{{ block title }}
Part 1 Round {{player.round_number}}
{{ endblock }}
{{ block content }}
There are two empty job positions, one for Job 1 and one for Job 2.
There are two workers, Ann and Bob.
With equal chance, Ann applies for Job 1 and Bob applies for Job 2 or vice versa.
That means, (Ann → Job1, Bob → Job2) or (Ann → Job2, Bob → Job1), each have equal probability.
You will submit your wage offers. You will submit one wage for each job. When you make the offers, you do not know who applies for which position.
The revenue each worker brings you when you hire them is given as below:
Revenue from each Worker
Ann
Bob
Job 1
{{C.VAA_6}}
{{C.VBA_6}}
Job 2
{{C.VAB_6}}
{{C.VBB_6}}
Each worker has a minimum willingness to accept, which means the minimum wage that the worker would accept.
For each job and each worker,
The worker accepts any wage higher than or equal to the minimum willingness to accept.
In that case, your profit is: Revenue the worker brings you - Wage Offer
Otherwise, the worker rejects the offered wage.
In that case, your profit is 0
Your final profit is the summation of the profit from two jobs.
Each person's minimum willingness accept is given as below: