perhaps because they traveled there more regularly, and that there was the potential that they might have a more established platform to be critical of Israeli policies.

One North American anthropologist told the Task Force that their graduate student had done research in a Palestinian refugee camp. When they began their project, they reported being harassed by Israeli authorities, and were detained for five hours in the airport. They later entered the country as a Christian missionary instead, but now they fear they may be denied re-entry in the future.
AAA Task Force on Engagement with Israel / Palestine

Some people told us that there seemed to be one standard for international scholars of Jewish descent, regardless of their citizenship, but another for scholars of Arabic, Palestinian, North American, or European background. In our interviews, one North American anthropologist of Jewish descent said:

“I’m actually in a somewhat unusual position (as a scholar). I know many other people like myself, but I’m Jewish. Many other scholars who work on Palestine confront direct challenges from Israel at every turn just getting into and out of the country. It is really kind of unbelievable the things that people go through. I don’t go through them. My experiences are evidence of the deep entrenchment of Jewish privilege in the Israeli state at every turn. Things are easier for me because I’m Jewish. It’s not just a little bit. It is in every possible way, just getting in and out of the country and getting things done with Israeli bureaucracy. I am not being oppressed or restricted by Israel. I am being privileged, and that is part of the problem with the structure of the state...” (North American anthropologist)

Others noted that, in their experiences, North American and European scholars of Arabic or Palestinian descent faced added scrutiny traveling to and conducting research in Israel/Palestine. They questioned why this should be.

“That (national security) is an excuse to repress academic freedom... Arab scholars do not have access to study in Israel and Palestine. With an Arab passport, forget about the possibility of that. (North American anthropologist)

“These are academics, these are scholars. There’s no security risk. They have articles, books... I think there is an attempt at demoralization, isolation, exercise of power. I do think they want people to leave by making life difficult...That disgust of Arabs is so deep. I would call it a form of racism... There is a whole ‘security theology,’ as someone has written... There is a security obsession, and then it produces all of these manifestations that seem justified and it creates a fear that all the time you’re in danger. There is a little danger, but on the whole I think there are just two separate societies.” (North American anthropologist)

Overall, this has had a deleterious effect on scholarship. At least five scholars told us that they had been so discouraged by such treatment from authorities, or were so worried about being able to gain entry to the country, that they had at least temporarily abandoned planning any new research projects in Israel/Palestine. One scholar decided to turn down a fieldwork grant to conduct research in the West Bank because they had second thoughts about the difficulty of gaining entry. These scholars also mentioned becoming depressed about how this had halted their career goals, and two people added that they had halted their research, in part, because they did not wish to bring their family members with them because of the difficulties involved in travel.

Effects on Academic Freedom

Many academics we spoke with said that the discourse around Israel/Palestine, and the BDS movement, had increased tensions in international academic circles. The increase in
tensions has had some real and potentially serious repercussions for people’s careers and academic freedom. An Israeli cultural anthropologist living in North America said that “people are already splitting apart and becoming suspicious of talking to each other.” Several anthropologists used the phrase “self-censorship,” adding that there was a climate of fear, or at least hesitancy, about expressing their opinions, whatever they might be. Another North American anthropologist felt that there was some demonization on the part of both the academic left and right. However, some others felt that one benefit of the current debates was that it had raised awareness and had increased dialogue among the wider anthropological community, as well as the public.

The Task Force also learned that there are both real and potential effects on scholars who express the ‘wrong’ opinion. These included: a hindered ability to conduct research or publish, diminished job prospects, and experiences of harassment or intimidation from both academics and nonacademics. There were also concerns that students or recent PhDs have been negatively impacted through guilt-by-association with their advisors’ positions.

These effects were felt differently by tenured and non-tenured faculty, as well as graduate students. One tenured North American anthropologist acknowledged that there were risks in taking a position, particularly for non-tenured faculty, but s/he felt an obligation to follow their conscience nonetheless. They personally did not feel pressures at their own university, but indicated that the climate can be different at other institutions:

“I think if you’re pre-tenure, you might be vulnerable. That’s not just my personal opinion…. Pre-tenure people have been attacked. That’s documented. For pre-tenure people, there might be a bit of a risk. For post-tenure people, I don’t know how much damage can be caused. But I think the boycott is not about individual careers, it is a moral obligation toward the people who helped you with your research.” (North American anthropologist)

Another European anthropologist said that they had signed the BDS petition, but that they had apprehensions about doing so, for the impacts it might have on their ability to conduct research, and for their students.

“I signed the boycott, but felt some fear. I advised junior colleagues not to put their names on it. I cannot rescind it. It is now there forever. I don’t think there are significant repercussions at my university. A few students may complain. When I signed, I was full professor and had job security. But for my students, job prospects could be tenuous in the future if they apply to jobs in the U.S. We don’t live in compartmentalized academic worlds. (Europe) is more open. I will be anxious the next time I go back to Israel, for having signed.” (Tenured European anthropologist)

One North American archaeologist told the Task Force that because s/he had been associated with BDS, her/his students had experienced repercussions. Some of the students found it “more difficult than it should be” to get permission to look at basic archaeological materials held in Israel that were excavated in Israel / Palestine decades
ago, even before the modern state of Israel existed. This person felt that her/his students were being denied permission because of their affiliation (which was obvious via letters of recommendation), and that this was particularly unfair because those students did not necessarily hold the same political opinions as they did. This same professor tells granting agencies to avoid sending their grant proposals to certain professors because they felt they would be punished solely for their politics, rather than being evaluated on the merits of their project.

Two North American tenured professors said that they felt there was pressure originating from BDS proponents. One expressed disappointment with how BDS supporters behaved toward those who did not support a boycott, including at the 2014 AAA Annual Meeting, describing them as having a ‘crowd mentality,’ which created a ‘mob-rally feeling.’ Another added:

“...What often happens, particularly for younger scholars and for students is that you get some bullying. It’s not active bullying, but it’s a feeling that ‘we know what’s moral, and unless you do the moral thing, then we really can’t consider you to be an ethical anthropologist.’ And what I think we’re beginning to see the same thing with the BDS movement is that younger scholars are feeling a great deal of pressure to sign on. I was talking to a young man yesterday, a newly tenured professor at a liberal arts college, and he said he signed the BDS petition despite grave reservations. And I said ‘Well, why did you sign?’ He said ‘I just felt I had to do something.’ It’s really easy to sign a petition. It’s a lot harder to start a PAC, to write letters to the editor of a local newspaper, to organize politically in a meaningful way to change U.S. policy toward the Middle East. The good thing about all this is that people are talking about the issue of Israel and Palestine, which is a grave issue. But aside from that, we’re getting sides drawn up – either you’re with us and oppressed people, or you’re for the oppressor.”

(Tenured North American anthropologist)

The ‘drawing up of sides’ has entailed some casualties, such as the 2014 case involving Steven Salaita and the University of Illinois. The AAUP committee that investigated his case concluded that the University of Illinois had violated his academic freedom by breaching the wall between a professor’s activities inside and outside the classroom and penalizing him for his social media postings (AAUP 2015). The Chancellor of the University of Illinois was forced to step down in connection with her handling of the case (Jaschik 2015).

Salaita is a not an anthropologist. His doctorate is in Native American Studies, with an emphasis on literature. Within anthropology, one of our interlocutors brought up the well-known case of the Palestinian-American anthropologist, Nadia Abu El-Haj, and her bid for tenure at Barnard College in 2007, which was mentioned in national media, including The New York Times. Briefly, Abu El-Haj’s tenure case was met with public criticism and became the subject of an online petition campaign organized by people outside of

academia, who felt that her scholarship – on the process of Israeli archaeology being folded into national identity – was biased against Israel.\(^{51}\) Abu El-Haj was in fact granted tenure, and praised by her colleagues, but the public criticism was severe, and often seemed politically motivated. One interlocutor said that some of the voices against Abu El-Haj’s tenure case were extraordinary in that they came from outside of anthropology, or even academia altogether, and that they were an affront to academic autonomy, representing an attempt at suppression of certain viewpoints:

“Nadia was kind of an exceptional case on the matter of tenure or employment because, one, she was one of the few women who’ve been attacked, and, two, because she was one of the few who were attacked on the basis of her scholarship. But most of the people who are attacked are Arab and Palestinian male scholars because no matter what they say, it is read as “Violent terrorist talking at me. This will be disruptive. We must be civil, suppressed.” (Tenured North American anthropologist)

Finally, one of the themes that arose from our interviews was a feeling of intimidation because of an individual’s position on Israel/Palestine. One scholar said that they had been physically accosted and grabbed by the arm by an audience member after they gave a presentation on Israel/Palestine at a university in the southern United States. Another professor said that they had been accused of anti-Semitism after they had put together a panel at their university critical of the Occupation – even though every speaker on the panel was Jewish and the panel included Israeli soldiers.

One of our interlocutors, a North American anthropologist, was asked about a suggestion from a Palestinian academic that there should be a selective boycott of individual professors and centers that have been explicitly complicit with the Occupation. S/he disagreed with this approach:

“Then you’re violating the principles of academic freedom. The AAUP has always vigorously opposed attempts to draw up blacklists based on the content of people’s research or speech. Academic freedom isn’t academic freedom once you make exceptions for people you don’t like. We don’t need more people drawing up lists. That’s what Campus Watch and all those people do. Besides, it’s clear that the boycott is of institutions, not individuals.”

