


ENGL 1310
Fall 2026

What's Wrong with Being Right?
Living an Examined Life, Making an Examined Case

Writing Across the Disciplines through Plato's *Apology*:
A Problem-Based-, Work-Integrated-Learning
Freshman Composition Course

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Course Description

This is a writing course. Its test case is a 2,400-year-old capital trial: Plato's *Apology of Socrates*. In it, a city prosecutes a citizen for the crime of asking hard questions. We'll read as working professionals read a case file — as a site where evidence, ambiguity, and consequences collide.

Unlike a first-year writing course structured around a textbook and a set of expository prompts, this one hands you a life-or-death problem and a choice of disciplines to address it. You will declare a professional field early in the semester — perhaps akin to a major you're seeking — and you will write in that field's language, using its tools, about the trial of Socrates. What you can discover about the *Apology* will change as your disciplinary lens sharpens.

When Socrates told the jury that “the unexamined life is not worth living,” he was not offering a self-help slogan. He was describing an ethical commitment: the willingness to remain faithful to the question, to acknowledge uncertainty, and to resist the urge to settle for answers that merely confirm existing beliefs, preferences, or assumptions. That commitment shapes this class. The course is a living document. The sprints will evolve as each cohort discovers new insights in dialogue with one another and through peer review. The goal is not “the right answer,” but to engage in an ongoing practice of examination, reflection, and revision.

Socratic dialogue is a practice for generating critical, imaginative, and deeply human thought by asking better questions rather than asserting what is “correct.” Socrates’ method was inquiry: admit what you do not know, test claims through conversation, and resist the temptations of easy certainty. His accusers’ method, familiar to us today, was assertion: repeat the charge, attack the person, and treat difference as a threat. This course is about learning how to bring the tools of a discipline to situations where evidence, expertise, and argument are themselves under pressure. You will encounter these situations in your own professional lives.

The assignments are provocations designed to trigger dialogue and critical thinking. The goal is not to discover what the *Apology* “really means.” It is to build a habit of asking precise questions through a disciplinary lens, being self-critical enough to follow the evidence, not relying on preconceived notions, and being rigorous enough to stand behind whatever answers follow.

The course and the trial mirror American civic life. Socrates’ crime was questioning “experts” who claimed to have “the answers.” His jury was composed of citizens swayed by politics and the media: rhetoric, resentment, and manufactured certainty. You read the *Apology* on your own, and we read passages aloud in class, with your annotations built into the session. After each reading, discussion begins with the same question: What does a professional in your declared discipline see in this text that others might miss? The tension between expertise and its critics, between evidence-based argument and I’m-the-only-one-who-can-solve-it-energy, is not ancient history. The issues in the *Apology* still face us. We should consider ways to face them.

Grading: A = 90+ / B = 80+ / C = 70+ / D = 60+

7 Sprint Deliverables	35 points
Capstone Discipline Brief / White Paper	15 points
Peer Reviews (3 formal)	10 points
Reflective Portfolio Memo	10 points
Final Portfolio	20 points
<u>Public Forum Capstone Showcase</u>	<u>10 points</u>
Total:	100 points

Required Attendance: Show up

This isn't a graded assignment — it's an expectation the course depends on. Deductions for excessive unexcused absences come off your final grade directly.

Please discuss any **ODA** accommodations (and provide ODA documentation) with the professor ASAP: <https://studentaffairs.unt.edu/office-disability-access>

See **UNT Policy 06.039, Student Attendance and Authorized Absences:**

<https://policy.unt.edu/sites/policy.unt.edu/files/06.039%20Student%20Attendance%20and%20Authorized%20Absences.pdf>

The first point of contact for all attendance questions is the professor. Absences that don't fall under Title IX, required military service, or official university functions are a matter between student and faculty member. If an absence due to an extenuating circumstance exceeds five consecutive days, faculty may request documentation through the Dean of Students' office.

An absence is officially excused by the university for:

- ✓ A religious holy day, including travel for that purpose
- ✓ Participation in an official university function
- ✓ Required military service, including travel for that purpose
- ✓ Pregnancy and parenting, under Title IX.

A student is responsible for requesting — ASAP, in writing — an excused absence: deliver the request personally to the professor; provide satisfactory evidence; request make-up work for missed days, complete it, and submit it. A student won't be penalized for an excused absence if make-up work is submitted within a reasonable period, which may involve out-of-class time. If you don't request the excused absence and make-up work close to the day(s) missed, we won't revisit it for dates and topics long gone, and the excuse will count as unexcused.

Your professor may or may not excuse other absences due to short-term illness or other extenuating circumstances. Having a note does not excuse an absence. Email the professor the reason within 24 hours. Be honest and clear — you don't have to provide personal details, but you do have to say something.

Things that do not count as extenuating circumstances:

- “I feel sick” / “I felt sick.”
- “I couldn't get out of bed.”
- “Traffic.”
- “My bus was late.”
- A scheduled, non-emergency doctor, dentist, or advisor appointment.
- Anything else that could have been scheduled for a time other than class.

The bottom line: Be present, on time, and actively engaged. This course only works if the room is full of people willing to argue the case and dialogue.

These things may result in your being counted absent:

- Consuming media on a phone, laptop, or any device.
- Doing work for other classes during our time.

You're allowed 2 free absences. Use them for any kind of **extenuating circumstance** — but don't think of them as skip days. If you burn one as a skip and then have a real unexcusable circumstance later, you don't get to double-dip; you get two, total, no matter the reason.

After your two free absences, **3 points come off your final grade for each additional unexcused absence.** A student missing more than 6 classes (3 weeks) risks failing the class due to absences and will need to meet with the professor. If the student is allowed to remain in the class with the hope of passing, the final grade will be no higher than a C. A student missing 8 or more times will fail due to excessive absences. **Unexcused absences cannot be made up.**

A student more than 20 minutes **late** is counted absent. A student 10–20 minutes late is counted **tardy**. Two tardies equal one unexcused absence.

Always contact your professor as soon as anything comes up that disrupts your attendance. I can only help if I know what's going on.

On AI and Academic Integrity

Generative AI — chatbots, writing assistants, paraphrasing tools, AI browser extensions, or any system that generates text, ideas, or structure on your behalf — may not be used at any stage of any deliverable in this course. This is a full prohibition: no drafting, no brainstorming, no research summaries, no editing or “cleanup,” no feedback on a draft. If a tool generated words, structure, or ideas you didn't produce yourself, it's forbidden.

Submitting AI-generated or AI-assisted text as your own work is plagiarism under **UNT's Academic Integrity Policy** and will be reported. This isn't primarily about detection. It's that AI can produce fluent, confident text in seconds, but it cannot do the thing this course actually teaches: the discomfort of discovering that a position you were sure of falls apart under scrutiny, and the work of rebuilding it. That discomfort is where judgment gets built, and there's no shortcut for it. Your disciplinary team exists to give you a human version of everything AI is tempting you to outsource — thinking partner, research sounding board, revision feedback — while leaving the actual thinking and writing yours.

AI policy enforcement: A first violation of the AI policy is a mandatory meeting with the professor before further work in the course is allowed. A second violation is reported to UNT's Office of Academic Integrity, per university policy. Avoid the next step.

Writing Center: The AI ban doesn't mean you're on your own. UNT's Writing Center (<https://writingcenter.unt.edu/>) is people, not a tool — someone to talk your argument through with, out loud, before you write or while you're stuck. Using it is not just allowed. It's the kind of help this course is built around.

The Living Document

Nothing you submit in this course is a final draft when you turn it in. A legal brief is revised as case law develops. A clinical protocol is updated as new data arrives. Your writing works the same way: every sprint deliverable is a draft open to revision. Every round of feedback is new evidence you are expected to use. The final portfolio is not a folder of finished essays. It is proof that you took feedback, reengaged the problem, and kept thinking. It requires you to say, in your own words, what you used to think and what changed your mind.

Pedagogical Method: Four Ideas Working Together

This course combines teaching approaches a standard writing class doesn't: real practice thinking inside a discipline, writing in its professional formats, and treating an ancient trial as a live case for problems you will meet in your career.

Approach	What it means	What it means for you
Problem-Based Learning	You get a real, unresolved problem before you're handed the tools to solve it.	You pick up a disciplinary framework because you need it to answer a specific question — not to memorize it for a test.
Work-Integrated Learning	The classroom is geared to work you'll do after graduation.	Every deliverable is a document a working professional in your field produces: a memo, a brief, a case file, a public record.
Writing Across the Curriculum	You write in conventions of your chosen field, not in "English class" mode.	No literary analysis. You argue the way your field argues, with the evidence your field trusts.
Creative Problem-Solving	Define the problem, generate more options than you need, then build the strongest one.	Every sprint asks you to do something with what you see — not just describe it.

Annotation, or Reading Like a Professional

Annotated reading is active reading. Bring your syllabus packet containing the *Apology* with your **handwritten notes** to every class. Read each assigned passage twice: once for orientation, once for annotation.

Work through the eight prompts below for each class, not necessarily in order, and not all will apply to every passage. Every class session begins with the text and your annotations, not from a lecture or summary of the reading. Come prepared to share your notes and what you marked—but specific moments: a repetition that unsettled something, a gap where the argument should have been, a moment where the voice shifted and you couldn't say why.

The goal is not to have resolved the issues. It is to have noticed them precisely, as problems to consider. Analysis builds from there, in the room, together. Your notes and annotations are the beginning of the argument, not its conclusion. Don't tell us what Socrates believes. Show us where his speech repeats, breaks, or refuses to complete itself.

Reading/Annotation Prompts	What to ask & What to respond to in writing
Situation	What is Socrates doing to his audience right now, in one sentence? Argument, performance, or something harder to name?
Voice	Who is Socrates speaking to in this moment? Who is his audience? Does the register shift — irony, sincerity, provocation — and where?
Knowledge	What does he claim to know, and what's his source — the oracle, reasoning, experience? Is the source credible? Does it hold up?
Lens	Which disciplinary lens from this syllabus would notice something here that the others would miss? What? Why? How?
Surprise	One moment that confused or contradicted your expectations. Don't resolve it — mark it and consider it.
Repetition	What does Socrates say again that he already said? Does repeating it clarify the point, or is the speech circling back on something it can't resolve?
The Gap	Where does a claim or assertion stand in for the steps of a logical argument? Where does the reasoning stop short, and why might that be?
Excess	Is there more detail here than the defense strictly needs? What is that extra material doing, or avoiding?

Sample Annotation of Plato's *Apology* (17a–17b)

1. SITUATION: What is happening in this moment?

Socrates opens by talking about his accusers before saying anything about the charges. This is odd: establishing how the accusers almost made him forget who he was, then recovering his identity by contrasting his method with theirs. The first move is a loss of self, followed by reassertion of self. Not a typical legal opening. He addresses the jury directly (“O men of Athens”) and immediately admits he doesn't know how they feel. The speech opens with an acknowledged gap in his knowledge of his own audience.

2. VOICE: Who is he speaking to — and is it always the same audience?

He addresses “O men of Athens” once, then never again in this passage. After that he's talking about the jury (“let yourselves be deceived”), then about the accusers (“they ought to have been ashamed”), then almost to himself (“well, as I was saying”). That “well, as I

was saying” catches me. Who is he saying it to? It reads like he’s recollecting his own thread, not addressing the jury. For one moment the speech seems to turn inward. The register shifts: he starts formal, then almost moralistic (“shame,” “shamelessly”), then conversational. Not a stable register.

3. KNOWLEDGE: What does Socrates claim to know, and how?

He says he doesn’t know how the jury felt then claims he knows the accusers “hardly spoke a word of truth.” He doesn’t know the effect his accusers had yet knows they were lying? His second claim is more confident. Yet he gives no direct evidence. He asserts, not argues.

4. LENS: Which disciplinary lens asks the most interesting question here?

Narrative Control: Socrates addresses the jury’s expectations about him. Long before the trial, his accusers shaped a public story in the Athenian “media” in which he appeared dangerous, deceptive, and corrupting. He responds by challenging that story rather than simply denying the charges. When his accusers warn the jury about his “eloquence,” Socrates accepts the label but changes its meaning. If eloquence means persuading people with truth rather than manipulation, he is willing to be called eloquent. The interesting question is not whether Socrates refutes the accusation or accepts it, but who gets to define the terms through which reality is understood. A Narrative Control lens asks: how does Socrates challenge an already-established public narrative, and can a person overturn a story that people have been taught to believe for years?

5. SURPRISE: A moment that surprised, confused, or contradicted your expectations.

The line “their persuasive words almost made me forget who I was.” I expected Socrates to start by arguing that his accusers are simply wrong, and he’s not guilty. Instead, he admits they were so effective, he nearly believed them. That’s a strange thing to say in your own defense. It gives the accusers a power he immediately takes back, yet he’s still already given it. Why admit the near loss at all? It seems like it could only hurt his case. Unless that’s the point? Not sure yet.

6. REPETITION: What has he said before that he says again?

Alēthēs appears four times in this one passage: “a word of truth,” “force of truth,” “a word of truth” (again), “the whole truth.” The word escalates: from “not a word of truth” to “the whole truth.” That’s a rhetorical arc. But the repetition of the same word for truth doesn’t stabilize it. It keeps reappearing in different guises with slightly different weights. By the fourth time, “the whole truth” has been set up as a contrast to what the accusers said, but he hasn’t demonstrated what his truth is yet. The repetition promises more than it delivers.

