JUDGMENT A.K. Ganguly, J.

1. In this writ petition question of some importance has cropped up.

2. The petitioner No. 1 is a resident on the ground floor of premises No. 26/1, C.I.T. Road, Scheme VII M, Kankurgachi, P.S. Manicktola, Calcutta-700 054 and the petitioner No. 2 is a resident of premises No. 23/1, C.I.T. Road, Scheme-VII M Kankurgachi, P.S. Manicktola, Calcutta -- 700 054. Both the places are adjacent.

3. The petitioners' grievances are that close to their building there is a showroom of Digjam, a well known concern carrying on business in Textile and dress materials and in the said showroom of respondent No. 7 there are huge air conditioning machine, the running of which causes air and noise pollution compelling the petitioners to seek redress by filing complaint before the Pollution Control Board. It is not in dispute that initially certain complaints were filed before the Pollution Control Board and some orders were passed by the Board, but since that could not adequately redress by the grievance of the petitioners, they came up before this Court and filed a writ petition which was numbered as W.P. 8734(W)/99. On that writ petition being filed, a Division Bench of this Court, which was otherwise known as 'Green Bench', was pleased to dispose of the writ petition on the basis of a suggestion made on behalf of one of the parties. From the said order dated 2nd July, 1999, it appears that the suggestion was that a cooling tower should be built at the top of the building where the air conditioners are installed to avoid emanation of hot air from two air conditioners. The said cooking towers were directed to be built within a particular time frame and the West Bengal Pollution Control Board was requested to oversee the construction. The Board was also authorized that in the event their directions are not fulfilled they were at liberty to take appropriate action against the erring party in accordance with law. The said order was passed virtually at the suggestion of the parties.

4. Thereafter, attempt was made to have the said order modified. Ultimately the attempt to get modification of the said order was unsuccessful and this Court finds that by an order dated 17th November 2000 the said Division Bench clearly expressed their opinion that no modification of the order is called for. But the said Division Bench also made it clear that if by reason of subsequent event any fresh cause of action arises, the parties are entitled to have recourse to such remedy as it permissible under the law.

5. Before the said order on the prayer of modification was passed, this Court finds that there is an order by the Pollution Control Board (hereinafter called the said Board) on 7th October 1999 for closure of the air conditioning machines. Since the said order has some bearing on the points at issue it will be appropriate. If the text of the said order is set out in full. The said order is, therefore, set out in extenso:

"In exercise of the powers conferred under Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and Rules made thereunder and after careful consideration of the records kept and maintained by the State Board, M/s. Hari Textile, located at Shop No. P-23/1 C.I.T. Road, Scheme VII M. Kankurgachi, Calcutta 700 054 is hereby directed to close down its air condition machines for the following reasons:

(1) that the aforementioned unit is operating its air condition machines without erecting cooling tower as per the order of the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta dated 02.07.99;

(2) that during inspection on 15.09.99, it is observed that the aforementioned unit is operating its air condition machines without erecting cooling tower as per the Order of the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta, within eight weeks from the date of order, i.e. 02.07.99.

(3) After erection of cooling system as per order of the Hon'ble Court, the aforementioned unit may approach before the State Board for suspension of closure order of its air condition machine.

(4) The closure order will take immediate effect and Officer-in-Charge, Manicktola Police Station, Calcutta, will execute the closure order and submit the compliance report to the State Board within 7 (seven) days from the receipt of this order."

6. From a perusal of the said order it is made clear that same was passed by the Board in exercise of statutory power and after careful consideration of the records in respect of respondent concerned and also for ensuring compliance of the Court's order which has been referred to above. It also appears that prior to the passing of the said closure order there was an inspection by the Board on 15th September 1999. Therefore, the said order was passed upon due application of mind and upon consideration of all relevant materials.

