Institutions Seminar Syllabus

Course Information

Course Number / Section	FINA 6017-001
Course Title	Institutions Seminar
Term	Spring 2021
Days & Times	Wednesdays 2:00 p.m. – 4:50 p.m.
Classroom	BLB 035

Professor Contact Information

Professor	Tomas Mantecon Prieto
Office	312L
Office Phone	940-891-6905
Office Hours	10 a.m. – 11:30 a.m. Tuesdays, and by appointment
E-mail Address	tomas.mantecon@unt.edu

Course Description

This seminar is an advance course in Financial Institutions, with special emphasis on banking. The final goal is to expose Ph.D. students to a selection of background sand contemporary studies so you can conduct their own research and advance our knowledge in this field banking, and more generally financial intermediation. Given the broad scope of the industry, we will focus on a few topics: the main roles of banks, bank regulation, relationship lending, securitization, the impact of banks on the real economy, and current topics related to the banking industry.

Course Organization

The objective is to prepare students to conduct empirical work in the area of financial intermediation, with special focus on banking. To this end, students need to be exposed to prior empirical and theoretical work. You will also follow banking related news. Finally, you will carry out small empirical projects using our databases.

Students are required to write a term paper. This should be an original research idea, a feasible attempt to extend the research frontier in the area of banking. This paper, at a minimum, should consist of the following sections. Section 1, introduction; section 2: literature review; section 3, hypothesis to be tested. This paper can be a theoretical or empirical study. If you decide to write an empirical paper, you should provide, in sections 4 and 5 respectively, an explanation of the data you will be using and the methodology to conduct the empirical test.

Class Format

Students are expected to:

- During the first hour we will:
  - Discuss 2-5 news related to banking during the prior week. You should use Bloomberg (recommended, but you can use a different source) to find banking related news, and write down 2-5 (I *may* ask you to e-mail them to me).
  - Exchange ideas about the development of the assignments.
- During the rest of the class, four of you will present a paper assigned the prior week. But I expect all of you to read all the four papers. Ideally, an exchange of ideas should ensue, and this should be a good source of learning.

Prerequisites

Students should be familiarized with the most important work in corporate finance, basic econometrics and the use of statistical software, such as SAS, STATA, or MATLAB or FORTRAN.

Performance Evaluation

a. Class participation in the discussion of the assigned papers: 10%

b. News reports: 10%

c. Weekly empirical assignments: 10%

e. Term Project: 30%

f. Final Exam: 40%

Grade Distribution

90% – 100% = A
80% – 89.9% = B
70% – 79.9% = C
60% – 69.9% = D
Below 60% = F

Tentative Schedule. The student is responsible to attend class and learn about unexpected modifications in the schedule.

	TOPIC	PAPER
Class Meeting 1 (January 13)	Introduction	
Class Meeting 2 (January 20)	Banks as providers of liquidity	1. Kashyap, A.K., Rajan, R. and Stein, J.C., 2002. Banks as liquidity providers: An explanation for the coexistence of lending and deposit-taking. *The Journal of finance*, *57*(1), pp.33-73 2. DeAngelo, H. and Stulz, R.M., 2015. Liquid-claim production, risk management, and bank capital structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks. Journal of financial economics, 116(2), pp.219-236. 3. Bai, J., Krishnamurthy, A. and Weymuller, C.H., 2018. Measuring liquidity mismatch in the banking sector. The Journal of Finance, 73(1), pp.51-93. 4. Silva, A.F., 2019. Strategic liquidity mismatch and financial sector stability. The Review of Financial Studies, 32(12), pp.4696-4733. *Related to this topic is, the value of liquidity*: • Krishnamurthy, A. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2012. The aggregate demand for treasury debt. Journal of Political Economy, 120(2), pp.233-267. • Cipriani, M. and La Spada, G., 2020. Investors' Appetite for Money-Like Assets: The MMF Industry after the 2014 Regulatory Reform. JFE forthcoming *Background papers/Other recent papers* o Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig, 1983, "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91, no. 3, 401-419. o Boyd, J. and E. Prescott, 1986, "Financial Intermediary-Coalitions," Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 38, 211-232. o Gorton, G. and Pennacchi, G., 1990. Financial intermediaries and liquidity creation. The Journal of Finance, 45(1), pp.49-71. o Diamond, D.W. and Rajan, R.G., 2001. Liquidity risk, liquidity creation, and financial fragility: A theory of banking. Journal of political Economy, 109(2), pp.287-327. o Diamond, D.W., Kashyap, A.K. and Rajan, R.G., 2017. Banking and the evolving objectives of bank regulation. Journal of Political Economy, 125(6), pp.1812-1825.

