

# PADM 6025. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Spring 2018

Dr. Skip Krueger

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Office Hours | Chilton 204D

Mondays 10 a.m. to 2 p.m.

Tuesdays 1 to 5 p.m.

## COURSE DESCRIPTION

This workshop provides an overview of the literature on the effect that various institutions have on the administrative apparatus of government. We will examine in great detail the influence that outside actors have on the organizational structure of the bureaucracy and on the outputs and outcomes of bureaucratic agencies. As such, this course will examine a broad array of works from political science and public administration. Students will be expected to read all the material each week, prepare short, evaluative papers of the readings each week, actively participate in class discussions, pass a thorough exam in the class, and write a research paper that can add new knowledge to the field.

*This course assumes students have some prior knowledge of American politics, equivalent to the two semesters of American Government required of all undergraduates in Texas universities. Students also are expected to have a basic understanding of the dominant approaches to the study of politics, especially rational choice and neo-institutionalism. If you are unfamiliar with these topics, you should read as much as you can find on them in the first two weeks of the semester.*

## REQUIRED TEXTS

Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (ISBN: 0-521-66960-X)

Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, 2nd Ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. (ISBN: 0-300-10587-8)

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Second printing (with new preface and appendix). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (ISBN-10: 0674537513)

Rosen, Bernard. 1998. *Holding Government Bureaucracies Accountable*, 3rd Ed. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. (ISBN: 0-275-95373-4)

**I also recommend a textbook on American government. Any text will do. I suggest you find one at a used book store. *Cheap and old will be fine for our purposes.***

## COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Your grade in this course will be comprised of three elements: short weekly papers, a comprehensive exam, and a research paper. Your grade will consist of the following:

|                |     |
|----------------|-----|
| Weekly papers  | 30% |
| Research Paper | 30% |
| Final Exam     | 40% |

**Weekly Papers.** You are responsible for writing a weekly paper of at least three single-spaced pages, but no more than five pages. Each weekly paper should include a summary of the readings, as well as a thorough analysis of the readings. For quantitative studies, the summary **must** identify the dependent variable and theoretically relevant independent variables, as well as provide a synopsis of the theory. Unexcused absences will result in a **zero being assigned for the paper due that week**. Excused absences will be worked out on a case-by-case basis, but students should make **strenuous** efforts to contact me as quickly as possible to discuss the situation.

*A note about writing: clear, concise, well-written papers are mandatory. I will grade especially harshly any poorly written paper. Proper citation style is mandatory.*

**Class Discussion.** This course will take the form of a workshop, which requires that you participate in a round-table discussion under the professor's guidance. With the exception of some introductory material presented in the first week, the professor will **not** be lecturing on the material. It is therefore mandatory that you come to class, and that **you come well prepared to discuss in detail** the material in the readings. Each week, one or two students will be assigned responsibility for taking the lead in generating discussion on the material, but *it will be up to each student to add to all discussions*.

**Research Paper.** You are expected to write a research paper, due the final day of class, in which they propose a quantitative study of some aspect of the material discussed in the course. The paper should take the form of a research design, which must include an introduction, literature review, theory and hypothesis sections, and a section on the appropriate methodology, sources of data (must be existing – no proposals to gather new data allowed for this project) and anticipated results from the study. You are **not** required to actually conduct the quantitative analysis. But in all other respects, the paper is expected to be of publishable quality. On the last class day, you are expected to make a brief presentation of their proposed theory.

**Final Exam.** You will be required to take an in-class, closed-book, all-essay comprehensive exam in class. The exam will require that you know all the relevant material in the course, that you can summarize each of the assigned readings, and that you can link the readings in theoretically relevant ways based on historical development and similarities/dissimilarities in the theories presented and tested in the readings.

## **POLICY ON CHEATING AND PLAGIARISM**

Notice of this policy shall be given in all public administration classes each semester, and written copies shall be available in the public administration office.

### Definitions

The UNT Code of Student Conduct and Discipline defines cheating and plagiarism “as the use of unauthorized books, notes, or otherwise securing help in a test; copying other’s tests, assignments, reports, or term papers; representing the work of another as one’s own; collaborating without authority with another student during an examination or in preparing academic work; or otherwise practicing scholastic dishonesty.”

