TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Report of the Government of Canada

September 1995
# Table of Contents

*Foreword by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Defence*

**Glossary of Acronyms**

**Executive Summary**

## I Why Rapid Reaction?

- The UN at 50 .................................................. 1
- Post-Cold War Peace Operations .................................. 2
- International Peace and Security .................................. 3
- The Humanitarian Imperative .................................... 4
- Cost-Effectiveness .............................................. 5
- The Need for Rapid Reaction .................................... 6

## II Principles of the Study

- Towards a Rapid-Reaction Capability for the UN .................. 8
- Orientation of the Canadian Study .................................. 9
- Principles of Rapid Reaction ..................................... 11
- The Four Levels of Rapid Reaction ................................ 12
- The Idea of Rapid Reaction ...................................... 13
- Organization of the Study ........................................ 15

## III The Record of Rapid Reaction: Recent Experience

- The Concept of Rapid Reaction .................................... 17
- France .............................................................. 18
- The United States of America ...................................... 19
- The NATO Model ................................................ 20
- An Assessment ..................................................... 21
- The Elements of Rapid Reaction Considered ..................... 23

## IV Elements of Rapid Reaction: How the UN Shapes Up

- From “Steady-State” to Rapid Reaction .......................... 25
- Early Warning ................................................... 26
- The Decision-Making Process ..................................... 28
- Transportation and Infrastructure ................................. 30
- Logistical Support ................................................ 30
- Financial Arrangements ......................................... 32
- The Availability of Well-Trained Personnel ....................... 33
- The Special Requirements of Rapid Reaction ................... 35
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

V A Practical Agenda for Reform: The Short to Medium Term ..................36

Increasing the UN's Capabilities ..................................................36
The Political Level ........................................................................37
Troop Contributors ........................................................................37
Groups of Friends .........................................................................39
Finances .........................................................................................39

The Strategic Level .........................................................................43
Early Warning ................................................................................43
Strengthening the UN Secretariat ..................................................44
Logistics .........................................................................................46
Standby Arrangements .....................................................................47

The Operational Level ....................................................................49
A UN Operational-Level Headquarters .........................................50
The Vanguard Concept .................................................................51

The Tactical Level ..........................................................................52
The Availability of Personnel ........................................................52
Training .........................................................................................53

Towards a Vanguard Concept .......................................................54

VI A Vision of the Future: The Long-Term Prospect for Rapid Reaction ....55

Balancing Pragmatism and Vision ..................................................55
Advanced Technologies for Peace Operations ..............................56
Securing the Civilian Components of Rapid Reaction ....................58
A UN Standing Emergency Group ................................................60
Financial Issues .............................................................................63

VII Towards a Rapid-Reaction Capability: Conclusions ..................65

Conclusions ..................................................................................65
Recommendations ..........................................................................67

The Conduct of the Study: Acknowledgements ..............................72

Endnotes .......................................................................................76
FOREWORD

In 1956, Lester Pearson helped to initiate the first real UN peacekeeping operation in response to the Suez crisis. Ever since, support for and participation in UN peacekeeping operations has played a prominent role in Canadian foreign and defence policy. It is therefore appropriate that in this, the UN's 50th anniversary year, the Canadian government should place a special emphasis on ways of improving the use of blue berets to help resolve conflicts.

At the 49th session of the General Assembly in September 1994, Canada announced its intention to conduct a study on ways of improving the UN's Rapid Reaction Capability. The study has led to a major report which will be offered to the 50th General Assembly as a significant contribution on the part of the Canadian government to the reflections on the UN's future at this pivotal juncture in its existence. In the course of preparing the report, considerable effort was taken to consult with other governments, non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental institutions in order to assess the validity and practicality of a variety of policy alternatives.

The central objective of the study was to consider practical and realizable ideas and proposals which would give the UN a capability to react more rapidly to crisis and thus enhance its effectiveness and credibility overall. In this report, we seek to recommend possibilities for pragmatic change within the UN system over the short to medium terms, while also addressing some of the more visionary, longer-term issues which the international community must confront if the UN is to remain capable of playing a central role in the field of international peace and security. We have framed the recommendations in the report in realistic terms. Many improvements are now underway and can continue to take place in the short to medium terms within the confines of current budgets. However, sustaining these changes and the promotion of longer-term improvements will ultimately require the UN to face the issue of securing new means of funding.

In the present climate these are sizable political tasks. Fiscal realities have forced all governments to be very cautious in dedicating resources; and domestic priorities tend to take precedence over contributions to international institution-building. The difficulties encountered in certain peace operations, particularly recent experience in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda, also give decision-makers pause. On the other hand, an effective rapid response capability in certain situations is not only appropriate, but highly cost-effective in comparison to the costs to all concerned, in both human and monetary terms, of not acting quickly.

We acknowledge that fundamental reform is not an easy task, especially in the midst of financial crisis. But headway can be made now. Many of the report's recommendations are framed with this in mind, while others are designed to have the collateral effect of making the full spectrum of peace support operations more effective. Still others focus on looking down the road where major change might be achievable. Together they represent a continuum of measures to advance the cause of global peace.
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

We are pleased to commend this report to you in the hope that it will stimulate discussion, constructive debate and most importantly action. The analysis and recommendations will be of little value unless Canada and others are prepared to back it with offers of tangible support. We will do our part. If matched by the contributions of other member states, such support will do much to enhance the rapid-reaction capability of the United Nations.

André Ouellet  
Minister of Foreign Affairs

D.M. Collenette  
Minister of National Defence
Glossary of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP(L)</td>
<td>ACE Mobile Force (Land)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U5 Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHA</td>
<td>Department of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Force d'Action Rapide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEWS</td>
<td>Humanitarian Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-STARS</td>
<td>Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Staff Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Services Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributer Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force (Sinai)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>UN Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UN Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>UN High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>UN Mission in Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAT</td>
<td>UN Training Assistance Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

Since the end of the Cold War, the peace operations of the UN have vastly increased in size, scope and number. Even at a time of fiscal crisis for the Organization, there are high expectations that the UN should play a pivotal role in the emerging global security system. Yet the UN in recent years has not been able to mobilize its peace operations quickly and respond effectively to crisis situations. Rwanda was a notable example. The critical lesson of the Rwandan experience is that modest but timely measures can make the difference between a situation which is stable or contained and one which spirals out of control. This study’s central objective is to recommend changes at all levels of the UN system which would give the UN an enhanced capability to respond rapidly to crisis situations.

Several principles are identified in the Report as crucial to creating a UN rapid-reaction capability. The principle of reliability emphasizes decreasing response time while increasing effectiveness in parallel. The principle of quality aims at doing the job well rather than on mounting a large and unwieldy multinational force. A related principle is that of effectiveness. A hasty response, poorly executed, could be worse medicine than not acting at all. And the principle of cost-effectiveness is based on the presumption that it is often better to act early when a situation remains relatively fluid and is more susceptible to outside influence — and when the costs of intervention are fairly low.

The Report examines the need for rapid reaction and reviews the capabilities of rapid reaction forces in France, the USA and NATO. It arrives at the conclusion that there are several generic components of rapid reaction which must be included in a UN capability if it is to be effective:

- an early warning mechanism to alert the system to an impending conflict or crisis;
- an effective decision-making process to facilitate contingency planning and mounting of an operation, including clearly defined command and control arrangements;
- readily-available transportation and infrastructure;
- logistics support;
- adequate finance to sustain and underwrite an operation; and
- well-trained personnel.

The Report then examines the UN system in order to assess where the UN stands with respect to all of these elements. After identifying deficiencies in the UN system, it goes on to make 26 recommendations for the short, medium and long terms which would give the UN the rapid-reaction capabilities it needs to respond quickly and effectively to crisis situations.

An overarching theme of the Report is to ensure that there is “unity of purpose” among UN Member States and the Secretary-General in deciding upon peace operations, leading to “unity of effort” on the ground among all of the constituent
elements of peace operations, military and civilian, governmental and non-
governmental. The Report places especially strong emphasis on the idea of
multidimensionality, in recognition of the growing complexity of recent peace
operations and the need for close cooperation among all elements under UN authority.

The principal idea in this report is the “Vanguard Concept”. Under this concept,
the UN would be able to assemble from Member States a multi-functional force of up
to 5,000 military and civilian personnel and rapidly deploy it under the control of an
operational-level headquarters upon authorization of the Security Council. The
operational-level headquarters, a new unit to fill a current vacuum in the UN system,
would be responsible for the planning and advance preparations which are crucial if
rapid reaction is to work. This concept emphasizes the importance of making
significant changes at the operational level of the UN system and with the troop
contributors who would provide the trained, equipped forces essential to rapid
reaction. Forces would be provided by way of enhanced standby arrangements which
the Secretariat would conclude with Member States offering personnel to participate in
peace operations. The Report includes recommendations to enhance training, explore
more efficient systems for logistics and transportation, and bolster the planning efforts
of the entire UN system.

A number of other reforms are also emphasized in the short to medium terms. At
the political level in the UN system, it is crucial to address deficiencies in the financial
and administrative systems of the UN and to develop new financial procedures which
delegate financial authorities to appropriate levels of responsibility. It is also important
to re-assess the issue of consultation among the UN Secretariat, Security Council
members and UN Member States. Better systems, including new institutions, need to
be put into place if troop contributors are to continue providing the UN with capable
forces. Similarly, ways need to be found to increase the quality of military advice and
ensure that military considerations are taken into account as the Security Council
considers its responses to crisis situations. With respect to the UN Secretariat
(although the Secretary-General has accomplished a remarkable amount in the past
two to three years), additional measures should be contemplated, such as a better
early-warning systems, linked to contingency planning and political action, and a
strengthening of the UN’s Standby Arrangements System, which would lie at the heart
of the Vanguard Concept.

In all, 21 recommendations are advanced in the Report for the short to medium
term. None involve changes in the UN Charter — Charter reform is not necessary in
addressing the area of peace operations. Some recommendations argue the case for
new institutions, such as Troop Contributors Committees and a Troop Contributors’
Council, and a Peace Operations Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee On
Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Other recommendations focus on
administrative and procedural issues, such as financial questions, or new techniques
such as Peacekeeping Services Agreements. Many of the recommendations are based
on the premise that the key to effective operations lies in the personnel equation.
Substantial emphasis has therefore been placed on advance training, systems of
recruitment and ensuring that qualified personnel are available for UN peace
operations on short notice.
The Report's recommendations for the short to medium term should provide the UN with an effective rapid-reaction capability. But reform may be a slow process, and the search for what is readily attainable should not stifle vision as to what may be necessary over the longer term. The Report therefore advocates continued thinking about logical next steps, should short and medium term reforms prove insufficient. Four separate issues are addressed: the need to harness advanced technologies in support of the UN's peace operations; the creation of a permanent group of civilian police to address chronic shortfalls in this area; the creation of a UN Standing Emergency Group, composed of directly-recruited volunteers; and the need for the UN to secure an independent source of revenue over the long term. In each case, the Report advocates a process of continued study, to help advance the degree of international consensus on these issues.

The Report also devotes substantial attention to financial questions, recognizing that short to medium term recommendations must take into account the current financial crisis of the UN and that all recommendations must be responsible in their implications for the UN and the international community. Through better partnership arrangements with the private sector and the non-governmental communities, however, as well as with new ways of doing business in the UN Secretariat, it is likely that many of the Report's recommendations will lead to substantial reductions in peacekeeping costs for the UN through greater efficiencies in operation.

The 26 recommendations are re-stated in the concluding chapter of the Report.
CHAPTER ONE

WHY RAPID REACTION?

"Are we to go on from crisis to crisis improvising in haste? Or can we now pool our experience and our resources, so that the next time we, the governments and peoples whom the United Nations represents, will be ready and prepared to act?"

Lester B. Pearson, 1957

The UN at 50

Fifty years after the creation of the United Nations (UN), the Organization is at a decisive time in its evolution. For fifty years, it helped to avoid major wars and contain the damage and destruction of conflict. In the area of international peace and security, it built a solid foundation for peacekeeping, perhaps its most famous and successful innovation. It met the newer conflicts of the post-Cold-War era with adaptability and imagination, mobilizing the international system to confront a new range of difficulties through peacekeeping operations of increasing size and complexity.

Despite these evident accomplishments, the UN has come under assault in recent years. In the area of peace operations, a few unsuccessful operations have sullied the Organization’s name and led to increased criticism of its performance. The range and complexity of the conflicts in which the UN has been invited to act have increased the risks to peacekeepers and led to doubts about the Organization’s capacities. In some cases, publics have grown sceptical about peace operations and governments have become resistant to the financial demands of an over-burdened international system. The UN is now in financial crisis, with the peacekeeping system of the past forty years in serious danger.

Yet in the face of this adversity, the Secretary-General, members of the UN Secretariat and military and civilian peacekeepers drawn from more than 75 UN Member States have continued to serve with distinction in their quest for stability and security through more effective multilateral cooperation. Fifty years after San Francisco, there continues to be a recognition that multilateral cooperation is preferable to unilateralism, and that action by the UN in the name of the international community confers a legitimacy that is well worth the difficulties of blending the efforts of many states of varying backgrounds and cultures.

This study examines the current UN approach to providing a more rapid response to crisis situations. Its essential conclusion is a reaffirmation of broad support for the general directions of the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat in building its peace operations capability for the future. At a time of financial crisis, and in the midst of several significant operations, it is turning what was once a modest foundation for peacekeeping operations into a modern instrument for the promotion of peace and the management of conflict through adherence to the objective of unity of purpose and effort. The task is not an easy one. It would be difficult enough even with adequate resources. In the face of considerable financial pressures, it is a monumental task, all too little appreciated in many parts of the world.
Post-Cold War Peace Operations

The peace operations of the United Nations have increased in size, scope and number since the end of the Cold War, reflecting new expectations that the UN should play a pivotal role in the emerging global security system. Yet the results have been mixed. Of the more than 20 missions launched since 1988, there have been both solid successes and troublesome failures.

The successes stem, in large part, from recent improvements in how the UN undertakes peace operations. These range from greater political understanding of the concept of peace operations among Member States, to enhancement of the means available to the Secretary-General within his Secretariat, to a growing organizational and operational sophistication in the field. As it demonstrated in Central America, Namibia, Cambodia and Mozambique, the UN has been able to handle complexity with adequate time for preparation and resources for deployment. On the other hand, the number of failures or ambiguous outcomes is distressing. The reasons have much to do with the high expectations that have been placed on an organization that is over-stretched and under-funded, as well as lacking in some of the most fundamental requirements needed to cope in a new era.

A key problem, apparent in a number of recent operations, is the often torpid response of the UN to emerging crises. Whatever the nature of the requirement (e.g., to shore up a recently-concluded peace settlement with the deployment of observers, or to send a force to help stabilize a rapidly-eroding security situation), the track record of the UN has often not matched needs with speed of deployment and numbers on the ground. While some operations, of course, do not require speedy preparation and deployment, what is most noticeable in today’s peace operations is the inability of the UN to meet reasonable targets of rapid response.

United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations
Total Number of Active Missions, 1988-1994

![Bar chart showing the increase in total number of active missions from 1988 to 1994.]

Total Percentage Growth 1988-1994 = 186%
Average Annual Growth = 20%

Source: DPKO, 1994
Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations

With the end of the Cold War and the increased cooperation evident in today's Security Council, there is no obvious reason why the UN cannot react more quickly to crisis. The absence of bipolar confrontation and consequent minimal recourse to the veto or the part of permanent members of the Security Council suggest a trend towards more effective and efficient international cooperation. At the same time, human rights and humanitarian concerns, once held hostage to the Cold War, have become part of the international peace and security equation. Finally, global media coverage continues to generate domestic and international pressure to act quickly, albeit on a selective basis.

All these factors weigh in the direction of developing the necessary instruments to deal quickly and effectively with emerging threats to international peace and security. It is worth exploring in greater detail some of the key trends which point to the need for a UN rapid-reaction capability.

International Peace and Security

Challenges to international peace and security since the end of the Cold War have primarily been from within states rather than between them. In his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace in 1995, the Secretary-General noted that, of the peace operations authorized prior to 1988, only one in five related to intra-state conflict. Since then, 62% of peace operations have related to intra-state conflicts, as have 82% of the 11 operations established since January 1992.1 Unfortunately, intra-state conflicts usually have deep and tangled roots, which profoundly complicate the UN's search for resolution. The Secretary-General described them in this way:

The new breed of intra-state conflicts have certain characteristics that present United Nations peace-keepers with challenges not encountered since the Congo operation of the early 1960s. They are usually fought not only by regular armies but also by militias and armed civilians with little discipline and with ill-defined chains of command. They are often guerrilla wars without clear front lines. Civilians are the main victims and often the main targets. Humanitarian emergencies are commonplace.2

In response, the Security Council has acted in such a way that the definition of international peace and security has gone beyond traditional norms. There have been a series of ground-breaking examples: the mandate to assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia, the use of the Unified Task Force to establish a secure environment and ensure the delivery of aid in Somalia, and the mission in Haiti to oversee and enforce the transition to democracy. This in no way implies that the UN has become overtly interventionist in the internal affairs of states. Nor does it imply that a rapid-reaction capability necessarily leads the UN towards interventionism. It does signal that the Security Council has become willing to contemplate action in a more diverse range of situations than prior to 1988.

These types of challenges — sometimes intra-state and increasingly complex — often require swift and decided responses. For example, in Haiti, the initial attempt to support democratic change was stymied by little more than a small gang of thugs. Hadthere been, for example, a more robust UN presence and a UN operational
headquarters in Haiti in 1993, it is quite possible that UN forces could have coped with the situation. Haiti’s democratic government might then have returned 18 months earlier, with vastly less suffering during the ensuing period.

What has not changed and what is not new in the post-Cold War era is the importance of leadership at times of compelling need. Expectations of the UN run high. Governments look to the UN to present solutions or at least to address problems. The result is a paradoxical situation identified recently by the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations in its study, *The United Nations in its Second Half-Century*. “In virtually all of its activities, from peacekeeping to development, from human rights to environmental accords,” the report argues, “the United Nations is being asked to play a larger role and to assume fresh responsibilities at a time when governments are increasingly anxious to reduce their financial contributions, and increasingly reluctant to provide the necessary political, military and material support.” If the only global institution of international security is incapable of mounting an effective peace operation, the logical consequence is that our Charter commitment to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war will ring increasingly hollow.

**The Humanitarian Imperative**

The new realities of the emerging international system suggest a pattern of conflict, sometimes along ethnic, religious or tribal lines, which will have important humanitarian repercussions throughout the world. Two long-time senior UN officials, Erskine Childers and Sir Brian Urquhart, have characterized the phenomenon as “the continuous human emergency” and identified the following causal factors:

> Economic stagnation, absolute poverty, over-population, environmental degradation, use of military force, and human rights violations crowd the list of factors likely to trigger future humanitarian crises.9

These scourges will continue to capture the attention of the media and arouse the conscience of much of the world. Some claim that repeated disasters will lead to a new apathy and complacency - a type of “donor fatigue” - which would dull the sensibilities of some publics and make them more resistant to claims to humanitarian assistance. But this prognosis has not been borne out by recent events. In effect, an opposite reaction has taken hold in recent years. Graphic depictions of international tragedies have led to increased demands for more ambitious efforts in meeting humanitarian challenges and making the international system more responsive to humanitarian needs.

In many of these cases, a rapid response to crisis is needed. The example of Rwanda illustrates the problem in bold relief. Despite various signals that a crisis was imminent, even a minimal response had to await the onset of crisis. The Arusha peace agreement, the basis of the peacekeeping operation, was signed in August 1993. But the Security Council waited some two months before authorizing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Troop deployments took place months after they were officially committed. The operational plan called for 4500 troops, but only 2600 troops were ever deployed. Of the troops provided, only the Belgians were
fully equipped, and they were withdrawn part-way through the operation. Other contingents were either partially equipped or came with no equipment at all.

Thus hobbled, the UNAMIR team continued to carry out the mandate of the mission to the extent possible. But the situation soon deteriorated into full-scale, ethnically-based civil war. In April, 1994, the slaughter began. In June 1994, the UN Security Council approved a new mandate for the Rwandan operation involving the proposed deployment of 5500 troops. Two months later, only 2500 troops had been provided. The commander of UNAMIR, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, has said:

In Rwanda, the international community's inaction... contributed to the Hutu extremists' belief that they could carry out their genocide... UNAMIR could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. As evidence, with the 450 men under my command during this interim, we saved and directly protected over 25,000 people and moved tens of thousands between the combat lines. A force of 5,000 personnel rapidly deployed could have prevented the massacres in the south and west of the country that did not commence in earnest until early May, nearly a month after the start of the war."6

Had the UN been able to launch an operation as soon as the Arusha peace agreement was signed, a number of elements which contributed to the later crisis might have been avoided. Moreover, had a UN mission been available to support the UNAMIR operation in an urgent fashion, in April and May, 1994, serious deterioration might have been prevented. The critical lesson of the Rwandan experience is that modest but timely measures can make the difference between a situation which is stable or contained and a humanitarian disaster which has spiralled beyond control.

The Cost of Failure to Prevent Conflict

| Straining budgets, diverting resources from development |
| Disaster relief, 1983: $300 million |
| Disaster relief, 1993: $3.2 billion | (current U.S. dollars) |

The humanitarian disasters that ensue from conflict have a double-impact on development. First, advances, attained through decades of investment in development can be wiped out in months, as infrastructure is destroyed and human resources fall victim to conflict; second, international assistance is diverted from long-term development assistance that should lead to self-sufficiency, to short-term relief. In the 1980's, emergency assistance and disaster relief accounted for some US$300 million, or about 3% of bilateral aid. By 1993, that figure had risen to $3.2 billion, or over 8%.

