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Please read carefully the following list of instruction.
The knowledge of them is essential for your further continuation in the experiment.
Your role is Manager.
There are 3 workers in your company and 1 manager. The workers carry out
work tasks and the manager performs executive duties.
All workers know you by the name Manager, and you know the workers by names Worker 1, Worker 2, and Worker 3.
There will be multiple rounds of production. First {{C.MIN_ROUNDS}} rounds will occur with certainty,
afterward the experiment may stop with probability 15% in any further round.
In each round, the workers will have {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}} seconds for the work tasks. Each
work task consists of individual work units. For each completed work unit, the company earns {{ C.M_MULTIPLIER }} ECU.
Next to that, each worker earns {{ C.W_MULTIPLIER }} ECU for each unit that this worker completes.
You will observe the number of units completed by each individual worker after each work task.
The company's budget and the workers' earnings accumulate across all the rounds.
From the second round on, the workers may experience an issue during the
completion of the work task. The workers experience the issues independently, that is,
some workers may experience issues of various lengths and some may not experience any issue at all.
The issue consists in a short-term invisibility of the work task. That may result into a lower production of the affected workers.
The probability of the issue appearing or worsening to any worker is {{ C.WORSENING}}%. Once the issue appears, its duration could progressively worsen in
steps to values 5s, 10s, 20s, and 40s with each step realization having the probability of {{C.WORSENING}}%.
You may intervene and fix the issue once the workers finish the work task in the given round.
Fixing the issue costs the company {{ C.FIX_COST }} ECU and fixes the issue for all the workers.
That is, in the next round all the workers will have {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}}s for the work task again.
You may spend more ECU than the company has in its budget and operate with a negative budget.
The workers know the fixing mechanism and also know how much it costs the company to fix the issue.
Before you decide on the issue fixing, the workers could communicate with each other.
You can not see this chat-conversation nor communicate with the workers.
The workers may decide to complain to you about the issue.
That will take place just after you observe their production and before
you make any decision about fixing the issue in the given round.
The workers that decide to complain send you individually signed messages. In the messages, the workers provide
you also with an estimate of the issue's severity in terms of missed work units that the undersigned worker think to miss because of the issue.
In any case, you lose {{ C.COMP_COST }} ECU from your final payoff (not from the company budget!) for every person
that complained across all the rounds.
You will see these costs only in the final summary in the end of the experiment.
If the company makes profit after the last round, 80% of
the company budget will be yours.
That is, your payoff in ECU will be 80% of the accumulated budget of the company
minus the accumulated cost for complaints, if there would be any.
If the company's profit is not positive, your payoff is 0 ECU.
The same applies when the complaining costs are higher than your potential gain from the company.
As mentioned above, independently of the company budget (not included in it),
the workers earn a piece-wise rate 1 ECU per any unit that they complete across all the rounds.
Plus, if the company makes profit in the end,
the workers will obtain an amount corresponding to the 20% of that profit.
You decide the bonus amount that each worker will obtain.
This decision does not influence your payoff.
You have to split the whole amount among the workers, you can not destroy any part of it,
and you can assign only non-negative amounts to each of the workers.
After clicking the Next button you will proceed to the Comprehension test.