7. THE GAP: Where does assertion appear where argument should be?

“They have hardly spoken a word of truth” is asserted twice before any evidence has been offered. He says it, moves on to the eloquence point, then says it again as if repetition confirms it. Another gap: “You shall hear from me the whole truth — not delivered after their manner.” He commits to delivering the whole truth and immediately shifts to talking about how he’ll deliver it (not in a fancy oration), not what the truth actually is. The

delivery method is being discussed instead of the content. Style is standing in for substance.

8. EXCESS: Is there more here than the argument requires?

The “they told you to beware my eloquence” section runs longer than necessary. A more efficient move: “they warned you about my eloquence; I have none; you’ll see.” He takes several sentences to redefine “eloquence.” The extended engagement with the accusers’ term seems disproportionate to its importance in the charges. The charges are impiety and corrupting the youth. He’s spending his opening on a meta-argument about rhetorical style. Unless the meta-argument is the argument? Unless how he speaks is inseparable from what he’s defending?

These sample annotations are not finished and run long. Some are deliberately left open. The question “Unless that’s the point?” is not a conclusion. It’s the beginning of the real question. Annotations that end with unresolved tension are usually the most useful ones to bring to class.

The Foundational Skill: CER

Claim, Evidence, Reasoning is the minimum unit of a written argument. Every paragraph you write — in every sprint — should contain all three. CER is not a formula for mechanical writing. It’s a diagnostic: if you can’t point to your claim, your evidence, and your reasoning in a paragraph, the paragraph isn’t arguing anything yet.

Move	What it is	How to check it
Claim	A debatable assertion — a sentence a reasonable person could disagree with.	Could someone reasonably disagree? If not, it’s a fact, not a claim.
Evidence	One specific, citable piece of textual support — a quotation or a paraphrase with a section number.	Is it specific enough to point to on the page? A summary of “the whole argument” is not evidence.
Reasoning	The “because” and “therefore” that connects the evidence to the claim. This is the part most often left out.	Write at least two sentences. If your reasoning is shorter than your evidence, it’s underdeveloped.

Worked Example

Claim: The impiety charge doesn’t meet a basic evidentiary standard — it’s a political grievance dressed in religious language.

Evidence: Under cross-examination, Meletus claims in the same breath that Socrates believes in no gods and that he introduces new ones. Both cannot be true.

Reasoning: An internally contradictory charge can’t survive real scrutiny. Meletus can’t say what Socrates actually believes, which suggests the charge wasn’t built from evidence — it was built to give a legally usable shape to a grievance that couldn’t be prosecuted directly.

Disciplinary Teams

In Week 1 or 2, you'll form a team of three to four students, self-selected, fixed for the whole semester. Individuals don't need to share a major — a future nurse, a future urban planner, and a future paralegal on one disciplinary team is a strength, not a problem.

Weeks 1–6, your team's job is lighter: reading partners and accountability. Starting Week 7, the team takes on its full role — the human version of the tasks people are often tempted to outsource to AI:

- Thinking partners — present your argument out loud; they find its weakest point; you respond in writing.
- Research orientation — explain your framework to your team before you research it further. If they can't follow it, you don't understand it yet either.
- Annotation help — talk through a hard passage together; write the annotation yourself, afterward, in your own words.
- Revision feedback — hand over a draft; they tell you, in person, where the reasoning is unclear.

Teams meet during built-in workshop blocks, plus at least once outside class per sprint. Each team submits a one-paragraph team log with every sprint deliverable — who met, what was discussed, what changed as a result. Graded on completion, not outcome.

Team dysfunction: If your team stops functioning — a member disappears, refuses to engage, or actively undermines the work — say so to the professor. Don't wait for it to resolve itself. Each team submits an individual accountability note alongside the group log at every sprint: one sentence per member on what they actually contributed. If the notes disagree sharply, the professor will follow up individually before grading. A student who is absent from team work for two consecutive sprints without explanation may be graded on individual contribution only, separate from the team's shared work. This isn't a threat — it's the same principle as the rest of the course: say what's true, in writing, before it's too late to fix.

Choose Your Disciplinary Lens

Pick the lens whose framework makes your most pressing questions answerable. A good lens produces claims about the trial you couldn't make without it — if it only confirms what you already saw, it's decoration, not analysis. You'll work individually but meet regularly in a disciplinary group of three to five to pressure-test each other's readings. LEAPH (Lab for Engaged, Applied, and Public Humanities, Room 370 EEST) is available for interdisciplinary support.

Medical Humanities: The Sickness of the Body Politic

A doctor looks for symptoms to figure out what is happening inside a body. This lens treats a society the same way. When a city punishes people who tell uncomfortable truths, what does that reveal about the city itself? Socrates' trial can be read as a diagnosis of Athens. Instead of listening to criticism and correcting mistakes, the city treats criticism as the

problem. The question is not whether Socrates was popular with the youth. It is whether a healthy democracy ought to punish someone for asking difficult questions. A city that prosecutes its critics is showing symptoms. This lens treats Athens as a patient and asks what a healthy immune response — a healthy democracy — would have looked like instead. The same failure mode shows up wherever inconvenient truths gets relabeled as criminal: corporate governance, regulatory capture, whistleblower management.

Driving Questions

- What does the prosecution of Socrates reveal about the health of Athens?
- When does labeling someone “dangerous” become a political tool?
- How have medical or psychological labels been used to silence people?
- How does storytelling influence who gets help and who gets ignored?
- What happens to public health when governments suppress dissent?
- If Athens were a patient, diagnose its symptoms?
- How can institutions protect critics from political pressure?
- What data might show that a democracy is becoming unhealthy?

Applies especially to: medicine, nursing, PA, public health, health administration, health informatics

Keywords: narrative medicine, medicalization of dissent, political pathology, body politic, institutional accountability, political repression

Neuro-Narratives: *The Daimon’s Voice*

Socrates says his inner voice, or *daimon*, warns him when he is about to do something wrong. Many Athenians saw this as strange and suspicious. The jury hears this as evidence of impiety, perhaps as atheism. This lens asks: what if unusual ways of thinking can provide valuable insights? What kind of institution would need to exist to receive that othered voice as knowledge instead as an abnormality and to notice a sharper irony: the men prosecuting Socrates are the ones he embarrassed in public? The real issue may not be Socrates’ inner voice. It may be that he challenged powerful people and exposed their weaknesses. What happens when institutions dismiss people because they think, communicate, or understand the world differently?

Driving Questions

- What might Socrates’ daimon represent?
- What is the daimon communicating that the jury can’t hear as evidence?
- Why does the jury dismiss it instead of considering it?
- What civic capacity is lost when society silences people who think differently?
- How do we distinguish difference from disability?
- What would a neurodiversity-friendly institution look like?
- How do legal systems treat people whose communication styles differ from the norm?
- How does technology and the media reinforce majority assumptions?

- How can archives preserve voices institutions would rather ignore?

Applies especially to: psychology, counseling, Applied Behavior Analysis, law, social work, data science, AI/UX, library and information science

Keywords: neurodiversity, epistemic injustice, testimonial injustice, whistleblowing, cognitive difference, institutional norms, democratic participation

Institutional Failure: The Tyranny of the Majority

Socrates was convicted and executed through a legal process. Is it the problem that a trial can follow every rule and still produce a bad outcome? Athens ran a lawful process — the jury voted, the law was followed — but its media culture had already convicted him. The institution rewarded flattery and punished honest speech. Consider Athens as a workplace. Socrates played the role of an internal critic or auditor: he found problems and named them out loud. Instead of using what he found, the organization removed him. That’s the gap this lens examines — not whether the rules were followed, but whether the culture could tolerate someone following them honestly. A legitimate process can produce an illegitimate outcome. That gap, between what an institution claims to value and how it actually behaves, is where the real story lives.

Driving Questions

- What cultural and structural factors led to Socrates’ conviction?
- What cultural conditions made this verdict predictable rather than exceptional?
- Was the verdict legal, legitimate, both, or neither?
- Where did real power exist in Athens, versus where it’s supposed to live?
- How do organizations silence criticism while following official rules?
- What structural safeguards can protect unpopular voices?
- How do institutions drift away from their stated values?
- What would evidence of institutional failure look like?

Applies especially to: business, management, HR, law, criminal justice, public policy, political consulting, data analytics

Keywords: psychological safety, democratic legitimacy, institutional capture, motivated reasoning, groupthink, manufactured consent, organizational culture, accountability

Philosophy: The Unexamined State Is Not Worth Living In

Socrates advocates for the examined life — separating what you actually know from what you merely believe. This is the idea behind the famous phrase: “The unexamined life is not worth living.” This lens asks whether Socrates’ approach works in the real world. Is it worth telling the truth when it is unpopular? Should you adapt to the people in power or stay loyal to your principles? Every profession faces a version of this. This lens doesn’t ask

whether he's right. It asks whether his framework works, and what it costs to apply it when an institution that rewards the opposite.

Driving Questions

- Was Socrates courageous, stubborn, or both?
- Was his refusal necessary or foolish?
- Should he have changed his approach to survive?
- What does his refusal of exile tell us about integrity?
- How do organizations discourage honest self-examination?
- What does ethical leadership look like? What does unethical leadership look like?
- How do professionals balance honesty with effectiveness? What if they don't?
- Can AI systems be designed to recognize ethical concerns?
- How do you challenge harmful assumptions without imposing your own beliefs?

Applies especially to: philosophy, business/product, organizational leadership, engineering, counseling/coaching.

Keywords: the examined life, integrity, professional ethics, moral courage, critical thinking, belief revision, Socratic method, ethical leadership, framework-dependent reasoning, principled refusal vs. paralysis, Socratic method at work

Narrative Control: Who Gets to Shape Reality?

Before Socrates entered the courtroom, many Athenians already believed a fake news story about him. Rumors, jokes, and public accusations shaped his reputation for years. Socrates tells the jury he's already lost — not because the charge is true but because the prejudice is old, built over decades by accusers who aren't even in the room. This is a narrative-management problem, not an evidence problem: once he's been named "impious" and "corruptor," those labels decide what the jury hears. This lens focuses on how stories influence belief. Once someone is labeled "dangerous," "corrupt," an "atheist," or "unpatriotic," those labels can shape how every future action is interpreted. The trial becomes less about evidence and more about a narrative that already exists.

Driving Questions

- How did public narratives, rather than evidence, shape the trial before it began?
- Who had the authority or power to define who Socrates was?
- Why is it so difficult to change people's minds once a story takes hold?
- How does control of information affect civil society and democracy?
- Where is the line between persuasion and manipulation?
- How do modern algorithms amplify certain narratives?
- How can investigators detect deception when the problem is the story itself?
- How do we evaluate sources when accounts are incomplete or biased?

Applies especially to: communications, advertising/brand, journalism, cybersecurity/policy, accounting/forensic audit.

Keywords: propaganda, manufactured consent, disinformation, naming as political act, algorithmic amplification, narrative control, information ecosystems, labeling, media literacy, reputation management

The Sprint Arc

The semester runs in four sprints. Each builds on the last. No single sprint determines your grade — the portfolio, where all are revised and assembled, is where you make your closing argument.

Late work: Deadlines matter because your peers are often the next people to use your work — a peer review, a workshop, a team log all depend on something existing on time. **Late work** turned in within 48 hours of the deadline **loses 10 percent per day**. After 48 hours, the professor decides case by case whether to accept it, and lateness may mean missing the peer feedback that would have improved it. Contact the professor before the deadline, not after — a five-minute heads-up before something is due is worth more than a good excuse after.

Feedback: Not all feedback in this course comes from the professor, and it isn't supposed to. Your team, your disciplinary group, and your peer reviewers are doing real evaluative work — reading your argument, testing its weak points, telling you what isn't landing. The professor is one more reader responding to your argument, not the final word on whether it's correct. Grades come from the professor; feedback comes from the room. Treat every round of it, from any source, as evidence to use in revision.

Sprint	Driving Question	Core Skill
1 · Source Credibility: The Criminal Charge (Wks 1–3)	Can we trust this source — and should we act on what we can't verify?	Stasis theory + credibility matrix
2 · The Performance Problem (Wks 4–6)	Is this a performance, a breakdown, or something harder to classify?	Observation vs. inference; differential analysis
3 · Three Decisions, One Institution (Wks 7–10)	When is principled refusal justified, and what did the institution owe the people it failed?	Declaring a discipline; applying a framework to a verdict and an institution
4 · Who Tells the Story (Wks 11–13)	Who gets to tell this story, and what does the narrator's position do to the truth?	Narrative authority and deliberate framing

Sprint 1 — The Criminal Charge (Weeks 1–3)

Sprint 1 deliverables due on Canvas Mon, Sep 7.

For Th 8/27: Read and annotate the *Apology*: 17a–28a (the formal charge, response to old accusers through the cross-examination of Meletus)

Driving question:

Can we trust this source, and should we act on what we can't verify?

What if the criminal charge against Socrates is unverifiable, politically motivated, and self-contradicting? That's a situation intelligence analysts, journalists, legal investigators, and risk professionals face: how do you act if the evidence is incomplete or biased, the source has an obvious stake, or getting it wrong is costly or irreversible?

Sprint 1 uses **stasis theory**, a framework from classical rhetoric used in debate and in courtrooms today, to find the exact point of disagreement in a contested claim. Before you can argue a case, you have to know which question is actually in dispute.