Some people mentioned being uncomfortable with organizations like Campus Watch: Monitoring Middle Eastern Studies on Campus and AMCHA Initiative to Protect Jewish Students, which publicly lists names of professors in the United States who had advocated for BDS or who had taken positions contrary to the Israeli government. These organizations describe themselves as monitoring the intrusion of Middle Eastern politics into academia. However, some of our interlocutors viewed such organizations as creating

\(^{51}\) See New Yorker (2008). The AAA Executive Board also made a public statement in this case, supporting the position of Barnard College President and affirming the Association’s commitment to rejecting public petitions as a means for influencing tenure evaluations. http://www.aaanet.org/pdf/PR_101807.pdf.
blacklists that were ultimately meant to intimidate and suppress their voices. While some of this information was already public (such as via Anthropologists for the Boycott of Israeli Academic Institutions), the act of publishing names in this way was interpreted as a type of blacklisting, which could affect academic freedom.

**Anthropological Scholarship and the Conflict / Occupation**

The Task Force was charged with determining whether anthropological research was being used to support or challenge claims of territory and historicity, or in a sense, whether anthropology was in some way complicit with the occupation. Our interviewees primarily discussed complicity as it related to the academy in general, which is the focus of the following section. We then consider cultural anthropology and archaeology.

**The Complicity of the Academy**

PACBI (the Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel), the coordinating organization in the campaign for a boycott, says in its official call for an academic boycott of Israel: “Academic institutions are a key part of the ideological and institutional scaffolding of Israel’s regime of occupation, colonialism and apartheid against the Palestinian people... Since its founding, the Israeli academy has cast its lot with the hegemonic political-military establishment in Israel, and notwithstanding the efforts of a handful of principled academics, the Israeli academy is profoundly implicated in supporting and perpetuating Israel’s systematic denial of Palestinian rights.”\(^{52}\) In its interviews, the Task Force heard this charge that Israeli universities are complicit with Israel’s project of settler colonialism many times from supporters of an academic boycott, both within the AAA and on the West Bank.

While some advocates of an academic boycott simply see boycott as a useful tactic to apply pressure for change on Israeli society, not a moral statement, for many supporters of a boycott the charge of Israeli academic complicity lends a moral argument to the case for academic boycott: those being boycotted are getting what they deserve for their part in the Occupation. One Israeli academic who is an outspoken supporter of an academic boycott felt, however, that it was a mistake to use arguments about complicity in support of a boycott: “academic complicity is not a valid argument because every major academic institution in the Western world is part of the war machine. There is no major university in the U.S. for which this is not also true, so I don’t find that to be a strong argument. Many people use this argument. I think it’s a weak argument to support BDS.”

This is a discussion that could benefit from much more nuance than it has received thus far. There can be no doubt that Israeli universities have been deeply involved in the project of Israeli settler colonialism (as explained in further detail below). Two universities (Tel Aviv University and Hebrew University) are partly built on demolished Palestinian sites; Israeli archaeology has been complicit with the development of settler colonial narratives of the land; and, as one Israeli faculty member put it, “all our universities are part of the military-industrial complex in a heavy way.” But this

\(^{52}\) http://www.pacbi.org/etemplate.php?id=1108.
involvement has been very uneven by discipline, and it is also the case that some of the sharpest critiques of and opposition to the settler colonial project in Israel’s Jewish community have come from within universities (though the best known and most outspoken academic critics of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians are historians and political scientists, not anthropologists). The most obvious and clear-cut instances of active academic participation in Israel’s colonial project do not involve anthropology, and many Israeli anthropologists protested to the Task Force that they are among the most uniform critics of Israeli government policy. The Task Force repeatedly asked supporters of a boycott for specific examples of active anthropological complicity with the conflict / occupation. In the end, the Task Force could find almost no examples of such active collaboration, although anthropologists may need to explore whether they are responsible for more passive forms of complicity.

The most clear-cut examples of university collaboration with Israeli settler colonialism are to be found in what Israelis call the “exact sciences,” such as computer science, mathematics and physics, as well as engineering. Academic complicity, an Israeli anthropologist told the Task Force, “is mostly in physics, chemistry, engineering, biology etc. On the humanities side, you have to be a leftist.” Faculty and students in science and engineering have worked extensively to develop new weapons systems and surveillance technologies, and there is sometimes an interweaving of personnel between the worlds of military-industrial commerce and university governance. The clearest example of this kind of interdependence and institutional interweaving is afforded by Technion University – the MIT of Israel. Scientists from Technion helped develop the D-9 unmanned bulldozer that was used to destroy Palestinian homes during Operation Cast Lead. They have also worked with the military contractor Elbit to develop surveillance cameras for drones and for the separation wall, and with the military contractor Rafael, a major employer of Technion graduates, to develop missiles for Israeli drones as well as the MK4 tank. Weapons contractors such as Elbit fund students to work on their military research as part of their university studies, and Technion has created a special MBA program for Rafael employees.53

In an interesting convergence with the United States, given recent revelations that the American Psychological Association was complicit with U.S. military interrogations that crossed the line into torture,54 the Task Force also heard numerous claims of work on behalf of Israeli settler colonialism in Israeli psychology departments. One Palestinian student who was arrested four times while in high school and college told us that an Israeli psychology professor was present when he was interrogated, taking extensive notes on the interrogations as they proceeded. An Israeli anthropology professor who has

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been a critic of government policy told us that she was unaware of any anthropologists working for the army’s well staffed research unit, but knows of psychologists who do. “Why doesn’t the American Psychology Association boycott Israel?” she asked.

**Anthropology and the Conflict / Occupation**

And what of Israeli anthropologists? Almost all of them have served in the Israeli military, as required by Israeli law. An older generation of anthropologists in the 1960s and 1970s sometimes wrote about Arab populations in a way that, following the anticolonial and reflexive critiques of the 1980s in American anthropology, most American anthropologists would now see as orientalizing, though it was hardly exceptional at the time. One Palestinian faculty member likened Israeli anthropologists’ writings on Arabs to those of British social anthropologists writing about Africa and India in the mid twentieth century. These older Israeli anthropologists were said to have emphasized rigid gender roles, ancient sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shi’a, subservience to tradition rather than participation in modernity, and clan rather than class – though even in this generation there were exceptions such as the Marxist anthropologist Henry Rosenfeld. Such writing was said to help create an ideological atmosphere that legitimated the subordination of Palestinians without taking any overt position on the conflict / occupation. Some anthropologists from this older generation are also widely believed to have consulted for the Israeli military. Perhaps the most notorious text from this generation is Patai’s *The Arab Mind* (1973).

As for contemporary anthropologists, with the exception of one non-academic anthropologist who has been involved as a state consultant in the forced relocation of the Bedouin, two Palestinian faculty members told us that if we were looking for complicity, we would not find anything “really incriminating.” In terms of contemporary academic complicity with the Occupation, they called anthropology a “side show.” “There are different kinds of complicity,” one said. “There are different kinds of knowledge that get directly translated into interrogations, home demolitions etc. That’s not anthropology. For anthropologists, you act as the justification by focusing on multiculturalism, and you humanize the occupation by writing about the experience of the soldiers, or being the mother of a soldier.”

The main complaint of Palestinian academics within Israel about their Jewish colleagues in anthropology is not that they have actively collaborated with the Occupation, but that they have done little to explicitly oppose it, especially as a collective community. You have to “go beyond looking for anthropologists’ smoking gun,” said one Palestinian. “There’s also complicity of omission.” She complained that, while individual anthropologists have sometimes attended protests, most liberal Israeli academics refused

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55 Perhaps the most famous critique is by Asad (1975).
56 For an example of Rosenfeld’s work, see Henry Rosenfeld (1964). In seeking to understand how Palestinians have been portrayed by Israeli and other anthropologists, the Task Force found Furani and Rabinowitz (2011) helpful.
to sign a petition to get rid of the Israeli checkpoint that was choking access to Birzeit University on the West Bank, and that they have in general what another Palestinian academic called a legacy of “historic silence.” This sense that Israeli academics were guilty of silence in the face of injustice was deeply felt by many Palestinian academics.

While this was fair comment at the time we conducted our interviews and our trip to Israel/Palestine, the Task Force notes that, on June 11, 2015, a few weeks after the Task Force delegation visited Israel/Palestine, the Israeli Anthropology Association adopted a resolution condemning the Occupation (while also condemning the boycott movement) with 74% of those voting in favor. The resolution called for “ending the siege in Gaza” and helping to reconstruct Gaza; “negotiating in good faith with the Palestinians toward a just and final settlement of the conflict based on Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967”; “recognizing the rights of Palestinian and Bedouin citizens of Israel to full equality”; and helping to find “dignified, just and effective solutions to the tragedy of Palestinian refugees.”

Archaeology and the Conflict / Occupation

In Israel, archaeology is separate from anthropology academically (as it is in many countries) and has a higher profile. Archaeologists with whom we spoke felt that in our report archaeology should be addressed specifically and separately from anthropology given its prominence in Israel and the long and on-going history of West Bank and East Jerusalem archaeological projects by Israeli scholars.

In discussing the effects of a potential AAA academic boycott, several of our interviewees noted that the AAA affects a minority of archaeologists in Israel, mostly prehistorians and those working in the early historical period. Most Israeli archaeologists are not familiar with the AAA. Some archaeologists thought that it would be significant in the Israeli archaeology community if ASOR (the American Schools of Oriental Research) would take a stand on the occupation, and they observed that ASOR seems to be beginning to do so. If ASOR decided not to support academic work in East Jerusalem, for example, and not to publish such work, then archaeologists in Israel would pay attention.

Archaeology has a long history of importance to the state of Israel as a source of information on the history of Jews in Palestine. Nadia Abu el-Haj (2003:149-150, 153; see also Abu el-Haj 2001; Greenberg 2009a; Emek Shaveh website: alt-arch.org), for example, writes that archaeology was considered a “national hobby,” in the early decades of Israel’s statehood. Excavations in the 1960s were funded by the state of Israel and the IDF with an aim of substantiating claims that Palestine was the Jewish homeland. In Israel, she argues, archaeology intervenes in the social world.

