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ORDER RESERVED ON :10.07.2017
ORDER DELIVERED ON:14.07.2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 14.07.2017
CORAM :
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.SURESH KUMAR
Crl.R.C.No.1307 of 2015 and
M.P.No.1 of 2015 and Crl.M.P.No.1771 of 2017
M/s.Sukumar Coir Industries (P) Ltd.,
Represented by its Managing Director, Mr.S.Kannan
Hanuman Palli Road,
Palayapalayam,
Murungathuzahvu Village,
Perumdurai Taluk, Erode District. .. Petitioner
Vs.
1.Revenue Divisional Officer-cum-
Sub-Divisional Magistrate,
Erode, Erode District.
2. District Environmental Engineer
Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board,
First Floor,V.R.V.Complex,
167, Bhavani Road, Perundurai-638 052.
3. Coir Board
Ministry of Micro Small and Medium
Enterprises, Government of India
Rep. by its Secretary Coir House
MG Road, Kochi 682 016.
(impleaded as per the order dt 19.1.16
in Crl.M.P.No.467/16 in Crl.O.P.No.1307/15)
4. P.Viswanathan
5. R.Chokkalingam
6. P.Krishnamurthy
7. C.Gopalakrishnamurthy
8. P.K.Subramani
9. C.Ramasamy
10. T.Periyasamy
11. K.Mohanasundaram
12. K.Velusamy
13. J.Periyasamy
(impleaded as per the order of this Court
in Crl.M.P.No.1222/16 in Crl.R.C.No.1307/15) ... Respondents
Petition filed under Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C to set aside the order of the 1st respondent dated 07.12.2015 in Na.Ka.No.1822/2015/A2.
For Petitioner : Mr.Muralikumaran for
M/s.Mc. Gan Law Firm
For R1 : Mr.R.Sekar, G.A (Crl side)
For R2 : Mrs. Rita Chandrasekaran
For R3 : Mr. J.Madanagopal Rao
For R4 to R13 : Mr.N.Manokaran
O R D E R
This criminal revision case has been filed challenging the order made in Na.Ka.No.1822/2015/A2 dated 07.12.2015 of the Revenue Divisional Officer / Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed under Section 138(2) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. (in short, 'the Code').
2. The following facts are required to be noticed for disposal of the present revision case:
(i) That the petitioner is running a Coir Industry under the name and style of M/s. Sukumar Coir Industries Private Limited at S.No.381/3, 4, 7,8 and 9 at Anumanpalli road, Palayapalayam, Murungathuzahvu Village, Perundurai Taluk, Erode District.
(ii) The petitioner is manufacturing coir items by using the coconut husks. The said industry had been functioning for more than 7 years at the said address. Whileso, some of the village people of that village, namely, Murungathuzahvu Village, seems to have given a complaint to the District Collector, alleging that, by running the said Industry, the petitioner was manufacturing coir by using coconut husks, in that process there was lot of storage of coconut husks in a larger extent in the village for months together. During the rainy season, rain water get mixed up with coconut husks, with the result, so much of effluent, coming out of the storage point would mix up with the stream water and other drinking water sources. Due to the influence of the said effluent, the water sources like well, tank and other sources get contaminated, where the Ph level would be alarmingly high. Also the water becomes harder and chloride values exceed the permissible limit and the water becomes bacteriologically contaminated.
(iii) That apart, it was also the complaints of the village people that because of large quantities of husks being stored for the said industrial purpose, the air becomes polluted with the result, it leads to so many respiratory / lung related diseases to the village people. Therefore, the said complaint is said to have been given by the village people to the District Collector for taking appropriate action to close down the industry run by the petitioner.
(iv) On receipt of the said complaints from the village people who are represented by respondents 4 to 13, the Collector seems to have referred the matter to the RDO for appropriate enquiry and decision there on. Pursuant to which, the concerned Zonal Deputy Tahsildar was directed to have a spot enquiry and to file a report. Accordingly, the Tahsildar have filed a report after spot enquiry and inspection.
(v) Based on the report submitted by the Tahsildar, the first respondent / Sub-Divisional Magistrate seems to have given notices to the petitioner to appear before him, under Section 133 of the Code. Pursuant to the said notices, the petitioner, i.e., one Mr. Kannan, the Managing Director of the petitioner industry, did appear before the first respondent and had given a detailed explanation as to how the industry is being run.