Stasis	Question	Applies here
Conjecture	Does it exist? Did it happen?	Did Socrates do what's alleged? Is there a case at all?
Definition	How do we define the terms?	What do "impiety" and "corruption" actually mean? Do the definitions survive scrutiny?
Quality	How serious is it?	Even if true, is this a crime? What kind? Is the harm real and traceable to Socrates?
Policy	What should be done?	What should an institution do with this situation? (This is your evidence brief.)

Professional Roles

Each member of a disciplinary group occupies a different role. The same charge looks different depending on who is evaluating it and what evidentiary standard their field requires.

- Intelligence analyst: national security, corporate intelligence, competitive intelligence
- Investigative journalist: fact-checking, source verification, accountability reporting
- Legal investigator: evidentiary standards, chain of custody, admissibility
- Risk analyst: corporate due diligence, political risk assessment

Deliverable 1 — Source Credibility Matrix (250–300 words)

A structured paragraph assessing the charge on four dimensions, in order:

- Corroboration — Is there independent evidence, beyond the accusers, that this happened? (conjecture)
- Consistency — Does the charge contradict itself or other known facts? (definition)
- Motive — Do the accusers have a personal or political stake that would justify distortion? (quality)
- Stakes of Error — What happens if the charge is false and you act on it anyway? (policy)

Deliverable 2 — Evidence Brief (400 words)

A short professional memo, written in your role, to a specific decision-maker — not to your professor.

- Header: TO / FROM / RE / DATE.
- Summary (1–2 sentences): your conclusion, stated first.
- Findings (3–4 bullets): one credibility dimension each, in compressed CER.
- Assessment (1 paragraph): overall verdict — what would have to be true for this charge to justify action?
- Recommendation (1–2 sentences): what your role requires you to do next.

What we're grading	Strong (A)	Proficient>Developing>Incomplete
CER	Every finding is a debatable claim + specific evidence + 2+ sentences of reasoning.	Evidence is present but claims read as facts, or reasoning is missing.
Stasis mapping	Each dimension is explicitly tied to a stasis and applied, not just labeled.	Stasis terms appear but aren't doing real work.
Credibility matrix	All four dimensions use specific textual evidence; the verdict follows from the analysis.	A dimension is missing, or the verdict doesn't match the analysis.
Evidence brief	Professional format, conclusion first, CER-based findings, a recommendation that follows from the assessment.	Format is ignored or findings read as plot summary.

Sprint 2 — The Performance Problem (Weeks 4–6)

Sprint 2 deliverables due on Canvas Mon, Sep 28.

Read and annotate 28b–35d (the philosophical mission, the oracle story, the gadfly speech, the refusal to bring his family to beg for pity)

Driving questions: Is this a performance, a breakdown, or something harder to classify — what do we do? Socrates refuses to flatter the jury. Is that a principled stand, a genuine account of his mission, or something closer to provoking his own death sentence? Clinical psychology, HR, and organizational behavior all have protocols for exactly this situation: someone is behaving unusually, the cause is contested, and someone in authority needs a written recommendation — without letting their own desires decide the answer in advance.

Professional Roles: Each Member of a Group Should Occupy a Different Role

- Clinical psychologist; HR director (assessment, differential diagnosis, employee assistance)
- Organizational behavior consultant (performance management, engagement analysis)
- Business psychologist (talent management, disengagement diagnosis)
- Risk analyst (behavioral assessment, insider threat evaluation)

Deliverable A — Observation Log (150–200 words): Three entries, each with four parts:

1. The gadfly/mission speech (30e–31c)
2. His refusal to stop philosophizing even under threat (29c–30c)
3. His refusal to bring his family to beg for pity (34c–35d)

Use only observational verbs — *said, stated, appeared, moved, responded, declined*. No interpretation in the observation itself.

1. Date/Section — where in the speech, and what surrounds it.
2. Observed Behavior — what he said or did, in neutral language.
3. Context — who was present, what preceded this, what the circumstances were.
4. Interpretive Note — one sentence naming what’s still ambiguous, not what you’ve concluded.

Deliverable B — Differential Assessment Memo (500 words)

Present a differential assessment memo containing **two competing interpretations** of Socrates’ behavior with equal rigor. Use clinical hedging throughout — *consistent with, may indicate, warrants further assessment*. You are a professional, not a critic delivering a verdict.

Header (TO/FROM/RE/DATE)

Addressed to a specific decision-maker in your role — a department chair, a case supervisor, a risk committee — not to your professor. Subject line names the case, not the assignment.

Executive Summary (40–60 words)

State your conclusion and your confidence level before any evidence appears. A reader should be able to stop after this paragraph and know your assessment. Name your confidence explicitly — “low confidence,” “moderate confidence” — rather than implying it through hedged language alone.

Overview of the Case (5–7 sentences)

Neutral background: who is being assessed, in what setting, under what circumstances, and what triggered the referral or review. No interpretation here — this section exists so a reader unfamiliar with the case can follow what comes next.

Differential Assessments: A vs. B (200–250 words)

Two competing readings of Socrates’ behavior, each built in full CER — claim, evidence, reasoning — regardless of which one you personally find more convincing.

Interpretation A might read his refusal to flatter as principled integrity under pressure; Interpretation B might read the same behavior as impaired judgment, self-sabotage, or provocation.

Give both the same word count and the same evidentiary weight. If one interpretation gets three sentences and the other gets nine, the memo has already tipped its hand before the assessment section.

Evidence Reliability (60–80 words)

Step back from the interpretations themselves and assess the evidence base. Where does bias enter — yours, the source text’s, the original jurors’? What’s direct evidence (his own stated words) versus circumstantial (how others reacted, what the outcome was)? Name what’s missing that would make either interpretation more certain.

Final Assessment (60–80 words)

Name the more defensible interpretation and state explicitly why it outweighs the other — not just that it does. Close by naming what remains genuinely uncertain. A memo that resolves all uncertainty at the end contradicts the hedged register you’ve held throughout; leave the residue of doubt a professional would actually report.

What we’re grading	Strong (A)	Proficient>Developing>Incomplete
Observation log	Inference-free observations; hedged, text-specific interpretive notes.	Observation and inference are blended together; notes are missing or vague.
Differential memo	Both interpretations argued with equal force; recommendation is procedural and proportionate.	One interpretation gets a fraction of the other’s development.

Sprint 3 — Three Decisions, One Institution (Weeks 7–10)
Sprint 3 deliverables due on Canvas Mon, Oct. 26. Draft Discipline Declaration due Th, Oct. 15; final declaration due with Sprint 3 deliverables Oct. 26.

Re-read, read, and annotate 29c–38b (the penalty proposal, Socrates’ counter-assessment).

Driving Question: When is principled refusal justified, who bears the consequences, and what did the institution owe the people it failed?

The *Apology* presents three decisions made by Socrates. Each can be defended. Each also contributes to his execution. **Choose one decision to evaluate through a disciplinary lens.** The same lens that helps you judge Socrates’ choice should also help you diagnose what Athens got wrong.

Step 1: Choose Your Decision (*no submission — this choice feeds directly into Step 2*)
The *Apology* presents three decisions made by Socrates. Each can be defended. Each also contributes to his execution. **Choose one** to evaluate through a disciplinary lens. The same lens that helps you judge Socrates’ choice should also help you diagnose what Athens got wrong.

Decision 1 — Refusing the Deal: Before formal prosecution, Socrates is offered a deal: stop practicing philosophy publicly and avoid prosecution. He refuses. Is refusing to compromise a professional or civic obligation, or principle taken too far?

Decision 2 — The Penalty Proposal: After being found guilty, Socrates proposes that Athens house and feed him as a public benefactor rather than exile or punishment. Moral courage, strategic miscalculation, or a deliberate choice of death over compromise?

Decision 3 — Refusing to Flatter: Throughout the *Apology*, Socrates refuses the normal performance of courtroom humility — no begging, no appeal to pity, no family brought in to sway the jury. Integrity under pressure, or a failure to understand the institution he’s facing?

Step 2: Declare Your Discipline — Draft Due Week 9 (Th, Oct. 15)

Now that you’ve chosen a decision, declare the framework you’ll use to evaluate it. A lens name alone isn’t enough — and your declaration should name the decision from Step 1 directly, since every part of it follows from that choice.

Your declaration identifies:

- Your disciplinary lens
- Your specific sub-framework
- Two or three conceptual tools
- One preliminary claim — about the decision you chose
- The sections of the text you plan to analyze — in relation to that decision

Too broad: Philosophy. Institutional Failure. Narrative Control. Neuro-Narratives. Medical Humanities.

Precise: Professional ethics and moral courage. Democratic legitimacy and institutional capture. Naming as a political act and narrative framing. Epistemic injustice and neurodiversity. Political repression as a public health problem.

Format (100–150 words):

- a) Decision Under Review — which of the three you’re evaluating
- b) Declared Discipline — sub-framework, not just a lens name
- c) Conceptual Tools — 2–3 concepts from your lens
- d) Preliminary Claim — one arguable sentence about your chosen decision
- e) Primary Textual Evidence — at least two specific sections tied to that decision
- f) One-Sentence Connection — what your framework reveals that a plain reading misses

Example:

- a) Decision Under Review: Decision 3, Refusing to Flatter
- b) Declared Discipline: Institutional Failure lens, using psychological safety and organizational culture
- c) Conceptual Tools: Psychological safety; motivated reasoning; institutional legitimacy
- d) Preliminary Claim: Socrates was executed not because Athens lacked procedures but because its culture rewarded conformity and punished correction
- e) Primary Textual Evidence: *Apology* 17a–18a; 36a–36d; 38a–38c
- f) One-Sentence Connection: This framework reveals how a legally valid process can produce a predictable organizational failure.

Grading: on commitment and precision, not correctness.

Step 3: Week 9 Declaration Workshop

Come to class with a complete draft declaration. *Before class:* Read your declaration aloud. Apply three tests:

- **Sub-Framework Test** — Remove the conceptual tools section. Do you still have a specific framework?
- **Disagreement Test** — Could a reasonable reader disagree with your claim? If not, it’s a topic, not an argument.
- **Framework Test** — Do your conceptual tools produce a reading you couldn’t get without them?

In class:

- **Partner Exchange** — Read each other's declarations. Identify the conceptual tools. Identify the claim. Explain what the framework reveals.
- **Revision Round** — Revise unclear claims. Revise vague framework descriptions.
- **Cross-Lens Conversation** — Share your declared lens. Compare approaches with classmates in other disciplines. Identify productive tensions between lenses.

After class: Submit your final declaration through Canvas on **Mon, Oct 26**. Changing your framework after Week 9 requires instructor approval.

Step 4: Write the Discipline Brief (first full draft) Due Mon, Oct. 26

Everything after Week 9 builds from the declaration. Your brief does two jobs at once:

Job 1 — Reach a Verdict: Use your framework to evaluate one of the three Socratic decisions. *Job 2 — Diagnose the Institution:* Use that same framework to explain what Athens failed to do.

Length: 750 words. One continuous professional argument moving from a verdict on Socrates' decision to a diagnosis of Athens.

Sections:

1. **Governing Framework** (60–80 words) — name and explain your framework's core principle.
2. **Facts Under Review** (40–60 words) — neutral summary of the relevant events.
3. **Verdict Analysis** (200–250 words) — evaluate one decision using CER: claim, evidence, reasoning, strongest counterargument, clear verdict.
4. **Institutional Failures** (200–250 words) — identify two failures. For each: name a professional standard, cite a textual moment, recommend one concrete intervention.
5. **Implications** (80–100 words) — explain how your verdict and diagnosis fit together into one argument.

Sprint 4 — Who Tells the Story (Weeks 11–13)

Read and annotate 38c–42a (Socrates’ final words after the death sentence, his reflections on death, his request regarding his sons).

Driving question: Who gets to tell this story, and what does the choice of narrator do to the truth?

Plato tells one version. Xenophon tells another. Aristophanes told an earlier, damaging one. Narrative authority convicted Socrates before the trial began. Journalism, archival work, truth-commission practice, and corporate communications all wrestle with the same problem: who speaks determines what counts as evidence.

Professional Roles

Each member of a group occupies a different role:

- Journalist filing a public record or dispatch — narrative authority, evidentiary standards.
- Archivist or historian constructing an official account — selection, framing, institutional memory.
- Truth commission writer — transitional justice, witness testimony, historical accountability.
- Corporate communications or public relations professional — crisis narrative, brand recovery, post-incident framing.

Choose Your Form: Each role writes in a matching form.

- Journalist writes a Journalist’s Dispatch — third person, inverted-pyramid news style. Good for examining editorial choices: what leads, what’s cut, what’s framed as cause versus consequence.
- Archivist/historian writes an Official Commission Record — third person, bureaucratic register. Good for examining what a government record installs as the official version of events.
- Truth commission writer writes Truth Commission Testimony — first person witness statement, spoken as a juror, a student, or a bystander. Good for examining whose testimony gets received as credible, and whose doesn’t.
- PR/corporate communications professional writes a Crisis Communications Statement — third person, institutional voice, addressed to the public and press. Good for examining how an institution manages reputational damage after a decision it can’t undo — what gets framed as regrettable necessity versus failure.

Header Templates

- Journalist’s Dispatch: dateline, outlet name, byline.
- Official Commission Record: issuing office, case number, opening phrase “In the matter of.”
- Truth Commission Testimony: witness name and role, date of testimony, presiding body.