Source: DAC, 1994 Report

Cost-Effectiveness

A number of recent conflict situations have shown that the costs of intervening in a crisis escalate dramatically as intervention is postponed. Once a crisis erupts, it initiates a chain reaction that becomes difficult to control. An initial conflict may spark a refugee problem. The combination of conflict and people on the move may then provoke widespread environmental degradation and contribute to famine (as in Somalia) or to health emergencies (as in Zaire). These new problems add fuel to the fires of conflict, widening

The critical lesson of the Rwandan experience is that modest but timely measures can make the difference between a situation which is stable or contained and a humanitarian disaster which has spiralled beyond control.
the scale and deepening the enmity. It is a classic vicious circle which adds to the human, financial, material and developmental costs of responding to crisis.

Rwanda again illustrates the need for timely intervention. During the slow process of creating UNAMIR, the Security Council made it clear that it wanted the operation conducted at minimal expense. Only a fraction of the US$200 million estimated cost of the operation was ever received by the UN. Only a portion of the troops required to implement UNAMIR's mandate ever arrived in the theatre. The lack of funding and material support for UNAMIR stands in sharp contrast to the money spent by the international community in aid and human resource support once the crisis attracted the attention of the international media. The United States alone provided US$350 million in aid in the first six weeks of the Goma catastrophe.

De-escalating such a crisis is not simply a matter of reversing the chain of events. As a crisis escalates in severity, it represents an exponential increase in the scope of the problem. It therefore requires a much larger and more vigorous response if it is to be effective. As the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans has written, "After a dispute has crossed the threshold into armed conflict, the process of peaceful resolution — peace making — becomes more difficult, demanding and complex. With the eruption of violence, the issues tend to generalise and proliferate... As the parties invest ever greater resources in the conflict, they become increasingly committed to and entrapped in the struggle to prevail." As an intervention is delayed, greater amounts of political influence and financial resources are needed to have a positive impact over the course of the conflict. These are lessons the international community has already learned from crisis situations in the 1990s, but for which it has not yet adapted the political, security or developmental structures of the UN system.

Dramatic depictions of mass suffering can lead to enormous pressure on governments and international organizations to take action. Even in the midst of addressing humanitarian tragedies of the gravest proportions, it is worth raising questions about cost-effectiveness. Is it better to do something early when the impact will often be greater, or should decisions be put off? Admittedly, there are times when delay may be appropriate, when rewards are reaped by those who wait. This is particularly true when the climate for intervention is inappropriate because of large-scale war or insurrection over which the UN can have little control. But when it is fairly clear that inaction means postponing the inevitable, then a rapid response is fully appropriate.

Some have argued that the UN is devoting too much attention and too many of its scarce resources to peace operations, especially at a time when development assistance efforts are flagging in many quarters. To this argument it is worth responding along the following lines: first, investments in international security through peacekeeping will bring developmental returns by ensuring the stability which permits development to take place; and, second, we can reduce the investments in peacekeeping, and enable states to focus on development assistance, by taking more timely, effective action. In order to do this, we need a UN which is able to act more rapidly.
The Need for Rapid Reaction

There can be little doubt that a capability to deploy UN forces more quickly and more effectively is badly needed. On many occasions the lack of such a capability has had dramatic consequences. After the collapse of the election process and the renewal of the fighting in Angola in 1993, negotiations began in Abidjan to get the peace process back on track. The two sides reached agreement on a blueprint for a new peace process, but requested a UN military presence in Angola to verify and support the ceasefire. The Security Council was willing to authorize a new UN operation, but only after a ceasefire was in place. The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Margaret Anstee, then faced what she termed a "chicken and egg" situation.

The Security Council required agreement at Abidjan before 'Blue Helmets' could be considered. UNITA [União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angolal] wanted an assurance of at least an immediate, symbolic presence of Blue Helmets before they would agree to the terms for a ceasefire set out in the Abidjan Protocol. The reality was even worse than that. I was told that I must warn both sides that, even if they agreed to a ceasefire, no UN troops could, for practical reasons, be made available until six to nine months later. Not surprisingly, I had two nightmares in Abidjan: one was that I would fail, which was what happened; the other was that I would succeed because then I could not see how a ceasefire would be monitored and supported.

This need not be the perpetual dilemma of the UN. These types of conflicts do not lend themselves to long lead-times prior to action by the international community. A response to a crisis of the order of Goma or Somalia must be virtually immediate, within weeks rather than months, if it is to be effective. A lead-time of up to six months in getting personnel to Angola to verify a ceasefire will not inhibit a return to fighting. A six-month wait in getting UN troops and personnel to Rwanda is the difference between a situation of imminent conflict and one of outright disaster.

These considerations argue strongly for a more effective UN rapid-reaction capability. The mere existence of a reliable, credible capacity to create a peace operation rapidly upon a decision of the Security Council would not automatically provide an invitation to action. Nor would simple possession of such a capacity inevitably lead to regular decisions to intervene. But having the ability to respond swiftly should encourage responsible, prudent decision-making within the Council itself. The ability to get forces and other personnel in the field quickly should encourage the Security Council to consider with care not only the immediate situation but also what is likely to follow afterwards. It will help, rather than hinder, the search for international peace and stability in a new era of more complex types of conflict.

---

A six-month wait in getting UN troops and personnel to Rwanda is the difference between a situation of imminent conflict and one of outright disaster.
CHAPTER TWO

PRINCIPLES OF THE STUDY

"The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for creating new ways to overcome crises. This is because the different world that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully understood. The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive, creative and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, which all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and social inequities. Perhaps above all it requires a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before."

Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, 1995

Towards a Rapid-Reaction Capability for the UN

There is a void in the United Nations' peacekeeping system which neither policy nor resources has yet been able to fill. This void is a central preoccupation of those Member States, including Canada, that seek to shore up the UN's capabilities in the maintenance of international peace and security. Especially during the United Nations' fiftieth year, there has been considerable reflection and discussion around the world about how the institutions and operations of the world body might be improved. Addressing this gap has also been the starting point for a number of proposals that would give the UN new or improved forces and capacities. Sir Brian Urquhart, a distinguished former senior UN official, has proposed a UN volunteer force comprised of military professionals recruited on an individual basis. The Government of the Netherlands has undertaken a study of a UN Rapid Deployment Brigade. The Danish Government has been coordinating an effort to provide a UN High-Readiness Brigade based on the Standby Arrangements System. A number of other countries and non-governmental institutions have come forward with complementary initiatives. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, has recommended that serious thought be given to the idea of a rapid reaction force. "Such a force", he has argued, "would be the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment when there was an emergency need for peace-keeping troops."

The Secretary General's recommendation is, in turn, the starting point for this study. It is undertaken in the conviction that there is an emerging international consensus on the need for more effective, rapid deployment of personnel in peace operations. Indeed, the Rwandan calamity of 1994 illustrated the disastrous consequences of the UN's continuing inability to react rapidly to crisis situations. It is also recognized, however, that there are many serious issues requiring exploration before a rapid-reaction capability can be fully attained within the UN. Moreover, consensus begins to fray when specific solutions are advanced. The consistent focus of the Canadian study has been on how to renew the credibility and capacity of the United Nations through pragmatic and incremental change. Quite properly, Canada and other UN member states wish to approach this issue prudently, since no one seeks to raise expectations beyond the ability of the UN to deliver.
Orientation of the Canadian Study

This study employs the term "capability", a much broader term than more limited concepts such as "force" or "brigade". It is intended to embrace a range of procedures and structures along a continuum of UN action. Such a capability would need to be multi-disciplinary and multidimensional, encompassing non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the humanitarian, human rights, political and legal dimensions and the civilian police component which have proven to be crucial to most peace operations. It would include the "instrument" at the sharp end of future UN action, which we have called the "Vanguard Groups". While many of the recommendations in the report could usefully be implemented on their own to remedy deficiencies within elements of the UN system, the report advances the case for a more global approach to remedy the current "capability gap", involving significant changes in many of the institutions through which the UN currently works.

The orientation of the Canadian study is therefore somewhat different than the complementary efforts currently under way in a number of other capitals, particularly by the Governments of the Netherlands and Denmark. These and other recent studies have focussed on improving the standby arrangements system, on strengthening the Secretariat in New York or on promoting the establishment of a Standing UN Force. The Canadian approach has been to build on these and other initiatives, reflecting the increasing interdependence of states, issues and disciplines, as well as the need to improve international structures that emphasize integrated action and coherence of purpose.

The Canadian study is divided along time lines. Some of the recommendations advanced in this report can readily be achieved in the short term, if sufficient support can be mobilized in the Security Council or General Assembly. Others are more properly designed for implementation in the medium term, as a certain amount of preparatory work needs to be done prior to implementation. The report does not attempt to define the short and medium terms precisely. Rather, they are intended to be indicative of realistic time-frames within which measures can be accomplished in the UN. Other measures are clearly meant for consideration over the long-term, recognizing that a great deal of new thinking will have to be done before consensus begins to emerge at the international level on these types of issues. While work on short and medium term options proceeds, the report suggests that there is merit in continuing to study long-term alternatives, as today’s idealism may readily become tomorrow’s realism.

At an early stage of this study it was decided that the best contribution which Canada could make to this ongoing debate would be a "technical" report, which would address practical issues of institutions, organization, resources and financing, focussing on how to make the elements of the international system more integrated and coherent in support of enhanced rapid reaction. The fundamental issue of "political will", that most elusive and crucial of questions, has also been addressed from the point of view of institutions and organizations. Improvements to the UN’s ability to set-up and conduct operations could make it easier for Member States to take the necessary political decisions to participate, but the timeliness of these vital decisions remains the key element in assuring an effective UN response. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that, if the Security Council is unwilling, for whatever reason, to address an urgent crisis, then no mechanism, procedure or institution can wholly rectify this difficulty.
Our central concern is improving the UN's capacity to respond to crisis, while respecting the right of the Security Council, possessed of this new capability, to decide the circumstances under which the UN will react to crisis situations.

United Nations Field Operations
Growth of Total Field Mission Budgets 1990-1994

Source: DPKO, 1994

Improved institutions and mechanisms can nevertheless encourage Security Council members and other Member States to address a desperate situation with greater confidence. If the UN possessed the capacity to deal effectively with problems on the ground, the Security Council might be less disposed to delay its consideration of pressing questions of international peace and security. Such a capacity would instill confidence among UN Member States that a well-honed instrument, going beyond the limitations of traditional peacekeeping, was available if needed.

Yet such an enhanced capability to respond to crises in no way ties the hands of the Security Council. The decision to deploy or not to deploy a UN peace operation would remain the Council's prerogative. Some commentators have cautioned that any new capability would have to be used very prudently, possibly only in rare circumstances, recognizing that the injection of outside military force is not always helpful in delicate disputes. Others have a contrary perspective, namely, that the Security Council should dare to be bold in a new era in which UN intervention, even in intra-state disputes, is no longer abnormal. The question of deployment or non-deployment in specific situations is beyond the scope of the present study. Our central concern is improving the UN's capacity to respond to crisis, while respecting the right of the Security Council, possessed of this new capability, to decide the circumstances under which the UN will react to crisis situations.

A guiding metaphor of this study is that of an ailing body politic and the need to search for remedies. In certain parts of the world, the society or nation-state is so afflicted that outside intervention is the only hope. In the body's case, this would mean active treatment by recognized medical authorities. Early on, before the body rebels absolutely, warning signals are sent out — perhaps a fever or another symptom. Doctors are consulted and decide whether and what treatment should be pursued. They are not always good diagnosticians, nor do they always possess the medicines
required. But especially if they can identify a remedy that works, the chances are that they will prescribe it. This is the essence of an enhanced UN rapid-reaction capability. It offers the United Nations a capability for effective intervention when the malady of the body politic reaches a crisis point or, better yet, when the disease is still containable. It remains up to the doctors (in this case, the Security Council) to decide how or if it should be used.

**Principles of Rapid Reaction**

Several principles are emphasized in this report as the foundation for enhancing a UN rapid-reaction capability which would simultaneously decrease the UN’s response time while increasing effectiveness. The principle of **reliability** or predictability stands as one of the guideposts. Equal emphasis has to be placed on the principle of **quality** rather than on quantity, aiming at doing the job well rather than on mounting a large and unwieldy multinational force. A related principle is that of **effectiveness** rather than rapidity *per se*. A hasty response, poorly executed, could well be worse medicine than nothing at all. A less rapid but more deliberate response might ultimately be far more effective. Finally, a principle that is at the root of the entire study is that of **cost-effectiveness**. It is often much better to act at an early stage, when a situation remains relatively fluid and is more susceptible to outside influence, and when the costs of intervention are fairly low, than await the consequences. The alternative, so evident in the case of Rwanda in 1994, is too often to procrastinate as the crisis emerges, but ultimately to bear much greater costs as the full bill of devastation is tallied.

These principles provide parameters for the practical, concrete steps recommended to enhance the UN’s rapid-reaction capability. The study draws a distinction between “steady-state” or traditional peacekeeping operations and those which warrant rapid reaction. Both are UN “peace operations”, to use the broad-brush term, and they have much in common. Improvements in one would undoubtedly benefit the effectiveness of the other. A rapid-reaction capability, however, is based upon sound contingency planning and working arrangements created in advance of crisis. It is therefore more systematic than traditional peacekeeping and requires more resources in the planning and “front end”. One of the important points of the study, however, is that additional emphasis on the start-up phase of peace operations is likely to mean more efficient and cost-effective operations on the ground.

Most of the changes recommended in this report will require resources to support them. For this reason, considerable emphasis has been placed throughout the study on financial and resource issues. The Canadian Government, like many others, adheres strongly to a policy of zero growth for the UN system. For the most part, therefore, recommendations advocated in this report are based on improved management techniques and enhanced efficiencies in UN operations, on possibilities for reallocation from areas of lower priority to ones of higher priority, and on shared arrangements whereby the UN can take advantage of national capabilities at minimal cost to the Organization. Financing is a persistent problem for the UN and has reached crisis proportions, in large part because of the failure of major contributors to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. This report does not seek to add to the UN’s difficulties by advocating measures which are clearly beyond
implementation. This study's practical approach recognizes the current limitations of
the UN to raise revenues and builds modestly on current foundations, at least in the
short to medium terms.

**The Four Levels of Rapid Reaction**

As an analytical technique, the study divides the UN system into four levels:
political, strategic, operational and tactical. In reality, these levels are inextricably
linked with ambiguous dividing lines between each level. Nevertheless, there are
specific functions and structures associated with each of these levels. If each is
analyzed separately, it then becomes easier to identify disparities or disconnections
between and among the levels. This is fundamental to the integrated approach
advanced in this study, since these levels function in some form within national
governments, military establishments, a wide range of non-governmental and private
institutions, as well as in international organizations. In the end, all four levels must
work together harmoniously, towards common objectives and as an integrated team,
with what this report calls "unity of purpose", in order to produce a coherent, effective
operation or "unity of effort" on the ground.

The **political level**, for the purposes of this study, is the international community
of nations which are members of the UN and acting through the Security Council and
General Assembly. This level is concerned with the formulation and/or modification
of fundamental goals or policy objectives. In the UN system, primary political
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security is vested in the
Security Council by Article 24 of the UN Charter.

Primary responsibility, however, should not be taken to imply exclusive authority.
The General Assembly also plays a significant role at the political level. This is
certainly the case concerning the financial dimensions of peace operations, on which
this report places considerable emphasis. But it also applies to the development of
policy, doctrine and standards. Most importantly, in the long-term the General
Assembly tends to set and reflect the overall atmosphere in the UN system, and it thus
helps determine the priority accorded the major issues of the day, whether they be
security, economic, humanitarian or social. The UN is a global system of sovereign
states. Thus, any set of proposals to change the system at the political level must take
account of the evolving policies of all Member States towards questions of
international peace and security and the role of the UN in that process.

The **strategic level**, for the purposes of the report, is the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, supported by the UN Secretariat. He allocates the means to achieve
political goals. The Office of the Secretary-General, in particular, is the link between
the political and strategic levels. Political goals are translated into strategic objectives
at this level, according to the nature and extent of the resources available. The more
ambitious and far-reaching the objectives, the more sophisticated and capable the
strategic apparatus (the Secretariat) must be. This has implications for the policies,
procedures, structures and resources of the UN Secretariat.

The critical link between the strategic objectives and tactical activities (i.e., the
detailed organization and execution of tasks) is found at what the report calls the
**operational level**. Here the broad strategic objectives set by the Secretariat are
"customized" to fit precisely the situation on the ground, for which specific tactical tasks will be executed. In military terms, which are fully appropriate to the report’s examination of peacekeeping and peace operations, the campaign plan is developed at the operational level for a specific “theatre of operations.” This plan may comprise a number of different “sub-operations” or sub-plans for specific locales or for differing periods of time. These operations and sub-operations are coordinated at the operational level by what, in UN terms, is the Head of Mission, either the Special Representative of the Secretary General or the Force Commander.

All of the financial, material and personnel resources identified by the UN in any operation are ultimately applied to pursue specific activities on the ground, at what this report calls the **tactical level**. Each tactical element in any operation has one or two discrete tasks. For example, one element of a peace operation might be responsible for monitoring a ceasefire. Another could be responsible for the collection and storage of weapons. A third could be assigned the responsibility for receiving, delivering and distributing humanitarian aid. A fourth element might be designated to help in the preparation of an electoral process. It is evident that nothing will be accomplished if these tactical activities function inadequately or fail to reflect the idea of “unity of effort”.

Our use of these four levels as an analytical device has two broad purposes. The first is to make absolutely clear our conviction that a rapid-reaction capability can only be successfully implemented through broad and systematic changes in many parts of the UN system, including among states and within the Security Council, as well as with respect to how the UN conducts its peace operations. The second is to identify with some precision the types of changes which require implementation at every level of the system. While we emphasize that some of the recommendations can be implemented on their own, our decided preference is for an “across the board” approach to ensure that the reforms which Canada and others are advocating are ultimately effective.

**The Idea of Rapid Reaction**

In the Secretary-General’s 1992 study, *An Agenda for Peace*, he described the range of peace and security activities undertaken by the UN: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and enforcement action pursuant to Article 42. *An Agenda For Peace* explicitly distinguished between operations ranging from preventive diplomacy through peace enforcement undertaken in accordance with Article 40, and enforcement action pursuant to Article 42. In following the analysis of *An Agenda for Peace*, this report advances the case for a rapid-reaction capability which would be appropriate and enhance a full range of peace operations. For example, rapid response can be a key factor in cases of preventive deployment. The ability to deploy rapidly to buttress a recently-concluded ceasefire or peace agreement may be crucial to the re-establishment of peace and stability. Reinforcement of a faltering operation through recourse to a rapid-reaction capability will also be more likely to succeed if augmentation can be effected quickly.

Enforcement operations pursuant to Article 42 of the Charter, however are substantially different both quantitatively and qualitatively. They can be enormously large and complex, and demand a resource commitment far beyond current UN resources. They also raise difficult issues related to the provision of Article 43 forces. Such operations for the foreseeable future are essentially beyond the range of UN
In contrast to NATO, with a sophisticated force planning system and a high degree of force commitment and availability, the UN has had to rely on a much more informal, cumbersome process to acquire its operational and tactical resources.

capacity. Even the Secretary-General does not envisage the UN as acting in a leading military role when it comes to enforcement under Article 42 (for example, in such cases as the Gulf War). For these reasons, this study's primary focus is restricted to peace operations as defined by the Secretary-General.

A number of states and at least one international organization (NATO) already have the capacity to react rapidly. We have looked at a number of these capacities as part of the study (see Chapter Three). They possess all of the elements required for a rapid-reaction capability to function effectively: political coherence, an early-warning system, a capacity for contingency planning, potentially effective and timely decision-making machinery at the political/strategic level, and well-trained, adequately-equipped mobile forces properly structured at the operational/tactical level. The costs of maintaining this capability at adequate levels of readiness are relatively high, but in each case resources have been made available to ensure that these capabilities can function effectively.

In the case of the UN, the situation is much different. Peacekeeping emerged in the UN, not as one element of a coherent approach to international peace and security, but as an ad hoc response to a particular crisis, namely, the Suez conflict of 1956. Peacekeeping had no specific basis in the UN Charter. The UN's capacity in this area was built up incrementally, slowly and through the experience of various operations over ensuing decades. When political will has been firm and the Security Council has reached a strong consensus, the UN has been able to respond quickly. But this capability is not a permanent fixture of the UN system. In contrast to NATO, with a sophisticated force planning system and a high degree of force commitment and availability, the UN has had to rely on a much more informal, cumbersome process to acquire its operational and tactical resources. This approach may have been adequate prior to 1988, when the UN had few operations in the field, and when a rapid-reaction capability would have been seldom used. But this approach is simply no longer adequate in the face of the challenges of the post-Cold-War period.

Based upon our examination of rapid-reaction capabilities elsewhere and our examination of the UN system, this study takes the idea of rapid-reaction to mean the following:

- the ability to acquire, analyze and take timely decisions based on early-warning data from a wide variety of sources;
- the organizational capability to prepare generic plans, including provision for transportation and logistic support, in advance of a specified crisis;
- the ability to undertake concurrent activities, such as allowing implementation actions to be initiated at early stages of the decision-making process;
- the capability to deploy the minimum necessary operational-level command and control facilities to a theatre of operations within seven days;
- the capability to deploy a group of sufficient size to deal with the immediate stages of an emergency (approximately 5,000 military and civilian personnel) within an additional three to five weeks.
Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations

This is not a "hard and fast" definition of a rapid-reaction capability. Rather, it is a summary of what a rapid-reaction capability would need in order to be an effective tool at the disposal of the Security Council.

