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Please read the following instructions carefully.
Understanding them is essential for continuing in the experiment.
Your role is Manager.
There are 3 workers in your company and 1 manager. The workers carry out
work tasks and the manager performs executive duties.
All workers know you as Manager,
and you know the workers as Worker 1, Worker 2, and Worker 3.
The experiment consists of multiple production rounds.
The first {{C.MIN_ROUNDS}} rounds will take place with certainty.
Afterward, the experiment may end after any round with a probability of 15%.
In each round, every worker has {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}} seconds to complete the work task.
The work task consists of individual work units in the form of slider-adjusting exercises.
For each correctly completed work unit, the company earns {{ C.M_MULTIPLIER }} ECU.
In addition, the worker who completed the unit earns {{ C.W_MULTIPLIER }} ECU.
After each work task, you will observe the number of units completed by each worker.
The company budget and the individual earnings of each worker accumulate across all rounds.
Starting from round 2, workers may experience an issue while completing the work task.
These issues occur independently for each worker,
meaning that some workers may experience issues of different durations
while others may not experience any issue. You do not observe the issue directly.
The issue temporarily makes the work task invisible on the screen.
During this time, the affected worker cannot complete work units.
In each round, there is a {{ C.WORSENING}}% probability
that the issue will either appear or worsen for a given worker.
If the issue occurs, the invisibility lasts for a certain duration.
The duration can increase step by step
to 5 seconds, 10 seconds, 20 seconds, and 40 seconds.
After the workers finish the work task in a round,
you may choose to intervene and fix the issue.
Fixing the issue costs the company {{ C.FIX_COST }} ECU
and removes the issue for all workers.
As a result, in the next round all workers will again
have the full {{ C.TIME_LIMIT}} seconds to complete the work task.
You may spend more ECU than the company currently has
in its budget (i.e., the company budget may become negative).
Workers know the mechanism for fixing the issue and the cost to the company of doing so.
Before you decide whether to fix the issue, the workers may communicate with each other.
You cannot see their chat or communicate with the workers.
The workers may decide to complain to you about the issue.
If they do so, their complaint will reach you after you observe
the workers’ production and before you make your decision
about fixing the issue in that round.
Workers can submit a collectively signed complaint message.
A valid complaint must be signed by at least two workers
(a single worker’s complaint does not count).
In the complaint message, the complaining workers report
their individual estimates of the issue’s severity,
expressed as the number of work units they believe
they missed because of the issue.
You will observe the sum of all individual estimates included in the complaint.
For every worker who participates in a collective complaint,
you incur a cost of {{ C.COMP_COST }} ECU,
which is deducted from your final payoff (not from the company budget).
These complaint costs accumulate across all rounds.
You will see the total complaint cost only in
the final summary at the end of the experiment.
If the company makes a profit after the final round,
you receive 80% of the accumulated company budget.
Your payoff in ECU equals 80% of the accumulated
company budget minus the total costs from workers’ complaints.
If the company’s profit is not positive, your payoff is 0 ECU.
Your payoff is also 0 ECU if the costs from complaints
exceed your potential gain from the company budget.
Independently of the company budget (not included in it),
each worker earns 1 ECU for every work unit that the worker completes across all rounds.
In addition, if the company makes a profit at the end of the experiment,
the workers jointly receive an amount equal to 20% of that profit.
You decide how the bonus is allocated among the workers.
You must distribute the entire amount among the workers:
no part of the bonus can be destroyed,
and each worker must receive a non-negative amount.
After clicking the Next button you will proceed to the Comprehension test.