- **Crisis Communications Statement:** issuing organization, date, “Statement Regarding...” subject line.

Deliverable — Witness Statement or Public Record (500 words)

1. Document Header — matched to your chosen form, using the template above.
2. Account/Record Body (350–400 words) — deliberate choices about what to foreground, include, and omit.
3. Reflective Note (100–150 words, written as yourself, not in character) — name one deliberate inclusion and one deliberate omission, and what your narrator’s position makes harder to see.

Opening Lines by Form — Compare the Framings

These are models to study, not text to copy — write your own opening that makes its own deliberate framing choice. Each opening decides: who is named first, what is presented as cause, what as consequence, and whose authority the account serves.

Journalist’s Dispatch: Dateline: ATHENS — The Athenian democratic court voted 280 to 221 today to convict the philosopher Socrates of impiety and corruption of the youth, recommending death by hemlock.

Official Commission Record: This office, acting under the authority of the Athenian democratic assembly, hereby establishes the official record of proceedings in the matter of the People of Athens v. Socrates of Alopeke.

Truth Commission Testimony: I served on the jury that convicted Socrates. I give this account so the record shows what I saw, and what I still can’t explain about my own vote.

Crisis Communications Statement: The Athenian assembly acknowledges the conclusion of proceedings against Socrates of Alopeke and affirms its continued commitment to the lawful and orderly administration of civic justice.

What we’re grading	Strong (A)	Developing
Form & register	Correct header; register held consistently throughout.	Reads as a personal essay regardless of the form chosen.
Narrative account	Framing choices are visible and consistent with the narrator’s actual knowledge and position.	Plot summary in modern language; no visible framing choices.
Reflective note	Names a specific inclusion and omission and explains the political/rhetorical stakes of each.	Describes plot instead of analyzing narrative choices.

The Discipline Brief / White Paper (Capstone, 500–750 words)

Discipline Brief Rough Draft — Due Week 14 (Tuesday, Nov. 17)

Minimum 500 words. Bring two printed copies for peer review. This is a revision pass on your Oct. 26 draft — not a new document. Reshape the five-section structure from Sprint 3 into the capstone's four-section format (Problem Statement, Framework, Analysis, Recommendation) as you revise.

Discipline Brief, Final Revised — Due Week 15

500–750 words. Substantial revision required. Include a 150–200 word revision reflection.

The discipline brief is the argument your sprint work has been building toward — the kind of document a consultant, clinician, policy analyst, or communications director actually writes for an organization. Not an academic essay: a claim, a framework, an application, and a recommendation someone could act on.

Section	Length	What it does
Problem Statement	75–100 words	Ground the problem in one moment from the trial. Name your lens and tools. End on your central claim.
Framework	100–150 words	Explain 2–3 key concepts from your lens to a reader who doesn't know the field.
Analysis	200–300 words	Apply the framework using CER to two or three specific moments. Engage the strongest counterargument.
Recommendation	100–150 words	Name who should act, and what specific action your framework calls for. "Athens needs better deliberation" is not a recommendation; naming the specific mechanism and who installs it is.

Format: MLA 9th or Chicago Author-Date, declared in Week 9 and used consistently. Cite the *Apology* by section number (e.g., 17a, 36d). 12-pt Times New Roman, one-inch margins, double-spaced, section headers required.

Your Brief & Your Lens

Each lens follows the same underlying structure as the Discipline Brief format (500–750 words: Problem Statement, Framework, Analysis, Recommendation) — but the content of each section shifts by lens.

Medical Humanities: Write a health policy recommendation or diagnostic report.

Treat Athens as a patient. Identify what Socrates' prosecution reveals about the health of the society and its institutions. Explain whose voices are being treated as problems rather than sources of information, and recommend policies or practices that would create a healthier public culture.

- a) Problem Statement (75–100 words): Name the moment in the trial where Athens's institutional health is most visibly at stake. State your claim: what does Socrates's prosecution reveal about the society's health?
- b) Framework (100–150 words): Explain your 2–3 medical-humanities concepts (e.g., diagnostic framing, patient voice, institutional pathology) to a reader outside the field.
- c) Analysis (200–300 words): Treat Athens as the patient. Use CER to show whose voices were treated as symptoms/problems rather than as sources of information. Engage the strongest counterargument — that the city acted to protect its own health, not suppress it.
- d) Recommendation (100–150 words): Name a specific policy or practice that would produce a healthier public culture. Name who adopts it.

Neuro-Narratives: Write a practice guideline or institutional recommendation.

Analyze how Socrates' way of thinking, communicating, or understanding the world was received by Athens. Identify where difference was mistaken for deficiency and explain what was lost because of it. Recommend institutional designs, policies, or practices that would better recognize and support diverse ways of knowing.

- a) Problem Statement (75–100 words): Identify a specific moment where Socrates's way of thinking or communicating was received by Athens as deviant. State your claim.
- b) Framework (100–150 words): Explain your 2–3 concepts (e.g., neurodivergence, epistemic injustice, deficit framing vs. difference framing).
- c) Analysis (200–300 words): Use CER to show where difference was mistaken for deficiency, and what was lost as a result. Address the counterargument that Athens had legitimate cause for concern regardless of how Socrates communicated.
- d) Recommendation (100–150 words): Name an institutional design or policy that would better recognize and support diverse ways of knowing. Name who implements it.

Institutional Failure: Write an organizational diagnostic or reform proposal.

Treat Athens as an organization that failed despite following its own procedures. Identify the structural, cultural, or leadership failures that produced the verdict. Explain the gap

between the institution's stated values and its actual behavior, and recommend reforms that could prevent similar failures.

- a) Problem Statement (75–100 words): Identify the specific procedural moment that looks legitimate on its face. State your claim about the gap between procedure and culture.
- b) Framework (100–150 words): Explain your 2–3 concepts (e.g., psychological safety, motivated reasoning, institutional legitimacy).
- c) Analysis (200–300 words): Use CER to identify the structural, cultural, or leadership failures that produced the verdict despite valid procedure. Address the counterargument that the process itself was fair.
- d) Recommendation (100–150 words): Name a specific reform that would close the gap between stated values and actual behavior. Name who installs it.

Philosophy: Write an ethics opinion or position paper.

Make a clear argument about what Socrates' case teaches about truth, integrity, justice, or moral responsibility. Apply a philosophical framework to the decisions made by Socrates, his accusers, or the jury. Explain what lessons professionals today can draw from the case.

- a) Problem Statement (75–100 words): Identify the specific decision or moment you're building your argument around. State your claim about truth, integrity, justice, or moral responsibility.
- b) Framework (100–150 words): Explain your 2–3 philosophical concepts (e.g., virtue ethics, civic duty, moral courage vs. moral rigidity).
- c) Analysis (200–300 words): Apply your framework using CER to the decisions of Socrates, his accusers, or the jury. Address the strongest counterargument to your position.
- d) Recommendation (100–150 words): Name the lesson professionals today should draw from the case, and what practice or standard it should change.

Narrative Control: Write a communications audit or information analysis.

Examine how stories, labels, and public perception shaped the outcome of the trial. Identify who controlled the narrative, how Socrates was framed, and why evidence struggled to overcome existing beliefs. Recommend ways institutions can build more reliable, transparent, and accountable information environments.

- a) Problem Statement (75–100 words): Identify a specific moment where narrative or framing shaped the outcome. State your claim about who controlled the story.
- b) Framework (100–150 words): Explain your 2–3 concepts (e.g., narrative authority, framing effects, evidentiary credibility).
- c) Analysis (200–300 words): Use CER to show how labels and public perception overrode evidence. Address the counterargument that the evidence itself, not the narrative, drove the verdict.
- d) Recommendation (100–150 words): Name a specific mechanism institutions could adopt to build more reliable, transparent information environments. Name who owns it.

Format for all five lenses: MLA 9th or Chicago Author-Date, declared Week 9, used consistently. Cite the *Apology* by section number. 12-pt Times New Roman, one-inch margins, double-spaced, section headers required.

Revision Notes and the Final Portfolio

Every sprint deliverable is preceded, when revised for the portfolio, by a short revision note (75–100 words): not what you changed, but what you now see that you didn't see when you first wrote it. "Revising the problem statement forced me to realize I had been describing the situation instead of making a claim about it" is a revision note. "I fixed some grammar" is not.

Substantial revision means a reconsidered argument, strengthened evidence, or restructured organization — not proofreading, not a bolted-on final sentence.

What Goes In the Portfolio, in Order

1. Reflective Portfolio Memo (300 words)
2. Sprint 1 deliverables, with revision note
3. Sprint 2 deliverables, with revision note
4. Sprint 3 deliverable, with revision note
5. Sprint 4 deliverable, with revision note
6. Final Discipline Brief, with revision reflection

The Reflective Portfolio Memo — Format and Guidelines

What it is not: A summary of assignments. Don't recap what Sprint 1, 2, 3, and 4 were. The reader doesn't need a syllabus recap — they need an account of what you actually learned to see.

Length: 300 words.

Audience: A future employer or colleague — not the instructor. Write as if this memo will be read by someone deciding whether to trust your judgment on a future project.

Header: TO / FROM / RE / DATE, professional register throughout.

What it must address, in some order:

1. **What your framework helped you see.** Name something about the trial, the institution, or the decisions that you couldn't have seen without your declared lens. Be specific — not "I learned a lot," but the actual insight the framework produced.
2. **Which deliverable surprised you most, and why.** Not which one you liked most — which one changed your thinking in a way you didn't expect going in.
3. **Where your argument changed most between draft and revision, and why.** Name the actual shift — a claim you abandoned, a piece of evidence that reversed your reading, a counterargument you had to concede.
4. **What you'd argue with six more weeks.** Name the unfinished edge of your thinking — not "I'd do more research," but the specific claim or complication you didn't have room to pursue.

5. **What you'll carry into your major.** Connect the semester's method — not the content — to your actual field of study.

What to avoid:

- Don't thank the instructor.
- Don't describe assignments in sequence ("First we did X, then Y").
- Don't hedge with vague praise ("This class taught me a lot about critical thinking"). Name the specific thing.

Grading emphasis: Specificity and self-awareness about your own intellectual movement over the semester — not polish, not comprehensiveness.

Public Forum Capstone Showcase (10 points)

The Public Forum Capstone Showcase is your "final exam" oral presentation. You deliver it during the final exam block, Dec. 7–11 (TBA).

Each student presents for five minutes, drawn directly from your Discipline Brief. No new research. No new arguments. You're presenting the case you already built.

Structure:

- Two minutes: your claim and framework.
- Two minutes: your strongest piece of evidence and the reasoning behind it.
- One minute: your recommendation.

Presentations run in lens order. Students working in the same discipline present back-to-back, so related arguments land together and the room can hear where frameworks agree, clash, or miss each other entirely.

Format: No slides. Bring a single printed page or note card. You may reference it — don't read from it.

Audience: You'll be told in advance whether the room includes outside listeners — other sections, faculty, or people from the LEAPH lab. That detail changes what "professional register" means for your delivery, so know it before you write your notes.

Grading: Worth 10 points of your final grade. Graded on clarity, command of your material, and adherence to the time structure — not performance polish.

Course Schedule

Week 1 — read and annotate *The Apology* 17a–24b for Weeks 1–3

T 8/18 — Jury Vote Reenactment + Course Orientation + Annotation Practice Introduced

Th 8/20 — CPS method; close-reading practice.

Week 2

T 8/25 — Credibility matrix introduced.

Th 8/27 — Cross-examination scene; stasis mapping workshop.

Week 3

T 9/1 — Credibility matrix workshop; CER structure.

Th 9/3 — Evidence brief drafting; peer share.

Sprint 1 deliverables due on Canvas Mon, Sep 7.

Week 4 — read and annotate *The Apology* 28b–35d for Weeks 4–6

T 9/8 — The performance problem; summary vs. analysis.

Th 9/10 — Observation log framework; motivated reasoning.

Week 5

T 9/15 — Differential memo structure; discipline preview.

Th 9/17 — Lens application; observation log drafting.

Week 6

T 9/22 — Observation log workshop; inference vs. observation.

Th 9/24 — Differential memo peer review.

Sprint 2 deliverables due on Canvas Mon, Sep 28.

Week 7 — Choose your decision (Step 1); re-read and annotate *The Apology* 29c–38b

T 9/29 — Three decisions introduced; ethics of refusal; stasis of quality.

Th 10/1 — Deep Dive Workshop: specific decision's textual evidence.

Week 8

T 10/6 — Three-decisions workshop; continued work on the decision/evidence, plus thesis drafting begins.

Th 10/8 — Institutional failure introduced; naming as political act. Jury Vote Reenactment, Moment Two (opening 15 minutes).

Week 9 — Declare your discipline (Step 2)

T 10/13 — Lens speed-dating (first 20 minutes); discipline declaration workshop; counterargument workshop: apply the three tests, partner exchange, revise.

Th 10/15 — Institutional-failure analysis; discipline brief introduced. Draft Discipline Declaration due in class.

Discipline Declaration (final) due on Canvas Mon, Oct. 19.

Week 10

T 10/20 — Ethics & Institutional Brief drafting; peer review.

Th 10/22 — Brief revision.

Sprint 3 Discipline Brief (first full draft) due on Canvas Mon, Oct. 26.

Week 11 — read and annotate *The Apology* 38c–42a for Weeks 11–13

T 10/27 — Narrative authority; who controls the story?

Th 10/29 — Witness statement form selection.