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As one interlocutor expressed it, archaeology is being used in very distinct ways to change the physical landscape and to authorize particular histories (while denying others) in a manner that extends the reach of the Israeli Occupation. Research on Jewish remains is promoted at the expense of those of other peoples, creating a narrative of exclusion. Archaeological salvage work also enables the expansion of settlements in East Jerusalem and on the West Bank, and is used to justify the demolition of Palestinian homes and entire villages.

Archaeologists whom we interviewed argued two points:

1. Archaeologists must cease ignoring what others do with their data. It is not sufficient to undertake scientific research and disseminate its results; misuse of this information (e.g., for political ends) must be countered by the archaeology community (see also Mizrachi 2013; Mizrachi and Veeder 2013; Mizrachi 2015). Following our visit to Israel/Palestine in early July, the Israel Academy of Sciences published a report condemning the political use of archaeology by the Israeli government.59

2. Archaeologists must complicate the public understanding of the past in Israel and Palestine. The record is a vertical one of many different peoples. No particular piece of space can legitimately be claimed as ancestral solely for one group. No single narrative trumps others in terms of the complex past of this area (e.g., Silberman 2013). Some archaeologists are certainly doing this (e.g., Greenberg 2009b), but the concern appears to be that their efforts are not as visible as the dominant narratives are.

Israeli Excavations in East Jerusalem and the West Bank

Several archaeologists maintained that all excavations in East Jerusalem and the West Bank are illegal under international law because these areas are under military

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Regardless of international concerns, Israelis have excavated extensively in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Between 1967 and 2007, the Staff Officer for Archaeology in Judea and Samaria (SOA; an official with absolute authority over archaeology in the West Bank) issued 1148 excavation licenses and permits for sites in the West Bank. While the majority of these licenses were given to work by the SOA, archaeologists from Bar-Ilan, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Hebrew Universities were also granted excavation permits (Greenberg and Keinan 2007). The SOA is within Israel’s Civil Administration of Judea and Samaria, an arm of the military. City of David excavations in East Jerusalem, which are under the authority of the Israeli Antiquities Authority, have been directed for several decades by archaeologists at the Institute of Archaeology at Hebrew University. The Israel Nature and Parks Authority has given administrative authority for the City of David Park to Elad, a developer with no archaeological background, but with strong political ties to the state (see Greenberg 2014). An archaeologist working in Palestine expressed the view that there was no sense among Israeli archaeologists working in East Jerusalem and the West Bank that there is a line that shouldn’t be crossed. One interviewee asked: “Isn't there a point when you say that you cannot work (excavate)... even at the risk of 'loss of sites to Science’?”

One of our interlocutors (see also Greenberg and Keinan 2007) noted that the majority of Israeli work in the West Bank is unpublished. It resides in “gray literature” that is archived by the SOA and difficult to access. We find this lack of dissemination of information from numerous West Bank Israeli projects disturbing. Archaeological excavation is in a sense, the scientific, systematic destruction of the archaeological record. One cannot re-excavate an area that has been excavated before. Thus the results of archaeological research must be disseminated to the profession for that knowledge to be built upon.

Contract archaeology is common in Israel given the density of archaeological features there. One of our interlocutors said that salvage archaeology was required to build in East Jerusalem and in the West Bank settlements. Another, however, noted that in Area C there is currently a great deal of Israeli construction for which no archaeology is being conducted. Bulldozers are plowing through significant sites, and neither the SOA nor the Palestinian Antiquities Authority are involved. There is no consultation with the Palestinian Antiquities Authority by the SOA on archaeology in Area C. Mizrachi (2013) note similar large-scale destruction in the excavations for an Elad building in East Jerusalem. Israeli archaeologists are aware of this situation, but do not publicly object to it.

Archaeology is used to justify the demolition of Palestinian houses and villages (Mizrachi 2013). We were told that in East Jerusalem if archaeological material is found on
Palestinian land, the land and/or house is confiscated. If the land is held by Jews, archaeologists can work around the problem. A recent New York Times article spoke directly to the issue of archaeology and demolition. In 1986, the article author’s family was expelled from their home in Susiya because the occupying Israeli authorities decided to create an archaeological and tourist site around the remains of an ancient synagogue there. The Israeli government is now threatening to demolish the homes of the 340 or so residents of Susiya that were rebuilt on land near the old village, because the buildings are “illegal” (Associated Press, 2015).

**Interpretations of Archaeological Data**

An American archaeologist whose research has focused on Israel noted that “the interpretation of the archaeological record is what is at stake.” This person observed that the archaeological record belongs to all. Ethnic boundary-making interprets the record in a chauvinistic manner on both sides. Israel simply has more resources to promote its version. Archaeology is vertical, not partible spatially into ethnic segments, with Islamic remains ‘belonging’ to the Palestinians, and pre-Islamic remains ‘belonging’ to Jews.

An argument put forward by one of our interlocutors was that biblical fundamentalists in the US are heavily to blame for the plans to expand Jewish Israeli neighborhoods in East Jerusalem because of “idolatry of Jerusalem as a holy place” and central to biblical history. The Israeli Antiquities Authority and the government have contributed to this too, notably by aiming at drawing American evangelicals as tourists. The mayor of Jerusalem plans to develop an area as a King’s Garden—a biblical theme park and to evict Palestinians to create it. This is part of the Silwan project referred to earlier.

Just to briefly summarize, the foregoing account has focused on troubling structural inequalities in terms of access to resources, education and health outcomes. It also has mapped out the complex system of identity cards, checkpoints and other restrictions that has been put in place to control the movement of Palestinians, with particular attention to the case of Jerusalem. Throughout, we see a tragic instance of victims of one of the most egregious instances of nationalism / colonialism creating a system of oppression with echoes of the very system they had managed to escape.

**POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION**

Why should the AAA engage with this political situation involving Israel and Palestine? Although different academic associations have their own by-laws, areas of professional concern, and historical conventions in terms of taking positions on political issues and controversies, the courses of action that other professional academic associations have taken on the Israel/Palestine issue provide a useful context for the task at hand. Given that supporters and opponents of a boycott of Israel sometimes claim that an AAA boycott

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would influence other professional associations, it only makes sense to map the range of responses to this issue on the part of other associations. In this section we summarize what other scholarly societies have done about engaging with Israel/Palestine. We then offer principles that we recommend be applied in assessing possible courses of action available to the Executive Board, ending with the possible courses of action themselves.

**Other Academic Associations’ Actions on Israel/Palestine**

Several academic associations have considered whether to take a position concerning Israel/Palestine in recent years. These associations have typically considered censuring the Israeli government, and divesting from corporations doing business in the Occupied Territories. In one instance a society has considered whether to suspend its long-standing ban on political or advocacy efforts and encourage discussion of an academic boycott.

Here, in chronological order, is a summary of the most relevant outcomes from scholarly societies to date.

**British Association of University Teachers**: In April, 2005, the Council of Britain’s Association of University Teachers voted to boycott two Israeli universities (Bar-Ilan and Haifa Universities), claiming that the two institutions were complicit in the oppression of Palestinians in the occupied territories. The two institutions denied these claims, and one month later, the Association rescinded its boycott, citing the potential damage to academic freedom and to dialogue and peace effort between Israelis and Palestinians. They concluded that singling out Israel for boycott could not be justified.

**Asian American Studies Association**: In April 2013, the Asian American Studies Association became the first US-based scholarly association to pass a resolution endorsing and committing to the request of the Palestinian civil society organization calling for a boycott of Israeli academic institutions. The Asian American Studies Association has about 1000 members, and 10% of them participated in this vote.

**American Studies Association** In December 2013, the American Studies Association (ASA) voted to support BDS through a two-step process involving its National Council approval, followed by a membership vote, where 1252 (25%) of the ASA’s 5,000 members voted, and 66% of those voting favored a boycott. The American Studies Association boycott bars the ASA as an organization from entering into partnerships with Israeli institutions, and bars the ASA from issuing invitations to Israeli academics as official representatives of their universities — e.g., invitations to deans and provosts. It does not bar individual Israeli academics from attending conferences or entering into research collaborations with ASA members. “However, the boycott does oppose participation in conferences or events officially sponsored by Israeli universities,” and individual academics whose travel to the ASA conference is sponsored by Israeli institutions are subject to boycott. ASA continues to sell its journal, *American Quarterly*, to Israeli university libraries.

**Native American and Indigenous Studies Association**: In December 2013, the Native American and Indigenous Studies Association (NAISA) Council declared its support for
the boycott of Israeli academic institutions. This declaration was a statement of the Council, and not the result of a membership vote.

**American Historical Association**: In January 2014, members of the American Historical Association decided not to vote on two resolutions condemning what was characterized as Israel’s violations of academic freedom for Palestinians and others. The resolutions had been sent to the group’s leadership well after the group’s regular early November deadline, and so could not be considered without a suspension of the rules. The resolutions had been drafted by the group Historians Against the War after an earlier proposed resolution by another group, calling for a full academic boycott of Israel, was rejected by the AHA’s leadership as falling outside the group’s mission. AHA has about 13,000 members. The 200 AHA members present at the business meeting voted by a margin of nearly 3-1 against suspending the rules to consider the resolutions. At its 2016 Annual Meeting, the AHA anticipates consideration of a resolution entitled “protecting the right to education in the occupied Palestinian territories.” It calls on the AHA to condemn Israeli government policies that restrict Palestinian access to higher education.

**Modern Languages Association**: In March 2014, the Modern Languages Association (MLA) executive board put before its 28,000 members a resolution condemning Israel for what it called Israel’s “interference in some scholars’ travels to the West Bank”; this resolution had been passed by a vote of 60-53 in its delegate assembly in January 2014. MLA rules require that at least 10% of its members participate in a referendum for its results to be binding. The resolution was not approved by the membership, for lack of a quorum.