(vi) In the said explanation, the petitioner appears to have given his defence that the industry run by him is agro based industry and for the purpose of coir production, the coconut husks in large quantities are being used. Even the coconut husks which are stored for the purpose, for some months together, would no way endanger to the general public by way of either air pollution or water contamination.
(vii) The petitioner's further explanation before the first respondent is that, since the said industry run by the petitioner comes under the category of Green industries, as categorised by the second respondent / Pollution Control Board, the industry did not get any consent from them.
(viii) Insofar as the query raised as to whether any effluent is being let off from the petitioner industry and if so whether any treatment is made before it is discharged to any water course, it was defended by the petitioner that first of all, there is no such situation of letting off any water effluent and even assuming that if anything is discharged and for that purpose if effluent treatment plant has to be installed, the same, since has not been directed to be installed, by the third respondent / Pollution Control Board and only recently they have instructed to do, the same would be complied with shortly.
(ix) After having heard the respective parties, the first respondent / Executive Magistrate, invoking Section 138(2) of the Code, has passed an order dated 07.12.2015. By the said order, the first respondent has directed the petitioner, not to run the machines attached with the industry, till the petitioner industry gets the necessary consent from the second respondent Pollution Control Board.
(x) Assailing the said order of the first respondent dated 07.12.2015, the present revision has been filed seeking to set aside the said order.
3. Mr. Muralikumaran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has made the following submissions:
(i) That the coir industry of the petitioner since was categorised as a green industry, there was no necessity to erect any effluent treatment plant, as, according to him, there was no scope of any discharge of effluent from the petitioner's factory.
(ii) The learned counsel would further submit that, though the said industry was categorized as Green industry, subsequently, by virtue of the order dated 02.08.2016 issued by the second respondent Board in B.P.No.06, the said industry of the petitioner, i.e., coir industry has been categorized as one of the White industry.
(iii) In this regard, Mr.Muralikumaran, drew the attention of this Court in the said proceedings of the second respondent dated 02.08.2016 and he very much relied upon the following part of the said order, which are reproduced hereunder:
Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board vide B.P.No.34 dated 5.10.2012 issued the list of industries which are classified as Red, Orange and Green Category Industries as per the directions issued by the Central Pollution Control Board on 04.06.2012. Subsequently, in 2013, the Board vide B.P.No. 37 dated 1.6.2013 has issued a revised list with the addition of left-out industries.
Now the CPCB vide letter No. B-29012/ESS(CPA)/2015-1, dated 7.3.2016 has issued direction to all the Chairman, State Pollution Control Boards / Pollution Control Committees under the section 18(1) (b) of the Water (P&CP) Act, 1974 and under the Air (P&CP) Act, 1981 regarding harmonization of classification of industrial sectors under Red / Orange / Green / White Categories. In the directions the CPCB has mentioned interalia as follows:- ..................................................................
Based on the directions of CPCB, the TNPCB has instructed all the District Environmental Engineers to fit in the industries in their jurisdiction. They were also instructed to give score and classify the industries which are not covered in the CPCB list and to send a complete list to the Board. Accordingly, they furnished the list. The list was scrutinized by the Committee comprising of Seniors Engineers of the Board headed by the Member Secretary. The Committee has classified 14 types of industries under Red, Orange and Green based on scoring. The final list is given in the Annexure.
In view of the above and in order to comply with the directions of the CPCB issued under Section 18(1)(b) of the Water (P&CP) Act, 1974 and under Section 18(1)(b) of the Air (P&CP) Act, 1981, the list was placed before the Board for approval. Further, it was also placed before the Board to authorize the Chairman, TNPCB to issue orders for addition of any new or left-over industrial sector and their categorization which is not in the revised list of Red, Orange, Green and White Industrial sectors, on getting the recommendation from the committee headed by the Member Secretary. The Miscellaneous Category of industries will be reviewed by the Committee on frequent interval.
The Board vide resolution No. CA/BM/09/2016 dated 29.7.2016, resolved to approve the proposal for revised categorization of industries (list enclosed) in view of directions dated 7.3.2016, issued by the Central Pollution Control Board under Section 18(1)(b) of the Water (P&CP) Act, 1974 and the Air (P&CP) Act, 1981. The Board also resolved to authorize the Chairman, TNPCB to issue orders for addition of any new or left-over industrial sector and their categorization which is not in the revised list of Red, Orange, Green and White industrial sectors, on getting the recommendation from the committee headed by the Member Secretary and that the Miscellaneous type of industries shall be reviewed by the Committee frequently to fit the industries in the respective type.
