JUDGMENT

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 22-8-1996 passed by a learned single Judge in Civil Rule No. 4827 of 1995. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants and directed them to close the operation of all the three units immediately till receipt of consent from the Pollution Control Board and to pay salaries and wages to employees and workmen.

2. The appellant No. 1 is a firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act. The firm established a coke manufacturing factory with three units. At the time of establishment of the factory the appellant firm requested the Pollution Control Board, Assam (for short, the Board) for consent under the provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 which was in force at that time. The said request was made in respect of the entire factory. Consent was given by the Board The Board used to give consent from time to time as and when necessary. This state of affairs continued till the present Act i.e. the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force. As per Section 19 of the Act the State Government may, after consultation with the State Board, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare in such manner as may be prescribed, any area or areas within the State as air pollution control area or areas for the purposes of this Act. On 12th of May, 1993, the State Government, in exercise of powers under Section 19 of the Act, issued a notification declaring the whole of the State as air pollution control area. With the aforesaid notification all industries are required to follow the provisions of the Act. This Act provides various provisions for prevention and control of air pollution. With the coming into force of the said Act the appellant firm was required to obtain consent, but this was not done and accordingly, the respondent No. 1 Board issued notice to the appellant firm to explain why the consent of the Board as required under the Act was not obtained. The firm duly explained and also submitted application for consent by letter dated 14-8-1995. It may be pertinent to mention here that at the time when the Act came into force the appellant firm had its factory in existence. In other words, it was a going concern of manufacturing coke. By Annexure 3 letter dated 27-9-1995 and 2nd respondent directed closure of the appellant firm's unit communicating refusal of the Board to grant consent for operation of the Unit during the year 1995-96 on the ground that the unit of the appellant firm had been emitting black smokes and no preventive measures were taken for control of emission. This was, according to the Board, in complete violation of the provisions of the Act. In the said Annexure 3 communication it was also indicated that for the last two years the firm had failed to take any action to control emission level from the unit. The appellant firm was directed to close down its unit till implementation of anti-pollution measure and report compliance within 29th Sept. 1995. On receipt of the said Annexure-3 communication the appellant firm submitted a letter dated 29-9-1995 to the Member Secretary, of the Board informing him that in so far as the two ovens (units) of the appellant firm were concerned, necessary anti-pollution devices had already been taken and for installation such devices in the third block, orders for materials etc. had already been placed. Along with the said letter copies of challans showing payment made for materials for installation of chimney in the third block were annexed. It was also stated by the appellant firm that they would be able to start the work of the third block within a short time and prayed for 6 months' time to complete the same. The appellant firm also requested the Board to revoke the direction given under Annexure-3 communication for closing down the units of the appellant firm. On 17-10-1995, the 1st respondent Board informed the appellant firm that it had been allowed to operate the two blocks in respect of which anti-pollution devices had been installed with a direction to inform the Board about completion of installation of anti-pollution measures in respect of the third block. By yet another letter dated 1-11-1995 issued by the Member Secretary of the Board the appellant firm was informed that to study the effectiveness of the devices installed by the appellant firm air quality monitoring had been proposed in and around appellant firm's manufacturing unit from 2nd of Nov. onwards. Air quality monitoring was done by the Board on 2nd, 3rd and 4th of Nov. 1995. The Member Secretary of the Board, in purported exercise of the power under Section 31A of the Act, by Annexure 7 order dated 15-11-1995 directed the appellant firm to close down its manufacturing units and report compliance thereof to the Board within 18-11-1995. Against that Annexure-7 order dated 15-11-1995, the appellants filed the Civil Rule No. 4827 of 1995 challenging the validity and legality of the impugned order.

On 21-11-1995 a single Bench of this Court directed to maintain status quo as on that date in respect of operation of the units of the appellant firm. This Court made it clear that the order of status quo would not apply to two renovated blocks operation of which had been allowed by the Board by order dated 17-10-1995. The order of status quo was again modified on a later date. Ultimately the case came up for final hearing and the learned single Judge after hearing the counsel for the parties passed the impugned judgment. Hence the present appeal.

3. We have heard Mr. R. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, Mr. A.H. Saikia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 Board, Mr. H. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3 and Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2.

