{{ endblock }}
{{ block content }}
Please read carefully the following list of instruction.
The knowledge of them is essential for your further continuation in the experiment.
Your role is Worker {{ experiment_id }}.
There are 3 workers and 1 manager in your company. The workers carry out
the work tasks and the manager performs executive duties.
Everybody in the company knows you by the name Worker {{ experiment_id }}.
There will be multiple rounds of production. The first {{C.MIN_ROUNDS}} rounds will occur with certainty,
afterward the experiment may stop with probability 15% in any further round.
In each round, each worker will have {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}} seconds for the work task. Each
work task consists of individual work units that are slider-adjusting exercises.
For each completed work unit, the company earns {{ C.M_MULTIPLIER }} ECU.
Next to that, each worker earns {{ C.W_MULTIPLIER }} ECU for each
unit that the worker correctly completes.
You do not observe the production of your fellow workers, unless they inform you during your chat-communication.
The company budget as well as individual earnings of any worker accumulate across all the rounds.
From the second round on, the workers may experience an issue during the
completion of the work task. All workers experience issues independently, that is,
some workers may experience issues of various lengths and some may not experience any issue at all.
The issue consists of a short-term invisibility of the work task.
That may result into a lower production of the affected workers.
The probability of the issue appearing or worsening to an individual worker
is {{ C.WORSENING}}%.
Once the issue appears, its duration could progressively worsen in
steps to values 5s, 10s, 20s, and 40s .
In each round, the manager may intervene and fix the issue once the workers finish the work task.
Fixing the issue costs the company {{ C.FIX_COST }} ECU and it fixes the issue for all the workers.
That is, in the next round all the workers will have {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}}s for the work task again.
The manager can operate with negative budget, meaning that the manager can spend more
ECU than the company has in the budget available.
Before the manager decides on fixing the issue, the workers may communicate and decide to complain about the issue.
First, all the workers can chat-message together for {{ C.CHAT_TIME_LIMIT }} seconds.
Once the time is up, the workers can still communicate if necessary,
but please, end the conversation swiftly. During the communication, do not provide others with
any personal information that would allow them to identify yourselves!
If we find out that you did so, your monetary payoff will be divided by 4 after the experiment.
After the communication, the workers may decide whether to complain.
Once you decide to complain, you will allways end up complaining in that round.
If you decide to complain, you will also have to estimate the severity of the issue by reporting
the number of units that you missed because of the issue. The manager will see any worker's complaint
as a private undersigned message with the number of missed units in it.
To repeat, in a case that you decide to complain, the manager knows it was you who complained,
and how many units you think that you missed due to the issue.
The manager will incur a loss of {{ C.COMP_COST }} ECU from own final payoff
for each instance of any worker complaining.
That is, if in round 1 there are 2 complainers and in round 2 there is only 1,
the manager will incur an accumulated loss of 6 ECU.
If the company makes profit after the last round, the manager
will obtain 80% of the accumulated company budget.
That is, the manager's payoff in ECU is 80% of the accumulated budget of the company
(the production of all workers minus the fixing costs)
minus the accumulated costs for complaints.
If the company profit is not positive, the manager's payoff is 0.
The same manager's payoff applies when the complaining costs are higher than 80% of the company budget.
As mentioned above, independently of the company budget (not included in it),
each worker earns a piece-wise rate 1 ECU per any unit that this worker completes
across all the rounds.
Plus, if the company makes profit in the end,
the workers together will obtain an amount corresponding to the 20% of that profit.
The manager decides the bonus amount that each worker will obtain.
The manager has to split the whole amount among the workers, can not destroy any part of it,
and has to assign only non-negative amounts to each of the workers.
After clicking the Next button you will proceed to the Comprehension test.