The following paragraphs concerning the flooding of the City of New Orleans were taken from the NOVA/PBS website from a page entitled "Storm that Drowned a City a 300 Year Struggle."

In 1708 a visitor to the area of what is now New Orleans wrote, "This last summer I examined better than I had yet done all the lands in the vicinity of this river. I did not find any at all that are not flooded in the spring. I do not see how settlers can be placed on this river."

In 1721 Surveyors laid down a grid pattern of streets of some 40 blocks, with drainage ditches around each block and a dirt palisade surrounding the town. A never-ending battle against high water – both floodwaters and high water tables – has begun.

In 1816 there was a month long flood in the city. In 1828 there was another flood in New Orleans. It produced the highest waters on record. This prompted laws and taxes mandating the construction of Mississippi River levees to protect the city.

Two topographic engineers describe the flood of 1849 as the most destructive flood known. A breach in the levee on the east bank of the Mississippi 18 miles above New Orleans does an "immense amount of damage," they write, inundating the city for 48 days. Another flood the following year convinces the federal government to grant monies to build a continuous levee system.

There were at least six incidents of major flooding between 1850 and 1893. In 1920 New Orleans has a population of about 400,000 and begins to expand in the direction of Lake Ponchartrain. In 1920 Albert Baldwin Wood invented a screw pump which gave the city a means of drainage for the newly expanded areas.

In 1923 The Army Corps of Engineers finishes connecting New Orleans to the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, a 1,300 – mile canal stretching from Texas to Florida. During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, this waterway will unfortunately provide a direct route for storm surge into eastern New Orleans.

In 1927 there were rising floodwaters in the Mississippi threatening to overwhelm the city. The governor orders the Corps of Engineers to dynamite a levee along St. Bernard Parish, allowing floodwaters to drain across the parish's rural neighborhoods and wetlands to Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico. New Orleans proper is saved, but the parish is devastated. More than 200 people die and 700,000 are left homeless.

In 1963 Corps engineers complete the Mississippi River – Gulf Outlet, a 76 mile canal that offers a direct route for ships between New Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico. This canal also serves as a highway to New Orleans for hurricanes and their storm surges.
Hurricane Betsy in 1965 flooded New Orleans and convinced. In 1985, in response to Hurricane Betsy, city engineers finally approve hurricane protection projects along the New Orleans lakefront and in St. Bernard Parish. The projects include strengthened seawalls and levees along the lakefront as well as within the Industrial Canal and along the Mississippi River Gulf–Outlet. The projects are 80% complete by 1994.

The following paragraphs concerning the history of the New Orleans Police Department are direct quotations from HISTORY OF THE NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT by Ruth Asher, N.O.P.D. Historian.

In 1852 a new mayor completely reorganized the police system and consolidated the three municipalities and John Youenes, the newly named Chief of Police, had a force of twelve officers and 345 policemen.

When the Municipal Elections in 1856 were once again marred by fraud and violence, the Mayor ordered the police to walk their beats unarmed and most resigned. Again a reorganization of the police force was called for in 1858 and the new Mayor proposed to upgrade the police department by raising their pay and removing them from politics.

In 1861 New Orleans was captured and General B. F. Butler suspended civil government and established martial law with military police and a provost marshal.

Military control came to an end in September, 1868, and then the legislature under Governor Henry Clay Warmoth created the Metropolitan Police Force by combining Orleans, Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes. This tri-parish law enforcement agency lasted until the end of Reconstruction in 1877.

Although there were many applicants, on January 21, 1891, the Board of Commissioners unanimously elected Dexter S. Gaster to the position of Superintendent of Police. The police force numbered 325 at this time. The story is that during an inspection of the hundreds of officers, the Superintendent was needed and when he was found, his badge was re-pinned upside down with the statement, “Now you will stand out.” This badge was adopted and became a tradition.

On January 1, 1929, Captain Theodore Ray succeeded Superintendent Healy. Into his lap fell the series of bombings, dynamiting, fights, shootings and assaults, all associated with a serious street car strike. In addition to this situation, the force was pressed to continue its crusade against slot machines, vice and other forms of gambling.

On August 15, 1960, Colonel Dayries retired and Giarrusso was appointed Superintendent of Police thus marking the end of the scandals and the beginning of a new era for the Department of Police.
One of the greatest tragedies ever to befall the NOPD was when on December 31, 1972 the first of a series of snipings and gun battles began between a lone gunman identified as Mark J. Essex and members of the Department. Essex was finally traced to the Downtown Howard Johnson on Sunday, January 7, 1973 where senseless murders were committed. At 8:50 P.M. when a military helicopter occupied by police riflemen was on its third flight over the roof, Essex ran from the cubicle firing at the helicopter and was shot. However, reports from several observation points were to the effect a second subject had also been seen so extreme caution was still exercised. Finally, about 2:00 P.M. on Monday, January 8, police officers entered the roof area from all sides and no other person was found. Also, a systematic search of the entire area of the motel proved negative. The personal loss to the Department of Police was the death of Deputy Superintendent Louis J. Sirgo, Patrolmen Paul Persigo, Philip Coleman, K-9 Officer Edwin Hosli and Cadet Alfred Harrell. Numerous other officers and civilians were wounded. On May 17, 1973 the playground and stadium located at 2300 Leonidas Street was named the Alfred Harrell Playground and Stadium in memory of Cadet Alfred Harrell.

When Ernest N. Morial took over the reins of the city from his predecessor, Moon Landrieu, on May 1, 1978, he appointed a citizens committee to interview applicants for the position of Superintendent of Police and asked that Giarrusso to remain until a new chief was selected. Giarrusso was praised as an innovative Chief who based his entire administration on the implementation of programs in crime prevention and law enforcement, many of which were adopted by other law enforcement agencies throughout the nation.

On June 12, 1978, James C. Parsons, a native and former police chief of Birmingham, Ala. was sworn in as Superintendent. His command started being besieged with problems starting in 1979 with dissension over the city's offered pay plan for diminishing many benefits, including slashing both annual and sick leave. After a walk-out and with Mardi Gras being cancelled in Orleans Parish during a sixteen day strike, benefits were then restored with the new stipulation only for new hires.

The one, two of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita slammed New Orleans with a mighty blow. Initially a Category 5 storm, Katrina made landfall and traveled along the eastern edge of the City in the late evening hours of Sunday, August 28, 2005 and into the morning hours of Monday, August 29, 2005. As a result of the storm surge entering the waterways surrounding the City, several area levees were breached. The breaches caused flooding to approximately 80% of Orleans parish. As the primary law enforcement agency for the city and parish, the men and women of the New Orleans Police Department remained in the City to protect and serve.

As a result of remaining in the City, the entire department became one of Katrina's many victims. Of an approximately 1741 commissioned members and 364 civilian members, the department has been left with approximately 1445 officers and a limited number of essential civilian employees. Under the current staffing, there is one Superintendent, five Assistant Superintendents, two Majors, and thirty-six Captains.
The aforementioned members make-up the "Command Staff" of the NOPD, and are responsible for completing After-Action Reports for all significant events. The hurricanes and resulting disaster are considered significant events and as such required after-action report submissions. Please note there are two additional commanders who hold the rank of lieutenant and are included in the report numbers.

As a way of compiling information in manageable portions, the command staff was asked to submit after-action reports covering the first 30-days of the Katrina event. The time period discussed in the initial after-action reports summarized below covers August 28, 2005 through September 28, 2005. Pre-Katrina references are included, but fall out of the 30-day target period. (Examples include issuance of Emergency Operations Plan prior to hurricane season, the beginning of hurricane season, June 1, 2005, and the impact of previous storms in the 2005 season.) A small committee was formed by the Research and Planning Division of NOPD and assigned to review and compile the initial after-action report. The committee included officers of the NOPD, a representative from the DEA, and a representative from the FBI. Listed below is the summary of the submitted reports. This summary and these base reports are currently being used as the beginning point for the final, all encompassing After Action Report which will cover this still on going event. Although some of the topics have recommendations, large portions are being investigated and final recommendations will follow.

The department intends to take the information presented in the Final After-Action Report and make adjustments, modifications, and or improvements to the Emergency Management Plan, the preparation and training plans for events of this magnitude, and to lead the nation in educating law enforcement agencies based on this experience.

* * * * *

Radio communications system failure and/or inadequate 20 = 76.9%

Radio Communications was the most common complaint of the unit commanders. There were several different categories of complaint concerning the communication system.

a. The system stopped working on the dispatch channels.
b. Many members did not know how to use the ITAC system. Nor did they know the radios could be used at close range without the repeaters.
c. No common channel with EMS and Fire and later military.
d. There was no alternate system of communication. For example, runners, handwritten messages...
e. With little to no communications there was an apparent end to supervision of unit commanders. Unit commanders made their own goals and plans.
Food and water supply 17 = 65.3%

The availability of and ability to maintain a supply of food and water was identified as a significant problem during this event.

a. There was a token handout of bottled water to each district prior to the arrival of the storm.
b. Part of individual recommendations was to have a three (3) day supply of food and water on hand when reporting for work.
c. No stockpile of non-perishables staged for use by essential employees.
d. No attempt on Department’s part to organize a distribution point to get supplies to units scattered around the City.
e. If there is a shelter of last resort it should be stocked with food and water. The shelters of last resort should also have medical personnel to assist with the elderly and infirm.

Backup fuel supply (generators for fuel sites) 17 = 65.3%

Knowledge that fuel was available at public fuel stations, but without electricity was not distributed.

a. Police Vehicles were kept filled prior to the storm’s arrival, but went to “E” once the pumps closed down.
b. Officers were able to improvise devices to acquire fuel from underground tanks.
c. Location of distribution sites once fuel arrived in tankers complicated the distribution of what little fuel was made available in the days following the storm.
d. Very limited supply of fuel type for generators which were functioning at some of the police facilities / shelters.
e. Members of the Fourth District had a generator powered pump which was able to remove and pump gas from the tanks of any dry gas station. This behavior is governed by the Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act. This device should be examined and duplicated.

Provisions for sheltering workers during a storm (2nd Command Post) 15 =57.7%

What to do with employees once a mandatory evacuation order has been given for the City of New Orleans became a dilemma?

a. Based on the predicted severity of the expected storm, pre-staging officers a short distance from the City to allow for rapid response back into the City once threat has moved on was a strong recommendation for consideration.
b. Although each assignment had a plan for its personnel, the plans were not thoroughly evaluated for safety of the shelter choice and accessibility to be supplied following the storm.
c. Once the emergency has been declared, the call to allow personnel to return to homes and report later (possibly during the storm) needs to be reconsidered. Many of our 1700 were victims and needed to be rescued from their homes due to rising water.

d. Knowledge of where each unit was and how to communicate with them would have made the exchange of information and supplies flow more smoothly.

e. Either a predetermined secondary Command Post Location or a properly communicated ad hoc location would allow for more efficient exchange of information on shelter locations for officers.

f. The department should avoid instructing unit commanders to “hustle” accommodations, food and water.

Vehicles appropriate to operate in high water conditions  

12 = 46.1%

Although some units had Expeditions, pick-up trucks, or other SUV-type vehicles, the majority of the department did not have access to a high profile vehicle which would allow for movement on streets filled with some water.

a. Movement of personnel en mass is limited, without high occupancy vehicles (buses, deuce and ¼’s, flatbeds.)

b. Vehicles considered high water are not properly outfitted for that use and are several years old without replacements.

Watercraft to conduct rescue operations  

10 = 38.4%

Search and Rescue is not listed as a primary function of the NOPD, but as the care for life is, the role was very quickly adopted by many of the department’s forces.

a. Once the storm had passed, and the levees breached, many officers made use of commandeered modes of transportation. Boats of all types were put into use as methods of transportation for both officers and rescues. This behavior is governed by the Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act.

b. Large portions of the city were covered in water at a variety of depths. Knowledge on how to handle a boat around obstacles, loading a boat with victims to capacity, and proper care for the craft would make their usefulness increase.

c. Smaller boats known as flat boats with smaller motors, 10 to 25 horsepower, are more able to navigate a flooded city. There were no currents except for the areas very near the breaches while the water was entering the city. Smaller boats and motors are also much less expensive.

Communications with Military / Feds  

9 = 34.6%

Once the Military and other Law Enforcement agencies were in the City, the inability to communicate with them hindered all efforts.

a. Dept. needs for assistance were not easily communicated, and therefore not met with support from agencies that arrived to help.
b. Posts / Positions given were discovered abandoned when missions / tasks were adjusted without the checks and balances performed with open communication.

c. Requests for assistance from the Military were not quickly responded to originally, and assignments of the outside LE were complicated due to lack of communication.

Generators for Districts/assignments  
9 = 34.6%

The ability to continue to function near “normal” was severely hindered by the absence of power at the locations of the police services.

a. Pre-storm planning, staging of generators and the fuel needed to run them could have made some of the problems disappear.

b. Post storm distribution of available generators (including ordered equipment) could have limited the negative impact of little or no power.

c. If we can’t keep a supply of generators on hand, knowing where they may be available to the NOPD and a plan to obtain them during the event would have to be placed into any future ER plan.

d. The generator in the Second District failed after nine (9) days. Its engine is completely shot. Other locations had their generators go underwater. The locations of city generators should be examined to see if they are at least above the level of Lake Ponchartrain.

Predetermined safe haven for vehicles (PV, NOPD)  
8 = 30.7%

Once again, the responsibility for unit assets has been left up to the individual commander / officer to come up with a plan on which to place into safekeeping and which to continue to use until the last moment.

a. District fleet cars must be parked in an elevated and protected location.

b. Officers must have time and assistance to place PV’s in safe, elevated, and protected locations. These would have to be nearby the shelter location or transport must be provided to the place of assignment.

c. TSB or the bureau responsible for the fleet need to be involved in the planning of safe havens for dept. vehicles.

d. Police parking garage was partially wasted when there was no controlling of who and what was parked within its floors.

e. It is not enough to have the city vehicles parked in an elevated garage. It needs to be in a location which is entirely above water so the vehicles can be removed immediately after the storm. Many department vehicles were safe and above water, but were unable to be removed for two weeks after the storm.
f. Trapped and destroyed vehicles created a need for vehicles. The sheer number of officers working during the first week of the storm also created a need for vehicles. Vehicles (watercraft, refrigerated trailers, tractors, forklifts, front end loaders...) were commandeered throughout the city. They were taken from many sources; private, business, RTA, and other government agencies. This behavior is governed by the Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act.

Total failure of OEP 8 = 30.7%

Although identified as the point of command for the emergency, the OEP was out of communication with a large percentage of the department several times during the storm.

a. Limited telephone access into the OEP contributed to the perceived failure.

b. An unannounced change of location from City Hall to the Hyatt Regency hotel caused additional confusion and concern about abandonment.

c. Representatives sent from departments throughout the City’s infrastructure were not of sufficient authority to assist in many matters presented to the OEP.

d. Many officers and supervisors did not know what the OEP was or what its function was.

Backup for vehicle repair (tires, windshields, decon) and towing 7 = 26.9%

With the department’s vehicle support operation located at one location, which went under water during the event, the continued safe and efficient operation of the fleet became another responsibility for the district commander to take on and overcome.

a. Due to the level of damage, tires were continually damaged and in need of repair.

b. Many police vehicles were tampered with by both LE personnel and civilian alike. The repairs needed to bring the vehicle back into service could not be performed.

c. Storm damage and conflict damage to windshields created a large need for glass replacement / repair.

d. There was a great need for towing throughout this storm. Tow trucks can be used for many road clearing tasks. It was nearly impossible to get a city tow truck during this event. Either city tow operators should be essential personnel or NOPD should have trained operators who have access to the tow trucks.

e. There was a tire shop at the intersection of St. Claude Avenue and Louisa Street that repaired all government tires for free. This was convenient, but the department should have been able to do this for themselves.
Additional weapons (long guns)  

Both the storage and use of weapons played an important roll throughout the event, and continues to do so to this date.

- Both locations where weapons and ammunition were stored were influenced by the presence of water and the need to protect the weapons and the public from their unauthorized use.
- The Range (New Orleans East facility) was damaged and concerns were presented regarding records, handguns & shotguns in storage, and the ability to operate as a current academy class was in session. More than 400,000 rounds of ammunition were exposed to rain when the roof of the range building was damaged. This ammunition is now suspect.
- The SOD Armory at 1700 Moss St. was damaged due to high water and concerns for creating another armory were presented.
- Many officers carried a variety of personal weapons (handguns and long guns) not authorized by NOPD, nor qualified with during annual qualifications. No record keeping to account for officers and their personal weapons.
- Shotgun and rifle training should be expanded. Louisiana P.O.S.T. has created a shooting course for both rifles and shotguns. This training should be voluntary, and there should also be a way for officers to qualify with personally owned shotguns and rifles for on duty use. This would lessen the cost to the department and ensure the voluntary status of the training.
- Officers are forced to walk around unarmed between accommodations and transportation as the weapon argument is made. In conjunction, the temporary armory set up to handle the department issued weapons did not allow for personal weapons for those officers who have no home or PV to secure them in. This forces the officer to locate another member of the department to assist in storage of those weapons.

TRAINING for search and rescue  

“Training” was a common theme throughout the after action memos. More specifically, a need for training in search and rescue techniques was identified by the units who heavily participated in that element of the event.

- Again, SAR was not a primary function of the department, but became one, based on the size and scope of the event.
- Handling of boats and related equipment, safe water navigation techniques, how to handle and maneuver rescued parties to aid in the rescue effort by speeding up the response ability is a need.
- The ability to develop a comprehensive and quick plan to better utilize the available SAR assets immediately and continuously over a long period is a must. It must be guided by a pre event general plan so everyone starts on the same page.
d. The ability to identify available resources which would aid in the SAR effort would be served by training.
e. A serious effort should be made to lessen the amount of duplication in SAR. There should be a SAR commander. Search commanders should assign areas of search to lessen the duplication of efforts by the multiple agencies involved.

Rally Points

Although practiced repeatedly during the many events in the City of New Orleans, the principle of Rally Points did not function properly as part of the event.

a. The ability to navigate around the City was very limited in the early stages of the storm/flooding, creating a need to change meeting locations. This was complicated by the failure in communications, where a change in plan could have been issued.
b. Knowledge of one unit’s plan by many of the units could have allowed for more control and flow of information.
c. Once communication was restored, the identification of the rally points again fell through the planning stages.

Medical support for citizens and city employees

During the event the area hospitals were evacuated to a variety of locations. The absence of these facilities greatly impacted the planning and efficiency of the NOPD.

a. The hospitals became victims and needed assistance from many to evacuate their patients and staff.
b. As officers and citizens alike began to feel ill, become injured, or ran low on pharmaceuticals, logistics for treatment and supplies were a large concern.
c. The need to evacuate patients and staff was a large portion of the initial rescue effort.
d. NOEMS worked alongside the NOPD & NOFD to provide medical care during all stages of this storm.

Early coordination with FEMA

Many first responders were concerned the notification of FEMA was delayed and that the response of FEMA was delayed.

a. What FEMA will do, is obligated to do, and will continue to do was not made clear from the beginning.
b. The time it appeared to take for the response teams to make it into the City and begin to make a measured effect was too long.
c. FEMA monies appeared to flow quickly at the beginning, but became complicated in the attempt as time went on.
d. FEMA did introduce the department to the concept of decontamination of personnel and vehicles.

Jail / Back up jail  

The repeated announcements from the City relative to its intention to, “vigorously go after looters and prosecute them to fullest extent of the law” appeared overly ambitious and unenforceable due to the evacuation of the jail.

a. Once the facility to intake arrested subjects was made unavailable, arresting subjects was not an option.

b. The development and implementation of the alternate facility at the Greyhound Bus/Amtrak Train Station was a positive boost to the department and the City.

Bathing Facilities (Decontamination)  

The ability to maintain good hygiene, and therefore, reasonably good health is a must to accomplish all missions with very limited losses.

a. Morale and spirits are lifted with the smallest effort at providing “cleaning stations” for the body. As water and power were out to most of the City, the need to have portable bathing stations (showers) became important.

b. The daily exposure to the floodwaters, and overall poor physical condition of the buildings and environment needed to be dealt with to ensure the health of the first responders and their ability to continue to respond.

c. Decontamination is a necessary / mandatory element of disaster management and the main element of that plan involved the use of water.

Direction and control of outside agencies that have come to help  

a. The issue of the direction of outside agencies is closely connected to communication and command location.

b. There were instances where a group from an outside agency arrived to assist in the SAR effort, but were poorly directed. It would have helped to have a SAR commander to properly direct these persons.

c. There were several agencies that came into the city to find and rescue a certain list of individuals and leave. This freelancing should be discouraged.

Morale in the aftermath of the storm  

a. There were many officers who were completely demoralized by this event.

b. Unit commanders could have lessened the effects of the morale by having regular meetings with all members of their command. During the meeting the commanders should stress the fact that the nation would not forget them.

c. Morale is closely related to other topics in this document. Hygiene, food, and water have a way of raising morale in and of themselves.
d. It would also improve morale to hear the upper leadership of the department and the City openly praise the members of the department for their performance during the event.

e. Unit commanders should also regularly praise members within their command. Praise can improve performance. Criticism may lessen errors, but it also lessens willingness.

True and accurate accountability of personnel

a. This issue was not at the forefront of commander’s minds. In the beginning of this event there was little to no documentation taking place, although there was a desperate need to document personnel. There were many officers and supervisors who chose to report to different assignments. There were many officers and supervisors who were forced to report to assignments other than their own.

b. Once it was discovered and put on the news that there were many officers who had fled the city it became necessary to document the personnel present.

c. Once it became apparent there would be severe disciplinary consequences for absence, many officers believed many of those who were absent would be “covered” by their commanders. This was a serious detriment to morale.

d. There were groups of officers and supervisors who did not leave the city, but they also did not leave the safety of the Westbank. This also created a new class system and lowered morale.

Rumor control

a. Rumors played a huge psychological role in this event. There were rumors that certain officers had died or committed suicide. There were rumors the Third and Seventh Districts had all drowned.

b. Rumors ideally are controlled by a working communication system.

c. In the absence of a working communication it falls upon the supervisors to stop the rumors and downplay their validity. Supervisors need to tell those under their command to believe what they see and be skeptical of what they hear.

d. Unit commanders need to go to the incident commander with a list of the common rumors and either confirm or deny their validity. This information then needs to be spread about their command.

“State of Emergency” “Martial Law” definitions and when it happened

a. The President of the United States declared a “State of Emergency” in Louisiana on August 26, 2005.

b. The Governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Babineaux – Blanco declared a “State of Emergency” in Louisiana on Friday, August 26, 2005.
c. There is a desperate need for training on the *Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act*. This document is contained within the New Orleans Police Department Emergency Operations Manual which is issued to unit commanders.

d. The *Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act* has provisions for the following in brief:

2. Utilize all state resources and resources of each political subdivision to cope with the disaster.
3. Transfer control of agencies to emergency planners to expedite the use of resources.
4. Commandeer or utilize any private property with compensation if necessary to cope with the disaster.
5. Direct or compel the evacuation of specific areas.
6. Prescribe routes of evacuation.
7. Control points of ingress and egress of the evacuation / disaster area.

**Command and control of outside agency assistance**

2 = 7.6%

a. This topic is closely connected to communications.

b. Agencies that come to assist in a disaster should be provided with a specific mission and the proper maps and contact person to accomplish the mission.

c. The agencies should also be instructed concerning the type of evacuation (mandatory / voluntary). They should also be specifically instructed concerning entry into locked homes.

**Breaching tools and rescue equipment, protective gear**

2 = 7.6%

a. Breaching tools are an easy method to gain entry into a residence or business. The tools can be purchased, but training should accompany them.

b. The department has no rescue equipment available to the field units. This equipment should also be accompanied by training.

c. There should be a supply of decontamination equipment and protective masks present at district stations and other unit commands. Decontamination also requires training.

**Immediate assistance from the government**

2 = 7.6%

a. Many citizens and officers were angry and demoralized by the lack of immediate response by the government.

b. This is basically a morale related issue. Commanders should ensure the persons under their command that help is coming.
Delay in body recovery 2 = 7.6%

a. There needs to be a more coordinated body discovery and recovery process. Many outside SAR agencies found bodies and painted something on the outside of the structure, but they made no further effort to communicate the location of bodies to the city or the Coroner's Office.

b. Some personnel of the Coroner's Office needs to be essential and remain in the area to collect the remains.

c. Officers were instructed to leave bodies in place after their discovery. This is counter to normal procedure and undermined the morale of the agency.

d. There needs to be a means of notification for all agencies and a group of persons to collect this information and send it to the persons responsible to collect the remains.

e. There were officer involved shootings where the bodies were left on the scene. This lead to the belief that there would be no investigation and no documentation of the event. This engendered a belief that all rules had been turned off.

f. Bodies remained out in plain view for weeks, adding to the low morale, and somber atmosphere of the City, not to mention adding to the fear of disease and possible inability to identify the subject.

g. As a result of the traumatic and widespread flooding of the City of New Orleans, there was an expectation of hundreds if not thousands of bodies (remains) to be recovered.