Week 12

T 11/3 — Witness statement drafting workshop.

Th 11/5 — Witness statement final workshop; brief peer review.

Witness Statement due Mon, Nov. 9.

Week 13

T 11/10 — Discipline brief rough drafting.

Th 11/12 — Revision planning.

Discipline Brief Rough Draft due Mon, Nov. 16.

Week 14

T 11/17 — Revision workshop; portfolio assembly.

Th 11/19 — Discipline brief final revision.

Week 15

T 11/24 — No class — Fall Break.

Th 11/26 — No class — Thanksgiving Day.

Week 16

T 12/1 — Final Portfolio Workshop.

Th 12/3 — Final Portfolio, Discipline Brief, and Reflective Memo due.


**Final Portfolio, Final Revised Discipline Brief, and Reflective Portfolio Memo
due Thurs, Dec. 3.**

Exam Week: Dec. 7–11 TBA

Final exam: Public Forum Capstone Showcase (five-minute slots per student, ordered by lens).

Plato

The Apology of Socrates



Background: Aristophanes, *The Clouds* (423 BCE)

Twenty-four years before the trial, Aristophanes staged his comedy, *The Clouds*. In it, a character named Socrates floats in a basket, worships clouds, and teaches students to cheat creditors. He charges a fee for making the worse argument seem to be the better one. This anti-intellectual caricature stuck. Athenian audiences were more familiar with Aristophanes' satirical version of Socrates as a charlatan-scientist, a teacher of sophistry, a corruptor of youth, and an impious mocker of the gods than with Socrates' actual methods.

This spoof of Socrates had lived in the jury's imagination for years, as Socrates says first at his trial. Tell a lie often enough, and it becomes the truth. Socrates cannot refute this propaganda jurors believed since they were children. Evidence rarely trumps a populist belief absorbed from pop culture. As Socrates says, his real accusers are not Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon. They are the stories told about him for decades. He's been parodied to fit a common bias against those who buck the status quo.

Consider what Aristophanes picked, what he exaggerated, what he left out, and why. Who in Athens gained the most from the picture he built? What kind of institution would need to exist to interrupt that picture before it became a verdict?

Some Aspects of Aristophanes' *The Clouds*

I. The Thinkery: Strepsiades, drowning in debt, comes to Socrates's school hoping to learn how to talk his way out of paying his creditors. He finds students bent over, faces to the ground, while Socrates himself hangs suspended overhead in a basket. The visual joke sets up Aristophanes's core argument: intellectual pursuits run counter to common sense. To those in ordinary life, intellectuals look absurd.

II. Socrates in the Basket: Socrates explains that he has to suspend himself in the air to study the sun properly: thought needs to rise above earth into thin air to see clearly. Aristophanes distorts a real feature of Socratic philosophy — that genuine understanding requires stepping back from ordinary perception — and stages it literally. The bit fits the bias that intellectuals think they're "better" than everyone else.

III. What the Thinkery Teaches: Aristophanes's Socrates tells Strepsiades to abandon the traditional gods for the gods of Chaos, of Clouds, and of the Tongue. This mocks Socrates, showing that beneath his thinking about cosmology isn't wisdom — it's sophistry, the ability to argue any side of anything regardless of what's true. The Clouds themselves are deified as gods by those who profit from ambiguity. A "school" is a place where good kids go to learn from teachers who practice trickery, evasion, and have a knack for talking in circles persuasively.

IV. The Pedagogy: Strepsiades enrolls, and Socrates promises to teach him to argue so well he can make the weaker case beat the stronger one. Strepsiades, still thinking in practical terms, asks whether that includes actual cheating. The disciple's answer collapses the distinction Strepsiades was trying to hold onto: the school doesn't teach persuasion and cheating separately. Cheating is the point. Persuasive speech is just how it gets delivered.

Background: Xenophon, *Apology* (c. 385 BCE)

Xenophon paints a different Socrates than Plato. Plato's Socrates is ironic, philosophically precise, committed to self-knowledge and the examined life for its own sake. Xenophon's cares more about practical advice and self-control. Asked whether he should prepare a defense, Xenophon's Socrates answers: hasn't he spent his whole life preparing one, by living guiltless of wrongdoing?

Xenophon shows Socrates deliberately inviting condemnation. His divine sign forbade him to plan a defense — a sign, he says, that the trial gave him a chance to end his life at the right moment and the easiest way, before old age set in and burdened his friends. He's seventy. His mind still works. He's done the math: dying now beats living longer, so he saw no need to prepare.

Xenophon emphasizes Socrates's *megalēgoria* — his tendency to speak highly of himself. Socrates claims he's never wronged anyone, never made anyone worse, never charged a fee, and benefited everyone he's dealt with. His defense against corrupting the youth is that no one who spent time with him ever turned from good practices to bad. Check the record.

Introduction to Plato's *Apology of Socrates*

We read *The Apology* now, in a politically polarized time where institutional trust is contested, rhetorical certainty gets weaponized, and the line between inquiry and dogmatic assertion has rarely mattered more. We consider it as a case file, not a literary artifact: a record of incompatible rhetorical and political methods colliding, with institutional authority and a human life at stake. Your job is to bring disciplinary precision to it — not to resolve it, but to weigh its consequences like a professional.

Read assigned sections as homework and complete your annotations. We'll read some sections aloud in class, instructor and students taking roles, to slow down and hear what the text says.

Socrates claims only to know that he knows nothing. He proceeds by question and dialogue, treats his accusers as people worth educating, and accepts the jury's verdict even while disputing the charge's legitimacy. His method is the course's method: inquiry over assertion, precision over confidence, accountability to evidence.

His accusers claim certainty. They proceed by assertion and repetition, frame inquiry itself as corruption, and mobilize fear and group identity instead of argument. Their method is what this course trains you to recognize and resist — not as a political position, but as a failure of reasoning. We're not looking for answers the text supplies. We're looking for questions it raises about power, institutional failure, and honest speech — questions you'll carry into your own careers. We weigh witnesses and the accused, conflicting evidence, institutional failure and democratic complicity. We build theories, test claims, and defend uncertain conclusions.

The Trial: Synopsis and Disciplinary Context

Athens, 399 BCE. The city survived catastrophe. The Thirty Tyrants, an oligarchic regime Sparta installed after Athens lost the Peloponnesian War, ruled eight months and killed 1500 citizens. Democracy returned, but amnesty shielded the oligarchs' crimes from prosecution.

Socrates, 70, spent his life asking powerful people to explain what they claimed to know with certainty. Three men charge him: Meletus, who believes the charge; Anytus, a politician Socrates embarrassed; and Lycon, a minor player. Amnesty blocks a direct political prosecution, so the accusers find a legal loophole with political intent. They cite Socrates' daimon, his inner voice, as evidence of atheism. Trained Sophists, they value rhetoric over truth. The fraud is the story told about Socrates, not what he taught. The charge: impiety and corrupting the youth.

That charge has thirty-year-old roots. Aristophanes' comedy *The Clouds* staged a fictional Socrates as a fraud. The caricature stuck. The jury carries that bias into the courtroom. Socrates can't cross-examine a playwright, and prejudice normalized over decades resists persuasion.

Socrates defends himself the way he always argued. He doesn't flatter the jury, doesn't weep, doesn't parade his children before them as custom expects. He examines premises and cross-examines Meletus, seemingly dismantling the charge. Then he explains why he

won't stop philosophizing, why exile solves nothing, and why Athens needs his criticism more than he needs to live.

The vote: 280 to 221, guilty — closer than his accusers expected. Socrates accepts it, still doing what he's always done: wondering, with the jury, about the true, the good, and the just. At the penalty phase, he proposes Athens house and feed him in the Prytaneum, the hall reserved for Olympic champions. The jury votes 360 to 141 for death.

In a related dialogue, *The Crito*, Socrates sits in prison. Crito has bribed guards to buy time and urges him to escape, citing their friendship, Socrates' children, and the trial's injustice. Socrates refuses. He has lived his whole life under Athens' laws and benefited from them; fleeing now, the moment the city rules against him, would betray that agreement. If the laws are unjust, the remedy is persuasion, not flight — he argued, he lost, and he won't now claim the process was invalid just because he dislikes the result. He drinks the hemlock and dies.

Reading Schedule

Weeks 1-3—17a-28a

Weeks 4-6—28b-35d

Weeks 7-10—29c-42a

Plato, *The Apology of Socrates*

(Translated by Benjamin Jowett)

Socrates: [17a] How you have felt, O men of Athens, at hearing the speeches of my accusers, I cannot tell; but I know that their persuasive words almost made me forget who I was—such was the effect of them; and yet they have hardly spoken a word of truth [alēthēs]. But many as their falsehoods were, there was one of them which quite amazed me—I mean when they told you to be upon your guard, and not to let yourselves be deceived [17b] by the force of my eloquence. They ought to have been ashamed of saying this, because they were sure to be detected as soon as I opened my lips and displayed my deficiency; they certainly did appear to be most shameless in saying this, unless by the

force of eloquence they mean the force of truth [alēthēs]; for then I do indeed admit that I am eloquent. But in how different a way from theirs! Well, as I was saying, they have hardly uttered a word, or not more than a word, of truth [alēthēs]; but you shall hear from me the whole truth [alēthēs]: not, however, delivered after their manner, in a set oration duly ornamented with words and phrases.

No indeed! [17c] but I shall use the words and arguments which occur to me at the moment; for I am certain that this is right, and that at my time of life I ought not to be appearing before you, O men of Athens, in the character of a juvenile orator—let no one expect this of me. And I must beg of you to grant me one favor, which is this—if you hear me using the same words in my defense which I have been in the habit of using, and which most of you may have heard in the agora, and at the tables of the money-changers, or anywhere else, [17d] I would ask you not to be surprised at this, and not to interrupt me. For I am more than seventy years of age, and this is the first time that I have ever appeared in a court of law, and I am quite a stranger to the ways of the place; and therefore I would have you regard me as if I were really a stranger, whom you would excuse if he spoke in his native tongue, [18a] and after the fashion of his country—that I think is not an unfair request. Never mind the manner, which may or may not be good; but think only of the justice [dikē] of my cause, and give heed to that: let the jury decide with their virtue [aretē] and the speaker speak truly [alēthēs].

And first, it's only right [full of *dikē*] that I reply to the older charges and to my first accusers, and then I will go to the later ones. [18b] For I have had many accusers, who accused me of old, and their false [non-*alēthēs*] charges have continued during many years; and I am more afraid of them than of Anytus and his associates, who are dangerous, too, in their own way. But far more dangerous are these, who began when you were children, and took possession of your minds with their falsehoods [non-*alēthēs*], telling of one Socrates, a wise [sophos] man, who speculated about the sky above, and searched into the earth beneath, and made the worse appear the better cause. [18c] These are the accusers whom I dread; for they are the circulators of this rumor, and their hearers are too apt to fancy that speculators of this sort do not believe in the gods. And they are many, and their charges against me are of ancient date, and they made them in days when you were impressible—in childhood, or perhaps in youth—and the cause when heard went by default, for there was none to answer. And, hardest of all, [18d] their names I do not know and cannot tell; unless in the chance of a comic poet. But the main body of these slanderers who from envy and malice have wrought upon you—and there are some of them who are convinced themselves, and impart their convictions to others—all these, I say, are most difficult to deal with; for I cannot have them up here, and examine them, and therefore I must simply fight with shadows in my own defense, and examine when there is no one who answers. I will ask you then to assume with me, as I was

saying, that my opponents are of two kinds—
one recent, [18e] the other ancient; and I hope
that you will see the propriety of my
answering the latter first, for these
accusations you heard long before the others,
and much oftener.

Well, then, I will make my defense, and I will
endeavor [19a] in the short time which is
allowed to do away with this evil opinion of
me which you have held for such a long time;
and I hope I may succeed, if this be well for
you and me, and that my words may find
favor with you. But I know that to accomplish
this is not easy—I quite see the nature of the
task. Let the event be as the god wills: in
obedience to the law [nomos] I make my
defense.

I will begin at the beginning, and ask what the
accusation is [19b] which has given rise to
this slander of me, and which has encouraged
Meletus to proceed against me. What do the
slanderers say? They shall be my prosecutors,
and I will sum up their words in an affidavit.
“Socrates does nothing that is just [dikē]; he
is a curious person, who searches into things
under the earth and in the sky, and he makes
the worse appear the better cause; [19c] and
he teaches the aforesaid doctrines to others.”
That is the nature of the accusation, and that
is what you have seen yourselves in the
comedy of Aristophanes; who has introduced
a man whom he calls Socrates, going about
and saying that he can walk in the air, and
talking a deal of nonsense concerning matters
of which I do not pretend to know either
much or little—not that I mean to say
anything disparaging of [literally: show no

tīmē toward] anyone who is wise [sophos] about natural philosophy. I should be very sorry if Meletus could lay that to my charge. But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with these studies. [19d] Very many of those here present are witnesses to the truth of this, and to them I appeal. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbors whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon matters of this sort. ... You hear their answer. And from what they say of this you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.