**Critical Ethnic Studies Association**: The Critical Ethnic Studies Association voted in July 2014 to endorse the BDS movement, in response to a request from the PACBI organization. The Critical Ethnic Studies Association has about 450 members.

**Middle East Studies Association**: The Middle East Studies Association passed a resolution at its Annual Meeting in November 2014, which was subsequently affirmed by a vote of the membership in February 2015, strongly encouraging the Annual Meeting program committee to “organize discussions at MESA annual meetings, and the MESA Board of Directors to create opportunities over the course of the year that provide platforms for a sustained discussion of the academic boycott and foster careful consideration of an appropriate position for MESA to assume.” MESA has about 3000 members. 300 attended the November 2014 business meeting, and 220 voted in favor of the resolution. 714 members voted in the February referendum, which passed by a 73%-27% margin. Additional discussion is expected at the November 2015 Annual Meeting, which is to be held adjacent to the AAA Annual Meeting in Denver, Colorado.

**Peace and Justice Studies Association**: In November 2014, the Peace and Justice Studies Association (PJSA), a bi-national professional association, including peace and justice scholars, activists, and educators in the United States and Canada, joined the

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61 [http://mesana.org/about/resolutions.html](http://mesana.org/about/resolutions.html)
Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign. After three months of deliberation, 87% of those voting endorsed the proposal to respond to the Palestinians’ call for international solidarity and to join the BDS movement. The Peace and Justice Studies Association has about 450 members.

American Anthropological Association: In December 2014, the AAA Business Meeting considered a resolution opposing an academic boycott of Israeli universities, and calling for the Israeli government to immediately renew its efforts to pursue a two-state solution. The AAA has about 10,000 members. About 700 members participated in the business meeting. 52 members voted in favor of the resolution opposing the academic boycott, so few that the number of ‘no’ votes was not counted (a vote to end debate and put the resolution to a vote had passed by a 653-27 margin just minutes earlier). At the 2015 Annual Meeting, further discussion of these issues is anticipated.

National Women’s Studies Association: In January 2015, the National Women’s Studies Association issued a “solidarity” statement in support of the BDS movement. The Association has more than 2,000 individual and 350 institutional members working in varied specialties across the United States and around the world. At November 2014 Annual Meeting plenary event, a strong show of support was reported by a majority of more than 1,000 plenary attendees in favor of the BDS movement, and for including injustices in Palestine among the issues Association members study and teach about. The possibility of a solidarity statement was also raised at the Membership and Delegate Assemblies and subsequently discussed by the Governing Council and the Executive Committee (which, in response, worked collaboratively to issue this statement) in January 2015.

National Association of Chicana and Chicano Studies: In April 2015, the National Association of Chicana and Chicano Studies adopted a resolution in support of the boycott of Israeli academic institutions with a unanimous vote of those present at the annual business meeting. According to the NACCS Chair, “One of our “foco” regions put forth the BDS. As it circulated around the conference, there was consensus support. The Board left the BDS resolution in the Business Meeting Consent Agenda and it was not pulled. The Resolution passed with the majority of the members present at our business meeting. I do not remember the count, but it was full house.” The Association has about 400 members.

The Israeli Anthropological Association: At a June 2015 meeting of the Israeli Anthropological Association (IAA) a resolution was passed calling for the end of the occupation, opposing academic boycott and supporting dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. The IAA has 102 members. The June ballot indicated 74% support for the resolution, 16% against, 10% abstaining. 62

62 AAA did hear from a group of Israeli Anthropological Association members dissenting on this resolution, and their reasons for voting against it: http://tinyurl.com/mu2vyxz; http://tinyurl.com/nnhdsk.
Some of those interviewed by the Task Force argued that, given the size of our association and its position at the intersection of science and humanities, a decision by the AAA to take some kind of action on the Israel/Palestine issue could have a ripple effect on other academic associations. In any event, the Task Force hopes that this report will be a useful resource for other associations as well as AAA if they are interested in further exploring the Israel/Palestine question.

**Recommended Guiding Principles for Assessing Potential AAA Actions**

The charge to the Task Force (see Appendix A) instructed us to “develop principles to be used to assess whether the AAA has an interest in taking a stand on” the issues raised by the political situation in Israel / Palestine and to “make recommendations to the Executive Board about actions the AAA could undertake.” Such principles, while clarifying the bases for our recommendations in the following pages, can provide a template for the Association as it navigates future controversies.

We recognize that AAA members have diverse political affiliations as well as a spectrum of opinions on the degree to which it is appropriate for the Association to take a stance on social and political issues. This spectrum stretches from the political anthropologist who told the Task Force that “AAA should not have its own foreign policy” to those who believe that the practice of anthropology entails an obligation to intervene on issues of human rights and social justice. In its official statement of purpose, the Association articulates its goals as advancing anthropology and furthering the “professional interests of American anthropologists” while promoting “the dissemination of anthropological knowledge and its used to solve human problems.” (Incidentally, although we are the [American Anthropological Association](https://aanet.org), an Israeli anthropologist observed to the Task Force that we have members from many countries and that, as the anthropological organization with the greatest global reach, we represent anthropology on a global scale. About 20% of AAA’s membership is based outside the US.) The AAA long-range plan, adopted in 2011, takes a broader view than the mission statement. It states that, as well as promoting “scholarly understanding of humankind,” AAA should “reinforce and promote the values associated with the acquisition of anthropological knowledge, expertise, and interpretation.” Referencing the AAA’s Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights, it states these values include “a commitment to the importance of diversity in the anthropological profession, both social and intellectual.” It also states that “AAA will foster inclusion in the discipline of persons from underrepresented categories… and promote the equitable treatment of all anthropologists.”

As can be seen from Appendix C, the Association has a long history of taking stances on political issues that are in some way relevant to the anthropological community. The AAA currently boycotts states and cities with anti-sodomy laws, weak labor laws, Native American sports mascots, and discriminatory immigration laws. It also boycotts Coca-Cola products (because of Coca-Cola’s labor practices in Colombia) and hotels with lax environmental practices. The Association has filed “amicus curiae” legal briefs in support of marriage equality, affirmative action, and other policies. In addition, the Association has taken public positions on a number of political issues, including, but not limited to: the embargo of Cuba; indigenous rights in Peru, Honduras, Colombia and other countries;
the interdiction of Haitian refugees in the US; South African apartheid; the CIA; the U.S. military in Iraq; HIV intervention; and war crimes in former Yugoslavia.

In framing its policies toward the Israel/Palestine conflict, we suggest the following orienting principles. Of course, some principles may conflict with each other, necessitating a weighing of priorities, and in some cases the implications of a principle may be open to debate in particular contexts.

- **A commitment to human rights**: The AAA’s Declaration on Anthropology and Human Rights states that “the AAA has long been, and should continue to be, concerned whenever human difference is made the basis for a denial of basic human rights,“ 63 and it affirms the Association’s “commitment to the equal opportunity of all cultures, societies and persons” to realize their human potential. The statement also references the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which contains a more detailed enumeration of universal rights64. The most relevant of these in the present context include “the right to life, liberty and security of person” (article 3), the right to freedom from “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (article 5), the right to “equal protection of the law” (article 7), freedom from “arbitrary detention, arrest or exile” (article 9), the right to “freedom of movement within the borders of each state” (article 13), the right not “to be arbitrarily deprived of his property” (article 17), and the right to “freedom of opinion and expression” (article 19).

- **A commitment to academic freedom**: As a professional society dedicated to the production and circulation of knowledge, AAA should be concerned to protect academic freedom.65 The Association should oppose practices that obstruct “the dissemination of anthropological knowledge and its use to solve human problems,”66 or that single out particular points of view or research conclusions for punishment or obstruction.

- **A commitment to advocate on behalf of minorities, disadvantaged groups, and indigenous groups**: Enshrined in the Association’s Long-Range Plan, this commitment draws on a disciplinary history, extending back to Franz Boas, of finding meaning and dignity in the knowledge and cultural systems of the marginalized communities anthropologists have preponderantly studied, and advocating for them when their communities are being harmed by states or other powerful political and economic interests. Anthropology has a particular responsibility that no other discipline has to oppose settler colonialism and modes of social domination that mobilize categories of race/ethnicity/culture that earlier generations of anthropologists were complicit in constructing.

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A commitment to the peoples whom we study: The AAA statement on ethics says that, while all anthropologists have an obligation to “do no harm” in their research, many “choose to link their research to the promotion of well-being, social critique or advocacy.”67 The Task Force interviewed a number of anthropologists who, having done research with Palestinians, felt a strong ethical obligation, construed as a professional obligation, to bear witness to Palestinian suffering and to find ways to intervene to prevent further suffering.

A critical awareness of American complicity: As the American Anthropological Association, we should be particularly sensitive to situations of suffering and injustice that are actively enabled by the resources of the American state and other U.S. institutions. While the Association should consider taking a stand wherever fundamental human values are violated, it may feel particularly moved to do so in situations where the U.S. provides military or other kinds of aid that sustain systemic violations of basic rights.

A fiduciary obligation to the Association: The Executive Board has a fiduciary obligation to the Association. In making decisions on behalf of the membership it should weigh possible implications for the financial and institutional sustainability of the Association.

An obligation to flexible democratic practice within the Association: An objective metric by which the Association might decide which issues merit intervention is elusive. As has been demonstrated repeatedly in the Association’s history with regard to such concerns as the Vietnam War, anthropological work for the military, LGBT issues, and racial equality, the Association takes a formal stand on an issue not only when the cause in question matches certain objective taxonomic criteria, but when a large enough group of members feels passionately about an issue and can persuade their colleagues to support them. There is evidence that, in the past, AAA leadership has on occasion treated motions from the AAA business meeting about Israel/Palestine differently than other kinds of motions, sidelining them;68 this is injurious to governance within the Association.

