ORDER

1. The petitioner is the author of all these three petitions. They involve common questions of law and facts. The Andhra Pradesh Pollution Control Board (for short 'Board') is the 3rd respondent in WP No.4501/95, and 1st respondent in WP 118/ 96. The General Manager, District Industries Centre, Warangal is the 1st respondent in WP No.4501/95. The Vice Chairman, Kakatiya Urban Development Authority, Warangal is the 1st respondent in WP No.7700/95. The Superintending Engineer, A.P. State Electricity Board, Warangal is the 2nd respondent in WP No.7700/95 and WP 118/96. The Gopalpur Gram Panchayat is the 2nd respondent in WP No.4501/95 and 3rd respondent in WP 118/96. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Warangal, is 4th respondent. The Environmental Engineer, A.P. Pollution Control Board, Regional Office, Warangal is 5th respondent, respondents 6 to 14 are private individuals and respondent No. 15 is the Executive Officer, Gram Panchayat, Gopalpur in WP No.4501/95.

2. The facts and circumstances and the controversies leading to these writ petitions require a brief record. Sri K. Sadasivudu is the Managing Partner of the petitioner indusny M/s. Kalyani Industries, Gopalpur. It is said to be a small scale industry for manufacturing cement, hollow bricks. An application was submitted in the month of August, 1992 showing two sites one at Hasanpartny and the other one at Sy.No. 122, Gopalpur village, Hanamkonda Mandal, Warangal District to locate and construct the factory of the petitioner, to the General Manager, District Industries Centre. After inspection by its officials, the site was changed from Hasanparthy to Sy.No. 122, Gopalpur under the proceedings dated 12-11-1993 as it is suitable for establishment of the industry. An application was also made to the Gram Panchayat, Gopalpur alongwith a map seeking permission to construct the building for the industry. Accordingly it was accorded on 28-10-1993. An application was made to the Board for permission as required. The District Medical and Health Officer, Warangal after an inspection issued no objection certificate in letter dated 7-4-1994 to the petitioner to locate the industry in Sy.No. 122 of Gopalpur village. The Board also accorded permission by its letter dated 6-6-1994 for setting up the industry at the said place. The Inspector of factories, Warangal also made inspection of the site and approved the plan. The petitioner has pleaded that after gelling approval from all the concerned authorities, the construction of the building for the industry was completed and the production was commenced. It is further pleaded that manufacture of cement hollow bricks does not cause any air, water or noise pollution. It is situaled in a place which is surrounded by M/s. Solvent Extracts Ltd. and other industries. There are agricultural lands abutting the industries. The officials of the Board again inspected the site and directed the petitioner to construct a wall around the machine to prevent the noise pollution and accordingly the wall was constructed. Thus, the petitioner was manufacturing cement hollow bricks in the industry till the impugned order has been issued by the General Manager, District Industries Centre requesting the petitioner to shift the industry from the present place to any other place within three months in the letter No. A4/ 3724/94, dated 7-2-1995 in view of the orders of the Commissioner of Industries, Hyderabad. It is contended that before passing the impugned order, no notice or personal hearing was given to the petitioner, it is against the principles of natural justice and against its own permission accorded as alleged. The petitioner had invested Rs.8 lakhs in setting up the industry by raising loans from A.P. State Financial Corporation and others and had commenced production after obtaining approval from all the authorities and without causing any pollution of any kind in addition to the approval having been obtained from the Board. It is also contended that even under the provisions of the Gram Panchayat Act, it is permissible to run industries from 9.00 am to 5.00 p.m. and the industry was being run within the specified timings. It is further contended that the impugned order is passed without cogent reasons, it is illegal, arbitrary and has put the petitioner irreperable loss and hardship and therefore, the impugned order is sought to be quashed.