As little foundation is there for the report that I am a teacher, and take money; [19e] that is no more true [alēthēs] than the other. Although, if a man is able to teach, I honor him for being paid. There is Gorgias of Leontini, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own citizens [of the polis], by whom they might be taught for nothing, [20a] and come to them, whom they not only pay, but are thankful [full of kharis] if they may be allowed to pay them. There is actually a Parian wise man [sophos] residing in Athens, of whom I have heard; and I came to hear of him in this way: I met a man who has spent a world of money on the Sophists, Kallias the son of Hipponikos, and knowing that he had sons, I asked him: “Kallias,” I said, “if your two sons were foals or calves, there would be no difficulty in [20b] finding someone to put over them; we should hire a trainer of horses or a farmer probably who would improve and perfect [lit: make them more agathoi] them in

their own proper virtue and excellence [aretē]; but as they are human beings, whom are you thinking of placing over them? Is there anyone who understands human and political virtue [aretē]? You must have thought about this as you have sons; is there anyone?" "There is," he said. "Who is he?" said I, "and of what country? and what does he charge?" "Evenus the Parian," he replied; "he is the man, and his charge is five coins." Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he truly [alēthēs] [20c] has this knack, and teaches at such a modest charge. Had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind.

I dare say, Athenians, that someone among you will reply, "Why is this, Socrates, and what is the origin of these accusations of you: for there must have been something strange which you have been doing? All this great fame and talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, [20d] why this is, as we should be sorry to judge hastily of you." Now I regard this as a fair [dikaios] challenge, and I will endeavor to explain to you the origin of my 'name' and of this evil fame. Please to attend then. And although some of you may think I am joking, I declare that I will tell you the entire truth [alēthēs]. Men of Athens, this reputation of mine has come of a certain sort of wisdom [sophiā] which I possess. If you ask me what kind of wisdom [sophiā], I reply, such wisdom [sophiā] as is attainable by man, for to that extent I am inclined to believe that I am wise [sophos]; [20e] whereas the persons of whom I was speaking have a superhuman

wisdom [sophiā], which I may fail to describe, because I have it not myself; and he who says that I have, speaks falsely, and is taking away my character. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine. I will refer you to a witness who is worthy of credit, and will tell you about my wisdom [sophiā]—whether I have any, and of what sort—and that witness shall be the god of Delphi. You must have known Chaerephon; [21a] he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle [manteuesthai] to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him whether there was anyone wiser [more sophos] than I, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser [more sophos.] Chaerephon is dead himself, but his brother, who is in court, will confirm the truth of this story.

[21b] Why do I mention this? Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. When I heard the answer, I said to myself, “What can the god mean? and what is the interpretation of this riddle [ainigma]? For I know that I have no wisdom [sophiā], small or great. What can he mean when he says that I am the wisest [most sophos] of men? And yet he is a god and cannot lie; that would be against his nature [= themis does not allow it].” After a long consideration, I at last thought of a method of trying the question. I

reflected that if I could only find a man more sophos than myself, [21c] then I might go to the god with a refutation of the oracle [manteion] in my hand. I should say to him, “Here is a man who is more sophos than I am; but you said that I was the most sophos.” Accordingly I went to one who had the reputation of being wise [sophos] and observed to him—his name I need not mention; he was a politician whom I selected for examination—and the result was as follows: When I began to talk with him, I could not help thinking that he was not really sophos, although he was thought sophos by many, and more sophos still by himself; and I went and tried to explain to him that he thought himself sophos, but was not really sophos; [21d] and the consequence was that he hated me, and his enmity was shared by several who were present and heard me. So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good [agathos], I am better off than he is—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to be slightly more sophos than him. Then I went to another, who had still higher philosophical pretensions [dealing with sophiā], [21e] and my conclusion was exactly the same. I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him.

After this I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me—the word of the god, I thought, ought to be considered first.

And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. [22a] And I swear to you, Athenians, by the dog I swear!—for I must tell you the truth [alēthēs]—the result of my mission was just this: I found that the men most in repute were all but the most foolish; and that some inferior men were really wiser and better. I must perform for you the tale of my wandering [planē], just as if I had been laboring [poneîn] to achieve labors [ponoi] that I endured for this purpose: that the [god's] oracular wording [manteiā] should become impossible to refute. When I left the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, [22b] and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something. Will you believe me? I am almost ashamed to speak the true [alēthēs], but still I must say that there is hardly a person present who would not have talked better about their poetry than they did themselves. That showed me in an instant that not by wisdom [sophiā] [22c] do poets write poetry, but by a sort of genius and inspiration; they are like diviners [theo-mantis plural] or soothsayers who also say many fine [kala] things, but do not understand the meaning of them. And the poets appeared to me to be much in the same case [literally have the same pathos, experience]; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the most sophos of men in other things in which they were not sophos. So I departed, conceiving myself to be

superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.

At last I went to the artisans, [22d] for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine [kala] things; and in this I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were more sophos than I was. But I observed that even the good artisans fell into the same error [hamartia] as the poets; because they were good workmen they thought that they also knew all sorts of high matters, and this defect in them overshadowed their sophiā— [22e] therefore I asked myself on behalf of the oracle, whether I would like to be as I was, neither having their knowledge nor their ignorance, or like them in both; and I made answer to myself and the oracle that I was better off as I was.

[23a] This investigation has led to my having many enemies of the worst and most dangerous kind, and has given occasion also to many calumnies, and I am called sophos, for my hearers always imagine that I myself possess the sophiā which I find wanting in others: but the truth is, O men of Athens, that the god only is sophos; and in this oracle he means to say that the sophiā of men is little or nothing; he is not speaking of Socrates, [23b] he is only using my name as an illustration, as if he said, He, O men, is the most sophos, who, like Socrates, knows that his sophiā is in truth [alēthēs] worth nothing. And so I go my way, obedient to the god, and make inquisition into the sophiā of anyone, whether citizen or stranger, who appears to be sophos;

and if he is not sophos, then in vindication of the oracle I show him that he is not wise; and this occupation quite absorbs me, and I have no time to give either to any public matter of interest or to any concern of my own, [23c] but I am in utter poverty by reason of my devotion to the god.

There is another thing—young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord; they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me [= do a *mimēsis* of me], and examine others themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they soon enough discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing: and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me: [23d] they say that Socrates is someone who is most polluted, he corrupts young men—and then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected—which is the truth: [23e] and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me

on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen; [24a] Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of this mass of calumny all in a moment. And this, O men of Athens, is the truth [alēthēs]; I have concealed nothing, I have dissembled nothing. And yet I know that this plainness of speech makes them hate me, and what is their hatred but a proof that I am speaking the truth [alēthēs]?—this is the occasion and reason of their slander of me, [24b] as you will find out either in this or in any future inquiry.

I have said enough in my defense against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class, who are headed by Meletus, that good [agathos] and patriotic man, as he calls himself. And now I will try to defend myself against them: these new accusers must also have their affidavit read. What do they say? Something of this sort: that Socrates commits wrong [a-dika] deeds, and corrupts the young men, [24c] and he does not believe in the gods that the state [polis] believes in, but believes in other things having to do with daimones of his own. That is the sort of charge; and now let us examine the particular counts. He says that I do no justice [dikē], but corrupt the youth; but I say, O men of Athens, that Meletus does no justice [dikē], and the evil is that he makes a joke of a serious matter, and is too ready at bringing other men to trial [agōn] from a pretended zeal and interest about matters in which he really never had the smallest interest. And the truth of this I will endeavor to prove.

Come here, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. [24d] You think a great deal about the improvement of youth [= how youth can be made more agathos]?

Meletus: Yes, I do.

Socrates: Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is. Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say. But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is.

Meletus: The laws [nomoi].

Socrates: [24e] But that, my good sir, is not my meaning. I want to know who the person is, who, in the first place, knows the laws [nomoi].

Meletus: The judges, Socrates, who are present in court.

Socrates: What do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth?

Meletus: Certainly they are.

Socrates: What, all of them, or some only and not others?

Meletus: All of them.

Socrates: By the goddess Hera, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience—do they improve them?

Meletus: [25a] Yes, they do.

Socrates: And the councilors?

Meletus: Yes, the councilors improve them.

Socrates: But perhaps the members of the citizen assembly corrupt them—or do they too improve them?

Meletus: They improve them.

Socrates: Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter? Is that what you affirm?

Meletus: That is what I strongly affirm.

Socrates: I am very unfortunate if that is true. But suppose I ask you a question: Would you say that this also holds true in the case of horses? [25b] Does one man do them harm and all the world good? Is not the exact

opposite of this true? One man is able to do them good, or at least not many—the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them? Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or any other animals? Yes, certainly; whether you and Anytus say yes or no, that is no matter. Happy [with good daimōn] indeed would be the condition of youth if they had one corrupter only, and all the rest of the world were their improvers. [25c] And you, Meletus, have sufficiently shown that you never had a thought about the young: your carelessness is seen in your not caring about matters spoken of in this very indictment.

And now, Meletus, I must ask you another question: Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones? Answer, friend, I say; for that is a question which may be easily answered. Do not the good [agathoi] do their neighbors good [agathon], and the bad do them evil?

Meletus: Certainly.

Socrates: [25d] And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend; the law [nomos] requires you to answer—does anyone like to be injured?

Meletus: Certainly not.

Socrates: And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you

allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?

Meletus: Intentionally, I say.

Socrates: But you have just admitted that the good [agathoi] do their neighbors good [agathon], and the evil do them evil. [25e] Now is that a truth which your superior wisdom [greater sophiā] has recognized thus early in life, and am I, at my age, in such darkness and ignorance as not to know that if a man with whom I have to live is corrupted by me, I am very likely to be harmed by him, and yet I corrupt him, and intentionally, too—that is what you are saying, and of that you will never persuade me or any other human being. But either I do not corrupt them, [26a] or I corrupt them unintentionally, so that on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law [nomos] has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; whereas you hated to converse with me or teach me, but you indicted me in this court, where the law [nomos] demands not instruction, but punishment.

I have shown, Athenians, as I was saying, [26b] that Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young. I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state

[polis] acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies [daimones] in their stead. These are the lessons which corrupt the youth, as you say.

Meletus: Yes, that I say emphatically.

Socrates: Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean! [26c] for I do not as yet understand whether you affirm that I teach others to acknowledge some gods, and therefore do believe in gods and am not an entire atheist—this you do not lay to my charge; but only that they are not the same gods which the city recognizes—the charge is that they are different gods. Or, do you mean to say that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism?

Meletus: I mean the latter—that you are a complete atheist.

Socrates: [26d] That is an extraordinary statement, Meletus. Why do you say that? Do you mean that I do not believe in the divinity of the sun or moon, which is the common creed of all men?

Meletus: I assure you, judges, that he does not believe in them; for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth.

Socrates: Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras; and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them

ignorant to such a degree as not to know that those doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras of Klazomenai, who is full of them. And these are the doctrines which the youth are said to learn of Socrates, when there are not infrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre (price of admission one drachma at the most); [26e] and they might cheaply purchase them, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father such eccentricities. And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god?

Meletus: I swear by Zeus that you believe absolutely in none at all.

Socrates: You are a liar, Meletus, not believed even by yourself. For I cannot help thinking, O men of Athens, that Meletus is full of insolence [hubris] and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado. [27a] Has he not compounded a riddle [ainigma], thinking to try me? He said to himself: "I shall see whether this sophos Socrates will discover my ingenious contradiction, or whether I shall be able to deceive him and the rest of them." For he certainly does appear to me to contradict himself in the indictment as much as if he said that Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods, and yet of believing in them—but this surely is an exercise in playfulness.

I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. [27b] And I must remind you that you are not

to interrupt me if I speak in my accustomed manner.

Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings? ... I wish, men of Athens, that he would answer, and not be always trying to get up an interruption. Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? or in reed-playing, and not in reed-players? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself. There is no man who ever did. But now please answer the next question: [27c] Can a man believe in things having to do with daimones, and not in the daimones themselves?

Meletus: He cannot.

Socrates: I am glad that I have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court; nevertheless you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in things related to daimones—things new or old, no matter—at any rate, I believe in things related to daimones, as you say and swear in the affidavit. But if I believe in things related to daimones, I must believe in daimones or gods themselves—is not that true? Yes, that is true, for I may assume that your silence gives assent to that. Now what are daimones? [27d] Don't we think that they are either gods or the children of gods?

Meletus: Yes, that is true.

Socrates: But this is just the ingenious riddle [ainigma] of which I was speaking: the daimones are gods, and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in daimones. For if the daimones are the illegitimate children of gods, whether by the Nymphs or by any other mothers, as is thought, that, as all men will allow, necessarily implies the existence of their parents. [27e] You might as well affirm the existence of mules, and deny that of horses and asses. Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been devised by you as a way to charge me. You have put this into the indictment because you had nothing real [alēthēs] of which to accuse me. But no one who has a particle of understanding will ever be convinced by you that the same man can believe in things having to do with daimones and gods, and yet not believe that there are daimones themselves [28a] and gods and heroes [hērōes].

I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus. Any elaborate defense is unnecessary; but as I was saying before, I certainly have many enemies, and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed; of that I am certain—not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good [agathos] men, and will probably be the death of many more; [28b] there is no danger of my being the last of them.