List of Red, Orange, Green and White category industries as per CPCB Directions
1. Red Category Industries- 85 Nos.
.................................................
2. Orange Category Industries 97 Nos.
........................................................
3. Green Category Industries 68 Nos .......................................................
4. White Category Industries-36 Nos.
1.................................................
...................................................
Sl.No Tyoe code Category Industry sector Types Ref 23 4023 White Manufacturing of coir items from coconut husks ...................................................
...................................................
(iv) By relying upon the said notification issued by the second respondent, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that altleast from 02.08.2016, the petitioner industry has been categorized as White industry. In view of the said categorisation, the petitioner industry need not get any consent from the second respondent board. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that, inview of the categorisation under which the petitioner industry since has been completely exempted from taking any consent from the second respondent Board, the question of getting any further consent from the said Board does not arise atleast from 2.8.2016.
(v) He would further submit that though the impugned order was passed by the first respondent on 07.12.2015 which is well before the categorization came into being, by virtue of such categorization from 02.8.2016, the condition imposed in the operative portion of the impugned order passed by the first respondent would either become superfluous or become infructuous. Therefore, the petitioner need not be driven to approach the second respondent Board to get any consent, as has been directed by the first respondent, through the impugned order, and therefore, the learned counsel would submit that, the prohibitive direction issued by the first respondent under the order impugned would also go.
(vi) Mr. Muralikumaran also made a submission that, under the Code, in case of any public nuisance is noticed, either by way of receiving any report from police or through other information by the Executive Magistrate, he can proceed with under Section 133 of the Code. In this regard, the learned counsel would submit that on prima facie consideration, if the Executive Magistrate, on taking such evidence as he thinks fit, considers any likelihood of health hazard by the activity of the person against whom such information or complaint is received, he can make a conditional order or if any objection comes for such conditional order, he can issue a show cause notice asking to show cause why such conditional order should not be made absolute.
(vii) The learned counsel would further submit that only after exhausting the procedure established under the provisions from 133 to 137 of the Code, the final order can be passed by the Executive Magistrate under Section 138(2) of the Code making the absolute order already passed with or without modification.
(viii) In this regard, the learned counsel would also submit that, here in the case on hand, no such procedure as contemplated under various provisions of the Code, as referred to above, has been strictly followed by the first respondent.
(ix) In fact, the first respondent without passing an interim order under Section 133(1) has straightaway passed final order under Section 138(2) of the Code, which, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, is against the said provisions of the Code itself and therefore, on that ground also, the learned counsel would submit that, the impugned order is vitiated and therefore, is liable to be set aside.
4. After filing this revision, the contesting respondents i.e., R4 to R13, have been impleaded as party respondents in this revision case. On behalf of these private contesting respondents, who are the complainants, who made the complaint initially against the petitioner industry that it causes air pollution as well as water pollution in the village and near by locality with the result it became a public nuisance, has been represented by the learned counsel Mr. Manokaran, who has also been heard.
5. Mr.Manokaran appearing for the contesting private respondents has drawn the attention of this Court in various correspondences between the contesting respondents and the Revenue authorities i.e., Collector of the District, the first respondent, the Pollution Control Board, the second respondent etc.
6. The learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the test report submitted by the Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board dated 24.8.2015. According to the said report, the water is chemically not potable due to TDS, total Hardness, Iron and chloride values exceeding the permissible limit.
7. The learned counsel also refers to the notice issued by the first respondent to these private respondents before the enquiry to be conducted by him under the proceedings initiated by him under Section 133 of the Code.
