

PSCI 5810: Proseminar in International Relations
Fall 2010
Thursdays 2:00-4:50

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Course Objective

The fundamental aim of this course is to provide students with a broad background in the field of international relations as a means of developing the foundation necessary for taking preliminary exams and advanced coursework in international relations. This course will focus upon broad themes of international relations and only touch briefly upon topics like international political economy and international conflict that will receive more advanced treatment in advanced courses. As we will see in our studies, there is no single, unified theoretical or methodological approach to the study of international relations. As a result, we will parallel the diversity of approaches with one another, evaluating their strengths and weakness, deriving their assumptions, and deconstructing the causal mechanisms that they develop.

Readings

Course readings will come from a combination of books and journal articles. The books listed below are available at the university bookstore. Journal articles, in order to save students costs, are available electronically through the library. A few readings (noted by ***) are available from the instructor and will be made available at least one week in advance of their discussion.

Kenneth Waltz. 2010. *Theory of International Politics*. Waveland Press.

Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye. 2001. *Power and Interdependence*. Longman

Robert Axelrod. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. Basic Books

Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds. 2004. *Models, Numbers and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*. University of Michigan Press.

D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam. 2003. *The Behavioral Origins of War*. University of Michigan Press.

In order to aid you in estimating the reading load for a week, weeks in which a full book is assigned are highlighted.

Class Meetings

This course will be conducted in a seminar format. As such, much of the success or failure of the course will rest with the students. Students are expected to attend all classes, read all assigned material, and participate thoughtfully in our discussions. Students who fail to attend class, who are unprepared, or who do not participate in class will be penalized heavily. Participation involves more than simply restating the material that is assigned, but instead involves making insightful points about those readings and raising thoughtful questions about the material that stimulate discussion.

Graduate school represents a transition point in scholarship in which students are asked to move from consumers of knowledge to producers of knowledge. As a result it is important for students to begin to deconstruct and analyze the material presented in class as a means of moving toward this transition. In order to aid in this transition, students will be expected to act as discussion leader for one week's group of readings. In this role, students will be expected to raise issues for discussion relevant for that week's set of readings. Students must email me the list of discussion topics/questions they intend to cover no later than 5 pm on the Wednesday before each class meeting. Students will sign up for their week as discussion leader during the first class meeting.

Papers

Students will be expected to write **six** short (5 double-spaced pages) papers during the semester. These papers will discuss a given week's readings and should be sent to me via email **no later than 5 pm on the Tuesday preceding that week's class**. No late papers will be accepted. Students will select the readings on which they will write during the first week of class. Students may not write a paper for a week in which they serve as discussion leader.

These papers should not be summaries of the readings but focused critiques and analyses of the readings. I am looking for you to evaluate the key arguments raised by the literature, discuss the ways in which the different readings compare and contrast with each other, and gauge the degree to which these readings move the literature forward by enhancing our understanding of international relations. Papers that simply summarize the readings with no original discussion will be penalized heavily. These papers must be typed.

Exam

There will be one closed-book exam in the course. This exam will be a take-home exam in which students will have a choice of exam questions to answer. Questions will resemble the types of questions those on preliminary exams. Students, upon opening the exam, will have three hours to complete it. The exam will be distributed at the end of the last day of class and will be due **no later than 3:30 PM, December 14th**. Exam responses are expected to be typed.

Grading

Participation – 30%
Analysis papers – 40%
Final exam – 30%

Introduction – August 26

I. Theoretical Approaches to the Study of International Relations

1. Approaches to the Study of IR – September 2

This first week's readings provide us with some thoughts about how we may approach the study of international relations. What is it we are looking for in our studies? What is the best means of finding it? These readings will provide the jumping off point to these questions that recur throughout the semester.

- Hedley Bull (1966). International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach. *World Politics* 18: 361-377.
- J. David Singer (1961). "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations." *World Politics* 14, 1 (October): 77-92.
- Kenneth Waltz (1997). "Evaluating Theories," *The American Political Science Review* 91(4): 913-917.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1985). Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View. *International Studies Quarterly* 29: 121-136. Also read responses by Krasner, Jervis, and Bueno de Mesquita, 137-154.
- Jack Levy (1997). "Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations." *International Security* 22(1): 22-33.

2. Classical Realism – September 9

Classical realism has, in many respects, represented the dominant theoretical approach to the study and practice of international relations. This week we will examine its core tenets, its assumptions, and the causal forces that it postulates for international relations.

• Thucydides. "The Melian Dialogue". *The History of the Peloponnesian War*.
<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/melian.htm>

• Thomas Hobbes (1996). "Chapter XXII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery." <http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan-c.html#CHAPTERXIII>

• Hans J. Morgenthau (1967). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, chapters 1 ("A Realist Theory of International Politics"), 11 ("The Balance of Power"), and 12 ("Different Methods of the Balance of Power"). ***

• Helen Milner (1991). "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory." *Review of International Relations Theory* 17:67-85.

• Alexander Wendt (1992). "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46: 391-425.

