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Please read the following instructions carefully.
Understanding them is essential for continuing in the experiment.
Your role is Worker {{ experiment_id }}.
There are 3 workers and 1 manager in your company. The workers carry out
the work tasks and the manager performs executive duties.
Everybody in the company knows you by the name Worker {{ experiment_id }}.
The experiment consists of multiple production rounds.
The first {{C.MIN_ROUNDS}} rounds will take place with certainty.
Afterward, the experiment may end after any round with a probability of 15%.
In each round, every worker has {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}} seconds to complete the work task.
The work task consists of individual work units in the form of slider-adjusting exercises.
For each correctly completed work unit, the company earns {{ C.M_MULTIPLIER }} ECU.
In addition, the worker who completed the unit earns {{ C.W_MULTIPLIER }} ECU.
You do not observe the production of the other workers
unless they inform you through the chat.
The company budget and the individual earnings of each worker accumulate across all rounds.
Starting from round 2, workers may experience an issue while completing the work task.
These issues occur independently for each worker,
meaning that some workers may experience issues of different durations
while others may not experience any issue.
The issue temporarily makes the work task invisible on the screen.
During this time, the affected worker cannot complete work units.
In each round, there is a {{ C.WORSENING}}% probability
that the issue will either appear or worsen for a given worker.
If the issue occurs, the invisibility lasts for a certain duration.
The duration can increase step by step
to 5 seconds, 10 seconds, 20 seconds, and 40 seconds.
After the workers finish the work task in a round,
the manager may choose to intervene and fix the issue.
Fixing the issue costs the company {{ C.FIX_COST }} ECU
and removes the issue for all workers.
As a result, in the next round all workers will again
have the full {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}} seconds to complete the work task.
The manager may spend more ECU than the company currently has
in its budget (i.e., the company budget may become negative).
Before the manager decides whether to fix the issue,
the workers may communicate and decide whether to complain about the issue.
First, all workers may communicate with each other via chat
for {{ C.CHAT_TIME_LIMIT }} seconds.
After the {{ C.CHAT_TIME_LIMIT }} seconds have passed,
communication may continue if necessary, but please conclude the conversation promptly.
During the communication, do not share any personal information
that could allow others to identify you.
If we determine that such information was shared,
your monetary payoff will be reduced to one quarter after the experiment.
After the communication stage, the workers decide whether they want to complain
about the issue. Complaints can be submitted only collectively.
A valid complaint must be supported by at least two workers.
If only one worker wishes to complain, no complaint will be submitted.
If two or three workers wish to complain, a complaint will be sent to the manager.
The complaint received by the manager will be signed by all workers who chose to complain.
If you decide to complain in a given round,
you will be asked to provide an estimate of the issue’s severity,
expressed as the number of work units you believe you missed
because of the issue in that round.
The manager will observe the sum of these estimates
across all workers included in the complaint.
To repeat, if you decide to complain,
the manager will know that you personally complained.
The manager will also observe the total number of work units
that all complaining workers together report
having missed because of the issue.
The manager incurs a cost of {{ C.COMP_COST }} ECU from their final payoff
for each worker who complains. For example, if 2 workers complain in Round 1
and 3 workers complain in Round 2, the manager incurs a total cost of 10 ECU.
If the company makes a profit after the final round,
the manager receives 80% of the accumulated company budget.
The accumulated company budget equals the total production
of all workers minus the costs of fixing the issue.
From that manager's payoff, the accumulated costs from workers’ complaints are subtracted.
If the company profit is not positive, the manager’s payoff is 0 ECU.
The manager’s payoff is also 0 ECU if the costs from
complaints exceed 80% of the company budget.
Independently of the company budget (not included in it),
each worker earns 1 ECU for every work unit that the worker completes across all rounds.
In addition, if the company makes a profit at the end of the experiment,
the workers jointly receive an amount equal to 20% of that profit.
The manager decides how the bonus is allocated among the workers.
The manager must distribute the entire amount among the workers:
no part of the bonus can be destroyed,
and each worker must receive a non-negative amount.
After clicking the Next button you will proceed to the Comprehension test.