ORDER Hanumanthappa, J.

1. Both these Petitions are listed for Preliminary Hearing. By consent of both parties both the Petitions are disposed of.

2. The reliefs sought and the questions to be decided in both these Petitions are common. Hence, they are clubbed together and a Common Order is passed.

3. W.P.No. 32769 of 1993 is the one filed by Dr. B. Shivalingaiah challenging curtailing his appointment as Member Secretary of the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (hereinafter called as the Board) and in his place appointing one Sri. K, Sudhakar, a Junior Grade K.A.S. Officer.

4. W.P.No. 33051 of 1993 is filed by one Sri, A.V. Amarnathan, an Advocate of this Bar as a Public Interest Litigation seeking for a declaration that the appointment of Sri, K. Sudhakar as Member Secretary of the Board as illegal and to continue Dr. Shivalingaiah as a Member Secretary.

5. A few facts which are necessary to dispose of these two Writ Petitions are:

The Karnataka State Pollution Control Board is a Board constituted under the provisions of the Pollution Board Act viz. The Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act 1974, hereinafter called as 'the Act'. Here we are concerned with Section 4 of the Act which deals with conferring powers on the State Government to constitute a State Pollution Control Board which is a corporate body. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 deals with composition of the Board which consists of a Chairman, representatives of both the State and the local authorities and non-official members. These appointments shall be made by the State. The Board also consists of a full time Member Secretary who must have knowledge and experience of Scientific, engineering or management aspects to deal with pollution control. The said Section is extracted hereunder:

"(2) A State Board shall consist of the following members namely:

(a) Chairman, being a person having special knowledge or practical experience in respect of (matter relating to environmental protection) or a person having knowledge and experience in administering institutions dealing with the matters aforesaid, to be nominated by the State Government:

(Provided that the Chairman may be either whole-time or part-time as the State Government may think fit;)

(b) (such number of officials not exceeding five) to be nominated by the State Government to represent that Government;

(c) (such number of persons, not exceeding five), to be nominated by the State Government from amongst the members of the local authorities functioning within the State:

(d) (such number of non-officials, not exceeding three), to be nominated by the State Government to represent the interests of agriculture, fishery or industry or trade or any other interest which in the opinion of the State Government, ought to be represented;

(e) two persons to represent the companies or corporations owned, controlled or managed by the State Government, to be nominated by that Government;

(f) (a full-time member-secretary possessing qualifications, knowledge and experience of scientific, engineering or management aspects of pollution control, to be appointed by the State Government.)"

The petitioner was earlier working as a Professor in the Department of Environmental Engineering - Post Graduate Centre, P.E.S. College of Engineering, Mandya He is the holder of the degrees of B.E., M.E, in Environmental Engineering, Ph.D. in Environmental Engineering and specialised in Water Quality Modeling. On 18.2.91 as per Annexure 'B', Government appointed the petitioner as Member Secretary of the Board for a period of one year on the terms and conditions enclosed to the notification. As per the terms and conditions of the appointment, the period of appointment mentioned was for a period of one year extendable year after year. The commencement and end of contract is for one year and the contract service will commence from the date of his relieving from the charge of the post in the P.E.S. College of Engineering (Technical Department). By an order dated 17-2-92 the petitioner's term was extended until further orders. By an order dated 9-6-92 the 2nd respondent wanted to relieve the petitioner from the office of Member Secretary of the Board but the same was withdrawn and another Notification was issued on 29.6,1992 whereby the earlier relieving order was cancelled and petitioner was continued to work as Member Secretary on the same terms and conditions which were notified by its earlier order dated 17.2.1992. On 30.6.1992 an order was passed relieving the petitioner from office. By another order dated 30.6.92 the petitioner was continued until further orders. On 18.2.1993 one more order was issued continuing the service of the petitioner for a further period of 3 years w.e.f. 20.2,93. However, by an order dated 21.8.1993 Sri. Sudhakar, a Junior Scale K.A.S. Officer of the rank of Asst. Commissioner was appointed as a member Secretary as against the office which was held by the petitioner. On the same day a notice was issued by the Minister for Forest, Environment and Ecology and a letter addressed to the President of the Board directing not to relive the petitioner from the office of Member Secretary, It was followed by a notice dated 3.9.93 issued by the Secretary, D.P.I. modifying its earlier order dated 21.8.93 handing over services of Sri. Sudhakar at the disposal of the 2nd respondent for being appointed as Member Secretary in the place of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said relieving and posting orders, the petitioner has preferred this Writ Petition seeking for the relief of quashing the order dated 3.9.93 handing over the services to Sri. Sudhakar at the disposal of the Department of Forest, Environment and Ecology and to direct the respondents to continue the petitioner in the office as Member Secretary till 19-2-1996 till the date his further appointment made by notification dated 18.2.93 comes to an end.

