There are two empty job positions, one for Job 1 and one for Job 2.
There are two workers, Ann and Bob.
With equal chance, Ann applies for Job 1 and Bob applies for Job 2 and vice versa.
That means, (Ann Job1, Bob Job2) or (Ann Job2, Bob Job1) with equal probability.
You will submit your wage offer. When you make the offer, you do not know who applies for which position.
The revenue each worker brings you when you hire them is given as follows:
Revenue from each Worker
Ann
Bob
Job 1
50
37
Job 2
45
40
The worker accepts any wage higher than or equal to the minimum willingness to accept
In that case, your profit is: Revenue the worker brings you - Wage Offer
Otherwise, the worker rejects the offered wage
In that case, your profit is 0
Minimum Willingness to Accept
Ann
Bob
Job 1
30
35
Job 2
25
33
Suppose that you suggest 35 for Job 1 and 27 for Job 2
Then, both Ann and Bob would accept the offer for Job 1 since 35 is greater than or equal both Ann and Bob's minimum willingness to accept for Job 1.
For Job 2, only Ann would accept the offer because 27 is greater than Ann's minimum willingness to accept and less than Bob's willingness to accept for Job 2.
With one half probability, Ann applies for Job 1 and accepts the offer and Bob applies for Job 2 but rejects the offer.
In this case, your payoff will be 50 (Revenue from hiring Ann to Job 1) -35 (your wage offer for Job 1) = 15
With one half probability, Ann applies for Job 2 and accepts the offer and Bob applies for Job 1 and accepts the offer.
In this case, your payoff will be
45(Revenue from hiring Ann to Job 2) -27 (your wage offer for Job 2)
+ 37(Revenue from hiring Bob to Job 1) -35 (your wage offer for Job 1)= 20