3. While the matter stood this way, the Vice Chairman of the Kakatiya Urban Development Authority issued a show cause notice dated 29-12-1994 to the petitioner calling upon to explain as to why the industry should not be shifted to some other place. To this show cause notice explanation was submitted on 17-1-1995 by the petitioner. Therein the petitioner explained the procedure he followed in getting the necessary permission from various departments and the authorities and the commencement of the industry manufacturing the cement hollow bricks. But the authority issued the impugned proceedings dated 8-3-1995 in Rc.No.02/1523/94 calling upon the petitioner to demolish the construction of the factory and the industry. It is contended that the authority had no jurisdiction or power to pass the impugned orders much less the Superintending Engineer, APSEB had no jurisdiction to disconnect the electricity on the basis of such proceedings, particularly when WP No.4501/95 was pending and an interim order has been passed in that proceedings by this Court. Therefore, the impugned proceedings of the Urban Development Authority has been sought to be quashed. Although the Board had permitted the petitioner to commence the industry and to carry on the production of the bricks after inspection and although the petitioner had obtained permission from fee various authorities as detailed above, the Board issued the impugned proceedings in No.55014/PCB/ AEE-II/95-116, dated 4-1-1996 alleging that the petitioner was operating the unit in contravention to the directions issued under Section 31(A) of Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Amendment Act, 1987 (for short 'the Air Act'), that the industry must be closed for violating the conditions imposed that the petitioner would be liable for prosecution in case the order was not obeyed and that the APSEB had been directed to disconnect the electricity connection to the industry and the impugned order would come into effect from 4-1-1996. The petitioner has contended that when the Board had given such a permission however, imposing the conditions which had been complied with by the petitioner, particularly when there was no pollution of any kind including the sound pollution, the Board had no authority or reason to issue such directions in the impugned proceedings. Particularly when the two other writ petitions were pending consideration in this Court and same interim orders were passed, the impugned proceedings were violative of such orders and repugnant to the questions to be decided by the Court in the said writ petitions. It is also pointed out that in the nature of the unit with electric motor of 7.5 HP, the operation did not produce any pollution of either air or sound. The impugned order is thus sought to be quashed as arbitrary, illegal and violative of the principles of natural justice.

4. The General Manager, District Industries Centre, Warangal in WPNo.4501/1995 filing counter affidavit has contended that the location of industry was permitted to be shifted on the application of the petitioner and not at the instance of the respondent. Based upon that, permission was accorded in the endorsement dated 12-11-1993. The allegation that the petitioner industry is situated among other industries is denied. As per the directions of the Commissioner of Industries in his Memo No.10548/Dsk.4/CDCC/94, dated 2-9-1994, the petitioner-unit was inspected and a detailed report was submitted after examining the complaints from the residents of Gopalpur village, a report was submitted on 24-11-1994 by letter No.3724/ A4/94 and based upon that the Commissioner of Industries through his memo dated 10-1-1995, No.10548/Dsk.15(4)/CDCC/94 directed the General Manager, District Industries Centre to advise the petitioner to change the unit to a non-residential locality and accordingly the impugned letter dated 7-2-1995 was to be issued to the petitioner. Based upon such a situation, the Executive Officer of Gopalpur was also taking necessary steps against the petitioner for causing air and sound pollution to the nearby residents of the locality and this respondent has also decided to take appropriate action against the petitioner after issuing show cause notice. It is contended that the petition has no merit and it deserves to be dismissed. The other nine respondents in WP No.4501/95 who were subsequently impleaded by virtue of orders dated 8-11-1995 in WPMP No. 10678/95 have alleged that the petitioner industry is located within the residential locality where these respondents are having their residences in addition to other residences surrounding the area which consists of so many residential houses besides agricultural lands. It is contended that the petitioner has managed to obtain the permission from the authorities by suppression of facts and by producing false certificates. In view of the several complaints filed by them and other residents of the locality, the appropriate authorities as above, have proposed to lake action against the petitioner rightly and in accordance with law. The so called permission depended upon by the petitioner has been cancelled by the authorities and the Kakatiya Urban Development Authority, Warangal has also issued the impugned proceedings dated 8-3-1995, Proc.Rc. NO.C2/1523/94 directing the petitioner to remove the constructions of the shed etc. It is also pleaded by that after an enquiry by the Board, it is found that the noise level and the nuisance caused due to the industry of the petitioner has become unbearable as it produces dust and unbearable sound. It is also found that it is injurious to the residents of the locality. The residents of the locality are mostly employees of Food Corporation of India who are residing since long time and the concerned authorities have taken appropriate steps against the petitioner preventing the continuous emission of such pollution. They have contended that the petition has no merit and it may be dismissed.