### Penalties

Normally, the minimum penalty for cheating or plagiarism is a grade of “F” in the course. In the case of graduate departmental exams, the minimum penalty shall be failure of all fields of the exam. Determination of cheating or plagiarism shall be made by the instructor in the course, or by the departmental faculty in the case of departmental exams.

Cases of cheating or plagiarism on graduate departmental exams, papers, theses, or dissertations shall automatically be referred to the departmental Curriculum and Degree Programs Committee. Cases of cheating or plagiarism in ordinary course work may, at the discretion of the instructor, be referred to the Curriculum and Degree Programs Committee in the case of either graduate or undergraduate students. This committee, acting as an agent of the Department, shall impose further penalties, or recommend further penalties to the Dean of Students, if they determine that the case warrants it. In all cases, the Dean of Students shall be informed in writing of the case.

### Appeals

Students may appeal and decision under this policy by following the procedure laid down in the UNT Code of Student Conduct and Discipline.

## **POLICY ON DISABILITY ACCOMMODATION**

The Department of Public Administration, in cooperation with the Office of Disability Accommodation, complies with the Americans with Disabilities Act in making reasonable accommodations for qualified students with disabilities. Please present your written accommodation request during regular office hours before the 12<sup>th</sup> class day of regular semesters (4<sup>th</sup> class day of summer sessions).

## **POLICY ON LAPTOPS AND CELL PHONES IN THE CLASSROOM**

The classroom setting at an institution of higher learning is intended to serve as a venue that permits the transfer of knowledge and facilitates the sharing of ideas. As such, it is imperative that any distractions from these stated objectives be avoided and kept to a minimum. Potential disruptions include modern electronic devices such as laptop computers and cell phones.

Students are allowed to take notes on personal laptop computers to enhance the learning process, but they should not activate their internet browsers during class or use computers for non-academic purposes (as this diverts attention from the lecture/discussion for both the student using it and others nearby). Students should also avoid using cell phones to search the Internet or text while class is in session.

Exceptions to this policy will be at the discretion of the faculty only and may occur if searching the Internet is necessary to find additional information or facts related to the subject being covered on that particular day.

## **POLICY ON STUDENT BEHAVIOR IN THE CLASSROOM**

Student behavior that interferes with an instructor’s ability to conduct a class or other students' opportunity to learn is unacceptable and disruptive and will not be tolerated in any instructional forum at UNT. Students engaging in unacceptable behavior will be directed to leave the classroom and the instructor may refer the student to the Center for Student Rights and Responsibilities to consider whether the student’s conduct violated the Code of Student Conduct. The university’s expectations for student conduct apply to all instructional forums, including university and electronic classroom, labs, discussion groups, field trips, etc. The Code of Student Conduct can be found at [www.unt.edu/csrr](http://www.unt.edu/csrr).

## COURSE OUTLINE

- 1 Jan. 22 **Introduction**

Public and private goods  
Aggregation of preferences
- 2 Jan. 29 **Form of Government, Federalism, Institutionalism**

Shafritz, Jay M., E.W. Russell, Christopher Borick. 2010. *Introducing Public Administration*. 7th Edition. Boston: Longman. Chapters 3, 4.  
Bickers, Kenneth N. and John T. Williams. 2001. *Public Policy Analysis: A Political Economy Approach*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. Chapter 3, 8.  
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. Chapters 1, 2, 13.  
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions and a transaction-cost theory of exchange. In *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 3 Feb. 5 **The Lack of Logic for Collective Action**

Olson, Mancur. 1971. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Second printing (with new preface and appendix). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 4 Feb. 12 **The Washington Establishment**

Rosen, Bernard. 1998. *Holding the Government Bureaucracy Accountable*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- 5 Feb. 19 **Role of Congress**

Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1994. Positive Theory of Congressional Institutions. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 19(2): 149-179.  
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. 1997. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions*. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Chapter 12)  
Moe, Terry M. 1987. An Assessment of the Positive Theory of "Congressional Dominance." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 14(4): 475-520.
- 6 Feb. 26 **Motivations of Congress**

Mayhew, David R. 2004. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- 7 March 5 **Fire Alarms and Police Patrols**

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms. *American Journal of Political Science* 28(1): 165-179.  
Banks, Jeffrey S. 1989. Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing. *American Journal of Political Science* 33(3):670-99.  
  
