ORDER

1. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Limited, Sheikhupur, Budaun, challenging the assessment orders made under Section 6, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as' the Cess Act').

2. The notice dated 22-2-1986 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) is the assessment of water cess calling upon the petitioner to pay the amount mentioned therein, the total of which was Rs. 1,22,890.32 paise. The relevant details of this notice are being given below :

Current Assessment Assessment Period : from April 1978 to December 1985. In exercise of my power under S. 6, Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977, I hereby assess the amount of cess payable by you for the above period as indicated below :

Purpose for which water consumed.

Consumption of water taken for the purpose of assessment (in kilometres) Gross amount of cess assessed(in Rs.) Net amount of cess assessed and payable (in Rs.)   1 2 3 4

(a) Industrial cooling spraying in mine pits or boiler feed 2565000 19237.50 19237.50

(b) Domestic purpose 837000 8370.00 8370.00.

(c).

Processing whereby water gets polluted and the pollutants are easily bio-degradable 2917800 58356.00 58356.00

(d) Processing whereby water gets polluted and the pollutants are not easily bio-degradable and are toxic     Total 85963.50

3. The Cess amount of Rs. 85,963.50 (Rupees Eighty Five Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Three & Paise 50 only) be remitted on or before 16-3-86 in the form of Bank Draft drawn in favour of "U.P. Water Pollution Prevention and Control Board, Lucknow."

4. Over and above the amount of Rs. 85,963.50 Paise, the interest arrears claimed through the said notice was Rs. 36,926.82 Paise. Taking these two sums together, the demand made was of Rs. 1,22,890.32 Paise.

5. Annexure '2', dated 7-3-1986 is a reminder for the payment of the amount mentioned above. Thereafter, Annexures '3' and '4' were issued by the U.P. Pollution Control Board for payment of the cess arrears and the amount of cess assessed for the subsequent periods. Since for deciding the points urged, details of these notices are not necessary to be given, we are of opinion that it is not necessary to give the same in the judgment.

6. In the writ petition, the main relief sought is for quashing of the aforesaid notices on the ground that as sugar industry is not covered by the Cess Act, no cess was payable by the petitioner under the Cess Act.

7. Water Pollution-Board constituted under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, was empowered under the Cess Act to levy, assess for partly meeting the finances required for its working.

8. Before we deal with the Cess Act, it appears necessary to make a mention of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (Act No. VI of 1974). Act No. VI of 1974 was enacted with a view to provide for the prevention and control of water pollution and the maintaining or restoring of wholesomeness of water for the establishment, with a view to carry out the purposes aforesaid of Boards for the prevention and control of water pollution and for conferring and assigning to such Boards powers and functions relating thereto. Act No. VI of 1974 was made for environmental protection in general and water pollution in particular. The Cess Act was enacted after three years of Act No. VI of 1974. These constraints under which the State Boards had been functioning received the attention of the Central Government and in that view of the matter the Parliament enacted the Cess Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Cess Act would be evident from the following passage :

"However, due to pressure on the limited resources, the State Governments are not able to provide adequate funds to the State Boards for their effective functioning. It is, therefore, proposed to levy a cess....."

9. That is also indicated in the preamble to the Act reading :

"An Act to provide for the levy and collection of a cess on water consumed by persons carrying on certain industries and by local authorities, with a view to augment the resources of the Central Board and the State Boards for the prevention and control of water pollution constituted under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974."

10. Section 3 of the Cess Act is the charging section laying down that there shall be levied and collected a cess for the purposes of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, and utilisation thereunder. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Cess Act is quoted below :

"3. (2) The cess under Sub-section (1) shall be payable by --

(a) every person carrying on any specified industry; and

(b) every local authority; and shall be calculated on the basis of the water consumed by such person of local authority, as the case may be, for any of the purposes specified in column (1) of Schedule II, at such rate, not exceeding the rate specified in corresponding entry in column (2) thereof as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time, specify."

11. From a reading of the Pollution Act along with the Cess Act, it would be found that the Cess Act is dovetailed into the Pollution Act. Payment of cess is linked with the water consumed by the industrialists or the local authority for the purposes specified in Schedule II of the Act. The rate is to be specified by the Central Government. Sections 4 to 6 of the Cess Act are the machinery provisions. The measurement of the water consumed is taken by the meters installed for the purpose. Section 5 of the Act imposes an obligation on every person carrying on any specified industry and every local authority, liable to pay the cess under Section 3, to furnish returns containing such particulars as may be prescribed. Under Section 6, the officer or authority to whom such a return has been filed is entitled to make the assessment order as against the concerned person carrying on any specified industry or local authority, as the case may be, Section 11 empowers the authority to impose on a person defaulting in payment of cess. By Section 13 a right of appeal has been given to any person or local authority aggrieved by an order of assessment under Section 6 or by an order imposing penalty under Section 11.