Unified Command 2 = 7.6%

Although the police department normally has entire command structure in place for normal, everyday operations, the scale of this event required the implementation of an ICS, where a unified command for all departments was a necessity.

a. Who was the Incident Commander and how did we receive instructions from him or her?

b. Where was the Unified Command position?

Evacuation Plan for citizens and employees 2 = 7.6%

The City of New Orleans originally stated there were no shelters available to the general public during this evacuation. The shift to having at first the special needs shelter open at the Dome, then the general population shelter within the Dome changed the dynamics of the department and their assignment.

a. To participate in the execution of the City's plan as the policing element it is very important know for certain, whether we are sheltering or not.

b. Once the shelter decision is made, there must adequate time to stock the shelter for both the citizens and the support staff.

c. Identification without public broadcast of a back up location in case of complications (flooding, power failures, contamination, fires, etc.)
New Orleans Police Department
Inter-Office Correspondence

To: After Action Report Committee Member Date: 23 October 2005
Lt. Heather M. Kouts
From: Commander, Research and Planning / Committee Chair

Subject: Committee Goals & Proposed Itinerary

Dear Law Enforcement Professional:

Thank you for volunteering to assist the Research and Planning Division in its efforts to review the After Action Memos (AAM) submitted from throughout the department. Once the review has taken place, we have a two-fold task ahead of us. First, we will take the information and present it in an organized and useful format for Superintendent Riley to review and use as an outline for improvements to problems and recognition of accomplishments. Second, recognizing these AAM’s were submitted as a 30-day evaluation, we will identify areas where there is missing input and design a format for a second AAM. The second form will be a 60 or 90-day AAR and it will ask some specific questions, in addition to seeking generic comment from the rank and file.

Enclosed with the correspondence are copies of the submitted AAM’s received as of 10-17-05. In an effort to save paper, I have double-sided the packets as they were stapled together (the District Commander submitted a cover 105, attached to his/her platoon commanders’ 105s.) If there is any confusion with your packet, please let me know, as I kept my original copies.

The goal of this committee is to create an honest and in-depth evaluation of the department’s performance just before, during, and following the Hurricane Katrina/Rita Natural Disaster. This evaluation will provide invaluable information and aide the department in creating an effective Emergency Management Plan for future events.

* * * * *

The packet contains AAM’s from:

OPERATIONS Bureau
- Bomb Squad / Dive Team / VOWS
- SOD Tactical
- Mounted / K-9
- PHCOPS (original & revised)
- Reserves
- Traffic
- Vice Crimes – Narcotics
News Media (blocked driveways, streets, meetings & roll calls) 1 = 3.8%

a. The media were relentless in their desire to make money off of this tragedy.

b. Members of the police department should be trained concerning their authority to control some behaviors of the media. Officers should keep in mind that members of the media are subject to all laws of the city and state.

Internal command and control 1 = 3.8%

a. This issue is closely related to communication and morale.

b. It was unknown by many officers and supervisors if their commanders were receiving any direction from the Incident Command Staff.

c. Commanders should relay the information received in meetings to members of their command.
RE: AAM Committee

Date: 10-23-05
Page 2 of 2

Operations Bureau continued:
- First District
- Second District
- Third District
- Fourth District
- Fifth District
- Sixth District
- Seventh District
- Eighth District

Other Bureaus (Policy, Planning, & Training) (Public Integrity) (Technical & Support)
- Homeland Security
- Recruitment & Applicant Investigations
- Records & Information Systems
- Central Evidence and Property
- SCID
- Communications
- Public Integrity Bureau
- Superdome Emergency Evacuation Shelter (Chief Swain)
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

To: Steven Nicholas
    Chief of Operations

Date: October 10, 2005

From: Captain Robert Norton
    Commander, Bomb Squad / Dive Team / VOWS

Subject: Katrina critique

Sir:

The following are problems identified with events that occurred before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina. Also listed are recommendations that I think will benefit the department for future events.

PRIOR TO EVENT

The following critical information was not made clear:
1) Location of incident/unified command
2) Location of each command element
3) Number of officers on duty
4) Central supply location
5) Alternate fuel locations
6) Rally points
7) Supplies available (boats, trucks, generators, etc.)
8) Evacuation sights
9) Location of Office of Emergency Preparedness Command
10) Back up radio communications and set up sights

Division Commanders should be responsible to provide Policy and Planning with staging locations, alternate staging locations and rally points. Technical Services should be the hub for supplies. Two locations should be established where supplies are stored and distributed. An option would be to store supplies in trailers. This would insure mobility. Temporary fuel sights should be established prior to an event. Homeland Security should supply information to Policy and Planning for proposed Incident Command Sights and possible evacuation sights. The Marine Division should provide Policy and Planning with pre-determined staging locations of boats and trucks. All of this information should be submitted to Policy and Planning 72 hours before a Hurricane enters the Gulf. Policy and Planning should complete a comprehensive report that is distributed throughout the department and distributed to outside agencies. This list should include contact numbers of Division Commanders and their mission for the event. The document should provide a list of outside agencies, contact numbers, responsibilities, capabilities and equipment.
DURING THE EVENT

The following items must be made clear:

1) Who is in command and control
2) It is pivotal to establish a true Unified Incident Command
3) What agency is responsible for each task
4) All tasked items should flow through the Unified Command
5) All agencies involved must supply personnel to the Unified Command
6) All involved must respond to the designated Unified Commander
7) In the Unified Command, an Operation and Logistics Chief must be identified
8) Briefings should be held in the morning for operations and evening for planning
9) One set of Unified maps must be utilized to prevent duplication
10) Establish a forward command sight that is staffed 24 hours
11) Provide equipped command post for efficient operations
12) Command Post should be set in a sterile environment with inner and outer security
13) Forward command must process information through the Unified Command
14) When units rotate out next command should be fully briefed

Unified command was never established. This in my mind was the major problem with the response during Katrina. It is my opinion that decisions were being made in the Office of Emergency Preparedness Command and never filtered down to the operations side of the house. This caused confusion on multiple layers. It slowed our response. Often duplication was the theme of the day. For example: While operating the boat rescue we would deploy to locations that were already checked by FEMA, Wildlife and Fisheries, Coast Guard or the New Orleans Fire Department. FEMA set up their base camp at Saints Camp. I was unaware of this for several days. I met with FEMA and realized that we were duplicating efforts. We utilized District maps for sector searches, while FEMA sectioned the city on maps in a total different fashion. Once we met with FEMA at Saints Camp, we matched the logistical maps and became more efficient. FEMA designated a staff member to meet us at Harrah's every morning. This was key. We were unable to travel to Saints Camp every day due to gas restraints. The rescue effort of these agencies were outstanding, however if the information flowed through one source we would have been more efficient.

AFTER THE EVENT

Recommendations:

1) Meet equipment needs
   A: Boats and high water vehicles (4x4 with tow package) are a must
   B: Portable communications towers
   C: Weapons for District and line officers
   D: Back up power for stations
   E: Food and water supplied to each command prior to event
   F: Breaching tools assigned to each command
   G: Chain saws
   F: Personal protective gear (gloves, masks, eye protection etc.)

2) Provide training for equipment
3) Special Operations and Narcotics should be hub for all special training
5) Special Operations, Tactical, Marine, Bomb and Narcotics / Vice should sub divide into four separate cells prior to an expected critical event. These cells should be deployed to four sectors of the city. These units should be self contained with boats, high water vehicles, special weapons, chainsaws and breaching tools. This configuration would enhance response to numerous types of events. It also allows room for error. Divided we cut down the chances of entire units being trapped. One sector can support another. I would also recommend that Narcotics /Vice be SWAT trained. This would multiply the cells ability for self containment. Storage trailers are recommended for these cells. This gives them portability and storage for food, water, power, fuel and support equipment.

6) District Units should have at least five high water vehicles assigned to its fleet

7) TSB should have several buses and transport vans to ferry equipment and officers

8) Training in Urban Search and Rescue

9) Training for building entry

10) Push to change focus of Homeland Security to include natural disasters

11) Add manpower to Homeland Security Division and merge that division with Special Operation / Narcotics / Marine / Bomb. Most of the equipment purchased will be utilized by these units. They should have input on equipment needed and purchased. In its current state, Homeland Security falls under Policy and Planning. The line form Homeland Security and the line officers should be a direct line and should fall under control of Operations.

We must look to the future and develop a true Marine / Search and Rescue Team. In its current state we did not have the ability to handle this type of event. The Marine Division has been neglected for many years. Several boat and equipment request have been made, and not answered. Equipment and training is imperative to mount a successful operation in the future. The department overcame many obstacles, and many officers utilized their personal boats and trucks to save lives. Training in Incident / Unified Command for the department is critical. When I completed my critique of the SPRINGEX training, one of my bullet points for improvement was to establish Incident / Unified Command training.

This document was prepared in an attempt to better our department, and is not intended to criticize any particular person or unit. These recommendations are bias to the part that I played in this event. It is time to be aggressive and change the department in a positive manner. I know that I made mistakes during Katrina, but hopefully I have learned from them.

Sincerely,

Captain Robert Norton
Commander, Bomb Squad / Dive Team / VOWS
TO: Steven B. Nicholas  
Chief of Operations  
FROM: Captain Jeffrey J. Winn  
Commander, SOD Tactical  
SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina After Action Report  

DATE: October 10, 2005  

Sir:

The following report contains information based on preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina. Although this information will appear critical, it is meant to be informational and constructive.

PRIOR TO EVENT

There did not appear to be a pre-plan for this event.
- Location of incident/unified Command
- Location of each patrol district Command position
- Location of "Rally Points"
- Location of each supporting unit and "Rally Points"
- Location of Rescue equipment (Boats, Breaching Equipment)
- Location to report to (how to get help)
- Number of personnel accounted for

Each Command and supporting Command should be identified by his or her location and unit Commander. Distinct time and location should be established for reporting into the incident commander or designee. This report should contain number of personnel and operations underway.

Support is critical because each unit knows the predetermined location for fuel, food, water and other supporting functions.

AFTER IMPACT

There did not appear to be an established incident Command, EOC, TOC after the impact of the storm.

- There did not appear to be any EOC, TOC or OEP contact, command or control.
- A "hasty" TOC was established at Harrah's Casino at the tail end of the storm
- The “hasty” TOC appeared to work and became the focal point for all Tactical, Traffic and Rescue operations.
- After the Harrah’s location was established, it still did not appear that an EOC, TOC or other Command Center had been established.
- FEMA units set up at Zephyr Field, but were seriously delayed in arriving at the Harrah’s location.

After the impact of the storm, Command should have been immediately set up with subordinate units reporting into the TOC. The TOC should have been reporting into OEP or the EOC however this did appear to occur. If FEMA’s command is established remotely, they should at least send a representative to the focal point of operations so that communication can be established and a flow of communication can be established.

**COMMUNICATION**

Communications failed at the most critical time. Back up systems did not work at all.
- Radio system crashed and was not operational
- This was critical to the operation and seriously hampered rescue operations.
- Lack of communication placed officers in extreme danger without an avenue for assistance.

**IT IS CRITICAL THAT WE HAVE A BACK UP RADIO SYSTEM THAT WORKS.** Storing an old system that can be “TURNED ON” WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR ASSET. The use of “MUTUAL AID” CHANNELS WERE HARDLY USABLE. IN THE FUTURE, WE NEED TO HAVE A BACK UP RADIO SYSTEM THAT CAN BE ESTABLISHED QUICKLY WITH MOBILE Repeaters THAT ARE ISSUED TO DISTRICTS AND UNITS THAT ARE STATIONED AROUND THE CITY. THIS ASSET WOULD ENABLE US TO ESTABLISH EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS INSTANTLY THAT WILL WORK.

**LOGISTICS**

Logistics and support was non-existent.
- There did not appear to be any preplanning for food, water, weapons and medical care
- No central collection point was established for the receiving of supplies
- No central distribution point was established for the movement of the supplies to the field.
- No forced distribution was initiated
- No planning was established for personal hygiene or restroom facilities.
- No planning was established for temporary housing of personnel.
  - No mobile water purification systems were requested or deployed to my knowledge.
  - Medical was centralized and then trapped making them unable to commit to support tactical or rescue operations.

In the future, SOD Tactical will strive to be self-sufficient for a period of five (5) days. It is suggested that the department make provisions to support district operations for future emergencies. Warehousing food, water, hygiene items and other support items is critical to district and support operations. "If the rescuers can’t get support, the rescue will break down.” Medical should be dispersed to the operational districts for security and direct support.

INITIATIVE

As a complete body, initiative saved the day. Commanders and subordinate Commanders took the initiative and “made it happen.” The Command presence and sometimes audacity of field Commanders and subordinate commanders were the driving force of the rescue operations and tactical operations. Units that were completely cut off made use of available equipment and personnel and did a remarkable job.

RESCUE OPERATIONS

- Hasty rescue operations began on the trunk of a police unit
- The effort was very effective
- The effort was hampered by lack of equipment and logistics
- The available equipment was pushed to the limit but supported the rescue operation
- The use and knowledge of breeching equipment was invaluable
- Extremely limited chem. Lights were used up in the first hours of darkness
- Flashlights and batteries were used up in the first hours of darkness

The rescue, however un-coordinated, was very effective. The effort could be much more efficient. There is a definite need for training and equipment. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR SOME TIME. Search “kits” should be put together with marking paints, first aid kits, laminated maps, chemical lights, extra batteries and other essential items. These kits should be kept at SOD and deployed prior to a storm or emergency.
TACTICAL OPERATIONS

SWAT operations were also hasty. SWAT was subdivided into rescue units and tactical response units. The unit was stretched very thin because of a lack of communication and direction from OEP. Based on initiative alone, SWAT divided into manageable groups that responded to EVERY call for assistance as well as rescue calls.

-Situations were fluid because of the sheer number of calls for assistance
-There was a need for immediate response (15 minutes) to calls for help
-SWAT responded to multiple calls on I-10
-SWAT responded to multiple calls to EVAC centers (Convention Center)

In the future, SWAT will deploy in much the same way. Units will work both day and night and perhaps subdivide into uptown and downtown response teams. This will cut down on response time and make situations manageable. In the future, it will also become necessary to train more frequently and efficiently. Training narcotics units and other specific units is critical to tactical response and rescue operations. The displacement of rescue and tactical personnel did not work. In the future, rescue and tactical operations needs to be in the house of SOD with direct links to Homeland Security.

CONCLUSION

We must look at the future and learn from our past. Equipment and training are critical items and elements. We must place take a very close look at the operations conducted by all elements of government. OEP needs to be revamped. We need interface with FEMA immediately and this must be a Command level person. We must have a “unified command” and conduct training in this part of Command. WE MUST HAVE AN OPERATING COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM AND A BACK UP SYSTEM.

All of these points are meant to be constructive and educational for our department. If we fail to learn from our past then we are doomed to our future. This should be the wake up that “it can happen here.”

Respectfully submitted

Captain Jeffrey B. Winn
COMMANDER, SOD Tactical Unit

cc: File
Chief Nicholas:

Below is an After Action Memorandum for Hurricane Katrina for the Mounted/K-9 Division, which is divided into three (3) sections: Pre-Hurricane, During Hurricane, and After Hurricane.

Pre-Hurricane:

- All equines were evacuated from the city to Franklinton, LA on Saturday, August 27, 2005, this allowed the Unit to make two (2) trips before Contraflow took affect. In the future, the Unit should handle the evacuation of equines in the same manner.
- All canines remained with their respective handlers throughout the hurricane, which enabled the canines to be utilized for calls for service. In the future, the Unit should handle in the same manner.
- Members were able to remove vital equipment from the compound prior to the hurricane.
- K-9 officers reported to work sixteen (16) hours prior to the expected landfall of the hurricane to secure equipment at the compound, as well as begin patrols in an attempt to prevent looting prior to the arrival of the hurricane.

During Hurricane:

- K-9 officers secured themselves and their canines at an area hotel once sustained winds reached 55-60mph and continued to monitor radio frequencies.
- Mounted officers secured themselves and Department equines at the Washington Parish Fair site.

After Hurricane:

- K-9 personnel immediately deployed and began patrolling and making looting arrests at businesses in the CBD.
• K-9 personnel were assigned to deploy with Tactical/SWAT. The decision to do this was a good concept, due to the fact that most K-9 Unit members are SWAT trained. In future instances, this concept should be kept in-place.

• Mounted personnel remained in Franklinton, LA, securing and maintaining equines, with half of the assigned members returned to the City and began daily patrols with the K-9 Unit, assisting Tactical/SWAT.

• Mounted personnel began mounted patrols in the French Quarter six (6) weeks after the hurricane had passed.

• The K-9 Unit was assigned to work with the Anti-Looting Task Force, patrolling various districts throughout the City.

• The K-9 Unit assisted NOPD SWAT, ICE, ATF, and the National Guard in conducting building searches.

• The K-9 Unit assisted the military at the Pontchartrain Expressway Heli-Vac site with evacuating over 1,500 evacuees from the City.

Other Recommendations for Consideration due to Hurricane Katrina:

• Giving each District/Division a large, enclosed utility trailer to be utilized to insure that vital equipment be removed prior to a hurricane's approach.

• Establishing a mobile Communications Center prior to any storm striking the City. This will insure that if our Communications System fails at Headquarters, this mobile communications system can be in-place in a short period of time.

• Obtaining two (2) good sized, flat-bottomed boats per District in the event of flooding. This will assist with assisting in the evacuation of citizens and responding to calls for service. These boats could be centrally housed or stored at each individual station, where they would be maintained.

• Relocating the Property and Evidence Division from the basement of Headquarters to a higher level or alternative site, but at least second floor or higher.

• Establishing additional central locations to house departmental vehicles from high flood waters.

• Having any commissioned members who can report 24-hours before expected landfall of any hurricane in our area to report to duty. This will allow the Department to have personnel available for any patrols to be in-place for anyone looting prior to the hurricane, and secure any Departmental property (ie: vehicles).

• Establishing tire/mechanic shops in different locations for any emergency-type repairs to Departmental vehicles.

• Lodging/shelter and food/water are essential to have in-place for all members of the Department prior to the arrival of any storm.
After Action Memo / Hurricane Katrina
10/16/2005

- **A Multi-Agency Round-Table discussion/planning group should be developed, which would include Police, Fire, EMS, RTA, etc., to better plan for future hurricane preparedness.**

- In the event the prison/lock-up must be evacuated and closed, the media should not be informed of this information for broadcast. The broadcast of this type of information only leads potential criminals to feel they will not be arrested for criminal offenses due to there being no location to incarcerate them. When this information was broadcasted, there was a proliferation of criminal activity, especially looting.

- With the need of boats/vehicles for rescue and patrol operations in the future, a plan must be in-place to get fuel trucks coming into the City immediately after the hurricane and plans to have the fuel dispensed at various locations.

- A better system of communicating information to command staff personnel in the event the radio system fails should be explored. Cellular telephone communications was not reliable during and after the hurricane.

Respectfully submitted,

Captain Clarence F. Hebert, III
Commander, Mounted/K-9 Division

cc: File
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE  
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE  

TO: Steven B. Nicholas  
Chief of Operations Bureau  

FROM: Capt. Bernardine W. Kelly  
Commander, PHCOPS  

DATE: 10/17/2005  

SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina Critique  

Sir,  

As per your request, the following is a critique surrounding events before, during and after Hurricane Katrina:  

Two days prior to the catastrophic event, members of the Public Housing COPS District were advised to secure their families and beginning Sunday, August 28, 2005 at 6:00 p.m., they would be on mandatory twelve-hour shifts. PHCOPS members were also advised to bring enough clothing and supplies to sustain themselves for at least three days.  

On Saturday, August 27, 2005 command decisions regarding placement and deployment of personnel were delineated. The PHCOPS Command Post was established at The Guste Homes High Rise Apartments. The PHCOPS Administrative and Investigative Personnel were also strategically placed at the Guste Homes High Rise Apartments, which housed elderly and handicapped people. This presence provided police protection, visibility and availability of assistance to those that were less likely capable of sustaining themselves throughout such an event.  

The Uptown PHCOPS Personnel were strategically placed at the PHCOPS substation located at 2301 Erato St., the Guste Homes Low Rise Apartments. This police presence was in close proximity to the Administrative / Investigative Personnel in case of needed support forces and it also provided swift and easy access to the Guste Homes Low Rise Apartments as well as the B.W. Cooper Housing Development.  

The Downtown Daywatch PHCOPS Personnel were lodged at the Marriott Renaissance Hotels located at 819 Common St., and 700 Tchoupitoulas St., and the Ritz Carlton Hotel located at 921 Canal St., which afforded swift access to the Iberville, Lafitte and St. Bernard Housing Developments.  

The Downtown Nightwatch PHCOPS Personnel were located at the Ameri Suites Host Hotel located on the corner of Canal and S. Saratoga Sts., which also afforded swift access to the Iberville, Lafitte and St. Bernard Housing Developments.  

PHCOPS Task Force members were lodged at the Comfort Suites Hotel located at 346 Baronne St., and the Cotton Exchange Hotel located at 200 Carondelet St. This afforded support accessability to all PHCOPS personnel if needed.
On Sunday, August 28, 2005 Hurricane Katrina fully impacted the City of New Orleans and several surrounding parishes. Hurricane Katrina, a category five hurricane, was described as one of the worst disasters in the history of the United States. Due to lack of communication and immediate assistance from the government, Hurricane Katrina caused widespread panic throughout the city.

As Hurricane Katrina swept the City of New Orleans, members of the PHCOPS District remained in their static positions until culmination of the inclimate weather. Upon completion of the inclimate weather, Members of PHCOPS started patrolling the Housing Developments and surrounding areas in an effort to prevent looting. On Wednesday, August 31, 2005 members of PHCOPS evacuated the elderly and handicapped living in the Guste Homes as well as other citizens around the city.

Upon completion of the above mentioned evacuation efforts and due to breechings in the levee systems resulting in rising water, all members of PHCOPS relocated to the Oak Park Baptist Church located at 1110 Kabel St. where temporary lodging and a command post was secured. At that time the members of PHCOPS who resided on the Westbank of New Orleans provided housing to those members that were prohibited from returning to their residences on the Eastbank.

After relocation to the Westbank of New Orleans, PHCOPS Officers were assigned patrol duties in the Fourth District. Since that time half of the members of PHCOPS have been reassigned to the newly formed Looting Squad.

Notably, many members of the New Orleans Police Department displayed unwavering commitment to the city throughout this unprecedented ordeal. Under the catastrophic and devastating conditions, most of the men and woman of the New Orleans Police Department rose above and beyond their call of duty and should be commended for their relentless efforts.

Payroll issues (lack of proper pay in a timely manner) appeared to be the main constituent surrounding officers’ low morale.

I am recommending that the following alternative measures be explored prior to expectancy of another catastrophic event:

Flood zones in the city should be identified and disseminated. Officers living in those identified areas should not be allowed to return home, instead temporary housing should be supplied and utilized.

NOPDs communication system as well as the local telephone and cellular services became inoperable. Two way radios (that do not rely on satellites) should be obtained and used to maintain desperately needed communication.

Several alternate Headquarters Command Posts should be designated prior to the event. District and Unit rallying points should be established and disseminated throughout the department. Evacuation plans for all first responders should be made available prior to such an event.
Equipment such as boats, high water vehicles, floodlights, gas/gas cans, and generators should be obtained and distributed to each district/unit prior to the expectancy or possibility of such an event.

Sanctions should definitely be imposed for the officers who did not fulfill their obligations.
Sanctions for job abandonment and other erratic behavior should be explored and elucidated prior to the event. Incentives should be established and made known relative to officers who performed their duties and stayed the course (Revise into Civil Service Rules).

In closing, Katrina/Rita has created an opportunity for NOPD to better prepare the Department for future events of this magnitude.

