{{ block title }} {{ endblock }} {{ block content }} Stage 1 - Owners' decisions for earnings

In stage 1 of each period, owners should choose P or R. This table indicates owners' earnings. 
Owners' earnings depend on how owners' and managers' make decisions.
For example, suppose you are an owner. your earnings will be one of the black numbers, depending on managers' choices about A and B.
- If you select P and the other owner selects P, then your earnings will be 1250 or 938 or 1406 or 1111. 
- If you select P and the other owner selects R, then your earnings will be 1125 or 625 or 1225 or 525. 
- If you select R and the other owner selects P, then your earnings will be 1350 or 1050 or 1250 or 750. 
- If you select R and the other owner selects R, then your earnings will be 1200 or 750 or 1125 or 800. 





Stage 2 - Managers' decisions for earnings

In stage 2 of each period, Managers should choose A or B, which decides earnings for owners and managers. 
Depending on owners' selecting P or R, a different table is given to managers.

[ The case that both owners choose P and P in stage 1]
Suppose you are a manager. your earnings will be one of the blue numbers.
- If you select A and the other manager selects A, then you get 125 and the other manager gets 125.
- If you select A and the other manager selects B, then you get 94 and the other manager gets 141.
- If you select B and the other manager selects A, then you get 141 and the other manager gets 94.
- If you select B and the other manager selects B, then you get 111 and the other manager gets 111.



[ The case that both owners choose P and R in stage 1]
Suppose you are a manager. your earnings will be one of the blue numbers.
- If you select A and the other manager selects A, then you get 143 and the other manager gets 123.
- If you select A and the other manager selects B, then you get 93 and the other manager gets 153.
- If you select B and the other manager selects A, then you get 153 and the other manager gets 93.
- If you select B and the other manager selects B, then you get 83 and the other manager gets 103.



[ The case that both owners choose R and P in stage 1]
Suppose you are a manager. your earnings will be one of the blue numbers.
- If you select A and the other manager selects A, then you get 123 and the other manager gets 143.
- If you select A and the other manager selects B, then you get 93 and the other manager gets 153.
- If you select B and the other manager selects A, then you get 153 and the other manager gets 93.
- If you select B and the other manager selects B, then you get 103 and the other manager gets 83.


 
[ The case that both owners choose R and R in stage 1]
Suppose you are a manager. your earnings will be one of the blue numbers.
- If you select A and the other manager selects A, then you get 128 and the other manager gets 128.
- If you select A and the other manager selects B, then you get 83 and the other manager gets 151.
- If you select B and the other manager selects A, then you get 151 and the other manager gets 83.
- If you select B and the other manager selects B, then you get 108 and the other manager gets 108.



Stage 3 - Managers' decisions for earnings
This stage is only open for managers when both managers select A in stage 2.
In this stage, Managers should choose X or Y, which decides earnings for owners and managers. 
Depending on owners' selecting P or R, a different table is given to managers.

[ The case that both owners choose P and P in stage 1]
Suppose you are a manager. your fine will be one of the red numbers.
- If you select X and the other manager selects X, then you get 0 (with a chance of 85%) or -25 (with a chance of 15%).
- If you select X and the other manager selects Y, then you get -25.
- If you select Y and the other manager selects X, then you get 0.
- If you select Y and the other manager selects Y, then you get 0 or -25 with a chance of 50% respectively.


[ The case that both owners choose P and R in stage 1]
Suppose you are a manager. your fine will be one of the red numbers.
- If you select X and the other manager selects X, then you get 0 (with a chance of 85%) or -29 (with a chance of 15%).
- If you select X and the other manager selects Y, then you get -29.
- If you select Y and the other manager selects X, then you get 0.
- If you select Y and the other manager selects Y, then you get 0 or -29 with a chance of 50% respectively.


[ The case that both owners choose R and P in stage 1]
Suppose you are a manager. your fine will be one of the red numbers.
- If you select X and the other manager selects X, then you get 0 (with a chance of 85%) or -25 (with a chance of 15%).
- If you select X and the other manager selects Y, then you get -25.
- If you select Y and the other manager selects X, then you get 0.
- If you select Y and the other manager selects Y, then you get 0 or -25 with a chance of 50% respectively.


[ The case that both owners choose R and R in stage 1]
Suppose you are a manager. your fine will be one of the red numbers.
- If you select X and the other manager selects X, then you get 0 (with a chance of 85%) or -26 (with a chance of 15%).
- If you select X and the other manager selects Y, then you get -26.
- If you select Y and the other manager selects X, then you get 0.
- If you select Y and the other manager selects Y, then you get 0 or -26 with a chance of 50% respectively.
To sum, your earnings will depend on 1) which contract owners choose between P and R, 2) whether managers join a market agreement (A) or not (B), and 3) whether managers report the agreement (Y) or not (X). Please click the next button and then you can see the instructions of each stage and specific earnings.
{{ next_button }} {{ endblock }}