Class Meeting 3 (January 27)	**Banks as Monitors**	1. Gustafson, M., Ivanov, I. and Meisenzahl, R.R., 2020. Bank monitoring: Evidence from syndicated loans. Forthcoming JFE 2. Ma, Z., Stice, D. and Williams, C., 2019. The effect of bank monitoring on public bond terms. Journal of Financial Economics, 133(2), pp.379-396. 3. Ivashina, V., Nair, V.B., Saunders, A., Massoud, N. and Stover, R., 2008. Bank debt and corporate governance. The Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), pp.41-77. 4. Sufi, A., 2007. Information asymmetry and financing arrangements: Evidence from syndicated loans. The Journal of Finance, 62(2), pp.629-668. *Background paper* • Diamond, D., 1984, "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, vol. 51, 393-414.
Class Meeting 4 (February 3)	**Regulation: Deposit insurance and Central banks as lender of last resort**	1. Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Detragiache, E., 2002. Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation. Journal of monetary economics, 49(7), pp.1373-1406. 2. Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Kane, E. and Laeven, L., 2015. Deposit insurance around the world: A comprehensive analysis and database. Journal of financial stability, 20, pp.155-183. 3. Calomiris, C.W., Flandreau, M. and Laeven, L., 2016. Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 28, pp.48-65. 4. Calomiris, C.W. and Jaremski, M., 2019. Stealing deposits: Deposit insurance, risk-taking, and the removal of market discipline in early 20th-century banks. The Journal of Finance, 74(2), pp.711-754. *Background paper* • Keeley, M.C., 1990. Deposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking. The American economic review, pp.1183-1200.
Class Meeting 5 (February 10)	**Regulation: Capital requirements**	1. Berger, A.N. and Bouwman, C.H., 2013. How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?. *Journal of Financial Economics*, *109*(1), pp.146-176. 2. Gropp, R., Mosk, T., Ongena, S. and Wix, C., 2016. Banks Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment. *The Review of Financial Studies*. 3. Berger, A.N., Zhang, D. and Zhao, Y.E., 2020. Bank Capital and Loan Liquidity. *Available at SSRN 3600578*. 4. Avdjiev, S., Bogdanova, B., Bolton, P., Jiang, W. and Kartasheva, A., 2020. CoCo issuance and bank fragility. Journal of Financial Economics, 138(3), pp.593-613.

		Other interesting papers • Kashyap, A.K., Stein, J.C. and Hanson, S., 2010. An analysis of the impact of 'substantially heightened' capital requirements on large financial institutions. Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, mimeo, 2 • Allen, F., Carletti, E. and Marquez, R., 2011. Credit market competition and capital regulation. *The Review of Financial Studies*, *24*(4), pp.983-1018. • DeYoung, R., Distinguin, I. and Tarazi, A., 2018. The joint regulation of bank liquidity and bank capital. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 34, pp.32-46. *Recent regulation* ○ Bouwman, C.H. and Johnson, S.A., 2018. Differential bank behaviors around the Dodd–Frank Act size thresholds. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 34, pp.47-57. ○ Berger, A.N., Makaew, T. and Roman, R.A., 2019. Do Business Borrowers Benefit from Bank Bailouts?: The Effects of TARP on Loan Contract Terms. Financial Management, 48(2), pp.575-639. ○ Berger, A.N., Roman, R.A. and Sedunov, J., 2020. Did TARP reduce or increase systemic risk? The effects of government aid on financial system stability. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 43, p.100810
Class Meeting 6 (February 17)	Bank debt versus market issued debt	1. Gande, A. and Saunders, A., 2012. Are banks still special when there is a secondary market for loans? The Journal of Finance, 67(5), pp.1649-1684 2. Becker, B. and Ivashina, V., 2014. Cyclicality of credit supply: Firm level evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics, 62, pp.76-93 3. Berg, T., 2018. Got rejected? Real effects of not getting a loan. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(12), pp.4912-4957. 4. Schwert, M., 2020. Does borrowing from banks cost more than borrowing from the market?. The Journal of Finance, 75(2), pp.905-947. *Background papers* • James, Christopher (1987), "Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans," Journal of Financial Economics 19, 217-233. • Rajan, 1992, "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and Arms-Length Debt," Journal of Finance 47(7), 1367-1400. • James, C. and Houston, J., 1996, "Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix of Private and Public Debt Claims," Journal of Finance, vol. 51, no. 5, December 1863-1889.