5. By filing counter it was contended that the permission to the petitioner was granted by the Board by imposing certain conditions. It is pleaded that the petitioner in violation of condition No.1 and 7 of para IV of the Board's No Objection Certificate dated 6-6-1994 by committing public nuisance to the residents of the surrounding area. It was also informed to the Board by the Kakatiya Urban Development Authority by letter dated 16-8-1995 that the area within which the petitioner's unit is located is earmarked as residential zone of high density and the petitioner by violating the provisions of the Air Act by emitting exceeding limits of noise levels by using vibrating brick moulding machine and by violating the stipulations in NOC has lost the right to continue the unit It is contended that as whole the operation of the petitioner-unit is causing a lot of vibration due to the brick moulding machine, noise pollution and dust pollution regarding which there has been an inspection and report of the Regional Officer dated 1-9-1995. It is contended that the Board has got powers to take appropriate action against the petitioner and it has been rightly done. The Writ Petition No. 118/96 is sought to be dismissed.

6. The Urban Development Authority, respondent No.1 in WP No.7700/95 has pointed out that the area within the petitioner-unit located is within the development area and it is subject to the provisions of the A.P. Urban Areas Development Act (for short 'the Act'), the petitioner located the unit without obtaining the permission from the Authority under the Act and therefore show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 29-12-1994 in view of certain complaints received from the residents of the locality and the petitioner instead of explaining the show cause notice managed to obtain permission from various authorities and therefore the authority under the Act was compelled to pass appropriate orders which is challenged as impugned proceedings. It is also contended that the writ petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution.

7. Mr. Prabhakar Rao, learned advocate for the petitioner has contended in addition to the grounds taken in the writ petitions that whole matter has proceeded on certain complaints made by the persons who are opposed to the petitioner and inspite of permission granted by the respective authorities as detailed above, suddenly they have realised that there has been pollution of air, sound and dust without realities. It is also his contention that inspite of other similar units nearby are carrying on units by creating pollution, they are permitted to run whereas the petitioner is sought to be prevented only due certain persons opposed to the petitioner. The learned advocate for the General Manager, District Industries Centre, Warangal has contended that the impugned letter issued to the petitioner under the circumstances has been in the form of a request and not an order passed by the concerned authority in view of the directions issued by the Commissioner of Industries and particularly when there were serious complaints by the residents of the locality and the action taken by the development authority. It is contended by him that instead of examining the situation arising under the circumstances and complying with the request in the impugned letter, the petitioner has approached this Court unnecessarily to seek some relief which cannot be granted. Mr. E. Kalyan Ram, learned Standing Counsel for the Board has contended that notwithstanding the permission granted by the Board to the petitioner to locate the unit for the purpose of manufacture of the cement bricks, it was conditional as per the stipulations in the permission not to cause any nuisance or pollution to the air due to dust and sound but in view of the pollution of noise as contended in the counter affidavit, the Board was justified in issuing the impugned proceedings under Section 31(A) of the Air Act which was statutorily required and empowered the Board to do it. All the contentions of the petitioner as stated above are denied and repelled. Mr. Gopal G. Naik, learned Standing Counsel for Development Authority has contended that by virtue of the provisions of the Act, particularly, when the area within which the industry is located is within the development area under the jurisdiction of authority, the petitioner was bound to obtain the permission of the authority under Section 14 of the Act and failure to obtain permission has been in violation of Section 15 and therefore the authority was justified in passing the impugned order under Section 42(3) of the Act. It is also his contention that in such a situation, the remedy for the petitioner was only to file an appeal under Section 42(3) to the authority since the impugned order is passed by the Vice Chairman. It is also pointed out by the learned advocate for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the Authority that an appeal has already been filed to the Vice Chairman and that is how Mr. Naik points that in the present case by virtue of Section 42(3), as the impugned order has been passed by the Vice Chairman the appeal should be preferred to the Authority. At any rate, Mr. Naik has tried to justify and support the order passed by the Authority.