4. Mr. Gogoi submits that when the Act came into force, the appellant firm had all the three units of manufacturing coke and it was a going concern. Consent was necessary for running the manufacturing units. Consent was sought for and it was refused. According to Mr. Gogoi, refusal was contrary to law and the Board refused to give consent without proper application of mind and without following the procedure prescribed under the provisions of the Act. The Board acquires the jurisdiction to pass order of closure only when the Board is satisfied that there has been violation of the provisions of the Act. The Board can exercise the power in strict compliance with the procedure prescribed under the Act. As per the Act it is necessary for the owner of any factory to take all anti-pollution measures so that the factory may not exceed the standard prescribed. In the instant case no standard has been prescribed, at least to the knowledge of the appellant firm. Mr. Gogoi further submits that detailed procedure has been prescribed under the Act to take action . According to him, the procedure prescribed in the Act has not been Complied with before invoking the power under Section 31A and, therefore, the entire action of the Board was without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions laid down in the Act and hence liable to be set aside. Mr. Gogoi also submits that all these aspects of the matter were not considered by the learned single Judge and, therefore, the impugned judgment is also liable to be set aside.

5. Mr. A.H. Saikia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 Board, on the other hand, refutes the submission made by Mr. Gogoi. According to the learned counsel, no factory can run without obtaining consent under Section 21 of the Act. Therefore, the very action of the appellant firm in running the factory without obtaining consent was illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act and, therefore, the respondent No. 1 Board had all the jurisdiction to take the impugned action in exercise of the power under Section 31A of the Act. In spite of repeated reminders and directions the appellant firm failed to comply with the directions and continued to operate the units. Mr. Saikia also refutes the submission of Mr.-Gogoi that no standard was prescribed inasmuch as standard had already been prescribed as will be apparent from Annexure-13 to the writ appeal.

6. Mr. H. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 3 submits that in case of an industrial unit which was in existence at the time when the Act came into force, under Section 21(1) of the Act, was required to take consent within a period of 3 months. The appellant firm did not take any step for obtaining consent till 14-8-1995 though the State of Assam was declared air pollution control area by notification dated 12-5-1993. According to Mr. Roy, admittedly the appellant firm did not-comply with the requirements of the Act. Mr. Roy further submits that loss of employment or revenue cannot have better precedence than the pollution hazard. The measures suggested by the Board were not taken by the appellant firm which will be evident from the statements made in paragraph 16 of the counter affidavit filed by the Board and reply given in the reply affidavit by the appellants" in paragraphs 12 and 13. If the present state of affairs is allowed to continue then the 3rd respondent and his employees are likely to suffer pollution hazard.

7. Mr. A. Dasgupta, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State supports the action taken by the Board.

8. On the rival contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, questions fall for determination are :

(1) Whether the respondent No. 1 Board had the authority and jurisdiction to give direction in exercise of the power under Section 31A in the present facts and circumstances of the case.

(2) Whether before invoking power under Section 31(A), and giving direction for closure of the factory, procedure prescribed under the Act had been followed.

9. Pollution, be that air, water or noise, is menace to the society. All the developed and developing countries are facing this hazard. With the industrialisation of a country problem of pollution comes in. If it is allowed to go unabated there will be serious health hazard to the human community. It is true that we need industrialisation for our development. No country can prosper without industrialisation. At the same time it should be the endeavour of all to control pollution. With the industrialisation pollution will be there. It can only be minimised so that it may not endanger the human life. We have to overcome hazard of pollution by taking proper measure to reduce it to the extent which may not cause health hazard. This is not the problem of one country, it is the problem of all the countries. Every country yearns for industrialisation for further development. In the process, the entire globe faces this problem. Even the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment which was held in Stock home in June, 1972 considered with all earnest how to get rid of this menace in the civilized world. In the said conference, India also took part. It was decided in the said conference to take appropriate steps for preservation of natural resources of the earth, which among other things, included preservation of the quality of air and control of air pollution. Earlier there were legislations so far prevention and control of water pollution. However, in the year 1981, in the light of resolution adopted in the United Nations Conference, the present Act was made. This Act came into force on 29-3-1981. In the said Act various devices have been prescribed to prevent and control air pollution which are very stringent in nature. Even a going industrial unit can be closed under the provisions of this Act, if the said industry or industrial unit does not take any step to confirm to the requirements of the Act. As the provisions of the Act are stringent in nature, certain safeguards have also been provided to the industrial units so that the officers entrusted with the job of control may not act arbitrarily and capriciously to the detriment of the industries or industrial units. As we have already said, we need industry for further development of our natural resources, at the same time we want that our atmosphere should not be polluted. We cannot forgo industry because of pollution. We also cannot conceive of hundred percent pollution free State. If we try to achieve that, we shall have to forgo the industry. Therefore, what is necessary is to take steps for growth of industries containing pollution to such an extent so that no health hazard is caused. There should be checks and balances. With this end in View the present Act has been enacted. Therefore; for violation of the provisions of the Act, the authority concerned will be entitled to take appropriate steps. But such action can be taken only in accordance with law.

