JUDGMENT Narendra Nath Tiwari, J.

1. In this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the notification contained in Memo No. 1437 dated 16.3.07 (Annexure-11) issued by the respondent No. 3 whereby the petitioner has been sought to be removed from the post of the Chairman, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) with immediate effect.

2. The grievance of the petitioner is that he has been removed from the post of the Chairman, Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board before expiry of the term of his post contrary to the legal provisions. The said order is also violative of the principles of natural justice as he was not given proper opportunity of hearing before issuing the impugned order.

3. It has been stated that the petitioner was initially appointed as a working Chairman of the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board, Ranchi by Notification No. 297 dated 11.5.05. While the petitioner was holding the said post, the Board was reconstituted in terms of Section 4(1)(2) of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act') vide Notification No. 920 dated 27.2.06 and was allowed to continue as the Chairman of the Board.

4. It has been further stated that the petitioner was earlier sought to be removed from the post of the Chairman of the Board by Memo No. 5299 dated 3.11.06 illegally and arbitrarily. The said order was challenged before this Court in W.P.(C) Mo. 6370/06. By order dated 5.1.07, this Court allowed the said writ petition and the impugned order dated 3.11.06 was quashed by this Court, It was, inter alia, observed that once a Member of the Board is appointed by the State Government, it has no authority to remove him without giving him a reasonable opportunity of hearing or giving a notice to show cause, before completion of the tenure of three years. In the said decision it was also, inter alia, observed that the petitioner does not suffer disqualification under Clause (c) & (d) of Section 6 of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. But in spite of the same, the petitioner has been sought to be removed from the post of the Chairman illegally and improperly making a vague allegation that continuation of the petitioner as the Chairman of the Board is contrary to the public interest as several criminal cases are pending against him.

5. It has been contended that the Government has no arbitrary power or pleasure to remove the Member or the Chairman of the Board before expiry of the term of his office under the provisions of Section 5(3) of the said Act under which the petitioner has been purportedly removed from the Office. The petitioner has, thus, contended that (i) the impugned order is violative of the principles of natural justice and offends the Article 14 of the Constitution of India (ii) the grounds for removal are perverse and without any legal basis.

6. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State of Jharkhand. It has been, inter alia, stated that

(i) The impugned order of removal (Annexure-11) is wholly legal and there is no infirmity in the said order. The petitioner was earlier removed from the post of the Chairman of the Board by the order dated 3.11.06. The petitioner had filed a writ petition before this Court being W.P(C) No. 6370/06. The said writ petition was allowed and the impugned order was quashed on the ground that the petitioner was removed from the post without giving him any opportunity to :;how cause and the said order was violative of the principles of natural justice.

(ii) In order to meet the said deficiency and pursuant to the order of this Court, a show cause notice dated 1.2.07 (Annexure-8) under Section 5(3) of the said Act was issued to the petitioner. It has been alleged that the petitioner is involved in a criminal case being Kamdara P.S. Case No. 46/06 registered under Sections 341/323/504/506/307/302/120B/34 I.P.C. and Section 27 of the Arms Act. The petitioner was arrested in respect of the said case on 27.9.06 and was remanded to Judicial custody. He was released on bail on 1.11.06. The petitioner is also involved in another criminal case being Khunti P.S. Case No. 130/06 registered under Sections 302/120B/34 I.P.C. and 27 of the Arms Act. The petitioner was arrested in connection with the said case on 21.12.06 and remanded to judicial custody and was released on bail on 12.1.07.

(iii) In view of the above, a show cause notice under Section 5(3) of the said Act was issued to the petitioner asking him as to why he should not be removed from the Office after curtailment of his tenure.

(iv) The petitioner had challenged the said show cause notice before this Court in W.P(C) No. 612/07. The said writ petition was disposed of giving liberty to the petitioner to file his reply to the show cause within the extended period of two weeks from the date of the order. Thereafter, the petitioner had filed his reply to the show cause.

(v) After due consideration of the reply to the show cause, by the impugned order (Annexure-II), the State Government has removed the petitioner from the post of the Chairman of the Board in terms of Section 5(3) of the said Act.

(vi) The petitioner has been, thus, given adequate opportunity of representation and there is valid compliance of law as well as the principles of natural justice. There is no legal ground to challenge the impugned order.

7. Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, vehemently argued that though the show cause notice was given to the petitioner to file his reply and he had filed reply to the show cause, no opportunity of oral hearing was, given to the petitioner and there has been violation of the principles of natural justice and the impugned order has been issued arbitrarily and no reason has been assigned for denying the opportunity of oral hearing to the petitioner. The respondents have also not applied their mind on the ground', taken by the petitioner and the impugned order has been passed with predisposed mind. The provisions of Section 5(3) of the said Art provides for full compliance of natural justice by using the words "after giving, him a reasonable opportunity of showing cause". It has been submitted that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of hearing and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty formality. The respondents being the Welfare State are duty bound to act fairly and reasonably. Learned Counsel referred to and relied on the decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India , a Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bhagat Singh v. State of Punjab , a decision of Allahabad High Court in Union of India v. Smt. Chand Putli . Learned Counsel submitted that the petitioner had demanded a right of personal/oral hearing, but the same has been arbitrarily denied. The authority was required to give finding on the charges objectively. The petitioner had raised several questions of facts and law. He should have been given opportunity of personal hearing to explain the stand taken in the explanation to enable the respondents to give an objective finding. Learned Counsel contended that the specific points were raised in the show cause reply that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the criminal cases and the image of the Board or State cannot be said to be tarnished only because of institution of a false case against the petitioner as several Cabinet Ministers of the State are accused of the criminal cases. It was wrongly alleged that the Board's functioning was affected while the petitioner was in custody or the functioning of the Board was affected adversely as alleged. The said complex questions raised by the petitioner required oral hearing. The petitioner would have substantiated in oral hearing that all the allegations are baseless. In absence of opportunity of oral hearing, the petitioner has been greatly prejudiced. The principle of natural justice was, thus, not complied with. The impugned order being violative of the principles of natural justice is, thus, wholly arbitrary and is liable to be quashed.

8. Learned Advocate General assisted by Mr. Summet Gadodia, on the other hand/ submitted that the contention of the petitioner that there has been violation of the principle of natural justice has no substance. Section 5(3) of the said Act prescribes for "reasonable opportunity of show cause" and does not contemplate grant of personal hearing before passing any order of removal. In the cases the legislature: contemplated for giving an opportunity of hearing. The same has been expressly provided in the provisions of this Act. Citing the instance of Section 21(4)(b), it has been submitted that reasonable opportunity of hearing has been specifically provided in the said Section before taking any action as contemplated in the said provision. The petitioner was given reasonable opportunity of show cause and on due consideration of the reply to the show cause, the impugned order has been passed and there has been due compliance of the rules of natural justice. Personal hearing is not necessarily an incident of the rules of natural justice. The petitioner cannot claim that the said decision is invalid for not affording him an opportunity of oral/personal hearing. Learned A.G cited the following decisions in support of his said contentions : (I) Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter (II) J.A. Naiksatam v. Prothorotary and Sr. Master High Court of Bombay and Ors. (iii) Ganesh Shanta Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India and Ors. and (iv) D.R.A.M Education Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal and Ors. AIR 1999(3) SC 3219.

9. Learned A.C. further argued that the provision of Section 5(3) of the said Act is the provision under which tenure of the Chairman is curtailed. Section 6(2) of the Act prescribes for disqualification. Section 5(3) of the Act has an independent operation as against Section 6(2) and even if a person does not entail any disqualification as contained under Section 6(2) of the Act, he can be removed by curtailment of his tenure under Section 5(3) of the Act. The provision of Section 5(3) of the Act is an ; independent power of removal. The removal of the petitioner under Section 5(3) of the * Act also does not cast any stigma on the petitioner. In exercise of power under the said provision, the State Government can only curtail the tenure of the petitioner. In the impugned order also only the facts have been narrated and no stigma has been cast upon the petitioner. The petitioner's removal is, thus, not like the removal under Section 6(3) of the Act as any Member after removal under the said provision shall not be eligible for re-nomination as a Member. The allegation that the petitioner has been removed due to political consideration is also baseless. The petitioner has been removed after following the due procedure and after due application of mind.

10. On the basis of the controversy raised in this writ petition, the following point arises for specific consideration : Whether there has been violation of the principles of natural justice for not giving an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner ?

11. The petitioner has contended that the principle of natural justice has been violated by not giving him an opportunity of oral/personal hearing and on the said ground alone the impugned order is null and void. Learned A.G, on the other hand, submitted that the principle of natural justice has been fully complied with by giving the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file reply to the show cause as prescribed by the provisions of Section 5(3) of the said Act. It was not incumbent on the State Government to give an opportunity of personal hearing when adequate opportunity was given to file his written reply.

12. Learned Counsel for the petitioner placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Swadeshi Cotton Mills, supra, particularly on paragraphs 31, 33, 34, 44 & 94 which are reproduced hereinbelow:

If the statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of rules of natural justice, the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature.

Audi Alteram Partem Rule may be disregarded in an emergent situation where immediate action brooks no delay to prevent some imminent danger or injury or hazard to paramount public interest.

Be that as ft may, the fact remains that there is no consensus of judicial opinion on whether mere urgency of a decision is a practical consideration which would uniformly justify non-observance of even an abridged form principle of natural justice.

The Court must make every effort to selvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But to recall the words of Bhgawati, J, the core of It must, however, remain namely that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relation exercise.

The majority of the House of Lords in Ridge v. Baldwin held that non-observance of this principle has rendered the dismissal of Chief Constable void. The rationale of the majority view is that where there is duty to act fairly, just like the duty to act reasonably, It has to be enforced as an implied statutory requirement, so that the failure to observe it means that they administration act or decision was outside the statutory power, unjustified by law and therefore ultra vines and void.