8. With these binding controversies, the matter has become simple to deal with. By virtue of an order of this Court dated 27-1-1997, an advocate-commissioner was appointed to visit the spot and to submit a report in view of certain matters which forms part of the controversies between the parties, particularly in view of the alleged pollution due to sound and dust. After inviting all the parties and the advocates of these petitions and with the aid of the work memos and after a spot inspection, the learned advocate-commissioner has submitted his report on 2-5-1997 regarding which no objections are filed by any of the parties and therefore it has become part of the records and therefore would take the character of evidence by operating the principle from Order 26 Rule 10(2) CPC.

9. It is true that the petitioner commenced his industry of manufacturing the hollow cement bricks on the land in question only after obtaining permission from all the authorities detailed above, including the Board except the Urban Development Authority under the Act. It is in admission that the process of manufacturing such bricks has been continuing since the year 1984. Now due to certain complaints by the impleaded respondents and due to further inspection of the location by certain authorities, it is found that the petitioner's unit is causing pollution of air both sound and dust. That is why, the impugned proceedings have been issued by each of the authorities stated above.

10. In so far as the impugned proceedings of the General Manager, District Industries Centre is concerned, it has no legal basis. It is based upon the directions of the Commissioner of Industries based upon certain complaints, neither mentioning the provision of law under which it was issued nor the authority under which such power was exercised. As rightly contended by the learned advocate for the General Manager, it was only a request to the petitioner to shift the industries. It is well known that a request is expected to be considered may be obeyed or may be disobeyed. The sanction of law remains in the realm of enforcement, that is why it is stated that the law is command of the sovereign. Any law which is capable of enforcement is law. Therefore, request by any authority can never take the character of law for the purpose of enforcement. Moreover, as rightly contended by the learned advocate for the petitioner and not seriously resisted by either side, the impugned order of the General Manager is bereft of legal basis, jurisdiction and has not been in conformity with the principles of natural justice. No opportunity was given to the petitioner before passing such an order or request. The fact that the very authority has permitted the petitioner to locate the industry is inconsistent with such a request in the impugned proceedings. It is true that such proceedings were to be issued due to certain complaints received from certain persons. Still no rule of law will become the rule of law unless the rule of law is conformed within the concept of rule of law. A rule of law which is repugnant to the rule of law is not a rule of law. Therefore, the impugned proceedings of respondent No.1 in WP No.4501 of 1995 cannot hold the legal lest and sustenance and deserves to be quashed.

11. Though it is slated that the petitioner was permitted to locate the industry and has been carrying on the production for a long lime by producing certain materials before the appropriate authorities, there has been certain allegations that he managed to obtain such permissions and approvals by various authorities by suppression of fact and by producing false material. It is also seriously alleged that it was brought to the notice of the authorities including the Board that the unit of the petitioner is causing both dust and sound pollution to unbearable degree to the residents of the locality. It is prima facie established that number of residential houses are nearby to the petitioner industry and it is located in residential area The respondent Board itself, after inspection by its officers, has come to the conclusion that the petitioner-industry is causing sound pollution and dust pollution and the petitioner is carrying on the industry in violation of the conditions imposed in the permission accorded by the Board. The Commissioner in his report has pointed out that there are agricultural lands on western and eastern side of the factory and it is also surrounded on eastern side by some residential houses and the particulars with location map is annexed to the plan showing the situation of the lands and also the residential houses. The Commissioner has given the details of the machinery in the petitioner-industry and also the state of affairs in the building and surroundings in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the report. He tested operation of the unit from various distances recording the degree of the pollution of sound which is being created as 56, 54, 56, 53, 52 and 58 respectively (vide paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report). In para 20, the Commissioner has given his suggestions as follows:

"(1) Construction of permanent compound wall at considerable length/height covering the unit from all sides may reduce not only noise but also pollution to the nearby residents of the unit;

(2) The petitioner unit may also be imposed a condition not to use diesel operated cement concrete mixture, to remove the apprehension of the neighbours about the high sound levels;

(3) To prevent the petitioner unit from manufacturing process during the nights.