3. Neorealism – September 16

Neorealism was motivated by a desire to make the study of international relations more "scientific". Waltz's work represents one of the key works of this approach. Focus on how the theoretical arguments differ from those of the realists.

• **Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, chapters 1-6, 8**

• Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co: chapters 1, 2, & 9. ***

• Paul Schroeder (1994). "Historical Reality vs Neo-Realist Theory," *International Security* 19, 2 (Summer): 108-148.

4. Challenges to Realism: Liberalism and Neoliberal Institutionalism – September 23

The theoretical approaches we will examine this week challenge the assumptions, predictions, and causal mechanisms described by both the realists and the neorealists. As a result, these theoretical schools reach very different conclusions about the nature of international relations and the manner in which actors in the system behave.

• **Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (2001). *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Longman. All**

• Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security* 24:1 (Summer 1999), pp. 42-63

• Andrew Moravcsik (1997). "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." *International Organization* 51, 4 (Autumn): 513-553.

• Joseph Grieco (1988). "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism." *International Organization* 42(3):485-507.

II. Approaches to the Study of International Relations

5. Methodological Approaches to International Relations – September 30

• Andrew Bennett, "Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages" in *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds.

- Arie M. Kacowicz, "Case Study Methods in International Security Studies" in *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds.
- Bear Braumoeller and Anne Sartori, "The Promise and Perils of Statistics in International Relations" in *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds.
- Paul Huth and Todd Allee, "Research Design in Testing Theories of International Conflict" in *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds.
- Duncan Snidal, "Formal Models of International Politics" in *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds.
- Andrew Kydd, "The Art of Shaker Modeling: Game Theory and Security Studies" in *Models, Numbers, and Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, Detlef Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds.

6. Rational Choice Approaches – October 7

Much of contemporary international relations scholarship assume, both implicitly and explicitly, rationality in the behavior of actors in the international system. We will discuss the basis for this assumption and how this assumption is integrated into theoretical explanations of events in the international system.

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James Morrow. 1999. "Sorting through the Wealth of Notions," *International Security* 24: 56-73.
- Stephen M. Walt (1999). "Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies." *International Security* 23: 5-48. Also responses by Bueno de Mesquita and Morrow, Martin, Niou and Ordeshook, Powell, Zagare, and reply by Walt (pp. 56-130).
- Fearon, James, 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War", *International Organizations* 49(3): 379-414.
- Powell, Robert. 2006. War as a Commitment Problem. *International Organization* 60 (Winter): 169-203.

7. Challenges to Rational Choice Theory – October 14

Although there is an emphasis placed upon rational decision-making in the international system, research from both political science and social psychology suggests that the manner in which individuals make decisions differs significantly from that assumed by rational choice theory. We will discuss the merits of the rationality assumption and the consequences of its violation.

- Richard Ned Lebow (1981). *Between Peace and War*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins. Chapter 6. (Read for theories of decision making) ***
- George Quattrone and Amos Tversky. (1988). "Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice." *American Political Science Review* 82:719-736.
- Richard Herrmann, James Voss, Tonya Schooler, and Joseph Ciarrochi. (1997). "Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata." *International Studies Quarterly* 41: 403-434.
- Dan Reiter. (1994). "Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past." *World Politics* 46:490-526.
- Jack Levy (1996). "Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict." *International Political Science Review* 17: 179-195.

8. Domestic Politics and International Relations – October 21

Many explanations of international relations envision states behaving as unitary actors as the fundamental actors in the international system. This set of readings discusses ways in which the internal characteristics of states impacts

their behavior in the international system. We will discuss the trade-offs between the simplicity of the unitary actor assumption and the complexity of domestic politics in developing theoretical models of international relations.

- James Fearon (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes". *American Political Science Review*, 88:577–592.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Randolph Siverson. (1995). "War and the Survival of Political leaders – A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability," *American Political Science Review* 89: (4) 841-855.
- Robert Putnam (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization*. 42:427-460.
- Peter Gourevitch (1978). "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." *International Organization* 32:4 (Autumn) 881-912
- Kenneth Schultz (2005). "The Politics of Risking Peace: Do Hawks or Doves Deliver the Olive Branch?" *International Organization* 59: 1-38.

III. Arrows & Olive Branches: Sources of Cooperation and Conflict in the International System

9. International Cooperation – October 28

Scholars of international relations have very different expectations about the frequency of cooperation in the international system and the forces that promote its occurrence. We will discuss what is meant by cooperation as well as examine the prevalence of cooperation in the international system, highlight its causes.

- **Robert Axelrod. (1984). *Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books. All.**
- Robert Jervis (1978). "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." *World Politics* 30 (January): 167.
- Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane. (1985). "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" *World Politics* 38(1): 226-254.
- Kenneth Oye (1986). "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies." *World Politics* 38: 1-24.
- Joseph M. Grieco, Robert Powell, and Duncan Snidal (1993). "Controversies: The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation." *American Political Science Review* 87: 729-743.

