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           IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
                   DHARWAD BENCH

             ON THE 16TH DAY OF APRIL, 2018

                        BEFORE

      THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA

           CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.100190 OF 2016

BETWEEN

THE KARNATAKA STATE POLLUTION
CONTROL BOARD
REPRESENTED BY
ITS REGIONAL OFFICER,
(DAVANAGERE)
                                             ... APPELLANT

(BY SRI. GURUDEV I. GACHCHINAMATH, ADV.)


AND

1.    GWALIOR RAYOK SILK MANUFACUTRE,
      RING (WEAVING) COMPANY LTD.,
      A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER THE
      GWALIOR COMPANY'S ACT AND
      HAVING ITS REGIONAL OFFICE AT NAGDA,
      MADHYAPRADESH AND HAVING ITS
      ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE AT
      KUMARAPATTANAM,
      RANEBENNUR,
      REPRESENTED BY ITS
      EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT,
      GRASIM IINDUSTRIES
      (GRASILENCE DIVISION),
      KUMARAPATTANAM PIN-581123.
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2.   SHRI.SHAILENDRA K. JAIN,
     EXECUTIVE PRESIDENT,
     GRASIM INDUSTRIES LTD.,
     (GRASILENCE DIVISION)
     KUMARAPATTANAM-581123.
     RANEBENNUR,
     DIST: HAVERI.
                                           ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. GANGADHAR S. HOSAKERI, ADV. FOR R1,
R2 SERVED)


     THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 378(4)

OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PRAYING TO SET

ASIDE THE IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT MADE IN CRIMINAL CASE

NO.725   OF   1990   DATED   31.07.2015   PASSED   BY   THE

ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE AND II ADDITIONAL JUDICIAL

MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS, RANEBENNUR AND CONVICT THE

ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 24

READ WITH SECTIONS 43, 25(1), 26 AND 25(4) READ WITH

SECTION 44 OF WATER (PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF

POLLUTION) ACT.


     THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS

DAY, THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
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                        JUDGMENT

This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 31.07.2015 passed by the Additional Civil Judge and II Additional JMFC, Ranebennur, whereby the learned Magistrate has acquitted the respondents - accused of the offences punishable under Sections 43 and 44 of Karnataka Water Pollution and Control Act, 1974.

2. The case of the prosecution is that accused No.1 is a company incorporated under Gwalior Company's Act, within the meaning of Company under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. Accused No.2 is the Executive President, who managed the entire affairs of the above units. Since 31.12.1989, the accused have been discharging effluents into the river Tungabhadra without consent, in violation of the provisions of Section 25(1) read with Section 26 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. Further, by discharging trade effluents in excess of tolerance limits, the accused have violated Section 25(4) of the Act, rendering them :4: liable for conviction under Sections 43 and 44 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.

3. Before the Trial Court, accused denied the charges and claimed trial. The complainant examined the Executive Engineer of Pollution Control Board as P.W.1 and produced in evidence 27 documents. However, he did not tender himself for cross-examination. In paragraph 15 of the impugned judgment, the learned trial Judge has noted that the evidence of P.W.1 cannot be looked into.

4. The prosecution has not examined any other witness other than P.W.1, in proof of the allegations levelled against the accused or in proof of the documents produced by it. As the evidence of P.W.1 stands eschewed from record, there is absolutely no material whatsoever to substantiate the offences charged against the accused. If for any reason, P.W.1 was not in a position to appear before the Court for the purpose of cross-examination, the complainant could have examined any other officials or :5: could have examined the authors of the documents sought to be produced in evidence. The impugned judgment reveals that the complainant did not even seek for an opportunity to examine any other witness which indicates total negligence and carelessness on the part of the officers of the complainant in conducting the case. In the absence of any evidence, the Courts are handicapped to record any finding either in respect of the allegations made against the accused or with regard to the documents relied on by the prosecution.

5. The complainant having failed to substantiate the charges by producing any evidence, much less any cogent evidence, the Trial Court was justified in acquitting the accused. Though the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the accused did not obtain the requisite consent from 31.12.1989 onwards which itself is an offence, yet in the absence of any material to this effect and the said circumstance having not been put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., :6: solely on the basis of the oral submission of the learned counsel, the impugned judgment cannot be reversed.

6. I do not find any merit in the contentions urged in the memorandum of appeal. The appellant having failed to adduce any evidence in support of the charges levelled against the accused, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

In view of the said order, I.A. No.1/2017 and I.A. No.2/2017 do not survive for consideration and the same are dismissed.

Sd/-

JUDGE Rsh