10. Before we deal with the present case, it will be expedient and apposite to look to some of the provisions of the Act.

As per Section 3 of the Act, Central Board for the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution constituted under Section 3 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, shall, without prejudice to the exercise and performance of its power and functions under that Act, exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Central Board for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution under the Act. Similarly, under Section 4 of the Act, in any State in which the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 is in force and the State Government has constituted for that State a Board for the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution under Section 4 of the Act, such State Board shall be deemed to be the State Board for the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution constituted under Section 5 of the present Act. A State Board can be constituted under Section 5 of the Act. Section 17 refers to the functions of the State Board. Under Section 17, a State Board has been entrusted with the job of looking after the problems of air pollution and to take steps for prevention and control. Under Section 17(g) of the Act, in consultation with the Central Board and having regard to the standards for the quality of air laid down by the Central Board, the State Board shall lay down standards for emission of air pollutants into the atmosphere from industrial plants and automobiles or for the discharge of any air pollution into the atmosphere from any other source whatsoever not being a ship or an aircraft. Under Section 18 of the Act, every State Board shall be bound by such directions in writing as the State Government may give it. As per Section 19, the State Government may, after consultation with the State Board, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare in such manner as may be prescribed, any area or areas within the State as air pollution control area or areas for the purposes of the Act. Section 21 puts restrictions on use of certain industrial plants. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 21, subject to the provisions of this section, no person shall, without the previous consent of the State Board, establish or operate any industrial plant in an air pollution control area. Sub-section (1) of Section 21 deals with those industrial units which came into existence after the commencement of the Act. But there may be industrial units which were in existence at the time of commencement of the Act. Proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21 states that in the case of a person operating any industrial plant in ah air pollution control area immediately before the date of declaration of such area as an air pollution control area, the period so specified for compliance with the conditions mentioned in Sub-section (1) of Section 21 shall be not less than 3 months. In Section 22 of the Act, it is provided that no person operating any industrial plant in any Air Pollution Control Area should discharge or cause or permit to be discharged the emission of any air pollutant in excess of the standards laid down by the Board under Section 17(1)(g).

From this Section, it is clear that there may be emission of air pollution to certain extent, but it cannot exceed standard prescribed by the Board.

As per Section 24 of the Act any person empowered by the Board shall have the right to enter at all reasonable time for the purpose of performing any function entrusted to him. Section 26 of the Act provides that the State Board or any officer empowered by it shall have the power to take samples of air or emission from any chimney, flue or duct or any other outlet in such manner as may be prescribed.

11. Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submit before us that the appellant firm violated the provisions contained in proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act inasmuch as the entire State of Assam had been notified to be air pollution control area by notification dated 12-5-1993. But till August, 1995, the appellant firm did not take any step in terms of requirement of Section 21. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submit that in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 54 of the Act, the State of Assam has made a set of rules known as Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Assam Rules, 1992 (for short, the Rules). Rule 2(e) defines "Consent" thus:

" 'Consent' means the sanction of the authority of the Board for the purpose of prevention and regulation and control of Air Pollution;"

Pointing out to the definition and the requirements of proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 21, Mr. Roy submits before us that consent was not obtained and the requirement of law is that consent has to be taken within a period mentioned from the date of notification. As the consent was not obtained, the Boardhad definitely jurisdiction to take action under the provisions of the Act. Mr. Gogoi submits that under the present Act though consent was not taken, consent was obtained under the earlier Act. When consent was applied for, certain directions were given for improvement of the units and, thereafter, the Board gave consent in respect of two units. The appellant firm expressed its intention to improve the third unit for getting consent and requested for 18 months' time. The Board, however, did not grant arty time. On the other hand, directed the appellant firm to complete the work and after completion, communicate the same to the Board. However, the Board never said that the consent would not be granted if the measures were taken.

