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Instructions
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Please read carefully the following list of instruction.
Their knowledge is essential for your further continuation in the experiment
Your role is the Worker {{ experiment_id }}.
- There are 3 workers in your company and 1 manager. The workers carry out
the work tasks and the manager performs executive duties.
- Everybody in the company knows you by the name Worker {{ experiment_id }}.
- There will be multiple rounds of production. The first 4 rounds will occur with certainty,
afterward the experiment may stop with probability 15% in any subsequent round.
- In each round, the workers will have {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}} seconds for the work tasks. Each
work task consists of individual work units that are slider-adjusting exercises.
For each completed work unit, the company earns {{ C.M_MULTIPLIER }} ECU.
Next to that, each worker earns {{ C.W_MULTIPLIER }} ECU for each own
correctly completed unit.
- You may not observe the production of your fellow workers, unless they inform you during your chat-communication.
- The company's budget as well as the workers' earnings accumulate across all the rounds.
- From the second round on, the workers may experience an issue during the
completion of the work task. The workers experience issues independently, that is,
some workers may experience issues of various lengths and some may not experience an issue at all.
- The issue consists in a short-term invisibility of the work task.
That may result into a lower production of the affected workers.
The probability of the issue appearing or worsening to an individual worker
is {{ C.WORSENING}}%.
Once the issue appears, its duration could progressively worsen in
steps to values 5s, 10s, 20s, and 40s
with each step realization having the probability of {{C.WORSENING}}%.
- The manager may intervene and fix the issue once the workers finish the work task in any round.
Fixing the issue costs the company {{ C.FIX_COST }} ECU and it fixes the issue for all the workers.
That is, in the next round all the workers will have {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}}s for the work task.
- Before the manager decides on fixing the issue, the workers may communicate and decide to complain about the issue.
- First, all the workers can chat-message together for {{ C.CHAT_TIME_LIMIT }} seconds.
Once the time is up, the workers can still communicate if necessary,
but please end the conversation swiftly. Do not provide others with
any personal information that would allow them to identify yourselves!
If we find out that you did so, your payoff will be divided by 4 after the experiment.
- Then, the workers may decide whether to complain. Once you decide to complain,
you will allways end up complaining in that round, except for a case when you decide
to complain collectively, and you are the only person who decided to complain.
Once you decide to complain, you estimate the severity of the issue by reporting
the number of units that you missed because of the issue. And as a last step you choose
the form of complaint, either individual or collective.
In the individual complaint you
send the manager a single authored message with the estimated number of units that you missed because of the issue.
In the collective complaint you sign a joint message with other workers willing to complain,
and you sum up your estimates of missed units.
- To repeat, in any case you decide to complain, the manager knows it was you (Worker {{ experiment_id }}) who complained.
- Based on majority voting, only 1 form of complaining will be chosen. That is, if 2 workers prefer
to complain individually and 1 collectively, then all 3 workers will complain individually.
If there is a tie, the complaining form will be decided randomly.
As mentioned above, if you are the only person,
who opts for collective complaining, there will be no complaint.
- The manager will incur a loss of {{ C.COMP_COST }} ECU from final payoff for any instance of
any worker complaining, no matter the form of complaining.
That is, if in round 1 there are 2 complainers and in round 2 there is only 1,
the manager will accumulate a loss of 6 ECU.
- If the company makes profit in the end, the manager
will obtain its full accumulated budget.
That is, the manager's payoff in ECU is the accumulated budget of the company
minus the accumulated costs for complainers, if there would be any.
If the company's profit is not positive, the manager's payoff is 0.
The same payoff applies when the complaining costs are higher than manager's potential
gain from the company.
- As mentioned above, independently of the company budget (not included in it),
each worker earns a piece-wise rate 1 ECU per any unit that this worker completes
across all the rounds.
Plus, if the company makes profit in the end,
the workers together will obtain an amount corresponding to the 20% of that profit.
- The manager decides the bonus amount that each worker will obtain.
It is the manager's decision how to split the whole amount among the workers.
This decision does not influence the manager's payoff
(as well the 20% bonus is not subtracted from the manager's payoff!)
The manager has to split the whole amount among the workers, can not destroy any part of it,
and has to assign only non-negative amounts to any of the workers.
After clicking the Next button you will proceed to the Comprehension test.
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