An awareness of leverage: Attempts to intervene in public debates or on behalf of social causes are most effective, and the obligation to intervene most powerful, where the Association has some leverage: professional knowledge relevant to the debate or resources whose withdrawal or deployment could be expected to have an impact.

Potential Actions AAA Could Consider

In weighing whether to intervene on the Israel/Palestine issue and, if so, what kind of intervention to undertake, the Executive Board should consider not only the intrinsic merits of the case, but also the underlying principles laid out here. We are of the unanimous opinion that, in terms of these principles, there is a strong case for the Association to take action on this issue and that the Association should do so. As viewed through the frame of “settler colonialism,” Palestinians constitute a disadvantaged group whose human rights are under threat, and some Palestinian civil society groups have asked AAA to intervene on their behalf. The State of Israel systematically limits the academic freedom of faculty and students in the West Bank and Gaza and also, in more subtle ways, of Jewish and Palestinian academics in Israel itself. Anthropologists who have a covenantal relationship with Palestinians in their research are, broadly, unanimous in their perception of injustice toward the Palestinian community and in urging the Association to take some kind of action.69 And there is a substantial community within the Association that, in accordance with the Association’s democratic traditions, has invested considerable effort in making the case that the Association should take action on this issue. If ever there was a time when this was a fringe issue within the Association, that time has passed.

The Executive Board should carefully weigh possible consequences of different actions the AAA might endorse. That includes weighing the consequences to Israeli anthropologists, who as a community have largely stood aside from, and in some cases opposed, direct oppression of Palestinians. It also includes the consequences to the Association itself. For example one person interviewed by the Task Force warned that deep-pocketed opponents of a boycott are “looking for venues where they can fight the boycott.” Saying “the AAA might be painting a target on itself,” he foresaw the possibility of “legal trolling and nuisance lawsuits by opponents with deep pockets who want to tie up the Association, run up its expenses, take up lots of staff time.”70 Others warned that members of Congress might seek ways to punish the AAA and the discipline of anthropology for a strong stance on this issue by cutting public support for anthropological research.

Within the AAA those members who do research in Israel and Palestine are likely to be significantly affected, being barred from the country or denied permits for archaeological research.

Bearing all this in mind, the Task Force sees the pros and cons of various possible courses of action as follows:

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69 The Task Force notes that this is different from the Yugoslav case in the 1990s, when anthropologists who worked in the region disagreed in their attributions of blame.
70 Kontorovich (2014a, 2014b) discusses threatened lawsuits against the American Studies Association for its academic boycott policy.
No Action: The gravity of the situation in Israel/Palestine and the widespread concern over this situation among AAA members is such that the Task Force recommends unanimously against inaction.

Censure: In the past the Association has issued statements condemning, for example, South African apartheid, the invasion of Iraq, and the illegal trade in antiquities. A statement condemning Israeli policy toward the Palestinians would be in line with such precedents, although perhaps more divisive than these other issues were within the Association. Any statement should address Israel’s restrictions on freedom of movement for Palestinian academics and foreign academics going to the West Bank; Israeli restrictions on access to publications on the West Bank; the damage checkpoints and IDF raids inflict on Palestinian academic life and, more generally, human dignity; the need for full accreditation for Al-Quds University; the need to guarantee freedom of expression to Palestinian and dissenting Jewish faculty and students at Israeli universities; the need for Israel to forward tax receipts in a timely manner so that West Bank faculty are paid in full and on time; and the repeal of Israeli laws that make it a crime to speak publicly in favor of a boycott. The Task Force unanimously supports a statement of censure or concern but, in view of the gravity of the Palestinian situation and the level of concern felt by many within the Association, this would in our view be an insufficient course of action if it were the only action undertaken.

Letter to the US government: several of our Israeli interlocutors made the point that Israel's appropriation of Palestinian land and militarized control of Palestinian populations is actively enabled by the U.S. government, which gives Israel approximately $3 billion per year, cooperates closely with Israel's military and police bureaucracies, and often vetoes condemnations of Israeli policy in the United Nations. Asking us to reflect on the United States' own complicity with the darker side of their political arrangements, some Israeli anthropologists suggested that we should see Israel and the U.S. as interlinked parts of a single system. The Task Force thus recommends that any statement of censure directed at Israel should be accompanied by a letter to relevant U.S. government agencies drawing attention to the ways in which U.S. government resources and policies contribute to policies in Israel/Palestine that violate academic freedom and disenfranchise Palestinians.

Letter Writing: The Middle East Studies Association (MESA) has an active campaign to write letters to governments to protest specific empirical cases of violation of academic freedom. The AAA could delegate specific responsibilities (e.g., to the AAA Committee for Human Rights) to write to relevant agencies within the Israeli and U.S. governments regarding specific cases where human and/or academic rights are violated. Alternatively, it could establish a new committee to monitor and protest such violations.

Apply pressure to Israel on archaeological issues: We have observed in this report that archaeology has been more implicated than cultural anthropology in the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. We therefore recommend that AAA enter into conversations with the Society for American Archaeology (SAA) and the American Schools of Oriental Research (ASOR) with regard to excavations in the West
Bank and East Jerusalem, and, more generally, the politicization of the archaeological record in Israel.

Active resource support for Palestinians: The Task Force was dismayed by what it learned of the conditions in which Palestinian academics, including anthropologists, conduct their teaching and research. Israeli policy ensures that they have difficulty accessing publications, acquiring and maintaining research equipment, getting paid, using the internet, securing visas for visiting scholars, travelling to international conferences, travelling for academic purposes within Israel and the West Bank, taking up fellowships abroad, and completing a semester of instruction. The Task Force is in unanimous agreement on the desirability of devoting resources to counteracting this wholesale strangulation of an ethnonational community’s academic development. The AAA could:

• make AnthroSource freely available to Palestinian universities;
• encourage its members to donate journals and books to Palestinian universities (bearing in mind, however, that Israel tends to make Palestinian institutions pay exorbitant fees to receive donated books);
• help establish fellowships to enable the travel of Palestinian academics to AAA conferences and of U.S. academics to act as teachers, mentors or research collaborators with colleagues in the West Bank and Gaza;
• encourage its journals and sections to publish special issues or spotlighted conference panels that would draw attention to these concerns.

Economic boycott: A number of Israelis and Palestinians told the Task Force that the measure most likely to reverse Israeli policy towards the Palestinians is an economic boycott. “Things here are stuck, and I’d like to see them move. When you touch the pockets of the middle class, it makes them move,” said one Israeli academic. They had in mind here particularly a trade boycott by the European Union, as well as the withdrawal of the $3 billion a year in aid from the U.S. to Israel. Obviously, it is beyond the Association’s power to enact such a boycott or withdrawal of aid. However, the Association could encourage its members to boycott products from the illegal Israeli settlements (lists of which are maintained by a number of third parties), and it could articulate an investment policy statement to ensure it does not invest in companies that have been spotlighted by pro-Palestinian activists as particularly complicit with violations of Palestinians’ basic rights. 71

Academic boycott: In response to calls from Palestinian civil society groups such as PACBI, there is a growing campaign for U.S. academic associations to enact academic boycotts of Israeli institutions, but not individuals. As noted, several academic associations have already enacted academic boycotts. If the AAA were to follow suit, it would be by far the largest academic association to do so, and it might result in other associations of similar size taking up the issue as well. (One Israeli supporter of a boycott said, “if a boycott ends with anthropology, I wouldn’t begin. [But] AAA can tell a story through a boycott. For it to reach APSA [the American Political Science Association],

which is a more conservative association, it has to go through anthropology…. Then it can go to sociology and so on”). At the same time, there is an inherent tension between an academic boycott and the commitment to “the dissemination of anthropological knowledge” foregrounded in the Association’s mission statement.\(^\text{72}\) An academic boycott is, in terms of the Association’s wider relationships, the most provocative of the actions available to it. While there is clearly support in some quarters for an academic boycott, a few prominent critics of Israel, such as Noam Chomsky (2014) and Juan Cole,\(^\text{73}\) have opposed it on grounds of academic freedom. We note also that, given their need for permits to undertake research, an academic boycott would have a disproportionate negative effect on members of the Association who are archaeologists.

A number of U.S. and Israeli academics told the Task Force that, in their opinion, it would be unfair to punish Israeli anthropologists who were among the Israelis most critical of their government’s treatment of Palestinians. They also doubted that the Netanyahu government would care about a boycott of Israeli anthropologists. And several asked where the line would be drawn between Israeli institutions and individuals, expressing concern that AAA not deny individual Israeli academics the right to register for a conference because their plane fare was paid by their university. On the other hand, a number of our interlocutors felt the same way as the Middle Eastern Studies specialist we interviewed who said, “A year ago I would have said a boycott was ineffective. I’m no longer sure of that. It has an effect on public debate in Israel, just the word boycott. The perception is that Israel is being South Africanized.”

An academic boycott itself could have any of a number of sub-components, and academic associations are, in principle, free to pick and choose as if ordering from a menu. These components from which a boycott could be constructed might include: a ban on providing AnthroSource to Israeli institutions (although this would violate the AAA’s contract with Wiley-Blackwell, and we note that the American Studies Association continues to make its journal available to Israeli universities); a ban on advertising jobs from Israeli institutions; a ban on use of conference facilities for job interviews and participation in the Graduate School Fair by Israeli departments; a refusal to list Israeli departments in AAA published materials; a ban on joint conferences and events; a requirement that AAA journal editors not acknowledge Israeli state funding in articles they publish; refraining from inviting Israeli university officials to official AAA events; recommending that AAA members decline invitations for visiting appointments at Israeli universities, from working in projects funded by the Israeli government, from research that requires Israeli state permits, or from working with special collections at Israeli universities and libraries; and a policy of discouraging members from refereeing tenure

\(^{72}\) The most comprehensive case against an academic boycott of Israel is made by Nelson and Brahm (2014). See also Walzer (2015) and the 2006 AAUP statement against an academic boycott of Israel at http://www.aaup.org/file/On-Academic-Boycotts_0.pdf. One of the principal authors of that statement subsequently changed her mind and endorsed an academic boycott of Israel (Scott 2013). For a spirited, and probably the best, debate on this issue in a 2006 issue of AAUP’s Academe magazine, see http://www.aaup.org/file/Papers-From-A-Planned-Conference-on-Boycotts.pdf.