If the above remedial steps are taken, the existing sound levels and pollution can be further reduced."

In sum and substance, both from the totality of the materials on record and also the report of the Commissioner, it is manifestly established that the industry of the petitioner is causing both sound pollution and dust pollution causing difficulties to the residents of the locality and also the detriment of the agricultural lands surrounding the unit. However, the Commissioner has suggested certain means as above as to how such pollution can be abated by adopting certain methods of construction of compound wall and restricting the petitioner to use certain methods in operating the machinery and also to run the industry within particular hours etc. Therefore, originally the respondents are resisting the petitioner from carrying on the unit in normal understanding of a common man or a lay man or a man of ordinary prudence in such a situation to understand, act and react.

12. Having heard all the learned advocates and the learned Standing Counsel, this Court had to deal with the matter in a manner so as to render complete justice to alt the parties in particular the members of the public, notwithstanding the right or no right of the petitioner in the matter of running the industry. Apart from this, in view of the serious contentions raised on behalf of the Development Authority that the location of the industry has been within the development area which requires mandatory permission on the part of the Authority to construct or locate or to run the industry, the legal implication under the Act is also being examined. It was also felt during the course of the arguments by the learned advocates that there are certain matters on facts and circumstances and equities which cannot be considered by this Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which requires factual investigation, assessment on evidence and determination of the matters in the light of the totality of the circumstances which some other authorities may be in a better position to do than this Court in a petition like this.

13. At the present moment, there was an enlightenment that a time has come that consistent and virulent pollution of the atmosphere is rampant and requires not only check but also prevention and demolition. Such a desire of one and all has become codified in the form of laws and popularly called as Pollution Control Acts, Rules and Notifications issued by the Government and Appropriate Authorities. The learned Standing Counsel for the Board has with all sincerity narrated and presented to this Court about the various enactments popularly called as Water Act, The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 amended upto 1988, The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Rules, 1975, The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) (Procedure for Transaction of Business) Rules, 1975, The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977 as amended by Amendment Act, 1991, The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Rules, 1978, The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, as amended by Amendment Act, 1987, The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Rules, 1982 and the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) (Union Territories) Rules, 1983 etc. a Compendium of such Acts and rules and notifications has been issued with the title 'Pollution Control Acts, Rules and Notifications issued thereunder' by the Central Pollution Control Board, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India in October, 1992 which has issued third edition in March, 1995. Usefully such an edition has been before this Court for consideration. We are dealing with Air Act as it is alleged that the industry or unit is causing sound pollution and dust pollution. In other words, and in short we are dealing with the Air Act. Section 2(a) defines air pollutant to mean any solid, liquid or gaseous substance including noise present in the atmosphere in such concentration as may be or tend to be injurious to human beings or other living creatures or plants or property or environment. The air pollution is defined in Section 2(b) to mean the presence in the atmosphere of any air pollutant. Therefore the sound, which should be noise, will definitely come within the definition as above and will be governed by the provisions of the Air Act. The respondent-Board has been constituted under Section 5 of the Act and it has got powers and functions to be performed in accordance with Chapter II, III and IV of the Act. Undoubtedly the Board has got powers not only to permit but also to prevent, check and take action against those who violate the provisions by causing air pollution. Under Section 16 of the Air Act, it has got Advisory Board to advise the Government also. Under Section 17 of the Act, it has got powers to plan and regulate steps to be taken in preventing and controlling and punishing in case of such pollution. It has also got powers to issue directions under Section 18 of the Act. It can declare any area as pollution control area under Section 19 of the Act. Section 21 of the Act is mandatory that subject to the provisions of the Act, no person shall, without the previous consent of the State Board, establish or operate any industrial plant in an air pollution control area. It is true that Section 21 of the Air Act do not conform in this case when the petitioner has applied for permission, obviously such a permission was granted after an enquiry and spot inspection imposing certain conditions. Sub-clause (4) of Section 21 of the Air Act is very clear that the Board by order in writing, and for reasons to be recorded in the order, grant the consent applied for subject to such conditions and for such period as may be specified in the order, or refuse consent. Every person in whose favour such consent is given is mandatorily bound to comply with the conditions mentioned therein in Section 21(5) of the Air Act. Therefore, both on facts and in law, the consent given by the Board to the petitioner was conditional for confirmation. The allegation is that there has been violation of such conditions. Now the stand taken by the Board is that the petitioner is running industry in violation of the conditions imposed and therefore the impugned order was to be passed. There is a prohibition under Section 22 of the Air Act that no person operating any industrial plant, in any air pollution control area shall discharge or cause or permit to be discharged the emission of any air pollutant in excess of the standards laid down by the State Board under clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 17. The Court is also empowered to object any violation of such prohibition under Section 22A of the Air Act even seeking the prosecution. Subsection (3)(a) of Section 22A of the Air Act empowers the Court to issue directions to such person to desist from taking such action as is likely to cause emission of air pollutant etc. The Board is also empowered to pass appropriate orders under Section 23 of the Act in case of continuation of such violation of the provisions. In other words, in its discharge of functions and duties under the Act by exercising the powers, the Board is entitled to pass any appropriate order as against the person who is said to be causing pollution of the air as defined under the law.