8. The learned counsel would also rely upon the order passed by the National Green Tribunal, South Zone in Application No. 114 of 2015 dated 03.02.2016. The said case is related to yet another similar coconut coir industry, where, after taking into consideration of the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent / Pollution Control Board in a related proceedings in W.P.No.21327 of 2015 which was pending at that time before this court, the Tribunal has made the following observations which can be usefully referred to hereunder:
8. Before parting with the case, we have to mention about the report filed by the Board in the Hon'ble High Court in W.P.No.21327 of 2015 in respect of the activities of the 4th respondent and also the corrective measures. In fact, the Board has imposed the following conditions to be followed by the 4th respondent unit:
i. The unit shall comply the orders of the Hon'ble High Court in W.P.No.21327 of 2015 and order of Hon'ble NGT (Southern Bench), Chennai in Application No.114 of 2015 ii. The unit shall not commission the unit without consent to operate from the Board.
iii. The unit shall not use water in the process at any stage as assured iv. The unit shall cover the drying of coir pith with adequate tarpaulins during rains and shall provide adequate collection tank for the open concrete year if any water collected in the drying yard during raining and shall be used for gardening after satisfying the standards prescribed by the Board v. The unit shall comply the emission and Ambient Air Quality standards prescribed by the Board vi. The unit shall cover all the conveyors at top and provide closed collection system with impervious floor for the final coir pith reject from the screener so as to avoid dust emission vii. The unit shall use the open concrete yard only for the drying of coir pith block manufacturing process without water spraying method viii. The unit shall ensure that approach road within the premises shall be either concrete or laid with bitumen.
ix. The unit shall not dry coconut fibre on the roads and along the banks of LBP canal x. The unit shall obtain all statutory clearance from competent authorities We make it clear that while considering the application for consent' the Board has to adhere to the above said conditions and shall impose any other conditions which are deemed fit and proper.
9. Thereafter, the learned counsel would submit that, the said writ petition i.e., W.P.No.21327 of 2015 was finally disposed by this Court, by order dated 11.2.2016. In the said Judgment, the learned Judge of this Court after having taken note of the said conditions likely to be imposed on the said industry, as has been quoted by the Green Tribunal, in the order referred to above, has give the following direction:
Therefore, in the light of the direction issued by NGT, it is open to the seventh respondent / Pollution Control Board to proceed further in the matter. If necessary, on their authorisation, the petitioner would be permitted to approach the Electricity Board for any temporary electricity supply without any opinion of the Pollution Control Board, which is required for assessment of application for grant of consent for establishment of Industry, as and when applied for by the petitioner/fourth respondent.
9. In the light of the above direction, the Writ Petition is disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.
10. By relying on these said proceedings as well as communications, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents would argue that the respondent Board since has imposed a number of conditions to be complied with by the industry like the one run by the petitioner, admittedly without complying the said conditions, if the petitioner industry is permitted to run, that will not only harm the public at large residing in the locality but also will run contra to the decisions of this Court as well as the Green Tribunal, in the orders referred to above. In this regard, the learned counsel would submit that, since the petitioner industry also is of the similar nature as it is also a coir industry by making use of coconut husks, all conditions imposed by the second respondent board to other similarly placed industries should also be imposed against the petitioner industry and unless and until the same is complied with in toto, the second respondent should not permit the petitioner industry to run.
11. Therefore, the learned counsel would submit that in view of the said position, the impugned order, though was given by the Executive Magistrate i.e., the first respondent invoking the provisions of Section 133 as well as 138 of the Code, would have a bearing and therefore, he would submit that the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that merely because the industry of the petitioner being categorized as White industry, it cannot be subjected to any controlling measures to be made by the second respondent Board, cannot be countenanced.
12. I have also heard the learned Government Advocate appearing for the first respondent, who also stoutly defend the sustainability of the order impugned, passed by the first respondent.
13. Mrs. Rita Chandrasekaran, the learned counsel for the second respondent / Pollution Control Board has submitted that though originally the petitioner industry was categorized as Green industry subsequently, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, this industry was categorized as White industry from the notification issued by the second respondent in B.P.No.06 dated 02.08.2016. By virtue of such notification, the petitioner industry cannot be subjected to the strict controlling measures of the second respondent Board. However, Mrs. Chandrasekaran further added that though the petitioner industry has become a White industry and because of that, it does require a consent to be given by the Pollution Control Board, it cannot be said that the industry can escape from the clutches of Pollution Control Laws and also the active monitoring of the second respondent Board.
14. In this regard, the learned counsel for the Board has produced an inspection report in respect of some other industry of similar nature, dated 10.4.2017.