13. From plain reading of the said paragraphs, it is evident that no strait jacket formula has been prescribed so as to contend that the personal hearing is the necessary component of the principles of natural justice. In Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter, supra, it has been contended that when there is no provision for giving personal hearing in law, the authority is not bound to give personal hearing even if there is request for the same. A party likely to be affected by a decision is entitled to know the evidence against him, and to have an opportunity of making a representation. He, however, cannot claim that an order made without affording him an opportunity of a personal hearing is invalid. The conclusion to that effect was recorded in paragraph 26 of the said judgment which runs thus:

Article 217(3) does not guarantee a right of persona/ hearing. In a proceeding of a judicial nature, the basic rules of natural justice must be followed. The respondent was on that account entitled to make a representation. But it is not necessarily an incident of the rules of natural justice that personal hearing must be given to a party likely to be affected by the order. Except in proceedings in Courts, a mere denial of opportunity of making an oral representation will not, without mote, vitiate the proceeding. A party likely to be affected by a decision It entitled to know the evidence against him, and to have an opportunity of making a representation. He, however, cannot claim that an order made without affording him an opportunity of a personal hearing is invalid.

14. Again in J.A. Naikstam v. Prothonotary & Senior Mutter (supra) the Supreme Court has held that when the delinquent was given a copy of the tentative decision of the disciplinary authority to furnish the detailed explanation, the principles of natural justice were fully complied with and it cannot be said that there was violation of principles of natural justice for not giving an opportunity of being heard.

15. In Ganesh Santa Ram Sirur v. State Bank of India, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that the principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae and cannot be put in a strait jacket. Its applicability depends upon the condition and the facts and circumstances of each case. The objective is to ensure a fair hearing and a fair deal to a person whose rights are going to be affected. When principles of natural justice require an opportunity to be heard before an adverse order is passed, it does not in all circumstances mean a personal hearing. The requirement is complied with by affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present his case before such quasi-judicial authority who is expected to apply his judicial mind to the issue involved.

16. From the said decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, it may be concluded as follows:

(i) The person affected by an order must have reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(ii) Reasonable opportunity of being heard does not necessarily mean grant of personal hearing.

(iii) Even if personal hearing is not provided, the authority may allow the personal hearing, but denial of personal hearing has no vitiating effect on the decision.

(iv) If the reasonable opportunity has been given for proper representation and for putting forward the points in defence and to present the case, even when principles of natural justice require an opportunity of being heard before an adverse order is passed, it does not in all circumstances mean a personal hearing, if oral/personal hearing is not specifically provided.

17. In the instant case a notice to the show cause was given to the petitioner stating that he is involved in several criminal cases and he remained in judicial custody which has affected the functioning of the Board and due to his judicial custody, the criminal proceedings initiated against him and his arrest from time to time, the image of the Board has been seriously tarnished among the general public and why he should not be removed from his Office with immediate effect. The said notice (Annexure-8) was issued under the provision of Section 5(3) of the Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. The petitioner had challenged the said notice before this Court in W.P(C) No. 612/07. By order dated 9.2.07 the said writ petition was disposed of giving liberty to the petitioner to file his reply to the show cause. The petitioner had filed his detailed reply to the show cause containing as many as 15 long paragraphs (Annexure-10).

18. After taking into consideration the reply to the show cause filed by the petitioner, the impugned order dated 16.3.07 (Annexure-11) has been passed holding that the continuation of the petitioner as the Chairman of the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board is contrary to law and it affects the image as well as the functioning of the Board and the State Government in exercise of its power under Section 5(3) of the said Act, has decided to remove the petitioner with immediate effect before expiry of the term of his Office. On perusal of the provisions of Section 5(3) of the said Act, it appears that the same prescribes for "reasonable opportunity of show cause" and it does not contemplate for grant of personal hearing before passing any order for removal. Learned A.G submitted that Section 21(4)(b) of the said Act provides for "reasonable opportunity of hearing" at the different place. It clearly shows that in the provisions of Section 5(3), the mode of natural justice has been restricted only to the opportunity of showing cause and not for giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

19. As discussed above, it is clear that if any provision does not specifically provide for an opportunity of oral hearing, the said opportunity cannot be sought as a matter of right In addition to right of representation, but the concerned authority in its discretion, can provide an opportunity of personal/oral hearing to the petitioner-in addition to giving him an opportunity of filing his show cause reply. As has been concluded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, if a person is given reasonable opportunity to present his case the decision cannot be held to be violative of the principles of natural justice for not providing him personal/oral hearing.

20. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the impugned order cannot be said to be violative of the principles of natural justice and cannot be held to be vitiated on the ground of want of opportunity of persona! hearing to the petitioner, as the petitioner was given proper opportunity of representing his case by filing his show cause reply in detail. The point raised by the petitioner is replied in negative against the petitioner. Though other points raising factual controversies were taken in the writ petition, the same have rightly not been pressed by learned Counsel for the petitioner as he was conscious that the same cannot be adjudicated upon and decided in writ jurisdiction of this Court

21. In the result, this writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.