7. Be that as it may, against the said order an appeal was filed before the Appellate Authority by the private respondents. This Court finds that there are two orders of the appellate authority, which have been brought on record. The first order is one dated 15th May 2001. By the said order, the Appellate Authority made it clear that the question which is raised in the appeal is--"whether the hot air discharge from the air condition machines creates air pollution". By the said order dated 15th May 2001, the appellants were directed to fix up split type air-conditioning machine so that the pollution load may not affect the neighbouring people for the time being. In the meantime, the Board was directed to inspect the unit at the cost of the appellants. The matter was made returnable before the Appellate Authority. The matter thereafter appeared before the Appellate Authority again on 26th June 2001 and on that date the Appellate Authority heard the parties. The Appellate Authority put it on record that the matter was considered from 'different angles' and report was obtained from Junior Environmental Engineer, West Bengal Pollution Control Board. The contents of the report were also stated in the said order.

8. The appellate authority again directed the Board to Inspect the said showroom through a competent engineer who is to see that the existing four machines mentioned in the report were sufficient to meet the requirement and whether two more machines could be installed after assessing the impact of those two additional machines. The board was also authorised to suggest shifting or changing the place of machine to control hot air and noise pollution, if necessary. After giving such direction to the Board the appeal was disposed of and the Appellate Authority directed that for the time being no split A.C. Machine should be used in the showroom and the same could be used only after the Board makes proper assessment and gives necessary direction. The appellate Authority further made it clear that presently four 1.5 tons of window type A.C. Machine facing V.I.P. Road will be continued to operate. It is, therefore, clear from the said order that the Appellate Authority while disposing of the appeal passed a well considered order and they have considered the matter in the language of the Appellate Authority, from "different angles".

9. The real dispute crops up. The petitioners found that the appellate Authority has entertained an application for review of the order elated 26th June 2001 at the instance of the private respondents and upon review, the Appellate Authority has taken a complete volte-face and held that there is no pollution and the order of the Pollution Control Board was set aside and the appeal which was disposed of by order dated 25th June 2001 was allowed.

10. The learned counsel for the petitioner as challenged basically the competence and jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority to entertain the review petition against a final order passed in appeal. On that question the Court has heard the counsel for the parties in some detail and some decisions were cited at the Bar.

11. Before examining the question of jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority to entertain the review petition certain broad features of the case may be clearly stated. It is not in dispute that the Appellate Authority is an authority created under the Statute. As an authority created under the Statute, it has certain quasi-judicial functions and it is vested with certain features or trappings of a Court but it is certainly not a Court nor is it a superior Tribunal. It is not in dispute that the Appellate Authority is to act within the four corners of the Statute and must act as an interior Tribunal. The distinction between the power and Jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal and a superior tribunal has been long decided and clearly demarcated, in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edn. Vol. 10 para 713, this aspect of the matter has been clearly stated as follows:

"The chief distinctions between superior and inferior Courts are found in connection with jurisdiction. Prima facie, no matter is Superior Court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular Court."

12. This passage from Halsbury has been accepted by the Supreme Court in its Constitution Bench in the case of Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar, of the report.

13. Now coming back to the Act and the Rules under which the Appellate Authority has been set up, this Court finds that the relevant Statute is the Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). Under Section 31 of the said Act any person being aggrieved by an order made by the State Board has been given the right of appeal before the Appellate Authority as the State Government may think fit to constitute. Under Section 31(3) of the said Act, it has been provided that the form and manner In which appeal may be preferred under Sub-section (1) and the fees payable for such appeal and the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authority shall be such as may be prescribed. The word 'prescribe' has obviously been defined under Section 2(9) of the Act to mean prescribed by rules made under this Act by the Central Government or as the case may be the State Government. It is not in dispute that rules have also been framed. Those rules are known as West Bengal Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Rules 1983. Those Rules have been framed in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 54 of the Act. Under Rule 19 of the said Rules, procedure has been prescribed for filing of an appeal. Then Rule 20 deals with the procedure to be followed by the Appellate Authority in dealing with the disposal of the appeal. It is common ground that neither under the said Act nor under the said Rules, there is any provision for review, to be exercised by the Appellate Authority of its own order. There is also another Rule framed under Section 64 of the Water Prevention & Control of Pollution Act, 1974. Under the said Rule also there is a provision for filing of an appeal. Even under the said Rule there is no provision empowering the Appellate Authority to entertain review of its own order. Here we are of course concerned with the West Bengal Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Rules, 1983. Reference in this connection may be made to the National Environmental Appellate Authority Act, 1997. Under the said Act, the Appellate Authority has been given the power of review under Section 12(1) of the 1997 Act.