This capability, once achieved, would inevitably be applied in crisis situations which would require a multi-functional response. As recent experience has demonstrated, planning and implementation of UN peace operations must incorporate political, civilian police and humanitarian components, as well as the military element. The idea of "multi-dimensionality" is therefore crucial to this study. At every level and at all stages of an operation, there must be an integrated approach to a problem which reflects the diverse range of capacities within the UN system and among Member States, and which brings in other relevant organizations which have roles to play. To achieve "unity of purpose" in defining the strategic goals of an operation and "unity of effort" on the ground, multidimensionality is a fundamental basis of modern UN peace operations.

### The Idea of Rapid-Reaction

- the ability to acquire, analyze and take timely decisions
- the organizational capability to prepare generic plans
- the ability to undertake concurrent activities
- the capability to deploy operational-level command and control facilities
- the capability to deploy (approximately 5,000 military and civilian personnel) within three to five weeks

At every level and at all stages of an operation, there must be an integrated approach to a problem which reflects the diverse range of capacities within the UN system and among Member States, and which brings in other relevant organizations which have roles to play.

### Organization of the Study

In ensuing chapters, the report elaborates on many of the above points. Chapter Three reviews briefly some current models of rapid reaction, in France, the United States and NATO. Based on this survey, it offers some reflections on what the report calls "the generic components" or basic elements that are essential to the creation and maintenance of any effective rapid-reaction capability. Chapter Four takes these generic components of rapid reaction and compares them with those capabilities currently available in the UN system. It also reviews some of the impediments in the UN to rapid reaction. This leads to the substantive parts of the report and to a series of recommendations in Chapter Five. They argue the case for fulfilling the basic requirements of rapid reaction, and outline structures and procedures necessary for what we call a "Vanguard Concept" at the operational and tactical levels, linked to more effective decision-making at the political and strategic levels.

Chapter Six offers a vision of the future, taking the report into a description of requirements over the longer-term. We acknowledge that, while reforms over the short to medium term may provide the UN with an effective rapid-reaction capability, they may not be the ultimate, fundamental changes which are needed to ensure reliability in the UN's approach to international peace and security. The report argues that the United Nations may need bold and imaginative proposals to assist it in contributing to global security. Its potential may only be realized if the Organization is
not constrained by the limitations of the present environment, particularly its reliance on state contributions for personnel, equipment and finances. Hence Chapter Six envisages a range of possibilities, ambitious in today's environment, but perhaps approaching realization in early years of the next century. Finally, Chapter Seven summarizes the report's conclusions and recommendations.

This study is intended to offer Canada's perspective on how rapid reaction might be achieved. It is not presented as the definitive work on the subject. Rather it is one contribution among many to a process that is bound to be marked by more hurdles than throughways. It is as well to bear in mind from the outset the potential difficulties involved in implementation, partly so as not to raise expectations beyond the ability of any organization or structure to satisfy. "The history of international organization is full of episodes in which high ambition has led to disappointment and adverse political reaction," Adam Roberts, Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, has observed, to which he then added: "None of this is a reason to abandon the effort to get a better quick reaction capability under UN auspices."

This is an apt description of the Canadian approach. The way is fraught with obstacles. That is a given. But this study is designed to offer both a series of possibilities for the way ahead and a series of practical recommendations to initiate the process of arriving at our destination. The late Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, in reflecting on the differences between high ideals and problems of implementation, noted in 1960, "The UN reflects both aspiration and a falling short of aspiration, but the constant struggle to close the gap between aspiration and performance now, as always, makes the difference between civilization and chaos." This study seeks to contribute to that difference.
CHAPTER THREE

THE RECORD OF RAPID REACTION: RECENT EXPERIENCE

"On 7 August 1990 President Bush directed the deployment of US forces in response to a request for assistance from the Government of Saudi Arabia. The first US soldier was on the ground within 31 hours of the alert order. What followed was the fastest build-up and movement of forces across greater distances in less time than at any other point in history."

US Department of Defense, Report to Congress, April 1992

The Concept of Rapid Reaction

The concept of a rapid-reaction capability is not a new one. In recognition of the need to deploy large numbers of persons in relatively short periods of time, many states and multinational organizations have created elements for this purpose, mainly but not exclusively within their armed forces. The deployment of a mission consisting of several thousand personnel to an area devastated by natural disaster or by conflict is a massive undertaking. Infrastructure may well have been destroyed. There may be significant numbers of displaced persons or refugees requiring assistance of all kinds. Measures may need be taken for the control of contagious disease, often in appalling conditions. Where there is a breakdown of order, banditry may be rampant. Distances between the crisis centre and transportation and logistics resources may be substantial, with important consequences for the supply of personnel and goods.

In response to these situations, states and organizations have built rapid-reaction capabilities which, although functioning in different ways, focus mainly on planning, decision-making, personnel, logistics, transportation and equipment. These and other "generic components" of rapid reaction are the elements which the UN must also acquire if its future rapid-reaction capability is to be as successful and effective as the efforts of states and other organizations. To assess these generic components of rapid reaction, and place them into a UN context, this study has examined three examples of proven and effective rapid-reaction capabilities. Two are national examples (France and the United States), and one is an international organization (NATO). In all three cases, a rapid-reaction capability was developed in response to a perceived need to react quickly to crises, designed to address both general and specific challenges to national or international interests.

In all three of these cases, a strong emphasis has been placed on joint planning, encouraging the involvement at all stages of the planning process of agencies likely to be involved in the implementation phases. The result is an integrated and coherent approach, indispensable for success, which we have described at the political and strategic levels as "unity of purpose" in peace operations. In a national context, the military component of such an operation can only achieve maximum effectiveness if it is organized in strict adherence with the principle of "unity of command". In a multinational context, with a number of different military units and both military and
civillian personnel, the goal is generally to emulate the same organizational structure, but without the rigour of "unity of command". The result on the ground, however, is a high degree of coordination and "unity of effort" among operational units — what the US Army calls "an atmosphere of cooperation rather than 'command' authority". These two elements — unity of purpose and unity of effort — are key objectives towards which any rapid-reaction capability must work.

France

France formally created the Force d'Action Rapide (FAR) as its modern rapid-reaction capability in 1983. It currently consists of four divisions with complementary capabilities: two light-armoured divisions, an airborne division and a parachute division. Together, the total of more than 55,000 troops, 240 helicopters and 275 armoured vehicles constitute a force capable of quick mobilization in a variety of configurations for deployment on very short notice to distant theatres.

The headquarters of the FAR is established at the operational level as a major army command, reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces and receiving its strategic direction from his joint headquarters in Paris. The Commander of the FAR relies on the strategic headquarters for planning guidance and the provision of early-warming intelligence. He frequently attends Cabinet meetings together with the Chief of Staff to ensure that he is fully conversant with key political and strategic issues currently before the French Government. The FAR is responsible for the development of detailed contingency plans for a wide variety of possible operations, and makes recommendations to the strategic headquarters on the composition, mission and rules of engagement of possible forces. The tactical units responsible for implementing contingency plans are assigned to the FAR by the French Chief of Staff. Once assigned to the FAR, these tactical units fall under the FAR's responsibility for mission-specific training.

Given a reasonable amount of lead time, based on early-warning intelligence, the FAR is able to deploy lead elements of the Force within hours anywhere in the world, with follow-on elements deploying within days. The Force can be deployed with about 80 transport aircraft, although foreign tankers may have to be leased to obtain sufficient air refuelling assets for distant operations. During the 1994 Rwanda deployment, it augmented its military lift capacity by contracting aircraft from the private sector.

The size and composition of the FAR in any given operation depends on the political objectives of the French Government and the strategic goals defined by the French Chief of Staff. Based on these objectives and goals, the French are able to assemble a "customized" force to conduct an operation. In the case of "Opération Turquoise" in Rwanda in 1994, France was able to deploy a force of between 2000 and 4000 personnel within 24 hours after receipt of authorization at the political level. The key elements in the technical success of this operation were early warning and alert procedures, clearly-defined and limited objectives, pre-established command and control structures and adequate logistic self-sufficiency for the deployed force.
The United States of America

The ability of the United States to project forces abroad rapidly has been achieved through a variety of organizational structures and techniques. This study, however, looked at the operation of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), a unified command (with a single commander, a broad, continuing mission and composed of two or more services) capable of deploying an operational-level headquarters with a variety of tactical units. CENTCOM's tactical capability is normally XVIII Airborne Corps. This corps, designed for maximum flexibility to fit the requirements of any mission, is maintained at a high level of readiness, and is capable of rapid deployment anywhere in the world. It has a strength of over 150,000 personnel and can begin deployment on 18 hours notice. CENTCOM is engaged in continuous contingency planning and training exercises based on strategic directives and readiness standards issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

To meet readiness and deployment criteria, CENTCOM has access to a system of early warning and alert measures, based on the analysis and distribution of intelligence through the US intelligence network. This early-warning system triggers the political and strategic decision-making process and allows CENTCOM to adjust existing contingency plans to recent developments. Early warning then permits CENTCOM to begin the implementation of contingency plans at the earliest possible opportunity throughout its operational and tactical levels.

CENTCOM is assigned tactical units for planning purposes by the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. These units, however, are geographically dispersed and operate under the direction of a variety of other commands until activated for service with CENTCOM. Training, capability and readiness standards are defined by the Joint Staff based on CENTCOM contingency plans. In effect, therefore, CENTCOM relies on a system of “standby forces” within the US armed forces, organized when required by an operational-level headquarters to implement assigned objectives.

Deployment of such an organization is obviously complicated. The US Army has a Strategic Mobility Program, the aim of which is to provide a light brigade anywhere in the world within four days, a light division within 12 days, a heavy brigade (pre-positioned afloat) within 15 days, two heavy divisions within 30 days, and a five-division corps (approximately 150,000 personnel) within 75 days. Readiness plans are based on several considerations, including the assumption that troops will deploy on a “come-as-you-are” basis, without time for additional training or for filling personnel or equipment shortages.

A good example of CENTCOM in action was the Gulf conflict of 1990-91. Based on extensive contingency planning and logistics preparations, the United States was able to move an initial rapid-reaction “deterrent force” of approximately 5000 personnel to the Gulf within 48 hours of a political decision. It subsequently increased the size of its forces through a series of well-planned stages over ensuing months, culminating in a multinational force of over 500,000 troops which conducted Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
The NATO Model

In the 1960s, as NATO moved to a new model of crisis management, the ACE Mobile Force (Land) or AMF(L) was created as a rapidly-deployable, multinational force. The underlying concept of the AMF(L) is to deploy a multinational force of approximately brigade size (5,000 personnel) to a specified "contingency area" within six days. On arrival, the force immediately begins to conduct deterrent operations, which essentially means showing the NATO flag and reassuring the local population of the full support of the Alliance.

The AMF(L) is based on a permanent, standing, operational-level headquarters, with its constituent tactical and logistics units on stand-by in the six NATO member states which provide these forces. The headquarters consists of 45 personnel of all ranks, but is augmented with additional personnel when deployed. Communications for the force is provided by a composite British/German communications squadron. Tactical units, which remain in their home countries unless deployed on operational exercises, come from Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the United States and the United Kingdom. These states keep specified units at appropriate readiness levels to ensure their deployment to the designated theatre of operations within six days. They deploy with 30 days' logistics support.

The headquarters (HQ) of the AMF(L) is responsible for the development of a wide range of detailed operational plans. This contingency planning process involves frequent reconnaissance of possible deployment areas and detailed co-ordination with both NATO and national organizations. HQ AMF(L) also deals directly with the forces assigned by nations. Direct contact with these tactical units is maintained through both staff visits from HQ AMF(L) and various commander conferences, study groups and command post exercises.

The process by which the AMF(L) deploys is suggestive of possible analogous arrangements in the UN context. As with the two national examples, early warning is a key factor in effective, rapid deployment. A request by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe to deploy the AMF(L) is forwarded to NATO’s Defence Planning Committee in Brussels for discussion among states. HQ AMF(L) is then able to begin turning its contingency planning into mission-specific planning. Concurrently, the strategic movements unit begins the coordination of strategic air and sea lift to move the force. At the same time, the Defence Planning Committee requests contributing states to prepare their contingents for deployment and increase their readiness states. While the Defence Planning Committee as a whole is responsible for the decision to deploy the AMF(L), member states determine their own participation in a given operation. To allow for the possibility of a number of non-participating states, there is a degree of "redundancy" in the AMF(L) force structure.

As decision-making proceeds at the political level, HQ AMF(L) deploys an advance headquarters unit to the theatre of operations. Initial contact with local NATO and national authorities is made at this time, and contributing states immediately deploy "key companies" (of 120 personnel each) to arrive for operations within 48 hours. This capability is achievable due to progressive enhancements of readiness levels and preparations which proceed simultaneously with the political and strategic decision-making process. The remainder of national contingents deploy over the next four days,
achieving full operational capability of approximately 5,500 persons within six days. Follow-on logistics supplies for up to 30 days are subsequently delivered by air and sea into the theatre. With the requisite planning and resources, HQ AMF(L) provides NATO with an effective and rapidly-deployable multinational force of more than 5,000 personnel capable of conducting operations within six days of the order to move.

An Assessment

The UN does not require a large-scale rapid-reaction force capable of moving into war-like situations. Nevertheless, some of the basic principles of rapid reaction can be deduced from the three rapid-reaction examples discussed above. First, these arrangements must be sufficiently flexible that they can meet a wide variety of possible contingencies, ranging from humanitarian assistance to operations in which there are high risks to personnel. Second, in order to obtain maximum flexibility, rapid-reaction forces must be organized in a "modular" fashion, lending themselves to quick organization in accordance with the requirements of a specific mission. Third, elements of these forces, generally widely-dispersed among separate organizations and in various locations, must be mobile, and thus capable of rapid concentration in a single location. In these and other examples examined in the course of this study, a standing operational headquarters organizes these forces on the basis of contingency plans and coordinates their deployment. Fourth, all of the key elements of a rapid-reaction force must stand at a high degree of readiness. They must be capable of assembling and transporting personnel and equipment quickly, and immediately upon debarcation be able to conduct the type of operation for which it is deployed. Finally, a deployed force should be self-sufficient, having all of the elements necessary to support and sustain itself for the initial stages of an operation.

In addition to these general principles there are six basic, "generic" components or elements which are fundamental to the success of virtually any rapid-reaction capability. These components would have to be reflected in the UN system if its aspirations towards an effective rapid-reaction capability are to be realized.

First, there must be an early-warning mechanism to provide advance notice of impending conflict or crisis. For the most part, this involves a capability to acquire, analyze and distribute the type of information which can then trigger concurrent activities: decision-making at the political and strategic levels, contingency planning at the strategic and operational levels, and the implementation process at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. To be effective, this early-warning mechanism must be linked to individuals and organizations capable of acting on such information.

Second, there must be an effective decision-making process to facilitate contingency planning and the implementation of an operation. Timely decisions are essential if rapid reaction is to be achieved. These are based on comprehensive assessments of what is required to achieve political objectives and on the mobilization of the means to implement contingency plans. Once a decision to take action has been taken, political objectives are translated into operational plans. Assuming the existence of the rapid-reaction capabilities examined in this report, extensive advance planning should already have taken place. It usually consists of two tiers. The first is contingency planning, based on information supplied by way of the early-warning
mechanism, which prepares likely courses of action dealing with a range of potential scenarios. The second is mission-specific planning, which evaluates the nature and scope of potential operations in specific geographic areas and the resources required to mount these operations. An effective decision-making process in which planning is central avoids the pitfalls of an ad hoc approach and promotes savings in the time and resources required to mount an operation.

Third, there must be readily-available transportation and infrastructure. The ability to transport personnel and equipment to and within a theatre of operation, as well as to identify the infrastructure required to support an operation, is fundamental to a successful rapid-reaction capability. This requires the collation in advance of a substantial amount of information, such as the load capacity of specific sea or air lift, the length of time in transit, the number of flights or ships required to transport specific loads and the early identification of sea and airlift capabilities to facilitate the movement of equipment, personnel and other required resources. It is also essential to have complete and authoritative data on local infrastructure, such as air strips and sea ports in the theatre of operations, along with information regarding their capacities for handling strategic movement. This is indispensable in determining with reasonable accuracy how quickly a mission will become fully operational. The availability of strategic air and sea lift also requires careful advance planning with Member States and often with the private sector.

Fourth, adequate logistics support is crucial to effective rapid-reaction. A force deployed into a region devastated by natural disaster or conflict must be self-sufficient to the extent that it can feed, clothe and house itself during at least the initial period of a crisis. Local conditions can vary enormously, and advance planning must take into account the extent to which a rapid-reaction unit can count on local suppliers for items as basic as potable water. Depending upon the specific tasks of a mission and the nature of the theatre of operations, demands for logistics support could be substantial. Contingency planning must be based upon "worst-case scenarios" but be sufficiently flexible to allow for any number of operational requirements once a mission begins.

Fifth, a key element is adequate finances. Finances are rarely a problem for rapid-reaction forces which function at the national level, where there are established procedures for obtaining financial authority and for disbursing monies. At the international level or among multinational forces, finances become more problematic. The key is the existence of appropriate financial authorities commensurate with responsibilities. At the strategic and operational levels, this means the ability to authorize expenditures and expend funds on contingency planning or mission
planning as the decision-making process takes place. At the operational and tactical levels, this means that the official responsible for the conduct of a mission must have adequate financial authority to meet his objectives, including the disbursement of funds on the ground. Adequate finances depend upon full funding of a rapid-reaction capability and the existence of rules and regulations which allow the timely disbursement of funds within well-understood principles of accountability.

Sixth, a rapid-reaction capability must have well-trained personnel. In addition to basic military training, which is a prerequisite for any military unit in high-risk situations, personnel must also have training in skills appropriate to a variety of missions, based upon contingency plans or likely scenarios. Personnel, particularly civilian staff, must also have more specific training, or "mission-specific training", in order to work within common frameworks towards the agreed objectives of a particular operation. In multinational forces, there must also be training for work where there are cultural and organizational differences. In multidimensional operations, training can help set the right course towards the "unity of effort" which is fundamental to success. In order to function cohesively, most organizations, whether national or multinational, need to train and exercise together in advance of crisis. This implies a foundation of similar policy, common doctrine or standard operating procedures among all participating Member States.

The Elements of Rapid Reaction Considered

Ensuring that these six elements function adequately becomes substantially more complicated when a rapid-reaction capability is multinational. Through all levels, from political decision-making level to tactical command and control, the need for coordination becomes critical. Of special importance is coordination between national authorities and officials responsible for multinational operations. Supra-national levels of command, for example, recommend training standards, but national authorities are responsible for the capabilities of their personnel. Strategic lift may be coordinated through a multinational command mechanism, but it is essentially a national responsibility, as are a number of logistic support functions. Financing and logistical support in an operation normally only shift from a national to a multinational responsibility once units arrive in a theatre of operations. In a multidimensional operation involving both military and civilian units, the problems are accentuated, due to differences of procedures and, very often, lack of familiarity with partner organizations.

The issue of standardization of equipment is important in multinational organizations in which disparate units must work together. The spectrum of standardization ranges from low-level compatibility (to ensure that equipment or procedures do not clash) to inter-operability (where some degree of workable harmony can be effected) to inter-changeability (where substitution is feasible) to commonality (where the same equipment is used or the same procedures are adopted).

A rapid-reaction capability may not be a new idea and there are many complexities involved in making rapid reaction work effectively. Within the UN context, with many more member states than NATO, vast differences in capabilities, policies, languages and cultures, these complexities are accentuated. In the short to
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

the medium term, while the UN puts into place procedures which enable multinational forces to function together more effectively, there are bound to be considerable operational problems.

On the other hand, the requirements of the UN are far less onerous than any of the three rapid-reaction forces examined in this report. As this study will propose, rapid reaction would involve relatively small forces, possibly in the order of 5,000 personnel, much smaller than the French or American equivalents. The UN units would not be expected to go into combat situations or into operations in which they would be called upon explicitly to use force against an aggressor. These differences are important. They mean differences in the quantity of personnel requested from Member States, the types of equipment used and the consequent demands placed upon transportation and logistical systems. They also have an important impact on the type of command and control system needed in the UN. As Dr. Cathy Downes of the Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force has written, “The broad military objectives for [rapid-reaction forces] see such taskforces being employed to hold, and where possible de-escalate or contain a crisis until such time as a follow-on UN peacekeeping force can be activated, integrated and deployed or a decision is made to abandon efforts, other than diplomatic, to contain or resolve the conflict.”

The UN has made remarkable progress in recent years in updating its approach to peace operations. It has laid the basis for future progress. The main task is to address those remaining deficiencies in policy and structure which would enable a UN rapid-reaction capability to function effectively in years ahead, thus ensuring that unity of purpose and unity of effort are the common objectives towards which the Organization and the international community are working. Identifying and addressing remaining deficiencies will be critical if the UN is to acquire an effective rapid-reaction capability.
CHAPTER FOUR

ELEMENTS OF RAPID REACTION: HOW THE UN SHAPES UP

"In its essential characteristics, the UN system for planning, organising and supporting peacekeeping operations in the field remains largely unchanged since the end of the Cold War. As a system management it evolved out of the experience of peacekeeping in the Middle East, and for its effective functioning it has always relied heavily on improvisation, ad hoc procedures and close working relationships among members of the Secretariat in New York and between officers and civilian personnel in the field..."

Mats R. Berdal, 1993

From “Steady-State” to Rapid Reaction

The rapid deployment of a peacekeeping or peace support operation is a complex undertaking involving all four levels at which governments or inter-governmental organizations function. At the political level in the UN system, the Security Council establishes goals and transforms them into political directives, while Member States and the Council determine the allocation of resources used to achieve these objectives. At the strategic level, the Secretary-General and the UN Secretariat identify the means to achieve these political goals. The link between strategy and tactics is made at the operational level, where resources are allocated and directed to achieve operational objectives in fulfillment of strategic goals. The achievement of tactical objectives in field operations contributes to the accomplishment of the operational mission. In essence, this discussion is an examination of how the UN is organized to manage crises and deploy the forces of Member States in response to crisis. Effective crisis management involves the coordination and integration into the planning and implementation process of all levels, achieving the objectives of unity of purpose and unity of effort.

