{{ block title }}
    <center> Instructions</center>
{{ endblock }}
{{ block content }}
<style>
    .box {
        border: 1px solid lightgrey; /* Light grey border */
        padding: 20px; /* Adds space around the text inside the box */
        background-color: #f7f7f7; /* Optional: Light grey background */
    }

    li {
        margin-bottom: 12px; /* Adjust as needed */
    }
</style>

<br>
<i> Please read carefully the following list of instruction.
    The knowledge of them is essential for your further continuation in the experiment </i>
<br><br>

Your role is the <b>  Manager</b>.
<br><br>



<div class = "box">
<ul>
    <li>There are <b> 3 workers </b> in your company and <b> 1 manager</b>. The workers carry out
         work tasks and the manager performs executive duties.</li>
    <li>All workers know you by the name <b><i> Manager</i></b>, and you know the workers by names <b> <i> Worker 1, Worker 2, and Worker 3</i></b>. </li>
    <li> There will be multiple rounds of production. <b>First 4 rounds will occur with certainty</b>,
        afterward the experiment can stop with probability <b>15% </b> in any subsequent round. </li>

    <li>In each round, the workers will have <b>{{ C.TIME_LIMIT}} seconds</b> for the work tasks. Each
    work task consists of individual work units. For each completed work unit, the company earns <b> {{ C.M_MULTIPLIER }} ECU</b>.
        Next to that, each worker earns <b>{{ C.W_MULTIPLIER }} ECU</b> for each unit that this worker completes.</li>

    <li>You will observe the number of units completed by each individual worker after each work task.</li>

    <li> The company's budget and the workers' earnings accumulate across all the rounds.  </li>

    <li>From the second round on, the workers <b> may experience an issue </b> during the
        completion of the work task. The workers experience the issues <b>independently</b>, that is,
        some workers may experience issues of various lengths and some may not experience an issue at all.</li>

       <li> The issue consists in a short-term invisibility of the work task. That may result into a lower production of the affected workers.
    The <b> probability of the issue appearing or worsening</b> to an individual worker is <b>{{ C.WORSENING}}%</b>. Once the issue appears, its duration could progressively worsen in
        steps to values <b><i>5s, 10s, 20s, and 40s </i></b> with each step realization having the probability of {{C.WORSENING}}%. </li>

    <li> You may intervene and fix the issue once the workers finish the work task in the given round.
        Fixing the issue costs the company <b>{{ C.FIX_COST }} ECU</b> and fixes the issue for all the workers.
        That is, in the next round all the workers will have {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}}s for the work task.</li>

    <li> The workers know the fixing mechanism and how much it costs the company to fix the issue.</li>

    <li> Before you decide on the issue fixing, the workers could communicate with each other.
        You can not see this chat-conversation nor communicate with the workers. </li>

    <li> The workers may decide to complain to you about the issue.
        That will take place just after you observe their production and before
        you make any decision about fixing the issue in the given round.
        The workers that want to complain may decide to do so collectively,
        by signing a joint letter of complaint.
        Attached to the complaint the workers provide
        an estimate of the issue's severity in terms of units that they estimate to miss due to the issue.
        In the collective letter, all these individual estimates get summed together.
        You lose <b>{{ C.COMP_COST }} ECU</b> from your final payoff <b> for every person
            that complained across all the rounds</b>.
        You will see these costs only in the final summary after the last round.</li>

    <li> <i> <b> If the company makes profit </b></i> in the end, the company's budget will be yours.
        That is, <b> <i>your payoff in ECU will be the accumulated budget of the company
        minus the accumulated costs for the complainers</i></b>, if there would be any.
    If the company's profit is not positive, your payoff is 0.
        The same applies when the complaining costs are higher than your potential gain from the company.  </li>

    <li> As mentioned above, independently of the company budget (not included in it),
        each worker earns a piece-wise rate <b>1 ECU</b> per any unit that the worker completes
        across all the rounds. Plus, <i> <b> if the company makes profit in the end,
            the workers will together obtain an amount corresponding to the 20% of that profit</b></i>. </li>

    <li> You decide the bonus amount that each worker will obtain.
        It is your decision how to split the whole amount among the workers.
        This decision <b> does not</b> influence your payoff <i>
            (the 20% bonus <b> is not </b> subtracted from your payoff!)</i>.
        You have to split the whole amount among the workers, you cannot destroy any part of it,
        and you can assign only non-negative amounts to any of the workers.</li>


</ul>
</div>

<br>
<center>
<i> After clicking the <b> Next button </b> you will proceed to the Comprehension test. </i>
<br>
<br>

    {{ next_button }}
    </center>
{{ endblock }}