14. From the aforesaid statutory dispensation one thing is clear that so far as the State Appellate Authority is concerned the legislature in its wisdom did not confer any power of review, whereas on the National Appellate Authority, power of review was conferred by the appropriate legislature.

15. Now the question is when the legislature has not conferred a power of review on the Appellate Authority can be Appellate Authority clothe itself with the said power when the appropriate legislature has denied the said power? The answer, obviously, would be in the negative. But strangely enough in this case the learned counsel who appeared before this Court for the Appellate Authority has handed over to this Court a bunch of directions known as Practice Directions framed by the Appellate Authority itself and the Court was given to understand that the same is pasted on the notice board of the Appellate Authority from Clause (f) of the said direction, it appears as follows:

"(f) Application for review and/or recalling or modification of order could only be entertained if a proper application is filed within a period of 30 days from the date of communication and/or knowledge of the order, giving reasons thereof."

16. This Court has been informed by the learned counsel for the Appellate Authority that the said Appellate Authority has entertained the application for review in the instant case on the strength of the alleged empowerment under Clause (f) of the said Practice Direction.

17. This Court has been informed by the learned counsel for the appellate Authority that the said Appellate Authority is entertaining other applications for review also on the strength of such alleged empowerment under Clause (f).

18. Mr. Manick Chandra Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Board submitted that the Appellate Authority has been constituted on the strength of the notification dated 1st March 2000 by the Government of West Bengal and from a perusal of the said notification it appears that the Appellate Authority's constitution was on the strength of Section 28 of Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Section 31 of Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and also on the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India dated 27th January 1999 in Civil Appeal Nos. 368-371 and 372 and 373 of 1989 (A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M.V. Naydu). The learned counsel submits that since the said Judgment of the Supreme Court which is also reported in AIR 1999 SC 112 was delivered while considering the provisions of National Environmental Appellate Authority Act and the Government has constituted the Appellate Authority considering the directions made in the said judgment the Appellate Authority, which is functioning under the State Act, should also have the power of review which is given to the National authority. Before examining the correctness of the said submission the Court proposes to consider various judgments on the question of power of review to be exercised by an authority created under the Statute and which is functioning as an inferior Tribunal, Reference in this connection may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported In the case of Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and Ors. . In that judgment, the learned judges of the Supreme Court was considering whether under the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, the Director Consolidation of Holding has a power to review. The learned judges after considering the statutory provision came to the conclusion that in the absence of expressed statutory power, the Director, Consolidation cannot review his previous order of dismissing the application of the petitioner under Section 42 of the Act and the learned judges held that the subsequent order of review passed by the Director is ultra vires and without jurisdiction. In coming to the said finding the learned Judges of the Supreme Court relied on various Judgments and discussed the principles in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the Judgment. Again in the same year in another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hazi Hasan Dada a three Judges Bench came to the said finding that in the absence of any express provision in the Statute the statutory authority has no power to review his decision nor is he authorized to ignore his previous order and to pass an order which is Inconsistent with his previous order.

19. The same principles have been reiterated in the case of Major Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan and Ors., and in the said judgment the previous judgment of the Supreme Court in has been relied upon.

20. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid discussion that the power of review has to be expressly conferred by the Statute In order to be exercised by a statutory authority which is acting as an inferior Tribunal and is discharging quasi-judicial functions. The power of review can never be an inherent power. This is also settled by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Patel Narshi Thakershi and Ors. v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji, .

21. In the context of the clear proposition laid down by the Supreme Court, it is difficult for this Court to accept the contention of Mr. Das that the power of review of the State Appellate Authority must be implied from the power of review given to the National Environmental Appellate Authority under express statutory provision. The power of review has to be expressly conferred or the same should appear by way of necessary implication from the language of the Statute. The same cannot be conferred by way of a side wind on the basis of certain observations which are made in a judgment in which the power of review is not even remotely discussed. All that has been stated in the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Andhra Pradesh Polution Control Board was a mere observation of the Supreme Court on the necessity of immediate Constitution of an appellate body and nothing else.