Respectfully Submitted,

Capt. Bernardine W. Kelly
Cdr., PHCOPS Unit
Sir,

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Notably, many members of the New Orleans Police Department displayed unwavering commitment to the city throughout this unprecedented ordeal. Under the catastrophic and devastating conditions, most of the men and woman of the New Orleans Police Department rose above and beyond their call of duty and should be commended for their relentless efforts.

Prior to the imminent arrival of Katrina, Officer Orlando Matthews secured several hotel accommodations for members of PHCOPS and their families. These accommodations afforded a safe haven as well as a safe place of operation.

Because of threatening high waters, HANO Security assigned to the Guste Homes, relieved themselves of their responsibilities. At which point the residents became uneasy with their situation. Under the commands of Capt. Kelly and Lt. Norwood, both coordinated joint rescue operations in separate locations. Members of the PHCOPS Unit placed themselves in harms way while evacuating over 700 elderly and handicapped residents and their families. During these efforts members of PHCOPS secured several operational vehicles to effectively transport the residents of Guste Homes to safety without assistance from any outside agencies.

It should be noted that Sgt. Thedrick Andres secured Oak Park Baptist Church located at 1110 Kabel St., which was used as temporary lodging and a command post for the PHCOPS Unit.

Once learning the locations of several New Orleans Police Officer’s family members who were trapped by high floodwaters, the members of PHCOPS relocated to several locations throughout the New Orleans metropolitan area, including: The American Can apartment complex, located at Orleans Avenue and Moss Street. Upon coming in contact with the police family members at the American Can apartment complex, the officers also encountered over 200 other trapped civilians at this location, who were also rescued. Simultaneously, other joint rescued operations were being conducted by PHCOPS member in the 7th and 9th wards where rescued efforts continued.
Under the direct supervision of Captain Bernardine Kelly, assisted by Sgt. Summers, along with the support of their spouses, Hall Kelly and Ronald Summers, Sgt. Summers' personal vehicle was used to relocate to Baton Rouge on several occasions to secure supplies; such as food, water, clothing, medical supplies, and other necessary equipment, from the Red Cross, Louisiana State Police, Baton Rouge Constables Office, and the Louisiana Army National Guard. These supplies were transported to O. P. Walker High School, which was a temporary New Orleans Police Department Command Post. The supplies were transported using a 20 ft. U-haul trailer that was rented by Col. Whitehorn of the Louisiana State Police.

Because of Officer Mark McCraney commitment and his unselfish devotion to the New Orleans Police Department, he returned to Guste Home to assist with providing additional security while off duty.

Throughout the duration of this catastrophic event, Captain Bernardine Kelly’s sister, Rapunzel Weaver, who was rescued from the Convention Center, prepared and provided home cooked meals to the members of the New Orleans Police Department, Military, and civilians on a daily basis, turning no one away.

Members of the PHCOPS who performed above and beyond the call of duty during the Katrina catastrophe, and proved their commitment to one another, the New Police Department and the City of New Orleans are as follows:

**HEROES & SHEROES**

**Captain Bernardine W. Kelly**
**Lt. Gwendolyn W. Norwood**
**Lt. Michael Roussel**

**Sergeants:** Sam Poole
Keith Joseph
Barry Marquez
Merlin Bush

**Officers:** Julio Alonzo
Niccoleta Baker
Gary Dupart
Alvin Walton
Karriem Jefferson
Van C. Ballard
Akron Davis
James Kelly
Harry Parker
Mark McCraney
Charles Henry
Len Major
William Brown
Bryan Bordes
Christopher Davis
Kermanshia Perkins

**Sergeants:**
Theodrick Andres
Thomatra Green
Shawn N. Summers

**Officers:**
Samuel Davis
Verna Hunt
Gregory Hill
Kendrick Allen
Lester Marshall
Brenda Bevley
Kenny Prepetit
James Clarkston
Herman Franklin
Carlton Lawless
Jason Allen
Leessa Augustine
Keyonn Bertrand
Joynal Abdin
Leonard Davis
Lionel Reneau

**Clarence Gillard**
**Sidney Jackson**
**Elphamous Malbrue**
**Desmond Pratt**
**John Butler**
**Henry Hollins**
**Ronald Mitchell**
**Abram Pedesclaux**
**Ronald White**
**Vincent Williams**
**David Bennett**
**Lloyd Clark**
**Ray Jones**
**Lamont Domengeaux**
**Orlando Matthews**
**Jimmie Slack**
**Christopher Buckley**
**Willie Gant**
In closing, Katrina / Rita has created an opportunity for NOPD to better prepare the Department for future events of this magnitude.

Respectfully Submitted,

Capt. Bernardine W. Kelly
Cmdr., PHCOPS Unit
New Orleans Police Department  
Interoffice Correspondence

Steven B. Nicholas  
To: Deputy Superintendent Operations Bureau  
Captain Juan R. Quinton, Jr.  
From: Commander Reserve Division

Subject: Hurricane Katrina After Action Report

Prior to the hurricane, members of the Reserve are informed to make arrangements for their families safety and stay in touch with the Reserve Division office should their services be needed. This was the same system used from the early years of Chief Richard Pennington.

As the hurricane approached, orders were received from the Operations Bureau that all vehicles not needed should be secured in the Superdome in order to avoid being lost to rising water. As per the instructions all vehicles, including one van assigned to the Crisis Intervention Unit, were placed on the second level of the Superdome parking garage.

Vehicles assigned to Captain Quinton, Sergeant Duplessis and Police Officer Gillard remained in service.

On Sunday, August 29, 2005, Captain Quinton and Officer Gillard joined members of the Traffic Division on the 18th floor of the Poydras Plaza. At this point in time Sergeant Duplessis had left the City of New Orleans and joined State Senator Ann Duplessis in the Senate apartments located in Baton Rouge.

Communications:

As we are all painfully aware, Police Headquarters was lost to the storm. Housed within HQ was the Radio Shop with all its batteries, radios and chargers. It goes without saying that some arrangements must be made so that in the future, should a disaster of this magnitude take place, radio equipment and communications will not be lost. The lack of cell phone communications further exacerbated the situation. In the end, member of the Electronics Section and Communications Division should be commended for their ability to put together a radio system that continues to provide service.

Following the break of several levees it was clear the City of New Orleans was facing a catastrophe like no other. Communications began failing shortly after landfall. This was not limited to NOPD radios. As wires fell and cell phone towers were toppled,
phone communications became difficult at best. On several occasions before the storm, members of the Reserve Division were trained in the use of “itac” communications.

It should be noted that before the storm and again during a roll call early on the Monday of the storm, Officers of the Traffic Division were also briefed on the operation of “itac” thus allowing continued communications during this critical time. Sounding almost primitive at times, the radios continued to function. The major problem was to come as batteries began to fail and few officers were equipped with chargers.

The near complete lack of communications ended nearly all communications with any available Reserve Officers. A number of Reserve Officers not devastated by the storm reported for duty at the earliest possible time. Each reported to areas of the Department where they were assigned before the storm.

Transportation:

Clearly if vehicles are to be secured to avoid high water, it should be in a place that will permit vehicles to put back into service as soon as needed. The use of the Dome left the vehicles subject to damage from flying debris, vandalism by evacuees and inaccessible due to flooding.

Of the three (3) vehicles not placed in Superdome parking during the storm, only two were in service during the storm. The third vehicle assigned to Sergeant Duplessis was left at his (Sergeant Duplessis) residence in the East Lake subdivision. It was later learned Sergeant Duplessis vehicle was destroyed by rising water.

Following the storm, rising water surrounded the Super Dome making it impossible to obtain the six (6) Reserve vehicles stored in that facility. In addition keys for the vehicles at the Dome had been secured in the Reserve Office on Moss Street which was also surrounded by water. It would be nearly two weeks before keys could be recovered.

It was later learned that orders had been given to break the ignitions of all police vehicles stored at the Dome. A trip to the Dome parking area revealed that only three (3) of the six (6) Reserve units remained. One vehicle, although damaged, was started with a key. The remaining two (2) vehicles had badly damaged ignitions and were stripped for parts.

As time when on all of the Reserve Division vehicles were recovered from outside units and returned to service with the exception of the 2005 Ford assigned to Sergeant Duplessis. Vehicles were issued to Reserve Officers that were working in a near full time capacity.
Housing:

If nothing else this catastrophe has revealed the weaknesses in the topography of the City of New Orleans. Clearly those areas of the City subject to flooding are well known. In the future the City of New Orleans must consider securing locations that did not flood and placing both Officers and essential personnel out of harms way. In the event of another serious storm threat the City should secure locations for District personnel. District Commanders should not be left to secure locations on their own. Not only were several stations destroyed, Officers were forced to retreat to secondary locations that in some cases were also flooded.

Dedication to duty and a strong resolve to get the job done helped each Unit of the Department to continue functioning. Although functioning in many cases as independent Units they continued to function.

The volunteer nature of the Reserve Division made it unnecessary for accommodations to be secured in advance. Unlike a Police District, Officers remained with their families and not in one secure location. It is clear that many Reserve Officers evacuated the City. Unfortunately there were few places in the City of New Orleans that were spared destruction and as a result many of the Reserve Officers that had evacuated to other locations have not been able to return. Those that have returned have provided hours when possible and in the case of at least ten (10) officers their time has reached a near full-time status.

Supplies:

The City of New Orleans was not prepared for a storm of this magnitude. Lessons learned during this storm should be the benchmark for future preparation. Certain supplies must be stored and secured in safe accessible locations. Non perishable items should be maintained. Perishable items such as water and food could be stored and recycled before the expiration dates.

Officers should not be placed in a position where they must locate and secure provisions including uniform parts. Although approved by the administration, the lack of provisions and a quartermaster system forced Officers to procure needed items from abandoned business locations. The result was a perception by the community and in some cases the nation that we, NOPD, are made up of uncontrolled looters.

Unit Objective:

The future of the Reserve Division will be determined in the coming weeks. Each Officer is being contacted in order to establish what their intent is. It is important to determine if the Reserve Division will be able to provide the level of service it reached pre-Katrina so that plans for upcoming major events can be properly completed. Will
there be sufficient numbers to provide traditional Mardi Gras assistance is of major concern. Other important questions:
How many Officers were permanently displaced?
How many Officers have returned or plan to return?
How much equipment has been lost?
Where will the office be housed?

Officer Recognition:

Reserve Officers are volunteers. They receive no compensation and no benefits of any kind yet several Reserve Officer have performed at an unprecedented level.

Before and after the storm struck Sergeant Tim Scholles assigned to the Traffic Division worked tirelessly. Sgt. Scholles has lived and remained with the Traffic Division every day since the storm.

Full time Officers assigned to the Seventh District approached this Officer to report that the actions of Captain Mike Parker during the storm had possibly saved many lives in and around Methodist Hospital. After securing his family at an out of town location, Captain Parker returned to the City where he has assisted with Reserve duties.

Lt Chris Mandry performed rescue duty as a diver and for days before leaving for the Middle East.

Travis St.Pierre a former St. James Parish officer had recently completed training at the Police Academy as a Lateral Transfer. St. Pierre evacuated with the Traffic Division and remained with them until being sworn in by Superintendent Compass. St. Pierre has remained a near full-time fixture in the Sixth District.

Captain (Doctor) Levy and Officer Abboud performed as a team in the Sixth District answering calls for service. When not answering calls for service, Doctor Levy would assist with the many medical needs of the Officers, helping to establish a medical facility in the WalMart parking lot.

Officer's Frank Denten and Robert McPete have worked the Second District for 12 to 18 hours a day nearly every day since the storm.

A total of twenty-five (25) Reserve Officers have worked during this crisis. Each one should be commended for their service.
Steve Nicholas
TO: Chief of Operations Bureau
DATE: October 14, 2005

Captain Harry Mendoza,
FROM: Commander - S. O. D. Traffic Division

SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina; After-Action Report

In compliance with your directive, the Traffic Division submits this after-action report relative to its actions, resources, encountered problems and recommendations as they relate to the period of August 27, 2005 through October 14, 2005. This period is succinctly defined as Hurricane Katrina.

Saturday August 27, 2005

The Traffic Division, under the command of Captain Harry P. Mendoza, was instructed to begin preparations to man traffic contra-flow positions to facilitate the evacuation of New Orleans. At 2:30 PM on Saturday August 27, 2005 Captain Mendoza held a staff meeting at 1700 Moss Street and informed all supervisory personnel that the city of New Orleans would initiate a traffic contra-flow plan at approximately 5:00 PM on the afternoon of August 27, 2005. The contra-flow plan would be worked in conjunction the Louisiana State Police, St. Tammany Sheriff's Office and the State Department of Transportation.

The Traffic Division was assigned to man and coordinate the egress of vehicular eastbound on the I-10 at its merger with the twin-span. This merger presented the Traffic Division with the problem of maintaining three lanes of eastbound traffic on the I-10 onto the twin-span. The twin-span is a two-lane thoroughfare that required normal eastbound traffic on the I-10 to merge into two lanes prior to entering the elevated twin-span.

The Traffic Division, through the use of manual traffic direction and the placement of 36-inch orange colored rubber cones was able to convert two lanes on the twin-span into three lanes. The Department of Transportation had strategically placed visible signage on the interstate, informing motorist to maintain three lanes of travel across the twin-span. Additionally, the Traffic Division began using three marked police units on the twin-span to align traffic and act as an escort.
The contra-flow process remained in effect at the twin-span until Sunday August 28, 2005 at 4:00 PM. Traffic Officers were relieved of their duties due to the intensity of the prevailing winds. At no time was the departing vehicular traffic brought to a standstill as a result of congestion, but the traffic was occasionally halted to re-erect traffic cones. Throughout the night Saturday August 27, 2005 and during the day Sunday August 28, 2005 contra-flow traffic maintained a constant speed of approximately 45 MPH or higher.

Sunday August 28, 2005

During the day on Sunday August 28, 2005 members of the Traffic Division continued to contact essential personnel to report for duty and to keep them advised of a rallying point outside of 1700 Moss Street. The physical structure at 1700 Moss Street continued to be prepared for the eminent hurricane. Traffic personnel were directed to relocate fifty-eight motorcycles to the second floor of the Police Headquarters parking garage.

Lieutenant Mike Cahn began in earnest to locate temporary housing for both traffic personnel and their vehicles. Lieutenant Cahn was successful in obtaining overnight quarters on the eighteenth floor of 650 Poydras Avenue. The management of this building afforded members of the Traffic Division empty office space in the building, as well as accommodating their personal and department vehicles.

The Traffic Division was allotted and received three cases of bottled water and six folding cots. Additionally, Captain Mendoza was able to acquire an allotment of food and bottled water from Mr. Jack Serio, the owner of the Plantation Coffee House on Canal Boulevard.

At 5:00 PM on Sunday August 28, 2005 the Traffic Division relocated to 650 Poydras Street on the eighteenth floor. Personnel present and accounted for were numbered at 54:

- Captain 1
- Lieutenant 2
- Sergeants 9
- Sergeant-Res 1
- PO 41

Additionally, the Traffic Division took in and accommodated one civilian employee, Elaina Rushing, assigned to the Narcotics Division, and her mother and two small children.

During the course of the evening of Sunday August 28, 2005 and into the early morning hours of Monday August 29, 2005 members of the Traffic Division maintained vigilance as the unmerciful forces of Hurricane Katrina assaulted the City of New Orleans. Several members of the Traffic Division witnessed rooftops being torn away and catapulted through the air, while others observed windows being blown out and trees being uprooted from adjacent buildings and the surrounding ground space.
Several of the windows, in the space occupied by the Traffic Division, were cracked and sharded. It was at this point that Captain Mendoza directed all personnel to migrate to the center of the office building for safekeeping.

Monday August 29, 2005

The assaulting winds of Katrina began to subside in the early afternoon of Monday August 29, 2005. At approximately 3:00 PM on Monday August 29, 2005 Captain Mendoza ordered all personnel out of 650 Poydras Street. The intent at this point was to seek a base of operations for the Traffic Division, procure additional provisions for the members and to survey the traffic conditions in and around the city. Several traffic cars were dispatched to the interstate to report on flooding conditions and to assist evacuees in getting to the Superdome.

Several streets were impassable due to debris and outside of the CBD a majority of streets were impassable due to flooding. Due to the intermittent failure of radio equipment and cell phone equipment, it was imperative that a secondary rallying point be established. At approximately 3:00 PM on Monday August 29, 2005 again Jack Serio provided resolution. Mr. Serio afforded access, to the Traffic Division, to his brother's restaurant located in the 100 block of St. Charles Avenue.

The Traffic Division established a base of operations at this location and was given access to two hotel rooms at the Marriott Courtyard, also located in the 100 block of St. Charles Avenue.

Tuesday August 30, 2005

At 2:00 AM Tuesday morning August 30, 2005 Captain Mendoza made the decision to relocate the Traffic Division to the driveway of Harrah's Casino located at Canal Street and Convention Center Boulevard. This decision was based on the rising street waters in the CBD.

The Traffic Division maintained a base of operations at Harrah's until Wednesday August 31, 2005. The Traffic Division began to immediately provide support personnel to Captain Timothy Bayard, who was coordinating the rescue efforts through the use of motorized boats. The Traffic Division supplied two Officers to work with Captain Bayard's rescue teams and the remainder of the Traffic Division began escorting trailered boats to launch locations. Several Traffic personnel, along with Officers from various units patrolled Canal Street to prevent looting and destruction to property.

During the daytime hours of Tuesday August 30, 2005 the Traffic Division also established a kitchen, which provided meals to over 400 civilians and Police Officers. The provisions for this facility were provided by the management staff of Harrah's Casino, as well as individual Officers who were able to returns to their homes and unload personal freezers.
During the course of the day on Tuesday August 30, 2005 Captain Mendoza and several Officers began scouting for a new base of operations. This became a necessity, since overcrowding was becoming a concern at Harrah’s Casino.

**Wednesday August 31, 2005**

On Wednesday August 31, 2005 the Traffic Division relocated to the Robin Street wharf and began establishing a more permanent base of operations. The wharf afforded personnel shelter from the elements and an area to secure provisions, as well as an enclosed area for sleeping purposes.

From this juncture, the Traffic Division established its own day-to-day routine. Traffic Officers continued to act in a support capacity by escorting rescue boats, water trucks and other personnel or equipment deemed necessary.

Initially rolls calls were conducted twice daily to account for the presence of personnel and to monitor individual Officer’s well being.

From September 18, 2005 until October 8, 2005 the Traffic Division worked the majority of their personnel in the evenings, so that selective traffic checkpoints could be maintained overnight.

On October 9, 2005 the Traffic Division was relieved of their checkpoint responsibilities by the military and immediate reverted to 24-hour traffic enforcement. The Division currently handles all traffic accidents in Orleans Parish.

During the time period of August 27, 2005 through October 14, 2005 the City of New Orleans was visited several times by the President of the United States. On each presidential visit, the Traffic Division rendered assistance to the Secret Service. On the last visit by the President of the United States, the Traffic Division handled all aspects of the visit, including transportation, identification and site security.

**Personnel Cost**

It is undetermined at this time, as to the cost of personnel used from the Traffic Division to aid in the Katrina aftermath.

**Resources Donated**

The Traffic Division has been the recipient of an undetermined amount of food and clothing supplies from private benefactors. The largest and best-known supplier was Wal-Mart, which supplied hundreds of emergency service workers with ice and water and food and clothing.

As far as personnel resources, the Traffic Division has had the benefit of military assistance on checkpoints, but has not been assigned to work with any other entity.
Problems Encountered

- Communications – Electronic communications were initially non-existent for a few hours after the storm. The remaining basic communications channel served a purpose but was overtaxed and at times was ineffective.
- Provisions – The lack of provisions – food and water – exacerbated the already present feeling of abandonment that Police Officers were experiencing. Added to the list would be fuel for the vehicles.
- Command Structure – Due to a lack of communication there was no apparent and overriding command structure to be discerned in the initial days of this catastrophe. Again the feeling of abandonment on the part of the rank and file.
- Morale – Morale, in the infancy of this aftermath, was at its most delicate. The real or perceived impressions by the rank and file, that governmental leaders were more concerned with pointing a finger of blame than trying to nurture a spirit of cooperative effort, were enhanced to a level of total distrust.

Recommendations

Every problem delineated is linked to a base perception that Hurricane Katrina was just going to be another hurricane. No one could have had the foresight to predict the breaching of drainage canals or the Industrial Canal. There was an attitude of indifference towards this hurricane due to the fortunate near misses of the past. Everyone was prepared for no more than a two-to-three day period of inconvenience that would include a temporary loss of electrical power and perhaps a short period of minor floodwater recovery.

1. Require each unit and division to prepare a list of real and visited rallying points.
2. Establish a warehouse storage facility for items such as canned or pre-packaged foods and water.
3. Develop and maintain above ground fuel storage facilities with mechanical pumping capabilities.
4. Implement training, on a consistent basis, that would address the impossible – the ultimate assessment center. The training would have to include inter-agency participation with an emphasis on the Incident Command System.

Captain Harry P. Mendoza
Commander – S. O. D. Traffic Division
Sir,

As per your request, I respectfully submit the following summary for your review. This document was prepared with input from the personnel assigned to the Vice Crimes – Narcotics Section.

Summary / Recommendations:

1) The Office of Emergency Preparedness needs to be revamped. If their role is to have us prepared to handle a disaster such as this they FAILED. They lacked a plan, did not provide the necessary equipment, provided no direction or leadership, did not coordinate or attempt to have commanders of field operations coordinate with any state, or federal agency etc. We really need to take a long hard look at this section.

2) Connect with FEMA as soon as possible. They have an unlimited amount of assets, personnel and equipment available. We must assign a Captain to FEMA as soon as they arrive. This Captain must coordinate all search, rescue and transportation operations with the FEMA commanders.

3) Purchase flat and airboats, trailers and outboard motors. Purchase the oil and other equipment needed to make these boats fully operational for an extended period of time. Provide training on how to operate both types of boats.

4) Position modes of transportation (school and RTA buses) on high ground, with full access to, in the event that emergency personnel have to utilize this equipment to evacuate refugees. Spare keys should be secured in the OEP. Secondly, the city should have a signed contract with bus companies throughout the metro area, in the event of an emergency such as this, to ensure that there are more than enough buses available to evacuate our citizens. Rescue and the transportation of evacuees must work as one entity. Train and issue CDL licenses to officers certifying that they can drive commercial vehicles.

Date: 10-16-05

Subject: Hurricane Katrina -2005

After Action Summary
5) Have MRE’s and water stored in a building located on high ground. If it floods around the location we can still access the food and water by boat and truck it to the evacuation centers. Store enough for 50,000 people, not including emergency personnel for a ten-day period.

6) Fuel reserves – Unleaded and Diesel - Trucks need to be in our city, on high ground two days prior to the storms arrival. Several hours prior to the arrival of the storm all emergency personnel SHALL top off the fuel tanks in each and every vehicle (including spare vehicles) at the gas pumps. The trucks are reserves only to be used if our pumps are inaccessible. We cannot be without fuel.

7) Mandate that each hospital and nursing home is equipped with an emergency generator large enough to provide electricity to ensure the housing of critical care patients. Secondly ensure that each hospital and nursing home has a yet to be determined amount of fuel to ensure that the generators can operate independently for at least a ten day period. Store MRE’s and water in a secured area inside the hospital/home to ensure that the medical staff and patients can sustain themselves for a ten day period.

8) Purchase twenty (20) 5550 watt gasoline generators to be distributed to each district and section in order to partially operate an exterior base of operations. Purchase commercial diesel generators to operate the city owned fuel sites. Also purchase portable electric gas pumps with extended tubing in the event that a fuel site has to be commandeered during a disaster.

9) Park both fully equipped mobile command post on high ground to ensure that our command staff can immediately locate, establish and operate a centralized command center.

10) Satellite telephones.

11) Purchase several portable communication systems that were utilized by the Military while deployed inside our city. Our failure to have a functional backup Communication system in a time of crisis should not happen again.

12) Purchase trucks and sport utility vehicles with 4 X 4 wheel drive, towing packages, heavy-duty winches and a snorkel package so that these vehicles can maneuver in three to four feet of water.

13) Immediately provide emergency personnel with all aerial views of the affected area(s) to ensure that command decisions and tactical plans are formulated with current accurate intelligence information.

14) Purchase chainsaws and protective gear as well as front end loaders so that major thoroughfares can be cleared by emergency workers to ensure immediate access to affected areas. If we cannot purchase this equipment the Park and Parkway commission shall supply and stage this equipment in a building located on high ground.

15) Each District, Division and Section shall have a rally point located on high ground. If they have to surrender the station they must rally on high ground.