10. Promoting Cooperation: International Institutions & Regimes – November 4

Fundamental to the disagreement about the possibility of cooperation in the international system is a lack of agreement about whether states pursue absolute or relative gains. We will examine the arguments behind each expectation and examine how they impact theorizing about international relations.

- Arthur Stein (1993). "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World" *International Organization* 36(2): 299-324.
- Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin (1995). "The Promise of Institutional Theory" *International Security* 19: 5-49.

James Morrow (2007). "When Do States Follow the Laws of War?" *American Political Science Review* 101 (3): 559-572.

Judith Kelley (2007). "Who Keeps International Commitments and Why? The International Criminal Court

and Bilateral Nonsurrender Agreements.” *American Political Science Review* 101 (3): 573-590.

Barbara Koremenos (2005). Contracting Around International Uncertainty.” *American Political Science Review* 99 (4): 549-566.

11. International Political Economy – November 11

This week's readings dovetail nicely with our previous discussions of cooperation. We will examine the core forces within the international economic system and discuss the diversity of theoretical explanations for the structure of the global economy.

- Robert O. Keohane (1984). *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 3 ("Hegemony in the World Political Economy"). ***
- Charles Kindleberger (1981). "Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides." *International Studies Quarterly* 25: 242-254.
- Stephen Krasner (1976). "State Power and the Structure of International Trade". *World Politics* 28: 317-347.
- David Lake (1992). "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?". *International Studies Quarterly* 37: 459-489.
- Joanne Gowa (1989). "Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?" *World Politics* 41: 307-324.

12. International Conflict – November 18

Conflict has represented a core feature of human interaction across human history. We will spend this week examining some of the key ideas surrounding the causes of warfare in the international system.

• Scott Bennett and Alan Stam, *The Behavioral Origins of War*. All

- Paul R. Hensel (2001). "Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992." *International Studies Quarterly*.
 - Brett Ashley Leeds, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long (2000). "Re-Evaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44: 686-699.
- Bear Braumoeller (2008). "Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 102: 1-17.

***** Thursday, November 25 – No Class, Thanksgiving Break *****

IV. The Placement of Contemporary International Relations Scholarship

13. Alternative Approaches - Constructivism – December 2

Thus far, our studies of international relations have taken a decidedly positivist approach to international relations. This approach, however, is by no means the only approach to the study of international relations. This week we take a very different approach to the study of international relations, constructivism

- Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993). "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework." In Goldstein and Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 3-30. ***
- Ted Hopf (1998). "The Promise of Constructivism in IR Theory." *International Security* 23 (Summer): 171-200.

• Nina Tannenwald, "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use," *International Organization* 53:3 (Summer 1999), pp. 433-468.

• Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change," *International Organization* 55:3 (Summer 2001), pp. 553-88.

• Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 54:4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 887-917.

14. Course Wrap-Up: The State of IR Scholarship – December 9

After our long discussion of IR theory, we will attempt to place what we have studied into a broader context. To what degree does IR theory contribute to our understanding of international relations? Do we know anything more about IR than Thucydides did in his day? Does IR scholarship offer any useful lessons for policymakers?

• Joseph Lepgold (1998). "Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and the Problem of Policy Relevance", *Political Science Quarterly*, 113: 43-62.

Final Exam Due No later than 3:30 PM, Tuesday, December 14th

Policy on Cheating and Plagiarism

The *UNT Code of Student Conduct and Discipline* defines cheating and plagiarism as the use of unauthorized books, notes, or otherwise securing help in a test; copying others' tests, assignments, reports, or term papers; representing the work of another as one's own; collaborating without authority with another student during an examination or in preparing academic work; or otherwise practicing scholastic dishonesty.

Normally, the minimum penalty for cheating or plagiarism is a grade of "F" in the course. In the case of graduate departmental exams, the minimum penalty shall be the failure of all fields of the exam. Determination of cheating or plagiarism shall be made by the instructor in the course, or by the field faculty in the case of departmental exams. Cases of cheating or plagiarism on graduate departmental exams, theses, or dissertations shall automatically be referred to the departmental Graduate Studies Committee. Cases of cheating or plagiarism in ordinary course work may, at the discretion of the instructor, be referred to the Undergraduate Studies Committee in the case of undergraduate students, or the Graduate Studies Committee in the case of graduate students. These committees, acting as agents of the department chair, shall impose further penalties, or recommend further penalties to the Dean of Students, if they determine that the case warrants it. In all cases, the Dean of Students shall be informed in writing of the case. Students may appeal a decision under this policy by following the procedures laid down in the the UNT Code of Student Conduct and Discipline.

Statement of ADA Compliance

The Political Science Department cooperates with the Office of Disability Accommodation to make reasonable accommodations for qualified students with disabilities. Please present your written accommodation request on or before the sixth class day (beginning by the second week of classes.)

Course Evaluations

The Student Evaluation of Teaching Effectiveness (SETE) is a requirement for all organized classes at UNT. This short survey will be made available to you at the end of the semester, providing you a chance to comment on how this class is taught. I am very interested in the feedback I get from students, as I work to continually improve my teaching. I consider the SETE to be an important part of your participation in this class.