22. Mr. Roy, appearing in support of respondent No. 4, who are proprietors of respondent No. 7 cited a number of decisions.

23. Mr. Roy first cited the decision in the case of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. v. The Collector, Central Excise, . In that case, the Court considered the powers of a tribunal in setting aside the ex parte order passed in the appeal. The Court held that Rule 41 of CEGAT (Procedure Rules) does not expressly state that an order, passed in an appeal which was heard and dispose of ex parte, can be set aside on sufficient cause. But this does not mean that CEGAT has no power to do so. The learned Judges found that Rule 41 of CEGAT Rules gives wide power to the appellate authority to pass such order or to give such direction as might be necessary or expedient in relation to its orders in order to prevent the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice.

24. Rule 41 of the said Rules which was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said decision is in the following term:

"Rule 41. Orders and directions in certain cases.--The Tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect or in relation to its orders or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice."

25. In the instant case under the 1983 Rules, there is no such rule similar to Rule 41 of CEGAT Rules is in the nature of a residuary provision on the lines of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, in the context, of the said Rule 41, the observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. But, since there is no such corresponding rule under the 1983 Rules, the alleged exercise of power of review by the Appellate Authority cannot be supported on the basis of the ratio in the case of M/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd.

26. The next Judgment cited by Mr. Roy was reported in AIR 1969 SC 430 in the case of Income-Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi. In that case, the question which fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether the Appellate Tribunal has the power to grant stay under the Income-Tax Act, 1961. The learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court construing Section 254 of the Act held that such power to grant stay must be construed to have been impliedly given to the Appellate Tribunal for doing of such acts and employing such means as are essentially necessary to the exercise of its statutory power. In coming to the said conclusion, the learned Judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied on Section 254(1) of the Act which is to the following effect:

"254(1). The Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass orders thereon as it thinks fit."

27. Section 255(5) of the said Act was also considered in this connection and the same is set out below:

"255(5). Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Appellate Tribunal shall have power to regulate its own procedure and the procedure of Benches thereof in all matters arising out of the exercise of its powers or of the discharge of its functions, including the places at which the Benches shall hold their sittings."

28. From Sections 254(1) and 255(5) of the said Act, it is clear that the appellate Tribunal has been statutorily conferred to pass such order as it thinks fit and again under Section 255(5), the Appellate Tribunal has been given the power to regulate its own procedure. But, neither the 1981 Act or the 1983 Rule, the appellate Authority whose orders are impugned in this proceeding have been given such wide powers, viz. either to pass such order as it thinks fit or the power to regulate its own procedure. On the otherhand, powers of the Appellate Authority in the instant case have been statutorily prescribed giving it no scope to exercise such wide powers as are conferred on the Appellate Tribunal under the Income-tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid rendered case on a construction of different statutory provisions cannot be made applicable here.

29. Mr. Roy also cited the decision in the cases of Md. Swalleh v. The 3rd Additional District Judge, Meerut and Anr., . In that case, the landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant and the application was granted by the Commissioner and the Revision by the tenant was dismissed by the State Government. The landlord then filed a suit in the year 1972 and in the year 1973 filed an application for withdrawal of the said suit on the ground of amendment of the relevant law. The landlord wanted to file an application under the relevant provisions of the Act for enforcement of the permission given to him under Section 3 of the Old Act. In such application, the Court held that as the cause of action on which the suit was filed has become anfractuous, the suit was liable to be dismissed. After dismissal f the said suit, the landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant from the premises.