16) Based on this experience all departmental vehicles should be secured at the Convention Center or any elevated parking facility located within the warehouse district. We lost hundreds of vehicles to wind related and water damage.
17) Emergency personnel shall report to work one day prior to the storms arrival. Each district and unit commander shall forward to the Chief of Operations the total number of officers sick, furlough, IOD etc. as well as the number of officers that reported as instructed. This gives our Command staff an accurate depiction of our workforce. Reporting personnel shall have enough clothing, food, water and bedding for six days. On the day prior to the storm personnel shall move all vital equipment into areas for immediate deployment and to locations designated as safe havens.

18) Designate a rally point for all outside law enforcement agencies to report to. A NOPD Captain shall coordinate with the lead supervisor from each and every agency represented. The personnel and assets from each agency will report to the District Commander of the area they are assigned for specific instructions.

19) Purchase a completely equipped Urban Search and Rescue Unit for our Department. With the on the job training and experience gained by many members of our department, (Vice-Narcotics/ Tactical) along with proper training we will have a fully trained and equipped unit that can deploy immediately.

20) Coordination of water rescues or any type of rescue is a must. Hasty, primary and secondary rescues must be coordinated. Thirteen days into the storm, we knew that the entire city had been offered hasty and primary rescue opportunities. When in reality, the entire city was covered twice if not three times. This was because FEMA was launching boats, the Louisiana Wild Life and Fisheries was launching boats and the NOPD & NOFD were launching boats. This entire operation was NOT coordinated and had no centralized command center. This was a major flaw that must be corrected.

21) The secondary rescue did not get into full swing until the end of the third week. The NOPD was involved with this operation for fifteen straight days. We worked daily with Fire Department Urban Search and Rescue Units for all over the United States. The NOFD was NOT represented. FEMA provided our officers with some equipment needed to conduct secondary rescue. (boots, mask, gloves, paint).

22) Purchase twelve (20) additional breaching kits – one for each district and section. (RAM – Pry bar – Mall)

23) Recovery of Human Remains: We drove trucks, piloted boats and walked past bodies in the first fourteen days of the storm. We did not have the proper clothing, equipment or training to attempt body recovery. We notified the communications section where human remains were and secure the bodies to unmovable objects. No one knows when these bodies were recovered of if they were even in the location initially reported. Kenyon was the contractor for the recovery phase. When they commenced operations they did an outstanding job. My concern is when did their operations commence. This needs to be part of the COORDINATED search and rescue operations. That means they need to engage
within the first few days. Many remains floated away with the waters currents and will never be recovered. I know it would have been impossible to recover all of the remains, I feel we could have recovered more.

24) News Media – I do not know if we could have slowed them down. I granted their every request. Therefore I created the monster. Their presence in an around our Harrah’s command post, at times hindered our operations. They blocked the driveway and street, interrupted meetings and were a distraction especially in the first two weeks when our operations were at its peak. In the first couple of hours, we need to designate and cordon off an area for media interviews and keep them in this secured area for the entire event. When available the Superintendent, Deputy Chiefs and personnel assigned to the department’s Public Information Office can meet the media in this area.

25) We need to move our food and water supplies to an area away from our Command Post. Our officers choked the access points just as the media did. Our supplies (MRE & Water) and chow line should have been set up on the river front (Spanish Plaza) with parking in the Hilton Circle and on Poydras St.

26) Each district commander will establish relationships with the owners / managers of businesses such as Wal Mart and Walgreens and secure these locations prior to the storms arrival. This will curtail looting and can provide resources for emergency workers.

27) Distribute fliers notifying officers where Red Cross, Insurance Companies, FEMA and other benefit resources are located. Many officers worked into the night and feel that they missed out on some opportunities.

QUESTION:

1) Where is the mobile command center that was housed in the fire station located at N. Miro St. and Elysian Fields Ave.?

In closing, our biggest flaw is the fact that we failed to communicate. This has been our problem for the 30 plus years that I have been associated with the department. The instructions and plans that are formed at the top are not clearly communicated to the rank and file. This leads to individual commanders implementing the operation as they understand it. This causes confusion and misdirection. In the time of crisis our leaders need to be SEEN and HEARD.

Yours in Quality Law Enforcement,

Timothy P. Bayard – Captain
Vice Crimes-Narcotics Section
Deputy Chief Steven Nicholas  

TO: Chief of Operations  

Captain Timothy P. Bayard  

FROM: Vice Crimes / Narcotics Section  

DATE: 10/17/05  

SUBJECT: After Action Report II  

Sir,

It is my understanding that our Office of Emergency Preparedness should have had a plan prior to the storm that included staging equipment, coordinating operations, providing food and water for the emergency personnel etc. Additionally the plan needs to be implemented and monitored. The final stage was a plan to rebuild the city. As you know, this did not happen.

This office should have had the following equipment staged to the west:

1) Food and Drinking Water.
2) Trailer trucks with water for bathing and to supplement hotels.
3) Generators and portable Air condition to keep hotels operational so that all emergency personnel would have a place to sleep.
4) Diesel and Unleaded fuel trucks.
5) Work clothing for emergency personnel.
6) High water vehicles and boats with fuel and oil to sustain operations for an extended period of time.
7) Refrigerator trucks loaded with ice.
8) Disaster mortuary teams with equipment to commence immediately.
9) Utilize the tractor trailer command post if we can find it.
10) Transportation – buses should have been staged on high ground.
11) Plans for an alternate command post with appropriate equipment (Royal Sonesta)

Suggestions:

1) Keisler Air Force Base – purchase 5 ton trucks, boats, clothing, MRE’s, etc. at one tenth the price. We do this with vehicles in Baton Rouge.
2) Build a large scale warehouse on city property to store equipment and provisions.
3) Do not secure our vehicles where we are bringing evacuees. Our vehicles were vandalized.
4) Identify a specific location for emergency operations command center.
5) Form a partnership with businesses who utilize flat and airboats on a daily basis. R&R Construction company that worked with Vice and Narcotics daily. They saved thousands.
6) Inform the Governor and Mayor that when New Orleans is effected by a disaster, that the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness is the coordinating agency in conjunction with FEMA throughout the entire event. This ensures greater command and control. We needed a centralized command post with a coordinated effort. What we had was people stepping up and getting jobs done. Many times our efforts were in triplicate. This prolonged the hasty and primary rescue which delayed our attempts at secondary rescue.

7) Communication must improve. We did not have specific instructions on where to bring evacuees, hospital (MASH) locations etc. In a crisis communication is vital.

8) Have all police personnel report to work. Keep skeleton crews in place. Relocate all additional personnel north of I-12 with the necessary transportation to return this entire workforce to our city for deployment.

Yours in Quality Law Enforcement,

Timothy P. Bayard – Captain
Vice Crimes / Narcotics Section
Due to the catastrophic impact of Hurricane Katrina on the City of New Orleans, City State and Federal resources proved inadequate.

Incident command and control by top leadership was limited by communications breakdown caused by failures of radio/telephone towers and loss of electricity.

Listed below are several aspects of emergency preparedness and response, which must be addressed in order to enhance our Department’s effectiveness during the next natural disaster.

1. Official notifications and reporting responsibilities prior to a disaster
   All officers should be on hand, at their assigned units, well in advance of a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, where prior warning is possible. Our Departmental policy should be revised as it relates to on call status. The Department is attempting to guess at what time a storm will strike us and then call Officers into work at an opportune time. This negatively impacted us during Katrina because we had Officers scheduled off who were unable to get to work. Once the decision is made to go to emergency notification, Officers should be paid for those hours.

2. Predetermined Emergency Operation locations
   Emergency operation locations for every Command should be established prior to the event, based upon such criteria as high ground, emergency communications, ability to provide housing, sanitary needs, etc. Commands such as Headquarters, along with the 3rd, 5th, and 7th Districts which lie in obviously vulnerable areas should designate emergency operation locations and move to them, prior to the arrival of the storm, thereby eliminating a great deal of chaos and confusion associated with providing for the needs of the members of the Department. This would additionally provide for pre-determined locations for FEMA aid such as additional supplies of food and water to be delivered, in the event of a prolonged emergency. Thirdly, the pre-designated Emergency Command locations would allow Commanders to know where to go to communicate with the Command Staff, in the event that traditional forms of communication are lost.

3. Water, Food and Supplies
   Adequate supplies of water, food and medical supplies should be delivered to the designated Emergency Operation Command locations in advance of the arriving storm.
The manpower and energy, required to procure supplies essential for the survival of police officers during Katrina, could have been put to much better use had adequate provisions for survival been in place.

4. EMS personnel assigned to Emergency Operation locations

EMTs should be designated to report to each Commanding Officer, at their previously determined Emergency Operation locations, once the State of Emergency has been declared. EMT’s would be an asset to any officers who might become ill or injured during the event. This is particularly critical during the first 72 hours of the event when communications and transportation to a medical facility is seriously impaired.

5. Search and Rescue

Each Emergency Command site should be equipped with search and rescue equipment necessary for officers to engage in such missions. This equipment should include, but not be limited to boats, high water vehicles, fuel, life vests, paddles, special weapons and additional ammunition. The lack of such items during Katrina became a source of stress for our officers who felt helpless and, at times useless, due to lack of equipment necessary to carry out our basic mission of preserving life and property.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

Captain, James F. Scott
Commander, First District
New Orleans Police Department
Interoffice Correspondence

October 14, 2005

Warren J. Riley
To: Superintendent of Police

From: Edwin C. Hosli Jr.
Commander, Second District

Subject: Hurricane Katrina-Initial after action report

The following report pertains to the Second District’s observations during hurricane Katrina.

From the initial projection of Katrina’s path and her potential for destruction, the need for more initial planning is now obvious. While the City of New Orleans is usually lucky during storms, that is, generally escaping a direct hit or massive tidal surges, most New Orleanians, including its police force, only prepare for a brief inconvenience. Preparing for 2-3 days away from home, not preplanning family issues and not preparing oneself. As a result, we as a police force were not totally prepared. Katrina’s force was somewhat unique and unpredictable. My staff and I have reflected on the issues deemed most important and share them in the following report.

♦ Housing for Second District officers are divided among Memorial (Baptist) and Touro hospitals. We secure a place for bedding down, food, water, and electricity. Although spread out, this distribution of officers and rank allows us to have law enforcement ready to respond once the storm passes. Special thanks to the staff and administration of both hospitals.

♦ Additionally, the command staff of the Second District is housed at the station where we meet regularly to discuss strategies and logistical issues.

♦ Patrol vehicles are secured in garages at the above locations. These vehicles are allowed to enter last so they can be the first to leave once the storm is over. However, hurricane Katrina delivered a new challenge when a vast number of our patrol fleet was unable to leave due to high flood waters in the area.

♦ The station had an adequate supply of sand bags. These sand bags were used to prevent water from entering the station through its first floor rear doors and the generator room, located outside on the first floor.
Once placed on alert, The Department should have each assignment report for distribution of hurricane supplies. If not used, these supplies should be returned and stored until placed on alert again. Districts should receive items first, followed by support units.

There was no food or water supply located at the station. A supply of bottled water and military MRE's should be distributed to district stations.

A large supply of bedding cots (military style) should be distributed to district stations. This would provide a place for rest for officers assigned to the district.

A supply of ammunition for duty weapons should be distributed to district stations.

A supply of flashlights and alkaline batteries should be distributed to district stations.

Each station should be issued a flat boat (a 15-16 foot) with life preservers as part of its inventory. This boat could be maintained and serviced at the station by officer's responsible for building and fleet maintenance. This boat could be utilized for evacuations of trapped officers and other urgent needs deemed necessary by district commander's. This boat would also allow officers a means to go out and borrow other vessels until help arrives.

Communications issues should be addressed. The total loss of communication's via, radio, telephone, and cellular phone were drastic and severed information related to the severity of the disaster and emergency recovery operations. In addition, the use of the same ITAC (SIMPLEX) channels by NOPD and the JPSO proved to be overwhelming.

The station generator performed well for 8-days. On the ninth day, the generator threw a rod making it totally inoperable. As fate had it, a private citizen with ties to a Second District officer came by the station and offered a generator mounted on a trailer. This allowed the station to regain power until FEMA delivered a generator several weeks later.

Diesel fuel for the generator was supplied through agreements with assigned military units. Fuel was delivered on a timely basis and the station had power.
Hurricane Katrina—Initial after action report (D-2)  
October 14, 2005

Gasoline for patrol units was limited. As patrol units were removed from the hospital garages and placed into service, fuel became a problem. The Second District was able to fuel its marked fleet with help from the Audubon Zoo. An on hand supply of unleaded gasoline at the zoo was distributed by zoo personnel to members of the Second District. The zoo’s curator, Mr. Maloney, was most helpful in making this happen.

The Second District station sustained damage from Katrina. Missing weather boards, broken central A/C and heater, broken window A/C units, plumbing problems, roof damage, and building leaks. The fleet also suffered damage as reported previously in our Vehicle Damage Report.

Once placed on alert for a storm, Mr. Nick Richards of Green Parrot Nursery is contacted about tree clearing. Immediately following a storm, Mr. Richards begins work, clearing main thoroughfares and creating passageways for emergency vehicles. This service is free of charge. One police officer is assigned to Mr. Richards for safety. This service is a true asset to the district and the City as a whole and must be recognized by city officials, possibly through a City Proclamation.

Members of the Second District performed admirably. Just as other members of the Department had. Some stood out, working untiringly, without rest, food, or water. Scared but never complaining. This core group has earned my respect many times over. In due time, they will be recognized.

I am proud to have commanded a fine group of men and women during the worst disaster this country has ever experienced. Furthermore, to have contributed to the rescue and recovery efforts gave the members of the Second District a true sense of what this Department is all about, “Service First!” There are issues that may arise at a later time. If this proves true, a supplement to this report will be submitted.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

Captain Edwin C. Host Jr.
Commander, Second District

EH/dja

cc: file
New Orleans Police Department  
Interoffice Correspondence

To: Warren J. Riley  
Superintendent of Police  

From: Captain Donald J. Paisant  
3rd District Commander

Subject: Hurricane Katrina After Action Report

Date: 10/17/05

Hurricane Katrina caused widespread devastation to the City of New Orleans and to the surrounding communities. The 3rd District station was a total loss due to the storm. We were stranded in a flooded building for 2 days without power, food, water, and other necessities. With all the adverse conditions and trying times during this storm, we managed to keep a large percentage of officers with us and did not realize the reduction of manpower that some other districts/units experienced.

Hurricane Lodging

Prior to the hurricane making landfall, each district/unit was told they were on their own to locate facilities for their personnel to weather the storm. In the 3rd, the LSU Dental School located at 1100 Florida Ave. was selected due to its construction of steel and concrete along with the fact it contained a generator on the 8th floor which operated on natural gas.

The building withstood the hurricane force winds, however even before the levees broke, the 1st floor of the building took on water. Additionally, the area where we had eleven (11) vehicles parked flooded. Those vehicles were used to evacuate personnel from the 3rd District to the Dental School flooded and we subsequently lost all eleven (11) vehicles. These vehicles were 2001 year models or older. Additionally, once the electricity was lost, the natural gas operated...
generator failed. In addition to not providing power to the building, the natural gas generator failed to keep the refrigeration coolers working therefore the cadavers located in the building were not kept refrigerated and began to decompose and a stench of death was all in the building for 2 days.

Not realizing we would be stranded in a building for 2 days, most officers only brought one (1) change of clothes and very minimal food and water supplies. After the first day of being stranded, we gathered all food and water supplies and rationed them to the personnel. Additionally, one sergeant fell down a flight of stairs and broke his ankle and leg. Fortunately for us, some EMS personnel were also trapped in the building with us and they tended to him. He was immobilized and given morphine for pain and was later evacuated.

Recommendation: It is recommended the city administration in concert with the NOPD identify location prior to the storm for police to evacuate. Currently, once winds reach 50 mph, we take police off the street. When this occurs, perhaps we should look into evacuating the majority of the officers and vehicles to a safer location outside of the storm path. This way we would have a better idea of what has occurred once the storm passed and be able to come back into the effected area and perform search and rescue (SAR) efforts and have the majority of our personnel ready to work and our vehicles functioning. With this hurricane, three (3) districts with over 300 people were stranded for some time and numerous vehicles were lost.

Food and Supplies

No food or supplies were provided by the department. The only food and water we had were the ones the individual officers provided.

Recommendation: The city administration should look into providing each unit with MRE's and water for a minimum of five (5) days. Even if the city had not flooded, the devastation left in the hurricane's path would have eliminated electricity usage and therefore made preparing of meals almost impossible.
Planning

Although we prepared a huge document entitled, “NOPD Emergency Operations Manual”, very few items were followed. One major area of concern was the establishment of a command center. The location of the Harrah’s Casino was more of a staging area than that of a command center.

A command center for NOPD should have been set up at a designated location and the location of this command center should have been made known to everyone. At the command center, all command staff members of the department or their designee’s should have been in attendance. In addition, 2 or 3 members of each command should have been designated as “runners” with vehicles to relay information to field units in the event of radio failure. Part of the problem with miscommunications and misunderstandings was that at times members of the command staff or their designee could not be located. This lead to individual decision making without information sharing. Additionally, rumors were abound in the police department. With the establishment and implementation of a command center, those rumors could be verified or denied and therefore those in the field could have been notified.

After the storm passed, the department’s communications system failed and caused confusion for personnel in the field. On numerous occasions, most officers were in a “wait” mode. This caused anxiety and frustration for officer in the field. Rumors were constantly being passed on. Without clear communications between members of this department, the rumors only added to the anxiety and frustration.

Morale

Personnel working long hours with very little rest had a definite effect on morale. Morale was also affected by promises that didn’t come true (ie, the 5-day trips to Vegas and Atlanta) along with rumors running rampant in the department and not being put to rest immediately.

Recommendation: Upon the arrival of outside agencies, NOPD personnel should have been rotated out and removed from the “battle zones”. Upon the removal of
these personnel for 2 to 3 days, they should have been immediately provided access to mental health professionals to help them deal with their concerns. 14-16 days in the "battle zones" is way too long for personnel to remain without addressing their mental health concerns. Within the first 5-6 days after the storm, this rotation of personnel should have occurred.

Other recommendations:

1. A comprehensive plan should be implemented in two phases. What to do before the storm and what to do after the storm.

2. Personnel should be assigned responsibilities before and after the storm (ie, SAR, looting patrol, etc.)

3. In a city vulnerable to hurricanes, this department should have a plan in place where personnel can weather out a storm. This plan should consist of locations that may be at an elevation that is not susceptible to flooding and is structurally sound. The department should remove the bulk of our personnel and equipment out of the storms path, leaving a small number of officers behind to provide some limited service. These officers will also be in a position to provide assessment and necessary communications to personnel returning to the city after the storm passes. This type of plan would save our equipment, vehicles, and resources from destruction. Our personnel should be placed out of harms way. Those officers riding out the storm should be equipped with boats and high water vehicles and placed in secure locations.

Hopefully, a full review of this event will allow our department to identify and correct issues which seem to have been problems. Mistakes were made and we can only hope to learn from those mistakes and insure we are better prepared in the event another catastrophic event occurs in our city.

Captain Donald J. Paisant
3rd District Commander
Acting Superintendent of Police    DATE: October 17, 2005
TO: Warren Riley
Captain David J. Kirsch
FROM: Commander Fourth District

SUBJECT: After Action Report Hurricane Katrina

Sir:

This report is neither to affix blame for errors committed nor an indictment for any actions taken during this horrendous catastrophe. It is written in the spirit of learning as much as possible from this dramatic event, so mistakes will not be repeated, and strategies and techniques that were successful will be redeployed.

A. Provisions for Sheltering Working Officers at the Peak of the Storm:

Headquarters should locate buildings in each District which should withstand the event forecasted. Arrangements to house working officers should be made by Headquarters to make use of these buildings prior to any impending catastrophe. A list of all such buildings should be made a part of a Disaster Plan, and the list should be updated periodically. Also, as part of this plan, a place to house vehicles during the crisis should be included. The Fire Department took over the complexes of the Mary Joseph Home, Our Lady of Wisdom Home, and Our Lady of Holy Cross College. These three complexes are located at Gen. DeGaulle and Woodland Highway. The Fourth District could make use of something similar, although on a smaller scale.

The Fourth District contingent rode the storm out in the Crescent City Connection Police Administration building.

Although the flooding of the area of the Superdome could not be forecast, it would be beneficial if some multi-storied parking garage could be located, even if in the adjoining parish, if the vehicles could be retrieved shortly after the event.

B. Communications

Once the Main radio system failed, the Mutual Aid system, although technically working, was inadequate because so many jurisdictions were on the system it was almost impossible to get in to talk on the channel.

Some provisions for extra radio batteries and chargers should be made to supplement the Districts.
C. Food and Water

The Fourth District went almost one week before the National guard delivered MREs and water to the station. The District subsisted off of food stuffs in Walmart's coolers which Officers cooked on grills outside the station. Walmart also delivered to the Fourth District truckloads of food which the district shared with all the other districts of the Police Department.

D. Electrical Generators

Members of the Fourth District, Officers Jeffrey Hirsch, Kevin Bell, and Brandon Bass, fashioned pumps to fuel police vehicles. These pumps were used at a commercial gas station which the police commandeered. The Fourth District was able to fuel police vehicles from all parts of the City until the Fuel Man pumps on Wall Blvd. were able to be activated. These officers used personal electrical generators to accomplish this task. It was later learned the Fire Department had a large inventory of generators at 420 Opelousas st. Many of these were not in use. A couple of weeks into the storm, the District was able to obtain and make use of two of these generators.

E. Outside Help

Many civilians came to the Fourth District station offering various forms of help. Two such people offered to do all the cooking at the station. This was done in the weeks prior to Fema setting up a feeding station for emergency workers. One civilian brought to the station equipment to plug and repair punctured tires, which the district made use of for our vehicles and other district's vehicles. Civilians also brought foodstuffs and cleaning articles to the station.

For the first few weeks of the storm, the District had great difficulty getting the National Guard to accomplish any missions. Once the California National Guard under Major Frank Emmanuel, was assigned to the Fourth District, things changed and all missions asked of them they completed.

After the first week, sheriff's offices from Maracopa County, Arizona, and Assumption Parish, Louisiana, were assigned to work in the Fourth District. These deputies told us that they were held up in Baton Rouge and Gonzales for approximately one week doing nothing. They did not know if FEMA, the State Police, or the Governor held them there, but this should be investigated, as they could have been of major help to the District during the first seven days.

Immigration Customs Enforcement agents were assigned to the Fourth District. This organization performed admirably. Every assignment given to them, whether dirty or
boring was completed without any complaints. Enough cannot be said for these agents and supervisors.

Officer Carlos Peralta ended his tour of duty, and went to find a custodian for his two children who had been left alone by his wife. Flood waters caught Officer Peralta's vehicle and flooded it. Officer Peralta waded through flood waters which reached his chest, carrying his children. They were shot at by looters, and Officer Peralta slipped and fractured his arm. He was able to get his children to a safe location out of town, and he returned to duty before receiving medical attention.

Officer Tommy Guidry was trapped in water at his residence. When the waters reached his chin, he got onto his roof but was washed away and had to hang on to a tree. He was able to get onto a rooftop, where he spent three and a half days awaiting rescue by boat.

Officer Kevin Thomas was shot in the head by looters as he tried to apprehend them while they were burglarizing a store. Officer Thomas has undergone several surgeries and is doing very well.

Respectfully submitted,

Captain David J. Kirsch
Commander Fourth District

APPROVED/ DISAPPROVED

Steven Nicholas
Assistant Superintendent
Operations
TO: Warren J. Riley  
Superintendent of Police  
FROM: Captain John P. Bryson  
Fifth District Commander  
SUBJECT: After Action Report (Hurricanes Katrina & Rita)

DATE: October 11, 2005

Overview

Fifth Police District

Station Location: 3900 North Claiborne Ave.  
New Orleans, Louisiana, 70117  
Boundaries: St. Bernard Parish Line/Mississippi River/St. Bernard Ave./Gentilly Blvd.  
Approximate Population: @ 80,000

Chronological Movement of the Fifth District Contingency

Fifth District Station (Sunday, 8-28-05, @ 2:25 p.m. thru @ 6:00 p.m.)

Bywater Hospital (Sunday, 8-28-05, @ 6:00 p.m. thru Tuesday, 8-30-05, @ 4:30 a.m.)