15. According to the said inspection report, the said industry covered under the report, since was already directed to comply with the conditions imposed against them by the Board, was inspected and it was verified that whether those conditions imposed by the Board was complied with by the said industry or not. In this regard, the learned counsel for the Board would submit that a similar condition can also be imposed against the petitioner industry as the petitioner industry is also similarly placed as the White industry and once those conditions to be imposed by the Board is fully complied with by the industry, then there can be no further impediment for the petitioner industry to commence its production, which has already been stopped by the orders of the first respondent, which is impugned herein.
16. In this regard, Mrs.Chandrasekaran also would submit that though consent is not required to be obtained by the petitioner industry because of its categorization, the compliance of other conditions to be imposed on them as that of any other similarly placed industries have to be necessarily complied with and in this regard, the Board certainly will have its role to monitor, oversee and control the petitioner industry within the meaning of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as Water Act and Air Act respectively).
17. I have also heard the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent / Coir Board.
18. The learned counsel appearing for the third respondent would state that the petitioner industry has already been registered with the third respondent Board and the registration certificate for three years period covering from 15.10.2014 till 14.10.2017 has been issued by the third respondent on 15.10.2014 itself. The said certificate since has been filed by the petitioner before this Court, the same is extracted hereunder:
Sub:- Registration of your unit with Coir Board Reg.
With reference to the above subject, I am sending herewith the Registration Certificate in respect of your unit bearing No.CB/ROP/1E/TN/2819 dated 15.10.2014 is valid up to 14.10.2017 for three years. Please acknowledge the receipt of the Registration Certificate Book.
19. I have considered all the said rival submissions made by the learned respective counsel appearing for the parties and have carefully considered the materials placed before this Court for its perusal.
20. The petitioner counsel has raised a ground that the first respondent / Executive Magistrate without passing an interim order under Section 133(1) of the Code, has straightaway passed final order under Section 138(2) of the Code, which according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, is unlawful and therefore, on the said ground, the impugned order is vitiated. The law is well settled in this regard as the Executive Magistrate, on evidence, if he thinks fit, that an interim order has to be passed to prevent immediate obstruction or physical discomfort or injurious to health to the public by virtue of any activity of trade or occupation construction or any like activity, he can pass an interim order by way of a conditional order requiring the person causing such obstruction or nuisance or carrying such trade or occupation to remove such obstruction or nuisance or to desist from carrying on any such trade or occupation.
21. At the same time, if the person against whom such an interim or conditional order is to be passed, objects for such order, the Executive Magistrate can issue a notice of show cause asking to show cause from the person against whom such a notice is issued as to why such a conditional order should not be made absolute.
22. Here in the case in hand, initiating proceedings under Section 133(1), the first respondent / Executive Magistrate has issued a notice and thereafter, an enquiry was conducted before which the Tahsildar concerned has been directed to have a spot inspection and to file a report and thereafter, both the petitioner as well as the complainants were, on notice, had been heard and ultimately, on considering the materials placed before him and on satisfaction of such materials, the first respondent has passed an order invoking Section 138(2) of the Code.
23. If we see the language used in the said provisions, namely, 133 and 138 of the Code, it cannot be said that the Executive Magistrate shall not pass an absolute order under Section 138(2) of the Code without passing a formal conditional order under Section 133(1). In support of this analogy, a reported decision of the Full Bench of this Court in 2016(4)CTC 12 in the matter of A.Dhaveethu Vs. The District Collector, Sivangangai District and others can be usefully referred to.
24. In the said Judgment, the analogous provision of Section 145(1) and 145(4) was taken into consideration in the context, as to whether the Executive Magistrate can pass a final order without passing a preliminary order, and in such case whether it makes the final order irregular or illegal.
25. After analysing the issue in depth, a Full Bench of this Court has answered the question in the following terms and in this regard paragraph 63 of the Judgment is reproduced hereunder:
63. In the light of the above discussion, we answer the questions posed by the learned Judge as follows:
1. Though the Executive Magistrate is required to pass a Preliminary Order under Section 145(1), the absence of the same will not vitiate his Final Order under Section 145(4) of the Code.
2. The failure of an Executive Magistrate to pass a Preliminary Order under Section 145(1) of the Code is a mere irregularity and will not affect his jurisdiction
3. Considering the nature of power vested on the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code, no prejuduce will be caused to parties.