Class Meeting 7 (February 24)	Relationship banking	1. Bharath, S., Dahiya, S., Saunders, A. and Srinivasan, A., 2007. So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships. Journal of financial Economics, 85(2), pp.368-419. 2. Ivashina, V. and Kovner, A., 2011. The private equity advantage: Leveraged buyout firms and relationship banking. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(7), pp.2462-2498. 3. Schwert, M., 2018. Bank capital and lending relationships. The Journal of Finance, 73(2), pp.787-830. 4. Berger, A.N., Bouwman, C.H., Norden, L., Roman, R.A., Udell, G.F. and Wang, T., 2020. Is a Friend in Need a Friend Indeed? How Relationship Borrowers Fare during the COVID-19 Crisis. How Relationship Borrowers Fare during the COVID-19 Crisis (December 25, 2020). *Background /review papers* • Petersen, M.A. and Rajan, R.G., 1995. The effect of credit market competition on lending relationships. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110(2), pp.407-443. • Boot, A.W. and Thakor, A.V., 2000. Can relationship banking survive competition? The journal of Finance, 55(2), pp.679-713. • Boot, A., 2000, "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?" Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 9, 7-25. (Survey) • Detragiache, E., Garella, P. and Guiso, L., 2000. Multiple versus single banking relationships: Theory and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 55(3), pp.1133-1161. • Drucker, S. and Puri, M., 2005. On the benefits of concurrent lending and underwriting. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), pp.2763-2799.
Class Meeting 8 (March 3)	Competition regulation and Risk taking	1. Boyd, J.H. and De Nicolo, G., 2005. The theory of bank risk taking and competition revisited. The Journal of finance, 60(3), pp.1329-1343. 2. Bouwman, C.H. and Malmendier, U., 2015. Does a bank's history affect its risk-taking?. *American Economic Review*, *105*(5), pp.321-25. 3. Dell'Ariccia, G., Laeven, L. and Suarez, G.A., 2017. Bank leverage and monetary policy's risk-taking channel: evidence from the United States. the Journal of Finance, 72(2), pp.613-654. 4. Mäkinen, T., Sarno, L. and Zinna, G., 2020. Risky bank guarantees. Journal of Financial Economics, 136(2), pp.490-522.