30. In that case, the tenant objected that since the previous suit had been dismissed, subsequent application was not maintainable. This objection was allowed by the Prescribed Authority. Dismissing the order of the Prescribed Authority, the Court held that even though no appeal lay from the order of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge, but, the order of the District Judge in setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority cannot be interfered with inasmuch as the District Judge rightly set aside the order. The learned Judges held that there might be some technical breaches on the part of the District Judge in setting aside the order. The apex Court Came to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority is invalid and improper and the same would have been set aside by the High Court itself. Since Justice has been done by the District Judge in setting aside the order technicality should not be allowed to prevail. In the instant case, the fact situation is totally different. Here the Appellate Authority itself sought to review its own order when it does not have that power. It is not an exercise of Jurisdiction by the District Judge, it is well-known that the District Judge is certainly a Court with all powers available to a Civil Court. Therefore, it can exercise its jurisdiction ex-debitio justifiac. But an inferior Tribunal does not have the same power. Apart from that, this Court is of the view that the order which has been allegedly reviewed was not an unjust order.

31. The last decision cited by Mr. Roy in the case of Maharaja Chintamoni Saran Nath Shahdeo v. The State of Bihar and Ors., reported in 1999 (8) SCC 60. In that case, the question which came up for consideration was the illegality of the order of the Member, Board of Revenue directing action to be taken for refund of the excess compensation. The learned Judges held that the said order was valid and proper even the Member, Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to pass the order. The order was upheld by the apex Court on the ground that if the order of the Member, Board of Revenues quashed, the same will revive an illegal order. The fact situation in this case is totally different. Here this Court does not think that after the order on review is set aside and the order of the Appellate Authority passed on the earlier occasion is revived. The same would not amount to revival of an illegal one. Therefore, the ration of the decision in Chintamoni Saran (supra) passed on facts which are completely different and are not applicable to this case.

32. It is very clear from the facts stated hereinabove that the matter came before this Court more than once and always the stand taken by the respondents before the Court is that there is pollution. From the two orders of Green Bench which have been referred to above, it is clear that purpose of the entire exercise by this Court was to arrive at a consensus in order to eliminate the pollution which is generated by the running of heavy air-conditioning machines. That is why the alternative suggestion of installation of cooling tower was made and the Green Bench of this High Court also refused to modify the said order even though it was approached by the concerned parties. Then again the Pollution Control Board by its closure order proceeded on the basis that there has been pollution and the closure order was aimed at controlling it. The Appellate Authority in both its order also proceeded on the basis that there is pollution and passed several directions and considered the matter on the basis of the reports submitted by the concerned parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no pollution and if the order of the Appellate Board dated 26th June 2001 is allowed to stand the same will bring out a grave injustice. So the factual basis of the case is totally different. And the principles decided in the cases cited by Mr. Roy are not attracted.

33. Therefore, considering the case from all its angles this Court is of the view that the respondent No. 1 acted wholly without jurisdiction in passing the order of review dated 9th October 2001. The said order is, therefore, quashed as being wholly without jurisdiction.

34. This Court also is of the opinion that in the name of Practice Directions the Appellate Authority cannot confer itself with a power to review when the statutory provisions are totally silent and no power of review has been advisedly conferred on such authority. The Practice Direction has been filed in Court by the learned counsel for the Appellate Authority and the Court has taken it on record. The Court in exercise of its inherent and plenary Jurisdiction to keep such inferior tribunal within the bounds of law is quashing Clause (f) of the said Practice Direction and forbids the appellate Authority from exercising its power of review on the basis of the said clause.

35. The other clauses of the Practice Direction have not been examined by the Court since it was not warranted in the facts of the case. Therefore, this Court does not express any opinion on those Practice Directions.

The writ application, therefore, succeeds. The Impugned order at annexure 'P-17' dated 9th October 2001 is quashed.

After this order is passed, Mr. Saptangsu Basu, appearing for the respondent No. 4 who are the proprietors of respondent No. 7 prays that the Court may direct Mr. Das's client, viz., the respondent No. 2 to implement the order dated 26th June 2001. This Court makes it clear that since the order of review has been quashed the order dated 26th June 2001 is revived and will operate on its own. It is expected that the respondent No. 2 will act in terms of the said order.

There will be no order as to costs.

Let xerox certified copies of this judgment if applied for, be given to the learned counsel for the parties at the earliest.