4. The aggrieved parties are empowered to move the very same Authority for reviewing his decision or in its absence, move the Competent Civil Court for an appropriate relief either regarding the title or regarding the right to possession. In rare cases, they can move this Court for a judicial Review either under Section 397 of the Code or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
26. Inview of the said legal proposition and if the said principle is applied to the facts of the present case, I am of the considered view, that the first respondent's order, which is impugned herein, cannot be vitiated, merely because, he has passed a final absolute order under Section 138(2) of the Code without passing a conditional interim order under Section 133(1). Therefore, the first objection / ground raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner assailing the order impugned herein, is rejected.
27. The other aspect of the impugned order is, whether the direction issued by the first respondent in the operative portion of the impugned order would be sustained or not, in the teeth of the powers vested in the second respondent Board, both under Water Act and Air Act as well as the Regulations and various proceedings issued by the Board of the second respondent from time to time.
28. In this context, in fact Mr.Manokaran has relied upon the following Judgments to substantiate the proposition that no special law can take away the power of the Executive Magistrate which is to be exercisable under Section 133 of the Code. The following Judgments were cited before this Court by Mr. Manokaran:
(i) (1980) 4 SCC 162 in Municipal Council, Ratlam Vs. Shri. Vardichan and others.
(ii) (2003) 7 SCC 389 in State of M.P. Vs. Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd., and others.
29. Insofar as the proposition held in the said two judgments cited by the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, there can be no quarrel that those principles are well settled and in view of the decision proposed to be taken in this revision, I deem that those issues need not be dwelt into, at this juncture.
30. As far as the sustainability of the impugned order is concerned, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, since his industry has been categorized as White industry, for which no consent is required to be obtained from the second respondent, the direction issued by the first respondent in the operative portion of the impugned order, is completely vitiated or superfluous. The said argument cannot be accepted for the simple reason that, at the time of passing the impugned order, the petitioner industry was not categorized as White industry. The said categorization has come only from 02.08.2016. Well before such categorization, since the impugned order was passed, the first respondent had no occasion to consider, as to whether or not the petitioner industry is required to be directed to get consent from the Board.
31. Assuming that, subsequently, since the industry has been categorized as White industry, the said directive therefore, becomes superfluous, and the said proposition also, though appears to be appealing, cannot be accepted in toto.
32. The reason being that, in the impugned order, the first respondent has passed the following order in the operative portion as extracted here under:
nkw;go RFkhh; fhah; bjhHpw;rhiy nkw;go ,lj;jpy; vt;tpj mDkjpa[k; ,d;wpa[k;. Rj;jpfhpg;g[ bra;J fHptpePhpid btspnaw;Wtjw;F chpa Vw;ghLfs; VJk; bra;ahky; ,a';Ftjhy; ,g;gFjpapy; epyj;jo ePh; khR Vw;gLk; vd;w mr;rj;ij mg;gFjpthH; kf;fspilna Vw;gLj;jpa[s;shh;/ khRf;fl;Lg;ghl;L thhpaj;jpd; mwpf;if. ,e;neh;t[f;fhf mikf;fg;gl;l FGtpd; ghpe;Jiuapida[k; ghprPyidf;F vLj;Jf; bfhz;L. jy Ma;t[ nkw;bfhz;L tlfpHf;F gUt kiH jPtuk; mile;Js;sija[k; fUj;jpy; bfhz;L nkw;go bjhHpw;rhiyapd; ,t;thwhd eltof;ifapid mtruk; fUjp epWj;jp it;f ntz;oaJ mtrpakhdJ vd;gjpy; csepiwtilfpnwd;/ bgUe;Jiw tl;lk; KU';fj;bjhGt[ fpuhkk;. hP/r/381-2.3. 453. 382-9.8.3.4 fhiyfspy; bray;gl;L tUk; jp-s;/RFkhh; fhah;!; bjhHpw;rhiyapy; bray;ghLfs; Fwpj;J Fw;wtpay; eilKiw rl;lk; gphpt[ 133(1) (M)d; fPH; mwptpg;g[ bra;J tprhuiz nkw;bfhs;sg;gl;L nkw;go chpikahsUf;F tha;g;g[fs; tH';fpa[k;. nkw;go bjhHpw;rhiyf;F chpa mDkjpa'k;. bjhHpw;rhiyapypUe;J btspnaWk; nj';fha;ehh; fHpt[ ePhpid Rj;jpfhpg;g[ bra;a nghjpa Vw;ghLfs; VJk; bra;ag;gltpy;iy vd;gjhy; mjd; chpikahsh; jpU/fz;zd; vd;gth; nkw;go bjhHpw;rhiyapd; bray;ghLfis jkpH;ehL khRf;fl;Lg;ghl;L thhpaj;jplk; chpa mDkjp bgWk; tiu ,ae;jpu';fspd; bray;ghl;il kl;Lk; Fw;wtpay; eilKiw rl;lk; gphpt[ 138(2)d; fPH; jw;fhypfkhf epWj;jp itj;Jbfhs;s cj;jutplg;gLfpwJ/
33. Considering the facts and circumstances, the first respondent has only directed the petitioner industry not to run the machineries till it gets proper consent from the second respondent Board. Therefore, the effect of the impugned order is that if the petitioner once get consent from the second respondent Board, the order passed by the first respondent under Section 138(2) of the Code, which is impugned herein, would automatically be vanished.