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<tr><td>Class Meeting 9
(March 10)</td><td>Securitization</td><td>1. Gorton, G. and Metrick, A., 2012. Securitized banking and the run on repo. Journal of Financial economics, 104(3), pp.425-451.
2. Keys, B.J., Seru, A. and Vig, V., 2012. Lender screening and the role of securitization: evidence from prime and subprime mortgage markets. The Review of Financial Studies, 25(7), pp.2071-2108.
3. Covitz, D., Liang, N. and Suarez, G.A., 2013. The evolution of a financial crisis: Collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper market. The Journal of Finance, 68(3), pp.815-848
4. Acharya, V.V., Schnabl, P. and Suarez, G., 2013. Securitization without risk transfer. Journal of Financial economics, 107(3), pp.515-536.
Other interesting paper
• Loutskina, E., 2011. The role of securitization in bank liquidity and funding management. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(3), pp.663-684.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Class Meeting 10
(March 17)</td><td>More about bank capital structure</td><td>Why are banks so leveraged? The topics covered in the prior weeks provide some answers. These papers offer other explanations:
1. Dell'Ariccia, M.G., Kadyrzhanova, D., Minoiu, M.C. and Ratnovski, M.L., 2017. Bank lending in the knowledge economy. International Monetary Fund.
2. Baron, M., 2020. Countercyclical bank equity issuance. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(9), pp.4186-4230.
3. Lin, L., 2020. Bank deposits and the stock market. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(6), pp.2622-2658.
4. Brancati, E. and Macchiavelli, M., 2019. The information sensitivity of debt in good and bad times. Journal of Financial Economics, 133(1), pp.99-112.
More interesting papers
Calomiris, C.W. and Kahn, C.M., 1991. The role of demandable debt in structuring optimal banking arrangements. The American Economic Review, pp.497-513.
Diamond, D.W. and Rajan, R.G., 2000. A theory of bank capital. the Journal of Finance, 55(6), pp.2431-2465.
Miles, D., Yang, J. and Marcheggiano, G., 2013. Optimal bank capital. The Economic Journal, 123(567), pp.1-37.</td></tr>
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Class Meeting 11 (March 24)	Bank size	1. Berger, A.N., Bouwman, C.H. and Kim, D., 2017. Small bank comparative advantages in alleviating financial constraints and providing liquidity insurance over time. The Review of Financial Studies, 30(10), pp.3416-3454. The Review of Financial Studies 30 (10), 3416-3454 2017 2. Minton, B.A., Stulz, R.M. and Taboada, A.G., 2019. Are the Largest Banks Valued More Highly?. The Review of Financial Studies, 32(12), pp.4604-4652. 3. Levine, R., Lin, C., Peng, Q. and Xie, W., 2020. Communication within banking organizations and small business lending. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(12), pp.5750-5783. 4. Gandhi, P., Lustig, H. and Plazzi, A., 2020. Equity is cheap for large financial institutions. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(9), pp.4231-4271. *Other interesting papers* • Bindal, S., Bouwman, C.H. and Johnson, S.A., 2020. Bank regulatory size thresholds, merger and acquisition behavior, and small business lending. Journal of Corporate Finance, 62, p.101519.
Class Meeting 12 (March 31)	Too big to fail	1. O'hara, M. and Shaw, W., 1990. Deposit insurance and wealth effects: the value of being “too big to fail”. The Journal of Finance, 45(5), pp.1587-1600. 2. Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Huizinga, H., 2013. Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(3), pp.875-894. 3. Brewer, E. and Jagtiani, J., 2013. How much did banks pay to become Too-Big-To-Fail and to become systemically Important? Journal of Financial Services Research, 43(1), pp.1-35. 4. Kelly, B., Lustig, H., Van Nieuwerburgh, S., 2016. Too-Systemic-to-Fail: What Option Markets Imply about Sector-Wide Government Guarantees? American Economic Review 106, 1278-1319
Class Meeting 13 (April 7)	Banks and the real economy	1. Chava, S. and Purnanandam, A., 2011. The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers. Journal of Financial Economics, 99(1), pp.116-135 2. Di Maggio, M. and Kermani, A., 2017. Credit-induced boom and bust. The Review of Financial Studies, 30(11), pp.3711-3758. 3. Célerier, C. and Matray, A., 2019. Bank-branch supply, financial inclusion, and wealth accumulation. The Review of Financial Studies, 32(12), pp.4767-4809. 4. Berger, A.N., Molyneux, P. and Wilson, J.O., 2020. Banks and the real economy: An assessment of the research. Journal of Corporate Finance, 62, p.101513.

		Other interesting papers • Slovin, M.B., Sushka, M.E. and Polonchek, J.A., 1993. The value of bank durability: Borrowers as bank stakeholders. The Journal of Finance, 48(1), pp.247-266. • Peek, J. and Rosengren, E.S., 2000. Collateral damage: Effects of the Japanese bank crisis on real activity in the United States. American Economic Review, 90(1), pp.30-45. • Kashyap, A.K. and Stein, J.C., 2000. What do a million observations on banks say about the transmission of monetary policy?. American Economic Review, 90(3), pp.407-428.? • Cetorelli, N. and Goldberg, L.S., 2012. Banking globalization and monetary transmission. The Journal of Finance, 67(5), pp.1811-1843.Bernanke, B.S., 2018. The real effects of disrupted credit: evidence from the global financial crisis. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2018(2), pp.251-342. • Smolyansky, M., 2019. Policy externalities and banking integration. Journal of Financial Economics, 132(3), pp.118-139. • Chakraborty, I., Goldstein, I. and MacKinlay, A., 2020. Monetary stimulus and bank lending. Journal of Financial Economics, 136(1), pp.189-218. • Hale, G., Kapan, T. and Minoiu, C., 2020. Shock transmission through cross-border bank lending: credit and real effects. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(10), pp.4839-4882.
Class Meeting 14 (April 14)	Banks and Financial crisis	1. Cornett, M.M., McNutt, J.J., Strahan, P.E. and Tehranian, H., 2011. Liquidity risk management and credit supply in the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 101(2), pp.297-312 2. Beltratti, A. and Stulz, R.M., 2012. The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(1), pp.1-17. 3. Kahle, K.M. and Stulz, R.M., 2013. Access to capital, investment, and the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Economics, 110(2), pp.280-299 4. DeYoung, R. and Torna, G., 2013. Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(3), pp.397-421. *Other papers*: • Allen, F. and Gale, D., 1998. Optimal financial crises. The journal of finance, 53(4), pp.1245-1284. • Fahlenbrach, R., Prilmeier, R. and Stulz, R.M., 2012. This time is the same: Using bank performance in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis. The Journal of Finance, 67(6), pp.2139-2185 • Cohen, L.J., Cornett, M.M., Marcus, A.J. and Tehranian, H., 2014. Bank earnings management and tail risk during the