Port of Embarkation (Tuesday, 8-30-05, @ 4:30 a.m. thru Tuesday, 8-30-05, @ 10:00 a.m.)

Sheraton Hotel (Tuesday, 8-30-05, @ 10:00 a.m. thru Thursday, 9-15-05, @ 12:00 p.m.)

Carnival Cruise Ship Ecstasy (Thursday, 9-15-05, @ 12:00 p.m. thru Thursday, 9-22-05, @ 8:30 a.m.)

Sheraton Hotel (Thursday, 9-22-05, @ 8:30 a.m. thru Sunday, 9-25-05, @ 6:00 p.m.)

Carnival Cruise Ship Ecstasy (Sunday, 9-25-05, @ 6:00 p.m. to present)
Overview Continued

Hurricane Katrina was slated to hit the Southeastern Gulf Coast early Monday morning, August 28, 2005, as a category four hurricane. The eye of the hurricane was forecasted to pass due east of the City of New Orleans. In preparation of the storm Captain John P. Bryson, the Fifth District Commander conducted a hurricane briefing on Sunday, August 28, 2005, at 2:25 p.m. The briefing, which was held at the Fifth District Station, included all available essential district personnel. In attendance were also representatives from the Harbor Police Department. During the briefing, hurricane logistics were discussed and assignments were disseminated. It should be noted that earlier that morning Sergeant Reginald Blanchard and Officer Keith Thibeaux were instructed by Captain Bryson to prepare the Fifth District Station and its fleet for the hurricane. The following is a list of preparations, assignments, and logistics that were implemented as a result of the briefing:

Preparations

1.) The station's generator was checked for operation and fuel.
2.) All exterior inventory and debris were secured.
3.) The station's food and water supplies were inventoried and stored
4.) All fleet vehicles were filled to capacity with fuel.
5.) Various fleet, take home, and personal vehicles were relocated to the Superdome for safe keep.
6.) Barricades and sand bags were also secured.
7.) The Lower Ninth Ward and COPS Station's were also prepared for the hurricane.

Assignments and patrol strategies

1.) Officers were assigned to particular zones within the district, utilizing the patrol vehicle's emergency lights and P.A. systems to inform the citizens of the forecasted threat and their evacuation options.
2.) Officers assigned to two schools in the district used as rally points for all evacuees who opted to be bused from the area.
3.) Officers also monitored R.T.A. bus stops within the district
4.) Officers monitored all thorough fares throughout the district which had the potential to flood (updates were continuous).
5.) Officers were on proactive patrol
6.) A contingency of six officers and one sergeant remained in the Fifth District Station while the remaining personnel relocated to Bywater Hospital which was identified as a secondary command post. The remaining personnel were to relocate to Bywater Hospital a few hours later.
Overview Continued

Fifth District's tenure at Bywater Hospital

- Identified area for command post and sleeping quarters.
- Posted officers in specific areas of the hospital for security purposes.
- Continued district patrols and assignment from the hospital.
- Due to the rising water, the hospital's generator became disabled. The remaining fleet which was located in a parking lot adjacent to the hospital was also partially submerged under water.
- Due to the fact the fleet was incapacitated, numerous radio broadcasts were made requesting a portable generator and gasoline which were required to recharge the batteries being used to sustain the life support apparatus of residing patients. With this being a life or death situation, the supplies were finally delivered after an extensive delay.
- Being aware of the deteriorating conditions (rising contaminated water, no electricity, etc.) the patients, most of them bedridden, were literally carried from the upper level of the hospital by Fifth District personnel, transferred to vehicles, and transported to other area hospitals. It should be noted this task took several hours to complete, and was very labor intensive. This was in addition to the hundreds of ninth ward and lower ninth ward residents being evacuated to the Superdome and the Convention Center in U-Hauls.
- In an attempt to keep the Fifth District contingency within district boundaries, officers were then relocated to the Port of Embarkation. This was also done in an attempt to seek improved conditions. Bywater Hospital did not have electricity, the water table had risen dramatically, and provisions were low.
Fifth District tenure at the Port of Embarkation

- Regrouped and briefed by Captain Bryson
- Acquired a fourth command post at the Sheraton Hotel (500 Canal Street)

Fifth District tenure at the Sheraton Hotel

- Met with hotel management and security director.
- Formulated a plan of action for interior and exterior security for the hotel.
- Assisted in the evacuation of guests and employees from the hotel.
- Assigned personnel to foot patrols on Canal Street in order to combat looting.
- Commandeered SUV type vehicles from Sewell Cadillac for the sole purpose of district patrols and rescue missions, which were implemented immediately.
- Secured a prison bus from the U.S. Border Patrol and provided two transport drivers for the temporary holding facility that was established at the bus terminal.
- Assisted military personnel with security at various fixed posts throughout the Fifth District
- Acquired additional patrol vehicles at which time district patrol coverage was expanded and vehicle checkpoints were manned.

Fifth District tenure at the Cruise Ship Carnival

- Continued patrols within the district
- Continued assisting military personnel with security at various fixed posts.
- Continued manning vehicle checkpoints
After Action Report (Hurricanes Katrina & Rita)
Page 5 of 6

Adverse impacts which affected the operation of the Fifth District during Hurricanes Katrina & Rita

1.) Lack of essential provisions (food, water, medical supplies, etc.)
2.) No assigned military personnel or high water vehicles on site at the district prior to the hurricane
3.) No accessibility to a watercraft vehicle on site for possible rescue missions
4.) Communications system were down for a short period
5.) The Fifth District Station’s generator was disabled by water during the hurricane
6.) Numerous inadequacies with the secondary command post (Bywater Hospital)

Positive impacts which affected the operation of the Fifth District during Hurricanes Katrina & Rita.

1.) An adequate contingency of officers
2.) Effective patrol strategies and assignments
3.) Continuous information broadcasts of weather conditions
4.) Commanders ability to implement strategic planning for the district
5.) A unified effort on the part of Fifth District Personnel which resulted in the accomplishment of the tasks or objectives at hand

Suggestions for future disaster related occurrences

1.) Secure vital documents and records prior to disaster
2.) Secure a more conducive site for officers and vehicles during the disaster
3.) Identify and assign a “disaster liaison” to coordinate and interact with various entities prior to the disaster
4.) Purchase additional shotguns and assault rifles which should be maintained on site at each district
5.) Implement training for officers on the handling and firing of assault weapons
6.) Establish a third command post in the event the primary becomes nonfunctional
7.) Elevate or relocate the district generator
8.) Compile a list of residents prior to the disaster that are unable or have no means to evacuate the city. A plan of action should be formulated directing transportation to the residents, instead of the residents attempting to relocate to the transportation site
9.) The National Guard should be on site in each district prior to the disaster with available resources (high water vehicles, watercraft vehicles, etc.)
10.) District commanders should have limited operational control over military assignments and should include military personnel in all briefings and planning meetings.

"No one can prepare for a disaster, only a response to it"
TO: Steven B. Nicholas, Acting Chief of Operations  
DATE: 10/17/05

FROM: Captain Anthony W. Cannatella, Commander

SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina After Action Report

Sir,

This report will contain a synopsis of the events leading up, during and after Hurricane Katrina.

On Saturday, 8-27-05, after attending a pre-hurricane meeting at police headquarters, I initiated the operations orders required to prepare for the storm.

On Sunday, 8-28-2005, I reported for duty at the sixth district station at approximately 12:00PM and began issuing orders and monitoring the weather situation in the district area. At approximately 9:00PM I ordered all of the DIU and administrative staff police cars to be parked in the high rise garage at the Saulet Apartments for safe keeping during the hurricane. At about 11:30PM with the winds rising to over 45MPH gusts, I ordered the remainder of the fleet to be parked in the Saulet Apartment garage. Note: No sixth district cars were lost to hurricane or subsequent flooding except those that were parked at EMD and two that were lost at detectives homes in Lakeview area after the 17th street canal levee broke.

The sixth district officers rode out the hurricane at the police station with relative ease and reported no major damage to the building except the minimal loss of some of the sheet metal roof trim work. The morning after the hurricane, Monday, 8-29-2005, it became evident that the city sustained major damage evidenced by the amount of large trees down in the streets severely limiting our mobility. Several of our officers that were trained in the use of heavy construction equipment located several front-end loaders at the new Guste Homes redevelopment site. The officers than began systematically removing all of the obstructions from the major streets in the sixth district area all the way to Louisiana Ave. This included pushing very large trees off of the roadway and onto neutral grounds.

On Wednesday, 8-31-2005, we relocated the entire sixth district to the parking lot of the WalMart located at 1901 Tchoupitoulas St. to escape the rising water on Martin Luther King Blvd due to the breach of the 17th St. canal levee. The water rose to a height of 2.5 feet in the street, however, the station and parking garage remained dry. A skeleton crew remained at the sixth district station to secure it during the absence of the main force.

The looting in the district quickly reached unenforceable levels. Beyond the fact that no holding facility was provided, the sheer number of individuals inside each business was
incalculable. Most of the businesses in the district were being looted while we cleared streets of trees and debris in order to respond to emergency calls that included looters.

The major problems faced by the sixth district during and after the hurricane are as follows:

Communications. Radios and cell phones were failing and it was impossible to know to what extent the city was damaged or flooded.

Vehicles. The regular police cars were useless during this event. We must have access to military style high water vehicles in advance of future hurricanes.

Food: A long term mutual aid contract must be set up with stores such as Winn-Dixie, WalMart, etc. for supplying food and water to police during these events. Beyond the food and beverages that each officer brought to the station we had nothing to eat or drink for the first 36 hours. Possibly military MRE’s could be stored at a city owned facility to be made available quickly after the passage of the storm.

Fuel: The system of fueling police vehicles after a hurricane has to be fixed and in place prior to a storm. The sixth district pioneered a portable hand pump system for pumping fuel out of the in-ground storage tanks at abandoned gas stations but this is a hit or miss proposition at best.

Medical: Emergency medical aid was non-existent. An EMS unit needs to be assigned to each district commander during and after hurricanes.

I have attached a copy of two after action reports prepared by platoon lieutenants assigned to the sixth district.

\[Signature\]

Captain Anthony W. Cannatella
Sixth District Commander
This report will contain noteworthy events taking place after Hurricane Katrina passed and officers were split into two platoons from the original three. Items listed below concern the “day” platoon which worked from Noon to Midnight throughout most of the aftermath. Some observations not called for in an after action report will follow in a critique prepared at a later date.

After the storm, patrol cars found a body on Jackson Avenue. They learned quickly that there were no means with which to remove the body from the scene of its death, so a guard was posted until such time as the coroner’s office was able to mobilize its vehicles and begin to remove the bodies within the city. After that shift was over, the “day” platoon notified the “night” platoon which also posted a guard on the body. By the time the “day” platoon returned the next day, another body was being guarded. It was at that time that Lt. St. Germain ordered the officers to abandon the posts as more and more bodies were sure to be located and manpower was running short. Something learned from this experience was that provisions need to be made in the future for the removal and storing of bodies very soon after the event causing regular body removal methods to cease.

Debris littered the streets around the district so densely that it soon became apparent that vehicular mobility was severely limited. Calls of distress and of looting came in one after another but officers could not get to the locations in their vehicles. Additionally, a safe route to the nearest operating hospital at the time, Touro Infirmary, was not available for officers or citizens in need of medical attention. The need to remove the debris was immediate but the necessary removal equipment and personnel were not yet available. Realizing this problem, officers located earth moving equipment and used it to clear the major streets in the district, resulting in the ability to get within blocks of any call the officers may have received for assistance. (Later, it was discovered that the levee would break and evacuation would have been nearly impossible for remaining citizens without this street clearing.) Rather than having to locate such equipment by chance, it would be convenient in the future to have such equipment strategically placed around the city so that each district would have access.

The looting in the district quickly reached unenforceable levels. Beyond the fact that no holding facility was provided after the traditional holding facility was flooded, the sheer number of individuals inside each business was incalculable. Practically every business in the district, large or small, on major streets or in neighborhoods, retail or restaurant, had been or was being looted. Officers began a catch and release program where they would obtain the identities of as many looters as possible for the purposes of obtaining arrest warrants at a later date, once the court system was
up and running. Later, a temporary holding facility was created at the Union Passenger Terminal and looters were arrested. By that time, however, the majority of the looting had begun to taper off.

The night the 17th Street Canal breached, the district was called to the station where Captain Cannatella quickly organized a plan to temporarily relocate the personnel and vehicles to Algiers based on reports that waters would reach unsurvivable levels in the city because of the breach. The decision was made in a very organized manner after soliciting suggestions from the entire district’s personnel in an open forum. A skeleton crew remained at the station to protect the building. After a brief overnight stay in Algiers, it was apparent that the earlier reports of extremely high waters were overestimated and the district promptly returned to the east bank.

The district station, however, was surrounded by enough water to prevent “to-and-from” traffic in ordinary vehicles. The electricity was still not functioning anywhere in the district but the station generator had successfully started and there was power at the station enough for the remaining officers to function inside. The remainder of the district personnel relocated to 1901 Tchopitoulas Street, the Wal-Mart, where they quickly organized a temporary station under the direction of Captain Cannatella. The captain methodically organized the personnel into units each with assigned duties including but not limited to patrolling the district, protecting the temporary station, managing a kitchen area and a clean up crew, and regulating the removal of necessary items from within the store through his Integrity Control Officer, Lt. Carl Perilloux.

Numbers of trucks on loan from Brown’s Dairy were used by officers to store refrigerated items for officers’ use. A quartermaster system was set up and run by Sergeants Chris Billiot and Steve Smegal under the direction of Lt. Christy Williams. Personal hygiene products, clothing, food and drink were distributed to officers as needed. This system worked very well.

It was at that time the district ranking officers began to compile lists of missing officers. Payroll records had to be produced and those officers who had left or who had never reported for duty were accounted for at that time. A daily log was kept by Sgt. Kenneth Miestchovich as to when officers finally reported for duty or when officers left but then returned. The list was then turned over to district administrative personnel.

Military evacuation efforts and food and water drops began in the area just behind the temporary station at Wal-Mart. The officers assisted in the security of those missions and in the distribution of the food and water to the responding residents.

Also at that time, there were many outside police agencies responding to the city. Several units were adopted by the Sixth District and stayed with the district until their departure. They brought with them clothing, medical supplies, food, elaborate cooking equipment, and manpower. Complete cooperation was enjoyed with the outside agencies and the military personnel in the area. The coordination of those officers with Sixth District officers was orchestrated by Captain Cannatella for routine patrol within the district. Evidently officials in Baton Rouge managed a sort of scheduling of outside agencies to respond to the area to keep everyone from coming at once and to keep a steady stream of agencies in town to assist. This seemed to work well.
Soon thereafter, the national and international media began to arrive at the temporary station at Wal-Mart. Following communication with Garry Flot of the Public Information Office, these media personnel were allowed to interview and ride along with Sixth District Personnel at the direction of Captain Cannatella. The coverage was positive and improved the spirit and morale of the officers.

Medical teams and missionaries began to arrive. MCI erected a telephone room at Wal-Mart which contained twenty-two phones hooked up to a satellite for officers’ use. From what anyone could determine, morale was as good as it could get considering the circumstances. Pride in their district and what they had accomplished reigned as the most powerful inspiration the officers had. Almost daily pep talks from the ranking officers likely kept several officers from making the mistake of leaving their job and career in the wake of the disaster.

As soon as the water receded enough from the station at 1930 Martin Luther King, the personnel moved back. Talk of getting back to some type of normalcy circulated among the officers. This mood continued until the writing of this report.
Department of Police
Interoffice Correspondence

Captain Anthony W. Cannatella, Sr.

To: Commander, 6th District

Date: Wednesday 10-12-2005

Lieutenant Michael Glasser

From: Commander, NightWatch, 6th District

Subject: After Action Report: Hurricane KATRINA

Sir:

Prior to Hurricane Katrina's arrival, a significant number of 6th district personnel opted to establish refuge in the Hampton Inn & Suites at 1201 Convention Center Boulevard. This site remained an alternative base camp throughout the entire operation, offsetting the primary base camp site of the Walmart at 1901 Tchoupitoulas Street.

The first of the numerous obstacles encountered was the loss of electrical power which occurred during the passing of the storm. Limited power was re-established through the use of gasoline powered generators. Use of generators was limited to availability and the ability to redirect use from other concerns. Use of the generators underscored the next crucial concern, that being the lack of gasoline for both the police vehicles and the generators. This obstacle was overcome by identifying local sources of uncontaminated gasoline and developing impromptu siphon-pumping devices to access the fuel reserves. Automotive fuel pumps were acquired through local but absent vendors and reconfigured to provide a portable means by which to access fuel reserves. The ersatz devices were designed to draw power from the vehicle's battery and used to refuel the vehicles and portable supply cans for the generators. Several such units were constructed and provided to the 4th and 2nd Districts to assist with their fueling needs.
Contiguous with the development of fuel acquisition was the identification and security of food, water, medical, and hygiene supplies. The Walmart provided the most obvious and logistically sound source of nearly inexhaustible supply. In spite of early looting incidents, the Walmart presented supply opportunities which satisfied the basic needs of the district, until more conventional and appropriate sources of supply were established.

As representatives from out-of-state police agencies arrived, issues of fresh uniform components, and other police-specific equipment were overcome by their generosity. Supplemental patrol by these other agencies gave relief to both personnel and fleet assets.

Desertions and insubordination issues were not pervasive in the 6th district and remained extremely limited throughout the operation. Decisive and affirmative leadership offset the erosion of confidence and moral exacerbated by desertions, personal property losses, and limited flow of information. Compromised police radio communication was supplanted by Verizon and Nextel wireless handsets until viable police radio communication was re-established.

In summary, major areas of concern were lack of:

- Communication
  (Police Radio, TV and Civilian Radio, Headquarters Instructions & Cellular Communication).
- Food, Water, Medical, Hygiene, Police-specific Supplies.
- Fuel and Vehicle Maintenance Support.
- Adequate and Secure Housing Sites.
- Erosion of Morale and Confidence in the Police Department's Ability to Provide Adequate Service to both the Public and the Members of the Force

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Lieutenant Michael Glasser
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

Deputy Chief Steven Nicholas
TO: Commander, Operations Bureau

DATE: October 12, 2005

Captain Robert Bardy
FROM: Commander, Seventh District

SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina - After Action Report

Sir,

Following Hurricane Katrina, the Seventh District would like to make the following suggestions.

Two Days prior to the storm officers who request it should be given furlough in order to evacuate their families and get them settled into a location outside the city. In order to allow a large number of officers furlough at the same time, overtime should be made available to the Districts to fill the patrol vacancies.

All Department personnel should be required to report prior to the storm (in this case at 6:00 pm on the Sunday). Having half the officers required to report after the storm resulted in a large number being stranded and a breakdown in Command and Control since many of the stranded personnel were supervisors.

Many Department personnel found their own locations to ride out the storm. All Departmental personnel should be required to go to specific locations which are known to the Operations Bureau. These locations should have food, water, extra radio batteries, charges, generators, and fuel.

Ideally, the Department should have one centralized location near Canal and the River where the officers and the Police Vehicles would be high and dry, available to respond back to their respective districts. This was done during Hurricane Rita, with the Department being housed at the Sheraton Hotel. Again, this location should have the above listed supplies should there be a delay in receiving outside assistance.

All District Commanders should be provided with a satellite phone for communication with Headquarters.

Districts should have boats available to begin rescue operations soon after the storm has passed. The Districts should also have high-water vehicles equipped with snorkel kits to allow the vehicles to traverse flooded areas. Additionally, the Districts should have available multi seat vehicles (buses, vans, trucks, etc) for the evacuation of citizens.
Identify and establish a separate evacuation center for Police Families. Many officers might not have left had they known their family was being taken care of and not being dropped off at the Convention Center.

Prior to the Hurricane, RTA buses were transporting citizens to the Superdome. Prior to the storm, no citizens should be transported to the Superdome. Once a mandatory evacuation is ordered, citizens should be transported to the Amtrack Station where they can be transported by rail out of the area.

Citizen Evacuation Centers for after the storm should be named prior to the storm and they should be supplied with food and water.

Respectfully Submitted,

Captain Robert Bardy
Commander, Seventh District
Sir,

The Seventh District response to the approach and aftermath Hurricane Katrina was poor. We were not properly prepared and due to our lack of training for this type of situation; therefore, we obtained median accomplishments based on trial and error tactics. Our first error was that many of our officers were AWP or were allowed to work earlier shifts prior the approach of the storm. After completion of the shifts, the officers were allowed to go to their residence. This allowed officers to become victims, themselves, and slowed the process of the police responding to other’s calls for help. Many officers were forced to retreat into their attics in an attempt to flee the rising flood waters and were stranded for many hours (some for days) awaiting rescue. Once the officers were rescued, they were “dropped off” and made conscious decisions, themselves, relative to their survival.

Other groups of officers were housed in numerous locations within New Orleans at places ranging from hotels to Methodist Hospital. Once the crisis began, there were officers without supervision left to maintain order at which ever location they found themselves. Many officers reported being fired upon by civilians, accosted by individuals they were attempting to help and even threatened as they attempted to care for the sick and elderly.

As we have been told many times before, there is strength in numbers. In the days prior to the storm, all officers should have been authorized overtime so that officers may request annual and properly secure his/her family and property. This would allow adequate coverage for citizens of New Orleans, while establishing piece of mind for the officers working the front line during the storm. Two days prior to the storm, all essential personnel should have been ordered to work in and attempt to gather accurate information for staffing to account to each officer.

At the approach of the storm, the Seventh District should have evacuated all officers (with the exception of a small crew of 5 officers) to a central location near Canal and the river. The five officers, consisting of one supervisor, should have remained at the highest point in the Seventh District for serious emergency response. As the storm passed and safety was established, evacuated officers could have returned to the district for patrol or should that have been impossible (as with this storm) officers were at one centralized location and could have began rescue missions as a group or could have been deployed to other parts of the city as deemed necessary (Convention Center or Superdome).
The Seventh District also experienced a large number of officers fleeing the city but later returning to work. Many cited the reason for their departure as "to check on family". Again, this could have been avoided had they been ordered to secure their family and property days prior to the storm and report for duty 48 hours prior to projected landfall of the hurricane.

Once each stranded officer was rescued and others were located, the Seventh District collectively rescued hundreds of individuals that were trapped by the effects of Hurricane Katrina. Most of us did not expect such devastation with the approach of this hurricane, although many meteorologists warned of the effects that a storm such as this could have on the city. This was traumatic experience for everyone involved and we should be better prepared for this sort of disaster should it happen again.

Respectfully Submitted

[Signature]

Lieutenant Kim Williams

cc: file
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

TO: Captain Robert Bary
Commander, Seventh District
FROM: Lieutenant Blaine Austin
Third Platoon
SUBJECT: Post Incident Critique – Hurricane Katrina

DATE: 10/6/05

Captain,

It is obvious that our department was not prepared for Hurricane Katrina. By means of this correspondence I would like to point out a few things that could have been done better, and offer suggestions for dealing with storms in the future.

First, the day before the storm all of the department’s personnel should report for duty. There is no sense in anyone staying home, just to be calling for help on the police radio from their attic as their house floods.

I spoke to an officer during the storm who advised me a fellow officer in Florida could not believe we actually stayed in the city for a hurricane. He stated his department evacuates their officers, and then brings them back after the storm. I feel this is a good idea to an extent. In the future maybe we could evacuate maybe 50% of the department’s manpower, and send them to Baton Rouge along with most of our departmental vehicles.

I understand we lost over 300 vehicles during the storm. There was no reason for this. We could convoy them up to Baton Rouge, and stage them perhaps at the State Police Academy until after the storm. Commanders should keep in touch via satellite phones until a time is decided upon to return after the storm.

Next, the chaos at the Superdome should could have been prevented. Most of the officers that do not evacuate could be stationed at the Superdome, or whatever other facility the city decides to use as a shelter. If the Dome was used for example, a Captain should be appointed as overall commander of the facility, maybe a Lieutenant, 4 Sergeants, and 20 patrolmen from each district should be assigned there during the storm, and the highest covered floor of the parking garage could have been used to keep police vehicles safe.

The personnel would report there when the winds reached a certain predetermined speed. During and after the storm these personnel could provide security. After the storm they could also be ready to hit the streets (if possible), and hold it down until the contingent from Baton Rouge made it back to the city.
Of course some districts that never flood, like the Fourth, could remain manned to give us a presence on the Westbank.