34. In this context, the submissions made by the learned standing counsel Mrs. Rita Chandrasekaran appearing for the second respondent Board, can very well be taken. From the submissions of the learned standing counsel, it becomes obvious that though the petitioner industry has been categorized as White industry and by virtue of that, it does not require to get consent from the second respondent Board, the entire monitoring of the said industry, by the second respondent Board, by ipso facto, is not taken away, from the purview of the second respondent Board.
35. In this context, the learned standing counsel has already produced a set of conditions imposed against similar coir industry, of course, the same was taken on record both by the Green Tribunal as well as the learned Judge of this Court, in a writ petition referred above.
36. As per the copy of the inspection report submitted by the standing counsel of the second respondent, the said industry, against whom such conditions were imposed and directive was issued by this Court in the said writ petition, had infact been inspected, and only based on the complete compliance of the said conditions, imposed on the said industry, the clearance would be given by the second respondent Board. The said clearance need not be necessarily to be a consent.
37. Therefore, the petitioner industry, which is also a similar industry making coir out of the coconut husks, is liable to be imposed similar conditions by the second respondent Board. If such conditions are imposed against them, it is for the petitioner industry to satisfy those conditions and once such conditions are complied with by the petitioner industry, it is open to the second respondent Board to clear the petitioner industry to start with the production.
38. If these combersome processes between the petitioner industry and the second respondent Board is completed and once the second respondent Board is satisfied with the compliance of such conditions imposed against the petitioner, then certainly, there would be no impediment for the petitioner industry to run. If such stage is reached, as I said already, the operative portion of the impugned order, which only restricts the petitioner industry to stop running the machineries till they get the consent from the second respondent Board, would automatically get vanished.
39. For all these reasons and discussions made above, I am inclined to pass the following order in this revision case:
(i) The impugned order is sustainable;
(ii) Since the petitioner industry, being a coir industry, has been categorized and declared to be a White industry as per the second respondent Board proceedings in BP.No.06 dated 02.08.2016, it does not require to get any consent from the second respondent Board;
(iii) However, the petitioner industry shall submit to the second respondent Board for all other monitoring purposes and in this regard, it is open to the second respondent to impose any conditions, which are imposable to any such category of industry, as that of the petitioner industry;
(iv) Once such conditions are imposed, it is for the petitioner industry to comply with the same in toto;
(v) After verification of such compliance, by having an on the spot inspection to be conducted by the Board of the second respondent, it is open to them to clear the petitioner industry to commence their production or business.
(vi) Once the second respondent Board clears the petitioner industry in the manner indicated above, the impugned order shall not stand in the way, it gets vanished, the moment the second respondent Board clears the petitioner industry to run.
40. With these directions, the criminal revision case is disposed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed. No costs.
14.07.2017 Index : Yes/No Internet : Yes/No kua To
1.Revenue Divisional Officer-cum-
Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Erode, Erode District.
2. District Environmental Engineer Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board, First Floor,V.R.V.Complex, 167, Bhavani Road, Perundurai-638 052.
3. Coir Board Ministry of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises, Government of India Rep. by its Secretary Coir House MG Road, Kochi 682 016.
R.SURESH KUMAR, J.
kua Crl.R.C.No.1307 of 2015 14.07.2017