6. The grounds made out to support the contentions raised by the petitioner are:

(1) Appointment of Sri. Sudhakar and relieving the petitions are not in the interest of public but it is politically motivated and made with a view to accommodate Sri Sudhakar;

(2) The petitioner is fully qualified with abundant experience and scholarship in the subject, He was responsible in pointing out certain mistakes in the administration of the Board. He also proposed to set up Jayaprakash Industries in Mangalore, O.K.;

(3) He has pointed out the irregularities committed by the Officers of the Board which had the approval of the Chairman of the Board though the Member Secretary alone had to operate the office of the Board and not the Chairman, etc. These irregularities pointed out by the petitioner have resulted in the misunderstanding between the petitioner on the one hand and the Board and the Government on the other; and (4) The appointment of the 4th respondent as Member Secretary is quite illegal and in violation of Section 4(2) of the 1974 Act. As Sri Sudhakar does not possess the qualifications mentioned therein, the relieving of the petitioner from the office of the Member Secretary in the absence of prior consultation with the previous Employer to repatriate him is bad as he was appointed for a further period of 3 years w.e.f. 18,2.93, as such he should have been continued till the 3 years period expired.

(4}(a) The tenure of appointment before termination or relieving had to be proceeded with a prior notice but the same is not complied with in the case of the petitioner, (5) The relieving of the petitioner not by the Department of Forest, Environment and Ecology, but by the D.P.A.R. who has no control over the Department under which the Board falls. Thus it is in contravention of the Karnataka Government (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1977, hereinafter referred to as 'the 1977 Rules'. To support the contention that relieving of the petitioner by the Department of D.P.A.R. and appointing Sri. Sudhakar as Member Secretary without prior permission of the concerned Department is in contravention of the 1977 Rules and thus it is illegal, Sri. B.B. Bajentri placed reliance on a Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of HARIDWAR SINGH v. BAGUN SAMBRUI AND ORS., :

"(8) Constitution of India, Article 166(3) - Rules under, Bihar Rules of Executive Business, Rule 10(1) - Interpretation of - Rule 10 (1) which requires prior consultation with Finance Department is mandatory - Settlement of coup by private treaty without prior consultation with Finance Department held invalid."

For the proposition that the petitioner should not have been relieved of his post without notifying him and the petitioner is entitled to continue in the said office, Sri. B.B. Bajentri placed reliance on a Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. L.P. AGARWAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS., 1992(4) SLR 583, wherein it has been held as follows:

"The appointment of the appellant was on a Five years Tenure but it could be curtailed in the event of his attaining the age of 62 years before completing the said tenure. The High Court failed to appreciate the simple alphabet of the service jurisprudence. The High Court's reasoning is against the clear and unambiguous language of the Recruitment Rules. The said rules provide "Tenure for five years inclusive of one year probation" and the post is to be called "by direct recruitment". Tenure means a term during which an office is held, It is a condition of holding the office. Once a person is appointed to a tenure post, his appointment to the said office begins when he joins and it comes to an end on the completion of the tenure unless curtailed on justifiable grounds. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes out of the office on completion of his tenure. The question of prematurely retiring him does not arise. The appointment order gave a clear tenure to the appellant. The High Court fell into error in reading "the concept of superannuation" in the said order. Concept of superannuation which is well understood in the service jurisprudence is alien to tenure appointments which have a fixed life span. The appellant could not therefore have been prematurely retired and that too without being put on any notice whatsoever. Under what circumstances, can an appointment for a tenure be cut short is not a matter which requires our immediate consideration in this case because the order impugned before the High Court concerned itself only with premature retirement and the High Court also dealt with that aspect of the matter only."