12. Mr. H. Roy submits that it will be the duty of the concerned industrial unit to seek consent from the Board. While seeking consent the industrial unit shall have to supply necessary information to enable the Board to consider the application for consent. If consent is not obtained by an industrial unit, the Board shall have the authority to take necessary steps either for closing down the unit or for any other direction.

13. In the instant case, it is admitted fact that on the date of notification i.e. 12-5-1993 and three months thereafter no application for obtaining consent was made by the appellant firm. They remained silent until a notice was issued by the Board seeking explanation for not obtaining consent. It is true that the appellant firm ought to have applied for consent. The appellant, however, did not do so. This action of the appellant firm was contrary to the provisions of the Act. But then it was the duty of the Board also to take action in this regard which they did after long time. Thereafter, application was made by the appellant firm. Though the appellant firm was required to make the application within 3 months from the date of notification, the application was made long after and the Board accepted the same. Therefore, the application cannot be thrown out on the ground of delay. As stated above, the appellant firm had three blocks and necessary measures were required to be taken for prevention of pollution because of the reasons of emitting obnoxious gases while manufacturing coke. In respect of two blocks the appellant firm took necessary mesures as directed, which was duly intimated to the Board and the Board allowed to continue the operation. In respect of the third block, the appellant firm prayed for 18 months, which, however, was not granted. The Board, directed the appellant to take necessary measure but what measures were required to be taken had not been specified and the Board asked the appellant not to operate the unit is respect of Block No. 3 till the measures were taken. When an application was made for consent it was the duty of the Board to consider the facts and circumstances with regard to the industrial unit including the measures taken for prevention of pollution. The Boards cannot give consent without considering those facts. Similarly, without considering those facts, consent cannot also be refused. Therefore, it is imperative on the part of the Board to examine and find out whether the industrial unit may cause pollution. In that respect various procedures have been prescribed under the Act and the Rules and that can be determined on the basis of standard prescribed by the Board as envisaged under Section 17(1)(g) of the Act. Under Section 17(1 )(g), the function of the Board is to lay down, in consultation with the Central Board and having regard to the standards for the quality of air laid down by the Central Board, standards for emission of air pollutants into the atmosphere from industrial plants and automobiles or for the discharge of any air pollution into the atmosphere from any other source whatsoever not being a ship or an aircraft. Therefore, under Section 17(1)(g) it is the duty of the Board to prescribe a standard to be maintained by an industrial unit with regard to emission of air pollutant. This is the first condition for the purpose of granting or refusing consent. Board does not have unfettered discretion to give consent or to withhold consent without there being any material in that regard. It is also not sufficient for the Board to give notice or ot take action for non-observance of the standard even when standard is prescribed. For that purpose also the Board is also required to analyse the sample as may be taken in the manner prescribed under Section 26 of the Act. Besides, for the purpose of analysis, laboratories are required to be established or recognised. Mr, Saikia very candidly informs this Court that he has no instruction regarding establishment or recognition of any laboratory. He only informs that the Board has laboratory of its own but not established or recognised as per law. Such laboratory does not fulfill the requirements of law.

14. Mr. Roy submits that not only emission of air pollutants from chimney etc. but also polluted air from the atmosphere should be taken for examination. As per Sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the Act the Board or any officer empowered in this behalf shall have the power to take, for the purpose of analysis, samples of air or emission from any chimney, flue or duct or any other outlet in such manner as may be prescribed. The manner has been prescribed under Rule 30 of the Rules. As per Rule 30 of the Rules the Board or any officer empowered by it in this behalf, shall have the power to take for the purpose of analysis, samples of air or emission from any chimney, flue or duct plant or vessel of any other sources and outlets, exhaust pipe, stationary or mobile, as may be prescribed by the Board or any officer empowered by it in its behalf. Without considering all these matters if the Board refuses to grant consent to an industrial unit it will be contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is the right of the industrial unit to get consent after fulfillment of me requirements. Even if the taking of sample from in and around the industrial unit is permissible, Section 26(3) requires that when a sample of emission is taken for analysis, person taking the sample shall --

(a) serve on the occupier or his agent, a notice, then and there, in such form as may be prescribed, of his intention to have it so analysed;

(b) in the presence of the occupier or his agent, collect a sample of emission for analysis;

(c) cause the sample to be placed in a container or containers which shall be marked and seated and shall also be signed both by the person taking the sample and the occupier or his agent;

(d) send, without delay, the container or containers to the laboratory established or recognised by the State Board under Section 7 or, if a request in that behalf is made by the occupier or his agent when the notice is served on him under Clause (a), to the laboratory established or specified under Sub-section (1) of Section 28.