Banks, Jeffrey S. and Barry R. Weingast. 1992. The Political Control of Bureaucracies under Asymmetric Information. *American Journal of Political Science* 36(2): 509-24.  
  
Huber, John D., Charles R. Shipan, and Madelaine Pfahler. 2001. Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy. *American Journal of Political Science*. 45: 330-345.

8 March 12 \*\*\*\* SPRING BREAK \*\*\*\*

9 March 19 Delegation of Policy Control

Espstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

10 March 26 Rulemaking I

Kerwin, Cornelius. 2003. *Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy*. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. (select chapters provided by instructor)

McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 3(2):243-77.

Potoski, Matthew, and Neal D. Woods. 2001. Designing State Clean Air Agencies: Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic Autonomy. *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 11(2): 203-222

Carpenter, Daniel P. 2002. Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval. *American Journal of Political Science* 45: 799-812.

Cooper, Joseph, and William F. West. 1988. Presidential Power and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules. *Journal of Politics* 50(4): 864-895.

Balla, Steven J. 1998. Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy. *American Political Science Review*. 92: 663-673.

11 April 2 The Empirical Study of Rulemaking II

Yackee, Susan Webb. 2006. Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16(1): 103-124.

Nixon, David C., Robert M. Howard, and Jeff R. DeWitt. 2002. With Friends Like These: Rule-Making Comment Submissions to the Securities and Exchange Commission. *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 12(1): 59-76.

Yackee, Jason Webb, and Susan Webb Yackee. 2006. A Bias toward Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy. *Journal of Politics* 68(1): 128-139.

Coglianesi, Cary. 2006. Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future. *Duke Law Journal* 55(5): 943-968.

13 April 9 Presidential Control of the Bureaucracy

Howell, William G. and David E. Lewis. 2002. "Agencies by Presidential Design." *Journal of Politics*. 64: 1095-1114.

Kraus, George A. 1994. Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making: Political and Bureaucratic Influences. *American Journal of Political Science* 38(1): 124-144.

Ingraham, Patricia W. Building Bridges or Burning Them? The President, the Appointees, and the Bureaucracy. *Public Administration Review* 47(5): 425-435.

Pfiffner, James P. Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century. *Public Administration Review* 47(1): 57-65.

Coate, Malcolm B. 2002. A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers. *Economics and Politics* 14(1): 1-18.

Eisner, Marc Allen and Kenneth J. Meier. 1990. Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining the Reagan Revolution in Antitrust. *American Journal of Political Science* 34(1): 269-287.

14 April 16

### "Other Principals" and the Bureaucracy

Waterman, Richard W., Amelia Rouse and Robert Wright. 1998. The Venues of Influence: A New Theory of Political Control of the Bureaucracy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 8(1): 13-38.

Waterman, Richard W. and Amelia Rouse. 1999. The Determinants of the Perceptions of Political Control of the Bureaucracy and the Venues of Influence. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 9: 527-570.

Whitford, Andrew B. 2005. The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principals. *Journal of Politics* 67(1): 29-49.

Woods, Neal D. 2009. Promoting Participation? An Examination of Rulemaking Notification and Access Procedures. *Public Administration Review* 69(3): 518-530.

15 April 23

### Latest Research

Woods, Neal D. 2015. Regulatory Democracy Reconsidered: The Policy Impact of Public Participation Requirements. *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 25(2): 571-596.

Selin, Jennifer L. 2015. What Makes an Agency Independent? *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4): 971-987.

Carpenter, Daniel, and George A. Krause. 2015. Transactional Authority and Bureaucratic Politics. *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 25(1): 5-25.

Schillemans, Thomas, and Madalina Busuioc. 2015. Predicting Public Sector Accountability: From Agency Drift to Forum Drift. *Journal of Public Administration Research & Theory* 25(1): 191-215.

Haeder, Simon F., and Susan Webb Yackee. 2015. Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. President's Office of Management and Budget. *American Political Science Review* 109(3): 507-522.

16 April 30

### Final Exam

17 May 7

### Turn in Papers and Paper Presentations