\(^{73}\) See Cole (2002) for a fuller explanation of his position on this issue. Since this piece was published, he has refined his position to favor a boycott of Ariel University (but not its individual faculty). Whereas other Israeli universities are within internationally recognized borders, Ariel exists outside those borders on illegally occupied land and should therefore be boycotted in Cole’s view.
and promotion cases at Israeli institutions, or grant proposals for the Israel Science Foundation.

Bearing in mind the Association’s commitment to academic freedom, as well as the BDS movement’s own distinction between individuals and institutions, the Task Force does not support denying individual Israeli academics the right to register for AAA conferences or to publish in AAA journals, even if their expenses have been paid for by their institutions. If the Association were to undertake an academic boycott, we would urge it to emphasize that the boycott is of Israeli institutions, not individuals, and to acknowledge that some Israeli anthropologists have been quite critical of the political system within which they live.

**Targeted boycott of individual faculty and institutions:** Some suggested to the Task Force that, instead of a blanket boycott of Israeli academic institutions, the AAA could boycott particular individuals and institutions most guilty of actively supporting violations of basic Palestinian rights. Ariel University, a new university on an illegal Israeli settlement in the West Bank, is often given as an example. (For example, as mentioned earlier, the Middle East Studies scholar Juan Cole opposes a general boycott of Israel academics, but supports a boycott of Ariel University because it is on an illegal Israeli settlement on the West Bank). Others have suggested boycotting individual institutes or academics who have aided the occupation. The Task Force is skeptical of this recommendation for a number of reasons: the Association lacks the resources to undertake the research such a course of action would necessitate; the Association, which is not a licensing association along the lines of the American Medical Association, has long taken a position against investigating allegations of individual misconduct by members; boundary cases would prove extremely contentious; and the targeting of Ariel violates AAUP guidelines which, while opposing all academic boycotts on principle, single out selective boycotts for special condemnation. The AAUP says “we especially oppose selective academic boycotts that entail an ideological litmus test. We understand that such selective boycotts may be intended to preserve academic exchange with those more open to the views of boycott proponents, but we cannot endorse the use of political or religious views as a test of eligibility for participation in the academic community.”

If the AAA Executive Board were to consider endorsing a boycott of Israeli academic institutions, we feel the Board must address the issue of when, and under what circumstances, a boycott would end. It is a general principle of boycotts that they are associated with demands for actions, which, if undertaken, will result in outcomes that enable the lifting of the boycott. The BDS movement has laid out three conditions that it says must be met before a boycott would be lifted. They are:

1. Ending Israel’s occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantling the Wall;
2. Recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and

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3. Respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194.\(^75\)

These conditions are straightforward to support in principle. In practice, however, they are highly problematic. AAA lacks the in-house capacity to monitor and assess the extent to which such conditions are met, and in the absence of further clarity concerning what these conditions entail, it is not possible to determine whether such a boycott could ever be ended.

We believe that we have met the charge we have been given. This report has outlined the issues that we feel are relevant to anthropology and to the AAA as an association of anthropologists. We have outlined a range of potential courses of action that AAA might take to engage with these issues. We have also presented what we feel are a set of reasonable principles by which the Board can assess the pros and cons of each of these courses of action. It has been a great privilege to contribute to this important conversation, and we remain indelibly impressed by the passion, energy, and insight that our anthropological colleagues bring to bear in addressing these issues.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A. Task Force Charge

Task Force on AAA Engagement on Israel-Palestine

Objective
As part of a more encompassing AAA effort to respond to members' interest in dialogue
about the ongoing Israel/Palestine conflict, the Task Force is charged with helping the
Executive Board consider the nature and extent to which AAA might contribute – as an
Association -- to addressing the issues that the Israel/Palestine conflict raises. The Task
Force will: 1) enumerate the issues embedded in the ongoing conflict between Israel and
Palestine that directly concern the Association. These issues may include, but are not
limited to, the uses of anthropological research to support or challenge claims of territory
and historicity; restrictions placed by government policy or practice on anthropologists’
academic freedom; or commissioning anthropological research whose methods and/or
aims may be inconsistent with the AAA statement of professional responsibilities; 2)
develop principles to be used to assess whether the AAA has an interest in taking a stand
on these issues; 3) provide such an assessment; 4) on the basis of that assessment, make
recommendations to the Executive Board about actions the AAA could undertake.

Duration of Task Force
Ends October 2015

Responsibilities
• Enumerate the issues embedded in the conflict between Israel and Palestine that
directly affect the Association.
• Develop principles to be used to assess whether the AAA has an interest in taking
a stand on these issues. This may include providing a comprehensive and neutral
overview of arguments for and against a range of specific possible stands
(including no action).
• Apply these principles in completing an assessment of the nature and extent of
AAA’s interest in taking a specific stand on these issues.
• Assess whether the AAA has an interest in taking a specific stand on any broader
but relevant issues that are raised in the context.
• Recommend a course of action (this may include no action) for the Association.

Selection Criteria, Appointment and Reporting Structure
Each member is a distinguished scholar with expertise in one or more of the discipline’s
major subfields (linguistic anthropology, archaeology, sociocultural anthropology and
biological anthropology). As a result, together the Task Force members bring a wide
range of forms of enquiry and analysis to this endeavor. They also have expertise in
conflict and historical memory, issues of identity, and the use of anthropology/archeology
in political efforts. Finally, almost all of the Task Force members have a record of
significant service to the Association, and thus a strong sense of its mission and governance. We kept the group small in order to ensure its agility and its ability to do its work with all deliberate speed; that is, to have sufficient time to assure that all relevant perspectives are duly considered, but not dragging out its activities unnecessarily.

**Task Force Membership**
- Staff coordinator: Edward Liebow (AAA)
- Executive Board liaison: Ramona Pérez (San Diego State U)
- Niko Besnier (University of Amsterdam)
- Patrick Clarkin (University of Massachusetts-Boston)
- Hugh Gusterson (George Washington University)
- John Jackson (University of Pennsylvania)
- Katherine Spielmann (Arizona State University)

**Task Force Reports**
The Task Force will provide AAA with a written report of its findings no later than October 1, 2015.

**Meetings and Schedule**
The committee will regularly meet regularly by phone and email in the months leading up to the Annual Meeting in Washington, DC and thereafter. The Task Force will meet face-to-face at the 2014 Annual Meeting.
Appendix B: A Brief Historical Outline

The history of relations between Palestinian Arabs and Jews is long, complex, and richly disputed. It is beyond the scope of this report to synthesize this history comprehensively or to do full justice to the divergent interpretations of key events. What we offer here is a brief outline of events and actions that pertain to the current experiences of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza, and in East Jerusalem, for those readers who are not familiar with the area. A detailed discussion of Palestinian history can be found in Kimmerling and Migdal (2003), among other sources.

- 1916: Sykes-Picot Agreement was reached in secret between Britain and France, dividing the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire outside the Arabian Peninsula into areas of future British and French control or influence in the event that the Ottoman Empire was defeated in World War I. South Syria, what was to become Trans-Jordan, was assigned to be under British influence.

- 1917: Balfour Declaration, a letter from British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Lord Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, which pledged Britain’s support for the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine. The Ottoman Empire, which had ruled Palestine, was defeated by British forces in the course of 1917 and 1918.

- 1923: British Mandate for Palestine, the legal document ratified by the League of Nations in 1922 that formalized British rule of what had been the southern portion of the Ottoman Empire. The Mandate created two British protectorates, Palestine, which was to contain a Jewish homeland, and Transjordan. The preamble of the Mandate included a statement: “…it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.”

- 1928: Transjordan became independently governed but still under mandatory authority until it gained independence in 1946.

- 1930s: In a context of increasing Jewish immigration and nationalistic movements among Palestinians and among Jewish settlers in Palestine, 1936-39 saw the Great Arab Revolt against British rule (Swedenburg 1989). This period also witnessed the region becoming the place to which many European Jews were exiled as displaced persons.
• 1939 British White Paper proposed an independent Palestine governed by both Jews and Palestinians with Palestinians in charge of all departments of the government, and Arabs and Jews staffing departments in proportion to their population in the country. The White Paper also proposed limiting Jewish immigration and restricting Jewish land purchases from Arabs. This proposal was rejected by both sides (The Avalon Project: British White Paper of 1939; Kimmerling and Migdal 2003:102-131).

• 1939-1946: Mobilization by the Jewish population in Palestine against the British occupation.

• 1946: Britain decided to withdraw from Palestine

• 1947: UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) proposed a partition of Palestine between Jews and Palestinians along with termination of the mandate and granting of independence. Resolution 181, passed by the UN General Assembly in November, proposed internationalization of the Jerusalem area.
Palestinians and Arab states rejected the partition; Zionists generally accepted it, albeit not universally.

Figure B-2: UN General Assembly Partition Plan 1947

- Late 1947-48: Civil war between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, and the establishment of the state of Israel. Nakba: the flight and forceful expulsion of 700,000-750,000 Palestinians (out of a Palestinian population of 900,000) from the portion of Palestine that became Israel. (Gordon 2008:5; NYT: August 17, 1948; Sa’di and Abu-Lughod 2007). The mass exile and dispossession of these Palestinians was consolidated in March 1948 with Plan Dalet (a plan for taking control of Mandatory Palestine, creating a Jewish state and securing its borders). In mid-1948, after the declaration of the state of Israel, 250,000 Palestinians were relocated (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003:162-163).