Perhaps someone might say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of pursuing such a goal in life, which is likely to cause you to die right

now? To him I would reply—and I would be replying justly [dikaiōs]: You, my good man, are not saying it well, if you think it is necessary for a man to calculate the risks of living or dying; there is little use in doing that. Rather, he should only consider whether in doing anything he is doing things that are just [dikaia] or unjust [adika], acting the part of a good [agathos] man or of a bad [kakos] one. Worthless men, |28c according to your view, would be the demigods [hēmi-theoi] who fulfilled their lives by dying at Troy, especially the son of Thetis [= Achilles], who so despised the danger of risk, preferring it to waiting for disgrace. His mother, goddess that she was, had said to him, when he was showing his eagerness to slay Hector, something like this, I think: My child, if you avenge the slaying of your comrade [hetairos] Patroklos and kill Hector, you will die yourself. “Right away your fate [potmos]”—she says—”is ready for you after Hector”. And he [= Achilles], hearing this, utterly despised danger and death, |28d and instead of fearing them, feared rather to live like a worthless [kakos] man, and not to avenge his friend. “Right away may I die next,” he says, “and impose justice [dikē] on the one who committed injustice [adikeîn], rather than stay behind here by the curved ships, a laughing stock and a heavy load for Earth to bear.” Do you think that he had any thought of death and danger? For wherever a man’s place is, whether the place which he has chosen or that in which he has been placed by a commander, there he ought to remain in the hour of danger; he should not think of death or of anything, but of disgrace. And this, O men of Athens, is a true saying [alēthēs].

Strange, indeed, would be my conduct, O men of Athens, [28e] if I who, when I was ordered by the generals whom you chose to command me at Potidaea and Amphipolis and Delium, remained where they placed me, like any other man, facing death; if, I say, now, when, as I conceive and imagine, the god orders me to fulfill the philosopher's mission of searching into myself and other men, [29a] I were to desert my post through fear of death, or any other fear; that would indeed be strange, and I might justly [with *dikē*] be arraigned in court for denying the existence of the gods, if I disobeyed the oracle [manteion] because I was afraid of death: then I should be fancying that I was *sophos* when I was not *sophos*. For this fear of death is indeed the pretence of *sophiā*, and not real *sophiā*, being the appearance of knowing the unknown; since no one knows whether death, which they in their fear apprehend to be the greatest evil [kakos], may not be the greatest good [agathos].

[29b] Is there not here conceit of knowledge, which is a disgraceful sort of ignorance? And this is the point in which, as I think, I am superior to men in general, and in which I might perhaps fancy myself more *sophos* than other men—that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether god or man, is evil [kakos] and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil.

[29c] And therefore if you let me go now, and reject the counsels of Anytus, who said that if I were not put to death I ought not to have been prosecuted, and that if I escape now, your sons will all be utterly ruined by listening to my words—if you say to me, “Socrates, this time we will not mind Anytus, and will let you off, but upon one condition, that are to inquire and speculate in this way any more, [29d] and that if you are caught doing this again you shall die;”—if this was the condition on which you let me go, I should reply: “Men of Athens, I honor and love you; but I shall obey the god rather than you,” and while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of philosophy, exhorting anyone whom I meet after my manner, and convincing him, saying: “O my friend, why do you who are a citizen of the great and mighty and sophos polis of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and [29e] honor [tīmē] and reputation, and so little about sophiā and truth [alēthēs] and the greatest improvement of the soul [psūkhē], which you never regard or heed at all? Are you not ashamed of this?” And if the person with whom I am arguing says: “Yes, but I do care;” I do not depart or let him go at once; I interrogate and examine and cross-examine him, and if I think that he has no virtue [aretē], but only says that he has, [30a] I reproach him with undervaluing the greater, and overvaluing the less. And this I should say to everyone whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien [xenos], but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren.

For this is the command of the god, as I would have you know; and I believe that to this day no greater good [agathos] has ever happened in the state than my service to the god. For I do nothing but go about persuading you all, old and young alike, [30b] not to take thought for your persons and your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of the soul [psūkhē]. I tell you that virtue [aretē] is not given by money, but that from virtue [aretē] come money and every other good [agathon] of man, public [= in the dēmos] as well as private. This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, my influence is ruinous indeed. But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth. Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; [30c] but whatever you do, know that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times.

Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an agreement between us that you should hear me out. And I think that what I am going to say will do you good: for I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I beg that you will not do this. I would have you know that, if you kill such a one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Meletus and Anytus will not injure me: they cannot; for it is not in the nature of things [themis] [30d] that a bad man should injure a better than himself. I do not deny that he may, perhaps, kill him, or drive him into exile, or deprive him of civil rights [literally: rob his tīmē]; and he may imagine, and others may

imagine, that he is doing him a great injury: but in that I do not agree with him; for the evil of doing as Anytus is doing—of unjustly [without *dikē*] taking away another man's life—is greater far. And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the god, or lightly reject his boon by condemning me.

[30e] For if you kill me you will not easily find another like me, who, if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech, am a sort of gadfly, given to the state by the god; and the state is like a great and noble steed who is tardy in his motions owing to his very size, and requires to be stirred into life. I am that gadfly which the god has given the state and [31a] all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. And as you will not easily find another like me, I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel irritated at being suddenly awakened when you are caught napping; and you may think that if you were to strike me dead, as Anytus advises, which you easily might, then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless the god in his care of you gives you another gadfly.

And that I am given to you by the god is proved by this: [31b] that if I had been like other men, I should not have neglected all my own concerns, or patiently seen the neglect of them during all these years, and have been doing yours, coming to you individually, like a father or elder brother, exhorting you to regard virtue [*aretē*]; this I say, would not be

like human nature. And had I gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in that: but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say [31c] that I have ever exacted or sought pay of anyone; they have no witness of that. And I have a witness of the truth [alēthēs] of what I say; my poverty is a sufficient witness.

Someone may wonder why I go about in private, giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. I will tell you the reason [aitiā] for this. You have often heard me speak [31d] of something related to the gods and to the daimones, a voice, which comes to me, and is the thing that Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This thing I have had ever since I was a child: it is a voice which comes to me and always forbids me to do something which I am going to do, but never commands me to do anything, and this is what stands in the way of being engaged in matters of the state. And rightly, as I think. For I am certain, O men of Athens, that if I had engaged in these matters, I would have perished long ago and done no good either to you [31e] or to myself. And do not be offended at my telling you the truth [alēthēs]: for the truth is that no man who goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly struggling against the commission of unrighteousness and wrong in the state, will save [sōzein] his life; [32a] he who will really fight for the right, if he would be safe [sōzein] even for a little while, must have a private life and not a public one [= one concerned with the dēmos].

I can give you as proofs of this, not words only, but deeds, which you value more [give more *tīmē* to] than words. Let me tell you a passage of my own life, which will prove to you that I should never have yielded to injustice from any fear of death, and that if I had not yielded I should have died at once. I will tell you a story—tasteless, perhaps, and commonplace, but nevertheless true [*alēthēs*]. [32b] The only office of state which I ever held, O men of Athens, was that of councilor; the tribe Antiochis, which is my tribe, had the presidency at the trial of the generals who had not taken up the bodies of the slain after the battle of Arginousai; and you proposed to try them all together, which was illegal [against the *nomos*], as you all thought afterwards; but at the time I was the only one of the Prytaneis who was opposed to the illegality, and I gave my vote against you; and when the orators threatened to impeach and arrest me, and have me taken away, and you called and shouted, [32c] I made up my mind that I would run the risk, having law [*nomos*] and justice [*dikē*] with me, rather than take part in your injustice because I feared imprisonment and death.

This happened in the days of the democracy. But when the oligarchy of the Thirty was in power, they sent for me and four others into the rotunda, and bade us bring Leon of Salamis, as they wanted to execute him. This was a specimen of the sort of commands which they were always giving with the view of implicating as many as possible in their crimes; [32d] and then I showed, not in words only, but in deed, that, if I may be allowed to

use such an expression, I cared not a straw for death, and that my only fear was the fear of doing an unrighteous [non-dikaios] or unholy thing. For the strong arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong; and when we came out of the rotunda the other four went to Salamis and fetched Leon, but I went quietly home. For which I might have lost my life, had not the power of the Thirty shortly afterwards come to an end. [32e] And to this many will witness.

Now do you really imagine that I could have survived all these years, if I had led a public life, supposing that like a good [agathos] man I had always supported the right and had made justice [dikē], as I ought, the first thing? [33a] No, indeed, men of Athens, neither I nor any other. But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private, and never have I yielded any base compliance to those who are slanderously termed my disciples or to any other. For the truth is that I have no regular disciples: but if anyone likes to come and hear me while I am pursuing my mission, whether he be young or old, he may freely come. Nor do I converse with those who pay only, [33b] and not with those who do not pay; but anyone, whether he be rich or poor, may ask and answer me and listen to my words; and whether he turns out to be a bad man or a good one, that cannot be my responsibility [aitiā], as I never taught him anything. And if anyone says that he has ever learned or heard anything from me in private which all the world has not heard, I should like you to know that he is speaking an untruth [non-alēthēs].

But I shall be asked, Why do people delight in continually conversing with you? [33c] I have told you already, Athenians, the whole truth [alēthēs] about this: they like to hear the cross-examination of the pretenders to wisdom [sophiā]; there is amusement in this. And this is a duty which the god has imposed upon me, as I am assured by oracles [manteia], visions, and in every sort of way in which the will of divine power was ever signified to anyone. This is true [alēthēs], O Athenians; or, if not true, would be soon refuted. [33d] For if I am really corrupting the youth, and have corrupted some of them already, those of them who have grown up and have become sensible that I gave them bad [kakos] advice in the days of their youth should come forward as accusers and take their revenge [= exact tīmē]; and if they do not like to come themselves, some of their relatives, fathers, brothers, or other kinsmen, should say what evil their families suffered at my hands. Now is their time. Many of them I see in the court. There is Crito, who is of the same age [33e] and of the same deme with myself; and there is Critobulus his son, whom I also see. Then again there is Lysanias of Sphettos, who is the father of Aeschines—he is present; and also there is Antiphon of Cephissus, who is the father of Epigenes; and there are the brothers of several who have associated with me.

There is Nicostratus the son of Theodotides, and the brother of Theodotus (now Theodotus himself is dead, and therefore he, at any rate, will not seek to stop him); and there is Paralus the son of Demodokos, who had a brother Theages; [34a] and Adeimantus the

son of Ariston, whose brother Plato is present; and Aeantodorus, who is the brother of Apollodorus, whom I also see. I might mention a great many others, any of whom Meletus should have produced as witnesses in the course of his speech; and let him still produce them, if he has forgotten—I will make way for him. And let him say, if he has any testimony of the sort that he can produce. Nay, Athenians, the very opposite is the truth. For all these are ready to witness on behalf of the corrupter, of the destroyer of their kindred, as Meletus and Anytus call me; [34b] not the corrupted youth only—there might have been a motive for that—but their uncorrupted elder relatives. Why should they too support me with their testimony? Why, indeed, except for the sake of truth and justice [dikaios], and because they know that I am speaking the truth [alēthēs], and that Meletus is lying.

Well, Athenians, this and the like of this is nearly all the defense that I have to offer. Yet a word more. [34c] Perhaps there may be someone who is offended at me, when he calls to mind how he himself, on a similar or even a less serious occasion [agōn], had recourse to prayers and supplications with many tears, and how he produced his children in court, which was a moving spectacle, together with a posse of his relations and friends; whereas I, who am probably in danger of my life, will do none of these things. Perhaps this may come into his mind, and he may be set against me, and vote in anger because he is displeased at this. [34d] Now if there be such a person among you, which I am far from affirming, I may fairly

reply to him: My friend, I am a man, and like other men, a creature of flesh and blood, and not of wood or stone, as Homer says; and I have a family, yes, and sons. O Athenians, three in number, one of whom is growing up, and the two others are still young; and yet I will not bring any of them hither in order to petition you for an acquittal. And why not? [34e] Not from any self-will or disregard of you [= not showing *tīmē*]. Whether I am or am not afraid of death is another question, of which I will not now speak. But my reason simply is that I feel such conduct to be discreditable to myself, and you, and the whole state. One who has reached my years, and who has a name for wisdom, whether deserved or not, ought not to debase himself.

[35a] At any rate, the world has decided that Socrates is in some way superior to other men. And if those among you who are said to be superior in wisdom [*sophiā*] and courage, and any other virtue, demean themselves in this way, how shameful is their conduct! I have seen men of reputation, when they have been condemned, behaving in the strangest manner: they seemed to fancy that they were going to suffer something dreadful if they died, and that they could be immortal if you only allowed them to live; and I think that they were a dishonor to the state, [35b] and that any stranger coming in would say of them that the most eminent men of Athens, to whom the Athenians themselves give honor [*tīmē*] and command, are no better than women. And I say that these things ought not to be done by those of us who are of reputation; and if they are done, you ought not to permit them; you ought rather to show

that you are more inclined to condemn, not the man who is quiet, but the man who gets up a doleful scene, and makes the city ridiculous.

But, setting aside the question of dishonor, [35c] there seems to be something wrong in petitioning a judge, and thus procuring an acquittal instead of informing and convincing him. For his duty is, not to make a present of justice [dikaios], but to give judgment [krinein]; and he has sworn that he will judge according to the laws [nomos], and not according to his own good pleasure; and neither he nor we should get into the habit of perjuring ourselves—there can be no piety in that. Do not then require me to do what I consider dishonorable [without dikē] and impious and wrong, [35d] especially now, when I am being tried for impiety on the indictment of Meletus. For if, O men of Athens, by force of persuasion and entreaty, I could overpower your oaths, then I should be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and convict myself, in my own defense, of not believing in them. But that is not the case; for I do believe that there are gods, and in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to the god I commit my cause, to be determined by you as is best [aristos] for you and me.

