ORDER K. Chandru, J.

1. Civil Revision Petition No. 207 of 2006 is filed for striking of the plaint in O.S. No. 53 of 2006 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Erode. Civil Revision Petition No. 208 of 2006 is filed by the revision petitioner against the order dated 25.01.2006 passed by the Principal District Munsif, Erode, granting exparte ad-interim injunction in I.A. No. 121 of 2006 in O.S. No. 53 of 2006 filed by the respondent.

2. The respondent is a resident of No. 85, Nasiyanur Road, Narayanavalasu, Erode-

11. According to the respondent / plaintiff, the revision petitioner / first defendant was running a Food Processing Industry and since it is causing pollution, nuisance and health hazard, it should be declared that the revision petitioner is not entitled to run the industry manufacturing Masala Powder causing air and noise pollution to the plaintiff and his family at his house situated in the residential area. He also filed I.A. No. 121 of 2006 for grant of ad-interim injunction restraining the revision petitioner from running the industry and manufacturing of masala powder.

3. The trial Court, by an order dated 25.01.2006, ordered notice to the revision petitioner and directed to file counter on 27.01.2006 and granted ad-interim injunction till then. On 27.01.2006, the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner filed a counter and the matter was posted on 30.01.2006 and the trial Court extended the interim order. On 30.01.2006, after taking the counter on file and marking the documents, the interim order was further extended stating that the order is to be pronounced on 07.02.2006. This is wholly unjustified and contrary to Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. In the counter statement filed by the revision petitioner, he had clearly described in paragraph 4 the steps taken by him with reference to the running of the industry and he has also mentioned about the consent order obtained from the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board with reference to the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, the permission given by the Town Panchayat at Veerappanchatram and the Registration Certificate obtained from the District Industries Centre. Inspite of all these, the trial Court granted an ad-interim injunction thereby bringing abrupt closure of activities of the revision petitioner Company. It is, at this juncture, the revision petitioner has come forward to file these two Civil Revision Petitions.

4. I have heard the arguments of Mr. V.P. Sengottuvel, learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner as well as Mr. N. Manokaran, learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent, Mr. P.S. Jay Raman and Ms. R. Revathy, learned Government Advocates representing the respondents 2 and 4 respectively and have perused the records.

5. At the outset, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent objected to the hearing of the revision petitions on the ground that the order passed by the trial Court was only an ad-interim injunction and, therefore, there is time enough for the trial Court to come to the conclusion in one way or the other. The learned Counsel stated that the striking of the plaint will come only if the issues are raised before the trial Court. Therefore, both the revision petitions should be dismissed and direction must be given to the revision petitioner to approach the trial Court.

6. It is in this context, he cited the judgment of this Court [A.R. Ponnusamy v. Thoppalan @ Karuppa Gounder] wherein it is stated that the bar under Section 46 found in the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981 will not operate against the Civil Court entertaining a suit as the suit is not challenging any order passed by the authorities. However, it must be seen from the said judgment that the suit was filed against the defendant from carrying on business of stone crushing by using stone crushers. But in that case, it is clearly found that the operator of the Industry was having permission from the Pollution Control Board to use the crusher on the date of the suit and he did not have any order from the Board. Therefore, it was not a case of a person operating an industry with clear permission from the concerned authority. It is under these circumstances, this Court held that such a suit is maintainable. However, in the present case, learned Counsel produced the order dated 23.6.2004 showing that he was existing operator of the plant and he had obtained consent under Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. These facts were also set out in the counter filed by the revision petitioner before the trial Court. The trial Court, which failed to note the defence taken by the revision petitioner, brought the industry to an abrupt halt.

7. The argument of the learned Counsel appearing for the revision petitioner that this petition need not be entertained, do not receive any acceptance by this Court. Since the trial Court has clutched on to the jurisdiction which it does not have, irreparable injury was caused to the revision petitioner.

8. This Court has held in the decision [Salem Co-operative Society Sugar Mill Limited, Mohanur v. Kuppannan] that in order to meet the ends of justice and to avoid miscarriage of justice particularly, when there is a flagrant violation both on the merits of the case as well as equity in justice, inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked.

9. Further, in the decision [Ouseph Mathai and Ors. v. M. Abdul Khadir], the Supreme Court has held that wrong decisions may not be a ground for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power of subordinate Courts and Tribunals resulting in grave injustice to the parties. It is useful to extract paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads as follows:

Para 4: It is not denied that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are extraordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt Article 227 confers a right of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said article as a matter of right. In fact power under this article casts a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority an that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such courts and tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments creating such courts and tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be a ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this article unless the wrong is referable to gave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate courts and tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party.

10. In the decision [State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afshan Guru and Ors.], the Supreme Court, in paragraph 28, held as follows:

Para 28: Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any Act of the State legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.

