JUDGMENT A.N. Divecha, J.

1. The original complainant has preferred this revisional application for enactment of the sentence awarded to respondents Nos. 1 to 5 herein by the order passed by the learned 3rd Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Amreli on 29th June, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 686 of 1986. Thereby, the learned trial Magistrate convicted respondents Nos. 1 to 5 herein of the offence punishable under Section 44 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 ("the Act' for brief) and sentenced each of them to fine of Rs. 150 and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 herein to imprisonment till the rising of the Court.

2. The facts giving rise to this revisional application are not many and not much in dispute. The complainant appears to have filed his complaint charging respondents Nos. 1 to 5 herein with the offence punishable under Section 44 of the Act read with Sections 25 and 26 thereof. That complaint was filed in the Court of the 3rd Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Amreli. It appears to have been registered as Criminal Case No. 686 of 1986. Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 herein appear to have given one purshis on 29th June, 1987 admitting their guilt. That purshis appears to have been taken on record at Exh. 20. They also prayed for mercy. Thereupon, by his judgment and order passed on 29th June, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 686 of 1986, the learned 3rd Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Amreli convicted respondents Nos. 1 to 5 herein as the accused of the offence punishable under Section 44 of the Act and sentenced each of them to fine of Rs. 150 and also sentenced respondents Nos. 2 to 5 herein to imprisonment till the rising of the Court. Aggrieved thereby, the original complainant has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 ('the Cr. P. C.' for brief).

3. It is not in dispute that Section 44 of the Act provides for the minimum punishment of imprisonment for six months. The punishment awarded in this case till the rising of the Court is ridiculously low. No adequate reasons are given while such ridiculously low punishment is awarded to respondents Nos. 2 to 5 more particularly to respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Ignorance of law on the part of the accused by itself would not be an adequate reason for awarding such ridiculously low punishment.

4. It is the case of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 that they were required to admit the guilt at the instance of the original complainant who assured them that they would lightly be dealt with in the matter of punishment if the guilt was admitted at trial. In his reply affidavit, the complainant has denied this allegation. I am disinclined to believe that the complainant could have persuaded respondents Nos. 1 to 5 herein to admit their guilt in such fashion.

5. It, however, appears that the learned trial Magistrate has not brought to the notice of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 herein more particularly to respondents Nos. 2 to 5, that the minimum punishment provided under Section 44 of the Act is imprisonment for six months when the plea of guilt was recorded. In this connection a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of this Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Harishkumar Vyas and Ors. reported in 1987 (1) GLH 296 : 1987 (2) GLR 931 It has been held therein:

When a minimum sentence is required to be imposed according to law, the concerned Magistrate should first apply his or her mind to the provisions of law and then give an indication to the accused that even if he or she pleads guilty, the minimum sentence which is required by law to be imposed shall have to be imposed and that should be made clear to the accused while recording his plea so that the accused knows before pleading guilty that he or she will be imposed not less than the particular minimum sentence prescribed by law. Unless the Magistrates adopt such a course, the accused are bound to come up with the defence that it was a case of plea-bargaining and on the face of it, this Court will be inclined to accept that contention in such circumstances. It is hoped that the learned Judicial Magistrates will carefully go through the two judgments given by the Supreme Court (reported at and AIR 1982 SC 747) and also go through the judgments of this Court delivered recently and reported in Gujarat Law Reporter and Gujarat Law Herald, so far as the punishment to be awarded under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act is concerned and also go through the relevant provisions of the Act carefully so as to understand as to what is the minimum sentence required to be imposed so that such cases do not occur in future.

The aforesaid ruling of this Court in the case of Harishkumar Vyas (supra) is certainly not restricted to cases arising under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. It would naturally and obviously be applicable to all cases arising under all enactments prescribing the minimum substantive sentence for offences punishable thereunder.

6. It appears that the learned trial Magistrate has not followed this procedure in the instant case. In that view of the matter, the case of plea-bargaining put up by and on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 5 deserves to be accepted though not on the specific allegation that it was done at the instance of the complainant herein. When the plea of guilt was made under some misconception, no enhancement of the sentence can be made without affording an opportunity to respondents Nos. 1 to 5 herein to face the trial according to law.

7. In view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Magistrate cannot be sustained in law and it deserves to be quashed and set aside. The matter deserves to be sent back to the trial Court for the trial of the case against respondents Nos. 1 to 5 according to law.

In the result, this revisional application is accepted. The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class) at Amreli on 29th June, 1987 in Criminal Case No. 686 of 1986 is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the trial Court for fresh disposal of the case according to law. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.