Sri. Bajentri also placed reliance on a Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF RAJASTHAN v. Dr. A.K. DATTA, . Thus arguing Sri. Bajentri, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Petition be allowed by granting the reliefs sought 7, The second Writ Petition is by Sri. A.V. Amarnathan, a Member of the Bar of Bangalore who has filed this Writ Petition in the form of a public interest litigation is seeking almost identical reliefs. He reiterated the same grounds which were canvassed by Sri. Bajentri, Regarding maintainability of the Writ Petition, Sri. Amarnathan submitted that he being a citizen is very much interested in challenging the appointment of Sudhakar as a Member Secretary and the Petition will be maintainable once it is demonstrated that his appointment has resulted in causing wrong to the public and has also given rise to public injury and the same is the resultant of not obeying the Constitutional mandate or non-observance of the statute or law. He maintained that appointment of Sudhakar is not in accordance with Section 4 as he does not possess the qualification mentioned therein on the date of his appointment;

(2) The appointment of Sudhakar is also not in the interest of the public but made with a malafide intention to dislodge Sri. Shivalingaiah who was appointed as a Member Secretary;

(3) Sri. Shivalingaiah possessed more than the sufficient qualification prescribed under Section 4(2) of the Act. As such, he alone should be continued; and (4) The appointment of Sri. Sudhakar on the one hand and the relieving of Sri. Shivalingaiah on the other is in direct contravention of Section 25 of the 1975 Act.

8. To support his contention that as he being a citizen is entitled to challenge the appointment of Sudhakar and for his removal by issuing a Writ of Quo Warranto or any other appropriate Writ and to issue a Mandamus directing the respondents to continue Dr. Shivalingaiah, he placed reliance on various Decisions. For the proposition that a private individual will have locus standi to challenge and file a Writ Petition once it is shown the action complained of is not in the nature of public interest and the same is not in compliance with the Constitutional mandate or statutory requirements, a Writ of Quo-Warranto can be issued he placed reliance on a Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of THE JANATA DAL v. H.S. CHOWDHARY AND ORS, . The relevant portion reads thus:

"In contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which give the right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper; since the dominant object of PIL is to ensure observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery in motion like action popularise of Roman Law whereby any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public delict."

For the proposition when once an office is held by a person who does not possess the qualification a Writ of Quo Warranto can be caused, he placed reliance on a Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v. HARYANA CO-OPERATIVE TRANSPORT LTD. AND ORS., , wherein it is held that challenge to an appointment is made directly in a substantive proceeding and not collaterally. In such cases, under such circumstances the Court can issue a Writ to such person holding the office without possessing the required qualification. In view of the grounds urged and the principles laid down in the above two Decisions, Sri. Amarnathan suggested that this Petition be allowed by granting the reliefs sought.

9. Regarding Statement of Objections, the Board filed its Statement in W.P.No. 32769/93 and sought permission to adopt the same in W.P.No. 33051/93. Its objections mostly confine to denying the allegations of malafides and incompetency. As far as the State is concerned to deny the allegations of malafides and competency to appoint, an affidavit of Chief Secretary of the State of Karnataka has been filed. As far as the facts which are not in dispute, the learned Advocate General chose to point out how relieving of Dr. Shivalingaiah was valid and how posting one Sri. Sudhakar also was valid. As an answer to all the contentions raised by Sri. Bajentri the learned Advocate General first pointed out that appointment of Sri Shivalingaiah was only contractual one, Since the Board has not framed its own Service Rules, it is adopting the K.C.S.R. (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977. Rule 15 of the 1977 Rules deals with provisions for appointment of retired Government servants and for appointment by contract. It reads as follows:

"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the rules of recruitment specially made in respect of any service or post, the Government may, if it considers necessary for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is in public interest so to do-(a) appoint to a service or a post any person who has retired from the service of the Government, Central Government or any other State Government on such terms and conditions and for such period, as may be necessary, and after consultation with the commission where such consultation is necessary;

(b) appoint to the following categories of posts any person who in its opinion is able to discharge the duties of such post on such terms and conditions as may be determined by agreement, for a period not exceeding one year at a time, -

(i) posts of Heads of Departments when suitable officers are not available for appointment, according to the rules of recruitment applicable to the posts;

(ii) posts requiring technical qualifications

(iii) posts in the personal establishment of a Minister, a Minister of State or a Deputy Minister:

(iv) posts in the personal establishment of a Chairperson of a Commission or a Committee constituted by the Government, where such Chairperson is a non-official and has been given the status of a Cabinet Minister or a Minister of State or a Deputy Minister.