Moreover, under Section 31A of the Air Act, the Board may, in the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions under the Act, issue any directions in writing to any person, officer or authority, and such person, officer or authority shall be bound to comply with such directions and it is also empowered under sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 31A to direct the closure, prohibition or regulation of any industry, operation or process or the stoppage or regulation of supply of electricity, water or any other service. That has been done by the Board in the present case by issuing the impugned orders. In such a situation the aggrieved person has a remedy by way of appeal under Section 30(1) of the Air Act as against the order of the Board wherein the appellate authority will dispose of such appeal in accordance with Rule 17 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) (Union Territories) Rules, 1983. Therefore, as rightly contended by the learned Standing Counsel for the Board and also other learned advocates except the learned advocate for the petitioner, it is proper for the petitioner to approach the appellate authority under Section 31 of the Act instead of coming up with this present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India This Court is in total agreement of such a contention and legal situation where the appellate authority, for the purpose of Section 31 of the Act, is empowered as per sub-clause (2) of Rule 18 of the Air Rules, 1983 to take additional evidence and call for further material from the appellant or the Board as it deems fit for the purpose of disposal of the appeal. In other words, an enquiry by the appellate authority will be full and complete and effective than an enquiry in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine the factual circumstances and apply the law to the facts of the case. Therefore, in the nature of the facts established and controversies presented to this Court and the materials available on record, particularly in view of the findings of the advocate-Commissioner's report, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner should approach the appellate authority under Section 31 of the Air Act to challenge the impugned proceedings of the Board for disposal in accordance with the law.