Deploying missions which can act effectively and rapidly can be an expensive undertaking. Costs mount in direct proportion to the size of an operation, the sophistication of the equipment used and the higher states of readiness of forces from contributing states. When these groups and the infrastructure supporting them are multinational, however, there are advantages of sharing the costs among many participating states. No single state is obliged to assume the high costs of creating a full capability on its own, and each state can offer national assets which reflect its strengths and capacities. Many of the fixed costs of developing a peace operation can be spread among several states, thus lowering the overhead for all participating countries. Nevertheless, there are significant resource implications which must be weighed if an overall rapid-reaction capability is to be cost-effective for the UN.

When one compares the generic components of rapid reaction identified in the previous chapter and the current capabilities of the United Nations, it is evident that the UN suffers from a number of serious deficiencies. The structure and operations of the UN Secretariat have largely been shaped by its experience in implementing "steady-state" peacekeeping operations, which are usually slow to mount, involving months of preparations. During the Cold War, this was the most that could be
expected of the Organization, and the elements required to enable the UN to act quickly in response to crisis were never put into place. What rapid-reaction capability it possessed was in large measure dependent on individual Member States.

Giving the UN a rapid-reaction capability involves addressing each of the generic components of rapid-reaction identified in the previous chapter and providing the UN with equivalent elements commensurate with UN requirements. In the sections which follow, the report reviews each of the six components and assesses where the UN stands with respect to each one.

**Early Warning**

The UN has access to information from many sources. In addition to the international media and the diplomatic community, well represented at United Nations Headquarters in New York, the UN has a global network of programs, institutions and specialized agencies, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and others, most of which have field offices throughout the world. Into this loose, unorganized network comes information from non-governmental organizations, most of which are represented in New York and many of which have representation in other states. Despite a traditional allergy within the UN system to the idea of “intelligence collection”, some Member States share open-source or low-level intelligence information with the UN Secretariat. There is no shortage of information available to the UN, and there are adequate avenues to provide the basis for early warning of impending crisis situations.

The UN Secretariat does not have a formal early-warning system. But various parts of the Secretariat, especially the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), carry out similar functions, including the Situation Centre, the Policy and Analysis Unit, and both the Generic Planning Unit and the Conceptual Planning Unit within the Mission-Planning Service. In 1993 the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) started a two-year project on a Humanitarian Early Warning System (HEWS), with the mandate of compiling information to identify potential crises with humanitarian

---

**Un Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)**

- **4 March 1964**
  - Security Council resolution 186 recommends establishment of UNFICYP

- **12/13 March 1964**
  - UN Secretary-General states that measures to establish a UN force were “underway and making progress”.

- **8 June 1964**
  - UNFICYP reaches full strength

- *“In the several weeks it took to conclude arrangements for the establishment of the force, the situation in Cyprus remained very unstable. The small British contingent on the ground was only able to contain a small portion of the escalating conflict.”*  
  - Karl Th. Birgisson, *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping*
implications. Initially, it gathered information on five countries, but it is expanding its range of analysis to 55 countries during 1995. Its aim is to produce weekly general reports, early-warning signals and country profiles which will be shared with DPA and DPKO. DPA is also working on a promising project to rationalize and coordinate the incipient early-warning systems among DPA, DHA and DPKO. Some thought is now being given to enlarging this circle of cooperation to include the Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis and focusing all of these activities in the Office of the Secretary-General.

Outside the Secretariat, various UN agencies, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have developed the equivalent of early-warning structures. UNHCR's Documentation Centre in Geneva also prepares country profiles, somewhat along the lines of the HEWS system in DHA. As the Rwandan crisis of 1994 so graphically demonstrated, however, early warning is not the problem. Many parts of the international community — the UN, specialized agencies, member states, NGOs, the media — were fully aware that disaster was around the corner.

The UN's problem is not the absence of information. Rather, it is the absence of a path for information to flow, linking early warning to the other processes crucial to rapid reaction, especially political decision-making and contingency planning. Early warning should be a crucial first step to enable the political and strategic levels to be seized of a situation and to implement measures before a crisis erupts. Reforms within the UN Secretariat in the past two years have taken the organization in the right direction. Although information-sharing between UN headquarters and field operations had once been inefficient, because of absences of procedures and an incompatibility between policy and operations, the Secretary-General has addressed most of the significant gaps. The creation of the Situation Centre provides the nucleus of a 24-hour operations centre at headquarters specifically responsible for the dissemination of information.

Early-warning systems are not yet coordinated, however, with contingency planning or crisis management functions, or with any other elements essential to rapid response, such as logistics and transport. Ideally, early-warning signals should trigger contingency planning, or at least "contingency thinking", to initiate preparatory actions. The Generic Planning Section of the Mission Planning Service within DPKO is now tasked with devising several "templates" of peace operations, along with model standard operating procedures, and will refine them in the light of experience. These templates will help contingency planning efforts. With a limited staff, however, it has insufficient strength to do more than generic planning. A sensitive political issue within the UN is contingency planning for particular countries or regions. Although there is bound to be sensitivity to the drafting of crisis scenarios, resistance is gradually being overcome, as Member States recognize that the absence of contingency planning effectively renders the UN unable to react rapidly to crisis situations.

The logical extension of contingency planning is preparatory activity, such as the preparation of maps, the identification of sources of equipment and supplies, the prepositioning of communications and the identification of possible troop contributing states. Such is the extreme sensitivity of Member States, however, that no action has been taken on an internal recommendation of 1994 that "DPKO should undertake a study of the political issues involved in preparatory activity prior to the adoption of a mandate for a peace-keeping mission." Ideally, on the basis of an early-warning
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

alert, the DPKO would have the authority to identify those elements of mission-specific contingency plans that could be implemented or initiated without compromising the Security Council's prerogative of deciding whether and when a particular mission would take place. Thus far, however, the linkage between the information available to the UN about potential crisis situations and the contingency planning efforts of the Secretariat has been decidedly weak.

Nor is there a linkage between the incipient early-warning systems of the UN and the troop-contributing states which might be asked to supply personnel for urgent missions. In 1993, the Secretariat began to refine its system of standby arrangements, designed to identify personnel for peace operations, in recognition of the problem that failure to provide well-trained and adequately-equipped units for particular missions remains the biggest stumbling block to UN rapid reaction. If national political authorities were able to weigh the merits of participation further in advance, and if officials and military authorities could prepare personnel before formal notification, the lead time between formal notification and deployment might be cut.

The Decision-Making Process

To enable the UN to react rapidly to crisis situations, the decision-making processes should reflect certain principles and guidelines. The mandate of a mission should be clear and implementable. There should be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority. The composition of the force should be appropriate to the mission, and there should be an effective process of consultation among all of the mission partners. In missions involving both military and civilian resources, there should be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities and agreed operating procedures. The participation of each troop-contributing nation should be accepted by all parties to the conflict. The size, training and equipment of the force should be appropriate to the purpose at hand and remain so over the life of the mission. There should be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure and clear rules of engagement.

The UN system is extraordinarily complex, however, and there is nothing approaching "standard operating procedures" when it comes to discussing, defining, deciding upon or implementing a peace operation. Until very recently, there had been no crisis management and emergency preparedness unit within the UN to integrate the views of its nine Under-Secretaries General and to enable the Secretary General to present a fully-coordinated response for consideration by the Security Council. The Council, jealous of its prerogatives under the Charter, was until recently reluctant to engage potential troop-contributing states in discussions about peace missions and mandates. There is no Secretariat unit which can take a draft resolution of the Council and transform it into an "options paper", with a fully-staffed list of options, consequences, risks and resource implications. Nor is there a unit in the Secretariat that provides the clear, unequivocal and achievable operational guidance between the Security Council and the operational level, that is, those responsible for executing the plan and integrating personnel and resources in pursuit of political and strategic objectives.
The UN's decision-making processes at all levels have historically been *ad hoc*. Each time an operation is authorized, the Secretariat begins anew, creating a plan, looking for contributions, gathering additional staff for mission-specific planning and establishing procedures. Preparation for implementation does not normally begin until the decision-making process in the Security Council is complete, with enormous implications for the time required to get a mission into a theatre of operations. The Secretary General has noted: "The United Nations has no armed forces, no readily deployable large civilian corps, no significant stockpile of equipment and only a very limited Headquarters staff to manage the Organization's activities for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Organization can levy assessments but has no effective recourse should its Members, despite their clear legal obligation under the Charter, fail to pay on time. In short, its peace-keeping missions can only be realized when the Member States are full and committed partners, willing to provide the personnel, equipment and money to do the job."\textsuperscript{15}

A number of the Secretary-General's recent reform measures have addressed some of these problems. Lacking a crisis management mechanism, he recently formed the Standing Task Force on UN Operations, chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs and incorporating among others senior officers of DPKO, DHA and the Office of Legal Affairs. This mechanism should permit much earlier action by the Secretariat in response to early-warning signals and more direct involvement in the formulation of mission mandates by key parts of the Secretariat. It could be strengthened by incorporating other relevant elements of the Secretariat, such as the Department of Public Information.

Problems in UN procedures and structures are also gradually being addressed. One basic problem in the UN system is that virtually all UN field mission activities are expected to operate in "headquarters mode" under the same administrative and operational rules as the rest of the UN Secretariat. In contrast, the field missions of most UN specialized agencies have varied their procedures to address the large difference between field and headquarters operations. Thus, Secretariat rules and procedures are not geared for fast-moving field operations. This situation reflects a tension between the needs of DPKO on the one hand and the financial accountability requirements of the UN on the other. It also reflects, in many cases, a contradiction between the decisions of Member States in the UN's administrative organs, especially the General Assembly's Fifth Committee, and what they aspire to do in other bodies, such as the Security Council or the Fourth Committee.

An effective decision-making process should integrate both those who set the objectives of a mission and those who are responsible for its implementation. Similarly, UN headquarters should have a solid understanding of the field situation and the strengths and weaknesses of the units involved in a mission. One problem is that Special Representatives are generally appointed by the Secretary-General only after the Security Council has authorized an operation. Force Commanders are brought in at an even later stage, sometimes after others have developed the mission's concept of operations. This is difficult enough in a "steady-state" peacekeeping operation. It could prove disastrous in responding rapidly to crises.
Transportation and Infrastructure

A major consideration in the rapid deployment of any peace operation is the ability to transport personnel and equipment to a theatre of operations quickly and, on arrival, to house, feed and equip personnel to implement their mandate. Current UN procedures for contracting strategic lift are ponderous and costly. With over-reliance on systems of centralized control, initiatives at other levels to arrive at workable solutions to transportation and infrastructure problems are effectively discouraged. There have been several innovative management practices introduced into the UN in recent years, including a better partnership with the private sector. But even more creative procedures, such as taking greater advantage of technology in securing bids for air lift, would save time and money while preserving the principle of accountability. These and other initiatives, such as standing contractual arrangements with commercial firms, making greater use of partnerships with the private sector and utilizing the strategic transportation assets of Member States, need to be developed if a rapid-reaction capability is to be realized.

The DPKO has launched a significant move towards enhancing the UN’s rapid-response capability by establishing a data bank of relevant infrastructure, transportation and pledged contributions from Member States. Another initiative, a trial Peacekeeping Services Agreement, is designed to simplify and speed up a response on the part of contributing states once a political decision is made. This system of agreements is now undergoing a trial in UNMIH in Haiti. It should eventually contribute to securing a more rapid response on the part of the UN. These efforts have placed demands on the planning staff of DPKO well beyond current staffing levels. But they tend in the right direction and should be supported by troop-contributing countries which have loaned personnel to DPKO.

Logistical Support

Logistics is a key component of any operation and is vital to a rapid-reaction mission. Logistics involves getting what the “customer” needs to the right place at the right time and for the right cost. It includes functions such as procurement, warehouse management and inventory control. For a variety of reasons, including an ineffective decision-making process, inadequate contingency planning and archaic procedures,
the UN has historically been unable to establish logistics support systems for some months following the creation of peace operations. It therefore normally requests troop contributors to deploy their personnel with sufficient logistics support that they can maintain themselves until such time as the UN system can be put into place. The difficulty in some recent operations is that units have not arrived fully equipped. In fact, in some cases, such as UNAMIR in 1994, they arrived with virtually nothing, straining a logistics system which was already fragile and over burdened. All of these problems are intensified in a rapid-reaction scenario, because the time-frames are compressed and a number of complementary activities must be carried out simultaneously (like identifying troop contributors and arranging logistics support).

The UN has been moving in the past few years to remedy deficiencies in logistics. Advances have been made in using private-sector contractors in the field to deliver services, a development which should provide for greater speed and flexibility. Some thought is being given to the concept of contingency contracting arrangements, along the lines of the United States’ Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LCA), which would enable contractors to assemble a proper combination of personnel and resources from a large, international civilian pool of logistics specialists. The recent availability of “start-up kits”, essentially for a mission headquarters, is another Secretariat initiative which will save time and money and enhance the UN’s potential for rapid reaction.

Procurement issues have always been fraught with difficulties, both political and administrative, and the growth of large-scale, complex peace operations in recent years has led to strong pressures for reform. In 1994 a UN inter-governmental Independent High Level Group of Procurement Experts conducted a detailed study of procurement issues in the UN. It was based on the premise that the process should ensure the timely provision of goods and services in a cost-effective manner, with transparency, clear lines of accountability and adequate control mechanisms. In the course of its work the Group identified problems with excessive bureaucracy, lack of delegation of authority, inflexible regulations, rules and practices, and poor management and leadership. The results of the study include 37 substantive recommendations to modify and strengthen the UN’s procurement system.

Action on these recommendations has begun, most importantly on increased delegation of authority for all peace operations and the elimination of restrictions which unduly limit procurement within geographic areas. However, substantial progress remains to be achieved, especially in the areas of reorganization and reallocation of staff in the UN Secretariat and the preparation of new policy manuals.

There is also considerable work to do in ensuring that the UN has adequate supplies of needed materiel for peace operations. The idea of regional stockpiles, either under the UN or possibly in cooperation with regional organizations, has been discussed inconclusively for a number of years. In some cases, regional centres, modelled after the UN’s logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, might be appropriate to meeting an urgent situation effectively. The logic of regional depots is that they might be close to future deployment sites and that time and money could be saved on transportation. But strategic air and sea lift is now relatively fast from almost any part of the world, and there might be only marginal savings in regionalizing equipment stocks. Having more than one UN logistics base will also drive up costs and produce duplication of services as well as duplication in the equipment stored. Moreover,
given the high cost of specialized items of equipment and on-going problems of maintenance, a great deal of thought needs to be given to determine which elements of materiel lend themselves to a stockpiling program, and where stockpiling could best be implemented.

Financial Arrangements

It would be difficult to overemphasize the degree to which inadequate, inefficient and constraining financing systems and procedures contribute to the problems of the UN. While some improvements have recently been made in the budgetary process, the entire financial area is a matter of considerable frustration for the UN and troop-contributing nations alike. Peace operations, unlike other UN core activities, are not funded from the regular UN budget, but are the subject of separate assessments to Member States. Once a budget is approved, and notices are issued to Member States, they are obliged to pay their contributions in full within 30 days. But, in the words of the Secretary-General, “in recent years, 90 days after the assessment, the Organization has received on average only 45 per cent of contributions, and after 180 days, only 68 per cent.” The most recent figures are even more appalling. If the budgetary process is not streamlined and the record of contributions does not substantially improve, a rapid-reaction capability will ultimately be dependent upon the good will of troop-contributors, leaving the UN with a tenuous, unpredictable capacity to meet future needs.

A basic issue in the UN is the difference between spending authority and the availability of money. According to UN financial practices, the UN cannot sign agreements incurring financial costs if the UN does not hold cash in hand. Without the cash for an urgent operation, rapid reaction is impossible. Moreover, the Secretary-General cannot now expend resources on a mission until it is mandated by the Security Council. Although creative fiscal juggling now handles this problem, ways need to be found to initiate preparatory activity in anticipation of a Security Council mandate. The Secretary-General has standing authority to spend US$3 million annually for matters of “peace and security”, but this amount is unlikely to take the UN far in a peace operation. After the Security Council has established a new mission, and pending General Assembly approval of a budget, the Secretary General has the financial authority to spend up to US$10 million annually per mission for general “unforeseen and extraordinary expenses”. Slightly later in the process, after the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) has approved the budget, but pending Fifth Committee and General Assembly approval, the Secretary-General can seek ACABQ authority to commit up to US$50 million to initiate a mission. Invariably, both the US$10 million and the US$50 million ceilings are far from sufficient. While, quite appropriately, the General Assembly ultimately holds the purse strings for UN operations, this mechanism is time-consuming, rendering a rapid response to crisis situations almost impossible.

Armed with spending authority, the Secretary-General has in theory several avenues to borrow funds within the UN. A Central Emergency Revolving Fund of US$50 million is largely restricted to humanitarian activities, while the Special Account of US$140 million and the Working Capital Fund of US$100 million are general cash
flow mechanisms to handle all UN internal financing, inappropriate for peacekeeping purposes. The purpose of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, on the other hand, is to provide adequate cash to handle the start-up costs of missions, as well as to alleviate temporary cash shortages in ongoing missions. In 1992, the General Assembly authorized the Fund at US$150 million, although less than half of this amount is currently available. The balance was to have been filled over time with general budget surpluses, but those surpluses have been required to meet regular UN budget arrears. Even if the balance should be forthcoming, this level is inadequate for current purposes. The Secretary-General has proposed "an amount of $800 million, a sum equivalent to approximately four months' expenditure of the peace-keeping budgets in 1993..."  

In addition to these fundamental problems, there are difficulties within the UN Secretariat and in the field because political authority for peace operations does not correspond to financial authority for disbursing funds. In essence, the UN system is overly centralized, and functions in "headquarters mode", with little or no discretionary authority to Special Representatives or Force Commanders, who are always faced with the need to disburse funds on the ground. While the principle of financial accountability must be maintained, financial regulations need to be developed which devolve financial authority to appropriate UN officials.

The Availability of Well-Trained Personnel

The core of a rapid-reaction capability is well-trained, adequately-equipped personnel. UN operations reflect the strengths and weaknesses of their component parts, and there is an undeniable variation in the training standards of peacekeeping forces, which sometimes face far different tasks in UN operations than those for which they trained. Clearly the UN has a major difficulty in achieving equal levels of capability across the gamut of troop contributors. With the explosion of peace operations in recent years, the UN has had to accept troop contributions which have been less than adequate. In areas other than military personnel, work on training has only begun, and much could be done in the areas of civilian police, humanitarian assistance, human rights and legal affairs. Because personnel in a rapid-reaction operation must deploy immediately and cannot undertake mission-specific training, the units offered by troop-contributing nations should be of comparable standards. Much, if not all, of this training is legitimately the responsibility of Member States. The role of the UN is to ensure that troop contributors work to comparable standards and that these standards are met in practice.

The UN Secretariat has done substantial work in the area of peacekeeping training, in recognition of its critical importance. It recently produced a draft Peacekeeping Training Manual, which has been distributed to Member States for additional input. It focuses on individual training, and with extrapolation could progress to collective training. It could be used as the basis of a minimum standard of individual training by Member States before troops are assigned to UN duty. Individual training alone will not be sufficient, as field missions are more oriented to group tasks than to individual ones. But progressing from individual training will require specifying training standards to be achieved at section, platoon, company and battalion levels or their equivalents.
Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations

In addition to pursuing what are essentially "capability standards", the UN has recently made a start at efforts to help put these standards into effect. The concept of UN Training Assistance Teams, or UNTATs, has recently been expanded and strengthened, using the "train-the-trainers" concept, and UNTATs will soon be available for assisting Member States in their training endeavours. The UN also has at its disposal a global network of peacekeeping training centres on which to build. The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, located in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, has carved out an especially significant niche in building what it calls the "new peacekeeping partnership" among the military, other government institutions and the non-governmental sector. With a solid emphasis on training, the UN next needs to look at the potential role of regional organizations, including the possibility of securing regional coordinators of the United Nations system, to build on the solid accomplishments of the past two years. Initiatives by the United Kingdom and France on peacekeeping training in Africa promise to help in the process of enhancing the global quality of peacekeeping forces.

Further progress on securing personnel which can function adequately in multinational operations depends largely upon the UN developing a set of authoritative policies and procedures, or "doctrine", which creates consistency of purpose and goals from mission to mission. Doctrine does not evolve in a vacuum. It derives from "lessons learned" from previous operations, and builds upon the political objectives and the strategic plans of the Organization. At the national level, doctrine is authorized by the senior military commanders. At the international level, achieving formal agreement on doctrine is inherently difficult. As peace operations become more complex, a lack of clear doctrine causes both philosophical and operational problems. As an activity not authorized in the UN Charter, peacekeeping has never rested on sound doctrinal foundations. Recent moves by the Security Council into "grey areas" in several operations have made the need for building more solid doctrinal foundations even more pressing.

UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG)

16 February 1989
Security Council resolution 632 approves Secretary-General plan for UNTAG. Initial deployment to be in place by D-Day (1 April): 4,650 troops (three battalions); 300 military observers.

1 April 1989
"D-Day". Apart from 291 unarmed military observers, few UNTAG personnel have arrived in Namibia. SWAPO forces cross the border from Angola into Namibia.

2-8 April 1989
Intense fighting between SWAPO and SADF forces leaves some 2,000 people killed.

"advance operational planning was one of the weakest aspects of UNTAG. The UN spent a decade working hard for the political settlement but did not develop operational plans sufficiently during that period to be ready when the settlement came through."