Finally, it was impossible to make arrest when the looting started after the storm because there was nowhere to bring any prisoners. In the future we should set up a temporary lockup before the storm, maybe at the Superdome or whatever shelter is being used for citizens. This could be coordinated with the Sheriff's office, and maybe the OPSO could provide personnel to man it.

Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]

Lieutenant Blaine Austin
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE  
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE  

TO: Captain Robert Bardy  
Commander, Seventh District  

DATE: 10-6-05  

FROM: Lieutenant Michael Lohman  
DIU. Commander, Seventh District  

SUBJECT: Hurricane “Katrina” After Action Report  

Sir,  
The following after action report was compiled from suggestions made by members of the Seventh District D.I.U. and Task Force Units.  

- Reporting time on day of the storm. We were ordered to report for duty three to four hours after the storm made landfall. As various areas of the city flooded heavily, some members were unable to report at the required time. A suggestion would be to have all officers report prior to the storm’s anticipated land fall.  
- Communications. This was a major problem during and directly after the storm passed. Radio communications were nonexistent. Information from the command staff was not disseminated to the Seventh District as well. A suggestion would be to provide all district commanders with a satellite phone.  
- Alternate staging sites for district personnel. Seventh District personnel were scattered throughout the district. A suggestion would be to identify two separate staging sites within the district complete with extra radio batteries, radios, food supplies, drinking water, etc.  
- Boats should be available for use at these staging sites to be used for water rescue efforts. High water vehicles should also be available and should include multi seat vehicles to be used for citizen transport.  
- Outside resources. Resources and outside agencies should be divided equally among all districts. Initially there were no other agencies aiding the Seventh District. Additionally, the Seventh District resorted to obtaining their own supplies (water, food, etc.) with no outside help.  
- Identify and establish a separate evacuation center for police officers family members. Each officer was burdened with protecting and caring for their family members that could not or did not evacuate. This increased the stress level of the officers and presented additional problems for the rank.  
- Citizen evacuation centers should be named prior to the storm and should be supplied with drinking water, food, etc. Police would then have a defined center to take all evacuees, thus alleviating any confusion.  
- Amtrak train station should be utilized as an evacuation center so as to aid in the transport of evacuees from the city.  

Please advise if any further information is needed.  

Respectfully submitted,
TO: Acting Superintendent of Police
FROM: Commander, Eighth District
SUBJECT: After Action Report for Hurricane Katrina

Sir,

The following is an after action report detailing the operations of the Eighth District from one day prior to Hurricane Katrina until the present:

As Hurricane Katrina was approaching the City of New Orleans, the Eighth District made preparations to weather the storm at two hotels located within the boundaries of the district. They were the Hilton Riverside and Omni Royal Orleans. These preparations were made because the Eighth District station was not equipped with a generator or any other equipment capable of supporting police officers in a time of emergency. Also, a majority of the vehicles assigned to the Eighth District were placed in elevated parking lots to prevent them from being damaged during the storm. All officers except one reported to duty when being called in for emergency activation status for Hurricane Katrina.

After the storm struck the City of New Orleans, the Eighth District abandoned the damaged command post at the Hilton Riverside and moved operations to the Omni Royal Orleans. Once the extent of the damage to the city became apparent, members of the Eighth District began aiding in the evacuation of tourists, hotel guests, and residents. This was done by transporting them to evacuation centers and physically escorting vehicles over the Crescent City Connection towards Baton Rouge.

After the Omni Royal Orleans was completely evacuated, the Eighth District abandoned its police station and moved all operations to the hotel. A command post was established on the second floor of the hotel which served as the police station. The hotel was equipped with an emergency generator which powered only a few hallway lights. The hotel was not equipped with air conditioning or running water.

The Eighth District was joined by the commands of Captain April Overman and Captain Thomas Smegal at the Omni Royal Orleans. The officers assigned to these units assisted the Eighth District in providing security to the French Quarter.
Once this evacuation was completed, the members of the Eighth District established a security perimeter around the French Quarter to insure its safety as thousands of refugees flowed through the streets towards the Superdome and the Convention Center. These officers monitored the crowds as they passed through to insure that violations of the law were kept to a minimum. A few isolated incidents of looting were reported and these were confined to grocery stores and other businesses which contained the necessities to support life.

This perimeter was maintained throughout the event to insure the safety of the property within the Eighth District and also the residences that elected not to evacuate. Particular attention was given to the dozens of historic buildings and landmarks within the Eighth District. None of these were damaged by looters during this event.

Per orders of the Chief of Operations, the Eighth District provided a security force of approximately thirty-five officers at the Convention Center for several days. These officers provided security on the exterior of Hall “C”. These officers assisted in the general security, feeding, and loading on to buses for the tens of thousand evacuees who were housed at this facility.

The Eighth District maintained regular patrols of the Eighth District utilizing police vehicles, scooters and golf carts with what little gasoline the officers could acquire from the Crescent City Connection Police. Upon the arrival of the United States Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, the officers began joint patrols with the army on a twenty-four hour basis. The 82nd Airborne established a communication center at the Omni Royal Orleans to facilitate efficient communications between the two units. The 82nd Airborne was a great asset to the Eighth District.

The Eighth District established an excellent working relationship with the outside agencies that came to assist us in our operations. Some of the agencies that assisted the Eighth District were as follows: Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, Louisiana State Police, New Mexico State Police, New York State Police, Maryland State Police, Task Force Blue Crab, Task Force Tiger, Oklahoma National Guard, Kentucky National Guard, and the Louisiana National Guard.

The Eighth District had four officers who left their posts during the storm and did not return to duty, three who were suspended for returning after the deadline, and eleven officers who left their assignments but later returned to duty. The latter group is currently under investigation by the Public Integrity Bureau.
The Eighth District was greatly assisted by nine police recruits who elected to stay at the Omni Royal Orleans Hotel after being allowed the chance to evacuate with the other civilians. They were John Fulhenco, Nicola Cotton, Cory Fox, Bruce Clemons, Mathias Rush, David Sierra, Mark Williams, Erica Whitfield and Craig Mosley. These recruits prepared three meals a day in the kitchen of the hotel for over one hundred emergency personnel. The kitchen area was not air conditioned or ventilated. The temperature in the kitchen was constantly over one hundred degrees but these recruits worked hard and they did not complain. They were given the opportunity to evacuate several times but they elected to stay with their fellow officers. They deserve to be recognized for their actions.

Respectfully submitted,

Captain Kevin B. Anderson
Commander, Eighth District

Approved / Disapproved

Steven Nicholas
Chief of Operations

Approved / Disapproved

Warren J. Riley
Acting Superintendent of Police
TO: Assistant Superintendent Daniel Lawless
Policy, Planning, and Training Bureau

FROM: Captain Mark Willow
Homeland Security Division

After Action Report – Hurricane Katrina

Sir:

Below are the items noticed by members of the Homeland Security Division concerning Hurricane Katrina.

Mutual Aid Radio Channels-
The mutual aid channels used by department in the wake of the catastrophic loss of the NOPD, NOFD, and EMS radio system need to be analyzed. The department used primarily one channel which was only good within a small geographical area (my estimate about 3-5 miles). There were obviously no repeaters and this “talk around” meant that transmissions were hard to hear and officers from one district distant to another district could not communicate. This was evident when personnel from the City Hall BOC had to go onto the roof of city hall in order to contact Captain Bayard when he was over 3 miles from city hall. Since this is a government mandated system and not NOPD, this is not a criticism of our department, only a warning that in the future use of these mutual aid channels is not a repeater driven system we are used to using. Although we were sporadically sharing the channel with NOFD and Jefferson Parish Law Enforcement, this was not a problem. In fact, I facilitated numerous radio transmissions between police officers reporting fire related incidents with fire supervisors using “plain text”. Plain text is a NIMS mandated term meaning officers use plain text words instead of the traditional 10-Codes. This was also used in transmissions between our officers and the medical representative. Myself, Lt. Marchese, and Sgt. Bondio became defacto dispatchers in the temporary time of the mutual aid from roughly Tuesday night through Thursday night. This system actually worked fairly well given city hall was the only functioning place where other emergency disciplines such as fire, ems, and health had representatives. Examples where this came in handy were police shootings, fires, medical emergencies, and the large fire at 3000 Chartres where outside entities were needed. In the future, I recommend some group, be specifically tasked to act as defacto dispatchers should the mutual aid system come into use if catastrophic events such as Katrina repeat themselves in destroying our communication center, the backup at fire headquarters, and the Jefferson Parish communications system simultaneously.
After Action Report
Page 2

High Profile Trucks-
A large problem was the number of "deuce and a half" trucks available. This may not be the fault of any one group due to the totality of the circumstances. What was evident was the fact these trucks were in short supply considering the overall circumstances of this event. Our department could have used a number of trucks dedicated for criminal patrols with a squad of officers. Due to the shortage, our department was literally forced to make the decision of whether to save the lives of trapped civilians or to go on criminal patrols. In future events, the "deuce and a half" trucks should be pre-positioned and in sufficient number to handle both rescue and criminal patrols which may have helped control some of the looting calls which were not accessible by cars. Our department should consider obtaining some similar trucks (which could be used for other uses such as barricade deployment) for future use.

Jails/Holding Facilities
Due to the catastrophic failure of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office jails and holding facilities our department was in large part, unable to make any arrests from Monday morning August 29, 2005 until Friday September 2, 2005. Because our department lacks an institutional knowledge required to handle temporary housing of prisoners, I believe this situation greatly contributed to the criminal activity during that time period. Again this is something that is no fault of any one agency, but represents a unique situation not seen before by our department or city. Because we were helpless to make arrests in numbers that needed to be made quickly I suggest the following. Our department should have a division or district which is tasked with at least rudimentary prisoner holding skills and a plan to hold arrestees along with some equipment such as restraints long periods of detention. Our department should also identify 3 sites in areas not prone to flooding where our department can hold arrests in emergency conditions. In addition, our department should absolutely assign one person as liaison with the Louisiana Department of Corrections as a contact for emergency prisoner holding. The temporary holding facility erected by the state at the AMTRAK facility was a great success and filled a need for holding of prisoners when needed most. An interesting concept which could be explored would be the use of National Guard troops trained in handling prisoners of war who might be pressed into service in the event our regular local corrections system would have a similar failure in the future.
Emergency Boat Rescue

The emergency boat rescue conducted by our department saved tens of thousands of victims and I personally consider that effort to be the proudest event in the history of this police department. This effort was done with little or no prior training and excelled due to the leadership and dedication of department members who stepped up to fill the void caused by the circumstances. Our department should immediately address the lack of small boat assets possessed by our department and staff a small unit to maintain the motors and boats. Regular training by department members should be ongoing throughout the year including marine exercises with other UASI parishes, state and federal agencies such as the Coast Guard and State Police. Our department should consider tasking certain units with emergency marine rescue responsibilities such as what the Narcotics and Vice Division did during this event. These units could immediately supplement the Marine Division if needed.

The one distressing element to Hurricane Katrina rescue effort was the refusal or inability of the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries to send a representative to the New Orleans Office of Emergency Preparedness in order to help coordinate rescue efforts. Most attempts to work with the LDWF in an incident command capacity were met with negative results and a general refusal by their personnel to participate in a cooperative effort. This should be remedied with a MOU or executive order of some type, and done as soon as possible.

Human Remains Removal

There was a lack of coordination between our department and the agency tasked with human remains removal. There was not a concerted effort to retrieve bodies for approximately 10 days. There was a great deal of confusion as to who was responsible (coroner, DMORT, state) for body retrieval even amongst the local Office of Emergency Preparedness. As a result, bodies remained in the street for days at a time. Due to the fact our coroner's office was flooded, that office was rendered ineffectual for an extended period of time. No representative ever appeared at the city Office of Emergency Preparedness and our department had no guidance as to what do with remains. This included two perpetrators shot by police and one officer who committed suicide. Our department made arrangements in both cases to secure the remains. This is not and should not have been our responsibility, but was undertaken due to the failure of any other entity to do so. This is a condition that should not be repeated in the future. A clear understanding of this problem should be thought through long before the next disaster occurs and a local or state agency should be tasked for body recovery. That agency should also have a clear understanding of the incident command system and be able to function in a pre-determined location in a nearby parish such as St. Charles or St. John the Baptist Parish should their primary location be destroyed.
Homeland Security Information Network

The Homeland Security Information Network was used by the Louisiana State Police to forward calls for service received in Baton Rouge back to New Orleans via the internet. This effort by members of the Louisiana State Police (Lt. Lane Barnum and Sgt. Doug Cain) was a bright spot in this disaster and all those members of the LSP who participated in this effort should be commended greatly for their ingenuity and hard work in a short period of time. This system allowed our dispatchers to view real time complaints and to dispatch emergencies in the early days when our 911 system was not totally operational. Their work should also be commended, especially in the early days of this event. I suggest the NOPD Homeland Security Division be tasked with continued work with the state police on keeping this system in place. Our Homeland Security Division currently uses the system for its terrorism monitoring mission and should maintain its membership in this system.

Emergency Bids

In the days and weeks following the hurricane, certain emergencies and needs for emergency equipment came about. At times, the regular city bid process was insisted upon by members of city government. I suggest certain bid law practices might be looked at in order to streamline or eliminate needs for competitive bids during emergencies. Certain things such as hazardous material cleanup were needed and the process slowed by limitations forced by bid laws. Our city’s Office of Emergency Preparedness should have fiscal personnel ready to help guide unique emergency requests to the state such as the Crime Lab and Central Evidence and Property cleanup.

Incident Command System

Our department should continue with the Incident Command Training that was started Pre-Katrina. This should expand into a department wide training curriculum similar to the Weapons of Mass Destruction (AWR-160) training our department has been participating in with the University of New Orleans.

Tabletop Exercises

Tabletop exercises are a valid way to test preparedness and should be practiced by our department singly and in larger multi-jurisdictional settings. However, it is my opinion a false sense of security comes from some of these exercises. It was apparent in this case, help from other outside sources did not come as quickly as many persons thought, including myself. Our department should learn a lesson that in the future, assets such as truck, MREs, boats, etc. may be delayed in the real world. This is in stark contrast to the Tabletop Exercise world. Again, I offer no quick solutions or fixes to this problem, only the warning we should be prepared for delays in equipment acquisition.
Military Communications

It should be recognized the military provided our department with a tremendous amount of support throughout this event. It was apparently however, there are significant communications issues to be overcome by widely different communications systems. This may not be an easy issue to resolve, but it is important to realize for future events that communications between police units and military units via radio may not be possible. Many persons, myself included, incorrectly believed the military units on the field all had radios. It is apparent many military squads had one radio operator and soldiers working small 2 or 4 person guard details may not have radios. This was also a problem at some checkpoints. Again, there may be very little our department can do about this problem in the short run, but it should be realized for future events.

Pets in Shelters

This is not an issue that is controlled by or should be the function of the New Orleans Police Department. I have been told by SPCA representatives that pet sheltering is done in other areas of the country. This should be explored by our local OEP and SPCA with the thought of implementation before the next storm. I am convinced some of the fatalities in New Orleans and surrounding areas may be attributable to the fact victims would not leave their pets at home or would not consider leaving without them.

Respectfully submitted,

Captain Mark Willow
Homeland Security Division

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED

Assistant Superintendent Daniel Lawless
Policy, Planning, and Training Bureau
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

TO: Assistant Superintendent Daniel Lawless
    Policy, Planning, and Training Bureau

FROM: Captain Mark Willow
    Homeland Security Division

After Action Report – Hurricane Katrina - Addendum

Sir:

Below are the items noticed by members of the Homeland Security Division concerning Hurricane Katrina.

Alternate EMD sites
An alternate gasoline distribution site should be identified on both the east bank, west bank of both New Orleans and Jefferson Parish and done so in advance of any hurricanes or other large scale events. This should include a site for minor repairs such as tire repairs.

Security Guards
In the aftermath of the hurricane there were literally dozens of security personnel who appeared on the streets, many apparently from out of town. This needs to be addressed probably on the state level. Perhaps our Special Officers Division could be mobilized in the future to monitor this.

Gun Stores
Due to the looting of commercial outlets that sell or repair guns our department was faced with armed criminals who might not have had access to guns under normal circumstances. Our city or state should at least investigate minimum security regulations for any business that handles guns. After this, I am of the opinion some sort of gun safe should be mandated or at least major security measures should be in place at those locations. Some suggestions would be unbreakable windows, burglar bars, etc. that is enforced by regular inspections.

Respectfully submitted,

Captain Mark Willow
Homeland Security Division

APPROVED/DISAPPROVED

Assistant Superintendent Daniel Lawless
Policy, Planning, and Training Bureau
Department of Police  
Interoffice Correspondence

Date: October 5, 2005

To: Lt. Richard A. Williams Sr.  
Commander, Recruitment Division

From: Sergeant John F. Deshotel  
Recruitment & Applicant Division

Subject: After Action Report regarding Hurricane Katrina

INTRODUCTION:

The following is a list of issues and concerns that were discussed by members of our rank and file concerning the Hurricane Katrina Assignments. It is understood that no one could have properly prepared for the impact that Hurricane Katrina had on our city, but it is also hoped that some of the negative issues being discussed, could possibly be rectified when we are faced with our next major catastrophe. Some of the issues discussed were actual experiences by officers under our command. Other issues are observations from other units, yet still a direct affect on our organization.

AREAS IN NEED OF IMPROVEMENT:

Consideration should be given to another safe haven for our vehicles to be stored in order to prevent what happened with the cars at the Superdome. We should also consider another location to be used as an evacuation site that can handle large numbers of people. Obviously the Superdome could not handle the category five storm.

The loss of our radio system, as well as the loss of our radio shop at Police Headquarters were both critical to our department’s operation. We should select a new site, above ground level, that would not be subjected to the flood waters of future storms. It is understood that since Hurricane Katrina we have acquired a modernized radio system that was provided and coordinated by the Federal Government that should protect us against future system failure.

What was unique about this catastrophe, was that the majority of the first responders, were victim’s themselves. The first responders were trying to help others when they too were in need of help.

Many of our officers lost their families, their property, and basically everything they had to their name. But they had to put on their game faces and handle the mission despite their own growing grief. There was absolutely no counseling or compassion being offered by the supervisors to the victimized officers.
After Action Report regarding Hurricane Katrina

We as a department were faced with something that was unheard of, in the City of New Orleans, yet we continued with the twenty-four hour shifts and completed our mission as First Responders.

Many of our officers expressed concerns that there was not anything in place to care for their families, such as shelters, that would have assured their families safety, while they worked the catastrophic event. A pre-determined area of shelter, for police officer’s families, could have eliminated the extra pressure of officers being worried about family with minimal to no phone service being available during the storm.

It is also understood that the Government’s response to our city’s tragedy was slow. During the evacuation of the Dome, we lost all Emergency Medical Teams including the military. There was absolutely no medical support available at all and dozens of people in need of medical attention. At one point I had THREE PEOPLE passed out at my ankles at the same time. They fainted from heat exhaustion while waiting for the bus evacuations. That incident was truly overwhelming for me, considering I had absolutely no medical resources available to me. It is hoped that situations of this nature can also be rectified by our next natural disaster.

ASSIGNMENTS AT THE DOME:

Another area of concern, related by our officers, was the lack of organization with the assignments at the Superdome. We were well understaffed to handle the number of people that were in the Dome to begin with, but there were many specialized units, who did nothing at all during the entire dome assignment. Their lack of participation was noted on several occasions, but it was never addressed or rectified by unit commanders.

Though the services of The National Guard Unit was appreciated, they were not trained on crowd control as we were, which presented another problem. As time went on at the dome the evacuees grew angry. They later welcomed the intervention by NOPD officers for they exclaimed that the military “was not sensitive to them and they treated them like animals.”

The police officers on the other hand were also growing tired. They too were frustrated and expressed concerns about feeling unsafe, due to the unruly crowds, lack of manpower and inoperable communications equipment. The officers also complained about no accommodations for hot food, personal necessities (i.e. portable toilet or showers) or portable air conditioning units or fans; basically the same concerns expressed by the evacuee’s.

The officers were under the false impression that their Supervisors were looking out for themselves, while enjoying the afore-mentioned accommodations at the Hyatt Hotel. The officers were upset that they were not allowed to enjoy the same privileges.
After Action Report regarding Hurricane Katrina

THE NEED FOR COUNSEL:

It is unfortunate that most of the members of our unit lost everything that they owned. Under usual circumstances, they would have been granted Furlough or other types of leave to attend to their personal problems. The officers would also have been referred for psychological evaluations, because of the stress level they were enduring, working the extreme amount of hours, under the extreme conditions of the storm aftermath.

The officers felt neglected, by their rank, for the way they claim we ignored their personal tragedy. Again, not to point fingers, but if time would have been taken, to think outside the box, we may have responded differently to our officer’s loss. We may have considered offering them grieving time or counseling as best available, to help them deal with their tragedy. Hurricane Katrina did not provide us with text book answers to the scenarios we were faced with. Hopefully, we will grow from our past mistakes and be prepared to respond differently in the event we are faced with a similar situation in the future.

The majority of the officers working this event were putting themselves, their co-workers, and the public they served at risk by trying to work their assignments while being actual victim’s themselves. I watched the looks, on several of the officer’s faces that were swollen to tears. They were trying to stay strong, but they are only human. Proper counseling and adequate time to grieve may have prevented the loss of life of one of our Police Officers.

Tempers flared on various occasions, including ranking officers. Animosities grew and many things were said out of stress and anxiety that would probably not have been said under normal circumstances. Some officers who should have been decommissioned and sent for counseling were given rifles instead and allowed to continuing working while choosing their own assignments.

ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS:

Officers were making decisions out of desperation. Some decisions were not the best decisions as demonstrated by the Sewell Cadillac incident. Many officers felt they needed to fend for themselves in order to survive. Again there were no text book scenarios or instructional videos to guide us through the aftermath of Katrina.

Many of our police officers were believed to be dead for they were last heard on the police radio pleading for rescue from their rooftops.

There was the wide spread cases of looting throughout the city. That same looting resulted in the shooting of veteran Police Officer Kevin Thomas. Remarkably he is okay, by the grace of God, and the looting problem was then addressed swiftly by S.O.D. and Task Force Units.
After Action Report regarding Hurricane Katrina

Again this event was something that none of us had ever prepared for. There was no specialized training on how we should act or react, and just like the public we served, we suffered the pain, anxiety and exhaustion that everyone else did too.

Hopefully the above mentioned issues can be reviewed and measures can be put in place to avoid this situation in case of another catastrophic event.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:

On a brighter note I speak for the men and women of our unit when I say we commend Lt. Williams for the handling of what would have been a potential riot following the shooting of a National Guard Soldier one late night at the Superdome.

The crowd had grown angry due to the conditions at the Dome, with days of extreme temperatures, no food, water, toilets or bathing facilities. There were no evacuation attempts in place yet and the population was beginning to assemble against us. This forced us to step in and diffuse the situation. Our unit worked the hostile crowd for over two hours that morning restoring order and building a rapport with them. It was the leadership of Lt. Williams, who first addressed the hostile crowds, that guided us through that ordeal.

In addition to the above, special recognition should also be given to Chief Lonnie Swain, for his handling of the bus evacuations from the Dome through the New Orleans Center. Not only did he issue the operating orders to the officers, but he physically worked the crowds with his officers as the evacuations took place. The officers have expressed on numerous occasions that they respected and appreciated the leadership and hard work by Chief Swain during those very trying times. Chief Swain was also the only person who inquired about what was going to happen with his officers following the evacuation of the citizens. (ie “Would we be bussed out too? ” etc.) The officers appreciated his gesture of concern for their well being.

Additionally, special recognition should be given to all officers involved in the rescue and recovery efforts and the Special Operations SWAT Team for the numerous incidents they handled during the aftermath of the hurricane. I know that some recognizable situations are being overlooked, in this report but as a whole, despite all of the problems, we as a department survived the storm, and the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.

Special recognition should be given to all of our commanders who guided us through this incident, including Mayor Nagin, who stood firm in his handling of the catastrophe.

Though many officers are complaining about our pay, I am grateful for the mirror checks we have been receiving. It is much better than no pay at all, until the system is up and running again.
After Action Report regarding Hurricane Katrina

It is also my opinion that we should be extremely grateful for the services of the Carnival Cruise Lines for housing and serving us in our time of need.

Though I am sure there are many incidents and situations that were not covered in this report, these are my remarks concerning the handling of the Hurricane Katrina Event.