		financial crisis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46(1), pp.171-197 • Calomiris, C.W. and Nissim, D., 2014. Crisis-related shifts in the market valuation of banking activities. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 23(3), pp.400-435. • Berger, A.N., Imbierowicz, B. and Rauch, C., 2016. The roles of corporate governance in bank failures during the recent financial crisis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 48(4), pp.729-770.
Class Meeting 15 (April 21)	New issues in Banking	1. Philippon, T., 2015. Has the US finance industry become less efficient? On the theory and measurement of financial intermediation. American Economic Review, 105(4), pp.1408-38. 2. Buchak, G., Matvos, G., Piskorski, T. and Seru, A., 2018. Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks. Journal of Financial Economics, 130(3), pp.453-483. 3. Heider, F., Saidi, F. and Schepens, G., 2019. Life below zero: Bank lending under negative policy rates. The Review of Financial Studies, 32(10), pp.3728-3761. 4. Xiao, K., 2020. Monetary transmission through shadow banks. The Review of Financial Studies, 33(6), pp.2379-2420 *Other good papers* • Gennaioli, N., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., 2013. A model of shadow banking. The Journal of Finance, 68(4), pp.1331-1363. • Hanson, S.G., Shleifer, A., Stein, J.C. and Vishny, R.W., 2015. Banks as patient fixed-income investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 117(3), pp.449-469. • Chiorazzo, V., D'Apice, V., DeYoung, R. and Morelli, P., 2018. Is the traditional banking model a survivor?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 97, pp.238-256. • Goldstein, I., Jiang, W. and Karolyi, G.A., 2019. To FinTech and beyond. The Review of Financial Studies, 32(5), pp.1647-1661.
Class Meeting 16 (April 28)		**Exam**

UIT Help Desk: [UIT Student Help Desk site](http://www.unt.edu/helpdesk/index.htm) (http://www.unt.edu/helpdesk/index.htm)
Email: helpdesk@unt.edu
Phone: 940-565-2324
In Person: Sage Hall, Room 130
Walk-In Availability: 8am-9pm
Telephone Availability:

- Sunday: noon-midnight
- Monday-Thursday: 8am-midnight
- Friday: 8am-8pm
- Saturday: 9am-5pm

Laptop Checkout: 8am-7pm

For additional support, visit Canvas Technical Help (https://community.canvaslms.com/docs/DOC-10554-4212710328)

Rules of Engagement

Rules of engagement refer to the way students are expected to interact with each other and with their instructors. Here are some general guidelines:

- While the freedom to express yourself is a fundamental human right, any communication that utilizes cruel and derogatory language on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, disability, genetic information, veteran status, or any other characteristic protected under applicable federal or state law will not be tolerated.
- Treat your instructor and classmates with respect in any communication online or face-to-face, even when their opinion differs from your own.
- Ask for and use the correct name and pronouns for your instructor and classmates.
- Speak from personal experiences. Use "I" statements to share thoughts and feelings. Try not to speak on behalf of groups or other individual's experiences.
- Use your critical thinking skills to challenge other people's ideas, instead of attacking individuals.
- Avoid using all caps while communicating digitally. This may be interpreted as "YELLING!"
- Be cautious when using humor or sarcasm in emails or discussion posts as tone can be difficult to interpret digitally.
- Avoid using "text-talk" unless explicitly permitted by your instructor.
- Proofread and fact-check your sources.
- Keep in mind that online posts can be permanent, so think first before you type.

See these Engagement Guidelines (https://clear.unt.edu/online-communication-tips) for more information.

ACADEMIC INTEGRITY STANDARDS AND CONSEQUENCES

According to UNT Policy 06.003, Student Academic Integrity, academic dishonesty occurs when students engage in behaviors including, but not limited to cheating, fabrication, facilitating academic dishonesty, forgery, plagiarism, and sabotage. A finding of academic dishonesty may result in a range of academic penalties or sanctions ranging from admonition to expulsion from the University.