Socrates' Proposal for his Sentence (The jury casts a vote, and finds Socrates guilty. According to Athenian law, votes of conviction and votes of punishment were separate matters, with argument after each phase. Socrates' opponents pressed for the death penalty—they presumed that Socrates,

after his conviction, would offer a more lenient (and acceptable) counterproposal, such as a fine or exile. Socrates' famous response (below) stuns his opponents and the jury.)

[35e] There are many reasons why I am not grieved, O men of Athens, [36a] at the vote of condemnation. I expected it, and am only surprised that the votes are so nearly equal; for I had thought that the majority against me would have been far larger; but now, had thirty votes gone over to the other side, I should have been acquitted. And I may say that I have escaped Meletus. And I may say more; for without the assistance of Anytus and Lycon, [36b] he would not have had a fifth part of the votes, as the law requires, in which case he would have incurred a fine of a thousand drachmae, as is evident.

And so he proposes death as the penalty. And what shall I propose on my part, O men of Athens? Clearly that which is my due. And what is that which I ought to pay or to endure [paskhein]? What shall be done to the man who has never had the wit to be idle during his whole life; but has been careless of what the many care about—wealth, and family interests, and military offices, and speaking in the assembly, and magistracies, and plots, and parties. [36c] Reflecting that I was really too honest a man to follow in this way and be saved [sōzein], I did not go where I could do no good to you or to myself; but where I could do the greatest good privately to everyone of you, thither I went, and sought to persuade every man among you that he must look to himself, and seek virtue and wisdom

before he looks to his private interests, and look to the state before he looks to the interests of the state; and that this should be the order which he observes in all his actions. What shall be done to such a one?

[36d] Doubtless some good thing, O men of Athens, if he has his reward; and the good should be of a kind suitable to him. What would be a reward suitable to a poor man who is your benefactor, who desires leisure that he may instruct you? There can be no more fitting reward than maintenance in the Prytaneion¹, O men of Athens, a reward which he deserves far more than the citizen who has won the prize at Olympia in the horse or chariot race, whether the chariots were drawn by two horses or by many. [36e] For I am in want, and he has enough; and he only gives you the appearance of happiness [with good *daimōn*], and I give you the reality. And if I am to estimate the penalty justly [*dikaiōs*], [37a] I say that maintenance in the Prytaneion is the just return.

Perhaps you may think that I am braving you in saying this, as in what I said before about the tears and prayers. But that is not the case. I speak rather because I am convinced that I never intentionally wronged anyone, although I cannot convince you of that—for we have had a short conversation only; but if there were a law [*nomos*] at Athens, such as there is in other cities, [37b] that a capital cause should not be decided in one day, then I believe that I should have convinced you; but now the time is too short. I cannot in a

¹ The Prytaneion was a public building used to feed and maintain famous citizens / athletes.

moment refute great slanders; and, as I am convinced that I never wronged another, I will assuredly not wrong myself. I will not say of myself that I deserve any evil [kakos], or propose any penalty. Why should I? Because I am afraid of the penalty of death which Meletus proposes? When I do not know whether death is a good [agathos] or an evil [kakos], why should I propose a penalty which would certainly be an evil? Shall I say imprisonment?

[37c] And why should I live in prison, and be the slave of the magistrates of the year—of the Eleven? Or shall the penalty be a fine, and imprisonment until the fine is paid? There is the same objection. I should have to lie in prison, for money I have none, and I cannot pay. And if I say exile (and this may possibly be the penalty which you will affix), I must indeed be blinded by the love of life if I were to consider that when you, who are my own citizens, [37d] cannot endure my discourses and words, and have found them so grievous and odious that you would want to have done with them, others are likely to endure me. No, indeed, men of Athens, that is not very likely. And what a life should I lead, at my age, wandering from city to city, living in ever-changing exile, and always being driven out! For I am quite sure that into whatever place I go, as here so also there, the young men will come to me; and if I drive them away, their elders will drive me out at their desire: [37e] and if I let them come, their fathers and friends will drive me out for their sakes.

Someone will say: Yes, Socrates, but cannot you hold your tongue, and then you may go

into a foreign city, and no one will interfere with you? Now I have great difficulty in making you understand my answer to this. For if I tell you that this would be a disobedience to a divine command, and therefore that I cannot hold my tongue, [38a] you will not believe that I am serious; and if I say again that the greatest good of man is daily to converse about virtue [aretē], and all that concerning which you hear me examining myself and others, and that the life which is unexamined is not worth living—that you are still less likely to believe. And yet what I say is true, although a thing of which it is hard for me to persuade you. Moreover, I am not accustomed to think that I deserve any punishment [kakos]. [38b] Had I money I might have proposed to give you what I had, and have been none the worse. But you see that I have none, and can only ask you to proportion the fine to my means. However, I think that I could afford a coin, and therefore I propose that penalty; Plato, Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus, my friends here, bid me say thirty coins, and they will be the sureties. Well then, say thirty coins, let that be the penalty; for that they will be ample security to you.

The jury votes to condemn Socrates to death / Socrates' Comments on his Sentence

[38c] Not much time will be gained, O Athenians, in return for [= from the cause of, aitiā] the evil name which you will get from the detractors of the city [polis], who will say that you killed Socrates, a sophos man; for they will call me wise even although I am not

sophos when they want to reproach you. If you had waited a little while, your desire would have been fulfilled in the course of nature. For I am far advanced in years, as you may perceive, and not far from death. [38d] I am speaking now only to those of you who have condemned me to death. And I have another thing to say to them: You think that I was convicted through deficiency of words—I mean, that if I had thought fit to leave nothing undone, nothing unsaid, I might have gained an acquittal. Not so; the deficiency which led to my conviction was not of words—certainly not. But I had not the boldness or impudence or inclination to address you as you would have liked me to address you, weeping and wailing and lamenting, [38e] and saying and doing many things which you have been accustomed to hear from others, and which, as I say, are unworthy of me. But I thought that I ought not to do anything common or mean in the hour of danger: nor do I now repent of the manner of my defense, and I would rather die having spoken after my manner, than speak in your manner and live. For neither in war nor yet at law ought any man to use every way of escaping death. For often in battle there is no doubt that if a man will throw away his arms, and fall on his knees before his pursuers, [39a] he may escape death; and in other dangers there are other ways of escaping death, if a man is willing to say and do anything. The difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding death, but in avoiding unrighteousness; [39b] for that runs faster than death. I am old and move slowly, and the slower runner has overtaken me, and my accusers are keen and quick, and the faster runner, who is unrighteousness, has overtaken

them. And now I depart hence condemned by you to suffer the penalty of death, and they, too, go their ways condemned by the truth [alēthēs] to suffer the penalty of villainy and wrong [non-dikē]; and I must abide by my award—let them abide by theirs. I suppose that these things may be regarded as fated, and I think that they are well.

[39c] And now, O men who have condemned me, I want to prophesy to you; for I am about to die, and that is the hour in which men are gifted with prophetic power. And I prophesy to you who are my murderers, that immediately after my death punishment far heavier than you have inflicted on me will surely await you. Me you have killed because you wanted to escape the accuser, and not to give an account of your lives. But that will not be as you suppose: far otherwise. For I say that there will be more accusers of you than there are now; [39d] accusers whom hitherto I have restrained: and as they are younger they will be more severe with you, and you will be more offended at them. For if you think that by killing men you can avoid the accuser censuring your lives, you are mistaken; that is not a way of escape which is either possible or honorable; the easiest and noblest [kalos] way is not to be crushing others, but to be improving yourselves. This is the prophecy which I utter [manteuesthai] before my departure, to the judges who have condemned me.

[39e] Friends, who would have acquitted me, I would like also to talk with you about this thing which has happened, while the magistrates are busy, and before I go to the

place at which I must die. Stay then awhile,
 for we may as well talk [diamuthologeîn =
 speak through mūthos] with one another
 while there is time. [40a] You are my friends,
 and I should like to show you the meaning of
 this event which has happened to me. O my
 judges—for you I may truly call judges—I
 should like to tell you of a wonderful
 circumstance. In the past, the oracular
 [mantikē] art of the superhuman thing [to
 daimon] within me was in the habit of
 opposing me, each and every time, even
 about minor things, if I was going to do
 anything not correctly [orthōs]. But now that
 these things, as you can see, have happened to
 me—things that anyone would consider, by
 general consensus, to be the worst possible
 things to happen to someone— |40b the signal
 [to sēmeion] of the god [theos] has not
 opposed me, either as I was leaving my house
 and going out in the morning, or when I was
 coming up to this place of judgment, or as I
 was speaking. No, it has not opposed me
 about anything I was going to say, though on
 other occasions when I was speaking, it [= the
 signal] has often stopped me, even when I
 was in the middle of saying something. But
 now in nothing I either said or did concerning
 this matter has it opposed me. So, what do I
 take to be the explanation of this? I will tell
 you. Perhaps this is a proof that what has
 happened to me is something good [agathon],
 |40c and it cannot be that we are thinking
 straight [orthōs] if we think that death is
 something bad [kakon]. This is a great proof
 to me of what I am saying, since the signal [to
 sēmeion] that I am used to would surely have
 opposed me if I had been heading toward
 something not good [agathon].

Let us think about it this way: there is plenty of reason to hope that death is something good [agathon]. I say this because death is one of two things: either it is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness for the person who has died, or, according to the sayings [legomena], there is some kind of a change [meta-bolē] that happens—a relocation [met-oikēsis] for the soul [psūkhē] from this place [topos] to another place [topos]. Now if you suppose that there is no consciousness, |40d but a sleep like the sleep of someone who sees nothing even in a dream, death will be a wondrous gain [kerdos]. For if a person were to select the night in which he slept without seeing anything even in a dream, and if he were to compare with this the other days and nights of his life, and then were to tell us how many days and nights he had passed in the course of his life in a better and more pleasant way than this one, I think that any person—I will not say a private individual [idiōtēs], but even the great king— |40e will not find many such days or nights, when compared with the others. Now if death is like this, I say that to die is a gain [kerdos]; for the sum total of time is then only a single night. But if death is the journey [apo-dēmiā] to another place [topos], and, if the sayings [legomena] are true [alēthē], that all the dead are over there [ekeî], then what good [agathon], O jurors, [dikastai], can be greater than this? |41a If, when someone arrives in the world of Hādēs, he is freed from those who call themselves jurors [dikastai] here, and finds the true [alētheîs] judges [dikastai] who are said to give judgment [dikazein] over there [ekeî]—

Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aiakos and
 Triptolemos, and other demigods [hēmi-
 theoi] who were righteous [dikaiōi] in their
 own life—that would not be a bad journey
 [apo-dēmiā], now would it? To make contact
 with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and
 Homer—who of you would not welcome
 such a great opportunity? Why, if these things
 are true [alēthē], let me die again and again.
 |41b I, too, would have a wondrous activity
 [diatribē] there, once I make contact with
 Palamedes, and with Ajax the son of
 Telamon, and with other ancient men who
 have suffered death through an unjust [a-
 dikos] judgment [krisis]. And there will be no
 small pleasure, I think, in comparing my own
 experiences [pathos plural] with theirs.
 Further—and this is the greatest thing of all—
 I will be able to continue questioning those
 who are over there [ekeî], just as I question
 those who are over here [entautha], and
 investigating who among them is wise
 [sophos] and who among them thinks he is
 wise [sophos] but is not. Who would not
 welcome the great opportunity, O jurors
 [dikastai], of being able to question the leader
 of the great Trojan expedition; |41c or
 Odysseus or Sisyphus, or one could mention
 countless other men—and women too! What
 unmitigated happiness [eudaimoniā] would
 there be in having dialogues [dialegesthai]
 with them over there [ekeî] and just being in
 their company and asking them questions!
 And I say it absolutely: those who are over
 there [ekeî] do not put someone to death for
 this; certainly not. I say that because those
 who are over there [ekeî] are happier [eu-
 daimonesterōi] than those who are over here
 [entautha]. And they are already immortal

[athanatoi] for the rest of time, if in fact the sayings [legomena] are true [alēthē].

But even you, O jurors [dikastai], should have good hopes when you face death, and you should have in mind [dia-noeîsthai] this one thing as true [alēthes]: |41d that nothing bad [kakon] can happen to a good [agathos] person, either in life or when he comes to its completion [teleutân]. The events involving this person are not neglected by the gods [theoi]. Nor is it by chance that the events involving me have happened. Rather, this one thing is clear to me, that to be already dead and to be in a state where I am already released from events involving me was better for me. And it is for this reason that the signal [sêmeion] in no way diverted me from my path. Further, it is for this reason that I am not at all angry with those who accused me or with those who condemned me. Granted, it was not with this in mind that they accused me and condemned me, since they thought they were doing me harm, |41e and for this they deserve to be blamed. In any case, I ask them for only one thing. When my sons are grown up, I would ask you men to punish them [= my sons] and give them pain, as I have given you pain—if they seem to care about material things or the like, instead of striving for merit [aretē]. Or, if they seem to be something but are not at all that thing—then go ahead and insult them, as I am now insulting you, for not caring about things they ought to care about, and for thinking they are something when they are really worth nothing. And if |42a you do this, then the things I have experienced because of what

you have done to me will be just [dikaia]—
and the same goes for my sons.

But let me interrupt. You see, the hour [hōrā]
of departure has already arrived. So, now, we
all go our ways—I to die, and you to live.
And the question is, which one of us on either
side is going toward something that is better?
It is not clear, except to the gods.