12. As would appear from the brief narration of the Cess Act, cess is calculated on the basis of water consumed for any of the purposes specified in column (1) of Schedule II. The expression "specified industry" is defined in Section 2(c) as meaning any industry specified in Schedule I. Schedule I has given 15 industries. The last one with which we are concerned in the present case is Item No. 15. The same is "Processing of animal or vegetable products industry".

13. The submission of Sri U. S. Avasthi, learned counsel for the petitioner, was that as sugar industry is not an industry covered by Entry 15 of Schedule I, no cess is payable. According to him, sugarcane is neither a vegetable nor a vegetable product, hence sugar industry could not be said to be engaged in the processing of any vegetable products and, as such, is not covered by the Cess Act. He referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court reported in State of West Bengal v. Washi Ahmad, AIR 1977 SC 1638, Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola, AIR 1961 SC 1325, and Motipur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 660, for the proposition that the word "sugarcane" being a word of every day use must be construed not in any technical sense, not from any botanical point of view, but as understood in common parlance.

14. The question that arose in Ramavtar's case (supra) was whether betel leaves are vegetables, and the Supreme Court held that they are not included within that term. While doing so, the Supreme Court approved the observations of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Pan Merchants Association, Santra Market, Nagpur v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 7 STC 99 : (AIR 1956 Nag 54), in which it was held that the word "vegetable" could not be given the comprehensive meaning. This term has to be understood as commonly understood denoting those classes of vegetable matters which are grown in kitchen garden and are used on the table. That was a case dealing with a Taxing Statute and the Supreme Court in that view of the matter held that Taxing Statute has to be understood as in common parlance.

15. This meaning of the word vegetable was reiterated in Motipur Zamindary Co. Ltd. case, (AIR 1962 SC 660) (supra), where the Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether sugarcane could be regarded as vegetable. The Supreme Court held that sugarcane cannot be said to fall within the definition of "vegetable".

16. In State of West Bengal, (AIR 1977 SC 1638) (supra), the Supreme Court held that green ginger is included within the meaning of the word "vegetable".

17. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the petitioner's counsel, we are of the view that while finding meaning of a word, it is necessary that the legislative purpose is taken into consideration. If the purpose is ignored, the legislative intent would get lost in bewilderness.

18. Reed Dickerson in his book "The Interpretation and Application of Statutes" (1975), at page 95 has said :

"On the necessity of legislative purpose to legislative interpretation, Llewellyn has said, "If a statute is to make sense, it must be read in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule, with no purpose or objective, is nonsense. Hart and Sacks have inquired whether it is not true that "The meaning of a statute is never plain unless it fits with some intelligible purpose".

19. Another principle which has to be kept in view while interpreting Entry 15 of Schedule I is the context in which that was made. It is highly improbable that any provision, considered entirely apart from the context, can convey meaning. Reed Dickerson at page 105, while dealing with the importance of context, said "The essence of a language is to reflect, express, and perhaps even affect the conceptual matrix of established ideas and values that identifies the culture to which it belongs. For this reason, language has been called a "conceptual map of human experience." As with any map, it has little or no significance apart from what it mirrors."

20. It has been said by some one that words are partly known by their backgrounds, their past, like men, and like men they do not have their full significance when standing alone, but are known by the company they keep. Full effect of the word is felt only when the context in which it has occurred is not ignored.

21. In M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107 at p. 1111, the Supreme Court said that the Courts strongly lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute must be construed in a manner which makes it effective and operative on the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (See CIT v. Sardar Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352).

22. Lord Denning dealing with this aspect of the matter in Fawcett Properties v. Buckingham County Council, (1960) 3 All ER 503, observed :

"But when a statute has some meaning even though it is obscure, or several meanings even though it is little to choose between them, the Courts have to say what meaning the statute to bear, rather than reject it as a nullity."