Respectfully submitted;

Sgt. John F. Deshotel
Recruitment & Applicant Investigation
Hurricane Katrina
After Action Report

Overview

This after action report was constructed using a common management strategy model known as the S.W.O.T. analysis. S.W.O.T. is the acronym for strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. Additionally, the report includes some FEMA recommendations regarding strategies that should be employed throughout the "Emergency Management Cycle". The four parts of the "Emergency Management Cycle" outlined by FEMA includes activities during 1. mitigation, 2. preparation, 3. response, and 4. recovery.

Summary of Assignment and Responsibilities

The Recruitment and Applicant Investigation Division consists of one lieutenant, two sergeants, eleven police officers, and three clerical staff. After preparing for the division's role during Hurricane Katrina, all commissioned personnel were determined to be essential and informed to make preparations for their families. The clerical staff was determined to be nonessential and informed to make preparations to evacuate when the order was given by the Mayor.

After the evacuation order was given, the Recruitment and Applicant Investigation Division was assigned by Captain Ernest Demma to report to the Louisiana Superdome for 6:00pm on Sunday, August 28, 2005. (The Superdome was identified as a shelter of last resort for evacuees.) The members of the division were assigned to report for 5:00pm to make final preparations to the Recruitment Division Office. The staff were instructed to lift all computer equipment off of the floor and take all files out of the bottom drawers of the file cabinets and place them on top of the file cabinets. This was done to move the files out of harms way in the event water was to breach the first floor of police headquarters. The staff then convoyed to the Superdome for assignment.

Upon arrival at the Superdome, the staff casually assembled with other units assigned to the Superdome in one of the quads on the Loge level of the dome. During this time, a hot meal was provided for the members of the department and the members of the Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff Office, who were also initially assigned to the Superdome. At this point the division's role was unknown and the members were unaware of the City and Superdome management's plan of operation for the shelter of last resort. Later that night, the staff was assigned to patrol the Loge level of the Superdome, establish a presence at the back door in the receiving area of the Superdome, and custody of the room assigned as a sleeping area for first responders. Other divisions were assigned to other tasks.

The Superdome began to populate with evacuees and continued throughout the night. The evacuees were assembled on the ground level where they were searched and then housed in the seating area on the Plaza level of the Superdome. As the Hurricane arrived on Monday, August 29, 2005, wind and rain began battering the roof of the Superdome. Power was lost causing the facility to operate off of minimal lighting. The roof was...
breached in several spots and rain water began to fall into the many areas of the Superdome. The evacuees were then shuffled back and forth between the halls, the stands and ultimately into the tunnels of the Superdome.

As evacuees continued to arrive, the population became more and more dense and more difficult to supervise. The ceilings in the sleeping area for first responders and other areas of the Superdome began caving in due to rain water leaking into the dome. Additionally, the restrooms were lost due to the contamination of the water and inability to get service for the toilets and urinals. As more and more evacuees were brought into the Superdome, the situation rapidly deteriorated.

The staff learned overnight on Tuesday morning, that the levees had been breached and that the city was flooding.

Due to the lack of food, clean water, toilets, ceiling leaks, and flooding, the Recruitment staff and other divisions relocated to the parking garage and moved the police vehicles to higher ground. From this point on, the staffs continued their assignments in the Superdome; however, napping, meetings, and other business was done in the parking lot.

For the next several days, the division experienced the stress of officers loosing their homes, being separated from their families, working around the clock, lack of clean water, the inability to shower and tend to basic hygiene needs, a lack of clean clothing, shoes, and basic necessities, cohabitation with thousands of evacuees, extreme heat, being surrounded by flood water, the fear of being exposed to unknown bacteria and disease, learning of officer shootings, an officer being shot, two officer suicides, officers being trapped on rooftops, and the feeling of uncertainty and helplessness due to the lack of communication amongst personnel at the dome, and ultimately the loss of communication from the remainder of the city. This stress began to manifest itself in the form of bad decisions, distrust, arguments, post abandonment, segregation of personnel, and dissension amongst the divisions, supervisors, and officers assigned to the Superdome. This condition continued until the evacuation of the Superdome was complete, the waters somewhat receded, the officers’ vehicles were towed away from the Superdome, and the officers were given a couple of days off to reunite with their families and somewhat recover.

During the second week of the storm coverage, Lt. Williams was assigned to the City’s Office of Emergency Preparedness while other members of the unit were assigned to patrol Algiers and assist Entergy personnel, security at the Zoo, and to the Superintendent’s staff for documentation of the Hurricane event.

Ultimately, Lt. Williams and seven members of the staff were assigned to the NOPD Quartermaster Supply Distribution location to receive, coordinate, and redistribute uniforms, equipments, and supplies to police personnel. The staff remained in this assignment until the conclusion of the hurricane event. The only interruption was Lt.
Williams’ four day assignment to the Ecstasy Cruise Ship while it evacuated into the Gulf of Mexico away from Hurricane Rita.

Strengths

- The initial strengths of the assignment appeared to be that the Superdome was a secure shelter of last resort (although untested) and could house almost 75,000 people and first responders if necessary.

- Until the loss of power, water, and sewerage, the Superdome was able to provide restrooms and clean water for first responders and evacuees and cooked food for first responders.

- The Superdome provided high ground to park police and other city vehicles.

- The military was present to coordinate the ingress of evacuees into the Superdome and the egress of evacuees during the evacuation of the Superdome.

Weaknesses

- The Superdome and first responders were not prepared to handle the large number of evacuees nor the number of evacuees needing special medical care.

- Organizational structure for the police department’s participation was not established, explained, and rehearsed prior to the Hurricane.

- Police captains, lieutenants, and sergeants did not appear to be utilized efficiently and effectively.

  - Roles and responsibilities were not defined, divided, and consistent with the Incident Command System model.
  - Some supervisors were not advised of meetings while others were told not to attend meetings.

- The Recruitment staff and the other divisions were unaware of their responsibilities prior to arriving at the Superdome. Roles were never totally established.

- Insufficient training regarding emergency mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery.

- Insufficient training and guidance regarding legal issues such as the acquisition of private property during disasters and “Marshall Law”.
• Food, ice, lodging, and other necessities were not arranged for police personnel prior to the storm.

• Once radio and phone communication were lost, there were no contingencies established for police personnel to communicate with each other.

• The flow of information was slow to nonexistent. Once communication was lost, staff was not assigned as “runners” in a coordinated manner to continue the flow of information. The little communication that remained was uncoordinated and inefficient.

Opportunities

• Acknowledge mistakes and embrace opportunities for improvement.

• Learn from past mistakes and not repeat mistakes.

• Update the police department’s Emergency Preparedness Manual to include a detailed organizational chart and plan for the police department’s role before, during, and after assignment to a shelter of last resort.

• Assure that all personnel are aware of the errors and are provided with the opportunity to provide input for future planning.

• Network with the public and business communities to secure mutual aid, equipment, and supplies for first responders who are required to remain in the city during a disaster.

• Develop plan to secure dry goods, water, ice, portable toilets, showers, clothing, generators, and other necessities for police personnel prior to the disaster.

• Develop a system of communication that can be employed when electronic communication fails.

• Develop an exit strategy for the police department’s role at shelters.

Threats

• Failure to learn from past mistakes

• Failure to think outside the box such as assigning “communication runners” when the communication technology was lost.

• Failure to employ and carry out directives outlined in the Department’s Emergency Preparedness Manual.
Recruitment & Applicant Investigation
Hurricane Katrina
After Action Report

- Failure to develop a detailed organizational chart and plan for the police department’s role while assigned to a shelter of last resort.

- Officers abandoning their post and assignments due to personal and professional concerns.

This after action report is merely a summary of my perspectives regarding this event and the role and responsibilities of the Recruitment and Applicant Division. This report should not be considered exhaustive in any way.

Additionally, attached is a supplemental after action report prepared by Sgt. John Deshotel, also assigned to the Recruitment and Applicant Investigation Division.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Lt. Richard A. Williams, Sr.
To: Daniel Lawless
From: Lieutenant Gary Marchese
Subject: after action report concerning the OEP

Date: 10/6/2005

The role of the police department at the OEP was not defined:

- The police assigned to the OEP assumed the jobs of Fire, EMS, information officer and supply company, but controlled no resources.

It is essential that the police representative at the OEP have the power to deploy troops and resources.

- Thousands of federal troops were reporting to the city and the commanders were directed to city hall. The Commanding Officers reported to the OEP and asked where to deploy. The officers at OEP did not have the authority to deploy personnel nor were they kept up to date on where responding agencies and military were already working.

- Meetings were held with military commanders at the OEP and a comprehensive deployment plan was devised only to be discarded later. The exact same plan was then implemented after hours of delay.

The OEP was located at an inadequate facility, both operational and for housing 24 hour employees.

- There was no planning of the layout; members that needed to communicate were at opposite ends of the building.

- The building was not set up with computers until well into the incident.

- The OEP was shut down and evacuated for 14 hours during a critical time due to electrical and plumbing problems.
There was **NO INCIDENT COMMAND**. The command staff needs to attend training on ICS.

- There was no coordination between federal and local agencies, no command structure, and no communications. A central command post needed to be established and it needed to be manned by the Incident Commander.

- Multiple command centers were established, resulting in a duplication of effort, confusion on who to direct requests and resources to, and wasted man-hours.

- There was no defined chain of command. Anyone with rank walked into the OEP and began to bark orders and commands. This often resulted in conflicting orders.

- With the lack of an incident command system, various agencies showed up and did their own thing without coordinating with the New Orleans Police Department.

The OEP shut down for a week on the 3rd week of the incident allowing over 60 employees to leave without replacements.

The **OEP is not** a press room. The Press **do not** belong at the OEP, taking over the police work area causing a shutdown of the operation.

- The OEP police emergency phone number was given to the national press and became the phone line for Public Information Office. This resulted in the line constantly being tied up with reporters calling and requesting interviews.

- Officers working at the OEP became messengers for the Public Information Office preventing them from handling rescue calls, requests for help, ETC...

- A separate phone line needs to be set up for Public Information and manned by members of that unit.
- Inexperienced and/or unqualified departmental representatives from various city agencies were assigned to the OEP resulting in a vast majority of the calls being forwarded to the police, even though they were unrelated to Law Enforcement's roll in this incident. Simply put, the representative did not know what to say and forwarded the caller to the police line, distracting and often times prohibiting the police personnel from doing their job.

EMS was not present at the OEP until week 3.

- EMS provided no emergency response to calls and officers were left stranded with injured and dying people. This was after the situation had stabilized and the police were patrolling the dry areas.

- After EMS arrived, they shut down operations at 5pm and no calls were handled after dark.

Public advisories and media releases were not forwarded in a timely manner to the OEP creating confusion.

No coordination between federal and state agencies resulting in a duplication of efforts.

No defined chain of command, particularly when it pertained to the military.

- The military often acted as though the city was under a federal takeover, challenging and preventing police from doing their job.

- The military would take assignments and without warning, pull up leaving the assignment unmanned. When the assignment was found vacant and the military questioned, it was learned they had been given a new assignment unbeknownst to the NOPD.

- The soldiers sent to assist were often confrontational, and failed to do what was needed at checkpoints.

Wildlife and Fisheries refused to cooperate and meet with the NOPD to coordinate rescue efforts. Ranking officers from the Wildlife and Fisheries were spreading rumors that the NOPD had been decommissioned.
NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

TO:        Major James Treadaway
            Technical & Support Bureau
            DATE: October 16, 2005

FROM:      Captain April Overman
            Records and Information Systems Division

RE:        After-Action Report

Sir,

The Records and Information Systems Division respectfully submits the following after-action commentary.

- A large portion of Records Section personnel are non-essential. As such, they were dismissed Friday before the storm with instructions to monitor the storm's progress and to not report for duty on Monday morning if the storm's path threatened the city. This was a positive element of the planning process as it provided non-essential personnel adequate time to evacuate their families 3 days prior to the storm's landfall. In the event of a future category 4 or 5 storm that is not on a weekend, we would highly recommend dismissal of non-essential personnel as early as 72 hours prior to landfall in order to allow them adequate time to secure their homes and evacuate their families. We believe the good fortune of a weekend storm encouraged many of our personnel to evacuate who might have otherwise remained in the city.

- NCIC and AFIS civilian personnel are considered essential because of their roles in warrant verification and fingerprint identification. As these functions become more computerized, our ability to provide these services long-distance increases. Prior to next year's hurricane season, we would like to explore the possibility of relocating these civilians to their respective Department of Public Safety offices in Baton Rouge should a category 4 or 5 storm threaten the city. In retrospect, the failure of the communication system made our NCIC and AFIS personnel non-essential during the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and their evacuation proved to be an additional burden on our overtaxed resources. If future communication proves to be more robust, we believe these personnel would be able to work from distant locations with only moderate inefficiencies experienced.
Many employees were unsuccessful in attempting early evacuation of small children and elderly or infirm family members. The reason for this was the unreliability of hotel reservations and extremely slow traffic out of the city. The health risks associated with lengthy and unreliable evacuation travel will in most cases outweigh the risk of “riding out the storm” for senior citizens and individuals with health concerns. Some people’s health simply cannot tolerate an 8-hour trip to Baton Rouge that yields “no vacancy” or “your reservation has been cancelled” at every hotel. Within this division, one employee’s attempt to evacuate her elderly mother prior to the storm led to her mother’s hospitalization and ultimate death in Mississippi. Other employees were simply unable to evacuate themselves or their family for financial reasons due to lodging costs; this was particularly the case with many of the lower wage essential and non-essential civilians.

It would alleviate many burdens if the department would arrange advance accommodations to house essential employees’ families beginning a couple of days prior to a major storm’s landfall, as well as a caravan to ensure safe travel as a group. The crucial element to ensuring the full attention of essential employees is making certain they are able to place their loved ones in a safe environment prior to the storm. Several members also attempted to evacuate pets in advance, but met with “no vacancy” responses from boarding facilities north of I-12. Advance assistance from the SPCA with establishing an evacuation point for city employees’ pets a couple of days prior to a major storm’s landfall would also significantly reduce the post-storm rescue burden.

Essential personnel in NCIC were unable to secure cots prior to the storm, even though they were scheduled to be housed in Headquarters starting 6pm Sunday night. The unit has over 20 individuals assigned; but, when their rank went to the cot distribution center, they were told there were no more cots available.

Commissioned members found themselves woefully under-armed when called upon to secure headquarters and/or assist with looter control. While there is obviously not a tremendous need for long guns in the Record Room, it is important that the commissioned members are provided adequate armament and training for those occasions when their duties require such.

Even after cellphone and police radio communications ceased, most officers had some access to a battery-powered AM radio and were glued to it in an effort to find out what was happening throughout the city. The Department could have potentially used this communication medium to provide instructions and information to officers until such time as in-house communication could be restored. While security would prohibit announcements of rally points or other sensitive information, it would be feasible to provide personnel an advance plan of meetings sites or instructions and simply use AM radio to refer officers to particular pages or sections of the plan.
Commissioned members and essential civilians who were rescued after the storm from around the city found they were thrown in with all other evacuees, making it difficult or impossible for them to report anywhere for duty and leaving them with a general feeling that the Department had abandoned them as they were herded onto buses bound for unknown destinations. Even those evacuated from Headquarters were scattered between the Superdome, the Sheraton, and the Convention Center with no means of communicating between the 3 locations. Those fortunate enough to find other police personnel were able to band together for safety; however, those who were less fortunate found themselves stranded. We believe it is of utmost importance to provide for the safe and relatively comfortable evacuation of essential civilian employees in order to ensure they do not feel abandoned by their employer. Having a single rescue point for police department personnel with priority transportation either out of the city (for essential civilians and families of commissioned members) or to a functioning district station (for commissioned members) would have been in the best interest of all personnel.

With respect to Public Records systems, we believe a break in public service provision equivalent in time to City Hall's closure is acceptable. The digital storage devices were adequately backed up and preserved to prevent long-term data loss, and we are technologically prepared to resume normal operations upon the return of our non-essential civilian staff. Our only dilemma is lack of office space due to Headquarters' uninhabitable status. We are working with City Hall personnel to resolve this; however, it would greatly benefit Public Records to have an advance plan for working space in City Hall or another off-site location with city network connectivity in the event Headquarters becomes uninhabitable in the future.

With respect to NCIC, we believe this event demonstrated clearly that this is the Records Division's most critical function. Again, redundant systems and adequate back up procedures prevented long-term data loss. However, we were at-risk for the physical warrants stored in the NCIC office, and the necessity of those warrants for our work made it difficult to re-locate the NCIC operation. Ultimately, we removed almost 20 file cabinets of documentation to a secure office provided by the US Marshall's Service, without lights or elevators at Headquarters, in order to become operational as quickly as possible. We believe there is a better alternative for the future. An initiative was started in December 2004 to develop a digital storage program allowing warrants to be scanned into a secure network repository. While this would not "replace" the physical warrants if needed in court, it would mirror the information and allow warrants to be searched for purposes of verifying and/or clearing them. Had this system been in place, we could have become operational as soon as a secure intranet connection was available instead of having to wait for water to recede so massive document transfer could be accomplished. This initiative should be considered a high priority in advance of the 2006 hurricane season.
With respect to MDT and Crime Analysis, we foresee no long-term data loss due to adequate backup procedures and advance shut-down preparations designed to preserve the equipment. The Crime Analysis function became a low priority during the storm’s aftermath as it became necessary to divert those personnel to more general information technology functions. We further found that the loss of MDT devices in the field was relatively low under the circumstances (less than 25%). It may have been possible to reduce MDT device loss further by re-locating all devices to the MDT office well in advance of the strong winds; however, this would have deprived field units of their use for a period of time prior to the storm. With respect to restoring MDT functionality, we have determined it is not practical to re-locate the MDT server off-site. The equipment is intact due to advance preparations and timely shutdown; however, there is inadequate power generation and airflow at Headquarters to allow safe start-up. Resolution of Headquarters’ power and air issues will also resolve the MDT service provision problem.

With respect to the Criminal Records / AFIS function, we were impressed to discover the Department of Corrections’ temporary booking facility was able to assume this function on our behalf. As a result, we had minimal loss of service and are prepared to resume normal operations as soon as adequate office space is secured.

With respect to Data Entry and the UCR reporting function, these systems were technically viable soon after the storm. However, without personnel and workspace, we were unable to remain current. Given the breadth of the storm damage, this is neither unexpected nor problematic. We have received no indication that the state is considering sanctions for late reporting under the circumstances.

The photo identification system became one of the more important Records functions as many officers’ credentials were lost in the storm. Placement of the photo identification equipment on the 1st floor of Headquarters was problematic in retrospect since we became unable to generate new identification cards after the 1st floor flooded. Secret Service provided significant assistance with issuing new forms of identification; however, we should be able to be more self-sufficient in this respect if the equipment is secured on the 2nd floor and we substantially over-stock on cards. Drafting an emergency identification card template and stocking large quantities of cards prior to next hurricane season could allow Records to produce official emergency identification cards in a future crisis for both local and outside agency personnel. Additionally, we were unable to fully verify the commissioned status of individuals requesting cards because the employee roster printed monthly by City Hall does not include Reserve officers and is often inaccurate. The issue of inaccuracy is long-standing and has been the subject of many work orders to City Hall; however, they have been unable to rectify the problem to-date. Now that the importance of the list has become more apparent, we will impress upon them the necessity of considering this work order a high priority.
Storage of archival reports in a bay on the first floor of the parking garage resulted in significant public records loss. This will be documented to the Secretary of State as soon as inventory permits, and will be unavailable as "best evidence" for court. All of these reports have been digitally-reproduced into the scanning system with significant reliability relative to retrieval. It is possible a minuscule number had problematic scans and will become permanently unavailable; however, we do not anticipate a large-scale problem in this regard. Preservation of the actual reports for "best evidence" purposes could be better effected by allocating storage space on a higher floor in the garage.

I personally wish to add one item to this list pertaining to contra-flow. Although I was the only person in Records to experience this problem, I have heard several other members complain of similar experiences with contra-flow. The problem with the plan implemented by the state is that it has no provision for returning emergency personnel. In my particular case, evacuation requires 3 separate trips because I am evacuating several horses in addition to other pets and elderly family members. My reservations are made well in-advance, and I had never encountered a problem prior to the new contra-flow plan implemented for Hurricane Katrina. I am offering details of my experience to demonstrate the problem clearly. As of the Friday afternoon before the storm, the path was predicted to hit Florida. On Saturday morning, the storm had turned and the new path placed us in danger. I began my evacuation trips without delay. Unfortunately, my return from the second trip to gather my last load of relatives and pets became problematic due to contra-flow. There was simply no return route to the city. Highway 59 south was closed to southbound traffic due to contra-flow, leaving absolutely no southbound routes into the city from the Louisiana state line at that point. A simple 2-hour return trip turned into an 11-hour trip as I was forced to explore back-roads trying to find a way to back to the city, ultimately driving from Pearl River, LA back to Poplarville, MS (on a very empty, but contra-flow controlled, Highway 59 north) in order to work my way west and ultimately south to Slidell. In other words, it took 10 hours to travel the 5 miles between Pearl River and Slidell because the contra-flow plan effectively blocked all routes between those 2 points in its failure to recognize that Highway 11 and Highway 59 are the exact same road for those 5 miles. Instead of reaching the city Saturday afternoon to begin my 3rd evacuation trip, I got back at 3am Sunday morning. Even though I could have still completed my 3rd evacuation trip out by 6am Sunday morning, since there was little or no traffic on I-10 East or Highway 59, I was fearful that I would be unable to report for duty as scheduled that afternoon if I attempted the trip. There were no designated return routes for emergency personnel and smaller backroads through the marshy terrain would certainly begin flooding by Sunday afternoon due to wind-driven waters. Contra-flow is an excellent concept; but, the plan fails to provide return routes for emergency personnel trying to get to work. That is a
major flaw that undoubtedly impacted employees' abilities to evacuate loved ones needing assistance with their travel. In addition to my own experience, officers outside of Records who chose to evacuate family members or who were out of town for other reasons on the Saturday before the storm expressed similar experiences that prevented them entirely from returning to duty. And, finally, after the storm I was made aware of 2 civilians (not city employees) who were unable to find a route into the city on Saturday afternoon as they attempted to come to New Orleans from Mississippi to evacuate elderly relatives. The lack of routes into the city during Contra-flow is a tremendous flaw in the plan that needs to be addressed in order to ensure everyone who wants to evacuate family members can actually do so.

As a general comment, the Records and Information Systems functions sustained minimal long-term damage. The delays in returning most functions are related to the lack of alternate office space in response to Headquarters’ uninhabitable status, as well as to reliance on civilian personnel who were evacuated far longer than anticipated. The most critical elements of this Division’s storm preparation involve backup procedures and full system redundancy. Improvement in the equipment available to accomplish these two items could substantially contribute to downtime reduction following a major event. Our overall storm preparations prevented major data loss and our commissioned members promptly joined with various districts after evacuating Headquarters to assist with essential law enforcement and rescue operations.

The most notable feedback received from personnel was a general feeling that the city had “let them down” during the crisis and that they were forced to “fend for themselves” for a much longer time than seemed necessary. As officers guarded posts or patrolled areas without relief, inadequate food/water rations, no ability to attend to personal hygiene, and lack of official information, they began to experience the effects of sleep deprivation, rapid weight loss, a variety of rashes and illnesses, and panic. Attention to and preparation for providing the basic necessities and critical information to first responders is paramount to ensuring both the officers’ loyalty and ability to perform the tasks at hand.

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________________
Captain April Overman
Records and Information Systems Division
TO: STEVEN NICHOLAS
Chief of Operations

FROM: THOMAS SMEGAL
Central Evidence and Property

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT

Prior to the hurricane, all commissioned personnel were present along with six civilian employees. All personnel performed admirably during and after the storm. The obvious problem with the storm was not the people but indeed the facility. People worked throughout the night in a feeble attempt to stem the flow of water into the basement.

All sections of the division were under water in the second day except for the annex located in the old radio shop. Upon evacuation from headquarters, confusion ruled as there was no plan for this unforeseen event.

With the assistance of Captain Kevin Anderson, lodging was found for all personnel. He should be recognized for his assistance and concern for his fellow officers. For days after, TSB personnel assisted the Eighth District in security and patrol duties.

The division has resumed collection and storage duties as directed.
New Orleans Police Department
Interoffice Correspondence

To: Major James P. Treadaway
Commander, TSB

From: Captain Rose R. Duryea
Commander, SCID

Subject: Hurricane Katrina After-Action Report

Date of Event: Sunday, August 28, 2005 through Present

Preparations Needed but not Provided: The Crime Lab was required to respond to calls up until the storm winds reached 45mph. By the time the Crime Lab came off of the street, the entrance to the parking garage at Police HQ was blocked by a truck. The Crime Lab vehicles were forced to park on ground level and thus were lost in the flooding around HQ.