14. It is clear from the materials produced on behalf of the contesting respondents that the area within which the industry is located and running is within the residential area It is also to be found that such property has been within the area covered by the Act (A.P. Urban Areas (Development) Act, 1975 which came into force on 27-1-1975 and it was published in the Official Gazette to make it enforceable as per Section 1(3) of the Act, Development is defined under Section 2(e) of the Act which includes the use of any land for the purpose of agriculture, gardening or forestry and for any purpose specified in the clause of any building occupied together with the land so used and also to carry out any temporary work for the maintenance improvement or other alteration of any building, being works which do not materially affect the external appearance of the building. Development with its grammatical variations means the carrying out of all or any of the works contemplated in a master plan or zonal development plan referred to in this Act, and the carrying out of building, engineering, mining or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in any building or land and includes redevelopment. Apparently, it incudes the construction of any building for the purpose of the factory within the area defined as development area under Section 2(f) of the Act. Mr. Naik, learned Standing Counsel for the Development Authority has pointed out that notwithstanding the preparation of the master plan and zonal development plans by virtue of Chapter in of the Act, it prescribes the procedure of survey of the area declared and to prepare the master plan which must be approved by the Government.

15. He has rightly contended that under Section 11 of the Act, any plan which had already been prepared and existing before the Act came into force, that shall be deemed to be the master plan for the purpose of the Act till such a plan is prepared. Any general town planning scheme under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area), Town Planning Act, 1920, any development plan under the Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act, 1955 or any master plan under the A.P. Municipalities Act, 1965, already prepared and published by the local authority concerned and sanctioned by the Government before the commencement of this Act with respect to any area now forming part or whole of a development area under this Act, shall be deemed to be a master plan so prepared and published by the authority and sanctioned by the Government subject to such alterations and modifications as may be considered necessary under Section 11 of the Act. Therefore, whenever such properly situates within the development area declared under the Act, it is mandatory under Section 14 of the Act that every person or body including a department of the Government desiring to obtain the permission referred to in Section 13 shall make an application in writing to the authority in such form and containing such particulars in respect of the development to which the applications relates as may be determined by regulations. Such a permission has to be mandatorily obtained in accordance with Section 13(4) of the Act. The ground on which the impugned proceedings are passed by the Development Authority is that the petitioner has not obtained such an approval. Rightly, the petitioner is not able to produce any material to show that such an approval has been objected by the authority nor it is the contention of the petitioner that such an approval has been obtained. Therefore, the impugned orders, as pointed out by Mr. Naik, learned advocate for the Development Authority, have been passed under Section 42 of the Act. In such a situation Section 42(3) of the Act provides an appeal to any person aggrieved by the order under Section 42(1) of the Act to be preferred to the Vice Chairman of the Authority within thirty days from the date of the order and the Vice Chairman may after hearing the parties to the appeal either allow or dismiss the appeal or may reverse or vary any part of the order.

As already pointed out, as in the case of the impugned order of the Board, the order of the Development Authority also involves question of facts to be investigated, in the first place, whether the property situates within the development area, secondly whether any permission was obtained by the petitioner and thirdly whether he has violated any provisions of the Act etc. Therefore in this case also, it is appropriate that the petitioner should exhaust the remedy under Section 42(3) of the Act and not expected to get any relief in this petition..

16. Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that except in WP No.4501/95 wherein the impugned orders of the General Manager, District Industries Centre are going to be quashed, the other two Writ Petition Nos.7700/95 and 118/96 are to be disposed of with a direction to the petitioner to exhaust the remedy by way of appeal and no remedy can be pursued in these petitions. A record to be made that none of the expressions made above, shall part as a guidance to the authorities while disposing of such appeals preferred by the petitioner which shall be determined independent of such expressions but in accordance with law, however, in the light of the observations made above while interpreting the law under the Act and the rules etc.

17. WP No.4501/95 is allowed and the impugned proceedings of the 1st respondent therein are quashed. WP No.7700/95 and WP No. 118/96 are disposed of with an observation that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in these petitions. But he shall be entitled to exhaust the remedies of appeal to the appropriate authorities as indicated in the observations made above which shall be disposed of by the appropriate authorities in accordance with law without reference to the factual observations made in this judgment, but however, to be guided by the legal principles laid down as above in addition to examining any other legal implication to be followed by the relevant Acts and rules etc. However, such appeals, if already preferred or even to be preferred shall be disposed of within three months from the date of receipt of this order or from the date of preferring the appeal, as the case may be. However, till then, the petitioner shall not be permitted to continue the operation of the factory. No costs.