23. Cross in his book on Statutory Interpretation, at p. 74, dealing with the rule of interpretation quoted the observations of Lord Reid's speech in Pinner v. Everett, (1969) 3 All ER 257 thus :

"In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to ask always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute. It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be "supposed to have been the intention of the legislature that it is proper to look for some other permissible meaning of the word or phrase."

24. From what we have said above, it follows that if the meaning of the word sought to be given stultifies the purpose of the statute, or produces absurdity or contradiction, in that event the Court must take into account the purpose and the context of the provisions of the Act while interpreting the same.

25. In the instant case, as to what is the meaning of the word "vegetable", one has to keep into consideration the object for which the Cess Act was made. We have not only to consider the Cess Act, but also the Pollution Act. Pollution, from a legal standpoint generally speaking is the wrongful contamination of the atmosphere, or of water, or of soil, to the material injury of the right of an individual. Pollution of waters has been Said to mean their impregnation with refuse or noxious substances. Man cannot exist without water. Procuring unpolluted supply of water to sustain life has become a national problem. There are several reasons which lead to pollution of water. It can be the discharge of effluents by commercial establishments and industries. In fact, industries are major source of water pollution.

26. In order to meet the abnormal situation that the Pollution Act, 1974, was enacted. The object of the Act enumerated is to provide for the prevention and control of water pollution and the maintaining or restoring of wholesomeness of water. The Pollution Act provides for constitution of State Boards. Under the Pollution Act, the Board is empowered to take measures necessary for preventing the deterioration of water. Sections 20 to 27 of Chapter V of the Pollution Act deal with the powers conferred on the Board. Under Section 17(l)(j), Pollution Act, one of the important functions of the Board is :

"to evolve efficient methods of disposal of sewage and trade effluents on land, as are necessary on account of the predominant conditions of scant stream flows that do not provide for major part of the year the minimum degree of dilution."

27. Section 24 contains a prohibition on use of stream or well for disposal of polluting matter.

28. For meeting all these multifarious activities conferred on the Board, it is necessary that it must have sufficient finances at its disposal without which it cannot serve the purposes for which it was constituted. For this purpose, as already noted above, the Cess Act was made. Since we have already mentioned some of the relevant provisions of the Cess Act, it is not necessary to refer to them again.

29. Sugar industry is one of the main sources of causing water pollution. Under the Pollution Act, its activities can be controlled and guided. Consequently, the Parliament thought of providing a provision in the Cess Act which levies cess on the water consumed by an industry engaged for the purposes specified in column (1) of Schedule II. The Parliament could not have specifically dealt with each industry separately, and it was for this reason that the industries falling under one category were lumped up together for the purposes of covering them under Schedule I. If we were to examine the Schedule, we will find it to be so established by finding that each particular industry is not named therein. The industries in Schedule I have been broadly mentioned. These entries would apply to the industries falling in one or the other entry of Schedule I irrespective of the fact that by name it is not so described.

30. Interpreting Entry 15, we have to keep in mind the words used therein which are "processing animal, vegetable products". The word "vegetable" has been used in opposition to the expression "animal". This word cannot be given the meaning of vegetables which are kept on the dining tables for dinner purposes. It has a wider amplitude. Sugarcane, in our opinion, would be covered by this entry inasmuch as the expression vegetable has been used in a comprehensive sense. In Words and Phrases, Vol. 44, it has been said :

"In the comprehensive sense, any living organisms not possessed of animal life; a plant of any kind. A plant, specifically, in common usage, a herbaceous plant cultivated for food, as the cabbage, turnip, potato, bean, etc. also the edible part or parts of such plants, as prepared for market or table."

"A living organism belonging to the vegetable kingdom or the lower of the two series of organic being a growth, devoid of animal life; a plant in the widest or scientific sense. A plant cultivated for food, especially an edible herb or root used for human consumption and commonly eaten, either cooked or raw."

31. Another clue which is important to find the comprehensive nature of the use of the word "vegetable" in Entry 15 is that this expression is used as opposed to animal.

32. We, in the circumstances of the present case, reading the relevant provisions, find that any person carrying on the sugar manufacturing industry would be covered by Entry 15.

33. The decisions relied upon by the petitioner's counsel have no relevance to the controversy in question inasmuch as the points arising therein were in a different context.

34. For what we have said above, we do not find any merit in this writ petition and reject the same summarily.

35. Since no substantial question of law of general importance needing to be decided by the Supreme Court arises in this case, the oral prayer for leave to Supreme Court is refused.