- 1948: May, Israel declared independence. The next day Syria, Egypt and Jordan invaded, turning a civil war into a transnational conflict that lasted ten months. At the end of the War of Independence, Israel retained control of the territory
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designated to Israel by UN Resolution 181 as well as over half of the area designated as Palestinian by the prior UN partition plan

- 1948: December: UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) article 11 was passed: “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.” Israel refused to accept the principle of repatriation (e.g., UNCPP 1949; cf. Feldman 2007, 2008).

- 1949: Armistice agreement between Israel, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria defines the “Green Line,” that becomes the de facto Israeli border until 1967. Israel holds 78% of Western Palestine; The Kingdom of Transjordan formally annexes the West Bank in 1950 and declares the Kingdom of Jordan; Egypt administers the Gaza Strip.

![Figure B-3: Israel After Armistice Agreement, 1949](https://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/)

Source: [https://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/](https://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/)
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• 1950: Absentees’ Property Law\textsuperscript{76}: an Israeli law retroactively (to November 29, 1947) allowing for the appropriation of Palestinian lands within Israel from Palestinian citizens of Israel. Absentees include anyone who “was a Palestinian citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine a) for a place outside Palestine before the 27\textsuperscript{a} Av, 5708 (1\textsuperscript{st} September, 1948); or b) for a place in Palestine held at the time by forces which sought to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel or which fought against it after its establishment,” essentially encompassing all Palestinian internal and external refugees (Halabi 2013). It is estimated that 40\% of Palestinian lands were confiscated under this law (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003:172-173). The subsequent Development Authority (Transfer of Properties) Law of 1950 became the principal mechanism for the transfer of Palestinian absentee properties to ownership by the state of Israel (Halabi 2013). (The state could assume ownership of these properties, but individual Israelis could not until recent years (Lehn, 1988, Forman and Kedar 2004)).

• 1967: Six Day War: Egypt mobilized its military along the Israeli border in the Sinai; Israel responded to perceived preparations for attack; Jordan shelled West Jerusalem; Syria shelled northern Israel. In the end, Israel took the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan, uniting the old Palestinian Mandate territory under a single authority. These areas were placed under Israeli military rule. 250,000 Palestinian refugees fled to Jordan (Kimmerling and Migdal 2003: 240-241). Israel annexed East Jerusalem and 64 square km around the city, which had belonged to 28 Palestinian villages on the West Bank (Gordon 2008:4). Israel took control of the electricity, water, welfare, health care, judiciary, and educational systems in the occupied territories. A permitting system was established. The international community (including the US) did not recognize the annexation of East Jerusalem.

• 1973: Yom Kippur War: Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel on Yom Kippur. The war, which ended with a ceasefire brokered with the aid of the United States and Soviet Union, was militarily inconclusive but, in the war’s aftermath, Egypt was able to regain the Sinai Peninsula, which was officially returned to Egypt according to the terms of the 1978 Camp David peace treaty. Egypt became the first Arab country to recognize Israel at this time.

\textsuperscript{76} http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL_NSF/0/E0B719E95E3B494885256F9A005AB90A
• 1987: December: First Intifada (“shaking off”) began in the Gaza Strip and spread to the West Bank, lasting for four years. Tactics used in the Intifada included general strikes, boycotts of Israeli administrative institutions in the Occupied Territories, economic boycotts, refusal to pay taxes, and throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails at Israeli soldiers, who are estimated to have killed over 1,000 Palestinians.100 Israeli soldiers and 60 Israeli civilians also died.77 Israel closed all schools in the Occupied Territories.

• 1991-93: As an outgrowth of the 1991 Madrid Conference and multilateral negotiations about regional cooperation, the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accord) established a 5-year transition period for the creation of a Palestinian governing council that would lead to independence for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, based on UN Security Council Resolutions 294 (called for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in 1967) and 338 (called for a ceasefire in the Yom Kippur war and the implementation of resolution 294 in 1973). Most of the Gaza Strip, as well as the Jericho region of the West Bank, were to be turned over immediately to the PLO. Israel established checkpoints at this time.

• 1995: Interim Agreement (Oslo II). PLO gained sole control over all Palestinian cities and populated areas in the West Bank and Gaza strips except for an area of

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Jewish settlements near Hebron. Oslo II allowed the redeployment of Israeli troops in the West Bank and created Areas A, B, and C. Area A is governed by the Palestinian Authority and policed by Palestinians, Area B is governed by the Palestinian Authority and policed by Israel, and Area C is governed and policed by Israel. By 2000 the Palestinian Authority had sovereignty, of a limited sort, over Area A: 17.2% of non-contiguous territory in the West Bank.

Figure B-5 Oslo Accord II, 1995
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oslo_II_Accord

- 2000: September: The Second Intifada was triggered by the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and over 1,000 Israeli police to the site referred to by Muslims as the Al Aqsa Mosque and by Jews as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Residents of most Arab settlements took to the street in protest. The Palestinian Authority was disabled and civil law was suspended.

- 2002: Construction of the Separation Wall began; a limited number of entries through it are available for Palestinians (Bornstein 2008). The separation wall
does not follow the Green Line. It frequently cuts off Palestinians from their farmland, and cuts through neighborhoods and villages.

- Growth of Israeli settlement populations in East Jerusalem and the West Bank continues to the present. By 2014, close to 600,000 settlers were living in these areas, including East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights, double the settler population at the time of the Oslo Agreement.

Figure B-6: Israeli Settlements, 1972-2014
Appendix C: AAA Past Engagement and Statements On Similar Issues

This Appendix provides information about AAA public policy statements since the 1990s, and AAA rules and procedures regarding their adoption. Due to the number of statements the Association has issued in the recent past, this document focuses on the Association’s major actions. To date, the AAA has never announced a boycott of any academic institution or foreign country.

ASSOCIATION RULES AND POLICIES

In 2004, the AAA adopted rules entitled “Guidelines for Consideration of Proposed Public Statements, to include Motions from the Annual Business Meeting.” [http://www.aaanet.org/committees/aoc/pub_stmts.htm](http://www.aaanet.org/committees/aoc/pub_stmts.htm) The guidelines include the following:

1) The Board should be strategic in selecting matters on which to speak out.
2) Public statements should address matters of clear common professional interest and concern to the Association's membership or public statements should be issued only on matters about which the Association's members have special knowledge and or expertise.
3) The statement itself should include language that demonstrates such special knowledge. Thus, to the extent possible, the statement should present anthropological findings, conclusions or recommendations on the matter being addressed.
4) Public statements should make a contribution to better public understanding of the matter being addressed.
5) Public statements should specify their intended audience.
6) If the statement seeks action, it should specify upon whom such action is urged and detail the action being sought.

US ANNUAL MEETING LOCATIONS SUBJECT TO AAA BOYCOTT

Several US locations have been identified as off-limits for annual or section meetings until specific, measurable changes have been instituted. These include:

1) Illinois (US) (repealed) – In 1999, the AAA passed a resolution announcing that the Association would not hold scholarly meetings in the state of Illinois until such a time that the University of Illinois replace “Chief Illiniwek” with a mascot that does not promote “inaccurate, anachronistic and damaging stereotypes of Native American people, or indeed members of any minority group.” In June 2007, the Executive Board agreed that in recognition of the fact that the University of Illinois has discontinued its use of Chief Illiniwek as a mascot, AAA will resume scheduling meetings in Illinois. AAA held an Annual Meeting in Chicago in 2013.

2) Arizona (US) – On May 22, 2010 the AAA Executive Board passed a resolution resolving to not hold a scholarly conference (applying to its Sections, Committees
and Commissions) in the state of Arizona until such time that Senate Bill 1070 is either repealed or struck down as constitutionally invalid and thus unenforceable by a court. This Bill SB 1070, would have, among other things, made the failure to carry certain immigration documents a crime, and given the police broad power to detain anyone suspected of being in the country illegally, even if they had committed no other crime. It is worth noting that this ban does not apply to Indian Reservations in the state. It is also worth noting that some of the most objectionable provisions were later struck down by the US Supreme Court. (http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/2012/06/03/20120603arizona-immigrationlaw-supreme-court-opinion.html).

3) Georgia (US) – Also on May 22, 2010, the AAA Executive Board passed a resolution resolving to not hold a scholarly conference (applying to its Sections, Committees and Commissions) in the state of Georgia until such time as HB 87 is either repealed or struck down as constitutionally invalid. Some of the provisions of the bill included a provision that would make the use of false information or documentation when applying for a job a felony. Another provision created an immigration review board to investigate complaints about government officials not complying with state laws related to illegal immigration, and applicants for public benefits would have to provide at least one state or federally issued "secure and verifiable" document. A month after this resolution passed, the Executive Board Ad Hoc Group on Immigration (Hugh Gusterson, Ed Liebow, Vilma Santiago-Irizarry, Jay Schensul, Alisse Waterston) drafted a General Statement on Immigration (http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/AAA-General-Statement-onImmigration.cfm) that declared that the AAA “will continue to monitor closely and avoid investing in states that sponsor laws that give police broad powers and discretion to single out members of a specific ethnic group whether in principle or by practice; remove social services from undocumented immigrants; ban undocumented immigrants from public schools and colleges, and/or charge discriminatory fees; criminalize those who drive or shelter undocumented immigrants; and require individual identification cards that indicate immigration status.” At the time of the drafting of the statement, at least five states (Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, and Utah) had passed anti-immigration legislation, and according to AAA staff research, legislation was pending in at least 23 other states, though none secured passage (https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/state-anti-immigrant-laws).

