{{ block title }} {{ if player.pagenumber < 4 }} Instructions {{ else }} {{ if player.pagenumber != 99 }} Instructions: Phase 1 {{ else }} {{ endif }} {{ endif }} {{ endblock }} {{ block content }} {{ if player.pagenumber == 1}}
Welcome to this study on economic decision making!
The study consists of 2 phases in which you will interact with other participants, connected online, and one final questionnaire. At the end of the study, you will receive an amount of money which depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the other participants in the two phases of the study, plus a participation fee of {{ Constants.participation_fee }} euros.
{{ endif }} {{ if player.pagenumber == 2}}Who will I be playing with?
This study involves {{ Constants.num_subjects }} participants, who will be randomly divided into {{ Constants.num_mgroup }} groups of {{ Constants.players_per_mgroup}} participants (as the figure below). The grouping is fixed across the whole study.
Who will I be playing with?
Each phase of the study includes several rounds. At the beginning of each round, you will be randomly matched with another participant in your group (as the figure below). That is, in each round, you are playing with a different participant. All the matches are anonymous.
What should I do?
In each round, your task is to decide how much you’re willing to contribute to a public good.
The value of this public good to you could be either {{ Constants.pg_valueL }} token or {{ Constants.pg_valueH }} tokens, each with 50% probability. The same holds for your match. Thus, there are 4 possible situations, as is illustrated in the table below.
Situation | Your Value | Your Match's Value |
A | V1={{ Constants.pg_valueL }} | V2={{ Constants.pg_valueL }} |
B | V1={{ Constants.pg_valueH }} | V2={{ Constants.pg_valueL }} |
C | V1={{ Constants.pg_valueL }} | V2={{ Constants.pg_valueH }} |
D | V1={{ Constants.pg_valueH }} | V2={{ Constants.pg_valueH }} |
What should I do?
The production of this public good costs 2, which must be covered by your contribution (x), and the contribution of your match (y).
If you and your match reach an agreement on how to share the production cost of the public good, then the public good is produced, and your payoff in the round is equal to:
V1 (value of the public good for you) - x (your contribution)
Your match’s payoff in the round is equal to:
V2 (value of the public good for your match) - y (your match’s contribution)
If instead you and your match fail to reach an agreement on how to share the production cost of the public good, the public good will not be produced, and both of you will lose 1 token .
{{ endif }} {{ if player.pagenumber == 6 }}What should I do? - The Game Structure of A Round in Phase 1
How do you bargain with your match?
How do you bargain with your match?
4. From the 2nd stage of the bargaining process, you have {{ Constants.time_bargainafter }} seconds to choose to either keep the same proposal (+0) or increase your poposed contribution (+1, +2). Your proposed contribution can’t exceed 2.
5. The outcome of each bargaining stage is
determined as in step 3. If the sum of your match’s and your proposed contribution is <2 and both
you and your match choose to repeat the previous proposal (+0) in a bargaining stage, then
bargaining fails, the round is over, and your payoff and your match’s payoff in this round are both equal to
{{ Constants.conflict }}.
Earnings
At the end of each round, you can check the outcome.
You’ll play
{{ Constants.num_rounds_phase1 }} rounds of this game, and at the end of this study,
{{ Constants.num_rounds_choseneachphase }} rounds will be randomly chosen to determine your final
earnings, according to the following exchange rate {{ Constants.transfer_rate }} tokens = 1 euro.
Page Number: {{ player.pagenumber }}
{{ endif }} {{ if player.pagenumber == 99 }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 1}} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page1_TF }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 2 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page2_TF }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 3 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page3_Bargaining1 }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 4 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page4_Bargaining1_solution }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 5 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page5_Bargaining2 }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 6 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page6_Bargaining2_solution }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 7 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page7_Bargaining3 }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 8 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page8_Bargaining3_solution }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 9 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page9_Results1 }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 10 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page10_Results1_solution }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 11 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page11_Results2 }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 12 }} {{ include Constants.Quiz_Page12_Results2_solution }} {{ endif }} {{ if player.quizpagenumber == 13}} {{ include Constants.Quiz_endpage }} {{ endif }} {{ endif }} {{ formfields }} {{ endblock }}