Provided that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any rule made under the proviso the Article 309 of the Constitution of India or in the agreement or the terms, conditions and the period of appointment of any person under Clause (a) or Clause (b), the services of a person so appointed shall be liable for termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by such person to the Government or by the Government to such person and the period of such notice shall be one month:

Provided further that the services of any such person may be terminated forthwith and no such termination he shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the case may be, for the period by which notice falls short of one month.) (2) The total period of appointment of any person or the total period of appointment in any post under Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) shall not exceed five years:

Provided that appointments to posts mentioned in Sub-clause (iii) of Clause (b) of Sub-rule (1) may be made for a period co-terminus with the tenure of office of the Minister, the Minister of State or the Deputy Minister concerned."

As far as the position that petitioner was appointed by the Government and Rules of 1977 will apply, is not disputed by the petitioner. When the term of appointment is initially for one year and subsequently extended by mistake for a period of three years by its order dated 18.2.93 and later found that the petitioner continuing in office is not correct, it posted Sudhakar to work as a Member Secretary. The appointment of the petitioner was purely a temporary one and controlled by doctrine of pleasure. His appointment a contractual one and he has no right to assert that he shall be continued to work in the said office till he attains super annuation. A person appointed on contractual basis on his termination, relieving or curtailment, all that is entitled is to either for a notice earlier or in its place a month's salary.

10. Regarding competency, viz. that the D.P.A.R. should not have posted Sudhakar to the office of the Member Secretary of the Board and the same should have been done by the Department of Environment and Ecology and Forest, there is no force in this contention in view of Article 161 of the Constitution of India which equally applies to the contention of Sri. Bajentri that order passed in the absence of Karnataka Government (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1977, viz. without obtaining the prior sanction of the Forest Department or without taking the consent of the petitioner's parent Department viz. P.E.S. College for his repatriation has no merit. He explained it by saying that such Rules are framed to regulate internal administration. They are not mandatory but directory in nature. When once an order is issued in the name of Government, it cures whatever defect it possessed. For this proposition he placed reliance on a Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF UP. v. OM PRAKASH GUPTA, .

11. The learned Advocate General further contended that so far Sri. Sudhakar has not taken charges of the office of member Secretary. However, it is still open for the State whether posting of Sri Sudhakar to work as Member Secretary of the Board shall be continued or to withdraw it. Regarding the second Writ Petition W.P.No. 33051/93 filed by Sri. A.V. Amarnathan, learned Advocate General submitted that the same is not maintainable for the reason that he has not shown what locus standi he has in the appointment of Sudhakar as Member Secretary. It is not to secure any public relief, but on the other hand, to expose the private cause viz. the cause of Dr. Shivalingaiah which fact is clear from the two reliefs sought by Sri. A.V. Amarnathan. First being quashing of appointment of Sudhkar and the second to continue Dr. Shivalingaiah as Member Secretary. According to the learned Advocate General, the petitioner has not shown any public injury or an illegality in appointing Sudhakar, so that this Court can hold that the petitioner has got locus standi by applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Janata Dal v. H.S.Chowdary. Thus arguing, he submitted that both the Petitions be dismissed as there is no merit in any of the grounds urged and the contentions raised by the petitioner.

12. Sri V.R. Datar, Counsel for the Board adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Advocate General.

13. From the averments made in the Petition and the arguments advanced, the Points that arise for Consideration are:

1. Whether relieving the petitioner from the office of Member Secretary curtailing his appointment even before the expiry of 3 years by order dated 18.6.93 is valid or otherwise?

2. Whether posting of Sudhakar as a Member Secretary of the Board is a proper one?

3. Whether W.P.No. 33051/93 is maintainable?

4. To deal with the first proposition we must bear in mind the petitioner's initial appointment and the terms and conditions of his appointment enclosed to the appointment order. We must also bear in mind Rule 15 of the 1977 Rules which deals with appointment of retired persons, etc. His initial appointment was for a period of one year. There was no assurance that the petitioner would be absorbed permanently. After expiry of one year, his office of the Member Secretary was continued. Later it was interrupted by its cancellation and again continued by subsequent order dated 18.6.93 which has been cancelled by the present orders posting Sudhakar to work as a Member Secretary. It is not petitioner's case that Government appointed him on a permanent basis. When his appointment was purely on contractual basis, the point to be considered is whether in such circumstances, if appointment is cancelled, a Writ can be maintained or an aggrieved person has to agitate the same in the ordinary course in other Courts. The appointment of the petitioner is governed by the Doctrine of Pleasure though it is not expressly termed in the appointment order. In case of termination of a temporary employee, unless Rules otherwise specify, the normal rule is that such an employee or an officer is entitled for a notice, in lieu, a month's salary. In the instant case before relieving the petitioner no notice was served on him nor was he tendered with a month's salary.

15. When this was pointed out, the learned Advocate General submitted that the Government is prepared to pay a month's salary to the petitioner. His appointment was contractual one. Hence this Court cannot under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution consider the case of the petitioner to issue a Writ of Mandamus to continue him as a Member Secretary of the Board in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the following cases:

(1) In the case of SATISH CHANDRA ANAND v. THE UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1953 SC 251. wherein it is held as follows:

"A civil servant, who had been engaged on the basis of a special contract for a certain term, was, on the expiry of the term, re-appointed by a further contract on a temporary basis. In accordance with the Government rules, which formed part of the contract, he was discharged from service after notice. The petitioner filed a petition under Article 32(1) seeking redress for breach of his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16(1). It was argued that the rights infringed were those conferred by Article 311 :

Held, (i) that Article 311 had no application because there was neither a dismissal nor a removal from service, nor a reduction in rank. As Article 311 had no application no question of discrimination arose.

(ii) Article 16(1) was equally inapplicable. The petitioner had not been denied by opportunity of employment or of appointment. He had been treated just like any other person to whom an offer of temporary employment was made. There can be no grievance against an offer of temporary employment on special terms as opposed to permanent employment;

(iii) There was no compulsion on the petitioner to enter into the contract he did. Having accepted the offer, he still had open to him all the rights and remedies available to other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights under his contract which had been denied to him, assuming there were any, and to pursue in the ordinary Courts of the land such remedies for a breach. The remedy of a writ was, therefore, misconceived."

(2) In the case of LEKHRAJ SATHRAMADAS LALVANI v. N.M.SHAH, , the Supreme Court observed that :

"The appointment of a person as a Manager by the Custodian by virtue of his power under Section 10(2)(b) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act is contractual in nature and there is no statutory obligation as between latter and the former. Thus the former is not entitled to move the High Court for grant of writ in the nature of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution."

(3) The contention that there should have been prior consent or consultation of the Department of Environment and Ecology and Forest and the non-compliance of the Karnataka Government (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1977, is not vitiated in cancelling the petitioner's appointment as non-observance of the same when final order is in the name of the Governor, the defect found cured. Further, defects if any cannot be found fault as they are not mandatory but directory in nature as held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of UP. v. Om Prakash Gupta6 wherein it is held as follows:

"In this case the impugned order was made in the name of the State Government. It was signed by the Chief Secretary. Therefore prima facie it is a valid order. We need not go further into that question in view of our conclusion that the respondent has failed to prove that he was appointed by an authority higher in rank than the Chief Secretary of the State."

From the above, it is clear that the curtailment of the term of office of Dr. Shivalingaiah from holding the office of the Member Secretary of the Board, is neither illegal nor invalid but is within the legal competence of the authority concerned. Since the appointment is a contractual one, this Court is not the proper forum under Article 226 of the Constitution to seek redressal.

16. Now the next point to be considered is : Whether the posting of Sudhakar as Member Secretary is proper?

It is not the State's case that Sudhakar possessed all the qualifications which have been detailed in Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the 1974 Act. The position of a Member Secretary and his duties and functions if be properly understood as detailed in the Act which are quite onerous in nature, whose discharge can be expected only from a person possessing scientific knowledge, technical qualification and not mere administrative and office experience. If the qualification prescribed in the Act to appoint a person as a Member Secretary has to be strictly followed and the qualification of Sudhakar is taken into consideration, it has to be said that the Government committed a mistake in appointing Sudhakar as a Member Secretary of the Board. This mistake shows that before taking a decision of posting Sudhakar as Member Secretary, it failed to apply its mind to ,the relevant provisions which speak about the qualification. Thus, the posting of Sudhakar as Member Secretary is not in accordance with law. No doubt, here both Sri Bajentri and Amarnathan submitted that the said posting made is with malafide intention and politically motivated. It is neither relevant to comment upon the same here nor is the same established. Moreover, the so-called political malafides as canvassed by the petitioners do not require to be considered in view of the fair submission made by the learned Advocate General that the posting of Sri Sudhakar if found as incorrect on the ground that he does not possess the required minimum qualification, the Department would make alternative arrangements by posting a fully qualified person.