15. Mr. Gogoi submits that nothing was done. Mr. Saikia has not been able to refute the same. The procedure prescribed under Section 27 was not followed as submitted by Mr. Gogoi.

16. Looking at the facts of the present case we find that a notice was issued by the Senior Environmental Engineer, Annexure-I to the writ appeal dated 28th July, 1995. In the said notice it has been mentioned that the appellant firm was running its unit without valid consent of the Board and also without taking any measure to control emission of heavy smoke from the process which is infringement of law. The said notice does not indicate that there was any examination of the smoke that was coming out. It also does not indicate what type of smoke were coming out from the chimney. At least Annexure-I does not indicate anything in that regard. Yet by another letter dated 27th September, 1995 the appellant firm was informed by the Member Secretary, Pollution Control Board, Assam, that ambient air quality monitoring done in December, 1993 in and around the industrial unit belonging to the appellant firm revealed level of S.P.M. and were beyond permissible limit. In the said letter it was also mentioned that the industrial units belonging to the appellant firm were emitting black smoke without any preventive measures in complete violation of the provisions of the Act. It is not known to this Court whether pollution can be determined on the basis of the colour of smoke. In our opinion chemical examination will be necessary to determine the nature of gas coming out with the smoke. From this it does not appear that any analysis was done to determine what type of black smoke was being emitted. These facts only go to show that respondent No. 1 abdicated its duty to determine whether the industrial unit actually was responsible for emitting air pollutants in excess of the permissible limit, as stated earlier. On this basis alone consent cannot be refused. The Board shall have to examine the matter as prescribed under the Act and the Rules. As already stated, the Board has not prescribed any standard as required under Section 17(1)(g), We do not find anything on record in this regard. In the absence of any such standard, no fault can be found with any industrial unit. Standard has to be prescribed so that the industrial units may know in what manner they should function. In the present case, the standard has not only been notified, but also not been prescribed.

17. Mr. A. H. Saikia, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 has not been able to produce anything to show that standard has been prescribed. However, an additional affidavit has been filed today without giving opportunity to the other side to rebut the same. We have gone through the notification annexed to the additional affidavit. The said notification was issued stating that it was issued in terms of Section 17(1)(g) of the Act. The notification is dated 11th July, 1996 i.e. after the issuance of closure notice dated 15-11-1995 in purported exercise of power under Section 31A. A close scrutiny of the notice reveals that notice was issued but not published. The contents of Annexure-C to the additional affidavit reads as follows:

"In exercising power conferred under Section 17(g) of Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 as amended, the Pollution Control Board Assam will follow the standards as laid down by the Central Pollution Control Board from time to time for emission of air pollutants into the atmosphere from industrial plants and automobiles or for the discharge of any air pollutants from any other source within the declared Air Pollution Control Area of the State".

This notification was issued under Memo No. WB/G-37/Pt/92-93/12A dated Gauhati, the 11th July, 1996. Copies of the notice were issued to the Joint Secretary to the Government of Assam, Science, Technology & Environment Department, Dispur, Guwahati-6 the Senior Environmental Engineer, Zonc-I/II/III, the Regional Executive Engineer, Regional Office, Dibrugarh/Sibsagar/Golaghat/Bongaigaon/ Guwahati/Silchar and the Board Analyst of Central Laboratory for information. From this it does not appear that the notice was even published either in the notice board or in the Gazette. In the absence of publication we cannot deem it to be a notice.