- Virginia Page Fortna, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping
Development of UN doctrine on peace operations has been awkward and complex, complicated by the lack of any formal development process, the absence of any sophisticated "lessons learned" analysis, the shifting political and strategic goals of the Organization in the area of international security, and a lack of adequate resources in the Secretariat. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has achieved a degree of consensus in defining some elements of peacekeeping policy, but oftenpolicy is overtaken by events, especially given the demands of current peace operations. The Security Council has created a certain momentum towards building UN peace operations doctrine. In 1994, for example, the President of the Security Council set out various factors that the Council takes into consideration when considering the establishment of a peace support operation. In his 1995 *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, the Secretary-General built on this statement, outlining the principles of peacekeeping — consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence — first laid down by the late Dag Hammarskjöld in 1958 in his report on lessons learned in the deployment of UNEF I. Just as rapid reaction poses special problems operationally, logistically and financially, the development of effective doctrine for rapid deployment will require a particularly well-focussed effort on the part of the UN and Member States.

**The Special Requirements of Rapid Reaction**

If the UN suffers from certain deficiencies in the way it plans and implements "steady-state" peace operations, these are bound to be accentuated by the requirements of a rapid-reaction capability. The "time factor" is obviously critical in the case of rapid reaction, and drives both the UN and Member States towards concurrent and simultaneous activities, such as making contingency plans while the decision process unfolds. The availability of trained, equipped personnel, the existence of pre-arranged transportation arrangements, and a well-planned logistics network are all fundamental to making a rapid-reaction capability work. In all of this, the availability of funds and the existence of sound financial systems and procedures is the indispensable foundation. If the UN is to achieve a rapid-reaction capability, many of its systems and procedures at all levels will need review and reform.
CHAPTER FIVE

A PRACTICAL AGENDA FOR REFORM:

THE SHORT TO MEDIUM TERM

"In many of today's crises, it is clear that an early intervention could have prevented later negative developments, and might have saved many lives. The problem has been to find the capacity to deploy credible and effective forces at an early stage in a crisis and at short notice. This would be particularly useful in low-level but dangerous conflicts."

Our Global Neighborhood,
The Report of the Commission on Global Governance, 1995

Increasing the UN’s Capabilities

The capacity to respond quickly in the face of crisis does not come easily. Within the UN system, an impressive series of reforms initiated in the past few years has begun to transform the way peace operations are undertaken. In the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, where an extraordinarily high degree of professionalism and motivation belies the criticisms often directed towards the UN, the progress of the past two years has been remarkable. There is truth in the observation, heard frequently in DPKO, that the UN knows what it needs but simply lacks the resources to do the job.

The principal idea which informs this chapter is the creation of a vanguard concept. In accordance with this concept, the UN would be able to assemble from Member States a multi-functional group of up to 5,000 military and civilian personnel and rapidly deploy it under the control of an operational-level headquarters upon authorization by the Security Council. This Vanguard Group would be the first element to deploy, either in a preventive or conflict management role, and it would, if necessary, be replaced by a subsequent “follow-on” force along more traditionally-organized lines. To realize this vanguard concept, which is addressed in recommendations 16 to 19 in this chapter, improvements will be necessary throughout the UN system. Attaining a credible rapid-reaction capability will be more difficult than reforming the process of “steady-state” peace operations. A number of measures touching all four levels of the UN system will need to be implemented, specifically:

- enhancing the effectiveness of the decision-making process in political council of the UN;
- strengthening the UN Secretariat’s capacity to conduct comprehensive, strategic planning in advance of a crisis;
- remedying the absence of any permanent operational-level planning and control capability; and
- ensuring that capable, adequately-equipped, multi-functional military and civilian personnel are available when required.
Each of these measures will contribute to an increase in the UN’s capability to react rapidly to crisis. But only by implementing all of them in comprehensive fashion will the greatest potential benefits be realized.

To improvements at each level must be added greater cooperation and understanding between and among the levels of the UN system. These are fundamental requirements if the UN is to keep pace with a new era. Mr. James Sutterlin, a former senior adviser to the Secretary-General, has emphasized the need for a “sense of co-responsibility among the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the Secretariat.” The Secretary-General has written: “The effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and their command and control systems is largely affected by clear understandings between the entities taking political decisions, bearing operational responsibility, and providing human and material resources.” In effect, it is arguable that the degree of cooperation and understanding among these levels rivals in importance that elusive political will, the absence of which so bedevils coherent responses to specific crises.

**The Political Level**

At the heart of the UN’s problems at the political level are questions of how the Security Council and General Assembly take decisions, how Member States contribute to missions in the field, and how the Secretary-General and his Secretariat receive a mandate to plan and implement operations. Without resorting to reform of the UN Charter, a difficult task not necessary in current circumstances, the decision-making processes at the political level need to be improved and refined in order that missions can be mounted more quickly and effectively.

**Troop Contributors**

A rapid response to crisis will ultimately depend upon the willingness of Member States of the UN to contribute personnel to peace operations. The idea of contributing personnel can be promoted most effectively if UN members which are troop contributors are given a more prominent role in policy formation with respect to peace operations, both in the definition of general goals and also in terms of providing direction for specific operations. They must also have a role in the development and implementation of a mission mandate throughout the duration of an operation. This is especially important in the case of urgent crises, where there is a need to build a force quickly and deploy national units in support of a UN operation. Substantial efforts were made over the past year in the Security Council.
by New Zealand and Argentina, in cooperation with the UK, to increase the role of troop-contributing nations. These efforts led to an important presidential statement of 4 November, 1994, on consultation. But they have not yet matured to the point where they are considered adequate by most troop contributors. To sustain the support of those providing personnel to peace operations, troop contributors need more than perfunctory consultation. They need greater and more formal involvement from the onset of mission planning.

For these reasons, formal ad hoc Troop Contributors Committees (TCC), consisting of all Member States contributing to a mission, should be formed for each UN peace operation. The Committee would be the formal vehicle for the transmission of national views to the Secretary-General and Security Council on operational issues relevant to the specific mission. To enhance rapid reaction to crisis situations, TCCs could be created as mandates are developed and as contributors are approached for participation, but prior to action in the Security Council. This would permit examination of the Secretary-General’s emerging plan for the operation, including such issues as command and control arrangements and rules of engagement. Consideration of these types of questions in a TCC would help the Security Council in arriving at decisions on mandates by ensuring that operations were supported by potential troop contributing nations.

To build on formal mission-specific committees, it would also be useful to establish an institution where troop contributors could share their expertise and experience on a range of general operational issues which cut across many peacekeeping operations. This type of operational discussion would complement the work of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, the acknowledged policy organ reporting to the General Assembly. The most appropriate body would be a formal Troop Contributors Forum, consisting of leading or major Member States engaged in peace operations or having standby arrangements with the UN. The Forum would meet regularly to discuss issues in the Standby Arrangements System and technical issues including logistics and transportation.

These institutional innovations have a strong bearing on the ability of the UN to deploy personnel rapidly. Better consultative arrangements for troop contributors would instill greater confidence among troop contributing nations, promote the availability of more personnel, help to enhance quality and preparedness for a larger number of missions, and assist the UN in ensuring a faster, more effective response to crisis.

1. In order to build upon current practice and institutionalize a formal consultative process involving nations contributing to an operation, the UN Secretariat and Security Council members, Member States should establish a Troop Contributors Committee for each peace operation.

Member States should also establish a Troop Contributors Forum, comprised of leading or major troop-contributing nations, which would meet periodically to review general peacekeeping issues of an operational nature and provide a formal voice to troop contributors.
Groups of Friends

The Security Council would be in a stronger position to take early, decisive action if its sources of corporate political and military advice were expanded beyond the relatively small circles of Council Member States. One potentially important source of building political support and consolidating consensus in favor of Security Council action are the groups of "friends" which have proliferated in recent years as ways of dealing with controversial issues behind the scenes, away from formal deliberative bodies and among Member States whose involvement is crucial to the successful resolution of the dispute or conflict in question. These groups generally include some Permanent Members of the Security Council, but must include those Member States which will make substantial contributions to the ultimate solution to the problem, mainly through the provision of personnel to peace operations.

This informal, unstructured approach has been tried recently with the creation of the "Friends of Haiti" group and the "Friends of Rwanda" group. Where there is strong evidence of an imminent crisis, the Secretary-General, in conjunction with leading UN Member States, should encourage the formation of a "friends" group and provide the informal assistance of the Secretariat for its work. These groups would provide an important bridge to both the Security Council and the Secretary-General in the formulation of political advice and in the more detailed work of drafting mandates and arriving at specific plans. Their work would benefit by access to professional military advice at an early stage, prior to formal discussion in Council, when informal soundings of military options would make formal consideration of a potential mission mandate much easier. In the event that an operation had to be mounted quickly, this advance, informal consideration of options would be highly useful to potential troop contributors.

Informal discussion of an issue in a "friends" group would also help ensure the Security Council of the political support necessary for formal passage of an appropriate resolution. The Secretary-General would benefit by having his plans, concept of operations and proposed force structure reviewed by those Member States most likely to be key players in the implementation of a mission. By greater recourse to "friends" groups, and ensuring the provision to such groups of sound military advice, the decision-making processes of the UN could be substantially enhanced, to the benefit of rapid reaction.

2. **Member States of the UN should build on the already established practices of convening informal groups of "friends" to address specific geographic situations and as one way of providing advice to the Security Council or the Secretary-General.**

Finances

The ability of the UN to finance a rapid-reaction capability is an issue of fundamental importance. The UN budgetary process is lengthy, confusing and often disappointing. Among the more compelling observations of current shortcomings in the UN was that of the ACABQ in a 1994 report on the financing of peace operations. The report commented that "the overwhelming impact of peacekeeping operations has
seriously affected the Secretariat's capacity properly to oversee the work of the UN; therefore, the development of a rational system for the budgeting, financing and administration of peacekeeping operations is absolutely crucial." A combination of better budgetary procedures, new financial regulations and modest institutional innovations is essential.

The UN has recently moved toward mission budgeting on an annual basis, as an alternative to the current practice of linking budgets to mandate periods, which are often shorter than one year and cut across the UN's calendar-year budgetary cycle. Although this change will dramatically lighten the administrative load on the Secretariat (the budget submissions for 1996 should be reduced from 82 to 27) and reduce the time required for consideration of mission budgets, it is insufficient as a basis for the future. Over the short to medium term, consideration should be given to the development of a unified budget for peace operations, which would improve the planning and forecasting processes and ensure the reliability of funding required for effective rapid-reaction. This reform would not eliminate the need for assessed contributions for individual peace operations. Nor would it permit the unauthorized movement of funds from one operation's budget to another. However, it would identify all operations and their resource requirements for longer periods, placing them on a more transparent financial footing, and enabling Member States to anticipate the funds required for future peacekeeping assessments.

3. The UN should move toward the creation of a unified budget for peace operations, which would place the financing of current operations on a more coherent, predictable and reliable basis.

The UN also needs reform in its institutional systems to permit more rapid reaction to emerging crises. The ACABQ currently meets approximately 150 days per year, and a substantial portion of its work involves consideration of peace operation submissions for a budget which is now four times that of the UN's regular budget. The ACABQ is clearly over-worked and cannot devote the time and attention to peace operations that are warranted. Moreover, the budgets of peacekeeping operations are inherently different and more complex than those of other UN organizations — which are primarily salaries and require an in-depth knowledge of the programs that are to be delivered by the organization. The large logistical component and the unique nature of military operations mean that expenditures for peace operations are much different than those of the regular budget. One way of helping the ACABQ is to create a peace operations sub-committee, where special expertise could be brought to bear on financial issues. This innovation would help the budgetary process while maintaining the critical principle of accountability.

4. Member States should establish a Peace Operations Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) made up of financial experts from Ministries of Defence.

A series of administrative questions within the Secretariat also needs to be addressed. In simplified form, current financial procedures to establish a peace operations budget involve the production of preliminary estimates, often entailing a Technical Survey Mission to provide background material to the Security Council's decision. In advance of a Council decision, the Secretary-General has limited
resources under provisions for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses with which to provide for pre-mandate activities. Once the Security Council approves a mission, a mission budget prepared by the Secretariat is submitted to the ACABQ. At this point, once the ACABQ has approved the budget, the Secretary-General is authorized to spend up to $50 million on preparatory work for each peace operation, and the budget is forwarded to the Fifth Committee for review and transmission to the General Assembly. Once approved by the General Assembly, the Secretariat is authorized to send assessment letters requesting Member States to pay their assessed contributions. Payment is formally required within 30 days of receipt of assessment notices.

The Secretary-General needs greater flexibility and discretion in preparing and mounting peace operations. The current authorization levels for planning in advance of a Security Council decision on a mission are woefully inadequate. The amounts allowed for preparation prior to a decision by the ACABQ or the General Assembly are equally unrealistic. These need to be changed in the interest of getting peace operations off the ground more quickly and, in the medium term, of producing missions which can meet their objectives in a timely, effective fashion.

Some of the current budgetary rules also require reconsideration. Although the Secretary-General can now expend up to US$50 million with the concurrence of the ACABQ, the approval of the ACABQ should be based on budgetary estimates provided to the Security Council rather than on the additional documentation normally required by the ACABQ. This would save time and a great deal of administrative effort. Moreover, once the mandate has been approved by the Security Council and the ACABQ, which currently permits the authorization of expenditures of up to US$50 million, assessment notices should be issued to Member States, thereby speeding up the receipt of funds for each operation.

5. The Secretary-General should be given financial authority to expend funds at various phases of an operation:

(i) authority should be provided to expend from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund up to US$10 million per mission for contingency planning and preparatory activities at the pre-implementation and pre-mandate phases, under provisions for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, where the Secretary-General attests to a potential threat to international peace and security;

(ii) authority to expend funds should be increased to US$50 million once the Security Council has authorized a mission but prior to consideration by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ);

(iii) in urgent situations, authority should be granted to expend out of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund a certain percentage of a mission budget, possibly in the order of 50 per cent, upon budgetary approval of the ACABQ but prior to authorization by the Fifth Committee and the General Assembly;

(iv) following approval of a mandate by the Security Council and the budget by the ACABQ, which permits the expenditures of up to US$50 million, assessment notices for this peace operation should be issued immediately to Member States to facilitate prompt payment.
The Secretariat needs the ability to delegate financial authority in implementing peace operations. The UN’s financial and budgetary systems, which are largely headquarters-based, are clearly antiquated. The requirements are clear: first, greater delegation of authority from UN headquarters to field operations; and, second, the creation of a special set of financial procedures for use in emergency situations. A UN study of operations conducted in 1993 indicated that 75% of UN procurement for peacekeeping missions were for purchases of between US$1,000 and $70,000. Delegation to the field for these relatively small amounts would reduce the load of an already over-burdened Secretariat and substantially reduce current delays in procurement. Some of the humanitarian agencies have already put into place emergency procedures which permit sufficient delegation of authority that they can function effectively and rapidly in the field. The UNHCR, for example, has a simple but effective procedure for emergency letters of instruction. The UN needs a parallel system providing for delegation of financial authority to appropriate levels. Implementing such a system would help address the chronic problem of the relationship among the Chief Administrative Officer, the Head of Mission and the Department of Administration and Management in New York.

6. **Member States and the Secretary-General should work toward the adoption of a set of financial regulations which would permit the UN to function adequately in a crisis situation. These regulations would involve the delegation of responsibility and commensurate authority to appropriate senior UN officials (Under-Secretaries-General, Special Representatives and Force Commanders) to facilitate the effective implementation of peace operations.**

An equally vexatious issue is the UN’s cash-flow problem. Due to late or unpaid contributions, the UN often has no funds at its disposal for operations. Often the Secretariat is forced to borrow from one mission account to pay for routine operations in another. In 1993 the General Assembly established the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, but it remains under-financed and, in any case, is authorized at only US$150 million, a sum inadequate in light of current operational requirements. The 1993 study of the Independent Advisory Group, *Financing an Effective United Nations*, co-chaired by Shiguro Ogata and Paul Volcker, supported an increase in the fund, which the Secretary-General has subsequently urged be raised to US$800 million. In the short to medium term, Member States of the UN should endeavour to increase the authorization of the fund to approximately the amount required to fund one month’s operations, based upon the current total peacekeeping budget, or a total of approximately US$300 million. It would also be useful if interest revenue could be retained in the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund.

7. **The funding of the revolving Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for current operations should be increased to US$300 million from the current $150 million, by way of assessed contributions from Member States, and interest revenue should be retained in the Fund.**

While the traditions of the UN’s financial system tend toward centralization of control, the idea of delegation to appropriate levels of authority needs to be pressed with vigour. A 1994 report of the Secretary-General on restructuring the UN Secretariat indicated that, “The process of modernizing management practices — an essential
underpinning of any credible reform effort — still needs priority attention, with particular emphasis on the delegation of authority in both financial and personnel administration.” It went on to state that the Secretary-General is concerned that the Organization “functions today under a regime of control from the top rather than one of decentralized operational responsibility.”

The Strategic Level

At the level of the UN Secretariat, the key requirement is to keep up the momentum of the past two years, in spite of the UN’s financial difficulties. In addition to continuing work on “steady-state” peacekeeping, efforts also need to be made to focus attention on the particular requirements of rapid reaction, in order to ensure that systems are in place to facilitate the planning of missions and the early identification of mission groups capable of quick deployment. As US Presidential Decision Directive 25 emphasized, “the goal is not to create a global high command but to enable the UN to manage its existing load more effectively.”

Early Warning

The Security Council and UN member states would respond more rapidly to crises if there were effective systems of early warning, triggering contingency planning and the decision-making process at the political level. Recent efforts to pool information among DPKO, DPA and other relevant departments are likely to result in the availability of a much higher standard of assessed information at the political level, particularly for Security Council members. Recent reports, such as The United Nations in Its Second Half-Century, by the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, have placed special emphasis on early warning and the need for better machinery within the UN Secretariat. Although its approach to early warning has validity, possibly of equal importance is the need to share early-warning information among the UN, the specialized agencies and regional organizations, which could enhance the depth of such reports. Given the UN’s current financial situation, the Secretary-General should be encouraged to cooperate with Member States with national capabilities in this area, with a view to helping develop and refine the UN’s early-warning capabilities.

8. The Secretary-General should continue to refine the early-warning capabilities of the Secretariat, concluding additional agreements between the UN and Member States to share information. He should ensure that the early-warning capabilities which already exist within the UN system and related organizations are effectively pooled and that Member States and regional organizations have access to this material.

A major improvement would be the development of an early-warning “alert system”, linked through the contingency planning efforts of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. Getting these triggering mechanisms and linkages right would be crucial to making an early-warning system function to the benefit of rapid reaction. The heart of such a system could be the recently-created Situation Centre, which might collate and analyze early-warning data and provide an alert service to the Secretary-
Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations

General. The key function to be performed by the Situation Centre, in collaboration with the rest of the Secretariat, especially DPKO and DPA, would be to prepare assessments enabling the Secretary-General to act on his authority under Article 99 of the Charter to bring to the attention of the Security Council "any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

Current early-warning systems could be substantially strengthened by working towards an element of "automaticity" in early-warning arrangements. Ideally, as Dr. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, of the Council on Foreign Relations, New York, has suggested, "The UN should develop an automatic system of responses.... The key is that a certain set of findings would trigger a set of predetermined responses for rapid reaction." In such a system, the Security Council would automatically review a potential crisis situation in close coordination with the Secretary-General. Such events would simultaneously trigger contingency planning efforts, or at least "contingency thinking", within the UN Secretariat. Over time, regional organizations could both feed into the system and also receive information from such a system, allowing them to play a greater political role.

These measures would have two important and complementary results. They would help reduce the decision-making time of the Security Council during a crisis by increasing the timeliness and quality of information available. They would also activate at an early stage the types of contingency planning efforts that are indispensable to an integrated response to crisis on the part of the UN.

9. Member states and the Secretary-General should work toward the development of an "early-warning alert" system, which would draw potential crisis situations to the attention of the Secretary-General and the Security Council and initiate contingency planning, or at least initial "contingency thinking", within the Secretariat.

Strengthening the UN Secretariat

The Security Council requires comprehensive, corporate political/military advice on a continuous basis to improve its decision-making. This includes advice which weighs the security implications of early warning information and the feasibility of various military options. In recent years, a number of Council decisions have been criticized on the grounds that mission mandates have been impractical and unimplementable, leading to inevitable military problems as operations have been mounted. Nothing can tie the hands of the Security Council in making decisions. However, the possibility of more reasoned judgements would be enhanced if the idea of military advice were more firmly imbedded in the traditions of Council deliberations and the culture of the UN system. The Charter originally assigned the Military Staff Committee (MSC) a primary role in providing this strategic advice and direction. The Cold War subsequently arrested the development of the MSC and led to the evolution of the Secretariat to fulfill this vital function. In today's environment, the Secretariat will continue to play a central role in advising the Security Council in the conduct of peace operations.

At the same time, building the ability to obtain sound military advice is no easy task. Structural innovations are unlikely to be accepted at this time in the UN's
evolution, particularly those involving Charter reform or seen to be infringing on the prerogatives of the permanent five members of the Security Council. Instead, the most practical way of ensuring the presentation and consideration of comprehensive military advice to the Council is to continue to reinforce the military capabilities and professionalism of the Secretariat, especially bolstering the role of the Military Adviser to the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations. A substantially strengthened DPKO, with integral links to the humanitarian and other agencies and possibly the non-governmental sector, and with an enhanced military presence largely provided by Member States, would increase the prospects that military considerations would be given due consideration in Council deliberations. Sound military advice is fundamental if the UN is to launch peace operations quickly and effectively in response to crisis.