LOCATIONS SUBJECT TO AAA STATEMENTS OF CENSURE OR CONDEMNATION

Several locations have been subject to Association statements of censure or condemnation in an effort to see measurable changes instituted. These include:

1. Cuba – In January, 1994, AAA passed a resolution condemning the US Cuban embargo and asking that the US Congress and President Clinton adopt a consistent humanitarian policy of alleviating human suffering by ending its Cuban embargo, and in particular lifting its ban on the sale of food and medical supplies and equipment; and adopt a more humane approach to resolving differences with
Cuba by encouraging a freer exchange of ideas and persons, lifting for example, its restrictions on US citizens’ travel to Cuba and Cuban citizens’ travel to the US, including Cuban scholars and students seeking academic degrees, and its ban on the sale of paper desperately needed for educational purposes.

2. Colorado (US) – In January, 1995, AAA passed a resolution calling upon the citizens of Colorado to challenge and repeal State Constitutional Amendment #2, which sought to repeal antidiscrimination ordinances in several Colorado cities, and also called upon Colorado citizens to urge the state legislature to prohibit the passage of any such ordinances in the future.

3. Peru – In June, 2009, the AAA and Organizing Committee of the World Council of Anthropological Associations (WCAA) issued a statement to Peruvian President Alan Garcia expressing concern about the government’s violation of indigenous peoples’ human, territorial and legal rights. The statement also condemned the use of violence against peaceful protestors, as well as the executive decrees against which they were protesting.

4. Honduras – In February, 2010, AAA members voted to adopt a resolution urging US President Obama and members of the US Congress to acknowledge and condemn the human rights violations that were committed by the de facto government in Honduras since the June 28, 2009 coup d’état; give support to progressive forces in Honduras striving to create a real democracy; work with allied countries to find a peaceful and democratic solution to the ongoing crisis in Honduras; and join other Latin American countries in withholding recognition of individuals selected in a subsequent election held November 29, 2009. The text of this AAA resolution can be found at: http://www.aaanet.org/issues/AAA-Honduras-Resolution.cfm.

**AMICUS CURIAE**

An “amicus curiae” (“friend of the court”) brief is where a legal opinion, expert testimony, or scholarly research findings are used to introduce concerns in a legal proceeding by someone who is not directly a party to the proceeding, has not been invited by any of the parties to the proceeding to assist the court, but has information that has a bearing on the case. The Association has, on certain occasions, offered an amicus brief based on research findings that have been published in our journals. Included among recent amicus briefs in which the Association has participated are:

1. *Varnum v. Brien* (same-sex marriage in Iowa) – AAA signed on to support the rights of six same-sex couples who filed suit in December 2005 in Polk County, Iowa, asking the court to uphold their right to marry under the Iowa Constitution and to strike down as unconstitutional the law in Iowa that excludes gay and lesbian couples from marriage.

2. *Greenberg v. National Geographic* (photo reproduction rights) – AAA supported the position of National Geographic, which held that a freelance photographer could not sue the magazine for reprinting photos originally taken for the magazine on its digital media outlets.

3. *Perry v. Schwarzenegger* (California Proposition 8) – AAA advocated for repealing Proposition 8, a state law, as supported by voters by ballot initiative that
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would have banned same-sex marriages in California.

4. *Lyons v. New Mexico Cultural Properties Review Committee* (Mt. Taylor – cultural resources protection) – AAA supported the position of the sovereign tribal governments of the area that the Mt. Taylor site should remain as a sacred site. An extinct volcano, Mount Taylor is considered sacred by the Navajo, Hopi, Zuni, Acoma and Laguna people and is an important pilgrimage site for members of at least 30 tribes.

5. *Fisher v. University of Texas* (affirmative action) – A student filed suit against the University of Texas after being denied admission. The student sued, believing he was denied admission while less qualified candidates of color were accepted. The AAA supported the University’s position that racial diversity should be a factor in admissions standards.

**AAA TOPICAL STATEMENTS**

Below is a list of issues that AAA has weighed in on in the past; the statements themselves are located online at [http://www.aaanet.org/about/Policies/statements/](http://www.aaanet.org/about/Policies/statements/).

Attached to this Appendix is a table of contents for a binder in the AAA office that contains topical statements/resolutions that the AAA has passed from 1949 to 1992.

1. Guidelines for Consideration of Proposed Public Statements, to include Motions from the Annual Business Meeting
5. Statement on Disabilities –January 1993
8. Statement on Evolution – April 2000
9. Statement on Confidentiality of Field Notes – March 2003
17. Statement on "Race" – May 1998
18. Statement on "Race" and Intelligence – December 1994

Missing from this list are the AAA are statements about gun violence (January 2013) ([http://www.aaanet.org/issues/press/upload/Gun-Violence-Statement.pdf](http://www.aaanet.org/issues/press/upload/Gun-Violence-Statement.pdf)), suggestions
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COMPANY BOYCOTTS

1. Coca-Cola (multinational) – In February, 2009, the AAA announced that it supports the Colombian union SINALTRAINAL’s call for a boycott of the Coca-Cola company and its products, and AAA calls on its members to do the same until Coca-Cola agrees in good faith with its workers. The resolution was adopted by the Executive Board at the recommendation of the AAA Labor Relations Commission and in response to a report by Lesley Gill, a specialist in Latin American human rights and political violence with American University. Her findings indicated that Coca-Cola had not been sufficiently proactive in protecting workers and their families in Colombia from intimidation and violence and that the right to organize unions had not been respected.

AAA INVESTMENTS

According to our investment advisor, the AAA portfolio currently has no funds invested in companies based in Israel or the West Bank. In addition, and although it is not the result of an explicit policy or strategy to avoid such investments, the AAA has no financial interest in companies identified by the wedivest.org campaign as having problematic investments/practices (Africa Israel, Caterpillar, Elbit Systems, G4S, Hewlett Packard, Motorola Solutions, Northrop Grumman, Sodastream, Veólia).
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Appendix D: Interlocutors

The Task Force interviewed 120 persons in individual or group interviews. Each was asked if they are willing to be identified or would prefer to remain anonymous. The following individuals gave their permission to be identified by name and institutional affiliation.

Fadia Nasir Abu-al-Haija, Sakhnin College
Mahmoud Abu Eid, Director of the Oriental Museum
Nadia Abu el-Haj, Barnard College
Orit Abuhav, Beit Berl College
Lila Abu-Lughod, Columbia University
Matthew J. Adams, W.F. Albright Institute of Archaeological Research
Madelaine Adelman, Arizona State University
Fida Adeley, Georgetown University
Diana Allen, Cornell University
Lori Allen, University of London
Jon Anderson, Catholic University
Sam Aramin, Combatants for Peace and Family Forum
Sa’ad Atshan, Brown University
Nir Avieli, Ben Gurion University
Rana Baker, student from Gaza at a European university
Omar Barghouti, co-founder Palestinian Campaign for the Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel
Zvi Beckerman, Hebrew University
William O. Beeman, University of Minnesota
Amahl Bishara, Tufts University
John Borneman, Princeton University
Glen Bowman, Kent University
Brian Boyd, Columbia University
Nathan J. Brown, George Washington University
Raya Cohen, Archive of Migrant Memories, Rome
Juan Cole, University of Michigan
Rochelle Davis, Georgetown University
Uriel Davis, Al-Quds University
Lara Deeb, Scripps College
Jackie Felman, Ben Gurion University
Ilana Feldman, George Washington University
Khaled Furani, Tel Aviv University
Farha Ghannam, Swarthmore College
Harvey Goldberg, Hebrew University and President of Israeli Anthropological Association
Neve Gordon, Ben Gurion University
Raphael Greenberg, Tel Aviv University
Jeff Halper, Director of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions
Rema Hammami, Birzeit University
Amos Hofman, Beit Berl College
Amal Jamal, Tel Aviv University & I’lam Media Center for Arab Palestinians in Israel
Rhoda Kanaan, Columbia University
David Katz, Tel Aviv University
Sulaiman Khatib, Co-Founder of People’s Peace Fund
Laurie King, Georgetown University
Julia Lerner, Ben Gurion University
Fran Markowitz, Ben Gurion University
Anne Meneley, Trent University
Danny Moses, Seeds of Peace Organization
Dan Monterescu, Central European University
Zakaria Odeh, Civic Coalition to Defend Palestinians’ Rights in Jerusalem
Dan Rabinowitz, Tel Aviv University
Michele Rivkin-Fish, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Lisa Rofel, University of California-Santa Cruz
Amalia Sa’ar, Haifa University
Cynthia Saltzman, Rutgers University
Joan Scott, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
Yehuda Shenhav, Tel Aviv University
Mtanes Shthadeh, MADA Arab Center for Applied Social Research
Neil Silberman, University of Massachusetts-Amherst
Gila Silverman, University of Arizona
Gregory Starrett, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Ted Swedenburg, University of Arkansas
Lisa Taraki, Birzeit University
Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi, Hebrew University
Michael Walzer, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
Jenny B. White, Boston University
Richard Wilson, University of Connecticut

In addition, a number of persons with whom we spoke wished to remain anonymous, but were willing to have their positions or institutional affiliations reported so that readers of this report would have a better sense of the range of perspectives from which we gained insights on the region. These persons include:

One former university president, West Bank
Two senior administrators, Hebrew University
One senior administrator Al Quds University
Israeli cultural anthropologist in U.S.
Israeli scholar at a European University
Twenty-one Israeli cultural anthropologists and sociologists in Israel
Israeli education specialist in Israel
Three Palestinian academics from Jerusalem
West Bank NGO consultant
West Bank political scientist
Fifteen faculty members and students from Birzeit University
Two senior administrators and two faculty, Beit Berl College
Three students from Beit Berl College
Eight students from Haifa University