When the Command Staff meets for Hurricane Preparedness, the Captains should not be told it is their responsibility to “hustle” provisions. As a professional police department we should not encourage this practice. The department should have contingency plans in place to provide food and shelter for its officers.

Recommendations for future storms:

I believe the City and the Police Department should have agreements with the various hotels in the city. These hotels would provide ballrooms where large groups of officers such as a police district could stay during the storm. Additionally, the hotels should provide a few private rooms, which the Captain and the rank and file could use to shower. The hotels should also provide some high rise parking so that when the storm is over, the police officers shall be mobile in their vehicles. This would be paid for by the City.

The City should make provisions to bring in gasoline trucks immediately following a major storm so police cars do not run out of gas.

The Police Department’s Hurricane Preparedness plan should also include information on potential Command Posts where the Commanders would know to meet the Chiefs in order to coordinate rescue efforts. There should be more than one location listed for this purpose.

Awards:

All essential Crime Lab Personnel with the additional assistance from P/O George Brown (FP&T) and P/O Troy Dickerson (ADD) worked tirelessly throughout this entire event. I feel that all of their actions were heroic and should be commended.

[Signature]

Captain Rose R. Duryea
Commander, SCID
DEPARTMENT OF POLICE

INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

TO: Warren J. Riley
Interim Superintendent

DATE: 10/17/2005

FROM: Captains Donald Curole and Carolyn Weigand
Public Integrity Bureau

SUBJECT: Hurricane Katrina – After Action Report

PIB MISSION

On the evening of Friday, August 26, 2005, all Public Integrity Bureau (PIB) personnel were placed on “stand-by” status for Hurricane Katrina. By Sunday, August 28, 2005, the NOPD had begun to mobilize its forces to an “activation status.” As a result, PIB personnel were ordered to report to Jackson Barracks. Members of PIB departed Jackson Barracks with a contingent of Louisiana Army National Guard troops. They were dispersed, via high water vehicles, throughout the city, with officers and soldiers being assigned to each of the NOPD’s eight districts.

By nightfall Sunday, August 28, 2005, some PIB officers reported to the downtown Hilton Hotel, where arrangements for overnight lodging had been made, while others voluntarily remained with the National Guard troops in their districts of assignment.

During the early morning hours of Monday, August 29, 2005, Katrina made landfall. All NOPD officers were ordered to seek shelter until the brunt of the storm passed and the hurricane’s wind speed slowed to 45 miles per hour.

By Monday afternoon, PIB personnel and their military counterparts departed the Hilton hotel and district stations in military high water vehicles in an effort to search for city residents who may have been trapped inside of homes and/or who otherwise needed rescue from rising flood waters and damage and/or destroyed homes. Officers also spent an inordinate amount of time rescuing “special needs” patients from area hospitals.

In the 7th District, PIB personnel and National Guardsmen remained in Methodist Hospital after the evacuation of 7th District personnel to continue assisting the hospital staff with the needed evacuation of patients, staff, and civilians until Friday, September 2, 2005 at 4:00pm.

PIB personnel and the National Guard troops worked consistently and continually for several days rescuing countless men, women, and children from the aftermath of hurricane Katrina.
Communication Division’s Hurricane Katrina After Action Report

Approved / Disapproved

[Signature]
Captain Stephen J. Gordon
Commander
Communication Division

Approved / Disapproved

Major James P. Treadaway
Technical and Support Bureau

Approved / Disapproved

Steven B. Nicholas
Chief of Operations

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Conclusion

Considering the resources and personnel, the Department had several units and individuals whose members performed exceptionally. In the future, the NOPD's efforts should continue to be focused on evacuation, rescue, transportation, food and shelter for citizens and members, and citywide security. This is similar to lessons learned from the 911 terrorist attacks. However, better planning, communications, technology and improved member support would have made us better prepared for the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe and for future catastrophic events.

Outside the scope of this report

The following are things that should be addressed that are outside the scope of this report.

- The NOPD attempted to function several days with no central location of decision makers directing the actions of the Department.

- Tire repair locations need to be established quickly with vehicles that will respond to an officer's vehicle.

- A large number of officers and equipment need to be located outside the metropolitan area so that the Department can better respond to public safety needs immediately following a state of emergency.

- The NOPD working with city government and a coordinated effort must be more self sufficient until outside resources are available.

- Members of Communications were not allowed to bring their children or family members to Headquarters per protocol; however, other members who were assigned to headquarters did not obey this protocol and some even had pets. While there may have been some justification, this caused feeling of unfair treatment for the people of communications (dogs over children) compared to the other members assigned to HQ during the storm. Whatever the policy, the NOPD's policy should be consistent.

Respectfully Submitted,

Lt. Simon B. Hargrove
Asst. Commander
Communications Division
3. While the Department did some planning, it must do more to meet the challenges of the future. It must use simulations and tabletop exercises for training purposes. Not only should the Command Staff participate, but also all members should participate in various exercises.

4. Purchase or lease a mobile radio tower during Hurricane season. Radio transmission sites need to have a diesel generator and fuel that can be added as soon as it is safe. The Energy Center needs to have a connection to place a generator on ground level that will power the transmitter on the roof.

5. A plan must be enhanced to reroute the 911 calls when catastrophic event occur.

6. The necessity of a secondary facility should be examined. It should be considered to exist outside the City and would serve as a central communications center.

7. The Department should train and prepare to operate without communications. M.B.O. by district and unit commanders would be beneficial in spite of lack of communications.

8. The Department should have plans to evacuate its members as the occasion may require.

9. Improvement of communications and the acquisition of technology to meet the needs of the Department should also be examined.
   a. The Department should have access to Satellite phones, which would be issued to essential personnel ensuring continued communications in the event of loss of landlines or cellular technology.
   b. The Department should acquire mobile or portable repeaters for use in the event of failure of its normal repeaters.

10. A formal system for members and their family should be created. This would include having a method to ensure contact with significant others. A website would also be a viable option. This will allow members to be able to focus on the task at hand.
As planned, use of the Mutual Aid channels were activated. These channels were congested because Jefferson Parish and New Orleans were attempting to use the same channels. The police department's back-up center, at Fire communications flooded, which forced evacuation. The BellSouth 911 system failed in New Orleans. 911 calls were routed to Jefferson Parish. Captain Gordon consequently had Jefferson Parish forward the calls to the administrative office desktop landlines and moved operators to handle the calls accordingly.

As flood water continued to rise, Headquarters was evacuated leaving NOPD with no central communication center. For nearly 2 days NOPD was without a fully operational radio system as units provided citywide security and rescue operations.

In an attempt to get the radio system operational, forty flights of stairs had to be climbed by Sgt. Tommy Green, Capt. Stephen, the engineer for the Entergy Center and representatives of MA/COM. Fuel and a diesel generator were lifted to the roof of the Entergy Center via helicopter. Once the Entergy Center's Transmitting Tower was functioning, work efforts between and among units became more coordinated. With the Entergy Tower operating, Captain Gordon established a limited dispatch center in City Hall on September 1, 2005.

With the radio system becoming functional and with the limited dispatch ability, the Department was able to improve its operations with the improved communications ability. With the technical and equipment assistance from the FBI, a location was secured and the Communications Center became operational in a local hotel.

Commissioned and non-commissioned members struggled to function effectively even though they did not know if their family members who had evacuated were okay. This resulted in leaving to search for their families.

Recommendations

1. The Department needs to make the Incident Command System part of our normal operations. This would enable us to examine our processes and systems for strengths and weaknesses.

2. Command Staff and members of all rank need training in crisis management. This would help members understand the dynamics of a crisis and crisis response. This would better prepare them to supervise and lead those under their command. Training must be used to help set up scenarios and to expand the use of table topics beyond chiefs and the command staff.

Crisis Management must also cover issues of keeping individuals focused on tasks and Managing By Objectives (M.B.O.). In crisis mode, this helps give structure where structure does not exist. Finally, crisis management will expedite a level of balance coordination within the organization.
To: Warren J. Riley  
Superintendent of Police

From: Lt. Simon B. Hargrove

Subject: Communication Division's After Action Report

Sir,

The impact of Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005 has shown the strength and fortitude of many of our members, commissioned and non-commissioned. Additionally, it showed some of NOPD's weaknesses and areas for improvement. It highlighted the importance of operations, planning, crisis management and the importance of Management By Objectives (MBO), improved technology, and member support. The Hurricane Katrina catastrophe necessitates that the NOPD examine and improve systems and the KSA's (Knowledge, Skills and Abilities) of its personnel. As well, training will improve the Department's readiness for future catastrophic events.

These recommendations stem from the feedback and observations of members of the Communication Division. Thirdly, some are from lessons learned from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on New York City.

Summary of Events

This summary addresses some critical events as the Communications Division responded to the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe. It also includes suggestions in planning, communications, and member support.

The police department went on duty for Hurricane Katrina on August 27, 2005, at 6:00p.m. The Communications Division proceeded with normal protocol assisting units in the field via the radio dispatch system and responding to calls for assistance via 911. NOPD officers were rescuing individuals based on calls for assistance until it became too dangerous for officers to respond. The storm passed with high winds and heavy rain. During the storm, the City lost electric power. When the storm passed members resumed rescue operations. Meanwhile flood waters continued to rise in the city.

The Department's radio system was degraded as a result of a damaged microwave dish and generator. This caused officers to use the “talk around” feature, which offered coverage within a one to three mile radius, from the radio transmitting to the radios receiving. The Communications Division transmitted to some units; however, transmissions and reception were poor.
Although PIB and countless other NOPD personnel worked diligently in their assignments, they were hampered in their efforts by numerous logistical problems. These problems and their recommended solutions are detailed below.

**Communication of Unit Mission**
According to the Emergency Preparedness Book, PIB's stated mission was to serve as liaison with the National Guard. However, no further explanation was provided as to the specific duties involved in serving as the National Guard liaison. Only on Sunday, the day of activation status, was PIB given more specific details of their assignment, requiring our supervisors to hurriedly devise deployment strategies with no prior planning.

The Department should provide a detailed explanation and clarification of each unit's designated assignment prior to the hurricane season, allowing supervisors to plan ahead and advise personnel of their responsibilities in advance. Fortunately, our PIB supervisory structure had experienced leaders who adapted and improvised according to the situation at hand, but a clear mission and advanced preparation is imperative. The department should also conduct mock hurricane preparedness drills for all units.

**NOPD Vehicles**
Numerous police vehicles were lost because they were allowed to sit on ground level. There were no police vehicles being utilized during the time the storm was passing and when the wind speed was high. Therefore, ALL police vehicles should have been moved to secure locations within the city whereby the vehicles would have been protected from flood waters and/or flying debris.

The Department should identify in advance suitable locations to secure and protect police vehicles and advise each commander of the designated location for the vehicles under their command prior to each hurricane season.

**Equipment**
Also, as first responders, we did not have the necessary equipment to be effective in responding to a storm of this magnitude. Police and National Guardsmen needed boats and higher trucks immediately after the storm to respond to citizens and police officers in need of rescue from flooded areas. The trucks provided by the National Guard could only handle 2 1/2' to 3 feet of water and no watercraft of any kind was available to us. There were also numerous RTA buses secured on the wharf which could have been used to transport evacuees from the interstate and other areas in greater numbers. There was an abundance of personnel available, but not enough search and rescue vehicles available for these personnel to utilize. On our own, we had to confiscate buses, boats, and shovels to use as paddles to complete simple rescue operations.

It is paramount that the Department make PRIOR arrangements for the immediate procurement of a sufficient number of the types of watercraft needed for rescue and
transport during an emergency event. Other means of transporting large numbers of evacuees, such as the RTA buses, should also be arranged in advance.

Also, a Department member/unit should be designated to make advance preparations with the National Guard for trucks which can handle more than three feet of water.

Additionally, due to the severity of the storm, ordinary police communication equipment (radios and telephones) was rendered inadequate during and after the storm. This caused a major problem for many officers who may have needed assistance at the time. With this lack of communication, there were no resources available to make contact with gas and/or power agencies as well as fire and EMS. Due to the lack of communication, several major gas main leaks were remained in effect for several days, endangering numerous civilians and emergency personnel in the area.

This also caused an inability to contact members of the command staff for guidance during emergency evacuation procedures, which changed on a continuous basis. What limited vehicles we had available were continuously running all over the tri-parish area looking for evacuation locations to which to bring rescued persons, wasting valuable time and resources. Until last week, PIB personnel still had to rely on their own personal communication devices to complete our assignments for this Department.

The Department should centralize its operations in a central command post where personnel can go for information when communication devices fail. The post should be stocked with replacement communication equipment and contact information to supply to personnel as needed.

Supplies
Also, the Department should have anticipated that we would need additional emergency supplies, such as extra flashlights, batteries, and first-aid kits, none of which was provided by the Department. Also needed were generators, water, food, clothing, fuel, and portable restroom facilities. Each individual command was left to fend for itself in acquiring the needed supplies and necessities before, during, and after the storm. NOPD's disaster plan mandates a full mobile fuel tanker on standby but it is uncertain as to whether that was available.

The Department should make prior arrangements to have generators, water, food, fuel, and portable restroom facilities available for all commands during and after the event. The Department should also provide each officer with some type of emergency survival kit containing life jackets; first aid equipment, waders, eye protection, masks, knives, and extra flashlights/batteries. Or, the Department could at least designate a location to stockpile these supplies in advance and pre-formulate a distribution plan. If it wasn't for the procurement of such items by individual officers, we would not have been able to operate as efficiently as we did.
Shelter
Each command was left to acquire shelter for their officers before, during, and after the storm. PIB captains made last minute arrangements on Saturday night to be housed in a meeting room at the Hilton Hotel through the head of security (a retired police captain). Unfortunately, during the storm, the hotel suffered roof leakage and a blown-in patio door on our floor, causing PIB personnel to live, walk, and work on waterlogged carpet for two days. This was in addition to additional unsanitary conditions caused by overfilled toilets.

On Wednesday night, due to the unlivable conditions at the hotel, PIB personnel left the Hilton Hotel and traveled to General Meyer in Algiers where we slept one night in our vehicles. After that, we found shelter in a PIB sergeant’s home in Algiers, where twenty-five PIB personnel stayed until the cruise ship became available.

The Department should be involved in making PRIOR arrangements for all commands to be housed before, during, and after a storm or other emergency event. The housing locations should be out of harm’s way, in areas that do not flood or may otherwise become incapacitated. (Emergency personnel, whose services are needed AFTER the storm, should not be housed in vulnerable areas susceptible to wind or flood damage.) The whole department does not have to be housed in one place, but individual commands should not have to fend for themselves.

Supervision / Discipline
During this storm it seems the rank as well as patrol officers abandoned their posts and in some instances, it’s been reported, ranking officers instructed subordinates to leave their posts. There were no means set up to immediately discipline personnel who abandoned their fellow officers. This type of behavior, especially on the part of ranking officers, is unacceptable.

The challenge facing the department relative to this matter is grave. Acceptable standards of behavior should be reiterated to all department members. Civil Service and the City Attorney should be consulted in advance to formulate an expeditious way of handling emergency personnel who abandon their jobs. And all commanders should be made cognizant of their responsibilities to immediately address these situations in order to quickly and fairly hold accountable those who violate the standards.

Central Command Post and Operational Communication
No central Command Center had been set up, which created limited and conflicting communication of information and assignments. After the storm, many NOPD personnel had no real information to impart to their subordinates relative to the condition of the Department or the City. There was no means to advise officers where to seek safety or how to make contact with their chain of command if separated from
their units, causing some officers to lose confidence in the command structure. Also, the command staff itself was not coordinated in their instructions, which on several occasions, contradicted each other. And most importantly, coordination of the rescue missions was seriously lacking, which resulted in a considerable waste of time each day. PIB / National Guard personnel were kept waiting each day for their rescue assignments and the current drop-off locations (which changed regularly).

The Department should designate an off-site central command post location well before any known emergency event. The central Command Center should be equipped with emergency communication equipment and at least a 30-day supply of food, water, and first-aid supplies. All work assignments should be coordinated through this command post to eliminate conflicting information as well as to provide needed information in a timely manner and allow the Department to speak with one voice.

On a positive note, some Department members did step up to the plate and assume the role of coordinating the search and rescue. However, specific Department members/units should be designated in advance to handle the rescue effort, with one person designated in charge.

Hospital and Nursing Home Facilities
PIB and other Department personnel spent an inordinate amount of time assisting in the evacuation and rescue of special needs patients. Many of these patients died due to inadequate planning on the part of the medical facilities.

The Mayor should mandate that medical facilities have a plan to evacuate their patients, especially their special needs and critical patients (dialysis, oxygen, paraplegics, diabetics, etc.). The Police Department is not equipped to transport medical patients and should concentrate its efforts on citizens trapped in homes and other businesses.

Satellite Jailing Facility
There were numerous looting incidents and minor crimes being committed with no means available to stop, arrest, and/or enforce minor laws. Officers were forced to allow these people access to a "get out of jail free card" because there was no means to house arrested subjects at the time.

A secondary location for processing arrested subjects should be designated IN ADVANCE and its location communicated to all personnel prior to the storm.

Summary
After the storm, PIB personnel conducted search and rescue missions from morning until nightfall. At times during the course of those days, we did not have ready access to water, food, and portable bathroom facilities. Our own personal survival skills surfaced which allowed many of us to make it through each day.
During this time, we as a unit overcame exceptional odds and kept numerous civilians from harm. However, we did this without any help and/or very limited communication with the department as a whole. The department should have had a much better plan, than to compel individual units to find their own shelter, supplies, and equipment. Because of this lack of planning and coordination, our job was all the more difficult after Katrina struck the City.

Each one of us who endured throughout this crisis sacrificed in one way or another. We all used our wit, courage, and ingenuity to work through impossible odds and through a department that was almost completely devoid of necessary communication, supplies, and central coordination efforts.

Our unit consisted primarily of sergeants and above who are skilled at decision making and possess remarkable leadership ability. Others in the unit have proven military experience and know how to “get the job done without all the red tape.” They held their heads high and utilized their individual problem solving abilities, such as a triage center at one district (Sergeant Barbara Sharp) and emergency equipment and supplies were obtained and put into operation at another district (Sergeants Walter Zschiedrich and Lasalle Rattler).

In return, we ask only that, with the experience of Hurricane Katrina, the Department conduct a serious assessment of its needs, balanced against its available resources, and pre-plan the procurement and deployment of adequate resources necessary for each individual command to complete its mission.

Respectfully Submitted,

[Signature]

Captain Carolyn Welzand
Captain Donald Carole
Public Integrity Bureau
Department of Police  
Interoffice Memorandum

To: Warren J. Riley  
Acting Superintendent

From: Lonnie H. Swain  
Assistant Superintendent

Date: October 15, 2005

Re: Hurricane Katrina - After Action Report  
Superdome Emergency Evacuation Shelter

Mission

The Louisiana National Guard (LNG) mission consisted of providing crowd control, medical assistance and the acquisition and distribution of food and water sufficient to sustain the evacuees throughout the operation. The NOPD mission consisted of support for the LNG troops with crowd control and the delivery of a law enforcement capability during the storm’s aftermath.

Command Components

The Superdome Emergency Evacuation Shelter Command consisted of about 140 NOPD officers working with a 450 troop LNG unit under the command of Colonel Doug Mouton. Several days into the post-Katrina operation, Colonel Thomas Beron assumed command of the LNG group.

The Superdome Emergency Evacuation Shelter Command was activated on the afternoon of Sunday, August 28, 2005 and deactivated on the night of Saturday, September 3, 2005. The Superdome Emergency Evacuation Shelter Command was composed of personnel from Education & Training, Recruiting, Investigative Support, Intelligence, Code Six, School Resource and personnel from various commands. A number of officers from commands throughout the Department who were unable to connect with their supervisors and colleagues reached the Superdome Emergency Evacuation Shelter and served with that command.

Evacuees

On the night of Sunday, August 28, 2005, as the storm struck New Orleans, the Superdome staff estimated the number of evacuees at 10,000 – 12,000. The number of evacuees grew substantially as LNG and U.S. Coast Guard helicopters rescued thousands of people trapped by floodwater in homes and other structures in the aftermath of Katrina. Estimates by Superdome staff and the LNG placed the number of evacuees, eventually transported from the
Superdome to distant locations, at 32,000 – 35,000. An overwhelming majority of the evacuees consisted of women, children and the elderly. A significant number are believed to have had health problems prior to the storm. The poor conditions in the evacuation center made this situation considerably worse. The temperature in the Superdome was estimated to be over 100 degrees in the days after the storm knocked out electric power. Most evacuees eventually left the building and moved to the outdoor corridors around the building in search of more tolerable living conditions. They remained outdoors until transported to safer locations.

After the storm, the Superdome lost all ability to dispose of human waste which, along with other factors, rendered the structure completely unfit for human habitation. The living conditions at the Superdome caused many evacuees to become fearful for their health and safety and, ultimately, to demand that they be allowed to leave the Superdome. Evacuee restlessness and dissatisfaction with conditions, made it more difficult to effectively police the crowd and ensure the safety of all evacuees.

Evacuation of the Superdome

On the morning of Thursday, September 1, 2005 the first buses arrived to carry evacuees from the Superdome to safer shelters in distant cities. The initial plan consisted of boarding evacuees on buses at Gate “A” on Poydras Street. Floodwater on Poydras Street prevented buses from reaching the Superdome. Less floodwater on Loyola Avenue near the Hyatt hotel allowed buses to reach the location and evacuees to board the buses.

The revised evacuation plan consisted of moving evacuees through the New Orleans Centre and the Hyatt hotel to Loyola Avenue where they were to board buses. NOPD personnel were posted in both buildings to prevent evacuees from deviating from the established evacuation route through these structures.

Through much of the evacuation operation, the command was unable to maintain a consistent and reliable availability of buses. Police control of crowd behavior and temperament, as well as our ability to minimize the health risk presented by prolonged exposure to harsh conditions, depended entirely on our control of the transportation assets. The inability to maintain a steady flow of buses, caused thousands of evacuees to remain exposed to direct sunlight on an exceedingly congested ramp between the Superdome and New Orleans Centre while waiting to move toward the buses.

The LNG troops provided evacuees an MRE and a small bottle of water twice per day during their confinement in the Superdome. While exposed to severe heat, in direct sun, for many hours, many of the evacuees suffered from dehydration. Medics assisted those unable to proceed to the buses due to fatigue, dehydration or other medical conditions. With little to work with, the medics treated dozens of evacuees during a 48 hour period. They were exemplary in their work. Their contribution is believed to have prevented scores of deaths. These troops
should be recognized for the meritorious performance of their duties under extremely difficult conditions.

Evacuation of the Superdome continued around the clock, impeded only by the intermittent unavailability of buses, until virtually all the evacuees had been moved to distant locations. Late on the night of Friday, September 2, 2005 LNG and NOPD personnel had effectuated the movement of virtually all evacuees.

Crime in the Superdome

Wild rumors with respect to the rate of violent crime came to our attention during the evacuation of the Superdome. Officers attempted to locate victims and witnesses to alleged crimes rumored to have been committed in the shelter. Repeatedly, investigators were unable to confirm or otherwise validate reports that a particular crime was committed within the Superdome. A single confirmed complaint of an attempted sexual offense was reported and investigated in the Superdome throughout the Katrina operation. The commander of the ISD Sex Offense Section should be contacted for specific information in this regard.

Deaths in the Superdome

On Saturday, September 3, 2005 LNG troops and NOPD officers conducted a sweep of the Superdome prior to securing the location. A total of ten deceased individuals were in the Superdome at that time. Three (3) of the corpses had been moved into the Superdome after being recovered in floodwater near the shelter. The remaining seven (7) corpses were believed to have died while inside the Superdome during the evacuation. None bore identifiable signs of trauma. All were transported to a temporary morgue in St. Gabriel, LA by FEMA contractors for a post mortem examination.

Inadequacy of Emergency Plan

Virtually all aspects of the pre-Katrina Emergency Management Plan were inadequate to effectively address a disaster of the size and scope of hurricane Katrina. A command level, comprehensive review of all aspects of Katrina operations is necessary to completely identify deficiencies in available assets and in the planning and execution of all aspects of our response to the natural disaster.

Respectfully,

Lonnie H. Swain
Commander
Superdome Evacuation Shelter