Current initiatives head in the right direction. The Standing Task Force on UN Operations provides a potentially sound basis for a much more structured approach to crisis management. The Secretary-General is also encouraging a more collegial approach among all key Secretariat departments, and these efforts have reduced the departmental rivalries which once bedeviled some operations. The Secretary-General should be encouraged to build on this success by establishing a cross-departmental civil policy unit involving DPKO, DPA, DHA and the Centre for Human Rights which would fulfill two functions. At the level of policy planning and analysis, it would coordinate the human rights and civil affairs aspects of peace operations, and at the level of operations, it would ensure logistic support and coordination for human rights monitors, election observers and other civilian activities in the field. Such a unit could assess the elements necessary for civilian field work, so that the lessons learned in operations such as Cambodia, Rwanda, El Salvador and Haiti are not lost.

DPKO has undergone steady improvements since its establishment in 1992. The strength of its military elements has increased through personnel on loan from Member States and the creation of fully-funded positions. The Office of Military Adviser has also become the recognized focal point for advice on all military matters in the UN. The Secretary-General has also bolstered the policy planning and operational analysis capabilities of the Secretariat. To help ensure the “unity of effort” which is the key to responding to multidimensional crisis situations, he has sought the cooperation of key humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations. Much more can be done, however, to consolidate planning and reduce the lead time prior to Security Council decisions or budget preparations. The Secretariat should move towards what Lieutenant-General (ret’d) J. K. Dangerfield has called an “iterative process”, where there is a high degree of cooperation between the political and strategic levels.

These are important steps for all peace operations, but are most crucial to those requiring a rapid response. The current directions of the Secretary-General should be encouraged. The military capabilities and professionalism of the UN Secretariat should continue to be reinforced, in the short to medium term mainly through national contributions. The lead role of DPKO in peace operations should be acknowledged, but contingency planning should continue to be based on a team approach involving all of the Secretariat and interested agencies. Moreover, the Office of Military Adviser should be strengthened, to ensure that he is able to provide timely, comprehensive
military advice to the Secretary-General and the Security Council. One specific initiative which should be pursued, in order to strengthen the place of military advice within the UN system, particularly in the Security Council, is the convening of monthly meetings between the Military Adviser and the military advisers of Member States of the Security Council.

10. The Secretary-General should continue the process of strengthening the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, including through loans and secondments from Member States, with the objective of establishing an effective political and military central staff for peace operations; Member States should be encouraged to assist in these efforts.

The Office of Military Adviser should be strengthened to enable it to execute fully the advisory functions assigned to this office.

In order to provide better and more continuous military advice to members of the Security Council, the Military Adviser should institute a system of informal, regular meetings with the military advisers of all Member States of the Security Council.

In addition to improvements in the UN Secretariat, a series of ad hoc measures should be implemented over the short to medium term to enable the UN to call on the resources of Member States on short notice. A "roster system" might usefully be developed to provide a list of prominent individuals with political or diplomatic backgrounds who would be prepared to serve as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in particular situations. A parallel system for military personnel could be of even greater usefulness. A roster system for future Force Commanders, in addition to helping to identify senior officers for peace operations, could also be used to help develop common UN practices and procedures. If groups of potential Force Commanders were brought to the UN for periodic discussion of a variety of operational issues, these informal meetings would help in the advance preparation of missions, particularly those where Force Commanders had to be appointed quickly in order to get a mission on the ground rapidly.

11. In conjunction with Member States, the Secretary-General should develop rosters of senior military commanders who might serve as Force Commanders in UN operations and bring these officers to UN headquarters for periodic discussions about contingency planning, mandates, operational guidance, the integration of humanitarian and human rights concerns into peacekeeping operations, and lessons learned from past operations.

Logistics

One of the most important components of rapid reaction, requiring integration into planning at all stages, is strategic transportation and logistics. The UN has gone a long way in the past two years towards a more professional, systematic approach to logistics, the basis of which is a system of standard regulations and procedures to facilitate rapid reaction. There is now a series of support manuals, either complete or
in the preparatory phases, such as the Field Administration Manual, the Operational Support Manual and the Procurement Manual. These need to be reviewed in order to incorporate the recommendations of the Logistics Working Group and the High Level Expert Procurement Group, with a view to issuing revised manuals within the next year. In addition, the recent work of a trilateral working group (Canada, United Kingdom and the United States) on peacekeeping services agreements, transportation, procurement and field mission organization is generating important conclusions for possible incorporation into the UN’s procedures.

Despite these advances, the product of two years of reform efforts, there is considerable scope for improvement. An internal report on the UN’s procurement practices stated in 1994 that, “without radical changes in the culture, procedures and practices of procurement, efficient and cost effective support to Headquarters and Field Missions will become unsustainable in the near future.” To enhance rapid reaction, essential supplies and equipment must be available immediately. There is a need, therefore, to explore the idea of “standing contracts” with commercial firms, based on contingency plans, to augment support provided by Member States under the standby arrangements system.

In order to ensure responsive strategic transportation and early logistics support, a number of other planning mechanisms need evaluation, including the use of “brokerage” systems to lease transportation on short notice, backed up by the greater use of standing contracts between the UN and commercial suppliers for frequently-used items. Logistical data also needs to be identified more clearly in the standby arrangements system, in order to facilitate rapid deployment of operational units with full equipment. In view of the likelihood over the medium term that the UN will be required to lease or acquire much of its own equipment, especially for complex peace operations, the UN needs to look at the most cost-effective ways of ensuring the availability of appropriate types of equipment, and explore the issues of regional stocks and pre-positioning. These are measures which could substantially improve support to rapid-reaction missions, while proving highly cost-effective for the UN.

12. The United Nations, as it develops generic and mission-specific contingency plans, should work on standing contractual arrangements with suppliers, either Member States or the non-governmental sector, for the provision of strategic movement and work as well to flesh out the “peacekeeping services agreement” concept with UN Member States.

The UN should also develop packages of equipment for generic missions, including equipment necessary for support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and work toward the acquisition/lease and pre-positioning of appropriate types and quantities of such equipment, or enter into a supply agreement with Member States for the provision of this equipment from National Reserves.

**Standby Arrangements**

As a fundamental requirement of rapid reaction is the availability of well-trained, adequately-equipped personnel, the standby arrangements system is indispensable.
The UN began to construct a system of standby forces in 1964, but only a handful of Member States entered into an arrangement with the UN. The explosion in demand for troops in the early 1990s led the Secretary-General to establish a Task Force on Standby Forces Arrangements in 1993 to recommend how the UN might improve its approach. After more than a year of intensive work, the team developed a new framework for concluding agreements between Member States and the UN through the completion of comprehensive memoranda of understanding (MOUs). While such MOUs in no way prejudice national decisions on participating in operations, they provide organizational and technical details sufficient to allow generic planning and the development of logistic support packages. The recent MOU signed by Denmark, covering the provision of a brigade-sized headquarters, is a good example. The current system could usefully be enhanced if additional information were contained in such agreements, which specified the range of operations in which units or individual might participate, or indicated readiness targets which Member States agreed to meet. The 1994 Canadian Defence White Paper strongly endorsed this approach.\[11\]

The Standby Arrangements System is one of the pillars of the current UN approach to peacekeeping. The Secretary-General should be encouraged to continue his emphasis on refining these arrangements as one of the keys to an effective rapid-reaction capability. Yet much more could be done. As the former Military Adviser to the Secretary-General, Major-General Maurice Baril, has remarked, “we need a better system than to beg every time there is a crisis.”\[12\] The “building block” approach currently being pursued by the the Standby Arrangements Management Unit of the UN Secretariat could be complemented by the conclusion of Peacekeeping Services Agreements (PSAs) between the UN and Member States. These PSAs, along the lines of the Canadian model currently undergoing a trial run in Haiti, would provide detailed specifications of equipment and personnel, as well as costing, reimbursement and other financial data, enabling the UN to prepare mission budgets quickly. Standby arrangements MOUs might usefully contain readiness targets, which would indicate the number of days required to move or the degree of warning necessary to move to shorter readiness states.

13. The Secretary-General and Member States should continue to refine and strengthen the Standby Arrangements System, with special emphasis on the ability of Member States to meet specific readiness targets for potential service in rapid-reaction operations.

14. The Secretary-General should be encouraged to use new techniques, such as the “peacekeeping services agreement” concept, to facilitate more rapid deployment of missions and more effective and efficient administrative and logistic support for deployed missions.

Standby MOUs should also contain data specifying types and levels of training. Redressing gaps in training could be done through the use of the UNTATs, based on agreed training standards developed in DPKO’s Training Unit. Ideally, contingency planners would identify a range of potential tasks in future peace operations, including missions of a multidimensional nature. The Training Unit would then develop training standards for each discrete task which could be disseminated to troop contributing nations. The Standby Arrangements Unit could coordinate information on contributing states, their units and their standards of training. Further steps, either training or exercises, could then be taken towards ensuring the availability of mission groups.
which are capable of covering all necessary functions in a peace operation and which are able to work together on short notice.

A key problem in the UN's response to crisis situations has been a shortage of civilian personnel with a full range of experience and expertise who could serve on relatively short notice in headquarters operations or in field missions. Urgent operations trigger enormous increases in workload, with commensurate demands for staff for deployment into the field or as staff for offices assigned to Special Representatives. These demands can rarely be met easily by a UN Secretariat which is not particularly large in the first place. This is particularly true when confronting new geographic situations, when there is likely to be a deficiency in linguistic capability or a lack of immediate diplomatic experience with the country or region concerned. Crisis situations can only be managed effectively by drawing on the good will and resources of interested Member States, which might be able to provide short-term assistance to the UN. The Secretary-General, in cooperation with Member States, should prepare for these contingencies by developing systems which can supply civilian personnel on short notice in the event of crisis.

15. In order to develop a pool of expertise to assist the UN in responding to urgent situations, Member States should explore the advance identification of personnel with expertise in relevant areas who could be seconded into the UN Secretariat for short-term assignments.

In order to refine further the Standby Arrangements System, the UN, in conjunction with Member States, should consider convening annual meetings of all states with standby arrangements, as well as those which have given notice of their intention to conclude a MOU. These meetings would focus on key operational issues likely to arise as standby arrangements are triggered by the UN: training standards, the formation of capability components, guidelines to promote inter-operability, etc. While they need not constitute a formal, decision-making body, these meetings would build familiarity with the standby arrangements system, help to instill greater confidence among troop contributors and work towards changes in practice which could enhance the ability of Member States to work together.

The Operational Level

The most serious problems in peace operations within the UN system are found at the operational level, where there is a virtual vacuum in terms of any reasonable capability. The planning and organization of missions are invariably undertaken on an ad hoc basis, delaying a coherent UN response to conflict by months in virtually every case. The former Commander of NATO's AMF(L), Major-General (ret'd) A. G. Christie, has written, the UN is forced to begin planning for every operation virtually on a clean sheet of paper under tight time pressures... As a result, the UN has often been criticized for its slow response to meet the operational requirement." While missions are being planned, functions best undertaken at the operational and tactical levels are attempted at the strategic level, thus fostering an unhealthy degree of centralization at UN headquarters, confusion among levels of authority, and slow reaction time where rapidity and effectiveness are paramount.
A UN Operational-Level Headquarters

Indispensable to filling the vacuum at the operational level of the UN is creating a headquarters unit. It should be capable of rapid deployment under the authority of the Security Council and at the strategic direction of the Secretary-General, and it should function as an integral part of the UN Secretariat. Such a headquarters, which might consist of between 30 to 50 persons, would be responsible for the development of generic contingency plans and, as a crisis appeared to be imminent, for mission-specific contingency plans. Various proposals have been made for the creation of such a unit. The most basic have focussed upon a Member State making available to the UN the required planning and command and control element on a standby basis. Though they represent an improvement over the current system, such proposals fall short of the need in terms of multi-dimensionality, contingency planning capability and, above all, reliability.

Another approach at the operational level would be to envisage the establishment of a standby, deployable military and civilian headquarters drawn from a number of Member States, with individual contributions remaining in their countries in a “double-hatted” capacity. Personnel assigned to this headquarters would receive prior training so that they could be brought together periodically for exercises. They would receive mission-specific training from a crisis action team located in the UN Secretariat prior to an operation. This option provides for a joint, multi-functional, multinational operational-level headquarters. However, it could not be brought together sufficiently quickly for effective deployment in a crisis. Moreover, its ability to train effectively or to conduct sustained contingency planning would be extremely limited.

The most promising approach in the short to medium term, therefore, is the creation of a permanent cadre headquarters or dedicated operational-level planning cell, whose focus is the development of plans in accordance with political/strategic guidelines and tailored to available tactical assets. As the prospects of deployment neared, it would be charged with elaborating a mission concept of operations and advising the Secretary-General on the nature of a mission mandate. It would be multinational, drawing its personnel widely from Member States of all regions. It would also be multidimensional, reflecting the requirements of the more complex operations of the 1990s, with a substantial civilian staff of diverse experience in the areas of civilian police, humanitarian assistance, human rights, and legal affairs. This staff, seconded or loaned by Member States to the UN Secretariat, could be deployed into a theatre of operations under the authority of the Security Council and at the direction of the Secretary-General but without further authorization at the national level.

This operational-level headquarters should be capable of directing at least 5000 personnel, possibly more if the headquarters is augmented at the time of deployment. It would be intended to conduct a “first in, first out” operation, moving into an area rapidly but capable of being removed equally quickly, three to six months later, once an operation had terminated or a more traditionally-organized peace operation had been mounted. When not deployed, the headquarters would function in fixed accommodation at a specific location. Mobile equipment would be provided by Member States or purchased by the UN and stored nearby for training purposes and rapid deployment with the headquarters.
Because of the deficiencies of both the above alternatives, the idea of a permanent operational-level headquarters is the most effective way of filling the vacuum at the UN’s operational level.

16. The Secretary-General, in conjunction with interested Member States, should establish a permanent UN operational-level headquarters, which would be a standing, fully-deployable, integrated, multinational group of approximately 30 to 50 personnel, augmented in times of crisis, to conduct contingency planning and rapid deployment as authorized by the Security Council.

To ensure multidimensionality, the headquarters should contain a significant civil affairs branch with linkages to the key humanitarian and other agencies and the non-governmental sectors.

One of the key duties of the operational-level headquarters, when not deployed, would be to develop a series of “contingency packages”, whereby “type” operations would be planned, utilizing information based on the standby arrangements system. These contingency packages would be derived from the experiences of a variety of operations. They would include detailed information concerning the numbers and types of personnel and equipment to be moved, which would then be coordinated by DPKO. Such contingency planning would allow participating Member States to prepare for specified degrees of self-sufficiency upon deployment. The headquarters, in association with DPKO, would also be able to develop detailed “matching” arrangements between Member States willing to provide troops and those willing to provide equipment for deployment. Such matching arrangements would also extend to training, not exclusively on designated equipment, but also for a broad spectrum of contingencies that a rapid-reaction mission might be expected to execute.

17. The operational-level headquarters should be tasked to undertake generic contingency planning when early-warning mechanisms are triggered as well as liaison with regional organizations and agencies, and a wide variety of training objectives.

**The Vanguard Concept**

The most crucial innovation in the UN’s peace operations over the next few years would be the full development of what this report calls the vanguard concept. Under this concept, Member States would link their national units to the operational-level headquarters by way of the standby arrangements system, and according to generic contingency plans and a range of force structures which would depend on the nature of the operation. Such national forces would remain in their home countries under the command of national authorities until requested by the Secretary-General and approved for deployment by national authorities. Following authorization to deploy, these forces would formally be placed under the operational control of the Secretary-General. Strategic movement of these forces would be the responsibility of the Secretariat, in conjunction with participating states. Logistic support for these forces would be planned in advance in coordination with the Secretariat and executed by the operational-level headquarters, using pre-stocking and whatever support can be obtained through regional arrangements.
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATION

The vanguard concept is based on the principle of linking all of the levels of the UN system, especially an operational headquarters and mission groups provided by Member States at the tactical level, for the purpose of deploying a force as rapidly as possible for a brief period, either to meet an immediate crisis or to anticipate the arrival of follow-on forces or a more traditionally-organized peacekeeping operation. With more sophisticated and precise standby arrangements with troop-contributing nations, along with the support of a permanent operational-level headquarters, the UN Security Council would have at its disposal tactical units or vanguard groups capable of deploying a multidimensional operation of up to 5000 personnel.

18. The United Nations should develop a vanguard concept which would link the operational-level headquarters with tactical elements provided by Member States to the Secretary-General through the standby arrangements system.

19. The Secretary-General and Member States should consider organizing standby units into multinational “capability components”, corresponding to function (observation force, humanitarian assistance force, ceasefire monitoring force, etc.) with appropriate training and exercising to enhance readiness. These capability components might include some of the newer tasks of multidimensional operations (natural disaster relief, humanitarian emergencies), working in close conjunction with other sectors of the UN and non-governmental organizations.

The Tactical Level

At the tactical level of the UN system, or the operation on the ground, virtually all of the assets belong to Member States. If the vanguard concept is to be workable, the challenge in this area is to provide capable, multi-functional personnel which can form part of any UN rapid-reaction mission group. This is best achieved through the development of training and equipment guidelines which will ensure a minimum level of performance and equipment standards when national units are deployed under the operational control of the UN. The core of this approach is the standby arrangements system now under process of development in the Secretariat (and discussed earlier in this chapter).

The Availability of Personnel

A number of measures could usefully be added to the steps already under way to increase the numbers of well-trained personnel available for deployment. Member States which may have reservations about contributing to peace operations should bear in mind an important recent development in the legal field related to the security of UN personnel - including peacekeepers: the Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel. The main objective of the Convention is to protect personnel serving in UN operations. Once it has entered into force, this instrument should provide an element of reassurance to Member States by extending the scope of legal protection available to their nationals participating in UN peace operations. Member States should be encouraged to ratify this Convention and bring it into force as soon as possible.
One problem in crisis situations is securing civilian personnel to serve in peace operations. This is particularly difficult in the case of civilian police, where pressing domestic responsibilities in most troop-contributing states make availability on short notice to the international community a major hurdle. It would be highly useful if Member States could develop their own national procedures which ensured the availability of experienced personnel on short notice in the event of peace operations. National experience in recruiting personnel for the UN Volunteers might offer useful precedents. Member States could help by training personnel to international standards and developing mechanisms to ensure availability. For its part, the UN would need to create a database which could capture information provided by national authorities.

20. **Member states should work with the United Nations to ensure the availability of qualified civilian personnel, in such areas as civilian police, human rights, legal advisors, election observers, etc., to serve in peace operations.**

   **Member states should be invited to sponsor training sessions leading toward the creation of rosters of experts for urgent missions.**

**Training**

Obtaining the trained units needed to deploy rapidly and function effectively on short notice is, in a multinational context, both difficult to achieve and absolutely crucial to the success of a peace operation. Military forces are very frequently well trained at the national level for a variety of contingencies, but they are not necessarily trained for tasks in modern peace operations. Civilians may bring skills to bear in certain missions, but sometimes lack skills appropriate to a UN operation. Nevertheless, as a recent report noted, specialized training should not replace traditional military training or try to supplant the experience of civilians. "Instead, traditional military training should be modified to include the unique tasks of peace missions because armed forces are now called upon to perform a wide variety of tasks to help resolve conflicts, as well as to be prepared for combat. Likewise, civilians destined for peacekeeping service should receive some specialized training to supplement expertise gained during their careers."

To enhance rapid reaction, the UN and Member States need to address the nature of training to be conducted and the management systems which should be put into place to ensure that national training programs are responsive to the UN's requirements. It is essential that training curricula be based on credible contingency plans which clearly indicate the tasks that military and civilian elements will be expected to implement in the field. This assumes a central role for DPKO in coordinating contingency planning with training, and in ensuring that both components act in coordination with the Standby Arrangements Management Unit. Training at the operational level should enable a mission headquarters to deploy on short notice an effective multinational, multidimensional operation. At the tactical level, training should prepare units and individuals for rapid deployment in peace operations.
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

In order to ensure that units from Member States are trained to participate effectively in peace operations, the UN Secretariat has to assume a more prominent role in the area of training. Specifically, DPKO should take the lead in the development of training standards and guidance to troop contributing nations, as well as an ability to ensure that Member States are adhering to training standards consistent with UN requirements. This could be done by way of the UNTAT System, which, in addition to current duties, could try to identify training needs in Member States and develop ways for redressing any training gaps. An annual report in which Member States with standby arrangements relay information to the UN on peacekeeping training and capability standards might help to identify the most obvious requirements on which the UN should be devoting its resources.

21. The Secretary-General, in cooperation with Member States, should develop a set of generic and mission specific training standards and “type” curricula applicable to all troop contributing nations. Member States with standby arrangements with the Secretary-General should provide the UN with annual training summaries outlining the training activities undertaken and proposed for those units identified in the standby arrangements system.

Towards a Vanguard Concept

The emphasis of this chapter has been on recommendations which span all four levels of the UN system and which, if implemented, would create an integrated model for rapid reaction from decision-making at the highest levels to the deployment of tactical units in the field. If all of the levels of the UN, political, strategic, operational and tactical, work together collegially, unity of effort will be achieved among the disparate Member States, organizations and groups that contribute to peace operations. Only by reforming a variety of diverse capabilities will a rapid-reaction capability be created and sustained. In the short and medium terms, the vanguard concept offers the best possibility of achieving that goal.
CHAPTER SIX

A VISION OF THE FUTURE:

THE LONG-TERM PROSPECTS FOR RAPID REACTION

"The fact that the theoretically best solution is not at present politically feasible does not mean that the system must simply muddle on indefinitely in its present condition. A great deal can be achieved without constitutional change, by changes in such salient features as geography, legal mandates and behaviour."