Hence, Point No. 2 is answered holding that appointment of Shii Sudhakar as Member Secretary is not proper.

Regarding the contention whether Dr.Shivalingaiah be repatriated by a separate order, there is considerable force in the submission made by the learned Advocate General that (i) there need not be a separate order of repatriation of Dr. Shivalingaiah to his original post viz., Professor of Department of Environmental Engineering, P.E.S. College of Engineering, Mandya. Because the same is not warranted when once the Government has dispensed with his services; (ii) However, to avoid confusion, Government has no objection to inform the P.E.S. College of Engineering, Mandya, that the Government has passed order dispensing with the services of Dr.Shivalingaiah as a Member Secretary of the Board and it is for the P.E.S. College of Engineering and for Dr. Shivalingaiah to work out about the petitioner's further position, (iii) The Board will pay to the petitioner one month's salary.

These submissions are placed on record.

17. The last Point to be considered is: Whether an individual can maintain a Writ of Quo Warranto?

It is needless to say that the general rule is, to seek a Writ, one should show that he has locus standi and aggrieved by an act and the injury complained of must be public in nature. But seeking of Writ of Quo Warranto is an exception to the said general Rule. Any tax payer can maintain a Writ of Quo Warranto, What are the grounds to be established to seek a Writ of Quo Warranto, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down in detail several ingredients in the case of M. PENTIAH AND ORS. v. MUDDALA VEERAMALLAPPA AND ORS., .

When a Writ of Quo Warranto can be issued is laid down as follows in the case of UNIVERSITY OF MYSORE v. GOVINDA RAO AND ANR, :

"(a) Constitution of India, Article 226 - Quo Warranto, writ of -Nature of writ - Conditions to be satisfied for issue of writ.

Broadly stated, the quo warrantd proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which may person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the enquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not."

Likewise, the Supreme Court in the case of STATESMAN (PRIVATE) LTD. v. H.R. DEB AND ORS., , has taken a similar view.

18. Grounds made out by Sri. Amarnathan, if followed carefully, the relief of quashing the appointment of Sudhkar looks collateral one and the substantive relief is that Dr. Shivalingaiah should continue, However, while this position was pointed out, Sri Amarnathan submitted that he may be permitted to delete the second prayer relating to continuation of Dr. Shivalingaiah as a Member Secretary of the Board. As such, his challenge is confined only to appointment of Sudhakar. The petitioner being a rate payer and the appointment of Sri Sudhkar being prima facie contrary to Section 4 of the Act, the same is contrary to law. In view of the Decisions referred to above including the latest Decision of the Supreme Court held in Janata Dal's case referred to supra, Sri. Amarnathan's Writ Petition is maintainable and answered Point No. 3 in affirmative.

19. For the reason given above, since the first relief cited by Sri. Amarnathan is also the one claimed by Sri Sudhkar in his W.P.No. 32769 of 1993, there is no necessity to give a separate finding or a direction in Amarnathan's Writ Petition, viz., WP.No.33051 of 1993.

20. Since posting of Shri Sudhakar is held as illegal and the learned Advocate General submitted that his posting be withdrawn, there is no necessity either to issue notice or to hear Shri Sudhakar that too when his appointing authority is represented by the learned Advocate General,

21. The submission made by the learned Advocate General that Dr. Shivalingaiah will be allowed to continue as a Member Secretary till suitable person is appointed and a month's salary in addition to the salary for the period for which he worked will be paid is recorded.

22. Since the relief sought by Sri. Amarnathan is identical to the one sought by Dr. Shivalingaiah, Writ Petition No,33051 of 1993 filed by Amarnathan is rejected with the observations made earlier.

To conclude : for the reasons given above and subject to the observations made above both the Writ Petitions, viz., W.Ps. Nos. 32769 and 33051 of 1993 are rejected.