EMERGENCY EVACUATION PROCEDURES FOR BUSINESS LEADERSHIP BUILDING

- **Severe Weather** In the event of severe weather, all building occupants should immediately seek shelter in the designated shelter-in-place area. If unable to safely move to the designated shelter-in-place area, seek shelter in a windowless interior room or hallway on the lowest floor of the building. All building occupants should take shelter in rooms 055, 070, 090, and the restrooms on the basement level or in rooms 170, 155, and restrooms 122, 182 or 183 on the first floor.
- **Bomb Threat/Fire** In the event of a bomb threat or fire in the building, all building occupants should immediately evacuate the building using the nearest exit. Once outside, proceed to the designated assembly area. If unable to safely move to the designated assembly area, contact one or more members of your department or unit to let them know you are safe and inform them of your whereabouts. Persons with mobility impairments who are unable to safely exit the building should move to a designated area of refuge and await assistance from emergency responders. All building occupants should immediately evacuate the building and proceed to the south side of Crumley Hall in the grassy area, west of parking lot 24.

STUDENT PERCEPTIONS OF TEACHING (SPOT)

Student feedback is important and an essential part of participation in this course. The student evaluation of instruction is a requirement for all organized classes at UNT. The short SPOT survey will be made available at the end of the semester to provide you with an opportunity to evaluate how this course is taught. You will receive an email from "UNT SPOT Course Evaluations via *IASystem* Notification" (no-reply@iasystem.org) with the survey link. Please look for the email in your UNT email inbox. Simply click on the link and complete your survey. Once you complete the survey you will receive a confirmation email that the survey has been submitted. For additional information, please visit the spot website at www.spot.unt.edu or email spot@unt.edu.

DISABILITY ACCOMODATION

The University of North Texas is on record as being committed to both the spirit and letter of federal equal opportunity legislation; reference Public Law 92-112 – The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended. With the passage of new federal legislation entitled Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, there is renewed focus on providing this population with the same opportunities enjoyed by all citizens.

As a faculty member, I am required by law to provide "reasonable accommodations" to students with disabilities, so as not to discriminate on the basis of that disability. Student responsibility primarily rests with informing faculty of their need for accommodation and in providing authorized documentation through designated administrative channels. Information regarding specific diagnostic criteria and policies for obtaining academic accommodations can be found at http://www.unt.edu/oda/apply/index.html. Also, you may visit the Office of Disability Accommodation in the University Union (room 321) or call them at (940) 565-4323.

If you need an accommodation, please contact me as soon as possible but at the latest by the second week of class.

COVID-19 Important issues

Statement on Face Covering

Face coverings are required in all UNT facilities. Students are expected to wear face coverings during this class. If you are unable to wear a face covering due to a disability, please contact the Office of Disability Access to request an accommodation. UNT face covering requirements are subject to change due to community health guidelines. Any changes will be communicated via the instructor.

COVID-19 Impact on Attendance

While attendance is expected as outlined above, it is important for all of us to be mindful of the health and safety of everyone in our community, especially given concerns about COVID-19. Please contact me if you are unable to attend class because you are ill, or unable to attend class due to a related issue regarding COVID-19. It is important that you communicate with me prior to being absent so I may make a decision about accommodating your request to be excused from class.

If you are experiencing any symptoms of COVID-19 (https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html) please seek medical attention from the Student Health and Wellness Center (940-565-2333 or askSHWC@unt.edu) or your health care provider PRIOR to coming to campus. UNT also requires you to contact the UNT COVID Hotline at 844-366-5892 or COVID@unt.edu for guidance on actions to take due to symptoms, pending or positive test results, or potential exposure. While attendance is an important part of succeeding in this class, your own health, and those of others in the community, is more important.

Class Materials for Remote Instruction

The UNT fall schedule requires this course to have fully remote instruction beginning November 28th. Additional remote instruction may be necessary if community health conditions change or you need to self-isolate or quarantine due to COVID-19. Students will need access to a [webcam and microphone – faculty member to include what other basic equipment is needed] to participate in fully remote portions of the class. Additional required classroom materials for remote learning include: [list specific software, supplies, equipment or system requirements needed for the course]. Information on how to be successful in a remote learning environment can be found at https://online.unt.edu/learn.