Balancing Pragmatism and Vision

The focus of this report is on identifying practical proposals to enhance the UN’s rapid-reaction capability in the short to medium term, given the current and foreseeable political and financial conditions of the UN system. These conditions do not preclude innovation. Indeed, most of the recommendations of the report call for significant changes in the way the UN conducts peace operations. But current conditions, especially on the financial side, define the parameters within which options can be considered practical. Simply put, the ideal may not be practicable in light of various constraints binding today’s UN.

The search for the practical, however, should not stifle vision. Current conditions are not immutable. In conducting this study, we have therefore sought to strike a balance between pragmatism and vision, placing emphasis on what is feasible under current and foreseeable conditions, while seeking to engage the debate on what may be desirable in the longer term.

The recommendations already outlined are practical and realizable under present or foreseeable political and financial conditions. They may prove insufficient, however, in remedying all of the deficiencies in the UN’s capacity to react rapidly. Clearly, the first step is to implement these ideas before embarking upon more far-reaching schemes which may in the end prove unnecessary. Ultimately, whether further action is required will depend upon the perceived gravity of the outstanding problems, as well as the cost and effectiveness of measures needed to rectify them. Because reform may prove to be a slow process, it is relevant now to begin long-term thinking about logical next steps.

In looking ahead, this chapter addresses four separate issues. The first is the question of how new, advanced technologies can be placed at the service of the UN both to increase effectiveness and also to reduce costs, mainly those associated with the deployment of personnel. The second issue is increasing the supply of specialized components of a rapid-reaction capability, especially civilian police, where demands have become especially acute. The third concern is the viability of a UN Standing Emergency Group. Lastly, the chapter looks at financial issues and the need for the UN to secure an independent source of revenue over the long term.
Advanced Technologies for Peace Operations

The application of advanced technologies to the field of peace operations offers considerable potential benefits to the UN. In many cases, new technologies would enhance the UN's effectiveness on the ground and its capability to react more rapidly to crisis. In other cases, there is substantial potential to reduce the costs of peace operations, by using technology in the place of personnel deployments. In broad terms, the types of technologies which could play a greater role in peacekeeping operations are: surveillance technologies, communications equipment and enhanced information management systems. Each category offers significant long-term potential to improve the UN's ability to carry out advanced planning and to establish an operation on the ground quickly.

To some extent, advanced technologies have already been applied successfully to peace operations. Aerial surveillance technologies were used in UNEF, and both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft have provided this service in several missions since the 1950s. Ground-sensor systems have also been used on occasion, such as in the non-UN Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. Current state-of-the-art technologies far exceed these earlier techniques and offer substantial advantages to the UN. The use of AWACS technology has demonstrated its utility in the area of monitoring no-fly zones in the former Yugoslavia, and analogous capabilities are available for maritime operations. An attractive technology for a variety of peace operations is aerial reconnaissance of ground activity. Access to satellite capability through national means and by way of private sector cooperation may have great strategic potential and could prove crucial to a properly functioning early-warning system.

At the operational and tactical levels, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) technology would be a key asset for Heads of UN Missions and Force Commanders. The technology available today would permit Force Commanders to have access to satellite imagery in real time. The ability to locate, identify and monitor virtually all vehicular movement throughout a theatre of operations has obvious applicability to monitoring, surveillance and control missions. Such a capability could be augmented through more extensive use of a wide range of portable ground sensor systems, including night vision equipment.

The right combination of communications and information management technologies represents an indispensable component of reliable, effective command and control systems. Command, Control, Communications, Computer and Intelligence systems (C4I) would incorporate the full range of strategic and tactical communications networks, together with data processing capabilities and real-time information transfer. Most such "packages" are available with a number of training and simulation programs which would greatly strengthen the UN's ability to develop training programs and conduct widely-dispersed training sessions. A training system linking the growing network of national peacekeeping training centres to the UN and national units could be instrumental in this process.

Advanced technologies cover a multitude of fields, and their potential applications to peace operations would need careful evaluation on a case-by-case basis. However, they have the potential to affect the work of the UN system at every level studied in this report. For example, communications and other technologies which assist in early
warning would be applicable at the political and strategic levels, while improved surveillance capabilities could be applied at both the strategic level, with appropriate “down links” to the UN Secretariat, and also the operational and tactical levels, in order to monitor local movements and activities within a theatre of operations. To some degree, surveillance technologies and information management systems could be integrated into an organization-wide system to enhance contingency planning, logistics preparations and the management of a significantly decentralized operation between the Secretariat and Field Missions. Communications technologies might be a key to the successful devolution of responsibility and authority within a global UN system which currently suffers from excessive centralization.

Over the long term, the acquisition of advanced technologies for the UN in peace operations faces two major, related obstacles: political and financial. On the political side, a number of UN Member States are bound to be wary of systems and equipment designed for advanced surveillance, intrusion detection, early warning and enhanced analytical capabilities, even if similar systems are already part of the national inventories of neighbours or adversaries. Some of these systems, even those available commercially, might be considered too “intrusive” for use by an inter-governmental organization. Even if these political hurdles can be overcome, acquisition of these capabilities faces enormous financial obstacles. A number of studies have contended that there are “real cost savings in terms of manpower...when compared to traditional methods of peacekeeping”, but the costs of some systems are well beyond the foreseeable capacity of the UN. Financial considerations, in fact, go beyond the purchase price of individual items, since advanced technological systems usually require extensive supporting infrastructure, including a qualified management structure.

A prudent, long-term approach to these issues would focus initially on the acquisition of advanced communication/information management systems for UN headquarters and the field. These would be “secure” systems which could readily be linked electronically to a variety of national systems provided to the UN under memoranda of understanding. The UN could then build upon this base, adding a variety of cost-effective “operational” elements, depending upon the nature of the UN’s current peace operations, possibly by way of the Standby Arrangements System, under agreements with Member States similar to current practice with respect to personnel and conventional equipment.

Given the virtually limitless technological options available and the potential costs of technology, any program to investigate the acquisition of such capabilities must be highly disciplined. There are key questions which will demand firm answers. Can the use of advanced technology increase the effectiveness of peace operations? Can it reduce overall costs? Which technologies are appropriate for the UN? What is the “value-added” of these systems both at headquarters and in the field? How would new technologies help the UN in moving more rapidly in response to crisis? These questions raise the issue of the management infrastructure required to employ these types of systems effectively. It is worse than useless to embark upon an expensive program of equipment acquisition if the information which these systems yield goes unanalyzed or underutilized. The current financial crisis of the UN argues that many of these issues are best dealt with over the long term, despite possibilities of
incremental steps in the short to medium terms. Moreover, extensive analysis of needs, costs and benefits will be essential, followed by the development of a carefully-prepared implementation strategy.

The challenge of mobilizing the long-term benefits of advanced technologies has been repeatedly addressed by many UN Member States. The techniques which could be used to improve peace operations are widely known and understood in many quarters. What is now required is a method to harness this knowledge for the long-term benefit of the UN’s peace operations.

22. The Secretary-General, in cooperation with Member States, should establish a High-Level Group of Technological Experts to study the potential application of advanced technologies to strengthen the UN’s effectiveness in peace operations and its capacity to react more rapidly to crisis situations.

Securing the Civilian Components of Rapid Reaction

One of the most important differences between the military and civilian units in peace operations is their relative abilities to launch operations quickly. Whereas most military forces are trained and equipped for relatively rapid deployment, and can even enhance their readiness standards over time, the civilian side suffers from a number of inherent problems. The most significant problem is that civilians are generally drawn from pools of individuals who occupy positions with domestic responsibilities. In order to take up positions in international operations, they generally have to secure their releases, and sometimes find others to take up their duties. In some cases, the process takes months. While this might seem to be a problem for which there are adequate short to medium term solutions, addressing the real deficiencies on the civilian side of peace operations will require long-term approaches.

Some UN Member States have responded to these difficulties by forming small rapid-reaction teams, particularly in the humanitarian assistance and natural disaster areas, composed of governmental or non-governmental personnel, which can be put at the service of the UN or its agencies within hours. These teams have been particularly useful in getting a UN presence on the ground quickly in the case of emergencies and providing first-hand information for the humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations which are to follow. The availability of these teams from a number of national governments has also meant that the UN does not have to recreate this capability, at great cost to the UN or other agencies. But in other situations the UN has been less fortunate. In Rwanda, for example in 1994, almost none of the civilian units slated for UNAMIR showed up in Kigali within four months of the creation of the operation, virtually closing off work on the political, legal and human rights sides of the operation.

The UN has attempted to remedy some of these shortages. In the case of mission legal advisers, it has instituted an in-house training program in the UN’s Legal Adviser’s Office which will result over time in a roster of candidates who might be available on short notice for peace operations. As UN employees, they are reclassifiable for duty upon a decision of the Secretary-General, thus avoiding the problem of national
authorization. The humanitarian agencies also have personnel available to join peace operations, albeit in small numbers. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, in recognition of the importance of the human rights component in several peace operations, began in 1994 to strengthen the support offered by the UN's Centre for Human Rights to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. These are small but useful steps in the direction of finding medium-term solutions to the problems of the civilian side of peace operations.

The most problematic area in past peace operations has been civilian police. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) suffered from a number of deficiencies in the way that the civilian police component was mounted, as well as in the uneven quality of police units. The UN learned important lessons from this operation which it applied in subsequent operations, including in UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia and UNMIH in Haiti. Although the UN currently has more than 1,800 civilian police deployed in various peace operations, it has never been able to secure the numbers of high-quality civilian police personnel required for peace operations. This persistent problem can only be remedied over the long-term through the development and training of the UN's own civilian police units, building a corps of international civilian police which can be supplemented, when needed, by national contributions.

The most obvious advantage of a permanent, standing UN civilian police unit is reliability. The UN would not have to seek national contributions to peace operations, or at least contributions of current orders of magnitude. It would not have to await the lengthy domestic processes of each Member State before a critical mass of police forces is assembled. Moreover, in remedying what has thus far been a key problem of the UN's civilian police sector, a permanent force could be trained to the high standards which the UN should demand of these units. How large a force might be required, how it would be recruited and trained, how it would be deployed, or how it could be divided to cover a number of current operations would be questions demanding a great deal of consideration over the short to medium term before the UN embarked upon what would admittedly be a relatively costly option.

The UN could begin by bolstering those units in DPKO responsible for civilian police, with a view to building capability standards and training packages. It could then move to the recruitment of small numbers of trainers, who could be devoted mainly to the types of training missions in which UNMIH has been involved in Haiti. It could, over time and drawing on the expertise of Member States, duplicate on the civilian police side the work which the UN Training Assistance Teams have begun to undertake on the military side. Because the civilian police components of peace operations have not been as large as the military components, the development of a permanent, standing UN police force could be an option developed at less cost than a comparable military option. As long as the UN remains in difficult financial circumstances, however, this is a long-term option, with a considerable amount of work in the short to medium terms prior to its full development.

23. The Secretary-General, in conjunction with interested Member States, should examine the technical feasibility of establishing over the long term a permanent, standing civilian police capability within the UN Secretariat, capable of rapid deployment in appropriate operations.
A UN Standing Emergency Group

The Vanguard Concept outlined earlier is based on standby arrangements for nationally-based units linked to a UN operational headquarters. Over the long term, and as the utility of an operational headquarters becomes evident, it would be logical to establish additional, regionally-based operational headquarters. The presence of regional headquarters would provide for greater flexibility and reduce the time required for deployment in respective regions. The effectiveness of such a system would be increased by narrowing the scope of contingencies planned by each headquarters and fostering greater technical and political understanding of the environment in which a UN operation might be deployed. Regional headquarters would also facilitate a closer working relationship with regional organizations, which often play critical roles in various aspects of the international response to a crisis.

24. **Consideration should be given, over the longer term, to the establishment of additional, regionally-based operational-level headquarters, once a first operational-level headquarters has been established and its performance and usefulness have been assessed.**

As noted, reliability is a central principle of rapid reaction. At present, there is no absolute assurance that nationally-based units will be immediately available at the behest of the UN. In 1995, the Secretary-General acknowledged that “a considerable effort has been made to expand and refine stand-by arrangements but these provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation”. The problem of reliability in the supply of national units poses a significant obstacle to a rapid UN response to crisis. Governments are sometimes reluctant to release their forces for UN duty, for a variety of reasons. Even when Governments are disposed to concur in participation, the process of seeking authorization is often slow. Although these delays can never be eliminated, they can be reduced in a number of ways. One way is to address specific operational concerns which inhibit states from agreeing to the deployment of their forces in specific operations. The second is by enhancing procedures for participation through a variety of measures, like joint training and exercises, which increase troop-contributor confidence and thus foster participation.

Ultimately, however, a UN rapid-reaction capability can be truly reliable only if it no longer depends on Member States of the UN for the supply of personnel for peace operations. If the UN is to build a rapid-reaction capability which is fully reliable, the challenge in years ahead will be to develop its own personnel, independent of state authority. The idea of a standing UN force is as controversial as it is old. It has been studied most recently by the Government of the Netherlands, which produced a technical report establishing the general validity of the idea of a UN rapid-deployment brigade. Nevertheless, it is apparent that no broad or even significant international support, much less consensus, currently exists for taking such a step in the short to medium term. Although current lack of support argues against expending political capital in pursuit of this option, it is not an argument against the idea in itself. As Nobel Laureate Dr. John C. Polanyi has noted:

Fire departments and police forces do not always prevent fire or crime, yet they are now widely recognised as providing an essential service. Similarly, a rapid reaction capability may confront conditions beyond its capacity to control. This
should not call into question its potential value to the international community. It is a civilized response to an urgent problem.\textsuperscript{57}

If short to medium-term options prove inadequate, and as the political landscape evolves, it may be worthwhile to explore how such a force might be established and the many issues that surround consideration of such an unprecedented step. This section develops the idea of a UN Standing Emergency Group. While this is an evolutionary approach, it in no way precludes the possibility of faster, more dramatic innovations in peacekeeping, should international consensus develop in this direction.

The foundation of a permanent, UN standing force, or UN Standing Emergency Group, would be the establishment of a UN Rapid-Reaction Base. Such a multinational base would begin by housing an operational headquarters, the tasks of which might be: forecasting detailed contingency plans; coordinating civilian and military aspects of operational planning; confirming standing operating procedures; developing arrangements for equipment procurement and stockpiling; establishing readiness and training standards; promoting interoperability, and refining training curricula and courses for both military and civilian elements. The base would provide a single facility at which the elements of the UN's rapid-reaction capability could gradually be consolidated.\textsuperscript{58}

Once a functioning base had been established, military and civilian units from participating UN member states could be assigned to the UN base for a period of about two years. Although these units would remain under national authority and would require national authorization to be deployed, they would train collectively under the direction of the Secretary-General. Working together at a common base should also increase confidence in multinational operations, thereby diminishing some potential national concerns over the deployment of stand-by contingents. Consolidating standing elements at the base would provide the UN with a core capability at relatively high states of readiness, ensuring the UN of a relatively reliable response to crisis situations. Common basing offers the best way of enhancing cohesiveness among national military and civilian units and advancing national training and professional development objectives. Deployment of a force composed of national contingents pursuant to a Security Council decision and national authorization would be more rapid than deployment from dispersed national locations.

Common basing need not be an exorbitantly expensive endeavour for either the UN or participating Member States, as participating countries would simply be re-locating existing national units, subject to recall in the event of national requirements. As they would remain under national command, national authorities would retain primary responsibility for their administration, pay and benefits. For the UN, cost-sharing might be arranged on a basis slightly less taxing than that of field operations, in which the UN frequently assumes responsibility for incremental costs, transportation of national elements to and from the site, operation and maintenance costs, as well as the provision of accommodation and allowances.

To ensure the availability of sufficient personnel for all foreseeable operations, there would need to be considerable redundancy of capabilities. This would also provide the UN with options for the selection of national contingents to serve in regions having particular political, ethnic, cultural or religious sensitivities. At this
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

stage in the development of a standing UN capacity, the base headquarters would ensure that there were at least two deployable mission headquarters capable of assuming operational control in a peacekeeping mission. The deployable military elements assigned to each mission headquarters would include a variety of capabilities, including deployable civilian elements, providing the UN with well-trained military and civilian units for most contingencies.

Contingency plans would need to identify the resources required to provide lift capabilities at short notice. Major Member States, such as the United States and Russia, who are uniquely placed to provide strategic air and sea lift, might be requested to provide contingency planning teams and operational units to the UN base. The UN could then negotiate a detailed stand-by arrangement or memorandum of understanding that ensured the prompt availability of strategic lift on short notice.

In order to tackle the fundamental issue of reliability in a UN response to crisis situations, consideration must eventually be given to moving beyond common basing of national units to the concept of a UN Standing Emergency Group, under the exclusive command and control of the Security Council and the Secretary-General. The size and general structure of this rapid-reaction capability would largely remain as described above, with a standing headquarters, at least two deployable mission headquarters and accompanying units and support personnel. By drawing on qualified personnel from national units to serve as the basis for this UN Standing Emergency Group, the UN would have a highly competent nucleus for the training and development of new recruits.

As professional volunteers develop into a cohesive UN force, they can assume responsibility for some of the riskier operations mandated by the Council but for which troop contributors have been hesitant to contribute. UN volunteers offer the best prospect of a completely reliable, well-trained rapid-reaction capability. Without the need to consult national authorities, the UN could cut response time significantly, and volunteers could be deployed within hours of a Security Council decision. As the 1995 Commission on Global Governance noted, “The very existence of an immediately available and effective UN Volunteer Force could be a deterrent in itself. It could also give important support for negotiation and peaceful settlement of disputes. It is high time that this idea — a United Nations Volunteer Force — was made a reality.” No matter how difficult this goal now seems, it deserves continued study, with a clear process for assessing its feasibility over the long term.

It should be acknowledged that the concept of a standing UN force is an expensive option. The study of a UN Rapid Deployment Brigade by the Netherlands concluded that a unit of some five thousand persons might involve a cost to the UN of some US$380 million annually. The recent study of the Independent Working Group on the Future of the United Nations, concluded that a force of 10,000 might involve annual costs of some US$500 million with a one-time start-up cost of US$500 million. Although these are expenses beyond the current capacity of the UN, there might be a time when they can be accommodated in the framework of a coherent peace and security program within the UN. In the meantime, the option, including its costs, should continue to be studied.
25. The Secretary-General could examine the political and technical feasibility of establishing a small UN Standing Emergency Group. As a first step, the Secretary-General could solicit views on this concept and report accordingly to the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Financial Issues

Over the long term, the UN will need a rapid-reaction capability which is both effective and reliable. Effectiveness can be established in many ways, and earlier chapters have developed a number of potentially useful ways to achieve this objective. Reliability, however, is a more difficult proposition. As long as sovereign states retain the right to decide on the deployment of their national units, there will never be complete assurance that a UN force can meet an urgent situation on time or with sufficient capacity. As we consider the future of the UN over the long-term, therefore, it makes sense to continue debate on how we can better equip the UN so that it can have the permanent, standing capabilities it needs to meet reasonable requirements.

Financial issues will continue to be a key element of that debate. As long as the UN remains wholly dependent for its financing on Member States, some of whom have huge arrears in payments, the UN will never have the resources essential to doing its job. It will continue to be trapped by the paradoxical situation that it cannot do its job without resources, but it cannot acquire the needed resources until it demonstrates its ability to perform more effectively. A number of ideas for securing an independent source of revenue for the UN have been advanced. Some have been widely discussed, including a tax on currency transfers and a surcharge on airline tickets. There has been some technical debate about the likely revenues to be generated and the systems which are required to ensure the collection of money. But none of these ideas has commanded much international support. Moreover, as a report of the InterAction Council noted, "all such innovations will need full public support and care should be taken to avoid an erosion of the present level of general support for the United Nations. Eventually, a specific facility with appropriate decision-making and voting procedures might need to be established to administer and apportion the funds thus raised to the various programmes - and not financing everything the United Nations is doing today or intends to do."

UN peace operations must be based on sound financing. The current situation is clearly untenable. For that reason, the idea of generating independent revenues for the UN continues to be attractive and should merit further study, notwithstanding current obstacles. An independent source of revenue, while undoubtedly posing political and technical difficulties, is the best way of assuring a stable funding base for an Organization whose work is crucial to international stability. A process should be put in place to consider the many proposals which have been put forward in this area and to assess next steps. It is important that the momentum towards finding imaginative solutions to the UN's financial problems not be lost.

As long as the UN remains wholly dependent for its financing on Member States, the UN will never have the resources essential to doing its job. It will continue to be trapped by the paradoxical situation that it cannot do its job without resources, but it cannot acquire the needed resources until it demonstrates its ability to perform more effectively.
26. The Secretary-General, in conjunction with Member States, should encourage continued international discussion of seeking alternative funding for the UN system, in order to place the Organization on a more stable financial basis, and should consider the appointment of a high-level expert group, reporting to the General Assembly, to examine possible future sources of financing.

The United Nations was created "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". Within that vision, we must seek to develop the best means of equipping the UN to perform its tasks. Over the long term, the UN needs to acquire a reliable, effective capacity to respond to crisis situations. As we consider the future of the UN, the focus should be on thinking about the possible security needs of the international community into the next millennium and on developing the capabilities which can enable the UN to meet those needs in effective ways.
CHAPTER SEVEN

TOWARDS A RAPID-REACTION CAPABILITY:

CONCLUSIONS

"The end of the Cold War has liberated the UN Security Council from the superpower confrontation, has raised public expectations and has opened up new opportunities for the UN with respect to international peace and security. At the same time it has presented the UN with new and unprecedented challenges, including a wave of humanitarian and peacekeeping emergencies, for which it is ill-equipped.... If the UN is to live up to its potential, more will have to be done to give it the effective structures, the political guidance and the resources it now lacks."