18. Mr. Saikia submits that the Central Pollution Control Board has already prescribed the standard and as per the notification dated 11th July, 1996, Annexure-C to the additional affidavit the requirements of prescribed standard under Section 17(g) of the Act have been fulfilled. Mr. Saikia has drawn our attention to the Gazette of India, Extraordinary dated 20th May, 19.94 annexed to the memo of appeal. Mr. Saikia has also drawn our attention to the relevant part of the notification which reads as under :

"The Central Pollution Control Board in exercise of its power conferred under Section 16(2)(b) of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (14 of 1981) hereby notify the National Ambient Air Quality Standards with immediate effect."

This notification is not with regard to emission of air pollutants. Therefore, taking all these together we do not find any standard prescribed by the Board.

19. Mr. Gogoi, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that adoption of any standard prescribed by the Central Board is not permissible under the Act by the Board. Because the Act does not envisage any such provision. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we refrain from giving an opinion in this regard. We come to the conclusion that no standard has been prescribed by the Board. This point may be examined in an appropriate case in future. From the record we find that regarding the air pollutants there was no examination in the manner prescribed. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that the Board did not take the pain to examine the matters in the manner as it is envisaged. This is adulty assigned to the Board. We record that the Board did not address itself regarding the relevant aspect of the matter and simply refused to give consent. As stated earlier, consent can neither be with held nor granted without proper examination. As nothing has been done in that regard, in our opinion, the Board failed to discharge its statutory duty and obligation in accordance with law. In that view of the matter we hold that refusal to grant consent without valid ground was illegal, without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of law.

20. We now come to Annexure-7 by which the Member-Secretary of the Board, respondent No. 1, in exercise of power under Section 31A of the Act directed the appellant-firm to close down the operation of the industrial unit of the appellant-firm situated at Borsajai, Beltola, with immediate effect after rejecting the prayer for consent. In said Annexure-7 the Member-Secretary also repeated that ambient air quality monitoring in and around the factory premises was carried out on 2nd November, 3rd and 4th November, 1995. The findings of the ambient air quality monitoring indicate that concentration of parameters like suspended particulars matter, sulphur dioxide and carbon monoxide has far exceeded the permissible limit. This observation of the Member-Secretary so far as Annexure-7 is concerned, in our opinion, is without any basis. The notice was issued under Section 31A of the Act which is quoted below :

"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, but subject to the provisions of this Act, and to any directions that the Central Government may give in this behalf, a Board may, in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under the Act, issue any direction in writing to any person, officer or authority and such person, officer or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions."

21. Mere perusal of this section makes the position very clear. The Board has power subject to the provisions of the Act and to any direction given by the Central Government to issue direction to any person. Therefore, it must be subject to the provisions of the Act and also to any direction of the Central Government. We do not find anything from record that any direction was given by the Central Government. Mr. Saikia has not been able to show that any such direction was given. Power under Section 31A shall be on the basis of requirements of the Act. We have already held that the directions given under the Act and the Rules, have not been taken into consideration before passing the impugned order (Annexure-7). Therefore, in our opinion, the issuance of the directions as per Annexure-7 is illegal, without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of law.

22. The learned single Judge disposed of the matter holding, inter alia, that the chimney of the industrial unit of the appellant-firm was emitting obnoxious pollutant substance causing air pollution. However, the learned single Judge did not consider the relevant provisions of the Act regarding the standard prescribed. It was the duty of the Board to prescribe the standard after taking into consideration the health hazard etc. Limit has to be prescribed before the Board comes to a conclusion regarding the exceeding limit. In the absence of any such standard no opinion can be formed regarding the exceeding limit. In our opinion it will not be enough if it is prescribed but not published because the people in general and the industrial units in particular must be aware of the same. Therefore, whenever standard is prescribed the same shall have to be published. As this aspect was not taken into consideration before coming to the conclusion by the learned single Judge, we respectfully disagree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge and we have no alternative but to set aside the impugned judgment of the learned single Judge and Annexure-7. As we have set aside the order of the learned single Judge on the ground that consent application was not properly disposed of, we hold that the consent application is still pending for disposal and, therefore, it is the duty of the Board to take into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and also to take all the measures which the Board is required to take as per the law and then dispose of the consent application afresh within a period of 3 months from today after complying with all the requirements of the Act and the Rules. If, however, at the time of disposal of the consent application some improvement is required to be made by the appellant-firm they may be given reasonable time to take further measures for prevention of air pollution within the prescribed limit. Till the disposal of the consent application which is deemed to be pending, the appellant-firm shall be entitled to run the factory.