11. In the present case, it is clearly seen that the revision petitioner's industrial activity that was licensed by the necessary authorities was brought to a grinding halt by an ad-interim injunction granted by the trial Court and the bar under Section 46 of the Act has not been considered and therefore this Court can entertain a revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Even while granting the ad-interim injunction, the trial Court has not given any reason and by ipsi dixit has granted the order contrary to the provisions of the Act and also the various decisions rendered interpreting the said provisions by this Court and the Apex Court. One need not list out all those decisions as the said proposition does not require any authority.

12. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner drew the attention of this Court to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in I.L.R. (1997) 2 Madras 1274 [M. Nandagopal v. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board and Ors.] wherein it has been held after referring to Section 46 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Section 58 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, in paragraphs 5 and 6 held as follows:

Para 5: ...Therefore, it is clear that in respect of any matter which is required to be dealt with by the Pollution Control Board and the Appellate Authority constituted under the Water Act, no suit can be entertained by a Civil Court. Similarly no injunction can be granted by any Court or Authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under the Water Act on the Pollution Control Board or the Appellate Authority.

...

...

Para 6: ... It is also clear from the aforesaid provision which is similarly worded as that of Section 58 of the Water Act that the matters which are required to be dealt with by the Pollution Control Board and the Appellate Authority are not taken away from the cognizance of the Civil Courts. No injunction also can be granted by the Civil Courts or any other Authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken, pursuant to any power conferred under the Act.

13. Further, it is useful to extract paragraph 8 of the judgment.

Para 8: There is a great purpose behind these provisions. It is common knowledge that any litigation in a Civil Court will not reach its logical conclusion within a year or two. It takes several years. These are enactments which are intended to ensure the pollution free water and pollution free air and pollution free environment, to the humanity and the people at large in India. It is common knowledge that every day, pollution of water, air and environment is increasing in such measure that if the volume and speed of this is not prevented or abated and controlled, it may prove to be fatal to the humanity within a short period. Therefore, keeping in view this catastrophe which may occur, if it is neglected, these enactments have been passed and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been taken away, as otherwise, the very purpose of the Act would be defeated, if the Board and the authority were to litigate bore the Civil Courts, which will taken nearly a decade to come to a logical end and after a decade, probably, the pollution might assume such an alarming proportion that it may even go beyond our capacity to control and consequently the very objective of the law would be defeated these final aspects of life and serious consequences the presiding officers of the Civil Courts shall bear in mind and make a little effort to know and acquaint themselves with the aims and objects of the enactments and the provisions contained therein before they embark upon entertaining the suits ignoring the specific prohibition contained in the aforesaid enactments. Inspite of this, if the Civil Courts go on entertaining the suits and granting interim orders preventing the Boards and the authority to perform their functions and discharge their duties in exercise of their powers under the Act, the same will prove to be fatal to the people and defeat the aims and objects of the Act. Therefore, with a view to ensure that the Civil Courts do not embark upon such expedition, we have considered it necessary to issue a direction to the Civil Courts in the State that they should not embark upon entertaining the suits against the Pollution Control Board and the Authority in respect of the matters which fall under the provisions of the Water Act, Air Act and Environment Act. All the Civil Courts are directed accordingly. We also further direct that such of the suits which have been entertained by the Civil Courts in respect of the matters falling under these enactments, shall be taken up within a fortnight from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and disposed of the same in the light of the aforesaid directions and in the light of the observation contained in this order and bar of the jurisdiction contained in the aforesaid three enactments.

14. Unfortunately, the said decision of the Division Bench of this Court was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge, who rendered the decision reported in 2003 (2) CTC 516 (Cited supra). In any event, the said decision was rendered under the peculiar facts of the case wherein there was no consent from the authorities on the date of filing the suit. It is surprising to note that the authoritative pronouncement of the Division Bench was not only rendered but also a direction was given to all Civil Courts to take up the matters covered by the provisions of the Water and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act and dispose of it in accordance with the Division Bench judgment. It is unthinkable as to how the trial Court can entertain a suit of this nature and also grant ex-parte interim order contrary to the pronouncement of this Court.

15. In the light of the above pronouncement, C.R.P. (PD) No. 208 of 2006 is allowed and the order passed by the trial Court in I.A. No. 121 of 2006 in O.S. No. 53 of 2006 is hereby set aside. In the light of the pronouncement of the Division Bench of this Court and the fact that the petitioner is having valid consent order and the matter is covered by the provisions of the Air and Water Pollution Act and also the fact that the suit itself filed by the respondent before the trial Court in O.S. No. 53 of 2006 is clearly not maintainable, the same will stand struck off from the file of the Principal District Munsif, Erode, forthwith. Accordingly, C.R.P. No. 207 of 2006 shall stand allowed. Consequently, connected C.M.P. Nos. 1968 and 1969 of 2006 will stand closed. However, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.