Conclusions

This study addresses reforms which need to be made if the UN is to be able to respond rapidly to urgent situations. Some of its recommendations address changes in the UN structure and institutional reforms in the Organization. These recommendations aim at practical, achievable objectives: among other things, the creation of more formal consultative mechanisms for troop-contributing nations, the institution of informal ways of enhancing military advice within the UN, especially to the Security Council, and the creation of a new peacekeeping sub-committee of the ACABQ. Each of these could be achieved with minimal resource implications to the Organization and without reform of the Charter.

With respect to the structure of the UN Secretariat, our recommendations build on current directions, calling for enhancement of key functions, such as analysis, contingency planning, training assistance and standby arrangements. For the most part, these initiatives, and others in which the Secretariat would be expected to play a key role, could be implemented within the framework of a policy of “zero growth” in the UN budget, with resource implications handled by way of reallocations from activities of lesser priority. The key initiative for the Secretariat — the creation of a new operational-level headquarters as one element of a vanguard concept for rapid deployment — might well be created, staffed and funded, at least initially, by UN Member States with already established records in the area of peace operations. Over time, as the UN’s financial crisis is overcome, it would most appropriately be funded out of the regular budget of the UN or out of a unified peacekeeping budget.

The report calls for a more effective partnership between the UN and regional organizations in many aspects of peace operations. Regional organizations have their own recognized strengths, although they vary enormously in structure, membership, financial viability and programs. There is much that regional organizations can do, especially in the area of preventive diplomacy, that can help the UN in its conflict-management strategies. Recent initiatives by the UK and France on peacekeeping training in Africa are models in this respect. On the other hand, there are some areas
where only the UN can act, and the report acknowledges the central role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. In some areas, such as the creation of regional equipment depots, only future studies will be able to judge whether regionalism is more efficient or cost-effective than single depots or maintaining equipment in national hands. Getting the right balance between the universality of the UN and the strength of regionalism will be one of the key challenges ahead for all states interested in more effective UN peace operations.

The report also calls for a better partnership with the private sector. In the past few years, a number of initiatives in the Secretariat have confirmed the importance of an effective alliance among the UN, national governments and the private sector in such areas as transportation and logistics. Other areas could usefully be explored, such as lease-to-purchase arrangements for equipment, which take advantage of the strengths of the private sector while meeting the standards and demands of the UN. As the UN considers the principles of reliability, efficiency, timeliness and cost-effectiveness, among others, it must harness all of the means at its disposal to meet the requirements of a new era.

Equally, the report emphasizes the need for multidimensionality in the UN’s approach to peace operations. The more complex missions of the 1990s have already demonstrated the importance of a comprehensive approach to peacekeeping, in which military and civilian staffs, drawn from a number of organizations and agencies, some governmental, some inter-governmental, some non-governmental, work to common objectives. Peacekeeping is no longer a purely military vocation, and humanitarian assistance, legal affairs, human rights, electoral assistance and other elements have become integral parts of the peacekeeping equation. To ensure the unity of effort crucial to success, adequate partnerships must be forged among all of the parties which are stakeholders in the types of operations likely to characterize the UN’s future work.

At the same time, recognizing that the UN is an association of states, the report places substantial emphasis on securing increased levels of cooperation and commitment between Member States and the UN Secretariat. This is important in many respects. At a time of financial crisis in the UN, Member States could be instrumental in implementing many of the recommendations in this report. Member States, for example, could offer to host meetings of potential Force Commanders, or conferences of states with UN standby arrangements. Member States could offer to share many of the resources developed for national forces, such as training manuals or data on global infrastructure. Member States could also take the lead in building coalitions in the UN to implement other ideas, for example, establishing a working group to look at the use of new technologies in peace operations, or helping the early-warning capabilities of the Secretariat through the development of an “alert system” and the establishment of secure electronic reporting systems. If Member States with established records in the area of peacekeeping share the burden of moving forward in many of these intricate areas, the UN Secretariat will be relieved of many responsibilities for which there are clearly no new resources.

This report devotes considerable attention to financial questions. At a time when the UN is in a deep financial crisis, triggered largely by the failure of some Member States to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time, the report endeavours to frame recommendations which are both responsible in their financial implications for
the UN and also cost-effective in terms of their eventual benefits. In contrast to initiatives offered by others in this anniversary year of the UN, most of the short to medium-term recommendations of this report can be implemented by the Organization at no additional cost. In some cases, modest reallocations from other budgets are all that is needed for implementation. In other cases, interested Member States will continue to be instrumental in helping the UN put initiatives into effect. By accepting recommendations which call for new ways of doing business within the Secretariat, especially through an emphasis on contingency planning and new financial rules, it is likely that some of these recommendations will lead over time to substantial reductions in peacekeeping costs for the Organization through greater efficiencies in operations.

The report also seeks to balance what is possible both in the short to medium term and also over the long term. The vanguard concept is at the heart of short to medium term recommendations, linking a new operational-level headquarters to forces provided by Member States through the Standby Arrangements System. With a greater emphasis on early warning, contingency planning, more timely decision-making and units which are fully trained and adequately equipped, the vanguard concept might well provide the UN with a reliable, effective force into the foreseeable future. But this should not foreclose alternative visions. If, for any reason, the vanguard concept should prove inadequate to future purposes, the report calls for continued study of alternative arrangements, including the uses of new technologies, building standing capabilities in the area of civilian police, the creation of a permanent UN Standing Emergency Group, and independent financing for the UN system, which could provide alternatives over the long term. While these more visionary alternatives are controversial in current circumstances, they may well become the reality of the next century, should Member States determine that peace operations need to be done in a fundamentally new way.

**Recommendations**

This report has arrived at the following recommendations, spanning the short, medium and long terms, which we have described more fully in chapters five and six.

1. In order to build upon current practice and institutionalize a formal consultative process involving nations contributing to an operation, the UN Secretariat and Security Council members, Member States should establish a Troop Contributors Committee for each peace operation.

   Member States should also establish a Troop Contributors Forum, comprised of leading or major troop-contributing nations, which would meet periodically to review general peacekeeping issues of an operational nature and provide a formal voice to troop contributors. (Page 38)

2. Member States of the UN should build on the already established practices of convening informal groups of “friends” to address specific geographic situations and as one way of providing advice to the Security Council or the Secretary-General. (Page 39)
3. The UN should move toward the creation of a unified budget for peace operations, which would place the financing of current operations on a more coherent, predictable and reliable basis. (Page 40)

4. Member States should establish a Peace Operations Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), made up of financial experts from Ministries of Defence. (Page 40)

5. The Secretary-General should be given financial authority to expend funds at various phases of an operation:

(i) authority should be provided to expend from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund up to US$10 million per mission for contingency planning and preparatory activities at the pre-implementation and pre-mandate phases, under provisions for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, where the Secretary-General attests to a potential threat to international peace and security;

(ii) authority to expend funds should be increased to US$50 million once the Security Council has authorized a mission but prior to consideration by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ);

(iii) in urgent situations, authority should be granted to expend out of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund a certain percentage of a mission budget, possibly in the order of 50 per cent, upon budgetary approval of the ACABQ but prior to authorization by the Fifth Committee and the General Assembly;

(iv) following approval of a mandate by the Security Council and the budget by the ACABQ, which permits the expenditures of up to US$50 million, assessment notices for this peace operation should be issued immediately to Member States to facilitate prompt payment. (Page 41)

6. Member States and the Secretary-General should work toward the adoption of a set of financial regulations which would permit the UN to function adequately in a crisis situation. These regulations would involve the delegation of responsibility and commensurate authority to appropriate senior UN officials (Under-Secretaries-General, Special Representatives and Force Commanders) to facilitate the effective implementation of peace operations. (Page 42)

7. The funding of the revolving Peacekeeping Reserve Fund for current operations should be increased to US$300 million from the current $150 million, by way of assessed contributions from Member States, and interest revenue should be retained in the Fund. (Page 42)

8. The Secretary-General should continue to refine the early-warning capabilities of the Secretariat, concluding additional agreements between the UN and Member States to share information. He should ensure that the early-warning capabilities which already exist within the UN system and related organizations are effectively pooled and that Member States and regional organizations have access to this material. (Page 43)
9. Member States and the Secretary-General should work toward the development of an "early-warning alert" system, which would draw potential crisis situations to the attention of the Secretary-General and the Security Council and initiate contingency planning, or at least initial "contingency thinking", within the Secretariat. (Page 44)

10. The Secretary-General should continue the process of strengthening the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, including through loans and secondments from Member States, with the objective of establishing an effective political and military central staff for peace operations. Member States should be encouraged to assist in these efforts.

The Office of Military Adviser should be strengthened to enable it to execute fully the advisory functions assigned to this office.

In order to provide better and more continuous military advice to members of the Security Council, the Military Adviser should institute a system of informal, regular meetings with the military advisers of all Member States of the Security Council. (Page 46)

11. In conjunction with Member States, the Secretary-General should develop rosters of senior military commanders who might serve as Force Commanders in UN operations and bring these officers to UN headquarters for periodic discussions about contingency planning, mandates, operational guidance, the integration of humanitarian and human rights concerns into peacekeeping operations, and lessons learned from past operations. (Page 46)

12. The United Nations, as it develops generic and mission-specific contingency plans, should work on standing contractual arrangements with suppliers, either Member States or the non-governmental sector, for the provision of strategic movement and work as well to flesh out the "peacekeeping services agreement" concept with UN Member States.

The UN should also develop packages of equipment for generic missions, including equipment necessary for support of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and work toward the acquisition/lease and pre-positioning of appropriate types and quantities of such equipment, or enter into a supply agreement with Member States for the provision of this equipment from National Reserves. (Page 47)

13. The Secretary-General and Member States should continue to refine and strengthen the Standby Arrangements System, with special emphasis on the ability of Member States to meet specific readiness targets for potential service in rapid-reaction operations. (Page 48)

14. The Secretary-General should be encouraged to use new techniques, such as the peacekeeping services agreement" concept, to facilitate more rapid deployment of missions and more effective and efficient administrative and logistic support for deployed missions. (Page 48)
15. In order to develop a pool of expertise to assist the UN in responding to urgent situations, Member States should explore the advance identification of personnel with expertise in relevant areas who could be seconded into the UN Secretariat for short-term assignments. (Page 49)

16. The Secretary-General, in conjunction with interested Member States, should establish a permanent UN operational-level headquarters, which would be a standing, fully-deployable, integrated, multinational group of approximately 30 to 50 personnel, augmented in times of crisis, to conduct contingency planning and rapid deployment as authorized by the Security Council.

To ensure multidimensionality, the headquarters should contain a significant civil affairs branch with linkages to the key humanitarian and other agencies and the non-governmental sectors. (Page 51)

17. The operational-level headquarters should be tasked to undertake generic contingency planning when early-warning mechanisms are triggered as well as liaison with regional organizations and agencies, and a wide variety of training objectives. (Page 51)

18. The United Nations should develop a vanguard concept which would link the operational-level headquarters with tactical elements provided by Member States to the Secretary-General through the standby arrangements system. (Page 52)

19. The Secretary-General and Member States should consider organizing standby units into multinational “capability components”, corresponding to function (observation force, humanitarian assistance force, ceasefire monitoring force, etc.) with appropriate training and exercising to enhance readiness. These capability components might include some of the newer tasks of multidimensional operations (natural disaster relief, humanitarian emergencies), working in close conjunction with other sectors of the UN and non-governmental organizations. (Page 52)

20. Member States should work with the United Nations to ensure the availability of qualified civilian personnel, in such areas as civilian police, human rights, legal advisors, election observers, etc., to serve in peace operations.

Member States should be invited to sponsor training sessions leading toward the creation of rosters of experts for urgent missions. (Page 53)

21. The Secretary-General, in cooperation with Member States, should develop a set of generic and mission specific training standards and “type” curricula applicable to all troop contributing nations. Member States with standby arrangements with the Secretary-General should provide the UN with annual training summaries outlining the training activities undertaken and proposed for those units identified in the standby arrangements system. (Page 54)

22. The Secretary-General, in cooperation with Member States, should establish a High-Level Group of Technological Experts to study the potential application of advanced technologies to strengthen the UN’s effectiveness in peace operations and its capacity to react more rapidly to crisis situations. (Page 58)
23. The Secretary-General, in conjunction with interested Member States, should examine the technical feasibility of establishing over the long term a permanent, standing civilian police capability within the UN Secretariat, capable of rapid deployment in appropriate operations. (Page 59)

24. Consideration should be given, over the longer term, to the establishment of additional, regionally-based operational-level headquarters, once a first operational-level headquarters has been established and its performance and usefulness have been assessed. (Page 60)

25. The Secretary-General could examine the political and technical feasibility of establishing a small UN Standing Emergency Group. As a first step, the Secretary-General could solicit views on this concept and report accordingly to the General Assembly and the Security Council. (Page 63)

26. The Secretary-General, in conjunction with Member States, should encourage continued international discussion of seeking alternative funding for the UN system, in order to place the Organization on a more stable financial basis, and should consider the appointment of a high-level expert group, reporting to the General Assembly, to examine possible future sources of financing. (Page 64)
The Conduct of the Study: Acknowledgements

This study was a joint effort of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence, with the collaboration of other interested agencies of the Government of Canada, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian International Development Agency. Following the address of Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to the 49th United Nations General Assembly on 23 September 1994, a Senior Steering Group was appointed to guide the course of the study. A Core Group was also formed to oversee directly the preparation of background materials and the production of initial papers. Over the course of ten months of research and writing, members of the Steering Group and the Core Group devoted considerable time to consultations with other governments, with inter-governmental organizations and with the non-governmental community. While the Government of Canada is responsible for the recommendations contained in the study, we wish to express appreciation to the many governments, individuals and organizations who played a part in the preparation of this report. We are especially indebted to officials of the United Nations, who followed this study closely, despite their many other obligations at an exceptionally busy and important time in the history of UN peace operations.

In order to help the Government of Canada in the preparation of its report, an International Consultative Group was created, chaired by Sir Brian Urquhart of the Ford Foundation and Dr. John C. Polanyi, Nobel Laureate of the University of Toronto, and consisting of experts drawn from governments, inter-governmental organizations, academic institutions and non-governmental organizations. The full membership of the International Consultative Group is as follows:

Sir Brian Urquhart (co-chair)  Scholar in Residence, Ford Foundation (UK)
Dr. John C. Polanyi (co-chair)  Department of Chemistry, University of Toronto (Canada)
Dr. Mats Berdal  Research Fellow, International Institute of Strategic Studies (Norway)
LGen. Çevik Bir  former Commander, UNOSOM II (Turkey)
M. Jocelyn Coulon  Journalist, Le Devoir (Canada)
Prof. David Cox  Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University (Canada)
Dr. Cathy Downes  Senior Research Officer, New Zealand Defence Force (New Zealand)
Ambassador Robert Fowler  Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, New York (Canada)
MGen. Gunther Greindl  Director, International Activities, Ministry of Defence (Austria)
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Paul Koring European Correspondent, The Globe and Mail (Canada)

M. Bernard Kouchner président, Association pour Action Humanitaire (France)

Dr. Winrich Kuhne Directorate, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Germany)

Prof. Albert Legault Département de science politique, Université Laval (Canada)

Prof. Andrew Mack Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University (Australia)

MGen (ret'd) Lewis MacKenzie former Deputy Commander, UNPROFOR (Canada)

MGen (ret'd) Clive Milner former Commander, UNFICYP (Canada)

Dr. Jessica Mathews Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York (U.S.A.)

Mr. Alex Morrison President, Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Canada)

LGen (ret'd) Satish Nambari former Commander, UNPROFOR (India)

Dr. Alexander Nikitin Director, Centre for Political and International Studies (Russia)

Prof. Masashi Nishihara Director, First Research Department, National Institute for Defence Studies (Japan)

Ambassador Robert Oakley former US Special Envoy to Somalia (U.S.A.)

LGen (ret'd) Tadhg O'Neill former Chief of Defence Staff (Ireland)

Mr. Olara Otunnu President, International Peace Academy and former Foreign Minister (Uganda)

Ambassador Hernan Patiño Ambassador to the Organization of American States (Argentina)

Mr. Geoffrey Pearson former Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Canada)

Prof. Adam Roberts Montague Burton Professor of International Relations, Oxford University (United Kingdom)

Dr. Robert Siekmann T.M.C. Asser Instituut (The Netherlands)

Dr. Janice Gross Stein Department of Political Science, University of Toronto (Canada)

Mr. James Sutterlin Yale University, former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General (U.S.A.)

Prof. Josiane Tercinet Université Pierre Mendès France (France)
As the study progressed, two seminars were held to discuss the basic concepts of a rapid-reaction capability and to help Core Group members refine their own work on individual papers. The first of these seminars — held at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Comwallis, Nova Scotia, from 7-10 February 1995 — focused on the operational and tactical levels of the UN system. It benefitted from the presentation of papers by: MGen. R.A. Dallaire (Deputy Commander, Land Force Command, Canada), BGen. M.K. Jeffery (Department of National Defence, Canada), Mr. Alex Morrison (Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canada), Cdr. Z.M. Jamka (UN Secretariat), Col. R.H. Coffin (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), LGen. (ret’d) J.K. Dangerfield (former Director IMS, NATO) and MGen. (ret’d) A.G. Christie (former Commander AMF(L) NATO). The second seminar, held in Quebec City from 15 to 17 March 1995, was organized by the Institut québécois des hautes études internationales and placed emphasis on the UN’s political and strategic levels. Presentations were made by: Dr. Kenneth Calder (Department of National Defence, Canada), MGen. J.A. MacInnis (Former Deputy Force Commander, UNPROFOR), Mr. David Malone (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada), Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello (UNHCR), Capt. (N) P.W. Dahlquist (U.S. J.C.S.), LCol. R. Roan (U.S. J.C.S.), Mr. Y. Takasu (UN Secretariat), Mr. Chris Coleman (UN Secretariat) and LCol. P. Olson (Department of National Defence, Canada).

The International Consultative Group met on 6 and 7 April, 1995, at Montebello, Quebec. Following the meeting, a number of other international experts joined the International Consultative Group in a larger conference to review major themes then under review. The international conference benefitted by papers by Dr. Cathy Downes, Dr. James Sutterlin, Mr. Sergio Viera de Mello and MGen. R. Dallaire, in addition to statements by the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Among the other participants in the international conference were BGen. A. Ghani, Mr. Dick Leurdijk, Mr. David Lightburn, Ms. Elisabeth Lindenmayer, LCol. S.E. Moffat, Ambassador Mario Sica, Mr. Henk Swarttouw and Professor Tulio Treves.

The Steering Group of senior officials who directed the study consisted of individuals from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence as follows:

Mr. Michael Kergin (co-chair) Assistant Deputy Minister (Political and International Security Affairs), DFAIT
Dr. Kenneth Calder (co-chair) Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications), DND
Col. M. W. Appleton Policy Planning Team, DND
Dr. Daniel Livermore Director, Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division, DFAIT
Mr. David Malone Director General, Policy Staff, DFAIT
Mr. Randy McCauley Senior Policy Adviser to the Minister of National Defence
Mr. Michael Pearson Senior Policy Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

LCol. J.P. Culligan
Directorate of International Policy, DND

LCol. L.W. Bentley
Head, Peacekeeping Section, DFAIT

The Core Group, co-chaired by Dr. Daniel Livermore of DFAIT and Col. M. W. Appleton of DND, met thirteen times over the course of six months, beginning in November, 1995. The other members of the Core Group were:

Ms. Jane Boulton
Queen’s University

Mr. Brent Cowan
Université de Montréal

Mr. Maxime Faille
Université d’Ottawa

Professor Michel Fortmann
Université de Montréal

Major (ret’d) T.T. Itani
former aide to the Commander, UNPROFOR

Professor W. Andy Knight
Bishop’s University

Mr. Peter Langille
Ottawa consultant

Professor Allen Sens
University of British Columbia

A number of other persons worked extensively on the research and writing which contributed to this Report. They include: Ms. Alison Grant, DFAIT, Ms. Ana Maia, DND, Ms. Wendy Winch, DFAIT and Mr. Gregory Wirick, Parliamentary Centre on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa. Professor David Cox, Queen’s University, and Dr. Albert Legault, Université Laval, have agreed to edit the papers of a number of contributors and publish them in a separate volume entitled UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects/Les capacités de réaction rapide de l’ONU: exigences et perspectives, which will be produced by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. Copies of the book can be obtained through Stephanie Blair at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (Tel: (902) 638-8042/Fax: (902) 638-8888).
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Endnotes


2 Ibid., para. 12.


5 Ibid., The Bellagio Statement, 1992, p.112.

6 An Address by MGen. Roméo Dallaire to the International Conference on a United Nations' Rapid-Reaction Capability in Montebello, Québec, April 7-8, 1995, p. 15/19.

7 Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, St Leonards, 1993, p. 90.


9 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, para. 44.


11 An Address by the late Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, to the University of Chicago, 1960.


16 A Peacekeeping Services Agreement (PSA) outlines the personnel, materiel or equipment to be provided by the contributing nation, as well as the administrative logistics and financial responsibilities of both the UN and the Member State regarding the establishment, deployment, support and redeployment of a Member State's contingent deployed in support of a UN Peace Operation. The PSA ensures that the provision of personnel and equipment is governed by comprehensive and simplified reimbursement arrangements that enable both parties to predict expenditures against agreed standard costs and to expedite reimbursement through a submission procedure based on these agreements.
TOWARDS A RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

17 US Army Regulation, 700-137, Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program
18 Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping, para. 47.
19 Ibid., para. 53.
21 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, para. 33.
29 Although all positions in principle should be fully-funded from the UN budget (which would permit all Member States to compete equally for positions), in the current financial crisis significant numbers of personnel on loan from Member States and military establishments is an essential ingredient for success.

36 Supplement to An Agenda For Peace, para. 43.


38 In a preliminary examination by the Study Group of one possible option such a headquarters might involve 200 military personnel exclusive of infrastructure and other support staff. The headquarters would also have a civilian component of approximately 85.

